

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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6 March 1975
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 March 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. D.V.E. Berasetegui (Argentina)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

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| <u>Argentina:</u> | Mr. D.V.E. BERASATEGUI Mr. D.J.R. SANCHIS MUNÓZ |
| <u>Brazil:</u> | Mr. G. ALVARES MACIEL Mr. L.H. PEREIRA DA FONSECA |
| <u>Bulgaria:</u> | Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. I. PETROV |
| <u>Burma:</u> | U THAUNG LWIN U TIN MAUNG AYE |
| <u>Canada:</u> | Mr. W.H. BARTON Mr. A.D. ROWE Mr. D.R. MACPHEE |
| <u>Czechoslovakia:</u> | Mr. V. SOJÁK Mr. J. STRUČKA Mr. M. ŠTEMBERA |
| <u>Egypt:</u> | Mr. M.A. NASR Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI |
| <u>Ethiopia:</u> | Mr. G. DEMISSIE |
| <u>German Democratic Republic:</u> | Mr. E. MOLDT Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H.-J. MICHEEL Mr. K.-D. ERNST Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI |
| <u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u> | Mr. G.J. SCHLAICH Mr. K. HANNESSCHLÄGER |
| <u>Hungary:</u> | Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. I. KÖRMENDY |

India:

Mr. B.C. MISHRA
Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI

Iran:

Mr. M. FARTASH
Mr. M. DABIRI
Miss C. TAHMASSEB
Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. G. VALDEVIT
Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI
Mr. A. YATABE
Mr. T. AMARI
Mr. M. SASAKI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Mr. M. MARÍN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
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Morocco:

Mr. S. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. C.A. van der KLAUW
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Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK
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Pakistan:

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Mr. C. ALZAMORA
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Mr. S. TOPA
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Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
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 Mr. G. TINCA
 Mr. C. IVASCU
 Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
 Mr. G. HAMILTON
 Mr. U. REINIUS
 Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
 Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
 Mr. Y. NAZARKIN
 Mr. N. PESTEREV
 Mr. Y. KLUKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. M. ALLEN
 Mr. J. TAYLOR
 Mr. A. WHITE

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN
 Mr. R. DREXLER
 Mr. D. BLACK
 Mr. P. STOKES
 Mr. C. WILMOT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIĆ
 Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. Y. YOKO
 Mr. LUKABU-K'HABOUJI

Acting Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the Meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 656th plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Vicente E. Berasategui, representative of Argentina.

Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Canada, Iran and Romania, and by the Chairman.

The delegation of the United States of America presented a document entitled "Message from the President of the United States of America" (CCD/447).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 11 March 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

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The CHAIRMAN (Argentina): Before calling on the first speaker on my list, may I take advantage of my position as Chairman to extend, on behalf of the Argentine delegation, a most cordial welcome to the representatives of the five States participating in the work of the Committee during this period of meetings? They are Ambassador Fartash of Iran, Ambassador Alzamora of Peru whose presence is of particular significance to my delegation because he is the representative of a country which has long been linked to Argentina by historic and fraternal ties and I am well acquainted with his personal and professional qualities also Mr. Moldt, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic; Ambassador Schlaich of the Federal Republic of Germany, whose mastery of Spanish will no doubt greatly assist the Spanish-speaking delegations on the Committee; and Ambassador Kasasa of Zaïre.

I should also like to extend a cordial welcome to the new representatives of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

My delegation pledges its co-operation to all those I have named in the forthcoming work of the Committee.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): The nations of this earth should not be allowed to forget that this decade, the decade of events of decisive importance to the future of mankind, is pronounced to be the Disarmament Decade as well as the Second Development Decade. The Swedish delegation to the Committee has come to this spring session impressed and encouraged by the breadth and the weight of the debate on disarmament matters at the 29th session of the United Nations General Assembly, and determined to do its utmost to contribute to having this year 1975, at the mid-term of the 70s, marked by some amount of real progress in disarmament.

After all, we live on an earth where human beings are plagued by the mental anguish and the staggering economic burdens of the armaments race. We live at a time when millions, even hundreds of millions, are impoverished and sent to starvation through the incapacity of the present world order to provide properly for the inhabitants of our one and only earth.

Since the end of the 29th session of the General Assembly I have travelled to meetings inside Sweden and internationally, and talked with people about the crushing global problems of our time. Although well acquainted with the impressive amount of constructive common sense among citizens everywhere round the world, I have been

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struck by the intensity of feeling for the urgency of genuine and tangible disarmament that I met wherever I went. The immense uselessness of the armaments costs are put against the urgent request to meet the basic human needs of its people which confronts every national government today. And let us agree that, for every year that passes, effective disarmament measures become for every conceivable reason even more urgent. People all over this world of ours request a stop to the armament race and a sensible and human use of increasingly scarce resources.

The spirit of detente which continues to characterize many aspects of international relations is a welcome achievement. The lack of progress in curbing the dreadful arms race, on the other hand, understandably gives rise to serious reactions among all peoples. Accordingly the Swedish delegation belongs to those who persistently urge the two most powerful nations on earth, the United States and the Soviet Union, to take the necessary steps towards real disarmament, thereby leading the way for others to follow.

The Vladivostok summit meeting last November has undoubtedly contributed to creating a strategic parity which hopefully reduces the likelihood of nuclear war. It would be wrong to state, however, that the agreements reached represent a contribution to disarmament. On the contrary, they permit further increases in the already formidable strategic missile forces, and almost unlimited possibilities for qualitative developments aimed at greater destructive capability. In fact, they seem to render meaningful disarmament measures improbable for a considerable time to come. We appreciated, however, the statement made at the opening session by the representative of the United States, Mr. Martin, indicating that bilateral negotiations on reducing the force ceiling might start in a not too distant future.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, which convenes here in Geneva on 5 May, will provide an opportunity to assess the effects of this state of affairs on the non-proliferation regime. We feel that, if the Review Conference is to have a chance to be successful, the nuclear-weapon States must give evidence that they take seriously their obligations under article VI of the Treaty relating to disarmament. The manifold problems connected with non-proliferation of nuclear weapons are now being actively considered in many capitals in preparation for the Review Conference. As a forum with a global mandate in the field of nuclear disarmament, the CCD will of course have to play an important role in the follow-up of that Conference.

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Regrettably, no progress has been achieved in the efforts to obtain a comprehensive test ban. A wealth of material covering all possible aspects of this question has been produced over the years in the CCD. The Swedish delegation has again and again provided concrete ideas in order to contribute to a positive development. I do not intend to prolong my statement by repeating them here and now. What has been lacking so far is a political will to reach agreement on a CTB among those nuclear Powers who have, after all, signed and ratified first the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the Partial Test Ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and then the NPT (ENDC/192/Rev.1). After all, both these Treaties contain commitments to proceed towards a complete test ban. An agreement to this end would represent the indispensable step towards implementing article VI of the NPT. The CCD now has a renewed mandate to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a CTB agreement. The CCD has indeed a serious responsibility to complete soon this item of our agenda.

The Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE) problem is a related one which in the past year has for obvious reasons attracted renewed attention. The CCD was given the task by the General Assembly at its last session to consider the arms-control implications of this problem. The Swedish delegation is prepared to assist in any possible way in this consideration. The International Atomic Energy Agency will report on its studies to the General Assembly, and the CCD has been asked to take into account the views of the Agency. It is also possible that the NPT Review Conference will transmit its views on the matter to the General Assembly. It would seem appropriate that this question be given a detailed consideration at the summer session of the CCD. It is thus our hope that the General Assembly at its 30th session this autumn, through the process enforced by its resolution 3261 D, will have the opportunity to review the entire PNE question. In our view this should hopefully form a basis for a much-needed international regulation of PNE.

The Swedish delegation raised a matter during the last session of the CCD and again in the General Assembly which in our view must be dealt with urgently by the international community. I am referring to the fact that the nuclear proliferation problems will grow more complex and sinister with the rapid expansion of civil nuclear-power programmes, particularly the equally rapid increase in the production of plutonium. Through this

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development nuclear explosive potentials will be created in many countries. In this context we listened with particular interest to the statement by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, voicing similar concern.

It is clear that what has been done so far to regulate nuclear explosive technology internationally is not enough. The main instrument in this regard, the NPT, has only partly fulfilled its aim. Furthermore, the IAEA safeguards systems are designed only to detect, but not to prevent physically, diversions of fissile material to nuclear-explosive uses. Also, international rules for the physical protection of nuclear facilities and of nuclear material during storage and transport are lacking. Projections of the rate of increase in the size of the problems involved are terrifying.

The Swedish delegation put forward some views on possible solutions to these problems at the General Assembly last year, and we intend to take up these matters again at the NPT Review Conference. The purpose of my mentioning them here is to continue the discussion on the possible role of the CCD in this area. The Swedish delegation looks forward to hearing the views of other delegations on the subject.

The General Assembly at its last session also devoted much attention to matters relating to nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Swedish delegation supported the proposal for a comprehensive study, under the auspices of the CCD, of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. We believe that such a study would be useful in clarifying many of the complex issues involved. It is clear that this item must be given a high priority if we are going to meet the request of the General Assembly expressed in resolution 3261 F. An expert group should be set up as soon as possible for this purpose. We understand that the co-chairmen have considered the matter and will consult with members of the Committee shortly.

Another new and important item on our agenda at this session is of course the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes. The Swedish delegation took an active part in the consideration by the General Assembly of this question. The General Assembly managed to make clear that the CCD should concern itself only with environmental modifications for military and other hostile purposes. Still, several questions of how to delimit civilian aspects of these problems, which should be dealt with, for example, by the United Nations Environment Programme, will continue to demand attention. An effective co-ordination

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between the CCD and UNEP is important in this connexion. Moreover, UNEP would have to be asked to provide substantive inputs to the CCD in its dealing with the task entrusted to it. It must also be clear that existing international efforts to regulate activities in this area must not be negatively influenced by the work on which the CCD is now embarking.

It seems to us that this highly complex problem will require detailed expert consideration by the CCD before any substantive results can be achieved. The subject of an expert study would be the Soviet draft convention already before us and other material which might be put forward. The Swedish delegation intends to revert to this matter at a later stage of our deliberations.

It is indeed gratifying to note that two of the Depositaries of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons have now ratified the Convention. I understand there is reason to believe that the third Depositary Power, the United Kingdom, which put forward the initial proposal for a convention in September 1969, will soon follow suit, so that the Convention will enter into force.

The Swedish Government has until recently withheld its signature from this Convention. We found, and still find, it unsatisfactory that even the investigation of a complaint against a State for an alleged breach of the Convention can be vetoed in the Security Council of the United Nations. At the same time we find that the Convention as such will serve a useful purpose, as it does contain measures of disarmament. Sweden therefore signed the Convention on 27 February 1975.

One cannot, however, watch without distress the present stalemate in the negotiations for a similar prohibition of chemical means of warfare. It is no exaggeration to state that no substantial progress towards such a treaty has been achieved in this forum despite strenuous efforts by many delegations over the years. We have of course noted that contacts have been established between the Soviet Union and the United States concerning a joint initiative in this Committee for an international agreement prohibiting the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare.

Against the background of statements made two days ago by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, concerning further steps to be taken in this matter, we should be interested to learn from the representatives of the two great Powers at what time the "active search for mutually acceptable solutions of these questions" which was agreed on

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at Vladivostok last autumn will result in proposals to the CCD for a convention. We hope that such a proposal will be acceptable to all nations concerned. We attach particular importance to the verification clauses, which should not be copied from those of the B-weapons Convention. In our view the highly interesting Japanese draft convention introduced on 30 April 1974 (CCD/420) provides a valuable basis for negotiation in this respect.

In concluding, let me once again state that the disarmament negotiations find themselves in the year of the mid-term review of the achievement of the 1970s in a state of critical appraisal by concerned citizens all round the world. We, the authorized delegates of States members of the CCD, and also the Governments which have sent us here, will be the subjects of such critical appraisals. It is of the utmost importance that we respond positively and constructively. In this spirit the Swedish delegation to the CCD has arrived here in the hope that this session will contribute something of value and thereby promote the cause of real and genuine disarmament.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): As this is the first time the Canadian delegation has intervened in the regular discussions at the current session of the CCD, may I begin by warmly welcoming the new delegation members to our Committee? We are pleased to have with us the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iran, Peru and Zaïre, as well as the new members of the other delegations. Their contributions to our discussions will be valued by all of us.

We are all aware that demanding new issues have been referred to this Committee by the United Nations General Assembly. We must, of course, maintain the momentum of debate and hopefully of negotiations in the vitally important areas of a comprehensive test ban and chemical warfare which remain constant priorities in our deliberations. We should respond effectively to these challenges, but equally we must ensure that we justify the confidence in this Committee demonstrated by the General Assembly when, at the 29th session, it asked us to address ourselves to the issues of nuclear-free-zones, environmental warfare and the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. To address ourselves adequately to all of these subjects and to report at least a degree of progress on a number of them to the 30th session of the General Assembly means, in the view of my delegation, that an orderly approach to the work of this Committee is imperative.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

We have six to eight weeks remaining at the current session, with perhaps a similar period of time during the second CCD session. If we continue our traditional unhurried and unstructured pattern of work, this could mean a total of only thirty to forty meetings to come to grips with all of the issues -- traditional and new -- which the Assembly has referred to us. Let me refer to each one of these issues briefly.

Our instructions from the Assembly with respect to the study of nuclear-weapon-free zones were that this work should be carried out by a qualified group of governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD. This raises a number of questions: (a) How large should the group be to ensure that it will take into consideration the views of all Governments interested in the study? (b) What sort of meeting programme do we envisage? (c) What guidance to the group should be considered regarding the general terms of reference set out in the resolution? (d) What is the role of the CCD in respect of the experts' final report -- do we simply transmit it to the United Nations, or do we have a responsibility to make comments on it?

My delegation's view is that we must make a conscious effort to fulfil our mandate on this subject. One approach would be to encourage the Secretariat in the early preparation of a factual "history" of nuclear-weapon-free zones proposals. The experts would then have a common base for their discussions. From this base, and their own individual and collective research, they might draw forth whatever observations they would agree upon. As we are well aware, approaches to NWFZ have varied and likely will continue to vary as relationships between States change; therefore it may prove difficult for experts to determine firm "criteria" or even "guidelines" for present and future proposals for NWFZ. Be that as it may, in the view of my delegation it should be possible to prepare a useful study of NWFZ in a reasonably short period of time given the goodwill and openmindedness of experts appointed. What is important, in our view, is that we begin now to establish the working group and have it function as soon as possible in order that the report will be available to the thirtieth Session of the General Assembly.

As the debate in the First Committee last fall clearly indicated, there was common agreement that the subject of environmental warfare required study. We have been requested to proceed as soon as possible to achieve agreement on the text of an appropriate international convention to adopt effective measures to prohibit action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes which are incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health. Here we are moving into unexplored territory, the dimensions of which are uncertain and indeed could be limitless.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

We should focus in the first instance on the best way to approach the problem and how to define it in sufficiently precise terms. In this way we may be able to work subsequently to much greater effect in carrying out the terms of the Assembly's mandate. One way to begin would be for an inter-sessional meeting of governmental experts. They might be requested to meet as soon as convenient to examine the dimensions of the problem and to identify specific areas in which prohibitions or restrictions might be considered. Information then is what we first may need; then agreement on what constitutes a real danger to mankind in the terms of the United Nations resolution; and finally how those dangers can be contained in the terms of a universally-acceptable international agreement.

This Committee has also been asked by the United Nations General Assembly to study the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, with our deliberations to form part of our Report to the United Nations General Assembly on our efforts to achieve a CTB. My delegation believes that discussion of this question could best take place during the second session of the CCD, after we have had the benefit of discussion of Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the Review Conference, by which time the United States and the USSR might be in a position to inform us of their progress in discussing the role of PNEs under their proposed partial underground test ban.

We continue to attach great importance to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban (CTB). I am sure all delegations will be interested in learning about further bilateral discussions between the United States and USSR in regard to the nuclear testing issue. It continues to be our hope that they will bear in mind the interests of other countries in participating in an exchange of scientific data, especially seismological and geophysical information, on nuclear test explosions. In this regard, seismological experts of Canada, Japan and Sweden will be meeting in Canada next month to discuss further the state of seismological techniques for the detection and identification of man-made disturbances of the earth's structure. While we doubt the need for a meeting with experts during the summer session of the CCD for a formal exchange of views on seismological verification, we hope delegations will take the opportunity to circulate papers on any significant developments in this field.

In July of last year, with the encouragement of the proposal made by Japan, a very useful informal exchange of views among experts took place on the subject of chemical weapons. My delegation noted that there appeared to be a general, if not yet completely

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unanimous, acceptance of the idea of a CW treaty which, at least to begin with, might involve agreement to partial measures. On 16 July we spoke at length on this aspect in terms of a "phased comprehensive agreement", and we would welcome comments from delegations on this matter.

Canada welcomed the news that the United States recently had ratified the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the BW Treaty. We remain confident that, given this positive step, it will now be possible for those countries which command such a prominent position in the field of armaments to move further towards a common approach, and hopefully a definite solution to the vexing question of CW.

Clearly we have our work cut out for us this year. Having in mind all the considerations to which I have alluded, I suggest that, without limiting the traditional privilege of delegations to talk about what they want when they want, and without any suggestion that we should move towards the constrictions of a formal agenda, we should attempt as a first order of business to deal with the procedural issues I have mentioned today. If we can get these matters sorted out, it should greatly facilitate our work between now and next September; and my delegation, for one, would be prepared to meet more frequently than twice a week for this purpose.

Mr. FARTASH (Iran): On behalf of my delegation I should like to thank the previous speakers for the many kind welcoming words we have heard this morning. We will try hard to live up to the hopes which have been expressed regarding our participation. Today I should like to outline the policy of Iran towards disarmament, as well as its position on certain specific items before our Committee.

Iran's commitment to disarmament is amply supported by the record. My Government has signed and ratified every international arms-control accord pertinent to this area of endeavour. We are a party to the partial Test Ban Treaty as well as to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Through these two treaties Iran has renounced the nuclear-weapon option. At the present time Iran is deeply concerned, as are many other countries, with the search for future sources of energy, and for this purpose has sought to develop an expanded programme of peaceful nuclear energy. We in this room are especially aware that any such benign and beneficial plans entail ominous military implications. With this in mind my country has concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency the safeguards agreement required by article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This agreement came into force in May 1974, and Iran's emergent peaceful nuclear projects will thus be subject to international control and inspection.

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Complementing its pledge undertaken in the NPT never to accept or to manufacture nuclear weapons, or other explosive devices, my country has also ratified the Treaty excluding nuclear weapons from the seabed, ocean floor or subsoil thereof. This Treaty represents another important step to check the arms race through the preservation of definable areas free of nuclear weapons. We hope that it will soon be possible to attain the larger goal specified in the body of the Treaty, to take further measures towards preventing the arms race in this environment.

Iran has always favoured measures designed to reduce the actual level of armaments. Therefore we welcomed the Convention to prohibit bacteriological and toxin weapons and did not hesitate to adhere to it. We note with satisfaction that the United States and the Soviet Union have now ratified this Convention, and we trust that it will soon enter into force.

In addition to adhering to those measures which have already been realized in treaty form, my country has taken an active part in furthering other proposals at the United Nations. We have taken a strong interest in the idea of a World Disarmament Conference, a proposal which has been before the General Assembly for several years. This year the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference, under the chairmanship of our Ambassador to the United Nations, concluded its work by submitting a highly useful report. Now it will be necessary to consider the next step. There are at least two essential ingredients in planning this meeting. One is the all-important factor of universal participation, the other is the need for careful preparation. We shall have to proceed slowly and cautiously. It is evident from the report that there are differing attitudes towards such a conference, and it would clearly be counter-productive to attempt to press forward too quickly.

Although the World Disarmament Conference is not on the agenda of the CCD, it is impossible to overlook its relevance to our Committee's work. The functions of the two conferences are not identical, yet there would be a distinct similarity in intention. If carefully prepared and truly universal in composition, the World Disarmament Conference could become a turning point in the history of disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

As a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which was established after the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, my country is anxious to see progress made on this issue in line with the Committee's mandate. We have also expressed our interest in measures to curtail the use of napalm and other incendiary weapons; they will be considered again in a sequel to the Lucerne Conference on this subject sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

The various advances made to temper the arms race, or at least limit its geographical reach, have also helped to create an atmosphere more receptive to further disarmament. However, not a single nuclear weapon has been destroyed. The world still lives under the threat of nuclear holocaust despite the temporary remission offered us by an imperfect detente. One approach which has persisted over the years as a possible answer to the need for States to ward off the danger of nuclear war has been that of denuclearized zones. With world attention increasingly riveted on regional rivalries, and the fears aroused that nuclear weapons might penetrate into these local conflicts, such zones have again become highly relevant.

Moreover, an even more urgent situation has been created now by the diffusion of nuclear technology. I have already had occasion to point to the dangerous potential for increasing nuclear-weapons capabilities offered by the spread of peaceful nuclear energy. Deeply concerned about this new dimension to the nuclear problem, our leader the Shahanshah renewed at the 29th General Assembly his proposal made several years earlier for a denuclearized zone in the Middle Eastern region. Expressing his motives in a message to the Assembly, he noted that "Atomic Science represents man's best hopes for survival and his worst fears of doom".

May I take this opportunity to say that my country was deeply gratified by the response to our proposal co-sponsored by the Government of Egypt, and in particular by the overwhelming vote in favour of the resolution urging the establishment of a Middle Eastern nuclear-weapon-free zone? Our objective is to prohibit the manufacture, acquisition, testing, stockpiling and transport of nuclear arms in the region, with an effective control system to assure compliance. An essential part of this arrangement would be a pledge by the nuclear Powers to respect the zone and never to use or threaten

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to use nuclear weapons against any States parties to the agreement. Such pledges by the nuclear Powers would also buttress the Non-Proliferation Treaty by providing the needed assurances to non-nuclear States that they would not be the victims of nuclear attack.

A nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would supplement the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in many ways. It would spare the world the dire possibility of a local nuclear war; it would avert the dangerous instability which the acquisition of atomic weapons by one country of the region would generate; and the countries of the zone would avoid the devouring demands made on their economies as a result of a nuclear arms race.

In presenting the outlines of our proposal at the United Nations, the leader of our delegation stressed the flexibility of our position as regards the method of attaining our goal. The States involved will have to deal with the specific political, strategic and technical problems of the area. In the Middle East these factors are highly complex and controversial, and we well realize that many difficulties will slow our progress. We take heart, however, in the successful accomplishment of the Latin American countries in establishing a nuclear-free zone on their continent; and we hope that our work will culminate in a similar display of admirable statesmanship.

We shall of course watch and support efforts to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. We shall follow with equal interest the development of the proposals for nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, as well as in other regions of the world. In this Committee we shall be considering the General Assembly resolution introduced by Finland calling for a study by governmental experts of the whole problem of nuclear-weapon-free zones under the auspices of the CCD.

Having spoken of measures which can help to attain the aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, I should like to speak briefly about the Treaty itself, a subject which will receive fuller treatment at the Review Conference in May. As my country welcomes the development of the peaceful atom, we should like to see the broadest possible realization of the promises contained in Article IV of the Treaty to further the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Similarly we should like to see progress made on the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. This Committee has been requested by the General Assembly to report on the arms-control implication of such explosions in the context of a comprehensive test ban. In view of the fact

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

that the "Threshold" Test Ban agreement does not prohibit peaceful explosions, and that negotiations have been recently held in Moscow on this subject, we hope that this Committee will be informed of the results of these negotiations. Both the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban provide for an international agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions. It is important for our efforts towards a comprehensive test ban that work on this subject be actively pursued and completed.

There is no doubt, however, that the most effective and immediate way to reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be for the nuclear Powers to fulfil their obligations undertaken under Article VI. In this context we note the understanding reached between the United States and the Soviet Union in Vladivostok last November. The SALT negotiations have now resumed, and the technical details of the agreement will presumably be formulated into a treaty. I need not stress the anxiety generally felt over the high ceilings permitted by this new agreement. Ample comment has already been made on this issue. Suffice it to cite only one editorial from the New York Times concerning the Vladivostok accords:

"Unless discussion is opened soon on constraints for the dangerous nuclear arms buildups that the military on both sides have planned for the next six to eight years, the possibility of effective arms control will be hopelessly compromised."

We hope that the apparently wide latitude still available to the nuclear Powers for continuing their nuclear-weapons programmes will rapidly be narrowed by further agreements. We understand that there is now a commitment to continue negotiations immediately upon conclusion of this agreement with a view to reducing the established ceilings. Without wishing to underestimate the hard work needed to succeed in this quest, we would urge both major nuclear Powers to redouble their efforts, and especially to apply their combined political wills, towards this goal so that a world which is still grappling with the problems of hunger, pollution and economic development may at last escape from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

I come now to the immediate work before this Committee. There are on our agenda two very important steps which could reduce the dangers of war. They are the main subjects of our deliberations here; a comprehensive test ban treaty, and a ban on the production, development and use of chemical weapons. We have followed the debates on these items with great interest and will do our utmost to help achieve progress. My country has in the past expressed its disappointment over the problems related to the verification issue on both these items. We look forward to some signs of flexibility on the part of the major nuclear-weapon Powers so that we may soon witness satisfactory progress on both items.

The history of the test ban negotiations is familiar to us all. The use of the word "history" is appropriate, as this subject has been under active discussion for more than fifteen years, during which time the number of test explosions has only increased. The effect of a comprehensive test ban in arresting the arms race and in curtailing the development of new nuclear weapons has been fully documented. The fact that radioactive substances released from underground testing are less detrimental to health than those released in the atmosphere does not make such testing any more desirable! The inability of the main nuclear-weapon Powers to resolve their differences over inspection remains the stumbling-block. My delegation has stated many times that the evident advances in seismological techniques as well as the auxiliary possibilities of satellite observation have weakened the arguments for on-site inspection. We have been especially impressed by the contributions of Sweden, Canada and Japan in proposing measures to enhance detection and identification capabilities through exchanges of seismological data.

The Threshold Test Ban Agreement signed in Moscow last summer is in our view too weak an effort on the part of the two nuclear super-Powers. We are not happy with its permissive range for underground tests and its lax dateline for taking effect. It can be regarded as useful only if it prompts both sides to persevere towards a more effective ban and does not serve as an excuse to evade further discussion of the issue.

I have already spoken of the negotiations on peaceful nuclear explosions within the context of the Threshold Test Ban Agreement. It is imperative that such peaceful explosions shall take place only under the most stringent international procedures along the lines of those established by the IAEA. The relationship between

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

a cessation of nuclear-weapons testing and peaceful nuclear explosions is a delicate one. In the opinion of my Government such explosions need not be detrimental to the aims of a comprehensive test-ban agreement provided that they are subject to strict arrangements for international observation.

We have thus welcomed the General Assembly resolution which requested our Committee to consider the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, taking into account the views of the IAEA. The resolution asked the IAEA to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. We look forward to the Agency's report on this subject, which will certainly facilitate our discussions in the CCD.

An area of perhaps greater hope-- because some flexibility has already been exhibited-- is that of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Several positive steps have been taken in this direction. We await a sequel to the announcement made by the United States and the Soviet Union last summer that they would undertake a joint initiative in this Committee towards a convention, as a first step, on prohibition of the most dangerous lethal chemical agents. At the same time we have studied with great care the interesting draft convention submitted to the Committee by the delegation of Japan. We are aware that many questions still remain unresolved. Some of these were tackled by the experts who met in July 1974; and we were encouraged to learn that there was some concurrence of opinion.

It should not be impossible to proceed further towards the goal of a chemical-weapons ban. Such an agreement would represent a milestone in the work of this Committee. Taken with the convention on bacteriological weapons, it would represent the first real arms-reduction measure, the first step which would go beyond a freeze on actual weapons levels and would usher in a reversal of the arms race. This issue has been recommended to our Committee by the General Assembly as a matter of high priority. The time has now come to try to make headway towards the final resolution of the difficulties involved before the same incrustation of positions develops as with the test ban.

The most recent item on our agenda is the very interesting proposal put forward by the Soviet Union at the General Assembly concerning "The prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health." An Assembly resolution has asked our Committee to work out a convention on this subject.

(Mr. Fartash, Iran)

We have noted the announcement made in Moscow by the United States and the Soviet Union last summer to the effect that the two countries intended to study measures to avert use of environmental modification methods for military purposes. We have also looked carefully at the text of the draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union and will make more comments on this pertinent document at a later meeting.

The growth of man's knowledge about the causes and processes of natural phenomena will help him to avoid their sometimes disastrous consequences; but the inevitable companion to this knowledge is its potentially hostile use as well. A carefully-formulated agreement ensuring that such frightening purposes can never be served would make a marked contribution to reducing the dangers of war.

This, then, represents the general outline of Iran's policy towards disarmament and the specific issues we shall be discussing with our eminent colleagues at this table. We intend to participate fully in the work before us and to use our energies and capabilities towards the attainment of our goals.

Mr. ENE (Romania): Mr. Chairman, I asked you to be kind enough to call on me at this stage in order that I may express some thoughts on certain procedural matters which in the view of my delegation might improve the organization of our work and also the effectiveness of our Committee. I must say that I have been encouraged to do so by the very pertinent comments made in this Committee at our last meeting, among others, by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, and referred to again today by the distinguished representatives of Sweden, Canada and Iran.

I have in mind the relation between the resolutions of the General Assembly on disarmament issues, and the work of our Committee. This question arises in a formal manner in connexion with the task entrusted to this Committee by the General Assembly of offering its auspices for a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones by an Ad hoc Group of governmental experts. My delegation will have more to say on this subject when the Committee concentrates on discussion of the concrete procedural arrangements for such a group; and I venture to think that an informal meeting of the Committee on this specific matter, with the participation of all its members, might prove at least as productive as the informal meetings we have had in the past.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

I refer to this matter now only to stress, as other delegations have done before me, that we should be careful not to reopen and, moreover, revise in this Committee questions which have already been decided by the General Assembly. For my delegation, what the General Assembly has asked the Committee to do has been to offer its auspices to the above-mentioned Group in order to study the question, and later on to transmit that particular study to the General Assembly. There is no doubt in my mind that the various aspects of the framework in which the Ad hoc Group should conduct its work have either been settled by the General Assembly or will be given more precision by the Group itself. I believe, for instance, that the autonomy of the Group has already been decided upon by the General Assembly, since the Committee was only requested to offer the Group its auspices. I believe also that the openness of the Group to "the interested governments" --- those are the words of the resolution --- is also a settled question. There are other aspects of the same nature which we should also take into account.

The purpose of my intervention, however, was more general. It would be to some extent in line with what the representative of Canada has just said. Much stress has been laid --- and rightly --- from the very beginning of our proceedings last Tuesday on the large number of resolutions adopted during the last session of the General Assembly concerning matters related to disarmament and therefore relevant to this Committee. An important number of them are specifically transmitted for action to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which is entrusted with the task of giving proper consideration to certain issues and then reporting to the General Assembly on the results of its work.

What are we going to do with those resolutions, and how are we going to discharge the task entrusted to us? To my delegation this is a matter of principle which derives from the consideration which our Committee is bound to give to the expressed will of the General Assembly --- and there is no other forum able to give expression to the concern and the will of the entire international community than the United Nations ---; and also from the need continuously to improve the organization and the effectiveness of our work, a task which is long overdue. In our view there is both a legal and a moral obligation on our Committee to give the General Assembly's will due attention.

The unusually large number of General Assembly resolutions on disarmament addressed to our Committee this year and transmitted to us by the United Nations Secretary-General with his letter CCD/446 has prompted my delegation to think over the manner in which we have treated such resolutions so far.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

First, we never know for certain whether, when and for how long our Committee will be convened after the end of the General Assembly sessions. All of us know, for instance, from the discussions in the corridors that this was specifically true this year.

Secondly, irrespective of the nature, scope or number of the requests we have received in the past from the General Assembly, we have always organized our work in the same manner. Thus matters which have taken the General Assembly weeks of deliberation may very easily be overlooked by this Committee.

The Romanian delegation therefore believes that there are at least two things that we could do.

The first is to decide that the Committee has the duty to meet as soon as possible after the end of each General Assembly session, in order among other things to continue or start consideration of the issues transmitted to it for negotiation. It should also feel obliged to report on its work to the General Assembly in due time, so that all Member States may be properly informed of the manner in which it has dealt with the topics it has received.

There are practical reasons for that also. I believe that many of us who happen to deal not only with disarmament matters need to know long in advance at least the approximate timetable of our work. This is the more necessary for those of us who stay in Geneva, in splendid isolation from some capitals where such decisions are taken. If this is possible for other international bodies and conferences, we do not see why the Committee on Disarmament cannot do the same.

In fact we witness an ingenious arrangement through which consultations are conducted somewhere else. The United Nations Disarmament Division is stationed in New York -- and we miss its presence and support here between our sessions. The Committee is convened in Geneva; the debates on disarmament during the General Assembly sessions take place in New York with only a few of us from here being able to attend them. It appears that good care has been taken that the whole shall be divided into pieces. One unit does not know exactly what the others do.

Secondly, we think that the Committee would improve its working and also show due consideration to the requests it receives from the General Assembly if it established at the beginning of each new round of negotiations some kind of framework or structure to ensure that the main issues dealt with by the General Assembly and found necessary to refer to it for concrete action are given due attention. I do not state now what those issues should be.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

This would also help to diversify our work and enable us to examine at the same time more topics in an organized manner, with beneficial results for our work's effectiveness. The practice we have followed so far of concentrating on one or two topics only, quite often not the most urgent ones, has brought us -- at least in the last three or four years -- to a deadlock.

I understand that these are procedural matters which may not be decisive for the final results of the work in our Committee. There are also other aspects of our work, perhaps of much more substance, which I do not want to enter into now. But I believe that the aspects to which I referred have a value of principle for our Committee vis-à-vis the United Nations General Assembly. They have a practical importance too. It is our duty in this Committee to deal with them before the General Assembly itself does.

These are my comments for the time being. The Romanian delegation will certainly refer to the substance of the tasks of this Committee on another occasion.

The CHAIRMAN (Argentina): The representative of Burma, who is Chairman for the week of the Group of fifteen countries, has requested me to inform the Committee that the delegations which attended yesterday's meeting of this Group wish the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to hold an informal meeting next week to examine certain questions concerning the organization and work of the ad hoc Group of Governmental Experts referred to in resolution 3261 F (XXIX) of the General Assembly.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.