

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. SULE KOLO

(Nigeria)

(Previous verbatim records in this series appeared under the symbols
ENDC/PV.1-ENDC/PV.430).

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. A.F. DUMONT
Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. R.E. SARAIVA GUERREIRO
Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA

Bulgaria:

Mr. T. PETROV
Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV

Burma:

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
Mr. R.W. CLARK
Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. F. MARESKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLESKE
Mr. G. ALMEU

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. J. PETRAN
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO
Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
Mr. R. BORSARELLI
Mr. U. PESTALOZZA

Japan:

Mr. H. TANAKA
Mr. H. OTSUKA
Mr. T. SENGOKU
Mr. J. SAKANOTO

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA
Mr. B. SEPULVEDA
Mr. R. VALERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBIEG
Mr. B. DASHTSEREN
Mr. Z. ERENDO

Morocco:

Mr. N. EL PASSI
Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. SULU KOLO
Mr. L.A. MALIKI

Pakistan:

Mr. K. AHMED
Mr. T.O. HYDER

Poland:

Mr. K. ZYBYLSKI
Mr. H. STEPOSZ
Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:

Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. N. CHILIE
Mrs. F. DIHU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. I. VIRGIN
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. I.I. TCHEPROV
Mr. L.A. MASTERKOV
Mr. Y.C. NAZARKINE

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALIAF
Mr. E.S. EL REEDY
Mr. Y. RIZK
Mr. M. ISMAIL

United Kingdom:

Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD
Mr. R. HOULISTON
Mr. L.W. BOYES

United States of America:

Mr. J.F. LEONARD
Mr. A.F. NEEDLE
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. R.L. MCCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
Mr. M. VUKOVIC

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): I declare open the 471st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
2. Before calling upon the first speaker on my list I wish to draw attention to a statement made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol (SG/SM/1282). Members of the Committee may find that statement interesting, and copies have been circulated.
3. Mr. ZYBYLSKI (Poland): At the outset may I, on behalf of the Polish delegation, welcome the new leader of the Bulgarian delegation, Ambassador Petrov, the new leader of the Mongolian delegation, Ambassador Erdenbileg, and the new leader of the Japanese delegation, Ambassador Tanaka? Wishing them all possible success in the fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to this Committee, I should like to assure them of the sincere co-operation of the Polish delegation in the achievement of that aim.
4. In its statement today the Polish delegation wishes to concentrate on the latest revised text of the joint draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof, presented by the co-Chairmen on 23 April (CCD/269/Rev.2). I should like to congratulate the co-Chairmen on the timely presentation of that document which allowed every delegation to study it in depth during the recess and to present the opinion of its Government in a relatively short time. It is the sincere wish and hope of my delegation that the Committee will soon reach agreement on a widely-acceptable text which could be submitted on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament to the next session of the General Assembly. We are hopeful of such a result, fully aware as we are of the fact that the text now before us is the result of extensive negotiations in which, in one way or another, almost every member of this Committee participated. We are indeed aware that careful scrutiny was made of the criticisms and comments made here at the end of last year's session and at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.
5. As is well known, the Polish delegation is playing an active role in the Committee's debates concerning the problem of reserving the sea-bed and the ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. It might also be recalled that

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Poland was the first country to advocate the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in a populated area (ENDC/C.1/1). It will therefore be understood that my country attaches special importance to any international action leading to the creation of additional areas where nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction will be prohibited. The elimination of weapons of mass destruction from military arsenals has been and remains one of the principal goals of my Government's foreign policy.

6. In the view of the Polish delegation the signing and coming into force of a treaty banning the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction is of unusual importance; the sooner we reach agreement on this question the better. Through such a treaty mankind will be given an invaluable guarantee against the extension of the arms race in weapons of mass destruction to a geographical area where the installation of such devices would be extremely dangerous. We are gratified to note that in its article I the draft treaty prohibits the setting-up of structures and launching installations designed for nuclear missiles as well as conventional arms. It might be remembered that the Polish delegation drew the attention of this Committee to that question at the very outset of our discussion (ENDC/PV.399, para. 66).

7. The renunciation of nuclear weapons on the sea-bed and the ocean floor will no doubt promote the utilization of that vast part of the globe exclusively for peaceful purposes and the exploitation of its resources in the interest of mankind, having in mind first of all the interests of the developing countries. The early entry into force of the treaty before us would certainly act as an impetus to a prompt solution of the difficult problems faced by the Committee on the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

8. Of course Poland, as a strong supporter of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, considers the draft treaty before us as a first step in that direction. Although the draft does not give us full satisfaction we note, with some hope, that its preamble expresses the prospective signatories' determination to continue negotiations concerning further measures leading to the exclusion of the sea-bed and the ocean floor from the arms race. We regret that the co-Chairmen have not

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found it possible to include in the draft the provisions contained in the Swedish paper (CCD/271). Understanding the need for a solution based on carefully-negotiated compromises, my delegation will not oppose the present wording of this preambular paragraph.

9. At the same time we would urge this Committee to keep on its agenda the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor as formulated in the 1968 report to the General Assembly when a programme of work (ENDC/236, p.3) for this Committee was established after the signing of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*). In that way members of the Committee may raise the question of further steps leading to the demilitarization of this important area whenever they see that a question is ripe for discussion, without waiting for the review conference as provided for in article VI of the draft before us. In this particular case we believe that what are generally called "conventional" armaments can be dealt with in a separate document.

10. I should now like to turn to the question of verification. During our discussion of the draft submitted by the co-Chairmen on 7 October (CCD/269) and the revised draft presented to this Committee shortly before it adjourned on 30 October (CCD/269/Rev.1), as well as during the debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly, most of the criticism was directed towards the question of verification. It is understood that for every government acceding to a treaty dealing with disarmament or other preventive measures in this field, the question of verification becomes a very important issue. As has been indicated in our previous statements on this question, our primary consideration in this regard is that the system of verification should be compatible with the character and scope of the obligation to be assumed under the treaty and should also correspond to the geographical area of application of this agreement, while taking fully into account the norms of international law.

11. As an example of that policy we may say that we shared the view that there was no need for verification machinery in the Moscow Treaty on the partial test ban (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and in the outer-space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)). We were among those who advocated strict international control and efficient international machinery for the implementation of the non-proliferation

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Treaty; and it is also well known that Poland took the initiative in proposing (CCD/285 and Corr.1) a system of complaints to the Security Council as a realistic safeguard against possible breach of a complete ban on chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.

12. So far as the sea-bed treaty is concerned, the criticism of the provisions for verification contained in the previous drafts was concentrated on two principal issues: first the request to spell out more specifically the coastal States' exclusive right of exploration and exploitation of their respective continental shelves and to affirm the right of the coastal State to consent to or participate in any verification procedure which may take place on its continental shelf; and second, the request for the establishment of international machinery for verification as a result of the fact that the immense majority of countries possessing sea coasts are not technologically or financially in a position to verify by themselves any violation or presumed violation of the treaty.

13. In the view of the Polish delegation the first of those points has been adequately taken care of in the new draft submitted to us on 23 April. This fact reflects the desire of all those who contributed to the final draft, whether directly or indirectly through consultation, to contribute as effectively as possible to the successful conclusion of an adequate and effective treaty eliminating nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the sea-bed and ocean floor.

14. As far as the second point is concerned -- the question of establishing international machinery for the verification of possible violations of the provisions of the treaty -- my delegation continues to believe that the establishment of such machinery is premature, if not altogether unnecessary. The argument has been advanced that what is satisfactory for the main Powers may not necessarily be admissible for the remaining ones. Although at first sight there seems to be some logic in that way of thinking, one must take into account that the main military Powers are not the only Powers with advanced maritime technology and possessing the appropriate equipment for carrying out effective verification on the sea-bed should the need for it arise. Therefore a division on this question along such lines does not seem to be relevant.

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15. On the other hand, the method of observation, assistance and co-operation between States parties to the treaty contains an important political factor as regards ways of solving differences between States. Mutual assistance and voluntary international co-operation promote better understanding among nations, thus strengthening the climate of confidence which we so badly need if we want to achieve substantive progress in the field of disarmament.

16. Approaching the problem of verification with a sense of realism, with a determined will to arrive at an agreement, we must resist the temptation to exercise excessive and complex control, which in the last analysis would be extremely costly. Should international machinery for control of this treaty be established, that machinery would have to be properly equipped in order to perform its functions independently. Who is going to secure the sophisticated equipment for that and who is going to pay for it? The funds at the disposal of the United Nations and other international organizations are already insufficient for carrying out the desired programme of assistance to the developing countries and other programmes of technical assistance. As we were reminded at the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mr. Sigvard Eklund, the Agency which he directs has elaborated a number of important programmes of assistance to the developing countries in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The only thing that prevents their being carried out is the lack of funds. Can we in those circumstances suggest the spending of a considerable amount of money on a scheme which has no practical utility for the time being?

17. Having in mind that the draft treaty provides in article VI for a review conference five years after its entry into force --

"... in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments" (CCD/269/Rev.2) --

it seems to us that the provisions for verification contained in the newly-drafted article III are fully adequate at the present stage of technological development.

18. Before leaving the area of verification I would like to say a few words about the statement made by the representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff, on 28 April. I shall quote the following passage from that statement:

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"While welcoming these developments in the thinking of the co-Chairmen as reflected in the latest revised draft, I have to note also an important omission in the present draft as regards verification. The present draft text makes no provision for recourse to appropriate international procedure or good offices -- including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations." (CCD/PV.468, para. 8)

I have dealt at length with the question of international machinery for verification of this treaty. I need not go into further detail. As for the good offices of the Secretary-General, my delegation sees in this proposal a limitation that narrows this widely-recognized international procedure. Conflicts may arise in situations where the good offices of another political or moral authority may prove more desirable and more effective. The result of the good offices of Soviet Premier Kosygin at the meeting in Tashkent where a solution for the 1966 conflict between India and Pakistan was elaborated speaks in favour of not limiting the exercise of good offices to the United Nations Secretary-General and not incorporating it in the text of the treaty.

19. The arguments of the Canadian and other delegations dealing with those specific points of the verification system provided for in the treaty before us did not convince my delegation. I hope that the clarification I have tried to furnish to this Committee will help members to understand the position of my Government.

20. My delegation fully endorses the view expressed by our Soviet co-Chairman when he described the new draft of article III as "a synthesis of the views and positions of States on the problem of control ..." (CCD/PV.467, para. 15). We are happy to note that the main ideas formulated in the amendment submitted by the delegation of Argentina at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly (A/C.1/997) have in substance been incorporated in the new draft. We also welcome the new article VIII as an encouragement for the establishment of zones free from nuclear weapons.

21. The Polish delegation considers the new draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof to be a document containing all the elements necessary to make it universally acceptable. We are fully

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aware that a document based on a compromise cannot take account of all the suggestions put forward during the discussion of this item in this Committee and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. We are happy to note that the great majority of them found their way into the new draft.

22. But before concluding may I be permitted to quote the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont? When speaking about the verification procedure of this treaty in the First Committee at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, he said: "if the parties to any agreement of this kind demand complete certainty on this score, then the probability is that there will be no agreement at all ...". And he went on to say: "No one is going to get all he wants; but this is what negotiation is all about, and this is what international agreement means." (A/C.1/PV.1694, provisional, p.23) May I add that this is exactly what we mean by a compromise solution?

23. We still have some very important items on our agenda at this session. Let us complete this one successfully so that we can tackle the others as soon as possible in order to be able to report honourably on the result of our work for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

24. Mr. TANAKA (Japan): First of all I should like to express my deep appreciation for the warm welcome extended to me by members of this Committee. It is indeed a great pleasure for me to be able to take part in the discussions of this Committee at the very time when it is taking an important step towards the goal of the Disarmament Decade; and I will do all in my power to co-operate with the other members of this Committee to make our discussions even more fruitful.

25. The United Nations General Assembly adopted last year resolution 2602 E (XXIV) (CCD/275) relating to the Disarmament Decade, in which it requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to work out a comprehensive disarmament programme, dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. In response to that request a number of invaluable suggestions were put forward at the last

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session of this Committee. Now, during this session, we are to prepare a programme to be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

26. In formulating a disarmament programme we need to make a clear-headed assessment as to how much headway it will be possible for us to make in the coming decade towards general and complete disarmament. I have to note in this context that one of the fundamental factors which make the achievement of general and complete disarmament difficult is that not all of the militarily-important States have yet taken their seats at the negotiating table. Nevertheless, some of the measures envisaged in the proposals on general and complete disarmament submitted in 1962 by the United States and the Soviet Union respectively have been achieved. For instance, the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests has been partially realized (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and treaties on the peaceful use of outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex) and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226*) have also been concluded. We regard these measures as important milestones towards general and complete disarmament. Taking these circumstances into consideration I submit that what we should do urgently in the Disarmament Decade is to deal energetically and in a concrete manner with such disarmament measures as can be taken even before all the militarily-important States are participating in disarmament negotiations; and I feel that this is a realistic approach.

27. The Committee has recognized that it is necessary to give highest priority to further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. First, as for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, much depends upon the political decisions of the two super-Powers; and that is part of the reason why we must solve the problem of how to discover adequate means of verification which will ensure compliance with a treaty relating to this question. In order to make progress in our efforts to solve this technical problem the United Nations General Assembly adopted last year, on the initiative of Canada, a resolution calling for the submission of data on national seismograph stations (2604 A (XXIV); CCD/275). As one of the co-sponsors of the resolution, my country cannot help expressing its regret that a certain number of States have refused to supply the data requested. Since we are

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requested by the General Assembly to submit to it a special report on the results of our deliberations relating to the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, and since we also need to make a follow-up study of the data supplied by various countries, I feel it is necessary for us to consider how to deal with the present question, taking into account the views of experts.

28. The problem of verification again presents a great obstacle in the matter of the halting of the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons; but I believe that it must be possible to apply as a verification measure in this case a system of safeguards similar to that which is to be applied to non-nuclear-weapon States by the International Atomic Energy Agency under the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. If there are States which find that view unacceptable, I think they should submit proposals of their own.

29. Since our work on drawing up a treaty prohibiting the emplacement on the seabed of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has entered its final stage, the member States of this Committee should make a united effort to complete the formulation of a draft treaty at the earliest possible date.

30. It might be difficult, generally speaking, to take non-nuclear disarmament measures before all the militarily-important States are participating in disarmament negotiations. While admitting that, I should like to suggest that, among non-nuclear measures, the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons could be achieved at a relatively early date. That is because all the militarily-important States have undertaken, either in international instruments or in government statements, to refrain from the first use of poisonous gases and bacteriological weapons. On 21 May this year Japan deposited with the French Government its instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, Rev.1, Annex VI) without attaching any reservation. It is well known, however, that many States have attached reservations to the Protocol, notably reservations relating to the retaliatory use of such weapons. We hope that these States will withdraw their reservations as soon as possible. At the same time we should make even more strenuous efforts towards banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons, to ensure that recourse will never, in any circumstances, be had to such weapons.

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31. We should also do our utmost to achieve universal adherence to the treaties on arms control or disarmament which have been concluded in the past. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force on 5 March this year; but the safeguards agreements to be concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency in accordance with article III of the Treaty still depend on future negotiations. I should like to point out, in that connexion, that in order to make the non-proliferation Treaty effective the participation of as many States as possible, especially all the potential nuclear-weapon States, is essential. That is part of the reason why we consider that safeguards agreements should be so formulated as to be acceptable to those States which are promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As one of the major industrial Powers, Japan attaches great importance to the progress and results of the negotiations relating to the conclusion of safeguards agreements.

32. It is indeed welcome that strategic arms limitation talks have been initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union with a view to achieving the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date; and we sincerely hope that the two States will push forward in their pursuit of the objectives of the negotiations without being influenced by momentary fluctuations in the international situation. The success of those talks would certainly contribute to the lessening of tensions in East-West relations and, furthermore, to the strengthening of the security of States throughout the world. I believe, therefore, that the entire world eagerly desires the success of the talks, and I earnestly hope that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union will not disappoint the hopes of the world.

33. While general and complete disarmament is the earnest wish of humanity, I believe that my country, which firmly adheres to its Constitution, which renounces war, is in a position to play a unique role in achieving that objective. We are well aware that disarmament and security are closely interrelated and we have no intention of turning our eyes away from the hard fact that the national security of the States of the world is dependent upon the existence of a military balance; nor can we deny that there are extremely difficult problems involved in achieving general and complete disarmament.

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34. One of the prerequisites for attaining the goal of general and complete disarmament is the participation of all the militarily-important States; and we hope that the Governments of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of France will take part in international disarmament negotiations as soon as possible. Pending the participation of these two States in this Committee, we should welcome the holding of talks between States outside the Committee for the relaxation of international tension and the achievement of various disarmament measures. With the development of weapons of mass destruction there has evolved among the militarily-important States a sense of mutual restraint with regard to the use of such weapons; and all these States now have bilateral channels of communication. I am convinced that it is the strengthening of such channels and the evolution of a sense of collective responsibility for international security without regard to differences in social systems or to the conflict of national interests that will direct us towards the way to general and complete disarmament.

35. The question of verification has in the past prevented the achievement of measures of disarmament. While differences in conditions between States are primarily responsible for our failure to solve the verification problem, technical developments in recent years have provided us with some of the answers to that problem. Moreover, increased communication throughout the world is an irreversible trend. The decade of the 1970s, which has been declared the Disarmament Decade, will also be a time of rapid change. It is my firm belief that the replacement of suspicion and distrust by the principle of openness and the spirit of international solidarity is the key to the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

36. The CHAIRMAN (Nigeria): In view of the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2603 B (XXIV) (CCD/275) calling upon all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol (A/7575/Rev.1, annex VI) in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, I am sure I shall be speaking on behalf of all members of the Committee if I request Ambassador Tanaka to convey our congratulations to the Government of Japan.

37. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian) One of the important results of the discussion of chemical and bacteriological weapons at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly was its adoption of a resolution inviting -

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"... all States which have not yet done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol in the course of 1970 in commemoration of the forty-fifth anniversary of its signing and the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations" (2603 B (XXIV), CCD/275).

This is the resolution to which you yourself, Mr. Chairman have just referred.

38. Yesterday, 17 June, was the forty-fifth anniversary, to the day, of the signing of that agreement. In this connexion we would say, first of all, that we have noted with interest the statement made by U Thant, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on the forty-fifth anniversary of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare (A/7575/Rev.1, Annex VI). That statement concerns an important question, the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, and we shall study it with due care. In connexion with yesterday's forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Geneva Protocol we would observe that the Protocol gave expression to mankind's desire to consolidate, in the form of a treaty between States, the prohibition of the use of those agents for military purposes. Of course, the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in war has always been condemned. The history of international relations provides clear evidence that prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for military purposes has become a generally-recognized rule of international law. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 reflects this universal awareness, which is why the Protocol states that its purpose is "that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the conscience and the practice of nations".

39. The signing of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, soon after the end of the First World War, reflected the peoples' condemnation of the use of chemical weapons during that war. The wave of revulsion caused throughout the world by the use of chemical weapons called for a juridical confirmation of what was already unchallenged politically and morally: the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons. At the same time a provision was inserted in the Protocol extending the prohibition to bacteriological methods of warfare.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

40. The past forty-five years have convincingly demonstrated the importance of the Geneva Protocol, which lies above all in the fact that the Protocol has served and continues to serve as an important means of preventing the outbreak of a war involving the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Who can say what disasters might have befallen mankind during the Second World War if chemical and bacteriological weapons had been widely used in it? Hitlerite Germany dared not disregard the warning of the allied Powers that the use of such weapons in warfare could not be tolerated. That warning, as we know, was based on the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

41. The Protocol is becoming even more important in our day. The progress of chemical and biological science, which has brought great benefits to mankind, has at the same time made it possible to create types of chemical and bacteriological agents whose use might not only inflict enormous loss of human life and incalculable economic damage but might even adversely affect the future development of human civilization. In that connexion it is particularly significant that the prohibition laid down in the Geneva Protocol has a universal character, comprising all forms of chemical and bacteriological weapons without exception. In its resolution 2603 A (XXIV) the United Nations General Assembly designedly drew the attention of States throughout the world to this fact by stating that the Geneva Protocol --

"... embodies the generally recognized rules of international law prohibiting the use in international armed conflicts of all biological and chemical methods of warfare, regardless of any technical developments" (CCD/275).

This resolution undoubtedly put an end to all attempts to place any other construction on the contents of the Geneva Protocol or to minimize its significance.

42. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that in recent years many States have acceded to the Geneva Protocol, thus bearing witness to the effectiveness and importance of that international instrument. Unfortunately it must be noted that not all the countries of the world have decided to condemn the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons outright. The United States,

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a Power of very great military importance, has not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol. The concern felt by the peoples of the world on that account is increased by the knowledge that the United States possesses a large arsenal of the types of weapons prohibited by the Protocol.

43. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 was actually the first agreement prohibiting the use in war of one of the weapons of mass destruction. In that sense it is a truly historic document. The conclusion of the Protocol demonstrates that it is possible to reach effective agreements prohibiting weapons of mass destruction and to define clearly the course to be followed to achieve that end. That is particularly important at this moment, when we are conducting negotiations for the conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. As many delegations observed at the Disarmament Committee's last series of meetings, the Geneva Protocol should become the starting point for further measures designed to achieve the complete elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the life of human society.

44. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons submitted by the socialist countries (A/7655) and now before the Committee on Disarmament proceeds from those very premises. Under the preamble to the convention the parties would recognize the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, reaffirm their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Protocol and condemn all actions contrary to it. The Convention, like the Protocol, covers both chemical and bacteriological weapons. We take this opportunity to express once again our conviction that the conclusion of an international agreement based on the text submitted by the socialist countries will complete the work begun by the Geneva Protocol.

45. On the occasion of the forty-fifth anniversary of the signing of the Protocol, we express the hope that the Committee on Disarmament will speed its work on the problem of freeing mankind from the threat of warfare with chemical and bacteriological weapons. This would be the best continuation of what was started in 1925 and would meet the responsibilities placed upon our Committee.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 471st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Sule Kolo, representative of Nigeria.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and by the Chairman.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 23 June 1970, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.