

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva  
on Thursday, 27 April 1978, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. Ogiso

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. A. MOLTEMI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. I. MASTROGIOVANNI
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. G. GAVRILOV Mr. I. PETROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U TINT SO U KYEE MYINT
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. E. ZÁPOTOCKÝ Mr. V. ROHAL--ILKIV Mr. F. FRANEK Mr. J. MORAVEC
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL-SHAFEI Mr. H. OMAR Mr. T. DINANA Mr. A.L. EL-RAFEI Mr. E.A.H. EZZ
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE Mr. G. ALULA
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. M. RAKAU
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. PFEIFFER Mr. J. POHLMANN Mr. H. HOFFMANN Mr. ZEIL

<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. H. DOMIKOS Mr. E. SEBOK Mr. I. KORMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. C.R. GHAREKHAN Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. G. VALDEVIT Mr. C. FRATESCHI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. H. OGISO Mr. T. SAWAI Mr. Y. NAKAMURA Mr. H. OKITSU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. M. MARÍN
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. G.A. FALASE Mr. S.T. ADAMU
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. K. SALEEM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. L. CHAVEZ-GODOY
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. H. PAĆ Mr. M. KRUCZYK
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. C. ENE Mr. V. TUDOR Mr. G. TINCA

Sweden:

Mr. L. NORBERG  
Mr. U. REINIUS  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. J. SANTESSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.I. LIKHATCHEV  
Mr. B.P. KRASSULIN  
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV  
Mr. L.A. NAOUMOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO  
Mr. E.D. ZAITSEV  
Mr. A.I. TIOURENIKOV  
Mr. G. SOKOLSKI  
Mr. K. DUMAEV  
Mr. N. TCHUGOUNOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. H. MARSHALL  
Mr. C.K. CURWEN  
Mr. I.R. KENYON

United States of America:

Mr. A.S. FISHER  
Mr. A.R. TURRENTINE  
Mr. R. MIKULAK  
Mr. J. LEONARD  
Mrs. M. FINARELLI  
Mr. D. CARLSON  
Mr. G. CROCKIER

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIC  
Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

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Mr. Risto HYVARINEN

Alternate Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Ms. A. SEGARRA

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 785th plenary meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Motoo Ogiso, representative of Japan.

The representative of Sweden (Mr. L. Norberg) made a brief statement on the question of a ban on chemical weapons. Attention was recalled to the fact that the acquisition of chemical agents, weapons and delivery systems was not the only decisive factor for acquiring an offensive chemical warfare capability. Equally important were the necessary training, planning and organization for operational use of these weapons. Not only development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, but also other preparations for offensive chemical warfare, must therefore be prohibited in a treaty.

He also introduced a working paper (CCD/569) on computerized scanning of chemical literature, as a verification method for strengthening confidence between parties to a treaty.

The representative of Romania (H.E. Ambassador C. Ene) made a statement on the question of the organization and the procedures of the Committee. He reiterated the official position of the Romanian Government on that issue and underlined the fact that a change in the CCD's organization and procedures was a prerequisite for the improvement of its efficiency.

Ambassador Ene referred to five conditions which were indispensable for efficient work by the Committee: (1) the extension of the authority of the United Nations over the work of the CCD; (2) democratization of its work and procedure; (3) the need to take into consideration, on an equal footing, the proposals and the viewpoints of all members of the Committee; (4) the creation of the necessary conditions for all members of the Committee to participate directly, at all phases of the discussions and the negotiations, as well as for all other interested States to have free access to the work of the CCD; (5) the use of open diplomacy within the Committee and the conveyance of correct information to public opinion on the consequences of the arms race and the progress of the disarmament negotiations.

He expressed Romania's support for the document submitted by 15 non-aligned or neutral States on 17 March 1978 (CCD/563) as well as for other proposals made in the Committee aimed at the improvement of the organization and procedures of the CCD, and concluded that there was already an important majority of the CCD's members who stood for democratic changes in the Committee's work.

With regard to the concrete suggestions concerning the system of co-chairmanship, he expressed strong preference that the CCD should be presided over by all delegations in alphabetical order.

He also stated that no chairmanship formula based on the representation of military alliances would be acceptable to his delegation.

The representative of Romania said that the change in the organization and procedures of the Committee should not be linked with the question of the participation of all nuclear-weapon powers in the work of the CCD. He stated that such a change was a basic requirement for the improvement of the performance of the CCD, which should be adjusted to the fundamental transformations which had taken place in international relations since its creation.

The representative of Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (Mr. E. Zápotocký) made a statement on the question of the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, and of the neutron weapon. He pointed out that the idea of the prohibition of new WMD and the prevention of an ever-increasing employment of scientific achievements for the creation of ever-greater destructive means of war had found wide support. Research and technical development were, at the present stage, among the main factors of the arms race, which must be unconditionally stopped. A comprehensive ban on the development and manufacture of new types and systems of WMD was, in the opinion of the Czechoslovak delegation, the main possible way of limiting the technological arms race and of eliminating the danger of military misuse of scientific discoveries for creating new WMD.

The Czechoslovak representative supported the proposal of the USSR on the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider the questions of the possible area of the ban.

He stressed the importance of the draft convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons, submitted by the socialist States, and pointed out that the term "increased radiation" did not actually express the fact that the radiation was different, having higher biological effects, causing a particularly serious radiation sickness, and damaging enormously the genetic tissue: because of this the damage would also be transferred to future generations.

He pointed out some of the other main military and political characteristics of the neutron weapon, clearly indicating that it was a new weapon of mass destruction and an offensive weapon which might be used especially for suppression of national liberation movements and local conflicts in any part of the world, seriously increasing the risk of escalation of nuclear war.

The Czechoslovak delegation shared the opinion that the problem of the neutron weapon should be approached from a direction which recognized its serious significance for European and world security. It noted with regret the statement of President Carter rejecting the recent Soviet declaration that the USSR would not start production of the neutron bomb unless the United States decided to do so. The negotiation of the treaty and its adoption fully corresponded with the mission of the Committee.

The representative of Mexico (Mr. M. Marín) stated that his delegation had received with profound satisfaction the announcement by the Soviet Union on 25 April concerning the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

The "Proposed terms of reference for the continued work of the CCD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events" was circulated for the consideration of members of the Committee.

The delegation of Sweden submitted a "Working Paper on a Methodological Investigation for Computerized Scanning of Chemical Literature" (CCD/569).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 2 May 1978 at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. NORBERG (Sweden): The Swedish position regarding the scope and verification of a CW convention was last stated on 23 August 1977 (CCD/PV.764). Since no single effective, non-intrusive verification method had appeared at that time, the Swedish delegation pointed to the need to find and explore additional ideas. Attention was called to the fact that the acquisition of chemical agents, weapons and delivery systems is not the only decisive factor when it comes to acquiring an offensive chemical-warfare capability. Equally and perhaps more important are the necessary training, planning and organization for operational use of these weapons. It was suggested that identifying such preparatory measures would constitute a necessary and probably effective method for the verification of a chemical convention. Therefore we feel that not only development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, but also other preparations for offensive chemical warfare must be prohibited.

As a further contribution to the discussion concerning possible verification methods as well as other methods for strengthening confidence between the parties to a treaty, the Swedish delegation would like to draw attention to a suggestion made ten years ago by the former leader of the Swedish delegation to the CCD, Minister of State Mrs. Alva Myrdal.

Mrs. Myrdal pointed out the potential value of collecting, systematizing and disseminating information contained in the scientific and technical literature (ENDC/PV.391, 20 August 1968). This method has also been discussed at informal meetings with chemical experts at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Scanning appropriate literature manually is a time-consuming task. Work of this kind demands a wide coverage of journals and other open sources. However, there is today an increasingly large number of abstracts publications which facilitate access to the world literature within a special subject. Many of these abstracts publications appear also on magnetic tapes and are available for direct computer scanning. This facilitates further following of the literature within a desired field. It therefore seemed worth-while to investigate suitable means and methods for utilizing such data-based abstracts publications and evaluate their possible applicability in connexion with a chemical weapons treaty.

The Swedish delegation tables today a working paper (CCD/569) containing a summary of a methodological investigation of computerized scanning of chemical literature which has been carried out by Swedish experts. The aims of the investigation, the method used and the main results obtained are described in the working paper. It appears from the study that large savings with respect

(Mr. Norberg, Sweden)

to manpower could be made. The number of literature references which it is necessary to evaluate can, for instance, be diminished to between 1 and 4 per cent of the total, using the types of search strategies formulated for the purpose of the investigation. It was also calculated that the likelihood of retrieving a relevant item by means of this method exceeded 80 per cent. The material studied exceeded 150,000 references to scientific and technical articles. It seems possible to improve the method and also to apply it to several more data bases. The method should of course be looked upon as one of many possible approaches to the problem of searching the enormous amount of published literature for pertinent information.

Mr. ENE (Romania) (translated from French): In the course of the debate that has taken place at this session, the question of the place of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in the framework of the negotiating system for disarmament, and of the Committee's operation, has given rise to many comments.

The attention given to this is quite justified when we bear in mind the unsatisfactory results achieved by the Committee so far, and also the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, at which the negotiating structures in the field of disarmament will certainly be the subject of thorough debate.

It is this problem that I too should like to discuss today.

The Romanian Government has often had occasion to express its position in this respect.

In the document submitted to the United Nations on 30 October 1975, entitled: "The position of Romania on the problems of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of lasting world peace", it was stated that:

"... it is high time that negotiations on disarmament reflected the need for the democratization of international life and for the equal participation of all States in the settlement of international issues, and the great changes which have occurred in international relations ...

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

Urgent measures are required to improve and expand the work of the Committee prominent among them being movement towards effective negotiations on essential problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the democratization of methods of work, arrangements for open negotiations which can be watched by international public opinion, the participation of all States on an equal footing in the negotiations on disarmament, and the creation of sub-committees and working groups to consider various disarmament themes that have been referred to the Committee by resolutions of the United Nations." (S/C.1/1066)

More recently, working paper S/DC.187/77, submitted by Romania to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session, emphasizes the fact that

"Disarmament problems are not the concern of a limited group of States and Governments alone: they are of vital interest to all the States and peoples of the world, large or small, irrespective of their military strength and of the types of weapons they possess. It is essential that all States should participate in disarmament negotiations and in the deliberations on and adoption of measures in that sphere, and that the right of each State to defend its legitimate security and development interests should be respected in any such negotiations ...

"It is essential to increase the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, in which it should exercise direct jurisdiction over negotiation, the development of disarmament measures and the monitoring of their implementation. It is necessary that the United Nations should exercise its leadership, and its evaluation, guidance and decision-making functions, with regard to all disarmament problems."

It is on this basis that the Romanian delegation intends to set forth its views concerning the need to improve the functioning of the Committee.

Why, at bottom, is it necessary to improve the organization and the functioning of the Committee?

Admittedly, we have always emphasized that the basic reason for the unsatisfactory activity of the Committee lies in the lack of political will on the part of States to engage in substantive negotiations for the purpose of adopting effective disarmament measures.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

It is not my intention here to embark on an analysis of this phenomenon. I should simply like to note that, regardless of the explanations that have been given us, the de facto situation regarding disarmament negotiations is completely inconsistent with the commitments entered into by States in signing the Charter of the United Nations, in which they undertake to act together to maintain international peace and security and ensure the development and progress of mankind. There is today no State that has not reaffirmed its profound dedication to the Purposes and Principles of the Charter. There is, to our knowledge, no State whose declared external policy is not devoted to promoting peaceful action for the maintenance of international peace and security.

In these circumstances, the chief role of the negotiating machinery in the field of disarmament is precisely that of mobilizing and harmonizing the declared political will of States. In achieving this objective, the organizational framework in which the negotiations are carried on can prove crucial.

This is all the more true in the case of a body for multilateral negotiations, such as our Committee, designed to provide a structure capable of contributing its support to the dialogue between the parties and of being used in situations in which a mutual crisis of confidence might arise.

If I stress this fact, it is to emphasize that concern to improve the organization and functioning of the Committee on Disarmament is not an end in itself, and that change is not being sought just for the sake of change.

The Romanian delegation has repeatedly drawn attention to the need for improvements in the organization and the functioning of the work of the Committee as a political prerequisite for its effectiveness. Indeed, the Committee on Disarmament can increase its efficiency only if its structure is designed and organized in full accordance with the aim for which it was established, namely, genuine and effective involvement in the disarmament negotiations, and if its procedures and methods of work are able to contribute to the achievement of this aim.

It must therefore be stated quite openly that the position of States with regard to procedures and methods of work truly reflects their political attitude towards the authority and competence which they would like

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

to see vested in the Committee on Disarmament, as an effective forum for multilateral negotiations which represents the interests of the international community as a whole.

In view of these considerations, I listed in my statement of 2 February a series of conditions which, in the Romanian delegation's opinion, are essential for efficient and substantive work by the Committee. We had in mind: (1) the placing of the work of the Committee under the authority of the United Nations as the forum most representative of the wishes and interests of all States; (2) the general democratization of its procedures; (3) the need to take into consideration the proposals and viewpoints of all members of the Committee on a footing of equality in the formulation of the agenda, in the organization of work on a forward-looking basis and in the substantive negotiations; (4) the establishment of conditions enabling all member States to participate directly in every phase of the discussions and negotiations, and the granting of access to the Committee's work to any other interested State so that it may defend its own interests; and (5) the use, within the Committee, of open diplomacy, and the conveyance of accurate information to the public on the consequences of the arms race and on the progress of the negotiations.

I said at that time that the establishment of such conditions would be vital for the future of the Committee, which should reflect the far-reaching changes that have occurred in international relations since its establishment.

We now note with satisfaction that, in the meantime, identical or very similar points of view have been expressed by a large number of delegations, and that a large majority of the members of the Committee have, in fact, stated that they are in favour of democratic changes in the functioning of the Committee.

The working paper submitted on 17 March by the group of 15 member States of the Committee (CCD/563) contains concrete proposals which form part of the general trend towards change and improvements in the organization of the Committee's work.

We give it our full support, particularly since it reflects the need for concrete solutions to a number of problems to which the Romanian delegation has, on many occasions, drawn the Committee's attention.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

Several considerations and proposals which we support have also been submitted by the representatives of Italy and the Netherlands. The Romanian delegation is also prepared to consider in a favourable light the proposal by the Netherlands for the establishment of an international disarmament agency.

Before concluding, I should once again like to emphasize two specific questions which arise in this connexion.

The Romanian delegation has a definite preference for rotation of the chairmanship of the Committee in alphabetical order among all delegations. No chairmanship formula based on a structure of military alliances is acceptable. The Committee's experience proves that a State's actual contribution to the negotiations does not depend on the military alliances to which it belongs, but, rather, on the policies and positions which it has chosen to promote and on the extent to which its national interests coincide with the general interests of the international community. This is the only way to enable every State to make an original contribution to practical results in achieving disarmament.

My second comment relates to the argument which is often advanced, namely, that changes in the methods of work and organization of the Committee would be justified only if they led to the participation in the work of the Committee of all the nuclear-weapon States.

The nuclear-weapon States obviously have a special responsibility for the achievement of disarmament. Accordingly, we maintain that measures of nuclear disarmament must be given priority within the general framework of disarmament, and that the nuclear-weapon States must take the initiative in adopting immediate measures for disarmament; so that the materialization of their responsibility will thus take the form of practical results. This responsibility, however, must in no way conflict with the principle of the equality of States, for the participants in the international decision-making process relating to disarmament are States which are equal both from the political and legal point of view and from the point of view of their national security, regardless of their armed strength.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

That is why the necessary efforts for the democratization of the Committee are of such deep significance; they are not the result of a y particular combination of circumstances, and do not amount merely to an attempt to bring certain States into the Committee. The purpose of the measures which are required is to improve the effectiveness of the Committee and to adapt its methods of work to the fundamental changes which have taken place in international relations.

In view of the crucial importance that the negotiating machinery has in giving a new direction to the negotiations on disarmament, we are of the opinion, as recently stressed by Nicolae Ceausescu, the President of Romania, that "the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament must adopt practical measures and recommendations which are primarily of an organizational nature and which will facilitate the immediate adoption of specific agreements on disarmament."

Mr. ZÁPOTOCKÝ (Czechoslovakia): In my today's statement I wish to dwell on two questions which are by their substance closely related to each other: the draft treaty on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of WMD, and the draft treaty on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, distribution and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons.

It is natural that the idea of the prohibition of new mass destruction weapons and the prevention of an ever increasing employment of scientific achievements for the creation of an ever greater destructive means of war have found wide support, expressed, inter alia, by resolutions 32/84 and 32/84 A adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-second session. Discussions in our Committee with the participation of experts have shown that there certainly are fields of research and technological development where new knowledge could be used in the near future for the creation of new weapons of mass destruction. Several kinds of radiation have been discussed, in particular those where an ever increasing knowledge about their harmful effects on the human organism exists, and where also technological development progresses very swiftly.

(Mr. Zépotocký, Czechoslovakia)

It seems that there is general agreement in the Committee that the necessity to prevent the misuse of scientific achievements for the development of new mass-destruction weapons is very pressing and unavoidable. We are convinced that a comprehensive ban is the most realistic way to make the treaty on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction an effective instrument of prevention.

At the same time, we are ready to consider the possibility of negotiating on individual newly identified WMD to reach that aim.

The preventive role of the treaty should be understood at least in two aspects of the relationship between scientific progress and the arms race: firstly, the results of science should primarily serve the progress, and not the destruction, of humanity. Secondly, research and technical development are, at the present stage, among the main factors of the arms race, which must be unconditionally stopped. The danger of scientific discoveries being used for purposes of developing new types of WMD is certainly a reality. Consequently, a comprehensive ban on the development and manufacture of new types and systems of WMD is, in our opinion, the main possible way to limit the technological arms race and eliminate such a danger.

The definition of the possible area of the ban, included in the draft agreement submitted by the Soviet Union at the last summer session (CCD/511/Rev.1), undoubtedly created a realistic basis for negotiations. We believe that the new Soviet proposal to establish an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to consider this basic question in as concrete terms as possible will be an effective way to narrow the existing divergences of views, thus speeding up the work of the Committee and facilitating the elaboration of the treaty. For these reasons, the Czechoslovak delegation supports the proposal and is ready to participate in the work of the group.

It has been already emphasized here that, in addition to weapons based on new scientific principles, the ban should also cover weapons based on principles already known but converted into new dangerous weapons by introducing new technical elements. This seems to be exactly the case of the neutron weapon, undoubtedly representing a new generation of nuclear weapons.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is one of the co-authors of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapon submitted on 9 March 1978, and we deem it necessary to clarify our position on that question.

(Mr. Zápotocký, Czechoslovakia)

It is clear that the draft treaty on the prohibition of the neutron weapon solves merely one question of the complicated complex of problems concerning the nuclear arms race, where our position recognizes the necessity of gradual reduction of the number of nuclear weapons until their complete removal. At today's stage it is, however, rather a key question. We have been told here that the term "neutron weapon" is not a correct one, and that its precise characteristics is "the reduced-blast, enhanced-radiation weapon". The term "neutron weapon" is more or less colloquial, but nevertheless a short one and generally accepted. The so-called precise characteristics express, however, only a partial truth and rather reflect the wishes of the weapon's defenders than its factual characteristic features.

The term "increased radiation" actually does not express the fact that this concerns a radiation different by the number of fast neutrons which have ten times higher biological effects than the gamma radiation. It means that -- besides immediate effects analogical to other nuclear weapons -- many of its targets will suffer from a particularly serious radiation sickness lasting for weeks and months, from which death is rather a deliverance. And what is probably most important, grave effects on genetic tissue transfer the damage also to future generations.

As to the military employment of the neutron weapon, we have been told that it is a defensive weapon aimed primarily against tanks, and that it is a weapon only an aggressor could be afraid of. The European area has been mentioned here not only as an example but rather as a direct culprit, because of whom the weapon had to be developed.

There are nations in Europe living beside each other which have selected different political and social systems -- various States belonging to various political and military groupings. The two biggest groupings, as is well known, have considerable stocks of nuclear weapons, the destructive effects of which would certainly be tremendous. We have lived with this knowledge and do everything to prevent those weapons ever being used, and to do without its deterrent significance. But if there is such a situation -- and in some countries there are forces which might not hesitate before armed conflict in which neutron weapons would be used -- can anybody imagine that the other side would not reply in the same kind? Is it at all possible not to see that it is exactly Europe with its extraordinary density of population where the neutron weapon, if used on its territory, would be really a suicidal weapon?

(Mr. Zápotocký, Czechoslovakia)

Doubts have been expressed here whether the introduction of neutron weapon means greater danger of nuclear conflict by the reduction of the difference between the conventional and nuclear weapons. In our view, that is not only a very clear fact, but it is among the main military and political characteristics of the neutron weapon. It is also very clear that the possible introduction of neutron weapon -- which cannot but be qualified as a clear attempt at intervention in the existing approximate balance of forces in Europe -- would cause another round of the arms race and would force not only the European countries but all countries substantially to increase their military expenditures, if only because they would like to have ready the corresponding means of defence.

Further, we are afraid that it would be naïve to believe the defenders of the neutron weapon when they say that it is a defensive weapon. On the contrary, it is a highly effective aggressive weapon, having an advantage, for example, in "small wars" against nations which have no means of nuclear retaliation and are not able to defend themselves adequately. It might be effective and could play a very negative role in possible local military conflicts in any part of the world.

The ambassador of the United States, Mr. Martin, stated some time ago in this Committee that the United States Government considers miniaturized nuclear weapons as weapons of mass destruction in any case. The distinguished representative of the United States in our Committee, Ambassador Fisher, has confirmed this position of his Government in relation to the neutron weapon. My delegation, while considering the neutron weapon also as a new type of weapon of mass destruction, has noted these statements with some satisfaction, because they seemed to be on the way towards approaching the problem of the neutron bomb from a direction which recognized its serious significance for European and world security. We consider, however, as contradictory to that position any efforts to use the danger of the production and deployment of neutron weapons as a means of negotiation instead of taking a concrete decision to ban the production and military deployment of neutron weapons within the framework of international agreement. In this connexion, we note with regret the statement of President Carter rejecting the recent Soviet declaration that the USSR will not start the production of neutron bomb unless the United States decides to do so. As to the Committee on Disarmament, it is our belief that the adoption of a treaty on the prohibition of the neutron weapon would fully correspond with its mission.

Mr. MARÍN (Mexico): As representative of the Depositary Government of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, or Treaty of Tlatelolco, my delegation feels deep satisfaction in placing on record our great appreciation of the statement made two days ago, on Tuesday, 25 April of this year, by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, with respect to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. In his statement, Chairman Brezhnev announced that the Soviet Union intended to accede to that instrument.

To realize the importance of this undertaking we have only to recall that the States Parties to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to which the nuclear-weapon States may accede, undertake, inter alia, to respect fully the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the provisions of the said Treaty, and also undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting States of the Treaty.

Once the accession of the Soviet Union to Additional Protocol II comes into effect, all the States to which the instrument is open will be Parties thereto. In this way, one of the most important requirements of article 28, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Tlatelolco will have been met.

Lastly, for those who have followed the discussions regarding this question both in CCD and in the First Committee of the General Assembly, the announcement made by the First Representative of the Soviet Union cannot fail to have a very special significance.

The CHAIRMAN: As there is no other speaker, and as Chairman of the day, I would like to draw the attention of the Committee to a revised text of the draft decision originally proposed by the delegation of Sweden concerning "Terms of reference for the continued work of the CCD Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events".

I have been informed that this revised text is a result of informal consultations involving several delegations, and I will now read out the full text of the proposed decision.

(The Chairman)

"Recognizing the valuable and important work carried out by the Ad Hoc Group and presented to the CCD in its report of 14 March (CCD/558), taking note of the suggestion by the Ad Hoc Group to conduct additional work, and also of a similar suggestion by the Japanese delegation (CCD/PV.776), CCD decides that the Ad Hoc Group continues its work by studying scientific and methodological principles of a possible experimental testing of a global network of seismological stations, which can be established in the future in conformity with the tasks of the international exchange of seismological data under the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The studies should include the working out of instructions and specifications of the following items:

- Data to be routinely produced at participating stations (level I data);
- Data format and procedures for level I data transmission through WIO communication network;
- Procedures to be used for data analysis at data centres;
- Format and procedures for the exchange of wave form data (level II data).

The organization and procedures of the work of this Group remain the same as they were defined in the decision of the Committee of 22 July 1976. The Ad Hoc Group will hold its first meeting under its new mandate during the week beginning 17 July 1978. The Group should present a progress report after each of its sessions. The Group should report the results of its work to the Committee during its spring session of 1979. After considering the final report of the Ad Hoc Group, the Committee will consider the question of desirability of carrying out an experimental exercise."

It is my understanding that the Committee may wish to take a decision on the proposal at its next meeting on Tuesday, 2 May 1978.

Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands): I have no comment on the communiqué, Mr. Chairman, but would like to make a remark concerning the draft mandate for the seismic group. My delegation would have preferred a different date for the first meeting, that is 24 July, one week later, for practical reasons.

Perhaps the Committee could take this into consideration when we discuss the mandate next week.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished delegate of the Netherlands. Your point will be noted.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.