

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.673
17 July 1975
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 17 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ali Skalli

(Morocco)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. L. PEREIRA DA FONSECA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. I. PETROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A.D. ROWE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. SOJÁK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. N. ELARABY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H.-J. MICHEEL Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. H. THIELICKE
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J. BAUCH Mr. K. HANNESSCHLÄGER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B.C. MISHRA Mr. P.R. SOOD
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. H. AMERI Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY

<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
	Mr. G. VALDEVIT
	Mr. A. BIZZARINI
	Mr. G. SCHIAVONI
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. M. NISIBORI
	Mr. A. YATABE
	Mr. H. OKA
	Mr. H. OKITSU
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. M. MARÍN
	Miss A. CABRERA
	Mr. M. CÁCERES
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. A. SKALLI
	Mr. S. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. C.A. van der KLAUW
	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. M. SAMAKI
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. YUNUS
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. G. CHAUNY
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. S. TOPA
	Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. V. TUDOR
	Mr. M. ROSIANU
	Mr. C. IVASCU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. G. HAMILTON
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. L.N. ANISIMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. M. ALLEN
Mr. J.G. TAYLOR
Mr. A. WHITE
Mr. C. McCOLL

United States of America:

Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. D. WESTERVELT
Mr. M. CHRISTOPHER
Mr. J. SHEA
Mr. D. THOMPSON

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIĆ
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ
Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Acting Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held its 673rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Ali Skalli, representative of Morocco.

Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The delegations of Canada, Japan and Sweden submitted a "Working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference held 14-19 April 1975 to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means" (CCD/457).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 22 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. ROWE (Canada): In my delegation's statement at the Committee's opening meeting on 6 March this year (PV/656), I reviewed the issues to be faced during this session. One of these issues was the great importance that we continue to attach to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. At that time we particularly referred to the interest of other countries in participating in an exchange of scientific data, especially seismological and geophysical, location and identification of nuclear underground explosions, and noted that a meeting of experts from Canada, Japan and Sweden would be held shortly. This meeting took place in Canada on 14-19 April and was the second informal conference of this group of experts.

The first meeting took place in Tokyo in June 1972, and its results were reported to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in a joint paper of our three delegations tabled by my distinguished colleague from Japan as document CCD/376.

It is now my honour to submit on behalf of my Swedish and Japanese colleagues a working paper (CCD/457) summarizing the current status of the research and development programmes of each of our countries in the field of seismological detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

Of particular interest during the meeting in Ottawa were discussions of studies which examined the possibilities of hiding seismic signals from nuclear explosions in signals from nearby earthquakes and of earthquake simulation using multiple nuclear explosions. The experts agreed that the measures described in the protocol to the treaty between the United States and the USSR on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons testing have considerable significance for seismological verification research. I hope this paper will encourage continued high interest in resolving the technical problems of achieving a comprehensive test ban.

Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): As is explicit from its title, the working paper which has just been introduced and referred to by the delegates of Canada and Sweden concerns the report of the conference held in Ottawa this April by the seismological experts of the three countries with a view to promoting trilateral co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means.

At this conference, the seismologists of the three countries reviewed among other things the past, present, and future of the verification research projects. Apart from the valuable contributions made by the scientists of Canada and Sweden, our experts reported that a high performance seismograph (HGLP) has recently been installed in

(Mr. Nisibori, Japan)

Matsushiro, and its capability is expected to be twice as strong as that of the conventional seismograph in detecting surface waves. They suggested a new approach for increasing accuracy in the estimation of focal depths by the use of surface-reflected waves (p^p , sp); and reported on a joint study with Sweden concerning the discrimination of Soviet earthquakes and explosions using surface wave-body wave magnitude ratios.

This working paper is a testimony to the steady progress being made in the field of verification by seismological means. It also gives the assurance that such progress will continue to be made in future by means of direct exchanges of expert scientific personnel between the institutions and through the implementation of the measures agreed on at the conference.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): It might not be a surprise to anyone that my first statement at this summer session of the CCD will be devoted to the continuous and increasingly serious problem of nuclear arms, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and nuclear disarmament, so long, and I would say too patiently, waited for. I want, as a matter of course, to dwell to some extent on the results of the Conference on the Review of the NPT, speaking here and now as the Swedish chief delegate to the CCD.

Before doing so, however, I want to say a few words in connexion with the working paper (CCD/457) on co-operation in detection seismology between Canada, Japan and Sweden, introduced today by the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. Rowe. My Government has over the years supported scientific research in Sweden in this field. We attach great importance to international co-operation, and appreciated, therefore, the Japanese initiative in 1972 to establish special research co-operation between research institutes active in this field in our three countries. The initiative certainly has led to the desired co-operation, and in April this year our scientists were invited to Ottawa to review results obtained and to set out new tasks. Our scientists have enjoyed effective co-operation with their Japanese and Canadian colleagues, and a number of research reports have already been presented to the CCD recording further clarification of and solutions to the problems involved in monitoring a complete test ban. We look forward to continued co-operation in this way. It is therefore a pleasure for us to co-sponsor this working paper CCD/457. I should also add that our scientists were much impressed by the scientific resources available in this field to the Canadian Government in Ottawa and by the remarkable array station in Yellowknife in the high North, visited through Canadian hospitality.

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We have reason to recall that yesterday was the thirtieth anniversary of history's first atomic blast. This apocalyptic event stirred a development that has been carried to continuously unsurpassed and inconceivable levels of destructive capability through the use of scientific ingenuity and technological skills and a waste of material resources on ever-expanding nuclear arsenals.

Was there anyone who had entertained hopes that in conducting their disarmament talks, the nuclear-weapon super-Powers would let reason and common sense prevail, by arriving, after years of pledges and promises, at genuine results in terms of nuclear disarmament long overdue, that they would be eager to show to the world, thereby, that they did not look at their commitment under the NPT, article VI, as a simple scrap of paper, which could be whisked away with a reference to ongoing negotiations, but as a serious pledge to stop the nuclear arms race at an early date and to produce those genuine results?

Yes, there were such persons, there were indeed such States. This might in retrospect seem a little naïve. We should long ago have learnt by experience that political realities as conceived by the super-Powers and not by the rest of the world, dictate the rules of international negotiations. We would not for a moment deny the importance of the fact that the two super-Powers entertain strategic arms limitation talks. But the fact is that these talks are bilateral and based on their concepts of world realities. This is what makes the super-Powers believe that each and every armament problem facing mankind today can best be solved, if solved at all, through bilateral talks between them, presenting the results to us as finished products, when they consider, for various reasons, the time ripe and appropriate. This is what makes them continue the nuclear arms race in spite of repeated talks of arms limitations. This is what makes them devote astronomic sums to research and development efforts to produce new and increasingly ingenious weapon systems, the latest of which is feared to establish a first strike capability. This is what makes us all live under the threat of a nuclear arms strategy, implying the possibility of first use of tactical nuclear weapons in areas of the world where this would cause unlimited, yes, total destruction.

Naïve questions were put to the super-Powers at the NPT Review Conference, naïve statements were made on that occasion, naïve proposals were submitted, in the common interest of mankind. I believe that I speak not only for myself, my own Government and my own country when I say, in all seriousness, to the super-Powers: we shall continue to put perhaps naïve but, hopefully, embarrassing and challenging questions to you. We

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shall continue to expose you to the strongest possible pressure to answer such questions. For you should not be allowed to bury ideas, suggestions, proposals and draft texts submitted by us, who are not super-Powers, in the secrecy of your bilateral talks, while asserting that these talks are nobody's business but your own. For you should not be allowed to turn the nuclear armament spiral one or several rounds upwards only in order to put yourself in a better bargaining position, while the world is crying out for nuclear disarmament.

I would like to assure you that if I have used, and will continue to use, rather harsh words in speaking of the domineering way in which the super-Powers use their military power and might, a phenomenon which should have long outlived itself in our age and in our interdependent world, it is because of what is known of the widespread support of the call for exactly the opposite: significant arms reductions, particularly in the nuclear field, restraint in arms trade, intensification of efforts to achieve permanent arms control, the effective turning of swords into ploughshares.

Against this background, would it surprise anyone that the overwhelming majority of States participating in the NPT Review Conference urgently requested the super-Powers finally to meet their obligations under article VI of the Treaty? As I said, with the moderation suited to my position, when summing up the general debate at the conference:

"It seems to me that an enlightened world opinion, reflected in this case in statements by non-nuclear-weapon States, rather impatiently awaits concrete and binding results of on-going bilateral negotiations, aiming at ending the quantitative and qualitative arms race and reducing substantially the levels of nuclear armaments." (NPT/CONF/26, p.2)

Much has been said of the results of the Review Conference, an event which was called, by some, the most important in 30 years of disarmament history. It has been called a failure, both by participants and observers. I would say, in all frankness, that the Conference achieved what was realistically possible. If it brought the super-Powers one inch towards a more clear understanding of what the world expects of them, it was worth-while efforts and costs. For what was a failure was not the Conference, but the way in which the super-Powers proved themselves unable to show the world not only their genuine will but also their capacity for disarmament.

Thus, as from now, and during the follow-up of the Review Conference, we, the non-aligned non-nuclear-weapon States, shall have to continue and increase our political and moral pressure on the super-Powers. We shall have to continue to give voice to our

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deep concern and growing impatience with the present situation. We shall have to make the super-Powers understand that their bilateral negotiations are indeed our business, because their outcome will affect the fate of all of us. We shall have to make them understand that we expect results, soon, of their talks, which will imply not a raising but a significant lowering of armament ceilings.

As is well known, there is one disarmament matter which, according to a decision by the United Nations General Assembly, has the highest priority on the CCD agenda, which is being referred to in deferential terms now and again but on which very little progress, if any, has been made for 12 years now. I am referring, of course, to the comprehensive test ban. It is our intention not to allow this matter to be buried beneath the threshold of any partial underground test ban treaty, as -- contrary to any such ban -- the CTB is the single most decisive step towards nuclear disarmament that could be taken, a step to be greeted with joy and relief all over the world, a step in the way of which there are no technical difficulties that could be accepted as an excuse not to take it. I therefore want to bring to light again the Swedish working paper CCD/348 of September 1971 as well as the nine delegations' joint memorandum CCD/354 of September 1971, on a comprehensive test ban treaty. As might be recalled by some around this negotiating table, the working paper CCD/348 contains a draft text of a treaty banning all underground nuclear weapon tests, thus making for a complete test ban. With the intention to initiate a full and concrete discussion on the many aspects of such a treaty, leading up to renewed negotiations on this urgent matter, I am considering to propose that the CCD call an expert meeting, to be held during its spring session 1976, on the remaining problems still considered to be in the way towards the discontinuance of all test explosions in all environments.

There is, I think, general agreement that with respect to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the recommendations contained in the final declaration of the Review Conference represented real progress. Let me mention just a few points. We are satisfied that the Conference urged the strengthening, in all achievable ways, of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in connexion with commercial transactions between supplier countries and recipient countries not Party to the NPT. We welcome the request that concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit be elaborated within IAEA and the call to all States engaged in peaceful nuclear activities to enter into such international agreements and arrangements that might be necessary to ensure such protection. We attach considerable importance to the suggestions for establishing regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres.

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I emphasize these particular points against the background of the ideas and suggestions regarding comprehensive international co-operation to prevent effectively any diversion of nuclear material from rapidly expanding nuclear energy programmes that I put forward on behalf of the Swedish Government here in the CCD about a year ago. It is our hope and belief that what is said in the final declaration of the Review Conference represents the first step towards some kind of international management of fissile material, assisting in efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear explosive technology as well as diversion of fissile material. We for our part are going to continue to discuss these matters and develop our ideas further in various international forums, and we pledge our full and devoted co-operation in and assistance for any such efforts.

Press reports have reached us indicating that a number of countries suppliers of nuclear facilities have met recently to discuss further measures to increase control and safeguard mechanisms in accordance with certain standards. As a country deeply concerned at the serious side-effects of nuclear technology, we appreciate the efforts thus reportedly made, although we have no information as to their scope and content.

In the light of these reported efforts, we find it disquieting, to say the least, that meanwhile immense commercial deals are concluded, involving the provision not only of nuclear reactors but also of all the facilities to complete the nuclear fuel cycle, thereby in reality enabling the recipient country to develop nuclear weapons capability. This affair again, but with uncommon force, brings to mind doubts whether the NPT-safeguards, not to speak of the original IAEA-safeguards, really are sufficient to contain the spread of nuclear energy technology in its hoped-for civilian limits. To avoid any misunderstanding here, I want to stress that I say this without address to the particular countries involved. I say it in response to my own doubts that our present nuclear energy regime really is sufficient, something I have said repeatedly before.

In view of the fact that the supplier country is a party to the NPT and was a participant in the Review Conference, I do, however, hope that it might be presumed that this country has kept in mind the Conference request -- which it has supported -- that export requirements include the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not party to the Treaty. Even better would it have been if the country in question had adhered to suggestions made for a moratorium on transfers

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of this kind, to give time for the implementation of the Conference recommendation -- also supported by that country -- for the establishment of regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres.

In concluding my comments on the outcome of the NPT Review Conference, I want to put on record my hope that all non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty will adhere to what is said in the final declaration in its review of article VIII. In doing so, we would ensure a procedure intended to keep, for the remaining years of the 1970s, the non-proliferation issue on the agenda of the international disarmament community, thus to utilize every opportunity to exert continuous pressure in order to stop vertical nuclear proliferation as well as further nuclear weapons tests.

We all know that in our efforts to stop nuclear arms proliferation of any kind and to establish a world free from nuclear arms, the heart of the matter, the real problem to overcome, is the belief in those arms as a supposed means to assert political power, to exert political influence. The political status-value thus attached to the possession of nuclear arms, or even nuclear explosive capability, is of course, one main reason for the resentment felt against the nuclear-weapon States for refusing to give up something themselves which they try to keep others from acquiring. Status, political power and influence must be effectively dissociated from the possession of nuclear arms. I look indeed forward to the day when the continuance of such a possession is a sign of weakness and lack of morals; when States in this category are considered politically inferior to those which have foresworn that possession.

But, alas, from here to there is a long way to travel. Much of the news of the day compounds a sinister confirmation of the political importance still attached to this horrible means of warfare and seems, incredibly enough, to negate, again, the hope that it will never be used as an instrument of foreign policy, for what else is at stake, when, against the background of huge arsenals of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and elsewhere, the leaders of one of the super-Powers repeatedly confirm their consistent refusal to rule out first use of nuclear weapons as a response to a massive attack with conventional weapons? What else is at stake, when new weapons or weapon systems are developed which seem to "take on a life of their own" and which seem to result in a need for new policies and strategics instead of the other way around, out of the sheer momentum of advances in military technology? What else is at stake, when we see again the proposition to replace higher-yield weapons now deployed in Europe with accurately delivered low-yield nuclear weapons?

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We remain unconvinced that these developments are likely to make nuclear war unthinkable and therefore impossible. We remain unconvinced that there is anything, in a world of realities, which can be called limited nuclear war by its victims or anything which by those victims will be called discriminate use of nuclear weapons. We remain firmly convinced that there is one alternative only to nuclear destruction: effective nuclear disarmament leading up to a world free of nuclear arms.

For this reason, we are determined not to be impressed with the rhetoric of the super-Powers' military planners and strategists, nor paralysed in our efforts by the political and military hegemony of these Powers. We are going to face them with the legitimate request, over and over again, that they respond in action and practical results to the universal cry for disarmament, as a means of substituting progress towards genuine peace for the possibility of catastrophic disaster. For it is they who carry the main responsibility for such a process leading up to human survival in decency and dignity. At the second NPT Review Conference we do indeed expect them to prove to the world the effective start of that process.

Mr. ALLEN (United Kingdom): Let me first welcome to our deliberations this session the new representative of Egypt, Ambassador Osman, and the new representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Wakwaya Berhanu. We are sure that they will make a substantial contribution to the CCD's deliberations.

May I also say how pleased we are in my delegation to see here Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the President of the late NPT Review Conference. We have listened with great seriousness to her important statement.

All of us, I think, still have very much in mind the results of the recent Review Conference on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. What did the Conference achieve? Most people had foreseen that the Conference would reveal differences between the parties, on the question how far the provisions of the Treaty had been carried out. But it seems to us that in the final Declaration the Conference demonstrated that these differences are differences of timing and emphasis rather than of principle. We also consider that the reservations which some Governments found it necessary to make did not detract from the significance of the Conference's unanimous statement. The Declaration was far from perfect. In particular, in our view, it did not sufficiently emphasize the importance of the Treaty as a whole. And we had hoped for a stronger statement that the best form of security assurance is universal adherence to the NPT. Nevertheless,

(Mr. Allen, United Kingdom)

we believe that the final Declaration presented a clear statement of the basic issues, and that it demonstrated that over and above their differences the parties intend to work to strengthen the Treaty and to ensure that the rights and obligations of all parties are honoured.

The Conference itself, as an event, is now behind us. But it would be a great mistake to think that we can now remove the subject of nuclear proliferation from our list of priorities. As the distinguished representative of the Netherlands said on 24 June (CCD/PV.666), the Review Conference has shown how much needs to be done; and the CCD will have an important role to play in furthering the objectives set out in the final Declaration of the Review Conference.

That Review Conference concerned perhaps the most important arms control treaty. It may be opportune to remind the Committee that under the terms of article VII of the Sea-Bed Treaty a review conference of the parties to that Treaty is due to be held here in Geneva in 1977. We assume that preliminary work on the preparations for this review conference will have to be set in train at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. In the view of my delegation, the preliminary arrangements for the Sea-Bed Treaty Review Conference can be simpler than those for the NPT Review Conference. Perhaps we should envisage only one Preparatory Committee meeting, to be held late in 1976.

The CCD has a very full programme this session. We have to report to the forthcoming session of the General Assembly, not only on the subjects which have been before us for some years, but also on the three new items that the Assembly remitted to us last December. I understand that the ad hoc group of Governmental experts considering nuclear-free zones is making good progress. I hope that their report will be available to us early next month. My Government attaches importance to this study and hopes that the report will contribute to a greater understanding of the issues involved in the creation of effective nuclear-free zones. We hope that the study will assist those States seeking to establish NFZs in their approach to these issues.

My delegation will participate in the informal meetings next month on environmental modification and I hope we shall be able to report significant progress to the General Assembly on this subject too.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) requested the Committee to include a section on PNEs in its report on a Comprehensive Test Ban. That resolution also invited us to take into account the views of the IAEA. We are following with

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interest the informal meeting of Government experts which is taking place on the arms control aspects of PNEs. The relevance of PNEs to a CTB is clearly important to our work here. However, it would be premature to reach firm conclusions when work on this problem is still under discussion in the IAEA and between the United States and the USSR in the context of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

The IAEA has in recent years given careful consideration to the question of PNEs. It has organized technical seminars; it has considered in depth the question of feasibility and cost of PNEs; and it has drawn up carefully considered guidelines on ways in which observation of PNEs might be carried out under an international agreement. We support the view expressed by the NPT Review Conference that the IAEA is the "appropriate international body" referred to in article V of the NPT through which potential benefits from the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any NNWS. The final Declaration of the Review Conference also urged the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussions could take place and through which advice could be given on the Agency's work in the field of PNEs. We are glad that the Board of Governors of the Agency has responded promptly to this request by adopting a resolution, sponsored by my country together with Australia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Thailand, setting up an Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.

I believe that other delegations will agree that the arms control aspects of PNEs, important though they may become, cannot be considered in isolation from the one well-known problem, verification, which still needs to be solved in connexion with a Comprehensive Test Ban. In this context I would draw attention to one point in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference. A passage in the Declaration expresses the hope "that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue" (i.e. a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) (NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, p.8). The Review Conference thus recognized that technical difficulties in the way of a comprehensive test ban remain to be solved. My delegation has in the past tabled several papers by United Kingdom experts on the possibilities of overcoming these problems by the use of seismological techniques. During the current session we intend to present a further paper, on the limited possibilities of using multiple explosions to circumvent a test ban. In this connexion I welcome the joint working paper to be submitted by the delegations of Japan, Canada and Sweden.

(Mr. Allen, United Kingdom)

Three weeks ago, at the ceremony celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General addressed a most urgent appeal to all nations, great and small, nuclear and non-nuclear, to exercise unilateral restraint, to slow down their arms races, and to limit the traffic in arms. He urged us, as a matter of priority, to broaden the scope and intensify the pace of our efforts to negotiate truly effective arms control and disarmament agreements. He described as particularly disturbing the startling increase in recent years of the international traffic in arms and called for restraint by both exporting and importing countries in the true interests of both.

This is therefore perhaps an opportune moment to refer to the statement by my distinguished colleague Mr. Martin on 10 April (CCD/PV.665). In it he put forward some thought-provoking ideas on how this Committee might contribute to the evolution of principles for restraint in conventional weapons, aimed both at increasing the security of States and at quickening the pace of economic progress.

Like Mr. Martin, we see hopeful prospects in a regional approach to conventional arms control.

There are clearly fundamental factors which will determine, first, whether the international community can arrive at principles to guide external support for regional initiatives; and, secondly, whether principles, once defined and endorsed, can be made to work by individual Governments in actual situations. One such factor is the difficulty of finding a widely acceptable understanding of individual countries' minimum security requirements. Another is the need for all Governments, whether suppliers or potential purchasers of arms, to make known their readiness to co-operate. For these reasons we look forward to hearing the views of all members of the CCD so that, together, we can see how to develop our discussion more productively than proved possible on earlier occasions. I propose therefore at this stage to offer only general comment on the four principles which Mr. Martin outlined on 10 April.

The first principle suggested by Mr. Martin was that every State should assume responsibility for ensuring that the arms it acquires or transfers will not adversely affect regional or international security. I think I can fairly say that as an arms exporter my Government recognizes and seeks to exercise this responsibility. It is our policy to examine each case on its merits, in the light of all the relevant economic, political, strategic and security factors.

(Mr. Allen, United Kingdom)

The second principle concerned consultations between an arms-acquiring State and any neighbours who might feel their security to be threatened by the proposed acquisition. Such consultations may well be useful in individual cases and could help to reduce arms competition and any consequent increase in tension. But enshrining this concept in a universal principle might appear to some people to constitute an infringement of national sovereignty, by conferring on one country a right to interfere in another's defence planning and arms procurement. We have only to recall the fate of a draft resolution tabled at the 1968 session of the United Nations General Assembly on a possible international register of arms transfers to realize how a well-intentioned proposal, in a sensitive area seen as affecting national sovereignty, can hamper progress.

Mr. Martin's third suggested principle refers to the need for economic progress. This need is increasingly recognized as fundamental to the achievement of national objectives, including that of national security. We should certainly aim to encourage Governments in this fashion to weigh the allocation of scarce resources so that the very minimum required for national security goes to arms procurement. But here again the determination of relative priorities remains essentially a question for individual States, not outsiders, to decide.

The fourth principle suggested was that each State should apply the same review procedures for the transfer of arms production capability as for the transfer of arms themselves. This would be a logical extension of the other three. My Government certainly treats the transfer of know-how in much the same way as the direct sale of weapons. In most cases it is not possible to dissociate the supply of technology from the supply of parts and associated equipment which remain subject to government control. In many cases the technology involved is also the result of government-financed projects. Problems may also arise where technology or equipment has both civil and military applications.

My delegation hopes Mr. Martin's "Four Principles" will stimulate discussion in the CCD on this vital subject. We all share a responsibility to examine his ideas carefully to see if they can be developed further as a means of promoting collective self-restraint on conventional arms.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): First I should like to join previous speakers in welcoming the new representatives to the CCD, Ambassador Osman of Egypt and Ambassador Berhanu of Ethiopia. We wish them good luck and are looking forward to a fruitful co-operation between our delegations.

Two days ago the Soviet Union and the United States launched successfully their two space crafts "Soyuz" and "Apollo". We congratulate the USSR and the United States on this joint operation. We consider this to be a symbol of the fact that it is also quite possible to use the latest achievements of science and technology for peaceful purposes in the co-operation between States of different social orders. This joint experiment is an important contribution to the promotion of international co-operation and to space research. The problem of the use of the achievements of science and technology for peaceful purposes is closely linked with our discussion of the agenda item "arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions".

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic has studied with great attention the working papers submitted and it has taken note with interest of the interventions of several delegations and of the statements of experts concerning the problems of peaceful nuclear explosions. Many questions were raised in this connexion, and reference was also made to the difficulties and the complexity of the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

In this context I should like to outline our point of view on some basic questions related to these problems, as far as -- to my mind -- this seems to be important for the fulfilment of the CCD's task.

First we proceed from the fact that, in accordance with resolution 3261 D (XXIX) of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament was instructed to include in its report to the General Assembly a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and in so doing, to take account of the views of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In our view, the main task consists in guaranteeing that peaceful nuclear explosions do not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Therefore, we consider the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions in close connexion with the consolidation of the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). We think that the NPT contains the basic international regulations for the execution of peaceful nuclear explosions in

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

non-nuclear-weapon States. The strict observance of this Treaty, in accordance with articles I and II, guarantees the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of other nuclear explosive devices. At the same time, article V of the Treaty permits non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty to benefit by the peaceful use of nuclear explosions since they get the opportunity to apply peaceful nuclear explosions by means of services of nuclear-weapon States.

In this connexion we should like to point to the proposal made by the USSR at the NPT Review Conference as well as to the corresponding statement contained in the Final Declaration of the Conference according to which any potential benefits of PNEs could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States even if they are not Party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services, provided by nuclear-weapon States in accordance with Article V of the NPT. If these stipulations are realized, there is no need for a non-nuclear-weapon State to produce nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes itself. Furthermore we think that another possibility to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons by means of PNEs is the strict observance of article III of the NPT. In this connexion we should like to stress the statement contained in the Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference according to which the States Party to the NPT are requested to strengthen common export requirements relating to safeguards, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty. The States Party to the NPT bear a special responsibility for that.

In our view, it is necessary to strictly implement and strengthen the NPT. All States should participate in this action. This would be the best way to prevent the misuse of peaceful nuclear explosions for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another fact which we want to underline is that we consider the IAEA to be the appropriate international body through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. It is a matter of fact that in recent years the IAEA has acquired important experience and deployed large activities in the practical realization of article III of the NPT.

For several years the IAEA has dealt very intensely with the problems of peaceful nuclear explosions and has created the practical preconditions for the realization of article V of the NPT. We should like to underline here the "Guidelines for the international observation by the Agency of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under the provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or analogous provisions in other international agreements".

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In our view, these guidelines constitute an essential guarantee that in the course of peaceful nuclear explosions in non-nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with article V of the NPT, articles I and II of the Treaty are not violated.

This leads us to the conclusion that the IAEA should -- in co-operation with nuclear-weapon States on the basis of corresponding agreements -- co-ordinate, lead and supervise the performance of peaceful nuclear explosions in non-nuclear-weapon States. We could state with satisfaction that the majority of delegations who have spoken so far, shared this opinion. It is now necessary to strengthen the IAEA and to make use of its possibilities.

The problems of peaceful nuclear explosions as they are discussed here underline the necessity to achieve further progress on the road towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. The conclusion of such a treaty to which all nuclear-weapon States should accede could contribute to a corresponding settlement of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. Therefore, it is very desirable that the efforts for the conclusion of such a treaty should be increased.

In this connexion we also welcome the negotiations between the USSR and the United States for the conclusion of an agreement on PNEs in accordance with the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests.

In conclusion I should like to state that -- in our view -- it will be necessary for the CCD and other competent organs to continue to attach due attention to the military aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Mr. ROSCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): One of the questions directly connected with the discoveries in the field of nuclear physics which have led to the creation of nuclear weapons is the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Pursuant to a request made by the United Nations General Assembly, this problem is being considered by the Committee on Disarmament. The General Assembly resolution on this question calls for its consideration in direct connexion with the elaboration of effective measures for halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Committee should consider the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions in relation to the realization of this objective. It ought therefore to discuss the political questions arising from the working out of this problem in conjunction with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and safeguarding international security as a whole.

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Accordingly, the Disarmament Committee ought to conduct its consideration of this problem in such a way as to combine it with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their testing. Since the technical aspects of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions are mainly a matter for study by IAEA, the appropriate competent international organization, primary attention in the Disarmament Committee should be given, as we remarked earlier, to problems of a political nature.

The solution of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is linked to the task of disarmament -- the creation of a firm régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is concerned with this problem, and also provides for safeguarding the interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in the matter of access to the benefits to be derived from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions.

To solve the problem of strengthening the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime is one of the aims which States have to set themselves in their efforts to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This problem was also dealt with by the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held at Geneva in May this year. The Conference gave considerable attention to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Declaration adopted by the Conference contains provisions to the effect that the benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions may be enjoyed, in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by any non-nuclear-weapon State, irrespective of whether it is or is not a party to the Treaty. At the same time it is emphasized that access to such benefits should not lead to any spread of capability to produce nuclear explosive devices.

The above-mentioned Conference also determined that, within the framework of the non-proliferation régime, IAEA is the appropriate international body through which the potential benefits to be derived from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions can be made available to any State which does not possess nuclear weapons. This position of the Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is in full accord with the recommendation adopted at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, which notes that "the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with its statute, is an appropriate organ to exercise the functions of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (resolution 2829 (XXVI)).

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The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions and the implementation, in that connexion, of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides, in particular, for the conclusion of a special international agreement or agreements through which non-nuclear-weapon States could obtain the benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions. The USSR is conducting a programme of scientific research and design work on the subject of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and is actively participating in the preparatory steps to provide services in that respect, in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, the Soviet side considers that peaceful nuclear explosions should be carried out in full harmony with the need to stop the arms race and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It takes the view that the procedure for carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions should be a constituent and integral part of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet Union also supports the view that IAEA is the international body through which non-nuclear-weapon States should be helped to obtain the potential benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions.

In regard to States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Union, approaching the matter from the point of view of the need to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, considers that these States, too, should have access to the potential benefits to be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. The USSR considers that these States, if given access to the use of such benefits, will have no incentive to create their own nuclear explosive devices and carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. In this connexion, the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to supply its services in respect of peaceful nuclear explosions even to States that are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on condition that such services are provided under appropriate international control and on the basis of the procedures worked out by IAEA. The provision of access to the benefits from peaceful nuclear explosions for non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, should be instrumental in bringing a wider circle of States within the compass of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, so that it comes nearer to being universal.

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Thus, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions should, in our opinion, be solved in conjunction with the problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and any solution should serve the purpose of strengthening the non-proliferation régime. We therefore cannot agree with certain views put forward in the Committee on this problem. For instance, in Japan's working paper of 7 July 1975 (CCD/454), the question is raised of determining the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. The working paper states, in particular, that "NNWS parties to NPT cannot conduct their own PNE, while non-parties can under certain conditions" (CCD/454, page 2, paragraph (c) (iv)).

In connexion with this proposition quoted from the Japanese working paper it may be asked whether the presentation of such a proposition for the Committee's consideration is in harmony with the task of achieving the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The presentation of this proposition may be regarded as an attempt to create, for a certain group of non-nuclear States, a special régime regulating their "rights" to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently, outside the framework of the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We consider that the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons will not be furthered by the Committee's consideration of such a question at the present time. Such consideration would only further the efforts of certain circles in a number of countries to gain a free hand to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions independently. Such a course of events would not make for a solution of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As we have already noted above, responsibility for carrying out functions concerning peaceful nuclear explosions devolves, in conformity with the decision of the General Assembly and the above-mentioned Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is an organization fully competent to perform such functions. In this connexion, it is also noted that IAEA must deal with "all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes" (NPT/CONF/35/I, Annex I, p.7). The Japanese working paper, however, raises the question of setting up a special international organization to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions. Besides increasing the number of international organizations, this proposal, if adopted, would have the

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effect of separating the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions from the task of achieving non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It would lead to the parallel operation of two régimes -- one for peaceful nuclear explosions and one for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side holds the view that the task is to ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions take place within the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime in conformity with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If peaceful nuclear explosions were to be conducted outside the framework of that article, we should have a situation in which, in addition to the States now possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, more such States would emerge in the next 5-10 years -- how many more it would be difficult at the present time to foresee. The problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and of disarmament as a whole would become considerably more acute, so much so that its solution would be virtually ruled out.

At the present time, the only way to solve the political problems connected with peaceful nuclear explosions is to strengthen the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation régime by making the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal. The Conference of the Parties to the Treaty calls for this, and it is to this that the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament, too, must be directed. Any attempt to deal with this matter by founding new international institutions through the creation of an independent régime for peaceful nuclear explosions can only be detrimental to the established forms of international co-operation on this issue and will offer no guarantee that the new institutions will provide, for the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions, solutions in harmony with the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet side is aware that the question of peaceful nuclear explosions is closely related to the problem of stopping nuclear-weapon testing, and that when agreement is reached on the complete cessation of testing, it will be possible to consider peaceful nuclear explosions on another level, that is to say, against the background of a ban on nuclear testing. The Soviet Union is in favour of stopping nuclear-weapon testing everywhere, by everyone, and that applies to underground tests as well. But this problem is not being settled, because some nuclear States are unwilling to stop these tests. It is hard to foresee when a solution will at last be found. We would like to think that it will be soon.

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The opinion has been voiced that the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions may act as a serious obstacle to the achievement of a ban on nuclear testing. We believe, however, that the main obstacle in the way of a universal ban on nuclear-weapon testing is not this matter of peaceful nuclear explosions at all. As we have already pointed out, the obstacle is unwillingness on the part of certain States to stop testing. In our view, the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions is secondary to a ban on nuclear testing. The first thing we must do is to agree on the latter, and once such an agreement is reached, it will then also be possible to settle the question of the feasibility of carrying out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in conditions of a total ban on nuclear-weapon testing.

In July 1974, taking steps towards a solution of the problem of a ban on nuclear-weapon testing and peaceful nuclear explosions, the USSR and the United States of America signed a Treaty on limitation of underground tests of such weapons, and a Protocol to the Treaty which provides for specific measures to ensure compliance by the parties with the provisions of the Treaty. Both sides expressed readiness to enter into negotiations on the conclusion of an agreement to regulate underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. We should like to observe in this connexion that negotiations on such an agreement are at present taking place between the USSR and the United States.

In conclusion, we should like to say that the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament of the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions serves a useful purpose, for it gives an idea of the importance of the problem, of the numerous elements involved in its solution, and of the attitudes adopted by the various States. The discussion of this problem will be an important source on which to draw for establishing different approaches to its solution -- approaches which will have to be borne in mind when the problem is further considered in various international forums, at the sessions of the General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament, and elsewhere.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.

1870

Received of the Treasurer of the State of New York
the sum of \$1000.00
for the year 1870

Given in full for the year 1870
the sum of \$1000.00
for the year 1870

Witness my hand and seal this 1st day of January 1870
at Albany, New York