

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 20 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Joseph Martin, Jr. (United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. V. E. BERASATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. G. A. MACIEL

Mr. M. T. DA SILVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Mr. I. PETROV

Burma:

U WIN PE

U THAUNG IWIN

Canada:

Mr. W. H. BARTON

Mr. D. R. MACPHEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt:

Mr. A. EL-ERIAN

Mr. A. EL-DIN KHAIKAT

Mr. N. ELARABY

Mr. S. A. ABOU-ALI

Ethiopia:

Mr. G. DEMISSIE

Hungary:

Mr. D. MEISZTER

Mr. I. KORMENDY

India:

Mr. B. C. MISHRA

Mr. M. K. MANGALMURTI

Mr. H. N. SUKHDEV

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO

Mr. P. BRUNI

Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI

Mr. A. YATABE

Mr. H. OKA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mr. M. MARIN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN

Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK

Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK

Mr. OLAJIDE ALO

Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. NIAZ A. NAIK

Mr. K. SALEEM

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER

Mr. S. TOPA

Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON

Mr. U. REINIUS

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. I.P. GLAZKOV
Mr. J.P. KLUKIN
Mr. J.D. USPENSKY
Mrs. M.I. IAKOUCHINA

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH
Mr. J.G. TAYLOR
Mr. A. WHITE
Mr. I.C. SLOANE

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. R.W. DREXLER
Mr. R. EINHORN
Mr. V. BLAZ
Mr. D. WESTERVELT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 653rd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr., representative of the United States of America.

Statements were made by the representatives of Pakistan, Poland, Canada, Egypt, Mexico and India, and by the Chairman.

The Committee recessed to hold an informal meeting on the subject of enlargement. The Committee resumed its session and the Chairman made a statement.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 22 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. NAIK (Pakistan): I am taking the floor today to make a brief statement on the subject of the establishment of nuclear-free zones.

The idea of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various geographical regions of the world, as a step towards disarmament, has often received the attention of the General Assembly of the United Nations. I do not intend to recall the various initiatives and proposals which have been made in this regard in the General Assembly, nor do I feel it necessary to refer to the appropriate resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this subject. I am sure that my colleagues in the Committee are well aware of these proposals and resolutions, since the issue of denuclearized zones has also been under frequent reference in the Committee itself.

As in the past years, several representatives have once again expressed their views on this subject during this year's sessions of our Committee. In fact at the last meeting of the Committee (CCD/PV.652), Mr. Ene, the representative of Romania, spoke at length on the need to establish nuclear-free zones. Like Mr. García Robles, the representative of Mexico, I would like to take this opportunity of fully associating my delegation with the views expressed by Mr. Ene. We fully endorse his view that the denuclearized zones can be an important element in promoting confidence and good-neighbourly relations among States, thus contributing towards the strengthening of international peace and security.

Recent developments have underlined the importance and urgency of action on the recommendations of the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Nuclear States in regard to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. Such zones have been created in Latin America and Antarctica. Recently, His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran has revived his proposal for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

On 28 November 1972, the Prime Minister (then President) of Pakistan, Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, stated that Pakistan believed in using atomic energy for peaceful purposes and as an instrument for development and progress. We have placed our nuclear facilities under the international safeguards of IAEA. We would like to see other countries in our region do the same. The most menacing problem in the sub-Continent of South Asia is that of the poverty and misery of its peoples. For our people, atomic energy should become a symbol of hope rather than fear. For this reason we would welcome it if the entire sub-Continent, by agreement of the countries concerned, could be declared a nuclear-free zone and the introduction of nuclear weapons banned.

(Mr. Naik, Pakistan)

In pursuance of this objective, I have the honour to inform the Committee that the Government of Pakistan has requested the inscription of a supplementary item on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled: "Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia".

The Government of Pakistan considers it imperative, especially in the light of recent events, that the region of South Asia be declared a nuclear-free zone.

All the countries of South Asia have already proclaimed their opposition to the acquisition of nuclear weapons or to the introduction of such weapons into the region. This common denominator can form the basis of an agreement establishing a nuclear-free zone for this region.

A model for such an agreement exists in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which at the time of its adoption was described by the then Secretary-General of the United Nations as "an important milestone in the long and difficult search for disarmament". It is noteworthy that besides containing an unequivocal commitment on the part of the Latin American States not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons, the Treaty also provides for the possibility of explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes on condition that such explosions are conducted under established procedures for independent verification to ensure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Treaty of Tlatelolco calls upon the nuclear-weapon States not to introduce nuclear weapons into Latin America or use, or threaten the use of, such weapons against the regional States parties to the Treaty.

The establishment of a similar régime of security for South Asia to ensure against the proliferation of nuclear weapons has become necessary and urgent. In seeking to inscribe this item on the agenda of the General Assembly, the Government of Pakistan is inspired by the conviction that the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia would help to strengthen international peace and security and promote stability and economic development in the region.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): As will be recalled, the Committee resumed its work this year amidst expressions of disappointment and even despair by some delegations over the admitted, and indeed regrettable, inability of the Committee to make any substantive headway in the matters before it over the last few years. However, the immediate and overwhelming repudiation by the Committee of the more outspoken exercises in epitaph-writing was the most heartening manifestation by the international community of its continued appreciation of the Committee's record of accomplishment as well as of the future potential of this body.

It may be useful to recall in this connexion the message of the United Nations Secretary-General of 29 February 1972, addressed to this Committee, in which he stressed:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has proved to be the most effective and productive organ for multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations available to the international community".

He also added, with reference to its major accomplishments:

"At no previous time in recorded history have so many agreements been achieved in the field of disarmament". (CCD/PV.545, p.7)

It seems to me that the above assessment is basically valid today, although, no doubt, the recent history of the Committee has brought about a certain slow-down in the elaboration of new instruments. An indication of the sustained confidence in the role that this body has to play in the process of multilateral disarmament negotiations, indeed, in its ability to play that role successfully, has been the officially expressed interest and desire of a number of States, among them States with considerable military potential, to participate actively in the Committee's endeavours.

These efforts, I might add parenthetically, stand to be facilitated by the climate of détente, co-operation and goodwill recently reaffirmed by the important results of the third Soviet-United States summit meeting. I wish to associate my delegation fully with the positive assessment which speakers preceding me in our debate gave of the agreements and understandings reached between the USSR and the United States in the field of arms control and disarmament. I am sure that their relevance to and significance for the work of this Committee cannot be lost on any of the Committee's members.

My delegation fully supports the idea of a reasonable enlargement of the Committee's membership, trusting that this body's negotiating ability will not be the casualty. While we are ready to extend our welcome and co-operation to new members, who, it is to be hoped, will join us at the next session, we cannot but share the views of those representatives who voiced their regret that the remaining two nuclear Powers have not as yet demonstrated willingness to share in our exertions.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

We must rid ourselves of any illusions that their absence from our midst and the consequent difficulties in the work of the Committee can be made up for by structural or procedural changes. Such changes would certainly be lost on the People's Republic of China with its totally negative view of any arms control or disarmament measure negotiated within or outside this Committee. This regrettable attitude of a nuclear Power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council can hardly be expected not to affect adversely either the pace or the scope of the disarmament measures negotiated whether in this Committee or in other forums.

In the view of the Polish delegation, another factor working against reaching greater progress in the Committee has been the sad reality of less-than-universal support for the major arms control or disarmament measures reached so far.

When a group of States, among them the socialist States, take upon themselves ever new obligations, or are urged to do so, it is not quite fair for other States to refuse to do likewise, much less to come forth with specious criticism of agreements which have been negotiated in the Committee and commended by the United Nations General Assembly.

Ever since the Disarmament Committee came into existence, in March 1962, it has devoted by far the greatest amount of attention to the question of slowing down and halting the nuclear arms race. The Committee's major accomplishments over the years are in this province. We would be less than candid, however, to claim that more could not be done.

For one thing, let us take a comprehensive test ban treaty. The significance of such a ban, embracing all environments and applicable to all States, for the checking of further technological perfection of nuclear weapons is beyond question. First and foremost, it would be instrumental to the forestalling of the development of a new generation of low-yield nuclear weapons. It is to be hoped that the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, one of the agreements concluded at the recent summit meeting of the Soviet and United States leaders, has placed the problem in the right perspective. Indeed, in his statement in the Polish capital on 21 July 1974, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, said: "We regard this agreement as a step leading towards a ban on nuclear weapon testing that will ultimately become comprehensive and universal".

That statement by Mr. Brezhnev points succinctly to the direction in which our most strenuous efforts must be directed.

There are other areas in the nuclear field which we might be well advised to explore. One of them is the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. As we are all aware, the better part of the nuclear potential of the major Powers is deployed in the depth of the seas and oceans, with the consequent reliance on foreign naval, military bases. Meant as instruments of national security, these weapons represent the major

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

source of insecurity and of international tensions. The Committee, which has the 1969 Treaty on the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and ocean floor to its credit, would be well qualified to give careful examination to further possible steps with a view to demilitarizing that environment, as indeed article VII of the Treaty calls for.

Furthermore, my delegation feels that the stated readiness of the USSR to reach an agreement with the United States on the withdrawal from the troubled waters of the Mediterranean of all Soviet and United States naval forces, including nuclear submarines, deserves every support.

At this particular turn in history, the concern over the grave implications of any possible breakdown of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons looms large in the mind of the international community. As the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference is about to resume its work in a few days' time, it is only proper to be clear about our sense of priorities in that regard. I have no doubt whatsoever that high among those priorities is for the community of nations to emerge from the review process with a firm control over the Pandora's Box of nuclear weapons. Assured universal adherence to the NPT, as well as observance of its provisions, seem at present to be the best ways of achieving that objective.

I would wish now to address briefly the question of chemical disarmament. This problem has been at the focus of the Committee's attention for the past three years, with, unfortunately, meagre results to show for it.

In 1972, the socialist countries came forward with a draft convention (CCD/361) advocating the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of "C" weapons as well as the destruction of their stockpiles. The following year, ten non-aligned members of the Committee tabled a working document (CCD/400) in which they sought to formulate some of the basic principles that -- in their view -- a chemical weapons convention acceptable to all parties should reflect. Earlier this year, the delegation of Japan submitted a draft convention (CCD/420) that was generally acclaimed as a constructive effort at bridging the existing differences of views and approaches. In fact, that document, while providing for a complete ban on chemical weapons, to be brought about gradually, was not entirely clear as to the scope of the limitations on "C" weapons envisaged for the first stage, or concerning the destruction of the stockpiles. Yet that is obviously a deficiency that could be taken care of in the process of negotiation. Finally, there are voluminous working papers submitted by a number of Western delegations.

Nevertheless, it appears that Western delegations are not able to come forth with an official position of their Governments either on the scope of prohibition or on the preferred method of verification. Which amounts to bringing us again to the point of departure.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

In those circumstances, the announcement emerging from the recent Moscow summit meeting that the USSR and the United States had agreed to consider a joint initiative with a view to the conclusion --- as a first step --- of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare has been welcomed in many countries, Poland included, as an important development and a potential breakthrough in the efforts to elaborate an agreement that is acceptable to all parties. The particular merit of the intended initiative, in our view, resides in the fact that such a convention would eliminate types of chemical weapons that are the most effective from the military point of view. It would, furthermore, pre-empt the possibility of any further qualitative development of such weapons.

While I am still with the subject of "C" weapons, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to put on record our positive assessment of the recent informal meetings with the participation of experts. I believe that they served the useful purpose of introducing a measure of clarity and order into the complex field of chemical weapons.

In the course of our spring session, the delegations of Sweden and Poland referred briefly (CCD/PV.633 and 635 respectively) to the distinct need for measures to prevent meteorological warfare. It was, therefore, cause for special gratification to my delegation to see the joint Soviet-American Statement on Environmental Warfare. We strongly believe that an agreement on the question of preventing any military applications of weather modification techniques will be of major importance not only as an arms control measure in its own right. An effective ban on weather tampering for military purposes will amount to a major gain also for those who hold environmental protection among imperatives of this generation for the sake of the future generations.

The issue of preventing the application of environmental modification techniques for military purposes has now been formally placed, at the initiative of the Soviet Union, on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly. I am sure that this important measure of arms control and environment protection will receive the necessary attention and support of the General Assembly.

The position of the Government of the Polish People's Republic with respect to the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference is only too well known and I do not want to ask your indulgence and go into this matter at any length. I wish to observe, however, that, in our opinion, the amount and scope of progress made in this matter since the Soviet Union first placed it on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

General Assembly is impressive enough to justify the speeding up of the ongoing efforts to convene such a conference. We believe that the transformation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference into a Preparatory Committee for such a conference would be a suitable step to be taken at the forthcoming session of the General Assembly.

I wish to conclude my brief intervention by quoting from a statement by Mr. Edward Gierak, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party on the recent 30th anniversary of People's Poland, in which he stated:

"Poland makes and will be making its contribution to the work of the United Nations, to the disarmament negotiations and to all undertakings serving the cause of peace

.... Pursuing the policy of the socialist community, People's Poland has played an important role in bringing about a situation in which the guns have been kept silent in Europe for the past 30 years. It is our earnest desire to see to it that this extends into the whole future ahead of us, to build peace so inviolate and durable that no future generation of Poles will know the terror and misery of war".

Mr. BARTON (Canada): As we approach the end of this session, once again we have to acknowledge that another year has gone by with little to show for our efforts. While we have made some progress -- notably in the field of chemical weapons -- we remain far from an agreement in any of the fields that concern us.

During this session, a number of delegations have spoken to the question of chemical weapons. In July we had a useful informal exchange of views among CW experts. The Japanese draft treaty, of which my delegation has already spoken, has served as a most useful focus for discussion, and I trust Mr. Nisibori and his delegation will consider the views they have heard this year as compensation for their endeavours and as encouragement to their developing further their welcome initiative.

In the course of discussing the Japanese draft, one significant point has arisen -- cynics might dismiss it as atmospheric, but I believe it to be important -- it seems to my delegation that there now appears to be among us a general, if not yet completely unanimous, acceptance of the idea of a treaty which, at least at the beginning, would involve agreement to partial measures. Perhaps this change cannot yet be termed a breakthrough in our negotiations, but I believe it is real and it is significant, as it

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

demonstrates a growing willingness among us to negotiate seriously on that which is obtainable now, while not losing sight of our ultimate goals. In arms control and disarmament matters this is surely the course of wisdom.

What precisely would be the scope of initial partial measures of course remains to be defined. The Canadian delegation has expressed the hope that even first steps could include some destruction of CW stocks. An important requirement for this would of course be agreement on satisfactory verification.

One technical point which I would like to make in this context is with regard to a statement made by Professor Melnikov of the Soviet Delegation at the Experts' meeting. He spoke of the threat posed by the on-site inspection of the destruction of stocks to international security. It would appear to my delegation at first glance that the problems in this regard are not as insurmountable as he painted them. To begin with, the formulae for most highly lethal chemical agents are generally known. However, in the event that classified agents were to be destroyed, we believe that a toxicity measurement could be made without revealing the structure of the agent in question. Analysis of the effluents could assist in confirming that the material had been destroyed. If the destruction facility itself were properly safeguarded and periodically inspected, the question of diversions to which the Soviet expert referred would not arise. This could be done without revealing the actual process of conversion should the State in question wish to protect this information.

Our discussions of CW this year took place in a newly hopeful atmosphere. In the communiqué issued by the United States and the USSR on 3 July, reference was made to a "joint initiative" to be taken by those two countries with regard to certain means of chemical warfare. Like all of us in this Committee, my delegation welcomes this indication of bilateral progress on a subject which has long preoccupied us, and we hope that our Co-Chairmen will be able to inform us of the nature of this initiative and, if possible, bring this Committee into their negotiations in the near future.

Recently the Canadian Government publicly expressed its concern and regret that during this year a number of countries were reported to have exploded nuclear devices, notwithstanding the widely expressed and long-standing objective of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing by all countries in all environments. Two States have been regularly carrying out tests underground. Two countries have made additional nuclear

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

tests in the atmosphere. Another country has carried out a test after a long abstention from such activities. Still another country has exploded a nuclear device for the first time, thereby challenging a principal aim of the NPT. All these tests point up the responsibility falling upon the Governments represented by the Co-Chairmen of this Conference to take the lead in moving towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In the light of our concerns about recent testing and the continued importance we attach to achieving a comprehensive test ban, my delegation can only join in the expressions of disappointment about this scope of the partial nuclear test ban treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union signed in Moscow on 3 July. Although the immediate impact of the agreement on nuclear weapons development is limited, we can hope at least that it will have the merit of inhibiting the development of future generations of large-yield weapons, the testing of which, I may say, has given cause for public concern in the past in Canada, not only because of the threat to peace but also for their possible environmental hazards.

In addition, we welcome those important features of the agreement which could facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive ban. We note that the agreement includes a commitment by the United States and the USSR to continue the negotiations with a view to a cessation of all underground nuclear weapons tests. In the Canadian view, this must remain the objective, and we would urge the parties to pursue negotiations to this end without awaiting implementation of this agreement.

We welcome also the provisions in the agreement for the exchange of scientific data between the United States and the USSR. We believe that such an exchange should commence informally as soon as possible in order to increase confidence between the two countries in the ability to detect underground weapons tests which we hope could facilitate the early achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Moreover, we hope that this exchange of scientific data, especially seismological and geophysical information, will be made available to all countries as it will lead to a better world-wide understanding of the earth's structure and permit a wider contribution to overcoming problems of verification of a comprehensive ban.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

In speaking of the recent Moscow Arms Control Agreements, we are also pleased to see the agreement to limit further United States and Soviet anti-ballistic missile systems. We note that, in the communiqué, it is stated that the two leaders had a thorough review of all aspects of the problem of the limitation of strategic arms, and that they have concluded that the interim agreement on offensive strategic weapons would be furthered by a new agreement between them on the limitation of strategic arms to be completed at the earliest possible date, before the expiration of the interim agreement. It is our hope that this decision will give a new impetus to the strategic arms limitation talks, and that negotiations will continue to be pursued vigorously and fruitfully.

Canada also welcomes the agreement that the two countries will hold talks before the end of this year to discuss the effective measures necessary to avoid the use of environmental modification for military purposes. It seems to us that this might be an appropriate subject for discussion in the Committee once Soviet and United States and perhaps other interested countries' experts have had an opportunity to define technically the scope of the problem.

In my statement of 23 May, I referred to the desirability of an expansion of this Committee to encourage France and China to take seats with us, and to admit "other major military Powers". Since that time, the Co-Chairmen have circulated requests from the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and subsequently Iran, Peru and Zaire, to join us. My delegation welcomes these requests and hopes that arrangements can soon be made for the seating of delegations from these States, as well as from an appropriate number of other States from different areas of the world to maintain the present equitable balance on this Committee.

Many of us, I wish all of us, at the end of this session of the Committee will be turning our attention to the second preparatory meeting for the conference to review the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held next year. The stated purpose of that conference is to review the effectiveness of the treaty and to consider action to further its objectives. But let us be frank -- our real task is to make one more desperate attempt to get the world to face up to the catastrophic consequences of nuclear proliferation, so that Governments will acknowledge and adopt the hard decisions involved in a change of course.

No one can gainsay the fact that the Non-Proliferation Treaty as it exists is an imperfect instrument:

- Notwithstanding its provisions, nuclear testing continues unabated;

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

- Notwithstanding its provisions and the SALT negotiations, the proliferation of nuclear warheads by the super-Powers continues unabated;
- Notwithstanding its provisions, we face a vast increase in the production of plutonium throughout the world as a consequence of the wide use of nuclear power which, despite the good work of IAEA, is without a comprehensive system of safeguards to ensure that it will not contribute to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by countries not now possessing them;
- Notwithstanding the danger that the spread of nuclear explosive technology without adequate safeguards will encourage non-nuclear nations to decide that they must have nuclear weapons, some countries find the provisions of the treaty too discriminatory to be acceptable;
- Notwithstanding the provisions of the treaty, countries which are not party to it seem to have been more successful in getting help from the nuclear Powers for peaceful nuclear development programmes than those which are.

The catalogue of shortcomings and problems that I have just cited is not all-inclusive, but it is sufficient to illustrate the magnitude of the task that confronts us. We must face up to these shortcomings if we are to carry out our mandate at the Review Conference effectively.

But at the same time we must be equally realistic about what we can hope to achieve. We are not going to solve all of these issues, and indeed, if we attempted to draft an instrument which purported to do so, it would almost certainly be so lacking in general acceptability as to be valueless. It was with reason that Voltaire said that the best is the enemy of the good.

And thus, although we can find ample cause to be critical of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Canadian delegation remains of the view that until we can perfect a better instrument that will find at least as wide acceptability, the NPT must serve as the basis of a non-proliferation structure upon which we can build.

Discriminatory and disappointing though many of the features of the NPT may be, Canada has chosen to support it strongly. Clearly the dangers posed by the weapons race between the super-Powers on the one hand, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries not now possessing them on the other hand, are closely linked. So long as we do not have the means to remove the dangers posed by existing nuclear arsenals, it is vital to international security that there should be no dissemination of weapons to other States. Such proliferation, inevitably, would introduce instability not only in the regions immediately affected, but also to the central nuclear balance of the great Powers.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

As the time for the conference approaches, we shall bend every effort to further a greater awareness of the nuclear dangers before us -- not to alarm, not to exaggerate, but certainly to remove complacency. We will consider what further steps we may, as a participating Government, take to strengthen and to promote wider adherence to the non-proliferation structure. Amending the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a formal sense does not strike us as a useful international activity, for the time of Governments would be consumed in procedure. But we can explore what additional complementary steps might usefully be taken.

Obviously, our efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban remain highly pertinent in this respect. One other area for exploration is whether or not the international community should provide more clearly defined and safeguarded arrangements for nuclear explosions to be applied for peaceful economic purposes. In the light of recent developments, it now seems most important that a serious international effort be made to examine more fully the economic utility of peaceful nuclear explosions with a view to implementing the provisions of article V of the Treaty.

It seems also of great importance that the countries transferring and receiving nuclear technology should give stronger support to the application of IAEA safeguards in order that international commerce in nuclear materials, equipment and technology can be promoted in an international environment in which States can be assured that their co-operation will not be inimical to their mutual security. In this respect States will be concerned not only to reassure each other in regard to their dedication to the peaceful uses of their nuclear activities but also to the very physical security of nuclear materials against possible misuse by political extremists.

I hope that what I have said will make it clear that the Canadian delegation's approach is not one of "resigned acceptance of the belief that certain countries cannot be stopped from having or developing their nuclear arsenals, and that therefore the others should meekly acquiesce in this situation", if I may quote the words of my Indian colleague (CCD/PV.651, p.25). Over the years we have belaboured the nuclear Powers, in the Committee, in the United Nations, and in every other forum that offered a platform, to point out the awful dangers that their policies pose for mankind. But two wrongs do not make a right. For the same reason that we challenge their behaviour, we dispute the thesis that because the nuclear Powers will not see the error of their ways the rest of us are fully justified in refusing to organize to prevent the further spread of the infection on the grounds that it is discriminatory.

(Mr. Barton, Canada)

We believe that in our own self-interest, non-nuclear countries should abjure nuclear weapons and support a system of safeguards to see that their undertakings are kept. We believe also that nuclear explosive technology, even if solely for peaceful purposes, is so difficult to separate from weapons technology that non-nuclear weapons countries will best be served by following the procedures set out in article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We hold to the position that all peaceful nuclear tests should be carried out under international supervision and only after careful study of the necessity and utility of each such test. Consistent with these views, the Canadian Government at the last meeting of the Board of Governors of IAEA, has affirmed that it interprets its NPT obligations as precluding it from making nuclear material, equipment and engineering services available to non-parties to the Treaty which could be used for the development of a nuclear explosive device in the absence of a satisfactory undertaking precluding their use in the development of such a device. This is, of course, also fully in keeping with the IAEA safeguards system, which the Government of Canada believes has an essential role to play in the promotion of a stable and peaceful world order.

I have talked at some length about the NPT review because the task of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons must now have an overriding priority, and is a responsibility not simply of the parties to the Treaty, but all nations -- especially those represented in the Committee. We have a collective responsibility to impress on each Government which has not acceded to the NPT Treaty the critical importance of doing so at the earliest possible moment. We must impress on the nuclear Powers, and particularly the super-Powers, the vital necessity for them to come to terms in their negotiations to prevent vertical proliferation. We must ensure that in making peaceful nuclear technology available to meet the needs of mankind throughout the world, we do not facilitate the spread of nuclear terror. I hope sincerely that by the time we meet again next Spring there will be encouraging progress upon which we can build constructively in 1975.

Mr. EL-ERIAN (Egypt): At this closing stage of the summer session of the Committee, allow me to make a few brief comments as a supplement to the statement I have made earlier. In these brief comments I propose to address myself to some of the issues upon which attention has been focused during the last few weeks as reflected in the statements made by the speakers who have preceded me.

My delegation shares the view expressed by many delegations as to the constructive results of the informal meetings held with technical experts from 17 to 22 July. During these meetings, my delegation has the opportunity to express some thoughts through the participation of the Egyptian expert. It is the considered opinion of my delegation that the discussion of questions pertaining to the scope and verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons which took place at those meetings have been very useful in promoting our work on this urgent problem. This discussion has strengthened our conviction that, notwithstanding the complexity of the technical problems involved in the question of chemical weapons, such problems could not and should not be an obstacle to an early and adequate agreement on this question.

I should now like to turn to the three documents in the arms-control area signed at the recent Moscow Summit between the Soviet Union and the United States: The Protocol to the 1972 Soviet-United States Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems placing further limitations on ABM deployment; the joint Statement on Environmental Warfare and the Treaty and Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests.

My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to the distinguished Co-Chairmen for the valuable information they have provided this Committee with regarding these important documents.

My delegation also welcomes the announcement at the Moscow Summit that the Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to consider a joint initiative in this Committee with respect to the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with lethal chemical weapons.

The above-mentioned agreements reached at the Moscow Summit demonstrate the propitious effects which the continuation of the policy of détente has in the promotion of measures conducive to international peace and security. Though partial

(Mr. El-Erian, Egypt)

and limited in scope, it is to be hoped that these agreements will lead to further and more comprehensive measures in the field of disarmament and arms control. It is gratifying to read in the last paragraph of Part II of the joint Soviet-United States communiqué of 3 July 1974, which is entitled "Further Limitation of Strategic Arms and Other Disarmament Issues", that:

"Both sides are convinced that the new important steps which they have taken and intend to take in the field of arms limitation as well as further efforts towards disarmament will facilitate the relaxation of international tensions and constitute a tangible contribution to the historic task of excluding war from the life of human society and thereby of ensuring world peace".

The third and last part in my statement today refers to the question of denuclearization of the Middle East. Members of the Committee are aware of the initiative taken recently by my Government pertaining to the question. Reference to this matter has been made at previous meetings of this Committee by Mr. Dugersuren, the representative of Mongolia, and by Mr. Ene, the representative of Romania, and at today's meeting by Mr. Naik, the representative of Pakistan. In his letter dated 23 July 1974 (Document A/9693/Add.1), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Egypt informed the Secretary-General of the United Nations that his delegation has decided to co-sponsor the request of Iran for inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the item entitled: "Establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

My Government has constantly given its active support to the principle of nuclear-free zones. It has contributed its share to the adoption by the Organization of African Unity of the 1964 Declaration regarding a nuclear-free zone for Africa which was endorsed in General Assembly Resolution 2033 (XV). In the United Nations, the Delegation of Egypt to the First Committee of the General Assembly supported the initiative and efforts for our sister countries of Latin America for a nuclear-free status for their region which led to the negotiation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

(Mr. El-Erian, Egypt)

My delegation heard with great interest the statement made on 23 May by Mr. Clark, the representative of Nigeria, that his Government intends to look again at the 1964 Declaration of OAU regarding a nuclear-free zone for Africa (CCD/PV.638, p.18). We have also taken note of the set of criteria which Mr. Martin, the representative of the United States, laid down in his intervention of 2 July 1974 for the establishment of nuclear-free zones (CCD/PV.639, pp. 8 and 9). Pertinent concepts and thoughts pertaining to this question were also included in the statement by Mr. Ene, the representative of Romania, on 1 August 1974 (CCD/PV.648). My delegation has also taken note with great interest of the announcement at today's meeting by Mr. Naik, the representative of Pakistan, that his Government has requested the inscription on the agenda of the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly of a supplementary item entitled: "Declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia".

I do not intend at this juncture to go into the details of our approach to the elaboration of the principles of criteria for the denuclearization of the Middle East. Our position will be elaborately defined at the next session of the General Assembly, which it is to be hoped will accord to this item the consideration which its importance deserves.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I wish to say a word on the results of the 1974 spring and summer sessions of the Committee. An objective, realistic and fair-minded assessment of these results cannot escape the conclusion that they have fallen short of what we would have hoped in this Committee or what the General Assembly has directed and expected us to achieve. Mr. Barton, the representative of Canada, has reminded us of this fact in his statement this morning.

True enough, a useful exchange of views took place, intensive informal discussions and consultations were conducted, and carefully prepared and well documented working papers were submitted which contained valuable research and data.

I wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the delegations which have submitted these working papers and to assure them that these documents are receiving the careful study of the competent authorities.

We wish to entertain the hope that on the basis of the progress made at this session, albeit of modest character, the Committee will be able at its next session to submit to the General Assembly more concrete and definitive results.

(Mr. El-Erian, Egypt)

Experts of the disarmament problem point out its complexity and counsel patience and perseverance in solving it. They constantly remind us that the element of time is of the essence and that the issues involved in disarmament are so intricate as well as intermingled with security and confidence-building, which are inherently slow and painstaking. This is an agonizing fact which is generally conceded. However, time, in as much as it is necessary in pursuing the long road to disarmament, carries with it a great risk. For it is equally recognized that as weapons become more sophisticated, the lapse of time renders more elusive the means of arms control. It is therefore imperative that progress in the process of disarmament and arms control be consonant with the disturbing urgency of the problem.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In his statement today, the representative of Poland made a passing reference to what he described as the People's Republic of China's "totally negative view of any arms control or disarmament measures negotiated within or outside this Committee".

Ambassador Wyzner presumably did not attend the last meeting of the Committee -- its 652nd -- held last Thursday. As the record of that meeting has not yet been distributed, I feel I ought to take this opportunity to point out, as I had great satisfaction in doing then, that the People's Republic of China has since 12 June 1974 been a Contracting Party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which it signed last year.

China, which as early as 1966, when the text that was to become the Treaty of Tlatelolco was being drafted, had expressed its support for the creation of nuclear-free zones and for the efforts of the Latin American States to establish such a zone in their region, has thus translated that support into action, something which unfortunately not every nuclear Power has yet done.

As representative of the Government which is the Depositary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, I have considered it necessary to make this brief rectification.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Due to my deep respect for Mr. Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, it is extremely difficult for me to disagree with him. However, in this particular connexion I simply would like to state that I do consider every word of my statement completely justified, especially if we read it from the point of view of arms control and disarmament measures that concern the People's Republic of China itself. Obviously, the case to which he referred does not concern the arms control measures and disarmament of the People's Republic of China.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I listened, as usual, with great attention and care to the statement made by my very good friend Mr. Barton, the representative of Canada. I notice that he had carefully heard, and perhaps read again, the statement which I made at our last-but-one meeting. We are not here to engage in a polemical debate, and, if I say a few words, I hope my friend Mr. Barton will not think that it is polemical.

We did not want to acquiesce in vertical proliferation. Therefore, we did not sign the NPT. There are others who adopted a different approach. We do not belabour this point. We think others have a right to their point of view as we have a right to our point of view. But that is what I meant when, on Tuesday last, I talked about acquiescence.

Furthermore -- and this again follows from the approach adopted by Canada and many others -- as has been pointed out by Mr. Barton this very morning, Canada does not, consistent with its NPT obligations, supply nuclear material, etc., to non-nuclear parties to NPT. I do not know whether I can infer from this that nuclear material, etc., is supplied to nuclear-weapon parties to the NPT; if so, then it is not only legal acquiescence, it is material assistance as well.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): I apologize for intervening, but I would like to take a moment to reply to Mr. Mishra's intervention. May I first assure the representative of India that I have no intention of engaging in polemics, but am speaking only in the interest of ensuring that there is no misunderstanding.

The Canadian Government respects a Government's right to state its own course of action, but reserves the right to try and convince them that, in our view, there is a better way. As I pointed out in my statement earlier this morning, the Canadian Government has affirmed that it "interprets its NPT obligations as precluding it from making nuclear material, equipment and engineering services available to non-parties to the Treaty which could be used for the development of a nuclear explosive device in the absence of a satisfactory undertaking precluding their use in the development of such a device. This is, of course, also fully in keeping with the IAEA safeguards system, which the Government of Canada believes has an essential role to play in the promotion of a stable and peaceful world order." I wish to assure Mr. Mishra that Canada has not sold or otherwise provided any nuclear materials or technology to the nuclear Powers parties to the NPT, except as provided for under the Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: It has been proposed that the following be included in the final report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"The Co-Chairmen and the other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have agreed to invite the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Iran, Peru and Zaire to become members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, beginning 1 January 1975. Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 2602 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, the Committee is reporting this agreement to the General Assembly for its endorsement."

"In letters dated 6 August 1974 to the Co-Chairmen, Australia confirmed its interest in securing membership of the Committee. This request was noted and, with the concurrence of Australia, consideration of it by the Committee has been deferred to a later date."

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 17.05 p.m.