

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.687
28 August 1975

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 28 August 1975,
at 10 a.m. and 4.20 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. G.A. Maciel

(Brazil)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI Mr. S.N. MARTINEZ
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. G.A. MACIEL Mr. M.T. DA SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. B. GRINBERG
<u>Burma:</u>	U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. W.H. BARTON Mr. P.E. McRAE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. SOJÁK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. S. ABOU-ALI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. B. RÖNSCH
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G.J. SCHLAICH Mr. J. BAUCH Mr. K. HANNESSCHLÄGER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B.C. MISHRA Mr. P.R. SOOD
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. H. AMERI Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
Mr. G. VALDEVIT
Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI
Mr. H. OKA
Mr. A. YATABE

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES
Miss A. CABRERA
Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
Mr. L. BAYARTE

Morocco:

Mr. Ali SKALLI
Mr. S. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. B.A. CLARK
Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. K. SALEEM

Peru:

Mr. L. CHAVEZ-GODOY
Mr. G. CHAUNY

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER
Mr. T. FIEĆKO
Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI
Mr. H. PAĆ

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
Mr. G. TINCA
Mr. D. APOSTOL
Mr. C. IVASCU

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON
Mr. U. REINIUS
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. L.N. ANISIMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. M. ALLEN
Mr. J.G. TAYLOR
Mr. A.G.P. WOOD

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN, Jr.
Mr. W. GIVAN
Mr. D. MAHLBERG
Mr. W. GRAYSON
Mr. R. EINHORN
Mr. S. COTTMAN

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. LUKABU-K'HABOUJI
Mr. MASSUDI BIN KANKUMBA

Acting Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 687th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador G.A. Maciel, representative of Brazil.

Statements were made by the representatives of Hungary, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, India, Romania, the United Kingdom and Canada, and by the Chairman.

The Co-Chairmen submitted the following documents:

"Draft Report to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission" (CCD/469).

"Draft Special Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects" (CCD/475).

After considering the Draft Special Report, the Committee adopted its Special Report transmitting a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects (CCD/476).

After considering the Draft Report, the Committee adopted its Report to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (CCD/477).

The Conference will reconvene on Tuesday, 17 February 1976, at 3.00 p.m.

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Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): The reason why I took the floor today is to raise some issues relating to disarmament and to express the point of view of my delegation on it. But before turning to the issues above, I would like to make some brief comments on the recently and I dare say successfully completed Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as has been done by a number of my distinguished colleagues.

It is well known that the European socialist countries, initiating the Conference, had the solid imagination to outline and to suggest a new perspective of a collective security system that would basically differ from the present political and military arrangements. This concept envisages essential changes. The peace and stability of the continent has to be based on peaceful coexistence, mutual trust and economic co-operation among States instead of the present balance of power. It is natural that the realization of these aims can only be achieved gradually in the course of a historical process by the joint effort and active participation of all States.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has opened a new period, a period in which the possibilities of the development of peaceful relations and co-operation have increased among the nations. Concerning the military aspect of European security, the Final Act of the Conference declares:

"The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world."

One of the experiences gained from the Conference is that to get advance in military issues demands a lot of time and patience on all sides because the basic security interests of States are affected. It became evident that disarmament or arms control agreements have to be based on compromises of such a nature that the balance of interests of all States or groups of States are respected.

The political and military aspect of security and that of détente are in close interrelation. The political arrangements and solutions have to lead to disarmament agreements, and disarmament measures will provide further progress in the improvement of the political atmosphere.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

The political achievements and the progress in military aspects of the Conference on Security might favourably influence the Vienna talks, too. The consolidation of détente among European States would have a positive effect in other regions as well.

The Hungarian delegation notes with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts who prepared a comprehensive study on nuclear-weapon-free zones. In an observer capacity my delegation followed with interest the efforts that were needed, and wishes to express its appreciation to the experts and to Professor Keijo Korhonen of Finland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group, as well as to the Secretariat for its valuable work.

Considering the content of the study, we believe that it covers a wide range of extremely complex problems. In a remarkable part of the questions consensus could be reached but in connexion with a number of important problems carefully balanced and contrasting views had to be included. After a preliminary analysis of the non-consensus parts of the study we have the impression that divergencies on major issues may not be really as numerous as it would appear on the basis of conflicting statements. Some experts were thinking not only in general terms but they quite understandably had in mind particular problems of their respective States and regions and they tended to the generalization of their specific experiences and views.

It was obvious from the very beginning of the work of the Ad Hoc Group that different views will occur. Therefore it is laudable that the Group was able to establish a considerable number of generally acceptable principles.

The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in our opinion requires that its creation and provisions should integrate into the complex system of international relations. In this context three main aspects can be identified.

First, the establishment of a NWFZ and the provisions of the zone treaty should be in accordance with the generally recognized norms of international law.

Secondly, as one of the specific measures of disarmament, the zone has to be an integral part of the system of existing arms control and disarmament agreements and treaties.

Thirdly, it cannot be in conflict with existing security arrangements and with the interests of parties to these arrangements.

In connexion with the first aspect we could see in the relevant part of the study an attempt for the selective application of the generally recognized norms of international law. Some are considered essential for the establishment and functioning

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

of NWFZs, others are disputed by a number of experts. We can agree only with a consequent approach, i.e., the full respect and observance of all of the international legal norms.

Another element of the legal aspects involved is the scope of authority of the General Assembly in connexion with the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. My delegation is of the opinion that it is not advisable to attribute more and new authority to the General Assembly which would be in contradiction with the United Nations Charter and would exceed the recommending role of the General Assembly. Concrete regulations and provisions of a zone treaty should be negotiated and finalized among the interested States of a given zone.

As to the second aspect, the treaty establishing a zone has to be in conformity with the existing multilateral disarmament and arms control agreements and treaties. In this connexion we stress the necessity of full harmony with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Priorities concerning the aims and significance of the NWFZs may differ from region to region or from State to State, but the nuclear-weapon-free zones, in our opinion, should supplement the non-proliferation régime.

As far as the third point is concerned, the significance of the compatibility of the zone with existing security arrangements is self-evident. Assuming that the basic objective of the zone is to strengthen the security of its member-States, as well as regional and global security, its establishment must not affect adversely the security of other States.

I do believe that the study on the table provides an appropriate basis for all States for consideration of the subject of the NWFZ at the next session of the General Assembly and offers useful guidance for countries interested in the creation of such zones.

Our Committee conducted a very useful discussion on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. The report on this item certainly will help delegations in the General Assembly to have more clear ideas on this important subject. The discussion within the CCD in some respects went beyond our immediate task, touching questions of technical development of PNEs, their feasibility and potential application.

The dual face of the atom, the threat and promise of its military and peaceful application, is perhaps most apparent in the case of PNEs. Therefore, in a period when interest in this problem was suddenly revived, it was a useful exercise to

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

clarify the arms control aspects involved. When thinking of the potential benefits of PNEs, we have always to bear in mind the risks also.

I can summarize our views on this subject in the following way. It seems to be important, even from arms control considerations, to keep open the practical possibilities for the implementation of article V of the NPT, including possibilities for technical progress. The Final Declaration of the NPT Review Conference stated, inter alia that all the non-nuclear-weapon States, whether parties or not to the NPT, should have access to the potential benefits of PNEs when further technical and scientific progress makes it feasible. It is important to provide a technical basis for this promise. We welcome the statement of the representative of the USSR made at the 673rd meeting informing us that the USSR is conducting a programme of scientific research and design work on the subject of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions and is actively participating in the preparatory steps to provide service in accordance with article V of the NPT to non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the same time it has to be ensured that the solution of the question of PNEs should, on the one hand, not lead to the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities and, on the other hand, it should not inhibit progress towards CTB.

My delegation agrees with the view of the majority of speakers who emphasized that indigenous nuclear explosive capabilities -- prohibited under the NPT -- can in no way be made compatible with the over-all interest of non-proliferation. Therefore, we consider that the basis of handling the questions of PNEs can only be article V of the NPT, and its practical implementation should be solved within the IAEA. I should like to emphasize the full agreement of my delegation with those speakers who firmly opposed the idea of an alternative international solution outside of the non-proliferation régime.

In our view, the Committee made very important progress in its summer session towards the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The discussion on this subject and the information of the members of this Committee were usefully helped by the experts participating at the informal meetings. My delegation would like to express its gratitude to the experts who shared their experience and knowledge with us. By the participation of a Hungarian expert we also wanted to make a modest contribution to the achievement of better understanding of this highly complicated issue.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

As a conclusion of the discussion on this subject, it seems to us that there was a considerable degree of common understanding. As far as my delegation is concerned, it summarizes the result of the meetings above as follows:

(a) Although there were no identical opinions and views about the feasibility and military application of the environmental modification techniques, no one has denied that the hostile uses of environmental modification techniques can be considered as a serious potential danger. Considering the pace of technical development, indicated by the widespread peaceful research and experimentation in a number of States, preventive action is urgently needed for prohibition of the military and other hostile uses.

(b) Some of the envisaged modification techniques could be developed as new kinds of weapons of mass destruction that could be dangerous for both the military forces and the civilian population. Even more, in the case of comparatively small States having special geographical, meteorological, hydrological or other conditions, environmental warfare could result in a national catastrophe.

(c) The existence of such special conditions might serve as a temptation for the application of environmental modification techniques. In the absence of an effective convention, a natural disaster might cause the suspicion that it was originated by hostile uses of modification techniques.

(d) One cannot exclude the possibility that a large-scale hostile environmental modification action would result in irreversible changes in weather and climate patterns.

To sum up, the discussion with the participation of experts pointed out clearly that a convention of a preventive nature is urgently needed. In our view, such a convention would be an effective means of controlling the development of environmental modification techniques at an early stage.

My delegation welcomes the identical draft conventions submitted by the USSR and the United States and considers them a substantial contribution to the final solution of the problem. Their submission was a major event of this session and we noted it with deep satisfaction. My Government will take a definite position after careful study and consideration of the draft. At this stage I should like to express my hope that next year the CCD will be able to elaborate a final draft convention on the basis of the identical Soviet-United States drafts.

As far as the work of the CCD is concerned, I believe that this year we have accomplished much more than at the previous sessions. The CCD proved again to be able to negotiate successfully on very complex and delicate questions. The lack of

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

progress in some areas is due to the lack of political will by some States and not to the organization of the Committee. Let me add that our work was better organized than previously and in the meantime it did not lose its flexibility.

Mr. SCHLAICH (Federal Republic of Germany): The delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomes with satisfaction the fact that this year's summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has brought along with it considerable progress in the field of the prohibition of environmental warfare. Thus an essential precondition has been created to enable the CCD to complete the corresponding task conferred upon it by the United Nations General Assembly.

From the very beginning, my Government has thoroughly manifested its interest in the discussion of this subject; it has particularly done so by its active participation in the informal CCD meetings (4 to 7 August, 1975), reinforcing its permanent delegation by two experts and also expressing its view in these meetings. On that occasion, we stated that a broad range of possibilities of influencing and modifying environment, weather, and climate are conceivable, a wide range of possibilities stretching from already existing ways of local weather modification to the not less interesting field of science fiction. Our experts, therefore, doubted the utility of a detailed list and categorization of all imaginable possibilities of far-reaching, long lasting and severe measures of environmental modification. For this reason, we expressed ourselves strongly in favour of restricting the corresponding mention in the envisaged convention to a more general clause. It seems that considerations of this kind also underlie the drafts introduced by the Soviet Union and the United States. The working papers introduced by Canada, the Netherlands and Sweden have certainly not only enriched our knowledge but also cleared the path to this result. The expert meeting helped to clarify the ideas existing on this hitherto scarcely explored subject of negotiation.

We welcome the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States came to terms on the lines of a convention; we also appreciate the fact, resulting therefrom, that they express this agreement by presenting identical drafts on the subject of a "Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques".

Notwithstanding, I need not stress particularly that governments will have to enter into a detailed examination of the draft-- my Government is in the process of doing so-- and that further discussions and negotiations at the next sessions of the CCD

(Mr. Schlaich, Federal Republic of Germany)

are necessary. The negotiating task of the CCD is essential. I express my conviction that all the parties concerned remain open-minded for certainly still possible improvements of the draft.

But, as already pointed out, we have the impression that this new draft, if compared with former proposals, contains a series of improvements. Among them one improvement deserves a special remark: a very significant aspect of the new draft resides in admitting not only peaceful activities of environmental modification (to be dealt with among others by agencies like the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Meteorological Organization), but also all corresponding research and development. We consider it of particular importance that this door into the future remains open. Nobody is yet in a position to say whether the complex and difficult task of assuring not only the survival of mankind but also of further improving its quality of life will at least be very much facilitated by new knowledge in this field and its peaceful application.

On earlier occasions we have already expressed our interest in and our positive attitude towards reaching an international agreement on the prohibition of environmental warfare. We have also underlined the importance which we attach to the wise and timely prevention of possible future disastrous developments. On this occasion I may repeat our opinion that efforts in the field of disarmament and arms control should not only comprise existing weapons and other means of warfare, but should also anticipate future dangers and protection against them.

On the other hand, the important event of the introduction of the draft before us must not divert our attention from the over-all necessity to halt the world-wide arms race in the field of weapons already known and tested, be they conventional or not; neither must it prejudice the efforts to attain further tangible and effective progress in disarmament, but rather spur them on.

This draft is to be considered, therefore, in the framework of the over-all picture of general, complete, and balanced disarmament in all its aspects. It is in this context that I may be permitted to recall the Final Declaration of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and especially its passages on the review of article VI of the NPT.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Today, the Committee on Disarmament ends its summer session. During this session of the Committee there took place an important historical event, in the form of the completion at Helsinki of the Conference of thirty-five States on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This Conference constituted a major landmark in the history of intra-European relations. It establishes the basis and lays down the principles for a new stage in those relations in conditions of international détente and co-operation among the States Parties to the agreement. The agreements reached as a result of the Conference marked the beginning of a new stage in the process of détente and thus represented an important step on the road towards the strengthening of the principles of peaceful co-existence and the general establishment of relations of equitable co-operation among States with differing social systems.

It is not the European States alone which should view the principles of international relations evolved and approved at the Conference as matters of great importance. Détente must expand, deepen and extend to all regions of the world. It is important that those principles should be reinforced and given effect in international life. And, of course, political détente must be supplemented by military détente, for the most pressing requirement of our age is to limit and subsequently to halt the arms race, as a means of moving towards general and complete disarmament. Application of the principles approved at the all-European Conference is bound to have considerable influence on progress towards the approval and implementation of arms-limitation and disarmament measures both in Europe and universally, in the other continents of the world.

In this connexion, we should like to point out that due attention was given to questions pertaining to disarmament in the Final Act of the Conference. Hence, it is stated in that document that the States Parties thereto will "take effective measures [...] which by their scope and nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

Reference to the importance of achieving disarmament and to the direct link between that goal and the lessening of international tension was made by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, in his statement at the all-European Conference on 31 July. He said:

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"In our view, the most important result of the Conference is that international détente is increasingly being given concrete material substance. It is indeed the materialization of détente which is at the heart of the matter and the essence of all that will make peace in Europe truly firm and lasting. And we give pride of place in this respect to the task of halting the arms race, to achieving genuine results in the sphere of disarmament" (Pravda, 1 August 1975).

Turning to the actual work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should mention the fact that this summer session took place shortly after the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. That Conference was an important link in the process of the development and consolidation of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a process on which the reduction and elimination of the threat of nuclear war largely depend. The Soviet Union and numerous other States made substantial efforts to ensure the success of that Conference and welcomed its results and the final declaration it adopted.

The statements made in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the results of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty are of great interest. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction the statements of those many delegations which called for the strengthening by all possible means of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and supported the final declaration of the Conference of the Parties thereto. That declaration, which sums up the work of the Conference, expresses the participants' concern at the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons in the world and their earnest desire to seek effective means of strengthening the non-proliferation régime for such weapons.

Considering as it does that the securing of the non-proliferation régime is one of the most important goals of our time, the Soviet Union places considerable emphasis on securing the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty of the greatest possible number of countries and of all the important military Powers. The universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be the best guarantee of the effectiveness of the nuclear weapons non-proliferation régime. In this connexion, the USSR delegation would like to stress yet again the great and positive significance of the accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the spring of this year of the non-nuclear countries of EURATOM and of a number of other States, an event which confirms the Treaty's vitality and its great international importance for the reduction of the threat of nuclear war.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

During the consideration of disarmament matters in the Committee, a great deal of attention was given to the question of ensuring the security of States. The USSR delegation would like to point out the great importance which the Soviet Union attaches to this question in the solution of the problems of disarmament. It is imperative that no one's security should suffer through the adoption and implementation of disarmament measures. On the contrary, such measures must benefit all States which share in putting them into effect. That is an indispensable prerequisite for successful progress in the sphere of arms limitation, in the cause of disarmament. All efforts to resolve the problem through the elaboration of disarmament agreements contrary to this principle, and the efforts of the representatives of some States to insist on agreements which ignore this principle, are clearly doomed to failure. It is the task of all the organs, including the Committee on Disarmament, which deal with disarmament problems to find ways of solving them which will not harm anyone's security, but will be of benefit to all. The Soviet people, which twice within a single generation has suffered the ravages of world wars and which lost in those wars many millions of human lives, is deeply anxious that the proper security of States should be preserved in the solution of disarmament problems. It has every justification for insisting on the observance of this principle and for rejecting any proposals and projects for the solution of the problem which ignore the need not to harm the security of the States participating in the implementation of measures to limit armaments and achieve disarmament.

The summer session of the Committee on Disarmament has been a very full and effective one. Together with the large amount of attention given to the general problems of arms limitation and disarmament, there was detailed consideration with the help of experts of such topics as peaceful nuclear explosions and the prohibition of action to modify the environment for military or other hostile purposes. As a result of these expert consultations, the members of the Committee gained an understanding of the substance and significance of a number of the problems discussed and were able to explore possible ways of solving them. A study was made, under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament, of all aspects of the question of creating nuclear-free zones. In addition, consideration was given to other matters, including the banning of chemical and nuclear weapons.

In connexion with the submission to the Committee by the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones of the Group's report on that topic, the USSR delegation would like to express its gratitude to all the Group's members. We should

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

like to mention the great contribution made to the work of the Group by Professor Korhonen, the expert from Finland, whose untiring efforts were largely responsible for the successful conclusion of the Group's labours. The USSR delegation would like to convey to him its thanks for his work as Chairman of the Group and as the expert from Finland.

An important positive feature of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament was the submission by the Soviet Union and the United States of America for consideration by the Committee of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. The submission of this draft opens the way to agreement within the Committee on Disarmament on an international agreement concerning the prevention of the use of geophysical and meteorological means of warfare. The adoption of such a measure would constitute a significant step towards limiting and halting the arms race in an area in which there could be substantial weapons development, with all the dangerous consequences that implies for mankind. The consideration and adoption of the draft convention which has been submitted to the Committee would encourage the elaboration of further measures to curb the arms race and achieve disarmament.

Although no agreed draft on disarmament matters is being submitted to the General Assembly as a result of the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee does now have a real basis for agreement at its next session of a draft convention concerning the prohibition of harmful environmental modification techniques. The Soviet delegation would like to express the hope that the discussion of disarmament problems which has taken place within the Committee and the studies made of some of those problems will ensure progress in future negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

The active and detailed consideration of disarmament problems by the Committee on Disarmament is an indication of the interest States have in matters pertaining to the limitation and halting of the arms race, and shows the need for broader efforts by the members of the Committee to solve the problems before them. The strengthening of peace and international security, and the well-being of all countries and peoples, largely depend on success in this matter.

In conclusion, we should like to thank the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Björnerstedt, and all his colleagues in the Secretariat, including the interpreters and translators, for their great and effective efforts to assist the Committee on Disarmament in the discharge of its mandate.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): As the CCD concludes its summer session, it is worth-while to review briefly some of the more significant developments in our work this year. Before turning to specific developments, however, I would make the general observation that the Committee in 1975 has been marked by a renewed energy, which my delegation welcomes. The infusion of new members and new subjects has clearly been an important factor in this regard.

A new subject on which progress has been made this summer is the question of restraints on military environmental modification activities. Last week the Soviet Union and the United States tabled, in parallel, identical draft conventions on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. In our view this action represents an important step toward effectively precluding the dangers of the potential use of such techniques as methods of warfare. Earlier this month, the informal meetings with experts added substantially to the technical information needed for further consideration of the subject. In particular, the meetings provided useful insights into the present state of the art of environmental modification. We look forward to beginning concrete negotiations, in which we hope all delegations will participate at our Spring session next year.

Also prominent among the results of this year's work is the study of nuclear-weapon-free zones prepared by the Ad Hoc Group of Experts under CCD auspices. I would like to express my delegation's appreciation to the experts who participated in the study and to commend the Chairman, Professor Korhonen of Finland, for his effective leadership in successfully completing the task. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the Secretariat for the invaluable support and assistance it provided to the experts. The result of the hard work by all concerned is a truly comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects.

Several delegations have commented on the approach, adopted in the study, of including differing views wherever consensus was not reached. This procedure was adopted by consensus in the CCD and included in its mandate to the experts. We believe this procedure was not only proper but essential in order to assure a thorough exploration of the many complex issues involved. It is important to recall that a substantial number of the issues that the experts explored in detail either had never surfaced before or had been addressed only in a general way. Their consideration in the study is an important achievement. We are pleased that the experts achieved consensus on a number of important points in each section of the study. We do not feel that the fact that consensus was not

(Mr. Martin, United States)

reached on other issues should detract from the value of the study. On the contrary, the presentation by the experts of their divergent views on many difficult questions contributes to a better understanding of the nuclear-weapon-free zone concept, of its feasibility, and of its potential value as a means of promoting non-proliferation objectives and strengthening regional and international security. We believe that the study will be useful to the States which are, or may be, considering the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in their region and to other interested States throughout the world.

Our summer session has also seen constructive developments in other areas. Among these, the Committee's informal meetings with experts on the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes were particularly significant. These meetings did not, of course, provide answers to all the questions involved, but they did allow us to focus on the basic problems and to clarify further a number of critical issues. We consider especially noteworthy the general agreement that, from a technological point of view, it is not possible to develop the capability to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. The informal meetings also helped increase awareness of the problems involved if PNEs were to be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban.

Last month my delegation put forward the suggestion that the CCD undertake an effort to resolve the problems involved in the definition and comparative measurement of military expenditures. We noted that success in this effort would constitute a significant forward step in bringing about conditions that would permit serious consideration of international measures for limiting such expenditures. We also noted that such a study would conform to the step-by-step approach suggested by the Group of Consultant Experts to the Secretary-General in their report on the reduction of military budgets.

We have been gratified by expressions of support for this approach by the delegations of Sweden, the Netherlands, and the Federal Republic of Germany. In reflecting on comments made by those delegations, we agree with the view that an effort to resolve the important issues involved could best be undertaken by a small group of experts, perhaps drawn from CCD member States. It seems to us that a group of qualified experts could contribute significantly to our common understanding of this complex area. We would prefer that such a group be composed of economists or budget specialists who would be able to devote as much time as necessary to an intensive study of the issues.

(Mr. Martin, United States)

In our view the General Assembly could give impetus and direction to such a study by adopting a generally acceptable resolution on the subject at its session this fall. The resolution should, among other things, take into account the replies of governments to the Secretary-General's request for views concerning the 1974 experts' report on the reduction of military budgets. My Government will give careful consideration to those replies. We look forward to working with other delegations at the Assembly in developing an appropriate resolution.

My delegation continues to believe that the CCD can make an important contribution in the field of conventional arms restraints. Our interest in giving serious attention to this subject was reflected in our intervention at the end of the Spring session. We regret that during this session there has been so little discussion concerning our presentation, although comments by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Sweden have provided a starting point for further consideration of the matter. For example, concern was expressed over the implications for national sovereignty of one of the illustrative principles we suggested in our presentation -- the principle concerning consultations between a State acquiring arms and other interested States that might consider such an acquisition as adversely affecting their security. It would not be the intention of such a principle to give outside States a basis to interfere in a particular State's decisions regarding its security requirements. Such decisions are indeed a fundamental matter of national policy. Rather, we believe that consultations along the lines suggested in this principle could help reduce uncertainties and suspicions regarding arms acquisitions. This in turn could create more favourable conditions for mutual self-restraint by the States participating in such consultations.

During the course of our meetings this year, a number of delegations have expressed concern about the slow pace of developments in the CCD regarding chemical weapons. We believe that the Committee's continuing consideration this year of various complex technical factors have made significant contributions to the resolution of CW issues. For example, this summer several delegations -- the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, and Japan -- have presented working papers contributing important information related to the question of definition of prohibited agents.

In our view, one particularly significant development over the past year has been the increasing acceptance of the idea that a phased approach to CW limitations may well be the most realistic one. This approach has been advocated by Japan and supported with some suggested modifications by Canada. A key consideration in establishing the extent

(Mr. Martin, United States)

of an initial prohibition is the nature of agents in national arsenals. Proposals have been made to deal initially only with supertoxic agents. Other proposals envision coverage of all lethal agents. There are arguments in favour of each of these approaches.

On balance, however, we believe that an initial prohibition should deal with all lethal agents. Restricting coverage to supertoxic agents would not equally constrain all countries having CW stocks if, in addition to supertoxic agents, some of these countries possessed lethal agents not usually considered supertoxic, such as hydrogen cyanide. Furthermore, it is important to remember that in some regions the possession of less toxic agents -- and not supertoxic agents -- represents the real threat.

On another major CW issue, my delegation has noted with particular interest the working paper submitted by Finland (CCD/453). The paper reports the effort under way by the Finnish Government to develop a CW verification capability for possible future international use. We consider this effort to be an especially valuable contribution in a critical area of chemical arms control, and look forward to further reports on its progress.

Before concluding, I would like to express the great appreciation of my delegation to Dr. Björnerstedt, the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, who has displayed once again his excellent abilities on behalf of the Committee. Special thanks are also due to Mrs. Gill and all the other members of the Secretariat for their efforts. Like many other delegations, I would like to pay a particular tribute to the interpreters, who did so well for us in the long and complex informal meetings, both of this Committee and of the Ad Hoc group of experts, where most of the interventions were extemporaneous.

My delegation firmly believes that the results of our work this year have amply demonstrated the continuing vitality of the CCD. We look forward to working with other members of the Committee at the General Assembly this fall on preparations for what promises to be an active and productive session in 1976.

Mr. MISHRA (India): My delegation is one of those which have not yet had the time to formulate views on the study prepared by the qualified governmental experts on nuclear-weapon-free zones. However, I would like at this stage to join other speakers who have paid well-deserved tributes to the experts and, in particular, to the Chairman of the Group, Professor Korhonen of Finland. I believe that the Group has done the best it could do, given the short time available to it and given the

(Mr. Mishra, India)

substantial divergence of views. I should also like to offer our thanks to the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. R. Björnerstedt, and the members of the Secretariat, without whose valuable assistance the study could not have been presented to us last week.

The meeting was suspended at 11.50 a.m. and reconvened at 4.20 p.m.

Mr. ENE (Romania): Before I give my delegation's consent for the adoption of the report of the Committee I am instructed to make the following statement:

The Romanian delegation expresses its discontent with the manner in which the annual report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the current year has been prepared and drafted. Its dissatisfaction stems from the following reasons:

1. The format of the report has been changed without prior consultation of all the members of the Committee. No unanimity of views existed with regard to the changes which have been proposed. A majority of members of the Committee has requested therefore that the format of the report for the current year be considered provisional and that this question should be discussed and decided upon a democratic basis, with the participation of all members of the Committee, at the beginning of its next session, in February 1976.

2. The report as drafted this year does not allow adequate reflection of the basic positions taken by all delegations on the issues before the Committee. The Romanian delegation is not satisfied with the way in which the basic positions it has pursued in the Committee in 1975 are reflected in the report. It felt therefore that it was its right to present amendments to the text of the report inasmuch as it referred to the stand taken by Romania in the CCD. The proposed amendments have not been accepted, however.

We wish to reiterate our view that, the CCD being a negotiating body and not a debating organ, its annual reports are required to reflect the basic positions of the negotiating parties. Besides, disarmament being a matter of deep concern to all States, the governments which are members of this Committee should, in our view, feel responsible vis-à-vis other governments which are not members of the CCD for the work they perform. Therefore the report of the CCD, when addressed to the General Assembly, also constitutes an instrument for the information of other governments on the situation in the field of disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

The new format of the report, as conceived this year, substantially weakens its information value and may contribute to the further isolation of the CCD from the United Nations General Assembly and -- for that matter -- from the international public opinion.

3. The report is unbalanced. The first half of the report, which contains issues of special interest to some delegations, is more detailed and the views of the delegations thereon better reflected than in the second half, which contains, in our view, more fundamental issues related to disarmament.

Despite all these reservations, in a spirit of conciliation, the Romanian delegation has not opposed this year the necessary consensus for the adoption of the report. It is its understanding, however, that the report as drafted for the current year does not create any precedent for the future and that the whole question of the procedure to be followed in drafting the Committee's report from now on as well as of its format and content will be thoroughly discussed and decided upon next year.

I ask that this statement be properly recorded.

Mr. ALLEN (United Kingdom): Before we bring down the curtain on the summer session of the CCD, my delegation would like to associate itself with those other delegations who have expressed their appreciation of the work of Professor Korhonen of Finland, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on NWFZs, and that of all the other experts in the Group. We believe Professor Korhonen carried out a difficult task with a commendable combination of patience and determination, and we regret that the CCD has not been able to agree on the text of a letter to him expressing its corporate appreciation of his and their work.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): After discussion at unofficial meetings of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of the format of the Committee's annual report to the United Nations General Assembly, the Co-Chairmen, by agreement with the members of the Committee, have agreed that the following sentence should be included in the current report to the General Assembly at the end of paragraph 13 (page 3 of the English text):

"Recognizing that the format of the present report has been adopted only for this session, the Committee, after unofficial consultations, agreed at the 687th plenary meeting, held today, 28 August 1975, that the question of the format of its future annual reports should be discussed and decided at the beginning of its 1976 session."

Mr. BARTON (Canada): In the regrettable absence of a formal expression of thanks from the CCD to the Chairman and members of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, I should like to express the appreciation of my delegation for their labours, and to express the hope that the Secretariat will ensure that the Chairman of the Group receives copies of all records of meetings containing references to the Group's report.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee now has before it for final adoption the Draft Special Report on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects (CCD/475) and the Draft Report to the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission (CCD/469).

I will first take up the Draft Special Report and invite your comments. If there are no comments, the report is adopted.

It was so decided.

Next, I put before the Committee for adoption the Draft Report to the General Assembly. If I hear no objection, I shall declare the Report adopted.

It was so decided.

I also wish to inform the Committee that the Secretariat will follow the practice established in previous years of forwarding advance copies of the Committee's report for circulation at United Nations Headquarters in New York.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

