

# CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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ENGLISH

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## FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 23 March 1972, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A.A. Roshchin

(USSR)

GE.72-4663

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. M E. DELPECH

Brazil:

Mr. P. NOGUEIRA BATISTA

Mr. O.S. CARBONAR

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. O. MITEV

Burma:

U HYUNT MAUNG SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. G. IGNATIEFF

Mr. R.W. CLARK

Mr. R.E. MOORE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Mr. M. SOUKUP

Egypt:

Mr. EL SAYED EL REEDY

Mr. M. ABOUL NASR

Mr. M. ISMAIL

Ethiopia:

Mr. M. IMRU

Mr. T. GEBRU

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. J. PETRAN

Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. P.K. BANERJEE

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Mr. G. SHANKAR

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILO  
Mr. E. GIUFFRIDA  
Mr. R. BORSARELLI  
Mr. P. BRUNI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI  
Mr. H. OTSUKA  
Mr. Y. TANAKA  
Mr. H. MATSUMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mr. M. MARIN  
Mrs. M. PRIETO

Mongolia:

Mr. O. KHOSBAYAR  
Mr. Z. ERENDO  
Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. M.A.A. KHATTABI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK  
Mr. A.J. ETTEMA

Nigeria:

Mr. J.D.O. SOKOYA  
Mr. A.A. OLUMIDE

Pakistan:

Mr. N.A. NAIK  
Mr. N. MIRZA

Poland:

Mr. W. NATORF  
Mr. S. TOPA  
Mr. A. GRADZIUK  
Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE  
Mr. O. IONESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. C. MITRAN

Sweden:

Mr. L. ECKERBERG  
Mr. U. REINIUS

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKINE  
Mr. V.M. BASKAKOV  
Mr. A.I. BELOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH  
Mr. D.F. DUNCAN  
Mr. J.T. MASEFIELD  
Mr. R. HOULISTON

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN  
Mr. W. GIVAN  
Mr. M.H.A. VAN HEUVEN  
Mr. R. McCORMACK

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. ČVOROVIĆ  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

Communiqué of the Meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 552nd plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Statements were made by the representatives of India, the Netherlands, Mongolia and Italy.

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 28 March 1972, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. BANERJEE (India): On behalf of the delegation of India, I should like to welcome our new colleagues: Ambassador Nisibori of Japan, Ambassador Polak of the Netherlands, Ambassador Ene of Romania, and Ambassador Martin of the United States.

In this tenth anniversary year of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it would be appropriate to take a general stock of the situation that now prevails in the field of disarmament, so that we could have a better perspective on and understanding of specific problems and issues before the Conference.

It is indeed a most encouraging development that, despite the ever-spiralling arms race and a growing disappointment in regard to any genuine progress in disarmament, the thinking of the international community has now become clearer than ever before in regard to the general direction of progress in the field of disarmament. There are several elements on which an important consensus seems to be developing within the international community.

In the first instance, the realization is growing that lasting global security could only be achieved through disarmament, and that no matter how long and difficult the road, the international community has to persevere in its noble task of achieving lasting security. The so-called theory of the balance of deterrence cannot be a basis for achieving international security.

Disarmament in this nuclear age can only be conceived of in terms of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The advent of nuclear weapons and the development of the other weapons of mass destruction have left the international community with no choice except total and comprehensive disarmament.

In view of the deep-seated mistrust and suspicion among nations and the existence of international tensions, only a step-by-step approach can be adopted in the field of disarmament. Hence the value of the so-called partial or collateral measures. And such measures have to be genuine, balanced and effective if they are to contribute towards the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The highest priority has to be accorded to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, so that significant progress towards nuclear disarmament could be achieved as early as possible. Any effort to divert the attention of the negotiating

(Mr. Banerjee, India)

body on disarmament from this task of highest priority would be looked at with suspicion by the international community and would not contribute to the achievement of the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

It is now almost universally accepted that the problem of disarmament, which is of fundamental importance to all the nations of the world and which at the same time raises highly complicated issues, should be tackled on two levels. In order that all nations of the world could have their say and make their contribution to the progress of disarmament, discussions on disarmament should be held in deliberative forums where suitable guidelines could be developed. The United Nations has provided such deliberative forums like the General Assembly, the First Committee and the Disarmament Commission. Meetings of these bodies have been very useful. In order that all countries without exception could have the possibility of expressing their views on the problem of disarmament, it has been proposed that a world disarmament conference be convened, and we welcome the proposal. There is no doubt that the holding of such a conference would provide a great impetus to progress in the field of disarmament. However, it has been strongly recognized that there should be a small negotiating body which could take up the guidelines developed in the deliberative forums and conduct serious and detailed discussions on specific problems and issues with a view to exploring the possibility of negotiating internationally-binding instruments for achieving progress towards the realization of global security based on disarmament.

The international thinking in regard to the essential need for and separate roles of the deliberative forums and a negotiating body has become so firmly rooted that it might well be considered as one of the most important trends that have emerged in international relations during the post Second World War period. Moreover, it is through a process of trial and error that a negotiating body -- the Committee on Disarmament -- was established in 1962 and has had a decade of useful existence. Never before in the history of mankind has a negotiating body on disarmament survived so long and done such valuable work. The international community has, year after year, given guidelines to the Committee on Disarmament for doing continued work and achieving progress in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Banerjee, India)

Against this background the desire of the international community for the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations has only become stronger with the passage of time. It is only to be hoped that such participation would become possible in the near future.

Recently several suggestions have been put forward in regard to the future reorganization of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. All such suggestions would need to be carefully examined, because any changes that might be agreed upon should have the sole objective of strengthening the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to making it a more effective instrument of negotiation on the problem of disarmament. The cause of disarmament will receive a set-back if the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament were disrupted. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to hold meaningful disarmament discussions if a proven forum were to be destroyed or changes made in it on the basis of preconceived expectations and wishful anticipation.

The 26th Regular Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations has recently considered several questions in the field of disarmament and has adopted various resolutions. These resolutions provide guidelines for the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during its meetings in the current year.

The question of elimination of chemical weapons is to be a high priority item. The delegation of India together with the other members of the Group of Twelve last year developed a Joint Memorandum (CCD/352) which suggests the fundamental approach as well as the important elements that could provide the basis for future agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons. It is the hope of the Indian delegation that the Joint Memorandum of the Group of Twelve would be fully utilized by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for its negotiations on the elimination of chemical weapons.

As regards the question of a comprehensive test ban, the views of the Indian delegation have been stated in my statement before the First Committee on 29 November 1971. I would like to reiterate that for achieving progress towards the objective of a comprehensive test ban it is essential that four main considerations be kept in mind. In the first instance, the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty should be fully observed, and those nuclear-weapon States which have not yet adhered



(Mr. Banerjee, India)

to that treaty should do so without any further excuse or delay. Secondly, whatever be the differences on the issue of verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests, and notwithstanding any other considerations, all testing of nuclear weapons in all environments must be immediately suspended. Thirdly, a comprehensive test ban has two aspects: (a) all nuclear weapon tests in all environments should be prohibited; (b) all nuclear-weapon States should be parties to it. Fourthly, negotiations should be undertaken for a separate treaty to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests in the underground environment, and attention should simultaneously be focused on the need to conclude an agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Recently some suggestions for what have been termed "measures of restraint" have been put forward in regard to the question of a comprehensive test ban. It has been argued that since, despite the repeated calls of the General Assembly, a complete suspension of nuclear-weapon testing has not taken place so far, it would now be very pragmatic to ask for a partial limitation -- say, in the size and numbers -- of nuclear-weapon tests being conducted in the underground environment.

The delegation of India is firmly of the view that the position taken by the international community over the years for a complete suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments is correct, as that is the only way in which suitable conditions can be created for achieving a comprehensive test ban. Suggestions for the so-called measures of restraint are only superficially attractive. They could only create an illusion of progress and would result in a legitimization of certain categories of nuclear-weapon testing. A partial approach would be inadequate, unworkable and dangerous. There should be a truly comprehensive approach to the question of a comprehensive test ban.

It is the earnest hope of the delegation of India that the sessions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year would lead to a deeper understanding not only of the overall situation in the field of disarmament but

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also of the basic issues involved in regard to the specific problems now under consideration. The need for patience and perseverance was never greater than today in the pursuit of the goal of disarmament.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to recall the following words of Jawaharlal Nehru, which he addressed in the Rajya Sabha of the Parliament of India on 15 March 1962 -- the day following the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva:

"In regard to foreign affairs or in regard to anything, the most important thing today, I have no doubt, is disarmament, looking at it from a world point of view, because if there is no disarmament, the world will naturally drift more and more towards conflict, towards war, and undoubtedly if there is war, it will be a nuclear war and possibly a war like that brought on without even a declaration of war ... Disarmament has become a very vital and urgent problem, and this conference that is being held in Geneva, the 18-Member Conference, is of the highest importance ... If this fails, then it will not be easy to come back to it. Some time or the other the world will have to come to disarmament -- there is no doubt -- unless it destroys itself beforehand."

Disarmament is a matter to which the Government of India have consistently attached the highest importance. It is, however, a highly complicated subject. Our attempt has therefore been to put forward proposals which are not only idealistic and right in our opinion but which are also realistic and likely to be acceptable to others. India would continue to co-operate with all the countries of the world in the achievement of the cherished ideal of the human race: that of a lasting world peace based on disarmament.

Mr. ROSENBERG POLAK (Netherlands): I should like to begin my first intervention in this Committee with some observations on the ultimate goal of our common endeavour in the field of arms control and disarmament. As stated in many resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and reflected in several treaties on matters of our special concern and interest, our ultimate goal is general and complete disarmament. A fully-disarmed world with no armed forces except for an international police force guarding the peace is and remains what we have to work toward.

During the first years of its existence this Committee has devoted a major portion of its deliberations to the question of general and complete disarmament. Thereafter it has focussed its attention mainly on so-called collateral measures of disarmament.

There exists, certainly in public opinion in the Netherlands and perhaps in the world at large, a sense of impatience and disquiet with regard to the speed and manner in which results are being attained in the field of disarmament. And even though some real progress has been made by this Committee in a field of international negotiations of great complexity, viewed against the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament the accomplishments of the past must seem modest indeed.

It is not to be expected that this tremendous task of achieving general and complete disarmament can be accomplished within a short period of time. Indeed, it is doubtful whether it will be achieved in the foreseeable future. This does not, however, absolve us from the duty, while exploiting today's possibilities in the field of partial measures, to look forward and to see matters in their proper perspective. This means, to my mind, that we must try to tackle the problems that are manageable now, without losing sight of our long-term goal.

One cannot imagine a disarmed world without profound changes in international relationships as we know them now. The will toward disarmament, as we see it, offers a stimulus to change international society. It is also true, however, that world-wide and large-scale disarmament can only come about as a consequence of changing patterns in inter-State behaviour and of the development of international procedures and institutions.

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

The Netherlands Government, in answering two years ago the questionnaire of the United Nations Secretary-General on the subject of the strengthening of international security, put into their reply the following thoughts, and I quote:

"At the moment of the 25th anniversary of the United Nations, it is not irrelevant to question whether the present world order sufficiently conforms to the increasing interdependence of all peoples which requires that, if necessary, national interests be subordinated to common interests. A secure world system is impossible if individual States are unwilling to accept such subordination. Eventually the security of mankind can only be ensured by the development of a world legal order based on justice, in which the issues of international politics will have been transformed into issues of global domestic politics."

This concept of a future world order will easily be liable to scepticism and even to opposition; but we think it to hold true, not only with regard to disarmament but also with regard to other global issues like international development co-operation, the exploitation of the world reserves of natural resources, and the preservation of man's environment. We believe that in the long run changing international patterns and needs will contribute and may even force us to closer co-operation and solidarity between nations.

It would only be commensurate with our ultimate goal and with the heavy tasks before us if all major Powers could decide to take part actively in our disarmament negotiations. My delegation associates itself with the hope expressed by many speakers that in the course of time China and France will consider it to be in their own interests as well as ours that they should join us in disarmament negotiations. We look forward to the moment at which also the German nation will be represented.

During the disarmament debate in the First Committee last year several wishes with regard to a reconstruction of the Committee were formulated. They were basically related to the co-Chairmanship and its prerogatives -- including the drafting of the annual report of the Committee -- and to the question of the openness of the Committee. It is not my intention to go into details with regard to these subjects. At this stage I merely want to state that the Netherlands delegation is willing to approach these

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questions with an open mind. If it should appear that a departure from past practices might contribute to an improvement in credibility and in acceptability of the Committee as a negotiating forum, we would have to be prepared to act with realism and with willingness to reach the attainable.

As to a world disarmament conference, we believe that such a conference will not be able to take the place of a limited negotiating forum. We have made our views on this point very clear during the general disarmament debate during the last session of the General Assembly. Therefore, whatever the outcome of the debate on the desirability of a world disarmament conference, it would according to our views remain true that a negotiating body of limited size cannot be missed. Disarmament without doubt concerns all States, big and small; but at the same time past experience has shown that detailed and time-consuming negotiations on such sensitive problems can prosper best in an atmosphere of quiet and patient contacts.

The General Assembly has specifically requested the Committee to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, as well as its negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

On the question of a comprehensive test ban our position is well known, as it has been set out at length in this Committee last year. The Netherlands position was summarized in a statement of the Netherlands representative in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly on 18 November last. Permit me to quote the relevant paragraph of that statement:

"The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has held ample discussions on the technical aspects of the verification problem. The seismological capabilities for the detection and identification of underground explosions now seem to be explored to an extent which makes it doubtful whether essentially new insights can be gained by further continuation of the scientific debate. In addition, the always thorny issue of on-site inspections has been scaled down to a problem of more modest dimensions. The range of nuclear explosions in regard to

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which on-site inspections could be of a practical value has shrunk significantly and would do so even more after the installation of special seismic instruments. If this is correct, the test ban problem now lends itself to a political rather than a technical approach. Therefore, we think that the time has come for the Powers most directly concerned to make such political decisions as are needed in order to achieve the speedy conclusion of an international agreement for the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests. Indeed, we fervently hope that such an agreement will be reached within a year from now."

I hope to come back to the question of a comprehensive test ban at a later stage in our deliberations. I should like to support the forceful plea of Mr. Ignatieff in his intervention of 2 March to the effect that we should not have a "dialogue des sourds" on this subject instead of meaningful negotiations. As regards his two proposed lines of approach, we have no strong preference for one or the other. Indeed, we do believe that they are not incompatible and that they could be followed on a parallel course. As to the urgency of progress in the field of a comprehensive test ban, I might perhaps be allowed to quote from the article by Henry R. Myers on "Extending the nuclear test ban" in the January issue of "The Scientific American":

"The attainment of a treaty banning underground tests would demonstrate to the non-nuclear countries that the major nuclear Powers would accept substantial restriction on their own nuclear activities, a demonstration that would strengthen arguments against the acquisition of nuclear weapons by other countries. As a result of its symbolic value, a cessation of underground testing, particularly in the absence of a major agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, would, more than any other likely step, signify an almost irrevocable commitment to seek security through arms-control agreements rather than through the never ending cycle of weapons and counter-weapons that has characterized the period since World War II."

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

We fully endorse that conclusion and we repeat our hope that our deliberations during this session will come to fruition and will lead to the conclusion of an underground test ban.

On the question of effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, extensive research will still have to be done. This conclusion can also be drawn from the discussions during a symposium organized by SIPRI a few months ago. My delegation shares the view expressed by Mr. Nisibori of Japan on the need of convening one or more informal meetings with experts in order to develop further our insight in certain technical questions. I may add to this that, in our view, future meetings with experts would be most productive if these would not be restricted to an exchange of prepared statements. We think it would be advisable to have experts from as many Member countries as possible to come here, and allow them time and opportunity to discuss matters at some length. We believe that such technical discussions could best be held at an early date. It would then be possible to take account of their results in political discussions later on in this year's session.

In his intervention at the opening meeting on 29 February, Mr. Martin of the United States raised some fundamental questions with regard to the scope and verification of a prohibition of the development, production etc. of chemical weapons. With regard to the question of scope, we have noted that the members of this Committee who form the Group of Twelve seem to have taken a flexible position on this issue. In their joint memorandum of 28 September 1971 (CCD/352) they proposed a prohibition of "chemical agents of types and in quantities that will be defined in future agreed provisions". We appreciate this flexible approach, and the Netherlands delegation is ready to explore all avenues for possible progress in this field. This is not to say that we do not have any preference of our own. In fact the Netherlands delegation is basically in favour of a chemical weapons convention whose scope would be comprehensive.

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

The major problem confronting such an approach arises from the situation that, of all chemical agents that might be used in warfare, only certain categories are exclusively suited to this purpose. The other categories serve either as raw materials in normal industry or are applied directly in a variety of civil activities. These materials are available in abundance in many countries all over the world. The close relationship between the production of chemicals for civilian needs and the production of chemical agents for warfare was clearly illustrated in a United States working paper of 16 March 1970 (CCD/283).

Only the highly lethal nerve agents seem to be an exception to this rule. Netherlands experts have tried to define these agents in an objective formula (CCD/320). But at least until now it has been doubtful how far such a course of action can be followed with regard to other chemical agents. Of course these too might be defined in chemical formulas; but, because of the capability of many of these agents to serve military as well as civilian purposes, such formulas would not fit into a treaty prohibiting the production and possession of chemical weapons unless combined with a statement of intent. In treaty language this might be phrased as a prohibition to develop, produce etc. such and such chemical agents unless for such and such purposes, or as an undertaking not to develop, produce etc. such agents for hostile purposes or for use in armed conflict.

In view of the feasibility of only an "intentional" or, to use a phrase coined by the Swedish delegation, a "conditional" prohibition of most categories of chemical agents, one might wonder if a selective prohibition of agents with a sole military purpose would not be preferable. At this stage of the discussion it would be premature to rule out a course of action that, for example, would lead us to concentrate initially on a prohibition of nerve agents as a model for progress in other fields. At the same time, we should aim at a comprehensive prohibition as the most desirable final result of our common efforts in the field of chemical arms control and disarmament.



(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

Our negotiations are dealing with means of warfare the use of which is already forbidden under international law. As we all know, this rule of international law is interpreted in different ways. It is not our intention to raise a new debate on questions that have been disputed for decades. But, looking to the future and in view of a possible new international agreement on chemical means of warfare, the Netherlands Government has on several occasions declared its readiness to take account of the opinion of a majority of States, to wit that the use in war of all chemical agents should be prohibited.

Such a prohibition should have as its corollary a provision for the total elimination of all chemical means of warfare from the arsenals of States. We suggest that such a provision would have to be comprehensive in order to be effective. Of course one category of chemical agents is more dangerous as a means of warfare than others; but a general observation like this is only relevant up to a certain point. For instance, only nerve agents could play a militarily-significant role in a conflict between parties that already possess the most modern armaments in conventional or even nuclear terms. The case is different, however, in a situation of confrontation between such a major military Power and a less well-equipped nation, or between two developing countries. In a case like this, chemical weapons of the types used during World War I could pose a threat that might not be measured by their relative degree of toxicity. Because this Committee is aiming at a generally-acceptable agreement, we have, I suppose, to take account of the different scenarios in which such an agreement should play its role.

Another argument in favour of a comprehensive approach also deals with the disarmament aspect of a chemical-weapons convention. If only a certain category of agents were to be eliminated from military arsenals, the verification of such a measure would be virtually impossible. One should have to open up or dismantle spray-tanks or bombs to get assurance that they would not contain an agent of the forbidden type. Only when the total absence of chemical agents from arsenals would be the rule, a certain degree of confidence could be derived from less intrusive measures such as the observation of the discontinuance of the training of armies in chemical warfare etc. We have as yet no concrete suggestions on the verification of chemical

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

disarmament. We are, however, inclined to think that the destruction of military stockpiles or their diversion to peaceful needs will have to be verified in an appropriate manner; because chemical means of warfare are actually deployed by several states. In this respect the Convention on Biological Weapons does not lend itself as a suitable precedent.

If a comprehensive approach would appear to be acceptable, we should realize that a chemical-weapons convention could provide for the total elimination of chemical weapons from military arsenals but that it could not cope with the less direct but nonetheless real threat posed by the existing and expanding capabilities of chemical industry. An intentional or conditional prohibition, as I mentioned before, could only up to a certain point put practical restrictions on the production and possession of several kinds of agents that might be suitable for military purposes. In fact, such a prohibition might be found to be of significance mainly as a reinforcement of the existing ban on the use of these kinds of weapons.

This could be said also with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention that we agreed upon last year. Article I of this Convention does not contain an absolute prohibition of the possession of microbial and other biological agents, or toxins, but only prohibits possession of types and quantities "that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes". But on the other hand it stipulates that this rule is to be applied "in any circumstances". Together with the provision in article III for complete disarmament in this field, this clause results in a total prohibition of the use of biological means of warfare. In our view this is one of the exceptional qualities of this convention. It puts a double lock on the already-existing ban on their use that, in essence, was only a prohibition of first use. The Netherlands delegation hopes that a similar provision could be agreed upon in a convention on chemical weapons. In that event, even an international or conditional prohibition of the possession of certain chemical agents would be of significance as an arms-control measure by completely outlawing them as a means of warfare.

(Mr. Rosenberg Polak, Netherlands)

I would like to conclude this intervention with a short remark on the question of conventional-arms control that has been raised by the United States delegation. On previous occasions the Netherlands delegation has supported the view that this Committee should pay due attention to this subject. No doubt the control and limitation of weapons of mass destruction deserve the highest priority in our deliberations. But as a matter of fact all wars that began after World War II were so-called conventional wars. Some members of this Committee who have spoken before me have already mentioned the huge amounts of money that are being spent year by year for military purposes. The Secretary-General's Report on the Social and Economic Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security has drawn a clear picture of the dimensions of this problem. The Netherlands delegation is ready to participate in a common search for practical measures in the field of conventional arms control. In the meantime, unilateral steps of self-control and self-restraint could already be taken by, for instance, the major supplier countries. Such a kind of unilateral action is, however, bound to be of limited avail unless it is co-ordinated and supported by bilateral or multilateral understandings or agreements. In this respect this Committee could do useful work, at least in an exploratory manner.

Mr. KHOSBAYAR (Mongolia): May I start my short statement by saying that my delegation is pleased to join the previous speakers in congratulating heartily the veteran members of the Committee, including yourself, Mr. Chairman, as well as our new colleagues, and wish them every success in their work.

During the whole period of its existence the Committee on Disarmament has earned itself the reputation of an effective and productive body dealing with the highly complicated problems of disarmament under a complex international situation. The decade of the Committee's work has been marked by the first series of important agreements well known to us which were aimed at curbing the arms race and reversing this adverse trend.

(Mr. Khosbayar, Mongolia)

Recalling the achievements scored by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we should, however, accept the truth that, so far as the principal objective of disarmament is concerned, we have failed to live up to the expectations of the world community. As the previous speakers have pointed out, the past ten years have witnessed the unforeseen increase in arms expenditures and both the qualitative and quantitative build-up of armaments, which have always had an adverse influence on disarmament negotiations.

Regardless of these unfavourable trends, the successful conclusion of certain agreements in the field of disarmament has been made possible thanks to the determination and untiring efforts of those who are sincerely interested in lessening international tension. It also testifies to the fact that, once there is a political will to negotiate seriously, there is always a way to reach concrete agreements on disarmament.

The socialist countries have been constantly striving to find the best possible solution to the problem of disarmament by putting forward a good number of proposals and suggestions, and by adopting a constructive and flexible attitude towards negotiations. But unfortunately they have often run against obstacles which prevented them from achieving more results.

It seems to us that the future disarmament negotiations will be no less difficult than the past ones, and that the Committee, therefore, should redouble its efforts in order to reach its goal. While striving to negotiate new agreements in the field of disarmament, we should at the same time seek the fullest possible adherence to and implementation of previously-concluded ones so as to make them universally-binding rules of international law.

It is obvious that an end to the deadly spiral of the arms race can be put only through concerted and collective actions of all States. Accordingly in our opinion all States, big and small alike, should commit themselves to adopt necessary measures which would further facilitate negotiations on disarmament. In this connexion I should like to refer to resolution 2833 (XXVI) of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations

(Mr. Khosbayar, Mongolia)

General Assembly, adopted at the initiative of the Soviet Union, on convening a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States. We maintain that the world disarmament conference would enable governments to concentrate their attention on the most important aspects of the disarmament problem and come forward with new ideas as well as outline measures that would have a favourable impact on the attainment of still wider and stricter agreements in this field. Such a conference will usefully supplement the bilateral and multilateral talks which are under way at present, as well as any other disarmament negotiations that may be held in the future. My delegation, like many others, believes that the Committee, as a body possessing rich experience in dealing with disarmament problems, could substantially contribute to the preparation of this conference.

My delegation concurs with the statements that the Committee is entering its second decade at a time when the political developments in certain areas have raised some hopes for meaningful talks on the vital problems of disarmament. The most important of these developments is no doubt the improvement of the situation in Europe, which if carried forward would not only bring about a new turn in the relations of the countries of this continent but would considerably promote the relaxation of tension in general. Hence it is quite natural that the initiative taken by the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty to convene an all-European conference, and their efforts to realize it, have been appreciated and supported by all nations, including my own.

While noting with satisfaction some positive developments in Europe, my delegation, representing an Asian country, cannot but mention with regret the fact that, due to the outmoded policy "from a position of strength" still being pursued by some Powers, the situation in some parts of Asia remains explosive. The remedy for this abnormal situation can be found in immediate cessation of all interference in the internal affairs of other countries. We believe that creation of the system of collective security in Asia based on the principles of peaceful co-existence is an important prerequisite to peace and stability in this region.

(Mr. Khosbayar, Mongolia)

Turning to the agenda of this year's session of our Committee, we understand that priority has been given to prohibition of chemical weapons and underground nuclear tests.

As is well known, it has always been the view of my delegation that both chemical and bacteriological weapons should be prohibited totally and simultaneously. When the socialist countries agreed to the conclusion of a convention banning bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons first, we proceeded from the firm belief that it should constitute the first step towards an early ban on chemical weapons. The close link between chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons established in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 has been repeatedly affirmed by General Assembly resolutions and has found its reflexion in the Convention banning Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, according to article IX of which the Parties to the Convention undertake to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical agents for weapons purposes and their destruction.

A question was posed by some delegations about the possibility of limiting the prohibition of chemical agents to some types. In the opinion of my delegation any partial prohibition would be contrary to the spirit of the Geneva Protocol, which banned the use of all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons as means of mass destruction, regardless of the degree of their toxicity. This is why my delegation stands for comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation is, of course, aware of the controversy over the problem of verification. However, since the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons has been studied in depth for the last few years, we maintain that preconditions for arriving at an agreement to that effect have been created. Moreover, the fact that we were able to solve the verification issue in a manner satisfactory to all, when last year the Committee successfully worked out the Convention banning Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, strengthens even further our belief that this issue should not become a stumbling-block on the way to an agreement.

(Mr. Khosbayar, Mongolia)

As for the other priority problem, my delegation insists, like many others, on the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests, including underground tests, by all testing countries. We firmly believe that a comprehensive test ban strictly observed and implemented would constitute an important breakthrough towards nuclear disarmament.

After fifteen years of intense consideration of this question, it is high time to respond positively to the numerous urgent calls of the United Nations General Assembly and, moreover, to the clearly-expressed wishes of the peoples all over the world to see an end to the nuclear tests. Since it has become a widely-accepted view that seismic methods of detection and identification through national means are adequate for verification of an underground test-ban agreement, the insistence on on-site inspection can only be considered as an attempt to obstruct the constructive approach to the solution of this problem.

During the course of our deliberations some delegations have suggested that certain changes should be introduced in the present composition and procedures of our Committee. In principle my delegation will not have any objections to changes made with due account of the further effectiveness of the Committee's activity and its specific nature as a negotiating body. However, some delegations, taking into account the delicacy of the problem, have expressed doubts regarding the desirability of making any hurried changes. It seems to us that the Committee needs more time to find the best possible solution acceptable to all. As far as the participation of the People's Republic of China and France and the two German States is concerned, it is the considered view of my Government that all militarily-important States should take an active part in disarmament efforts.

In conclusion, I would like to express my earnest hope that we, in the course of the current session, will take concrete and constructive steps towards general and complete disarmament.

Mr. CARACCILO (Italy) (translation from French): I shall be brief, but I should nevertheless like to present a few considerations on the progress of our work.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

Judging by the average length of our periods of activity, we have more or less reached the half-way mark in our winter-spring session. By now most delegations have explained their positions on the problems before us; this should enable us to assess our prospects and the targets that we can reasonably achieve this year. In the present political situation, on which I commented in my previous statement on 7 March, and at a time when even the future of our Committee may be questioned, it is in fact our duty to do everything possible to prevent a deadlock in our work, which would certainly have the most undesirable consequences.

I feel that I am right in saying that most of the previous speakers agree that the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons offers the best possibilities for any progress in the immediate future. Indeed, my own delegation apart, the representative of the United States of America, Mexico, Japan, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Poland have recently expressed quite detailed views and put forward many suggestions and ideas which merit scrutiny. Some of these views, along with others, are presented in the working paper which the United States representative introduced and explained the day before yesterday; this well-constructed document communicates the full weight of American technology and reflects the scale of its advances.

Clearly, however, the technical aspects of such a huge and complex problem can be seen from widely-differing angles. We have had proof of this at a number of our meetings devoted especially to the problem of chemical weapons, at which several delegations have made observations which, although extremely interesting, lack co-ordination and have therefore left us somewhat frustrated and feeling that we have heard a dialogue of the deaf.

I think I am also expressing a general opinion in saying that our final aim, as far as the problem of chemical weapons is concerned, is clearly the conclusion in due course of a properly-worded prohibition treaty which, alongside the treaty which we approved last year on biological weapons, may ultimately strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

But it also seems clear to me that, before we embark on the final and political stage of our negotiations, which relates to the preparation of such a treaty, common sense itself tells us to begin by organizing, selecting and studying all the valuable



(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

technical data communicated to us by many delegations. These are now part of the Committee's records and are already a substantial body of material which will be supplemented, as we receive them, by new contributions such as those presented to us during the past month by the delegations mentioned above.

If we do otherwise, we shall be putting the cart before the horse and indefinitely prolonging labyrinthine discussions which will not clarify the technical issues.

We must therefore first undertake an essentially technical task before we can pass on to a more specifically political and legal stage. We all know, of course, that no technical work is completely separable from politics; indeed, we are here to ensure that this steady link between technology and politics is maintained. That does not mean, however, that in the present initial stage we do not require the continual assistance of qualified experts, which most of us, especially myself, are not.

It has often been argued here that the best method of obtaining expert assistance and advice is the one we have practised hitherto, namely that each delegation puts its questions to its national experts through its own governmental channels and communicates their replies to us in due course. In my opinion the experience of the last two years has demonstrated beyond all doubt the slowness of this process, which, lacking international co-ordination, ultimately continues the dialogue of the deaf to which I referred just now.

Yet without abandoning this traditional system, to which a number of delegations seem particularly attached, we could, if we really wished to speed our work, combine it with another and a much more efficient system: that of having our experts meet here for as long and as often as is necessary and work with us under our constant direction. I feel that this system would help us to elucidate many technical matters around which our discussions continue to revolve because at present each delegation can only communicate the content of the technical information furnished by its national experts, and cannot discuss it in detail or compare it with the information provided by other delegations. If, however, we gave the experts for the first time a chance to discuss among themselves, in their own technical language, the problems which from time to time we found it necessary to lay before them, I feel that we should succeed in co-ordinating and illuminating the various facets of these problems more easily and in forging a common language. In that process the confrontation of different arguments and points of view may help towards the discovery of new approaches and new ideas.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

Apart from the technical and practical considerations which in our opinion justify the participation of experts in our work, there is also a political one which should not be underestimated. Merely by adopting this new procedure, whose effectiveness is widely acknowledged, we should abundantly demonstrate to the public, who are now watching us with the closest interest, that the negotiations on chemical weapons have entered a serious and active phase.

For the organization of this expert consultation under our auspices, we truly have a wealth of alternatives. After all, we are a committee which enjoys some measure of independence, and we have no bureaucratic or statutory rules to prevent us from adopting the procedure we find most effective. All that is needed is the will to discuss and settle the matter together; this can very easily be done at a single meeting of the Committee - either official or unofficial as we please, but one devoted specially to this topic.

Today there is still time; tomorrow it may be too late.

I have therefore taken the liberty of placing these thoughts before my colleagues, whose wisdom will naturally dictate their response.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.