

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 14 August 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. A. Roshchin (Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. S. N. MARTINEZ
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. M. T. DA SILVA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG
<u>Burma:</u>	U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. W. H. BARTON Mr. P. E. McRAE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. SOJAK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. A. OSMAN Mr. N. ELARABY Mr. S. ABOU-ALI
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. B. RÖNSCH
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. J. SCHLAICH Mr. J. BAUCH
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B. C. MISHRA Mr. P. R. SOOD

Iran:

Mr. M. FARTASH
 Mr. H. AMERI
 Mr. D. CHILATY
 Miss C. TAHMASSEB

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO
 Mr. G. VALDEVIT
 Mr. A. BIZZARINI
 Mr. A. PIETROMARCHI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI
 Mr. A. YATABE
 Mr. H. OKA
 Mr. H. OKITSU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
 Miss A. CABRERA
 Mr. M. A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
 Mr. L. BAYARTE

Morocco:

Mr. S. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. C.A. van der KLAUW
 Mr. A. J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. B. A. CLARK
 Mr. O. ALO
 Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. YUNUS
 Mr. K. SALEEM

Peru:

Mr. J. CÁCERES
 Mr. L. CHÁVEZ-GODOY
 Mr. G. CHAUNY

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER
 Mr. S. TOPA
 Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI
 Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
 Mr. G. TINCA
 Mr. C. IVASCU
 Mr. D. APOSTOL

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON
 Mr. U. REINIUS
 Mr. G. BERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
 Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
 Mr. Y. K. NAZARKIN
 Mr. N. V. PESTEREV
 Mr. L. N. ANISIMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. M. ALLEN
 Mr. J.G. TAYLOR
 Mr. A. WHITE
 Mr. C. McCOLL
 Mr. A.G.P. WOOD

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN, JR.
 Mr. W. GIVAN
 Mr. S. COTTMAN
 Mr. D. MAHLBERG
 Mr. W. GRAYSON
 Mr. R. EINHORN

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Acting Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 681st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Egypt, Japan, the Netherlands, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mexico, the United States of America, India, Romania and Canada and by the Representative of the Secretary-General.

The delegation of Japan submitted a "Working paper concerning the scope of chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of the national verification system" (CCD/466).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 August 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Permit me, Mr. Chairman, to begin by joining other delegations in extending a warm welcome to our new colleagues from Egypt and Ethiopia, Ambassadors Osman and Berhanu.

In my intervention to-day I would like to confine my remarks to two issues, in the main: that of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, including the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones; and the problem of the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes incompatible with international security, human well-being and health, which, on the initiative of the Soviet Union, has been referred to the CCD by the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth session.

However, before I address those two topics I should like to make several observations of a somewhat general nature.

It is the view of the Polish delegation that while, regrettably, no major new ground has been broken so far in the field of disarmament negotiations this year, the remarkable broadening of the scope and acceleration of the pace of the negotiating process, as well as of the disarmament-related debates and discussions, conducted at various places and in different forums over the past few months, will have important implications for our disarmament efforts and may well bear fruit in the not-too-distant future.

As is generally agreed, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held last May, was by far the single most important event in that regard.

The sense of a generally quickened pace of endeavour in the field of disarmament was further confirmed by the fact that there has been no let-up in the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, and by the continuation of the Vienna talks on the reduction of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe.

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, recently concluded in Helsinki, in itself was an event of major and historic proportions. Its Final Act, truly a "Charter of Europe", signed by the leaders of 35 European States, the United States of America and Canada, is of direct relevance to the work of this Committee. In a section entitled "Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament", it reads as follows:

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

"The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world".

The theme of the need for political détente to be complemented in Europe by military détente also figured prominently in the Joint Statement by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, Mr. Edward Gierek, and the President of the United States, Mr. Gerald Ford, following his official visit in Poland, as well as in the Helsinki address by Mr. Edward Gierek a few days later.

I submit that against the background of increased activity in disarmament and in related fields this summer, the Disarmament Committee has been no exception to the rule. With the multitude of official and unofficial meetings with the participation of experts on the subject of the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions, on environment modification techniques and -- of course -- the study on all aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones, I would assume that those representatives who are fortunate enough to have the prospect of a vacation still ahead of them will certainly enjoy their holiday with a sense of well-deserved respite from the rigours of the sweltering Geneva climate and the long hours at the Palais.

While I am on this subject of the commendable practice of the Committee working increasingly with the assistance of experts, I would like to observe that we certainly appreciate the wealth of technical and scientific information with which they provide us, making for a more educated and intelligent debate on the issues on our agenda. However, while appreciating the benefit of the expert advice, we must not lose sight of the basically political and negotiating function of this organ. Consequently, we must take care not to detract in any way from our primary responsibility of negotiating the matters which have been referred to the CCD by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

As I have just observed, the NPT Review Conference was an event of major significance in the field of arms control and disarmament. While it represented many things to many delegations, it has fully vindicated the view shared by my country that its primary objective ought to be the reaffirmation of the important role of the Treaty in preventing further proliferation of nuclear weapons, thereby helping to slow down the nuclear arms race. Indeed, in our view, the Treaty has emerged from the review process considerably strengthened and reinvigorated. A sounding proof of confidence in that instrument came with its ratification by a number of countries, among them the "near-nuclear" EURATOM member States. Directly or indirectly linked to the Review Conference, this was a development which considerably advanced the cause of universality of the Treaty and consolidated the non-proliferation régime established by the NPT.

Although, admittedly, divergent opinions were voiced at the Conference, my Government found it most gratifying that complete agreement was recorded by the States Parties to the Treaty as to the full effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime and the strict observance of articles I and II, the mainstay and the very raison d'être of the Treaty.

The Final Declaration of the Conference, elaborated and adopted by consensus, largely thanks to the perspicacity and determination of the President of the Conference, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Madame Thorsson, proves that the NPT Review Conference made an important contribution to preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons. This, too, was the primary consideration in dealing with the question of the peaceful application of nuclear energy, where care was taken to preclude any possibility of the spread of nuclear explosive capability.

In this connexion, my delegation would wish to associate itself fully with the apprehensions expressed in this Committee over industrial deals in the nuclear field, deals that run counter to the Declaration's intent.

Our positive assessment of the outcome of the NPT Review Conference would be incomplete without registering our agreement with the widely shared view, confirmed in the Final Declaration, that universal accession to observance of the Treaty by all States would in itself be the most reliable and effective guarantee of security of all non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

It is entirely appropriate that the Committee should apply itself -- with the help of qualified governmental experts -- to a study of all aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones only after the international community had the occasion, during the NPT Review Conference, to acquaint itself with the potential risks to world peace and security inherent in an unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons. Indeed, we fully share the view expressed by yourself, Sir, on behalf of the Soviet Union, that "... it is essential in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones to ensure that they constitute an important supplement to, and development of, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that these zones should be an effective instrument in the struggle for reducing and eliminating the threat of nuclear war ..." (CCD/PV.666 p.14).

Naturally, it is too early for my Government to pass judgement to-day on the substance of the expert study, now in its final stage, or to take a definite position with respect to many important issues involved.

A few preliminary comments on behalf of my delegation should not, however, be out of place, particularly bearing in mind Poland's interest in the preparation of the study and her active role in the NPT Review Conference.

I believe it fair to state, first, that the experts should be commended for their conscientious approach to the task of preparing, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3261 F (XXIX), under the auspices of the CCD, a comprehensive study on all aspects of nuclear-weapon-free zones. I am confident that when we examine their product, our appreciation of their expertise, as well as of the competent assistance they have received from the Secretariat, will prove to have been well deserved.

In all frankness, few delegates around this Conference table thought it realistically possible for the group of experts to be able -- within a matter of weeks -- to elaborate a universally applicable prescription for ways and means of establishing such zones, and including, to boot, a detailed break-up of the conceivable rights and obligations of States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, within a zone and outside it.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

While it can be expected, therefore, that not in all instances would consensus be possible on some intricate aspects of such a study, we believe that this Committee will eventually accept as a basic consideration, reflecting upon the validity of the concept of denuclearization, that nuclear-weapon-free zones are important factors of regional security and, through their direct relationship to the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, of world security as well.

When dealing with the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, one has to bear in mind that there are difficult and complex problems, whose solution, so crucial to the effectiveness of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, requires a careful and pragmatic approach.

One such problem is sure to be the question of a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the territory of a zone. It will be recalled that the desire to secure such a commitment was among the important motives behind Poland's decision when it was the first to come out, as early as 1958, with a comprehensive concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the sensitive region of Central Europe. However, now as then, the international peace and security of States largely depend upon the stability of the mechanism of balance between the existing politico-military alliances; and no international agreement in the general area of arms control and disarmament can disregard that fact if it is to be a really effective agreement. Appropriate security guarantee arrangements must naturally stem from the negotiations or consultations between non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States concerning vital interests of both, which -- as a result -- would succeed in reaching a satisfactory solution of such matters, for example, as a detailed outline of mutual obligations of the two groups of States.

In our opinion, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions is no less complex when it comes to drafting principles to govern the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. While recognizing the interest in such peaceful nuclear explosions, especially from the viewpoint of their potential attractiveness for the economic development of non-nuclear-weapon States, we believe that a thorough and responsible consideration of

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

all their implications would be most appropriate. At any rate, in a situation when potential benefits of such PNE technology can be made available, through appropriate procedures to be worked out by IAEA and under international control, to any non-nuclear State, irrespective of whether or not a party to the NPT, we would wish to believe that in every case of a conflict between the narrow, particular interest and the supreme interest of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the latter would gain the upper hand. Bearing in mind that -- technically -- there is practically no difference between the explosion of a nuclear weapon and that of a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes, the overriding consideration must be that the consolidation of the non-proliferation régime comes first.

As a result of the contribution by experts, especially those from the Soviet Union and the United States, the CCD is now much better equipped in its efforts to elaborate a draft convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes incompatible with international security, human well-being and health.

In this connexion, our thanks go also to the delegation of Canada for its helpful working paper contained in document CCD/463.

As a result of the discussions last week, we believe that there can be no doubt that the important Soviet initiative in this regard is not only timely, but also necessary and entirely realistic. In the light of the debate on this subject, it would appear that while solutions are not only possible but urgently necessary in certain areas, they are less clearly identifiable in others. However, bearing in mind technological and scientific progress, especially in the military sphere, we would be well-advised not to let that consideration discourage us. What is uncharted and unexplored to-day may not be so in the near future. As we are only too well aware, when a new technology is developed and a weapons system deployed, vested interests set in and the opportunity to halt and control a situation might be lost for quite a time. There are all too many examples known to this time-tested body to show that crying over spilt milk does not serve much useful purpose when it comes to disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

While my delegation strongly believes that it would be entirely inappropriate and unfortunate for prohibitions and limitations to be placed in the way of peaceful research in the areas which, as in the case of environment and climate, are likely to contribute to human well-being, we have no qualms about the imperative necessity of establishing bans where a chance of abuse exists. Thus, far from hampering, we must encourage and promote research capable of better preparing man to face and deal with such natural calamities as drought, flood, hailstorm, hurricane and earthquake. Conversely, the Committee is duty-bound to see to it that any new scientific or technological breakthrough in those areas is not and cannot ever be put to use for purposes other than peaceful. While, therefore, it would be entirely wrong to interfere with research into the effects of high-flying aircraft upon the upper atmosphere and, in particular, upon its ozone layer--- it must be decreed that any such research on deliberate destruction of the protective ozone layer is outlawed once and for all.

The question of influencing the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes is no doubt an area where it may often prove difficult to draw a clear line between what is innocent and peaceful or inadmissible military and hostile activity. Likewise, a certain kind of difficulties in terminology was detectable during the informal meetings, when, for instance, what for one expert was "intensification of rainfall", for another was "rainfall distribution". The inescapable corollary is, of course, that what for a large country can be a mere "distribution of rainfall" for a small one may mean a cataclysm of enormous proportions.

In concluding, I wish to add my voice to those of my distinguished colleagues from Bulgaria and Iran and to urge again an early and determined action by the Disarmament Committee to elaborate an appropriate draft convention on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other hostile purposes. We must not be deterred by the unexplored, the untested or the unheard-of. We should take pre-emptive action with the same foresight and wisdom which this Committee demonstrated in the negotiation of the 1971 Sea-Bed Treaty, or which earlier the United Nations demonstrated when working out the 1967 Outer-Space Treaty, providing for -- inter alia--- the prohibition of all military activity on the Moon and other celestial bodies.

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

There is no doubt that our Committee is eminently qualified to negotiate an appropriate draft convention, despite the undeniable overlap areas which may be in the purview of such agencies as the United Nations Environment Programme, the World Meteorological Organization or bodies dealing primarily with humanitarian issues. Still, taking into account the arms control implications of the envisaged instrument, it is up to the CCD to take appropriate action, including all necessary co-ordination efforts with respect to interested agencies or organs.

I believe that, as a result of the hard-working summer session, the Disarmament Committee will now be in a better position to come to real grips with the pressing issues which have been facing us for much too long.

Mr. OSMAN (Egypt): Allow me at the outset to express my heartfelt thanks to each of the distinguished representatives who so kindly and graciously welcomed me on the occasion of the assumption of my new responsibilities as Egypt's representative to the CCD.

I assure you, Mr. Chairman, and all my distinguished colleagues, that I am looking forward to fruitful and friendly co-operation in the attainment of our common objectives. I wish also to extend my sincere welcome to Ambassador Berhanu of Ethiopia; our two countries have since time immemorial maintained close and neighbourly relations, which I am sure will be reflected in our work here.

I had the pleasure of representing my country in the Geneva Disarmament negotiations, some ten years ago, in the ENDC. My last years with the ENDC were fully absorbed in the arduous negotiations that eventually culminated in the adoption of the NPT in 1968. I shall at a later stage of my intervention express our basic position on the NPT in the light of the recent Review Conference. I wish, however, to confine my remarks, at this juncture, to one point, namely the general expectations raised at the time of its conclusion that significant steps towards vertical disarmament would immediately be forthcoming. The negotiating history of the NPT will reveal that on many occasions non-nuclear weapon States were influenced by a genuine desire to halt the nuclear arms race through the implementation of article VI of the NPT. The atmosphere in the Geneva disarmament negotiations when I departed was dominated by a general feeling of anticipation and expectation that the nuclear-weapon States would honour their commitments as contained in article VI to pursue negotiations in good

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faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. I may say, that in this respect a sort of "contrat social" was struck between the non-nuclear States and the nuclear States. The non-nuclear-weapon States forswear the right to possess nuclear weapons and the nuclear States should embark on the process of nuclear disarmament. Years later, I return to the Geneva disarmament negotiations and see that the international community is still awaiting the achievement of these goals. Certainly, in the intervening years some concrete agreements have been reached with respect to the "collateral measures of disarmament". I would like to mention here the 1970 Sea-Bed Treaty and the 1971 Biological Weapons Convention.

Since 1971, however, the CCD has not been able to score meaningful progress in any direction. I would like in this connexion to associate myself fully with the pertinent remarks made by Mr. Lalovic, the representative of Yugoslavia, when he stated on 31 July 1975:

"... the CCD has not succeeded in moving forward from the standstill in which it has been bogged down for several consecutive years. In our view, the inability of this body, the only multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament, to produce any concrete results for the international community is the consequence of the profound crisis which has afflicted the entire process of disarmament negotiations for a considerable number of years. The basic reason for this, as we see it, lies in the lack of political readiness of the major military and nuclear Powers to halt the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race. It also stems from the fact that the most important disarmament problems having a bearing on peace and security are considered outside the United Nations, beyond its direct guidance and broad engagement".

(CCD/PV.677, pp. 6 and 7)

We believe that the time may soon come when a wider forum should devote adequate time to bolstering the disarmament negotiations, either in the form of a special session of the General Assembly and/or of a world disarmament conference.

(Mr. Osmañ, Egypt)

I would like now to make three remarks of a general nature before turning to the specific subjects inscribed on our agenda.

First of all, I wish to recall that as far back as 1957 the General Assembly approved the call for a comprehensive ban on testing nuclear weapons. In 1959 the General Assembly adopted resolution 1378 (XIV) which contained, inter alia, the following operative paragraph:

"Expresses the hope that measures leading towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control will be worked out in detail and agreed upon in the shortest possible time".

It was considered then both acceptable and desirable to urge the adoption of the necessary measures towards general and complete disarmament. Today, sixteen years later, when we look back in retrospect we appreciate the merit and the relevance of the 1959 resolution, which called the disarmament issue "the most important one facing the world today". History, as well as the power of reason, would vindicate the urgency the General Assembly attached to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Many of the acute problems which mankind is gravely affected with today could have been considerably alleviated had the astronomical amounts of money and energy wasted on armament been directed to more beneficial areas of human endeavour.

In 1962, the United Nations Secretary-General submitted a study to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. In the introduction, the late U Thant states that the sense of urgency with respect to disarmament does not only spring from "the existence of a threat to mankind that has grown into one of mass destruction", but also "from the consciousness that the resources that make this threat possible ... are being diverted from the tasks of lightening the burdens and enriching the lives of individuals and of society" (United Nations Publication, Sales No.62.IX.1, p.1). These two aspects or two sides of the same coin have multiplied and acquired serious dimensions in the 1970s.

If the Secretary-General in 1962 could afford to talk then about lightening the burden and enriching the lives of individuals and society, the hard fact is that individuals and society in 1975 are profoundly beset by severe and overwhelming crises, acute problems and urgent tasks which dwarf mere alleviation. Indeed, individuals and society are confronted with a combination of accumulated staggering challenges which need all the attention, energy and resources which are freely drained to

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armaments. One can mention, in passing, inflation, recession, monetary crises, economic instability, unemployment, overpopulation, hunger, famine, disease, etc. Economic and social ills are not limited to the less fortunate peoples on our earth. Affluent and industrialized societies have also their share of serious problems, although of a different kind. If I underlined the economic, social and humanitarian problems facing the individuals in our modern age, I have no intention of brushing aside the important problem of military security of States. After all, we have to protect ourselves from what Puffendorf already in 1759 talked of, that is "la malice des hommes, de leur ambition démesurée, et de l'avidité avec laquelle ils désirent le bien d'autrui".

The answer to this problem today is to rededicate ourselves to the concept of collective security as enshrined in the United Nations Charter and to ensure that a sincere attempt is made to secure an effective implementation of this concept. With the end of the cold war, such an endeavour should not prove impossible today.

Secondly, the relaxation of tension in international relations, in particular between the two Super Powers is indeed a welcome sign. The international community has, in general, hailed détente as an indispensable concept in the nuclear age. It was considered a necessary catalyst to enable mankind to undertake the required measures to ensure survival and avoid a global conflagration and holocaust. Thus, the most direct consequences of détente should have been more concrete measures in the realm of nuclear disarmament to speedily achieve the desired objective of general and complete disarmament. Yet these possible beneficial results have not hitherto been forthcoming. It has been noted, however, that détente has led to the development of a trend to conduct all meaningful disarmament talks on a bilateral level and surround these talks with the utmost secrecy. In this connexion I would fully subscribe to what Mrs. Thorsson, the leader of the Swedish delegation, stated on 17 July 1975, that:

"We should long ago have learnt by experience that political realities, as conceived by the Super Powers and not by the rest of the world, dictate the rules of international negotiations. We would not for a moment deny the importance of the fact that the two Super Powers entertain strategic arms limitation talks. But the fact is that these talks are bilateral and based on their concepts of world realities. This is what makes the Super Powers

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believe that each and every armament problem facing mankind today can best be solved, if solved at all, through bilateral talks between them, presenting the results to us as finished products, when they consider, for various reasons, the time ripe and appropriate. This is what makes them continue the nuclear arms race in spite of repeated talks of arms limitations". (CCD/PV.673, p.8)

We believe that the international community has a right to be informed and consulted, and this for a simple obvious reason. We could all very well be the first victims if the huge arsenals of mass destruction were to be unleashed. The interdependence of our contemporary world necessitates more institutionalization in the disarmament talks. This is no verbal rhetoric, or empty exhortation; this is the only course to adopt when the extinction of mankind is involved. We should be heard, because we will not have a second chance.

It is therefore submitted that it would be advantageous to involve the international community in disarmament talks by increasing the involvement of the CCD in these talks.

My third remark relates to a topic bearing special relevance to our work, which is the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. In our part of the world, we fully realize that peace and stability in Europe are indispensable for the maintenance of international peace and security. The sufferings, devastation and destruction caused by the two world wars are still vivid in our minds. Battles and campaigns were conducted on our soil. Monuments in various parts of our territories bear witness to this very day that the disruption of peace in Europe would directly affect our region. This integral interrelationship is, no doubt, a two-way channel. When peace is shattered in our region, Europe could be the first to suffer. We therefore consider that European security could not be adequately attained so long as Europe's southern periphery festers with instability and recurrent violence. The Helsinki Final Act actually confirms Europe's interest and Europe's full understanding of interrelationship with the Middle East. I hasten to add that interest and understanding, however sincere, do not suffice. When the United Nations Charter is flagrantly and repeatedly flouted, the culprit should not be allowed to reap the benefits from his illegal action. I do not intend to elaborate at any length on the Israeli aggressive policies in the Middle East. I would

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merely point out that to have peace and security in Europe it is essential to have a just peace in the Middle East, and that peace with justice could only be achieved through strict application of the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter and full compliance with the relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly.

After these remarks of a general character, I would like to turn now to the specific subjects under consideration. The first and most urgent item on our agenda is, no doubt, the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban. A comprehensive test ban has been inscribed on our agenda for a considerable number of years. Every year the General Assembly requests our Committee to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, and every year our Committee fails to discharge this important task. To our great regret, this year's report to the General Assembly will not contain any agreed concrete steps on a comprehensive test ban agreement, while two events that have occurred in the course of this year have clearly re-emphasized the absolute necessity and urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban. I am of course referring here to the NPT Review Conference and to the expert meeting on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. With respect to both events I wish to express the views of my delegation.

Let me first state, in very clear terms, that Egypt fully adheres to the basic rationality and philosophy behind the NPT. We have readily signed it and we have declared, at the highest levels, that we would ratify the NPT the moment Israel accedes to the Treaty. This position was recently reaffirmed in the reply Egypt addressed to the Secretary-General regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, in pursuance of General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXIX), contained in document S/11778. The relevant part of our reply reads as follows:

"The accession of the parties in the area of the Middle East to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is indispensable for the establishment of a N.W.F.Z. in the region of the Middle East".

Our reply includes also the following passage: "Egypt is ready to ratify the Treaty the moment Israel accedes to it and becomes a party thereto".

(Mr. Osman, Egypt)

We, however, share the view of many non-nuclear-weapon States who regard the NPT as a step in the right direction, but not as an end in itself. To curb horizontal proliferation is indeed desirable and, no doubt, urgently required. Nevertheless, this should be done in the proper framework derived from balancing the mutual responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

I have had the opportunity of expressing our position with respect to the NPT in the course of the deliberations in the Review Conference. I would, therefore, confine myself to three basic issues emanating from the dire necessity to achieve and maintain the afore-mentioned required balance.

The first relates to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The negotiating history of article IV demonstrates that it was the direct result of the endeavours of so many non-nuclear-weapon States to redress the provisions of articles I, II and III of the Treaty, which were drafted in a manner favouring the interests of the nuclear Powers. During the Review Conference, the non-nuclear Powers stressed once more the increasing relevance of nuclear energy to provide impetus to their economic development. It was eloquently and even powerfully pointed out that renouncing nuclear weapons should in no way act as an impediment to their development. Arguments were advanced that no serious effort to meet the needs of the developing countries has been genuinely undertaken, that technical assistance and more funds are needed. It is sincerely hoped that the outcome of the Review Conference will indicate that on this specific issue the attitude and outlook of the nuclear Powers have changed.

Another related issue is the implementation of article VI. It will be recalled that this article has particular significance. In point of fact, the major responsibility of the Review Conference was to assess the results so far achieved in discharging the obligations under this article. For on the one hand its provisions inspired the final formulation of paragraph 3 of article VIII containing the terms of reference of the Review Conference, and on the other hand the implementation of its obligations are generally considered as the yardstick to measure whether the NPT is, as its proponents insist, an effective instrument towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and eventually the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

It is our considered view that only through a comprehensive agreement on an underground nuclear weapon test ban, and by embarking seriously on the process of effective nuclear disarmament will the obligation contained in article VI be carried out.

(Mr. Osman, Egypt)

The third issue arising from balancing the obligations in the NPT is the fundamental question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has on various occasions, including the Review Conference, focused on the built-in limitations in Security Council resolution 255 (1968). It should, nevertheless, be recognized that the credibility of Security Council resolution 255 hinges on the credibility of the collective security system of the United Nations Charter itself. The latter has been the cause of concern, apprehension and profound disappointment for the victims of aggression by conventional weapons. Yet, we submit, it would be inconceivable to envisage any laxity or hesitation on the part of the Security Council to suppress a nuclear attack. The solemn obligation to provide or support immediate assistance to a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used should be a constant warning to States with aggressive inclinations. Non-nuclear States have, as of late, raised this matter in numerous forums. Their deep and justified concern was cogently reflected in General Assembly resolution 3261 G (XXIX), in which, inter alia, the General Assembly declared its firm support for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommended the consideration, without loss of time, of the question of strengthening their security.

In all candour we do not believe that the genuine and profound concerns which we, the non-nuclear States, constantly underlined, were allayed as a result of the NPT Review Conference. I may be permitted to add that the element of time is crucial, and the Super Powers are in duty bound, by virtue of their Charter obligations, as well as their NPT obligations, to urgently reconsider their hitherto rather relaxed attitude vis-à-vis the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

On 14 July, the CCD held an informal expert meeting to consider the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. My delegation has closely followed the experts' presentation and the subsequent discussions with keen interest. Arguments were advanced calling for the elaboration of an international regime to regulate PNEs. Yet we cannot disregard the concern, widely shared, that States should in no way be prevented from enjoying the potential peaceful benefits that could be derived from PNEs. IAEA has already initiated useful urgently-needed studies in this respect, as

(Mr. Osman, Egypt)

revealed in the letter of its Director-General (CCD/455). We believe that the representative of Bulgaria, Mr. Nikolov, rightly summed up the course to be adopted when he stated on 12 August 1975 that:

"... we question the wisdom of the idea of seeking a solution to the PNE outside the framework of the NPT and IAEA, i.e. outside the already tried and proven system of safeguards against nuclear proliferation." (CCD/PV.680, p.14)

In view of the above considerations, it is submitted that the proper course for the CCD to follow is to concentrate its energy and vision on concrete steps to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty. A comprehensive test ban has been rightly described as the single most decisive step towards nuclear disarmament. We are grateful for the Swedish delegation's timely initiative in proposing that the CCD call an expert meeting, early in 1976. We whole-heartedly support this proposal, which would facilitate the discontinuance of all nuclear tests in all environments. To sum up this point, I wish to reaffirm in very clear terms that it is our sincere hope that the CCD adheres faithfully to the directives issued annually by the General Assembly to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement. I wish also to register our deep concern over the slow pace in carrying out this mandate.

Another urgent subject, long overdue on our agenda, is the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

The CCD has now before it three categories of documents. The first contains three documents dealing with legal issues, namely, the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons submitted by the USSR and some other socialist countries (CCD/361), the memorandum presented by ten non-aligned countries, including Egypt, contained in document CCD/400, and the draft agreement submitted by the delegation of Japan in its working paper CCD/420.

The second category of documents is of a rather technical nature. It comprises all the technical working papers submitted. These working papers provide a compilation, highly appreciated by my delegation, of the relevant scientific and technical data.

The third category of documents pertains to the results obtained from the different informal meetings organized by the CCD in 1971, 1972 and 1974.

(Mr. Osman, Egypt)

In spite of the ample documentation at our disposal, the negotiations aiming at the prohibition of chemical weapons are still stagnant. The United States and the USSR promised, almost a year ago, to submit a joint initiative on "the most dangerous and lethal means of chemical warfare".

On several occasions, the views of my delegation on the prohibition of chemical weapons have been expressed in the CCD. In principle we fully support the comprehensive approach aiming at the total prohibition of such weapons under adequate national and international measures of verification. As to the method to be adopted for the achievement of this final aim, we realize that the Japanese draft convention contained in document CCD/420 provides us with very relevant practical ideas.

It is no longer sufficient to extend exhortations and state that efforts by the CCD should be increased. What is needed now is action by the CCD leading to the conclusion of an agreement. The representative of Iran, Mr. Fartash, rightly pointed out on 5 August 1975 the inherent dangers of further delays. He stated that "we are threatened by the danger that chemical weapons may be gradually assimilated and accepted as conventional weapons" (CCD/PV.678, p.14). Let us not forget that the chemical and biological weapons have been referred to as a poor man's atom bomb and as an alternative to atomic weapons.

Last year the General Assembly adopted resolution 3264 (XXIX) on the prohibition of action to influence the environment and climate for military and other purposes incompatible with the maintenance of international security, human well-being and health, and stressed the importance of the conclusion of an appropriate convention providing effective measures to prohibit such actions. The USSR, moreover, submitted a draft international convention on the prohibition of these actions which had been transmitted to the CCD by the General Assembly, as an annex to its resolution 3264.

The informal meetings held, last week, within the framework of the CCD with the participation of experts to consider this subject were of considerable value. It confirmed the urgency of channeling scientific and technical achievements in order to avoid any diversion to military applications and to encourage its peaceful aspects.

The question of meteorological warfare testifies to the great complexity of disarmament subjects. It shows also that the solutions to such new items resulting from

(Mr. Osman, Egypt)

scientific and technical progress depend upon our full awareness of all the dimensions involved. However, it is necessary to know the technical data relevant to these subjects.

This is no easy task for the majority of States, whose technical, scientific and financial capabilities would not enable them to follow closely the progress achieved. Yet their survival may very well be affected by these achievements. The NPT Review Conference drew attention to this problem by expressing the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all Governments and peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance.

It was on account of these considerations that the NPT Review Conference invited the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all Governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved.

Before concluding, I would like to refer briefly to the comprehensive study of the nuclear-weapon-free zones which is being prepared by a group of governmental experts. I have on more than one occasion expressed the views of my Government on this important subject. As co-sponsor with Iran of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, we attach great importance to this study. We hope that the outcome of the study will contribute to facilitating the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the areas which the General Assembly is considering now. The study is being reproduced now in its final form and I shall therefore refrain, at this stage, from expressing our views on it.

In conclusion, I must state in all frankness that on various important topics the CCD has not undertaken the necessary measures and the required action.

Soon the summer session will adjourn. Our report will cause disappointment and concern to many when considered in the General Assembly. Yet I must note that this was an active session. Its main feature has been the frequent meeting of expert groups on various topics.

Let us hope that the studies undertaken and the deliberations conducted will facilitate the adoption of the necessary concrete measures.

Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): The purpose of my statement today is to introduce our working paper (CCD/466), which is entitled "Working Paper concerning the scope of chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of the national verification system".

As to banning chemical weapons, we are at present eagerly awaiting the joint initiative on banning the most dangerous and lethal means of chemical warfare as referred to in the joint statement on the summit meetings held between the United States and the Soviet Union in July last year in Moscow and reconfirmed at the Vladivostok summit meetings last November. Meanwhile, it should be noted that this Committee has continued its work with a view to expediting deliberations on this subject. During this session, for example, Finland, the Federal Republic of Germany and Sweden have each submitted working papers, CCD/453, 458 and 461. Also, in his statement on 5 August, Mr. Fartash, of Iran, analysed in a most lucid manner the present state of the deliberations and the key problems, and made useful suggestions for facilitating the discussions.

As delegates will recall, my delegation submitted a draft convention (CCD/420) during the spring session of last year with a view to expediting the deliberations on this subject. We have been encouraged by the fact that Mrs. Thorsson, of Sweden, has recently taken the floor and introduced a working paper (CCD/461) further developing our idea.

Our working paper is intended to develop further on our own the idea contained in the Japanese draft convention (CCD/420) and working paper (CCD/430) on the basis of suggestions made by several delegations. The draft convention prescribes in its article I (a) the chemical warfare agents (CWAs) which should be eventually banned as "Chemical agents of types and in quantities that have no justification for protective or other peaceful purposes" (CCD/420, p.20). By thus adopting purpose criteria, the provision has the merit of covering not only the chemical warfare agents which should be banned from the outset, but also the dual-purpose agents to be banned by stages, and unknown CWAs. On the other hand, it is hard to deny that this provision leaves open the difficult problem of deciding whether a certain chemical agent comes under the ban or not. In order to remove this difficulty, it is necessary, as suggested in the Swedish

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working papers (CCD/427 and 461), to look at the whole range of chemical agents, divide it into chemical warfare agents (CWAs), and chemical agents for peaceful purposes (PCCs), to screen out dual-purpose chemical agents (DPWAs), and finally to delimit clearly the boundaries of the three categories.

As for the chemical warfare agents which should be banned from the beginning, we submitted last year a working paper (CCD/430) containing a list of them. As a follow-up to that working paper, we have this time tried to show in table 1 the chemical agents that have justification for peaceful purposes, with a view to helping clarify further the whole range of chemical agents.

In Japan, chemical substances with a toxicity exceeding a certain level have been placed under obligatory control since 1950 by virtue of (a) the Poisons and Deleterious Substance Control Law, (b) the Narcotics Control Law and (c) the Stimulating Drugs Control Law. However, due to the recent and remarkable progress of the chemical industry, harmful chemical substances such as PCB which are liable to leave deposits in the human body and thus undermine human health have been found, and it has become clear that these laws are insufficient to deal with these newly produced substances of a harmful nature. In order to meet this new situation, the "Law concerning the Screening of Chemical Substances and Regulation of their Manufacture, etc." was brought into force in 1973. To put this law into effective practice, a list of existing chemical substances was drawn up enumerating approximately 19,500 kinds of chemical substances which were not covered by previous laws as being poison, deleterious substances, narcotics and stimulating drugs. As Japan does not have any of the so-called CBR weapons, all the chemical substances which appear in the list are for peaceful uses. Since it is difficult for practical reasons to list here these nearly 20,000 kinds of chemical substances, we have chosen only the phosphorous compounds out of the list and put them in table 1 of the working paper. This table 1 corresponds to the list of organophosphorous compounds contained in our working paper (CCD/430) as chemical warfare agents which should be banned from the outset. By submitting this table 1, we have shown in concrete terms the chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and chemical compounds for peaceful purposes (PCCs) within the phosphorous compounds.

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With chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and chemical compounds for peaceful purposes (PCCs) thus clarified, the next step is to delimit the boundaries of the scopes of both categories. If a consensus is to be reached at this Committee on such criteria as toxic criteria, chemical structural formulae and classification methods, as suggested by the Federal Republic of Germany (CCD/458) as those for delimiting the boundaries, we shall be able to sort out the dual-purpose agents (DPWAs), thus clarifying the whole picture of chemical substances and contributing a great deal to the conclusion of a convention banning chemical weapons.

In this connexion, we noted with interest that the new idea which is useful in delimiting the scope of the chemical agents to be prohibited was introduced, as I just mentioned, by Mr. Schlaich, of the Federal Republic of Germany, in his working paper on the definition and classification of chemical warfare agents (CCD/458). We noted with particular attention the idea of adding such secondary criteria as perceptibility and shelf life to toxic criteria for the purpose of classification and of giving objectivity to evaluation by way of mathematical formulae. This is really an original thought, but we wonder how we would deal with the unknown chemical substances and with those which have not been used in the past as chemical warfare agents but which have chemical characteristics more suited to chemical warfare agents (CWAs) than to compounds for peaceful purposes (PCCs).

The second aspect of our working paper concerns the means and systems of verification, which is another key problem for concluding a chemical weapons convention. As to the means of verification, Finland has revealed in its working paper (CCD/453) that it is doing research on detailed and precise verification means by applying instrumental analysis methods including NMR-spectrometry. Attention should be drawn to the part of this working paper which refers to the method of analysing minute amounts of phosphorus-containing compounds contained in samples collected at the site. We look forward to the day when the results of the study will be disclosed.

As to the verification systems, we have already submitted our idea to this Committee in the form of a working paper (CCD/430). This time our working paper offers as an illustration our existing national control system as to what we consider to be a concrete example of a national organ. This system (a) establishes a list of all chemical substances which exist at present in Japan, (b) requires the announcement in

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advance of new chemical substances that are intended to be produced or imported and which do not appear in the list, (c) examines the chemical substances thus reported and classifies them into harmless chemical substances and those which require control, and (d) thus observes only the chemical substances requiring control. An illustration is given in table 2 of the working paper.

Today we have submitted in our working paper a list of the chemical substances which have justification for peaceful purposes and an example of our national control system, and believe that we have thus marked a step forward towards solving the problems of the classification of chemical agents and of verification systems. We hope that our working paper will further stimulate the discussion of banning chemical weapons.

Mr. van der KLAUW (Netherlands): Last week this Committee started discussions on the subject of environmental modifications for military or other hostile purposes in somewhat more technical terms than in the past. A substantial number of States members of the CCD were represented by experts in the informal talks. In particular, I would like to express my gratitude to the experts from the Soviet Union and the United States for their instructive and detailed oral contributions and to the Canadian delegation for its excellent working paper, CCD/463. My delegation also listened with great interest to the statements in our formal meetings last Tuesday by the delegates of Iran and the United States.

From the outset it was clear that the informal discussions last week would not lead to any conclusions. It was indeed too early to expect more definite results. What the Committee needed was to obtain a clearer insight into the problems involved. In this respect the meetings with the experts were a success and a concrete contribution to our task. Such a concrete result of last week's meetings is the Swedish working document, CCD/465. The experts from the Netherlands also tried to make a contribution in the form of a preliminary classification of some suggested environmental modification techniques.

For example, our experts tried, in a quantified form, to answer the questions: is the activity widespread, is it long-lasting, is it severe? The motive behind the introduction of these elements into the discussion was that they were used both in the

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past and in our recent discussions. I may recall, for example, that article 33, paragraph 3, of the draft protocol relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts currently under discussion by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts reads as follows:

"It is forbidden to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause widespread, long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment". (Conference document CDDH/III/286/Add.1, p. 2)

In the joint statement by the United States and the Soviet Union on environmental modifications for military purposes (CCD/431, p. 8), the term "widespread, long-lasting or severe" is used, as it was in our recent discussions by the United States delegate (CCD/PV.680, p. 23). It seemed therefore useful to study the possibilities of making a quantitative assessment of the elements involved with respect to the suggested environmental modification activities.

My first observation with regard to this assessment is the following: in practice it is not an easy task to decide what is "widespread" and what is not, what is "long-lasting" and what is not, and what is "severe" and what is not. For each of these elements, our experts could at this stage do no more than establish three arbitrary classes without exact borderlines, and even there it was found sometimes difficult to decide which class would be relevant. My delegation expects therefore some serious problems on definition when we come to treaty language. If we only banned those activities having widespread, long-lasting and/or severe effects, it could be difficult to establish a borderline between what is allowed and what is not. I introduce this observation as a discussion point; my Government has yet no definite views.

Second observation: the quantification of the word "severe" was made by looking at the number of human beings killed, injured or severely affected by the modification activity. I recognize that one could just as well argue that changing the natural environment on a substantial scale with long-term effects is in itself an activity which must be considered as severe, even if human beings would be barely affected. An extreme example: the deliberate introduction of a strange biological species on an uninhabited island for some trivial purpose which after some time would change the whole ecology of the island could be considered as a severe "disturbance of the ecology of the vegetable and animal kingdom", as it is called in the Soviet draft convention (General Assembly resolution 3264 (XXIX), annex, art. II (k)).

I may also touch here upon widespread activities which, as far as anybody knows, do not harm, but which do not seem useful either. Last week, in the informal talks, information was given about an earlier nuclear explosion which created a new radiation

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belt around the earth which lasted for about a year. Nobody could find any direct harm in this activity, but I wonder if the world would not be better off if such activities were banned, certainly as long as we are not sure of the effects and as long as the international community has not approved of such a project.

Third observation: as I said before, in the draft protocols to the Geneva Conventions on Humanitarian Law, mention is made of "widespread, long-term and severe" effects, while the bilateral United States - Soviet Union statement mentions "widespread, long-lasting or severe". The United States delegate also used the word "or". The words "and" and "or" are of the utmost importance. The number of activities falling under all three elements -- widespread, long-lasting and severe -- is considerably smaller than the number of activities falling under only one of the elements applied: widespread, long-lasting or severe. We must therefore, when elaborating a treaty, keep in mind that, although hopefully some of the mentioned activities will be banned by the new Geneva Conventions, other possibly important ones will not. In general, indeed, it is of interest for our further work in the CCD on this subject to know what measures will be taken by the Conference on Humanitarian Law.

Our experts also tried to classify the suggested environmental modification activities into three groups, groups which were mentioned by the Swedish delegate during the informal talks. These groups are:

- I. Those activities which could be used for military purposes during actual war.
- II. Those activities which have a hostile intent, but which could be used in "peacetime".
- III. Those activities which are carried out for strictly peaceful purposes, but which nevertheless can harm other countries or do harm to mankind in general.

In addition, our experts came to the conclusion that several suggested activities are practically impossible to use for military or hostile purposes. Most of these conclusions are in conformity with the Canadian, Swedish and American views.

As a fourth and last observation, I wish to say the following: it is clear that several activities, such as the diversion of rivers in border areas, could be used either for hostile purposes or for strictly peaceful purposes but with harmful effects on neighbouring countries. How is one going to establish a possible hostile intent, as the United Kingdom delegate rightly asked. Frankly, if put in this context, I do not know. But it shows the urgent need for developing an international régime, for example under the auspices of UNEP, in which an environmental modification activity would only be allowed if all affected States would agree to it or be adequately compensated. If such a system existed, it could perhaps help to solve the problem raised by the United Kingdom, since all activities harmful to other countries, deliberately or accidentally, would be covered. Perhaps international registration of environmental experiments, as suggested by the delegation of Iran, would be a very useful first step. Indeed, WMO is already engaged in the registration of weather modification programmes. However, in spite of the Stockholm declaration, I doubt whether an adequate régime can be set up in the near future. In the meantime, therefore, we should try to negotiate a treaty banning activities with a hostile intent. This would perhaps create some verification problems but would be considerably better than nothing. A good complaints procedure in connexion with such a ban is, of course, essential.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

In accordance with the request of the United Nations General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has, in collaboration with experts, examined the question of prohibiting action to influence the environment and climate for military or other hostile purposes. This new issue affects a sphere of human activity which has not hitherto been the subject of intergovernmental discussions on disarmament. The views of the Soviet side on this matter were presented by the Soviet delegation at the informal meetings, attended by experts, held by the Committee on 4 and 7 August this year. On this present occasion we should like to make a number of general observations on the matter.

The reason for considering this problem is that steps have recently been taken for the purpose of actively influencing weather conditions and climate. A number of measures in this direction are already highly developed, such as artificial rain-making, prevention of hailstorms, fog-dispersal, anti-hurricane measures, and many other measures in the same field. Progress made in influencing geophysical and meteorological processes for peaceful purposes is providing extensive opportunities for influencing the environment in the interests of human wellbeing.

At the same time, it must be stated that action to influence the environment and climate can also be taken for military or other hostile purposes. As the experts pointed out, such techniques include modification of the hydrological and thermal balance of a particular part of the earth. It was observed, for example, that rain-making can be used for hostile purposes -- infliction of damage on an opponent by inducing flooding and destroying roads and dams, etc. Possibilities exist of using other, more dangerous, techniques for influencing the environment and climate, such as destruction of part of the ozone layer which protects the planet from ultraviolet solar radiation, and the melting of glaciers and of Arctic and Antarctic ice-caps, etc. The experts have told us that long-term techniques for influencing the environment are being rapidly developed. Many experts currently regard these techniques as belonging only to the realm of theory and as unlikely to be used by man at present, but there is no doubt that such techniques might eventually become feasible, and be added to the armaments of States.

Thus, it may be said that some of the methods of influencing the environment and climate for military or other hostile purposes which have been referred to here by the delegates and experts are already capable of practical application, while others have some prospect of being used in the future.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Many delegates and experts have emphasized with very good reason that environmental modification for military purposes could have a negative or catastrophic impact on human life on the earth as a whole. It was observed that the use of such modification techniques could entail long-lasting consequences which would have a highly pernicious effect on the state of the environment and on man's living conditions for decades. All this makes it essential to prohibit any kind of modification of the environment for military or other hostile purposes.

Since means of influencing the environment for purposes inimical to man are not widely developed at present, their prohibition should be relatively more achievable and less complicated now. When, however, such methods of influencing the environment become widespread and are used for arming States, their prohibition will be far more difficult and possibly even unrealizable.

The prohibition of means of influencing the environment for military purposes must be attained by the conclusion of an international agreement. The conclusion of such an agreement would contribute to a solution of the task of preventing the appearance of highly dangerous and destructive methods of warfare, and at the same time help to solve the problem of conserving the environment.

A solution to the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes must not, of course, create obstacles and difficulties when it comes to influencing the environment for peaceful purposes, nor must it hamper research and practical work on changing natural conditions for the benefit of mankind.

The question of environmental modification for peaceful purposes is relatively recent, and many approaches and methods are only at the research and experimental stage. The same applies to the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes. The fact that many aspects of the problem of prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes have not been thoroughly investigated is bound to give rise to difficulties in dealing with the issue as a whole. But these difficulties must be overcome, so that a barrier may be constructed here and now against geophysical and meteorological warfare -- something which is in the interests of all countries of the world.

The consideration of this problem at informal meetings of the Committee, with the participation of the experts, has been most useful. It has given a clearer idea of the nature, possibilities, and serious negative effects of techniques for influencing

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the environment and climate for military purposes. It has shown that there are great possibilities of developing highly destructive and extremely dangerous means of warfare by influencing the environment and climate, both in the short term and in the long term. It has given members of the Committee on Disarmament the possibility of approaching with greater knowledge of the problem and its technicalities the task of working out an international agreement to prohibit geophysical and meteorological methods of warfare.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I merely wish to address through you, Mr. Chairman, a question to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General. My delegation has very much in mind the exchange of views and the consensus which we believe was reached a week ago, on 7 August, as a result of a similar question asked by my delegation on that occasion.

Today, I should like the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to please bring us up to date regarding the present status of the report which the group of experts has been preparing on nuclear-weapon-free zones and which, in accordance with the original time-limit, should have been transmitted by 7 August and, according to the maximum time-limit agreed to on 7 August, should have been transmitted by 13 August, that is to say -- yesterday.

Mr. BJORNERSTEDT (Acting Representative of the Secretary-General): As I have done on previous occasions, I would briefly report, only on an informal basis, on the progress of work of the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts preparing the study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The group met yesterday night in an effort to finalize the study and to decide on the transmission of it to the CCD. The group did not reach a consensus on the adoption of the study and in consequence the distribution of the study to the members of the CCD has been held up. The group suspended its meeting until 3 p.m. today awaiting advice from the CCD as to how the group should proceed in order to finalize its work.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has given genuine proof of a spirit of understanding with regard to all the real difficulties which the group of experts may have encountered. We cannot demonstrate the same spirit, however, with regard to difficulties which we consider imaginary and unreal. My delegation notes that, in addition to the Mexican expert, there are a number of other experts who have to leave tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. Consequently, the group of experts will be unable to act as a full body after tomorrow.

According to my delegation's information, it appears that the report was completed yesterday and that the only reason why it has not been transmitted to the CCD is that one or more delegations would like to receive final instructions from their respective Governments. We do not believe that one thing should be allowed to interfere with another or that it is necessary to delay transmission of the report to the CCD for the receipt of such instructions. If the report has been completed and if various experts have to leave Geneva inasmuch as the time-limit has been considerably exceeded, then the proper procedure to follow -- and one which is always followed in such cases -- is that if a Government considers it necessary, its expert should make a statement of interpretation -- should enter a reservation, if it wishes to go so far, which will be added to the report. Therefore, to show its utmost goodwill, my delegation would see no reason why the report should not be distributed today, or tomorrow morning at the latest, but without any change as it now stands. Nor would there be any difficulty for my delegation if the report had no symbol for the time being and if it were given a symbol on Monday once it is known whether statements of interpretation or reservations or whatever they might be called are going to be made and added to the report, so that as from today or from tomorrow morning, the members of the CCD may have an opportunity to study its contents.

I repeat, however, that my delegation could not accept any claim that the report is still open to further modification. If that were so, the task would never end since we all know quite well that if new additions were made, the delicate balance of the report would require further modifications and new additions by other experts.

Therefore, from the procedural point of view, the situation as my delegation sees it is as follows: at the meeting on 25 March, the Chairman, who at that meeting was the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, read out the consensus which the CCD had reached as a result of painstaking conversations. That consensus is to be found on page 28 of document CCD/PV.661. Paragraph 5 of the consensus states: "Requesting the group to submit to the CCD the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects not later than 7 August 1975". That is the first point.

(Mr. García Robles, Mexico)

The second point is that at the meeting held one week ago, on 7 August 1975, as a result of a question similar to that which I asked today and of the reply by the distinguished Acting Representative of the Secretary-General, a number of suggestions were made. Among them was my suggestion that last Saturday, 9 August, or Monday, 11 August, at the latest, should be set as the time-limit. Other suggestions were more generous and went as far as 13 August. My delegation, I repeat, in an effort to show understanding and good will, did not object to that time-limit of 13 August. Therefore, the distinguished representative of Romania, who presided over that meeting, said that he would transmit to the group of experts the various suggestions which had been made here. As there were no objections, that meant that there was a new consensus which allowed for the longest and greatest time-limit, 13 August.

Now, in order to change that, a new consensus would be required. I am compelled to say that my delegation is not prepared -- and I have solid grounds for believing, as a result of informal conversations with several of my colleagues, that a number of delegations take the same position -- would not be prepared to accept a new consensus that would modify the previous consensus, which is the only legally valid one and, in my view, the Chairman of the group of experts has the responsibility of ensuring that the group meets that time-limit.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): My respect and admiration for the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico is well known. I consider him one of the deans of disarmament and it is always with a great deal of diffidence that I take the floor to have differences with him. Unfortunately, in this case I have no choice but to put forward a slightly different view, although a view that I hope will not be completely irreconcilable with the view of the representative of Mexico.

Members of the Committee will recall that when this study was first proposed in New York last year it was proposed that we have a traditional expert study by private consultants. However, discussions revealed that this was a highly political question, a very important question and a very difficult question. It was therefore decided that the expert group would be composed of representatives of governments who would speak for their governments. This would give the finished study a weight that it could not possibly have in any other way.

When we originally met in the CCD this Spring, we decided that where consensus was impossible, delegations -- experts, that is -- would have the right to set forth differing views.

(Mr. Martin, United States)

It is my opinion that the strength of this study would come from these two elements -- first, that it is a study by governments and second that the entire range of views on all of the complex problems involved in this subject will be set forth. We will have, in effect, a source-book for all knowledge on this subject.

In view of the difficult problems involving sensitive security matters which are entailed in the study, I have made no secret of the fact that I was going to have to send it back to Washington ad referendum, and that my Government reserved the right to suggest reasonable changes in areas of concern. I have informed the Committee of this. I have informed the experts of it. From the beginning I have said that it would take time and that my Government would not be able to act hastily in such an important area. This is a genuine difficulty, I assure the members of this Committee, and not an imaginary one. I envy the other delegates who have the authority to commit their Governments. I do not have that authority and that has at all times been made crystal-clear.

In view of the importance of this study it would be unfortunate if my Government, or any other government, were unable to join, because, at this very late date, we have decided that it was an "all or nothing" submission.

I can recall many informal conversations in the beginning of our work where we agreed that the study would go back to governments in ample time to permit them to comment and that those comments would be taken into consideration in the study. I also remind members of this Committee that the United States has continually pushed for more and more work. We opposed, but we finally agreed to accept, a two-week break in the work of the Committee at an early stage. We requested that the Committee should work last Sunday in an effort to give us the time that was required -- that we knew we were going to need. Unfortunately, the situation was such that those requests could not be honoured.

It is understandable that people want to get this study done as quickly as possible. I have heard informal discussions that the study should go forward without the participation or acquiescence of some members. Now, I put this question to the Committee: will this study be of more value, of more weight, if all of the experts can join, or if it has to go forward as an unofficial document signed by only some, or even most of the experts?

With due deference to the distinguished representative of Mexico, I would like to suggest the following schedule, and may I point out that I have no instructions to suggest this timetable, but in view of the well-founded concerns that I have heard expressed, I am going to suggest a schedule. I cannot believe that when governments

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have their representatives on the ad hoc group and there are so many qualified people in each delegation who could deal with the final wrap-up of this report, that the personal and individual problems of some of the experts should get in the way of a true consensus.

I agree with Ambassador García Robles that I can see no reason why the study in its present state should not be circulated immediately on an informal basis to members of the CCD. I can think of no legitimate reason why this should be delayed at all. I can assure Ambassador García Robles and every other delegation that I am doing everything I can to get the study approved in its present form because I am agreeable to signing off at this stage on an ad referendum basis. But as I have told you, I do not have the authority to commit my Government.

I would suggest that early Monday morning the ad hoc group of experts meet to discuss any further suggestions that any government may wish to make and that this meeting continue as long as needed on Monday, but that thereafter, and no later than Monday evening, a plenary meeting of the experts be held for formal approval of the study, and for its transmittal to the CCD at its meeting on Tuesday, 19 August.

Since there is apparently a need for some delegations to comment on the study and to insert those comments in the annual report of the CCD, I would suggest that we hold as many meetings of the CCD after 19 August as necessary. There is no reason to limit ourselves to two meetings a week, because I feel certain that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to secure a consensus to extend this present session past 28 August.

I appeal sincerely to the distinguished representative of Mexico to give sympathetic consideration to these requests. I hope that he will feel that they are conducive to carrying out our mutual desire and that they are reasonably calculated to expedite the adoption of the report either unanimously or by the largest possible number of delegates. This will assure that the study is as weighty as it should be and that the CCD is not subject to criticism for being unable to produce a study which all of the experts can sign.

I apologize for taking so much time, Mr. Chairman, at this late hour; but this is a matter of grave, overriding importance to my delegation.

Mr. van der KLAUW (Netherlands): I will be brief. I would like to speak as the representative of a country which is not represented on this experts group, so we are not yet familiar with the study. First I would like to say that in general I quite agree with Ambassador Martin, that it is of the utmost importance that all experts agree on the study. It is a group of governmental experts, but as we all know we are sometimes at liberty to act in the framework of our general instructions and at other times we have to go back to our capitals and ask for confirmation whether the stand we have taken is the correct one or some correction has to be made. That is something that can always happen.

Now, as regards the timetable, I do not agree with Mr. Martin with respect to the discussions of the study in the CCD. If we get a study, we will have to send it back to our capitals, where it has to be considered. I cannot see how, in the two weeks or so that we still have, we could get instructions to really discuss this study here in the CCD. It has always been my impression that this study, after the experts had finished their work, would be sent on by us, just formally, to the General Assembly and that the discussion actually would take place during the disarmament debate in the First Committee. If that is a more general opinion, then there is not much pressure from the point of view of the CCD itself in having the study already circulated.

It is much more important that we have a study approved by all the experts and then, in view of the extreme importance which we attach to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones, this will be discussed in depth during the meetings of the First Committee in New York.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I should like to seek a clarification from the representative of the United States, Ambassador Martin. He mentioned the schedule for finalizing the work of the experts' group. He said that the group should meet on Monday, early Monday, or its informal meeting should be continued on Monday, to consider any comments which might be made by his Government or any other Government on the report as it is ready today. And that later on Monday, there should be a formal meeting of the experts to complete the work. Now the clarification I should like is that if there is no agreement within the group in regard to incorporation of comments which might be made by the United States or any other country, what would be the position then? Would it not then mean that the comments of the United States or of any other country would be included as dissenting opinions? That is the clarification I should like from Ambassador Martin.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Let me assure the Committee and my distinguished friend Ambassador Mishra that I am not trying to unduly prolong this matter. I anticipate that it will end Monday and I repeat, this is without instructions. I consider the report now ad referendum. I think after last night it was ad referendum. If my Government instructs me to make suggestions for changes and if agreement cannot be reached on those changes Monday, then I assume that my instructions will tell me what to do in light of the fact that we have not succeeded in convincing the other members. If that is the case, I am not asking that anything in the way of dissenting views be added to the report. I hope that clarifies the question for Ambassador Mishra.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I am grateful to my very good friend, Ambassador Martin, for the clarification he has provided. My conclusion from this is that if the views of the United States are not accepted in regard to the changes which might be wished, then either there will be a dissenting opinion or there will be no signing by the United States experts.

If I may make a suggestion at this stage, I would suggest in all humility and with all sympathy for the position outlined by Ambassador Martin that the report be finished today, with the reservation that if governments wish to comment upon them, they could do it within one week i.e. between now and 21 August, and this would not only be for a particular government but for all governments represented by experts in the study group. Then, in the meanwhile we will have the report for our consideration. We could begin consideration of the report in the CCD early next week. I have no objection to the suggestion that we hold more than two meetings a week. We could hold 2, 3, 4 or 5 meetings to begin consideration of the report and try to finalize it by the end of next week including the comments of governments, if any, which are sent by 21 August. I make this suggestion in order not to put any particular expert in difficulty vis-a-vis his government but in order to expedite our work.

I have a feeling that it would not be possible to transmit the report of the study group to the General Assembly without comments upon it within the CCD and for this purpose we need time. So, I would like to say to Ambassador Martin that we also have a genuine difficulty in regard to finalization of that report within the CCD and we do need time to go through it to make our comments so that they are incorporated along side the report when it is transmitted to the General Assembly.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics): The Soviet side is of the opinion that, before the adoption of the report of the ad hoc group of governmental experts for the study of nuclear-weapon-free zones, the experts should be given two more days in which to consider the text of the report. In practice, the report may be adopted on 18 August 1975. Albeit short, this postponement of the adoption of the report is due, in particular, to the fact that so far there is still no Russian text of the report. The Soviet expert needs that text for studying the report more carefully, after which he will be able to express an opinion on its adoption.

After the report has been adopted by the group of experts, some time will be needed for delegations to obtain instructions from their capitals and give their conclusions on the report in the Committee on Disarmament, which, in conformity with the decision of the General Assembly, is required to send the report on nuclear-weapon-free zones to the United Nations General Assembly.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation would venture to make a strictly procedural motion. I would suggest that we do not now embark upon a discussion and an examination of what CCD is going to do about the special report requested in resolution 3261 F (XXIX). My delegation is completely open to any method or procedure which the majority may wish to follow -- that suggested by Ambassador van der Klaauw, that just suggested by yourself, Mr. Chairman, or that suggested by the representative of India. But let us not confuse matters. It will be the special report of the CCD. Will it contain comments by the government representatives in the CCD or not? To my delegation it amounts to the same thing, for in any case, if a delegation wishes to make comments, it has the right to devote a full statement to the matter that will be included in the record of the meeting and will go to the General Assembly. If, on the other hand, it is desired that the special report of the CCD should be a report like that of the experts, that can also be done, if time allows, which I doubt. However, I repeat that, as a matter of principle, for us it is all the same.

But for the moment, Mr. Chairman, I would request you and my distinguished colleagues to concentrate our attention on the other point, which, I believe, is easier to resolve but also more urgent -- the point which I raised at the beginning and which was later referred to by the representative of the United States, Ambassador Martin, after whom the representative of India, Ambassador Mishra, asked

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a very pertinent question. Although my delegation was convinced when it took the floor that we had reached the limit of concessions, the very eloquent statement by our distinguished friend Ambassador Martin has caused me to consider the possibility of making still a further concession.

From what he said, I understand that his delegation has no objection to considering the document which was approved ad referendum last evening by the group of experts and which is now ready. That is the first point that I think I understood very clearly from what the representative of the United States said. Secondly, he wishes, and says that this is a proposal which his Government may consider bold -- I do not think so, I think that his Government will find it very sensible and really the most that could be expected in the circumstances -- he says that he would agree, apart from ad referendum approval of the document completed last evening, that this should be done today, at the meeting of the Group of Experts which will take place today. Now, apart from that, would he like his delegation, and any other delegation that might find itself in a similar position, to have the right, on Monday morning, to make some suggestions for changes or additions if they receive instructions to do so? I would ask the representative of the United States if he would be willing for us to interpret his suggestion to mean that at a formal meeting on Monday afternoon or evening, as he said, the group of experts would officially and finally approve its report.

I repeat, I should like to know whether I may interpret Ambassador Martin's suggestion to mean that any proposed changes -- it would be simplest if there were none -- will be subject to the consensus rule, that is to say, that if there is no consensus in the group of experts regarding all or some of the proposals, there should be no further discussion of the matter, and the delegation or delegations concerned would then consider the various possibilities which have been mentioned here -- impossibility of signing, contrary opinion, statement of interpretation or reservation. But let it be clear that, as the report of the experts represents, I repeat, a delicate balance resulting from weeks of arduous talks, negotiations and discussions, it cannot be expected that the debate should be reopened at the last minute. So, if Ambassador Martin allows me to interpret his proposal in that sense, I would agree not to oppose a consensus on the new schedule he mentioned.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): I must admit that the suggestion of Ambassador García Robles gives me some problems that I am trying to work my way around. Under the rules of the study, if no consensus can be reached, delegations have the right to state their positions in their own way.

I recognize the problem that he raises that one change may induce another change and that is why I proposed a firm cut-off. I think I have to, under my instructions, reserve the right to suggest changes in our formulations until Monday.

I can see that if these new statements create a tremendous problem of imbalance, the report will have to be extended -- that the experts will not be able to agree. But then I think probably I would have to say that at the end of the Monday deadline we would be faced with the choice of either accepting the report in its present form without our suggested changes or rejecting the entire report.

I sincerely hope we are not put in that position. But I would like to hope that as long as the meetings go on, on Monday, we could operate under the rules of the group as they have been agreed to to date, recognizing that at a given hour on Monday there is to be a cut-off and that at that point I will recommend to my Government that they be prepared to make a decision either "go" or "no go", so that there will not be any further delay as from Monday.

Mr. ENE (Romania): Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. Frankly, I am in the same position as the representative of Mexico, because our expert has to leave this afternoon. Of course, we understand the problem of the representative of the United States and, in fact, any of us might sometimes be in a similar position. We appreciate the efforts made by all the experts in order to finalize the report. In fact, we consider that we have before us now a report which is not, of course, official, but which has practically been agreed upon more or less. There are only a few experts which might have some point to clarify further with their Government. With due respect to the fact that there are individual problems as well as the matter of the departure of the experts, I believe the question concerns the work of the group and its mandate. It did receive a calendar from this Committee and as it now stands it has no further mandate since the latest decision, which was taken by this Committee -- and I had the honour to be in the Chair at the time -- was that the group could work until the 13th of this month at the latest. In other words, we must now decide how the group should proceed further. I understand that the representatives of both India and Mexico put forward very valuable suggestions which, in my opinion, meet the problems of the two delegations that do not yet have final instructions from their Governments, and I would support both those suggestions.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): I have been reluctant to intervene in this discussion because, not being a party to the working group, it is easy to make bright suggestions without being aware of all the difficulties. But it strikes me, at this late stage, that the real thing that we want to turn out -- and we will have to compromise with our desires, principles and personal convenience to do so -- is a report that carries the largest possible consensus and, from what I hear, we are on the edge of this. I think that we are faced, on the one hand by at least one government with strict instructions about the right to have a final look at it. But perhaps just as important is the point that was raised by the representative of the Soviet Union, that he has not yet got it in the official language that he works in. I would have thought that that consideration would operate for some others as well. It would seem to me that it would be improper for the group to put a number on its document until it is in all the working languages and I gather from what I have heard that that will not be until Monday.

Now, we have been worried about all sorts of hypotheses about the position that the United States might find itself in on Monday, and maybe some other delegations as well. I think that these are probably chimeras and we do not really need to worry about them. These are possibilities, but only theoretical possibilities. Every Government is going to be aware of what has gone into this document and the nature of the tenuous agreement and I would venture to suggest that when the Committee meets on Monday it will have a document in the official language of each of the delegations. They can look at it, they can decide whether or not they agree to it and then they will address themselves to any problems that they may be faced with at that time, which in my personal estimate, will not prove to be very serious. Then it can be formally tabled in the CCD on Tuesday. I would hope, if we could follow that kind of timetable, that in the meantime those of us who have not been party to the group could have an informal copy of the informal draft of the informal document to have a look at over the weekend.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I am sorry to impose upon the patience of the Conference, but I really do have a clear conscience that it is not our fault. Of course I agree with what the representative of Canada has just said -- that it is desirable that we should have the report in all working languages, and in passing I should like to reiterate more or less what you yourself have said, Mr. Chairman.

It has been accepted that we are to work in English -- I do not know why, but we have always worked in English -- and this has been a disadvantage for us all. We are

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now hoping to have the Spanish text. I am told that all texts will probably be ready tomorrow, the 15th. With this last gesture of conciliation and good faith on our part, only one more point remains to be clarified. I am sure that Ambassador Martin, who is an excellent lawyer, will realize that the reply to a question such as the one I asked must be clear. The question is, of course, whether the United States delegation and any other delegation would have the right to present any suggestions which it may be instructed by its Government to make. That is clear, very clear, and I said that we would agree to it, with one reservation: I should like to know whether the United States delegation would agree that, at the deadline, it should be subject to the consensus rule. That means that if two delegations, or only one, say "Gentlemen, I cannot accept that proposal because it would entail amending the whole chapter", then that would simply mean that the proposal cannot be included because it would destroy the whole balance. I am sure that all the members of the group of experts are responsible and reasonable men and that they would not raise an objection of that kind without having come to the well-considered conclusion that to include it is not possible because it would make void and useless all the reconciliation work that had gone into that particular chapter. Thus, I do not think it would be difficult for the distinguished representative of the United States to give me a "yes", a categorical "yes", answer, and with that the problem is solved.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): The only difficulty that I have in saying yes is the difficulty that I have been labouring under for over an hour now. I just do not think I have the authority to agree. However, I think that in practical effect, if we reach the deadline and there has been no agreement because of the factors Ambassador García Robles mentioned -- and, like him, I am perfectly certain that all of the experts will be as reasonable as possible in listening to any slight modifications that we might want to propose -- if there is no agreement then I think the United States is faced with a problem of deciding how it wants to go. I agree to a firm deadline for the end of discussions. And I assume that if the United States says at that point, "Gentlemen: we have laboured long and hard but we, with all the goodwill in the world, cannot agree with you and cannot go along with this report because of one, two or three reasons" then the report would go on without us and the other experts could do what they wanted.

But I am in no position at this point to waive the present rules of the Committee. All I can say is that at a certain point we will make up our minds and we will agree to set the hour right now.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico): Perhaps all may be a question of a misunderstanding. The representative of the United States has just said that he is in no position to waive the rules of the Committee. I do not know which rules he has in mind, and I would be grateful if he would clarify that for me.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): The rule I have in mind is rule (4). It says that "whenever the group is unable to reach consensus on substantive matters each of the experts will be entitled to incorporate in the study his own opinion" (CCD/PV.661, page 28). The way it has worked in practice is that when you incorporate your own opinion, somebody else changes his. I recognize this.

To be perfectly frank and blunt I cannot put myself in the position where I must go back to my Government and say that we can make a lot of suggestions to the experts but no matter how reasonable they are the experts have the right to turn them down without consideration or after fifteen minutes of discussion on the ground of consensus. This is something that I am in no position to do. While I know that that is not the purpose of Ambassador García Robles, that would be a way that his proposed procedures could be interpreted, and I have to protect myself against that contingency.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I think we are approaching and have almost arrived at a meeting point. According to Ambassador Martin's original suggestion, the group of experts would hold a first meeting in the morning. That meeting could take place at 9 o'clock if the group wishes to have more time, or at an hour to be determined by the Chairman of the group. Afterwards, in accordance with what he has just said, the procedure would be applied which the Group has been following and which is that laid down in point (4) of the CCD consensus, namely that whenever the group is unable to reach consensus on substantive matters, each of the experts will be entitled to incorporate in the study his own opinion.

I would suggest, then, that we fix a deadline by which delegations submitting any proposed changes should give the secretariat the text of any opinion which, by virtue of paragraph (4) of the CCD consensus, they feel compelled to submit for incorporation in the report. I refer to those delegations which may want to suggest changes. I wish to state here and now that, even though there are many points in the report with which it is not fully satisfied and which it would have preferred to see drafted in another way, the delegation of Mexico will not submit any opinion of the kind referred to in point (4), unless those submitted by the delegations which are going

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to send the report to their Governments should make that necessary in order to restore the balance; and I am sure that some other Delegations which participated in the preparation of the report are in the position of the Mexican delegation. Thereafter, so that all delegations are treated fairly and equitably, the deadline for delegations wishing to submit suggested changes would be 3 p.m. and we would fix a deadline five hours later; in other words 8 p.m., for all other delegations that have not submitted new suggestions to decide whether, in the light of the opinions that are to be inserted, they in turn feel compelled to request the insertion of opinions.

I think that safeguards the rights of everyone and harms nobody. If Ambassador Martin agrees to that suggestion, we have solved the problem.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): If I understand Ambassador García Robles' point it was that by 3 p.m. on Monday all proposed changes will be submitted in writing and that from then on there will be five hours to discuss and consider, and at 8 p.m. the game is over. Is that correct?

I am sorry but that is the way I understood the translation.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico): In accordance with the suggestion of Ambassador Martin, the group of experts will meet on Monday morning, and I suggested the earlier the better, at 9 a.m. Then at that moment, the United States delegation, if it has received instructions to that effect, or any other delegation, will present its suggestions in writing or orally, and then the group of experts will have from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m. In those six hours, a conclusion will be reached one way or the other. If it is reached to accept them by consensus, well and good, they will be incorporated in the report. On the other hand, if there is no such consensus, and then the United States delegation needs to have recourse to point (4) of the consensus then the other delegations represented in the group of experts which had not asked for modifications will have up to 8 p.m. to study those new opinions which are going to be incorporated and to decide whether in the light of those additions they feel they will need to have recourse to point (4) and ask for the inclusion of their separate opinions.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): I now understand Ambassador García Robles' proposal. It is completely acceptable to me and to my delegation. I would just like to express my appreciation for the understanding and the tolerance which the distinguished representative of Mexico has shown on this, as on all other occasions, and I hope that we can put this problem behind us, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTON (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I just hope that in your summing up you will also include the point I mentioned earlier, that in the meantime, we receive informally the informal text so that we can have a look at it over the weekend.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we have achieved consensus regarding the presentation of the report and the approval of the report of the group of experts. On 18 August at 9 a.m. any delegation may submit comments and considerations relating to the report of the group of the experts.

From 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., that is, for six hours, the group of experts may examine the considerations and amendments made by any of the delegations. After that, any delegation may, until 8 p.m. on the same day, make its own observations on the amendments, which will be the result of the group of experts. I understand also that the text of the study will be distributed, informally, to CCD members in the course of the afternoon, today. Am I to understand this as the interpretation of the consensus or not?

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico): I do not know if it was a question of interpretation of what I said. The deadline of 3 p.m. applies to the delegations which present proposals for modification. For them, 3 p.m. is the deadline. They cannot present anything after 3 p.m. The other deadline of 8 p.m. is for all other delegations, delegations which will not have presented suggestions for modification on Monday.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that the proposal by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico is clear to everybody. Is there any objection to the consensus proposed by the representative of Mexico?

Mr. van der KLAUW (Netherlands): I have no problems with the consensus. However, I wish to state that it is my understanding that when you, Mr. Chairman, spoke about any delegation which may make comments on Monday, this refers only to delegations which are represented in the group of experts. I make this remark only to avoid any misunderstanding.

Mr. MISHRA (India): I have no objection to the consensus which now seems to be emerging happily. But I should like to make two points before you bang your gavel

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and adopt it. One is that, in my delegation's opinion, we will still require at least one week for commenting upon the study in the CCD. The second is that whether the experts' group meets at 9 or 10 a.m. should be left to them rather than that we direct them to meet at 9.

The CHAIRMAN: Is there any objection to the statement made by the Ambassador of India to the draft consensus proposed by Mexico? Therefore, the consensus is adopted.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.

