

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.736
15 March 1977
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SEVEN HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 15 March 1977 at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Constantin Ene

(Romania)

GE.77-83102

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. I. MASTROGIOVANNI
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. M. PETROV Mr. M. SREBREV
<u>Burma:</u>	U THA TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. R. HARRY JAY Mr. J.T. SIMARD Mr. J. KOOP
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. RO ^V ZEK Mr. V. ROHÁL-ILKIV Mr. J. FRANEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. O. EL SHAFEI Mr. F. EL IBRASHI Mr. A. ABOUL KHEIR
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. F. SAYATZ
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. J.G. SCHLAICH Mr. J. PÖHLMANN Mr. K.L. HANNESSCHLÄGER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. R. TOTH Mr. I. KÖRMENDY

<u>India:</u>	Mr. K.P. JAIN Mr. S.T. DEVARE
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. M. FARTASH Mr. H. AMERI Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. A. BIZZARINI Mr. G. VALDEVIT
<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. T. SAWAI Mr. Y. NAKAMURA
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCÍA ROBLES Mr. M. MARÍN Miss A. CABRERA
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. P. KHALIUM Mr. L. BAYART
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. S.M. RAHHALI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. A.J. MEERBURG Mr. VAN BATENBURG
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. S.T. ADAMU
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. YUNUS Mr. K. SALEEM
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. L. CHÁVEZ-GODOY
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. H. PAĆ Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI Mr. I. MALECKI

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. G. TINCA
Mr. M. ROSIANU

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON
Mr. U. REINIUS
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.I. LIKHACHEV
Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
Mr. A.I. TIOURENKOV
Mr. M.M. BELOUSOV
Mr. B.T. SOURIKOV
Mr. A.V. FOKIN
Mr. A.P. CHEPURNOV
Mr. V.V. IVANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. M.E. ALLEN
Mr. I.R. KENYON
Mr. J. GARNETT

United States of America:

Mr. H. MEYERS
Mr. W. HECKROTTE
Miss B. MURRAY
Mr. A. TURRENTINE
Mr. C. WILMOT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. D. DJOKIC

Zaire:

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. Risto HYVÄRINEN

Alternate Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. A. CORRADINI

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 736th meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Constantin Ene, representative of Romania. The Chairman recalled that, on 14 March, the CCD had marked 15 years of its existence. This was an anniversary which gave the members of the Committee an opportunity for reflection on the work the CCD had performed and the efforts it had deployed in discharging its responsibilities as the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. He expressed the hope that the Committee on Disarmament would enter its sixteenth year of life full of determination to redouble its efforts in order to respond sooner and better to the important tasks that the international community had entrusted to it.

The representative of India (Mr. Kashi Prasad Jain) devoted his statement to the question of organization and working procedures of the Committee on Disarmament.

He noted that the CCD's basic structure rested on the principle of consensus and flexibility of procedures. The principle of consensus had ensured the sovereign equality of its member States. The Committee was master of its procedures and could modify or alter them, as and when necessary, in the best interests of its work.

The representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States had been appointed Co-chairmen by a unanimous decision of the Committee on Disarmament at its first meeting on 14 March 1962, so that they could help organize the work of the Committee. On substantive matters of disarmament, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States could speak and act for their respective Governments only.

The representative of India also considered, in the light of previous experience, that a working group or any other subsidiary organ of the CCD should be established on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis, as and when considered necessary. He also suggested that the possible association of non-member States with the CCD's work should be arranged in such a way as to secure their contribution to the cause of disarmament.

He observed that CCD meetings were private but not confidential. Its records and documents were available to all Member States of the United Nations, and any delegation had the full right to brief the press on its position.

With regard to the absence of France and the People's Republic of China from the CCD negotiations, he noted that the entire international community would warmly welcome their participation in disarmament negotiations for the achievement of a lasting world peace, which could only be based on total disarmament and a just economic order.

The representative of the German Democratic Republic (H.E. Ambassador Gerhard Herder) declared that the Memorandum of the USSR on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament of 28 September 1976, as well as the Declaration of the Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 26 November 1976 should be taken into account in elaborating a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament. He stressed the importance of the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The representative of the German Democratic Republic held that the Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests provided an appropriate basis for solving the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under such a ban. He confirmed the view that national means of control supplemented by international exchanges of seismic data were sufficient for monitoring compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. The representative of the German Democratic Republic stated that the CCD should, as soon as possible, conclude the discussion on its procedures and that the Co-Chairmen should, at the proper time, submit a draft decision to the CCD containing all questions on which agreement was reached during the exchange of views on this matter.

The representative of Bulgaria (H.E. Ambassador Raiko Nikolov), noting the fifteenth anniversary of the Committee on Disarmament, pointed out the concrete results which the Committee has achieved. He stressed that, in the present conditions, the CCD proved to be the most appropriate body for conducting multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament. He also commented on some procedural questions and strongly advocated the necessity to preserve the character and the stability of the CCD, which was called upon to play also in the future an important role in the solution of the crucial problems arising from the arms race.

The representative of the United States of America (Mr. Howard Meyers) read a statement by the President of the United States commemorating the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the CCD.

The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (H.E. Ambassador V.I. Likhatchev) made a statement on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the Committee on Disarmament. He pointed out, in particular, the positive activities of this international organ during that period of time and also referred to some tasks before the Committee.

After that, the Soviet representative dwelt in detail on the problem of the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. He recalled that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics suggested the inclusion, among new types of weapons of mass destruction, of any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action -- according to the mode of use and the targets to be destroyed or the nature of the effect. The Soviet representative declared that an agreement on new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should not prohibit what had already been prohibited by other agreements. He spoke in favour of the necessity to begin concrete consideration of the provisions and articles of a future agreement and, first of all, to reach an understanding concerning the scope of prohibition. In this connexion he suggested that, at this stage, attention should be focused on the identification of possible directions for the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The representative of Mexico (H.E. Alfonso García Robles), after recalling that fifteen years ago the Special Representative of the Secretary-General had stressed the need for the Committee to attain concrete results, noted that this was precisely what the Committee had sought in vain over the last decade and a half regarding the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

Recalling also that, at the tenth anniversary meeting, Mrs. Myrdal had remarked that the CCD had barely produced any tangible results, he referred to the 1973 eight-nation memorandum (CCD/396) which stressed the Committee's responsibility to mankind and the United Nations, their increasing concern at the lack of tangible progress in its negotiations, their firm belief that the two Superpowers had the primary responsibility to contribute positively to the CCD's work, and their opinion that the absence of two nuclear-weapon States from the CCD should not prevent it from discharging its obligations, especially with respect to a CTB.

With regard to the present situation, Ambassador García Robles noted that the unequivocal statements made by the new United States President in his inaugural address and their apparent favourable reception by the leaders of the Soviet Union had increased the responsibility of those two States, and failure to live up to those statements would entail a credibility loss and have profound negative consequences for the cause of disarmament.

Regarding a CTB, he stressed that, should the CCD want to avoid appearing before the General Assembly empty-handed once again, the nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee should act in accordance with the General Assembly's reiterated conviction that whatever might be the differences on the question of verification, there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB and that they bring to a halt without delay all such tests, either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria. He noted, in conclusion, that history would judge the CCD not by its longevity but by its results.

The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 17 March 1977, at 10.30 a.m.

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The CHAIRMAN: Before entering upon our usual business I would like to remind you, distinguished delegates, that yesterday, on 14 March, the Committee on Disarmament marked its 15 years of existence.

This was an anniversary which gave the members of the Committee an opportunity for reflection on the work the CCD had performed and the efforts it had deployed in accomplishing its responsibilities as the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament.

Opinions may differ as to the degree to which its mission has been fulfilled so far; we have to recognize that we are still far from having solved the most urgent problems for which the Committee was created. One thing can be safely said, namely, that during its 15 years the Committee on Disarmament has amply justified the confidence that peoples around the world placed in it. This was repeated again this year, at the beginning of our session, when the Secretary-General of the United Nations made a pressing appeal, that our negotiations must reflect a sense of urgency commensurate with the now prevailing threat to world peace and security.

May I, on this occasion, express the wish which, I would like to think, is shared by everybody around this table, that the Committee on Disarmament enter its sixteenth year of life full of determination to redouble its efforts in order to respond sooner and better to the important, though complex tasks that the international community believes it is able to perform.

Mr. JAIN (India): The Committee on Disarmament observed its fifteenth anniversary yesterday, 14 March 1977. It was most appropriate that this occasion was marked by a reception given by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in order to stress the importance that the international community attaches to the cause of disarmament and the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament is 15 years young today, in its service to the international community, as a unique multilateral negotiating body in the entire history of mankind's disarmament efforts.

Ever since 14 March 1962, when the Committee on Disarmament held its first meeting at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, it has been in continuous session, except for recesses necessitated by three main considerations. First, the Committee goes into recess at the time of the United Nations General Assembly's sessions in which disarmament questions are considered by the entire membership of the United Nations on a deliberative plane, so that a full debate and exchange of views among all States can take place on the entire range of disarmament matters. The work

(Mr. Jain, India)

of the Committee on Disarmament as a negotiating body is reviewed in particular at these sessions. The General Assembly then issues guidelines and instructions for the future and continuing work of disarmament negotiations. Secondly, the Committee on Disarmament observes a recess, so that its member States can -- on the basis of these fresh guidelines and instructions framed by the General Assembly each year -- carry out appropriate studies in depth of the various questions in their capitals, develop their positions on the issues involved and finalize instructions to their delegations. Thirdly, the Committee on Disarmament takes breaks to enable delegations and the Secretariat to have some rest and recreation, so that they can come back to their work with renewed vigour.

From time to time, members of the Committee on Disarmament have carried out informal consultations among themselves and have also held discussions on the floor of the Conference to consider how its work could be better organized and its working procedures improved to attain speedier progress towards the goal of total disarmament. One such periodic debate has been taking place since the commencement of the current session on 15 February 1977.

The Committee on Disarmament has no written charter, statute or constitution. It has worked on the basis of the principle of consensus and flexibility of procedures. Its basic structure based on these two pillars has proved to be sound for its work as a multilateral negotiating body on various disarmament questions. The Committee on Disarmament is master of its procedures and can modify or alter them, as and when necessary, in the best interests of its work.

It is clear that a negotiating body on disarmament cannot work on the basis of majority decisions. The principle of consensus ensures sovereign equality of its member States and enables recommendations to be made for serious consideration by the entire membership of the United Nations.

It is against this general background that the following four issues, which have recently been under discussion among member States of the Committee on Disarmament, should be considered: (i) The institution of co-chairmen; (ii) Appointment of a standing/permanent sub-committee or working group comprising the entire membership of the Committee to negotiate texts of treaties, conventions, agreements or other documents; (iii) the association of non-member States with the work of the Committee on Disarmament; and (iv) the opening of all or some of the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament to the public and the press.

(Mr. Jain, India)

The institution of co-chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament should be examined from the points of view of its historical background and its implications, so that we are clear about its raison d'être.

By its resolution 1660 (XVI) of 28 November 1961, which was adopted unanimously, the General Assembly urged the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States "to reach agreement on the composition of a negotiating body which both they and the rest of the world can regard as satisfactory". When such an agreement was reached between these two Governments, the General Assembly endorsed the composition of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, which was also adopted unanimously. The same basic approach in regard to the composition of the Committee has been followed in the enlargement of its membership from 18 to 26 in 1969, and to the present strength of 31 in 1975.

It is also essential to recall that, for the sake of better organization of its work, and particularly in order to avoid sterile and protracted debates on procedures and other organizational matters, the Committee on Disarmament decided at its very first meeting and in its first ever document, namely, ENDC/1, that, while the chair would be rotated daily in English alphabetical order among all members of the Committee, "the Permanent Co-Chairmen of the Committee will be the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America".

The two Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament were required to consult all its other members and make agreed recommendations, based on their consultations, on procedural matters for adoption by the Committee on the basis of the principle of consensus. It should be noted that no deviation from this agreed organization of work has ever occurred.

On substantive matters, the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States can speak and act for their respective Governments only -- just like other member States -- and not as Co-Chairmen of the Committee, whether acting singly or together. Thus, for example, when they present the text of a draft treaty or convention on a disarmament matter, which has been agreed to between their two Governments, it is considered as a Soviet-United States draft and not as a Co-Chairmen's draft. All member States, irrespective of the group to which they may belong, retain full freedom of expression of their views on and action towards that draft treaty or convention, even after it has been finally referred to the United Nations General Assembly for its consideration by the Committee as a whole.

(Mr. Jain, India)

The institution of co-chairmen has been established by a decision of the Committee on Disarmament. It is not an imposition from outside. Any implication that the institution of co-chairmen detracts from the sovereignty of other member States of the Committee would be totally erroneous and should be categorically rejected.

As regards the question of the appointment of a standing/permanent sub-committee or working group to negotiate treaty texts on a specific subject or subjects, it has always been understood that the Committee could at any time take any decision it might deem appropriate in the best interests of its work, on the basis of the principles of consensus and flexibility of its rules of procedure. A case in point is the very recent instance of how the Committee had set up a Working Group in 1976 to negotiate the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques (ENMOD Convention). It is accepted by everybody that this Working Group functioned effectively. Its example shows that it is best to constitute working groups or any other subsidiary organs, whether appointed by the Committee or working under its auspices, on an ad-hoc and case-by-case basis, as and when considered necessary.

It is absolutely essential that the Committee should not adopt any rigid framework for its organization of work or take decisions on any basis other than the principle of consensus. The Committee on Disarmament could not work either within a rigid framework or on the basis of votes, if it were to function at all as a negotiating body.

It should always be borne in mind that substantive differences on disarmament questions cannot be resolved by procedural devices.

On the question of the association of non-member States with the work of the Committee on Disarmament, it may be mentioned that the membership of the Committee itself has been enlarged from time to time. Nobody has ever claimed that there can be any sacred figure or magic number in regard to the membership of the Committee. The Committee can always be further expanded, provided that the basic difference between a deliberative forum and a negotiating body is always borne in mind and that the negotiating body is kept small so that it can function effectively.

It should also be recalled that non-member States have been associated with the work of the Committee on Disarmament in various ways. They have been most welcome to submit proposals, working papers or other documents pertaining to disarmament work. Their representatives have been included in groups of experts, whether such groups have been appointed by the Committee or have worked under the auspices of the Committee. One such group, namely, the Ad-Hoc Group of Governmental Experts on

(Mr. Jain, India)

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, not only comprised several non-member States, but had as its Chairman the representative of a non-member State. Other similar ways can always be found to associate any interested non-member States with the work of the Committee, as all States have a vital interest in disarmament. However, it is equally evident that all States -- those who are members of the Committee on Disarmament as well as those who are not -- would not wish to destroy the negotiating character of the Committee.

As regards the question of opening all or some of the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament to the public and the press, it is best to remember that these meetings are private but not confidential. The Committee's records and reports are available to all Member States of the United Nations. Similarly, any delegation of a member State of the Committee on Disarmament has the full right to brief the press on its statement and/or position on any disarmament matter. However, it is universally recognized that disarmament negotiations can neither be conducted in public nor in the glare of publicity.

The absence of two nuclear-weapon States, namely, France and the People's Republic of China, from disarmament negotiations has frequently been noted, keenly felt and greatly regretted.

France has been a member of the Committee on Disarmament ever since its inception, although France has not attended any of its meetings so far.

The entire international community will warmly welcome the participation of France and the People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations and will look forward to receiving their contribution to the achievement of a lasting world peace based on disarmament and a just economic order.

In conclusion, it is the view of the delegation of India that the Committee on Disarmament, being master of its procedures and working on the basis of the principle of consensus, can always and at any time modify its organization and procedures of work in the best interests of achieving speedier progress towards the goal of total disarmament.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): It is a great pleasure for me to have the honour of taking the floor on this historical date. Yesterday the CCD marked its fifteenth anniversary. Permit me, Comrade Chairman, to express to you and to all members of the United Nations staff present here our congratulations on this occasion and to wish them success in their efforts to strengthen the CCD and to achieve further progress in halting the arms race by negotiating new and effective disarmament agreements.

First of all, I would like to welcome, on behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, as new representatives to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the new Co-Chairman, Mr. Howard Meyers of the United States of America, Ambassador Gabriel O. Martinez of Argentina as well as Ambassador Omran El-Shafei of the Arab Republic of Egypt.

We are convinced that the presence of Ambassador Jain from India, whose experience and knowledge concerning questions of disarmament we highly appreciate, will contribute to the successful work of our Committee.

It is a great pleasure once again to meet Ambassador Erdembileg who, over many years, as Ambassador of his country in Berlin, made a valuable personal contribution to the development of close and friendly relations between our two countries. I would like to assure you that my delegation is willing to co-operate objectively and constructively with them in order to enable the Committee on Disarmament to measure up still better to its growing role and responsibility.

At present the movement to halt the arms race and to achieve disarmament is acquiring ever wider dimensions. This was reflected at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, where the demand for real progress in this field was again raised emphatically. The disarmament movement of the peace-loving forces is gaining increasing importance in all parts of the world. This was proved by the fact that more than 400 million people have already signed the Appeal of the World Peace Council to halt the arms race. In view of these and many other facts, ever-more favourable conditions are being created for the implementation of far-reaching measures to halt the dangerous arms race. Many initiatives have been taken in this direction, both outside and in the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In their Declaration of November 1976, the Parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their view that at present the key question is "to put into effect the existing initiatives, to advance along the road of achieving mandatory, effective international understandings in the sphere of disarmament".

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic holds the view that the CCD bears a high responsibility for the elaboration of effective disarmament measures. The Committee is a representative organ and has broad experience gained in the elaboration of a number of agreements on the cessation of the arms race during its 15 years of work.

The role of the CCD is determined by the fact that its objective is to reach general and complete disarmament. This orientation is contained in the "Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations" by the USSR and the United States of America of 20 September 1961. Now as before, this statement is the basis for the activities of the CCD. We hold the view that, in connexion with the elaboration of a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the proposals and initiatives contained in the "Memorandum of the Soviet Union on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament" of 28 September 1976, and in the Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member States of 26 November 1976, have to be taken into account. Bearing in mind the actual international situation, these documents show concrete ways of solution and for achieving, step by step, general and complete disarmament.

Thus the fact is taken into account that, up to now, some States are not ready to accept a radical cessation of the arms race and to realize comprehensive disarmament measures. Without losing sight of the strategic aim - general and complete disarmament - these documents focus on nuclear disarmament measures, starting with the universal prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in the framework of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations and continuing right up to the complete liquidation of all nuclear weapons.

Within the framework of the present activities of the CCD, the consideration of measures for the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, as well as chemical weapons, is of the utmost importance. The German Democratic Republic regards the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as a key question for the cessation of the nuclear arms race. This measure will end the qualitative development of nuclear weapons and prevent the emergence of new types of nuclear weapons. A radical solution of this problem can be achieved only by a treaty to which all nuclear Powers are parties. Such a treaty would lay upon all countries equal obligations and lead to the freezing of the present situation as regards the development of nuclear weapons. It would change

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

absolutely nothing in the existing international relationship of forces. The security interests of all States would be fully maintained, and all States would enjoy the material and political benefits resulting from such a ban. This is the aim of the proposal of the USSR for the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, which was supported by a great majority at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. As co-sponsor of resolution 31/89, the German Democratic Republic, now as before, stands for the participation of all nuclear Powers in a comprehensive test ban. We note with satisfaction that, during the ongoing discussion, these aims have been supported by all the other representatives who, up to now, have addressed the CCD on the test ban issue.

My delegation took note with great interest the Swedish proposal for a treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments. Although this proposal still needs to be thoroughly studied, I should like to make some preliminary comments on it.

In her speech of 3 March, the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, said: "To ask that all nuclear-weapon States negotiate, sign and ratify a CTB treaty as a precondition for its entry into force will not, however, give the world a CTB in the foreseeable future." Instead of asking for a comprehensive test ban binding on all nuclear-weapon Powers, the Swedish draft confines itself to proposing a moratorium on underground nuclear weapon tests to be agreed upon only by two nuclear Powers, the United States of America and the USSR.

Now as before, the other nuclear Powers would be allowed to continue with their nuclear weapon tests. Is this approach not likely to stimulate those nuclear-weapon States that are left out of consideration in the treaty intensively to continue testing in order to gain benefits and change the existing relationship of forces?

History is always a good teacher. Allow me to remind you of the fact that, for instance in 1958, the Soviet Union launched an initiative for a moratorium on nuclear weapon tests in order to halt the nuclear arms race. But soon it appeared that opponents of a prohibition of nuclear weapon tests were misusing this attitude for obtaining one-sided benefits. A cessation of the nuclear arms race could not be achieved.

We do not close our eyes to the fact that, since 1958, international conditions have basically changed. Nevertheless, the lessons of the past should not remain unconsidered.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In its article IX, the Swedish draft treaty provides that if the treaty has not been adhered to by all nuclear-weapon States x years after its entry into force, each party shall have the right to withdraw from the treaty with immediate effect.

Considering the declared intentions of some nuclear-weapon States to continue with their nuclear weapon tests, one can already today foresee the time when the moratorium, therefore, will be called into question. An intensified nuclear arms race would be the result of such a development. Thus, the moratorium would prove to be an illusion and would do great harm to the cause of disarmament.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic proceeds from the fact that a comprehensive test ban including all the nuclear Powers has to be achieved. That is the only possible way of making real progress in halting the nuclear arms race. That is what we are obliged to fight for if we do not want to disappoint the peoples.

In the final analysis, a ban on nuclear weapon tests can only be comprehensive and effective if adherence to it by all nuclear-weapon States is guaranteed. Therefore, we consider the strengthening of the efforts directed towards this aim to be a main task of all members of the Committee on Disarmament.

All possibilities should be used to include all nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on a CTB. Negotiations on this matter in conformity with resolutions 3478 (XXX) and 31/89 of the United Nations General Assembly are especially suitable because, in this regard, the well-known attitude of some nuclear States with regard to the CCD is of no importance. Only the will of these States to participate in the elaboration of measures for halting the nuclear arms race will play a decisive role.

The proposal of the USSR to start negotiating a corresponding treaty in the CCD opens up new possibilities for progress on the road to a complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. As some nuclear Powers have refused to participate in the negotiations provided for in resolution 3478 (XXX), the Committee could now play an extraordinarily useful role in the preparation of such an agreement. A draft treaty negotiated and fully supported by the Committee on Disarmament would without any doubt have a positive impact on the attitude of the nuclear Powers which are not yet ready to participate in the preparation of CTB agreements

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In order to assure the co-operation and participation of all nuclear Powers in the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban, the creation of a corresponding international atmosphere is of extraordinarily great importance. Guided by the desire to contribute to this matter, the Warsaw Treaty member States last year proposed to the other States which participated in the Helsinki Conference to conclude a treaty in which they would assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We deeply regret that the reaction to this proposal so far shown by the NATO member States has been a negative one. With astonishment we noticed at the same time that certain NATO circles are even considering a reduction in the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.

One question which needs to be solved in the framework of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, is the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Studies of IAEA and a number of experiments show that PNEs are of potentially great significance in the solution of immense economic and technical tasks. Proceeding from this fact, many States, here in the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the United Nations and IAEA, again and again demanded a guarantee that benefits from such explosions will be made available to all interested non-nuclear weapon States in accordance with article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Therefore, in our opinion, a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should not exclude from the very beginning nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It also should not provide for conditions which, in fact, make such explosions impossible. We fully subscribe to the demand that measures to halt the arms race should not hamper the application of achievements of science and technology for peaceful purposes. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful nuclear explosions should be further guaranteed. Furthermore, the banning of PNEs would constitute a subsequent revision of the NPT.

Starting from these considerations, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic holds that article III of the Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is an appropriate basis for the solution of the

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

PNE problem. The procedure provided for in this article would guarantee that the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes will (a) not lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and (b) not serve to undermine a CTB.

It is necessary that the nuclear-weapon States, in connexion with the negotiations on a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, should also agree upon special arrangements with regard to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Treaty between the USSR and the United States of America on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976 could play a positive role in reaching such an agreement.

With regard to the problem of verification and control of compliance with a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, we confirm our view that national means of control supplemented by international exchanges of seismic data, still to be agreed upon, are sufficient. We fully share the view of the representative of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Comrade Ambassador Nikolov, who on 24 February declared before this Committee that "control presents no technical difficulties and is no longer a genuine problem". We fully support his comprehensive explanations on the system of control. In order to confirm this point of view, the German Democratic Republic now participates with one expert in the activities of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events.

We are looking forward with great interest to the statement of the delegation of the United States of America on a CTB announced for this session.

My delegation expresses its hope that a constructive contribution by the United States will help us to achieve progress on the road to the conclusion of a corresponding treaty. At a later stage, after having clarified the basic political questions, an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament could start drafting the text for a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Last year's intensive and successful work, especially the preparation of the ENMOD Convention, confirms the view of my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament is a flexible and effective negotiating body. We are in favour of changes in its procedures if they will increase its effectiveness. But we are resolutely against the involvement of this Committee in endless discussions on technical and procedural questions. With good reason, many delegations have noted that there must be no question of carrying out changes for the sake of changes. In the past few years, the Committee on Disarmament has developed manifold forms for its organization of work: plenary meetings, informal meetings, informal meetings with the participation of experts, as well as the establishment of ad hoc working groups. These organizational forms proved to be useful, and should not be complicated by establishing inflexible bureaucratic machinery. That is why we are against the establishment of a so-called permanent sub-committee.

[We share the view that even the most sophisticated system of procedures cannot replace a missing political will. My delegation therefore, stands for the conclusion of the discussion on questions of procedure as soon as possible. It supports the proposal that, at the proper time, the Co-Chairmen should submit a draft decision to the Committee containing all questions on which agreement was reached during the exchange of views. In this way, it would be possible for the Committee to concentrate more on substantial questions, such as: (a) the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (b) the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; and (c) the prohibition of chemical weapons.]

The main concern of the Committee should be the achievement of visible progress in these fields. This would be at the same time the best contribution to its further strengthening and to the preparation of the forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

Mr. NIKOLOV (Bulgaria) (translated from French): The emergence of nuclear weapons has radically affected political, military and strategic thinking. The international community has quickly become aware of the grave danger in which the arms race, in both nuclear and conventional weapons, places world security, and the imperative need to make every possible effort to promote disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament was created in response to the demands of the realities of the world in which we live. Today is the fifteenth anniversary of its creation. No other organ for multilateral negotiations on disarmament has functioned for so long.

The work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament takes place within the framework of activities aimed at halting the arms race, eliminating the threat of nuclear war, and consolidating international security. On the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the CCD one cannot refrain from reviewing, however briefly, the results of the negotiations that have taken place within it up to now. As is known, the CCD has to its credit the elaboration of several international instruments, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, whose exceptional importance for international stability in our nuclear age need hardly be demonstrated, the Treaty on the Denuclearization of the Sea-bed, which had the merit of excluding the nuclear arms race from ocean areas covering 70 per cent of the surface of our planet, the Bacteriological Weapons Convention, which is the first international agreement in this field whose entry into force has allowed an entire class of weapons of mass destruction to be withdrawn from arsenals and destroyed, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, aimed at preventing the spread of the arms race to a new sphere.

While opinions may at times differ as to the value of these agreements, it is nonetheless true that they have all exercised a favourable influence on the international situation as a whole, and created the political premises for continuing negotiations with a view to the solution of other problems of concern to humanity. In our opinion, the normative achievements of the CCD are not to be ignored. The CCD has proved to be an effective instrument for the formulation of an international law in disarmament matters. Like other delegations no doubt, we should have liked to be able to express gratification at better results today, but disarmament is a long and difficult task. An assessment of the work of the CCD must take into account the complexity of disarmament

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

problems. If the results of negotiations up to now do not completely satisfy us, it is not the CCD as a multilateral negotiating organ which is at fault. It is not the lack of appropriate machinery, because such machinery exists, but the lack of a convergence of views on the substance of problems which has always hampered the progress of negotiations.

In present conditions, the Committee on Disarmament offers the most appropriate institutional framework for the conduct of multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament. It faithfully reflects the image of the contemporary world, because all geographical regions and all political tendencies in international relations are represented in it.

If we have drawn attention to the work of the CCD during the fifteen years since its establishment, it is because this multilateral negotiating organ is sometimes the object of excessive and unjustified criticism from various quarters. This criticism, however, does not express the dominant sentiment within the CCD. We are convinced that in the future the CCD will also be called upon to play a predominant role in the search for solutions to the problems posed by the continuation of the arms race. The experience it has acquired over years of negotiation has made it a unique instrument. The CCD has demonstrated its efficacy when all its members in the negotiations were motivated by goodwill and a political determination to reach their goal.

A debate on the CCD's procedure and organization of work recently began in its informal meetings. This debate is more or less a repetition of the discussions of a year ago. Proposals for the reform of the Committee on Disarmament have been advanced. A number of our colleagues have made their views on the proposed changes known. As the distinguished representative of India, Mr. Jain, observed, the CCD has shown flexibility in its methods of work and composition; examples in support of this observation are not lacking. Thus, the number of members of the CCD was increased, first from 18 to 26, and then from 26 to 31, with France ever absent. Alongside the official meetings, informal meetings have often been held as a means of exchanging views on the substance of problems, the organization of work and the procedures of the CCD. The informal meetings of the CCD, with the participation of government experts to examine various specific aspects of problems on our agenda, are now a practice rooted in the CCD's work. The Secretariat of the CCD has also become more closely associated with the preparation of the report on the

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

CCD's activities. It should be added that the communiqués issued after official meetings have become more complete. Experience has proved that it was useful, at an advanced stage of negotiations, after the principal obstacles had been overcome, to create ad hoc working groups to draw up the text of the agreement in question. Last year, a group of this kind prepared the text of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. By all accounts, it will again be necessary to resort to this method of work at the appropriate time.

Everything I have just said confirms that there have been changes in the organization, procedures and methods of work of the CCD, but these changes have always met needs which have emerged in connexion with the negotiations. Change should not be an end in itself, whether it concerns the procedure of the CCD or its structure. We support the proposal that the verbatim records of meetings of the CCD should be distributed in New York to States not members of the CCD as and when such records are issued. In this way States would be in a better position to follow the progress of the work of the CCD.

As is well known, the Committee on Disarmament is not an organ of the United Nations, but that does not mean that it functions in isolation from the United Nations. Every year the Committee on Disarmament submits a report on its activities to the General Assembly, on the one hand, and the General Assembly submits its recommendations to the Committee, on the other. The General Assembly of the United Nations and, in particular, the First Committee constitute a forum for deliberations in which disarmament problems occupy a central position, whereas the Committee on Disarmament is a negotiating body. The members of the Committee on Disarmament which participate in the deliberations in the United Nations draw therefrom the necessary conclusions for their work in the Committee on Disarmament. An enduring link exists between the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly of the United Nations. The present status of the Committee on Disarmament vis-à-vis the General Assembly offers unquestionable advantages and provides the conditions necessary for the efficient conduct of negotiations. Consequently, it is essential to preserve the character and stability of the Committee on Disarmament.

During the discussions on procedure and working methods, the question of the co-chairmanship of the CCD was again raised. My delegation's position on this question

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

has not changed. We share the opinion of most members of the CCD that co-chairmanship by the representatives of the USSR and the United States meets undeniable political needs. The considerations which governed the establishment of this institution 15 years ago are still valid. We agree with Ambassador Jay of Canada, who said in his statement on 24 February:

"There are many persuasive reasons why that institution became the cornerstone of the CCD and continues to enable our body to reflect year after year the main strategic reality of the political and military environment in which we seek to be influential".

The institution of co-chairmanship derives from the special role incumbent on the two great Powers both within the CCD and in the world at large. The value of this institution for us also derives from the responsibilities assumed by the two great Powers in the United Nations as permanent members of the Security Council. At the practical level, co-chairmanship serves the fruitful development of the work of the CCD. Everyone understands the significance of an agreement between the two great Powers on the approach to the future work of the CCD. In this matter, the Co-Chairmen's duty to act in concert with regard to the organization of work and procedure introduces a positive element into the negotiations. The distinguished representative of India, Mr. Jain, who has again, at this meeting today, described the historical background of the institution of co-chairmanship, demonstrated most eloquently and with supporting arguments, the raison d'être of this institution, which in no way jeopardizes the sovereign equality of States or the democratic development of the discussions, because negotiations in the CCD are conducted on the basis of respect for the principle of consensus, which consists in reconciling divergent positions by means of reciprocal concessions. Certain colleagues incline to the view that the abolition of co-chairmanship would make possible the participation in the CCD of France and even the People's Republic of China. But it is well known that the attitude of these two nuclear Powers to negotiations on nuclear disarmament matters and, in particular to the CCD is prompted by quite different considerations.

As we have emphasized, three problems lie at the centre of attention of the CCD this year: the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. There is a great desire to carry the negotiations forward and to achieve progress on each of these problems. There is every reason to believe that the prospects of doing so are at present better than before.

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

We all hope to be able to bring new results with us to the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973. We do not, however, share the feelings of some of our colleagues who imply that the future status of the Committee on Disarmament will depend on the report on its work which it will submit to the General Assembly at its special session, because firstly, the solution of disarmament problems does not, by the very nature of those problems, always lend itself to a time-table, and secondly, the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament cannot be a substitute for the existing negotiating bodies which have already asserted themselves.

These are the few observations which we considered it necessary to submit for the attention of the CCD at the present stage of its work.

Mr. MEYERS (United States of America): The Chairman and all previous speakers this morning have expressed congratulations to the CCD on its fifteenth anniversary, 14 March. These sentiments are shared by the Head of State and Government of my country, the United States of America. I have a message to this Conference from President Carter, whose lively interest in moving ahead to achieve arms control agreements has been evidenced many times.

The message from our President is as follows:

"On behalf of the people of the United States of America, I wish to extend congratulations and best wishes for the future to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of its founding. The negotiation of treaties to curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to eliminate the threat of biological warfare and to prevent modification of the environment for hostile purposes are accomplishments for which the Conference can be justly proud.

"Even more challenging opportunities lie ahead. I have pledged to the people of my country that my Administration would pursue its full commitment to limiting the world's armaments to those necessary for national security. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has proved itself to be an effective forum for negotiating agreements leading to the achievement of this goal."

Mr. LIKHATCHEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

Today's meeting is extremely significant. Yesterday saw the completion of exactly 15 years of the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In accordance with established tradition, we do not hold commemorative meetings. The Committee on Disarmament is a working body with the task of holding businesslike negotiations on disarmament. Nevertheless, I cannot let this important date pass unnoticed.

Over the past 15 years, there have been varying periods of productivity in the Committee's history, and nevertheless it is precisely here, in the Committee on Disarmament, that such agreements as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed, the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons and the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques have been worked out. Of course, these agreements are only approaches to disarmament: they and other agreements limit the arms race to some extent in individual areas. Other important problems, such as the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and other questions are also awaiting solution. We express the hope that the Committee on Disarmament, which has demonstrated its effectiveness in working out agreements on disarmament matters, will be able in the very near future to make an important contribution to the solution of these pressing problems as well.

Today I should like to dwell on one of them: the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are holding informal meetings on this question with the participation of experts this week. Experts from 13 countries are participating in these meetings. The fact that the first of these meetings, which took place yesterday, was held in a constructive, businesslike atmosphere gives us a feeling of satisfaction, and this enables us to count on the fact that the present series of informal meetings with the participation of experts will represent a new and important stage in the consideration of this question and will enable us to make an early transition to practical negotiations on the text of an agreement on this question.

I should now like to come to the substance of the matter.

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

The Committee on Disarmament continues the consideration of one of the substantial aspects of the whole problem of limiting the arms race and averting war -- the question of the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. As is known, a proposal to conclude an appropriate agreement was put forward by the Soviet Union in 1975 and attracted the attention of a large number of States. This question is not new for the Committee on Disarmament either. We all examined it -- in a rather concrete manner by the way -- with the participation of experts from 11 States during our meetings last year. In that way, businesslike consideration of the problem was started. It was helpful in clarifying a number of aspects of the problem of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, in understanding better the substance of the question, and in putting forward constructive views concerning the ways for the solution of this problem.

The submission of the Soviet proposal with regard to the prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction was dictated by a desire to put an end to the utilization of scientific and technological discoveries for developing new dangerous types of weapons which, in terms of their destructive effect, could become comparable with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological weapons, or even surpass them. Accelerating scientific and technological progress poses with all acuteness the problem of preventing the emergence of new types and new systems of such weapons and, if measures are not taken in time, the arms race may start in qualitatively new directions.

At times pronouncements can be heard to the effect whether it is now worth dealing with the problem of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction and spending time and effort to this end while much more topical problems of the prohibition of the types and systems of weapons of mass destruction already in existence have not been solved so far. Our firm response to this is as follows: certainly it is worthwhile.

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

It is worthwhile because in this case it is a question of weapons of mass destruction. In our Committee -- and not only in our Committee -- the necessity of solving, on a priority basis, the problems connected with precisely such types of weapons has, as a rule, been emphasized. And it is quite obvious that, while we favour the speediest prohibition of the types of weapons of mass destruction which have been already developed, we must naturally take care to avert, in time, the development of their possible new varieties. Agreements and accords on the limitation or prohibition of certain existing types and systems of weapons of mass destruction have been already elaborated or are being elaborated, but there are no agreements banning the development and creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction. It is common knowledge that there are no limitations on the use of scientific achievements for such purposes. At the same time everybody agrees, in principle, that the danger of the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction is quite real.

Thus, while we are working to find solutions to the problems of curbing or banning existing types of weapons of mass destruction, the emergence of their new types and systems cannot be ruled out. It stands to reason that the task of disarmament, which is already complicated enough, would become even more complicated as a result of this. Should we wait for such a course of developments? Surely it is much easier, in our opinion, to reach agreement on the prohibition of any given type of weapons before they emerge rather than after such weapons have been developed, manufactured and deployed by the armed forces of any given States. We have drawn attention to this point before and are hopeful that it will be duly taken into account.

Sometimes proposals are put forward to the effect that new types of weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited while they emerge. But the objective is precisely to forestall such a course of developments and to raise a barrier on the road to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

As is known, the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, having considered the state of affairs with regard to the implementation of the proposal on the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, adopted, by an overwhelming majority, resolution 31/74 (it was supported by 120 States) which

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

requested the Committee on Disarmament to continue the negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union attaches exclusive importance to the wide and constructive participation of countries members of the Committee in the consideration of this problem, for its practical solution requires concerted efforts by many States -- and above all, by the States that are important Powers in military terms -- which are most capable of developing and producing new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction all by themselves. Prerequisites would thus be created for proceeding with concrete work on the text of an appropriate agreement in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly.

The question of how the subject-matter of the prohibition should be put in concrete terms was at the centre of discussions during the two previous sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. Indeed, this question is both important and far from easy, since we are bound to deal with the problem of prohibiting such types of weapons which are as yet non-existent. However, in no way can this problem be considered insoluble.

In trying to make the discussion on this issue businesslike and constructive, the Soviet delegation to the Committee on Disarmament voiced a number of specific proposals at its last session. Considerations in this regard are also set forth in the Soviet Union's Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and of disarmament with which the members of the Committee had a possibility to get acquainted.

We would like to recall that the Soviet Union is ready to suggest an approach according to which new types of weapons of mass destruction would include any types of weapons based on qualitatively new principles of action -- according to the mode of use and the targets to be destroyed or the nature of the effect.

As to new systems of weapons of mass destruction, they should not be developed either for new types of such weapons or for those types of weapons which are based on scientific principles already in use but whose characteristics can be made even more dangerous by introducing new technical, combat or logistic elements. The Soviet side has also given corresponding examples of possible types and systems of weapons.

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

The views stated in the Committee on Disarmament by Soviet experts with regard to the determination of the subject matter for prohibition, aroused considerable interest on the part of other participants in the negotiations. A discussion, held in a businesslike atmosphere, took place. With their positions of principle, the representatives of other socialist countries actively supported the proposals of the Soviet Union.

Western representatives also stressed the topicality and usefulness of the discussion.

At the same time, the delegates and experts of a number of Western States pointed out that some of the possible new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, cited by the experts from socialist countries, either had already been banned by the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, or their prohibition was being considered within the framework of a future agreement on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, as well as within that of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

At the same time, references were made to the approximate definition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction (CCD/514) proposed by the Soviet Union, and it was said that such a definition was of multi-purpose character and, therefore, also touched upon those types of weapons of mass destruction which were prohibited by the agreements in operation or which are being discussed in the course of other negotiations. In this connexion we would like to state that, in submitting working document CCD/514 containing an approximate definition to the members of the Committee on Disarmament for their consideration, our primary objective was to list the criteria on the basis of which it might be possible to come closer to a more specific determination of objects for prohibition. It seems to us that the views set forth in our working document and also developed in the statements by the Soviet delegation and Soviet experts serve this purpose.

Certainly, an agreement on new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction should not prohibit what has been already prohibited by other agreements. This concerns, in particular, biological weapons.

(Mr. Likhatchev, USSR)

As to new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction based on principles of chemical action, we agree that they can be covered by an agreement resulting from negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In determining the scope of prohibition, an agreement on new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction must take into account any possible understanding in this area, including any understanding of a partial nature. However, at the present stage there is no agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and it is not yet known what its scope of prohibition would be if it is concluded. A question arises whether it is not worthwhile examining the possibility of new types and new systems of chemical weapons being covered by an agreement on new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are looking forward to the views of other delegations in this regard.

The Soviet delegation feels it is time to proceed from a general exchange of views not connected with provisions and articles of a future agreement to their more specific consideration. In this connexion we should evidently reach, first of all, an understanding concerning the scope of prohibition. As is known, paragraph 1 of article I of the Soviet draft agreement (CCD/511) envisages that the definition of what is covered by new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is to be agreed upon through concrete negotiations. We could therefore focus on the identification of possible directions for the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. A whole number of such directions have already been indicated and substantiated during our work. We would like to hear other delegations' views on this matter.

We express the hope that all participants in the negotiations will make their positive contributions to the consideration and solution of such an important problem as the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In inaugurating the work of the Committee on Disarmament, 15 years ago yesterday, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General stated:

"The recent General Assembly resolutions related to disarmament questions would seem to indicate that the Members of the United Nations intend to persist in this field until the world's deep and growing concern has been transmuted into concrete achievements".

Concrete achievements. This is what we have sought in vain for 15 years in respect of the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

On the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Committee, Alva Myrdal, who had headed the delegation of Sweden at the inaugural session and who, with such clear-sightedness and courage, was to be the spokesman for her country in the Committee for so long, was compelled to confess with the greatest frankness:

"Although, or rather because, I am a veteran from that early time of our disarmament efforts, I am incapable of showing much enthusiasm for celebrating today. We cannot blind ourselves to the fact that in reality little has been achieved -- yes, that in reality tenfold more of armaments have been amassed. In material terms our results amount to next to nothing".

The following year, when the date of the meeting of the Committee fell, not on 14 but as it has done today, on 15 March, I myself had the privilege of introducing, on behalf of the delegations of eight member States situated in four different continents -- Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico -- a memorandum (CCD/396) which stressed, inter alia:

- (a) The responsibilities of the CCD to mankind and to the United Nations.
- (b) The increasing concern at "the lack of tangible progress in the solution of the main disarmament problems entrusted to the Committee".
- (c) The belief that "primary responsibility rests with the two States which have been exercising jointly the chairmanship of the Committee and which also possess, to an overwhelmingly greater degree, nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction".
- (d) The fact that, while "it is most desirable that all nuclear-weapon States participate in the disarmament negotiations, ... the non-participation of two of those States in the work of the CCD should not prevent the Committee from discharging its obligations".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The sponsoring delegations concluded their memorandum by stressing the need to concentrate on the solution of the two problems to which the Assembly had requested that special priority should be given and which, it seems to me, are the same as those which it was agreed should be given the first two places on our agenda this year, although, unfortunately, it has not been possible to begin considering them in depth.

Clearly, it might be said that the situation continues to be the same as that which Mrs. Myrdal deplored five years ago and which, it may be said in passing, she analyses and describes in a masterly fashion in her recent book entitled "The Game of Disarmament" and about which the eight countries I mentioned just now deprecated four years ago.

We must not forget, however, that on this occasion there are some new developments whose consequences may be of great significance. They are the unequivocal statements made by the new President of the United States in his inaugural address and the favourable reception those statements appear to have had from the leaders of the Soviet Union, as has been possible to ascertain in similar statements at the highest level, and as I had occasion to expound at some length in my statement on 15 February.

But precisely because of this, because of the hopes which such statements have aroused, it seemed to us that the special responsibility of the two Superpowers has doubled, for it would be disastrous for their credibility among the peoples of the world and for the cause of disarmament if these hopes were dashed once more.

Accordingly, we should like, with respect to the measure which is unquestionably of the greatest urgency and importance, namely the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, to reiterate our firm belief that, if it is the desire to avoid, on this fifteenth anniversary of the Committee on Disarmament, a situation whereby we go once again to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as we have done so many times in the past, in order to attempt to excuse our inability to comply with its repeated request for "the highest priority", it will be necessary for the nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee to act in a way which takes due account of the two following factors:

- (1) The conviction expressed on various occasions in resolutions by the General Assembly that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban" of the nature contemplated almost fourteen years ago in the preamble to the Treaty of Moscow.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

- (2) The appeals addressed, also on a number of occasions, by the General Assembly to the Governments of the two States whose nuclear armaments exceed by far those of all the rest to "bring to a halt without delay all nuclear weapon tests either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria".

The procedure thus suggested by the Assembly would not, in our view, be in any way unusual and, in view of the existing situation, is probably the only realistic one. It is in line with that which was applied at the end of 1958 and which resulted in a suspension for almost three years of nuclear weapon tests by the three Powers who are represented here.

We also believe that recourse to a provisional measure of this kind, as was explained by the 20 States -- Bolivia, Ecuador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yugoslavia and Zaïre which submitted a draft additional protocol on the question to the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it could in no way undermine the security of the Superpowers as "the extent of the lead in nuclear war technology and the enormity of the nuclear arsenals of the USSR and the United States are such that, even if they were to suspend all nuclear weapon tests for half a century, it is absolutely certain that they would continue to maintain an indisputable superiority".

Lastly, we are convinced -- and this is something that we must always bear in mind -- that history will judge our Committee not by the number of years it managed to survive but, as the Bible says, for the fruit it was able to bring forth.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.