

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.650
8 August 1974

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FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 8 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman

Mrs. Inga Thorsson

(Sweden)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Mr. C.A. PASSALACQUA

Brazil:

Mr. M.T. DA SILVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. R. NIKOLOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Burma:

U WIN PE

U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. W.H. BARTON

Mr. D.R. MACPHEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt:

Mr. A. EL-DIN KHAIRAT

Mr. N. ELARABY

Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. BIFTU

Mr. G. DEMISSIE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KÖMIVES

Mr. I. KÖRMENDY

India:

Mr. B.C. MISHRA

Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI

Mr. H.N. SUKHDEV

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO

Mr. P. BRUNI

Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISHIBORI
Mr. A. YATABE
Mr. S. SUYEHRO
Mr. H. OKA
Mr. T. AMARI
Mr. H. TSUJIMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M. MARIN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK
Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. OLAJIDE ALO
Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. NIAZ A. NAIK
Mr. K. SALEEM
Mr. M.J. KHAN

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER
Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
Mr. V. TUDOR
Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. L. ECKERBERG
Mr. G. HAMILTON
Mr. U. REINIUS
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCIN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N.V. PESTEREV

Mr. J.P. KLUKIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH

Mr. J.G. TAYLOR

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. R.W. DREXLER

Mr. R. EINHORN

Mr. V. BLAZ

Mr. D. WESTERVELT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 650th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. the Under-Secretary of State, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, representative of Sweden.

Statements were made by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mexico, Hungary, Argentina, the United States and the Chairman.

The delegation of Mexico submitted a "Letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD/439).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 13 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

We should like to devote our statement today to the problem of averting the threat of nuclear war and to the related problem of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to dwell on some important aspects of this problem.

The great scientific discoveries in nuclear physics which ushered in the atomic age in the development of mankind have opened up great opportunities for the use of a new type of energy for man's benefit. Those discoveries, however, have led to the emergence of the most destructive and deadly means of warfare. Those means, if ever used, would destroy a vast number of human lives and annihilate whole States. Therefore one of today's most vital tasks is to plan and execute measures to avert the danger of nuclear war. Important factors in such measures are the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the institution of a strict régime to prevent their proliferation, and steps to ensure that it operates effectively. To achieve that supremely important aim a Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was concluded in 1968 (ENDC/226*) and made an effective international instrument in March 1970. That international instrument has become an outstanding document of the nuclear age, its aim being to limit the threat posed by the emergence of the most destructive means of warfare. The Non-Proliferation Treaty is intended to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, to prevent their acquisition by an increasing number of States. The parties to the Treaty undertake not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to transfer such weapons or explosive devices or control over them. By restricting opportunities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty reduces the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. Implementation of the Treaty's provisions is in the interests of world security and the further relaxation of international tension. We note with satisfaction that the provisions of the Treaty are being fulfilled by all its participants. Since the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force more than four years ago, no cases have arisen of deliberate or involuntary failure by a Party to fulfill its obligation not to transfer or to acquire nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Nevertheless, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has obviously not yet become the kind of international instrument that would ensure strict observance by all States of the régime for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The danger of the proliferation of such weapons has not yet been eliminated. The prediction that a number of States will acquire nuclear weapons in the next ten years is not unrealistic and cannot be described as unfounded.

The main cause of this situation is that a number of "near-nuclear" countries having a considerable industrial potential and consequently able to produce nuclear weapons are still not parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and are not bound by the terms of that important international instrument. Therein lies the fundamental inadequacy of the present non-proliferation régime. The main task therefore is to make every effort to ensure the full participation of all near-nuclear States in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The near-nuclear States themselves must realize how important it is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world, and be aware of the consequences of their proliferation. The only way of avoiding that situation is for all States to co-operate fully in ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is necessary to use all political and practical means to ensure that all States strictly observe the non-proliferation régime, and thereby to avert the real danger of wide-spread possession of such weapons.

We have heard much criticism of the Non-Proliferation Treaty since it came into force. We have heard such criticism here in the Committee on Disarmament, and indeed at the present session. I therefore wish to stress that the Non-Proliferation Treaty at present offers the best real possibility of checking the process of nuclear-weapons proliferation, of preventing a chain reaction in the spread of such weapons. Of course, from the point of view of individual States the Treaty could have been better, but from the point of view of the entire community of States it is at present a common denominator for any solution to the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We therefore cannot agree with the adverse opinions expressed about the Treaty, or with its qualification as a "discriminatory" international instrument. Far from sharing such an opinion of this outstanding international

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

document, which reflects the realities of the present-day world, we believe that a negative attitude to and deprecation of the Treaty are detrimental to the non-proliferation régime provided in it. Whatever the motives and reasons behind the attacks on the Treaty by States and their representatives, such a course of action is clearly intended to erode and weaken rather than strengthen the non-proliferation régime. The harm done by such a course may not at first glance be apparent now, but in the longer term it may prove irreversible.

The system of safeguards ensuring the fulfilment by States of their obligations is a very important element of the Treaty. It is defined in Article III and is being implemented through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It has been worked out by a large number of States and is effective, serves the purposes for which it was established, and conforms with present world possibilities. It is therefore universally recognized and supported.

Nearly all the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty which are substantially engaged in nuclear activities have concluded control agreements with IAEA as provided by the Treaty. It is essential, however, for other States Parties to the Treaty which have not yet done so to speed up the conclusion of such agreements. It is equally important to speed up agreement on the practical implementation of the Treaty provision requiring fissionable material and special equipment to be exported to non-nuclear countries solely under IAEA control.

In her statement on 30 July Mrs. Thorsson, the representative of Sweden, suggested that the present safeguards system should be extended to permit, not only detection, but also prevention of the misuse of nuclear material, by providing a system for the "physical protection of all stockpiles of nuclear material". She put forward the idea of "ownership" of nuclear material by an international body, and of "internationalization of the management of nuclear material". She thus proposed a very substantial revision of the present safeguard system for verifying the fulfilment of obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, whereby the principle of observation of the use of fissionable material would be replaced by the principle of "internationalization" of its ownership and management.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The idea of "internationalization" of the ownership and management of fissionable material advanced by Mrs. Thorsson is not new. At the very outset of the nuclear age the principle of "internationalization" of the ownership and management of nuclear material and nuclear facilities was strongly advocated by the United States Government. It was embodied in the Acheson-Lilienthal Plan and was formally moved in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946 as the "Baruch Plan", named after the United States representative in that Commission. The plan provided for a control system based on "internationalization" of the ownership and management of atomic raw-material sources and of enterprises processing and using such raw material. Its main purpose was to give the United States a monopoly of the military and peaceful uses of atomic energy. It was aimed at ensuring advantages for some countries at the expense of others, and disregarded States' sovereign rights. Subsequent developments demonstrated that it was completely unrealistic and unviable.

The idea proposed by Sweden, although with different motives and objectives, like the "Baruch Plan" runs counter to the sovereign rights of States, thus ignoring an important reality of our time. Such an approach can only divert efforts away from the task of generally strengthening the present safeguards system by extending it to cover the maximum number of States and improving observation methods to prevent violations of the non-proliferation régime established by the Treaty. As I have already stated, the primary task is to ensure that all States, particularly the industrially and technologically advanced ones, conclude control agreements with the IAEA without delay. We hope that Sweden, which has advanced far in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, will conclude such an agreement as soon as possible.

Peaceful nuclear explosions are an important problem directly linked with that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. This problem is reflected in Article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which provides measures to make the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions available to all States. Work in that direction is being done in the IAEA, and we understand that details of it will be given in documents prepared by the Agency for the conference on review of the operation of the Treaty. We hope that due efforts will be made to solve the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

On the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, Mrs. Thorsson, the representative of Sweden, said that the Treaty's provisions with respect to such explosions had so far not been implemented. We should like to point out in this connexion that at present, when peaceful nuclear explosions still have no practical application because of inadequate technology, there are no grounds for speaking of failure to implement that part of the Treaty. It would be more accurate to say that the Treaty's provisions with regard to such explosions have not so far been implemented, since there has been no practical need for such explosions. Nevertheless, the preparatory work for the implementation of Article V of the Treaty is already being done in the IAEA.

Article VI, containing an undertaking by the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate measures on the cessation of the nuclear and non-nuclear arms race, is an important element of the Treaty. Like many other Parties to the Treaty, we have repeatedly expressed our dissatisfaction with the course and results of the disarmament negotiations. At the same time it cannot be denied that a number of important agreements have been concluded in that field in pursuance of Article VI since the signature of the Treaty. Of great significance in this respect are the agreements concluded between the USSR and the United States in 1972 and 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war, on the limitation of anti-ballistic-missile systems, and on certain measures concerning the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The third Soviet-United States summit meeting held this year produced another series of important agreements. A Protocol was signed providing for a new substantial limitation of the anti-ballistic-missile systems of both countries. At the talks further steps in the limitation of strategic offensive armaments were outlined. The two sides agreed to restrict their underground nuclear tests considerably over an agreed period, and to stop high-yield test explosions altogether. This agreement is a step towards the eventual complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. Agreement has been reached to outlaw the use of highly dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare, as well as environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

Speaking of the Soviet-United States arms-reduction agreements, Mr. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated at Warsaw on 21 July:

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

"We think that this whole series of practical measures, which is a good example of the limitation by the Powers of their military preparations, is in the interests of all who want more secure world peace.

"... I can say that we should like to go still further and were prepared to go further. The Soviet Union, for instance, is ready to conclude an agreement on the complete cessation of all underground nuclear-weapons tests. We also consider it desirable to agree on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of all Soviet and United States warships and submarines carrying nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, we have not yet managed to agree on this matter. We are convinced, however, that the implementation of our proposals would make a new and real contribution to the consolidation of peace and would be warmly welcomed by the peoples of many countries. Let us hope that agreements on those questions will one day become possible".

Thus the Soviet-United States summit talks and the important agreements resulting from them have contributed considerably to the fulfilment of obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to the cessation of the arms race, and to the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and war in general.

In this connexion we should like to state that our opinion of the significance of the Soviet-United States agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapons tests differs substantially from that expressed by Mrs. Thorsson in her statement on 30 July. She said that the limitation provided by the agreement affected only 10 per cent of United States and 20 per cent of Soviet nuclear tests. Without questioning the accuracy of the proportions mentioned by the representative of Sweden, we should like to point out that even 10 and 20 per cent are substantial figures in arms limitation and that their importance should not be ignored or belittled. Of still greater significance, however, than the statistics is the fundamental aspect, the limitation of underground nuclear-weapons tests.

In our opinion the agreement, with that essentially new element, is an important step towards the complete cessation of all nuclear-weapons tests. For the first time limits have been imposed on underground tests. By prohibiting explosions with a yield of over 150 kt, the agreement limits the possibility of developing and perfecting the most powerful and consequently the most dangerous types of weapons. It is helping to foster international confidence and improve the international climate. Therefore we cannot accept Mrs. Thorsson's opinion of that Soviet-United States agreement.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

Today we have dwelt only briefly on some aspects of the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty. All facets of this problem will be considered more closely at the conference on the review of the operation of the Treaty to be held here at Geneva next May. In mentioning some aspects of the Treaty's operation we should like to stress the imperative need for seeking all means and exerting all efforts in order to strengthen in every possible way -- politically, legally and technically -- the non-proliferation regime and the Treaty providing for it. The participation of a large number of States in the international disarmament agreements already concluded would play an important part in strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We must therefore continue our efforts to ensure the participation in such agreements of all nuclear, near-nuclear and other militarily-significant States. Primarily, this would mean participation in the Treaties on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, on the Prohibition of Nuclear Tests in the three environments -- in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water -- on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, and others. Universal accession to these international instruments would greatly help to limit the nuclear arms race and the arms race as a whole, to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, and consequently to promote international security and peace. This is an important task for the Committee on Disarmament and all other international forums dealing with various aspects of arms control and disarmament.

Disarmament affects all States without exception, nuclear and non-nuclear. However, it is an undeniable fact that the fundamental disarmament problems, and especially those of nuclear disarmament, can only be solved with the participation of militarily-significant States on the basis of the principle of equal security for all countries. These countries bear special responsibility for the solution of arms-control and disarmament issues. This applies in the first place to all the nuclear Powers, since they possess huge military potentials including a nuclear capability. It is a matter for regret that at present not all nuclear Powers are participating in the current disarmament negotiations. Consequently we must intensify our efforts to draw all militarily-significant States, including all the nuclear and near-nuclear countries, into the disarmament talks.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

I should like to take this opportunity to touch on the question of "mini-nukes", that is miniature nuclear weapons, raised last August by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden, and again in the statement by Mrs. Thorsson. In the last few decades nuclear weapons have received special treatment in a number of international instruments. So far there has been no need for distinctions among individual types of tactical nuclear weapons. We consider that they are still unnecessary. It seems to us that the attempts to equate certain types of these weapons with conventional armaments are dangerous in that they may conceal a search for loopholes to circumvent the prohibitions on nuclear weapons imposed by a number of international treaties and agreements, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We believe that there is no justification for distinguishing among individual types of tactical nuclear weapons, or for trying to equate some types of those weapons with conventional armaments.

In accordance with this position, I should like to state that the Soviet Union's obligations under resolution 255 (1968) of June 1968 adopted by the United Nations Security Council in connexion with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and under the Soviet-United States agreement of 22 June 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war, cover all types of nuclear weapons whatever their power.

In conclusion, I should like to quote from the statement made by Mr. Brezhnev on 21 July concerning the Soviet Union's position on arms control and disarmament:

"The Soviet Union, like other socialist countries, has repeatedly stated that it is prepared to agree to drastic measures to limit the arms race and subsequently to reduce armaments. We repeat that we are ready, for instance, to agree on a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The need for more effective and universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is more urgent than ever before. We are prepared -- and have long been prepared -- to sit down to a World Disarmament Conference. We are also ready to come to an agreement on measures to reduce the confrontation between the present blocs, and eventually on their complete elimination. In other words, it will not be our fault if there is no progress."

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): At the opening of the 1974 session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 16 April of this year, I ventured an assessment of the Committee's twelve years of work. In my view, the survey which I made on that occasion demonstrated conclusively the gap which has existed and continues to exist between words and deeds, and brought out the many formal promises and solemn commitments of the nuclear Powers which from the outset have been a dead letter.

There has been no basic change since that time. The four modest multilateral instruments which, directly or indirectly, have produced this negotiating organ remain truncated and mutilated. This has not been, of course, through a lack of accessions -- as one of the representatives who spoke on 25 April put it, giving free rein to his imagination (CCD/PV.630, page 23) -- but merely, as I quite clearly stated on the previous occasion, through failure to comply with a number of the basic provisions of those instruments, such as those contained in the preamble and article I of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/101/Rev.1) and in articles VI and V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*).

In view of my preceding remarks and in order to avoid superfluity, I shall refrain from commenting further on the matter at today's meeting. I should not, however, like to leave the subject of the CCD before adding that one of the few positive contributions to its current session has been the "Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction" (CCD/420), submitted to the Committee by the representative of Japan on 30 April. How fortunate it would be if only this imaginative and commendable effort stimulated negotiations and induced a positive reaction in the two super-Powers in particular, who have failed so far to submit any draft treaty or convention on the subject.

I should also like to place on record our hope that the enlargement of the Committee on Disarmament which is virtually sure to be approved by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth regular session, will make the Committee more effective. For that aim to be achieved it is, in our view, necessary not only to enlarge the Committee but at the same time to reorganize it. The delegation of Mexico has been advocating this since 1969 and has suggested a number of specific reforms. It will be recalled that, on the proposal of our delegation, the Committee devoted on 16 August 1972 a whole informal meeting to that question, which was the subject of many statements during that year. This is proved by the two working documents which we submitted on 8 and 28 August 1972 under the symbols CCD/385 and CCD/390.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Having said that, I believe it is not appropriate to set out briefly our position with regard to the latest results of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, known as SALT.

First of all, I should like to say that we have requested that General Assembly document A/9293 of 8 November 1973 be reproduced as a document of the Committee -- it has in fact already been circulated under the symbol CCD/439 -- not only because the two texts in it are unquestionably of direct interest to the Committee itself but also, and more particularly, because the second of those texts -- signed on 21 June 1973 and bearing the title "Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms" -- contains provisions regarding the implementation of which the representatives of the two signatory States, who happen to be the co-Chairmen of the CCD, might give us some relevant explanations.

The first of the "basic principles", after affirming that "the two Sides will continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction", in accordance with the five-year Interim Agreement of 26 May 1972, states unequivocally that --

"Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974".

Despite this, neither document CCD/431, co-sponsored by the United States and the Soviet Union, nor the statement of the United States representative in introducing that document on 16 July 1974, told us anything about the fate which has befallen the basic principle of 1973 to which I have just referred. Its vital importance is, I am sure, clear to all, particularly when it is recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 3184 A (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, after reiterating its appeal of the previous year, once again drew the attention of the two super-Powers to "the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament".

The Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests, signed at Moscow on 3 July 1974, is reproduced in pages 1 to 3 of document CCD/431, to which I referred a few moments ago. My first

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

comment is that, much to our regret, we feel obliged to take a rather sceptical view of the promise in paragraph 3 of article I that the Parties "shall continue their negotiations with a view toward achieving a solution to the problem of the cessation of all underground nuclear weapon tests".

The reasons for our scepticism should be obvious to anyone who recalls that, for eleven years, we have waited in vain for translation into acts of the "determination", so solemnly proclaimed in the preamble to the 1963 Treaty, to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". This is reinforced by the fact brought out last week in the excellent statement of the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, that, on the same day on which that new Moscow Treaty was concluded, no less an authority than the Secretary of Defence of one of the two super-Powers signatories of this Treaty stated in Washington that those who were waiting for a comprehensive test-ban agreement might "wait eternally".

This unavoidable scepticism will not, however, prevent us from assessing, in all objectivity, the possible impact of the recent bilateral instrument on disarmament. In order to attain the balanced and realistic perspective required for such an assessment it is in our view necessary to bear clearly in mind some fundamental factors such as the following.

In the past twenty years the General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted more than twenty-five resolutions urging the nuclear Powers to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests. In four or five of those resolutions the Assembly has -- using a word which it employs only rarely -- condemned most strongly all tests of nuclear weapons, without exception and regardless of their explosive force. Undoubtedly the Assembly's main objective is to avoid what in its latest resolutions it calls "the harmful consequences of nuclear weapon tests for the acceleration of the arms race". In other words, it wishes to prevent any improvement or increase in the destructive power -- already terrifying -- of the stockpile of weapons in nuclear arsenals.

Careful and reliable investigations, such as those reported on in the working paper submitted by the delegation of Sweden on 1 August 1974 (CCD/438), show that in the past few years the vast majority of nuclear explosions carried out by the two super-Powers have been below the 150 kt threshold, which limit will continue to be permitted without any hindrance whatsoever by the new Treaty and which, incidentally, is the equivalent of 150,000 tons of dynamite and some eight nuclear bombs of the kind which, exactly twenty-nine years ago the day before yesterday, reduced Hiroshima to ashes.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The bilateral instrument in question will not enter into force until 31 March 1976, which leaves a period of twenty months in which, as experience in similar cases has shown, it is to be feared that the two super-Powers will engage in an all-out race to test nuclear weapons, especially, if they deem it necessary, weapons of more than 150 kt.

In the view of the best-qualified experts in this field, made public after 3 July, the United States and the Soviet Union will have no difficulty at all in completing, before the Treaty enters into force, all the new types of nuclear warheads which they had planned. There is also general agreement among the experts that, in view of the absolute freedom those countries will enjoy till 31 March 1976 and, as I have already stated, in view of the little use they have made of tests of more than 150 kt, the limitation which will become effective on that date will not have any moderating effect at all on the nuclear arms race between those two States.

Thus the conclusions reached from an analysis of the recent Moscow bilateral agreements are as discouraging as those which I described at length in my statement of 16 April in connexion with the CCD and which today I have ventured to recall very briefly.

These meagre results and the purely meretricious nature of the measures proposed lend increasing gravity to the alarming situation created by the existence of huge arsenals of nuclear weapons, whose destructive power is enough and more than enough to wipe out every sign of life on our planet. In the last few years my delegation has drawn attention on numerous occasions, both in this Committee and in the General Assembly, to the fateful menace presented by those arsenals.

We have repeatedly quoted Toynbee's words that "the threat to mankind's survival has become much greater since 1945 than it ever was in the first million years of history".

We have dwelt on the need to bear constantly in mind the statement made by the Committee of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1967 to prepare a report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons:

"There is one inescapable and basic fact. It is that the nuclear armouries which are in being already contain large megaton weapons every one of which has a destructive power greater than that of all the conventional explosive that has ever been used in warfare since the day gunpowder was discovered."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We have said that we share the view of Dr. Iklé, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who has pointed out that merely "wishing to put out of our minds the thought that nuclear war may be as inevitable as death" will not suffice to eliminate the causes which may "put an end to our days and our society, in this generation or the next".

Starting from such unassailable premises as these, my delegation affirmed and repeated more than five years ago, both in New York and at Geneva, that --

"We refuse to believe that the so-called deterrent power -- a formula that has regrettably been much abused -- of such weapons can be regarded as a positive factor justifying their existence. We cannot understand why today international peace and security should have to depend on weapons such as the nuclear weapons, the very existence of which entails the danger of universal suicide".

I should like to conclude my statement today by quoting two very recent opinions which seem to us to confirm the validity of our belief. The first was expressed last month by someone who could certainly not be accused of a tendency to dramatize situations, namely the United States Secretary of State, who, according to information published in the New York Times of 4 July last, after emphasizing that only eighteen to twenty-four months remained in which to avoid an "explosion of technology and numbers" and to gain a grip on the problem of multiple warheads, added that if this problem is not solved well before 1977 "we will be living in a world which will be extraordinarily complex, in which the opportunities for nuclear warfare exist that were unimaginable fifteen years ago at the beginning of the nuclear age".

The second opinion emanates from what I consider the most serious and renowned non-governmental institution on disarmament questions, namely the International Institute of Peace and Conflict Research, with its headquarters at Stockholm; the preface to whose Yearbook for 1974, just published, includes the following unequivocal statement:

"There is an ever-present risk that any major conflict, even a limited, non-nuclear war, will escalate to a general nuclear war. Moreover, the possibility of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation is always with us. The dangers of this situation are increased by advances in nuclear-weapon technology... The catastrophic consequences of a general nuclear war demand either that the probability of any war be reduced to an acceptable level (most reasonable men would say that this would have to be zero), or that nuclear weapons be abolished as part of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Even though we do not underestimate the difficulties of the latter, we believe its achievement to be a simpler task than the former. For all the reasons outlined above, we believe that the need for positive action in disarmament has never before been greater".

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Yesterday was the fifth anniversary of the second phase of the enlargement of our Committee in 1969 when the Hungarian People's Republic, together with other States, joined this Committee. I had the honour and privilege of making the first statement of the Hungarian delegation before this very important body. In my first intervention I stated: "My Government accepted the invitation with the intention of taking an active part and doing useful work to the best of its ability, in the search for solution of the great problems before the Committee."

Since then I have never ceased to follow with great interest the activity of the CCD, to which I have done my best to contribute. As all of you are well aware, the Hungarian delegation, with other delegations, has taken an active part in the elaboration of two important international instruments.

Now I am about to leave Geneva to return to my country, where I am called upon to assume other duties. I am happy to inform you that in my new function I shall be able, and it will be my duty, to maintain close contacts with the activity of the CCD. In this way I can and will follow your efforts aimed at new results in disarmament, in which I should like to wish all of you every success.

I thank you all for your co-operation and the friendship you have extended to me; and I should like to express my gratitude and respect to the Co-Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Roshchin of the Soviet Union and Ambassador Martin of the United States, with whom I have had excellent co-operation, and to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Pastinen, and all his collaborators.

In concluding, to all my colleagues and friends in the Committee I say Goodbye and good luck.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank the distinguished representative of Hungary, Ambassador K6mives, for his statement, which at the same time constitutes, on his part, a valedictory statement. As we heard, this is indeed the last meeting of the Committee in which Ambassador K6mives participates, at least in his present capacity.

(The Chairman)

As Ambassador Kőmives himself said in his statement, he has represented his country in this Committee as well as in other international organs and organizations in Geneva for a period of five years. I am quite certain that even those among us who have the work in the CCD as a main and even unique occupation can appreciate at its proper value the enormity of the different tasks that an Ambassador who is concurrently representative of his country to all the international organizations in Geneva must perform. I should like to believe, however, that the work in the CCD has had a special place and a high priority among the multifarious duties of Ambassador Kőmives. At this moment of his approaching departure, we are all very conscious of his devotion to the work of the CCD and his dedication to the cause of disarmament. This has indeed been proved by his statement here today. Beyond the call of his official duties, we have found Ambassador Kőmives an esteemed colleague and friend whose constant good sense and good humour have on many occasions made our work more easy.

I know that I am expressing the feelings of all the members round this table in extending to Ambassador Kőmives and also to Madame Kőmives our warmest thanks for a fruitful and agreeable co-operation, and in conveying to them our best wishes for success in their new and important duties. We are glad to understand that he will keep constant contact with the important tasks that this Committee has been called upon to perform.

Mr. BERASATEGUI (Argentina) (translation from Spanish): Madam Chairman, allow me to associate myself with your words of farewell to Ambassador Kőmives. This week the Argentine delegation has had the good fortune to preside over the Committee of the Twelve, and it is in this capacity that I echo your sentiments. But even if my delegation had not been occupying the Chair, we should still have followed your example, which the personal and diplomatic qualities of Ambassador Kőmives fully justify.

Ambassador Kőmives, as he himself pointed out, was his country's first representative to this Conference, associating himself with our work five years ago yesterday. On that occasion he was the first speaker after the new members, including Argentina, had taken their places in the Committee. Since then he has rendered distinguished services to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by his tact, intelligence and ability with which we are all familiar.

While we deeply regret his departure, we have no doubt that in his new functions he will continue to collaborate with us in our work with the efficiency to which we have become accustomed. And although we lose his wise contribution to our day-to-day activities, we receive in exchange valuable support for the tasks of our Committee.

Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian):

As Ambassador Kőmives is to take up a new assignment and will shortly leave us, I should like to express the Soviet delegation's congratulations and convey its best wishes to him.

As Ambassador Kőmives has already told us, we first heard our distinguished colleague speak in the Committee on Disarmament as the representative of Hungary five years ago on 7 August 1969. He had the honour of being the first representative of Hungary when it became a member of this Committee. During the past five years he has actively and ably collaborated with the other members of the Committee and helped it to make an effective contribution, tackling the problems under discussion with profound understanding and an open mind. In cogently-argued statements and in his daily contacts with other members of the Committee, he has propounded with skill and dignity his country's policy of seeking a solution to the problems of peace and security, disarmament and limitation of the arms race.


The Hungarian People's Republic has co-sponsored a number of important documents, such as the draft conventions on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the prohibition of bacteriological weapons alone, and lastly the prohibition of chemical weapons. Ambassador Kőmives has made a great personal contribution to the drafting of those and other documents discussed here in the Committee on Disarmament and at sessions of the General Assembly.

We have been very happy to work together with Ambassador Kőmives, whose good-natured approach and friendly attitude to his colleagues we shall always remember with pleasure when we recall our long years of collaboration in the Committee on Disarmament and at sessions of the General Assembly. We hope that our collaboration with him will continue in other multilateral and bilateral forums.

I should like to wish our dear colleague and comrade Ambassador Kőmives every success in his new and responsible post at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We also wish him and Mrs. Kőmives every personal success and happiness.

Mr. MARTIN (United States): It is always a sad occasion when we have to bid farewell to a distinguished and esteemed colleague. It is particularly sad to have to say goodbye to Ambassador Kőmives, who has played a unique and important role in this Committee. I have always had the greatest respect for his ability and integrity, and it has been a personal pleasure to have worked with him during the last few years, both in this Committee and in New York at the United Nations General Assembly. It will be difficult not to have Ambassador Kőmives here with us. I would like to extend my best wishes and those of my delegation to Ambassador Kőmives in his new assignment. I hope that he realizes that he will be greatly missed by all of us.

The meeting rose at 12.00 noon



CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.651
13 August 1974
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 13 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. A. Roshchin

(USSR)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:

Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI

Brazil:

Mr. M.T. DA SILVA

Bulgaria:

Mr. R. NIKOLOV

Mr. B. GRINBERG

Burma:

U THAUNG LWIN

Canada:

Mr. W.H. BARTON

Mr. D.R. MACPHEE

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Egypt:

Mr. A. EL-ERIAN

Mr. A. EL-DIN KHAIRAT

Mr. N. ELARABY

Mr. S.A. ABOU-ALI

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. BIFTU

Mr. G. DEMISSIE

Hungary:

Mr. I. KÖRMENDY

India:

Mr. B.C. MISHRA

Mr. M.K. MANGALMURTI

Mr. H.N. SUKHDEV

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO

Mr. P. BRUNI

Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI
 Mr. A. YATABE
 Mr. S. SUYEHIRO
 Mr. H. OKA
 Mr. T. AMARI
 Mr. I. YAMAMOTO

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
 Mr. M. MARIN

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
 Mr. J. CHOINKHOR

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. M.J. ROSENBERG POLAK
 Mr. E. BOS

Nigeria:

Mr. B. AKPORODE CLARK
 Mr. M.T. OBASHAH
 Mr. F.J. OSEMEKEH
 Mr. M.G.S. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. NIAZ A. NAIK
 Mr. K. SALEEM
 Mr. M.J. KHAN

Poland:

Mr. E. WYZNER
 Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI
 Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. C. ENE
 Mr. V. TUDOR
 Mr. A. SASU

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON
 Mr. G. HAMILTON
 Mr. U. REINIUS
 Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
 Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
 Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
 Mr. I.P. GLAZKOV
 Mr. J.P. KLUKIN
 Mr. J.D. USPENSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. H.C. HAINWORTH
 Mr. I.C. SLOANE
 Mr. A. MONTGOMERY

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN
 Mr. R.W. DREXLER
 Mr. R. EINHORN
 Mr. V. BLAZ
 Mr. D. WESTERVELT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. LALOVIC
 Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Special Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Mr. ILKKA PASTINEN

Alternate Representative of the
 Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJORNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 651st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador A.A. Roshchin, representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Statements were made by the representatives of Sweden, Japan, Yugoslavia, India and the United Kingdom.

The delegation of the United Kingdom submitted a "Working Paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources" (CCD/440).

The delegations of Japan and Sweden submitted a "Working Paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden" (CCD/441).

The delegation of Japan submitted a "Working Paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events" (CCD/442).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 15 August 1974, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): In my statement two weeks ago I discussed the test ban issue at some length and stressed that the achievement of a comprehensive test ban must remain the priority item on the agenda of our Committee. The Swedish Government will continue to contribute political, scientific and technical efforts to this end.

The Japanese-Swedish working paper tabled today is the result of a joint research project carried out within the framework of a co-operation agreement in the field of detection seismology between institutes in our two countries. It illustrates the benefits of using seismological data from more than one station in the identification of explosions and earthquakes. I hope that the results of this study, and those of a similar Canadian-Swedish study presented last year (CCD/380), will give impetus to a joint utilization of the highly sensitive stations operating today, not only for event detection and location but also -- which is important for the purpose of controlling a test ban -- for event identification.

A substantial part of the station network needed for monitoring not only the threshold Treaty but also a comprehensive test ban seems to exist today. I am primarily referring to the short and long period array-stations, the so-called very long period stations, and the extensive national station networks operating in certain countries, such as the Soviet Union. The seismological research observatories now being installed by the United States in different countries may also play an important role in a global seismic station network, although their capabilities still have to be assessed. There seems, however, to be a definite need for further highly-sensitive stations in Africa and South America.

The main effort in order to obtain adequate data for test ban monitoring would thus not be the installations of new stations, but rather the full use of the capabilities of already-existing stations and an exchange of the obtained data on a routine and globally-accessible basis. The American so-called ARPA-computer network which is now being implemented may be one important communication link in such a global data exchange system, if the net is accessible in a non-discriminatory way. I thus think that the time has come to increase further the use of collected seismological data for identification purposes through an international data exchange, not only for monitoring the recent threshold Treaty but above all in order to achieve a generally-acceptable monitoring capability for a comprehensive test ban.

Having introduced today's Working Paper, I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to comment on some of the views presented by you as representative of the Soviet Union

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

in your comprehensive and interesting statement at our last meeting (CCD/PV.650). In that statement Mr. Roshchin turned against several ideas which I had introduced in a Swedish statement on 30 July (CCD/PV.647, pages 6 et seq.)

May I start by discussing the character and the effects of the criticism which I directed towards the NPT? The Swedish delegation is certainly not the first nor the only delegation which has labelled it a "discriminatory" treaty. We have said that it is "discriminatory by nature", but -- and this I again wish to underline -- we have also said that its purpose is such that it should still be supported by the entirety of the world community.

Mr. Roshchin said at our last meeting: "Whatever the motives and reasons behind the attacks on the Treaty by States and their representatives, such a course of action is clearly intended to erode and weaken rather than strengthen the non-proliferation régime". (ibid., page 8).

I cannot as representative of Sweden, a country which firmly -- yes, categorically -- supports the NPT, agree with this assessment. In our view it is not the fact that a non-nuclear State party to the Treaty directs attention to its discriminatory character which weakens the Treaty. This is known to all, but it is necessary to point it out repeatedly. What weakens the Treaty is rather the lack of implementation of Article VI by the nuclear Powers, thereby preserving its discriminatory character.

Mr. Roshchin said in his statement that "Implementation of the Treaty's provisions is in the interests of world security and the further relaxation of international tension". (ibid., page 6). We agree that the implementation of all the provisions of the NPT, including the crucial Article VI, would indeed make the Treaty less discriminatory and further the cause of detente and peace. We again urge the responsible parties to proceed as rapidly as possible towards the full implementation of Article VI, thus removing what we consider the main obstacle to strengthening the NPT regime and enabling it to become truly universal.

Mr. Roshchin also referred to my suggestion of 30 July of a possible "internationalization of the management of nuclear material, the key task being not only to watch but also to protect all the material in order to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation and guarantee the safest possible management of nuclear energy production". In his opinion this would be a measure that "runs counter to the sovereign rights of States, thus ignoring an important reality of our time" (ibid., page 9).

I, in my turn, want to express strong opposition to this interpretation. As I see it, what Member States of this Committee and the United Nations have been doing over

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

all these years in their own enlightened self-interest is to exercise their sovereign right to forgo, in co-operation with other States, certain privileges in the arms field in order to achieve more and more disarmament, thereby restricting certain such sovereign rights. The Soviet Union itself has here within and outside this Committee in the past negotiated and later acceded to a number of international treaties. This in my view reflects the important reality of our time, which forces us to proceed further along the road of building a safe and just international community by an increasingly stronger network of international agreements.

As to the idea of international management of nuclear material itself, my suggestion was, as I pointed out, preliminary. However, the frightening prospects of growing stockpiles of plutonium, the serious dangers for man himself and his environment that are involved and the related risk for proliferation of nuclear weapons, are far from preliminary. Therefore the time has come, it is in fact overdue, to do something to curb this threat. As we were searching for a solution, we looked into what has been done before and also, as Mr. Roshchin pointed out, studied the proposals tabled in the United Nations by Mr. Baruch as well as by Mr. Gromyko in June 1946. At that time there was a real possibility of containing the "genie in the bottle". For well-known reasons those proposals led to nothing. We have also had in mind the Euratom system. I have no illusion that it will be easy to find an acceptable and practical solution to the problem. As I said in my statement, we intend to study it further and come back to it. Meanwhile I feel it necessary, however, to say that some of the fears expressed by Mr. Roshchin seem exaggerated.

There is also another aspect of the problem to which I would like to draw your attention. The big Powers have always taken the NPT aspect into consideration when exporting nuclear material. Smaller countries have not the same possibilities and do need an effective international management which can ensure that its exported material and equipment will not in some future be used for bombs or other explosive devices. Recent experience shows that this concern is well founded in reality. Whatever will be the final legal term to be used in an agreement -- be it ownership, or management, or stockpiling by the IAEA, or perhaps something else --, we must always bear in mind the principle affirmed in the preamble to the NPT that "the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology... should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States". What we suggest is not intended to limit the sovereign right of any country to develop its nuclear industry, in so far as it complies with the provisions of the NPT. What we suggest is aimed at ensuring to all States, big and small, the greatest possible amount of safety and

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

security in developing and managing their nuclear-energy industry through the strongest possible international arrangements that are politically acceptable.

Mr. Roshchin also in his statement last week discussed the so-called threshold Treaty, which was recently agreed upon between the Soviet Union and the United States. He said that his assessment of the significance of this Treaty substantially differed from the one given by me a week earlier. I regret that our views now differ on this issue. I wish to recall that three years ago, on 7 September 1971, Mr. Roshchin expressed views which my delegation can fully subscribe to. Speaking of establishing a certain threshold of magnitude for underground nuclear tests, Mr. Roshchin then said that

".... it must be admitted that such an approach would not provide a solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, nor would it create more favourable prospects for progress towards its solution. We share the doubts of a number of delegations -- Sweden, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and the Netherlands -- about the effectiveness of the 'threshold' approach as such. In particular we recognize the cogency of the arguments advanced by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, against the proposal to establish a 'threshold'. She said:

'There are two sets of reasons, of which one may be called political and one technical, why the Swedish Government has all along hesitated to support the threshold proposal. It would, in our view, be another half-measure, perhaps limiting arms development in some directions but leaving other directions open for so-called improvements of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.513, para.14).'

"In fact it can hardly be doubted that establishing a 'threshold of magnitude', while at the same time authorizing nuclear explosions below the established 'threshold', would have the result of stimulating the conduct of nuclear explosions of lower yield, which would thus become, as it were, legalized. Such a solution would entail the development of nuclear weapons of small capacities or, as the representative of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, described it, a 'miniaturization' of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.518, para 25). Thus the establishment of a 'threshold of magnitude' would not put a stop to the building up of nuclear arsenals, nor would it contribute towards nuclear disarmament, which many countries, including the Soviet Union, are striving to achieve. On the contrary, it would encourage new efforts to devise improved types of warheads and thus would promote the development of nuclear weapons as a whole. It goes without saying that that is not the path along which we would wish to direct efforts towards disarmament and arms limitation." (CCD/PV.536, page 10).

This is what Mr. Roshchin said in his statement on 7 September 1971. His assessment at that time of the value of threshold agreements is practically identical with the one which I presented on behalf of the Swedish delegation on 30 July this year (CCD/PV.647, pages 8 et seq.), and which he criticized last week.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Let me add a few more words about the threshold and about "strong" and "weak" tests. The information on test activities presented in our recent working paper (CCD/438) is based on so far available data. We would be happy to review these figures when calibration data are released by the testing Powers. The significance of weak tests was discussed at an informal expert meeting in this Committee a year ago, when a distinguished expert from the United States told us that tests at small yields do not pertain only to weapons of small yields, but that it is entirely feasible to use tests at a lower yield which would relate to devices of larger yields, and that this is not an uncommon procedure at present. It is the considered opinion of the Swedish delegation that the threshold of 150 kilotons agreed upon in Moscow neither reflects the capability of present verification methods nor constitutes any serious limitation of the development of nuclear weapons for either tactical or strategical purposes.

Before concluding my remarks on the threshold question, I should like to recall that in my statement of 30 July I put a question to the co-Chairmen. I expressed the hope that the control co-operation foreseen in the recent Moscow Agreement would lead to better understanding and trust, so that at least the control issue in connexion with a comprehensive test ban could be settled by the two Powers. I suggested that measurements from observatories in other countries could contribute to this end, and that therefore it would be politically and technically appropriate if data on test sites and explosion data were made available to other governments. As it was not clear from the threshold test ban Treaty and its Protocol whether this was intended or not, I said that the Swedish delegation would welcome a statement on this point.

I think that the kind of dialogue that the representative of the Soviet Union and I are now engaged in is useful for our work in the Committee, and I shall therefore with great interest look forward to hearing more from the co-Chairmen on this particular question.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to express the thanks of the Swedish delegation to you in your capacity of representative of the Soviet Union, for your reply to Mrs. Myrdal's question on nuclear mini-weapons at our last meeting. We are particularly happy to note your statements that "There has been no need for distinctions among individual types of tactical nuclear weapons..... The attempts to equate certain types of these weapons with conventional armaments"; and that the Soviet Union's obligations under Security Council resolution 255(1968), and under the Soviet-United States Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, "cover all types of nuclear weapons whatever their power" (ibid., page 13). I share your view that equating nuclear mini-weapons with conventional arms would, among other things, provide a danger to the NPT. Your statement and the previous statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

on this issue are, taken together, reassuring. The Swedish delegation welcomes the fact that, although the issue of nuclear mini-weapons obviously will remain under constant review, it can under the present circumstances be considered closed in this Committee.

Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): In my statement of 11 July I made some comments, as a view of the Japanese Government, concerning the agreement on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests between the United States and the Soviet Union announced on the occasion of their recent summit meeting. I then said, "Rather than letting ourselves be satisfied with this modest step forward, we should endeavour to gather further momentum for nuclear disarmament." (CCD/PV.642, page 9)

I note with respect that, in response to such a desire commonly shared by us, the delegates of the United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed in this Committee their intention to continue negotiations with a view to banning all underground nuclear-weapon tests. At the same time, I would like to seize this opportunity to reiterate my delegation's hope that, in subsequent negotiations between the two countries, special efforts will be made not only to lower the agreed threshold but also to develop the agreement into a multilateral one.

Next I would like to draw attention to the fact that the agreement reached between the two countries includes, in particular, the exchange of various data on underground nuclear-weapon tests and the test areas in order to ensure compliance with the obligations.

The "Working Paper on the Accuracy of Locating Seismic Events" (CCD/442), which was submitted by the delegation of Japan, is the report of a study conducted by choosing as master events the Matsushiro Earthquake Swarm, which occurred in the central part of Japan in 1966 and 1967. Their epicentre and depth were determined very accurately by a dense local network of seismic stations; and larger ones among them were monitored also from a long distance. Location error is generally 40 to even 60 Km when only stations at epicentral distances of more than 2,000 Km are used. As a result of this study, however, it has become clear that location error can be reduced to less than 20 Km even with distant stations alone, if corrections by means of master events are applied.

From this point of view, the agreement reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on confining nuclear-weapon testing to specified test areas and on exchanging data concerning underground nuclear-weapon tests is an extremely important decision. As emphasized in the Swedish working paper (CCD/438), the announcement of geological data on testing areas and of the yields of given nuclear explosions is expected to facilitate the estimation of the yields of other underground nuclear-weapon

(Mr. Nisibori, Japan)

tests conducted in the testing areas concerned. In view of this, it is no exaggeration to say, I believe, that the key to lowering the threshold of 150 kt by the United States and the Soviet Union has already been provided in the Agreement. We have submitted the working paper of our delegation (CCD/442) and also the joint working paper of Japan and Sweden (CCD/441), which was introduced by the representative of Sweden a little while ago, in the hope that not only the United States and the Soviet Union but also this Committee will come to an agreement on a comprehensive underground nuclear-test ban at the earliest possible date. I hope that these working papers will serve as useful documents to that end.

Mr. LALOVIC (Yugoslavia): Every year we attempt to make a balance-sheet of our achievements, to enable us to draw the proper conclusions and define our tasks for the future. It has also become customary to consider the work of the Committee within the wider context of world events. This is only understandable, for we live in a world of extremely dynamic movements, where constant efforts are made to create new and juster relations, in order to remove many factors which permanently threaten the maintenance of stable peace and security in the world.

Many features of international relationship require serious and permanent re-examination: the remnants of colonialism, the policy of action from a position of strength, interference in internal affairs, interventions by foreign Powers aimed at forcibly overthrowing independent and sovereign States, unjust and unequal international economic relations, and other features, all of which are manifested in various forms and in many regions of the world. The last of these problems was placed on the agenda of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, which considered a number of basic principles for creating a new system of equitable international economic relations, and various solutions for the acutest problems of international economic co-operation.

All mankind is constantly harassed by the evergrowing arms race, in particular by the nuclear arms race, which moves by its own incomprehensible logic --- always in inverse proportion to the efforts and plans made to halt or reverse it. We find ourselves in a paradoxical situation, because the more numerous the forums for arms control and disarmament negotiations, and more numerous the appeals and demands made to halt or reverse the arms race, the greater and quicker the increase of expenditure.

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

New generations of nuclear weapons are multiplying both on land and sea, and new military doctrines are being launched to justify their use. Although the momentum of the cold war has been arrested for quite some time, and international co-operation is gradually being brought to the stage described as detente, nevertheless the arms race has not only not frozen or ended, but gains new dimensions contrary to what we consider detente should mean.

We must express our very great concern at the continuance of the arms race, the increase of nuclear stockpiles, and the improvement of nuclear-weapon systems. Our attention is particularly drawn to the constant increase of different types and stockpiles of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, and to the ever-present strategic ideas of the nuclear-weapon Powers about the possibility of using these weapons not only in general but also in "local" wars.

At the same time there is a constant increase of expenditure on the development and production of nuclear weapons, to which huge financial, scientific and human resources are being applied. At the same time the gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to grow; and the international community ought to make strenuous efforts to help the developing countries to free themselves from poverty and backwardness, in the interest both of the developed countries and of peace and security in general. It is a fact -- often repeated -- that more than \$200 billion is spent yearly on armaments, out of which the lion's share, that is to say 70 per cent, is spent by four military Powers only (without the People's Republic of China). It is estimated that approximately \$20 billion is spent and about 400,000 scientists and engineers are engaged on military research and development. This situation is very disturbing because of its adverse effects on social and economic development in general and on peace and security in the world in particular, and because of its devaluation of the initial and very modest results achieved so far in the CCD and in some bilateral arrangements. What is most discouraging about the outlook for the future is that, in spite of all the negotiations taking place in various forums for arms control and disarmament, the technological and qualitative arms race continues unabated. The

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

present terrible weapons of mass destruction are constantly improved and sophisticated, the new ones are multiplied, and there seems to be no prospect of a halt in the expenditures on armament. The agreements already achieved and those now being negotiated do not stop the arms race; they allow it to continue in relative immunity with the aim of conducting further experiments for improving the fire power, precision and diversity of weapons of mass destruction.

Certainly nobody has any illusions about the complexity of the problems which we are trying to solve. They grow not only from the real difficulties of harmonizing the often very conflicting interests of various countries and groups of countries, but also from the constantly active and persistent attempts made to preserve and strengthen existing privileges, advantages and inequalities. The problem of the political readiness and the specific duty of the chief military Powers to make a significant turning-point in their policy which would halt or reverse the arms race, and in particular the nuclear arms race, is becoming more and more urgent.

We are aware that such anxieties are present in the minds of the leaders of the two super-Powers. We listened with attention to the statement which the representative of the USSR, Mr. Roshchin, made on 8 August, when he quoted two relevant passages from the speech made by Soviet Union Leader Leonid Brezhnev on 21 July (CCD/PV.650, pages 11, 13). Allow me also to quote from a similar statement made by the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, during his press conference on 3 July:

"If we have not reached an agreement well before 1977, then I believe you will see an explosion of technology and an explosion of numbers at the end of which we will be lucky if we have the present stability; in which it will be impossible to describe what strategic superiority means. And one of the questions which we have to ask ourselves as a country is what in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at this level of numbers? What do you do with it?"

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

As a result of the policy of detente and within the favourable climate it has created, a number of fruitful contacts have been made among statesmen at the highest level, some important results have been gained, and consideration of some of the major world problems has begun. In particular such meetings have improved relations between States and groups of States. We are also aware of the importance of holding the European Conference on Security and Co-operation, which we hope will lay new foundations for even more fruitful co-operation and security in Europe. However, this essentially positive political co-operation and these efforts did not simultaneously stop the arms race, nor did they produce concrete measures of disarmament, among which the highest priority certainly belongs to nuclear disarmament. This means that the policy of detente still lacks one of its most important elements, that is its implementation in disarmament, which should make it more convincing and longer lasting.

From the outset the problem of nuclear armament has caused the utmost concern to the international community, because of the possible consequences which the use of these weapons may have for its survival. All efforts to solve this problem have unfortunately remained futile. Yugoslavia, together with other non-aligned countries, has always resolutely devoted its efforts to measures aimed at comprehensive banning of the use, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and at the destruction of the existing stockpiles. In that context we have always declared ourselves against all nuclear-weapon tests, in all environments and by all States. These main standpoints were also formulated in the Political Declaration adopted at the Fourth Conference of the Heads of States and Governments of the Non-Aligned Countries, and in the documents of previous summit meetings and ministerial conferences held by the non-aligned States. In that spirit Yugoslavia signed and ratified the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and will consistently strive for the realization of these aims.

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226) and the Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) are limited in their scope. Neither of them has ended the armaments race or nuclear-weapon tests. On the contrary, after their adoption the arms race was intensified, and in consequence underground nuclear weapon tests have increased. The solemn obligation undertaken in the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty "Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", and the obligation in Art. VI of the NPT "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" have not yet been fulfilled.

Some of the recent arms-control agreements sound rather unconvincing, in spite of the good intentions expressed at their conclusion; because they have been immediately followed by nuclear-weapon tests and the announcement of a new series of tests aimed at further improvement of nuclear weapons. It is not likely that endeavours to encourage a number of countries to adhere to the NPT will be fruitful if at the same time nothing is done to remove a number of factors which these countries regard as serious obstacles to their adherence. Some of the agreements signed during the last summit meeting in Moscow between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics indicate areas where attempts may be made to halt and reverse the vicious circle of the arms race. We hope that future negotiations will produce new and more substantial agreements that will permanently ban further sophistication of nuclear-weapon systems as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. Every lost opportunity, every postponement of an agreement which would halt the nuclear arms race, will considerably impede its halting at a later stage, not only because the quantity and diversity of stockpiled weapons will be larger, but also because the arms race is usually accompanied by a mutual mistrust which is further enhanced by its continuation.

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

We must unfortunately state again that during the last four years during which the NPT has been in force very little has been done either to halt or to limit the nuclear arms race, or to transfer nuclear technology to developing countries. While expressing our satisfaction with the initial efforts of the two greatest nuclear Powers to limit strategic nuclear weapons, we are bound to call the concrete results very modest in comparison with the successful efforts to develop and produce more perfect and deadly nuclear weapons, from the mini-nukes to those with the greatest range and fire power. Our dissatisfaction is even greater because the results of transfer of nuclear technology to developing countries are still far short of expectations, promises and assumed obligations. A situation has been created in which we may justifiably speak of the monopolistic position of the nuclear-weapon Powers not only in weapons but also in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. If nuclear-weapon States do not proceed more quickly along the road of nuclear disarmament, it may be expected that a certain number of non-nuclear weapon States will try to solve their defence problems by developing and producing their own nuclear weapons. This capacity is becoming nowadays more and more nearly attainable for quite a number of States, even for some whose general level of development is not very high. Similarly, under the existing conditions it is quite understandable that developing countries, by pooling their resources and by strengthening international co-operation, must search for solutions for their very complex development problems, including development of nuclear-energy potential, which are not heeded by many developed States. Developing countries should not be denied their sovereign right to take necessary measures, individually and jointly, to accelerate their development, both in their own interest and in that of the international community. Within this general context we also form our opinion about the underground explosion of a nuclear device carried out recently by India for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

At the beginning of 1975 a conference will be convened by the States parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty in order to review the operation of this Treaty and ascertain whether the purposes of its Preamble and provisions are being realized. One significant feature of this conference is that it is to take place at a time when, owing to a number of events and factors, doubts are starting to grow about the credibility of the NPT. At the same time there is also a growing conviction that a number of necessary steps should be taken to soften or remove such doubts and so create a necessary balance of rights and duties between the Parties to the Treaty.

I will mention some of our preliminary thoughts on practical measures which could serve those purposes. The Yugoslav Government, in its declaration of 27 February 1970 when it submitted the Non-proliferation Treaty for ratification, expressed the motives and expectations which had guided its decision to sign the Treaty (CCD/278). Similar thoughts have been expressed earlier in this forum by other delegations; and only recently the leader of the Swedish delegation, Under-Secretary of State Mrs. Inga Thorsson, has also mentioned a few useful ideas in her speech of 30 July (CCD/PV.647).

In our opinion these measures should be mutually connected because, although each one separately could mean positive improvement, it would not be sufficient by itself. The Non-proliferation Treaty's chief aim is to prevent a spread of nuclear weapons; but it also contains equally important provisions concerning early cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, "the inalienable right of all the Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination", "the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world", and the "potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions on a non-discriminatory basis".

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

The best situation in respect of fulfilment of the basic aim of the Non-proliferation Treaty would be its universal acceptance. However, although about 80 States are Parties to the Treaty, there are still some nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States who are not members.

The absence of a satisfactory solution for the problem of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States is in our opinion one of the basic faults of the NPT. The minimum which should be secured in order to make the Treaty most widely acceptable would be, in our opinion, that nuclear-weapon States should assume a solemn obligation never to use in any circumstances nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, nor in any circumstances to threaten those States with the use of such weapons. To withdraw nuclear weapons from the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States would be in those States' best interests.

A comprehensive test ban is in our opinion one of the most urgent and important measures to be taken in order to strengthen the Non-proliferation Treaty. Continuation of nuclear-weapon tests is contrary to the spirit and letter of the NPT and also to the obligations of the Moscow Partial Test-Ban Treaty. A nuclear-weapon test ban would be very effective in limiting the nuclear arms race and preventing improvement of nuclear weapons. It would provide convincing evidence of the gradual removal of the nuclear threat. Another important consequence of a comprehensive nuclear test ban would be the creation of a favourable international climate conducive to the negotiation and adoption of new arms-control and disarmament agreements and to the strengthening of the existing ones. Other important benefits would be creation of additional financial resources for the needs of domestic and international development projects, and protection of the human environment.

A comprehensive test ban is also an important prerequisite for the creation of an internationally-agreed régime governing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Article V of the NPT stipulates that "Non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special international agreement or agreements", and further that "Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

possible after the Treaty enters into force". Such international agreement has not yet been concluded, nor have any negotiations started with this aim. We believe that the moment has come to start serious and timely consideration of the need to convene such an international conference. This conference should be open for participation by all countries, nuclear and non-nuclear alike; and it should consider and elaborate a generally-acceptable régime and procedure to govern nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This régime should not be discriminatory and should apply equally to all States, including nuclear-weapon Powers. The generally-recognized ability of a number of countries to develop themselves and use the existing scientific and technological achievements of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes fully proves the need for a timely international movement to regulate those activities, which will most probably assume much wider dimensions in the following decade.

The wider and more intensive use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes which the non-aligned States have always advocated at the summit meetings could be one of the most important factors accelerating the economic development of the developing States. Interest in nuclear energy has greatly increased during the recent energy crisis as a possibly available source of energy in the near future. This interest is stimulated by the opinion of a number of developing countries that nuclear power plants are the cheapest source of electric power.

At the non-nuclear Conference held in Geneva in 1968 the non-nuclear-weapon States resolutely sought the creation of international conditions which would enable speedier transfer of adequate nuclear technology to the developing countries, particularly in the fields of radiation and radio-active isotopes, nuclear power plants, and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Many of them, including Yugoslavia, adhered to the NPT in the conviction that its provisions relating to peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to the transfer of nuclear technology will be

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

respected by the nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty. The existing sources of finance for these activities can hardly be considered sufficient to satisfy the ever-growing needs. The International Atomic Energy Agency is devoting a substantial part of its scientific and material resources to the strengthening of its safeguarding functions in fulfilment of its duties under the Treaty, while the acute need of the developing countries for peaceful uses of nuclear energy remain to a great extent unfulfilled. The Agency has no doubt made great efforts so far to perform some of its tasks. However, there is still much to be done to diminish the very important existing gap between the highly-developed and the developing States.

Many actions and projects have been undertaken so far and important results have been achieved in some of the fields in which nuclear energy is applied (e.g. agriculture, medicine, and radiation protection), while some other fields remain the exclusive privilege of highly-developed States. We are convinced that a number of activities in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes could and should be made available to a greater extent, especially to the developing non-nuclear-weapon States. Confidence in the Non-proliferation Treaty would be strengthened and its universal adoption hastened if present forms of financing were reconsidered and if new ways and means were found for financing such activities and for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, especially for the supply of energy needs and accessibility to nuclear fuels.

These are some of our preliminary thoughts which we considered worth mentioning within the context of nuclear problems. We hope that other delegations too would like to express their views about these problems, particularly at the forthcoming Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

My delegation has repeatedly stated its reasons in favour of a comprehensive agreement on measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction. During the unofficial meetings held with experts from 17 to 22 July my delegation had the opportunity to express in more

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

detail some of its thoughts through the active participation of the Yugoslav experts. For these reasons I shall limit myself today only to some general remarks. In our opinion recent meetings with the experts indicated possible solutions of a number of still unresolved problems connected with a comprehensive ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and with their destruction. The debate during these meetings, furthermore, strengthened our conviction that the basic obstacle to a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons is political and that a satisfactory way of removing it can be found after five years of intensive negotiation. A number of documents submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including the Draft Convention of nine socialist countries (CCD/361), the Japanese Draft Convention (CCD/420), and a great number of working papers submitted by many delegations, including that of the ten non-aligned countries (CCD/400), offer a solid base from which to start drafting the agreement. Such an agreement is not yet in sight because some States still have not taken the political decision necessary for its drafting.

We have also to wait for the fulfilment of the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union to consider a joint proposal in the CCD for the conclusion, as a first step, of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. It is necessary, however, to stress once again, in connexion with the problem of banning chemical weapons, that each new agreement in this field must be based on the principles and aims laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The valuable aim of this Protocol to eliminate chemical and biological warfare altogether, and to strengthen the credibility of implementation of further arms-control and disarmament measures, could be significantly promoted if the United States would ratify the Protocol as soon as possible, thus adding to it the influence and prestige of one of the world's greatest military, industrial and economic Powers.

(Mr. Lalović, Yugoslavia)

The summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is coming to an end. Much to our regret, the Committee will again this year not be able to submit to the United Nations General Assembly any concrete results. This situation, which has been repeated for the last few years, calls for very serious concern. We cannot be satisfied to measure the value of this, the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, solely by its existence for over twelve years. This is obviously a sign of the great interest of the international community in solving the disarmament problem, and of the need for such a negotiating body. The earlier and the present modest results achieved by this Committee are the sole measure of its value. One cannot live endlessly on old glory, and new efforts must be made to give new substance to this Committee's work.

The Yugoslav delegation would appreciate also the creation of conditions conducive to the participation in multilateral disarmament negotiations of all nuclear-weapon and other militarily-significant States whose contribution would doubtless add to the achievement of concrete results. In this context Yugoslavia will make all necessary efforts in the future, as it has done before, for an urgent convening of the World Disarmament Conference.

Mr. MISHRA (India): Since India's peaceful nuclear explosion on 18 May this year, several delegations have expressed views on its implications and consequences as they see them. In the process, statements have been made which are at variance with our thinking and our intentions. In the previous meetings of the Committee I have stated India's position several times, but only piecemeal. Now that we have decided to end the 1974 session of the Committee in about ten days' time, it is opportune for me to reiterate those views all together, and also to touch on one or two other points which merit attention.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Some delegates have asserted directly or indirectly that at present there are hardly any peaceful applications of nuclear explosion technology. The announcement of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission which I read out in this Committee on 21 and 23 May had this sentence in it: "As part of the programme of study of peaceful uses of nuclear explosion, the Government of India had undertaken a programme to keep itself abreast of developments of this technology, particularly with reference to its use in the field of mining and earth-moving operations".

It is clear that the Government of India is not alone in this respect. Peaceful nuclear explosions carried out underground over a period of several years by other Member States have confirmed the feasibility of this technology, although many problems still remain to be solved. Their experiments have been oriented towards gas and oil stimulation, have shown promising results, and are even reported to have increased oil production by 30 to 60 per cent. A former Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. Glenn Seaborg, stated "The technology and understanding of peaceful nuclear explosions has advanced to the state where they can be safely, efficiently and beneficially used for earth moving, for recovering natural resources and as research tools for man's understanding of his environment". It should not, therefore, be a matter of surprise or regret if India, without contravening any treaty it has entered into, were to experiment and try to develop this technology for exploiting the natural resources within its own territory. We have a right to develop our own natural resources in accordance with well-established principles of international law. We are not prepared to wait for others to perfect nuclear-explosion technology and thereby lag behind by a decade or more in its development in India.

I should also like to quote the "Declaration on Disarmament" adopted at Lusaka on 10 September 1970 by the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference, which had this to say: "The Conference is aware of the tremendous contribution which the technology of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including peaceful nuclear explosions, can make to the economy of the developing world. It is of the opinion that the benefits of this technology should be available to all States without any discrimination".

Recently the Soviet Union and the United States have given fresh indications of the trust they put in the usefulness of this technology by excluding underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes from the proposed limited ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Another point which we have heard rather frequently here is that, if India's intentions are peaceful, it should place all its nuclear activities under international safeguards. Our policies on safeguards for nuclear energy are well known. The late Dr. Bhabha was one of the so-called Washington Group of Twelve which did preparatory work on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency in 1956. Dr. Bhabha expressed his views clearly during those meetings as well as subsequently; and these were that India advocated safeguards on a completely non-discriminatory basis so that they do not operate mainly against the developing countries, and secondly that they should be devised on functional criteria. These views have been consistently expressed by Indian leaders and representatives in India and abroad. Dr. Bhabha had also spoken of safeguards in the context of peaceful nuclear explosions and had said that, if these are to be subject to observation by an international body, it should be on a non-discriminatory basis and in the general framework of non-discriminatory safeguards to be applied to everyone. On 13 June 1974 the Indian representative stated in the IAEA Board of Governors meeting: "Some Governors enquired whether India would place all its nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Well, Mr. Chairman, we shall certainly consider this possibility when all the Member States of the Agency, and indeed others too outside the Agency, voluntarily place all their nuclear activities, civil and military, under the Agency's safeguards".

Is it not strange that, while the nuclear activities of nuclear-weapon States are allowed to operate in a completely unrestrained manner, some delegations seem more concerned with controlling the peaceful activities of non-nuclear-weapon countries? We believe that we should have a proper sense of priorities and proportion in disarmament matters. Part of the problem of nuclear proliferation stems from the resigned acceptance of the belief that certain countries cannot be stopped from having or developing their nuclear arsenals, and that therefore the others should meekly acquiesce in this situation. We have stated this before and we shall state it again, that we have no intention to campaign against the NPT. Even if we do not agree with the approach adopted therein, we feel that our aim is the same -- which is to ensure non-proliferation, but both horizontal and vertical. We respect the views of the parties to the NPT and have no intention to impose our views on them. At the same time we feel we are entitled to our own views.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Another question which has been raised by some delegations concerns security guarantees against nuclear threat. This question is of vital importance to all non-nuclear-weapon States, whether or not they are parties to the NPT. It is not justifiable to consider it merely in the context of that Treaty.

One of the strangest arguments that I have heard in this Committee is that India, by exploding a peaceful nuclear device, has broken some kind of a barrier to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, that India has set a bad example. We have solemnly declared for the last twenty years that we intend to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes. Even after exploding a nuclear device we have, unlike others, reaffirmed our solemn declaration. Thus only in this respect have we broken a barrier. And all to the good. If other non-nuclear-weapon States follow us in reaffirming their resolve to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only, is it to the benefit or to the detriment of mankind? If, on the other hand, one or more non-nuclear-weapon States proceed to acquire nuclear weapons, they will certainly not be following India's example.

It is also quite wrong to imagine that the Indian explosion for peaceful purposes has somehow damaged the NPT. As I have already said, India has not and does not intend to campaign against that Treaty. The Treaty stands or falls by its own merits or demerits. Even after India's peaceful nuclear explosion we are not aware that any so-called near-nuclear State which had intended to become a party to the NPT had decided not now to do so. The others in the same category who from the beginning had refused to accept the obligations of the NPT did so for their own reasons.

There are no reasons for any doubt regarding India's views on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. For years India's policy has been stated and re-stated in this Committee. India is opposed to all proliferation, vertical or horizontal, of nuclear weapons. It is also our hope that all States -- nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States -- will, like India, commit themselves to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes only. The nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in this matter.

Before I conclude, I should like to thank the preceding speaker, Mr. Lalović of Yugoslavia, for his very understanding reference to India's peaceful nuclear explosion.

Mr. HAINWORTH (United Kingdom): I shall be very brief, since I have only asked for the floor in order to introduce a working paper which my delegation has tabled today as document CCD/440. This is entitled "A development in discriminating between seismic sources".

As is explained in the paper, this is a continuation of a series of reports on work carried out in the seismological field in the United Kingdom, and follows the two papers (CCD/401, 402) which were tabled last year in connexion with the informal meetings with experts on a comprehensive test ban. Those two papers were introduced by Dr. H. Thirlaway, Director of the United Kingdom Seismological Research Station at Blacknest in Hampshire. Last June's papers included a review of the United Kingdom seismological research and development programme and a report of the estimation of the depth of seismic events. The new paper presented today describes a technique known as "seismogram modelling", illustrated by the case of a seismic event which occurred in East Kazakhstan in 1969. We intend to continue to keep the Committee abreast of all significant and relevant developments in United Kingdom seismological research in this field.

We hope that these papers, making an original contribution to progress in seismology, will help us to attain our objective of so refining the seismic art that it may eventually prove possible adequately to verify a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The meeting rose at 11.55 a.m.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. This ensures transparency and allows for easy verification of the data.

In the second section, the author details the various methods used to collect and analyze the data. This includes both manual data entry and the use of specialized software tools. The goal is to ensure that the data is both accurate and easy to interpret.

The third section provides a detailed breakdown of the results. It shows that there is a clear trend in the data, which is consistent with the initial hypothesis. The analysis also identifies some areas where the data deviates from the expected pattern, which may be due to external factors.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the findings and a list of recommendations. It suggests that further research is needed to explore the underlying causes of the observed trends. The author also provides contact information for anyone who has any questions or needs further assistance.

The following table provides a summary of the key data points discussed in the report. It shows the overall trends and highlights the most significant findings.

| Category | Value | Notes |
|-----------------------------|-------------|---|
| Total Revenue | \$1,234,567 | Includes all sales from Q1 to Q4. |
| Operating Expenses | \$876,543 | Includes salaries, rent, and utilities. |
| Net Profit | \$358,024 | After accounting for all expenses. |
| Customer Satisfaction Score | 4.5/5 | Based on 1,000 survey responses. |
| Employee Retention Rate | 92% | Over the past 12 months. |

The data presented in the table above shows a strong positive trend in both financial and operational metrics. The net profit has increased significantly compared to the previous year, and customer satisfaction remains high. However, there are still some challenges that need to be addressed, such as the rising cost of raw materials and the need for more efficient production processes.

In conclusion, the company is in a strong position to continue its growth and success. By focusing on innovation and customer service, we can overcome the challenges ahead and achieve our long-term goals. We are confident that the future is bright for our organization.