

CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.670
8 July 1975
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 8 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. Nisibori

(Japan)

GE.75-67253

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V.E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. L. PEREIRA DA FONSECA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. R. NIKOLOV Mr. B. GRINBERG Mr. I. PETROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A.D. ROWE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. SOJÁK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. N. ELARABY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H-J. MICHEEL Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI Mr. H. THIELICKE
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. SCHLAICH Mr. J. BAUCH
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. P.R. SOOD
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. H. AMERI Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. N. DI BERNARDO Mr. G. VALDEVIT Mr. A. BIZZARINI Mr. G. SCHIAVONI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI
 Mr. A. YATABE
 Mr. H. OKA
 Mr. J. YAMADA
 Mr. N. EGUCHI
 Mr. H. OKITSU

Mexico:

Mr. M. MARÍN
 Mr. M.A. CÁCERES

Mongolia:

Morocco:

Mr. S. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. A.J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Pakistan:

Peru:

Mr. G. CHAUNY

Poland:

Mr. S. TOPA
 Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. TUDOR
 Mr. G. TINCA
 Mr. M. ROSIANU

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON
 Mr. U. REINIUS

Union of Soviet Socialist
 Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
 Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN
 Mr. N.V. PESTEREV
 Mr. L.N. ANISIMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. A. WHITE
 Mr. C. McCOLL

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN

Mr. W. GIVAN

Mr. D. WESTERVELT

Mr. C.L. WILMOT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mr. LUKABU-K'HABOUJI

Acting Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 670th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador M. Nisibori, representative of Japan.

No statements were made.

The following document was submitted:


"Letter dated 2 July 1975 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on methodology for chemical analysis and identification of CW agents -- progress of a Finnish research project (CCD/453)."

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 10 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

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The meeting rose at 10.35 a.m.



CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CCD/PV.671
10 July 1975

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 10 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. J. Castañeda

(Mexico)

GE.75-67359

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. V. E. BERASATEGUI
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. L. PEREIRA DA FONSECA
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. STEFANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U NYUNT MAUNG SHEIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. A. D. ROWE Mr. P. McRAE
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. V. SOJAK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. N. ELARABY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. W. BERHANU Mr. G. DEMISSIE
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H-J. MICHEEL Mr. M. GRACZYNSKI
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. SCHLAICH Mr. J. BAUCH
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. M. DOMOKOS Mr. D. MEISZTER Mr. I. KÖRMENDY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. B. MISHRA Mr. P. SOOD
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. H. AMERI Miss C. TAHMASSEB Mr. D. CHILATY

Italy:

Mr. N. DI BERNARDO

Mr. G. VALDEVIT

Mr. A. BIZZARINI

Mr. G. SCHIAVONI

Japan:

Mr. M. NISIBORI

Mr. A. YATABE

Mr. H. OKA

Mr. J. YAMADA

Mr. N. EGUCHI

Mr. H. OKITSU

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA

Mr. M. MARIN

Miss A. CABRERA

Mr. M. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. M. DUGERSUREN

Morocco:

Mr. S. RAHHALI

Netherlands:

Mr. C. A. van der KLAUW

Mr. A. J. MEERBURG

Nigeria:

Mr. M. SAMAKI

Pakistan:

Mr. K. SALEEM

Peru:

Mr. S. TOPA

Mr. A. CZERKAWSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. TUDOR

Mr. G. TINCA

Mr. M. ROSIANU

Sweden:

Mr. G. HAMILTON

Mr. U. REINIUS

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSCHCHIN

Mr. Y. K. NAZARKIN

Mr. N. V. PESTEREV

Mr. L. N. ANISIMOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. J. G. TAYLOR

Mr. A. WHITE

Mr. C. McCOLL

United States of America:

Mr. J. MARTIN, Jr.

Mr. W. GIVAN

Mr. J. S. COTTMAN

Mr. D. THOMPSON

Mr. D. WESTERVELT

Mr. C. L. WILMOT

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Acting Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. BJÖRNERSTEDT

Communiqué of the meeting

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament today held its 671st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H. E. Ambassador J. Castañeda, representative of Mexico.

Statements were made by the representatives of Hungary, Japan and the United States of America, and by the Chairman.

The delegation of Japan submitted a "Working paper containing the views of a Japanese Expert -- Arms Control Implications of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE)" (CCD/454).

The following document was also submitted:

"Letter dated 24 June 1975 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects" (CCD/455).

The delegation of the United States of America submitted a "Working paper on arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs)" (CCD/456).

The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 July 1975, at 10.30 a.m.

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Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): Similarly to all my colleagues who have already taken the floor before me during this summer session, I also feel it is appropriate to offer a few comments related to the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This was an event of great importance in the course of multilateral disarmament negotiations. In fulfilling its primary task — the review of the operation of the NPT — the Conference gave an opportunity to consider other related problems of disarmament, including those under negotiation in this Committee.

My delegation shares the view of those who made an essentially positive assessment on the Conference concerning the basic issue — that is, the strengthening of the Treaty and of the régime of non-proliferation.

First, the Conference reminded the Parties once again of the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons inherent in the rapid progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As a result of the Conference, Parties to the Treaty have become more conscious of this danger. It is to be hoped that the recognition of this hazard will influence all their actions connected with nuclear matters.

Secondly, immediately before and during the Conference, a number of countries — among them, five member States of EURATOM — ratified the Treaty. The Hungarian delegation regards this development as a significant contribution to the strengthening of the Treaty as well as a convincing proof of its viability and efficiency. We noted with satisfaction that the Conference stressed the importance of the universality of the NPT, and we strongly hope that States that have not yet joined the Treaty will soon do so. I feel it necessary to emphasize this point also in the CCD, because I have the impression that the non-adherence of a number of States, including nuclear-weapon States and some near-nuclear countries, did not get sufficient attention during the deliberations of the Conference.

Thirdly, the most important result of the Conference has to be seen in the reaffirmation of the commitments of the Parties to maintain and strengthen the NPT régime and the Treaty itself.

An additional reason to refer to the Review Conference is, I think, that there are some conclusions that may be derived and that are valid also in the context of our discussions within the CCD.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

One of these conclusions, in our opinion, is that the primary condition for the success of any arms control and disarmament negotiation is the consideration of the legitimate security interests of all the participants. In negotiations on disarmament matters the vital security interests of participants are affected. It is the right and duty of each Government towards its people to consider disarmament measures in the context of these vital interests. Ideas may emerge which appear to be attractive disarmament actions for one country, but the same actions might have a disadvantageous impact on the security of others. It has to be admitted at the same time that references to security interests might serve in some cases to hide negative attitudes towards specific disarmament proposals. However, no stable results in the field of arms control and disarmament can be achieved without due consideration of legitimate security interests.

For the very reason I have just outlined, the fact that the Conference, especially in its concluding phase applied the principle of consensus could be considered as one of its appreciable values. The experience gained at the Conference reaffirmed our belief that this method of decision is particularly suitable to disarmament negotiations. To achieve meaningful consensus, as we have seen it at the Conference, participants will always have to consider that, when making their choice between the alternatives of deadlock or limited success, the latter has to be preferred.

In connexion with the items on the agenda of our Committee, I wish to turn now to the study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Hungarian delegation at the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly supported resolution 3261 F (XXIX) in which the General Assembly decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, and it welcomed the request that this study should be carried out by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD. We feel that the raising of this problem within the CCD is most appropriate, since it obviously broadens the spectrum of issues before us and offers new opportunities to take advantage of the knowledge and experience accumulated within this body. We are looking forward with great interest to the experts' study and to the discussion on it in our midst.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

As far as the substance is concerned, we approach the idea of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important possibility for contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. We believe that non-proliferation on the global, as well as regional, level is essential to bring about conditions in which nuclear disarmament and thus the strengthening of international security will become possible. We are firmly convinced that, in supporting measures aimed at the achievement of universal non-proliferation, all countries participating in this effort are serving the very best interests of their own security. While underlining the contribution which nuclear-weapon-free zones could render to non-proliferation, we are not ignoring that the initiative to set up a nuclear-weapon-free zone cannot be successful without enhancing in a tangible manner the security of the given region and the security of individual States within this region.

The study being undertaken by the group of experts will, according to our understanding, have a general character. This cannot be avoided due to the fact on the one hand that conditions in various regions of the world are different and these differences would have to be kept in mind, and on the other hand that conceptions regarding potential nuclear-weapon-free zones are also different and these variety of views will be reflected in the study. Nevertheless, in the opinion of my delegation, there are a number of characteristics that would have to be taken into account whenever a concrete proposal to establish a specific zone would be negotiated:

- (a) The arrangements will have to ensure that the zone to be set up will be completely free of nuclear explosive devices and will include the prohibition of the development and production, the acquiring and possession, the deployment and stockpiling, the transport and transit of nuclear weapons.
- (b) A zone could not be viable and stable without ensuring the strengthening of the security of each of its participants.
- (c) Since the viability and effectiveness of the zone arrangements would be consolidated through the extension of guarantees by the nuclear-weapon States, it would be realistic to ensure that their legitimate security interests will also be taken into consideration.
- (d) To achieve the satisfaction of all the interests of all States concerned, the accepted norms of international law, including the freedom of the navigation on high seas and the free use of straits, will have to be complied with.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Among the items on the agenda of the CCD, one of the most important questions is the prohibition of environmental warfare. During our spring session, I had already the opportunity to present the position of the Hungarian delegation in general terms.

It is our expectation that the informal meetings with the participation of experts -- among them those of the USSR and the United States of America -- to be held from 4 August will provide each delegation with useful information and will give a new incentive for a constructive discussion in the CCD on the basis of the Soviet draft convention with a view to an early and comprehensive solution of this important problem of disarmament. Until then we would welcome additional comments by delegations on the draft convention.

I would like to make some remarks also on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, a long-standing task before this Committee.

We noted with satisfaction that bacteriological and biological (toxin) weapons, this very dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction, have been eliminated from arsenals. At the opening meeting of this session the distinguished representative of the USSR declared that his country does not possess any bacteriological agents or toxins, or means of delivery. Similar statements were made earlier by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Concerning the discussion to be continued in our Committee, I share the view of the distinguished representative of the USSR, expressed in his statement at our 666th meeting, that: "For the present, we consider it necessary that the Committee should continue its comprehensive consideration of the various aspects of this problem, on the basis of the documents submitted to the Committee, among which documents a prominent place is occupied by the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries" (CCD/PV.666, p.13).

My delegation, among a number of others, has repeatedly stated that its basic position is a comprehensive solution of the prohibition of chemical weapons. On this basis, we are ready to consider favourably a step-by-step approach if this would lead to tangible progress toward the final solution. It would be very helpful for our discussion if all interested delegations which have not yet done so would clearly state their position concerning a possible solution. Until then our deliberations will have a somewhat abstract character.

The Hungarian Government has, from the very beginning, given its full support to the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference. It has seen with satisfaction that this proposal enjoys the support of an ever-growing majority of States. My Government is fully convinced that the time is ripe and the conditions exist for starting to take practical steps aimed at the convening of the WDC.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

In its communication addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in connexion with General Assembly resolution 3260 (XXIX), the Hungarian Government expressed the conviction that: "The convening of the world disarmament conference would create a very important international forum which, as yet, is still missing from the system of independent but inevitably interacting, bilateral or multilateral organs effectively dealing with various aspects of disarmament. Consequently, it also means that the world disarmament conference would not substitute for, but properly complement, the activities already going on in the present bilateral, regional and other international bodies." (A/10090, p.2).

Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): In my statement of 24 June, I referred to the informal meetings concerning the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions which are to start on 14 July and further stated that we would submit for reference by distinguished delegates and experts a working paper containing a few comments on the main points of the discussions.

Now, the working paper is ready and before us, the title and the number being "Working paper containing the views of a Japanese Expert" (CCD/454).

The working paper attempts to sort out and examine the many difficult and complicated issues arising from the difficulty in distinguishing between peaceful and military nuclear experiments and also from the potential uses of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. In other words, the paper has been submitted in the hope of serving as an initial attempt at identifying the relationship between peaceful nuclear explosions and arms control, as made clear in the concluding chapter.

I hope that this paper will serve as a useful basis for beginning our discussions on the arms control aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions, and also wish to take this opportunity to call on the delegates, particularly those of States which have nuclear explosive capabilities, to make positive contributions in identifying the key problems, and thus supplementing our working paper.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): Since early in the nuclear age, consideration has been given to utilizing the unique characteristics of nuclear explosions for peaceful as well as military purposes. However, for a number of reasons -- including the addition last year of a sixth State with a nuclear explosive capability, the pressing worldwide need to exploit new sources of energy, agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the review of the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes has only recently become a major international issue.

At the 1974 United Nations General Assembly, many delegations noted that in approaching the overall question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, it was necessary to weigh carefully, and perhaps to balance against one another, many diverse factors -- among them economic utility, technical feasibility, health and safety concerns, legal considerations including existing treaty obligations, and arms control implications. It was generally recognized, however, that current international understanding of several of these factors was far from complete.

On the issue of economic utility, for example, a number of delegations acknowledged that to date PNEs had failed to meet early expectations. My delegation pointed out that, despite considerable efforts in PNE device design and some application experiments, the United States had not yet realized any commercial benefits from PNE technology. At the same time, it was widely recognized that use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes was still in the experimental stage, and that the possibility of achieving substantial benefits in the future could not be altogether excluded.

On the question of arms control implications, many delegations were aware of the potential conflict between the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and the promotion of important arms control objectives, particularly preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons and placing further restraints on nuclear weapons testing. However, there was considerable uncertainty and some difference of opinion as to whether or not peaceful nuclear explosions could be carried out in a manner consistent with those objectives and, if so, the circumstances under which this could be done.

In the course of the General Assembly debate it became apparent that overall assessments and policy prescriptions would have to await further efforts to resolve the remaining uncertainties. Well-informed trade-offs among the various and potentially

(Mr. Martin, United States)

competing considerations simply could not be made without a clearer understanding of each of the separate considerations involved. Accordingly, the General Assembly decided, in the form of resolution 3261 D (XXIX), on a division of labour for further examination of the diverse component parts of the PNE question.

The International Atomic Energy Agency was asked to continue its studies of the utility and feasibility of peaceful nuclear explosions, including their legal, health and safety aspects. The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was requested to give consideration to the role of PNEs as provided for in that Treaty. Finally, this Committee was called upon to examine those aspects of the problem falling within its particular area of expertise -- the arms control implications of PNEs.

The informal meetings with experts next week will give us an opportunity to work toward fulfilling the CCD's part of the General Assembly's mandate. Today, in preparation for those informal meetings, I would like to outline my Government's views on the principal issues that we believe should be covered in the Committee's consideration of the arms control implications of PNEs and to table a working paper that treats those issues in greater detail.

Basic to any examination of the arms control implications of PNEs is an understanding of the common characteristics of all nuclear explosive devices, whether intended for peaceful or military purposes. As is pointed out in the United States working paper, the most fundamental of these characteristics is that all nuclear explosives release extremely large amounts of energy from a relatively small and light package in an extremely short period of time. Moreover, the weight and external dimensions of all nuclear explosive devices considered by the United States for either military or engineering applications are such that they could all be delivered to military targets, although with varying degrees of efficiency, by a wide range of existing land, sea, or air vehicles.

We therefore do not see how nuclear explosive devices could be developed that would not be capable of military application. All existing or foreseeable nuclear explosive devices designed for peaceful purposes could be employed in some fashion as a weapon, although it should be pointed out that such devices would not necessarily add significantly to the military capability of nuclear-weapon-testing States that already possess a broad range of nuclear weapons delivery systems and nuclear explosive devices well-suited to those systems.

(Mr. Martin, United States)

From the standpoint of arms control, the chief concern in nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is their potential for contributing to nuclear weapons capabilities. An important arms control objective should therefore be to achieve adequate assurance that a nuclear explosion programme carried out for peaceful purposes does not provide nuclear-weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to the State conducting the programme. It is an objective that can and should be applied to all States. The United States working paper examines first the case of States that had not previously demonstrated a nuclear explosive capability, and then the case of existing nuclear-weapon States, to determine in each case whether and to what extent this objective can be achieved.

Given the desire of all States to enjoy the fullest possible benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a critical question is whether it is possible for a State previously without a nuclear explosive capability to carry out a PNE programme without in the process achieving a nuclear weapons capability. As the working paper points out, there is no reliable means of constraining a PNE programme by a "non-nuclear-weapon State" so as to prevent the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability. The unavoidable consequence of any test that results successfully in a nuclear detonation is to provide the testing State with confidence in the explosive capability of a device that could be used as a weapon.

The working paper goes on to examine various suggestions aimed at preventing a PNE programme from leading to a useable nuclear weapons capability -- including constraints on device characteristics, restrictions on the acquisition of delivery systems, and physical control of all special nuclear materials. It concludes that none of these methods provides a reliable basis for distinguishing between a "PNE Power" and a nuclear-weapon State.

On the basis of these considerations, the working paper asserts that the objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is incompatible with the carrying out of a PNE programme by a non-nuclear-weapon State. It was this conclusion, of course, which led to the prohibition, in article II of the NPT, of the acquisition of "nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices." However, it was fully understood at the time of the NPT negotiations that this important arms control implication of PNEs should not stand in the way of non-nuclear-weapon States receiving the potential benefits of PNE technology. Accordingly, article V was designed to assure States

(Mr. Martin, United States)

that give up the option to acquire any nuclear explosive device that they will not be denied any benefits of PNE technology that are realized by the nuclear-weapon States party to the NPT.

The United States working paper is based on the assumption that the principal arms control objective regarding PNEs should be pursued just as scrupulously in the case of nuclear-weapon States as in the case of non-nuclear-weapon States. Thus, it is necessary to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapon State PNE programmes do not provide nuclear-weapons-related benefits otherwise not available to those States. Whether or not a PNE programme carried out by a nuclear-weapon State would provide such weapons-related benefits would depend on several factors, including the extent and character of that State's existing nuclear weapons capabilities, the level of its PNE activity compared to the level of its weapons testing programme, and the effectiveness of any constraints on its PNE programme.

The working paper notes that if weapons testing were limited by international agreement while PNEs were not constrained, the potential would be created for using the PNE programme to achieve weapon-related benefits no longer available in the weapons testing programme. Therefore, in order to prevent the acquisition of such military benefits, it would be necessary to place strict controls on PNEs as well. Such constraints are currently being worked out by the two parties to the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. While it is too early to predict the content of the PNE agreement called for in article III of the Threshold Treaty, it is essential that it contain adequately verifiable constraints capable of ensuring that PNEs are consistent with the provisions of that Treaty.

Under a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing, the objective of preventing the acquisition of weapon-related benefits from a PNE programme would be considerably more difficult to achieve. Since there would be no authorized weapons testing, incentives for seeking military benefits in the course of a PNE programme would be much greater than under a threshold test ban régime that accommodated PNEs.

If PNEs were to be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban, a verification system would have to be devised that would be capable of providing adequate assurance that PNEs were not being used to test a new weapon concept, to verify the performance of weapons already in the stockpile, or to conduct studies of nuclear weapons effects.

(Mr. Martin, United States)

In assessing the feasibility of accommodating PNEs, it is important to take into account other information and experience gained in a PNE programme that could be of military value. The working paper concludes that further consideration of these difficult and complex verification issues could provide a better understanding of how it might be possible to achieve adequate assurance that nuclear-weapons-related benefits were not obtained if PNEs were to be permitted under a comprehensive weapons test ban.

It would be unrealistic to expect next week's informal meetings with experts to resolve all remaining uncertainties about the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions. However, my delegation believes that several of the important issues -- issues that are essential to a well-informed assessment of the overall PNE question -- could be clarified considerably in the course of the experts' discussions. We would hope the United States working paper will help facilitate such discussions, and our experts are coming to Geneva prepared to make a constructive contribution.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico): Before adjourning the meeting, may I remind members of the Committee that in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 664th meeting on 8 April 1975, informal meetings on the question of the arms-control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of a CTB, note being taken of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX), will begin on Monday, 14 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.

