

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.447
10 March 1988

ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 10 March 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel (Federal Republic of Germany)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 447th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 3, entitled "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". In accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, however, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Canada, Ambassador de Montigny Marchand.

Mr. de MONTIGNY MARCHAND (Canada) (translated from French):

Mr. President, I wish to join previous speakers in wishing you every success during this month when you will be guiding our deliberations and negotiations. As has been done by other speakers, I also wish to underscore the quality of the work of your two predecessors. Ambassador Morel made the intersessional period particularly useful and Ambassador Rose, for his part, was successful in creating an atmosphere that enabled us to get this session under way in almost record time. Finally, permit me to thank most warmly all those who have extended such kind words of welcome to myself and our colleagues who have recently arrived in Geneva.

(continued in English)

I wish to make mine also the eloquent words our colleague, the Australian Ambassador, Richard Butler, has used to salute International Women's Day and delegations from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. It is an honour for me today to salute and welcome in the galleries a Canadian delegation from the Voice of Women and from their group primarily dedicated to peace, arms control and disarmament. May their work in Geneva be successful.

(continued in French)

In my initial plenary statement, I wish first to comment on recent developments in the field of international security, arms control and disarmament, beginning with the bilateral negotiating process between the two main nuclear Powers. Secondly, I want to address the three principal items on our agenda: the negotiations with a view to the elimination and banning of chemical weapons, the discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In conclusion I shall talk briefly about our preparations for the third special session devoted to disarmament.

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Throughout my remarks, I will emphasize what Canada regards as a fundamentally important element that must characterize both the bilateral process and our multilateral work, namely effective verification achieved through efficient, agreed implementation mechanisms. That is an element essential to the maintenance of confidence in compliance with obligations assumed.

The Conference on Disarmament begins its work this year amidst more auspicious circumstances than have prevailed for many years. The Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) signed by President Reagan and by General Secretary Gorbachev in Washington in December last is an historic achievement. For the first time, an agreement provides for real reductions in nuclear arsenals on an international scale, and as such, it constitutes an important first step in the process of reducing nuclear weapons. Canada is fully aware of the significance of this document, as the following words from Prime Minister Brian Mulroney demonstrate:

"The Treaty is welcome for what it accomplishes. It is also welcome for what it tells us about East-West relations. Only a few years ago, such agreement seemed far in the future, hopelessly idealistic.

So much has changed since then. What was once the stuff of dreams is beginning to come within our grasp: significant arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, progress on human rights."

We are also encouraged by the evident seriousness with which the United States and the Soviet Union are pursuing additional arms control agreements in particular. The priority attention now being given to the negotiation of major reductions in strategic nuclear weapons deserves our full support. The successful conclusion of agreement in this sphere would be a key contribution towards the central objective of the arms control process: enhanced security at much lower levels of armaments.

The verification régime of the INF Treaty is a breakthrough in efforts to include effective verification provisions in a disarmament agreement. The régime provides not only for prior exchanges of data, but also for baseline inspections of facilities, challenge inspections and the establishment by each side of permanent monitoring stations at production facilities on the territory of the other. In the terms of the Declaration of Heads of State and Government of the Atlantic Alliance, issued on 3 March following the summit meeting, "The Treaty's provisions on stringent verification and asymmetrical reductions provide useful precedents for future agreements".

Indeed this Treaty, like the negotiations on substantially reducing strategic nuclear arms constitutes an encouragement, an example and a precedent for our work in the Conference on Disarmament, particularly in the chemical weapons negotiations. The bilateral negotiations have illustrated a central truth of effective arms control: meticulously detailed and often intrusive verification provisions are a necessary and central element of viable, politically sustainable arms control and disarmament agreements.

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Our work on a draft convention banning chemical weapons has progressed during the past year and during the intersessional period, thanks to the untiring efforts of the Chairman, Ambassador Ekéus and his assistants, Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Mr. Macedo and Mr. Krutzsch. This work is now continuing under the able leadership of Ambassador Sujka, to whom I pledge my full co-operation and that of my delegation.

Notwithstanding the progress achieved, it is clear to my Government that, while the end is in sight, we are not quite there yet. As Soviet Deputy Minister Petrovsky told this body on 18 February, serious major issues are still outstanding. Some of us, conscious of the enormous strides made and impatient to end the race, have suggested that these problems can be speedily resolved. I feel that implicitly, if not explicitly, denies the importance and difficulty of the remaining issues. As our colleague, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, indicated on 16 February, the danger for the marathon runner deciding to make a last desperate spurt towards his goal is that he risks running out of breath or stumbling into pitfalls. While the moment to begin our final sprint is not yet here, it is not forbidden for us to step up our pace as of now. We can and we must do so, but we should make haste carefully.

With regard to the major issues referred to by Deputy Minister Petrovsky, it is evident that several of them concern the central issue of effective verification. As pointed out last month by Mr. Genscher, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, we knew from the beginning that these issues would cause the greatest difficulties. The Minister noted that:

"The right solution to this problem would not be to dispense with a chemical weapon convention, but to seek stringent verification arrangements which effectively preclude the creation and possession of a militarily relevant chemical weapons potential."

We agree with Mr. Genscher that effective verification mechanisms to achieve this objective can be developed through joint efforts.

First and foremost among the outstanding verification issues is the question of the non-production of chemical weapons, that is, the article VI issue. These issues involve some of the most complex and difficult decisions in the entire treaty negotiation process. Assuming that we agree on the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and CW production facilities (articles III to V), how can we achieve a verification régime for non-production that will both be as reliable as possible and keep to a minimum intrusion in or interruption of the legitimate commercial activities of our chemical industries?

In the view of the Canadian Government, the problems raised here should not be insuperable. Several valuable and illuminating suggestions, such as the one recently submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany on ad hoc checks, could help to fill gaps and resolve issues and they warrant our careful consideration. Moreover, as proposed at the Puqwash Conference last January, equipment and procedures that would go a long way towards the

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achievement of our goals exist already or could be designed and developed within a reasonable time. It is encouraging to note that the industry itself is now actively aware of our problems and positively inclined to help us solve them.

Also of direct relevance to verification are article VIII and our efforts to develop an organizational structure to ensure the effective implementation of the convention, as well as its timely adaptation in the light of experience and of new technological and scientific developments. It is the International Inspectorate, with its verification tasks, that will be primarily responsible for ensuring that the convention is, and is seen to be, effectively implemented. With this in mind, my Government intends in the near future to submit working papers dealing with the International Inspectorate's personnel and other resource requirements.

The effectiveness of verification is also a relevant consideration for a third major area of concern, namely the challenge inspection provisions contained in article IX. We seem agreed that a challenge inspection is to be a last resort, for when all other avenues have been exhausted. This underlines the importance of establishing routine inspection procedures that are as complete and as comprehensive as possible. With regard to the conduct of challenge inspections, I suggest the most essential requirements are that the inspectors should have the freest access possible and all the information they need and that their technical competence should be indisputable, so that they can conduct a thorough inspection and issue a definitive report. If these requirements can be met, then many of our concerns about procedures for handling inspection reports might well be allayed or disappear.

A further major issue is the question of exchanges of data prior to the entry into force of the convention. There is no doubt that exchanges of this kind will be essential, not only to build confidence, but also to assist in making realistic assessments of the extent of verification required and the size of the machinery needed to carry it out. The information already provided by some States has been useful in this regard. We particularly welcome the attention that the United States and the USSR have given to this issue. Here I want to note our interest in the proposals submitted by Deputy Minister Petrovsky on 18 February; they contain some useful ideas which we hope will be further clarified and built upon in the weeks to come.

The negotiation of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable global ban on chemical weapons would be a pioneering achievement in the area of multilateral arms control. It would be the first time the international community had negotiated a multilateral agreement banning an entire class of weapons and incorporating detailed verification provisions touching extensively on activities in civilian industry and involving the establishment of a new administering authority to oversee its implementation in perpetuity. This, we all agree, poses formidable challenges. Our shared sense of the urgency of this work can only be strengthened by the numerous accusations, verified by the United Nations Secretary-General, of the repeated use of chemical weapons and by the disturbing reports of the proliferation of chemical weapons production capabilities. Canada was therefore gratified to note that, in

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their Joint Summit Statement on 10 December 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for intensive negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention.

I have noted the interesting points many of you have made at recent plenary meetings on problems to be resolved in the negotiations on chemical weapons. I refer in particular to the statement made by the Netherlands representative, Ambassador van Schaik, at the last plenary meeting on 8 March. I will also be addressing this subject in greater detail in the near future.

I turn now to item 1 on our agenda - the discontinuance of nuclear testing. The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty remains a fundamental Canadian policy objective. The participants in this forum have naturally noted with interest that the two major nuclear Powers have also entered into negotiations relating to nuclear tests. The planned exchange of teams for on-site observation of nuclear tests on their respective territories is a good sign and will, we hope, lead to the early ratification, as a first step, of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests. This is the kind of step-by-step process which Canada has always advocated as the most realistic means of making progress on the control and eventual elimination of nuclear tests. We earnestly hope that these negotiations will proceed as soon as possible to the second phase in this process, namely, the adoption of further limitations on nuclear testing.

Like Ambassador Yamada of Japan, I feel it is particularly important to see this development between the United States and the Soviet Union as presenting an opportunity for advancing our work in this multilateral forum, not the opposite. I fully agree with him that it is equally important for the two major nuclear Powers to become constructively engaged in the multilateral process so that progress may be achieved in this area.

In the search for ways to move forward on the issue of the complete discontinuance of testing, we must rise above differences on the content of the mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee so that discussions on the substance of the issue can finally get under way. Any attempts to impose an approach which remains unacceptable to the major nuclear-weapon States are obviously doomed to failure. We must also give careful consideration to how we can best structure our work so as to support and complement the United States-USSR negotiating process.

There is one area of work on which we all agree: the development of an international seismic data network for the verification of the complete discontinuance of testing. The steady progress made in this respect by the Ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts is truly a reason for satisfaction. We expect the Group to continue its important work here throughout the year, inter alia, by moving forward with the preparations for the international data exchange experiment, an experiment which a member of my delegation, Mr. Peter Basham, has been asked to co-ordinate.

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We are pleased that the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space has finally been re-established. Our discussion under that agenda item shows that we are well aware that we are confronted with what is potentially a completely new theatre of operations. Often, however, our recognition of this fact paradoxically goes both too far and not far enough. Too far, in the sense that the desire of some to prevent militarization before it is too late takes no account of the fact that military-related activities have been going on in outer space for the past 30 years. That is a fact that can be wished away; nor, in view of the stabilizing role of many of these activities, do I think it should be wished away. At the same time, our recognition does not go far enough. Too often, our discussions reflect neither the innovative and evolving aspects of the legal régime applicable to outer space, the elements of which are gradually being put in place, nor the incredible rapidity of changes in space technology.

I do not think I am overstating the case if I suggest that, unless we all come to grips with the reality of the existing situation and acknowledge the revolutionary nature of the task before us, the work of this Conference on the prevention of an arms race in outer space will go unfinished.

When we look at what the Ad hoc Committee has done, we cannot help thinking that results are slow in coming. We seem to be applying ourselves to going over some already well-trodden ground. Yet our discussion of the legal issues, of verification and compliance and of definitions and terminology, to cite only a few examples, have by no means exhausted the mandate agreed on at the start.

We might try to give fresh impetus to our work in the Ad hoc Committee by taking to heart some of the lessons we are learning in our discussions under other agenda items. I am thinking, in particular, of chemical weapons, where it is obvious that a wide range of issues did not receive the attention they deserved from the Conference as a whole until the pace of the work forced all participants to give them priority. In the Ad hoc Committee on Outer Space, we should try to avoid any situation of this kind.

Here, too, we can try to enrich our work through interaction with the bilateral negotiations between the two major space Powers. In the view of the Canadian delegation, we must be particularly careful not to do anything that would be detrimental to the progress of the bilateral space talks. We hope that the two major space Powers might see some advantage in promoting a discussion in this forum of some of the practical and legal problems that have come to light during their talks.

In the past few years, the participants in this Conference have worked hard to shed more light on the issues involved in the conclusion of a treaty or treaties on radiological weapons. Under the able guidance of our British colleague, Ambassador Solesby, we are making another effort this year to move forward on this issue.

I do hope that we will be able to make progress on this question. If, however, despite all our best efforts, we are unable to do so, I think that

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our report to SSOD-III should reflect both that fact itself and the conclusions to be drawn from it regarding the agenda for our Conference in the years to come.

The third United Nations special session devoted to disarmament will be one of the major events of this year. That, of course, will have significant implications for our programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament. More specifically, we will have to prepare a report on our activities for submission to the special session. Our report should be concise, factual and free from polemics. Important and useful work has been done in several areas. Moreover, as Mr. Várkonyi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, rightly pointed out in the statement he recently made here, the Conference on Disarmament reflects the international political climate and, even during a relatively unproductive period, serves as an important forum for dialogue. My delegation also agrees with Minister Várkonyi that we need to give more serious attention to how we might improve our own procedures. His suggestions in that regard deserve careful study.

Lastly, I feel I must point out that the results of the work of the preparatory committee for the special session were a disappointment, but not a disaster. As we approach the special session itself, we must change our attitude in order to make that meeting a success that will give fresh impetus to the multilateral arms control and disarmament process. To press unrealistically for the setting of comprehensive and detailed negotiating priorities and targets in ways which are unacceptable to many countries would be a recipe for failure. No participant should be expected to subscribe to commitments inconsistent with its own policies and objectives. In addition, all participants must recognize the need for flexibility and constructive give-and-take as a contribution to the legitimate efforts being made by the international community to discuss security and arms control issues of vital concern to it and to express those concerns with one voice. We must avoid making the special session a stage for acrimonious and futile exchanges. Instead, it must be a co-operative endeavour to define realistic, forward-looking priorities for the multilateral arms control agenda.

As my predecessor, Ambassador Beesley, told the Conference earlier, "the establishment of a stable basis for enjoying international peace and security must not and cannot be a proprietary monopoly of the two super-Powers". In this and other multilateral arms control forums, we must take care to ensure that our efforts do not undermine the vitally important bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR; they must, on the contrary, support that process. It is in this spirit that we subscribe to the concept of "constructive parallelism", referred to by Foreign Minister Genscher at the opening of our session.

I should like to conclude on an optimistic note. The question of arms control and disarmament is a central element of the international political agenda and, as the old adage has it, politics is "the art of the possible". Rhetoric has its place, but our words and aspirations must not lose touch with reality. Otherwise, we risk sinking into futility and ridicule. Realism does not preclude optimism and, as I said at the beginning of my statement, more may now be possible than we not long ago dared to hope. Let us get down to work.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Friedersdorf.

Mr. FRIEDERSDORF (United States of America): Mr. President, the United States delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the Chair of the Conference on Disarmament for the month of March. Our two delegations have worked closely together over the years, and we stand ready to support you in your efforts to guide the work of the Conference in this important period prior to the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Our delegation also congratulates Ambassador Rose of the German Democratic Republic for the very efficient and courteous way in which he conducted his presidency during the month of February.

This week the Conference has on its programme of work agenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". The views of the United States with regard to this agenda item have been expressed in this Conference at some length on previous occasions, and I do not propose to address them again now in detail. I would, however, like to point out that agenda item 3 has two parts, both of which are important. In our view, the second part of this item, that is, "including all related matters", encompasses the vital objective of preventing all wars, not just nuclear wars.

The question of preventing nuclear war cannot be isolated from the problem of preventing all types of war. The fundamental issue is how to maintain peace and international security in the nuclear age. In addressing this issue, it should be recognized that the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence in preventing war and preserving peace in Europe since 1945 cannot be disproven. But, during this same period, millions of casualties have been inflicted around the world in non-nuclear armed conflicts.

Nuclear deterrence is a fact of life that in our view has made a significant contribution to East-West stability. At the same time, the large asymmetries in the conventional forces that exist in Europe clearly must be addressed to improve stability in that region. And conventional arms control deserves attention in other regions as well.

In the joint communiqué following their summit meeting in November 1985, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev pointed out the importance of avoiding any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. As a contribution toward this objective, I would like today to discuss briefly an Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union that pertains more directly to the first part of agenda item 3. The Agreement concerns the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centres. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed this Agreement in Washington on 15 September 1987. It is the result of bilateral efforts, which began at the expert level in 1986, and became formal negotiations in 1987. In parallel with the delegation of the Soviet Union,

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

our delegation is introducing the text of this Agreement, together with that of its two Protocols, as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/815.

On the occasion of the signing of this Agreement, President Reagan pointed out that the nuclear risk reduction centres to be established in the capitals of the United States and the Soviet Union would "play an important role in further lessening the chances of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union". While these new centres are intended, as their name implies, to reduce the risk of nuclear war, it is important to note that President Reagan refers to their role in reducing the risk of any conflict, not just nuclear conflict.

President Reagan also welcomed this Agreement as another means of building confidence between the two countries. He observed that the Agreement establishes "the first new, direct channel for communications between Washington and Moscow since the creation of the 'hot line' in 1963" and that it constituted "another practical step in our efforts to reduce the risks of conflict that could otherwise result from accident, miscalculation, or misunderstanding".

In signing this Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union affirmed their desire, as stated in the preamble of the Agreement, "to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular, as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident". The preamble also declares, in a frequently quoted passage, "that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" and "that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interest of strengthening international peace and security".

Under the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union are each establishing in their respective capitals a national centre which is to be used to transmit notifications such as those required concerning ballistic missile launches under article 4 of the 1971 United States-Soviet Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War, and under paragraph 1 of article VI of the 1972 United States-Soviet Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas. Each side has also agreed that, at its discretion, it may, as a display of good will and to help build confidence, use the nuclear risk reduction centres to transmit other communications.

In addition, under paragraph 2 of article IX of the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty of 8 December 1987, the text of which is contained in document CD/798, the two sides have agreed to make use of the nuclear risk reduction centres to update data provided initially in the INF Treaty's Memorandum of Understanding, and to provide notifications required by the Treaty.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement will establish communications channels that permit the rapid and secure transfer of data and facsimile via INTELSAT and STATIONAR satellite circuits.

(Mr. Friedersdorf, United States)

This Agreement neither replaces nor affects the operation of the existing communications link between the United States and the Soviet Union known as the "hot line", which has twice been upgraded and now also allows the exchange of facsimile material as well as of messages.

The Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement complements both the ongoing efforts of the United States to reach agreement in the nuclear and space talks on broad, deep and effectively verifiable reductions of strategic nuclear weapons, and other United States efforts to achieve a more stable and secure international environment. We believe that it makes a practical, substantive contribution toward attaining the objectives embodied in agenda item 3 of this Conference, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters".

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Permit me first to congratulate you, Sir, on taking office as President of the Conference for the month of March and to wish you success in this important post. I should also like to express my gratitude to your predecessor in this post, Ambassador Rose, who in guiding the work of the Conference on Disarmament in the first month of the session, laid down a sound basis for its future activity.

Today, the Soviet delegation, in parallel with the delegation of the United States of America, is submitting to the Conference on Disarmament as official documents the texts of the Soviet/American Agreement on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers and the two Protocols thereto which were signed at Washington on 15 September 1987 by the USSR Minister for Foreign Affairs, E.A. Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, G. Shultz.

The point of the Agreement is the following. It is a matter of establishing new machinery for the expeditious transmission of notifications - on the basis of the relevant Soviet/American agreements already in existence - in connection with activity in the military sphere that could be misinterpreted by the other side, which situation could, in its turn, become the cause of an increase in the nuclear threat. The transmission of the aforementioned information through a single channel - through the centres to be established - ensures additional possibilities for giving warning of dangerous situations. It is precisely for this reason that, in the preamble to the Agreement, the parties have affirmed their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Specifically, the Agreement that has been reached includes the following.

In keeping with the Agreement, each party will establish in its capital a national nuclear risk reduction centre. This centre will operate on behalf, and under the control of its respective Government. Each national centre will be staffed as the Party establishing it deems appropriate in order to ensure its normal functioning.

It is provided that at this stage the centres will be used for the transmission of notifications of ballistic missile launches under article 4 of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War between the USSR and the United States, of 30 September 1971, that is, planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond national territory in the direction of the other party. Also transmitted through the centres will be notifications of ballistic missile launches under article VI, paragraph 1, of the Soviet-American intergovernmental Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas, of 25 May 1972, that is, missile launches which represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight. This, of course, does not rescind the existing practice of notification which the USSR and the United States carry out under the 1972 Agreement with respect to all other States.

The Agreement that has been concluded means the establishment between the USSR and the United States of yet another channel for timely communication on issues of direct relevance to the guaranteeing of stability and mutual confidence. It should be stressed that the work of the centres will in no way duplicate or replace the functions of the existing direct Moscow/Washington communications link that ensures the possibility of the immediate establishment of direct contact between the leaders of the USSR and the United States should extraordinary circumstances arise.

The conclusion of the Soviet/American Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers Agreement means that a substantial step has been taken towards confidence-building. For all that, of course, we have to bear in mind that confidence-building measures are not in themselves capable of stopping the continuing arms race. Experience shows that the continuation, and still more so the whipping-up of military competition and the transfer thereof into new spheres, is the main source of instability on the international scene. Confidence-building measures become truly effective if they are taken in the context of practical agreements in the field of real disarmament. The rule here is unequivocal: the lower the level of military - and, above all nuclear - confrontation, the greater the mutual confidence and the possibilities for instituting peaceful co-operation among States in various fields.

One of the characteristic traits of the Agreement on the centres is precisely the organic link established with future agreements between the USSR and the United States on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons. This finds its expression in the provision to the effect that in the future the list of notifications transmitted through the centres may be altered by agreement between the Parties as relevant new agreements are reached.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

In this connection, I should like to draw attention to the fact that in the INF Treaty it is provided, in article 9, that the Parties will update the data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to the INF Treaty and will provide the notifications required by that Treaty through the nuclear risk reduction centres.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that, to solve the problem of eliminating nuclear war from the life of human society, more radical measures are required, and first and foremost measures to reduce the existing levels of nuclear armaments until their final elimination. Not nuclear deterrence, but the freeing of the world from nuclear weapons and the creation of a comprehensive system of international security - that is the passport to a future where the security of all is the guarantee of the security of each.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he expressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

The secretariat has circulated today an informal paper containing the timetable of meetings for the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and subject to change, if necessary. In that connection, I should like to inform the Conference that I have met with the chairmen of Ad hoc Committees to review the situation in view of the increasing workload facing the Conference and its subsidiary bodies as the first part of the annual session proceeds. The timetable that is being circulated today reflects the results of my consultations with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees, and I hope that it will be acceptable to all of you. If I see no objection, I shall consider that the Conference adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

I should like to inform the Conference that at the plenary meeting next Tuesday we shall receive the visit of His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway, Mr. Thorvald Stoltenberg. I would be grateful if, as on previous occasions of high-level visits to the Conference, delegations were already in the Council Chamber at 9.55 a.m. on Tuesday, so that they may greet the Minister before we start the plenary meeting punctually.

The Ad hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances will meet immediately following the adjournment of the plenary this morning in this same conference room.

As there is no other business for today, I intend now to adjourn this meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 15 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.