

# CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 17 March 1988, at 10 a.m.

President: Mr. Paul Joachim von Stülpnagel (Federal Republic of Germany)

The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 449th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In conformity with our programme of work, the Conference continues consideration of agenda item 4, entitled "Chemical weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. I give the floor to the representative of France, Ambassador Morel.

Mr. MOREL (France) (translated from French): Mr. President, permit me to begin by extending to you my warmest congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Conference - for a term already marked by significant results - and to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. I greet in you a friend, a diplomat known for his thoroughness, his experience and his authority. I greet also the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, which has embarked with France on an exceptional undertaking: our two countries have managed to break out of an antagonistic and painful past to build together a common and peaceful future. If disarmament has any meaning, it is certainly between the French and the Germans, and irreversibly so.

I would also like to extend my thanks to Ambassador Rose for his efficient presidency, which gave an excellent start to our work for this year.

Permit me also to welcome the new representatives, Ambassador Solesby of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Marchand of Canada, Ambassador Elaraby of Egypt, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, Ambassador Azikiwe of Nigeria, Ambassador M'Buze-Nsomi of Zaire and Ambassador Nasserri of Iran. May I assure them of the co-operation of the delegation of France.

As this session begins, the state of the negotiations in the field of disarmament shows 1988 to be marked by several important dates, whether multilateral, bilateral or regional. The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly, which will take place exactly 10 years after the first, the forthcoming Soviet/United States summit with the possible signature of a treaty on strategic weapons and space, and the completion in Vienna of the mandate for negotiations in the framework of the CSCE on confidence-building measures and conventional stability are all major events requiring the marking-out of courses conducive to genuine disarmament, that is, disarmament that will yield greater security. It is time to take stock, assess the situation as it is and establish true priorities, without mincing words, whether it be in the case of nuclear weapons or of security in Europe, chemical weapons or the other aspects of disarmament.

To begin with the nuclear field, we have yet to identify all the effects of the major step constituted by the Washington Treaty on intermediate-range nuclear missiles. As the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Jean-Bernard Raimond, said recently, let us leave it to history to decide whether it is an historic document. The very fact that it is so new means

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that we will have to be particularly careful in terms of its implementation in practice in the case of the two States concerned, and we must also look closely at its broader political and strategic effects.

In this respect, I would like to dwell for a moment on the Treaty's innovative provisions regarding verification, which are already being referred to as models for other disarmament agreements. There is no doubt that the complex mechanism of the six different categories of on-site inspection merits our attention. To our mind, however, it is not so much a question of seeking in it an example as of drawing from it a number of lessons. For the time being, let us note that the rules in question are:

Essential: without them, there would have been no treaty;

Multiple: one precaution is not enough; it must be possible to grasp the reality of a situation from several angles at the same time;

Specific: direct transposition of these procedures to other categories of weapons is not conceivable.

In other words, there can be no ready-made pattern in the field of verification. Each treaty must define and contain its own régime. The Soviet/United States arrangements mark significant progress, and one could even wish to go further in the area in question. However, the idea that they should be the compulsory reference for all the other agreements must be dismissed, as must, still more strongly, the excessive ambition of instituting an international verification system to supervise the application of all disarmament agreements. Verification should be determined in the light of practical experience in the field in question, and not on the basis of a preconceived model.

The bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on their strategic weapons and on space remind us at the same time of the imperatives peculiar to each category of weapon. The variety and dispersion of the systems concerned, as of the production processes, the fact that at issue will be reductions and not elimination, the need to go to undeclared sites and the impossibility of applying the same degree of intrusion everywhere are sufficient to show that, between one treaty and another, the difference is not one of degree, but of nature, even though the negotiating process is one and the same, between just two partners.

Owing to these difficulties, and others no doubt, the signing of a new document at the forthcoming summit is, it seems, possible but not definite. It is not for us to substitute for the negotiators, and the delegations meeting in the Conference are well placed to assess the objective constraints that inevitably complicate even negotiations conducted with all the requisite diligence. But precisely because of the importance for the entire international community of the objective of reducing strategic weapons arms by half that the two negotiators have set themselves, we must ensure that it is not set aside or watered down.

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Quite apart from the possible extension of the time-limits, it can already be presumed that the START treaty will not lead to a reduction of 50% of the two countries' strategic warheads, but probably to a cut of the order of 35%. The effect of such an adjustment would be to bring the strategic forces of the two greatest Powers down by the end of the century to their level of approximately 1975.

No one can, for all that, resign themselves to the failure or bogging-down of the START negotiations; quite the contrary. The difficulties inherent in the undertaking must not lead us to question the priority accorded by the two negotiators, and by the entire international community, to the drastic reduction of Soviet and United States strategic weapons, which for decades have been the particular point of application of the arms race. At the same time, and indissociably from this, it is essential, in our view, to confirm and even to consolidate the ABM Treaty, which contributes to strategic stability.

Nothing, therefore, can justify digressing from this universally recognized, vital objective. The temptation does, however, exist to turn aside in order to embark, in the name of a so-called extension of the INF Agreement, on the course of the denuclearization of Europe, which would run precisely counter to everything that has gradually been consolidated on the continent since the war.

It would, to our mind, mean the veritable hijacking of the Washington Treaty for political ends that are foreign to its *raison d'être* and profoundly contrary to the interests of the European countries. This confusion would undermine from the outset the confidence in the merits of this Treaty and would call in question the credibility of the START negotiations. To propose the denuclearization of Europe is, politically speaking, to seek to make it once again a subject of negotiation among the biggest Powers, while militarily speaking, it is implicitly to accept a situation where conventional conflict - or the threat of such conflict - would again be possible. We cannot, therefore, allow ourselves to be caught up in that process, which would provide the classic example of disarmament leading to insecurity.

The urgency, in Europe, lies elsewhere. What must indeed be sought is conventional disarmament, in the context of the well-established and now indispensable process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; the framework has already been established in Vienna: twofold negotiations on confidence-building measures after Stockholm going as far as measures of transparency and, perhaps, constraint and on conventional stability through the reduction and redeployment of the arms most suitable for use in surprise attacks.

Does this mean that, once the balance between conventional forces has been restored, we would be prepared for our part to renounce nuclear weapons? At the risk of creating a surprise, the answer must be no. Conventional balance is eminently desirable, but history, in Europe and elsewhere, has shown that it is not enough. Furthermore, we must not forget after the INF Treaty that a strategic system can always strike below its maximum range.

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Moreover, nothing is more mobile than a submarine bearing nuclear weapons, and the most recent redeployments are confirmation that Europe has not ceased - far from it - to be a prime target for all the existing categories of nuclear weapons.

We are not dismissing any prospects for genuine, verifiable disarmament, but we do not intend to renounce the practical necessity of deterrence as it has gone down in history. It is, in Europe in any event, the only means of preventing aggression in whatever form. We cannot, therefore, stop at the statement made in Geneva in 1985, and often quoted, according to which "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". That eminently Soviet/American pronouncement is perhaps the beginning of wisdom for those who in the past considered they could win such a war, but it is none the less a product of specific circumstances, incomplete and, in the final analysis, ambiguous. Nuclear weapons aim to prevent all wars, and the question of perhaps winning such a conflict does not even come into it. At the same time, the other types of weapon cannot be ignored. The phrase cannot, therefore, be held up as a universal truth.

There remains the question of nuclear testing, which continues to hold the Conference's attention to no avail. Our position is well known, and we have not sought to complicate the discussions and work here in Geneva, quite the contrary. We feel bound to remark once again that this question is not, to our way of thinking, a true priority. In our opinion, reducing tests to the point of banning them completely would be meaningful only at the end of a process of nuclear disarmament.

There is, of course, the recent start of Soviet/United States negotiations on the verification of partial agreements signed 12 and 14 years ago. But here again, the time lag speaks for itself. If there is any urgency, it is more symbolic than real. As for the idea that is sometimes voiced of reducing the threshold and number of tests, it is not axiomatic that the reduction of weapons leads to the reduction of tests. It will be a long time before the still hypothetical self-limitation of the two major Powers calls in question the substantial fruits of their long-standing super-strength, as a result of which we have to remain vigilant. We will therefore continue cautiously to conduct our tests, which are indispensable for the maintenance of our deterrent force at the level necessary for its credibility.

With respect to chemical disarmament, I would recall that, in 1978 and again in 1983, the highest authorities of the French Republic made the banning of these weapons one of the conditions for participation by our country in multilateral negotiations on nuclear weapons. That is to say that France accords vital importance to the negotiations that currently account for the bulk of the activity of the Conference on Disarmament.

In order to assess the state of the work under way under Ambassador Sujka's authority, it suffices to compare what has been settled with what has not yet been settled. Considerable progress has been made, sometimes spectacularly so, and the convention is therefore gradually taking

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shape. But there is also considerable work still to be done and it is too early to set a date. Rather than thinking a priori that a few political compromises would suffice to settle the real questions that are now at issue, let us try, without preconceived ideas, briefly to identify those questions.

Going through the convention, it is possible to find a dozen or so major subjects for which, after so many years of negotiation, no solution has been found. For each of them, the problem is not, as sometimes happens, just with a particular point or a specific obstacle. No, in each case there is a set of difficulties, a nucleus of problems. These are, to our mind, the main points still outstanding:

First, problems of definition, with respect to which widely differing positions have been voiced, though I will not recall them here;

Second, declarations and data exchange as provided for in the convention, a point I just mention now and to which I will revert later in my statement;

Third, designation of substances, whether it be super-toxic lethal chemicals or more generally future conditions for list management. In this regard, I would recall the role that should, as we see it, be played by the scientific advisory council which is indispensable to the proper functioning of a convention of unlimited duration;

Fourth, the order of destruction of stocks. This point is of particular interest to us, and I need not recall our concern that the convention should assure equal security for all parties during the transitional period. But, contrary to what some might wish, we are not alone in attaching importance to this point; far from it. We are perhaps alone for the time being in raising this problem untiringly, simply because it exists; but I must say that, even if we have not yet found a solution, the reactions that we have seen so far lead us to believe that we are not working in vain. In the context of this inventory, I should just like to make clear a few elements of our position:

The idea of the levelling-out of stocks is an interesting element: As it has been presented so far, it really applies only to the end of the transitional period and only settles a part of the problem: what means does it offer for dealing with the case of recalcitrant countries that choose to remain outside the convention and join it only during the eighth year, in the final phase of destruction?

This example shows that an approach based on an immediate "freeze" of the existing situation is incapable of satisfying the twofold need to ensure the security of all countries during the period of destruction of stocks and to make the convention attractive to all. That is what led us to submit our proposal.

To take only the situation in Europe, it would not be acceptable if, on the entry into force of the convention, a country had a virtual chemical monopoly. It could be argued that the present situation is not very far from that; however, the other European nations now have the possibility of

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organizing their chemical defence as they see fit, in keeping with their assessment of the threat. This possibility must be left open to them, if they wish, for as long as the threat persists, but within narrow limits, under international control, until reduction of the present stocks has been virtually completed, that is, the eighth year after the entry into force of the convention.

In that way, the first phase of the convention would indeed be what it should be: a period of transition, not only as regards the destruction of stocks but also as regards the organization of security. A country should not overnight be placed abruptly and irreversibly in a situation where it is unable to organize its chemical defence; it is, on the other hand, fair that it should find itself in a situation of lesser freedom. Whence the idea, which we consider an essential one, of leaving open, under the strict conditions we have proposed, the possibility of having a minimum security stock supplemented by a production unit placed, from the moment of entry into force, under international control.

We have often been criticized for favouring proliferation in this way, whereas we want, on the contrary, to prevent it. We think that a convention that neglected the real difficulties of this especially critical period would offer the best of alibis to those in favour of proliferation, and that a transitional and selective arrangement whereby the security States deemed indispensable would have a very real price, namely the permanent intrusion of international verification, would oblige each country to make a clear declaration and to shoulder its responsibilities, thus depriving the possible recalcitrants of a convenient loophole.

To resume my inventory, I come now to the fifth point, verification. It must still be checked that régimes 2 and 3 defined for civilian industry will be viable. With respect to routine inspections, which should perhaps be described as regular inspections so as to avoid any pejorative connotation that would detract from the importance of a central mechanism, we think it better, rather than to construct an intermediate category of inspection halfway between current practice and challenge, to be prepared to broaden their range. In our opinion, the most recent proposals concerning ad hoc or confirmatory inspections should be integrated appropriately into the regular verification activities.

Sixth, I will turn to institutions. The main lines of the edifice have already been drawn, but what should be the specific weights of the various organs, their respective areas of competence, their modes of operation? With respect more particularly to the composition of the Executive Council, we think that the aim should be a mechanism that is not simply a copy of the usual rules in general political bodies such as the United Nations or this Conference, but is, on the contrary, directly linked to the convention itself and so combines the geographical, the political and the industrial criteria.

Concerning the seventh point, challenge inspection, there is no need to recall the progress already made. However, several important issues are still pending, particularly that of the last phase, which concerns consideration of

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the report of the inspectors and the possible consequences thereof. The divergences concerning the respective roles of the requesting State and the Executive Council are manifest. As a preliminary step, to facilitate the discussion and without prejudging the balance that is ultimately agreed on, we propose looking into the following sequence, which, it seems to us, derives from the very nature of the exercise: first, the inspection team would simultaneously submit its report to the requesting State, the requested State and the Executive Council so that consultations can commence among the parties concerned; second, the requesting State - which, let us not forget, would be at the origin of the procedure - would take a formal stand in the light of the report and indicate whether it considered there had been a violation of the convention or not and the consequences it drew from that; third, the Executive Council would adopt its position on the report and its possible consequences. This is, I repeat, a possible working framework which deliberately leaves open several very important substantive issues.

The eighth point is assistance and economic and technological development. This, as numerous delegations have pointed out, is an essential element of the convention for the same reason as those already mentioned. Technical and industrial co-operation will be one of the fields covered by the convention, as will verification machinery. In the light of the various interesting proposals made recently with respect to assistance, it can, furthermore, be seen that there is a direct link between assistance and security during the transitional period.

The ninth point is the entry into force of the convention. Many questions remain open, and the mention simply of a figure for the number of States necessary for implementation will not be enough to resolve them. Thought must also be given to the integration of laggard States in the activities in the transitional period.

Finally, there is the question of linkage between the convention and the Geneva Protocol.

This relatively brief inventory is in no way exhaustive, and other participants in the negotiations could compile it quite differently, with very good reasons. But I hope we are well understood: this cannot be used as an alibi for doing nothing or to win time. The experience of recent years, and particularly of the past few months, has, on the contrary, shown that these very real difficulties can be overcome through patient and methodical endeavour. But it would be futile to imagine that a sudden political inspiration could at one stroke bring about a solution comparable to the gesture of the Emperor Alexander to Gordius of Phrygia. It would at worst be to deceive ourselves and at best to put off the difficulty until later and so undermine the convention in advance. The best way to make progress towards a credible, stable and durable convention is not to set a date - which would necessarily be artificial - but to intensify our work. We are prepared to do that at any moment.



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The question of information for the future parties to the convention, which has the Conference's attention today, is an important element, and even an indispensable one in certain instances, even before the text is completed. We have stressed this on several occasions. Signing cannot be a shot in the dark. But it is also clear that the gathering of the data necessary for developing the various mechanisms of the convention is a sensitive exercise which must be subject to the convention itself and must not become an autonomous exercise. An effort must therefore be made to define the modalities for such an exchange precisely by relating it constantly to the negotiations now under way.

The very general two-stage system described in the Memorandum submitted by the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union a month ago deserves detailed consideration. We must, however, draw attention as of now to a series of drawbacks. First of all, technical drawbacks: several of the classifications mentioned are not yet the subject of agreed definition. The Soviet Union, having noted this itself, is proposing that everyone should add their own definition; such an exercise would result in the formation of a mass of heterogeneous and not immediately verifiable information and would at the same time tend to crystallize the differences of position on this matter. Next, legal and political drawbacks: no rule of law can compel a State to participate in such an exercise until it has signed the convention. There is, of course, the factor of confidence, but confidence is not something that can be decreed, and the recent experience of the Stockholm Conference has shown that several years were needed to come up with an agreed mechanism for the multilateral transmission of information on military activities. In other words, such a system for generalized exchange of information would rapidly give rise to parallel negotiations culminating in a sort of "shadow convention" that would be fatal for the real convention. Far from speeding up the negotiations, such a procedure would in fact delay it and distort its mechanisms in advance.

Our thinking is therefore oriented towards the definition of a far more specific mechanism.

First of all, rather than confusing them, a clear distinction must be made between the preliminary transmission of information before the completion of the treaty and the normal data exchange that will take place after the entry into force under the agreed rules and with the necessary means of verification. Of course, it is not a distinction that it is easy to make, and we would like it to be discussed in depth. It seems to us at first sight that the "need to know" as it emerges from the negotiation of the essential provisions of the convention would provide a more specific and objective criterion than overly general provisions defined in the light of the inevitably vaguer criterion of confidence. Once the outlines have been clearly determined, it would be advisable to check on the satisfaction at the same time of a certain number of conditions with respect to the internal balance of the convention: the transmission of information will be meaningful and effective only if the draft convention spells out beforehand the definitions of the data in question, the modalities for actual exchange after

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the period of 30 days from the entry into force, the relevant verification régime and, finally, the main characteristics of security during the transitional period.

That seems to us to be the means to avoid the confusion of species and a slide towards the parallel negotiation of a "convention bis". Data exchange cannot of itself anticipate the entire convention and establish confidence in one go. It is just a part - an important part, of course - of a whole that is to come. The exchange of information that we suggest would thus confirm the viability of the essential provisions of the convention even before the conclusion of the negotiations. To seek to prove too much before the signing or before the entry into force might, on the other hand, lead to a cheapened convention, which is not our objective.

As regards the other items on the agenda, I cannot go into them in such detail but I must at least mention them, beginning with the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

We think that a commendable effort has been made within the framework of the Committee over the past few years. And yet the opportunities for true multilateral work have not been fully exploited; far from it. We are not alone in regretting this, but opinions differ as to the reasons for the shortcoming. Several countries think that it is a question of mandate, and that there is a need for an agreement on a more precise, more directive and more ambitious text. For our part we do not think that that is a promising path to take. On the contrary, it seems to us that the framework that has been determined and has now been carried over on several occasions is altogether appropriate. What is needed is to reconsider the way in which we discuss the prevention of the arms race in outer space, so as to tackle the question in a specific, concrete and realistic fashion.

In the light of the discussions over the past few years, it seems to us that the Conference is now at a turning-point and must shoulder its responsibilities: either it continues its work by using the true situation in outer space as a basis to establish and progressively strengthen the role of the international community in this field, a field that is going to be *changing very fast*, or it becomes bogged down in a debate on principles without any foothold in reality.

Let us call a spade a spade: 70% of outer space activities are now military in nature, and that situation will not change soon. Furthermore, most of these activities - warning and detection, monitoring, communications, navigation, meteorology, data collection - contribute to strategic stability and more generally to the security of States throughout the world, and play an *already significant and certainly increasing* role in arms control.

Saying this is not a matter of pleading the cause of fatalism but of trying to size up the movement now under way. Civilian activity in space is progressing at the same time as military activity, and in certain cases it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish between them. That is to say

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that one cannot be content with declaratory acts or arbitrarily fixed borders. Nor can one ignore what is going on in the Soviet/United States bilateral framework.

It seems to us, therefore that the Ad hoc Committee that has just been re-established under the chairmanship of Ambassador Taylhardat must take advantage of the situation to determine an approach that is both modest and ambitious. Modest because nothing can be done without real collective competence, which must be rapidly increased, in particular by recourse to national experts who could strengthen delegations in turn; ambitious because, even starting from the current situation, it is possible, so broad are the prospects, to identify the most promising directions for international action - and we are thinking in particular of non-interference in non-aggressive space activities, the preparation of a code of conduct in outer space, the strengthening of notification, and verification.

With respect to agenda item 6, namely negative security assurances, our position is well known.

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, France stated that "for its part ... it will not use nuclear arms against a State that does not have them and that has pledged not to seek them, except if an act of aggression is carried out in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State against France or against a State with which France has a security commitment".

I would like to stress that this is a firm and solemn commitment. It is universally applicable; the condition of non-aggression attached to it shows that it is meant to cover specific, concrete situations and goes beyond declarations of intent.

The delegation of France is prepared to participate once again, in the framework of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 6, in the search for a common solution to the question of negative security assurances. Such a formula should however be fully compatible with the unilateral declaration by France that I have just recalled.

With respect to radiological weapons, I would like to say that the delegation of France is still interested in the negotiation of an agreement on a ban, and is participating in the efforts to progress on this matter in the Ad hoc Committee chaired by Ambassador Solesby. At the same time it reaffirms its earlier position with respect to the work on the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities.

Under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is this year again pursuing its efforts to prepare a draft text acceptable to all and free from all the square brackets now encumbering it. We hope that these efforts will make it possible to transmit to the General Assembly a document reflecting a balanced and realistic approach to the enterprise of disarmament. We are well aware, however, how much remains to be done.

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In reviewing these many quite different subjects of varying degrees of complexity I have tried to show that, in each instance, France has sought to maintain a constant attitude based on a few very simple rules: not everything is possible, so the starting-point must be the situation as it is, not in order to set limits to ambitions but in order to make the best disposition of the resources, as far removed as possible from slogans and ready-made formulae. That will again be our attitude at the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Nazarkin.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The USSR delegation has asked for the floor today to submit for circulation as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament a Soviet proposal for the "establishment of an international system of verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space".

Guided by the goal of achieving a strict and universal ban on the deployment of all arms in outer space, the Soviet delegation proposed during the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament that, without waiting for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement on space, a start should be made on establishing a system for international verification of the non-deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space. In the opinion of the USSR, the central place in such a verification system might be taken by an international space inspectorate having access to any objects intended to be launched into and stationed in outer space.

The Soviet proposal to establish an international inspectorate was met with interest, as witnessed by the questions addressed to us and the requests made to us to explain the details of our proposal. Taking into account the discussion of this idea at the Conference, in particular in the Ad hoc Committee on Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, we have put our proposal in more concrete terms and today we are submitting the result in the form of a document. In this connection, we believe that, depending on the specifics of actual agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, the verification system, the structure of the international space inspectorate and its modes of operation could be further worked out and refined in the course of negotiations.

Let me briefly describe the major provisions of the document we are submitting.

The document defines the main aim in establishing the international space inspectorate as being to implement measures to verify that any objects to be launched into and stationed in outer space by States parties are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind.

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Obviously, the simplest and most effective way to verify that objects to be launched into and stationed in space are not weapons and are not equipped with weapons of any kind is on-site inspection directly before launch. Consequently we suggest that States should inform the international inspectorate in advance of every forthcoming launch, giving, inter alia, the date and time of launch, the type of launch vehicle, the parameters of the orbit and general information on the space object to be launched. Then, at a certain time to be agreed upon, inspectors would check the object to be launched. As space launch sites are few in number and launches are rather frequent, it would seem appropriate for the inspection teams to remain at the launch sites during the period between inspections as well, that is, for them to be there permanently.

Of course, we cannot ignore the possibility of undeclared launches of space objects. Under our concept, a State party has the right in this case to request the international space inspectorate to obtain clarification from any State party regarding a situation which may be considered unclear as a result of suspicions of the undeclared launch of a space object. If the requesting State party considers the clarification insufficient, it may request the international space inspectorate to take a decision to hold an ad hoc inspection at the launching site and in the area of landing of detachable parts of the launch vehicle and spacecraft. A State which has received a request from the international space inspectorate for the holding of an ad hoc inspection shall be bound to afford the ad hoc inspection group the opportunity to carry out such an inspection without delay, that is, without right of refusal.

The document contains proposals on the structure of the governing bodies and the financing of the international space inspectorate's activities and on the composition and method of appointment of permanent inspection teams.

To enable the inspectors to determine with sufficient certainty that the space object is not a weapon and is not equipped with weapons, it is provided by way of obligations for the inspected side vis-à-vis the inspectors that the receiving State shall, inter alia, in the course of the inspection: provide the inspectors with the necessary instruments, materials and equipment; provide the inspectors, in the course of the observation programme, with the necessary information directly connected with the performance by the inspectors of their functions; admit the inspectors to the sites where space objects are mounted on the launch vehicle and to their launching sites; etc.

It goes without saying that many of the provisions of this document can be further developed and refined in the course of the future negotiations. We trust that, after careful consideration of the Soviet proposal, delegations will share their views on it in the course of our work. We are open to constructive proposals aimed at an early and effective solution to the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

I have no other speaker inscribed for today. Does any other member wish to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

The secretariat has circulated the timetable of meetings to be held by the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. It is, as usual, only indicative, and has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the subsidiary bodies. It is subject to change, if need be. On this understanding, I propose we adopt the timetable.

It was so decided.

The PRESIDENT: Before I adjourn this meeting, I should like to make a short announcement. On Tuesday we shall have the visit of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of India, His Excellency Mr. K. Natwar-Singh. I should like to ask members to be available at 9.55 a.m. to welcome the Minister and in order that we can start our plenary meeting punctually.

That concludes our business for today. I intend to adjourn this plenary meeting now. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 22 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11 a.m.