



**Agenda item 23: Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**

**DOCUMENT A/6700/REV.1**

**Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples**

**Chapters V-XI\*\***

CONTENTS

<i>Chapter</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
V. TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION		
A. Action previously taken by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee .....	1-15	2
B. Information on the Territories .....	16-536	4
C. Consideration by the Special Committee .....	537-985	63
D. Action taken by the Special Committee .....	986-1025	118
<i>Annex: Territories under Portuguese administration—question of refugees: note by the Secretariat .....</i>	<i>1-22</i>	<i>123</i>
VI. ADEN		
A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session .....	1-5	125
B. Information on the Territory .....	6-64	126
C. Consideration by the Special Committee .....	65-91	132
D. Action taken by the Special Committee .....	92-93	136

\* *Part I contains chapters I to IV of the Special Committee's report:*

- I. Establishment, organization and activities of the Special Committee
- II. Meetings held away from Headquarters
- III. Southern Rhodesia
- IV. South West Africa

*Part III contains chapters XII to XXIV:*

- XII. French Somaliland
- XIII. Oman
- XIV. Mauritius, Seychelles and St. Helena
- XV. Gilbert and Ellice Islands, Pitcairn and the Solomon Islands
- XVI. Niue and the Tokelau Islands
- XVII. New Hebrides
- XVIII. Guam and American Samoa
- XIX. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
- XX. Cocos (Keeling) Islands, Trust Territory of Nauru, Papua and Trust Territory of New Guinea
- XXI. Brunei
- XXII. Hong Kong
- XXIII. United States Virgin Islands, British Virgin Islands, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Bermuda, Bahamas, Turks and Caicos Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and British Honduras
- XXIV. Information on Non-Self-Governing Territories transmitted under Article 73 e of the Charter of the United Nations and related questions

\*\* The present version of chapters V to XI is a consolidation of the text of the following documents as they appeared in mimeographed form: A/6700/Add.3 and Corr.1, dated 11 October and 3 November 1967; A/6700/Add.4 and Corr.1, dated 22 November and 1 December 1967; A/6700/Add.5, dated 3 November 1967; A/6700/Add.6, dated 16 November 1967; A/6700/Add.7, dated 16 November 1967; A/6700/Add.9, dated 28 November 1967; and A/6700/Add.10, dated 29 November 1967. For a check list of relevant documents, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23.

CONTENTS (*continued*)

<i>Annexes</i>		<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Page</i>
I.	Letter dated 11 August 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General .....	.....	136
II.	Note dated 17 November 1967 from the Secretary-General to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland .....	.....	136
III.	Report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden .....	.....	137
	<i>Appendices I-XIII</i> .....	.....	137
 VII. FIJI			
A.	Action taken by the Special Committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session .....	1-2	188
B.	Information on the Territory .....	3-41	188
C.	Consideration by the Special Committee .....	42-89	191
D.	Action taken by the Special Committee .....	90-101	195
 VIII. EQUATORIAL GUINEA			
A.	Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly .....	1-10	197
B.	Information on the Territory .....	11-18	198
C.	Consideration by the Special Committee .....	19-64	198
D.	Action taken by the Special Committee .....	65-88	204
	<i>Annex: Question of Equatorial Guinea: report of the Secretary-General</i> .....	1-5	206
 IX. IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA			
A.	Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly .....	1-7	207
B.	Information on the Territories .....	8-15	208
C.	Consideration by the Special Committee .....	16-37	209
D.	Action taken by the Special Committee .....	38	212
	<i>Annex: Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara: report of the Secretary-General</i> .....	1-7	212
 X. GIBRALTAR			
A.	Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly .....	1-4	213
B.	Information on the Territory .....	5-16	214
C.	Consideration by the Special Committee .....	17-103	215
D.	Action taken by the Special Committee .....	104-218	226
 <i>Annexes</i>			
I.	Question of Gibraltar: report of the Secretary-General .....	1-27	238
II.	Letter dated 6 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General .....	.....	247
III.	Letter dated 25 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General .....	.....	247
IV.	Letter dated 30 October 1967 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General .....	.....	247
 XI. SWAZILAND			
A.	Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly .....	1-5	247
B.	Information on the Territory .....	6-104	248
C.	Consideration by the Special Committee .....	105-127	258
D.	Action taken by the Special Committee .....	128-144	260

## CHAPTER V\*

## TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

**A. Action previously taken by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee**

1. In 1960, the General Assembly, by resolution 1542 (XV) of 15 December 1960, decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter of the United Nations and requested the Government of Portugal to transmit to the Secretary-General, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI, information on the conditions prevailing in the Territories concerned.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.3 and Corr.1.

2. Early in 1961, following the outbreak of disturbances in Angola, the General Assembly (at its resumed fifteenth session) and the Security Council became seized with the question of the situation in that Territory and a sub-committee was appointed to study and report thereon.<sup>1</sup>

3. At its sixteenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1742 (XVI) of 30 January 1962 concerning Angola, whereby it reaffirmed the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence and called on Portugal to cease repressive

<sup>1</sup> General Assembly resolution 1603 (XV) and Security Council resolution 163 (1961). See also *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978 and Corr.2)*.

measures and undertake reforms with a view to the transfer of power to the people of Angola. The General Assembly also considered as a separate item the "Non-compliance of the Government of Portugal with Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations and with General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV)". In connexion with this item, the Assembly, by resolution 1699 (XVI) of 19 December 1961, established a special committee to examine the available information on Territories under Portuguese administration and to submit observations, conclusions and recommendations to the Assembly and any other body appointed by the Assembly to assist it in the implementation of its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.<sup>2</sup>

4. At its seventeenth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 1807 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, in which it approved the Special Committee's report and urged the Portuguese Government to give effect to the recommendations contained in that report, in particular by taking the following measures:

"(a) The immediate recognition of the right of the peoples of the Territories under its administration to self-determination and independence;

"(b) The immediate cessation of all acts of repression and the withdrawal of all military and other forces at present employed for that purpose;

"(c) The promulgation of an unconditional political amnesty and the establishment of conditions that will allow the free functioning of political parties;

"(d) Negotiations, on the basis of the recognition of the right to self-determination, with the authorized representatives of the political parties within and outside the Territories with a view to the transfer of power to political institutions freely elected and representative of the peoples, in accordance with resolution 1514 (XV);

"(e) The granting of independence immediately thereafter to all the Territories under its administration in accordance with the aspirations of the peoples;"

5. Between 1962 and 1965, the Territories under Portuguese administration were the subject of resolutions by the Special Committee,<sup>3</sup> by the General Assembly (1913 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX)) and by the Security Council (180 (1963), 183 (1963) and 218 (1965)), all of which sought to obtain fulfilment by Portugal of the measures referred to above. The resolutions also contained appeals for supportive action by other States and international institutions, including the specialized agencies of the United Nations. Thus, the Security Council, in its resolution 218 (1965) requested all States:

"to refrain forthwith from offering the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the people of the Territories under its administration; and to take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to the Portuguese Government for this purpose, including the sale and shipment of equipment and materials for the manu-

facture and maintenance of arms and ammunition to be used in the Territories under Portuguese administration".

A similar appeal was made by the General Assembly in its resolution 2107 (XX). In addition, however, the Assembly, *inter alia*, urged Member States to take certain coercive measures, including the breaking off of diplomatic and consular relations and a boycott of trade with Portugal, and appealed to all specialized agencies of the United Nations to refrain from granting assistance to Portugal so long as the latter failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

6. During 1966, the Special Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration at meetings held in May and June during its visit to Africa and again in October at Headquarters.

7. At the first series of meetings, the Special Committee heard petitioners from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe. It also considered the situation of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and Member States in response to the resolution of 10 June 1965 of the Special Committee and General Assembly resolutions 2040 (XX) and 2107 (XX).

8. At its 455th meeting, on 22 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>4</sup> chap. V, para. 675) whereby, in addition to reaffirming its previous decisions and recommendations, it recommended that the Security Council should make it obligatory for all States to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). The Special Committee also requested all States, and in particular, the military allies of Portugal within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to take the following steps: (a) refrain forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which would enable it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its administration; (b) take all the necessary measures to prevent the sale or supply of arms and military equipment to the Government of Portugal; (c) stop the sale or shipment to the Government of Portugal of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of arms and ammunition. It appealed once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance so long as the Government of Portugal failed to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). It also reiterated an earlier request to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration and to the people who had suffered and were still suffering from military operations.

9. By his letter of 1 July 1966,<sup>5</sup> the Chairman of the Special Committee transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of this resolution and the text of another resolution also adopted by the Special

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 54, documents A/5160 and Add.1 and 2).

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, addendum to item 25, document A/5238; *ibid.*, Eighteenth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 251; *ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, Annex No. 8 (Part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 352; *ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 415.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>5</sup> Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1966, documents S/7394 and S/7395.

Committee on 22 June 1966 concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), in operative paragraph 3 of which it recommended to the Security Council "to make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Portugal...".

10. Continuing its discussion on the Territories under Portuguese administration in October, the Special Committee had before it a supplementary report, submitted by Sub-Committee I in connexion with a study initiated in 1964 on the activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the granting of independence in the Territories under Portuguese administration. On 6 October, the Special Committee adopted the supplementary report of the Sub-Committee and included it in its report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, together with the background papers prepared by the Secretariat on agriculture and processing industries, foreign-owned railways and Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. In doing so, the Special Committee reaffirmed all its conclusions and recommendations contained in its 1965 report on this subject (A/6000/Rev.1,<sup>6</sup> chap. V), and decided to recommend to the General Assembly that it inscribe on the agenda of its twenty-first session as a matter of urgency the following item:

"The activities of foreign economic and other interests which are impeding the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in Southern Rhodesia, South West Africa, the Territories under Portuguese administration and in other colonial Territories".

11. In a letter dated 21 September 1966, the acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo reported that Portugal was allowing foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of his country and requested that the Security Council be convened. The Security Council discussed this question at four meetings held in September and October, and on 14 October, adopted a resolution (226 (1966)). In this resolution, the Security Council urged the Government of Portugal, in view of its statement denying the charges, "not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo": called upon all States "to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo", and requested the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the resolution.

12. In operative paragraph 8 of resolution 218 (1965), the Security Council had requested the Secretary-General to ensure the implementation of the provisions of that resolution, to provide such assistance as he may deem necessary and to report to the Security Council not later than 30 June 1966.

13. In his report (S/7385 and Add.1-4),<sup>7</sup> the Secretary-General made public the replies of Governments, including an exchange of correspondence he had had

with the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal with a view to fulfilling his mandate from the Security Council. Although in one of his letters the Minister for Foreign Affairs had indicated that while the Portuguese Government had made the most explicit reservations regarding Security Council resolution 218 (1965), without prejudice to those reservations, it was prepared to discuss problems of regional co-operation in Africa and questions of international peace and security in that continent. Within this context, the Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested that conversations could be initiated immediately following the termination of the general debate at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly and that a date could be then fixed in view of the circumstances. However, although the general debate ended on 18 October, as at 14 November 1966 no further information had been received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal and no discussions had taken place with the Secretary-General.

14. The Fourth Committee considered the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on the basis of the Special Committee's report (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V).

15. On the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly, on 12 December 1966, adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) on the question of the Territories under Portuguese administration, the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, twenty-first session, supplement No. 16.]

## B. Information on the Territories

### 1. THE TERRITORIES IN GENERAL

#### *Constitutional and political developments: general policy*

16. There were no major constitutional or political changes in the Territories during 1966.<sup>8</sup> Despite continued and intensified fighting in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, Portugal remains committed to "a military solution" of the problem of its Overseas Territories regardless of the criticisms and doubts that have again been raised in recent months both in Portugal and the Territories themselves.

17. Determined to retain the Overseas Territories by armed force, Portugal during the past year introduced some new measures in preparation for a lengthy war. The period of compulsory national military service was extended, the Portuguese navy is being strengthened and modernized, and all sectors of the population are being called upon to share in the sacrifices needed to "safeguard national unity". As part of its long-term strategy, Portugal increased the civil and military defence and security forces in Angola and Mozambique; it is improving road and telephone communications and transportation both between Portugal and the Territories and within the Territories; it reorganized and centralized various administrative services and, with the gradual coming into force of the Portuguese common market and escudo zone, the economic development of the Territories is to be integrated in an over-all plan.

<sup>6</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to item 23.

<sup>7</sup> For document S/7385, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-first Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1966*; for documents S/7385/Add.1-3, *ibid.*, *Supplement for July, August and September 1966*; and for document S/7385/Add.4, *ibid.*, *Supplement for October, November and December 1966*.

<sup>8</sup> Information on the central and local government of the Territories and political rights is contained in the Report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly: *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V.

18. During 1966, a number of official statements emphasized and explained Portugal's determination to remain in Africa. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the Angola uprising, Prime Minister Salazar, in a speech to a delegation from that Territory, recalled the decision taken in 1961 to defend Angola "at once and on the largest scale". Looking back, he found the decision was justified because the Portuguese in Angola had been determined to stay, and because "any man who stays, alive or dead, does in fact occupy the land; he who leaves, deserts and abandons it. It is only the former with his posterity who gains the right of occupation and possession, [a right] that history recognizes as the basis of society and a share in authority".<sup>9</sup>

19. On another occasion, explaining Portugal's overseas policy in a press interview, Prime Minister Salazar said:

"One thing is certain, that the Portuguese Government refuses to adopt a policy that would lead to the disintegration of the nation. The advantages of collaboration and integration of vast areas and units are becoming increasingly clear and the Portuguese nation, being integrated and multi-continental, meets fundamentally the real needs of all its peoples far better than could their division into impracticable political units, that would sooner or later become economically subject to other countries and would end up by losing their national independence."<sup>10</sup>

20. During a visit to Mozambique in July 1966, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Mr. Franco Nogueira, took the occasion to answer certain criticisms and doubts regarding Portugal's overseas policy and also to explain why the Government had no alternative but to continue its present course:

"Some in our country seem to be perturbed by doubts in the scrupulousness of their consciences. Even if our position is based on valid political and legal justifications, is it equally secure on a moral basis? We should unhesitatingly reply in the affirmative, for the generous idealism of others, as it were, hardly conceals national aims; and, besides, the principles that are proclaimed in order to accuse us are not in fact being carried out; and, finally, our own principles are not less noble or honourable than those. Some in our country might ask if there is no other more practical, more advantageous method of defence, some other doctrinal construction, any other process of argument. Is not our position characterized by its rigidity and inflexibility, a refusal to listen to others, as if we surrounded ourselves by an iron wall? Would it not be better to try to soothe away others' hate, by yielding a little in what is secondary, the better to save the fundamental, or trying to gain the support of some great Powers, at least to satisfy them in theory, by mere declaration of intention, even if in our hearts we do not intend to carry them out in practice? To all this I would answer that those who think in this manner are not realists, but naïve people. Our position must be as rigid as the enemy's, because the latter neither alters nor restricts his aims. Our adversaries know that if they can make the slightest breach in any of our principles, we should at once be at their mercy; we should then be fighting on our critics' ground, not on our own; we should be throwing up the logic of our position to submit to

the enemy's logic; without our enemy's having accepted anything of our aims, we should have accepted everything others want to thrust on us. There can be no partial transigence, no half compromises, no possible stops halfway down a slope. We must realize once and for all that the enemy's aim is not to bring into Angola or Mozambique human rights, individual liberty and collective progress, so that the methods that would lead to such ends could be discussed. No, the aim is to dominate Angola and Mozambique, to include them in the spheres of foreign influences, to utilize their economic and strategic position for the benefit of major policies of other Powers . . ."<sup>11</sup>

21. Portugal's overseas policy and guidelines for future action were also discussed by various leaders participating in the series of lectures under the title "Praise the past and build the future" as part of the eight-month-long commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of Portugal's national revolution. Speaking on Portugal's national defence,<sup>12</sup> Brigadier-General Kaulza de Arriaga, former Secretary of State for Air, said that from the point of view of world strategy, Portugal with its Overseas Territories was a unique nation both as regards its ethnic composition and its geographical discontinuity. The future of the Portuguese nation depended, he said, on a policy of unity and the exercise of full Portuguese sovereignty over all the Territories comprising the nation. Measures required "to strengthen the national structure" involved in order of priority: in the short term, improved inter-territorial communications; in the medium term, economic development; and in the long term, national population growth, settlement of Angola and Mozambique, raising the level of development of both Europeans and Africans and a special effort in the field of research. In terms of strategy, Portugal's position in the western world could remain significant only if it was based on a participation in military installations and bases which kept pace with general developments.

22. In Africa, the speaker said, Portugal had to face the fact the war against it would continue, with varying intensity, for an indefinite period. This was a prolonged war which demanded great economy in its conduct and operation. Thus Portugal's strategy in regard to its struggle in Africa must be developed along the following lines: externally on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts; internally it must counter subversion (see section 2 below on Angola) and be prepared for traditional large-scale military actions; and finally it must obtain wherever possible the necessary war materials.

23. Discussing the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration, he said that land communications in these Territories were inadequate to allow rapid military action, and this was one of the main obstacles to counter subversive action. He urged that if necessary, infantry units should be used to help build the roads urgently needed.

24. In the Overseas Territories, defensive forces needed to be supplemented by highly mobile airborne striking forces. This required a better supply of aircraft and better intelligence work. Commenting on the problem of obtaining military supplies, he said that while some foreign sources had been obstructive, others had

<sup>9</sup> *Boletim Geral do Ultramar* (July 1966), p. 317, English text.

<sup>10</sup> "Dr. Salazar on 40 years of Portuguese Progress" (an interview) in *Southern Africa*, 18 April 1966.

<sup>11</sup> Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, *An Old Debate*. An address by A. Franco Nogueira, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, Lisbon, 1966, p. 18, English text.

<sup>12</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 21 October 1966.

managed to furnish arms on a more or less regular basis. The real solution lay in substituting arms manufactured in Portugal. Although Portugal was self-sufficient as regards a great deal of the material used by the army, it was dependent on foreign sources for much of its naval and air material.

25. The importance of the Overseas Territories of Portugal was also stressed by other speakers. Professor Daniel Barbosa, former Minister of Economy and at present Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional, in a long speech entitled "New directions of economic policy",<sup>13</sup> explained that the economic integration of the Portuguese realm was intended not only as a means of accelerating progress and to enable Portugal better to face the world but also to strengthen the political unity which was the essential feature of the Portuguese nation. He also said that Portugal's survival as a nation could depend on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories. It was necessary for Portugal to try to divert to the Territories the hundreds and thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries, but he warned that large-scale settlement would be possible only if conditions of living and economic opportunities in the Territories were improved so as to attract settlers in sufficient numbers.

26. Only one speaker in the series of commemorative lectures referred to the question of the future political and administrative relationship of the Overseas Territories with Portugal. This was Admiral Lopez Alvez,<sup>14</sup> who had been Overseas Minister at the time of the Angola uprising. Any changes, he said, had to be guided by the fundamental principle of the indestructible unity of the composite parts of the Nation. Although many changes were hypothetically possible, he suggested that the two basic directions should be towards creating national services and the progressive administrative decentralization of authority by granting each Territory, in accordance with its special circumstances, wider powers of decision. Changes in both directions had to be undertaken together to ensure the best use of technical resources. While the goal of administrative decentralization was to increase the authority of the local government bodies and elected groups, two safeguards had to be kept in mind: (i) there should never be any service in any Territory which did not come under the Governor's authority, and (ii) the territorial governments should never be given authority in matters which were not under the control of the Overseas Minister. On the other hand, it could be expected that the participation of the Overseas Territories in central government matters would become more prominent as a result of their increased representation in the "higher organs of sovereignty", such as the Overseas Council, the Corporative Chamber and the National Assembly.

27. Towards the end of 1966, Portugal's continued pursuit of a military solution to the problem of its Overseas Territories appeared to be causing increased concern in Portugal as fighting in Angola extended to the eastern border and military expenditures continued to rise. First, in October 1966 in Lisbon, a group of five persons asked permission from the Government to take part in a series of lectures commemorating the national revolution because they did not share the views expressed or the official conception of the New State, particularly so far as its future was concerned. Then in November, 118 Portuguese of Socialist, Christian Democratic and Liberal views, including many Catholic

leaders, claiming that they represented "millions of Portuguese who are opposed to the present régime", issued a manifesto in which they accused the Government of political oppression, forced labour and racial discrimination in favour of capitalism in the Overseas Territories. They said that "the Government of Mr. Salazar has not the competence, the moral authority, the prestige, or the open intelligence to allow it to face the historical problem of decolonization of the Overseas Territories". They found the Government's choice of policy in the Overseas Territories "ill-fated", as self-determination was a principle above discussion. In a further statement addressed to the President of Portugal in March 1967, forty-six members of the Social Democratic Action group criticized the Government's overseas policy and called on it to recognize the right of the Territories to self-determination. The statement cited at length the errors which, its authors said, had been committed by the Government in India and Macao, and called for a full discussion of this subject. The statement also called on the Government urgently to take a position on the question of sanctions against Southern Rhodesia (on Portugal's position as regards sanctions, see section 3 below on Mozambique). Finally, the statement protested against the censorship of the Press and "the excessive use which is made of it".

28. As if replying to the earlier criticisms, the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal, Mr. Silva Cunha, at the swearing in of the new Governor-General of Angola in November 1966 (see below), described Portugal's approach to the Overseas Territories as a form of decolonization.<sup>15</sup> He explained that, since colonization was a form of contact between peoples of different cultures and civilizations, it was inherent in the relationship established that colonization tends to replace itself because of the evolution it brings about. Decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unit" or through the separation of the colonizers and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. However, he said, real decolonization only takes place when integration or emancipation lead to a real and profound transformation of the colonized, either when there is a real union of cultures, which did not imply uniformity, or when the colonized can live autonomously and independently.

29. Mr. Silva Cunha said that the characteristics of the present politico-judicial situation in the Overseas Territories were: (a) political unity expressed through equality in status of all Portuguese nationals irrespective of race, religion or culture; (b) economic solidarity of all the separate units comprising Portuguese Territories, expressed especially in the legislation establishing the Portuguese common market, which had already begun to come into effect; and (c) extension to all elements of the Portuguese population benefits or social legislation strictly in harmony with international conventions, especially those of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). This theme, that economic development and social integration constitute Portugal's approach to the problem of decolonization, has been echoed recently also in Angola. Thus for instance, on taking office, the Provincial Secretary for Rural Development, Mr. Vasco de Sousa Dias, expressed his satisfaction at being chosen "to return to the front line" with responsibilities for "activities which the Minister for Overseas Territories has designated as decolonization

<sup>13</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 11 October 1966.

<sup>14</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 21 December 1966.

<sup>15</sup> *Diário de Luanda*, 15 November 1966.

practiced by Portugal without any racial discrimination". Such decolonization, he said, had as its ultimate goal the integration of the less developed peoples through their social advancement to the full extent of their capacities.

#### *Military activities and defence expenditure*

30. For Portugal, as President Thomaz noted in his 1967 New Year's address, 1966 was overshadowed by the "defence of the Overseas Territories".<sup>16</sup> Owing to intensified fighting in Angola since August (see addendum), it is estimated that Portugal now has over 120,000 troops in its Overseas Territories. To meet the growing needs of the armed forces, towards the end of the year new regulations were introduced in Portugal extending the length of compulsory military service for all citizens from a previous maximum period of twenty-four months (eighteen months of active service and a maximum training period of six months) to a period of three years, extendible up to a maximum of four years.

31. Since the new regulations apply to all citizens, Africans in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration will be subject also to military service, which, as now defined, will no longer be limited to participation in the armed forces but will include any work contributing to national defence "within the military framework". For the first time, women will be admitted into the armed forces in capacities other than nurses. To ensure the full use of national manpower, men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-two will not be allowed to emigrate until they have completed their military service, and special provisions have been included to enable persons with professional training to serve in their own fields whenever possible, especially in the Overseas Territories. A further new measure is the introduction of subsidies to be paid to families of servicemen who are without adequate means of support.

32. In December 1966, Portugal took a further step (Decree 47,381 of 15 December) to accelerate the modernization and expansion of the Portuguese navy, begun in 1964, by authorizing the purchase of six additional corvettes. The fleet expansion is part of Portugal's long-term overseas defence programme with emphasis on ships for coastal defence and protection of maritime routes between Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Eleven new ships are under construction: four escort destroyers and four submarines (to be paid for entirely by Portugal) are being built in France under the agreement concluded in 1964 (Decree 45,889 of 24 August) and another three escort destroyers are being built in Portugal. For the purchase of the first four of the six new corvettes, a total of 580 million escudos have been authorized to be paid over the period 1966-74. Apart from the additions to the fleet, Portugal has also increased considerably the number of small craft of various types to be used on lakes and rivers by the defence forces in the Overseas Territories.

33. According to the 1967 budget estimates, the total revenue of the Portuguese Government is expected to reach 20,206 million escudos and expenditure 20,204.3 million escudos, leaving a surplus of 1.7 million escudos. Ordinary expenditure has been kept to a minimum, amounting to 14,962.1 million escudos so that there will be a surplus of 2,356.7 million escudos to finance part of the extraordinary expenditures totalling 7,598.9 million escudos.

34. Of the extraordinary budget, a total of 5,347

million escudos is allocated for national defence (5,341 million escudos) and public security (6 million escudos). This represents a 33 per cent increase over the 1966 defence allocations, which amounted to 4,011 million escudos, and is the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961. Of the total defence allocations for 1967, 3,500 million escudos, an increase of 1,000 million escudos over 1966, are for the "extraordinary military forces in the Overseas Territories". For the acquisition of the four destroyers and four submarines now being built in France, 500 million escudos are allocated, which together with an initial sum of 45 million escudos for the first four new corvettes and 85 million escudos for the construction of escort ships (*navios escoltas*) brings the total expenditure for the year on modernization of the navy to 630 million escudos.

35. In his commemorative lecture referred to above, Brigadier-General Kaulza de Arriaga<sup>17</sup> pointed out that Portugal's defence expenditure was 6.6 per cent of the gross national product<sup>18</sup> and 34.3 per cent of the total public expenditure. These percentages were higher than corresponding figures for Belgium, France and Denmark. In terms of absolute value, Portugal's defence expenditure, which was below 6,000 million escudos,<sup>19</sup> was only about half of that which each of the other three countries spent. The annual contribution per person in Portugal was only about 700 escudos and this was also lower than the other European countries. In his view, Portugal's low *per capita* income seriously affected the country's defence capacity and therefore accelerated economic development would be an essential factor affecting national strategy and defence. While it was not possible for Portugal to reach a stage of economic development in the near future which would ensure it "strategic tranquillity", such a stage was a possibility as an intermediate goal and the nation should be required to make the effort.

36. To finance the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, Portugal raised two foreign loans of \$US20 million each by bond issue in the United States in 1965 and 1966 and it has issued another series of development bonds totalling \$US18 million at 7 per cent interest, which, however, were not offered for sale in the United States. An examination of the extraordinary budget<sup>20</sup> in recent years shows a growing reliance

<sup>17</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 21 October 1966.

<sup>18</sup> This figure of 6.6 per cent of the gross national product is close to the figure reported in a United States State Department survey of defence expenditures by NATO countries and published in the *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 27 December 1966. It may be pointed out that the figures given in the 1966 background paper on Territories under Portuguese administration (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 35) were taken from the Portuguese budget report and refer to budgetary allocations for defence and not to actual expenditures.

<sup>19</sup> The actual amount is probably higher since it has been reported that already for 1965 defence costs were 7,705 million escudos (*Financial Times*, 10 August 1966).

<sup>20</sup> Sources of extraordinary budget (in million escudos)

	1964	1965	1966	1967
Total extraordinary revenue, the sources of which include:				
Minting	5,187.0	6,027.2	6,383.8	7,598.9
Overseas defence and development tax	68.5	67.8	78.5	162.5
Internal loans	120.0		100.0	100.0
Development bonds (internal)	1,350.0	1,602.8	1,901.1	3,120.4
External loans	348.4	673.0	232.0	432.0
Surplus from ordinary budget	1,726.7	1,365.7	1,058.5	220.0
Ordinary budget	200.0	—	1,791.0	2,354.8
Ordinary budget	707.0	910.7	—	—

<sup>16</sup> *Diário de Luanda*, 2 January 1967.

on Portuguese domestic financial sources. Whereas in 1964 almost one third of the extraordinary expenditure was financed from external loans, in 1967 almost half of the total (46 per cent) is to be raised by internal loans and bonds, over 30 per cent from the ordinary budget surplus and only slightly over 3 per cent from external loans. Since both ordinary sources of revenue and the capacity of the internal market to buy bonds depend on the economic development of the country, it is apparent that, if this trend continues, Portugal's capacity to afford increased defence costs in the future may depend upon an acceleration of its economic growth.

37. Since 1961, though extraordinary budgetary allocations for development had increased by 72 per cent to 2,145.4 million escudos in 1967, in the same period defence allocations increased by 220 per cent from 1,670 million escudos to 5,347 million escudos (and actual expenditures were probably at least 50 per cent more than original estimates). Comparing the 1967 budget with that for 1966, it is seen that development allocations have been cut back by 2.5 per cent, while defence allocations rose by 33 per cent. Allocations for the item "other investments", which includes public buildings and utilities, have also been cut back, dropping from 731.6 million escudos in 1961 to 106.5 million escudos in 1967.

38. In Portugal, the burden of defence on the economy has already become noticeable in the guise of rising inflation,<sup>21</sup> shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour, mounting taxes and a growing trade deficit. Since 1961, revenue from direct taxes has increased by 72 per cent (from 2,673.5 million to 4,602 million escudos in 1967); revenue from indirect taxes, which up to last year had increased less rapidly, is expected to total 5,297 million escudos in 1967 as a result of a new sales tax which will yield around 1,000 million escudos.

39. External and internal borrowing has led to an increase in the annual cost of servicing the public debt by 128 per cent since 1961 to 2,114.5 million escudos in 1967. Because of the general slowing down of the rate of economic growth in 1966<sup>22</sup> and the shortage of capital (the total volume of credit granted by the Central Bank showed a decline of 16.6 per cent in 1966 from that of 1965) some economists have expressed concern that defence efforts could compromise Portugal's development aims. According to a recent report,<sup>23</sup> Portugal's gross domestic product in 1966 compared with the preceding year showed an increase of much less than the average annual rise of 6 per cent envisaged in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965 to 1967, and it was also lower than the average annual increase since 1960.

#### *Economic integration and development*

40. Although Portugal is officially considered to be an integrated multi-continental nation (see para. 19 above) and though in fact the politico-juridical framework has now been completed, economic integration of

<sup>21</sup> The consumer price index (1960 = 100) rose from 109 in the third quarter of 1964 to 119 in the first quarter of 1966 (*Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 27 December 1966), and the index of food prices rose from 116 to 130 in the first four months of 1966 (*Financial Times*), 5 December 1966, p. 43).

<sup>22</sup> The increase in the gross national product in 1966 was less than in 1965 and 1964, and the rate of formation of fixed capital in 1965 and 1964 was less than in 1963 (*Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 22 November 1966).

<sup>23</sup> Report to the Annual General Meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by the Chairman of the Board of Directors (*Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 28 January 1967).

the Overseas Territories with Portugal is yet to be achieved. The goal of economic integration, as a Portuguese author has expressed it,<sup>24</sup> is to forge together into an organic whole and for the greater benefit of each of the parts, the medium level economy of Portugal with the under-developed economies of the Overseas Territories which are characterized by the existence side by side of subsistence and market economies and social groups of disparate productivity.

41. What is called the "Portuguese realm" (*o espaço português*) comprises an area of 2.2 million square kilometres with a population of over 23 million. Portugal and the adjacent islands, however, account for only 4.4 per cent of the area (91,970 square kilometres) and about 40 per cent of the population. Because of the disparities existing among the different components of the realm, particularly as regards their size, the nature of their economies and their different stages of economic development, the basic economic integration law (Decree Law 44,016 of 8 November 1961<sup>25</sup>) provided that the removal of barriers to the free circulation of goods, capital and persons should be progressive over a period of ten years.

42. In setting out various steps for the establishment of the Portuguese common market and an escudo zone, the law recognized that the process of economic integration had to be closely associated with the development of the individual Territories. Thus, while economic growth is a pre-condition for the successful elimination of restrictions on movements of goods, capital and persons, the progressive freeing of such movements would in turn give a decisive impulse to accelerated economic development of each of the complementary units and stimulate a more efficient division of labour.

43. As a first step towards the establishment of a Portuguese common market in 1962, duties were abolished on imports into Portugal of all "national goods" of which the total trade with Portugal in 1960 did not exceed 50,000 escudos (less than \$US2,000). Also eliminated at the same time were duties on exports from Portugal and the adjacent islands to the Overseas Territories. Later, in 1963, import duties were abolished on goods from the Territories, the total value of which amounted to 20 per cent of the purchases by Portugal in each Territory, and in 1964, import duties on goods from the Territories entering Portugal were eliminated. The next step was scheduled to come into effect on 1 January 1967 with the removal of import duties in each Territory on goods from Portugal and the adjacent islands, the total value of which represented at least 40 per cent of their respective imports in 1960. Remaining duties on "national goods" traded within the *espaço português* are to be progressively eliminated according to the special circumstances of each unit.

44. As noted above, the original plan envisaged that the economic integration of Portugal with its Overseas Territories should be completed by 1972, half of which period has already elapsed. Although no official assessment of the progress made has been published, available data on the changing pattern of trade, the movement of capital between Portugal and the Overseas Territories give some indication of the effects of the changes in stimulating economic development of the separate units and what Premier Salazar

<sup>24</sup> Henrique Cabrita, "*Integração económica do espaço português*", *Ulamar*, No. 10 (October-December 1962), Lisbon, p. 59.

<sup>25</sup> Extracts of this Decree Law appear in document A/AC.108/L.5/Add.1, pp. 66-70.



described as "the advantages of collaboration and integration of vast areas". The data on Portugal's trade with the Overseas Territories and the way in which capital movement has affected Portugal's balance of payments are reviewed in the following paragraphs. Information on the situation in the individual Territories will be given in the relevant sections on each Territory.

(a) *Effects on trade between Portugal and the Territories*

45. Figures published in the first quarter of 1966<sup>26</sup> show that from 1962 to 1965 Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories increased by 67 per cent from 2,122 million to 3,575 million escudos. In contrast, exports to the Overseas Territories increased from 2,391 million to 4,104 million escudos, or about 72 per cent. Over the same period, Portugal's imports from countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) rose from 3,940 million to 5,567 million escudos and exports to EFTA countries from 2,208 million to 4,500 million escudos, representing increases of 41 per cent and about 102 per cent respectively. An article in the Portuguese Press<sup>27</sup> suggests that so far Portugal has benefited more from the reduction in tariffs than the Overseas Territories and that more effort has to be made to develop the Territories to enable them to benefit from the metropolitan market.

(b) *Exchange transactions and balance of payments between territorial units*

46. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Overseas Territories, while forming an "integral part of the Portuguese State", are "financially independent" but are nevertheless subject to the government's superintendence. Each Territory has its own budget and is responsible for its own revenues—except for revenue resulting from common property or services and those assigned to common funds (Organic Law, article LVIII). Each Territory also has its own currency which, though nominally on par with the metropolitan escudo, is subject to exchange controls.

47. In order to facilitate the free transaction of goods, services and capital, in addition to the removal of quotas and customs duties, a multilateral clearing system for payments within the escudo zone was envisaged under the 1961 legislation (Decree Law 40,166). Details of the system were set out in legislation enacted in 1962 (Decree Law 44,703 of 17 November) and the system came into effect on 1 January 1963. The major feature of the new system of payments is the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which acts as a centralized escudo reserve fund for all the Territories by providing funds on a temporary basis to cover inter-territorial transactions that the Territories themselves are not able to meet.<sup>28</sup> However, the new system of payments has not only not eased exchange restrictions, but, as shown below, it has created new difficulties which many consider inimicable to the expansion of free trade in the escudo zone.

<sup>26</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 5 April 1966.

<sup>27</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 5 April 1966.

<sup>28</sup> The Fund has a total capital of 1,500 million escudos in which each Territory has a proportional share as follows: Cape Verde, 60 million escudos; Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, 140 million escudos; São Tomé and Príncipe, 60 million escudos; Angola, 750 million escudos; Mozambique, 450 million escudos; and Macau and Timor each 20 million escudos.

48. Although the escudo zone is intended to "free" capital movement between the separate territories, the existing restrictions have led some observers to consider that it represents the cornerstone of Lisbon's control over the Overseas Provinces. At present, each of the Territories has its own budget, tax system, currency, issuing bank and exchange fund. Within the Portuguese realm (i.e., both between the Territories and between the Territories and Portugal), payment transactions are cleared through a central exchange which is the Bank of Portugal in Lisbon. The exchange holdings of each Territory (in metropolitan escudos, gold and foreign exchange) are kept in separate reserve funds in the Bank of Portugal. When a Territory has inadequate exchange reserves to pay its own accounts, it may borrow from the Escudo Zone Monetary Fund which is operated by the Bank.<sup>29</sup> However, since all accounts cleared with the Bank are in metropolitan escudos, the net gold and foreign exchange earned by the Territory benefit Portugal's own account. The following table shows the important role played by the foreign exchange earnings of the Territories in the escudo zone balance of payments.

PORTUGAL'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

(Million escudos)

	1964	Metropolitan	Overseas Provinces	Escudo zone
Trade	.....	-6,162	+ 929	-5,233
Invisibles	.....	+2,958	+2,757	+5,715
Capital movement	.....	+3,040	- 60	+2,980
TOTAL	.....	- 124	+3,626	+3,502
1965				
Trade	.....	-8,058	- 781	-8,839
Invisibles	.....	+4,991	+3,398	+8,385
Capital movement	.....	+2,874	- 163	+2,711
TOTAL	.....	- 131	+2,454	+2,323

49. Although complete figures are not yet available for 1966, according to a recent report,<sup>30</sup> the foreign exchange earned by the Overseas Territories is becoming an increasingly important factor in Portugal's balance of payments with foreign countries. The report noted that, during the first nine months of 1966, despite Portugal's own growing trade deficit (which amounted to 8,000 million escudos as compared to 7,100 million escudos in the corresponding period of 1965), the surplus from foreign exchange transactions (*saldo de balança de liquidações combiais*) including Portugal's own invisible earnings in the Bank of Portugal amounted to 750 million escudos and this was 550 million escudos more than that of the same period of 1965.

50. The difficulties caused by the present system of exchange controls have been the subject of criticism

<sup>29</sup> Each Territory may borrow on an "automatic" basis up to one third of the capital it has subscribed (see foot-note 28), which for Angola is therefore 250 million and for Mozambique 150 million escudos. The Territories may also obtain one or more special loans from the Fund under certain conditions negotiated beforehand between the Government of the Territory concerned and the Fund. As a general rule, the total amount a Territory can borrow may not exceed the amount of its own share in the Fund.

<sup>30</sup> Report to the annual general meeting of the Bank of Lisbon and Azores by Dr. Guilherme Moreira, Chairman of the Board of Directors, *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 28 January 1967.

in Portugal and in the Territories. Reference was also made to this problem in an order from the Ministry of the Economy on wine-growing policy.<sup>31</sup> Since wine is one of Portugal's principal exports to the Overseas Territories,<sup>32</sup> attention is being given to the expansion of their markets for wine through: (i) directly or indirectly stimulating the increased consumption of wine and other allied beverages; and (ii) reducing the intermediary charges in the marketing chain but maintaining the quality of wine reaching the consumer. The order notes that the expansion of the markets in the Overseas Territories, not only for wine but also for other non-essential consumer goods from any other "national territory", would require a larger amount of capital than people were willing to risk in the interruptions of transfers due to the inadequacies of the present system of payments. The risks involved not only prejudiced investments but also resulted in the consumer Territories going into production themselves which was not the most economical solution.<sup>33</sup>

51. As reported last year, the freeing of movement of goods without a more liberalized system of payments had already created a serious situation in Angola in 1965 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 126-130). During 1966, difficulties in securing exchange continued in Angola and became more serious in Mozambique. Towards the end of the year, stiff penalties were introduced in Portugal to put a stop to an increasing number of illegal transfers of capital (Decree 47,413 of 23 December). According to certain estimates, the amount of money transferred abroad runs into thousand millions of escudos mainly in Europe and the United States and that the shortage of medium-term and long-term capital available from commercial banks makes the recovery of this money important.

52. Clandestine dealings in foreign exchange have also increased in Angola. Early in 1967, the Governor General issued a statement<sup>34</sup> saying that the judicial police and PIDE were being called upon to put a stop to such activities and that heavy penalties would be applied to all persons who violated the exchange regulations or who collaborated directly or indirectly with foreign organizations enticing the exodus of capital. The Portuguese Government is now studying how to put into effect fully the system of payments envisaged in Decree Laws 44,016 and 44,703, which, in turn, will depend on the results of a survey being made of the economic structures and current determinants of the balance of payments of the various Territories.

53. The illegal exodus of capital from Portugal is due partly to the fact that interest rates in other countries are substantially higher than in Portugal. In Portugal, although the statutory interest rate is set at 5 per cent per annum, most of the Government's borrowing has been at lower rates. Pending the revision of measures affecting the money market, and without prejudice to such future measures, the Government in January 1967<sup>35</sup> authorized a new series of 5 per cent treasury bonds (*obrigações do tesouro 5 por cento 1967, fomento económico*) totalling 1,000 million escudos. The Government hopes that the higher interest rate will attract savings and will reduce the exodus of capital. The proceeds from the bonds are to be used

exclusively for investments in plans approved by the Council of Ministers for Economic Affairs.

### (c) *Effect on development of the Overseas Territories*

#### (i) *Planning*

54. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, which is now in its last year, was intended to bridge the gap between plans which were drawn up for each geographical unit and the next plan which will deal with different sectors of the "national economy" of the Portuguese realm. Thus, in the Territories, the Transitional Plan was intended mainly to stimulate private investment, to co-ordinate and to set out the lines of orientation towards the forging of a national economy. As a means of ensuring a greater degree of consultation and co-ordination, it was decided in 1966 to provide for increased territorial representation in the working groups preparing the Third National Development Plan.

55. During 1966, both the Overseas Services and the statistical services in the Territories were reorganized. The new statute unifies the Overseas Services and establishes the conditions of service in the Overseas Territories. To meet the growing need for statistical data by national and international bodies and to facilitate economic planning of the Portuguese realm as a whole, the national statistical services and the statistical system have been reorganized (Decree Laws 46,925 and 46,926 of 29 March 1966). The over-all responsibility is vested in the National Council of Statistics as a policy-making and co-ordinating body. The National Institute of Statistics will be responsible for the collection, study and presentation of statistics both in Portugal and the Overseas Territories. It is intended that the present statistical services in the Territories will become branches of the Institute. Heretofore, the lack of statistical data has hampered economic and development studies.<sup>36</sup> Among all the Overseas Territories, Cape Verde is the only one for which an attempt has been made to calculate the gross national product. For Angola and Mozambique, the difficulties in obtaining statistics relating to the subsistence sector and services have made such calculations impossible. Under the new system, there are to be regular (every ten years) censuses of population, agriculture, extractive and transforming industries, distribution and services and housing.

56. Under the new laws (Decrees 46,925 and 46,926 of 29 March 1966), transgressions in the preparation and use of statistics are subject to fines varying from 50 to 10,000 escudos. For instance, fines range from 50 to 6,000 escudos for giving inaccurate information or failing to give the information required or, in the time allowed, publication of statistics without prior approval of the Institute or publication of statistics not in accordance with the standards of the Institute. Since it is officially claimed that Portugal does not maintain statistics on a racial basis, it appears likely that, in future, publications trying to analyse social data on such a basis could be prosecuted under these provisions.

#### (ii) *Financing of development*

57. In addition to the measures affecting trade and balance of payments referred to above, steps have been taken to accelerate the economic development of the

<sup>31</sup> *Ministério da Economia, Despacho, "A política vitivinícola," Diário do Governo, Series I, 9 December 1966.*

<sup>32</sup> In 1966 the Overseas Territories imported 35.7 million gallons of wine from Portugal (*Cape Times*, 6 January 1967).

<sup>33</sup> *Diário do Governo, Series I, 9 December 1966, p. 2178.*

<sup>34</sup> *Diário de Luanda, 27 January 1967.*

<sup>35</sup> *Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 27 January 1967.*

<sup>36</sup> Mário de Oliveira, *Problemas do Ultramar no Plano Inter-tarcal de Fomento, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisbon, 1964, p. 16.*

Territories by easing the regulations on foreign investments, expanding banking and credit facilities and relaxing some of the controls over local industries (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 52-68). Although conditions for foreign investments have been eased and some new foreign investments were made in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration during 1966 (see sections on each Territory), there are indications that, in order to strengthen economic integration, preference is given to national companies and national capital in the development of certain sectors in the Overseas Territories. For instance, the selection of ANGOL to participate in petroleum exploitation in Angola was said to be guided by this policy (see section 2 below on Angola).

58. To facilitate development financing, the banking system in the Territories was revised in 1965 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 62-64). This has enabled existing banks in Angola and Mozambique to establish new branches and a number of other banks have been authorized to establish offices in these Territories; thus during 1966 the Banco Standard-Totta, controlled jointly by the Banco Totta Aliança of Portugal and the Standard Bank of South Africa, opened branches in both Angola and Mozambique as did a new credit bank, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial, which supplies credit to industries producing for home consumption.

59. In spite of the measures to stimulate development, economic growth in most sectors of Angola was at a slower rate than in 1965, while in Mozambique the effects were visible mainly in the industrial sector and in new investments in sugar production (see section 3 below on Mozambique), agricultural production remaining, in general, below the level of earlier years. Credits granted by the National Development Bank (Banco de Fomento Nacional) to the Overseas Territories in 1965 dropped to a total of 549 million escudos, compared with 1,030 million escudos in 1964. These credits included fifteen direct loans to Angola amounting to 126 million escudos, eleven loans to Mozambique totalling 248 million escudos and one loan each to Guinea under Portuguese administration and to Timor for 4 million and 5 million escudos respectively. Other operations of the Bank consisted of a 25 million escudos participation in the financing of a paper goods factory in Angola, investment of 40 million escudos in a soft drink factory in Mozambique and a guarantee of 71 million escudos to an industrial concern in Mozambique.<sup>37</sup>

60. So far, the most immediate effect of the 1965 legislation on the co-ordination of industrial development has been the establishment or projected establishment of several new cotton spinning mills in Angola and Mozambique. Nevertheless, the cotton regulations presently in force in these Territories still require them to export most of their raw cotton to Portugal in order to supply the metropolitan textile industry. A similar situation also applies in respect of sugar, production of which is being increased, especially in Mozambique. Under the existing regulations, which have been extended until 1982 (Decree 47,337 of 24 November 1966), the Overseas Territories are assigned guaranteed quotas for the supply of sugar to Portugal. Recently, however, the existing sugar refineries in Portugal have been authorized to increase their refining capacity to 300,000 tons per annum<sup>38</sup> to meet

the anticipated increase in Portugal's sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Since other sugar producing countries are cutting back production in order to stabilize world prices, this presumably means that in the Overseas Territories priority will still be given to the supply of sugar to Portugal in a semi-refined state.

61. A study by the National Institute of Statistics published in 1966<sup>39</sup> showed that almost half of Portugal's imports from the Overseas Territories consisted of agricultural products and recent developments do not indicate any significant change in this trade pattern. On the contrary, efforts are being made to expand the exports of the primary products of the Territories to meet Portugal's needs. Thus, in June 1966, the Junta Nacional dos Produtos Pecuários in Lisbon was authorized to set up with representatives of producers in Angola and Mozambique a scheme for supplying Portugal with meat.<sup>40</sup> However, instead of giving producers in the Territories a subsidy, as is paid to meat producers in Portugal and in the adjacent islands, frozen meat imported from these Territories will be guaranteed the price quoted on the international market. It is hoped thereby to encourage production to the extent that Portugal may gradually reduce its foreign imports. The difference in the price paid to producers and the sale price in Portugal (which is lower) is to be made up from the Fundo de Abastecimento as in the case of meat imported from foreign countries (see also sections on Angola and Mozambique).

62. The central Government is also taking measures to increase fruit exports from the Territories to Portugal. Early in 1966, on the recommendations of a special working group, the Minister for Overseas Territories laid down guidelines for the production and transportation of banana exports to Portugal. Several refrigerated ships have been acquired for this purpose and have begun operations. Banana production is being encouraged especially in Angola, São Tomé and Príncipe and in Cape Verde and citrus fruit production in Mozambique. In January 1967, another working group was established in the Overseas Ministry to stimulate fruit production in the Overseas Territories and to assist government and private undertakings. The working group is to collaborate with the territorial Governments in the establishment of producer associations, to co-ordinate and advise on the production of the most suitable varieties both for the national and international markets and to propose measures necessary for the marketing and transport of the fruits.

#### *Social integration and cultural assimilation*

63. Since the abolition in 1961 of the Native Statute, more emphasis is being given in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea to the problem of the progressive integration of the indigenous populations in the non-indigenous organization of these Territories.

64. From the Portuguese point of view,<sup>41</sup> the social problems in these Territories are different from those

<sup>39</sup> *Boletim Mensal*, August 1966, as reported in the *Diário*, Lourenço Marques, 6 November 1966.

<sup>40</sup> In order to help stimulate livestock reproduction in the Overseas Territories, the Veterinary Services were reorganized and strengthened and veterinary research institutes were set up in Angola and Mozambique.

<sup>41</sup> Narana Coissoró, "Os princípios fundamentais do direito Ultramarino português", *Estudos Políticos e Sociais*, vol. IV, No. 1, Lisbon, 1966, offprint, p. 6.

<sup>37</sup> Banco de Fomento Nacional, *Relatório Anual*, 1965, p. 17.

<sup>38</sup> *Diário*, Lourenço Marques, 16 November 1966.

in the smaller Territories where no "cultural competition" exists (in Cape Verde and São Tomé because the inhabitants are predominantly *mestiço*, in Macau because they are "Luso-Chinese", and in Timor because they are "Luso-Indonesian-Malayan"). The three Territories in Africa are characterized by the fact that, whereas the indigenous population constitute a numerical majority, they live mainly in traditional societies and it is the small number of *originários* from Portugal who are considered to form the "sociological majority" because as a group they are considered to possess "enlightenment" and education and control political power, technological and economic development.

65. In the past, because of these differences, the African population in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea were governed by the Native Statute<sup>42</sup> and their integration within the normative Portuguese pattern of local government and administration depended on their attaining the "state of development" (*estado de evolução*)<sup>43</sup> deemed necessary for them to be governed by Portuguese civil law. As a result of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 (Decree 43,896 of 6 September 1961), Africans may now opt to be governed by Portuguese civil law without having to meet any educational or cultural requirements. Nevertheless, though it has been suggested that this means that an African's juridical status no longer depends on his "state of development",<sup>44</sup> in practice the administrative division of the African Territories still retains the dual pattern as before, with the predominantly African areas organized into *regedorias*, forming administrative posts because, as provided in the Revised Overseas Organic Law of 1963 (article XLV), these are considered to be regions which have not attained the "economic and social development deemed necessary" for the normative administrative pattern of the *concelho* to be established.<sup>45</sup>

66. Up to 1961, when the Native Statute was repealed, most of the regions predominantly occupied by Africans were classified as *circunscrições*, almost entirely made up of *regedorias*, in which native custom and usage applied. In recent years, there has been a progressive increase in the number of *concelhos* (especially in Angola) reflecting economic and social changes brought about partly by increased European settlement and, in the coffee growing areas, partly due to the changing role of the African farmer.

67. During 1966, further changes in administrative divisions were in process or under consideration in

<sup>42</sup> The special status of Africans under the Native Statute is described briefly in the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, paras. 99-105) and in greater detail in document A/AC.108/L.6, part II.

<sup>43</sup> The requirements laid down in article 56 of the Native Statute are given in detail in document A/AC.108/L.6, paras. 88-94. Among other requirements, he had to speak the Portuguese language "correctly"; be engaged in an occupation, trade or craft from which he derived sufficient income to support himself and his family or else possess adequate resources for that purpose; and be of good conduct and have attained the level of education and acquired habits which are a condition for the unrestricted application of the public and private law pertaining to Portuguese citizens.

<sup>44</sup> Coissoró, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

<sup>45</sup> For details on the administrative structure of the Territories under Portuguese administration see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. III.

both Angola and Mozambique. In Angola, special rural reorganization committees have been established at the district level to plan and regroup the rural population (see section on Angola). In Mozambique, more particular attention is being given to the north, where the administrative division of each district is to be revised and brought in line with actual needs in order to facilitate the "stabilization of the local population" (*fixação de populações*) and to promote the better use of resources. However, as the Minister for Overseas Territories noted in May 1966,<sup>46</sup> the actual division of the districts had to take into account as a basic consideration the "equilibrium and co-ordination" (*equilíbrio e articulação*) between the self-governing local bodies and the administrative units which were not self-governing. He said that it was therefore necessary to use the maximum prudence in the creation of new local government bodies because these, by their nature, were only justified when they possessed the human and material resources which enabled them to be truly self-governing as the law envisaged.

68. In practice, the administrative areas which are not "self-governing" are the *regedorias* in which the majority of Africans live. Since, according to the explanation provided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal, self-government in the Overseas Territories is to be developed through increased number of local government bodies, it is not clear whether the statement by the Minister for Overseas Territories foreshadows a slowing down of the previously envisaged progress of transition of the African areas towards self-government or the need to provide greater safeguards for the African population coming under the control of the mainly European elected local government bodies. The new Overseas Administrative Code may be expected to provide a clearer picture of any changes introduced in the administrative structure of the Territories.

69. In Angola, where plans for rural regrouping of the population were first formulated in 1962 (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, paras. 168 ff.), a few pilot projects have only recently come into operation after a complete reorientation. As will be seen in the section on Angola, rural regrouping, which had been intended "to establish a natural hierarchy of classes" with zones of influence radiating from "a civilized nucleus", will now form an integral part of the general plan for social promotion and settlement with a view to improving rural communities and developing their resources. However, the regrouping is to be based on areas with geographical, economic and social unity. Particular consideration is to be given to changes necessary in agriculture and livestock raising and the incorporation (*enquadramento*) of traditional infrastructures in the "national complex". It appears from the orientation to be given to regrouping and delimitation of *regedorias*, which are to be planned with the co-operation of the inhabitants, that recognition is now being given to the importance of economic development as a basis of social change and that transformation cannot be imposed from above but requires the willing co-operation of those involved.

70. In Mozambique also, there are indications that a need is felt for a new approach to rural reorganization and the economic and social progress of the African population. Speaking before the National As-

<sup>46</sup> J. M. da Silva Cunha. *Na posse do Secretário Geral de Moçambique*, 26 May 1966, *Agência Geral do Ultramar*, Lisbon, 1966, pp. 12-13.

sembly in January 1967, a representative of Mozambique, Dr. Nunes Barata, said:

"Portugal cannot only affirm its presence in Africa by armed force. The great battle of peace is one of economic and social development . . . and of the social and cultural progress of the '*populações nativas*'. It is urgently necessary to increase education in all its aspects. At the same time it is necessary to assure them work and guarantee their standard of living. These are indivisible aspects because if we declare our intentions without promoting harmonious economic development and a just division of wealth we shall only be making candidates for terrorism."<sup>47</sup>

71. It may be noted that while in theory<sup>48</sup> the form of law under which an African chooses to be governed is a matter of personal juridical status, in practice his political, social and economic rights are limited so long as he is not fully governed by Portuguese civil law. In particular, while Africans living in *regedorias* and ruled by African custom and usage have a right to free and joint use by the *regedoria* of five times the area occupied, it is only in special circumstances that they may appropriate land on an individual use. Since under the present laws, Africans living in *regedorias* do not have full economic rights, it seems that until further changes are made in the regulations governing the concession and occupation of land, it will not be possible to bring Africans into a really integrated modern society in these Territories.

72. According to press reports in January 1967, new measures were introduced (Decree 47,486 of 6 January)<sup>49</sup> to enable persons or local government bodies now occupying public land illegally in the Overseas Territories to obtain legal title to it.<sup>50</sup> First, persons or local government bodies who have occupied land for more than fifteen years and who can prove that they have developed it will, on application to the authority concerned, be granted full title to the land free of charge. Secondly, persons who occupy land illegally but who have not improved it may obtain an *aforamento* (leasehold) title to it directly without the procedure of public bids.

73. According to one speaker in the National Assembly,<sup>51</sup> the new measures are intended not only to benefit farmers (*agricultores*) but also to enable the African *autóctones* who have occupied land with the effective recognition of the authorities, now for the first time, to acquire legal title. Since land in the *regedorias* is reserved for the use of Africans living there, the new measures can only apply to Africans occupying land outside the *regedorias*. If this is the case, it does not appear from the information available so far that the new measures will substantially improve their situation since the present land concession regulations already provide that Africans may acquire rights over land outside *regedorias* "by *bona fide*, peaceful and continued possession during *ten years* of previously

vacant or abandoned land, on which permanent trees or crops have been established"<sup>52</sup> (italics added).

74. In Mozambique there have been litigations over land occupied by Africans. It seems that for various reasons the 1961 land concession legislation has not been effective and many Africans who could qualify for a title over the land they currently occupy and farm have not yet acquired legal rights. Thus once again the problem is not the letter of the law but its implementation on the local level in the Territories.

75. Apart from the physical regrouping of populations, special efforts are being made through the schools, youth activities and mass information media to accelerate the development among the inhabitants of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration of a conscious identification with Portugal.

76. In July 1966, at the Atlantic Conference on Education which was held in Lisbon and at which eighteen countries were represented, Portugal's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Franco Nogueira, after explaining Portugal's deep concern for the provision of education, went on to say that "education had been developed throughout the whole nation without distinction between metropolitan and Overseas Territories because all these parts make up the Portuguese Nation, and it is our fundamental policy to expand and improve educational activities in the Overseas Territories".<sup>53</sup>

77. Nevertheless, a wide disparity still exists between the opportunities for education in the Overseas Territories and those in Portugal. As noted by Professor Leite Pinto in a speech during the commemoration of the fortieth anniversary of the national revolution, there is not yet a unified national school system applying equally to Portugal and the Overseas Territories. Differences exist in the text-books used, the structure of classes, the period of compulsory education and the availability of training facilities at different levels.

78. In the Overseas Territories, the 1964 reform of primary elementary education made school attendance compulsory for all children between the ages of 6 and 12 living within five kilometres of a school. While considerable sums have been spent in Angola and Mozambique for school buildings, especially of rural school posts, most of these are in the more economically developed areas,<sup>54</sup> as for instance Uíge district in Angola (see section on Angola), and it may be some time before all school age children are able to attend school. In rural areas, even where schools are available, they are staffed at present, not by fully qualified primary school teachers but by "monitors", and African children who do not speak Portuguese have to go through a pre-primary adaptation class before they can enter the first grade of the primary school.

79. According to the 1964 legislation, children who are already 7 years old (or who will be 7 before the end of the calendar year in which they enter school)

<sup>47</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 14 January 1967.

<sup>48</sup> Mr. Adriano Moreira said on the occasion of the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961 "there is no connexion whatever between status in private law and political status".

<sup>49</sup> At the time of writing the present report, the Secretariat had not received the Government Gazette, *Diário do Governo*, containing the text of this decree.

<sup>50</sup> For details concerning the land concession regulations in the Overseas Territories see document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, chap. III.

<sup>51</sup> *Diário*, Lourenço Marques, 5 February 1967.

<sup>52</sup> Decree 43,894 of 6 September 1961, article 230, paragraph c (English translation in document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, para. 52).

<sup>53</sup> *Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, July 1966, pp. 241-242.

<sup>54</sup> Mr. Salazar said recently

"We force ourselves to act simultaneously in the economic and educational fields because education and economic development have to progress together. The economic development of the people . . . is not possible without education, and education not accompanied by economic expansion only succeeds in throwing the evolved persons into political agitation and subversion—i.e., persons to whom employment cannot be guaranteed in economically under-developed societies." (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, April 1966).

may be excused from attending the pre-primary class at the request of the parent or guardian if they speak Portuguese fluently and "possess the development sufficient for them to attend first grade, in accordance with the regulations governing primary education, and with the approval of the provincial school inspection service". Nevertheless, it appears that for many African children, the pre-primary class is a major hurdle, and the six years of schooling do not necessarily ensure a retaining literacy.

80. Recent events in Angola suggest however that an African child, who is already 7 years old, who speaks Portuguese fluently and can count in Portuguese, may not be able to enter first grade as a Portuguese child would but may have to go through the pre-primary class, where he will be "made to acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same success as children from a European type of environment". As the OECD study on education and development showed that school children in Portugal are slow in completing each class and, in a sample year (1961-1962), as about 33 per cent of the children had to repeat the first class,<sup>55</sup> it can be expected that with the present requirements even fewer African children can complete the first four classes by the time they are 12 years old.

81. The fact that education in the Overseas Territories is separate and different from that in Portugal is also underlined by the existence of the Co-ordinating Council for Education in the Overseas Territories (Conselho Coordenador das Actividades Dependentes da Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ministério do Ultramar).<sup>56</sup> When it last met in September 1966, the Council recommended that future educational policy in the Overseas Territories should concentrate on measures strengthening national unity.<sup>57</sup> It recommended, in particular, intensified efforts to disseminate Portuguese language and culture in the Overseas Territories, strengthening of the relationship between the Mocidade Portuguesa (Portuguese National Youth Organization) and the schools, an extended student exchange programme including visits between the inhabitants of the Overseas Territories as well as between those of Portugal and the Territories, improved school attendance statistics and the establishment of a uniform procedure for the final classification of primary school teachers in all national Territory.

82. In his report to the Council, the Director-General of the Department of Overseas Education in the Ministry for Overseas Territories, Dr. Justino Mendes de Almeida, referred to the approval of textbooks for use in the Overseas Territories as one of the most difficult problems facing the Council, especially since the approved texts would replace ones already in use. Although originally in 1964 it had been decided that the textbooks approved in Angola would be uniformly used in all Territories, since then the Co-ordinating Council has established a special procedure for approving textbooks. Each textbook is now reviewed by a committee comprising as wide a representation as possible from the Overseas Territories and specialists in the subject. Speaking on this procedure which inevitably involved delays, the Director-General ex-

pressed the hope that "the day would arrive when a compendium of books could be drawn up for use in Portugal and the Overseas Territories alike without infringing on the principles of national unity and affecting the economy of the nation".

83. Irrespective of the degree of literacy children attending rural schools in African Territories may expect to achieve, it is evident that much is expected of the primary school years in inculcating Portuguese values and way of life. This process of transforming the indigenous population into good Portuguese citizens will also be carried forward in the schools through obligatory extra-curricular activities for which the Portuguese National Youth Organization (Mocidade Portuguesa) was given sole responsibility after its reorganization in 1966. The Mocidade Portuguesa's activities are to stimulate and reinforce patriotism and a sense of national unity, to inculcate moral and social values and to familiarize the young people with "the realities of Portuguese life".

84. In Angola, public information media and especially radio broadcasting are also to play an important role in disseminating the Portuguese language and culture and in explaining government activities to the people (see section on Angola).

85. To strengthen the feeling of unity between the separate territorial units of the "Portuguese nation", a number of important conferences were held in different Territories as part of the celebration of Portugal's national revolution. These included the Fourth National Colloquium on Labour Corporative Organization and Social Security held in Angola in September 1966 and the National Tourism Conference held in Mozambique. The Overseas Territories are also being given more publicity in Portugal through exhibitions and participation of the Territories in such events as agricultural and industrial fairs, for which special allocations have been made.

86. As reported previously in some detail (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, paras. 87-198 and 258-329), Portugal considers that increased white settlement in Angola and Mozambique is an important means of transplanting Portuguese culture to those Territories and of strengthening their ties with Portugal. Several speakers in the commemorative lecture series again stressed the need for a massive settlement of Europeans from Portugal in the African Territories as a matter of urgency. Because emigration from Portugal to other European countries and the American continent has increased in recent years, the Government last year introduced new penalties for illegal emigration. Towards the end of 1966, legislation was also introduced under which ex-members of the armed forces who wish to migrate to any of the Overseas Territories will be entitled to have their passage paid by the Government (Decree 47,349 of 28 November 1966). Other measures for diverting emigration to the Overseas Territories are under consideration.

87. In Angola and Mozambique, various government bodies have also been concerned with increasing settlement from Portugal both in the interest of stimulating economic development and as a means of securing Portugal's sovereignty in these areas through actual occupation. During 1966, new legislation was introduced in Mozambique (Legislative Instrument No. 2,671 of 4 January 1966) to encourage a wider spreading of the *povoações* (population centres usually of European families) along the main arteries by requiring commercial centres to be located at least five

<sup>55</sup> Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Education and Development, Country Reports, The Mediterranean Regional Project, Portugal*, Paris, p. 26 (English text).

<sup>56</sup> The membership of the Council includes education inspectors, provincial educational inspectors and heads of departments of the *Direcção Geral do Ensino do Ultramar*.

<sup>57</sup> *Diário de Notícias*, Lisbon, 4 September 1966.

kilometres apart. In Angola also, spacing requirements have been laid down for farm houses.

88. In order to attract and retain settlers from Portugal in both Angola and Mozambique, efforts are being made to improve living conditions. A number of special allocations have been made in 1965-1966 for "local improvements" in Angola, especially electricity and water supplies. In Benguela District alone, which in 1960 had the second largest European population after Luanda, some 56 million escudos were spent on local improvements in 1966. In Mozambique large sums were also spent on municipal development, including electricity and water supplies, sanitation services and low-cost housing, in the main urban centres.

*International relations of Portugal affecting the Territories under its administration*

(a) *Participation in international and regional organizations*

89. In May 1966, the Nineteenth World Health Assembly considered the recommendation (AFR/RC15/R2) adopted by its Regional Committee for Africa, and taking into account the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and the Security Council in regard to the African Territories under Portuguese administration, decided to: (a) suspend the right of Portugal to participate in the Regional Committee for Africa and in regional activities until the Government of that country has furnished proof of its willingness to conform to the injunctions of the United Nations; and (b) suspend technical assistance to Portugal in accordance with the request contained in operative paragraph 9 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX). (The full text of this resolution appears in document A/AC.109/194, pp. 9-10.)

90. In November 1966, the General Conference of UNESCO, acting in accordance with the appeals contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), adopted by 72 votes to 11, with 26 abstentions, a resolution entitled "Tasks in the light of the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations at its twentieth session on questions relating to the liquidation of colonialism and racialism". In this resolution, the Conference noted that although UNESCO had made a certain contribution to the attainment and consolidation of independence by former colonial countries and peoples by assisting them to develop education, science and culture, it had by no means made use of all the opportunities available. The General Conference therefore authorized the Director-General of UNESCO to take measures to expand the work in this area. The Director-General was also authorized, "in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, to withhold assistance from the Government of Portugal, the Republic of South Africa and the illegal régime of Southern Rhodesia in matters relating to education, science and culture, and not to invite them to attend conferences or take part in other UNESCO activities, participation in which might be considered as conferring technical assistance, until such time as the Governments of these countries abandon their policy of colonial domination and racial discrimination". In a further resolution, adopted by 60 votes to 38, with 4 abstentions, the General Conference of UNESCO confirmed the decision taken by the Executive Board at its seventieth session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 41) not to invite Portugal to attend meetings of UNESCO subordinate bodies pending the conclusion of an *in situ* study of educational conditions in the African

Territories under Portuguese administration. Accordingly, it also rejected the request of the Portuguese Government (*ibid.*, para. 43) that the question be referred to the International Court of Justice. In the preamble of the resolution, the General Conference stated *inter alia* that "the Government of Portugal continues to pursue in the African Territories under its domination a policy of colonialism and racial discrimination which deprives the peoples of those Territories of their most elementary rights to education and culture, thus violating the fundamental obligations of every member of UNESCO"; "that this behaviour on the part of Portugal violates the fundamental principles of the Convention and Recommendation against Discrimination on Education"; and that the General Conference, as the sovereign organ of UNESCO, had the right to interpret the provisions of the Constitution, particularly the provisions which give the Executive Board authority to carry out the programme in accordance with the decisions of the General Conference.

(b) *New bilateral agreements*

91. In September 1966, Portugal and Brazil signed agreements on trade, technical and cultural co-operation and a joint declaration on economic co-operation. The new trade agreement, which revokes those of 1949 and 1959, aims at encouraging the growth and diversification of trade between Brazil and Portugal as well as the Territories under its administration which are specifically included. The agreement provides that payments shall be made under a régime of free exchange and that free trade zones for products from Portugal or Brazil may be established in either country. The agreement also provides for mutual assistance in regard to industrial investment, freer movement of capital, freer convertibility and the reciprocal application of "most favoured nation treatment" in so far as this is compatible with existing international obligations. The agreement is to remain in force for five years, and if not revoked by the end of the period, it will be automatically extended for successive periods of one year.

92. The Luso-Brazilian Economic Committee established under the provisions of the new agreement met in December 1966 to discuss problems of transport, free trade zones, customs duties, complementary industrial establishments and questions concerning technical assistance. The terms of the new treaty will be put into effect on a provisional basis pending ratification by the Brazilian Congress.

93. The joint declaration on economic co-operation, which also explicitly includes the Overseas Territories, provides for mutual treatment of Brazilian, Portuguese or Brazilian-Portuguese industrial companies established in Brazilian or Portuguese territory as if they were national companies. The basic criterion for the establishment of such companies is that they must fill the needs of the country concerned. The two Governments agree to stimulate joint companies exploiting mineral resources.

94. In January, four ships of the Brazilian Navy carrying 2,800 men visited Angola for five days.

*Membership of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea under Portuguese administration in the Economic Commission for Africa*

95. At its eighth session, the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) adopted a resolution (151 (VIII) of 21 February 1967) on the admission of Angola,

Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa as associate members.

96. In the preamble of the resolution, the ECA reaffirmed its conviction that the active participation of all African countries and territories in its work was an essential condition for the attainment of its objectives. Taking into account the decision of the Economic and Social Council in resolution 974 (XXXVI) of 1963 by which it expelled Portugal from the Commission's membership, and having ascertained that there were no valid juridical considerations against the participation of Angola, Mozambique, so-called Portuguese Guinea and South West Africa in its work, the Commission recommended that the Organization of African Unity designate representatives of the Territories concerned.

97. Economic and Social Council resolution 974 (XXXVI) also revised the Commission's terms of reference which provides that the following "shall be associate members of the Commission": the Non-Self-Governing Territories situated in the area of the Commission's competence and "Powers other than Portugal responsible for international relations of those Territories".

## 2. ANGOLA

### *General*

98. Angola lies on the south-west Atlantic coast of Africa between 4°22'S and 18°03'S in latitude and between 24°05'EG and 11°41'EG in longitude. Except for the Cabinda enclave which is administered as part of it, the entire Territory of Angola lies south of the Congo River. The total area of the Territory is 1,246,700 square kilometres. At the 1960 census, the total resident population was 4,830,449 of whom 172,529 were listed as *Branco*, 53,392 were listed as *Mestiço* and 4,604,362 as *Preto* (Provincia de Angola, *Boletim Mensal*, No. 10, October 1963, p. 5).

### *Government and administration*

99. The fundamental constitutional provisions relating to all the Overseas Territories are the same and are set out in the Constitution of Portugal<sup>58</sup> and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963.<sup>59</sup> According to those instruments, which establish the structure of the Portuguese State, each of the Overseas Territories is a province of Portugal, subject to the authority of the central Government, but having its own territorial organs with limited powers and functions which are defined in a separate political and administrative statute for each Territory. In the case of Angola, this is contained in Decree 45,374 of 22 November 1963.<sup>60</sup>

100. The organs of the State and central Government of Portugal which are most directly concerned with the Overseas Territories are the Council of Ministers, the Overseas Minister, the National Assembly, the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber. The National Assembly, the Government and the Minister for Overseas Territories all have power to legislate for the Overseas Territories.

<sup>58</sup> Portugal, Political Constitution of the Portuguese Republic, SNI.

<sup>59</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixteenth Session, Supplement No. 16 (A/4978)*, paras. 160-167.

<sup>60</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73; see also sections on each Territory.

101. At the territorial level in Angola, the Governor General, as the representative of the central Government, possesses both legislative and executive powers. The power to propose legislation of purely territorial concern and not including additional expenditure is also vested in a Legislative Council which meets normally twice a year for not more than a total of three months, during which time the Governor General is precluded from legislating on matters within the Council's competence. The Council comprises 36 members, of whom 2 are *ex officio*, 19 are elected by "organic groups" (such as employers' and workers' associations, cultural and religious groups, local government bodies and others) and 15 are elected by direct vote on a franchise which, in practice, includes only a minority of the population.<sup>61</sup> There is also in Angola an economic and social council comprised of representatives of high officials and representatives of special interest groups whose function is mainly to advise the Governor General.

102. The Territory is divided into fifteen administrative districts, each under a district governor. These in turn are divided, according to circumstances, into *concelhos* (municipalities) or *circunscrições*; the *concelhos* in turn are divided into *freguesias* (parishes). Elected councils exist at the district level and in the *concelhos*, *freguesias* and *circunscrições* where there are sufficient qualified voters. Finally, Africans living in traditional societies are organized in *regedorias* which are administered under native law and custom.

103. Angola is represented in the National Assembly of Portugal by seven representatives who are elected by direct vote on a franchise different from those governing elections to territorial bodies, but which also contains qualifications which restrict the right to vote to a minority of the population.<sup>62</sup> It is also represented in the Overseas Council and the Corporative Chamber of Portugal by representatives chosen from the Territorial Economic and Social Council and in the electoral college which elects the Head of State.

### *Appointment of new Governor General*

104. In November 1966, Lieutenant-Colonel Camilo Augusto de Miranda Rebocho Vaz was appointed Governor General of Angola. His appointment appears to have been unexpected as he had initiated a movement earlier in the year to petition for the extension of Colonel Silvino Silvério Marques's term as Governor General. Lieutenant-Colonel Rebocho Vaz first earned his reputation as a military leader in the important coffee growing Uíge district where in 1960 he checked an insurrection of over 100,000 men and after 1961 successfully recovered areas occupied by guerrillas. His appointment may therefore be considered as reflecting Portugal's determination to face a long-term war in Angola.

105. In a speech delivered at his swearing in ceremony in Lisbon (in reply to the Minister for Overseas Territories, Mr. Silva Cunha, who entrusted him to make Angola ever more consciously Portuguese) and in various speeches made since then, the Governor General outlined his Government's future policy and some of the immediate measures under consideration

<sup>61</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 55-64.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, *Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 54, document A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, para. 113.



for dealing with the urgent problems with which the Territory is faced.

106. The principal goal of his Government, he said, is to build up all sectors of the Territory to secure it for all time against attempts to subvert it or to wipe out Portuguese civilization there. As there had been a feeling of expectation and uncertainty in some circles because changes in the territorial Government had not yet been completed<sup>63</sup> he wished to make it clear that his Government would follow "only the policy of the President of the Council and which was supported by the whole authentic nation". Any solution which did not lead the Overseas Territories to a closer relationship with Portugal could only result in personal ruin and loss to the national patrimony. He stressed that there would not be a policy for Europeans or a policy for Africans (*não haverá política de europeus ou de africanos*); there would be only one national policy, through which people are integrated on the basis of their individual merits and not for any other reason.

107. More than ever before what Angola needed was to unite around the same ideas.<sup>64</sup> The truth was that the enemies who opposed Portugal's presence in the "Portuguese world" were not yet convinced of the futility of their struggle and continued to try to disrupt the life of the Territory. It was therefore necessary for all the people to be aware that in the near future many developments could be expected indicating continued subversive attempts against values that were most prized.

108. Late in December 1966, the Governor General addressed a speech to the people of Angola warning them against rumours then current in the Territory. On this occasion he noted that there was disquiet in large and small population centres, in government offices and homes, in the streets and in the cafes where extravagant rumours were circulating. Without stating what the rumours were, he said that they were partly attributable to the holding of civil defence exercises (see below). He explained that the exercises were intended to train the population in preventive and defensive activities and did not in any way indicate that the internal situation of the Territory had deteriorated. He considered that what was needed was "a policy of truth". Anyone who helped in circulating rumours was committing a crime against the security of the Territory, and it was everybody's duty to search out rumours and destroy them. The Government would take measures to improve the information services, which had been inadequate; exchange of information between Portugal and the Territory, as well as within the Territory, would be increased and radio broadcasting would be improved with stronger transmitting stations

<sup>63</sup> Since Mr. Rebocho Vaz's nomination as Governor General, new appointments in Angola have included those of three of the six provincial secretaries, namely those for rural development, health, welfare and labour, public works and communications.

<sup>64</sup> There are indications that Portuguese businessmen and settlers in Angola both have grievances against Lisbon. A recent newspaper article quoted the following statement as expressing the feelings of at least one section of the Portuguese residents:

"If we had economic autonomy, every White in Angola could be a millionaire! But the Government [in Lisbon] allows us no economic autonomy. Our European community falls into two groups: those who do too much for the African and then get out; and those who stay behind and keep what we have built up. Portugal's recent prosperity at home is our doing, and they owe us much in Angola."

and special programmes for certain areas and certain groups. He stressed that what was necessary was to make the reality in Angola understood externally and internally and to show both to the neighbouring countries and to the people in Angola the progress which had been made in the Territory. On the domestic front, he urged that greater effort should be given to: (a) research into public information to isolate and put a stop to rumours which aimed at destroying Angola; (b) civil defence, so that full use would be made of people and materials; (c) permanent vigilance, so that the enemy should never be able to gain advantage by surprise attacks; and (d) increased production in order to support the defence expenditures.

#### *Registration of voters*

109. Local newspapers in Angola have recently carried notices concerning the 1967 registration of voters for elections: (a) to the National Assembly and (b) to the Legislative Council and members of parish boards. The notices set out the documentary and other evidence required as proof of, among other things, marital status and the ability to read and write Portuguese.

110. The ability to read and write Portuguese may be proven by submission of a diploma from public examination, by an official statement from a government department, by an application written and signed by the applicant and with the signature and handwriting certified by a notary, and by an application written, read and signed before the appropriate authorities.

111. A Portuguese citizen who does not read and write Portuguese may also vote in the direct elections to the Legislative Council if he is a head of family, that is to say, if he has "a legitimately constituted family living with him under his authority and sharing his board", and pays taxes (*contribuições*) of any kind of not less than 100 escudos. Proof of status as head of family for this purpose must be certified by the administrative authority where the applicant resides. Marital status is to be proven by a certificate from the civil registry or from a Catholic parish or mission, or registered in terms of the law in force prior to the repeal of the Native Statute in 1961.

#### *The war in Angola*

112. In the latter part of 1966, the war in Angola entered a new phase when fighting flared up again with intensity in Cabinda and what has been called "a second front" was opened on the eastern border of Angola. In late December, Vila Teixeira de Sousa, near the Zambian border, was the target of a surprise attack and thus, by the end of 1966, Portuguese military units were engaged on the eastern, northern and north-western borders of the Territory.

113. According to press reports, since the first outbreak of fighting at Cazombo, large numbers of Portuguese troops have been moved to the borders of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and all settlements have been cleared from a strip several miles in depth along the frontier. New airfields are completed in this region and defence measures are being strengthened. In January 1967, eastern Angola had become the main centre of military activities.

114. In the north, the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo was closed by the Portuguese authorities in December following a

series of events which began with an attack on the Portuguese consulate in Kinshasa. In September, the Democratic Republic of the Congo submitted to the Security Council charges that Angola was being used as a military base for mercenaries planning to attack it. Portugal denied these charges and suggested an on-the-spot investigation. Following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolution 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966, the Democratic Republic of the Congo ordered the closing of all Portuguese consulates within its borders. Then, in early December, Portugal charged that troops inside Angola had been fired on from the Congolese side of the border.

115. In their military communiqués, the Portuguese admit that they are fighting three nationalist movements: the *Movimento popular de libertação de Angola* (MPLA), the *Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil* (GRAE) and the newly formed *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA). Early in January 1967, a Portuguese military communiqué reported that whereas there had been no incidents in Cabinda during the period reviewed, there had been fighting around Nôqui near the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, a surprise attack on the Canga Lucossa road, and also continued fighting in the area north of the Uíge mountains and in the Dembos area. Moxico District, according to press reports, was the main centre of military activities, with fighting north of Lumbala, in Nhamihia and Sacair, Lucolo and at the juncture of the Henrique de Carvalho-Luso road (near Buçaco) and the Luando River. For the week ending 21 January, Portuguese casualties were reported heavier than usual, with eleven dead, including three civilians, and eighteen wounded.

116. Although on 15 March 1967, on the sixth anniversary of the Angola uprising, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal announced that the situation in Angola "has returned to normal on the political, military and economic planes", as is indicated by the Governor General's speeches (see paras. 107 and 108 above), the war has again become the main concern overshadowing the everyday life of Angola. Reflecting this, the 1967 budget allocates 782 million escudos for national defence and the armed forces, representing a 25 per cent increase over that of 1966 and almost three times as large as the allocation in 1961. In terms of the budget estimates, allocations for defence and the armed forces have increased from 10.8 per cent in 1961 to 12.4 per cent in 1965, 16.3 per cent in 1966 and 18.4 per cent in 1967.

#### *Civil defence and security measures*

117. Apart from the armed forces, Angola has two other quasi-military organizations engaged in defence activities. One of these is the traditional militia, a military corps composed of *vizinhos das regedorias* (Africans living in traditional societies) (Legislative Instrument 3,252 of 6 June 1962) which is under the direct command of the local administrative authority and responsible to the Governor General. In case of war or emergency, the militia may be placed under the authority of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps as necessary.

118. In Angola, the Volunteer Corps was first created in 1961 following the uprising and was composed of Portuguese citizens resident in the Territory. Now known as the Provincial Organization of Volun-

teers and Civil Defence (*Organização Provincial de Voluntários e Defesa Civil de Angola* (OPVDC), it has a permanent staff and organized units throughout the Territory which is divided into civil defence zones corresponding to the administrative districts.

119. The Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps has an autonomous budget supported mainly by special taxes. In 1965, estimated expenditure for the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps was 58.5 million escudos. The 1966 budget provided for an estimated expenditure of 56.0 million escudos, of which 49.1 million escudos (87.7 per cent) was for salaries and allowances, 500,000 escudos for civil defence courses and 250,000 escudos for public information.

120. During 1966, civil defence courses and exercises were held in Luanda and Moçâmedes and in various towns in the border districts including Silva Porto (Bié District); São Salvador and Vila do Ambrizete (Zaire District); Cabinda, Guilherme Capelo, Dinge and Buco Zau (Cabinda District); and Luso (Moxico District). Towards the end of 1966, there were frequent courses for training the local population in active defence, special training courses for civil defence leaders (commanders and assistant instructors) and general orientation courses. Both men and women participate in the courses which end with a civil defence exercise.

121. To co-ordinate the various new defence and security units, a separate Provincial Security Department was established in January 1966 (Legislative Instrument 3,609 of 3 January) under the head of the Services for the Co-ordination and Centralization of Information who thereby becomes the Provincial Security Authority. The Provincial Security Department is responsible to the Governor General and is in permanent relation with the Security Department of the Overseas Ministry and, through the latter, with the National Security Authority in Portugal. There is also a Provincial Security Commission which is responsible for the planning of security policy to be adopted in the Territory in accordance with the general security policy of Portugal. The Commission is composed of the Provincial Security Authority, all the provincial secretaries and one representative from each of the following: Angola's intelligence police, the *Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE), the Public Security Police and the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps.

122. As a further security measure, the Governor General issued an order in January 1967 under which persons who serve in public buildings belonging to the State or to local governments or public bodies automatically become members of the OPVDC and must render such services as they may be called upon to give in the defence of the buildings or the area in which they are located.

123. Although there have been no recent reports of arrests for political reasons, speeches by the Governor General (reported above) and by other government officials, including the new District Governor of Uíge, as well as newspaper editorials seem to suggest that there may be some disaffection in the Territory. The Public Security Police force is reported to have been increased to 10,000 men, and during the year the personnel of the PIDE (intelligence police) was increased by almost 50 per cent from 355 to 567. The increase in the PIDE force in the Territory followed the trials in Lisbon of eight Angolans charged with being mem-

bers of the MPLA. Of these, three men and one woman were sentenced to between 2-1/2 and 8-1/2 years' imprisonment for subversive activities in Angola and three others were acquitted but lost their civil rights for fifteen years. No information has been published on the result of the trial of the eighth person, a twenty-six-year-old student.

#### *Economic conditions*

124. *General.* Despite the growing importance of the mining sector in recent years, the economy of Angola is still based mainly on the production and export of agricultural commodities. The most important export crop is coffee, which in 1965 accounted for almost half of the Territory's total exports by value. The other export crops are sisal, maize, sugar and cotton which in an average year account for 10 to 15 per cent of the value of exports.

125. Until 1960 diamonds were the most important mineral exported, on the average accounting for about 14 per cent of exports by value. Since then, owing to the increase in petroleum and iron ore production, the share of minerals in the total value of the exports has risen to over 20 per cent.

126. Most of the export crops are controlled by European capital. African independent farmers grow for their own account about one quarter of the coffee exported. Otherwise, Africans are mainly employed as wage earners or engaged in traditional agriculture, growing food crops, including maize, manioc, palm oil, beans and peanuts, largely for their own subsistence.

127. Although the gross value of industrial production increased by 198 per cent between 1960 and 1965, the industrial sector remains small, the most important activities being concerned with the processing for export of such primary products as petroleum, sugar and cotton (i.e., ginning). Except for a few larger units producing cement, paper, beer, textiles, soft drinks and tobacco, most of the manufacturing industries are relatively small and the total number of wage earners in industry (excluding mining) is less than one quarter of those in agriculture. The range of consumer goods produced locally is growing, however, and now includes various items of food, fertilizers, tools, electric batteries, other electronic equipment, bicycles, tires, shoes and some clothing. However, consumer goods, including flour, canned foods, wine and textiles, still account for a substantial part of the Territory's imports.

128. Angola's trade is characterized by a favourable balance with those foreign countries to which it exports most of its coffee, diamonds and iron ores, and a deficit with Portugal, to which it exports its lower-priced commodities such as maize and sugar in return for manufactured goods. Under the existing trade and currency controls, this situation has enabled Portugal to benefit from Angola's foreign exchange earnings but at the same time it has affected the Territory's economic growth.

129. In 1965, there was less expansion in the main sectors of the economy than in the two preceding years. This was reflected in a deteriorating balance of trade, as imports increased more rapidly than exports of both agricultural and mineral products, and by a lower rate of capital investment compared with 1964. By the middle of 1966, the Territory's exchange problems,

rising cost of living and shortage of capital began to cause concern.

130. In November, the new Governor General warned that the Territory would have to face a period of austerity and indicated that new legislation would be introduced to help solve some of the economic and financial problems which the Territory was facing. As noted above (section B. 1, para. 52), the Governor General recently ordered the judicial police and the secret police to put a stop to the illicit export of capital from the Territory and heavy penalties have been imposed on transgressors. Since 1967, all government departments have been ordered to reduce expenditures to a minimum compatible with the administrative needs and the interests of national defence. The departments have been placed on a monthly budget system under which any surpluses automatically revert to general revenue.<sup>65</sup>

131. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly pointed out that Angola's exchange problem and its balance of trade and payments deficits with Portugal tended to reinforce each other in a vicious circle, making it difficult for the Territory to attract the investments needed for a more rapid growth. But so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of economic development between Portugal and the Overseas Territories, economic integration without safeguards would only make Portugal increasingly a supplier of manufactured goods with the Territories as the consumer markets. He therefore asked the Government to take measures to help bring Angola out of its economic plight and suggested that, among other steps, the Government should restrict its exports, especially of wine and textiles, to Angola as this would encourage the Territory to develop import substitutes. Subsequently the Industrial Association of Angola sent a telegram to the President of the Assembly giving its support to this request.

#### *Balance of trade and payments*

132. Preliminary reports for 1966 show a continuation of the decline in the volume of exports which began in 1964. Exports in 1966, totalling 1,700 million tons, were 200 million tons less than in 1965, though the value rose by more than 10 per cent from 5,747 million escudos to 6,361 million escudos. Imports continued the upward trend and increased from 430,000 tons in 1965 to 514,000 tons in 1966 with a corresponding increase in value from 5,601 million escudos to 6,002 million escudos. Thus, although the net trade surplus in 1966, amounting to more than 350 million escudos, was slightly higher than in 1965, it was only 55 per cent of the surplus in 1961 and only 31 per cent of that in 1964.

133. Detailed trade figures for 1966 are not yet available but it is unlikely that there was much change in the general pattern of trade and its deficit relationship with Portugal. In the period 1960-63, Angola's annual trade deficit with Portugal fluctuated around 800 million escudos, with imports from Portugal averaging 1,600 million escudos. Although in 1964, some diamonds were shipped to Portugal for the first time and as a result the trade deficit with Portugal dropped to 552 million escudos, imports from Portugal have continued to rise and in 1965 the trade deficit had again increased to 638 million escudos.

<sup>65</sup> Known in Portuguese as the *duodécimo* system.

134. Although much of Angola's imports in recent years have been for production needs, in 1965 more than one third of the total imports by value (5,600 million escudos) consisted of consumer goods, including wines, beverages and foods (about 18 per cent) and textiles (17 per cent). Metal goods, machinery, equipment and vehicles accounted for about 10 per cent and chemical products 8.2 per cent. Portugal supplied 48 per cent of the imports: goods supplied by Portugal, valued at 2,661 million escudos, included wine (414 million escudos) and textiles, dyed and other fabrics (389 million escudos).

135. Continuing the pattern of recent years, in 1965, agricultural exports, led by coffee and followed by sisal, maize, sugar and raw cotton, accounted for about two thirds of the total value of exports. Next in importance were minerals, which accounted for about 20.4 per cent of the exports. Portugal's share in the Territory's exports rose from 30 per cent in 1964 to 35 per cent in 1965 (2,023 million escudos out of a total of 5,747 million escudos). In contrast, Angola's exports to its other major clients decreased slightly: exports to the United States were 23 per cent of the total (compared with 25.8 per cent in 1964); to the Netherlands 11.8 per cent (compared with 13.9 per cent in 1964) and to the Federal Republic of Germany 5.4 per cent (compared with 7.6 per cent). Exports to France increased from 2.4 per cent in 1964 to 4.3 per cent and those to South Africa increased from 0.6 per cent to about 1 per cent. South Africa in return supplied about 2 per cent of the Territory's imports in both 1964 and 1965.

136. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev. 1, chap. V, paras. 126-130), in recent years Angola had suffered chronically from exchange problems because of its deficit trade with Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, and because of currency regulations which make Portugal the beneficiary of the Territory's foreign exchange earnings. Angola's visible and invisible transactions with Portugal have increased since 1960 but, except for 1962, the Territory has each year had a balance of payments deficit with Portugal, which reached a peak of 883 million escudos in 1963.

137. In 1964, outgoing invisibles exceeded incoming by almost 1,000 million escudos but this difference was largely compensated for by a surplus balance of trade and favourable capital movements, so that the balance of payments deficit was only 253 million escudos. In 1965, there was an adverse balance of trade resulting in a balance of payments deficit of 629 million escudos at the end of the year.

138. Figures for 1966 are not yet available but reports indicate that there has been little improvement although export earnings are expected to be higher than in 1965. However, as reported above (section B. 1, para. 52), as in Portugal, the financial situation in the Territory has led to the illicit export of capital and the Governor General has already issued an official statement calling attention to the penalties applicable to such transgressions. He has also announced that various measures are being drawn up to help the Territory get out of its present difficulties regarding foreign exchange and to improve the economic and financial situation.

#### *Agriculture and livestock*

139. As in Mozambique, available information shows that the output of most of the important crops

has remained fairly static since 1962. In fact, with the exception of coffee, the production of which continued to expand, in 1965 most of the other export crops fell below the level reached in 1962. Sisal production dropped to 60,000 tons from 68,000 tons in 1964 and 70,000 tons in 1962; maize dropped to 131,000 tons from 152,800 in 1964 and 160,000 in 1960; and though cotton production was 19,506 tons compared with 13,609 tons in 1964, it was lower than that of 1962 when the output was 22,500 tons. Wheat output was also lower, 26,305 tons compared with 34,696 tons in 1964, which was a record year. Rice, on the other hand, increased from 18,000 tons in 1964 to 22,000 tons in 1965. Statistics for 1966 are not yet available but government sources expected at the end of the year that, except for maize and sisal, the output of most crops would be equal to or exceed slightly those of 1965.

140. Although coffee production in 1965 was 4 per cent higher than in the previous year (205,000 tons compared with 198,232 tons) and exports rose by 15 per cent (from 138,700 to 159,168 tons), the value of coffee exports dropped by about 6 per cent, from 2,859 million escudos to 2,687 million escudos. As reported previously (*ibid.*, annex, appendix II, para. 70), under the International Coffee Agreement, to which Portugal is party, Angola has an annual quota for exports to traditional markets (2.38 million sacks for 1966-1967) and expansion of the Territory's exports in recent years has been due to additional allowances and export waivers (given to members who experience special difficulties concerning production and stocks) and sales to new markets. Because of continued surpluses in world production and accumulated stocks, early in 1966, the Government introduced legislation (Decree Law 3,623 of 7 February) prohibiting the planting of new areas with robusta coffee. In July 1966 (Order 14,437 of 23 July), it raised the annual registration fee for green coffee exporters from 1,000 escudos to 50,000 escudos. As the International Coffee Council, in September 1966, adopted measures to induce members to reduce coffee production, it may be expected that Angola's coffee output will gradually level off. Recently Portugal applied for a quota of another 30,000 sacks to cover coffee produced in Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe and Timor. The International Coffee Council is reported to be considering this request. In the meantime, in order to reduce the number of exporters, it was decided early in 1967 that monthly export quotas of green coffee will be given only to traders who have minimum reserves totalling 500 tons (for washed coffee, the required reserve is lower).

141. Sisal, which is Angola's second most important export crop, in 1965 accounted for only 4.8 per cent of the Territory's exports by value as compared with 8.2 per cent in 1964 and 12.4 per cent in 1963. This drop was due mainly to smaller demands from overseas markets and lower prices but, as noted above, production also dropped and about 9,000 tons were retained in the Territory. There is no information on the output of the new rope factory, COFIANG, established in 1965 (*ibid.*, para. 90), which was expected to absorb 30 per cent of the sisal produced in the Benguela District.

142. Although cotton has always been one of the Territory's important cash crops, between 1955 and 1960 production fluctuated around 20,000 tons of seed cotton annually. Between 1961 and 1964, it oscillated

between 22,500 and 13,099 tons, returning in 1965 to about the same level as in 1960. However, in 1965 more of the cotton was retained in the Territory so that cotton exports to Portugal in 1965 represented only about 25 per cent (4,175 tons) out of a total production of 19,506 tons. In 1965, it ranked tenth in value of exports. Efforts are being made to mechanize cotton growing and in 1967 it was reported that in the Baixa do Cassange area Africans are being paid to grow cotton under the supervision of agricultural specialists. In this region, sunflower is also to be grown on a larger scale to provide Africans with a second cash crop.

143. Unlike Mozambique, there have been no large new investments in sugar and the only new unit planned in the late 1950s has not materialized (*ibid.*, para. 94). Since 1960, sugar production has fluctuated between 65,000 tons and 71,000 tons and in 1965 it was 67,000 tons. Like cotton, however, the proportion exported dropped from 70 per cent of the production in 1960 (46,900 tons out of 67,500 tons produced) to about 38 per cent of production (24,600 out of 65,400 tons) in 1964. In this period, the share of sugar in the value of the Territory's total exports dropped from 3.5 to 1.2 per cent. In 1965, about 50 per cent of sugar was exported and the share in the value of the total value of exports rose to 2 per cent. It is likely that this change may have been due to the higher c.i.f. Lisbon price introduced in 1964, since most of the Territory's sugar exports go to Portugal.

144. In contrast to the rather recent levelling off in the production of European-owned or -financed crops, exports of traditionally grown African crops including maize, palm oil, coconut, beans and manioc have generally declined since 1950. Exports of maize, for instance, reached a peak of 190,000 tons in 1950 which has not been surpassed since. For many years the Government has considered plans for regrouping the rural African population and for introducing modern farming techniques. However, from the information so far available, there do not seem to be any special plans to inject capital and to improve production in the subsistence sector. It appears to be still hoped that the distribution of improved seed, higher purchase prices and better marketing and storage facilities will suffice to make available larger surplus production for sale.

145. As regards maize, past experience seems to indicate that better official purchase prices do not necessarily increase African production though they may affect exports. In 1965, for instance, the *Grémio* for purchasing maize (*ibid.*, paras. 164 ff.) acquired 131,000 tons but exports amounted to 168,200 tons, valued at 283 million escudos, which represented 4.9 per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. In both 1960 and 1964, production was considerably higher (160,000 tons and 152,800 tons respectively), though for those years exports were lower. There are no data available for 1966.

146. Before 1961, only European farmers could obtain credit from the various export boards for special crops (*ibid.*, annex, appendix I). The main source of agricultural credit is now the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa) which was established in 1961 with an initial capital of 100 million escudos. Although the Caixa may grant loans up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees and it is required to give priority to small farmers, in general, loans can

only be obtained by those who have a legal title to their land or can offer other acceptable security. African growers or livestock owners who do not possess security can only obtain loans when a government body superintends the use of the loan. In both 1963 and 1964, the loans granted by the Caixa amounted to over 100 million escudos but some 80 per cent of these were short-term loans which went mainly to coffee growers and, to a lesser extent, sisal and cotton producers. In 1964 (Ministerial Legislative Order No. 1) and 1965 (Order 13,792 of 22 May) the Caixa's operations were extended to provide short-term loans for revolving expenses and medium-term and long-term loans to industries processing agricultural and livestock products. Further changes were made in 1966 (Decree 47,057 of 25 June 1966): on the one hand conditions governing collateral for short, medium and long-term loans have been tightened and on the other the credit resources of the Caixa have been increased with a further loan of 50 million escudos from the National Development Bank in Lisbon, so that the total available credit in 1967 is expected to amount to some 180 million escudos.

147. In the interest of introducing new cash crops in the Territory and with the metropolitan market in mind, government support is being given to banana and pineapple production as plantation crops and, to a lesser extent, to tobacco grown both by Africans and by Europeans. Recently the development of cashew has begun along the coast in northern Angola.

148. Bananas, which are grown throughout the Territory, were first exported in large quantity to Portugal in 1960 (1,273 tons, valued at 1.1 million escudos). By 1964, the amount and value of bananas exported had doubled and in 1965 rose to 3,619 tons, valued at more than 6 million escudos. In 1967, exports are expected to reach 15,000 tons and several ships have been acquired by the Overseas Ministry especially for carrying fruit. Of particular interest is the 1,200-hectare banana project in the Cavaco valley in Benguela District which is expected eventually to produce 120,000 tons of green bananas annually, with an export value of 132 million escudos.

149. In December 1966 (Angola, Order 14,751 of 29 December), an export tax of 20 centavos per kilogramme was imposed on bananas and 25 centavos per kilo on pineapples. The banana tax is about 20 per cent of the average export price of 1.1 escudos per kilogramme.

150. Increased efforts are also being made to expand the livestock resources both for the domestic market and for export to Portugal of frozen meat (see above). According to the livestock census taken in 1962,<sup>66</sup> there were over 1.5 million head of cattle in the Territory most of which are owned by the African population. The census showed that since 1935 there has been a significant decline in the cattle population in the Territory as evidenced by the drop from over 1 million head to 705,000 head in Huíla District, and from 300,000 head in Moçâmedes to 87,000 in 1962.

151. Since 1961, in addition to the establishment of the Agricultural and Livestock Credit Bank, new regulations have been introduced to facilitate land concessions to stockbreeders and to facilitate imports of breeding cattle. Subsequently, special committees were created to draw up plans for organizing pasture land

<sup>66</sup> Vasco Sousa Dias "Notas sobre a Produção de Carne", *Planeamento e integração económica* (July 1966).

in order to ensure its optimum use and to help stabilize the rural population.

152. According to the plans adopted in 1965 (Order 13,906 of 4 September), Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts have been divided into pasturage zones in accordance with the size, character and degree of evolution of the population, the actual number of livestock and the type of livestock industry, the area of potential and developed pasturage and the water resources. Where the livestock is being bred for commercial purposes or can be developed for this purpose, government services are to assist, particularly in the delimitation of the land and in the provision of water. African livestock farmers are to be given all the assistance needed, especially by the granting of land to them on a communal or individual basis. In November 1966 (Order 14,013 of 20 November), guidelines were laid down for the work to be done by the Veterinary Services which is to be organized by "livestock zones", beginning with Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts. Water supplies will be developed under a co-ordinated plan for pastoral regions in southern Angola as a whole.

153. In 1966, there were reports of a sudden increase of requests for concessions of vacant land for raising livestock in Uíge and Cuanza North Districts. As these districts are fairly densely occupied and much land had already been concessioned (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II, tables 3 and 4), the new influx has created difficulties sometimes involving African land rights. The Government has therefore issued an order that all concession boundaries in those districts are to be marked only by the official teams (*brigadas de demarcação e vistorias*). These teams will also be responsible for boundary marking of land in cases where a demarcation licence has already been obtained but the land has not been used for the purpose intended<sup>67</sup> or the concession has not yet been duly registered.

154. In February 1967, boundary marking difficulties were also reported in connexion with livestock concessions under the pastoral zoning plan in Huíla and Moçâmedes Districts. In this area too, boundaries of concessions for livestock raising may henceforth only be marked by the official teams.

155. Angola's fresh meat exports, which amounted to 26 million escudos in 1961, dropped to 19 million escudos in 1962 and 1963. In 1964, 67,000 head of cattle were slaughtered, producing 9,689,000 kilogrammes of meat of which about one fourth was exported. The value of fresh meat exported was 2.3 million escudos, representing just under 0.4 per cent of the total exports. In 1965, only 60,000 cattle were slaughtered and while the quantity exported remained about the same, the value rose from 21.6 million to 30.5 million escudos. According to the study published in 1966, Angola's cattle output is estimated at present at 135,000 head per year of which 75,000 head may be expected to reach the market.<sup>68</sup>

156. Recent reports from Angola stress the important role played by government supervised rural

markets in encouraging African agricultural production. The present system of officially controlled rural markets was established in 1963 (Angola, Governor General's Order No. 12,788 of 22 June 1963) to facilitate and regulate trading in African-grown crops and livestock.<sup>69</sup> These markets are held at officially designated places and times for the sale by local inhabitants of their produce. The district governors may limit any market to traders, exporters and industrialists of only the district concerned or of one locality. Official minimum prices are fixed for products according to grade and are publicly posted. All sales have to be paid for in cash and traders are free to negotiate sales above the minimum prices, which in the case of export crops are fixed in relation to the prevailing f.o.b. prices, less costs of transportation, packaging and other expenses and profits to the middleman, which may amount to as much as 20 per cent.

157. The first rural markets were held in Uíge District in 1962. The quantity of Mabuba coffee traded in these markets increased rapidly in the first three years: 2 million kilogrammes at 4.3 million escudos in 1962; 7.7 million kilogrammes at 32 million escudos in 1963; and 12 million kilogrammes at 56.7 million escudos in 1964. In 1965, the amount traded dropped to 10 million kilogrammes (51 million escudos) but in 1966 almost 13 million kilogrammes were traded at 65 million escudos.<sup>70</sup> Although about half of the total number of market days are held in Uíge, in 1964 some markets were held in all but two (Cabinda and Moçâmedes) of the fifteen districts. In 1965, a total of 5,108 market days were held in all districts and 270 million escudos were paid for the 70 million kilogrammes of produce traded, including coffee (35.5 million kilogrammes, 170 million escudos),<sup>71</sup> tobacco (251,550 kilogrammes, 1.7 million escudos), beef cattle (6.4 million escudos) and hogs.

158. In December 1965 (Legislative Order 3,593 of 13 December), the legislation establishing rural markets was revised. Products which may be traded in these markets now include simple or manufactured agricultural and livestock products and handicrafts. As sales of goods in the rural markets increased in 1966, there were rumours that money paid to Africans had been illegally exported to support nationalist movements outside the Territory. In late February 1967, the Angolan Government published a detailed report on the rural markets in Uíge District,<sup>72</sup> showing how the money paid in the markets had been spent locally or deposited in banks, thus refuting the rumours.

<sup>69</sup> As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix I, paras. 60-63), the Native Statute made provision for the regulation and control of sales of African agricultural products. The repeal of the Native Statute made it necessary to introduce new regulations. Although Africans have to sell their produce through the rural markets, in practice, they are intended to protect the African from unscrupulous traders.

<sup>70</sup> The government report to which reference is made below estimated that there were in 1965 some 12,000 African coffee growers, of whom about 1,000 employed an average of four men during the period of four months in the year.

<sup>71</sup> Representing about 17 per cent of the Territory's total production in 1965.

<sup>72</sup> This report showed that out of 65.5 million escudos paid to African growers, the Government received 2.52 million escudos in general taxes (350 escudos per person, 7,200 taxpayers) and an additional 3.22 million in taxes and licences paid in the markets and to the Carmona Municipal Council. In addition, 2 million escudos were paid in the form of interest on loans. The report also gave figures of purchases of bicycles, radios, motorcycles and the number and value of new houses built.

<sup>67</sup> Under the existing land concession legislation, much larger areas of land may be requested for livestock purposes than for agriculture. As in the case of the latter there are certain development requirements and, to obtain free title, a certain number of cattle have to be raised according to the size of the concession.

<sup>68</sup> Vasco Sousa Dias, op. cit. According to the Bank of Angola report for 1965 (p. 62), 81,710 head of cattle were slaughtered, producing 11,913,670 kilogrammes of meat.

159. Information is not yet available for all districts, but preliminary data suggest that in 1966 there were large increases especially in Huíla District where purchases in the one month of April 1966 are reported to have amounted to more than 280 million escudos.

#### *Settlement and land utilization*

160. Since the last report on land settlement (A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex II), there has been very little new information on settlement schemes in Angola. Although it remains Portugal's policy to increase settlement in both Angola and Mozambique, the emphasis in the Territory is now more on the need for a sound economy and for the development of its human and natural resources—especially in the rural areas—in order to attract and retain new settlers. Recent statements reflecting this view include one by the Governor General who said that in principle he agreed that the increased settlement of whole families was indispensable to the Territory but that such settlement would be really viable only if more industries were established throughout the Territory. A similar statement was made by the District Governor of Uíge who said that it was necessary to diversify agricultural production and to introduce new industries which would improve the purchasing power of the people, a condition which in turn would attract the surplus population from Portugal.<sup>73</sup>

161. In Angola, emphasis is given to rural reorganization as part of the general plan for social promotion, settlement and improvement of rural communities. Plans first approved in 1962 were revised in 1964 and what seems to be envisaged now is the regrouping of the rural African population in units which have "geo-economic and social unity". This is also to be the criteria in establishing new *regedorias* or in the delimitation of existing ones. The regrouping is intended to make it easier to provide health, education and agricultural services, to improve housing and production and to develop the private ownership of land.

162. In the first instance, the Territory is to be divided into basic regrouping regions subdivided into zones, each under a zone regrouping committee comprising members appointed by the district governor and presided over by the local administrative authority. In drawing up plans for regrouping, the government departments are to seek the co-operation of the local population which is also to be consulted in the establishment of priorities. The main considerations are the need to introduce changes in farming and stock-rearing methods and the inclusion or assimilation (*enquadramento*) of "the traditional infrastructure in the national structure".

163. So far, complete plans for the whole Territory have not been published. There appear to be some pilot projects under way. In 1966, 25 million escudos were allocated from the extraordinary budget for rural regrouping projects as follows: Cabinda and Huambo Districts, 2 million escudos each; Bié and Malanje and Zaire Districts, about 1 million escudos each; Cuanza North, Moxico and Huíla Districts, about 650,000 escudos each; Benguela and Luanda, 500,000 escudos each and Lunda, 400,000 escudos.

<sup>73</sup> He also complained that there were far too many traders whose sole activity was as intermediaries and who did not contribute to the economic growth of the area.

164. There is no information on the progress made under the rural regrouping plan, nor is there any information on whether or not there has been any increase in the number of African farmers who own land on the same basis as Europeans.

165. Government efforts to improve the rural areas have varied from district to district. Recent information suggests that more has been done in Uíge District to help African farmers than anywhere else in the Territory, but now there are also plans for developing the northern parts of Zaire District and Cabinda. In November, an Angolan newspaper, reporting on progress in Uíge District since Mr. Rebocho Vaz became District Governor in 1961, listed a large number of new "rural villages" (*aldeamentos rurais*) in each of which a two-room school had been built and in many of which a new house had been built for the headman (*soba*) and health facilities or water supplies had been provided. According to the article, there is now a shortage of labour in this district since the local inhabitants do not work for others and all manual labour for European farms has to be imported. Only a few settlers have been established and in the mountain regions some of the abandoned coffee farms have been turned over to workers from the south who are now being organized into a new village.

166. Plans are being made along the border of Zaire to improve the standard of living of the rural African population and to introduce European settlement. Around Santo António do Zaire (on the south bank of the Zaire River which divides the Territory from the Democratic Republic of the Congo) it is planned to plant hundreds of hectares with cashew and oil palm for the usufruct of Africans. In Quinzau (which is about half way down the coast to Ambri-zete) 80,000 State-owned cashew trees will be turned over to Africans who will be responsible for their care. Agricultural assistance stations under headmen (*capatazias agrícolas*) will be established at Quelo (on the Lucula River) and Sumbo (on the Zaire River). Centres for European settlement are also under study and in January the District Governor, together with other civil and military personnel, made an aerial and land survey of possible locations. It is reported that speakers in the Legislative Council and the Press in Angola are all in favour of establishing new settlements along the frontier because the settlers are to be given special training and will help the armed forces in defending the Territory.

#### *Industry*

167. The industrial sector in Angola is still limited and plays a relatively small role in the economy of the Territory. Most of the industries are concerned with the production of consumption goods for local use or processing of primary products for export. Except for a few larger units producing sugar, beer, cement, petroleum and textiles, most of the industries are small in size. Figures for 1962 showed, for instance, that with some 2,800 million escudos invested in 3,050 establishments, eleven units alone accounted for about one third of the total capital and another 320 units (processing vegetable oil, fish and sisal) accounted for a further 20 per cent of the total, so that the average capital per unit in the remaining 88 per cent of the industries was about half a million escudos (less than \$US20,000) each.

168. Between 1958 and 1961, the rate of capital investment rose to almost 250 million escudos annually.

New industries established in this period included a cement plant (established in 1958 with a capital of 150 million escudos), two beer factories (established in 1959 and 1961 with a total capital of 63 million escudos), a vegetable oil plant (established in 1960 with a capital of 70 million escudos) and a petroleum refinery (established in 1961 with a capital of 150 million escudos). Since 1962, annual investments in transforming and manufacturing industries in Angola have been at a lower rate; although there was a slight improvement in 1964, the total for 1965 was only 103 million escudos; and the average annual rate of investment over the period 1962-1965 was less than 120 million escudos.

169. Complete data are not yet available for 1966. Preliminary figures for January to May suggest an upward trend as investments during those five months already surpassed 230 million escudos, which was more than double the total investments in the preceding year. New industries established in 1966 include a cardboard packing material factory, financed by the Companhia União de Cervejas de Angola (CUCA) in association with the South African company, Amalgamated Packaging Industries Ltd. (API); a flour factory, subsidiary of CUCA in association with Sungold of South Africa; a textile factory known as Sociedade Angolana de Tecidos Estampados, S.A.R.L. (SATEC) which has contracted a 70-million escudos loan from the Interamerican Capital Corporation of New York (the Interamerican Capital Corporation has already financed various projects in Angola, including a hydro-electric installation, roads, airports and factories, as mentioned in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap V, para. 122)); a 40-million escudo tobacco factory in Benguela owned by the Fábrica de Tabacos Ultramarina; a match factory, the Indústria Fosforeira Angolana (IFA), with an initial capital of 15 million escudos which is owned by the Borges and Irmão group (owners of the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the tire factory Mabor Angolana); two electrical appliance factories, one in Nova Lisboa with a capital of 18 million escudos and the other in Luanda (Indústrias Electrónicas Angola, S.A.R.L.) with a capital of 2 million escudos; a new fish oil and fish meal factory in Porto Alexandre established by the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense, Limitada (SIAC) with a 12-million escudo loan from the Fisheries Assistance Fund (Fundo do Apoio às Indústrias de Pesca); a 26-million escudo tile factory known as Fábrica de Cerâmicas de Angola; a 30-million escudo pineapple juice factory in Lobito; and a plant for industrial chemicals, including sulphuric acid, with an investment of 500 million escudos owned by the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos. An existing metal works has been expanded to become Siderurgia Angolana, S.A.R.L. with a capital of 100 million escudos.

170. During the period 1961-1965, the value of the output of almost all the processing and manufacturing industries increased steadily. The major exceptions were sugar and cotton ginning (see above). Large gains were made in beer (160 per cent increase, from 127 million to 331 million escudos); petroleum (70 per cent increase, from 304 million to 516 million escudos); tobacco (64 per cent increase, from 138 million to 226 million escudos); and milling (800 per cent increase, from 20 million to 163 million escudos). Smaller gains were registered in cement, soft drinks

and sausage making. Wood pulp, which came into production for the first time in 1963, rose from 52,000 to 75,000 tons in 1965 and paper increased from less than 3,000 tons in 1961 to 33,000 tons.

171. As yet, however, local production meets only a small part of the Territory's consumption needs as evidenced by the still-growing value of such imports as the following: tobacco, which increased 46 per cent between 1964 and 1965; textiles, 10 per cent; wheat flour, 35 per cent; paper, 12.4 per cent; conserved milk products, 17 per cent.

172. As noted in a Portuguese study published in 1961,<sup>74</sup> the industrial structure of the Territory is almost entirely directed from Portugal. According to that study, of the 40 more important industrial establishments in Angola, 10 had their headquarters in Lisbon, 16 at least had their main offices there and 14 were represented there. Official information<sup>75</sup> further shows that a large share of the profits and earnings from industrial and other enterprises are transferred out of the Territory. In the period 1960-1962, for instance, transfers out of the Territory exceeded 2,000 million escudos of which profits and earnings (including earnings on property) amounted to more than 600 million escudos and the remainder consisted of private transfers. The transfers of profits and earnings alone exceeded the new capital invested in industries in Angola in that period.

173. Another characteristic feature of the industrial sector in Angola is its high concentration in three main regions: (a) Luanda-Dondo-Malanje, which is supplied with electric power by the Cambambe station on the Cuanza River; (b) Lobito-Benguela-Nova Lisboa, supplied by power from the Catumbela River and (c) Moçâmedes-Sá da Bandeira with power supplied from the Matala station on the Cunene.<sup>76</sup> However, a greater proportion of the capitalized industries and a majority of the transforming industries are located in the Luanda region. Although the areas of concentrated industries act as "poles of development", the concentration has tended to aggravate development problems in the rural areas from which there has been considerable exodus of manpower. Recent information from Angola indicates that there is growing support in both government and business circles for a more balanced distribution in the location of industries throughout the Territory.

174. In January 1967, the Governor General was authorized to introduce any changes he thought necessary in the collection of industrial and other taxes and he has since offered industries locating in the border districts a 50 per cent reduction in their tax rates.

175. In Angola, building was seriously affected by the uprising in 1961. The number of new constructions dropped from 761 in 1960 to 494 in 1961 and to 320 in 1962, while the value dropped from 340 million escudos to 273 million escudos and to 160 million escudos. There has been a partial recovery in 1966 and 1967, and in 1965, 628 units were built with a value of 213 million escudos.

176. Electric power production and consumption have more than doubled since 1960. In 1965, production was 320,000 kWh compared with 143 kWh in

<sup>74</sup> L. M. Teixeira Pinto and Rui Martins dos Santos, *Angola Polos e Perspectivas de Desenvolvimento*, Instituto Superior de Ciências Económicas e Financeiras, Lisbon, 1961.

<sup>75</sup> *Presidência do Concelho, Projecto de Plano Intercalar de Fomento para 1965-1967*, Lisbon, 1964, vol. II, p. 153.

<sup>76</sup> L. M. Teixeira and R. M. dos Santos, op. cit., pp. 35 ff.



1960 and representing a 31 per cent increase over 1964 (260,000 kWh). In this period consumption increased from about 82 per cent of production to 95 per cent in 1965.

177. The present generating stations are distributed as follows: Cambambe station on the Cuanza River, 260,000 kWh; Mabubas station on the Catumbela River, 15,000 kWh; and a private station, 12,000 kWh. A recent estimate by the Junta de Electrificação puts Angola's potential capacity at 10 million kWh.<sup>77</sup>

178. In December 1966, the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal signed contracts with three French companies for the supply of electrical equipment under the loan guaranteed by the General Trade Company. The three French companies are Ateliers de montages électriques, which will supply radio-electric parts valued at 1,440,501 francs,<sup>78</sup> the Société de monteurs thermiques, which will supply electric generators and parts valued at 2,407,860 francs; and the Société générale de constructions électriques et mécaniques Alsthom, which will supply 28 Diesel generators and replacement parts valued at 936,330 francs.

#### *Mining*<sup>79</sup>

179. Although in the period 1960-1965 the gross value of mineral production increased at an average rate of about 14 per cent per annum to 1,458 million escudos in 1965, the share of minerals in the value of the Territory's exports dropped from a peak of 23.4 per cent in 1963 to 20.4 per cent in each of the two succeeding years.

#### (a) *Diamonds*

180. The output of diamonds rose from 1,083,571 carats in 1963 to 1,149,068 carats in 1964 and to 1,155,726 carats in 1965. The number of carats exported was lower in 1965 than in 1963 but owing to price increases in 1964 the value of exports increased steadily to 904.3 million escudos in 1965, representing 15.7 per cent of the value of the total exports.

181. So far, the Angola Diamond Company remains the only diamond producer in the Territory as no finds have been reported from prospecting concessions granted since 1964. Towards the end of 1966, it was reported that Anchor Diamonds, a South African company, had requested exclusive diamond prospecting rights over an area of 1.1 million hectares south of Luanda. No details are available, however.

#### (b) *Petroleum*

182. Owing to technical difficulties, crude petroleum production dropped in 1965 to only 655,000 tons, compared with 905,000 tons in the previous year. Exports of crude petroleum to Portugal also dropped by more than 50 per cent, from 361,000 tons to 114,000 tons, valued at 39 million escudos, representing less than one per cent of the total value of the Territory's exports. But exports of refined petroleum products to Portugal amounted to 214,047 tons (32 tons of butane gas, 455 tons of gasoline, 12,838 tons of airplane fuel, 4,894 tons of gas oil and 195,828 tons of fuel oil). The Angola refinery has an annual capacity of 660,000 tons and in 1964 and 1965 the amount of crude oil

processed was 15 per cent higher than in 1963 (an average of 542,000 tons compared with 482,000 tons in the earlier year).

183. Angola's petroleum production is expected to rise substantially in the next few years as a result of the reorganization and refinancing of Petrangol and the extension of its concession and the new discoveries of petroleum by Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in the Cabinda enclave.

184. As reported last year (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 117), at the end of 1965, the Portuguese Government signed a new contract with Petrangol which is the only petroleum producer and owns the only refinery in Angola. The new contract extended Petrangol's concession area and also envisaged that the Government would select another company to participate in the exploitation of the concessions on a joint venture basis. Although several foreign companies had been included in the list from which the choice would be made (including the South African company Federale Mynbou), in July, a Portuguese company, ANGOL (Sociedade de Lubrificação e Combustíveis), was selected.

185. ANGOL is reported to be closely associated with the two principal oil companies in Portugal, SACOR (Sociedade Anônima Concessionária de Refinação de Petróleos em Portugal) and SONAP (Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos, S.A.R.L.).

186. SACOR, which owns a refinery and has distributing rights in Portugal, also holds rights to process the surplus crude oil from Angola and is currently building a new refinery which is expected to cost over 2,231 million escudos, part of which is being financed by government-guaranteed loan bonds.

187. The statement by the Government announcing the selection of ANGOL, which holds petroleum distributing rights in Angola, said that this move was in keeping with the policy of encouraging activities by national companies and national capital in the development of the Overseas Territories. At the same time, the Government's participation has increased as it has a one-third share in SACOR which in 1964 held 78.4 per cent of ANGOL's registered capital.<sup>80</sup>

188. Since their association in the development of petroleum in Angola, both companies have changed their statutes. Petrangol's new statute published in October 1966 requires it to raise its present registered capital of 150 million escudos to 900 million within 90 days upon notice from the Government after consultation with the company. This is to be done by the issue of new shares, one third of which are to be given free of charge to the Government. Under its new statute approved in September 1966, ANGOL becomes Sociedade Portuguesa de Exploração de Petróleos and its capital, which was raised in April 1966 from 70 million to 120 million escudos, is to be further increased to 220 million escudos by an issue of new shares, 100 million escudos of which will be for public subscription in Angola. The company has been authorized to increase its capital further to 320 million escudos when necessary. The Government is to receive free of charge 10 per cent of the new shares issued. Participation of foreign capital is envisaged

<sup>80</sup> In November 1966, SACOR issued \$US6 million bond series at 6 1/2 per cent interest which was reported to have been underwritten by a Luxembourg bank. Previously, in 1961 and 1962, SACOR issued two other bond series in European units of account. The Portuguese Government has undertaken to guarantee a total of 580 million escudos of SACOR's loans.

<sup>77</sup> *Diário*, Lourenço Marques, 29 January 1967.

<sup>78</sup> \$US1 equals 5 francs.

<sup>79</sup> This information supplements the study on mining in Angola contained in document A/6000/Rev.1, chap V, appendix, annex I.

through purchase of shares, but, in accordance with the 1965 regulations governing foreign investments (Decree Law 46,312 of 28 April) there is to be a Portuguese majority in the administration, direction and management.

189. In December 1966, ANGOL was granted a contract for petroleum mining in the Territory under which it will have a 50 per cent share in the existing Petrangol petroleum mining concession (excluding the deposits already discovered and excluding refining rights) and exclusive rights in other areas. It is required to invest an equal amount of 750 million escudos in the joint concession by the end of 1970 and an additional 300 million escudos in the areas over which it has exclusive rights. Thus ANGOL's investments in the Territory will amount to more than 1,000 million escudos during the first five years of its contract. In addition, ANGOL undertakes to contribute 1.5 million escudos annually to the Mining Development Fund when established. ANGOL is specifically authorized to co-operate with other national or foreign enterprises. If foreign capital is associated with this project, the amounts required to be spent in prospecting will be further raised. If oil is found, the company must begin exploitation as soon as feasible and must give Portuguese refineries priority of purchase.

190. At the end of 1966, Cabinda Gulf Oil Company (CABGOC) found oil in Cabinda where it has had an exclusive concession since 1957 (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex I, paras. 188-194). The original contract having expired in November 1966, a new contract has since been signed under which the company is granted until the end of 1968 an exclusive concession for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, especially petroleum, in a large part of the Cabinda district and off-shore. The contract may be extended for another two years. Reports indicate that the company has already spent 360 million escudos on prospecting in the area. Under the new contract, instead of paying the surface rent of 630 escudos per square kilometre during the period of prospecting only, the company will pay during the whole period of the concession a rent of 600 escudos a square kilometre during the first two years, 750 escudos in 1969 and 900 escudos in 1970. The company undertakes to invest a minimum of 150 million escudos before the end of December 1968 and to pay one million escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund. The Government of Angola will receive 50 per cent of the company's profits.

191. In September 1966, Texaco, Inc. filed an application for the prospecting and exploitation of hydrocarbons, including raw petroleum, in the Congo district and off-shore Cabinda.

### (c) Iron

192. The largest foreign and Portuguese investments since 1961 have been in iron mining in the Territory, mainly for the development of the deposits at Cassinga which are estimated to be over 120 million tons of high grade ore and many thousand million tons of lower grade deposits.

193. Average production over the period 1960-1965 was around 800,000 tons a year and exports averaged around 650,000 tons. In 1964, exports reached an all-time high of 1.27 million tons (which included reserve stocks), but dropped to 693,000 tons in 1965. According to reports, production and exports have been held back pending completion of rail and port

facilities for handling the ore. With the exception of 1964, the value of iron exports has averaged slightly less than 150 million escudos annually but it has not kept pace with the total value of the Territory's exports, dropping from 4.3 per cent in 1960 to 2.5 per cent in 1965. (In 1964 exports were valued at 234 million escudos and represented 4 per cent of the value of total exports.)

194. The two principal mines in production are those at Cuíma and Cassinga, both owned and operated by the Companhia Mineira do Lobito which is closely associated with the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige. Although, according to previous estimates, ore reserves total more than 10 million metric tons at Cuíma and production from this mine has probably accounted for about half of the annual exports in the last few years, it is now reported that the mine will be closed next year when the Cassinga mine comes into production.

195. The Cassinga mine is being financed partly by foreign capital, which is being used for the purchase of rolling stock, mineral handling facilities and equipment. Up to the end of 1966, financial assistance in connexion with the project included (a) 1,300 million escudos provided by a consortium comprising Fried Krupp (Essen), Jørgaard and Schulz A/S (Copenhagen) and the Sociedade de Empreitadas e Trabalhos Hidráulicos, Lda. (of Lisbon and Luanda); (b) a loan of 300 million escudos from the Bank of Angola to the territorial Government for the development of Moçâmedes port facilities; (c) 1,500 million escudos furnished by Krupp in 1965 for locomotives and wagons; and (d) a loan of 32 million escudos in 1966 by the Danish firm. In December 1966 (Decree 47,380 of 16 December), the Portuguese Government, on behalf of the Companhia Mineira do Lobito and the Sociedade Mineira do Lombige, guaranteed foreign loans totalling 2,700 million escudos (approximately \$US97 million).<sup>81</sup> Total investments in connexion with the project already exceed 3,000 million escudos, making it the most expensive current project in the Territory.

196. The guarantee by the Government has been made to enable the preparatory work to be accelerated so that the mine will start producing in 1967 and output will increase from 5 to 5.5 million tons annually in 1968, instead of at an annual rate of 1.5 million tons as previously planned. It is reported that contracts have already been signed for deliveries of ore to the Federal Republic of Germany and to Japan. In January 1967, it was reported that 75,000 tons were ready for shipment to Japan and a further 10,000 tons of scrap was waiting transportation. Total value of exports of ore are expected to reach 1,300 million escudos annually (about half the value of coffee exports in 1965) and, during the period of amortization (about ten years), foreign exchange earnings are expected to amount to about 500,000 escudos annually, and after amortization to about a million escudos annually.

197. The work of the mine is currently being carried out under some sixty contracts most of which are expected to be completed by the end of this year. The mining operations will be highly mechanized so that very little manual labour will be involved. Transport facilities include sixty locomotives, twenty vans and 800 freight wagons. The Moçâmedes port is being equipped with a mineral quay capable of handling 3,000

<sup>81</sup> This guarantee is reported to cover both the initial 1,300 million escudo loan and additional loans made since then or to be made.

tons per hour and a storage area for at least 1 million tons of ore.

198. Early in 1967, the registered share capital of the Lobito-Lombige companies was increased and Portuguese holdings will be increased by 500 million escudos through the subscription of shares by the Portuguese and Angolan Governments and other governmental bodies. The Government of Angola is already a shareholder in both companies.

(d) *Other minerals*

199. There have also been recent developments relating to the mining of manganese, copper and phosphate deposits. New manganese deposits have been reported and the Portuguese Government has authorized the territorial Government to subscribe to 10 million escudos in shares in the Companhia do Manganês de Angola, which has hitherto been the main producer of manganese, although production and exports have been insignificant during the last three years.

200. New deposits of copper have also been reported at Tetelo in the Mavio region. There are reports that the Nippon Mining Company plans to invest \$US25 million in the development of these deposits. A new company, Empresa Mineira de Angola, is reported to be actively prospecting for copper in the Alto Zambezia region.

201. In January 1966, the Companhia Mineira do Lobito is reported to have filed a claim to exploit natural phosphate deposits in northern Angola. The International Mineral and Chemical Corporation (reported to be a United States company) is said to be interested in developing the phosphate deposits.

*Fisheries*

202. In the 1950s the fishing industry was one of the Territory's most important economic activities and was also a source of foreign exchange. Since the drop in world fish meal prices in 1959, the industry has been seriously depressed and in spite of various government measures to help reorganize and finance it, production of fish derivatives (conserves, fish meal, fish oil and dried fish) dropped from an average of about 80,000 tons a year in 1961-1962 to under 60,000 tons in the two following years; thereafter production rose to 93,000 tons in 1964 but in 1965 it was again only 81,000 tons. Annual exports of fish derivatives have fluctuated around an average of 70,000 tons annually, but as a result of improved prices their value rose from an average of 250 million escudos a year in the period 1960-1961 to over 300 million escudos a year in 1964-1965, and in 1966, fish meal alone ranked fifth in value of the Territory's exports.

203. As in the case of several of the important export crops, government measures have aimed at the structural reorganization of the industry and the provision of technical assistance and credit facilities. Among other measures, the Government has set up a Fisheries Industries Institute and a Fishing Industry Assistance Fund which acts both as a marketing fund, producing subsidies in times of low prices, and as a credit institution. Since its establishment, the Fund has helped to modernize and re-equip the fishing fleet and has added a floating factory to help process the catch at sea. In 1962, the fisheries industry was reorganized along corporative lines with fishermen and other producers engaged in this sector organized into *grêmios* through which the industry can co-ordinate and regulate its

own activities and provide insurance and welfare assistance to its members.<sup>82</sup>

204. In March 1966, the South African company, Marine Products, which had intended to set up a \$1.5 million fish processing plant in Angola, decided to withdraw. The company is reported to have made this move because "Portuguese legislation promulgated in November [1965] had the effect that foreigners are not permitted to control fishing vessels".<sup>83</sup> In addition to the Sociedade Industrial Alexandrense reported above (para. 169), another new Portuguese fisheries company known as Sociedade dos Armadores de Pesca em Angola, S.A.R.L. (ARAN) was established with an initial capital of 7.5 million escudos. The new company, which has its counterpart in Mozambique, plans to supply fish to Portugal and the local market. A third Portuguese-owned fisheries company, the Sociedade de Pesca, has begun operations with the first of five vessels equipped to freeze the catch at sea.

*Transport and communications*

205. In Angola, priority has been given to transport and communication facilities under the successive development plans since 1953, not only as a necessary part of the Territory's infrastructure but also as part of the Government's long-term plan to occupy and settle the Territory with surplus population from Portugal. The importance attached to this sector is reflected in the proportion of the total expenditure successively allocated for roads, rail transport, ports and harbours, and airport facilities and equipment: 66 per cent (1,478 million escudos) under the First National Development Plan, 1953-1958; 54 per cent (2,147 million escudos) under the Second National Development Plan, 1959-1964; and almost 30 per cent (1,930 million escudos) under the Transitional Development Plan, 1965-1967.

206. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix IV), the railways in Angola have in the past operated continuously below their capacity and do not make an important contribution to the territorial revenue. This situation may be expected to change, however, when the Cassinga mine comes into operation later in 1967, as the Moçâmedes line is expected to run more than twenty trains a day, eventually carrying a daily load of more than 10,000 tons of mineral ore. The equipment of the Luanda Railway is also being modernized under a recent government guarantee for the purchase of electric engines from the United States amounting to 82 million escudos.

207. Of the three main lines, only the Benguela railway traverses the whole Territory and carries transit trade. Nevertheless, competition from other lines has in the past prevented the Benguela railway from carrying more traffic. Only since the early part of 1966 has the Benguela railway come into greater use for exporting copper ore from Zambia. General in-bound traffic to Zambia rose 65,000 tons over that of

<sup>82</sup> For a brief description of the Portuguese corporative system of economic organization see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix I, paras. 6-15. In this system, "Institutes have the function of co-ordinating all activities in relation to those commodities which are mainly for export, which already have fully developed corporative organized production and commerce sectors, but which because of their importance require official guarantees as to quality and type of product".

<sup>83</sup> It appears that the legislation referred to is Decree 46,666 relating to the co-ordination of industrial development in the Portuguese realm which is briefly reported in document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 65-68.

1966 and by the end of 1967, with the exception of November and December, exports of copper were around 15,000 tons a month. Although the Benguela railway put forward a plan in early 1966 for doubling its capacity if it could be guaranteed a minimum of 120,000 to 140,000 tons of mineral traffic a year (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix IV, paras. 59-60), there is no recent information on whether the plan is being implemented.

208. The three main ports are at Luanda, Lobito and Moçâmedes. Under the first two development plans, more than 660 million escudos were allocated to port development and of this about half was spent in the expansion of Lobito and the installation of ore loading facilities to serve the Cuima mine (see above). Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, of the 278 million escudos allocated for ports and navigation, more than half (150 million escudos) is for improving the Luanda port, the main coffee port. In 1966, two new wharfs were opened and ten South African manufactured cranes were installed. A new naval dock was also opened.

209. As reported above, the improvements to the Moçâmedes port are being financed mainly by the mining companies and special allocations. However, under the contract, all port and rail facilities financed and built by the companies become government property immediately upon completion. The Moçâmedes port will be able to handle ships of up to 100,000 tons even at low tide.

210. According to a recent official statement expenditure on roads has averaged 445 million escudos a year since 1962, representing about 55 per cent of the Territory's annual expenditure on all public works. The Territory's road programme is the responsibility of the Roads Board set up in 1962 and is financed through regular and special taxes on fuel imports and exports from the 850 million escudos allocation under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 and by the 1965 loan from Petrangol amounting to 250 million escudos.

211. In 1966, Angola's road system comprised some 72,000 kilometres. During 1967, it was expected to build about 1,000 kilometres of roads and to asphalt about 500 kilometres, bringing the total length of paved roads to 3,500 kilometres compared with 600 kilometres in 1962. By 1970, all district capitals are expected to be linked by paved roads. One of the major projects, which is expected to cost 240 million escudos, is the extension of the highway from Sá da Bandeira to the border of South West Africa from whence it will eventually link with Mozambique through the South African highway system.

212. Next in importance to roads has been the expansion of internal airports, airfields and landing facilities, mainly for military use. In 1965, Angola had two international airports, capable of receiving DC-8s, one at Luanda and the other at Nova Lisboa; two airports serving district capitals; twenty smaller airports; and 400 landing fields (compared with 100 in 1961). In 1966, four new airfields were built in the eastern part of the Territory: a large field at Gago Coutinho in the Moxico district near the Zambian border, capable of receiving aircraft of the DC-6 type, and three other smaller ones. Another runway is to be completed at Serpa Pinto early in 1967.

213. Since 1961 also, the telephone, telegraph and radio-telephone network in the Territory has been greatly expanded. In 1966, there was a very high fre-

quency system linking Luanda with the principal towns—Salazar, Carmona, Malanje, Nova Lisboa, Benguela, Lobito and Sá da Bandeira—with supplementary systems linking the secondary towns and especially those along the borders with Luanda. In 1967, a permanent telephone line between Portugal and Angola came into operation.

214. Radio broadcasting facilities are to be expanded under a new allocation of 47.4 million escudos to be spent within the next eight years. In 1963, the last year for which data are available, there were eighteen broadcasting stations with forty-six transmitters with a total power of 47.25 kilowatts. Under legislation enacted in 1944, business concerns may establish telecommunications for their own use between their different branches. Such installations, which have to be approved by an order of the Governor General, have increased steadily since 1961.

#### *Public finance*

215. Under the Portuguese system, as the budget for the following year is usually published in December and the final accounts are only available six months after the closing of the financial year, there is an eighteen-month period before actual expenditures can be studied. For Angola, the final accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and although there have been brief reports of the 1967 budget, the details are not yet available.

216. The report on the final accounts for 1965 shows that the actual ordinary revenue was 4,298 million escudos which exceeded estimates by about 483 million escudos, owing mainly to increased receipts from the extraordinary defence tax introduced at the end of 1964, which amounted to 224 million escudos (174 million escudos more than the original estimates). With one exception, expenditure by all government departments rose above the 1964 level: expenditures for development services rose by 170 million escudos to 1,608 million escudos, and defence rose by 173 million escudos (40 per cent over 1964) to 616 million escudos which was 30 per cent above the original estimates (474.4 million escudos).

217. As reported in the Press, the legislation governing the 1967 budget for Angola (Legislative Instrument 3,692) lays down the policy that there is to be stringent economy in all expenditures (excepting contractual and fixed commitments). Priority is to be given to national defence, internal security, education, health and development. Not only are government departments to be placed on the monthly budget system (see para. 130) but all expenditures are to be reduced by 10 per cent below the estimates.<sup>84</sup>

218. For 1967, the estimated ordinary revenue is 4,247.5 million escudos representing an increase of 12 per cent over 1966, and estimated expenditures are also higher. The largest increase is for defence, rising by 156 million escudos to 782 million escudos.<sup>85</sup> Despite an increase of 32.5 million escudos, the 297 million escudos allocation for education, which includes 34.5 million escudos for the *Estudos Gerais Universitários*, represents only about 6 per cent of the budget. About 4 per cent of the budget is to be spent on public health and special services. In contrast to the sharp rise in

<sup>84</sup> Since defence expenses usually exceed estimates, savings from other expenditures provide the necessary margin to prevent a final deficit.

<sup>85</sup> This does not include internal security for which, in 1966, the allocation was 144 million escudos which was about two thirds that for education.

defence allocations, the 1,204 million escudos allocation to services concerned with development is less than 5 per cent above that of the previous year.

#### *Development financing*

219. The Transitional Development Plan covering the period 1965-1967 envisaged an investment target of 7,210 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 2,403 million escudos, which is more than the total investment envisaged under the First National Development Plan for 1953-1958 and almost three times the annual investment targets under the Second National Development Plan for 1959-1964. As noted above, over 2,068 million escudos (about 30 per cent of the total) are to be invested in the industrial sector, and 1,930 million escudos (27 per cent) are to be invested in transport and communications. Other sectors to receive more than 5 per cent of the total investments are: education and social welfare, 820 million escudos (11 per cent); electricity, 850 million escudos (about 12 per cent); agriculture, 130 million escudos (8.8 per cent); fisheries, 370 million (5.2 per cent). Of the total investment, about 40 per cent is expected to be derived from external sources, about 33 per cent from private investment, about 14 per cent from the central Government and the remainder from territorial funds.

220. Although there have been no reports published on the progress made under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the preceding sections give some indication of the extent to which the targets are being met. For 1966, the investment target was 2,415.5 million escudos, or almost exactly one third of the total. External sources were expected to provide 970.5 million escudos (40.2 per cent) including 211.8 million escudos in foreign loans. The remaining 60 per cent was to be financed as follows: 320 million escudos from the central Government (13.3 per cent); 250 million escudos (10.3 per cent) from the Angolan Government; 530 million escudos (22 per cent) from private industry as "self-financing"; 200 million escudos (8.3 per cent) from development bonds; and the remaining 145 million escudos from credit institutions and private investment companies.

221. It was officially reported in July 1966 (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*) that France would finance projects up to a total of 1,000 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. The sectors in which projects were to be financed included agriculture, fisheries, communications, hydro-electric power and public health. Some of the projects were already in progress while others were awaiting authorization from the Portuguese Government.

222. Bond issues totalling 200 million escudos were authorized in April 1966 as the third and fourth series of the *Obrigações de Tesouro de Angola, 5 por cento, 1965, Plano Intercalar de Fomento, 1965-1967*. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.I, chap. V, para. 56), these bonds may be used for settling both visible and invisible accounts with escudo zone, and when used for this purpose, the payment of interest on the bonds and amortization outside the Territory of issue receive priority over other transfers to the same area.<sup>86</sup> In this

connexion it may be noted that the total bond issue of 200 million escudos represents only about one fifth of the yearly total capital transfers out of the Territory in 1960 and 1961 and one third of the transfers in 1962. Thus although on the one hand the exchange control seeks to keep money in the Territory, the lack of convertibility and the difficulties in transferring funds do not encourage new investments in the Territory.

223. According to press reports, Angola's 1967 budget provides a preliminary allocation of 1,137.5 million escudos for the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. This sum is to be financed as follows: 180 million escudos from ordinary budgetary surpluses; 510 million escudos from the metropolitan loan; 115 million escudos from the loan from Petrangol; 70 million escudos from the *sobrevalorização* taxes; 62.5 million escudos from credit institutions; and 200 million escudos from a further issue of the development bonds.

224. In March 1967, one of Angola's deputies in the National Assembly (see para. 131) renewed the plea he had made in 1965 to the Government to introduce measures to protect Angola's economy. He pointed out that so long as there existed a wide disparity in the level of development of the component Territories to be integrated in the Portuguese realm, economic integration itself would only increasingly make the less developed Territories markets for the manufactured goods of the more developed part. The currency exchange restriction and the difficulties of Angola's balance of payments formed a vicious circle and, until some solution was found to these problems, it was difficult for the Territory to attract capital investments needed for economic growth.

#### *Education*

225. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, for Angola, the three goals in education are: (a) total enrolment of primary school children within twenty years; (b) increased adult education; and (c) raising the actual school enrolment. The Plan also established priorities for the building of a number of technical, secondary and middle-level (*ensino médio*) schools. In all, for the three-year period, 540 million escudos (about 7.5 per cent of the total) were allocated for education.

226. Since the primary education reform of 1964, in Angola, the former adaptation schools have been abolished and a uniform primary school system established. During 1965, a large number of new school posts were established in the rural areas, especially in the more populated districts which have a greater density of European population. The rural school posts, which are often buildings with one to two rooms, must now provide all of the first three primary classes with a pre-primary class for teaching oral Portuguese. Whereas previously, adaptation schools were mainly the responsibility of the Catholic missions, the Government now helps to provide the necessary staff.

227. Budgetary allocations for the territorial education services which increased almost fourfold between 1963 and 1966, rising from 62 million escudos to 242 million escudos, will be increased by only 9 per cent in 1967 to 263.6 million escudos. Thus it seems that following the 1966 trend, the expansion of education services will continue at a slower rate compared with 1965 when almost 500 new school posts were added in a single year.

228. As already noted above in section B.1, great importance is attached to the extension of primary

<sup>86</sup> The *Jornal Português de Economia e Finanças* in January 1967, noting that the Angola Inspectorate of Credit and Securities had invited persons wishing to make transfers to use the development bonds, considered that this implied that no real solution to Angola's exchange problem could be expected in the near future. (The bonds can only be amortized beginning in the sixth year after the date of issue.)

education to the rural populations to raise their level of living and to make them even more consciously Portuguese. In particular, it is hoped that the spread of the use of the Portuguese language will strengthen "national unity".

229. Although there is now a "unified" school system, African children have not yet been truly "integrated" in the primary schools and there are still differences between the programmes in the school posts in rural areas and those in the primary schools in the more populated urban or semi-urban areas. This difference is underlined by the officially defined objective of the pre-primary class, which, despite the repeal of the Native Statute and abolition of the adaptation schools, continues to be defined in the official teachers' handbook for the pre-primary class (*Livro de Didáctica das Lições da Classe Pré-Primária do Ensino Primário Elementar*) in the following terms:

"The [pre-primary] programmes of education have to reflect distinctly the determination to give the pupils a sufficient knowledge of the spoken Portuguese language and to make them acquire the social habits necessary for attending common schools with the same chances of success as children who have a European type of living."

230. Based on this policy, in January 1967 in Luso (Moxico district), children who already could speak Portuguese were not admitted to take the pre-primary exemption examination because they came from a different environment and were therefore required to go through the pre-primary adaptation class.

231. Compared with the previous school year, during 1964-1965 there was an increase of 339 schools, 439 teachers and a school enrolment of 39,000. The school statistics for 1964-1965 are given below.

SCHOOL STATISTICS FOR 1964-1965<sup>a</sup>

	Number of schools	Number of teachers	Number of pupils
Total 1964-1965 .....	2,036	3,259	191,693
(1963-1964) .....	(1,697)	(2,766)	(153,088)
of which:			
Government			
Primary .....	197	894	} 148,597
School posts .....	898	1,121	
Catholic Missions ....	752		
	(663)		
Primary .....	...	214	} 43,096
School posts .....	...	939	
Adult courses .....	75	91	...
Adult school posts ...	3	...	...

<sup>a</sup> *Comércio do Porto*, 3 February 1967. Comparable figures for 1963-1964 are given in parentheses. These figures vary slightly from those reported in A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 136.

232. One of the main problems in Angola is the small number of teachers completing training each year. Because there are not enough fully qualified primary teachers available, the rural school posts are taught by "monitors". These may be persons who have completed as little as four years of primary education and one special 2½-month intensive monitor training course (though to become fully qualified rural teachers, they must complete the four-year primary teachers' training courses and have three years of teaching experience). In June 1966, there were 1,685 monitors and seven monitor training schools, of which one was for

male and female teachers, five for female teachers and one for male teachers only.

233. In contrast, the regular primary schools must be taught by teachers who have had at least five years of secondary education and have completed a two-year primary teachers' training course (*Escola de Magistério Oficial*). In 1966, there were still only three training schools for such teachers, one of which graduated only sixty-four teachers in the period 1964-1966.

234. Teachers for the academic secondary schools (*liceus*) have to complete a special four- to five-year university level course leading to the *licenciatura*. To qualify for tenure, they must in addition have completed two years of teaching (*estágio pedagógico*) at an approved school. Although courses are given in the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* (EGU) for training of some technical professional teachers, complete training for secondary school teachers is only available in Portugal. As a transitional measure, however, persons who do not have the full training required may be approved to teach in academic schools.

235. The total number of students enrolled in the university level courses (*Estudos Gerais Universitários*) has more than doubled since 1963-1964, rising from 286 to 467 in 1964-1965 and to 601 in 1966-1967. Of the students enrolled in the current school year, 281 are in engineering courses, 178 in medicine, 40 in agronomy and silviculture, 52 in veterinary medicine, 23 in pedagogical science (decreased from 112 in 1963-1964) and 27 in special secondary teacher courses. How far these figures fall short of the Territory's needs can be seen from the fact that, in January 1967, the Overseas Agricultural and Forestry Common Services (excluding Veterinary Services) had more than 93 vacancies in the professional and administrative levels; these included vacancies for 11 first class and 33 second class agronomists, 18 silviculturists, 2 agronomy engineers, 15 civil engineers and 3 entomologists.

236. The large number of vacancies in the various overseas technical services has been mainly due to the small annual output of trained personnel in Portugal, the competitive examination system and the generally higher pay offered by private industry. As a transitional measure, since October 1966 (Decree 47,261 of 17 October) the conditions for appointment to the Overseas Services have been eased so that middle level and senior technical posts may now be filled by contracting qualified candidates without examination, provided that there are no other candidates available or that the number of vacancies exceeds the number of candidates.

#### Labour

237. According to a recently published study,<sup>87</sup> in 1964, there were 367,815 persons employed in Angola as wage earners which represented 13.7 per cent of the economically active population. Of these, 45.3 per cent were engaged in the primary sector (agriculture 144,667, fisheries 16,225, livestock 5,721); 28.3 per cent in the secondary sector (including 30,249 in mining, 29,838 in industries and 40,747 in construction); and 26.4 per cent in the tertiary sector (including 31,683 in communications and transport, 25,000 in commerce, banking, etc., 40,500 in services).

238. Almost all the workers in the primary sector are engaged in rural areas and they are almost ex-

<sup>87</sup> *Alfonso Mendes. O Trabalho Assalariado em Angola, Instituto Superior de Ciências Sociais e Política Ultramarina, Lisbon 1966.*

clusively African. As "rural" workers they are governed by the Rural Labour Code for the Overseas Territories (Decree 44,309 of 27 April 1962)<sup>88</sup> which replaced the Indigenous (Native) Labour Code approved by Decree 16,199 of 6 December 1928.<sup>89</sup> Whereas one of the principal features of the Native Labour Code was the provision under which idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects, the Rural Labour Code of 1962 is silent on the obligation to work.

239. The study shows that the number of rural workers has decreased since the 1950s, dropping from a maximum of 393,325 in 1954 to 241,351 in 1964. It attributes the decrease to mechanization, higher productivity, more rational use of labour as well as better wages and other benefits.

240. It appears that, following the introduction of the new Rural Labour Code, minimum wage rates were not only raised but better enforced so that there was no shortage of labour. In 1966, complaints of labour shortages in agriculture began to appear in the local newspapers. In December it was suggested in the Legislative Council that the Government should introduce measures to make it obligatory for persons over 18 years of age to work if they were not students or did not have income on which they could support themselves.

241. One of the districts most affected by the recent labour shortages is Uíge, where African farmers have been able to grow coffee on their own account (see above). Although the Governor General has not agreed to the introduction of legislation to make work obligatory, he has expressed the view that in a modern society every citizen is expected to work either for himself or for others. Subsequently he announced that the Government intended to launch an intensive campaign "to convince the great masses of the population" to work harder and to increase their productivity.

### 3. MOZAMBIQUE

#### *General*

242. Mozambique lies south of the Equator between latitudes 10°30' and 27°. It is bounded on the north by the United Republic of Tanzania, on the west by Lake Nyasa, Malawi, Zambia and Southern Rhodesia, on the south by South Africa and Swaziland, and on the east by the Indian Ocean. It has a total area of 771,125 square kilometres. At the 1960 census, the total resident population was 6,578,604, of whom 6,430,530 were Africans. The non-African population comprised 97,268 Europeans, 31,465 *mistos* and 19,341 Asians.

#### *Government and administration*

243. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Mozambique is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,375 of 22 November 1963.

244. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Angola (see section B.2). The

<sup>88</sup> English text contained in the ILO Legislative Series 1962, Par.1.

<sup>89</sup> Some of the main provisions contained in the Native Labour Code of 1928 have been summarized in A/5160 and Add.1 and 2, paras. 354 ff. (*Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 54). Under the Native Labour Code, idleness could render indigenous persons liable to compulsory labour on public work projects.

Territory is, however, divided into 9 administrative districts and the Legislative Council consists of 29 members, of whom 2 are *ex officio*, 18 are elected by "organic groups" and 9 are elected directly. Other provisions are the same as those for Angola, including the composition of the Economic and Social Council, the franchise qualifications and the number of representatives in the National Assembly, which for each Territory is seven, despite the difference in the size of their populations.

245. The election of representatives to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and information pertaining thereto is contained in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 146-149). Elections to local bodies were held in 1964, the next elections being due in 1968. In January 1967, it was announced that registration of voters for the elections to the Legislative Council would be completed by 15 May.

#### *The war in Mozambique*

246. In Mozambique, as in Angola and Guinea called Portuguese Guinea, Portugal is engaged in a defensive war against insurrectionary forces, directed in this case by the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) and the Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO). The fighting began in September 1964 when small bands of guerrillas entered Mozambique from the north and has since grown and spread until now it includes large areas of the Territory. Owing to the nature of guerrilla warfare and the fact that both sides issue conflicting reports, it is not possible to state precisely what are the zones within which the guerrilla forces are operating but it appears that, aside from minor outbreaks of fighting near the borders of the Tete, Zambézia and Moçambique Districts, the main fighting is confined to the sparsely populated northern districts of Niassa and Cabo Delgado which share a common border with the United Republic of Tanzania. Portuguese sources describe the fighting as being confined to two zones: first, a coastal zone in Cabo Delgado extending from the Tanzanian frontier to the Montepuez River and stretching inland for about 100 miles to include the country around Mueda and the Makonde plateau; and secondly, in Niassa, the eastern shore of Lake Malawi from the Tanzanian frontier southwards to beyond Vila Cabral, a distance of about 140 miles, and inland for an indeterminate distance. One objective of Portuguese strategy is apparently to confine guerrilla activity within these zones and to prevent the guerrillas from infiltrating further south into economically more developed areas. In Cabo Delgado district, Portuguese forces have established a *cordon sanitaire*, whence the inhabitants, numbering about 250,000, have been removed to defended settlements and in which most crops have been destroyed.

247. Within the fighting zones and along the northern frontier, the Portuguese have established a network of military bases from which ground and air patrols are sent out. These are supplemented by large-scale combined operations for the purpose of seeking out and destroying guerrilla bands and their encampments. At the same time, a programme of "psycho-social" measures, consisting of propaganda and other inducements, is employed to encourage the return and resettlement in fortified villages of refugees and others in hiding or aiding the guerrillas. The insurgents, for their part, operate principally in small, well-armed groups, engaging in raids, ambushes, mining of roads and acts of sabotage, such as the destruction

of bridges. In July 1966, they severed the railway line under construction at Catur, near Vila Cabral. Since 1965, they have undertaken larger operations, including attacks by groups of 65 to 150 men on defended localities and military bases. Thus, in mid-1966, they claimed to have made a mortar attack on the town of Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado District and, in October and November, FRELIMO reported attacks on Vila Cabral and a Portuguese army camp at Nova Coimbra in Niassa District.

248. It is difficult to assess the progress or extent of the fighting because both sides make conflicting claims. FRELIMO sources report numerous victories, claiming that, during the two years of warfare, the guerrillas killed or wounded 7,000 Portuguese and destroyed 20 aircraft. According to FRELIMO, most of the countryside in Niassa and Cabo Delgado Districts is under guerrilla control. The Portuguese military command describes these claims as mainly fictitious. Although it admits that raids have been made on towns near the Tanzanian frontier, it asserts that during two years of fighting it inflicted more than 4,000 enemy casualties with only relatively small losses among its own troops and that the guerrillas are able to continue their attacks only because they can operate from outside the Territory and receive foreign aid. Portuguese official communiqués enumerate repeated successes against the guerrillas and report that the local population is being won over or "recuperated" in increasing numbers.

249. Both sides agree, however, that the guerrilla forces are now more numerous and better trained and equipped than they were in 1964. Portuguese sources estimated their number at 3,500 in November 1966 while FRELIMO recently gave a total of 7,000 guerrillas under arms supported by 3,000 cadres serving in various capacities. FRELIMO further claims that in the areas under its control it has established nuclear administrative services with schools and hospitals of its own. At the same time, the number of Portuguese troops in Mozambique has nearly doubled and was believed by foreign observers to be in the region of 40,000 at the end of 1966. In addition to regular troops, the defence forces include, as in Angola, a locally recruited volunteer corps and a militia comprised of Africans recruited in the *regedorias*. The militia is divided into a "protection militia" which is responsible for the local defence of villages and settlements, and an "intervention militia" which participates with the volunteer corps and regular army in the pursuit and destruction of guerrilla bands. There are also two mobile companies of police, but it is not clear whether these are used in the fighting zones or whether they are solely for internal security.

250. Although the fighting is sporadic and on a limited scale, it resulted, especially in late 1964 and early 1965, in the exodus of large numbers of African refugees to the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia. At the end of 1965, some 12,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania were being cared for by the Tanzanian Government with assistance from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Lutheran Church and the UN/FAO World Food Programme; a further wave of 3,000 refugees was reported to have arrived in January 1966. Similar groups of 3,000 and 2,000 were reported to be still in Malawi and Zambia respectively. By mid-1966, the warfare had also resulted in incidents involving Mozambique's northern neighbours; in November 1966, it was reported that a Portuguese patrol had penetrated

three miles into Malawi territory and had taken 50 prisoners who were subsequently released; later in the month, according to a formal charge addressed to the Security Council by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 December 1966 (S/7605), Portuguese troops were accused of having crossed into Tanzania and laid mines causing the death of four persons. Both charges were denied by Portugal, which replied to the Tanzanian complaint in a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7622).

251. One immediate result of the fighting can be seen in the rising cost of military and related expenditures both for Portugal (see section B.1) and Mozambique. For 1966, the Territory's share in defence and security expenditures included, according to a decree of 21 January, an allocation of 724.4 million escudos for the regular expenses of the armed services, or roughly 255 million escudos more than the amount allocated in 1965 and about twice the actual expenditure of the armed services in 1963 before the fighting started. In addition, the budget estimates for 1966 contained allocations of 45.2 million for extraordinary military expenditure, including 5 million for the volunteer corps and 111.9 million for police, "psycho-social" measures, including resettlement of refugees, and other related costs. The sum of all these allocations, including subsequent additional appropriations totalling 52 million, is equal to approximately 23 per cent of the estimated budget of Mozambique for 1966. This substantial expenditure is in part financed by special taxes (notably the defence tax introduced in 1964 and the defence stamp tax introduced a year later), which it was estimated would yield about 131 million escudos in 1966, and by a special levy on the receipts of the various autonomous bodies and economic funds, which was estimated to yield 222.7 million escudos. Nevertheless, despite this increased revenue, the rising expenditures resulting from the guerrilla war, added to the anticipated loss of transit earnings due to the international embargo on trade with Southern Rhodesia, are straining government finances (see section on public finance below).

#### *Security measures*

252. Although precise information is lacking, there appears to have been a progressive tightening of security measures in Mozambique to counter any possible subversion. In 1966, the regular budgetary appropriation for police services amounted to 93 million escudos or more than twice the sum appropriated in 1960.<sup>90</sup> The largest increase, from 2.7 million to 23 million escudos, was for the *Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE) (intelligence police) and it may be noted that, between 1965 and 1966, the numbers employed by PIDE increased from 355 to 475. In September, new legislation was enacted requiring all persons entering or leaving the Territory to possess valid passports.

253. In October, there began in Lourenço Marques the retrial before a military tribunal of nine persons accused of subversive activities against the State. The defendants were among a group, including several well-known intellectuals who had been arrested in 1965 as members of a clandestine unit of FRELIMO. The nine had previously been absolved by the Tribunal but the verdict had been rejected on review by the Supreme Military Tribunal in Lisbon which had ordered a retrial

<sup>90</sup> A decree enacted on 21 February 1967 authorized the Governor General to disburse additional expenditure for the expansion of police services, including the formation of new mobile police units.



with different judges. At the conclusion of the second trial, seven of the defendants were found guilty and received prison sentences ranging from two to three years with loss of political rights and restriction of movement for further periods.

### *Economic conditions*

#### *General*

254. The structure of Mozambique's economy and the main problems connected with it have been described in detail in the previous reports of the Special Committee and, particularly, in the background material accompanying the Special Committee's reports on the activities of foreign economic interests.<sup>91</sup> Briefly, the two dominant sectors are agriculture and transportation services. In agriculture, the emphasis is upon about eight principal export crops, of which cotton, cashew, sisal and copra are outstanding. Except for cotton, which is grown by Africans for sale at controlled prices to large ginning and export companies, production is mainly on plantations and farms owned by non-Africans. Africans produce, in addition to cotton, a certain amount of smoke-cured copra which is sold to local oil mills, about half the cashew nuts, rice and food crops which are sold to dealers and quasi-governmental agencies. For the most part, however, Africans are either subsistence farmers or wage earners.

255. Despite recent growth, transforming industries are few and the Territory imports most of its requirements of manufactured goods. It has a chronically adverse balance of trade which, in the past, was largely offset by invisible foreign exchange receipts in the form of revenue derived by its railways and ports, mainly from the highly lucrative transit trade of neighbouring land-locked areas, notably the Transvaal, Southern Rhodesia, Zambia and Malawi. Since 1958, however, as a result of increasing imports, the trade deficit has each year exceeded invisible earnings and resulted in a growing adverse balance of payments, mainly with metropolitan Portugal (see below). The trade deficit reached a peak in 1965 and, according to preliminary data, continued to grow until in 1966 it was announced that measures would be taken to restrict the issue of import licences.

256. The years 1965 and 1966 were also characterized by: (a) rising public expenditures, particularly for defence and for services affected by the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967; and (b) increased public and private investment, both at the infrastructural level (i.e., port installations, railways and roads) and in secondary and light transforming industries. During this period, there was a marked increase in private industrial investment which coincides with the recent easing of controls over the establishment of industries and of regulations governing foreign investments in the Overseas Territories (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 52-68). Important among these were new investments in sugar production and cashew processing which in time are expected to increase significantly the value of the Territory's exports.

257. During 1966, Mozambique's transport industry felt increasingly the effects of the international boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia. Since nearly all Southern Rhodesia's overseas trade passed through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques and much of

Zambia's trade followed the same routes, the revenue derived from this source by the Territory's railways and ports constituted an important segment of its invisible earnings of foreign exchange (see below). In addition to the effects of the boycott, Mozambique may also suffer in 1967 a probable set-back in the production of some of its export crops, especially sugar, as the result of severe floods which occurred during February and March.

258. Further information on recent developments by sectors is given below.

### *External trade and payments*

#### *General*

259. As already noted, the year 1965 saw a marked deterioration in Mozambique's balance of foreign trade. Whereas the value of exports, at 3,107 million escudos, was 7.3 per cent higher than in 1963, imports increased over the same period by 22 per cent, from 4,075 million escudos to 4,981 million escudos. This resulted in an adverse balance of trade in 1965 of 1,874 million escudos, which was 69 per cent more than in 1963. Data for the first six months of 1966 showed continued growth of imports and an actual drop in the value of exports compared with the previous year.

260. The comparatively poor performance of the export sector in 1965 and the first half of 1966 was partly due to adverse climatic conditions and a temporary drop in sugar exports, but the data also reflect a reduced rate of growth of agricultural exports generally (see below). The sharp increase in imports was attributed to several factors, among them increased public spending, especially for defence, and increased industrial and infrastructural investment, both undoubtedly contributing to an upsurge in consumer demand. Analysis of imports in 1965 by categories reveals that the largest increases were in capital and production goods, which in 1965 accounted respectively for 33.9 per cent and 23.3 per cent of total imports by value. Consumption goods accounted for 42.8 per cent.

261. To what extent the reduction of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see section B.1, para. 43) may have affected the over-all balance of trade is not immediately apparent. Between 1963 and 1965, there was, however, a significant increase in Mozambique's trade deficit with metropolitan Portugal, imports from Portugal rising by 32.8 per cent in value, whereas exports to Portugal rose by 11.8 per cent. At the end of 1965, Mozambique's adverse balance of trade with metropolitan Portugal stood at 569 million escudos, or nearly one third of its total trade deficit. At the same time, as the figures show, Portugal's share of Mozambique trade increased significantly. In 1965, nearly 40 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade took place within the escudo zone. The other principal trading partners were South Africa with 10.9 per cent, the United Kingdom with 8.2 per cent and the Federal Republic of Germany with 6.1 per cent. Despite the signing of a trade agreement with Southern Rhodesia early in 1965 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 47), and a subsequent exchange of unofficial trade missions, Southern Rhodesia's share of Mozambique trade underwent little significant change either in 1965 or the first quarter of 1966. In 1965, it amounted to only 2.2 per cent of the total.

262. Up to 1957, invisible earnings, derived mainly from the transit trade of neighbouring territories,

<sup>91</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/6000/Rev.1), chap. V.*

sufficed to offset the Territory's negative trade balance. Thereafter, the combined effect of rapidly increasing trade deficits, together with a growing outflow of investment earnings, amortizations and other private transfers, resulted in a continuously adverse balance of payments, amounting to 218 million escudos at the end of 1965.<sup>92</sup> In consequence of this drain, Mozambique's exchange reserves, including foreign exchange and metropolitan escudos held by commercial banks, dropped from 1,549 million escudos in 1960 to 412 million escudos at the end of 1965, sufficient to cover about one month's imports.

263. In 1965, Mozambique's balance of payments showed a net inflow of foreign exchange under the heading of transport earnings amounting to 1,151 million escudos, or nearly one fifth of its foreign exchange earnings. Most of this was attributable to the transit trade of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the latter accounting for about 700 million escudos and the former for about 311 million escudos. The difference was due in part to the fact that Southern Rhodesian trade consisted largely of high value goods for which higher transit rates are charged, and also, in part, to the fact that much of Zambia's external trade passed through Southern Rhodesia.

264. Following the unilateral declaration of independence by the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, the transit trade has been affected, first by the cessation of petroleum shipments through Beira in December 1965 and later by the application of a more general international boycott called for by the Security Council. The international measures taken against the illegal régime also resulted in partial interruption and rerouting of Zambian transit trade. Full data which would permit a detailed appraisal of the effects of these changes on Mozambique's invisible receipts, however, are not yet available in published form (see below).

#### *Trade relations with Southern Rhodesia<sup>93</sup>*

265. As stated above, for Mozambique, the revenue derived from the transit trade of Southern Rhodesia, which passes mainly through the ports of Beira and Lourenço Marques, represents a major source of foreign exchange. Since much of Zambia's external trade normally follows the same routes, it is difficult to determine from the published statistics precisely what proportion of the total transport receipts is directly attributable to the trade of Southern Rhodesia. However, according to the data published in Mozambique, revenue from transit trade entering from Southern Rhodesia totalled about 700 million escudos in 1965. In comparison, special trade between Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia is small, totalling in 1965 only 179.4 million escu-

dos, or 2.2 per cent by value of Mozambique's external trade.<sup>94</sup>

266. Portugal's own attitude on the question of Southern Rhodesia has been officially described as one of strict neutrality. While it has not accorded diplomatic recognition to the illegal régime, for several reasons it has not felt obliged to participate in international sanctions against the régime or to deny to Southern Rhodesia the right of transit for its external trade; according to a recent statement by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Portugal considers that it is bound by international conventions which guarantee the right of transit for the trade of land-locked countries. Portugal's policy of maintaining trading relations with Southern Rhodesia has in effect meant the application of the provisions of the trade agreement signed early in 1965 whereby the parties undertook to promote increased trade and closer economic co-operation between them. Accordingly, during 1966 there was an exchange of unofficial trade missions and other contacts on a more or less unofficial basis. As yet, official trade statistics are not available to show whether or not these exchanges resulted in any significant increase in trade. Data published by the Mozambique Government for the period January to April 1966 indicate that the items and quantities traded<sup>95</sup> were much the same as in the corresponding period of 1965. Subsequent press reports to the effect that the Portuguese-owned SONAREP refinery at Lourenço Marques had supplied 70 million gallons of gasoline to Southern Rhodesia were formally denied by the president of the parent company, SONAP, in a statement issued on 10 March 1967. The President said that not only was such an amount beyond the capacity of the refinery, but the Southern Rhodesian market had never been among its clients. A similar denial had been made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal on 28 December 1966.

267. As regards the transit trade, even less data are available for 1966,<sup>96</sup> and the complexity of the situation (particularly the changes which have occurred in the transit trade of other territories) makes difficult any assessment of the effects of the boycott on the basis of partial information. According to the report of the Mozambique Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the volume of cargo handled at Beira during the period January to June 1966 decreased by 342,991 tons, or 18 per cent compared with the corresponding period of 1965,<sup>97</sup> while the volume handled at Lourenço

<sup>94</sup> In 1965, exports from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia were valued at 93.4 million escudos and consisted mainly of vegetable oils and husks (34 million escudos); wood products (20.8 million escudos); bananas (5.5 million escudos); and petroleum products (4.4 million escudos). Imports from Southern Rhodesia were valued at 86 million escudos, the principal items being maize (14.3 million escudos); copper (4.7 million escudos); iron and steel products (4.4 million escudos); coal (3.3 million escudos); automobiles and parts (2.3 million escudos); and agricultural machinery (3.1 million escudos).

<sup>95</sup> For instance, according to the official statistics, Mozambique's exports of petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia in the first four months of 1966 consisted of only 576 tons of gas oil and diesel oil and less than one ton of gasoline.

<sup>96</sup> According to press reports, Southern Rhodesian exports of chrome and amianto amounted to 94,000 and 7,000 tons respectively during the first six months of 1966. Tobacco exports amounted to 69,003 tons during the first seven months, compared with 190,300 tons in January to July 1965.

<sup>97</sup> Later figures obtained from press reports indicate that for the first ten months of 1966, the decrease was in the vicinity of 24 per cent. These data relate to a period before the adoption of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) and probably reflect in large measure the cut-back in the supply of crude oil to Southern Rhodesia after December 1965.

<sup>92</sup> This figure represents the balance of all exchange transactions. In fact, Mozambique's balance of payments with metropolitan Portugal shows a much larger deficit, which is normally offset by favourable balances with other countries, particularly South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Hence the Territory is a net contributor of foreign exchange to Portugal. This is illustrated by the following data for 1964:

	<i>Balance (+ or -) in million escudos</i>
Metropolitan Portugal .....	-1,192.7
Southern Rhodesia .....	+1,100.7
South Africa .....	+ 525.0
Rest of world .....	- 656.4
TOTAL	- 223.4

<sup>93</sup> A more detailed description of Mozambique's economic relations with Southern Rhodesia is contained in document A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix V, paras. 42-79.

Marques increased by 184,662 tons. These figures throw very little light on the effects of the boycott, however, in view of changes in the volume of traffic from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Zambia known to have taken place during the same period.

268. On the other hand, global figures of the losses in revenue up to the end of 1966 due to the boycott were contained in a letter dated 11 February 1967 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal to the Secretary-General (S/7734/Rev.1). These figures showed a loss to the Mozambique economy of £9,796,000 (783.68 million escudos) apportioned as follows:<sup>98</sup> transit receipts and port dues, £6,705,000 (536.4 million escudos); additional losses from transit trade, £1,341,000 (107.3 million escudos); special trade, £1,750,000 (140 million escudos). In citing these losses, which he reserved the right to document at the appropriate opportunity, the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked that consultations should be initiated between the Security Council and the Portuguese Government pursuant to Article 50 of the Charter "in order that the modalities for paying the compensation to which the province of Mozambique has a right, may be agreed upon".

#### *Agriculture*

269. Detailed statistics showing the production of the main cash crops are not yet available beyond 1964. In so far as exports reflect production, they show that output of several major crops has remained fairly static or has decreased over the past three years. Thus, exports of cotton lint, which in 1960, before the abolition of obligatory cultivation, exceeded 44,000 tons, decreased to 31,339 tons in 1965. Copra, owing to falling world prices, dropped from over 46,000 tons in 1963 to 28,574 tons, and sugar from 124,896 tons to 94,936 tons. Sisal exports at 31,381 tons were above the average of the previous six years but below the high levels of over 32,000 tons attained in 1957 and 1958. The principal increases registered since 1963 were in tea (from 8,438 to 10,091 tons) and vegetable oils (from 14,963 to 20,189 tons). In the first quarter of 1966, exports of cotton dropped by nearly one half compared with the corresponding period of 1965 (from 8,018 to 4,242 tons); sisal by about 20 per cent (from 6,900 to 5,528 tons); and cashew nuts by about 7 per cent (from 33,594 to 31,209 tons). There were, however, significant increases in sugar (from 13,178 to 18,568 tons); tea (from 3,306 to 5,018 tons); and a small increase in copra (from 5,578 to 5,703 tons).

270. The increases in exports in 1965 and 1966 were partly attributable to the effects of adverse climatic conditions including a cyclone and extensive floods in January 1966 which did severe damage to crops, especially cashew and fruit.<sup>99</sup> In the case of sugar, there was a temporary drop in production during 1965 due to the installation of large-scale irrigation work by one of the leading producers, Sena Sugar Estates. Cotton production generally declined after 1961, due probably to the abolition of compulsory cultivation and falling

world prices.<sup>100</sup> Cashew production, exports of which increased remarkably from 82,378 tons in 1962 to 127,796 tons in 1964, appears to have reached a plateau in the vicinity of 100,000 tons annually.

271. The present trend in regard to the main cash crops is towards more capital-intensive production and the establishment of processing industries. The most important developments in 1965-1966 were the introduction of mechanized processing of cashew nuts and the investment of large sums in projects which will substantially increase sugar production. At the same time, new factories were established to process sisal, soap, wheat, tea, cotton, coir fibre, fruit and condensed milk (see section on industries below). The progressive mechanization of cash crop production is illustrated by the increasing number of tractors imported, from 449 in 1964 to 642 in 1965. Particular attention is being given to the development of tea growing as a medium for increasing European settlement, and tobacco, fruit and meat, mainly to supply Portugal and substitute for imports in Mozambique. It is estimated that Portugal at present expends nearly 150 million escudos in foreign exchange on the purchase of tobacco which could be produced in Mozambique and could furnish the basis for new settlement schemes. Measures instituted during 1966 to improve the productivity of agriculture included the establishment of an Institute of Agronomic Studies and reorganization of the Agricultural Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agrícola) (see below). In early 1967 it was announced that a separate water development service would be created in view of the major irrigation and river development projects now under study, notably the Zambezi river valley scheme (see section on settlement and land utilization schemes).

272. The most important development in agricultural production was the movement towards expansion of the sugar industry. As previously noted (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix III, paras. 73-77), Mozambique supplies about 70 per cent of Portugal's sugar consumption, most of the sugar produced (163,969 tons in 1965-1966) being exported to Portugal under a special régime whereby quotas and prices are determined annually by the Portuguese Government. In 1966, a decree law was enacted continuing this régime, with minor changes, until 1 May 1982, and the Portuguese Government also approved a reorganization and expansion of the sugar refining industry in Portugal, involving an increase in productive capacity to 300,000 tons annually in order to allow for increased sugar consumption over the next ten to twelve years. Prior to this, plans had already been laid to increase sugar production in Mozambique. In 1965, Sena Sugar Estates, one of three existing producers, began a 360 million escudos irrigation programme aimed at nearly doubling its output by 1970, and in addition, two new companies have already been formed. The greatest progress has been made by the Mozambique Sugar Company which plans to begin production in 1969 with an initial sugar output of 30,000 tons to be increased eventually to 90,000 tons. The company is Portuguese-owned with French participation. In April 1966, the territorial Government was authorized to underwrite bank loans to the company in the amount of 280 million escudos, the money to be raised by the bank from foreign sources (thus ensuring that the majority of the capital remains Portuguese). Part of its plantations, which are located

<sup>98</sup> According to the letter, the sums cited, in addition to imports and exports, losses of receipts from normal traffic, loss of compensation from the Beira oil pipeline and losses resulting from failure to fulfil contracts drawn up and signed for exports from Southern Rhodesia.

<sup>99</sup> Even more extensive floods occurred in February and March 1967. Heavy crop losses are reported, especially in the Limpopo and Incomati river valleys, the latter being an important sugar producing area.

<sup>100</sup> Partly owing to reduction of export subsidies by the United States of America.

on the Púnguê River near Beira, will be allocated among 100 settlers. The other company, the *Maragra-Marracuene Agrícola Açucareira*, located at Manhiça near Lourenço Marques, was reported in April to have obtained additional bank loans, bringing its working capital to 130 million escudos, but it has not yet announced when it will begin production. The company, which is also Portuguese-owned, with some of its capital subscribed locally, will have an initial capacity of 40,000 tons of sugar, to be increased eventually to 60,000 tons. About 60 per cent of its sugar output will be refined (one third of it will be exported to Portugal, the remainder going to the local market), the remaining 40 per cent being exported as raw sugar for refining in Portugal. Construction of the refinery began in October 1965. There is no new information concerning plans by a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation to develop sugar production in the lower Zambezi Valley (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix III, para. 89).

273. As previously mentioned (section B.1, paras. 61-62), steps were taken in 1966 to develop the production of meat and fruit in the Overseas Territories in order to supply metropolitan Portugal. In Mozambique, various factors, among them the prevalence of the tsetse fly in several regions and the limitations of the local market, have been obstacles to the development of a large-scale meat industry. Although there are about 1.1 million head of cattle, most of them are owned by traditional African pastoralists or are raised by large agricultural companies to feed their own employees. Commercial cattle-ranching, as a principal activity, is mainly confined to the district of Gaza, where cattle are raised to supply Lourenço Marques and the Angónia plateau, near the border of Malawi. In 1965, exports of meat and meat products were valued at only 5.2 million escudos. In 1966, however, steps were taken to develop this sector, namely the establishment of an Institute of Veterinary Research and the reorganization of the veterinary service which in 1965 consisted of some fifty-four veterinary officers. The intention, in particular, is to build up extension services and foster the growth of co-operatives among the small cattle breeders in the southern districts of Lourenço Marques and Gaza. During 1966, several commercial enterprises were reported to be considering the establishment of meat factories, and one meat and dairy products factory, representing an investment of 25 million escudos and owned by a producers' co-operative, was completed. In addition, during the year, refrigerated warehouses for meat and fruit were built at the ports of Lourenço Marques and Beira (see below), and by the end of the year frozen meat was for the first time exported to Portugal.

274. Fruit growing is at present mainly confined to the south of Mozambique and to the Manica highlands. The fruit consists of bananas, which are exported to South Africa and other neighbouring territories, and citrus which is marketed overseas under arrangements with the South African Citrus Marketing Board. Exports are small, valued in 1965 at only 16.8 million escudos for bananas and 17.3 million escudos for citrus. One reason for developing citrus exports is that the fruit reaches the European market during the winter season.

275. As may be seen from the above, the principal emphasis has been placed so far on expanding the output of export crops. In 1966, however, greater

attention was given to the need to develop food crops in order to eliminate imports of such products as maize,<sup>101</sup> wheat, vegetables and fruit, which together accounted for about 400 million escudos in 1964 and 1965. It appears to be the contention in Mozambique that the best way to achieve an all-round growth of the agricultural sector, excluding large-scale production, is through assistance to small, predominantly non-African, farmers and through settlement schemes which would have an impact on the surrounding African subsistence economy. Among the measures taken in 1966 to assist small farmers may be cited the grant of a 10 million escudos loan to an agricultural co-operative in the Maputo valley and the reorganization and expansion of the Agricultural Credit Bank into a governmental agency receiving regular budgetary allocations and with power to make or underwrite loans (including crop loans) against minimal guarantees (in exceptional circumstances, loans may be granted up to 500,000 escudos without guarantees). The loans may be granted either to private (i.e., non-African) farmers or to Africans engaged in "traditional" farming, but in the latter case the recipients will be mainly collective groups. There is also to be increased public expenditure on roads serving agricultural areas, especially in the north (see below).

276. It appears that attention is still focused very largely on the development of agriculture on farms held under individual ownership, i.e., mainly owned by non-Africans. Of the major cash crops, which together account for about 80 per cent of Mozambique's agricultural exports, only cotton, about half the cashew nuts and some copra are produced by African farmers. For the rest, Africans are mainly engaged in subsistence farming, selling their surplus produce to dealers or through government agencies. So far, apart from the work of specialized bodies such as the Cotton and Cereals Institutes, which provide supervised loans and technical assistance for specific purposes or in specified regions, comparatively little appears to have been done to raise the level of the "traditional" farming sector. The relative stagnation of subsistence farming is revealed by comparing the data on purchases of food crops from Africans for the years 1960-1963 (the latest years for which such data is available) with the same data for 1950-1953. The comparison shows that whereas purchases of a few crops, such as wheat, cashew nuts and beans, increased significantly, purchases of many import crops, such as rice, ground-nuts, copra and manioc, were about the same or actually less than a decade earlier.

277. During 1966, several commentators in the Territory referred to the need for a new approach to the development of the "traditional" farming sector. Thus, one speaker in the Legislative Council called for the creation of organized rural markets similar to those in Angola. Another observer, writing in a local periodical, called for a policy of agricultural credit which would help to transform subsistence farming and bring it into the cash economy. He pointed out that since its creation in 1945 until 1966 when it was absorbed into the Agricultural Credit Bank, the Rural Credit Fund, which was intended to aid "traditional" farmers, had been inactive because it lacked machinery for supervised loans. While the new bank was intended to aid "traditional" as well as organized farming, it could aid the

<sup>101</sup> For the first time for many years, in 1966, Mozambique had a surplus of 20,000 tons of maize available for export.

former on a significant scale only if the extension of credit formed part of a general approach to the problem and steps were taken, either by developing co-operatives or by furnishing systematic technical assistance, to provide the machinery whereby credit could be injected into the "traditional" farming sector and used as a means to promote improved techniques.

278. The need for greater efforts to promote the economic progress of Africans in the subsistence sector was also emphasized by deputies from Mozambique in the National Assembly during January and February 1967. As noted previously (section B.1, para. 70), Dr. Nunes Barata stressed that the improvement of living standards and the "harmonious economic development" of the African peoples was an essential ingredient in the struggle against subversion. Dr. Manuel Nazaré and Dr. Satúrio Pires developed this theme, urging the necessity of concerted measures to hasten the economic and social advancement of the rural African communities. Among the measures which they considered necessary was the granting of individual land titles to farmers of proven ability. They believed that, done on a mass scale, this would help to reduce the practice of shifting cultivation and would provide incentive to the individual farmer. They also considered necessary the formation of rural farm settlements (*ruralatos*), agricultural education, research and extension services supplemented by agricultural credit, guaranteed markets and finally the stimulation of rural co-operatives.

#### *Settlement and land utilization schemes*

279. Great importance is attached to the settlement in Mozambique of Europeans, both as a means of developing the economic wealth of the Territory and to promote its closer integration within the Portuguese realm. Among the main settlement schemes initiated in the past are the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valley settlements and smaller schemes in Niassa and near Gurué (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex, appendix II). Allocation of land for settlers is also a feature of several large agricultural projects (i.e., sugar and cashew). A particular concern at present is to encourage ex-soldiers to settle in the northern districts or in border areas, where their presence would contribute to defence. Recent results have not been spectacular, only one new settlement for ex-soldiers being established in 1966. The settlement is at Mahinga, near Vila Pery, and it is believed that it will accommodate some thirty to fifty settlers on 200 hectare estates. A small group of South African farmers is also reported to be settling in the same general area.

280. Although the main emphasis has been on the settlement of Europeans, provision has been made, notably in the larger settlement schemes such as those in the Limpopo, Revuè and Maputo valleys, for the allocation of part of the land to Africans. In addition to these specific settlement schemes, efforts were made under the First National Development Plan to stabilize Africans on the land and to form permanent settlements (*ruralatos*), but since 1963 there have been few reports of progress in this direction, presumably because of the immensity of the task and lack of available funds and personnel. Recently, however, as noted above (para. 278), two deputies in the National Assembly urged a renewed effort in this direction, calling for the grant of individual land titles to Africans, their organization into rural communities (*ruralatos*) and the creation of

planning and executive machinery to promote and supervise this form of settlement.

281. Potentially the most important settlement and land utilization scheme, which has been under study since the early 1950s, is a multipurpose project for the development of the Zambezi River valley, based on the control and utilization of the river flow. The project envisages the construction of a high dam at Cahora Bassa, north of Tete, and a series of smaller dams down river, which would permit the development for settlement and other purposes of an area of 140,000 square kilometres, or one tenth of the whole Territory. At the same time, hydro-electric power produced at Cahora Bassa would be used to develop iron and coal reserves in the Tete District, and construction of the dams would make possible navigation on the river between Tete and Chinde, at the mouth of the Zambezi, where it is proposed to construct a new port.

282. The completion of such a vast project, the ultimate cost of which is estimated at 10,000 million escudos, is necessarily dependent on several factors and must, in any case, take a number of years. One of the problems is to find suitable markets for the electricity produced, which is estimated at about 17,000 million kWh, per year; according to press reports, the possibility of selling this electricity either to the Transvaal or to Southern Rhodesia has been considered. In August 1966, Portugal took an initial step towards carrying out the project, by appropriating 20 million escudos for expenditure on plans for the Cahora Bassa dam. Negotiations were later reported to be in progress for the creation of an international consortium to finance the dam which is expected to cost 500 million escudos, plus an additional 250 million escudos for rechanneling of the river and relocation of the local population living in the area of the future reservoir.

#### *Industry*

283. Manufacturing and transforming industries so far constitute a relatively small sector of Mozambique's economy when compared with agriculture. Although there are over 1,000 industrial enterprises, the majority are small and are concerned with the processing of agricultural products or the production of food-stuffs and consumer goods. Most manufacturing industries are light, involving only limited capital, the principal exceptions being a petroleum refinery at Lourenço Marques, cement factories, a cotton textile factory and spinning mills, a jute factory and a metal work which serves the railways, ports and construction industry. In 1961, there were only eighty-two enterprises with capital in excess of 5 million escudos, their combined capital amounting to 1,874 million escudos; these included two sugar refineries, oil and grain mills, breweries and cotton ginneries.

284. Commentators in the Territory have on a number of occasions urged an expansion of secondary industry as a remedy for Mozambique's chronic trade deficit, citing, among other things, the substantial imports of consumer goods, particularly cotton textiles, which the Territory could produce itself. In the past, various factors inhibited industrial development, among them the policies pursued by Portugal in regard to the licensing of new industries in the Overseas Territories and the conditions governing foreign investment. In recent years, however, the development of this sector has received closer attention as may be seen from the fact that, under the Transitional Development Plan for

1965-1967, it was allocated the second largest investment target (1,350 million escudos) after transport and communications. The development of industries has also received stimulus from a recent extension of banking and credit facilities in Mozambique and from legislation enacted in 1965 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 62-68) providing for a greater decentralization of controls over the establishment of new industries and the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment.

285. As a result of these measures, industrial production is now expanding more rapidly than other sectors of productive activity. According to published statistics, the value of output of transforming industry (excluding construction and electricity and most processing of agricultural products, except sugar, tea and tobacco) increased by approximately 30 per cent between 1963 and 1965, most of the increase taking place in the latter year.<sup>102</sup> The principal increases between 1964 and 1965 were, by sub-sectors: food stuffs, which increased from 908 million escudos to 1,024 million escudos; chemical products (including soap and vegetable oil) from 406 million to 542 million; cashew kernels from 92 million to 129 million; construction materials from 177 million to 216 million; and petroleum derivatives from 326 million to 337 million escudos. Preliminary data for the first five months of 1966 suggest further over-all increases in the region of 11 per cent.

286. In the agricultural processing sub-sectors, the most important innovations concerned sugar (see section on agriculture) and the mechanical processing of cashew. During 1965-1966, several companies were authorized to establish cashew processing factories or to expand existing operations. The largest of these, MOCITA, which is financed by South African and Italian interests, was opened in August 1966 at João Belo (Gaza District) at an initial cost of 72 million escudos. When finally completed, the MOCITA operation will represent an investment of 170 million escudos and will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons annually, employing 800 workers. In December 1966, a second factory was opened, owned by Spence e Pierce, Lda., which is jointly controlled by a local private firm, Pierce and Leslie and Co., and by Gill and Duffus of London. The factory represents an investment of 48 million escudos and will have an eventual capacity of 25,000 tons. Another company, which is expanding its operations, is the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Caju, S.A.R.L. (SOCAJU). This company was formed in 1965 with an initial capital of 120 million escudos. It is controlled by Portuguese and local interests, among them the C.U.F. group of Portugal. The company is authorized to establish three factories with a combined capacity of 80,000 tons per year at Nacala, Porto Amélia and Nampula. The first of these, at Nacala, was to be opened in April 1967. It is estimated that the total investment will eventually be about 250 million escudos. A fourth company, Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUÇA), which was formed in 1962 with Italian participation and began operations in the following year with three small experimental factories, commenced large-scale production in 1965 with the opening of a new factory at Lourenço Marques; this new factory represents an investment of 45 million escudos and

has a yearly capacity of 15,000 tons. In April 1966, the Portuguese Government underwrote bank loans to CAJUÇA totalling 60 million escudos. This sum will be used for the construction of a larger factory at Nacala. Two other smaller enterprises were also authorized to establish factories of up to 15,000 tons capacity.

287. Other new agricultural processing industries established in 1965-1966 included a sisal products factory, a soap factory costing 80 million escudos, a rice decorticating factory, grain mills, and factories for the processing of tea, fruit, milk and meat products. Among these, the factory producing rope and other sisal products, Companhia Industrial de Cordoaria de Moçambique (CICOMO), was formed in May 1965 and represents an investment of 50 million escudos. Forty-five per cent of the capital is held by subsidiary companies of the Portuguese C.U.F. group, the remainder being held by four agricultural companies in Mozambique. The factory is located at Nacala and employs 200 workers. During 1966, the first year of operation, it exported 7,000 tons of sisal products, mainly to the United States and Canada. Of the two grain mills, the larger is at Machava and is owned by the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Moagem (SOCIMIL). The mill, which is still under construction and will be completed in 1967, will process wheat and will have a yearly capacity of 30,000 tons. Costing 50 million escudos, it is entirely Portuguese-owned. The second grain mill, which is being built at Beira, will process maize. It is owned by the Moagem de Beira, S.A.R.L. (MOBEIRA) and is Portuguese-financed, the total investment of 11.84 million escudos being furnished by the Banco Nacional de Fomento. The milk and meat products factories, located near Lourenço Marques, are both owned by a local producers' co-operative, the Cooperativa de Criadores de Gado, the combined investment being 27 million escudos. The rice-processing factory, which is located at Manhiça (Lourenço Marques District), is owned by a private entrepreneur, Mr. Inácio de Sousa Mostra. Representing an investment of several million escudos, it is financed by loans from banks, including the Banco Nacional Ultramarino; the factory has a production capacity of 1,000 tons a year and uses machinery purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. Among new processing industries authorized in 1966, are a tea factory to be built by Monteiro e Giro, a company which owns tea plantations at Sacone, a fruit preserves factory to be built at Nampula at a cost of 10 million escudos, a mechanized bakery to be built by a Portuguese concern, SAIPAL, at a cost of 4 million escudos, and a large *abattoir*, to be built near Lourenço Marques, which will serve the livestock industries of Southern Mozambique and Swaziland. Also announced were two condensed milk factories, one of which will be built by Nestlé, South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. at a cost of 40 million escudos. The factory will be located at Lourenço Marques and will have a capacity of 7,500 tons. It will employ 120 workers and will begin production in 1968. The second, which will cost 30 million escudos and will produce 1,000 cans per day, will be owned jointly by a local company, PROTAL, and by the Cooperativa Condens Fabriek Friesland of the Netherlands.

288. New manufacturing industries established in 1966 include a bicycle factory near Lourenço Marques, the Fábrica de Bicicletas de Moçambique, built at a cost of 30 million escudos. The factory is Portuguese-owned and produces about 36,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-

<sup>102</sup> In 1965, 389 licences were issued for the establishment of new enterprises, involving a total capital investment of 304 million escudos. This includes, however, servicing and trading enterprises.

bicycles yearly. An automobile assembly plant, the Fábrica de Automóveis de Moçambique, Lda., which began production in 1966, is also Portuguese-owned, assembling trucks and other heavy vehicles on behalf of a Japanese manufacturer, ISUZU. The company's programme aims at the production of 2,000 automobiles yearly. Both companies plan to export their products to the neighbouring territories of Malawi, Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, after supplying local demand. In addition, a salt factory, costing 10 million escudos, was opened in 1966 by Portuguese interests, and plans were completed for the construction of an ammonia and fertilizer factory to be built at Beira. The factory, which will be completed by the end of 1967, will cost about 200 million escudos and will, according to its directors, produce sufficient fertilizer to satisfy most of the present demand in the Territory. The factory is being built by a French firm, GEXA, on behalf of the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique, and will use patents developed by the Société Belge de l'Azote. Licences were granted during 1966 to Portuguese firms, one of them the Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, for the construction of three cotton spinning mills with a combined capacity of 12,000 tons, two of which will be established in the south (at Lourenço Marques and Chibuto, in the Gaza District) and the other either at Beira or at Monapo (district of Manica e Sofala). Other new industries under construction or authorized in 1966 include a match factory, a cellulose fibre factory and factories for the manufacture of paper bags, electrical batteries, automobile tires, pharmaceuticals, furniture and parquetry, glass bottles and light metal products. The automobile tires will be produced at two factories, one of them to be built at Beira by the Companhia de Refrigerantes MacMahon, S.A.R.L., a Portuguese company presently producing beer and soft drinks in the Territory, and the other by Firestone Portuguesa; the latter plans to invest 150 million escudos in a factory which will have a productive capacity of 60,000 to 100,000 tires yearly. Other companies which, according to press reports, have requested authorization to build factories in Mozambique include the Standard Electric Company which has asked for a licence to produce telecommunications and electronic equipment, the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique, which has asked authorization to establish an iron and steel foundry with a yearly capacity of 250,000 tons (see para. 50), and the Fábrica Colonial de Borracha, Lda., which requested authorization to establish a shoe factory at Beira. According to the local Press, a private entrepreneur in the United States also made application to establish petro-chemical factories at Lourenço Marques and Beira and a foreign financial group, RHOMOC, was reported to have proposed several industrial projects, including a rope factory at Nova Sofala and a chemical industry at Dondo. Other light industries established during 1965-1966 included electrodes and electronic cables, clothing, bedding, paints and varnish. In 1966, the petroleum refinery owned by SONAREP (a subsidiary of the Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos of Portugal) at Lourenço Marques was expanded to include the production of asphalt and liquid gas for domestic and industrial use. The additional investment to finance this expansion was 130 million escudos. Finally, towards the end of 1965 a request was made for authorization to build a dockyard at Lourenço Marques which would include two floating docks and other installations for ship repairs, the whole representing an investment of 600 million escudos.

289. Other sectors of industrial activity, namely construction and electricity production, have also shown marked expansion. After three years of relative inactivity, there was a sudden upsurge in the building industry during 1965 and 1966, the number of new buildings under construction rising from 750 in 1964 to 1,317 in 1965. In most of the major municipalities, important public works were undertaken or initiated to cope with a rapid expansion of the urban areas. The largest programme of urban renewal was for Lourenço Marques, where the municipality is utilizing a loan of 150 million escudos from Portugal, contracted in 1966, for, among other things, the construction of low-cost housing estates for African workers.

290. Apart from the hydro-electric project at Cahora Bassa, which is described above, two other hydro-electric projects are under construction; the first is at Massingir, on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo River, from which power would be supplied to industries in Lourenço Marques and the Sul do Save; and the second is at Chicamba on the Púnguê River near Vila Pery. The latter represents an expansion by the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuê of its existing facilities to meet the growing needs of industry in the area, particularly in view of the proposed construction of a large cotton-spinning mill in addition to the existing textile factory, and also to supply Beira. The estimated cost of the project is 80 million escudos, of which 20 million were obtained during 1966 in the form of a local bond issue underwritten by Portugal. A third hydro-electric project being considered is on the Umbeluzi River. The project, which would take six years to complete and require a prior agreement with Swaziland, would furnish electricity to the whole Sul do Save and permit irrigation of an extensive area. Also during 1966, thermal electricity plants were constructed to supply a number of centres, including the port town of Nacala and the Limpopo valley settlement.

#### *Mining*

291. In 1965, the output of the mining industry was valued at approximately 50 million escudos, equal to less than 2 per cent of the value of agricultural cash crops. Mineral production at present consists mainly of coal (valued at 29.7 million escudos) and smaller quantities of pegmatitic minerals, mainly beryl and colombo-tantalite, together with some bauxite and very minor quantities of gold, copper and semi-precious stones. The Territory is known to possess unused mineral deposits, especially coal and titaniferous magnetites, together with vanadium, and possibly some other minerals, including manganese and chrome in the north-west, but insufficient funds and transportation difficulties have so far prevented their full utilization. One of the arguments for the Zambezi valley development scheme, referred to above, is that it would permit the establishment of an iron and steel industry near Tete where there are proved magnetite reserves of 35 million tons. Most of these reserves are controlled by the Uranium Company of Mozambique which has held an exclusive licence to prospect for iron at Mavudzi since 1961. According to a press report, the company, in September 1966, requested authorization to establish an iron ore smelting plant with an annual production capacity of 250,000 tons. It has already expended a substantial sum on housing and other installations.

292. In 1965, the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, which has been prospecting for petroleum for the past sixteen years, discovered a major

deposit of natural gas at Pande; the former, however, became ignited and over 100 million escudos were spent on efforts to extinguish the fire which was finally accomplished in March 1967. In August 1966, it was reported in the Press that the South African Government had approved a project for the construction of a 220-mile pipeline to supply the gas to the Transvaal once the fire could be brought under control. The Mozambique Gulf Oil Company denied the report which, however, reappeared in the Press in January 1967.

### *Fisheries*

293. Although the offshore waters of Mozambique are known to be rich in fish, especially rock lobster and shrimp, these resources are not yet fully exploited. Most of the fishing so far has been done by small private companies or individually owned boats, the total catch landed averaging only 60 million escudos yearly over the period 1963-1965.

294. In the past three years, there has been increasing awareness of the extent of this unexploited wealth. This was largely due to research undertaken by a South African-financed company, INOS, which in 1963 obtained extensive fishing rights as well as licences to establish a shrimp and lobster cannery and a refrigeration plant. Between 1963 and 1965, the company invested approximately 180 million escudos, mainly in studies, but for technical reasons it was not able to begin large-scale industrial activities, which it now plans to commence in 1968. In the meantime, revelation of the fisheries potential increasingly attracted ships of foreign nationality, leading to incidents which were reported in the Press during 1966.

295. During the past year, the Government took several measures to stimulate Portuguese investments in and to expand this sector. Besides extending the limit of territorial waters to twelve miles, it established an official fisheries research body in Mozambique and enacted legislation providing for the corporative organization of fishing (*casas de pescadores*) and for the establishment of trade schools. In June 1966, a new company, ARPEN, was constituted in Lisbon by important Portuguese fishing interests to develop commercial fishing in the Overseas Territories, and other projects were also reported to be under consideration in Portugal. Later in the year, the Minister for Overseas Territories, speaking in Lourenço Marques, announced that ARPEN had formed a Mozambique Fisheries Development Company. The project involves the establishment of a commercial fishing fleet, based on a new fishing harbour, with refrigeration, storage and ship repair facilities, to be established at Lourenço Marques. At the same time, a decree was enacted in Portugal to control the transfer of fishing boats from Portugal to the Overseas Territories. It was later reported in the Press that ARPEN had placed orders for the construction of two deep-sea trawlers for Mozambique. It was also reported that several foreign companies, notably South African and Japanese, were interested in obtaining licences to operate in the Territory, and that the Mitsui financial group of Japan, in collaboration with South African interests, planned to establish a fish-processing factory at Lourenço Marques, involving an investment of about 80 million escudos.

### *Transport and communications*

296. After agricultural exports, Mozambique's second most important source of foreign exchange consists in the services provided by its railways and ports.

Invisible earnings from the transit traffic of its neighbours, together with earnings derived from the sale of supplies and services to visiting ships, are equal to approximately one third of its receipts from special trade and one fifth of the total inflow of foreign exchange. Because of Mozambique's strategic location, the volume of transit traffic has increased with the economic growth of the hinterlands so that the amount of trade handled at Lourenço Marques is now only 20 per cent less than that at Durban. In 1965, before the boycott on Southern Rhodesia, the ports of Mozambique handled 14 million tons of cargo. This combined total, the largest in Mozambique's history, was 2.5 million tons more than in 1964, the increase being partly due to new exports of mineral ores, sugar and other commodities from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia.

297. To meet the growing needs of the transit trade, as well as Mozambique's own exports, substantial sums have been recently invested in the ports and railways, part of the cost being paid by the exporting countries. According to the Mozambique Ports and Railways Administration, the total value of the improvements completed or in progress in 1965 was in the vicinity of 2,000 million escudos. Among the major port projects completed during 1965-1966 at Lourenço Marques were the construction of a mechanized iron ore loading wharf for the export of Transvaal and Swaziland ore under long-term agreements with Japan, a sugar terminal to handle sugar exports from Southern Rhodesia, refrigerated warehouses for fruit and meat exports, and also a 320-metre extension of the main deep-water berth, this last costing 600 million escudos. A grain loading wharf and a petroleum wharf, costing 100 million escudos, are under construction. At Beira, about 650 million escudos were spent on the extension of berthing facilities, the construction of a dry dock, completed in September 1966, warehouses for refrigerated goods, tobacco and general merchandise, and a chrome ore loading wharf to handle exports from Southern Rhodesia. Important extensions were also made at Nacala which is being developed as a supply port for Malawi to relieve congestion at Beira and at Quelimane, which serves the district of Zambézia.

298. The expansion of harbour facilities was accompanied by substantial investment in railways. During 1965, orders for the construction of 1,020 railway wagons, amounting to 247 million escudos, were awarded to a local metal foundry which was thereby enabled to double its production capacity; other orders for railway equipment, including twenty-five diesel engines, totaling 40 million escudos, were placed in the United States. In 1966, a new main railway terminal and a goods terminal were completed at Beira at a cost of 81 million escudos, major construction work was undertaken on the line from Beira to Umtali and the British-owned Trans-Zambézia Railway announced that orders had been placed for the acquisition of five diesel engines by 1967. In the north-west of Mozambique, work was continued on the extension of the Niassa railway from Catur to Nova Freixo where, under an agreement signed in 1966, it will link up with an extension of the Malawi railway system, thus enabling the overseas trade of Malawi to pass through Nacala beginning in 1967.

299. The effects of the boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia cannot yet be fully estimated in the absence of detailed statistics on transit traffic for 1966 (see paragraphs 265-268). Whereas the volume of cargo



handled at Beira decreased by 342,991 tons in the first six months of 1966, compared with the same period of 1965, the tonnage handled at Lourenço Marques increased by 184,662, any decrease in Southern Rhodesian traffic at that port presumably being offset by the growing South African and domestic trade. Rerouting of Zambian trade through Malawi contributed to a sudden upsurge in the gross receipts of the Trans-Zambézia Railway, by 37 per cent during the first half of 1966.

300. With current plans for investment in ports and railways now largely completed, particular attention is being given to the extension and improvement of roads, for reasons which are both economic and military. The need for better roads has been repeatedly and urgently stressed in newspaper articles and in statements by local bodies in many parts of the Territory, especially the districts of Manica e Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado, according to which the poor condition of roads is a serious obstacle to the development of commercial agriculture. The inadequacy of the roads in the north has also been cited as a major problem in combating guerrilla activities. In speeches delivered in October and November 1966, the Minister for Overseas Territories stated that improvement of roads, particularly in the north, would be given special attention in the Third Development Plan now in preparation. He also said that a rationally planned system of roads was needed for the expansion of agriculture and to enable the armed forces to move about freely at all seasons in areas where guerrillas were active. He stressed that the planning and construction of the road system required co-ordination between the various services, including the military engineering services. To achieve this, a decree, enacted in October, created an autonomous Road Board for Mozambique and, in the following month, the Minister appointed as Provincial Secretary of Public Works and Communications an army officer who had previously been in charge of army engineers in the Territory.

301. The current Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages the expenditure of 600 million escudos on roads, of which loans of 200 million and 130 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank were authorized in 1966. The first loan was earmarked for new roads and feeder routes in the districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Zambézia. The second was made in connexion with a major highway now under construction between Lourenço Marques and Beira, which is scheduled for completion by 1968. It is intended subsequently to extend this road to the extreme south of Mozambique and north to Quionga near the border of the United Republic of Tanzania, thus providing the Territory with a north-south artery linking all major ports. The additional cost of the road, which will involve building a bridge four kilometres in length over the Zambezi River, is estimated at 700 million escudos. Other contracts concluded in 1966 were for the construction of an all-weather road, extending 110 kilometres between Macomia and Diaco in Cabo Delgado District, to be completed within one year, and another road, of 215 kilometres, from Matema to Fingoè in Tete District, which is currently an area of European settlement. The cost of these roads will be about 17.5 million and 6.5 million escudos respectively.

#### Public finance

302. Although the final budget accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and only preliminary in-

formation, based on press reports, is available concerning the estimates for 1967, it is clear that government expenditure for these years was the highest on record. Excluding financing of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the estimated expenditure for the year 1966, which totalled 4,213 million escudos, was 272 million escudos more than in 1965, and 41 per cent more than ordinary expenditure in 1960.<sup>103</sup> Among the factors contributing to the increase were growing recurrent expenditures resulting from development and the rising cost of defence and security measures.

303. The total sum of the budget estimates is somewhat misleading since over 50 per cent consist of earmarked funds, being the revenue and expenditure of autonomous bodies such as the Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the latter amounting in 1966 to 1,340 million escudos. Apart from this, the items which showed the largest increase compared with the previous year were national defence, which increased by 80.2 million to 549.4 million escudos (supplementary appropriations brought this figure considerably higher) and public debt servicing, which increased by 34 million to 240.5 million escudos. Other items of expenditure which increased were public health, which rose by 17.8 million to 175.1 million escudos, and public education, which rose by 14.5 million to 158.2 million escudos.<sup>104</sup> As has been noted previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 159), expenditure on education also includes assistance paid to Portuguese Catholic missions (69.5 million escudos) and the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* (19 million escudos). In 1966, allocations for education represented about 6 per cent of the budget, and for public health about 4 per cent.

304. The increase in the budget estimates for 1967 (see above) is of particular significance in view of the fact that the legislative instrument enacted in November 1966, which laid down guidelines for the forthcoming budget, called for restriction or elimination of non-essential expenditures or those not related to the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Earlier in the year, the Governor General, in an order to all government departments and services, had called for austerity measures during the balance of the year. He specified, among other things, that there should be no increase in the number of teachers or new schools during 1966-1967. The reasons for this can only be conjectured, but it must be noted that: (a) the Territory was facing a severe loss of revenue from Southern Rhodesia's transit trade; and (b) actual defence expenditure had substantially exceeded the original estimates in 1965. Pending the availability of the budget for 1967, there is no information as to the sources from which revenue will be obtained to meet the increased expenditure.

305. Up to 1966, however, rising expenditures were made possible by substantial increases in direct and indirect taxation and by special levies on the receipts of autonomous services, such as the railways and ports. Between 1961 and 1965, revenue from direct and indirect taxes (including taxes on industries, subject to special régimes, such as cotton and sugar) increased by nearly 50 per cent from 1,302 million

<sup>103</sup> According to press reports, the estimated budget for 1967 envisages a further rise in expenditure of 387 million escudos. Of the total expenditure of 4,600 million escudos envisaged for 1967, 640 million escudos is allocated for defence, an increase of 91 million escudos over the estimate for 1966.

<sup>104</sup> The estimated budget for 1967 allocates 160 million escudos for public education.

to 1,918 million escudos. The most significant increase, in direct taxation, was mainly due to the introduction in 1964 and 1965 of new taxes, including defence taxes and a supplementary personal tax, or to the increase of rates, particularly of taxes on income and commercial and industrial activities. In 1966, decrees were enacted increasing tax rates on imports and consumption.

#### *Development financing*

306. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisaged for Mozambique an investment target of 5,400 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 1,800 million escudos, or about three times the yearly investment under the previous plan. The principal sectors chosen for investment were: transforming industries, 1,350 million; roads, 665 million; irrigation and settlement, 560 million; social services, 500 million; ports and railways, 495 million; electricity, 400 million; and fisheries, 308 million escudos. Approximately 31 per cent was to be derived from private investment, 28 per cent from external loans, 21 per cent from the Government of Portugal and the remainder from territorial funds.

307. The preceding sections have already given an indication of the extent to which the targets are being fulfilled. Actual expenditures under the Plan during 1966 amounted to 1,769.5 million escudos. This included loans from the Government of Portugal totalling 400 million escudos, external loans guaranteed by Portugal totalling 150 million escudos, and 143 million escudos from territorial funds. The remaining 1,061.5 million escudos consisted of private investment capital, of which 165.5 million escudos was non-Portuguese.

308. One of the objectives of the plan was to mobilize savings available in the Territory for revenue-producing projects. Following the enactment in 1965 of legislation relaxing restrictions on the establishment of banks in the Overseas Territories (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 62), there was a considerable expansion of commercial banking facilities. Among the new banks were the Portuguese Banco Pinto e Sotta Mayor, which opened the first of five branches in Mozambique, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the Banco Standard-Totta, resulting from a merger of the activities in Mozambique of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Totta-Allianca of Lisbon. In 1966, a public loan of 100 million escudos was raised in Mozambique to finance the development plan.

#### *Educational conditions*

309. The latest available statistics on education published by the Government of Mozambique relate to the school year 1963-1964. Data extracted from these statistics were included in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 171-175). The statistics showed, among other things, the number of children enrolled at primary schools, as officially redefined in September 1964,<sup>105</sup> and their composition by ethnic groups. According to this data, out of a total primary enrolment of 44,725 pupils in primary schools, 23,093 were known to be Africans. Similar statistics of secondary school enrolments showed a total of 18,415, including 2,781 Africans. Compared with population figures for Africans of all ages in 1960, this represented a percentage of 0.35 per cent at the primary level and 0.04 per cent at

the secondary level. These figures were cited solely in order to indicate the spread of educational facilities among Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

310. It should be noted, however, that, as previously explained, the statistics of primary school enrolments related only to children in schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes. In Mozambique many rural schools, mostly run by religious missions, furnish less than this minimum and, under the reform of primary education effected in September 1964, are not classified as primary schools *strictu sensu*. In 1963-1964, there were 3,233 schools of this kind, known as "adaptation schools", with an enrolment of 373,587 African children, representing 5.82 per cent of the total African population in 1960. Of this number, 70,867 obtained promotion from one class to another or were successful in examination.<sup>106</sup>

311. According to the same source, the number of pupils of all races enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-1964 was 18,415, of whom 7,369 were at grammar (*liceal*) schools, 10,388 in technical professional schools (including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the Public Service) and 405 in religious seminaries. More recent information from press reports gives a figure for 1964-1965 of 7,969 pupils at grammar (*liceal*) schools<sup>107</sup> and 11,794 at technical professional schools.

312. Criticism of the situation in regard to education was voiced in a speech delivered in the National Assembly by Dr. Satúrio Pires, a deputy from Mozambique. He pointed out that, according to the provisional audit of the territorial accounts, actual expenditure on the public education service amounted to only 183.4 million escudos in 1965, or less than 3.4 per cent of the territorial budget, and that even when the subventions paid to religious missions were added to this, it still represented only about 5 per cent of the budget.<sup>108</sup> He referred, in particular, to what he described as the "penury and the seriousness of the problem of secondary education in Mozambique", remarking that out of 214 teaching posts, 24 were unfilled and that 41 per cent of the existing teachers were only temporary.

313. Though there appears to be some increase in expenditure on education (the estimates for 1966 and 1967 showed increases of 14.5 million escudos and 4 million escudos respectively in anticipated expenditure on public education), the increases which have occurred since 1965 do not appreciably alter the situation described by Dr. Pires. Indeed, as mentioned above (see paragraph 304 above), during part of 1966, expansion in the number of schools and teachers was temporarily halted under an order of the Governor General owing to a shortage of available funds. Nevertheless, some improvements were achieved during 1966. Among them may be cited the graduation of fifty-two new secondary teachers, of whom seventeen will teach in grammar

<sup>106</sup> These figures do not include 16,055 adolescents and adults attending special literacy and other classes in the evenings.

<sup>107</sup> There is considerable difficulty in comparing statistics from different sources, probably because of differing methods of computation. In his statement before the National Assembly in March 1967, Dr. Satúrio Pires was reported to have said that there were only 4,495 pupils in grammar (*liceal*) schools in 1965-1966.

<sup>108</sup> Not including the expenditure on the *Estudos Gerais Universitários*; see para. 315.

(*liceal*) schools and the remainder in vocational schools. Also, work was in progress on two new grammar schools (*liceus*) and land was acquired at Porto Amelia for the construction of a new elementary technical school.

314. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, which assigned an investment target of 220 million escudos for education, priority is being given to the expansion of secondary, vocational and agricultural training. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 83), agricultural education in the Overseas Territories was reorganized in 1965. As a follow-up of this reorganization, decrees were enacted in Mozambique during 1966 setting out the curricula for agricultural training at both the elementary and secondary levels. In addition, a Co-ordinating Council for agricultural education was created, which will have among its functions the issuing of grants and scholarships from funds to be donated by governmental bodies and private sources. Towards the end of 1966, a new agricultural school was opened at Chimoio in the Manica highlands.

315. In his criticism of the inadequacy of funds available for education, Dr. Satúrio Pires noted that the budget of the General University Studies (*Estudos Gerais Universitários*) in 1965 was only 22.8 million escudos, or less than 0.5 per cent of the actual budget of Mozambique. For 1966, the original figure cited in the budget estimates was 19 million escudos, later increased by supplementary appropriations to a total not much more than that of the preceding year. Despite the limited funds available for recurrent financing, the college continued to expand, the number of students enrolled rising to 603 in 1966-1967, compared with 329 in 1964-1965. Of the total, 298 students were studying engineering, 144 were studying medicine, 40 veterinary science and 32 agronomy. The institution provides three-year courses in general studies, agronomy, forestry, veterinary science, biology, chemistry, and teaching and, since 1966, a four-year course in medicine. During 1966, land was acquired by the Government for the construction of a permanent campus at Lourenço Marques. So far, the college, which was founded in 1963, has been housed in temporary buildings. During 1966, however, a sum of 7 million escudos was allocated for the conversion of an existing hospital into a teaching clinic to be completed by mid-1967, and projects were also approved for the construction of permanent buildings to house the schools of agronomy, chemistry and physics. Also in 1966, laboratories were opened for the study of radioisotopes and electronic microscopy in application to medicine. It was announced that a school of economics will be created shortly.

316. In his commencement speech delivered in October 1966, the rector of the institution stressed the need to bring the college up to the status of a full university by extending the courses up to licentiate level in humanities and sciences in order to supply the urgent demand in the Territory for secondary school teachers.

#### 4. GUINEA, CALLED PORTUGUESE GUINEA

##### *General*

317. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, lies on the west coast of Africa between 12°40'N and 10°52'N in latitude and between 13°38'WG and 16°43'WG in

longitude. Situated between the Republics of Senegal and Guinea, the Territory extends 198 miles inland from the coast at its widest point. Besides the mainland, it comprises the Bijagós Archipelago and a string of islands. The total area of the Territory is 36,125 square kilometres, of which approximately one tenth is periodically submerged by tidal waters and largely covered with mangrove. As previously reported,<sup>109</sup> the preliminary results of the 1960 census showed a total resident population of 544,184, compared with 510,777 at the previous census in 1950 when there were reported to be 2,263 Europeans, 4,568 *mestiços*, 11 Indians, 1,478 assimilated Africans, and 502,457 non-assimilated Africans. A Portuguese official source<sup>110</sup> published a revised figure for the total resident population in 1960 of 519,229. According to the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1965*, the estimated population at mid-1965 was 527,000.

##### *Government and administration*

318. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Territory is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,372).<sup>111</sup>

319. The Territory is divided into nine *concelhos* and three *circunscrições*, and for purposes of direct elections, it is considered to form one electoral district. As in other Territories with a governor, namely Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor, a Legislative Council was established for the first time in 1963. It is presided over by the Governor and comprises 14 members, of whom 3 are *ex officio*, 8 are elected by "organic groups" and 3 are elected directly. No workers' or employers' interests are represented in the Legislative Council. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor. It is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief, 3 *ex-officio* members and 3 members elected by the Legislative Council, one of whom represents the *regedorias*.

320. The Territory is represented in the National Assembly by one deputy. Elections to the National Assembly last took place in 1965; elections to the Legislative and Government Councils were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in these elections are not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

##### *Military situation*

321. Fighting in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, began in 1963 and is now entering the fifth year. Since about May 1964 the fighting has gradually grown in intensity and has become more widespread. By mid-August 1966, Portuguese troops had increased to some 23,000 but were reported to be generally based on the main population centres.

322. In June 1966, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which is reported to have some 5,000 uniformed guerrillas, was already claiming that it had "liberated almost half

<sup>109</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chap. I, para. 35.

<sup>110</sup> Portugal, *Anuário Estatístico*, vol. II, Lisbon, 1964.

<sup>111</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V.

1965-1967, it was allocated the second largest investment target (1,350 million escudos) after transport and communications. The development of industries has also received stimulus from a recent extension of banking and credit facilities in Mozambique and from legislation enacted in 1965 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 62-68) providing for a greater decentralization of controls over the establishment of new industries and the relaxation of restrictions on foreign investment.

285. As a result of these measures, industrial production is now expanding more rapidly than other sectors of productive activity. According to published statistics, the value of output of transforming industry (excluding construction and electricity and most processing of agricultural products, except sugar, tea and tobacco) increased by approximately 30 per cent between 1963 and 1965, most of the increase taking place in the latter year.<sup>102</sup> The principal increases between 1964 and 1965 were, by sub-sectors: food stuffs, which increased from 908 million escudos to 1,024 million escudos; chemical products (including soap and vegetable oil) from 406 million to 542 million; cashew kernels from 92 million to 129 million; construction materials from 177 million to 216 million; and petroleum derivatives from 326 million to 337 million escudos. Preliminary data for the first five months of 1966 suggest further over-all increases in the region of 11 per cent.

286. In the agricultural processing sub-sectors, the most important innovations concerned sugar (see section on agriculture) and the mechanical processing of cashew. During 1965-1966, several companies were authorized to establish cashew processing factories or to expand existing operations. The largest of these, MOCITA, which is financed by South African and Italian interests, was opened in August 1966 at João Belo (Gaza District) at an initial cost of 72 million escudos. When finally completed, the MOCITA operation will represent an investment of 170 million escudos and will have a processing capacity of 30,000 tons annually, employing 800 workers. In December 1966, a second factory was opened, owned by Spence e Pierce, Lda., which is jointly controlled by a local private firm, Pierce and Leslie and Co., and by Gill and Duffus of London. The factory represents an investment of 48 million escudos and will have an eventual capacity of 25,000 tons. Another company, which is expanding its operations, is the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Caju, S.A.R.L. (SOCAJU). This company was formed in 1965 with an initial capital of 120 million escudos. It is controlled by Portuguese and local interests, among them the C.U.F. group of Portugal. The company is authorized to establish three factories with a combined capacity of 80,000 tons per year at Nacala, Porto Amélia and Nampula. The first of these, at Nacala, was to be opened in April 1967. It is estimated that the total investment will eventually be about 250 million escudos. A fourth company, Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUCA), which was formed in 1962 with Italian participation and began operations in the following year with three small experimental factories, commenced large-scale production in 1965 with the opening of a new factory at Lourenço Marques; this new factory represents an investment of 45 million escudos and

has a yearly capacity of 15,000 tons. In April 1966, the Portuguese Government underwrote bank loans to CAJUCA totalling 60 million escudos. This sum will be used for the construction of a larger factory at Nacala. Two other smaller enterprises were also authorized to establish factories of up to 15,000 tons capacity.

287. Other new agricultural processing industries established in 1965-1966 included a sisal products factory, a soap factory costing 80 million escudos, a rice decorticating factory, grain mills, and factories for the processing of tea, fruit, milk and meat products. Among these, the factory producing rope and other sisal products, Companhia Industrial de Cordoaria de Moçambique (CICOMO), was formed in May 1965 and represents an investment of 50 million escudos. Forty-five per cent of the capital is held by subsidiary companies of the Portuguese C.U.F. group, the remainder being held by four agricultural companies in Mozambique. The factory is located at Nacala and employs 200 workers. During 1966, the first year of operation, it exported 7,000 tons of sisal products, mainly to the United States and Canada. Of the two grain mills, the larger is at Machava and is owned by the Sociedade Comercial e Industrial de Moagem (SOCIMIL). The mill, which is still under construction and will be completed in 1967, will process wheat and will have a yearly capacity of 30,000 tons. Costing 50 million escudos, it is entirely Portuguese-owned. The second grain mill, which is being built at Beira, will process maize. It is owned by the Moagem de Beira, S.A.R.L. (MOBEIRA) and is Portuguese-financed, the total investment of 11.84 million escudos being furnished by the Banco Nacional de Fomento. The milk and meat products factories, located near Lourenço Marques, are both owned by a local producers' co-operative, the Cooperativa de Criadores de Gado, the combined investment being 27 million escudos. The rice-processing factory, which is located at Manhiça (Lourenço Marques District), is owned by a private entrepreneur, Mr. Inácio de Sousa Mostra. Representing an investment of several million escudos, it is financed by loans from banks, including the Banco Nacional Ultramarino; the factory has a production capacity of 1,000 tons a year and uses machinery purchased from the Federal Republic of Germany. Among new processing industries authorized in 1966, are a tea factory to be built by Monteiro e Giro, a company which owns tea plantations at Sacone, a fruit preserves factory to be built at Nampula at a cost of 10 million escudos, a mechanized bakery to be built by a Portuguese concern, SAIPAL, at a cost of 4 million escudos, and a large *abattoir*, to be built near Lourenço Marques, which will serve the livestock industries of Southern Mozambique and Swaziland. Also announced were two condensed milk factories, one of which will be built by Nestlé, South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. at a cost of 40 million escudos. The factory will be located at Lourenço Marques and will have a capacity of 7,500 tons. It will employ 120 workers and will begin production in 1968. The second, which will cost 30 million escudos and will produce 1,000 cans per day, will be owned jointly by a local company, PROTAL, and by the Cooperativa Condens Fabriek Friesland of the Netherlands.

288. New manufacturing industries established in 1966 include a bicycle factory near Lourenço Marques, the Fábrica de Bicicletas de Moçambique, built at a cost of 30 million escudos. The factory is Portuguese-owned and produces about 36,000 bicycles and 3,000 motor-

<sup>102</sup> In 1965, 389 licences were issued for the establishment of new enterprises, involving a total capital investment of 304 million escudos. This includes, however, servicing and trading enterprises.

bicycles yearly. An automobile assembly plant, the Fábrica de Automóveis de Moçambique, Lda., which began production in 1966, is also Portuguese-owned, assembling trucks and other heavy vehicles on behalf of a Japanese manufacturer, ISUZU. The company's programme aims at the production of 2,000 automobiles yearly. Both companies plan to export their products to the neighbouring territories of Malawi, Southern Rhodesia and Zambia, after supplying local demand. In addition, a salt factory, costing 10 million escudos, was opened in 1966 by Portuguese interests, and plans were completed for the construction of an ammonia and fertilizer factory to be built at Beira. The factory, which will be completed by the end of 1967, will cost about 200 million escudos and will, according to its directors, produce sufficient fertilizer to satisfy most of the present demand in the Territory. The factory is being built by a French firm, GEXA, on behalf of the Sociedade de Estudos e Investimentos de Moçambique, and will use patents developed by the Société Belge de l'Azote. Licences were granted during 1966 to Portuguese firms, one of them the Companhia Nacional Algodoeira, for the construction of three cotton spinning mills with a combined capacity of 12,000 tons, two of which will be established in the south (at Lourenço Marques and Chibuto, in the Gaza District) and the other either at Beira or at Monapo (district of Manica e Sofala). Other new industries under construction or authorized in 1966 include a match factory, a cellulose fibre factory and factories for the manufacture of paper bags, electrical batteries, automobile tires, pharmaceuticals, furniture and parquet, glass bottles and light metal products. The automobile tires will be produced at two factories, one of them to be built at Beira by the Companhia de Refrigerantes MacMahon, S.A.R.L., a Portuguese company presently producing beer and soft drinks in the Territory, and the other by Firestone Portuguesa; the latter plans to invest 150 million escudos in a factory which will have a productive capacity of 60,000 to 100,000 tires yearly. Other companies which, according to press reports, have requested authorization to build factories in Mozambique include the Standard Electric Company which has asked for a licence to produce telecommunications and electronic equipment, the Companhia de Urânio de Moçambique, which has asked authorization to establish an iron and steel foundry with a yearly capacity of 250,000 tons (see para. 50), and the Fábrica Colonial de Borracha, Lda., which requested authorization to establish a shoe factory at Beira. According to the local Press, a private entrepreneur in the United States also made application to establish petro-chemical factories at Lourenço Marques and Beira and a foreign financial group, RHOMOC, was reported to have proposed several industrial projects, including a rope factory at Nova Sofala and a chemical industry at Dondo. Other light industries established during 1965-1966 included electrodes and electronic cables, clothing, bedding, paints and varnish. In 1966, the petroleum refinery owned by SONAREP (a subsidiary of the Sociedade Nacional de Petróleos of Portugal) at Lourenço Marques was expanded to include the production of asphalt and liquid gas for domestic and industrial use. The additional investment to finance this expansion was 130 million escudos. Finally, towards the end of 1965 a request was made for authorization to build a dockyard at Lourenço Marques which would include two floating docks and other installations for ship repairs, the whole representing an investment of 600 million escudos.

289. Other sectors of industrial activity, namely construction and electricity production, have also shown marked expansion. After three years of relative inactivity, there was a sudden upsurge in the building industry during 1965 and 1966, the number of new buildings under construction rising from 750 in 1964 to 1,317 in 1965. In most of the major municipalities, important public works were undertaken or initiated to cope with a rapid expansion of the urban areas. The largest programme of urban renewal was for Lourenço Marques, where the municipality is utilizing a loan of 150 million escudos from Portugal, contracted in 1966, for, among other things, the construction of low-cost housing estates for African workers.

290. Apart from the hydro-electric project at Cahora Bassa, which is described above, two other hydro-electric projects are under construction; the first is at Massingir, on the Elefantes River, one of the main tributaries of the Limpopo River, from which power would be supplied to industries in Lourenço Marques and the Sul do Save; and the second is at Chicamba on the Púnguè River near Vila Pery. The latter represents an expansion by the Sociedade Hidroeléctrica do Revuè of its existing facilities to meet the growing needs of industry in the area, particularly in view of the proposed construction of a large cotton-spinning mill in addition to the existing textile factory, and also to supply Beira. The estimated cost of the project is 80 million escudos, of which 20 million were obtained during 1966 in the form of a local bond issue underwritten by Portugal. A third hydro-electric project being considered is on the Umbe-luzi River. The project, which would take six years to complete and require a prior agreement with Swaziland, would furnish electricity to the whole Sul do Save and permit irrigation of an extensive area. Also during 1966, thermal electricity plants were constructed to supply a number of centres, including the port town of Nacala and the Limpopo valley settlement.

#### *Mining*

291. In 1965, the output of the mining industry was valued at approximately 50 million escudos, equal to less than 2 per cent of the value of agricultural cash crops. Mineral production at present consists mainly of coal (valued at 29.7 million escudos) and smaller quantities of pegmatitic minerals, mainly beryl and colombo-tantalite, together with some bauxite and very minor quantities of gold, copper and semi-precious stones. The Territory is known to possess unused mineral deposits, especially coal and titaniferous magnetites, together with vanadium, and possibly some other minerals, including manganese and chrome in the north-west, but insufficient funds and transportation difficulties have so far prevented their full utilization. One of the arguments for the Zambezi valley development scheme, referred to above, is that it would permit the establishment of an iron and steel industry near Tete where there are proved magnetite reserves of 35 million tons. Most of these reserves are controlled by the Uranium Company of Mozambique which has held an exclusive licence to prospect for iron at Mavudzi since 1961. According to a press report, the company, in September 1966, requested authorization to establish an iron ore smelting plant with an annual production capacity of 250,000 tons. It has already expended a substantial sum on housing and other installations.

292. In 1965, the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, which has been prospecting for petroleum for the past sixteen years, discovered a major

deposit of natural gas at Pande; the former, however, became ignited and over 100 million escudos were spent on efforts to extinguish the fire which was finally accomplished in March 1967. In August 1966, it was reported in the Press that the South African Government had approved a project for the construction of a 220-mile pipeline to supply the gas to the Transvaal once the fire could be brought under control. The Mozambique Gulf Oil Company denied the report which, however, reappeared in the Press in January 1967.

### *Fisheries*

293. Although the offshore waters of Mozambique are known to be rich in fish, especially rock lobster and shrimp, these resources are not yet fully exploited. Most of the fishing so far has been done by small private companies or individually owned boats, the total catch landed averaging only 60 million escudos yearly over the period 1963-1965.

294. In the past three years, there has been increasing awareness of the extent of this unexploited wealth. This was largely due to research undertaken by a South African-financed company, INOS, which in 1963 obtained extensive fishing rights as well as licences to establish a shrimp and lobster cannery and a refrigeration plant. Between 1963 and 1965, the company invested approximately 180 million escudos, mainly in studies, but for technical reasons it was not able to begin large-scale industrial activities, which it now plans to commence in 1968. In the meantime, revelation of the fisheries potential increasingly attracted ships of foreign nationality, leading to incidents which were reported in the Press during 1966.

295. During the past year, the Government took several measures to stimulate Portuguese investments in and to expand this sector. Besides extending the limit of territorial waters to twelve miles, it established an official fisheries research body in Mozambique and enacted legislation providing for the corporative organization of fishing (*casas de pescadores*) and for the establishment of trade schools. In June 1966, a new company, ARPEN, was constituted in Lisbon by important Portuguese fishing interests to develop commercial fishing in the Overseas Territories, and other projects were also reported to be under consideration in Portugal. Later in the year, the Minister for Overseas Territories, speaking in Lourenço Marques, announced that ARPEN had formed a Mozambique Fisheries Development Company. The project involves the establishment of a commercial fishing fleet, based on a new fishing harbour, with refrigeration, storage and ship repair facilities, to be established at Lourenço Marques. At the same time, a decree was enacted in Portugal to control the transfer of fishing boats from Portugal to the Overseas Territories. It was later reported in the Press that ARPEN had placed orders for the construction of two deep-sea trawlers for Mozambique. It was also reported that several foreign companies, notably South African and Japanese, were interested in obtaining licences to operate in the Territory, and that the Mitsui financial group of Japan, in collaboration with South African interests, planned to establish a fish-processing factory at Lourenço Marques, involving an investment of about 80 million escudos.

### *Transport and communications*

296. After agricultural exports, Mozambique's second most important source of foreign exchange consists in the services provided by its railways and ports.

Invisible earnings from the transit traffic of its neighbours, together with earnings derived from the sale of supplies and services to visiting ships, are equal to approximately one third of its receipts from special trade and one fifth of the total inflow of foreign exchange. Because of Mozambique's strategic location, the volume of transit traffic has increased with the economic growth of the hinterlands so that the amount of trade handled at Lourenço Marques is now only 20 per cent less than that at Durban. In 1965, before the boycott on Southern Rhodesia, the ports of Mozambique handled 14 million tons of cargo. This combined total, the largest in Mozambique's history, was 2.5 million tons more than in 1964, the increase being partly due to new exports of mineral ores, sugar and other commodities from the Transvaal, Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia.

297. To meet the growing needs of the transit trade, as well as Mozambique's own exports, substantial sums have been recently invested in the ports and railways, part of the cost being paid by the exporting countries. According to the Mozambique Ports and Railways Administration, the total value of the improvements completed or in progress in 1965 was in the vicinity of 2,000 million escudos. Among the major port projects completed during 1965-1966 at Lourenço Marques were the construction of a mechanized iron ore loading wharf for the export of Transvaal and Swaziland ore under long-term agreements with Japan, a sugar terminal to handle sugar exports from Southern Rhodesia, refrigerated warehouses for fruit and meat exports, and also a 320-metre extension of the main deep-water berth, this last costing 600 million escudos. A grain loading wharf and a petroleum wharf, costing 100 million escudos, are under construction. At Beira, about 650 million escudos were spent on the extension of berthing facilities, the construction of a dry dock, completed in September 1966, warehouses for refrigerated goods, tobacco and general merchandise, and a chrome ore loading wharf to handle exports from Southern Rhodesia. Important extensions were also made at Nacala which is being developed as a supply port for Malawi to relieve congestion at Beira and at Quelimane, which serves the district of Zambézia.

298. The expansion of harbour facilities was accompanied by substantial investment in railways. During 1965, orders for the construction of 1,020 railway wagons, amounting to 247 million escudos, were awarded to a local metal foundry which was thereby enabled to double its production capacity; other orders for railway equipment, including twenty-five diesel engines, totalling 40 million escudos, were placed in the United States. In 1966, a new main railway terminal and a goods terminal were completed at Beira at a cost of 81 million escudos, major construction work was undertaken on the line from Beira to Untali and the British-owned Trans-Zambézia Railway announced that orders had been placed for the acquisition of five diesel engines by 1967. In the north-west of Mozambique, work was continued on the extension of the Niassa railway from Catur to Nova Freixo where, under an agreement signed in 1966, it will link up with an extension of the Malawi railway system, thus enabling the overseas trade of Malawi to pass through Nacala beginning in 1967.

299. The effects of the boycott on trade with Southern Rhodesia cannot yet be fully estimated in the absence of detailed statistics on transit traffic for 1966 (see paragraphs 265-268). Whereas the volume of cargo

handled at Beira decreased by 342,991 tons in the first six months of 1966, compared with the same period of 1965, the tonnage handled at Lourenço Marques increased by 184,662, any decrease in Southern Rhodesian traffic at that port presumably being offset by the growing South African and domestic trade. Rerouting of Zambian trade through Malawi contributed to a sudden upsurge in the gross receipts of the Trans-Zambézia Railway, by 37 per cent during the first half of 1966.

300. With current plans for investment in ports and railways now largely completed, particular attention is being given to the extension and improvement of roads, for reasons which are both economic and military. The need for better roads has been repeatedly and urgently stressed in newspaper articles and in statements by local bodies in many parts of the Territory, especially the districts of Manica e Sofala, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado, according to which the poor condition of roads is a serious obstacle to the development of commercial agriculture. The inadequacy of the roads in the north has also been cited as a major problem in combating guerrilla activities. In speeches delivered in October and November 1966, the Minister for Overseas Territories stated that improvement of roads, particularly in the north, would be given special attention in the Third Development Plan now in preparation. He also said that a rationally planned system of roads was needed for the expansion of agriculture and to enable the armed forces to move about freely at all seasons in areas where guerrillas were active. He stressed that the planning and construction of the road system required co-ordination between the various services, including the military engineering services. To achieve this, a decree, enacted in October, created an autonomous Road Board for Mozambique and, in the following month, the Minister appointed as Provincial Secretary of Public Works and Communications an army officer who had previously been in charge of army engineers in the Territory.

301. The current Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages the expenditure of 600 million escudos on roads, of which loans of 200 million and 130 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank were authorized in 1966. The first loan was earmarked for new roads and feeder routes in the districts of Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete and Zambézia. The second was made in connexion with a major highway now under construction between Lourenço Marques and Beira, which is scheduled for completion by 1968. It is intended subsequently to extend this road to the extreme south of Mozambique and north to Quionga near the border of the United Republic of Tanzania, thus providing the Territory with a north-south artery linking all major ports. The additional cost of the road, which will involve building a bridge four kilometres in length over the Zambezi River, is estimated at 700 million escudos. Other contracts concluded in 1966 were for the construction of an all-weather road, extending 110 kilometres between Macomia and Diaco in Cabo Delgado District, to be completed within one year, and another road, of 215 kilometres, from Matema to Fingoè in Tete District, which is currently an area of European settlement. The cost of these roads will be about 17.5 million and 6.5 million escudos respectively.

#### Public finance

302. Although the final budget accounts for 1966 have not yet been published, and only preliminary in-

formation, based on press reports, is available concerning the estimates for 1967, it is clear that government expenditure for these years was the highest on record. Excluding financing of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the estimated expenditure for the year 1966, which totalled 4,213 million escudos, was 272 million escudos more than in 1965, and 41 per cent more than ordinary expenditure in 1960.<sup>103</sup> Among the factors contributing to the increase were growing recurrent expenditures resulting from development and the rising cost of defence and security measures.

303. The total sum of the budget estimates is somewhat misleading since over 50 per cent consist of earmarked funds, being the revenue and expenditure of autonomous bodies such as the Ports, Railways and Transport Administration, the latter amounting in 1966 to 1,340 million escudos. Apart from this, the items which showed the largest increase compared with the previous year were national defence, which increased by 80.2 million to 549.4 million escudos (supplementary appropriations brought this figure considerably higher) and public debt servicing, which increased by 34 million to 240.5 million escudos. Other items of expenditure which increased were public health, which rose by 17.8 million to 175.1 million escudos, and public education, which rose by 14.5 million to 158.2 million escudos.<sup>104</sup> As has been noted previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 159), expenditure on education also includes assistance paid to Portuguese Catholic missions (69.5 million escudos) and the *Estudos Gerais Universitários* (19 million escudos). In 1966, allocations for education represented about 6 per cent of the budget, and for public health about 4 per cent.

304. The increase in the budget estimates for 1967 (see above) is of particular significance in view of the fact that the legislative instrument enacted in November 1966, which laid down guidelines for the forthcoming budget, called for restriction or elimination of non-essential expenditures or those not related to the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Earlier in the year, the Governor General, in an order to all government departments and services, had called for austerity measures during the balance of the year. He specified, among other things, that there should be no increase in the number of teachers or new schools during 1966-1967. The reasons for this can only be conjectured, but it must be noted that: (a) the Territory was facing a severe loss of revenue from Southern Rhodesia's transit trade; and (b) actual defence expenditure had substantially exceeded the original estimates in 1965. Pending the availability of the budget for 1967, there is no information as to the sources from which revenue will be obtained to meet the increased expenditure.

305. Up to 1966, however, rising expenditures were made possible by substantial increases in direct and indirect taxation and by special levies on the receipts of autonomous services, such as the railways and ports. Between 1961 and 1965, revenue from direct and indirect taxes (including taxes on industries, subject to special régimes, such as cotton and sugar) increased by nearly 50 per cent from 1,302 million

<sup>103</sup> According to press reports, the estimated budget for 1967 envisages a further rise in expenditure of 387 million escudos. Of the total expenditure of 4,600 million escudos envisaged for 1967, 640 million escudos is allocated for defence, an increase of 91 million escudos over the estimate for 1966.

<sup>104</sup> The estimated budget for 1967 allocates 160 million escudos for public education.

to 1,918 million escudos. The most significant increase, in direct taxation, was mainly due to the introduction in 1964 and 1965 of new taxes, including defence taxes and a supplementary personal tax, or to the increase of rates, particularly of taxes on income and commercial and industrial activities. In 1966, decrees were enacted increasing tax rates on imports and consumption.

#### *Development financing*

306. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisaged for Mozambique an investment target of 5,400 million escudos. This represents an average annual investment of 1,800 million escudos, or about three times the yearly investment under the previous plan. The principal sectors chosen for investment were: transforming industries, 1,350 million; roads, 665 million; irrigation and settlement, 560 million; social services, 500 million; ports and railways, 495 million; electricity, 400 million; and fisheries, 308 million escudos. Approximately 31 per cent was to be derived from private investment, 28 per cent from external loans, 21 per cent from the Government of Portugal and the remainder from territorial funds.

307. The preceding sections have already given an indication of the extent to which the targets are being fulfilled. Actual expenditures under the Plan during 1966 amounted to 1,769.5 million escudos. This included loans from the Government of Portugal totalling 400 million escudos, external loans guaranteed by Portugal totalling 150 million escudos, and 143 million escudos from territorial funds. The remaining 1,061.5 million escudos consisted of private investment capital, of which 165.5 million escudos was non-Portuguese.

308. One of the objectives of the plan was to mobilize savings available in the Territory for revenue-producing projects. Following the enactment in 1965 of legislation relaxing restrictions on the establishment of banks in the Overseas Territories (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 62), there was a considerable expansion of commercial banking facilities. Among the new banks were the Portuguese Banco Pinto e Sotta Mayor, which opened the first of five branches in Mozambique, the Banco de Crédito Comercial e Industrial and the Banco Standard-Totta, resulting from a merger of the activities in Mozambique of the Standard Bank of South Africa and the Totta-Allianca of Lisbon. In 1966, a public loan of 100 million escudos was raised in Mozambique to finance the development plan.

#### *Educational conditions*

309. The latest available statistics on education published by the Government of Mozambique relate to the school year 1963-1964. Data extracted from these statistics were included in the previous report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 171-175). The statistics showed, among other things, the number of children enrolled at primary schools, as officially redefined in September 1964,<sup>105</sup> and their composition by ethnic groups. According to this data, out of a total primary enrolment of 44,725 pupils in primary schools, 23,093 were known to be Africans. Similar statistics of secondary school enrolments showed a total of 18,415, including 2,781 Africans. Compared with population figures for Africans of all ages in 1960, this represented a percentage of 0.35 per cent at the primary level and 0.04 per cent at

the secondary level. These figures were cited solely in order to indicate the spread of educational facilities among Africans, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

310. It should be noted, however, that, as previously explained, the statistics of primary school enrolments related only to children in schools which provide at least the pre-primary class and the first three elementary classes. In Mozambique many rural schools, mostly run by religious missions, furnish less than this minimum and, under the reform of primary education effected in September 1964, are not classified as primary schools *strictu sensu*. In 1963-1964, there were 3,233 schools of this kind, known as "adaptation schools", with an enrolment of 373,587 African children, representing 5.82 per cent of the total African population in 1960. Of this number, 70,867 obtained promotion from one class to another or were successful in examination.<sup>106</sup>

311. According to the same source, the number of pupils of all races enrolled at the secondary level in 1963-1964 was 18,415, of whom 7,369 were at grammar (*liceal*) schools, 10,388 in technical professional schools (including commercial and trade schools and training institutions for the Public Service) and 405 in religious seminaries. More recent information from press reports gives a figure for 1964-1965 of 7,969 pupils at grammar (*liceal*) schools<sup>107</sup> and 11,794 at technical professional schools.

312. Criticism of the situation in regard to education was voiced in a speech delivered in the National Assembly by Dr. Satúrio Pires, a deputy from Mozambique. He pointed out that, according to the provisional audit of the territorial accounts, actual expenditure on the public education service amounted to only 183.4 million escudos in 1965, or less than 3.4 per cent of the territorial budget, and that even when the subventions paid to religious missions were added to this, it still represented only about 5 per cent of the budget.<sup>108</sup> He referred, in particular, to what he described as the "penury and the seriousness of the problem of secondary education in Mozambique", remarking that out of 214 teaching posts, 24 were unfilled and that 41 per cent of the existing teachers were only temporary.

313. Though there appears to be some increase in expenditure on education (the estimates for 1966 and 1967 showed increases of 14.5 million escudos and 4 million escudos respectively in anticipated expenditure on public education), the increases which have occurred since 1965 do not appreciably alter the situation described by Dr. Pires. Indeed, as mentioned above (see paragraph 304 above), during part of 1966, expansion in the number of schools and teachers was temporarily halted under an order of the Governor General owing to a shortage of available funds. Nevertheless, some improvements were achieved during 1966. Among them may be cited the graduation of fifty-two new secondary teachers, of whom seventeen will teach in grammar

<sup>106</sup> These figures do not include 16,055 adolescents and adults attending special literacy and other classes in the evenings.

<sup>107</sup> There is considerable difficulty in comparing statistics from different sources, probably because of differing methods of computation. In his statement before the National Assembly in March 1967, Dr. Satúrio Pires was reported to have said that there were only 4,495 pupils in grammar (*liceal*) schools in 1965-1966.

<sup>108</sup> Not including the expenditure on the *Estudos Gerais Universitários*; see para. 315.

<sup>105</sup> Decree Law 45,908 (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 81).



(*liceal*) schools and the remainder in vocational schools. Also, work was in progress on two new grammar schools (*liceus*) and land was acquired at Porto Amelia for the construction of a new elementary technical school.

314. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, which assigned an investment target of 220 million escudos for education, priority is being given to the expansion of secondary, vocational and agricultural training. As reported previously (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 83), agricultural education in the Overseas Territories was reorganized in 1965. As a follow-up of this reorganization, decrees were enacted in Mozambique during 1966 setting out the curricula for agricultural training at both the elementary and secondary levels. In addition, a Co-ordinating Council for agricultural education was created, which will have among its functions the issuing of grants and scholarships from funds to be donated by governmental bodies and private sources. Towards the end of 1966, a new agricultural school was opened at Chimoio in the Manica highlands.

315. In his criticism of the inadequacy of funds available for education, Dr. Satúrio Pires noted that the budget of the General University Studies (*Estudos Gerais Universitários*) in 1965 was only 22.8 million escudos, or less than 0.5 per cent of the actual budget of Mozambique. For 1966, the original figure cited in the budget estimates was 19 million escudos, later increased by supplementary appropriations to a total not much more than that of the preceding year. Despite the limited funds available for recurrent financing, the college continued to expand, the number of students enrolled rising to 603 in 1966-1967, compared with 329 in 1964-1965. Of the total, 298 students were studying engineering, 144 were studying medicine, 40 veterinary science and 32 agronomy. The institution provides three-year courses in general studies, agronomy, forestry, veterinary science, biology, chemistry, and teaching and, since 1966, a four-year course in medicine. During 1966, land was acquired by the Government for the construction of a permanent campus at Lourenço Marques. So far, the college, which was founded in 1963, has been housed in temporary buildings. During 1966, however, a sum of 7 million escudos was allocated for the conversion of an existing hospital into a teaching clinic to be completed by mid-1967, and projects were also approved for the construction of permanent buildings to house the schools of agronomy, chemistry and physics. Also in 1966, laboratories were opened for the study of radioisotopes and electronic microscopy in application to medicine. It was announced that a school of economics will be created shortly.

316. In his commencement speech delivered in October 1966, the rector of the institution stressed the need to bring the college up to the status of a full university by extending the courses up to licentiate level in humanities and sciences in order to supply the urgent demand in the Territory for secondary school teachers.

#### 4. GUINEA, CALLED PORTUGUESE GUINEA

##### *General*

317. Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, lies on the west coast of Africa between 12°40'N and 10°52'N in latitude and between 13°38'WG and 16°43'WG in

longitude. Situated between the Republics of Senegal and Guinea, the Territory extends 198 miles inland from the coast at its widest point. Besides the mainland, it comprises the Bijagós Archipelago and a string of islands. The total area of the Territory is 36,125 square kilometres, of which approximately one tenth is periodically submerged by tidal waters and largely covered with mangrove. As previously reported,<sup>109</sup> the preliminary results of the 1960 census showed a total resident population of 544,184, compared with 510,777 at the previous census in 1950 when there were reported to be 2,263 Europeans, 4,568 *mestiços*, 11 Indians, 1,478 assimilated Africans, and 502,457 non-assimilated Africans. A Portuguese official source<sup>110</sup> published a revised figure for the total resident population in 1960 of 519,229. According to the *United Nations Demographic Yearbook for 1965*, the estimated population at mid-1965 was 527,000.

##### *Government and administration*

318. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, the Territory is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,372).<sup>111</sup>

319. The Territory is divided into nine *concelhos* and three *circunscrições*, and for purposes of direct elections, it is considered to form one electoral district. As in other Territories with a governor, namely Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Macau and Timor, a Legislative Council was established for the first time in 1963. It is presided over by the Governor and comprises 14 members, of whom 3 are *ex officio*, 8 are elected by "organic groups" and 3 are elected directly. No workers' or employers' interests are represented in the Legislative Council. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor. It is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief, 3 *ex-officio* members and 3 members elected by the Legislative Council, one of whom represents the *regedorias*.

320. The Territory is represented in the National Assembly by one deputy. Elections to the National Assembly last took place in 1965; elections to the Legislative and Government Councils were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in these elections are not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

##### *Military situation*

321. Fighting in Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, began in 1963 and is now entering the fifth year. Since about May 1964 the fighting has gradually grown in intensity and has become more widespread. By mid-August 1966, Portuguese troops had increased to some 23,000 but were reported to be generally based on the main population centres.

322. In June 1966, the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), which is reported to have some 5,000 uniformed guerrillas, was already claiming that it had "liberated almost half

<sup>109</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23 (A/5446/Rev.1), chap. I, para. 35.

<sup>110</sup> Portugal, *Anuário Estatístico*, vol. II, Lisbon, 1964.

<sup>111</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V.

of the Territory, including in the south, Catió, Fulacunda, half of the Xitoli and Boé regions". In the north, it claimed that it "controlled the Oio and Farim regions, about half of the S. Domingos region, approximately 30 per cent of the Cachungo region and approximately 25 per cent of the Gabú region"<sup>112</sup>

323. Portuguese official military bulletins for the period September-December 1966 reported fighting in eight out of the nine *concelhos*, often close to, or around, the administrative headquarters, including those of S. Domingos, Cacheu and Farim in the north, those of Batafá and Gabú in the east, and those of Mansôa, Fulacunda and Catió in the south. In mid-February 1967, fighting intensified and Portuguese casualties rose to thirteen in one week, compared with an average of about three deaths a week last year. The Defence Minister flew to the Territory to review military operations. While he was there, the Portuguese military command announced that patrols were being launched throughout the Territory. This action was interpreted by the English language Press as confirming that guerrillas had in fact infiltrated the whole Territory.

324. On his return to Lisbon, the Portuguese Minister for Defence reported on the high morale of the Portuguese troops fighting in the Territory and stressed that "there was no war between Portuguese Guinea and the neighbouring countries". He described the war as one "on a higher level" involving, on the one hand, those who wanted to take over the Territories under Portuguese administration because of their wealth, and, on the other hand, those who wanted to control these Territories because of their strategic position in the East-West struggle.

#### *Economic conditions*

325. *General.* The economy of the Territory is exclusively based on agriculture. The main crops are ground nuts and coconut, which together account for about 90 per cent of the exports, and rice and millet, which are the main subsistence crops. As the climate is not suitable for European settlement, there are no European farmers and almost all the agriculture is in the hands of the local population. The Companhia União Fabril (CUF) is however reported to have some large estates in the Territory. Livestock and fishing supply local needs, though some hides and skins are also exported. Except for a few factories processing rice, ground-nuts and vegetable oil, there are almost no industries. A concession has been granted for petroleum prospecting but so far no discoveries have been reported.

326. *Trade and balance of payments.* Over the past decade the Territory's external trade has been characterized by a growing deficit due to both rising imports and falling exports. Thus, while the value of imports increased by about 210 per cent, from 198 million escudos in 1956 to 417 million escudos in 1965, the value of exports, which had averaged around 200 million escudos annually up to 1961, dropped sharply thereafter to only 106 million escudos in 1965. As a result, the Territory's trade surplus, which amounted to 4.9 million escudos in 1956, has given place to annual deficits which increased by over 350 per cent between 1961 and 1965 (from 86 million escudos to 311 million escudos):

#### BALANCE OF EXTERNAL TRADE

(Million escudos)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Imports .....	297.2	327.3	407.2	421.4	417.2
Exports .....	211.1	188.9	166.5	156.2	105.8
Deficit balance ..	86.1	138.4	240.7	265.2	311.3

327. The sharp deterioration in the Territory's balance of trade in the past four years appears to be due in a large measure to the effects of the war which has disrupted the already stagnant agricultural sector and increased the need for additional imports of supplies and food replacements. Available data show that, although the Territory was in the past a rice exporting country, since 1960 it has had to import rice. There has also been a severe drop in exports of unshelled ground nuts (from 24,000 tons in 1963 to less than 2,000 tons in 1965 with a corresponding drop in value from 69 million escudos to less than 5 million escudos). The quantity of coconut exports also decreased in this period by almost 25 per cent, though due to rising prices the value of exports did not drop but rose from 24 million escudos to over 30 million escudos.

328. The Territory's imports consist mainly of consumer goods. In 1958 (the last year for which the territorial statistical yearbook is available) cotton fabrics, wine and tobacco accounted for more than one third of the total imports by value. In the period 1963-1965, these three items accounted for about 20 per cent of the total imports, and automobiles, gasoline and gas oil accounted for another 20 per cent. In 1964, rice imports amounted to 30 million escudos, or 6 per cent of the total.

329. Portugal has always been the Territory's most important trading partner, taking on an average about 90 per cent of its exports and supplying over 70 per cent of its imports. In the period 1963-1965, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and France accounted for the remaining 10 per cent of the Territory's exports while the remaining imports were supplied mainly by the United States of America (6 per cent), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (5 per cent) and the Federal Republic of Germany (2 per cent).

330. In spite of its adverse balance of trade, the Territory's balance of payments registered a surplus of 19.1 million escudos in 1965 compared with a deficit of 16.3 million escudos in 1963 and 5.2 million escudos in 1964. The 1965 surplus resulted from governmental transfers from Portugal to support defence costs. In 1965, except for the transfers from Portugal, all the other items in the balance of payments were negative.

#### *Agriculture, livestock and fisheries*

331. It is officially estimated that about 90 per cent of the economically active population of the Territory is engaged in agriculture and that about 77 per cent of the production is consumed locally. The total arable land is estimated to be about 263,000 hectares of which in an average year 159,000 hectares are under food crops, 59,000 hectares under cash crops (mainly ground nuts), and 59,000 hectares are fallow. At the 1960 agricultural census, there were 86,951 farming units (*explorações*) each with an average area of 3.2 hectares

<sup>112</sup> A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 450-452.

and four units of labour. Production that year of food crops (based on the average prices over the five previous years) was estimated at 355 million escudos and cash crops at 90 million escudos.

332. Most of the ground-nuts for export are grown in the north and north-eastern part of the Territory, where the main food crops are maize, manioc, rice and sweet potatoes. In the south, where rice is the main food crop, some ground-nuts are grown in the interior part of the Territory, but oil palm, which grows naturally along the coastal areas, provides the main export crop. It is estimated that oil palms occupy about 90,000 hectares of which about 30,000 hectares are exploited. The Territory has good timber resources which are being opened to exploitation.

333. There are no recent data on the output of food crops except for rice, which amounted to 10,581 tons in 1961, 11,304 tons in 1962 and dropped to 5,643 tons in 1963, after which no figures are reported.

334. A survey of the economy of the Territory, published in 1965 in the quarterly bulletin of the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino), suggests that the main economic problem of the Territory is the disinterest and the lack of understanding among the population of more advanced farming techniques. Although assistance has been provided through the distribution of improved seeds and fertilizers, it is felt that little progress can be expected in increased production until the people have acquired a better basic knowledge of farming through the spread of primary education especially geared to their needs.

335. Efforts are being made to introduce new crops and to encourage livestock production. As there are already some semi-spontaneous cashew trees in the Territory, several new projects have been started for growing cashew on an organized basis. A cashew shelling factory has also been established. Some fruits, including bananas and pineapples, and vegetables, are being developed with a view to eventual canning or direct export.

336. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, projects to improve agriculture include bringing into cultivation 4,000 hectares of rice, 1,000 hectares of manioc, 5,000 hectares of oil palm and 10,000 hectares each of cashew and bananas.

337. The Territory is considered to have considerable livestock potential. In 1966 it had a cattle population density of seven head per hectare. To provide credit to farmers and livestock farmers, an agricultural and livestock credit bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro Pecuário), similar to the one in Angola, was established in April 1966 in the Territory. The bank will provide credit for agriculture, livestock raising for commercial purposes, and real estate. The initial funds of the bank will be furnished from the territorial budget but, as in other Territories, the bank may issue bonds to obtain more working capital.

338. Most of the fishing carried on in the Territory is for local consumption. The fish catch increased from some 500 tons in 1963 to 760 tons in 1964 and 853 tons in 1965. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 18 million escudos are to be spent on developing the fisheries industry for local consumption. The plan envisaged the gradual motorization of the fishing boats and the installation of freezing, salting and drying plants, either through mixed enterprises involving government and private capital or

through private enterprises in which Portuguese and foreign capital would be associated.

339. In 1966, the Government of the Territory was authorized (Decree 47,101 of 16 July) to invest 2 million escudos in a newly established Sociedade Frigorífica da Guiné (SOFRIGO) which will install freezing facilities in Bissau and plans to organize a distribution network throughout the Territory. The Government also announced plans for creating a pilot fishing co-operative on Bolama.

#### *Industry*

340. Apart from a few factories processing agricultural products, there are practically no industries in the Territory. In 1965, there were only four factories for shelling rice, three for shelling ground-nuts, three vegetable oil extraction plants, a soap factory, a rubber processing factory and a petroleum refinery, owned by SACOR, at Bandim.

341. The Territory has many waterways but it does not have much hydro-electric potential. In 1965, the total electric power capacity was 3,109 kW. No provisions are made under the Transitional Development Plan for the development of transforming industries. Of the total allocation of 16.5 million escudos under the heading "industry", 9.3 million escudos are for mining, 7 million escudos are for water supplies and 200,000 escudos are for geological mapping.

#### *Mining*

342. Little is known of the actual mineral resources of the Territory and some geological surveys are being carried out as part of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Some bauxite has been found at Boé and the Companhia Lusitana do Alumínio da Guiné e Angola, S.A.R.L. was reported to be interested in developing the deposits. An exclusive concession to prospect for, and exploit, petroleum deposits is held by Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc., a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey.

343. The company, which at that time was incorporated in Delaware, United States, and had its head offices in New York, held a previous concession from 1958 to 1961. During that period the company found no petroleum but is reported to have spent some 250 million escudos (just under \$US9 million), which exceeded the minimum of 118 million escudos it was required to spend under the contract.

344. In December 1965 (Decree 46,796 of 29 December), Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. was again granted an exclusive concession for petroleum mining in the Territory and following approval of the basic terms of the contract in February 1967 (Decree 46,878 of 19 February), a supplementary contract was signed in March by the Minister for Overseas Territories of Portugal, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and Esso Exploration Co. Inc.

345. Under the new contract, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. is to have its headquarters in Portuguese Territory and to be subject to Portuguese law. The chairman of the board of directors and the majority of its members are to be Portuguese citizens. The company is to have a minimum initial registered capital of \$US1.5 million and 20 per cent of the initial as well as of any future shares are to be given free of cost to the Government of the Territory.

346. The concession, which is estimated to cover some 50,000 square kilometres, includes all the land area of the Territory and the sea, lake and river shores. The term of the concession is for 45 years, and may be extended for another 15 years. It grants the company exclusive rights to prospect for and exploit deposits of solid, liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons, including petroleum, naphtha, ozokerite, natural gas and asphalt, as well as sulphur, helium, carbon dioxide and saline substances.

347. During the initial period of five years, the company undertakes to spend not less than a total of 297 million escudos (about \$US10.6 million). This amount is to be spent as follows: 24 million escudos in the first year, 59 million in the second, 78 million in the third and 68 million escudos in each of the fourth and fifth years. Within six months of the end of this five-year period, the concessionaire must request demarcation of the areas it wishes to retain. The area of the concession is to be successively reduced as follows: after the initial five years to 75 per cent of the original area granted; after eight years to 50 per cent; and after ten years to 25 per cent.

348. The surface rent for the first five years is 400 escudos per square kilometre and, within three months of the signing of the contract, the company is to pay to the territorial Government a sum of 40 million escudos (in dollars) as a down payment of the first year's surface rent (20 million escudos) and 25 per cent of the rent for the next four years. The annual surface rent is to be increased to 800 escudos per square kilometre after the tenth year and to 1,500 escudos after the fifteenth year.

349. The territorial Government is to receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sale value and has the right to purchase a maximum of 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. In return, the company is granted "full freedom to produce, save, sell and export any and all substances extracted from the area of the concession". It is exempt from all taxes "whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future", with the exception of the 50 per cent income tax on profits from oil operations, the statistical tax of one mil *ad valorem* and the stamp tax customs clearance documents. It is also exempt from present or future taxes on shares, capital and debentures of Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. so long as these remain in the ownership of the concessionaire, its parent companies or any foreign affiliate of its parent companies.

350. As in the case of Petrangol and Cabinda Gulf Oil Company in Angola, Esso Exploration Guiné, Inc. has the same privileges as regards use of the public domain, duty-free import of goods and machinery, facilities of entry into and exit from Portuguese territory for its personnel. The employment of aliens as well as of nationals is subject to the legislation in force in the Territory, but there is no obligation to employ a fixed percentage of Portuguese personnel.

351. The company is subject to the exchange control measures of the Territory. It must pay to the Territorial Exchange Fund all the foreign currency it earns from sales outside the Territory after deducting the company's local taxable income less taxes paid, expenses and depreciation. The Government undertakes to facilitate the granting of foreign exchange to the company for transfers specified in the contract, including payments for goods and services, interests and

loans and dividends to shareholders. However, the total amount of the foreign exchange made available to the company shall not exceed the total amount it has invested in foreign currency, plus the amount it has given to the Territorial Exchange Fund.

352. The terms of the contract are apparently comparable in benefits to those of other petroleum concessions in Africa. If at any time during the life of the contract, Standard Oil of New Jersey or its subsidiaries offer better terms for petroleum concessions in Africa or the Persian Gulf area, consultations may be opened between the two parties for a revision of the terms of this contract.

#### *Transport and communications*

353. Internal transport is mainly by the network of waterways, supplemented by over 1,000 kilometres of roads. The two main ports are Bissau and Bolama. In 1965, ninety-six ships with a total of 310,000 tons entered the port of Bissau.

354. The largest allocations under both the First National Development Plan for 1953-1958 and the Second National Development Plan for 1959-1964 were for expenditures on transport and communications. Under the first plan, 87 per cent of the total of 86.2 million escudos was for improving the harbour of Bissau and transport facilities on the Geba River. The second plan allocated 52 per cent of the total of 180 million escudos mainly for road construction, improving river transport and telecommunications. The implementation of both plans was slow in starting, however, and not all the funds were committed.

355. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 51 million escudos (representing 28 per cent of the total) are allocated for transport and communications. The major project under this heading is the establishment of an air service linking the Territory with Cape Verde at a cost of 24 million escudos for airport equipment and carriers. Other expenditures envisaged in this sector are: roads, 12 million escudos; ports and navigation, 10 million escudos; and telecommunications, 5 million escudos.

356. The new airline, Transportes Aéreos da Guiné, was established in 1965 (Decree 46,511 of 2 September 1965) and has since come into service.

#### *Public finance*

357. Because of the generally low level of economic development, the Territory's ordinary revenue has risen very slowly in the last ten years; the estimated ordinary revenue for 1967 was only 20 per cent higher than the revenue collected in 1957 (156 million escudos compared with 127 million escudos). Revenue from indirect taxes has remained at almost the same level since 1962 and revenue from direct taxes has decreased, largely due to a drop in receipts from the *imposto domiciliário* (the personal tax which replaced the former Native tax after the abolition of the Native Statute in 1961). Actual receipts from this source dropped from 23.2 million escudos in 1962 to 19.5 million escudos in 1964<sup>113</sup> (probably because of the

<sup>113</sup> The *imposto domiciliário* is levied on all active males between eighteen and sixty years of age. The annual rate varies from 150 escudos for a single male or a man with one wife, rising by 50 escudos for each additional wife, to 400 escudos for a man with six wives (Guiné, Legislative Instrument 1,771, of 26 June 1962).

exodus of refugees into neighbouring territories and to difficulties in collecting the tax).<sup>114</sup> On the other hand, there has been a significant increase in the revenue derived from the general consumption tax introduced in 1964 (Legislative Instrument No. 1,814, 29 August 1964). This tax is levied at an average rate of 10 to 20 per cent *ad valorem* on almost all imported goods (including matches, textiles, fruit juices, beer, wine, tobacco, firearms, tools, machinery and parts) and at a lower rate on various local products. The tax produces about 20 million escudos in revenue annually.

358. The accounts of the Territory show that, in 1964, actual ordinary revenue was 153 million escudos and exceeded the estimated total by about 8 million escudos. Although receipts from general direct taxes were 6 million escudos less than estimated, the difference was more than compensated by the receipts from the new consumption tax (which yielded some 6 million escudos more than had been anticipated) as well as by larger revenues from indirect taxes and also larger revenues in the closed budget accounts. Expenditure also exceeded estimates (148.7 million escudos compared with 145 million escudos), the difference being partly due to an increase of 2 million escudos in the public debt servicing charge. In 1964, the Territory's share (12 million escudos) in the cost of the armed forces represented 8 per cent of its total expenditures. This compared with 4.2 per cent spent on education and 13.7 per cent on health services.

359. For 1966, the sources of budgetary revenue are as follows: direct taxes, 45.4 million escudos, of which about half is to come from the *imposto domiciliário*; indirect taxes, 34.7 million escudos; the special consumption tax, 20.5 million escudos; revenue from independent accounts (closed revenue), 30.2 million escudos; and other taxes and fees, 22 million escudos. Estimates of ordinary expenditure for 1966 allocated 16.4 million escudos for servicing of the Territory's public debt (an increase of 30 per cent compared with 1964)<sup>115</sup> and 12 million escudos to its share in the total cost of the Territory's armed forces, which in 1966 amounted to 67.4 million escudos (distributed as follows: army, 29.2 million escudos; navy, 17.5 million; and air force, 20.7 million). Except for the share paid by the Territory and a contribution of 2.1 million escudos from the Overseas Defence Fund, the remainder of the cost of the armed forces was charged to Portugal's extraordinary budget, as follows: 19.1 million escudos for the army; 15.5 million escudos for the navy; and 20.7 million escudos for the air force.

360. Although no details are available on the 1967 budget, it is anticipated that there may be a rise in the allocations for general administration in view of the fact that members of the public services received a salary increase of 12.7 per cent in December 1966.

<sup>114</sup> At the above rates, the difference of 3.7 million escudos represents the loss due to non-collection of taxes from 10,000 to 15,000 persons.

<sup>115</sup> In 1962, the Territory's public debt totalled 135.7 million escudos of which 76 million escudos represented the amount outstanding on two loans, one raised in 1948 and the other in 1953. The remaining amount represented loans from Portugal to the Territory at 4 per cent per annum (Decree 43,519 of 28 February 1961) for the implementation of projects under the Second Development Plan for 1959-1964. At the end of 1964, the Territory's total public debt had risen to 188.3 million escudos of which 126.2 million escudos was for development.

It may be recalled that the need for a salary increase had been raised in the National Assembly in January 1965 by Mr. Pinto Bull, the former Secretary-General of the Territory.

#### *Development financing*

361. As reported previously,<sup>116</sup> the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 contains an allocation of 180 million escudos for the Territory's development projects. The envisaged expenditures, in millions of escudos, in the different sectors are as follows: industry, 16.5; transport, 51; education, health, etc., 33.2; agriculture, 33.3; fishing, 18; housing, 10; energy, 3; and other sectors, 15. Since the Territory's budget is so limited that, according to the Governor, it cannot afford even the staff and services that it needs, the entire amount of 180 million escudos was originally to be financed by annual loans from Portugal (Decree 46,683 of 3 December 1965) (see A/6300/Rev. 1, chap. V, para. 57).

362. In 1965, the first year of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the budget estimates envisaged expenditure totalling 54.2 million escudos for development, but actual expenditure amounted to only 25.6 million escudos, or slightly less than half the sum estimated. This was, moreover, 50 per cent less than the expenditure on development in 1964. Expenditure on research and surveys amounted to less than one per cent of the sum allocated for this purpose and, of the 6.2 million escudos allocated for social welfare, including education, less than 15 per cent was spent.

363. Following the conclusion of the new contract with Esso Guiné Exploration, Inc., the central Government decided to use part of the 40 million escudos down payment (see above) for the implementation of the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. For 1966, financing of the development plan projects included: a loan of 12 million escudos from the National Overseas Bank (Banco Nacional Ultramarino) (Decree 47,132 of 3 August 1966); 6.9 million escudos from loans from Portugal (Order 22,107 of 7 July 1966); 4.4 million escudos from the territorial budgetary surpluses; and 32.2 million escudos from the money received for the petroleum concession<sup>117</sup> (Order 22,153 of 5 August 1966). Envisaged expenditures, in escudos, were: ports and navigation, 2.5 million; telecommunications, 1.9 million; development of agricultural, forestry and livestock resources, 7 million; roads, 20 million; air transport and airports, 5.2 million; the port of Bissau and telecommunications, 12 million.

#### *Educational conditions*

364. The latest available education statistics are for the school year ending in 1964 (for comparison, the figures for 1963, which were reported in 1966, are given in parentheses).

365. The statistics show that in 1964 there were a total of 156 (163) government primary schools, including 33 school posts, with a total of 241 (212) teachers and 13,040 (12,000) pupils. The Territory's one academic high school had 19 (20) teachers and

<sup>116</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 35, 108 and 109.

<sup>117</sup> Of the remaining 7.8 million escudos, 2.8 million have been allocated to the payment of the Territory's public debt charges (Order 22,226 of 26 September 1966).

an enrolment of 305 (272) students; the commercial industrial high school had 31 (26) teachers and 482 (308) students; the elementary professional school had 5 (4) teachers and 40 (19) students. The 79 koranic schools had 81 teachers and 758 students. There were 85 people in government training programmes of whom 55 were attending courses in agriculture and veterinary science and 30 were undergoing training in the fields of public health and welfare.

## 5. CAPE VERDE ARCHIPELAGO

### General

366. The Cape Verde islands lie off the west coast of Africa, the nearest point being about 600 kilometres from Dakar (Senegal). They form a crescent-shaped archipelago facing west and extending between 14°48'N and 17°12'N latitude and between 22°41'WG and 25°22'WG longitude. There are ten islands and five islets divided into two groups: the Barlavento (windward) and Sotavento (leeward) islands. The Barlavento group comprises the islands of Sando António, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Sal, Boa Vista and Santa Luzia. The Sotavento islands are Santiago, Fogo, Maio and Brava. The islands range in size from 991 square kilometres (Santiago) to 35 square kilometres Santa Luzia, the total land area being 4,033.3 square kilometres.

367. The islands are of volcanic origin and most are mountainous with deep, eroded valleys and rocky shorelines. The appearance of the islands during most of the year is one of barrenness. There has been extensive deforestation and the climate, influenced by winds from the Sahara, is arid, rainfall is uncertain and the Territory suffers from prolonged droughts; the islands are also subject to severe cyclonic storms originating in the Atlantic Ocean.

368. Despite difficult conditions of life, and considerable emigration, the population is increasing rapidly, at an estimated yearly rate of about 3.5 per cent between 1950 and 1960. In 1964, the total population was unofficially estimated at 221,770. There are no recent data available concerning its composition by ethnic groups, but in 1950, according to the census of that year, 69.09 per cent of the population was *mestiço*, 28.84 per cent was African and 2.06 per cent was European. Except for the five islets and the small island of Santa Luzia, all the islands are inhabited, but according to the 1960 census, nearly one half of the population lives on Santiago where the capital of the territory, Praia, is located.

### Government and administration

369. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Cape Verde is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,371).<sup>118</sup>

370. Although the governmental and administrative framework is similar in its broad outlines to that in other Territories under Portuguese administration, there are certain differences deriving from the fact that the Native Statute was never applied to Cape

Verde and consequently the inhabitants all have the same legal rights and obligations as citizens living in metropolitan Portugal. Hence, there are no *regedorias*, the local administration consisting, as in Portugal, of *concelhos* (municipalities) and *freguesias* (parishes), each with its elected council or parish board. There are twelve *concelhos* and for purposes of direct elections to the National Assembly and the Legislative Council of Cape Verde the Territory comprises two districts, namely, the Barlavento and Sotavento island groups.

371. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of eighteen members, of whom three are *ex officio*, twelve are elected by "organic groups", and six are elected by direct franchise, three from each of the two districts. Of the twelve representatives of "organic groups", two are chosen by bodies representing interests of employers and two by bodies representing workers' interests.<sup>119</sup> There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the Secretary-General, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, and two other *ex officio* members, as well as three members elected by the Legislative Assembly from among its members, one of whom must be a representative of the administrative bodies.

372. Elections to the Legislative Council were last held in 1964 at which time approximately 18,000 voters, or about 10 per cent of the population, participated in the election of the six representatives chosen by direct suffrage, a percentage believed to be higher than in the other Overseas Territories. In the elections to the National Assembly held in 1965, 86.5 per cent of the registered voters were reported to have participated, though the actual number is not known. The next elections to the Legislative Council will be held in 1968.

### Economic conditions

373. *General.* Economically, Cape Verde presents a picture of chronic poverty and heavy dependence on financial assistance from Portugal. With very few natural resources and a growing problem of overpopulation, its main economic importance lies at present in its function as a refueling station for shipping and aircraft travelling between Western Europe, South America and southern Africa, and as a relay point for trans atlantic telephonic communications.

374. As already stated, the Cape Verde islands suffer from general aridity and uncertainty of rainfall, experiencing periodic droughts which formerly decimated the population. Of the nine inhabited islands, three are almost barren of natural vegetation and on most of the others soils are poor and farming is mainly restricted to the narrow valleys and higher regions of the interior. Apart from salt, *pozzolana* earth and lime, which are exported, they have no known mineral resources and there is little industry other than that concerned with food-stuffs and the processing of primary products. Fishing is potentially a source of wealth and is now attracting significant investment (see below), but for many years the industry languished owing to poor techniques and insufficient capital.

375. For the most part, the inhabitants are small tenant farmers, principally engaged in growing food crops and rearing livestock (mainly goats and pigs)

<sup>118</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73, and the subsection on the Territory.

<sup>119</sup> Details of the composition of the Legislative Council are found in document A/5800/Rev.1, paras. 187 and 188.

for local consumption. There is a limited export of bananas, coffee, *purgueira* (an oil-seed), peanuts and castor seeds, but exports are small and their value in 1965 was only 8 per cent of the total value of imports. Not only must the Territory import nearly all its requirements of manufactured consumer goods, but, since food production even in good years is insufficient for consumption needs, it also imports large quantities of food-stuffs, including maize and beans, which are among the main subsistence crops. In times of drought, the need to supply purchasing power for subsistence has led to the rescheduling of development expenditure, financed predominantly by loans from Portugal, as a means of providing employment. It is not surprising, therefore, that Cape Verde is traditionally a Territory of emigration with a net annual outflow of between 1,000 and 4,000 persons, most of whom go to São Tomé and Príncipe.

376. Faced with a rising population, increasing imports and almost stationary exports, the Portuguese Government is endeavouring to find ways of stimulating production and increasing foreign exchange receipts. Attention is being directed particularly to the rehabilitation and expansion of the fishing industry, the production of bananas for export to Portugal and the fostering of a tourist industry. Measures are also being taken under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 to improve agricultural techniques, promote land reform, improve water supplies and communications and develop technical training.

377. *External trade and payments.* Because of its generally low production and lack of industries, Cape Verde's exports cover only a fraction of the value of its imports. In recent years, moreover, this fraction has been growing smaller owing to rapidly increasing imports. Between 1963 and 1965, for instance, whereas the value of exports rose by 16 per cent (from 24.1 million to 28.0 million escudos), the value of imports increased by 34 per cent (from 170.2 million to 228.3 million escudos). In 1965, exports covered only 8 per cent of imports by value, leaving a deficit of no less than 200.3 million escudos.

378. Despite this, however, Cape Verde's external payments showed a favourable balance of 23.2 million escudos at the end of the year. This was because the Territory derives substantial invisible receipts from the sale of services and supplies to ships in transit, mostly in the form of water and of fuel (which is imported for the purpose) and because its development expenditure (54.6 million escudos in 1965 and 72.9 million escudos in 1966) is financed by loans from metropolitan Portugal.

379. The Territory's main exports consist of fish and fish products, bananas, salt, coffee, *pozsolana* and ground-nuts. Of these, only fish and bananas have shown appreciable increases in recent years. Between 1963 and 1965, exports of fish and fish products increased in value from 5.1 million to 8.0 million escudos, while bananas increased from 2.9 million to 3.4 million escudos. There are, unfortunately, no data available for 1966, but according to plans for the expansion of banana exports to Portugal, it was forecast that the quantity supplied would increase from 3,391 tons in 1965 to 4,600 tons in 1966 and 6,500 tons by 1968. Other exports have, in contrast, remained static or declined. Thus, salt, declined in value from 3.4 million escudos in 1963 to 2.7 million escudos in 1965, *pozsolana* from 1.6 million to 1.3 million escudos and ground-nuts from 1.1 million to 0.9 million escudos.

Exports of coffee are extremely small, amounting in 1965 to only 45 tons, valued at 1.5 million escudos.

380. More than half of the Territory's imports consist of consumer goods, the major items in 1965 including, in descending order, textiles, maize, sugar, wheat flour, rice, automobiles, wines and petroleum products. It is noticeable that among the leading imports are such food-stuffs as maize, beans and sugar, all of which are grown in Cape Verde, but not in sufficient quantities to meet the needs of the rapidly growing population. Imports of food-stuffs, and of maize in particular, vary substantially from year to year, depending on whether or not the local crop has been affected by drought, but in recent years imports of all the main food crops have shown progressive increases; thus, maize imports rose from 8.7 million escudos in 1963 to 18.1 million escudos and rice from 5.5 million to 7.8 million escudos. In 1966, authorization was given for the duty-free import of 10,000 tons of maize.

381. Cape Verde's main trading partners are metropolitan Portugal and the other Overseas Territories, especially Angola. In 1965, metropolitan Portugal supplied about 50 per cent by value of all imports and purchased about 55 per cent of exports, mainly food crops. Next in importance was the United States of America, supplying 5 per cent of imports and taking about 9 per cent of exports.

382. *Agriculture and livestock.* Although agriculture constitutes the principal economic activity of the Cape Verde islanders, agricultural production is limited by the availability of suitable soils and water and by the uncertainty of the rainfall. Except in the case of Fogo where rainfall is more plentiful, all the larger islands have substantial areas of barren land, cultivation being mainly restricted to the valleys and higher regions of the interior. Farming is mostly by small individual farmers who use rudimentary methods and are primarily concerned with the growing of food crops. Of the total cultivated area of about 54,000 hectares, some 31,000 hectares are reportedly devoted to maize and beans. Other food crops include sweet potatoes, manioc, vegetables and fruits. Sugar cane is grown, not for export but for the production of a locally consumed alcohol. Permanent crops include *purgueira*, which grows in the arid coastal areas and produces an oil-seed which is exported for the manufacture of soap and fertilizer, and, in the more humid areas, bananas, coconuts and coffee. In the valleys, castor and ground-nuts are cultivated, in addition to maize and beans. There are no data available concerning production but, except for bananas, exports are small and have followed an erratic pattern in recent years. Thus, *purgueira* exports have varied between 666 tons in 1963 and 443 tons in 1965, castor seeds from 54 tons in 1963 to 126 tons in 1964 and 65 tons in 1965 and ground-nuts from 205 tons in 1963 to 559 tons in 1964 and 184 tons in 1965.

383. In recent years, government efforts have been directed towards the expansion of coffee and bananas for export. As concerns coffee, legislation enacted in 1959 (Decree 42,390 of 15 July) made the cultivation of coffee compulsory in certain designated areas of irrigated land. Despite this, coffee exports have declined, from 132 tons in 1959 to 37 tons in 1963, and in 1965 amounted only to 45 tons (valued at 1.5 million escudos). More success has attended efforts to promote banana exports, which rose progressively from 1,125 tons in 1957 to 3,392 tons in 1965 and,

it is hoped, will increase to 6,500 tons by 1968. This is partly the result of expenditure under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 on irrigation and partly because of recent measures (see para. 62) to develop a guaranteed market in Portugal. During 1966, the Government acquired a refrigerated cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit and one of the purposes of the road-building programme (see below) is to facilitate the export of produce.

384. Reference has already been made to the low productivity of agriculture in Cape Verde, which is amply illustrated by the importation of food crops, especially maize, of which 12,000 tons were imported in 1965 and 10,000 tons in 1966. This is partly due to adverse natural conditions but it is also attributable in part to outmoded agricultural methods, lack of capital and to a system of land tenure whereby most of the land is owned by hereditary landlords and is farmed by leasehold tenants or share-croppers under contracts which, hitherto, were often of short duration and subject to frequent revision by the land-owners. In November 1966, a legislative order made applicable to Cape Verde Law 2,114 of 15 June 1962. Under this law, farming contracts and deeds are henceforth subject to government regulations; they must be reviewed by the administrative service and they must have a three-year term, renewable for nine more years; the law also contained provisions for an equitable division of produce in the case of share-cropping contracts and established arbitration commissions for any litigation between proprietor and farmer.

385. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on the extension of irrigation wherever possible, improved land use and soil conservation; a total of 42 million escudos being allocated for this purpose. In 1965, a special enlarged team of experts (*brigada técnica*) was established to promote agricultural co-operation, draw up plans for land use, ensure the maximum use of existing and new irrigation works and encourage reafforestation and soil conservation.

386. In addition to their crops, the farmers of Cape Verde also rear livestock, especially goats and pigs. In 1963, there were reported to be about 30,500 goats, 12,363 pigs, 13,900 cattle and about 7,000 donkeys, the latter used mainly for transportation.

387. *Fisheries.* Fishing is potentially an important economic activity in Cape Verde. The seas around the islands are known to be rich in tuna and lobster and fish constitute a major element of the islanders' diet, especially on the islands of Sal and Boa Vista where the aridity is such that there is almost no agriculture. Though fishing plays a role in the domestic economy second only to agriculture and fish and fish products are the Territory's principal exports by value, the industry was for many years in a state of decline, carried on by out-dated methods, with insufficient capital and only limited access to external markets. As late as 1957, a report on the fishing industry described it as stagnant and the processing factories as lacking in adequate facilities and equipment, unhygienic and bordering on insolvency.<sup>120</sup>

388. Efforts to improve industrial fishing in the islands date principally from 1957 when scientific research into the fisheries potential was first initiated. This was followed in 1958 by the establishment of two

industrial freezing units on the island of São Vicente and by the introduction of a few motorized trawlers. As at 1964 it was estimated that there were about 3,000 persons engaged in fishing, most of them still fishing from small boats by traditional methods and five processing companies engaged in the production for export of frozen and canned fish and fish-meal. Exports of fish products increased from 4.9 million escudos in 1958 to 6.8 million escudos in 1964.

389. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, more than half of the total investment envisaged (250 million escudos) is allocated for the development of the fishing industry. Part of this is being devoted to fisheries research now being undertaken by a research unit, the Centre for Aquatic Biology, which was established in May 1966 (Order No. 21,916 of 30 May). The largest part of the investment is, however, being used to improve the fishing fleet and to provide needed capital for the transforming industry. In May 1966 (Decree 46,990 of 21 May), a government loan of 30 million escudos was granted to the largest processing company, Companhia de Pesca e Congelação de Cabo Verde (CONGEL), raising its total investment to 50 million escudos. At the same time, foreign interests are reported to be turning their attention to Cape Verde. In April 1966, an agreement was concluded between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany permitting the latter to establish a fishing base in the islands. Under the agreement, the Federal Republic of Germany will undertake a six-month study of tuna resources and fishing methods in the neighbouring waters. Deep-sea tuna fishing is already being carried out by boats of the Japanese Mitsui Company, based on São Vicente. In November 1966, it was reported in the Press that a German financier was considering the possibility of joining with other foreign interests in a company to be established on Santiago. According to the report, the investment contemplated was between 200 and 300 million escudos.

390. *Extractive and transforming industries.* Apart from the processing of fish and of food-stuffs for domestic consumption, the only sizable industries established in Cape Verde are concerned with the extraction for export of salt, lime and *pozzolana* earth, the last being the raw material for the manufacture of cement and concrete. Salt, which at present ranks third in importance among the Territory's exports (2.7 million escudos in 1965), is produced by evaporation from salt pans on the islands of Sal, Boa Vista and Maio. Owing to loss of the traditional export market, namely Brazil, the industry suffered a setback after the Second World War, the quantity exported decreasing from 34,780 tons in 1939 to a low figure of 20,269 tons in 1965. Since then it has slowly increased, attaining 39,626 tons in 1965.

391. *Pozzolana* deposits were first discovered in 1948 and were initially developed mainly for export to Portugal. Although production increased rapidly until 1959, when 9,102 tons were exported, it has since oscillated between a low figure of 3,668 tons in 1960 and a high of 11,825 tons in 1963. In 1965, only 4,139 tons were exported.

392. In August 1966, plans were announced to establish a cement industry based on *pozzolana* on the islands of Maio and Boa Vista. According to press reports, the Companhia Pozzolana de Cabo Verde, S.A.R.L., which controls the deposits, will invest 400 million escudos in two cement factories to be built with technical and financial support from European

<sup>120</sup> J. Gutierrez and others, "Estudos das Pescas em Cabo Verde" in *Estudos, Ciências Políticas e Sociais* (Lisbon, 1961), vol. I, No. 47.



cement interests. The factories will, it is reported, employ more than 100 technicians and 450 local workers and will have a productive capacity of 300,000 tons yearly, valued at approximately 135 million escudos. Exports will be directed to African markets.

393. *Transport and communications.* As already stated, Cape Verde's main economic importance derives from its role as a service station for long-distance shipping, aviation and telephone communications. The main harbour for shipping is Porto Grande on the island of São Vicente. At one time São Vicente ranked in importance with such ports as Singapore, Malta and Port Said as the chief bunkering station for ships travelling in the Atlantic. With the establishment of better and larger ports such as Dakar, São Vicente has gradually declined.

394. In 1960, the harbour area of Porto Grande had an area of about 700 hectares and several wharves accessible to large ships. In 1961, a deep-water berth was built in Porto Grande. Ninety per cent of all sea traffic stopping at Cape Verde, including nearly all foreign steamers, were served by the port. Eight smaller ports, namely Praia, Santa Maria and Pedra de Lume (Sal); Palmeiras and Fura (Brava); Porto Novo (Santo Antão); São Felipe (Fogo); and Sal Rei (Boa Vista) generally handle smaller Portuguese ships. The number of ships stopping in Cape Verde has not increased since 1953, the yearly average being approximately 600 to 650 ships with a total tonnage of between 2.4 million to 3.9 million tons. In 1966, a new port was constructed on the island of Fogo under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 and, as noted above, the Government was reported to have purchased a new cargo ship for the inter-island transport of fruit.

395. The Territory has a major international airport at Espargas, on the island of Sal. The airport has increased in importance since 1961 due to the growth in Portuguese air traffic between Europe and Africa. Following the closing of several African airports to its aircraft, the Republic of South Africa is reported to have concluded an agreement with Portugal for the use of the Espargas airport and, according to press reports, is expected to contribute investment capital to expand the existing facilities.

396. São Vicente had long been a relay point for submarine telephonic cables between Europe, Brazil and South Africa. In August 1966, a press report announced that the largest submarine cable in the world would be completed by 1968 and would use Cape Verde as a relay point.

397. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total of 96 million escudos is allocated for expenditure on transport and communications. Approximately two thirds of this is to be used for improvement of ports and air transport facilities and 30 million escudos for roads. Considerable importance is attached to the construction of new roads, partly to increase exports and partly as a means of promoting tourism which is, at present, in its infancy. The first organized tour to Cape Verde visited the island of Santiago in May 1966.

398. *Public finance.* The budget of Cape Verde shows a progressive increase in both ordinary and extraordinary expenditures during recent years. Actual expenditure under the ordinary budget rose from 68.24 million escudos in 1963 to 78.98 million escudos in 1965 and an estimated 85.84 million escudos in 1966. Extraordinary expenditure, mainly for the im-

plementation of development plans, rose from 52.99 million escudos in 1964 to 54.63 million escudos in 1965. The allocation for 1966 was 72.95 million escudos.<sup>121</sup>

399. For 1965, Cape Verde contributed 1.7 million escudos towards a total expenditure of 23.8 million escudos on the armed services in the Territory, the remainder being paid from Portugal's budget and from the Overseas Military Defence Fund. Estimated expenditure on defence in 1967 amounts to 19.7 million escudos, of which 2 million is chargeable to the Territory (Orders 22,455; 22,460 and 22,496 of 16 and 31 January 1967). Other budgetary allocations included 10.36 million (12 per cent of the ordinary budget) for education and 7.9 million (9.1 per cent) for public health.

400. Because the Territory has so few resources, extraordinary expenditure, mainly for development, is financed almost entirely by loans from metropolitan Portugal with the result that the ordinary budget must bear a growing charge for servicing of the public debt, amounting to 2.9 million escudos (3.3 per cent of the ordinary budget) in 1966.

401. *Development financing.* Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 347 million escudos was allocated to Cape Verde: 137 million escudos under the first plan and 210 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated more than half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads, the second largest allocations going to agriculture including, especially, irrigation projects. With supplementary allocations, actual expenditure came to 374 million escudos.

402. The pattern of investment planned under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 shows a new orientation in the economic development of the Territory. The plan allocates a total of 500 million escudos to be invested during the three-year period, of which 258 million escudos, or more than half, is for the development of the fishing industry, other sectors receiving much smaller investment targets, namely: 70 million escudos (14 per cent) for transport and communications; 18 million (3 per cent) for education; 30 million (6 per cent) for public health; and 42 million (5.4 per cent) for agriculture.

403. Expenditure under the plan in 1965 amounted to 54.6 million escudos, or 18.4 million escudos less than the original appropriation. Of the original appropriation, the largest allocation was for roads (20 million), followed by ports and navigation facilities (20 million), agriculture (8 million), public health (6 million) and industries (5 million).

404. Because of the increasing burden of public debt servicing on Cape Verde's slender economy, a decree (Decree 46,683) of 3 December 1965 authorized the Portuguese Ministry of Finance to make interest-free loans, repayable over twenty-four years, for implementing the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967. Accordingly, expenditure during 1967, which will amount to 70 million escudos, is being provided in the form of a "reimbursable subsidy" (Order 7,496 of 19 March 1966). Of this sum, 21.5 million escudos are to be used for housing and municipal improvements, 17 million for transport and communica-

<sup>121</sup> Due to carry-overs, there are considerable discrepancies between estimated and actual expenditures on development for any given year.

tions (including 6 million for harbours and 5 million for roads), 11.7 million for agriculture, reafforestation and livestock, 4 million for electricity supplies, 6 million for public health, 5 million for education and 1.25 million for new transforming industries.

#### *Educational conditions*

405. According to the most recent statistics available (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, May 1966), there were in 1964 a total of 427 primary school classrooms,<sup>122</sup> of which 200 were in primary schools *strictu sensu* and 227 were in rural schools (*postos escolares*). The total number of primary teachers was reported to be 549 and the number of children enrolled 24,334, indicating an average ratio of 53 pupils per teacher and 57 children per classroom. This would seem to imply a substantial recent improvement in primary facilities since, according to a semi-official study,<sup>123</sup> the ratio in 1960-1961 on the island of Santiago was 325 children per class and 207 per teacher.

406. At the secondary level there were, according to the same statistics, two grammar (*liceal*) schools with 52 teachers and 1,103 pupils and three technical professional schools with 454 pupils (one of the three being an agricultural school). There was also a religious seminary with 60 students. Above the secondary level, there were no institutions other than government training courses, all post-secondary education being given outside the Territory on government scholarships, of which 35 were granted in 1964.

407. If the above statistics are correct, they represent an increase of 120 primary classes and 5,741 pupils enrolled at the primary level since the preceding year (these may include adult literacy classes). This increase is probably due to the introduction in 1964 of compulsory primary education. At the secondary level, there was an increase in pupil enrolments of 27 in the two grammar (*liceal*) schools and 39 in the three technical professional schools.

408. No statistics are available for the years after 1964, but it may be noted that of the total investment target of 18 million escudos for education contained in the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 2.5 million escudos was allocated for expenditure in 1965 and 5 million escudos in 1966. The programme for 1966 provided for the construction of nineteen new schools, most of them rural school posts (*postos escolares*). A decision was also taken to establish a primary teachers' training school in the Territory, the cost of which would be shared by other overseas Territories.

#### *Public health*

409. There is very little new information concerning public health in Cape Verde. In March 1966, it was reported that, following a study of hospital facilities and needs in the Territory, plans had been completed for the construction of new central hospitals on the islands of São Vicente and Praia and of a psychiatric hospital at Pedra Badejo, which will serve the whole Territory. The plans also provide for expansion of the existing hospitals on Sal (to meet needs resulting from the existence of the Espargas airport) and

<sup>122</sup> According to a report (*Boletim Geral do Ultramar*, January-February 1966) special measures were taken to expand primary school facilities because of an alarming rise in illiteracy.

<sup>123</sup> Idídio do Amaral, "Santiago de Cabo Verde", *Memórias da Junta de Investigações do Ultramar* (No. 48), Lisbon 1964, p. 318.

at Ribeira Grande. Study is at present being given to hospital facilities needed for the treatment of tuberculosis.

## 6. SÃO TOMÉ AND PRÍNCIPE

### *General*

410. The two islands of São Tomé and Príncipe are situated in the Gulf of Biafra, west of the Republic of Gabon. Their total area is 964 square kilometres, and they lie between 1°44'N and 0°1'S latitude and 6°28'EG and 7°28'EG longitude. São Tomé and Príncipe are volcanic islands. The area of São Tomé is 854 square kilometres; the area of Príncipe, which lies about 120 kilometres north of São Tomé, is 110 square kilometres.

411. According to the 1950 census, the population of São Tomé was 55,827 and that of Príncipe was 4,332, a total of 60,159. The provisional 1960 census figures give the total population as 63,485, of whom 58,880 were in São Tomé and 4,605 in Príncipe. In 1960, about 60 per cent of the population were considered to be "autoctone"; the remainder were from Portugal and other "national" territories, mainly Angola, Cape Verde and Mozambique, including 2,655 Europeans. The local (*autoctone*) population is of mixed origin; it includes descendents of the original settlers, elements from Gabon and other parts of the Guinea coast and "Angolares" from Angola.

### *Government and administration*

412. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, São Tomé and Príncipe are considered to be a province of Portugal. Their Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,373).<sup>124</sup>

413. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory comprises two *concelhos* (São Tomé and Príncipe), which are divided into *freguesias* (parishes). The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of thirteen members, of whom three are *ex officio*, seven are elected by "organic" groups and three are elected directly.<sup>125</sup> There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which comprises the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, three *ex officio* members, and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the *freguesias*.

414. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. Electoral registers organized for the first time under the 1963 electoral law (Decree 45,408 of 6 December) resulted in a 20 per cent increase in the number of people entitled to vote. However, no actual figures are available. For reference, it may be recalled that in the 1956 elections to the National Assembly only about 4,400 people voted, which was about one tenth of the population then listed as assimilated (A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 203).

<sup>124</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

<sup>125</sup> For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VI, paras. 46-53.

415. In contrast to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, the Native Statute has never applied to São Tomé and Príncipe. Although since the end of the last century the local inhabitants have been considered Portuguese citizens governed by Portuguese civil law, at the 1950 census, two thirds of the population were classified as assimilated and one third as non-assimilated. Since the last census in 1960, no distinction is made between assimilated and non-assimilated persons.

#### *Economic conditions*

416. *General.* Plantation agriculture is the main economic activity and traditionally cocoa has been the most important export crop, followed now by coffee, copra, oil palm and coconuts. Because of the concentration on cash crops for export and because there are few industries, the Territory has to import most of its food (including wheat flour, rice, dried fish, sugar and maize) as well as manufactured goods such as textiles and tobacco.

417. In the last few years, government policy has aimed at establishing the economy on a broader basis by introducing new crops and encouraging the development of fisheries and transforming industries.

418. *External trade and payments.* São Tomé and Príncipe have traditionally had a sizeable foreign trade surplus. In the peak years 1953 and 1954, when exports amounted to almost 250 million escudos, imports were only about half of that amount and the trade surplus exceeded 120 million escudos. However, by 1960, the surplus balance had dropped to 76 million escudos. Since then, the trade balance has further deteriorated. Over the period 1961-1964, due to a continued drop in the quantity of the principal exports and to falling market prices, total exports averaged less than 160 million escudos annually. In 1965, the value of exports was 146 million escudos, which left a trade surplus of only 1 million escudos, an all-time low.

419. The Territory's trade is now mostly within the escudo zone. Since 1961, Portugal's share in the Ter-

ritory's trade has increased and in 1965 accounted for 48 per cent of its imports and 55 per cent of its exports. Angola supplied another 20 per cent of the Territory's imports, followed by the Netherlands (5 per cent), the Federal Republic of Germany (4 per cent), and the United Kingdom and the United States (3 per cent each). After Portugal, the Netherlands is the Territory's next most important client, taking 21 per cent of its exports in 1965.

420. São Tomé and Príncipe's balance of payments surplus increased from 15.8 million escudos in 1963 to 28.4 million escudos in 1964 and 34.7 million escudos in 1965. In 1965, the Territory's invisible receipts included private transfers (48.8 million escudos) and remittances to the Territory from the central Government for development (amounting to 31.3 million escudos).

421. *Agriculture, forestry and livestock.* Agricultural activity in São Tomé and Príncipe is concentrated in some 150 large companies which own 90 per cent of the cultivated land. Most of the export crops are grown on large plantations with paid labour which used to be recruited mainly from Angola. As a result of the changes introduced in labour recruitment in Angola and the 1962 Rural Labour Code, São Tomé and Príncipe has experienced a shortage of agricultural workers which has affected production. Part of the local population is engaged in small-scale farming but most of it is underemployed (see below).

422. In the period 1963-1965, copra and coconuts accounted for an average of 92 per cent of the value of the annual exports. In 1965, cocoa accounted for 58 per cent, copra 24 per cent and coconuts about 10 per cent. Coffee exports dropped from 202 tons in 1963 to 168 tons in 1965, but the value rose from 4.8 to 5.6 million escudos. Palm oil exports, which had dropped about 12 per cent since 1963, amounted in 1965 to 871 tons, valued at 4.4 million escudos. In recent years the Territory has begun to export some quinquina and cinnamon, as well as bananas and pineapples.

423. The output of principal crops (in metric tons) for the period 1963-1965 is shown in the table below:

<i>Year</i>	<i>Cocoa</i>	<i>Copra</i>	<i>Bananas</i>	<i>Coconuts</i>	<i>Palm oil</i>	<i>Coffee</i>
1963 .....	0,541	5,304	3,069	2,096	1,640	256
1964 .....	7,995	6,001	4,926	1,813	1,371	196
1965 .....	10,577	6,970	...	1,989	1,732	214

*Source:* Banco Nacional Ultramarino, S.A.R.L., *Boletim Trimestral* (No. 66/67), Lisbon, 1966.

424. The drop in the export price of cocoa from an average of 20,000 escudos per ton in 1955-1958 to 10,000 escudos per ton in 1965 has seriously affected the economy of the Territory. Despite government measures to provide relief by reducing export duties and introducing new credit facilities, many companies were reported in 1966 to have transferred their operations to Angola.

425. In 1966, new legislation was introduced to regulate timber exploitation (Governor's Order 3,994 of 28 April). Annual licences are now issued which in each case specify the quantities of timber that may be cut and exported. These regulations, however, do not apply to farmers who own less than 10 hectares of land.

426. Timber exports may be prohibited in order to assure the satisfactory supply of the local market. Minimum export prices are fixed by the Territory's Governor. A tax (*taxa de exploração*) varying from 20 to 50 escudos per cubic metre is levied on timber for export.

427. Livestock are kept mainly for local consumption. In 1965 there were 4,459 hogs, 3,025 oxen, 2,652 sheep, 1,300 goats and 480 horses.

428. In 1963, it was estimated that only about 2,000 of the local population were employed on the plantations and some 20,000 were probably engaged in farming on their own account. In order to increase production and stimulate economic activity, the Government is encouraging the development of more small-

scale farming by acquiring land from private owners and turning it over to individual small farmers. This scheme, which is estimated to cost about 70,000 escudos per family, is being financed out of the allocation of 30 million escudos for agriculture under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967.

429. The Government is also trying to encourage the permanent settlement of agricultural workers from other Territories. Under the labour legislation of 1948 (Decree 36,888 of 28 May), the territorial Government is responsible for building villages for workers who "in accordance with their background, appear to be able to become independent farmers". During the 1950s, the Government built two villages, Riba Santana and Neves, where workers have been provided with housing and plots for cultivation free of charge. In 1965, the Government decided to open these houses and the attached plots (*terrenos*) to individual ownership (Governor's Order 3,767 of 6 May). The heads of family who so desire may purchase their houses and plots in monthly instalments over periods of up to ten years. Prices of houses and plots are fixed at 6,000 escudos for small properties, 7,200 escudos for medium properties and 8,400 escudos for large properties. Those who do not want to purchase their houses and plots may stay on free of charge, provided they keep their houses in good condition and cultivate their plots.

430. Two government credit institutions have been created to provide loans for agricultural and livestock schemes: a fund for development of small agricultural and industrial undertakings (Fundo de Fomento de Pequenas Empresas Agrícolas e Industriais) and a special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito de São Tomé e Príncipe).

431. The fund for development of small enterprises was established in 1964 (Legislative Instrument 695 of 24 September). The fund may itself purchase or guarantee the purchase of tools and equipment for agricultural and industrial schemes or provide loans for such activities. The maximum loan is 12,000 escudos (less than \$US500) repayable in 16 months at 2 per cent annual interest. For 1966, the fund's budgetary resources totalled 510,097 escudos (compared with 251,000 escudos in 1965). The special loan fund (Caixa de Crédito) was authorized in 1965 to provide loans for agriculture, livestock raising, industry (including mining and fishing) and building construction (including housing).<sup>126</sup>

432. In 1966 (Legislative Instrument 716), the Caixa was established on a provisional basis under the authority of the Governor, who may determine the credit policy to be adopted. Under its present regulations, the Caixa grants short term loans of up to one year for the purpose of financing exports or purchase of supplies, such as fertilizers, insecticides, etc., by agricultural and industrial companies; medium term loans (up to eight years and 90 per cent of the value of the total investment) for development projects including the establishment of new plantations, purchase of equipment and cattle, irrigation, installation or remodeling of industrial units, purchase of boats and fishing equipment and other investments, including mining; long-term loans (up to 20 years and 60 per cent of the value) for the building of houses in São Tomé, Santo António do Príncipe and "classified" villages (*vilas e povoações classificadas*). The fund is to be financed from the Territory's own resources and by local savings.

433. There is also a special housing development fund for the low-income groups (Fundo de Fomento de Habitação para classes economicamente débeis). The fund may provide guarantees for the purchase of construction material, purchase directly construction material to be loaned and it may build villages and urban housing projects. Guarantees and loans may be granted for families with a maximum annual income of 25,000 escudos. The maximum value of loans is 15,000 escudos.

434. *Industry.* Industrial activity in São Tomé and Príncipe is mainly limited to the processing of agricultural products. Apart from the extraction of palm oil and the processing of cocoa and coffee for export, there are a few small factories, including manufactures of soft drinks, soap, tiles and sawmills. Although no allocations were made to the industrial sector under the first and second national development plans, the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 allocates 12 million escudos for the establishment of new industries, including three cocoa processing factories and three factories for the extraction of palm oil.

435. *Mining.* In February 1967 (Decree 47,549), exclusive rights were granted to a company to be formed by Mr. Manuel Rodrigues Lagos to prospect for petroleum, ozocerite, asphalt and natural gases. The terms of the concession are similar to those of the mining concessions in Angola and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea.<sup>127</sup> The concession area includes the total area of the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe (except for a central area on São Tomé island) and their continental shelves. The exclusive prospecting rights are for three years and are extendible for another five years; the exploitation rights are granted for fifty years, extendible for another twenty years. The new company is to be organized under Portuguese law and it will have an initial capital of 30 million escudos which may be increased up to 100 million escudos. Ten per cent of the capital will be given to the Territory. The concessionaire will pay a surface rent of 350 escudos per square kilometre during the first three years, 500 escudos during the fourth and fifth years, 750 escudos during the sixth, seventh and eighth years, and 1,000 escudos from the ninth year on. When the exploitation of a deposit begins, the surface rent of the area demarcated for this exploitation becomes 1,000 escudos per square kilometre irrespective of how long the company has been prospecting. The company is required to invest a minimum of 30 million escudos during the initial period of the prospecting concession (three years), 30 million escudos during the first extension of this period (two years) and a minimum to be fixed by the Government (but not more than 30 million escudos) during the second extension (three years). The territorial Government will receive a royalty of 12.5 per cent of the sales value and 50 per cent of the company's profits, and it will have the right to purchase up to 37.5 per cent of the quantity of crude oil produced each year. The company will pay 500,000 escudos a year to the Mining Development Fund when established; this amount is included in the minimum investments required. As in other similar contracts, the company is exempt from "duties, imposts or taxes, whatever their name or nature, whether national, provincial or municipal, present or future". On imported equipment, the company will pay only the sta-

<sup>127</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, appendix, annex I.

<sup>126</sup> See A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 218.

tistical tax of one per cent *ad valorem* and the stamp tax on customs clearance documents.

436. *Fisheries.* The development of fishing is a new trend in São Tomé and Príncipe. An industrial fishing centre is to be established in the Territory by fishing companies of Cape Verde. The first fleet of forty-three motor boats, which will replace the fishing canoes, began operation in 1966. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 15 million escudos (8 per cent of the total) were allocated to fisheries development for the first time. Of this, 4 million escudos are for research and technical assistance, 2.5 million escudos for improvement of equipment and 8.5 million escudos for the organization of local supply. It is hoped that the fish available for local consumption will be sufficient to meet the needs now supplied by dried fish imports, which have to be paid for in other than local currency.

437. *Transport and communications.* The largest allocations under the various development plans for São Tomé and Príncipe have been for transport and communications. A total of 137 million escudos was allocated to transport and communications under the first two development plans. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 42.5 million escudos representing 24 per cent of the total is allocated to this sector. Of this total 30 million escudos are for roads, 1 million escudos for ports and navigation, 9 million escudos for air transport and airports, and 2.5 million escudos for telecommunications.

438. In 1964, the Territory had 323 kilometres of public roads, to which there is being added a road linking the airport to the main town in Príncipe and a road around the island of São Tomé. Both roads were to have been completed in 1966.

439. The two principal harbours are Ana Chaves on São Tomé and Santo António on Príncipe. Shipping entering these harbours has averaged about one million tons annually since 1950. Up to 1964, port facilities at Ana Chaves could only handle 600 tons of cargo a day and ships drawing up to three metres, so that larger ships had to remain at sea while goods and passengers were ferried to land. In 1965, facilities at Ana Chaves were being improved to accommodate larger ships.

440. There is an airport on São Tomé, an airfield at Porto Alegre (São Tomé island), and on Príncipe. The São Tomé airport is a strategic stopover between Portugal and Angola and Mozambique. It was completed in 1964 and can be used by jet planes in an emergency. It is jointly maintained and operated by funds from Angola, Mozambique and São Tomé and Príncipe. Annual maintenance is 4 million escudos, of which Angola and Mozambique are each to pay 1.7 million escudos and São Tomé and Príncipe 600,000 escudos (see A/6300/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 213).

441. *Public finance.* São Tomé and Príncipe's annual ordinary budget increased from 57.2 million escudos in 1959 to 70 million escudos in 1963. The budget estimates for 1967 amount to 77.2 million escudos which represents a 10 per cent increase over 1963 and a 35 per cent increase over 1959. Export duties have been the main source of increased revenue. However, this increase has been partially offset by a drop in the revenues from various services. Other items have remained stable. Almost all the extraordinary budget is for financing development.

442. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide 9.4 million escudos for public debt servicing, 23.3 million es-

culos for general administration, including 6 million escudos (some 8 per cent of the total) for education, and 8 million escudos (some 10 per cent of the total) for health.

443. Estimated expenditure on the Territory's armed services for 1967 amounts to 10.5 million escudos for the armed forces, including 7.4 million escudos for the army, 2.3 million escudos for the navy and 846,000 escudos for the air force. The Territory's total share in these defence expenditures is 5.5 million escudos.

444. *Development financing.* Although between 1955 and 1964, a total of 305 million escudos was allocated to the Territory under the two national development plans, of the original 150 million escudos allocated under the first plan, only 60.8 million escudos were actually spent. Under the second plan the original allocation of 155 million escudos was subsequently increased to 216.2 million escudos, and of this sum 213 million escudos were spent.

445. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total of 180 million escudos has been allocated for development projects in the Territory. As in the case of the other small Territories under Portuguese administration, the entire amount is to be financed from annual loans from Portugal at 4 per cent interest, repayable in twenty-four annual instalments after the fifth year (Decree 46,683 of 3 December 1965).

446. Implementation of the Transitional Development Plan has also been slow. In 1965, for instance, an allocation of 55.4 million escudos was made for development (36 million escudos from Portugal and 19.4 million escudos brought forward from the unspent balance from the previous year), but only 33.6 million escudos were actually spent.

447. As has been noted above, the largest allocation under the Transitional Development Plan for São Tomé and Príncipe is for transport and communications, representing 42.5 per cent of the total. Allocations for agriculture, forestry and cattle raising amount to 30 million escudos (17 per cent); education and public welfare, 15 million escudos (8 per cent); and housing, 3 million escudos (1.6 per cent).

#### *Educational conditions*

448. The latest education statistics show that the total primary school enrolment in government and private schools rose by 15 per cent, from 4,992 in 1963 to 5,738 in 1964. These figures appear to indicate a new trend in the Government's education policy because, although the Territory has had compulsory primary education for many years, between 1950 and 1960, school enrolment increased only slightly more than 20 per cent, from 2,202 to 2,864. Further evidence of the Government's interest was the creation in 1965 of a territorial Department of Education.

449. According to the Government, in 1966, almost all the children of school age were enrolled in school and as a result it had become necessary to employ as teachers persons who did not have adequate training. In order to remedy this situation the Government has established special courses for training school monitors and teachers for school posts (Legislative Instrument 727 of 3 February 1966). It was reported subsequently that enrolment in government primary schools alone was 6,000 at the beginning of the 1966-1967 school year.

450. There are no recent school statistics. In 1964, the latest year for which such data are available, there were a total of 30 primary schools, of which 14 were government schools with 103 teachers and 4,370 pupils, and 16 were private schools with 30 teachers and 1,368 pupils. In addition there was one academic secondary school (*liceu*) with 35 teachers and 601 students, and an elementary vocational school with 7 teachers and 93 students. In 1965, a new technical elementary school was established, and the Territory received from Portugal 250,000 escudos towards the building and equipment of an elementary agricultural school.

451. The Territory provides scholarships for university studies in Portugal. For the school year 1966-1967, the budgetary allocation for various scholarships amounted to 86,000 escudos, compared with 151,500 for the preceding year.

## 7. MACAU AND DEPENDENCIES

### *General*

452. Macau is located on the south coast of China, on the west side of the Canton River. It is almost directly opposite Hong Kong, which is thirty-five miles away. The total area of the Territory is about 15.5 square kilometres comprising a peninsular area and two small islands, Taipa and Colowan.

453. Most of the population is Chinese but the exact number is not known. At the time of the 1960 census, the resident population was 169,299 of whom about 8,000 were Portuguese. In 1966, the population was estimated to be between 250,000 and 300,000.

### *Government and administration*

454. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Macau is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute is contained in Decree 45,377 of 22 November 1963.<sup>128</sup>

455. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Cape Verde (see paras. 369 and 370). The Territory comprises two *concelhos*; for the purpose of elections to the National Assembly, which last took place in 1965, the Territory constitutes one electoral district.

456. The Legislative Council, which was established for the first time under the 1963 Political and Administrative Statute, consists of twelve members, of whom three are *ex officio*, one is nominated by the Governor to represent the Chinese community, and eight are elected (three by direct suffrage and the other five by special interest groups). Macau is the only Territory in which there is a nominated member in the Legislative Council, probably because most of the Chinese would be excluded from standing for elections to the Council, since candidates must be "original" Portuguese citizens (*cidadão português originário*). There is also a Government Council similar to that in Cape Verde with the exception that one of the members has to be the president of the municipal council of Macau.

457. There is a municipal council in each of the two *concelhos*. The members of these councils are elected

<sup>128</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the subsequent section on the Territory.

according to law with due representation of Chinese interests. The Governor may also nominate two members of the Chinese community to each council. There is no information on the last elections.

### *Status of the Territory*

458. Portugal has always recognized and accepted the Chinese character of Macau and the role of the Portuguese administration has been mainly one of maintaining law and order. The Chinese population own and operate most of the business, schools and hospitals in the Territory. Even though the Portuguese Government claims that "the existence of Macau as a land subject to Portuguese sovereignty" is based on past treaties, the Portuguese realize, as Prime Minister Salazar said in 1961, that "if we leave the sphere of legality and take into account other factors, it is true that whatever resistance we might make, Macau would finally be absorbed by China, on which it depends in its daily life".<sup>129</sup>

459. The reality of this situation was underlined by developments since December 1966. The trouble began in November when Portuguese police used force to disband a group of Chinese who were purportedly attempting to build a school on Taipa without authorization. Early in December, when organized demonstrations were held to protest the official action, police opened fire, with the result that eight persons were killed and over 100 persons were wounded. Subsequently, the Macau Government imposed a curfew and called out troops (total strength estimated at some 3,000) armed with automatic weapons, who joined in patrolling the streets with squads of police similarly armed.

460. The riots were followed by further demonstrations and demands by local Chinese leaders. Among other conditions, the Portuguese authorities in Macau were asked to: apologize to the Chinese residents and the families of the victims; punish the four officials (the army commander, the police commandant and his deputy, and the acting administrator of Taipa Island) who were held responsible for the deaths which had occurred; pay compensation to the families of the victims; suppress the activities of groups supporting the Republic of China; and hand over seven Chinese held in the Territory who were accused of intelligence activities.

461. As the Portuguese authorities in Macau did not agree immediately to all the conditions, further demonstrations and unrest continued through December 1966 and part of January 1967. One of the main difficulties was reported to be the wording of a statement the Governor was asked to sign. Late in January 1967, some Macau residents began to take economic measures against the Portuguese, refusing to sell them food, boycotting Portuguese-run buses and refusing to pay taxes to the local government. It was also announced that water and electricity supplies to Portuguese residents would be cut off but, before this happened, an agreement was reached at the end of January on the settlement of the incident.

462. In the agreement which was finally signed by the Governor, the Macau Government is reported to have "admitted the guilt" of the Portuguese officials in the eight deaths during the riots and it was acknow-

<sup>129</sup> Oliveira Salazar, "The Portuguese Overseas Territories and the United Nations Organization" (speech delivered on 3 June 1961, Lisbon), quoted in A/AC.108/L.12, para. 8.

ledged for the first time that the officials concerned had been sent back to Lisbon "for trial". In addition to apologizing to the eight families, the Macau Government agreed to pay hospital expenses and compensation totalling \$US360,000. It also agreed to turn back refugees entering the Territory, to put a stop to activities of groups in sympathy with the Republic of China and to hand over the seven men who were accused of being political agents.

463. Since then, various Chinese schools, trade unions and refugee centres have been given notice to close down. By the end of February, several groups of refugees seeking asylum in Macau had been turned back to the authorities on the mainland of China (including one group of five persons on 10 February and a second group of nine refugees later in the same month). The Republic of China has filed several protests with the Portuguese Government over the new policy of returning mainland Chinese refugees. In February and again in April, the Permanent Representative of the Republic of China to the United Nations addressed communications to the Secretary-General, with a request that they be circulated to all Member States, protesting that the return of refugees is contrary to international practice and in total disregard of human rights and specifically constitutes a flagrant violation of the principle of "non-refoulement" embodied in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, to which Portugal is a Contracting State.

464. Portugal rejects these charges. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General in March 1967, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Portugal to the United Nations stated that the Portuguese Government "is certain that it has not violated any humanitarian principles nor shown any disrespect for international conventions". The communication went on to say that the measures taken were within the competence of any Government and were taken to prevent illicit activities by persons who styled themselves refugees but whose true purpose was to endanger the security of lives and property.

465. At the opening of the Legislative Council meeting in April 1967, the Governor noted that while the good understanding of the local population, both Chinese and Portuguese, had made it possible to settle the crisis, some changes would have to be introduced. He stressed that the Government's policy in Macau would continue to be a realistic one—as it had always been—based on good neighbourliness and that hostile acts against the People's Republic of China would not be permitted.

466. According to the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (A/6311/Rev.1, paras. 162-165), there were 75,000 Chinese refugees in Macau at the beginning of 1965 and some 80,000 by the end of that year. In addition to assistance provided by local voluntary agencies, the local government and the UNHCR also provided help to enable the refugees to become self-supporting.

467. In 1965, assistance provided by UNHCR amounted to \$US170,000. Of this sum, \$US65,000 was for building a causeway which provided employment for a large number of workers including a majority of refugees (including \$US10,000 for the extension of a refugee-rehabilitation centre); and \$US105,000 was given for the construction of housing. In 1966, UNHCR provided \$US184,000 which again included an allocation for \$US100,000 for the construction of 122 apart-

ments. Another amount of \$US100,000 has been approved for 1967 to continue assistance to the local housing projects. In addition, \$US24,000 will be provided for the extension of a school and \$US21,000 out of a two-year allocation of \$US42,000 for vocational training, bringing the total 1967 allocation to \$US145,000.

#### *Economic conditions*

468. Because of its location, Macau's main economic asset is its harbour which in the past has made the Territory an important gateway for *entrepôt* trade with China. As there is little land available, agricultural activities are limited mainly to horticulture and the Territory is therefore dependent on imports from the mainland for almost all of its food. There is some fishing which is partly for local consumption.

469. Since the early 1950s, the economic structure of the Territory has gradually been undergoing a change as a result of new trends in trade movements and the growth of local manufacturing industries financed by Chinese capital. Tourism which has increased in the last few years is believed to have considerable potential. According to estimates made in 1964 of the Territory's gross national product the most important sectors were then, in order of importance, salaries and wages, small business (*rendimento das empresas não constituídas em sociedades*), income from property, and government income from its private domain and enterprises (*rendimento do estado proveniente do seu domínio privado e empresas*).

470. *Trade.* As a result of the increase in the number of established industries, the value of the Territory's exports rose from about one third to approximately one half of the value of its total merchandise imports between 1960 and 1965. Trade in gold has continued to play an important role in the economy of the Territory (it is reported that gold is taxed at the rate of \$US.04 per gram and that this source provides about one sixth of the Territory's annual revenue); but whereas in 1960 the value of the gold traded exceeded that of the merchandise trade by about 20 per cent, in 1965 it was 20 per cent less, amounting to only 1,430 million escudos, compared with merchandise valued at 1,970 million escudos.

471. Unlike the African Territories under Portuguese administration, Macau's trade with Portugal is almost negligible, though its exports to Angola and Mozambique have substantially increased since 1961, with the gradual removal of trade barriers within the escudo zone (see paras. 40-45). In 1965, over 25 per cent of its total exports were traded within the escudo zone, of which 2.7 per cent went to Portugal and over 22 per cent went to other Territories, principally Angola and Mozambique. Macau has a particularly close trade relation with Hong Kong from which, in an average year, it obtains about two thirds of its imports (776 million escudos out of a total of 1,205 million escudos in 1963) and which takes about one third of its exports (180 million escudos out of a total of 600 million escudos in 1963). However, since Hong Kong is also a trans-shipment point, these statistics probably conceal to some extent the true origin and destination of some of the merchandise trade.

472. *Fishing.* Fishing is one of the Territory's main economic activities, and a considerable number of the local population are fishermen. Most of the fishing boats are now motorized, and fuel for the boats is supplied by the port authorities at a special rate. The catch

of fish increased from 7,336 tons in 1961 to 9,462 tons in 1965. About one third of the fish is consumed locally; the rest, which is exported, accounts on the average for about 13 per cent by value of the Territory's merchandise exports.

473. *Industry.* Macau has a wide range of light manufacturing industries, most of which, except for the manufacture of fireworks and matches, have been established since the early 1950s. In 1965, industrial production was valued at almost 500 million escudos, of which about 65 per cent was accounted for by furniture and another 15 per cent by non-metallic (mostly plastic) manufactures. Food, drink, tobacco, clothing, shoes and paper articles make up the rest of the industries. During 1965, thirty new industries were established, including two factories for the manufacture of non-alcoholic beverages (with a capital of 2.8 million escudos); one textile factory (capital, 1.1 million escudos); twenty-one clothing and footwear factories (with a combined capital of 2.1 million escudos); a leather factory (1 million escudos); and a chemical industry (550,000 escudos).

474. As in Angola, the present system of payments within the escudo zone (see paras. 46-53) has also created difficulties for traders in Macau. At the opening session of the Legislative Council in April 1967, the Governor said that the Government was aware of the situation and was trying to work out a solution which would at least make it possible for Macau to continue to trade with Angola and Mozambique.

475. *Transport and communications.* The Territory has two ports, an inner port located between Macau and Lapa and an outer port between Macau and the island of Taipa which has large modern wharves that serve hydroplanes and various ships. A separate harbour is used for the hydrofoil service between Hong Kong and Macau. However, large ships have to remain over one mile outside the harbour and their cargo is transported to land by barges.

476. Between 1960 and 1964, the number of ships visiting the Territory rose from 3,289 to 6,728 and the tonnage from just under 2 million tons to over 3 million tons. Slightly less than one third of the total allocations under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 will be spent on improving transport and communications of the Territory, including dredging of the harbour, improving wharf facilities and acquiring eight hydrofoils for a new service to and from Hong Kong.

477. *Public finance.* During the past ten years, Macau's ordinary budgetary expenditure has been rising by an average of about 20 per cent annually (from 91.5 million escudos in 1955 to 297 million escudos in 1964). Extraordinary expenditure, however, has fluctuated, dropping from 44.2 million escudos in 1955 to 12.4 million escudos in 1960 and rising to 39.6 million escudos in 1964. The 1967 budgetary estimates provide for a total ordinary and extraordinary expenditure of 257 million escudos (Macau Legislative Instrument No. 1,730 of 31 December 1966). Of the total, less than 3 per cent is for education, about 7.3 per cent for public health and about 9.3 per cent for public security police, the local PIDE force and the volunteer corps. In addition, 28.1 million escudos are allocated for the Territory's share in military expenditures including 26.9 million escudos for the Army (Order 22,453 of 16 January 1967) and 1.2 million escudos for the Navy (Order 22,458 of 16 January 1967). The entire military

budget is to be paid out of the Territory's local resources and its contribution to the Overseas Defence Fund.<sup>130</sup>

478. *Development financing.* Under the two previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 300 million escudos was allocated to Macau: 120 million escudos under the first plan and 180 million escudos under the second plan. Both plans allocated almost half of the total sums to be invested to the improvement of harbour facilities and roads and urbanization; town hygiene received the remaining allocations under the first plan and 12 per cent of the total under the second plan, which also allocated 30 per cent to development of resources and industries and 11 per cent to school buildings and hospitals.

479. According to official estimates from 1959 to 1962, planned investments amounted to 162.8 million escudos, but only 156.8 million escudos were authorized and only 51.8 per cent of this amount (84.3 million escudos) was actually spent.<sup>131</sup>

480. The pattern of investment under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 aims at: improvement of the electrical power and port facilities; improvement of health, education, and housing and sanitation; creation of conditions to enable Macau to become a commercial *entrepôt* in the Orient for products from the escudo zone; development of tourism; and improvement of fishing, horticulture and aviculture. Of the 660 million escudos to be spent during the three-year period, about 30 per cent is for developing tourism, another 30 per cent for improvement of ports, harbours and transport, and 24.5 per cent for housing and local improvement.

481. During 1966, several allocations were authorized under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 which included over 15 million escudos for housing and local improvements, 1.8 million escudos for transport and communications, about 1 million escudos for studies and surveys, and 880,000 escudos for improving agriculture, irrigation and settlement.

#### *Educational conditions*

482. The Territory has two school systems, an official one similar to those in other Territories and a Chinese school system, financed and run by the Chinese community and in which more than half of the student body is enrolled. Although the primary education reform of 1964, which introduced compulsory primary education, has been extended to the Territory, with modifications, school attendance is not a main problem, since already in 1962 over 90 per cent of the school-age children were enrolled in school. The greatest need has been to provide enough school buildings and teachers, but this has been met by private sources as, on the average, less than 3 per cent of the Territory's budget is for education supplemented by an approximately equal amount in subsidies to missions, while under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 just over 1 per cent is allocated for this purpose.

483. The latest available school statistics (1964) show that out of a total enrolment of 56,104 pupils, 33,386 were in Chinese schools (27,890 in primary, 5,477 in secondary and 19 in special schools). Of the

<sup>130</sup> Only Angola and Mozambique are also responsible for the full share of the territorial military budgets; in all the other small Territories Portugal also bears a share of the cost.

<sup>131</sup> Portugal, *Planeamento e Integração Económica, Boletim do Secretariado Técnico da Presidência do Conselho*, October 1964, p. 37.



22,718 pupils enrolled in the official school system, there were 3,415 in kindergarten; 13,796 in primary schools; 5,146 in secondary schools; 80 in higher secondary schools and 281 others including 133 in public service training courses. Over 90 per cent of the primary and secondary pupils were enrolled in private or missionary schools.

## 8. TIMOR AND DEPENDENCIES

### General

484. The island of Timor is located at the tip of the chain of islands forming the Republic of Indonesia. It lies between 8°17'S and 10°22'S latitude and between 127°19'EG and 123°25'EG longitude. The western part of the island is part of the Republic of Indonesia. The eastern part, administered by Portugal, includes an area of about 18,990 square kilometres and comprises also the enclave of Oé-cussi (Ocússi) and Ambeno, the island of Atauro off the north coast and the small uninhabited island of Jacó off the extreme eastern tip.

485. According to the 1950 census, the population of Timor was 442,378, of whom 568 were persons of European origin, 2,022 *mestiços* and 3,128 Chinese. There were 436,448 indigenous inhabitants, almost 98 per cent of whom (434,907) were listed as *não civilizado*. According to the 1960 preliminary census figures, the population was 517,079.

### Government and administration

486. Under the Portuguese Constitution and the Overseas Organic Law of 1963, Timor is considered to be a province of Portugal. Its Political and Administrative Statute was published on 22 November 1963 (Decree 45,378).<sup>132</sup>

487. The governmental and administrative framework is similar to that of Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea (see paras. 318-320). The Territory, which in 1960 comprised one *concelho* (Dili) and nine *circunscrições*, is now divided into ten *concelhos* (Baucau, Bobanaro, Cova Lima, Dili, Ermera, Lautém, Manatulo, Same, Viqueque and Ainaro) and one *circunscrição* (Oé-cussi). Nevertheless, most of the rural areas are still organized as *regedorias*, implying a traditional form of administration by *regedores*. For purposes of elections to the National Assembly, the Territory constitutes one electoral district. The Legislative Council, which is presided over by the Governor, consists of fourteen members, of whom three are *ex officio*, eight are elected by corporative groups and three are elected directly.<sup>133</sup> There are no workers' or employees' interests represented. There is also a Government Council whose main function is to advise the Governor, which is comprised of the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, three *ex officio* members and three members elected by the Legislative Council, with one representing the *regedorias*.

488. Elections to the National Assembly took place in 1965 and elections to the Legislative Council were held in 1964. The number of persons who voted in the elections is not known. The next territorial elections are to be held in 1968.

<sup>132</sup> For a more detailed summary of the constitutional and administrative arrangements concerning the Overseas Territories, see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, paras. 17-73 and the section on the Territory.

<sup>133</sup> For details on the composition of the Legislative Council see A/5800/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 223.

489. Elections to the local administrative bodies were held in November 1965. Local legislation enacted in 1965 (Order No. 3,703 of 25 September) regulates elections of members to local administrative bodies, namely municipal councils in *concelhos*, municipal commissions in *circunscrições* and local boards in administrative posts and parishes.<sup>134</sup> Elections to these bodies are henceforth to be held in November every four years. Candidates must be of age, be able to read and write in Portuguese, have lived in the electoral district over six months (the electoral district being the area under the jurisdiction of the administrative body) and in the Territory over three years, and not be an active civil servant. Aliens may be candidates if they have lived in the Territory at least five years; however, not more than one third of the membership of any administrative body may consist of aliens.

490. Legislation introduced in 1965 (Legislative Instrument No. 688 of 8 May) fixed the salaries of *regedores* (chiefs of *regedorias*) and *chefes de grupo de povoações* (chiefs of group of villages). The salaries vary according to the number of taxpayers (*imposto domiciliário*, formerly called "native tax") under the jurisdiction of each chief. The *regedores* are classified into four basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 400 to 1,200 escudos. The *chefes de grupo de povoações* are classified into six basic echelons with monthly salaries varying from 200 to 500 escudos. Those who are not included in the established echelons, as well as the *chefes de povoações* (village chiefs), are entitled to 3 per cent of the personal tax (*imposto domiciliário*) collected in the area under their jurisdiction.

491. Legislation enacted in 1966 (Legislative Instrument No. 721 of 18 June) approved revised regulations of the annual personal tax (*imposto domiciliário*). Although the rate of the annual tax remains at 160 escudos (except in the Oé-cusse *circunscrição* where it is 130 escudos because of local economic conditions), there is an additional 30 escudos which is paid to local government bodies.

### Economic conditions

492. *General*. The Territory's economic potential is only partly developed. Its resources include many fertile areas, valuable forests and minerals, which are believed to include some copper, gold, manganese, chrome and petroleum. Despite this, it has so far held little attraction for investment. Mineral prospecting by private concerns has been limited and few industries have been established. Timor's economy remains purely agricultural. Although a great variety of crops are grown, the main exports are coffee, copra and rubber. The Territory was formerly an important producer of sandalwood but exports of this commodity are now small (see para. 503 below).

493. Portuguese sources attribute the slow economic development of the Territory to lack of European settlement and shortage of indigenous labour. A recent report<sup>135</sup> considers that the main obstacle to development is the low productivity of local labour and suggests that, in addition to providing tools and technical knowledge, the Government should take steps to improve the local diet.

<sup>134</sup> For details on the composition and structure of local government bodies see A/5800/Rev. 1, paras. 46-53.

<sup>135</sup> Banco Nacional Ultramarino, *Boletim Trimestral*, Nos. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966, p. 107.

494. *External trade and payments.* Because of its generally low production and lack of industries, Timor has a continuous and growing foreign trade deficit. Between 1963 and 1965 for instance, whereas the value of exports increased by 77 per cent (from 42.9 million to 75.8 million escudos), the value of imports rose 87 per cent (from 80.4 million to 130.5 million escudos). As a result, the trade deficit was 54.7 million escudos in 1965, compared with 37.5 million escudos in 1963, and 37.2 million in 1960.

495. The Territory's main imports are textiles, cement, combustible oils, sugar, wheat flour, medicines and manufactured tobacco. As local production has apparently not risen sufficiently to keep pace with growing needs, the Territory has also had to import some basic food crops. Although there are no trade statistics available for 1965 and 1966, government notices published in the official gazette show that over 700 tons of maize, some 50 tons of rice and some 30 tons of potatoes were imported duty free for local consumption from Singapore and Hong Kong in 1965. Similarly, in March 1966, the import of 60 tons of potatoes from Hong Kong and 20 tons of maize from Singapore was authorized for local consumption.

496. The Territory's exports are limited. In an average year, coffee, copra and rubber account for more than 90 per cent of the total value of exports. By far the most important crop is coffee, which in 1964 and 1965 made up 80 per cent of the total value of exports (2,368 metric tons, valued at 43.7 million escudos, in 1964, and 2,493 metric tons, valued at 45.1 million, in 1965). Copra, which ranks second in exports and which has accounted for an average of over 11 per cent of total exports by value, dropped to only 9 per cent in 1964 and 1965 (1,628 metric tons, valued at 4.9 million escudos, in 1964, and 1,435 metric tons, valued at 4.6 million escudos, in 1965). Rubber, which ranks third in exports, dropped from 9 per cent of the value of total exports in 1962 to 5 per cent in 1964 and 1965 (238 metric tons, valued at 2.6 million escudos, in 1964, and 243 metric tons, valued at 2.6 million escudos, in 1965).

497. Timor's foreign trade has traditionally been more closely linked with the countries in the region and with countries maintaining good shipping connexions with the Territory, such as the Netherlands and Denmark. In 1964, the Territory's principal clients were Denmark (24.9 per cent of total export value), the Netherlands (15.7 per cent), Portugal (13.9 per cent), Macau (11.1 per cent) and Singapore (10.2 per cent). In 1965, the Netherlands ranked first (25.6 per cent of the total export value), followed by Denmark (21.6 per cent), Portugal (18.5 per cent), Singapore (11.2 per cent) and the United States of America (8.4 per cent).

498. In recent years, despite its chronic trade deficit, Timor has generally registered a net surplus in its balance of payments because of remittances made to the Territory from Portugal. These amounted to 105.3 million escudos in 1964 and 167.9 million escudos in 1965. The net surplus at the end of 1965 was 12.9 million escudos.

499. *Agriculture, forestry and livestock.* Apart from coffee, rubber and coconuts, the Territory produces a wide range of food crops, including maize and rice, which are the two most important cereals, and sweet potatoes, beans, wheat, barley, ground-nuts, cocoa, castor seeds, tobacco, bamboo, tea and tung (*aleurites*

*moluccana*). There are no recent data available on the output of these crops.

500. Available information indicates that local production of food crops has not been able to meet the growing needs of domestic consumption. (The increased needs are partly due to the larger number of local troops mobilized and to the better diet provided to them.) To check rising prices, the Government in 1966 imposed fixed retail prices for locally produced food crops; however, as the prices fixed were so low, smaller amounts were offered for sale and, as noted above, the Territory had to import considerable quantities of potatoes (at a price differential of 2.4 escudos/kg.), maize (at a price differential of 4 escudos/kg.) and rice (at 3 escudos/kg.).

501. Although some export statistics are available, there is difficulty in ascertaining the actual situation due to wide discrepancies in the figures reported by the two principal government bodies concerned.<sup>136</sup> According to the customs services in 1964 and 1965, the average annual coffee exports were larger than in 1962 (2,400 tons compared with 1,860 tons); copra exports also rose slightly (1,550 tons compared with 1,401 tons); but rubber exports dropped. According to the same source, in terms of value, coffee accounted in 1965 for 83 per cent of the total visible exports, copra 9.2 per cent and rubber only 4.8 per cent.

502. There are only a few agricultural companies in Timor, which employ some 3,000 persons normally and some 6,000 persons during the coffee harvest. The traditional sector, however, accounts for most of the agricultural production.

503. Although Timor has valuable forests, most of these have not yet been exploited commercially. In the past, exports of sandalwood led to the destruction of some forests and further cutting was prohibited for many years. Though now permitted, exports of sandalwood are small. Since June 1966, Japanese have been surveying the forest resources and there are prospects for the establishment of a joint Portuguese-Japanese company for timber exploitation.

504. Livestock plays an important part in the economy of the Territory. In 1963, there were over 750,000 head of livestock, or about 1.3 head per inhabitant. In 1965, the livestock population comprised 226,650 goats, 225,257 hogs, 119,865 buffaloes, 94,396 horses, 47,760 sheep and 36,213 oxen. The Government considers that the natural environment does not favour commercial cattle-raising and assistance to improve livestock has been limited to development for local consumption and for agricultural work.

505. From 1953 to 1964, special allocations under the national development plans for the development of agriculture, livestock and forestry totalled 60 million escudos. This included 15 million escudos under the first plan and 45 million escudos under the second, but of the second allocation only about two thirds was spent. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, emphasis is placed on improving the productivity of traditional agriculture. The stated objec-

<sup>136</sup> Banco Nacional Ultramarino, *Boletim Trimestral*, Nos. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966. According to the Commercial Banking Inspectorate, in 1964 and 1965, territorial exports amounted to 44 and 76 million escudos respectively while, according to the customs services, the corresponding figures were 53 and 55 million escudos respectively. The discrepancies are attributed in part to the use of "fiscal values" for customs purposes and possibly to different periods covered by the reports of the two agencies.

tive is to increase the production of food crops to meet the needs of the population by 1975 and at the same time to increase production of export crops, such as coffee, copra, rubber, pepper, vanilla, fruits and green vegetables. Out of the total of 270 million escudos allocated for development expenditure during the period 1965-1967, 39 million escudos (14 per cent) are destined for these sectors.

506. In recent years, various measures have been introduced along the lines of those taken in Angola to encourage agriculture and European settlement. Early in 1965 (Timor, Order 3,521 of 6 March), an Agriculture and Livestock Credit Bank (Caixa de Crédito Agro-Pecuário) was set up with an initial capital of 10 million escudos to provide medium-term and long-term loans for agriculture and livestock schemes. The Caixa is similar in structure and functions to those established in other Territories, but exceptionally it may grant loans for tax purposes. Early in 1967, the Caixa obtained a 10 million escudo loan from the Banco Nacional Ultramarino at 2.5 per cent interest per year for 10 years. This brings the total capital available for loans to 20 million escudos.

507. *Land concession.* In 1965, the Government extended to Timor (Ministerial Order 21,283 of 11 May) the land concession legislation of 1961 (Decree 43,894) to encourage agricultural development.<sup>137</sup> Thus, in Timor, land concessions may now be granted free of charge to settlers as well as to military personnel on indefinite leave (*militares licenciados*) even if they are not stationed in the Territory. In 1966, local legislation (Legislative Instrument No. 718 of 7 May) was introduced regulating the enforcement of the land concession legislation in the Territory. The Provincial Department of Public Works and Transport is responsible for processing and regulating the land concessions. Under the 1961 legislation, the right to grant concessions is vested in the Governor, except for larger and more important concessions which are the responsibility of the Minister for Overseas Territories.<sup>138</sup>

508. *Internal trade.* As part of its plan to ensure that the maximum amount of local production reaches the domestic market, the Government introduced new legislation in 1965 regulating and limiting traders and trading stores. In urban areas, stores are to be established in permanently constructed buildings (*construção definitiva*) which fulfil all legal hygiene requirements; in rural areas they may be built with local materials, but they must be torn down if and when so determined by the authorities. The itinerant purchase of agricultural crops is permitted only to traders who own a fixed trading establishment duly authorized by the Governor. All purchase of agricultural crops must be done in cash.

509. To facilitate price controls (see para. 500 above) and regulate trading of locally grown crops, the Government established in Timor a system of local markets, in 1966, similar to those in Angola. There is no recent information on the results obtained.

510. *Industries.* Apart from the processing of rice for local consumption and of coffee for export, there are only a few small factories, which produce, among other things, soap, pottery and soft drinks. Under the

Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, the total planned investment in processing industries amounts to only 9.1 million escudos (3.4 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged for Timor). Priority is to be given to the following industries: pottery, rice, soft drinks, soap, alcohol; ice, fruit juices, milling and freezing facilities for meat, vegetable oils (ground-nuts and copra), dairy products; and soluble coffee and coffee roasting, hides and shoes, soda water, sausages and caustic lime.

511. With a view to protecting local industries, especially tobacco, soft drinks, oil and soap manufactures, the Government in 1966 made it compulsory for local stores selling imported products to display equivalent local products, whenever available and to post their price and origin.

512. *Mining.* In September 1964, a mining concession was granted to the Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho, Limitada. The company has an exclusive licence to prospect for copper, iron, manganese, magnetite and zirconium for an initial period of three years, renewable for two more years if all the terms of the contract are fulfilled (see A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, para. 131). In 1965, the Governor of Timor authorized the company to start its prospecting activities in accordance with a plan approved by the Government. In order to make possible the appraisal of mining possibilities in the areas of the concession, the company was required to complete by August 1965 the following projects: (a) a study of the available documentation on the geological and mineral resources of the Territory; (b) establishment of administrative services at the office of the company in Díli; (c) establishment of an analysis laboratory in Díli; (d) intensive prospecting in the zones of Vemasse, Uato-Carbau and Subão Grange; (e) detailed topographical surveys of these same zones; and (f) a preliminary survey of the Ossú zone. No further information on these projects is available, but prospecting activities are continuing.

513. Although exclusive concessions for petroleum prospecting have been granted in the past (including, for instance, one in 1939 to the Companhia Ultramarina de Petróleos and one in 1947 to Carlos da Câmara Pinto Coelho), there is no information on new concessions. So far no large commercially exploitable deposits have been found, though small quantities are extracted at Suai for local use. Some petroleum also exists in the Manatuto *concelho*.

514. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a sum of 6 million escudos (some 2 per cent of the total expenditure envisaged) was allocated to mining development.

515. *Fisheries.* Commercial fishing is not yet developed in the Territory. The catch is very small and it is almost totally consumed at Díli, which has 10,753 inhabitants. The Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages the expenditure of 10 million escudos (3.7 per cent of the total expenditure) on the development of fish culture centres in the interior of the Territory, on improving the catch and on the provision of facilities for freezing or drying and salting fish for distribution inland.

516. *Transport and communications.* Timor has neither railroads nor inland water transport. In 1964 there were 1,941 kilometres of roads.

517. The only important port is at Díli, the capital of the Territory. The wharf facilities at Díli, which were built during the Second World War, were ex-

<sup>137</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 10-38.

<sup>138</sup> For details of the land concession legislation, see document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. V, annex II, paras. 58-155.

panded under the first and second development plans. Traffic at the port of Díli declined from 158,000 tons entering the harbour in 1954 to 54,500 tons in 1960 and 22,167 tons in 1964. In 1965, a Díli Port Authority was established with responsibility for the administration, operation, maintenance and extension of the port of Díli and the development of trade with neighbouring countries, especially Macau.

518. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 100 million escudos, or 37 per cent of the total amount, is allocated to transport and communications. Of this amount, 20 million escudos are for the improvement of roads, including the construction of the roads between Díli and Suasi and between Díli and Baucau; 30 million escudos are for ports and maritime navigation, including the construction of four small ports on the south coast (Suasi, Betano, Beaco and Loré), two on the north coast (Baucau and Latém), one in the Ocússi-Ambeno enclave and one on Ataúro Island; 45 million escudos are for airports and air transportation, including the construction of a 1,200-metre airstrip at Díli Airport and improvements of the facilities of the airfields at Baucau, Ocússi, Ataúro and Con; and 5 million escudos are for the improvement of telecommunications, especially the connexions with Portugal and foreign countries.

519. *Public finance.* Although Timor ranks fourth in area among the Territories under Portuguese administration, its annual budget is among the lowest, being only a little larger than that of São Tomé and Príncipe, which have only 7 per cent of its area and one eighth of its population.

520. From 1956 to 1961, the Territory's annual ordinary budget increased less than 3 per cent, from 52.4 million escudos to 54.6 million escudos. Since 1962, when for the first time ordinary revenue and expenditure rose to 65 million escudos, the budget has continued the upward trend with actual revenue reaching 66.5 million escudos in 1963 and 75 million escudos in 1964 and actual expenditure reaching 62.5 million and 67.8 million escudos respectively. Although, in accordance with the established practice, the ordinary budget has usually provided for a surplus, exceptionally in 1966 no significant surplus was expected, ordinary revenue being estimated at 77.9 million escudos and expenditure at 77.8 million escudos.

521. On the other hand, the Territory's extraordinary budget, which mainly reflects development expenditures, rose by more than 220 per cent between 1959 and 1962; it increased from 19.7 million to 64.8 million escudos, but dropped to 53 million escudos in 1963 and just under 50 million escudos in 1964. Estimated extraordinary revenue and expenditure for 1966 were balanced at 51.6 million escudos.

522. For 1966, the total estimated expenditure on the armed forces for the Territory was 28.3 million escudos, of which the Territory's share was 5.1 million escudos, to be paid out of the ordinary revenue (some 6.5 per cent of the total ordinary budget), the remainder being paid by Portugal. For 1967, estimated military expenditure rose to 33.3 million escudos, but the amount to be paid by the Territory remained 5.1 million escudos. The territorial budget estimates for 1966 allocated 11.3 million escudos for public health services (14.5 per cent of the budget, compared with about 10 per cent in the early 1960s) and 3.2 million escudos for education (4.1 per cent).

523. *Development financing.* Under the previous development plans, for 1953-1958 and 1959-1963, a total of 332 million escudos was allocated to Timor: 92 million escudos under the first plan and 240 million escudos under the second. Annual expenditures were, however, considerably below the allocations and by the end of 1962, for instance, only 80 per cent of the annual allocations under the second development plan had been spent (actual expenditure totalled only 154 million escudos, compared with an allocation of 190 million escudos).<sup>139</sup>

524. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, a total investment of 270 million escudos is envisaged. The entire amount is to be financed by loans from the central Government of Portugal. The largest allocations are for transport and communications (100 million escudos or 37 per cent of the total). Allocations for education and public welfare amount to 40 million escudos (15 per cent of the total); agriculture, forestry and cattle-raising, 39 million escudos (14 per cent); and housing, 30 million escudos (approximately 11 per cent).

525. Although the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967 envisages an annual expenditure of 90 million escudos (which is more than double the allocations under the previous development plans), implementation has in fact been slow. Recent information<sup>140</sup> shows that, although initial estimates for 1965 provided for a total investment of over 57 million escudos under the Transitional Development Plan, actual funds committed amounted to only just over 36 million escudos. If continued at that rate, only slightly more than one third of the total investments will have been made by the end of the period of the plan.

#### *Educational conditions*

526. There are kindergartens at the religious missions and one at Díli (Portuguese Youth), but no figures are available regarding enrolment in recent years. There were 147 primary school classrooms,<sup>141</sup> which include the pre-primary classes for children whose native language is not Portuguese. Of the primary schools, 51 are government schools, 78 are Catholic mission schools and 18 are Arabic and Chinese private schools. There were also primary classes conducted by the military units. In 1965-1966, the total enrolment in primary schools was 18,488, which included 7,268 pupils in Catholic schools, 6,970 in government schools, 3,004 in schools run by the military and 1,246 in private schools. There were 450 primary teachers, of whom 155 were in Catholic schools, 120 in government schools, 100 in private schools and 75 in military schools. The Catholic missions maintain primary boarding schools subsidized by the Government and some tuition is paid by the pupils.

527. As of 1966 there was as yet no complementary primary school providing the 5th and 6th classes, although the elementary technical school at Díli (established under Decree 46,519 of 4 September 1965) was expected to come into operation in the school year 1966-1967. There is a preparatory technical school in

<sup>139</sup> "Análise Sintética da Execução do II Plano de Fomento no Quadriénio 1959-1962 (Províncias Ultramarinas)", *Planeamento e Integração Económica*, October 1964.

<sup>140</sup> Banco Nacional Ultramarino, *Boletim Trimestral*, Nos. 66/67, Lisbon, 1966, p. 109.

<sup>141</sup> The statistics do not show the actual number of schools, which may be full primary schools or school posts (*postos escolares*) with a limited number of classes.

Fuiloro which will be transferred to the new school of Dili. An agricultural elementary school is under construction at Fatu-Maca, near Baucau; this school is expected to begin its activities in October 1967.

528. There are also evening courses for illiterate adults at government schools and at those run by the military. No figures are available on these courses.

529. At the secondary level, there is one government grammar school (*liceu*) and a private Luso-Chinese school at Dili. In 1965-1966, there were a total of 671 secondary pupils: 562 pupils (and 29 teachers) at the government *liceu* and 109 pupils (and 9 teachers) at the Luso-Chinese school. There were also 54 students enrolled in the Catholic Seminary at Dili. In a speech delivered in 1966, the Governor of the Territory emphasized the importance of teaching the Portuguese language at the Chinese schools. The schools run by the military provide some courses at the secondary level.

530. According to official information,<sup>142</sup> most of the teachers in primary schools and school posts were trained in Portugal, Angola and Mozambique, and formerly some were trained in "the Portuguese State of India". New teacher-training facilities established since 1965 include a training school for school post teachers and courses for school monitors (teachers of pre-primary classes). In the school year 1965-1966, there were 60 students studying to be school post teachers in the first two classes of the four-year course; there were 180 monitors in training in 1965 and 110 in 1966. Monthly salaries of school post instructors range from 1,000 escudos for those who have completed the first year of the monitor course to the maximum of 1,500 escudos for those who have been on the job for over 20 years with good reports from the *inspecção* (the school superintendence).

531. There are also training courses for public service personnel. The Health and Welfare Department has had training courses since 1947; by 1966, it had trained 9 nurses, 45 midwives, 281 assistant nurses and 12 assistant pharmacists. In 1964, the Health and Welfare Department established a technical school; its initial enrolment was 58 students. In 1966, 16 public servants attended training courses at the Agriculture and Veterinary Department.

532. In 1965-1966, seventeen scholarships (compared with fifteen in 1964-1965 and seven in 1963-1964) were granted for the completion of studies abroad. Allocations for scholarships in the local budget amounted to 65,500 escudos in 1963, 81,250 escudos in 1964 and 124,662 escudos in 1965.

533. Under the Transitional Development Plan for 1965-1967, 21 million escudos are to be invested in the extension and improvement of school facilities.

### Labour

534. Although the Native Statute never applied to Timor, before 1961, the majority of the inhabitants of the Territory were designated as *não-civilizados* and were organized into *regedorias*; the local labour legislation was moreover patterned after the Native Labour Code of 1928, which applied to the African Territories under Portuguese administration. The Rural Labour Code of 1962 (Decree 44,309 of 27 April) now applies also to Timor.

<sup>142</sup> Portugal, Agência Geral do Ultramar, *Panorama Actual e Perspectivas Futuras do Ensino na Província Portuguesa de Timor*, Lisbon, 1966.

535. For rural labour and manual workers similarly classified,<sup>143</sup> the local government has established minimum daily wage rates and determined conditions of employment, including the guarantee of food and lodgings on days of rest or holidays and extra pay for overtime work (Legislative Instrument No. 670 of 28 November 1964).

536. For rural agricultural workers, the established minimum daily wage rate is 6.60 escudos, of which 3.60 represent the actual wages and 3.00 escudos are for food. For agricultural workers under 18 years of age, the minimum daily wage is 1 escudo less, but the other entitlements are the same. For manual workers engaged in mining, industry and civil construction who are similarly classified as rural workers, the daily wage rate is 10 escudos in Dili and 9 escudos elsewhere; if they are under 18 years of age, the corresponding rates are 7 and 6 escudos respectively. A clothing allowance of 1 escudo is payable to workers with contracts for four months or more, and employers who do not provide officially approved lodgings have to pay an additional allowance for housing.

### C. Consideration by the Special Committee<sup>144</sup>

#### Introduction

537. The Special Committee considered the Territories under Portuguese administration at its 513th to 518th, 524th, 526th, 532nd to 534th, and 538th to 541st meetings held in Africa between 30 May 1967 and 20 June 1967.

538. On the question of refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration, the Special Committee had before it a note by the Secretariat (see annex I) concerning the situation with regard to refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and the measures taken to extend material and other assistance to them by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations in response to operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) and resolution 2184 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966.

539. During their stay in Kinshasa and Dar es Salaam, members of the Special Committee were able, at the invitation of the organizations concerned, to visit camps and other facilities for refugees from Angola and Mozambique. In Kinshasa, they visited a reception centre, a hospital and school run by GRAE where they were enthusiastically received by several hundred refugees and met with teachers, doctors and others con-

<sup>143</sup> Under the Rural Labour Code (for English text see: ILO Legislative Series July-August 1962), "rural worker" means any manual worker of unspecified trade engaged in activities connected with the farming of land and harvesting of produce, etc. In the absence of any special regulations, a worker "shall be placed on the same footing as a rural worker", if his services involve no more than the performance of manual labour and the nature of such services does not place him in any class of salaried employee or specially skilled worker.

<sup>144</sup> This section includes those portions of the statements made on the Territories under Portuguese administration in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the draft resolution are included in the succeeding section. It should be noted that additional comments on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration are contained in the statements made at the opening of the Special Committee's meetings at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. These statements are included in chapter II of the Committee's report.

cerned with aid to refugees. In Dar es Salaam, members visited facilities run by FRELIMO, including a hospital and the Mozambique Institute which provides secondary and vocational (nurses' aides) training at Dar es Salaam and conducts primary and other teaching programmes elsewhere. Also, during their stay in Kinshasa and in Kitwe, members of the Committee were able to examine weapons captured from the Portuguese armed forces in Angola, and to which reference was made by the petitioners in their statements.

### 1. *Written petitions and hearings*

540. The Special Committee circulated the following written petitions concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
<i>The Territories in general</i>			
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth (WAY)	A/AC.109/PET.695	<i>Angola (continued)</i>	
<i>Angola</i>			
Mr. Marcus Kassanga, Minister for External Affairs, Govern0 do Conselho do Povo Angolano no Ex0lio (GCPA)	A/AC.109/PET.576	to, President, Mouvement populaire de lib0ration de l'Angola (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.650/Adc
Mr. Jo0o Chisseva, Secretary-General, United States Section, Uni0o Nacional dos Estudantes Angolanos (UNEA)	A/AC.109/PET.581	Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Parti progressiste angolais (PPA)	A/AC.109/PET.651
Mr. Pedro Simba Macasso, Prime Minister, Gouvernement provisoire des r0volutionnaires fiotes en exil (GPRFE)	A/AC.109/PET.641	Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA)	A/AC.109/PET.652
Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, Uni0o Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)	A/AC.109/PET.642	Mr. Sim0o Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confedera0o Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA)	A/AC.109/PET.653
Mr. Carlos Pinto Nunes Vunzi, General Chairman, Uni0o Pr General Chairman, Uni0o Progressista Nacional de Angola (UPRONA)	A/AC.109/PET.642/Add.1	Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, Ligue g0n0rale des travailleurs de l'Angola (LGTA)	A/AC.109/PET.654
Messrs. Henriques Tiago N'Zita, Secretary-General, and Henri Charles Tembo, Deputy Secretary, Comit0 r0volutionnaire cabindais (CRC)	A/AC.109/PET.643	Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General, Ngwizani A Kongo (NGWIZAKO)	A/AC.109/PET.655
Messrs. Fran0ois Lele, President, and Fran0ois Kuta, Secretary-General, Parti d0mocrate Nto-Bako Angola	A/AC.109/PET.644	Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement r0volutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE)	A/AC.109/PET.656
Messrs. Fran0ois Lele, General Chairman, and Fran0ois Kuta, Secretary-General, Parti d0mocrate Nto-Bako Angola	A/AC.109/PET.644/Add.1	Mr. Antonio Mpululu	A/AC.109/PET.657
Mr. Domingos da Silva, Vice-President, Mouvement populaire de lib0ration de l'Angola (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.650	Mr. No0 Pedro, President, Jupa, Moerbeke Branch, Camp Beton	A/AC.109/PET.658
Mr. Luiz de Azevedo, Jr., Member of the Executive Committee, Mouvement populaire de lib0ration de l'Angola (MPLA)	A/AC.109/PET.650/Add.1	Mr. Tuwumo Emmanuel	A/AC.109/PET.659
Mr. Alfred Kgekong, Director of Publicity and Information, African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), on behalf of Mr. Agostinho Ne-		Mr. Manuel Costa	A/AC.109/PET.660
		Messrs. Emmanuel Tulengana, National Secretary, and Gracia Dongala, Vice-President, Cartel des nationalistes angolais (CNA)	A/AC.109/PET.663
		Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Centrale nationale angolaise, Conf0d0ration des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA)	A/AC.109/PET.664
		Mr. Pedro Raoul Malaquitas, President, Union des populations de l'Angola (UPA), Thysville	A/AC.109/PET.665
		Mr. Ndonga Fernandes	A/AC.109/PET.666
		Messrs. Henriques Nzita, Foreign Affairs, and Ranque Francque, President, Front pour la lib0ration de l'enclave de Cabinda (FLEC)	A/AC.109/PET.667
		Angolan People of the Makala Section of Parti d0mocratique de l'Angola (PDA)	A/AC.109/PET.668
		Mr. Pedro Nocolas, President, Angolan Refugees of the Ozone Section, Kinshasa	A/AC.109/PET.669
		Mr. Mayanda, President, Angolan Notables of the Kinshasa Section, Parti d0mocratique de l'Angola (PDA) and Union des populations de l'Angola (UPA)	A/AC.109/PET.670
		Mentale Section of the Parti d0mocratique de l'Angola (PDA)	A/AC.109/PET.671
		Miss Therese Kisevesa, Angolan Women's Democratic Movement (MFDA)	A/AC.109/PET.672
		"Angolan People of Lembart Riffart and Mdjili Brasserie"	A/AC.109/PET.673

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>	<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
<i>Angola (continued)</i>			
"The Assembly of Angolan Scouts and Guides"	A/AC.109/PET.674	Mr. A. P. Matondo, President, Parti progressiste angolais (PPA) (A/AC.109/PET.651)	516th
Mr. André Kitabia	A/AC.109/PET.675	Mr. P. Barreiro Lulendo, Acting General Secretary, Ligue générale des travailleurs angolais (LGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.654)	516th
Miss Suzana Belina, President, Association of Angolan Women	A/AC.109/PET.676	Mr. Emile Ndongala Mbidi, Assistant General Secretary, Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA) (A/AC.109/PET.652)	517th
Primary School Children of Angolan Refugees and other Groups	A/AC.109/PET.677	Mr. François Lele, President-General, Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola (A/AC.109/PET.644 and Add.1)	517th
"Movement of Angolan Women Workers"	A/AC.109/PET.678	Mr. Simão Ladeira-Lumona, National President, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA) (A/AC.109/PET.653)	517th
Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)	A/AC.109/PET.679	Mr. A. Medina, Secretary and Inspector-General of Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO) (A/AC.109/PET.655)	517th
Mr. Jean Kiaka, President, Committee of Barumba Section, Parti démocratique de l'Angola (PDA), Kinshasa	A/AC.109/PET.683	Mr. Emmanuel Tulengala, National Secretary, Cartel des nationalistes angolais (CNA) (A/AC.109/PET.663)	517th
President, Union nationale étudiants angolais (UNEA)	A/AC.109/PET.684	Mr. Gracia Kiala, President, Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA) (A/AC.109/PET.664)	518th
Secretary-General, Mouvement jeunes ouvrières angolaises (MJOA)	A/AC.109/PET.685	Mr. Smart Chata, Acting President, União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) (A/AC.109/PET.679)	524th
Mr. Lamvu Emmanuel Norman, President, Comité de bons offices angolais (CBOA)	A/AC.109/PET.688		
<i>Mozambique</i>			
Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO)	A/AC.109/PET.686	<i>Mozambique</i>	
Mr. Marcelino dos Santos, Secretary for External Affairs, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	A/AC.109/PET.690	Mr. P. J. Gumane, President, Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO) (A/AC.109/PET.686)	526th
		Mr. Eduardo Mondlane, President, Mr. Lourenço Mutaca, Secretary for Finance, and Mr. Mariano Matsinhe, Organizing Secretary, Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO)	532nd-534th
<i>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</i>			
Mr. Amílcar Cabral, Secretary-General, Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC)	A/AC.109/PET.661	<i>Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea</i>	
Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portugaise (FLING)	A/AC.109/PET.662	Mr. Benjamin Pinto-Bull, President, Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portugaise (FLING) (A/AC.109/PET.662)	518th
<i>São Tomé and Príncipe</i>			
Executive Committee, Comité de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (CLSTP)	A/AC.109/PET.682		

541. The Special Committee heard the following petitioners concerning the Territories under Portuguese administration:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Meeting</i>
<i>Angola</i>	
Mr. Holden Roberto, President, Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE) (A/AC.109/PET.656)	513th and 514th
Messrs. Domingos da Silva, Vice-President, Mr. Lara Lucio, Executive Secretary, and Mr. Luís de Azevedo, Jr., member of the Executive Committee, Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA) (A/AC.109/PET.650 and Add.1)	515th and 516th

542. Mr. Holden Roberto, speaking on behalf of the Gouvernement révolutionnaire de l'Angola en exil (GRAE), said that despite the fact that the Portuguese periodically announced that the armed struggle in Angola was ended and although 85,000 Portuguese troops were engaged in the tragic conflict, in reality, the struggle, now six years old, was still being waged and there was no longer any limit to the atrocities practised by the enemy. Napalm bombs continued to be dropped on civilians, poison gas was used and whole villages were burnt to ashes. The Special Committee would have found such a situation, if it had visited the region controlled by the Angolan National Liberation Army (ALNA), which had an area of 250,000 square kilometres and a population of 400,000. He mentioned those few aspects of the Angolan people's daily life simply to place the tragedy in its proper context. In accepting their responsibilities, after having exhausted all peaceful means, the Angolan people knew the consequences of their decision and the immense sacrifices which they must bear.

543. Since 1966, the military operations conducted by the forces of the Angolan National Liberation Army

had inflicted the following losses on the enemy: 523 Portuguese soldiers killed, 37 tanks destroyed, 2 helicopters and 1 aircraft shot down, 44 lorries destroyed, a large quantity of arms seized and 2 Portuguese soldiers captured. Economically, the plantations and crops of the Portuguese settlers, a principal source of finance for the colonial war, continued to suffer attack by the Angolan forces and were confiscated and restored to the people. Contrary to the lies of the Portuguese, the war had never ceased in Angola and, despite the many United Nations resolutions, Portugal, calling its repressive activities a civilizing mission, had no intention of leaving Angola.

544. It was perhaps paradoxical to discuss self-determination with the Portuguese colonialists, since Salazar, who did not believe in democracy, had never taught them what it was. For Angolans, there was only one kind of self-determination, which implied the expression of the people's will, genuine freedom to manage their own affairs and freedom of choice—and they had made their choice abundantly clear by a cruel six-year fight for independence. But it implied the exact opposite for the Portuguese. To Salazar, self-determination meant forcing the people to agree to a specific administrative system. To limit a people's choice to consenting to or accepting something already decided was tantamount to controlling that choice and thus to denying them in advance a free choice of the various possible solutions which could fundamentally affect their future. If the principle of self-determination was to be applied to the full, two essential factors must be taken into account. First, the *de facto* separation of the Territories concerned from the metropolitan State—which was the case with Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)—in the light of General Assembly resolution 1542 (XV), and, second, the right of peoples to independence, as defined in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

545. Those factors had emerged very clearly in all General Assembly debates, whether on the occasion when the right of peoples to self-determination had been proclaimed or in connexion with other colonial problems. The right to independence could not be divorced from the concept of self-determination, as defined during the General Assembly's thirteenth session in 1958, in the Fourth Committee's discussion of international respect for the right of peoples to self-determination. The idea of veiled or disguised integration which the Portuguese continued to advance had been specifically raised and condemned during that debate. It was an idea which the United Nations had categorically rejected, with the approval of all its Members—including Portugal's friends who had also had to assume responsibility for colonial Territories.

546. As to the reforms which the Portuguese Government frequently mentioned, Africans in general, and the Angolans in particular, were sufficiently on their guard not to allow themselves to be deceived by so-called reforms thought up by a colonial Power unwilling to show itself for what it was. Furthermore, the Angolan people had not taken up arms in order to reform colonialism. The Special Committee had itself stated in 1962 that it was not through Portuguese reforms that the situation in the African Territories under Portuguese domination could be improved and the problem solved, since what the people of those Territories wanted was independence, immediate and complete. The Special Committee's report on Angola in 1961 showed that the reforms announced by Portugal

were basically designed to strengthen the political integration of Angola with that country, that the Portuguese Government was maintaining its grasp on the Territory, militarily and politically, and was taking steps to increase its economic integration with Portugal, that it had undertaken no major political reforms and that, in particular, it had not created any representative political institutions composed of freely elected members in order to transfer power to the Angolan people. As far as GRAE was concerned, all possible arguments in that connexion had been finally disposed of when the General Assembly had adopted resolution 1514 (XV) on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, and after the Security Council itself, in its resolution 180 (1963) had once again confirmed that the right of the peoples dominated by Portugal freely to decide on their own future should entail complete independence.

547. None of the provisions of the resolutions adopted, whether by the Security Council or the General Assembly, had yet been implemented by the Portuguese Government. In short, Portugal had in no way altered its position since then, in theory or in practice, and there were no grounds for believing that it was willing to do so.

548. Consequently, the colonial war was being intensified and military repression continued in Angola and other Portuguese colonies. The military forces in those Territories, most particularly in Angola, continued to be reinforced. No amnesty had been promulgated and no genuine provision had been made for political parties to operate freely in the Territories, as Security Council resolution 218 (1965) expressly demanded. Following various frontier incidents with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, Guinea and Senegal, the Portuguese colonialists had recently cut the Dilolo-Lobito railway in order to strangle the Congolese and Zambian economies. It would be recalled that in 1963 the Portuguese had also threatened to block the channel at the mouth of the Congo by sinking three boats full of cement at Santo Antonio de Zaire. That would have rendered unusable the Democratic Republic of the Congo's only outlet to the sea and established a veritable blockade of the country.

549. The situation resulting from Portugal's policy towards both the African people in its colonies and the neighbouring States thus seriously disturbed international peace and security.

550. It was impossible to avoid the conclusion that Portugal, an under-developed country with extremely slender resources, could only carry on a war through the assistance it received from NATO, which was also the reason for its obstinacy regarding the implementation of United Nations resolutions. That was not only inconsistent with the so-called free world's principles but also with any desire to maintain peace. He was forced to point out, for the benefit of all the Western countries, the NATO Powers, and particularly the United States of America, that the Angolan people would never forgive the fact that all means of destruction employed against them came from the arsenals of the West. There were those who hoped to persuade the Angolan people that the NATO weapons delivered to the fascist Portuguese were not intended for the oppression of African peoples. It might be argued that the Atlantic Treaty, which enabled Portugal to maintain an army of 85,000 in Angola, 40,000 in Mozambique and 30,000 in Guinea (Bissau), was not



directed against those Territories and their peoples. Unhappily, while that might be true according to the terms of the Treaty, the facts indicated otherwise. NATO weapons were actually used in Africa solely against colonized peoples. The 5 million Angolans would never agree that it was by chance that Western arms were used against them. The assurances which they had demanded must be reinforced by preventive measures. The Angolan people urged the United States of America to enforce the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, as provided for by Security Council resolution 218 (1965), and called on all concerned, including the Brazilian people whose Government had recently sent a naval squadron to visit Angola, to admit in their hearts that they were a party to the Angolan people's sufferings. He considered them accomplices to the abominable crimes perpetrated by Salazar's henchmen in Angola and elsewhere. They must alter their policy.

551. The Angolan people would not be satisfied by theoretical explanations. They called on the United Nations to condemn the odious arms traffic and the alliance harmful to peoples whose only desire was for freedom and peace. The Security Council should strengthen and supplement the measures already taken in order to make them fully effective. It was for the Council, as the body primarily responsible for international peace and security, to devise effective and efficient ways of persuading the Portuguese to adopt a sane attitude to their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the principles contained therein and the right of peoples to self-determination and to respect the relevant United Nations resolutions as scrupulously as the situation demanded. For the time being, and while waiting for signs of understanding, the Angolan people would continue the war, which was a hard one and threatened to be long.

552. The members of the Committee had been able to visit the GRAE camps and also to see for themselves how much the Government in Exile was doing to help the refugees in regard to medical care and education for their children. They had been able to understand how great and acute were the problems facing the Service d'assistance aux réfugiés angolais (SARA), which GRAE had set up to assist the ever-growing number of Angolans fleeing from Portuguese atrocities. There were more than 600,000 Angolan refugees in the Congo, who had been welcomed by their Congolese brothers from the very beginning. Land had been given to them all along the frontiers, where they had settled and started plantations. The problem did not end there, however; there were cases of sickness and refugees coming out of the bush, where they had sometimes been for two or three years and needed to be clothed. There was the additional problem of feeding those who had recently arrived and had not yet been able to settle themselves. Nor should it be forgotten that assistance was not only given on the frontiers; GRAE was trying to deal with the impoverished situation of the Angolan people in the liberated areas. As often as possible, it provided them, like the refugees, with the means of survival. The same applied to the schools GRAE was operating inside Angola, which were maintained by contributions from Angolans, as were those it operated in Kinshasa.

553. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that Angola was the most valuable of all Portugal's colonies. There were almost 350,000 Portuguese settlers, work-

ing a subsoil infinitely richer than that of Mozambique or Guinea (Bissau). It was therefore only to be expected that the Portuguese Government should do everything possible, whatever the price, to retain Angola. On the other hand, to judge by its recent statements, it might agree to abandon Guinea (Bissau), where considerable investment was needed to obtain indifferent profits, and even Mozambique. The subsoil in Angola was extremely rich in iron, petroleum, diamonds, manganese, etc. These resources were extracted by companies from the United States, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, which were openly assisting the Portuguese Government to maintain its grasp on Angola. He himself, while on a journey, had met a representative of the Krupp group, who, in confidence, had admitted that his cartel gave money to the Portuguese Government, ostensibly to improve the Angolan people's living standards. The following list of foreign companies and monopolies operating in Angola was the so-called list of the "300 families" who were helping to prolong the misery of the Angolan people.

#### *Diamonds*

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa  
Morgan Bank  
The Oppenheimer Group  
De Beers  
Guggenheim  
T. F. Ryan  
Forminière  
Guaranty Trust Bank  
Société Générale de Belgique

#### *Petroleum*

Compagnie Financière Belge des Pétales (Petrofina)  
Chase National Bank  
National City Bank of New York  
Cabinda Gulf Oil Company

#### *Transport*

Anglo American Corporation of South Africa  
Westminster Bank  
British South Africa Company  
Cooper Brothers Company  
The Angola Coaling Company  
Tanganyika Concessions

#### *Palm Oil*

La Luinha, Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

#### *Aluminium*

Pechiney, shareholder in Alumínio Português (Angola)

#### *Bauxite*

Biliton Maatschappij

#### *Mica*

Standard Oil (represented in Angola by União Comercial de Automoveis)

#### *Banking*

Banque Belge d'Afrique (shareholder in the Banco Comercial de Angola)

#### *Coffee*

Banque Rallet et Cie (shareholder in the Companhia Agrícola de Cazengo and the Companhia Angolana de Agricultura (CADA))

*Trade*

- Anglo American Corporation (represented in Angola by the Sociedade Luso-Americana)
- Casa Americana
- Devon Estates
- Loanda Trading Company
- Robert Hudson and Sons, La Luinha
- Société Anonyme Agricole et Industrielle

*Sugar*

- Barton Mayhew and Co. (shareholder in the Sociedade Agrícola do Cassequel)

*Cotton*

- Société générale de Belgique (represented by the Companhia Geral dos Algodões)
- Banque Belge d'Afrique
- Compagnie Cotonnière Congolaise
- La Luinha
- Société Agricole et Industrielle

*Hydraulic Works*

- Hydrotechnic Corporation, New York
- Marshall Aid Funds (loan of \$US25 million in 1951)

*Mining Prospecting*

- E. J. Longyear Co., Minneapolis
- Remina
- Aero Service Corporation, Bethlehem Steel
- Carbide
- Mutual Security Agency (financed the Portuguese Government in 1952 with a loan of \$US1.3 million)

554. In 1963, a representative of one of those companies had approached him in New York to propose that GRAE should be given the money which, until then, had been paid to the Portuguese Government as a tax to support the war effort, which all firms operating in Angola were bound to pay. That approach had been motivated by the anxiety of the company's directors at the irreversible course of events, which made them doubt whether the Portuguese could remain in Angola.

555. Replying to questions about the activities of GRAE, the petitioner said that the total surface area of Angola was 1,246,700 square kilometres, and that the zone at present controlled by the National Liberation Army, 250,000 square kilometres, was therefore approximately one fifth of the whole Territory. It was not true, as Portugal claimed, that Portuguese troops were fighting on one front only, in the far north. There were at present three separate fronts. There was the first front in the far north. A second front had later been opened on the north-east Angola-Congo frontier, with the rear base at Kasongo-Lunda (Democratic Republic of the Congo). The third front, relatively recent, was in the south, with the rear base in Katanga. It was therefore clear that, contrary to the claims of those criticizing the national liberation struggle, the fighting was spreading and would continue to spread. The area controlled by the ALNA was, and would remain, free. As the opportunity arose, the ALNA intensified its struggle with all the means at its disposal. In the other areas, the leaders of the movement had organized a system of mass mobilization led by political activists, whose task was to explain the reason for the action undertaken to the population. The political dangers were very great.

556. Regarding the organization of GRAE, he said that GRAE maintained both a military organization

in Angola to assert its authority within the country and a system to enable refugees to escape. In each area there was a commander who was also in charge of the camp. He was assisted by an adjutant. There was also a political commissioner, an officer in charge of social services and population movements, and an information officer. The officer concerned with schools and hospitals worked in collaboration with the area commander.

557. In reply to a question concerning the treatment of prisoners by the Portuguese, the petitioner said that reports of the way in which the Portuguese authorities treated prisoners were extremely disturbing. Several escaped Angolan combatants reported that the Portuguese troops tortured their prisoners in an attempt to obtain information. They frequently killed them in cold blood. Prison conditions were inhuman. At GRAE headquarters, the members of the Committee could see women and men mutilated by the tortures inflicted on them. One escaped Angolan prisoner had returned to his brothers with his lips pierced and closed by a padlock.

558. Asked whether the bombings and military operations were confined to the liberated territories under GRAE control, the petitioner said that terrorist attacks were made from time to time in areas not under GRAE control and terrible repressions then followed. If those regions were accessible by land, the infantry intervened; otherwise, the Air Force conducted operations. The liberation movements were not of equal strength in all regions; but repression extended everywhere. It was mainly the forests that were bombed. It could be said that the territory as a whole was subjected to bombing, but the bombing was more intense in the areas under GRAE control. The refugees were forced to leave those areas, since they were destroyed and gutted by fire. When they could, they fled to the Congo.

559. In reply to a question, the petitioner informed the Committee that, in addition to the regular army of 85,000 men stationed in Angola, there was also a provincial civil defence organization. Weapons were distributed to everyone, including women. Further, in the Lunda area the British-run Angola Diamond Company had its own private army and employed foreign mercenaries. However, for the Portuguese, the most effective way of combating subversion and terrorism was to populate heavily the areas inhabited by the whites, particularly with "soldier-settlers". The people received not only weapons but also directives. The prisoner in question had said that, in his area, the motto was: "A black on the road is a dead man", meaning that he would be killed instantly.

560. Asked whether there were any military experts not of Portuguese nationality at present active in Angola in any capacity, the petitioner said that he had been informed by prisoners that the head of the comandos was French and that soldiers not of Portuguese origin were also stationed in Angola. The prisoners had been unable to say what country those soldiers had come from.

561. Replying to a question concerning the assistance Portugal received, the petitioner said the military budget was a heavy burden on a poor country like Portugal and was causing economic difficulties. Portugal, although a small Power, maintained over 150,000 soldiers in Africa. It was quite clear, however, that its Government did not have the resources to meet

the needs of that army by itself. It was receiving assistance from NATO in the form of weapons, and even money. The United States had given \$20 million to the Portuguese Government for the improvement of its roads network, but there was no doubt that the money had been diverted from its original purpose and used to finance the colonial war. Furthermore, Portugal had joined NATO and thus received arms, which were used to massacre those fighting in Angola. Arms had been provided by the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and Belgium.

562. Asked whether shipment of arms made in Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany continued, the petitioner said that only two or three weeks previously the Angolan free forces had captured a machine-gun with markings showing that it had come from Israel. Some officers had confirmed that they had seen machine-guns of the same type in the hands of the Katangese mercenaries. The weapon in question had been a very old one. It was the only weapon found which had come from Israel.

563. Elaborating on the assistance being received by Portugal, the petitioner said that he had heard of a man who had received eighteen months' military training as a parachutist in the Federal Republic of Germany, near Bonn. Funds were being supplied to Portugal, ostensibly to improve its infrastructure; in fact, however, those funds were being used for the purchase of arms and for the maintenance of the 150,000-man army stationed in Africa. Portugal's war needs were enormous, and it needed funds. Portugal was also receiving assistance from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Monetary Fund. It was undeniable that Portugal was receiving assistance, since it was a poor, under-developed country and was only able to continue the repression because of the assistance it was receiving. He could state further that Portugal had received funds from the United States for the alleged purpose of improving its road and highway system. That was an incontrovertible fact because statements had been made by the Portuguese authorities on the subject.

564. Replying to a further question, the petitioner stated that much had been said about the solidarity between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories. An article entitled "The White Bastion in Southern Africa", which had been published in a semi-official Angolan newspaper, dealt with the co-operation between the NATO Powers and Portugal and the contacts existing between South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia. It clearly stated that the purpose of Portuguese activities in Africa was to defend the white man in southern Africa. It stated that nothing the Africans could do could destroy that fortress. There was a possibility that the Portuguese Government might seek to follow the Rhodesian example by giving "self-determination" to the white settlers of Angola. In a Portuguese newspaper the previous year he had read a statement by a Portuguese settler in Angola who was disturbed that after almost six years, the Portuguese Government, despite all its assurances, had proved unable to end a worsening conflict which was degenerating into massacres and killings. The settlers had added that if the Portuguese Government was not capable of waging war against the Angolan freedom fighters, the settlers would take

things into their own hands and appeal to their Rhodesian brothers. It was by no means impossible that the Angolan settlers, following the example of the French extremists during the Algerian war, would combine with the army, organize an uprising, seize power and then secede and proclaim Angolan independence unilaterally. The gravity of the situation could not be overemphasized.

565. To the 85,000 Portuguese soldiers stationed in Angola should be added the 300,000-odd Portuguese settlers in the Territory, which meant that there were more than 400,000 white Portuguese now living in Angola. The policy of encouraging white settlement, begun in 1930, had forced the Africans to leave their land and settle 50 or 60 kilometres at least from their villages along the main roads (*estradas*). Thus prevented from cultivating their plantations, such "displaced persons" had been considered as unemployed and recruited by force to cultivate their own lands for the benefit of the new settlers. He had recently seen a poster encouraging Portuguese soldiers to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government promising them plots of land in Angola after victory. The illustration showed the soldier-settler with a gun in his right hand and a machete in his left.

566. Replying to a question concerning refugees, the petitioner said that the total number of Angolan refugees was 627,350. There were two types of Angolans in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: those who had emigrated, had been settled in the Congo for some time, and were now working and playing a part in the life of the country; and those who had fled from Angola after 1961 and were living in conditions of hardship. There were 45,000 refugees in Kinshasa, 500,000 in the Central Congo, 40,000 in the northernmost region, 7,000 in some other regions and 35,000 in Katanga. After the repression had begun, refugees had also come to the Congo from Cabinda. There was a general tendency to separate Cabinda from Angola, but in 1963 the United Nations had adopted a resolution including Cabinda in Angola. There were also some refugees in Zambia, but they were very few in number. The Special Committee would gain first-hand knowledge of the number of those refugees when it went to Zambia.

567. With regard to education, GRAE had received no assistance from UNESCO and that made its task more difficult. Nevertheless, that agency's failure to contribute was doubtless due to its anxiety not to take sides rather than to any deliberate intention of undermining action undertaken for the benefit of the Angolan people.

568. The schools maintained by GRAE were supported by the Angolans themselves. Since it was very difficult to obtain outside assistance, GRAE made the Angolans contribute to them. The Angolans could count on no one but themselves. Apart from the schools at Kinshasa and near the borders, there were some schools inside Angola which were supported by the Angolans.

569. With regard to aid to the Angolan refugees, GRAE was receiving assistance from some philanthropic organizations and from some Governments. For example, it was receiving medicines from the Indian, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak Governments. Some organizations like the Catholic Relief Services and the Protestant Organization for Aid to Refugees were providing assistance independently of GRAE. Apart

from a few scholarships, the Angolan refugees were receiving no direct assistance from the United Nations. UNESCO granted scholarships to a few students. GRAE would have welcomed UNESCO co-operation. Unfortunately those students were compelled to leave the schools run by his organization and to go to subsidized schools in the Congo. In addition to UNESCO, Lovanium granted some scholarships to the refugees; GRAE would have preferred the assistance to be granted to the schools under its control and not to other schools. He had written to that effect to the official in New York responsible for granting scholarships and had been told that the students must apply directly to New York. The situation was much the same with regard to medical aid. The fact that Portugal was a member of most of the specialized agencies unquestionably meant that certain States would oppose any move conflicting with the interests of the colonial Power. To take only one example, in 1961, at the beginning of the Angolan people's fight for independence, the International Committee of the Red Cross and begun to give help to the refugees. It had withdrawn that support shortly afterwards, doubtless as a result of political pressure. At present, only philanthropic organizations were demonstrating their support for the struggling Angolan people by gifts of clothing, food, and so forth.

570. Mr. Lara Lucio, speaking on behalf of the *Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola* (MPLA), stated that the ten-year-old movement had played a leading role in the fight of the Angolan people for their independence. Although MPLA was currently involved in a bloody war against the oppressors of the Angolan people, it was nevertheless devoted to the noble universal principles proclaimed by the United Nations. The Angolan people had been forced into war. Long before the bloody events which had started on 4 February 1961, many Angolan leaders had made dramatic appeals to the United Nations, in the hope that the Organization would intervene and bring the crimes of the Portuguese colonialists to an end. MPLA itself had sent an appeal to the States Members of the United Nations and, foreseeing the war which the colonialists had been hastily preparing, in a statement addressed to the Portuguese Government in 1960, it had laid the responsibility for the bloody consequences of its obstinacy on the shoulders of the Lisbon Government. It did not hold the Portuguese people responsible for the crimes of the régime in power and was ready to establish ties of friendship with all the peoples of the world, including the Portuguese people.

571. All the efforts of MPLA to arrive at a peaceful solution had met with blind intransigence. For over six years, the colonialist army, rendered powerless by the mobility and effectiveness of the Angolan armed forces, had been committing all kinds of violence against the civilian population. The continual bombing of suspected resistance areas, the poisoning of crops, the cold-blooded liquidation of anyone suspected of nationalism, the increasing debasement of the Angolan people and the frantic exploitation of their wealth—those were the main characteristics of a doomed policy desperately aimed at surviving the radical changes of the modern world. The Portuguese régime persisted in its attempts to turn the clock back by emphasizing the myth of a "multiracial and pluri-continental community", which was completely meaningless.

572. Portugal allowed a certain measure of reform and some evolution, provided that it did not bring the myth of a pluri-continental and multiracial Portugal into question. The armed revolt of the Angolan people had forced the Portuguese administration to make a pretence of introducing reforms for the benefit of the Angolan population.

573. The features of colonialism, although they had been rendered slightly less severe for the sake of appearances, had been intensified in many respects. The Angolan people were still under foreign domination, they were still governed by Portuguese and all important matters were decided at Lisbon by the Portuguese authorities, which conveyed the decisions to the Governor General, also a Portuguese, and to the administrative organs in Angola, headed by Portuguese. The pretence that there were local executive organs did not stand up to the most cursory scrutiny. The Angolans did not have the right to vote because voters had to know how to read and write and pay at least 200 escudos (\$7) in taxes, while 95 per cent of the Angolan population was illiterate. Only three of the Legislative Council's thirty-six members could be considered Angolans. There had been no political freedom before the war but now anyone—even some settlers—who dared to criticize the Government was accused of high treason. The Angolans had even fewer fundamental freedoms than before, and recently ANANGOLA (*Association des originaires de l'Angola*)—which had already been under the direction of the colonial administration—had been found to be dangerous and obliged to disband. The special courts which tried those suspected of nationalism were at Lisbon, so as to avoid explosion of anger by Angolans during the trials. The prisons of Luanda and the concentration camps at Bié and Roçadas could no longer hold all those whom the PIDE (*Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado*) considered to be a public danger. Many political prisoners were gaoled in Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands. The nationalist Angolan priests who had been deported to Portugal and the Protestant ministers who had survived the massacres of 1961 and 1962 were still not allowed to contact their congregations.

574. Although there had been some reform in the laws governing forced labour, it continued to be practised in Angola. That shameful but profitable practice was threatening the stability of the family and reducing the workers to slavery. The minimum wage laws were not observed and Angolan workers still could not form trade unions to press their claims.

575. The influx of Portuguese immigrants and particularly the authorities' campaign to encourage soldiers to settle in Angola had considerably increased the number of settlers to about 300,000. The continual increase in the number of settlers, in violation of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), was a factor in the impoverishment of the entire Angolan population, who were still being robbed of the best land and denied access to better paid employment because of competition from the poor immigrants. The competition encouraged discrimination in wages, since the African worker was often obliged to accept a quarter of the wages paid to a European for the same work.

576. An important question arose: who was paying for Portugal's war in Africa? Portugal levied a "defence tax" on companies whose profits exceeded 500,000 escudos, and the public debt now amounted to 32,000 million escudos (over \$1,000 million). However, it

was foreign investors who were helping Portugal to meet its military expenses. They had been granted favourable terms in Angola by Decree 46,312 of 28 April 1965 and now many financial groups—South African, West German, Spanish, Japanese, American, Dutch, Norwegian, British, Belgian, French, Italian and Swedish—were competing for licences to exploit the wealth of Angola put up for auction by the Portuguese Government. Instead of being used to raise the level of living of the Angolan people, the vast economic resources created by foreign investments in Angola served to strengthen Portugal's limited capacity to pay for the colonial war.

577. All who were contributing to that situation should therefore be roundly condemned. The United Nations General Assembly had realized that and consequently, in operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2184 (XXI), it condemned the activities of the financial interests which were exploiting the human and material resources of the Territories under Portuguese domination and preventing the people from exercising their legitimate right to freedom and independence. That was an important contribution by the United Nations to the Angolan people's fight for liberation. The financial interests currently involved in Angola were universally recognized to be the enemies of the independence of the people and therefore could not complain if they were the target of reprisals by the freedom fighters. The most regrettable fact was that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, like financial circles of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, was not implementing General Assembly resolutions 2105 (XX), 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI). The five loans totalling \$57.5 million granted to Portuguese enterprises as at 25 November 1966 had also helped to swell the Portuguese military budget. The fact that the enterprises belonged to the private sector in no way invalidated that conclusion. The Portuguese military budget for 1967 provided for expenditure of the order of 8,000 million escudos (about \$300 million), or over 44 per cent of the State budget. For a country whose *per capita* income was the lowest in Europe, that represented an effort which could not be maintained for very long.

578. All aid, whether public or private, swelled the general Portuguese budget. Without aid, the Portuguese Government would be obliged to spend funds inside the country, which would prevent it from continuing the fight against the Angolan people. Thus, even if the assistance given to Portugal was not military in character, it still threatened the Angolan people's right to freedom.

579. It was common knowledge that some Powers were taking advantage of Portugal's need for aid. For instance, NATO in general and some of its members in particular were continuing to provide Portugal with the means to decimate the African peoples.

580. It was not true that weapons were being supplied to Portugal on condition that they would not be used in wars against the Africans. MPLA had salvaged several kinds of weapons made in Germany, the United States, Belgium and Israel, but none made in Portugal except, of course, ammunition and certain types of grenade. Something must be done to make States Members of the United Nations undertake to comply with the numerous resolutions and appeals to stop supplying and selling to the Portu-

guese Government anything it needed to pursue the war against the colonized peoples. It was not enough to note that the Federal Republic of Germany had set up a military base in the Portuguese town of Beja, in exchange for very substantial financial and military assistance; or that the United States was also giving financial and military support in exchange for the facilities in the Azores; or that France—the same France which had understood in time the irreversible process of national independence—was supplying Portugal with helicopters and warships; it was not enough, in short, to draw up a black list of all those who were helping Portugal to prolong a war which it had already lost.

581. MPLA considered that only attitudes such as that recently adopted by Sweden—whose Minister for Foreign Affairs had unequivocally condemned Portuguese colonial policy, causing excitement in official Portuguese circles—helped to make Portugal understand that the only outcome of the war would be the victory of the patriotic forces.

582. In addition, Portugal's alliance with the racists of South Africa and Rhodesia posed a serious threat to the African peoples in southern Africa. Africa and the world could not stand aloof while the political, economic and military ties between those Powers grew steadily closer. The identical positions held by the inseparable partners in United Nations votes were well known. So were the affairs of the Bank of Lisbon and South Africa Ltd., the embryonic link between the economies of the Territories under Portuguese administration, South Africa and Rhodesia. In addition, two months previously, an official Portuguese source had announced joint manoeuvres by Portuguese and Southern Rhodesian firemen along the frontier between Mozambique and Rhodesia. Nobody had any doubt about the kind of fire which those makeshift firemen were meant to put out. The military nature of the visit to Lisbon in April 1967 by the South African Minister of Defence, Pieter Botha, the Chief of General Staff and the Commandant-General of the South African Armed Forces also aroused justifiable concern, which had been intensified by South Africa's recent defiance of the United Nations in connexion with South West Africa. MPLA hoped that the Special Committee would work closely with the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and not allow the United Nations to neglect that serious problem, which was indeed a threat to world peace.

583. Concern had also been aroused by the visit to Angola of four Brazilian warships—the cruisers *Tamandaré* and *Barroso* and the escort vessels *Paraná* and *Pernambuco*—with 2,000 men on board. The Brazilian Government had made such whole-hearted declarations of support for Portugal's policy that the African Ambassadors in Brazil had been constrained to protest. However, MPLA was sure that the brotherly solidarity between the Brazilian and the Angolan peoples would prevent the worst from happening.

584. MPLA had on several occasions described to the Special Committee the goals it was pursuing and the work it had done in the six years since its establishment. During 1966, MPLA had succeeded in implanting itself more firmly in some regions of the country which had not yet been able to organize resistance. For example, in May 1966, MPLA had opened the sizable eastern front, in the districts of Moxico

and Cuando-Cubango. The size of that new front had alarmed the Portuguese General Staff and particularly the Minister of Defence, General Gomes de Araújo, who, on his return from an inspection tour in September 1966, had not concealed his pessimism. With the eastern front, which had rapidly been extended to the areas of Cazombo, Bundas and Sandando and along the Benguela railway, excellent prospects had been opened up for MPLA's armed struggle, particularly since there was a possibility of extending the front to the south and mid-west of Angola. On 12 December 1966, *Le Monde* had reported the Portuguese authorities' concern about the expansion of the war in Angola. According to that newspaper, an official Portuguese source had announced a considerable increase in the Portuguese forces in Angola. The same source had said that 50 per cent of the Portuguese troops in Africa were in Angola. In addition, during 1966, MPLA had been able considerably to strengthen the northern front, which now had a large number of better trained and better armed members, leading a population of tens of thousands in regions entirely controlled by patriots. There had been action on that front in the districts of Luanda, Kuanza Norte and Congo, particularly in the valley of the Dange and along the Luanda-Uige roadway. At the same time, on the Cabinda front, guerrilla activities had continued normally in the areas of Cacongo and Mayombe.

585. In 1966, MPLA guerrillas had carried out over 2,000 missions. The enemy had lost at least 1,610 men, including some officers and non-commissioned officers. MPLA forces had destroyed six bridges, ten motor launches, three military aircraft, six barracks and over a hundred military vehicles. A large amount of equipment, including weapons, grenades, ammunition and medicaments, had been salvaged.

586. Very significant results had already been achieved in the first quarter of 1967—the year in which MPLA's armed struggle would spread throughout the national territory.

587. There were very clear signs of a decline in the morale of the enemy troops. The general mobilization decree promulgated by the Portuguese Government in 1966 had already created considerable anxiety among the Portuguese population and soldiers. Compulsory military service had been fixed at a minimum of three years but could last as long as four years. Young people who were physically unfit for military service were no longer given an exemption; anyone could be called up until the age of forty-five. In addition, women had been taken on as volunteers in the Portuguese army for the first time. Following on the decree establishing provincial branches of the Civil Defence and Volunteer Corps, the general mobilization showed how concerned the Portuguese Government was.

588. The violations of the frontiers of Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo also showed how much the military were on edge. The mutiny of Portuguese soldiers in some Angolan barracks, particularly at Huambo (Nova Lisboa) in December 1966, gave some idea of the disarray which, despite all appearances, reigned in the colonialists' ranks. Indeed, that disarray had been mentioned by Deputy Commander Cunha who, at a meeting of the Portuguese National Assembly in March 1967, had

criticized the confusion which reigned in the various sectors of government activity. According to him, there was no co-ordination of Portuguese economic, political and military activities.

589. MPLA's activities were not only military. MPLA had embarked on an intensive political campaign to mobilize more forces in support of the sacred cause of Angolan independence. For that purpose it had participated in many international meetings, contributing to the study of a series of problems connected with Angola's fight for freedom and many other African and international questions. At the Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (CONCP), MPLA had also continued to co-ordinate its activities with progressive organizations in the other Portuguese colonies, such as PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP. MPLA welcomed the decision by the United Nations to organize an international seminar on *apartheid*, to be held shortly at Dar es Salaam, which MPLA would attend as an observer.

590. There was some misunderstanding about the district of Cabinda. MPLA wished first of all to emphasize Portugal's hold on certain people who were spreading confusion about that district of Angola. That was what the traitor Alexandre Taty was doing; with a handful of irresponsible men, he was copying the role played by the *harkis* during the Algerian war, arousing the indignation of the entire oppressed population of the district. MPLA respected the specific course taken by history of the Kingdoms of Ngoyo and Kakongo and the Realm of Mayombe before the Conference of Berlin in 1885 which, in the arbitrary manner adopted for other regions, had integrated those territories with the others that made up Angola today. MPLA considered that, once all Africa was free, the African countries would be able to remedy the evils caused by the arbitrary demarcation of 1885, as part of their efforts to achieve African unity. In that connexion, MPLA fully endorsed the principles defended by the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) with regard to existing frontiers. It therefore considered that the region of Cabinda was at present part of Angola and was suffering like the rest of the country from Portuguese colonial oppression. That was why MPLA was fighting, weapons in hand, in Cabinda, as it was at Nambuanguongo, Moxico and throughout Angola. That was why MPLA was fighting for true national unity against regionalism and tribalism.

591. The important problem of the Angolan refugees was a matter of serious concern to MPLA, which was continually using the material and human resources that could be spared from the war of liberation to assist the Angolan refugees. The problem was very complex and MPLA had made some suggestions to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in two documents: one on the education of the Angolan refugees and one on general aspects of the Angolan refugee problem (see paragraph 596 below). The latter document had been prepared for the seventeenth session of the Executive Committee on the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, held at Geneva on 22 May 1967.

592. The attention of the Special Committee was drawn to those two documents, which reflected the opinion of a group fighting to solve the social problems of the Angolan people. They described MPLA's efforts

to provide the refugees with medical and educational assistance and the difficulties which were preventing a more rapid expansion of that assistance. They showed the results of the school experiments and the reasons why the results of the training programme for the Territories under Portuguese domination outlined in General Assembly resolution 2108 (XX) were unsatisfactory, contained MPLA's suggestions for improving it and described the method used to meet the need for intermediate, secondary and vocational education. The collaboration and material assistance of agencies such as UNESCO, UNICEF, WHO, the ILO, UNDP and FAO would be extremely useful.

593. Generally speaking, MPLA encountered prejudice because it was a liberation movement, with which international agencies were afraid to get involved, even in purely social matters, despite the principle approved in the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 28 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) of "co-operation with the liberation movement of all the Territories under colonial domination" in connexion with programmes of assistance to refugees.

594. That was one matter in which MPLA wanted to enlist the co-operation of the Special Committee: the specialized agencies could co-operate openly with the national liberation movements which submitted sound social welfare (cultural, medical, etc.) programmes. MPLA had every reason to believe that the Special Committee would make even greater efforts to persuade the Portuguese Government to abandon its criminal attitude and would do its utmost to make the struggle more effective until the Angolan people triumphed. The Committee should urge Angola's neighbours, who were still hesitant, to grant MPLA the freedom of action it needed to expedite the routing of supplies to its fighters, particularly those hundreds of kilometres away from the frontiers. Such backing of MPLA would be one of the strongest weapons against the aggressive scheming of the Salazar-Vorster-Smith alliance in Southern Africa.

595. In conclusion, he invited the members of the Committee to go and see the military and social activities of MPLA inside Angola and at the frontier zones—in the Congo (Brazzaville) and in Zambia.

596. The two documents referred to by the petitioner in paragraph 592 above are reproduced below.

*"(a) Statement of MPLA views on the education of Angolan refugees"*

"(1) The peoples of the African Territories under Portuguese administration could not but be moved by the resolutions which the United Nations has adopted since 1961 with a view to inducing Portugal to comply with the United Nations Charter by respecting the legitimate aspirations of these peoples for freedom and independence. By adopting resolution 1514 (XV) on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and resolutions 1807 (XVII), 1819 (XVII), 1913 (XVIII), 2105 (XX) and 2107 (XX), the United Nations established a point of departure for concerted action to accelerate the dismantling of the Portuguese under colonial domination to exercise their right to self-determination and independence.

"(2) More effective action to liberate the peoples of these Territories was not initiated until the United Nations established a special training programme for Territories under Portuguese administration (resolutions 1808 (XVII), 1973 (XVIII) and 2108 (XX)).

Under this programme, numerous countries offered fellowships for victims of Portuguese colonial oppression. Furthermore, in order to assist the refugees from these Territories, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees instituted measures to facilitate their adaptation to a new way of life by providing them with work or a minimum of education.

"(3) Since its establishment in 1956, the Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA) has been very active in the field of education. Long before the armed struggle began, MPLA had established clandestine schools in the towns and villages of Angola, and despite constant persecution by the police, these were never altogether suppressed. At the present time, too, MPLA is trying to provide educational as well as medical assistance for the refugees. It therefore wishes to express its views on the matter to all the specialized agencies dealing with these questions. Indeed, it has a duty and a right to do so in accordance with operative paragraph 6 of the resolution which was adopted on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619) by the Special Committee and which requests:

... the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories . . .

In any case, the views of the liberation movements of the Territories under Portuguese domination are helping the United Nations and the specialized agencies to prepare aid programmes adapted to the conditions and particular circumstances of each recipient people and of the countries of asylum.

"(4) Education programmes for our peoples are particularly important, as education is a matter which the colonial administration always treated with scorn. Everyone knows that the illiteracy rate in countries under Portuguese domination averages 98 per cent. The present state of war has obliged the administering Power to announce an increase in the number of schools, which, in fact, continue to serve the interests of the settlers. Consideration must also be given to the ever-increasing number of Angolan refugees living in neighbouring countries who are destitute. MPLA believes that the education programmes of the United Nations, voluntary agencies and liberation movements should be analysed and adapted to the actual needs of the peoples for whom they are intended, having in mind that these peoples will be reintegrated in their own countries once they become independent.

"(5) MPLA, for its part, has accepted direct offers of fellowships from relief organizations in Africa, Europe and America, and has sent more than 200 young people abroad for technical and higher training. For some years, too, it has tried to provide primary education—in Portuguese—along the frontiers with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo. More than a thousand pupils have attended these 'improvised' schools. After the prohibition of MPLA activities at Leopoldville (September 1963), educational activities were transferred to Congo (Brazzaville) where a better-organized MPLA school service has been established. Reading and writing primers have been produced

and readers for the more advanced classes are now in the preparation. On the basis of the experience acquired, it is possible once again to envisage the extension of primary education to Angolan refugees in all countries bordering on Angola.

“(6) A very careful analysis should be undertaken now to ensure that future education programmes for the Angolan people (the present programmes are only for Angolan refugees) are properly oriented from the very outset. Fellowships alone cannot produce the desired results. Students receiving fellowships have to learn a foreign language; the majority of the candidates do not have an adequate basic education; the planning of courses is often ill-adapted to the real needs of the student's country of origin; and the very different conditions and standards of living in the countries of study produce an unfavourable reaction when the students return home. Furthermore, there are at present no facilities for secondary education, and the efforts being made in regard to primary education are quite inadequate, as there is no special programme to support them. Lastly, there is the difficult problem of the method to be used for launching a comprehensive programme that would make use of all the kinds of assistance which are available for educational purposes. The question here is whether refugee education should be integrated with the programmes of the host country.

“(7) MPLA does not, unfortunately, claim to have found the key to these problems, but it does feel that it should help in trying to solve them. It believes that the main effort should be concentrated on basic education at the primary, secondary and technical levels. For secondary education, there could be an accelerated programme leading to higher education. UNESCO might be asked to prepare secondary education programmes with special emphasis on science (mathematics, physics, chemistry, mineralogy, biology). One foreign language (French or English) would be compulsory. After three or four years of secondary education, students could apply for admission to higher educational institutions in the various countries collaborating in the implementation of the programmes. A primary education programme could also be prepared, with the minimum periods of schooling to be determined later. All organizations dealing with primary education for refugees would be expected to follow these programmes, the preparation of which would be entrusted to UNESCO working in conjunction with the education departments of the liberation movements.

“(8) Furthermore, MPLA believes that education in these categories (secondary and primary) should be given in Portuguese. There are several reasons for this choice, including the following:

“(i) As English is spoken in some of the countries bordering on Angola, and French in others, Angolans would otherwise receive their primary or secondary education in different languages, depending on the country of asylum. The programmes in each host country would also be different.

“(ii) The host countries have no room in their schools owing to the increasing influx of students after independence, which put an end to the limited schooling facilities of the colonial era. They would therefore find it difficult to accommodate refugee children as well.

“(iii) The situation of the refugees is still uncertain, in spite of all the measures taken to integrate them in a new society. Most refugees want to return home, and their country needs them. It would seem, therefore, that any education programme should be based on the principle that it will be continued in an independent Angola, where the official language is not likely to be French or English.

There are other problems too, such as the choice of suitable sites for secondary schools, when these are established. This too will call for discussions with the authorities of the host countries.

“(9) The implementation of resolution 1808 (XVII) seems to be the responsibility of the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, supported by the United Nations Development Programme. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is responsible for several refugee aid programmes dealing with education, particularly primary education. Up to now, UNESCO has not been involved in these programmes. However, of all the international agencies concerned, UNESCO seems to be best equipped for ensuring the success of the combined efforts which the international community is making to provide education for our peoples. Its long experience in basic education, its experts, its professors and teachers, combined with its vast network of permanent missions and first-class technical resources—all these assets could well be mobilized on behalf of the refugees from the countries under Portuguese domination. UNESCO itself has taken a step in this direction by authorizing its Director-General to ‘co-operate fully with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the High Commissioner for Refugees in the planning and execution of any joint programme of assistance that may be undertaken... for the benefit of refugees from southern Africa with a view to enabling them to receive the education best suited to their needs.’ In addition, provision has been made for a UNESCO official to collaborate with the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (item 249 of the draft programme and budget).

“(10) These considerations lead MPLA to suggest that a meeting of representatives of the countries bordering on the countries under Portuguese domination, and of representatives of UNHCR, UNESCO and the liberation movements of the countries concerned, should be convened as soon as possible to undertake a detailed study of all the problems involved in the successful implementation of the education programmes, and of ways of solving them. A meeting of this kind, which could be held under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, would make it possible for all the parties concerned to co-ordinate their efforts for the voluntary funds to be distributed in an equitable manner and for an effective structure to be set up in order to provide education—without which freedom would be a mere illusion—for the peoples still under colonial domination.

“(b) *Contribution of MPLA to the study of the Angolan refugee problem*

“(Prepared for the seventeenth session of the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)



*“Introduction*

“No one today questions the legitimacy of the struggle for freedom by peoples who are still subject to colonial oppression. Portugal, almost alone on the African continent, still refuses, however, to comply with the universally recognized principles and has even resorted to war as a means of prolonging its shameless exploitation of Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Mozambique and the islands of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe.

“Nearly all States Members of the United Nations have repeatedly protested against Portugal’s refusal to yield to the aspirations of the peoples of the Territories under its domination.

“The United Nations resolutions on the Territories under Portuguese administration have become increasingly sharp in tone. Their intention is to give the oppressed peoples, whose right to express their views has at least already been recognized by an international personality. The participation of petitioners in some of the proceedings of the United Nations has proved to be a valuable aid to the United Nations in the discharge of the functions it has assumed in the matter of decolonization.

“Furthermore, the periodic visits made by the Special Committee for the sole purpose of obtaining from the representatives of the peoples struggling for their independence the information required for the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) confirm the value of the contribution which these representatives are making to the work of the United Nations.

“Also, in regard at least to the refugee aid programmes, the United Nations has already recognized the principle of ‘co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination’, to which reference is made in operative paragraph 6 of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 22 June 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619).

“In the light of these principles, MPLA believes that it has a duty to contribute to the work of the international agencies whose activities directly affect the Angolan refugees in all fields.

“It has therefore decided to address this contribution to the Executive Committee on the Programme of UNHCR, and requests the officers of the Committee to arrange for it to be circulated as a working paper during the session.

*“The refugees*

“After the Angolan people had taken up arms to challenge the Portuguese colonialist administration in February 1961 and the villages and countryside had been savagely bombed, thousands of Angolans crossed the frontiers of neighbouring countries in order to wait there until the time came to return to their country and resume their normal life.

“The main flow of refugees was into the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Kinshasa), and particularly into the Lower Congo provinces. Other refugees went to Katanga, the Republic of Zambia, and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville).

“Although it has always been difficult to provide even a rough estimate of the number of refugees, information provided by non-official sources indicates that at the end of 1966 the figures were as follows:

Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .....	more than 400,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of Zambia .....	about 4,000
Angolan refugees in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) .....	about 20,000.

*“Aid to refugees*

“The influx of Angolan refugees soon attracted world attention. The relief organizations which tried to provide assistance for the refugees in the Congo (Kinshasa) encountered many difficulties—not least among them, the political instability in the country itself.

“MPLA was the first Angolan political organization which decided to make an active contribution to the aid operations for Angolan refugees. It set up a relief organization—the Angolan voluntary corps for assistance to refugees (CVAAR)—which succeeded in channelling to the refugees a large proportion of the international aid provided.

“Philanthropic organizations in Belgium, the Netherlands, Gabon, the Central African Republic, the Kingdom of Morocco, the United Kingdom, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Sweden, the USSR, Bulgaria, Switzerland and Italy, as well as certain United States philanthropic organizations with offices at Kinshasa, provided CVAAR with gifts of food-stuffs, drugs, clothing and even equipment and cash.

“With this assistance, CVAAR was able to set up a vast network of dispensaries and schools along the Congo-Angola frontier. This was undoubtedly the main refugee aid network in the Congo (Kinshasa) during 1962 and 1963, and it was destined to become the backbone of aid operations which—even at that time—included the distribution of food, vaccination campaigns, disease diagnosis campaigns, education campaigns, etc.

“This network consisted of more than twenty dispensaries and school posts situated all along the frontier from the province of Kwango as far as the coast, and extending to the frontier of the Cabinda district. It was directed by a team of Angolan doctors, nurses and teachers. In addition to the central dispensary at Kinshasa, there was a dispensary and—in most cases—a school at other frontier localities such as Kimpangu, Lukala, Boma, Kimwenza, Matadi, Kipindi, Kindopolo, Tumbamani, Kahemba, Boko, Malele, Songololo, Moerbeke, Lufu, Kimongo, Luali, Mbata Manga, Nganda Binda, Iloupanga and Banga.

“CVAAR was also having some success with a programme for the distribution of agricultural requirements (hoes and seeds) so that crops would be grown to make up for the shortage of food-stuffs.

“Although CVAAR did not receive any contribution from the Office of UNHCR, this United Nations body was of course helping Angolan refugees, particularly by its contribution to certain projects undertaken by humanitarian organizations such as the Congo Protestant Relief Agency, Caritas-Congo, the Congolese Red Cross, the Baptist Missionary Society, etc.

“In September 1963, following the unilateral recognition by former Prime Minister Adoula of a self-styled Angolan government in exile, the network of dispensaries maintained by CVAAR in the Congo (Kinshasa) was paralysed, with regrettable results

for the refugee population, which was thus deprived of one of its most effective sources of aid.

"In 1966, CVAAR was authorized to resume its activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Two dispensaries for refugees were immediately opened, one at Kinshasa and the other at Songololo (on the frontier). Unfortunately, it has been difficult to do any useful work there, owing to the acts of pillage and banditry committed by representatives of the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile with the connivance of some of the local authorities. Only a short time ago, these persons broke into the CVAAR dispensary at Songololo, looted the drugs and kidnapped the male nurses on duty there. One of these nurses is missing (believed murdered), while the other two are detained with a few dozen other Angolans in the Congolese village of Kinkuzu, in a camp which the Congolese Government made available to the head of the self-styled government in exile in 1962.

"It seems that the political motives which have obstructed CVAAR action on behalf of the Angolan refugees have also had a direct or indirect effect on UNHCR action. The UNHCR programmes have not, of course, been suspended, but they have suffered—at least to outward appearances—from a certain stagnation. This apparent stagnation may be due partly to the success of certain programmes to integrate groups of peasants into the new conditions of the country of asylum. It is well known, on the other hand, that UNHCR has had some difficulty in finding agents to carry out larger-scale aid programmes for the Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"This explains the differences between the amount of funds allocated for programmes on behalf of Angolan refugees in the Congo, and those earmarked for refugees from Mozambique, Guinea (Bissau) and the Angolan refugees in other countries (to mention only the refugees from countries under Portuguese colonial domination).

"According to the note by the Secretariat on the question of refugees (A/AC.109/L.293 and Add.1), the number of refugees at the end of 1965 from the Territories under Portuguese colonial domination was estimated as follows:

Angola .....	220,000 refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Mozambique .....	12,000 refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania
Guinea (under Portuguese administration) .....	30,000 refugees in Senegal

"For Angola, at least, the figure given is certainly too small. The authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo put the number of Angolan refugees at 600,000, while other sources gave a figure of 379,000 for 1965. These estimates, in spite of their tentative character, give some idea of the difficulties encountered in providing extensive assistance to the great mass of Angolan refugees in the Congo.

"In 1965, UNHCR allocations for the three countries under Portuguese colonial domination were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293, annex):

	\$US
For refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .....	15,000
For refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania .....	213,000
For refugees from Guinea (Bissau) in Senegal .....	108,170.

"In 1966 the allocations were as follows (A/AC.109/L.293):

	\$US
For refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo .....	15,000
For refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania .....	192,550
For refugees from Guinea (Bissau) in Senegal .....	260,000.

"In October 1966, the steady increase in the number of Angolan refugees in Zambia, which was rapidly approaching the figure of 4,000, prompted UNHCR and the Zambian Government, which was also providing aid, to make a number of emergency allocations. By the end of 1966, these allocations totalled \$US115,600 (A/AC.96/INF/61, Add.1).

"Even if allowance is made for the \$US89,238 spent on certain projects for Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the period 1962/1965, it is quite clear that, for reasons beyond the control of UNHCR, these refugees have been prevented from receiving assistance more commensurate with their numbers and needs.

"It is also clear that the 20,000 or so Angolan refugees, most of them from the district of Cabinda, who are now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), have never received any assistance from UNHCR at all.

"It is true, of course, that the action taken by UNHCR on behalf of refugees in a given country depends largely on the programmes submitted to UNHCR by the Government of the country concerned. Many African countries, however, are so preoccupied with problems of reconstruction and the consolidation of independence that they do not have time to deal comprehensively with the difficult problem of the refugees to whom they have so generously offered asylum.

"This in itself is surely one reason why UNHCR, with the prior agreement of the Governments concerned, should try to encourage the organizations closest to refugees—that is, any liberation movements which are anxious to help—to draft aid programmes which would be implemented under the supervision of a representative of the host country and a representative of UNHCR.

#### "Education problems

"In October 1966, MPLA circulated to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Director-General of UNESCO and the Director of the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories a statement of its views on the education of Angolan refugees. Of the various problems mentioned in that document, we should like now to revert to those which still seem to be of particular importance.

"MPLA was glad to note that, at its last session, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme took a number of decisions on problems of concern to us, namely:

"(a) that UNHCR should now be associated with the implementation of the special training programme for Territories under Portuguese colonial domination;

"(b) that UNESCO and UNHCR should collaborate closely in the implementation of education programmes for refugees;

"(c) that the Executive Committee authorized the High Commissioner to open a special fund for refugee education.

"MPLA also notes that its concern with refugee education programmes is shared by a number of organizations dealing with the same problems. For example, after the statement by MPLA of its views had been circulated, meetings of organizations and public figures dealing with refugee education were held at Wickrath (November 1966), London (March 1967) and New York (April 1967).

"The conclusions and recommendations put forward at these meetings contain a number of valuable suggestions and could very profitably be applied in the implementation of large-scale projects. Most of the participants advocated discussions—or even close co-operation—with the liberation movements of countries which are still dependent.

"In the view of MPLA, however, much better results could be achieved if these meetings were held under the auspices either of UNESCO or UNHCR, and if they were attended by representatives both of the African countries and of the liberation movements concerned.

"In the conclusions reached at all these meetings, reference was made to the difficulties resulting from the low level of education of most of the refugees of school age, a situation which excludes any possibility of a coherent programme of higher education.

"It is therefore generally recognized that special attention should be given to primary, secondary and technical education and that the procedures to be established for solving these problems call for effective co-operation between the various groups concerned.

"There is talk of setting up pilot programmes designed to produce the maximum returns for the minimum time involved, and there is talk of finding material resources (premises, teachers, equipment, etc.) but in our view the most important thing is to make a start.

"The following is an example of one of the practical problems facing MPLA.

"About eighty Angolan children, aged from seven to eighteen years and selected from among the pupils of various MPLA schools along the frontiers, have been admitted as boarders to a school (a farm rented for the purpose not far from the Cabinda-Congo (Brazzaville) frontier), where they are receiving primary education in four classes. The plan of MPLA is that those who have completed the final class will, from the beginning of the following year, receive an accelerated secondary education lasting three or four years—depending on the performance of each pupil—to enable them to apply for admission to higher educational institutions. This would fill the existing gap at the secondary education level.

"For the moment, the special difficulties involved in providing technical education are preventing MPLA from establishing a similar programme in this field.

"The plan is very simple in outline but is not devoid of difficulties. These could be reduced considerably by collaboration with specialized bodies.

"Difficulties have been encountered, for example, in obtaining textbooks and some kinds of school equipment (laboratory equipment, maps, etc.) and, at another stage, in providing food and clothing for the school children once the improvised class-rooms are ready.

"MPLA has devised temporary solutions for some of these problems. Cyclostyled copies have been produced of readers, and of textbooks on the history and geography of Angola and Africa and on the natural sciences. Dormitories and blackboards have been improvised; notebooks and pencils have been kindly provided by certain organizations.

"Much more, however, is required.

"UNESCO should be invited to make a contribution, at least in regard to the teaching problems, and UNHCR should be invited to help in solving some of the material problems such as the provision of accommodation, food and clothing for the school children.

"In spite of all these difficulties, a small hospital with a doctor in charge has been opened on the premises of the boarding school. Apart from providing facilities for consultations and operations, the hospital serves as a school of nursing. Courses are given to ten trainees at a time, since this is the maximum number which can be accommodated.

"The teaching in these schools is given in Portuguese in accordance with the principles which MPLA advocated in paragraph 8 of the statement of its views.

#### *"Health problems*

"In this particular field there is no doubt that many voluntary organizations as well as persons devoted to the cause of the refugees have done magnificent work.

"It would obviously be over-ambitious to claim that a solution to the problem is already in sight, especially as the problem is not confined to refugees alone. In any event, the seriousness of the refugee health situation still gives ground for deep concern. Prolonged malnutrition, leading to diseases of various kinds, and a large number of infectious diseases are rife among refugees and are on the increase, but no projects have yet been launched to curb the incidence of disease.

"CVAAR, in co-operation with similar organizations, could play a very important role in this connexion if the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were to provide it with the necessary guarantees.

"A council or committee composed of representatives of all the voluntary organizations operating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo might, with the co-operation of the United Nations specialized agencies (FAO, WHO and UNDP), provide lasting solutions for many of the problems involved.

#### *"Status of the Angolan refugees*

"All the independent countries bordering on Angola have received the Angolan refugees as brothers, often at great sacrifice to themselves. Even in his hour of distress, the refugee from Angola has found a welcome in neighbouring countries regardless of the difficulties which these countries have inherited from the recent colonial situation.

"The only thing marring this picture of fraternal solidarity is the apparent tolerance of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo towards the kidnapping, detention, murder and looting practised by the above-mentioned self-styled government in exile against Angolan refugees. These crimes and activities, which may be regarded as impugning the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,

violate the rights of the refugees and seriously impede the implementation of the refugee aid programmes—to mention but this one aspect of the problem.

#### “Conclusions

“The sole object of MPLA in preparing this document has been to contribute to the effectiveness of the United Nations effort on behalf of the Angolan refugees.

“MPLA believes that UNHCR, in the exalted task which it has assumed, needs the assistance of all persons of goodwill. In the light of this principle, MPLA is still convinced that UNHCR could improve its aid programmes for the Angolan refugees if it could find a way of discussing them with the specialized agencies, the host countries and representatives of the liberation movements concerned. Discussions of this kind would certainly lead to an intensification of aid to the Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; to the establishment of an aid programme for the Angolan refugees now in the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville); to a study—in collaboration with UNESCO—of model programmes of accelerated education to be followed by organizations providing education for the refugees; to a study of the possibilities of providing technical education to meet the requirements of an independent Angola; to a study of the problems involved in providing housing, food and clothing for school children; and to the implementation of new settlement and medical assistance programmes for the refugees.

“MPLA hopes that UNHCR and the Executive Committee of its Programme will regard this document as a response to the vast aid effort already contributed by the UNHCR, and as an expression of views by a group which is fighting for the right to assume legitimate responsibility for solving the social problems of the Angolan people.”

597. Replying to questions, the petitioner said that emigration from Portugal to Angola was one of the weapons used by Portugal to prolong its domination over that Territory. In order to persuade emigrants to settle in Angola, the Portuguese Government was obliged to offer them inducements. It had established settlements (*colonatos*)—groups of farmers who chose the best land. The occupants were evicted and their place was taken by families of settlers from Portugal, the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands. The families were lent agricultural equipment and money, so that they would have everything they needed to farm the land. There were over 2,000 families in the largest settlement, which was at Cela. By evicting Africans to give the settlers the best land, the Portuguese Government was committing an act of piracy. In addition, it recruited “soldier-settlers” from the Portuguese expeditionary forces, who were persuaded to settle in Angola and send for their families. That policy, which was jeopardizing the economy of the indigenous population, had admittedly produced some results.

598. The petitioner said that Portugal was not implementing the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI), which requested the colonial Powers to dismantle their military bases and installations in colonial Territories. Angola had become an enormous military base. Airfields were being set up everywhere for the latest military aircraft purchased by Portugal. More and more troops were being massed in Angola. The situation was becoming increasingly dangerous

for the whole of southern Africa due to the explosive situation in South West Africa and Rhodesia.

599. In reply to a question concerning the effects of the war in Angola on the economic, social and financial position of Portugal, the petitioner said that the current military budget had increased by 44 per cent, at the expense of public health, education and the small Portuguese taxpayers, who paid the indirect taxes levied on all imported goods in order to finance the war. Portugal was ruined. It had an enormous public debt, which showed the effort that Salazar’s war in Angola represented for the Portuguese people.

600. Asked whether any reduction in Portugal’s arms potential had been observed since the General Assembly had requested Member States to refrain from supplying arms to Portugal, the petitioner said that the United Nations General Assembly had repeatedly adopted resolutions aimed at preventing States from supplying arms to Portugal, in order to keep a ruthless war from continuing. The fact was, however, that nothing of that nature had been achieved. On the contrary, Portugal’s arsenal of weapons was growing ever larger and more modern.

601. Portugal received weapons from NATO but it also purchased weapons abroad. The Angolan resistance fighters had captured from the enemy weapons made in Israel. Israel had been asked for an explanation. Apparently the weapons had been sold on a kind of “open market” for weapons in the Federal Republic of Germany, which had in turn sold them to Portugal. The weapons included a Belgian FAL rifle bearing the mark of the Herstal arms factory, Italian grenades, etc. Some of the countries supplying arms to Portugal said that their bilateral agreements with that country stipulated that the arms should not be used against the peoples under Portuguese domination. It was obvious that Portugal was violating those agreements. The Angolan resistance fighters had defused a foreign-made bomb weighing almost 400 kilogrammes, dropped from an aircraft. They had kept it to show the Special Committee, if necessary. France was still taking orders for warships (especially submarines) and supplying Portugal with helicopters which the Portuguese Air Force used against the *maquis*.

602. Asked for details about the weapons made in Israel and the quantity which Portugal possessed and was employing in its struggle against the Angolan fighters, the petitioner said that so far, the Angolan guerrillas had recovered only one weapon made in Israel, a UZI Lewis gun. As he had already said, the Israel authorities accounted for the presence of that weapon in Angola by the fact that the Federal Republic of Germany had purchased weapons made in Israel on the “free market” and resold them to Portugal. He was not in a position to give any details as to the quantity of weapons made in Israel at Portugal’s disposal.

603. Asked whether he had any knowledge of special training programmes for Portuguese parachutists, either in Angola, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel or elsewhere, the petitioner replied that, with regard to Israel, no evidence against that country had so far been found. On the other hand, the military agreements concluded between the Governments of Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany were a matter of common knowledge. The important air base at Beja, in southern Portugal, was being used as a base for German Starfighter aircraft, and German instructors were training Portuguese pilots there. The Starfighters

had a very long range and were often used in Angola. The military agreements between Portugal and the Federal Republic of Germany even made provision for Portuguese wounded in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who were transported to the Federal Republic for treatment in German hospitals.

604. Asked if there were any military experts other than those of Portuguese nationality operating with the Portuguese forces against the African patriots in Angola, the petitioner said that he thought the Portuguese forces were assisted by foreign experts. It was difficult to give proof, because the Angolans had not yet killed or captured any. Everyone knew, however, that certain foreign countries were giving Portugal military assistance. For example, the Federal Republic of Germany had given Portugal weapons and aircraft and German experts were training the Portuguese to use them. In addition, the Angolan partisans had reported that, during the fighting, they often heard shouts in a foreign language.

605. Asked whether Israel, the Federal Republic of Germany or any Western Power had given any help to the Angolan liberation movement, the petitioner explained that some of the countries which were helping Portugal in its war against the Angolan people offset that policy by certain forms of assistance, which were, moreover, the act of voluntary organizations rather than Governments. As well as material aid, those voluntary organizations sent some doctors and students to Angola, but, again, such action had no official character. For the sake of completeness, two exceptions to that rule should be mentioned: Denmark and Sweden were giving direct aid in the execution of the programme of assistance to Angolan refugees in the Congo.

606. Asked what particular difficulties were encountered by the Angolan people in their fight for national liberation, he said that MPLA was encountering tremendous difficulties. It had inherited a colonial situation which had deprived the Angolans of all means of progress. They had no leaders. They had to be trained during the fighting, but then they were not available for fighting. The war against the Portuguese was a terrible war. It was not possible to defend villages where there were no partisans. The Portuguese savagely murdered all those suspected of being connected with the *maquis*. They bombed villages with napalm and poisoned crops. It was extremely difficult for the Angolan people to hold out with the scanty means at their disposal. The Angolans needed schools where they could learn about the problems of their country. They needed medical assistance and hospital beds, since there were none for the Africans in Angola. They needed to recover their dignity.

607. The national liberation movement had other difficulties to overcome. There was a shortage of equipment. The Angolan forces could not come to the assistance of their people in time, because of the lack of equipment. It was also difficult to supply the *maquis*. It was high time that neighbouring countries realized the gravity of the situation and gave the Angolan patriots the freedom of action which they needed to function properly.

608. MPLA was glad to have an opportunity to describe to the Special Committee the difficulties it was encountering. It hoped that the Committee would help it solve the important problem of freedom of action. Indeed, that was why it had sent its representatives to appear before the Committee.

609. Asked about the political and psychological impact of MPLA's military successes on the people living in the non-liberated areas, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained combat centres about 20 kilometres from the capital, for instance in the Lower Congo region, where it had many partisans. For many years it had not been possible to keep them regularly supplied with equipment, weapons and ammunition. However, they had held out heroically until 1966. MPLA had at last succeeded in sending relief columns with good leaders and good weapons to revive the fight in those regions.

610. MPLA had then opened the eastern front, which was spreading continually. It was very easy to mobilize people in those regions, because MPLA enjoyed a certain freedom of action in Zambia. The people were only waiting for weapons to fight. Whole villages rallied spontaneously to the MPLA forces. Unfortunately, there were not enough weapons.

611. In addition, MPLA usually prepared the ground before unleashing an armed struggle, so as not to involve the people in a hopeless revolt. Political leaders went to the area to give the people a grounding in political and military matters, so that they would be able to participate more effectively in the war of national liberation.

612. He had already referred in his statement to the declining morale of the Portuguese forces. That was one result of the MPLA's military action. A communiqué in *Le Monde* of 15 September 1966 had stated that, upon his return from an inspection tour in Angola, a Portuguese general had announced that the rebels had opened a new front and were using Zambia as an operational base. That had been the first official reference to fighting near Zambia. The Minister had sent huge reinforcements to the eastern front but had made no secret of his pessimism.

613. The Angolan people, for their part, welcomed the guerrillas enthusiastically and gave them every support. Wherever there was one man with a rifle, forty more armed themselves with machetes. That spirit was making headway on all fronts. At Nova Lisboa, one whole barracks of Angolan soldiers dragooned into the Portuguese army had mutinied.

614. The eastern front was linked with the centre and the west of Angola by an important railway line which ran to the port of Lobito. That was the channel for transmitting MPLA's orders. The railway had been important, when the eastern front had been opened, in undermining the morale of the Portuguese troops.

615. Recently, in the Portuguese National Assembly itself, a deputy had cast doubts on the competence of his leaders and drawn attention to the complete lack of co-ordination in the military, economic and political spheres. That was a clear indication of the psychological climate created by the current situation.

616. In reply to a question about the extent of MPLA's control in Angola, the petitioner said that MPLA had always maintained a strong presence in Cabinda. It was eagerly awaiting the arrival of the OAU military commission, which would be able to see for itself the situation in the region. Some of the figures which had been given concerning the area of the territory liberated had perhaps not been understood rightly. It would be more correct to speak of controlled territories, rather than liberated territories. MPLA control over the liberated part of Cabinda consisted of such

activities as resisting the ambushes laid for its guerrillas and laying its own ambushes, preventing Portugal from dropping provisions for its troops by parachute and training guerrillas as parachutists.

617. It was difficult for anyone to give figures for the controlled areas, as it was not always possible to go there and check. That was the reason why MPLA had refrained from quoting figures and had merely mentioned certain villages. For example, in one sector, in the northern region, MPLA controlled thirty villages, with a total population of about 15,000. It was in such terms that MPLA tried to assess the relative importance of the liberated areas.

618. Replying to questions about the nature of MPLA's activities in the liberated zones, the petitioner said that this depended on the problems which arose. The liberated zones were encircled by Portuguese forces. Relations with the towns and villages controlled by the Portuguese were difficult. However, MPLA was trying to prepare the people for independence. Thousands of children were subjected to rigorous discipline. However, they often suffered from nervous diseases, because they were terrified of the bombing, and from malnutrition. Often, even when they went abroad to study, they could not control their panic when an aircraft passed overhead. As many of them as possible attended school, but they could not buy books. Moreover, even if they could buy Portuguese books, they did not want to.

619. MPLA had opened a small hospital, which was also used as a nurses' training school. The graduates trained the others. However, the whole organization was rather rudimentary.

620. At the administrative level, MPLA had set up an action committee in each village, which administered the village in agreement with the military command in charge of the liberated zones.

621. Co-operation between the military and political leaders of MPLA was maintained with the assistance of the political commissioner, who was also the second in command of the armed forces in each region. He was usually an experienced soldier and a wise man, who was knowledgeable about the various aspects of social life and was responsible for reconciling military and civilian needs.

622. While the fight went on, MPLA was constantly working to build the future, to provide a solid basis for the independence for which it was struggling and above all to ensure the country's economic development. In the liberated zones, the *maquis* had only limited means of action. All it could do was provide a minimum of medical assistance while at the same time caring for the education of the people. The latter was the essential problem and the only one towards whose solution the *maquis* could contribute. Without textbooks, exercise books or pencils, children of school age sat at the foot of trees and were given lessons by teachers seeking to prepare them for the future. Nothing more than that could be done for the present.

623. Asked how MPLA managed to maintain regular supplies to the garrisons operating in the regions which he had mentioned earlier, the petitioner said that the question of supplies was a very sensitive matter. The MPLA would be able to give information to the military commission of the OAU but it could not do so publicly to the Special Committee.

624. Regarding the possibility of obtaining freedom and independence for Angola through peaceful negotiations, he said that the movement which he represented was not a belligerent one. Well before the outbreak of war, it had made urgent appeals to the people and to the Portuguese Government, pointing out the threat of war which was hovering over Angola. MPLA had always hoped that the Portuguese people, unlike their Government, would give evidence of a desire to grant the peoples of Angola and the other Portuguese colonies the right to self-determination and independence. On 13 June 1960, MPLA had sent the Portuguese Government a statement in which it had analysed the situation created by the considerable reinforcements of troops and arms which the Portuguese had been sending to Angola. It had asked the Portuguese Government to accept, in particular, the following proposals: immediate official recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination; a total amnesty and the immediate release of all prisoners; recognition of political freedoms and the right to form parties; the withdrawal of Portuguese armed forces and the liquidation of military bases; and a meeting with Angolan political organizations to discuss the methods by which independence should be reached. The position of MPLA had not changed. If it had been obliged to resort to armed force, the reason had been because that was the only means of combating Portugal's activities. If the Portuguese Government would accept the conditions set forth in the MPLA statement, that organization would still be prepared to discuss the situation in Angola.

625. In reply to an appeal to the various Angolan parties to form a common front and mobilize their strength against the common enemy, the petitioner said that he fully agreed about the need for a common front in the struggle against Portugal. His movement's programme bore that point out. He read out provisions of both the minimum and the maximum programme. The minimum programme for which MPLA was fighting envisaged the speedy formation of an Angolan liberation front bringing together in a broad union all political parties, all popular organizations, all armed forces, all prominent persons in the country, all religious organizations, all national or ethnic minorities in Angola, all African classes of society and all Angolans living abroad, irrespective of their political beliefs, wealth, sex or age. The maximum programme towards which MPLA was working envisaged a common struggle waged with all patriotic Angolan forces in a vast popular movement leading to the taking of power by the Angolan people and the establishment of a democratic republican régime on a basis of total independence.

626. That position had been taken by MPLA since the beginning. It went back to the formation of a political resistance front in Angola in 1956. As the leaders of the movement had stated time and again, they had always been and continued to be prepared to meet the leaders of the other movements fighting against Portuguese domination. Thus MPLA had taken advantage of the gatherings that had taken place during 1960 in connexion with "Africa Year" to arrange such meetings, with the help of countries like Algeria, Guinea, Ghana and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. MPLA had done the same at the Monrovia Conference. It had taken part in the meeting of the Three-Nation Commission of the Organization of African Unity, doing its utmost to foster union among the liberation movements. Anyone would attest to MPLA's constant efforts

to establish a common front of resistance to oppression. It was to be hoped that those who were doing nothing to achieve a common front would understand that the difficulties increased with the passage of time and that internal division was virtually a crime in the existing circumstances. The Angolan problem could be solved only by the dynamic process of struggle. It was essential to dispel the confusion which minor dissension among the Africans themselves might create in the minds of those who shaped world public opinion.

627. The waverings of Angolans were understandable. Far too many people, including non-Africans, had meddled with their problems. As matters were at present, it was hard to draw together the threads of African resistance. That was all the more regrettable as Angola seemed clearly to be more capable of successful resistance than any other Territory under Portuguese domination. Unity was a pre-condition of success in the struggle and it must be achieved at all costs.

628. Asked whether a specific agreement existed between the liberation movements in all Portuguese-occupied Territories and, if so, how it was implemented, the petitioner stated that the collaboration between MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO and CLSTP had existed for some time. It was included in the programme of the Ligue d'action unitaire pour l'Angola. In 1960, it had been decided to establish CONCP (Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas). At that time, it had been, above all, a question of mobilizing the opinion of international organizations by calling their attention to the situation of the colonies under Portuguese domination. Two years had sufficed to attain that objective. CONCP had then decided to extend its programme, because the situation had now become known and the issue had been brought before the United Nations. It had decided, therefore, to go further and apply itself, on the one hand, to a joint training scheme for future cadres in the three countries and, on the other hand, to the consolidation of military collaboration, which must remain secret and which gave rise to frequent meetings between leaders from the three regions.

629. Asked which countries he had in mind when he had asked the Special Committee to help him in obtaining the assistance of certain countries, the petitioner said that he would have to give a brief historical résumé of the problem. In 1963, certain African countries had considered that the best weapon at their disposal for fighting colonialism was to recognize the existence of an Angolan Government in exile. The idea had been an excellent one, but it had been put into practice too soon and under unfavourable conditions, because unity had not yet been achieved. The choice which had been made had dealt a very serious blow to the chances of achieving unity, because it had involved a value judgement which no one had been qualified to make and of which MPLA had been the victim. Following that decision, MPLA had been obliged to withdraw from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Prime Minister Cyrille Adoula had forbidden it to continue its activities. It had always hoped and still hoped that that unfortunate matter would be cleared up. OAU itself had been obliged to recognize that one of the most important, if not the most important, of the liberation movements had been underestimated. The investigations which it had carried out through its liberation committee had led it to the realization that MPLA was a patriotic organization

which deserved to be helped. Since then, many African countries had shown their sympathy towards MPLA and had given it their support.

630. Asked what, in his judgement, the United Nations could do in addition to what it was already doing, to assist the Angolan freedom movement, the petitioner said that the United Nations field of action was undoubtedly limited. The problem must be viewed in that light. The efforts of the United Nations were useful in that they helped to inform international opinion about the activities of the liberation movements. That was in itself a great deal. Through the Security Council, the United Nations should seek, on the one hand, to make Portugal respect the United Nations Charter and, on the other hand, make other countries respect the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly.

631. The Angolan freedom fighters did not fear a prolongation of the war from the military viewpoint. They would lay down their arms only when Angola had achieved total independence. The United Nations should intervene in order to spare human lives on both sides, for the number of Portuguese soldiers being killed by Angolan partisans was far greater than the number of freedom fighters being killed by the Portuguese army. The issue was thus a humanitarian one. In other fields, science and culture in particular, the United Nations specialized agencies could give the Angolan people invaluable assistance in making up for the time lost under colonialism.

632. Regarding economic conditions within Angola, the petitioner said that there were two sides to the economic picture in Angola. On the one hand, there had been a definite economic upsurge due to the investment rush of the past few years, and hence a development of Angola's economic potential that could not be ignored. On the other hand, the expansion was not benefiting the indigenous Angolan population. The gains went to the big companies investing in Angola, to the Portuguese Government's budget, to senior Portuguese officials and, to a lesser extent, to junior officials and Portuguese "poor white" settlers in Angola. So far as the people were concerned, not only did they derive no benefit from the economic development in Angola but the development had produced a rise in the cost of living whose consequences were borne by the African population.

633. Asked about the current flow of refugees from Angola and whether it was increasing or decreasing, the petitioner said that it was difficult to answer the question because it was a few years since MPLA had maintained health stations on the border between Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo and it could not therefore gather direct statistics on the rate of arrival of refugees. However, certain religious organizations, mostly Protestant and some Catholic, which received refugees, did keep a check on refugee arrivals. On that basis MPLA was able to affirm that the rate of arrivals remained high. Only Portuguese propaganda claimed that the rate had substantially declined in the past few years, but one had merely to examine the Portuguese reports critically to draw the proper conclusion.

634. Asked what efforts MPLA was making to help the refugees, how many it was doing something about and where they were, the petitioner said that it was very difficult to give any exact figures; MPLA had preferred to take an average estimate and say that

there were over 400,000 refugees. In addition to its military activities, MPLA was particularly concerned with medical and educational provision for the refugees. The work it was doing in that field in the Congo was well known. At the moment, the organizations which were especially concerned with refugees were the Protestant and Catholic missions, and MPLA was grateful to them for the work they were doing to help Angolan refugees. MPLA was primarily a political organization. It was giving the refugees all the help it could, because it had not managed to persuade the international assistance agencies to aid them directly. MPLA recognized the needs of the refugees. At Kinshasa there was a clinic, which was not yet organized on a very large scale but which the members of the Special Committee had been invited to visit. The Committee might also visit a small school near the Cabinda border. The school was not intended for the children of the *maquis*. MPLA had set it up as a pilot school, with approximately ninety resident students, with a view to carrying out a full educational programme, particularly at the secondary level.

635. The main emphasis of the programme drawn up by MPLA to solve the Angolan refugee problem was on education, as there were many children among the refugees. MPLA had tried to organize primary schools, which would enable them to go on to secondary school later. However, the primary instruction had to be given in the language of their country, or at least in Portuguese, and that naturally posed a problem. The education programmes of the international agencies and UNHCR specified that education for refugees should be "integrated" with education in the country of asylum. However, the Angolan refugees were scattered over Zambia, the Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the languages spoken were different from theirs and the way of life was not what they had been accustomed to. Instruction given in Portuguese would be more useful to the Angolan refugees, who all wanted to return to Angola eventually.

636. MPLA had opened a school where instruction was given in Portuguese. The school had ninety pupils. The curriculum had been drawn up by MPLA. Excellent results had been obtained. MPLA would be glad if members of the Special Committee or representatives of specialized agencies could visit the school.

637. Later that year, MPLA was going to open a secondary school. It was at the secondary school level that there was a serious gap to be filled. The United Nations had decided to grant fellowships to refugees from Territories under Portuguese domination, but there were no qualified candidates. In their efforts to assist the Angolan refugees, the United Nations and the specialized agencies should therefore concentrate on secondary and technical education. There should be a programme of accelerated secondary or technical training. MPLA had stated its views on the subject to the specialized agencies, and to UNESCO and UNHCR in particular. UNESCO should cooperate with the leaders of the political movements and help them to draw up education programmes. Unfortunately, UNESCO's financial resources were very limited. The United Nations should provide UNESCO with the means to give more effective aid in that sector.

638. The amount of assistance given by MPLA to the Angolan refugees depended on its resources,

the bulk of which were obviously being used to extend the military front. War needs had absolute priority. The Movement therefore had very limited means to help the refugees. Three kinds of aid were needed. After covering several hundreds of kilometres on forced marches, the refugees arrived in a country whose laws and language of communication were different from theirs. They were naked—or almost naked—exhausted, starving and often ill. The first step was therefore to look after those uprooted and unhappy people, to feed and clothe them and often to nurse them, as they were highly vulnerable to epidemics and tuberculosis.

639. Secondly, they had to settle down and earn a living. In that connexion, he wished to pay a tribute to Angola's neighbours and particularly to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose co-operation was beyond all praise. In most cases the farmers, who asked nothing better than to work, were given a parcel of land in return for farming it. Of course, they had not been able to bring tools, seeds or live-stock with them. MPLA had tried to help, so far as its means permitted, by giving them the bare minimum. Unfortunately, it could not help the refugees who were currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but aid to them was provided for in its programme.

640. Thirdly, there was the problem of the family and particularly the children, who were the future of the country and, as such, the focus of MPLA's attention. There was one international organization which specialized in aid to children: UNICEF. Yet it had so far done nothing for the Angolan children. That was surprising, since it should be bent on helping all children, even and especially if they were children of poor and wretched refugees. He asked the Special Committee whether it could bring that problem to UNICEF's attention.

641. Asked whether the Angolan organizations which had sent petitioners had tried to establish a joint programme for aid to refugees, with a view to strengthening the assistance given to such persons, the petitioner said that the Special Committee would undoubtedly already have realized that the situation of the Angolan patriots did not allow the establishment of a joint assistance programme. That was not, however, the fault of the Angolan political organizations. MPLA considered that the international organizations which were giving aid to the refugees had every interest in refraining from meddling in Angolan political problems. A joint programme could be established only if the specialized agencies agreed to deal openly with the liberation movements and supply them with the cadres, nursing staff and medicaments which they needed. MPLA had been able to maintain aid stations in the Congo under the direction of competent nursing staff. At Kinshasa it had even obtained assistance from several bodies which were looking after refugees in that city. Those bodies did not make distinctions between one political organization and another. They were concerned, above all, with the effectiveness of the aid they were giving to the Angolan refugees in the form of food-stuffs, clothing and so forth.

642. Replying to a question about the amount of assistance MPLA was receiving from UNESCO, the petitioner said that, unfortunately, UNESCO aid to Angola—fighting Angola or Portuguese Angola—was so far virtually non-existent. Portugal did not cooperate with UNESCO and UNESCO was prejudiced



against MPLA. However, UNESCO had been co-operating for the past year with UNHCR, which had set up a special education fund for refugees in November. Previously UNHCR assistance to the education programme had been given purely on an *ad hoc* basis. It was now organized under a complicated procedure, which was reducing the effectiveness of UNHCR's generous initiative.

643. It was encouraging to note that the UNHCR had succeeded in obtaining assistance from UNESCO and perhaps from other agencies in drawing up an education programme for the refugees. If the programme was to be implemented, however, an independent country would have to meet the needs of the refugees. The countries sheltering the refugees already had difficulty in solving their own problems. They lacked personnel and resources, especially when the refugees arrived in their thousands, as had been the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

644. Neither UNESCO nor UNHCR would talk with the representatives of the liberation movements. The Special Committee should persuade them to do so. MPLA had schools but no teacher training, no personnel qualified to draw up a sound literacy programme or a curriculum for primary or secondary studies. MPLA had prepared textbooks with the means available. They were poorly bound mimeographed textbooks, which rapidly disintegrated. Technical improvements were needed. Those concerned also wanted to know whether, from the educational viewpoint, the textbooks prepared for uprooted Angolan children in a foreign country should be altered and improved. That was where the assistance of UNESCO experts would be invaluable.

645. After members of the Special Committee had viewed a collection of captured Portuguese arms (see paragraph 601 above), the representative of Iraq thanked the representatives of MPLA for giving the Special Committee yet another opportunity to inspect a collection of arms captured from the Portuguese forces operating against the freedom fighters in Angola. The weapons and bombs had been manufactured in the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, the United States, Belgium and Italy.

646. The representative of Italy, replying to the representative of Iraq, said that the Italian-made grenade exhibited by MPLA was of a type produced during, or even before, the Second World War and that such weapons had come into the hands of a great many people during the events in Italy in 1943-1945, so that it was now impossible to trace its origin.

647. The representative of Iraq said that the important fact about the weapons was not their age but the fact that they were still being used against the people of Angola.

648. The representative of Italy added that, when Italian-made grenades had been shown at Kinshasa, he had asked the petitioners if they could tell the Special Committee not only the country of manufacture of the arms, but also how they had been supplied to Portugal. He had been told that it was impossible to find out where they had come from. He once more stressed that Italy had not supplied any arms to Portugal. The weapons in question were very old stock which could now be found almost anywhere.

649. The Chairman said that the men fighting could not be expected to trace where the arms had come

from. If the freedom fighters captured weapons manufactured in a given country, the onus of proof was on the authorities of that country to establish how its arms had come into the possession of Portugal. If Italian arms were captured, the African people could only assume that the arms had been supplied from Italy, unless the Italian Government proved otherwise.

650. The representative of Iraq said that the arms shown by the MPLA included a 100-pound bomb manufactured in the United States in 1964. That bomb could demolish any building. It, and the other weapons shown, were just as deadly as those produced today.

651. The representative of the United States of America said that he supported the Italian representative's logic. The arms shown by the petitioners were very old. With regard to the 100-pound bomb, the Zambian Army expert had said that its origin was doubtful; it might have come from Belgium; it might have come from the United States; it might have come from any other country. The implication, however, was being made that the United States Government was knowingly making arms available to Portugal for the purpose of using them in its Territories in Africa. That was untrue. It had been the firm policy of his Government since 1961 to prohibit the export of all arms to Portugal for use in its Territories in Africa from public or private sources in the United States. But there were millions of arms manufactured by all countries on the second-hand market and it was impossible for the countries of origin to trace their movements. At the end of the Second World War, large quantities of weapons had been left overseas. To say that, because the weapons had been made in a given country, they had therefore been supplied by the Government of that country was quite illogical. He hoped that no more allegations of that kind would be made unless it was known that the arms had been deliberately supplied to Portugal in violation of the embargo.

652. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that arms manufactured in 1945 still worked. United States soldiers had used such arms to defend themselves, and the Portuguese colonialists were now using them to murder and mutilate the people of Angola and to destroy their homes. When the petitioners had given verbal testimony concerning the origin of the weapons used against the freedom fighters, they had been told to produce concrete proof. Now they had produced physical evidence and some delegations were still not satisfied. But what more could they do? The freedom fighters could hardly be expected to ask the Portuguese soldiers and airmen where they had obtained those arms. It was significant that all the weapons shown had been manufactured by Portugal's NATO allies. Although the United States and other countries claimed to have enacted legislation against the provision of arms to Portugal, the weapons were still trickling through. The whole world had heard of the twenty B-26 bombers that were being flown from the United States to Portugal. In other statements, it had been admitted that arms were supplied to Portugal through the NATO system, and the people of Africa knew what Portugal did with those arms.

653. The representative of the United States of America said that the case mentioned by the Tanzanian representative was the only violation to have come to the attention of the United States Govern-

ment. The B-26 aircraft were surplus stock which had been made available for private purchase for civilian use on the open market in accordance with existing legislation and within the limits of existing export regulations. Because United States law forbids unauthorized sales of military equipment to Portugal, the buyers had tried to smuggle them to Portugal, but they had been arrested and brought to trial. Two of the individuals involved were tried in Buffalo, New York. Although they were acquitted, the jury rejected implications that the United States Government was in any way involved in the transaction.

654. The Chairman said that it had never been charged that the United States Government, as such, openly and officially supplied arms to Portugal in the knowledge that they would be used against the freedom fighters. The arms were supplied through private channels. The African public, however, was amazed to learn that in the United States private individuals could deal in bombers. Nobody ever heard of private individuals in the United States supplying arms in Cuba, for instance, but arms sent through private channels to Portugal were used to kill Africans. At the meetings of the Special Committee in 1966, a captured Portuguese pilot had confirmed that arms provided to Portugal by NATO, and which were supposed to be used exclusively for NATO purposes, were in fact being used against African freedom fighters.

655. Mr. Neto, speaking on behalf of Mouvement populaire de libération de l'Angola (MPLA), said that there was no hope that Portugal would change its attitude and accede to the demands of the peoples it had colonized. For Portugal, Angola would always be a Portuguese province and the Angolans would always be Portuguese with black skin. The Salazar Government was demanding an extraordinary effort from the Portuguese people in order to continue the war in Angola. As a result of the opening of the south-eastern front, the colonialists had been compelled to increase their total military strength from 50,000 in 1965 to 80,000 in 1967. The period of compulsory military service had been extended from two to four years. All settlers and officials of the colonial administration had to join the colonial civil defence militia. Young people between eighteen and twenty years of age were prohibited from emigrating. Portugal hoped by those means to make certain of having enough soldiers to continue the war in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

656. Portugal was also reorganizing the Angolan economy so as to be able to withstand a long war. It was attempting to diversify agriculture. It was encouraging banking investments and the investment of foreign capital in order to speed industrialization. It was building the infrastructure needed for industrial development—roads, dams, railways, harbours and airfields—was modernizing research services and was trying to develop the domestic market by creating new demands in order to replace Angola's traditional economy by a market economy. At the same time, it was intensifying its propaganda campaign for the community.

657. Angolans had no choice but to take up arms in order to force the withdrawal of the colonialists from the national territory and to attain independence.

658. Unfortunately, United Nations efforts to persuade Portugal to change its policies had not yet

produced very positive results—partly because of Portugal's obstinacy and partly because of the attitude of the Western great Powers. Since the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, petitioners and some Members of the United Nations had furnished proof of the assistance given to Portugal by the NATO countries. At the last session of the General Assembly and the present session of the Special Committee, the question of the military assistance received by Portugal from the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Israel and France, not to mention Rhodesia and South Africa, had been raised repeatedly.

659. An appeal had been made to those countries to halt their aid to the Salazar Government. He hoped that that appeal would be heeded and that the resolutions and recommendations adopted at the present session would help to hasten the solution of the Angolan problem and the liberation of all the Portuguese colonies.

660. The MPLA was the principal Angolan organization and the only one which was actually fighting in the national territory. Its military activities were concentrated mainly in the Cabinda district, the Dembos and Nanbuangongo regions and the districts of Cuanza North and Luanda. It was supported by the great majority of the Angolan people. In the liberated zones, the MPLA was trying to organize education, production and medical care and to give the people political training.

661. Asked what specific and immediate support the people of Angola required to help them in their work of rehabilitating the refugees and the people in the liberated zones, the petitioner said that, under existing circumstances, military activities naturally absorbed the greatest part of the MPLA's resources, for its primary task was to supply arms and money to the combatants. Nevertheless, the refugee problem had not been neglected. The refugees were in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Zambia. They had to be sheltered, fed and clothed; education also had to be provided, for that was one of the MPLA's first concerns. Newly arrived refugees were generally accepted by the schools in the countries adjacent to Angola; that meant, in practice, that Angolan children and adults had to start over again from the beginning the studies they had carried on in Portuguese in their own country. They had to adjust to instruction given in French in the Congo and in English in Zambia and thus lost considerable time. The MPLA should therefore be given the means to establish primary and secondary schools in which the refugees would find favourable conditions for resuming the studies interrupted by their departure. It was hoped that the United Nations specialized agencies would give substantial assistance; however, apart from the useful activities of the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, no practical steps had yet been taken to meet that need.

662. As for primary education, the MPLA had opened a boarding school at Brazzaville for children between seven and eighteen years of age, but there was a shortage of clothing, food and books; indeed, the teachers were reduced to writing their own textbooks, particularly since the French and English textbooks proved difficult to adapt to the needs of the students. The problem of secondary education was

even more serious. There was nothing to work with in that field, and technicians, teachers and educators were in short supply. Assistance from the United Nations specialized agencies and from UNESCO, in particular, would be especially desirable. The Zambian Government had assumed responsibility for the education of refugees, but it had not yet found a satisfactory solution to the problem.

663. In the liberated zones, seated under trees in the middle of the forest, without schoolhouses, paper, pencils or ink, forty-five groups of children were studying from mimeographed texts. Surely the United Nations and the specialized agencies should take an interest in the problem, even if only by helping to prepare Portuguese-language textbooks for primary schools.

664. Asked for information about the difficulties encountered by the MPLA in training skilled cadres and about any assistance being provided to it by such specialized agencies as, for example, UNESCO and the ILO, the petitioner repeated that MPLA had not yet received assistance from any specialized agency. The Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees was planning to deal with the problem of education in so far as the refugees were concerned. At the present time, the educational level was very low—so much so that it was necessary to begin by completing the primary education of the future cadres. One of the United Nations specialized agencies and some friendly countries had offered several dozen scholarships to Angolan students; however, they were good only for universities, so that it had not even been possible to use all of them. It was essential to establish, on a priority basis, one or more secondary schools which would provide a bridge between primary education and the opportunities for university study offered to young Angolans. Any international or national assistance for that purpose would be welcome. It was, of course, desirable that secondary education should be provided in the Portuguese language.

665. In the zones which had been free from Portuguese control, life was very hard. The people had to defend themselves against constant attacks by the Portuguese, who had a formidable air force whereas the Angolan fighters had no anti-aircraft defence. The Portuguese air force was not satisfied with bombing the population. It also dropped poisonous substances in the liberated zones. In addition, there was a shortage of everything, particularly clothing and certain foods such as salt; in some regions, the children born after 1961 did not know the taste of salt and were surprised when they discovered it in exile.

666. The situation in the liberated zones could obviously be mastered only through very strict discipline. The MPLA had organized military and political training of the population, setting up two centres, one in the north and the other in the south, for that purpose. It was fully conscious of the fact that the population must be made self-sufficient, especially with regard to food. It expected little in terms of outside assistance. The continuation of the liberation war depended mainly on the efforts of the people. The situation with regard to health care was also difficult, for there were very few Angolan doctors. They trained nurses, who acted as medical assistants, but such assistants were too few in number and lacked drugs. Many people were dying in the bush for lack of treatment. First-aid workers, trained in three-month accelerated courses, took care

of the wounded and also gave preventive care to the civilian population. They were called upon to treat deficiency diseases more often than infectious diseases.

667. The MPLA had thus created a civilian organization which, through action committees, guided all the communities liberated from Portuguese control. To achieve success it was relying on its own efforts and on aid from the OAU, from the African countries and from all friendly peoples whose assistance was enabling it to continue the fight.

668. Asked whether there were any fighting organizations other than the MPLA in Angola and, if so, what were the relations between the MPLA and the other organizations, the petitioner said that the MPLA was the principal Angolan nationalist organization and the only one actually fighting in the national territory.

669. Asked to cite facts to support the contention that the Federal Republic of Germany was supporting the Portuguese colonialists, the petitioner said that for some time past the Federal Republic of Germany had been giving Portugal substantial aid in various ways.

670. First of all, there was military aid. Portugal was forced to keep a considerable number of troops in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). At the outset, Portugal had had an army of about 120,000 men. At the present time, it was obliged to spread its troops throughout the Territories fighting to escape its control. It accordingly needed reinforcements, and that was where the Federal Republic of Germany had intervened. In 1965, the Federal Republic of Germany had established a military base at Beja in Portugal. There German advisers and other foreigners were training fliers to handle Portuguese Starfighter aircraft, the supplier of which was not known. The Federal Republic of Germany had sent 17,000 soldiers to Portugal to replace Portuguese troops which were being used to suppress the liberation struggle of the colonized peoples.

671. Mention must also be made of economic aid. Portugal benefited from very large investments originating in the Federal Republic of Germany. Krupp was exploiting enormous iron deposits there. The Federal Republic of Germany had aided in the construction of a railway. German capital was invested in the exploitation of manganese deposits and gold mines.

672. However, the Federal Republic of Germany did not merely give Portugal financial aid. It also supplied that country with weapons and even, through Brazil, with aircraft. That question had been raised at the last session of the General Assembly.

673. Asked whether there were any other military or para-military organizations in Angola and whether private companies operating in Angola had their own police or armed forces, the petitioner replied that until about 1955 repressive activities had been directed by the colonial administrators and heads of posts and in the towns by the police. In 1955, PIDE—a political police force which was similar to the one functioning in Portugal but which operated with even greater cruelty in Angola—had been established. At the present time, repressive activities were conducted by the administration, PIDE and the militia, a para-military organization composed of men and women settlers mobilized for civil defence. All Portuguese and Angolan officials were required to belong to the militia.

674. The companies which exploited Angola's wealth were controlled by the colonial administration,

with the exception of the diamond-mining company in the north of the country, whose private police and militia were not responsible to the Luanda Government. The diamond-mining company was very powerful; it was a kind of State within a State.

675. Mr. Matondo, speaking on behalf of the Parti progressiste angolais (PPA), said that PPA, which was resolved to achieve the national liberation of Angola amid national unity and understanding, had always preached territorial integrity and had always regarded Portugal as the one common enemy. PPA wished to point out that, with a view to the implementation of the resolution adopted by the OAU at the Accra Conference in 1965, the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had convened a parliamentary session for the purpose of obtaining a ruling on the existence of the Angolan movement in exile. As a result, the Chamber of Deputies of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had applied itself to that problem and had prepared a report calling for the unconditional unification of all the Angolan movements at Kinshasa and elsewhere. President Mobutu was so deeply concerned about the problem of unification because the Congo felt the weight of Portuguese repression very heavily.

676. He gave a historical account of Portugal's colonizing activities in Angola from the time of the Portuguese exploratory mission led by the explorer Diogo Cão in 1482 up to the time when, in 1911, Portugal, changing its feudal régime for a fascist republican régime, had repudiated all the treaties which had been concluded by common agreement between Portugal and Angola. The Lisbon Government had decided at that time that Angola was a territory which had been conquered by Portugal and that its people were to be subjected to bloody and inhuman aggression. Forced labour and slavery had then been imposed on the Angolans. In order to strengthen its colonial rule, Portugal had decided to embark upon the decisive phase of the Portugalization of Angola. Numerous settlers had been established in Angola. Angolans were imprisoned without trial and paid shamefully low wages. The Supreme Chief of Angola had been reduced to just an ordinary chief and his authority no longer prevailed. Because of Portuguese colonial oppression, a great many Angolans had moved to the neighbouring colonies since 1930, in particular to the former Belgian Congo and the former French Congo.

677. Portuguese colonialism was continuing to develop. The Lisbon Government unashamedly asserted that there were no Angolans in Angola, but rather "Overseas Portuguese". Portugal had taken up arms against the innocent and unarmed Angolan people. It was supported by NATO, which provided it with the means of fighting against the Angolan people. Angolans were being burned alive by the Portuguese, while others were kept in prisons where they died for lack of medical care. By NATO's wish, Portuguese military training camps had long been established in Angola.

678. The historical facts which had been recognized by the Berlin Conference of 14 February 1885, the Brussels Convention of 25 May 1891, the Lisbon Protocol of 8 April 1892, the Brussels Declaration of 24 March 1894, the International Conference at Saint-Germain-en-Laye of 1919 and diplomatic relations with the Vatican and Spain showed the friendly

relations which had existed between Portugal and Angola before the Portuguese fascist Government had come to power. Legally speaking, those facts gave the Angolan people a very powerful weapon for the decolonization of Angola.

679. A people fighting for freedom must think about united action. If General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) was to have effect, the Angolan liberation movements would have to unite their efforts to put an end to the crimes of colonialism in Africa. Any disorganized action would benefit colonialism, and the practical steps taken by the United Nations would remain a dead letter. The United Nations should endeavour to bring about the unification of the Angolan liberation movements. It was called upon to play a great role in mediating a conference between Portugal and the representatives of the Angolan people in a neutral country. The problem of liberation must be resolved, in order to put an end to the sufferings of the Angolan people, who needed both material and moral assistance from the United Nations. PPA therefore urged freedom- and peace-loving countries to turn their attention to the problem of the Angolans and to give them unconditional support.

680. Mr. Lulendo, speaking on behalf of the Ligue générale des travailleurs angolais (LGTA), said that the growing number of Angolan workers who were refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or still in the *maquis* inside Angola was a major concern of the LGTA leaders. That was the reason why that organization had ventured to submit a petition to the United Nations through the intermediary of the Special Committee. Portugal's policy in Angola was a flagrant violation of the principles set forth by the United Nations in respect of dependent Territories. LGTA had spared no effort in order to draw the attention of world opinion, and more particularly that of the most competent agencies, to the seriousness of the situation in Angola and in the other Territories under Portuguese domination. To that end, LGTA had, in 1963, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a report on forced labour and Portugal's inhuman attitude towards Angolan workers and the Angolan people in general. However, the resolutions adopted by the United Nations in July 1963, condemning Portugal, had not prevented that country from pursuing its criminal activities. It would be a very serious matter if those resolutions came to nothing. The Angolan people had received proof of the material and moral support afforded to Portugal by certain Powers and must express its displeasure. It thus had a right to demand, as had been done at the ILO Conference in May 1966, that Portugal should be expelled from the United Nations. For nearly seven years, the refugee workers and those who were still in the *maquis* had been suffering unemployment and exploitation. The United Nations had already taken radical measures enabling certain peoples of the world to govern themselves. It was because Portugal refused to implement the decisions of the United Nations that the Special Committee had decided to meet in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to observe in all objectivity the development of the Angolan struggle. Availing itself of that opportunity, LGTA, speaking on behalf of the Angolan working masses, called for United Nations intervention with a view to immediate and unconditional recognition by Portugal of the Angolan people's right to self-determination and independence.

681. Mr. Lele, speaking as President-General of the Parti démocrate Nto-Bako Angola, said that his party had been set up in 1960 by Angolans belonging to different ethnic groups, all of which were, however, equally nationalistic and equally determined to liberate the soil of their ancestors. Since it still believed in the possibility of maintaining friendly relations with Portugal and avoiding bloodshed, the Nto-Bako had espoused the doctrine of non-violence and had made a number of proposals to the Portuguese authorities; but, as it had turned out, it was a waste of effort.

682. In 1960, a delegation of the Nto-Bako Party, led by its then President, Mr. Angelino Alberto, had gone to Lisbon to contact the Portuguese authorities. Its proposals had had the following results: culturally and administratively, the Portuguese Government had granted a number of scholarships to Party militants; politically, the Portuguese Government had authorized the Party to carry on its political activities freely throughout Angola. But those had been merely vain promises.

683. In February 1961, fourteen scholarship holders had gone to Lisbon to study. In June 1962, thirty-seven Angolan students had returned to Angola with the permission of the Governor General of the country. Two months later, together with six members of Mr. Angelino Alberto's delegation, they had been arrested by the Portuguese political police (PIDE) and kept in prison without trial. Everything had been done to prevent the young students who had then been in Portugal from continuing their studies, in particular under the pretext that they did not yet have a sufficient grasp of the language to be able to follow the courses and enter the higher classes. Shortly thereafter, they had been compelled to adopt Portuguese nationality and to do their military service in the Portuguese army. Recalcitrants had had the remainder of their scholarships, their school equipment allowances and other benefits taken away from them. In 1962-1963, some of them had been expelled from the educational institutions in which they had been studying. Later, they had been expelled from Portugal, without being able to take any of their possessions with them.

684. Previous petitioners had described the miserable lot of the indigenous inhabitants of Angola to the Special Committee. Angelino Alberto had turned out to be a lackey of the Portuguese colonialists and was still free, protected by PIDE, whose ideas he shared. Consequently, he himself had succeeded Mr. Alberto as chairman of the Nto-Bako Committee, which met at Kinshasa, and his petition had been heard by the Fourth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly in New York at its 1457th meeting. The Nto-Bako delegation in New York had, *inter alia*, demanded the following: a round-table conference similar to the one held in Brussels in 1960; recognition of the Angolan people's right to self-determination; the setting of a time-limit for Angola's independence; the drawing up of a detailed calendar for all interim stages during the transitional period preceding the country's independence; the proclamation of a general amnesty; and the withdrawal of Portuguese troops from Angola and their replacement by United Nations forces.

685. Unfortunately, the experience of recent years was that all efforts were in vain and the results of the negotiations begun with the Portuguese Govern-

ment in an effort to obtain independence for Angola had been nil. The negotiations themselves had been demeaning. Whereas all the free and justice-loving peoples of the world had heard the voice of the Angolan people, Portugal remained entrenched in its inadmissible position as a colonial Power. It was understandable therefore why the Angolan people and the Nto-Bako Angola Party, which represented them, had no alternative but to associate themselves with the protest made by other movements and appeal to the United Nations and the OAU to help them find the right solution to that crucial problem. He wished to warn public opinion against some of the former members of the Nto-Bako Angola Party, who were trying to defame it by allegations of internal dissension in the Party. Those persons were mere lackeys of colonialism in the pay of the Portuguese, who were making use of such traitors to sow confusion in the minds of the Angolan people and to prevent them from shaking off the yoke under which they had laboured since the fifteenth century. The Nto-Bako Angola Party was a national, democratic party fighting by all available means for the independence of its country. It had moved from the era of non-violence to the era of revolution. The position of the Nto-Bako Angola Party should be clearly defined. International public opinion should know that that party was a unitary political party fighting by all means in its power, without either opportunism or sectarianism, to gain its country's sovereignty and free itself from the shameful colonial régime of Salazar.

686. In view of the problem's importance, he asked the Special Committee to draft and adopt unanimously a resolution inviting the Lisbon Government to take all necessary steps forthwith to ensure the implementation in Angola of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Any infringement of the interests of one people was *ipso facto* an infringement of the interests of the world as a whole, because the only sound basis for human relations was true political, economic and social interdependence. Peace could rest on a solid foundation only when colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism had become things of the past. In any case, the Nto-Bako was resolved to fight to defend the interests and rights of the Angolan people and to oppose any attempts by Salazar and his henchmen to perpetuate their domination of Angola.

687. The Special Committee was still trying to get Portugal, like other countries, to carry out the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. However, as everyone knew, Salazar's Portugal, Ian Smith's Rhodesia and Vorster's South Africa, whose cruel policies had been condemned by the United Nations, continued to endorse those policies, notwithstanding all United Nations resolutions, and were able to do so because of the increased assistance given by certain countries and international organizations.

688. The Nto-Bako Party was asking the Member States of the United Nations to adopt further resolutions aimed at putting an end to the increased assistance which the fascists, colonialists, neo-colonialists and imperialists were receiving from those who, while pretending to strive for world peace, were actually fomenting war. The international organizations might also be giving the enemies of peace indirect assistance by refusing to accept any responsibility in that regard, even if they were not giving them direct assistance. It was common knowledge that funds

passed from some organizations through countries which took responsibility for them into the hands of bandits, who were doing their utmost to worsen the international situation.

689. He urged the Special Committee to give special attention to the problems now facing the Angolan people with a view, in particular, to securing the release of all Angolan political prisoners and the convening of a round-table conference of all the leaders of the various Angolan political parties in order to achieve unity. He hoped that the conference would bear in mind the previously adopted resolutions concerning a diplomatic boycott of Portugal and the application of economic pressure to Portugal as long as it continued to treat Africa with contempt. The solution of Angola's problems depended on the unification of hitherto scattered forces at the sacrifice of all personal ambition.

690. That was, in brief, what the Angolan people demanded if Portugal wished to maintain normal relations with them after independence.

691. Mr. Ladeira-Lumona, speaking on behalf of the Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores de Angola (CGTA), stressed the need for Angolan patriots to adopt a new and more positive attitude and to unite in order to succeed in their common struggle and eliminate ignorance, hatred and foreign influence. The CGTA, for its part, sought a round-table conference attended by all representatives of Angolan liberation movements. It appealed to all those who could in any way affect the drama being played out in Angola to enlist themselves in Angola's just cause. Angolan workers said "No" to the domination of Portugal, which was flouting human rights and Christian principles. They were asking the United Nations to help them gain independence. The régime imposed by the Portuguese was unacceptable. Politically, it meant the oppression of the black majority by a minority of Portuguese, in violation of democratic principles. Economically, the corporate system introduced by the Portuguese was an obstacle to the modernization of agriculture, industrialization and the integration of the Angolan economy into the African economy. It made it impossible to raise the standard of living of the people. Culturally, the régime meant the virtual suppression of the culture of the Angolan people, to whom freedom of conscience, religion and speech were denied. The régime had succeeded in depersonalizing the Angolan by destroying African folk lore, religion and languages. Lastly, the régime was equally pernicious in social terms: the standard of living of the Angolan people was one of the lowest in the world; and public health services served only the Portuguese and some assimilated blacks living in urban centres. The population was being decimated by illness, hunger and war. The educational system was designed to "disafricanize" the black man, whom it made unstable and uprooted.

692. Not only was that hypocritical and reactionary régime a brake on the Angolan people's development but it also posed a serious threat to peace in Africa and in the world. The provocative action of Portuguese troops and aircraft in bombing frontier zones and violating the territory of neighbouring African countries might lead to violent retaliation by those countries.

693. The United Nations, in which the Angolan people whole-heartedly placed their faith, should do everything possible to hasten Angola's attainment of

independence by demanding that its resolutions on decolonization should be carried out and by arraiging the oppressor before the bar of world public opinion. United Nations efforts at decolonization had so far been virtually unproductive because the world Organization lacked the legal and political means to take action and because of the hypocrisy and bad faith of the Portuguese Government. Nevertheless, the CGTA wished to thank the United Nations Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories for its initiative with respect to the training of Angolan cadres. It hoped that in the future the Angolan national organizations in exile would be consulted on the choice of scholarship recipients in order to take account of Angola's current situation and future needs. The CGTA requested the United Nations to do everything in its power to persuade the Vatican to review the Concordat it had concluded with Portugal, which favoured the perpetuation of colonial oppression and was contrary both to the principle of religious freedom proclaimed by the United Nations and to the spirit of the Papal Encyclical *Progressio Populorum* and of the Ecumenical Council, Vatican II; to induce the International Monetary Fund to discontinue the financial assistance it was giving Portugal for economic purposes, which was being used to perpetuate its colonial domination; and to influence the NATO Powers to discontinue their military assistance to Portugal and to urge them to take action in favour of Angola. It requested the ILO to continue its efforts to compel Portugal to respect Conventions Nos. 87 and 98 with regard to the abolition of forced labour and the colonization of Angolan lands in the economic interests of Portugal; to give material support to the educational activities of Angolan trade unions (the CGTA had a vehicle for the dissemination of its educational programmes, the Centre d'études sociales pour l'Afrique noire d'expression portugaise (Social Studies Centre for Portuguese-Speaking Black Africa) (CESANEP)); to associate Angolan trade unions with its information, training and research activities; to preserve the spirit which had led delegates to the fifty-first session of the International Labour Conference to challenge the right of Portuguese delegates to represent Angolan workers; and to grant Angolan trade unions consultative status so that they could take part in ILO activities.

694. With respect to FAO, the CGTA hoped that the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign would co-operate with Angolan national organizations in giving relief to the helpless Angolan refugees, who were thought to number some 500,000 scattered over the countries adjoining Angola. The CGTA had set up a popular education institution for social betterment; the Centre (TEMO) was carrying out programmes in the fields of rural promotion, literacy, vocational and technical training, culture and health for the Angolan refugees. The Centre wished to play what part it could in the Freedom from Hunger Campaign.

695. The CGTA hoped that UNESCO, which alone among international institutions had expelled Portugal, through the efforts of the Afro-Asian countries, would grant Angolan national organizations consultative status to enable them to take part in its literacy programme. The CGTA was particularly interested in the training of teachers of functional literacy and in techniques and methods of adult education.

696. He expressed his satisfaction at Portugal's exclusion from the Economic Commission for Africa.

He hoped that the Angolan nationalist movement would be admitted as Angola's representative in that body, a step which would enable the independent Angola of the future to take its proper place more easily within the African economy.

697. Lastly, the CGTA hoped that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would provide greater material assistance to Angolan refugees and would protect political refugees better, particularly so that they could travel abroad freely in order to discharge their political responsibilities. It also hoped that the High Commissioner for Refugees would use his training programme for future Angolan cadres to help any stateless Angolan without means of his own.

698. On behalf of all Angolan Christian trade unionists, he reiterated the solemn undertaking of Angolan workers and peasants to continue their struggle with even greater single-mindedness so that Angola could become a free and democratic country able to co-operate with all men of goodwill in building a better world founded on international morality, justice and fair play. He addressed a solemn appeal to all Members of the United Nations, to all religious persons and to the Western Powers, especially the United States, to combine their efforts and help the Angolan people attain independence in a suitable manner. He requested the People's Republic of China to put an end to its opium trade with Macau.

699. The CGTA hoped that the United Nations would not disappoint the hopes which millions of human beings had placed in it.

700. Angola possessed a sufficient number of able public servants to form a government, lead the nation and make it a valuable partner for other countries.

701. Mr. Medina, speaking on behalf of Ngwizani a Kongo (NGWIZAKO), said that the Territory now called Angola had not been established by the will of the persons living in it but had been artificially created by Portugal. In an address delivered on 12 August 1963, Salazar had declared that Angola was a Portuguese creation and that it would not exist without Portugal. That territory had been a part of the great Kingdom of the Kongo, which Portugal, Belgium and France had divided among themselves. The Portuguese had called their part "Angola" to blot out its true identity. Not content with that, the Lisbon Government now considered that there were no longer any Angolans, but only overseas Portuguese.

702. In fact, the only treaty that had been concluded since the arrival of the Diogo Cão on Congolese territory in 1482 had been the treaty of friendship between the Kingdom of the Kongo and Portugal. The establishment of the colony of Angola had been no more than a stratagem employed by the Portuguese Government to make that part of Africa Portuguese. However, the lawful heirs of the throne of the Kongo were now asking for the return of their kingdom.

703. On 24 September 1960, at São Salvador do Congo, the leaders of the Royalist Party of the Kongo had met Mr. Lopes, the delegate of the Governor General of Luanda, and Mr. Eduard Matos de Pio, the Administrator of São Salvador, who had acknowledged the validity of NGWIZAKO's view on the subject of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 17 February 1961, a 280-man delegation of NGWIZAKO members had been about to go to São Salvador when the Administrator of Luvo, a town sixty kilometres from São Salvador, had urged them to return to the Republic of

the Kongo and there await a summons by the Governor General of Luanda. On 22 February of the same year, at the request of the Portuguese Government, NGWIZAKO had decided to establish its headquarters at São Salvador and had, for that purpose, sent Mr. José dos Santos Kasakanga, Mr. Garcia Henrique Monteiro and Mr. André Pecado, respectively President-General, Secretary and Counselor of the Party, to Abanza-Kongo. On 15 June 1962, a five-member delegation had been summoned by the Portuguese Government to Luanda. The Governor General, Mr. Venancio Deslandes, had told the members of the delegation to go to São Salvador to elect the King of the Kongo and to fix a date for his coronation. Several days later, Dom Pedro VIII had been elected King of the Kongo. He had been crowned on 9 September 1962. He had been due to address the people and the Portuguese Government on 10 September, but the Portuguese authorities had sent the members of NGWIZAKO to Kinshasa to fetch those who were to form the Government of the Kingdom of the Kongo. On 8 February 1963, a forty-member NGWIZAKO delegation had met at Songololo, while another delegation had gone to Brazzaville to get the passports of the members due to go to São Salvador from the Portuguese Embassy. However, the passports had carried the inscription: "Delegation of Portuguese Africans wishing to resettle permanently in their countries of origin", instead of the inscription "Delegation of NGWIZAKO members invited by the Portuguese Government to go and set up their Government". The delegation had had to return to Songololo, where it had written to the Administrator of Luvo, who had replied that it must wait. Since that date, the Portuguese had made only empty promises.

704. Since 1960, the year of the foundation of NGWIZAKO, the Congolese Government had given hospitality to the members of the party. However, the members of NGWIZAKO regretted that their brothers in arms regarded them as enemies and that unity was impossible.

705. NGWIZAKO was prepared to enter into discussions with the Portuguese Government, but needed financial assistance in order to be able to send its delegates to Portugal and would prefer them to be accompanied by two or three representatives of the United Nations.

706. Mr. Tulengala, speaking on behalf of the Cartel des nationalistes angolais (CNA), said that his delegation was, of course, aware of the crimes committed by the Portuguese in Angola, but it did not intend to add to the recriminations which did not help to solve the essential problem: that of finding political and technical means of arriving at a settlement. A settlement should be negotiated in a conciliatory spirit by the Portuguese authorities with the free and independent Angolan people. The parties and organizations affiliated to CNA were entirely independent; they had no foreign ties and had made no promises to anybody. CNA strongly protested against some of the statements made about it by the representatives of other organizations who had addressed the Special Committee; being accustomed to encountering prejudice, it was not dismayed. Its determination, like that of the Angolan people, was unshakable. The Portuguese knew that too and that was why they would finally realize that it was in their own interests, in order to save Portuguese as well as Angolan lives, to negotiate according to the principles of the Charter.

707. The purpose of CNA was to save lives. The population of Angola was too small for it to be able to bear the burden of a full-scale war; moreover, there were Portuguese in Angola who had no intention of returning to Portugal and who would be a useful element in the future, when peace was restored.

708. Though there were grounds for doubting the good faith of the Portuguese, new and better methods should be tried of convincing them that the institution of peace, freedom and human rights in the Territories they administered was as much in the interest of Portugal as in that of the peoples of those Territories.

709. Since Article 73 of the United Nations Charter recognized the right of colonized peoples to independence, the Angolan people wished freely to choose their country's political, administrative and social system. Portugal was one of the signatories of the United Nations Charter. A colonized country's attainment of independence did not necessarily entail the complete breaking of the age-old ties between the colonizers and the colonized; on the contrary, it should strengthen those links through friendly and fraternal co-operation.

710. The Angolan political parties and non-political organizations—including Nto-Bako (Origem do Povo do Kongo Angola), MDIA (Mouvement pour la défense des intérêts de l'Angola), NGWIZAKO (Association des congolais d'expression portugaise), RCKKP (Rassemblement des chefs coutumiers du Congo portugais), CBOA (Comité des bons offices), UGTA (Union générale des travailleurs angolais), UREA (Union révolutionnaire des étudiants angolais) and UGEA (Union générale des étudiants angolais)—considered that Angola must attain independence by peaceful means. Too much blood had already been shed by the Angolan people.

711. Foreign Powers, particularly the United States of America, should assist the parties to the dispute to find an area of agreement. The Angolan people were weary of war. They longed for peace and prosperity based on the observance of their human rights. The Cartel would do its utmost to see the situation settled by peaceful means. But to do so, it needed the support of all Angolans.

712. In short, CNA wished, within a reasonable period of time, to negotiate with the Lisbon authorities with a view to finding a compromise solution that would pave the way for the transfer of power. It hoped that in the interests of Angola, the United Nations would serve as mediator.

713. Mr. Gracia Kiala, speaking on behalf of Confédération des syndicats libres angolais (CSLA), said that millions of Angolan workers were dying in the struggle to free their country. Of course, CSLA hoped that the Angolan liberation movements would unite, but an effort must be made to eschew demagoguery and to tell the truth.

714. CSLA's slogan was "food, shelter and freedom for all". It hoped that the Special Committee would meet with real success and requested it to use its influence with the Angolan movements to make them understand that disunity, assassinations, kidnappings and fratricidal wars among exiles would not hasten independence. Nor would sporadic expeditions on the Angolan frontier bring Salazar to his senses. One would have to be very naïve to believe in the victory of the Angolan nationalist forces when their political armies were fighting separately. CSLA condemned the short-sighted policy followed by those Angolan move-

ments and was indignant at the lack of conscience they showed in carrying out their activities. CSLA had always maintained that a congress should be organized, in which all the active Angolan forces would take part and from which would emerge a national liberation front with a specific programme. No single Angolan movement could hope to liberate the Angolan people. Angola would be liberated by mutual understanding and unity.

715. Mr. Chata, speaking on behalf of UNIÃO Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), said that UNITA felt deep concern and sympathy for its fellow freedom fighters in South West Africa, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Mozambique and "Portuguese Guinea", who were the victims of the same imperialist and colonial atrocities. He condemned the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa, which were solely interested in defending their minority rule; they were not champions of democracy, as they could not stand the challenge of the system of one man one vote.

716. The political situation in Angola was very complicated. The world was told that Angola was part of Portugal and that the Africans of that country were "Portuguese", yet they had no rights to participate in the affairs of their own country. Since 1965, however, the same African masses, labelled as "Portuguese", had risen up together under the banner of the rekindled revolution, which was spreading widely and winning the confidence of the masses.

717. Portuguese brutality against Africans was traditional, but he would confine his account to events since 1965. With the political changes taking place in neighbouring countries, Portugal had intensified its acts of provocation against the masses in Angola. The Angolans were strictly prohibited from listening to foreign radio stations and anyone found doing so was arrested, the radio was confiscated, and, during periods of particular tension, the person concerned was even killed.

718. Houses were searched for suspected political cards or letters from neighbouring countries or local papers containing political literature; for those found in possession of any such items, the punishment was normally death.

719. The movement of people from one administrative centre to another was free only in zones controlled by UNITA. Soldiers always checked the movement of villagers and made sure that none left their districts. Troops were on guard on most bridges and army units had been established in many parts of the country to ensure the execution of orders.

720. Portuguese soldiers took cattle, goats, sheep and fowl without payment; they raped African women in public and countered the husbands' opposition with bullets. Many women had been widowed in that way. For example, one Senior Chief at Lumbala had reported that a certain woman had been raped in her home by ten Portuguese soldiers while her husband had been kept outside the house at gun-point. The same woman had later been raped by the same soldiers for the second time.

721. Taxation was very high, the minimum being £2.10s.0d. It was difficult for unemployed peasants to produce such an amount, but if they did not they were sent to prison for six months. On release they had to pay the same amount or face forced labour, but even after the period of forced labour, the same amount of tax was still owing.



722. If a man was dead or sick, the Portuguese asked his relatives to pay for him. Despite all oppression, the Africans had not abandoned the idea of political reform but in view of the Portuguese provocations and brutality, the Angolans had placed their hopes of salvation in the armed struggle.

723. Since 1965, Salazar's defence budget had increased steadily and, in 1967, had amounted to £81 million, mainly for its aggressive policies overseas and over half the sum was intended for Angola. With that money it was hiring white lunatics and criminals from South Africa and Rhodesia, armed with weapons from the NATO countries and Israel, to help suppress the African masses in Angola. Defenceless villagers were bombed, their houses smashed by bazookas and hand grenades, and their property stolen or destroyed. Fields were bombed and crops completely ruined. As a result, many thousands of families had been made homeless and forced to live in the bush or flee to Zambia and the Congo. The homeless had no clothes, food or medicine. Those who fled the country were bombed, if spotted before they reached their destination, and those who escaped death by bombs but fell into Portuguese hands were shot dead in public to frighten the masses. He could produce photographs to support the allegations of Portuguese atrocities and brutalities.

724. Angola was rich in natural resources, as could be seen from the number of investors interested in that country, including Krupp of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pechiney of France, Japan's Nippon Mining Company and several others, but Africans were not benefiting from such foreign investment. Most of the money was sent to Portugal to feed its starving population, and the little that remained went to the settlers.

725. The method of recruiting labour in those industries was shocking. A company in need of workers contacted the administrative officers; the Government hired labourers on contract for one year, during which time they were given nothing except food. On completion of the contract, the workers returned home where they expected to receive their full pay, but found they had first to pay the taxes for that period. The Administrative Office then decided how much they should be given so that the poor men received almost nothing, most of their earnings going to the Government.

726. The peasants who lived on subsistence farming also had to pay tax and were obliged to sell their food to do so. Unfortunately, the money paid for their crops was very little, and the Government did not help them to improve their yields. European farmers, however, were given all facilities by the Government. He drew the attention of all freedom lovers to the inhuman exploitation by the Portuguese.

727. With regard to social problems, the Portuguese had done practically nothing to promote education. In Angola, the oldest colony in Africa, 93 per cent of the African population was still illiterate, the other 7 per cent having received some education from foreign missionaries who merely taught them to read the Bible. The State-owned schools, found in towns only, were Catholic schools, the few Africans attending being children whose fathers had been *assimilados*. No Africans were allowed in secondary schools unless they and their parents were *assimilados*.

728. In rural areas or small administrative centres, no schools were built for the African population. None

of the refugees who had come to Zambia in 1966 had completed his primary education, yet the Portuguese claimed to have established education on a multiracial basis.

729. Health services were scarcely known to the people of Angola. In many rural areas, modern drugs and medicine were unknown. Venereal and other diseases were still unchecked. Villagers still depended on herbs from the bush. The death-rate exceeded the birth-rate so that the area of 481,250 square miles had a total population of only 5 million. The shortage of doctors was acute and it might well be asked what became of the money collected as taxes. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should investigate the situation in Angola as a matter of top priority.

730. The Angolan masses would never flinch before NATO-supplied guns or bombs and their march to freedom would continue. Portugal should realize that Angola would eventually be free; the more it engaged in aggression, the greater African resistance would become and the sooner Portugal would be isolated. UNITA had confidence in the Special Committee and requested it to take the following action: to inform Portugal that Angola was not a province of Portugal, that the Africans of that country were not "Portuguese", and that it should quit Angola immediately as its presence was a menace to the Africans; to put pressure on the members of NATO and other countries to stop supplying arms to Portugal; and to encourage the Members of the United Nations to support Angola's fight through UNITA. The United Nations should not overlook the growing problem of refugees and the Committee in particular should seriously consider the demand for freedom of the oppressed Africans, Latin Americans and Asians.

731. Asked to explain what he meant by the term "*assimilado*" and to provide any information on the number of *assimilados*, their status and their attitude towards their non-assimilated African brethren, the petitioner replied that the *assimilado* system was a complicated one introduced by the colonialists which UNITA was trying to suppress. The Portuguese did not consider the Africans to be human beings but had allowed some with a little education to become "*assimilated*" (*assimilado*). To retain their *assimilado* status and be respected by the Portuguese, they had to break completely with their African friends and relations, and their complete isolation from all but Europeans was constantly checked by the secret police. Religion was another serious matter for the African *assimilados*, for they were almost always forced to become Catholics. As mentioned in his petition, only 7 per cent of the Angolan population were literate and not all of those had become *assimilados*. He was unable to quote an exact figure, but it probably represented a minute proportion of the population, restricted to those living in the towns.

732. Mr. Ndongala Mbidi, speaking on behalf of the Union nationale des travailleurs angolais (UNTA), regretted having to inform the Special Committee that, on 29 May 1967 at 2 a.m., the Portuguese army had crossed the border and intruded into Congolese territory as far as the outskirts of Malele, killing one woman, one child and two men and leaving several wounded. The refugees in the area had gone to warn the detachment of some twenty GRAE soldiers stationed there. However, the soldiers had fled, leaving the people defenceless. The Portuguese army had in-

flicted many casualties. Several of the wounded had been cared for at the hospital at Kisantu, 100 kilometres from Kinshasa. The refugees and the inhabitants of Kimbona, Kimpindi, Mpete, Kiyamgila and Yoyo had abandoned their villages and fled for their lives. UNTA requested the Congolese Government to guard its frontiers. It also asked the Special Committee to make an on-the-spot inquiry in order to establish the accuracy of the accusations made by President Mobutu, who had said that Portuguese forces frequently intruded into Congolese territory and attacked villages.

733. During the last six years, there had been daily bombings, burnings and massacres throughout Angola. The cause of that terrible war was the Portuguese Government's obstinate refusal to grant the Angolan people the right of self-determination, in accordance with the Charter and the resolutions of the United Nations. The Portuguese Government had established a reign of terror in Angola. It perpetuated its domination with the assistance of its NATO allies, including the United States of America, which had sent into Angola hundreds of thousands of tons of arms, some of which had been manufactured in Israel, and hundreds of military aircraft. The United States had also sent men to officer the Portuguese forces. Some of the large Portuguese companies established in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were also financing the military action in Angola. The Portuguese had been torturing and killing for six years. They spared neither women, nor children, nor old people. In the circumstances, UNTA saw no alternative to armed combat. The leaders of the Angolan political parties realized that they could win independence for their country only by waging a war without quarter. If the struggle was to be successful, all the popular forces must be mobilized into a broad national liberation front. Unfortunately, the Angolan political parties were divided and the Portuguese Government, supported by capitalist and imperialist forces, took advantage of their feuds. At the present time, those parties could be divided into the moderate group, composed of several inoffensive parties, and the strong group, consisting of three parties. The Lisbon Government had tried to make the moderate group accept the Community as the price of success. Secret negotiations had been held at Lisbon and Luanda, but had not led to any result. The Portuguese authorities had consistently refused to recognize the strong parties, which were taking direct action against them. The customary chiefs, for their part, had tried to negotiate at Luanda. The Portuguese authorities had hired faithful lackeys. The Portuguese Ambassador at Kinshasa, who had been replaced by the Spanish Ambassador, was co-ordinator for the Lisbon and Luanda Governments' policy of corruption.

734. The Portuguese Government was carrying on a mendacious propaganda campaign in Angola. The UNTA delegation, which had just returned to Kinshasa after a tour through Angola, had confirmed that the Portuguese were distributing leaflets extolling the advantages of the Community. They forced prisoners to make propaganda statements in favour of the Community. Portuguese soldiers went into the villages preaching peace and understanding. They claimed that henceforth all inhabitants of Angola would be equal and that the evils suffered by the Angolan people had come to an end. However, the lackeys of the Portuguese colonialists forgot that there could be no Community without the consent of the Angolan people.

735. The Angolans were determined to fight on until final victory. They were encouraged by the example of the Algerian patriots who, after seven years of fierce struggle, had thrown off the age-old chains of French imperialism. However, once again, the Angolans could not vanquish Portuguese imperialism, which was supported by international imperialist forces, except by uniting to form a solid front. Unity of action was essential for success. UNTA deplored the political squabbles dividing the Angolan parties. UPA and PDA refused to make common cause with MPLA and the trade unions. For six years, UNTA had unceasingly attempted to arrange meetings between the leaders of all political and trade union groups in Angola in order to persuade them to unite. In 1961, it had set up a Consultation Commission for the purpose of welding all parties into a single front. However, it had encountered only misunderstanding. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) had, for its part, appointed conciliation commissions, which had not achieved very satisfactory results because of the partisanship of some of their members. The divisions among the Angolan nationalists were kept alive by foreign capitalists. The United States, United Kingdom and German imperialists, who had made common cause with those who wished to supplant the Portuguese colonialists in Africa, like Israel, were using a handful of Angolan exiles to arrange the kidnapping and murder of patriotic Angolan fighters. The Angolan people demanded that all the national liberation movements should unite and take concerted action. It now remained to find out whether Angolan politicians were prepared to admit their mistakes and abandon their pettiness. UNTA hoped for the convocation of a national congress whose purpose would be to unify all the fighting forces into a single front; to give the Revolution a programme based on truly revolutionary, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist principles; to train a body of political leaders who would concern themselves with the education of the masses in accordance with the programme laid down by a representative front; and lastly, to analyse the historical position of the Angolan people.

736. UNTA would never cease its fight until it had attained the objective it had set itself, namely the reunification of the fighting forces and the liberation of Angola. It hoped that the Special Committee would make itself the spokesman for Angolan patriots. It also hoped that the United Nations would assist Angolan refugees, who were dying of hunger and disease. Since 1961, UNTA had done much for them: it had distributed food and medicine. But it also needed agricultural implements. The refugees were farmers; if they were confined to large towns, they would become bandits.

737. UNTA was at one with all the workers of Africa, Asia and Latin America, who were fighting for the same cause, and especially its brothers in Viet-Nam, Somalia, Aden, Palestine, South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and the other Portuguese colonies, who were dealing death blows to imperialism and colonialism.

738. Asked what firm evidence the petitioner could advance to support the wild allegations he had made with regard to the United States support of Portugal's action, he replied that he could show the United States representative an article stating that Portuguese officers were being sent abroad for training in how to wage "a Viet-Nam type of war". In 1964, moreover,

there had been fifty-four United States officers in Angola: for what purpose had they been in the country?

739. The representative of the United States of America, commenting on the petitioner's allegation that United States officers were serving in Angola and that hundreds of United States aircraft and hundreds of thousands of United States arms were being used by the Portuguese there, said that it was preposterous and incredible. His Government did not support such action by Portugal in its overseas Territories, to which not a single United States officer, aircraft or gun had been sent. No firm evidence for the allegations made had been advanced by the petitioner.

740. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, replying to the statement made by the United States representative, recalled that many resolutions had been passed by various United Nations organs calling upon Member States to cease giving assistance to Portugal. There was, however, evidence to show that it was because of the moral, financial and military assistance which Portugal received from Western Powers, particularly the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other NATO allies, that the dictatorial régime of Salazar was continuing to ignore the legitimate demands of the people under its domination, and to wage war against them.

741. The representative of the Soviet Union had stated the facts in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly on 25 November 1966. They had now been corroborated in the Special Committee by statements which vividly illustrated the magnitude of the economic assistance received by Lisbon from its Western allies, particularly the United States.

742. In 1962, Portugal had received two loans, one of \$20 million from the United States and one of DM150 million from the Federal Republic of Germany. Similar assistance had also been given by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a specialized agency of the United Nations in which, however, the United Nations rule of one country one vote did not prevail, votes being based upon the volume of capital subscribed, which gave the United States the greatest share. The Bank had its headquarters at Washington, D.C.

743. Evidence had been given in the Special Committee that F-86 and Lockheed aircraft were being used in the Portuguese colonies, and there could be no doubt concerning the economic and moral assistance being given by the United States to the Portuguese colonialists, who were violating the Charter and waging a foul war against a heroic people.

744. The representative of Spain, commenting on the petitioner's reference to the help given to the Portuguese by the Spanish diplomatic representative at Kinshasa, explained that the help was confined to protecting Portuguese interests in consular matters and in no way implied support of Portuguese policy as a whole. Although the two nations were alike in many ways, he disapproved the tendency to confuse Spain with Portugal.

745. The representative of the United States of America, in exercise of his right of reply concerning what he referred to as certain aspersions cast on the policies of the United States and of NATO towards Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa, said that his Government's policy was based upon its conviction that all men were entitled to live in justice and liberty under political and economic systems of

their own choosing, and that the prospects for a stable peace in Africa depended largely upon steady, orderly and rapid progress towards true self-determination. It also believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should continue to be considered as non-self-governing within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and that the people of those Territories should have the right to the full and free exercise of self-determination. It did not consider that the limited measure of self-determination contemplated by the Government of Portugal took the wishes of the inhabitants fully into account.

746. United States policy concerning the shipment of arms and military material to Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa had been clear and consistent. Since 1961, the United States Government had been aware that it would be unwise and unjust to permit arms supplied to Portugal under NATO commitments to be used in its overseas Territories. United States policy thus preceded by four years Security Council resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965. The United States did not supply Portugal with arms or military equipment either from public or private sources for use in those Territories, and exports of those items to Portugal itself required specific assurances that the material would not be used in Africa. His Government was aware of no confirmed reports that material shipped under its present policy to Portugal was in fact reaching the overseas Territories.

747. Tendentious accounts had recently been given in the Special Committee concerning alleged NATO support for military action in the Portuguese-administered Territories. He stressed that no NATO member could dictate policy to Portugal, a sovereign State, although the United States Government had not hesitated to make its views known to the Portuguese authorities. It was perhaps because of Portugal's unyielding resistance to those views that some delegations in the Committee had focused their attention on NATO. That approach was wholly unwarranted and perhaps motivated, in certain cases, by considerations of foreign policy which lay outside the Committee's purview. Indeed, it sometimes brought back to mind "cold war" polemics.

748. NATO was not in fact supplying weapons or armaments to Portugal for use in the African Territories under its administration. NATO was committed to the defence of, and was operational only in, the North Atlantic area. There were no secret protocols extending that area of operations. Moreover, NATO itself did not supply arms, although some NATO countries supplied arms to others under their common defence commitments. The United States did not provide arms to Portugal under NATO arrangements for use in the Territories under Portuguese administration; the policies of the other NATO countries were matters of public record. The Portuguese Government's unyielding attitude could not be attributed to its membership in NATO; logic would indeed suggest the contrary, for the NATO countries other than Portugal which still had dependent Territories had generally accepted the principle of self-determination laid down by the United Nations, and most of them had expressed disagreement with Portuguese policy. Indeed, the NATO countries had "decolonized" extremely rapidly in the last decade or so, implementing policies that were in direct contrast with those applied by Portugal.

749. Most of the arguments advanced by certain delegations concerning his country's present policy towards Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa were very old and discredited. It had, for example, been alleged that Lockheed Harpoon, F-84 and F-86 aircraft were being used by the Portuguese military authorities in Africa. But those were old Second World War aircraft, sold as surplus to Portugal long before the present restrictions had been introduced in 1961. The sabre jets supplied to Portugal under the military assistance programme were stationed only in metropolitan Portugal; those previously stationed in Africa had been withdrawn at the request of his Government.

750. Another frequently reiterated statement was that arms and ammunition of United States manufacture were being used by the Portuguese in Africa. Such arms and ammunition had, however, been manufactured during the Second World War and were on sale throughout the world. Stocks had existed in a number of countries other than the United States for many years. His Government had not approved the export of such material for use in Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa since 1961, nor was it aware that any arms or equipment supplied to Portugal for NATO purposes were being used in those Territories. Such use would indeed constitute an unauthorized diversion from the NATO defence area. His delegation deeply regretted that armed warfare was being conducted in the Territories under Portuguese administration, and that some old weapons and aircraft manufactured in the United States were apparently involved, but it rejected the accusation that those facts reflected upon the integrity of United States policy or upon NATO.

751. Turning to the allegations bearing on economic policy, he recalled that claims had been made that Western economic interests somehow played a sinister role in impeding the self-determination of the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa. It was, however, surprising that no statistics had been provided on certain economic relationships that would complete the picture; nor had any attempt been made to show how such relationships benefited the Portuguese authorities more than the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration. Complaints about the evil influences of private investment in that part of the world often came from individuals who, because of their basic conviction, regarded all private investment and private economic activity as exploitation. That viewpoint, however, was not one which a United Nations body could afford to adopt if it wished to maintain its representative nature. In that connexion, he pointed out that thirty independent African countries had signed investment guarantee agreements with the United States Government; they would hardly have done so if they had feared exploitation by the United States.

752. In his country, trade and investment were mostly privately controlled, and were not channelled and directed by government authorities on the basis of political or other considerations. United States foreign investment did not seek out colonial areas for political purposes: it sought economic opportunity. In Africa, the United States found such opportunity mainly in the independent countries north of the Zambezi, and the volume of its trade with and investments in those countries were about double that with southern Africa. Investment in Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa was less than in independent African States of comparable size and natural resources.

753. United States Government aid to the Territories under Portuguese administration was limited to supplying, through the World Food Programme, surplus food-stuffs for refugees from those Territories living in the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

754. His Government had consistently supported those provisions in United Nations resolutions that called upon Portugal to speed up the economic and social advancement of the peoples in the Territories under its administration. It had never been demonstrated to his delegation's satisfaction that the economic relationships he had mentioned influenced Portugal's policies towards those Territories, and he did not consider that their termination would improve the present situation.

755. He had been surprised to hear the representative of the USSR repeating charges concerning United States policy towards Portugal that had already been shown to be groundless. He rejected the allegations that the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) was controlled by the United States. The Bank was an international body whose leadership included representatives from all over the world, and its Articles of Agreement and terms of operation prevented it from being controlled by any individual member State. The charges made by the USSR representative implied disrespect for the integrity of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. In point of fact, the Bank had twenty executive directors, five of whom were appointed by the five members with the largest number of shares in the Bank (the Federal Republic of Germany, France, India, the United Kingdom and the United States), the other fifteen being elected by the remaining members. The executive directors were responsible for the conduct of the Bank's general operations. In that connexion, he referred the USSR representative to the official record of the 1645th meeting of the Fourth Committee, held on 28 November 1966.

756. The statement of the USSR representative that the United States Government had made a grant of \$US20 million to Portugal in 1965 was incorrect. Perhaps he had meant the \$US20 million loan contracted by the Portuguese Government in the New York private market to help finance projects in Portugal under a three-year economic development plan. The loan was therefore not a United States Government transaction.

757. As the United States representative in the Security Council had stated when the matter had been last discussed, the United States Government "believes strongly that Portugal should recognize the right of self-determination of the peoples of the Portuguese Territories. We have urged Portugal in this Council and outside of this Council to make this right a reality. We ourselves have no question, nor do we believe that in this body there can be any question, as to what that concept of self-determination ought to be." The United States considered that the self-determination that should be applied in the Territories under Portuguese administration should be that specified in Security Council resolution 183 (1963) of 11 December 1963, for which his delegation had voted, which was: "All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development." The Government and people of the United States unequivocally supported the application of that

concept to the people in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

758. The Chairman recalled that, in his opening statement, he had appealed to the Western Powers, and in particular to the NATO countries, to cease helping Portugal. Many delegations had followed his example, and for that reason he felt that he owed the Special Committee an explanation.

759. His appeal had been made in all seriousness and was intended to draw attention to the plight of the people under Portuguese administration and to demonstrate that Portugal, a Western State, was responsible for what was happening there. Portuguese soldiers were being trained under NATO arrangements; since Portugal was carrying on no war in Europe, those soldiers were being used in the Portuguese-administered Territories in Africa.

760. In making his appeal he had only been reiterating the one already made in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), adopted by the majority of Member States, which would hardly have adopted a text that was not based on facts. Moreover, in 1966, the Special Committee itself had received evidence on the subject from a Portuguese pilot. Certain principles had been laid down, as described by the United States representative; it was time that they were translated into action.

761. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, exercising his right of reply, said that the United States representative had not adduced any convincing argument to invalidate his previous assertions. Those statements had been repeated for some three years because the United States and other members of NATO continued to ignore United Nations decisions concerning aid to Portugal, thus violating the Charter. His delegation was not suggesting that NATO countries should dictate policy to Portugal, but only that States Members of the United Nations should comply with the decisions of the General Assembly, which expressed the opinion of the overwhelming majority of its Members.

762. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples had been adopted by the General Assembly on the initiative of the USSR delegation. It had been supported by some ninety Governments; nine countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Belgium and Spain, had abstained. Some of the abstaining delegations, representing major colonial Powers, were members of NATO, thus proving that the colonizers did in fact act in concert. The United States and NATO had continued to assist Portugal, which in its turn continued to repress the freedom fighters in the Territories under its administration.

763. His delegation did not, however, wish to bring "cold war" polemics into the Special Committee, which had important work before it, and he would therefore say no more on the subject.

764. The representative of India said that the representative of the United States, while speaking about the functioning of the IBRD, had made a reference to India and, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be made clear that India condemned Portuguese rule in Africa and stood for the rights of the people in the Portuguese-administered Territories to self-determination and independence.

765. Unlike certain others, the Indian delegation had not only voted for but had also co-sponsored all

resolutions on the Portuguese-administered Territories, and had stood by them. His Government had not given any assistance to Portugal to enable it to strengthen its economy and thus to continue its armed aggression against the people under its rule.

766. The representative of Sierra Leone said that his delegation had never questioned the right of any group of States to form an alliance, whether for defensive or for economic reasons. It was for each country to determine its policy in that respect. However, the United Nations needed a guarantee that no arms would find their way, by whatever means, into the Portuguese-administered Territories of Africa for use against the people there. No such assurance had been given, even though a request had been made more than a year previously, and he therefore continued to believe that the arms given to Portugal under NATO arrangements found their way into Africa. The members of NATO were well aware of Portugal's Constitution and her doctrine that since her Colonies were an integral part of the realm, arms could therefore be used anywhere in her Territories.

767. So far as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development was concerned, the system of weighted voting ensured that the United States, with by far the largest number of shares, wielded considerable influence in that body and could determine the direction in which aid was channelled.

768. The United States representative had stated that no direct assistance was being given by his Government to Portugal and that the loan referred to by the USSR representative had been floated on the New York Stock Exchange. The United States Government had, however, been able to ban trade with and loans to other countries, including some in the western hemisphere, and it was hard to see why it could not do the same in the case of Portugal. Perhaps it did not feel that the slaughter of Africans in the Portuguese-administered Territories was a threat to international peace and security and that its economic involvement caused it to support Portuguese policy in its African colonial Territories.

769. With regard to United States help to Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo under the World Food Programme, he pointed out that the most important need was not to help but to prevent. It was for the United States Government to take measures to prevent a situation arising in which refugees had to leave their homes because of cruel treatment, to try to convince Portugal that its policy was entirely wrong and to help the Portuguese-administered Territories to gain independence. As to the United States representative's reference to "self-determination", he believed that the Members of the United Nations generally agreed that the Territories under Portuguese administration should have not "self-determination" but independence.

770. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that he had stated that the assistance which the Western countries, and in particular NATO, gave to Portugal was the crux of the problem. It was for that reason that he wished to exercise his right of reply to the statement by the United States representative.

771. He noted with regret that in the four years during which he himself had been a member of the Special Committee, the tone and content of the United States representative's speeches had not changed. The United States delegation denied all the facts reported

by the delegations of countries which were not members of NATO. Furthermore, the United States representative had tried to isolate the socialist countries, particularly the USSR, but had succeeded only in isolating the United States. He associated himself fully with the Chairman's reply to the United States representative's statement.

772. The United States representative had said that criticism of the economic assistance which the monopolies gave to the Portuguese colonies was based on ideological, political and other concepts. That was not the case. The point at issue was not the financial interests or financial relations of the United States with certain independent countries, but the fact that the United States interests operating in the Portuguese colonies were impeding the struggle which the people of those colonies were waging for their freedom.

773. That problem was related to the problem of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. It had already been pointed out that in the Bank votes were proportional to the capital invested. The United States had invested the most capital in the Bank and was therefore responsible for its policy and the loans to Portugal. In 1966, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly had invited a representative of the Bank to speak at one of its meetings, and he had not denied the existence of the loans. The Fourth Committee had also heard the views of the Legal Counsel of the United Nations and, at his suggestion, had included in a resolution on the Portuguese colonies a paragraph requesting all States to abandon policies that assisted Portugal and to ensure that their representatives in international organizations supported United Nations policy and took no decisions that would result in Portugal being granted assistance. Before adopting General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), the Members of the United Nations had thus examined all the facts; they had consulted the competent United Nations organs and even the Legal Counsel. The Fourth Committee's suggestions should therefore be acted upon; the peoples who were struggling for their freedom needed help. It was to be hoped that the United States representative would accept those suggestions, so that the Committee could work in satisfactory conditions and complete its task, which was to ensure the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

774. The representative of Spain, speaking at the invitation of the Chairman, said that, in view of the fact that the Soviet Union representative had first mentioned Spain's abstention on a General Assembly motion submitted by the USSR and had then stated that the members of NATO had abstained from voting on the said motion, he wished to put it on record that Spain was not a member of NATO.

#### *Petitioners concerning Mozambique*

775. Mr. Gumane, speaking on behalf of Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (COREMO), said that his party wished to bring urgently to the Special Committee's notice the threat to peace which prevailed in Mozambique, and Africa as a whole, as a result of the present political turmoil in Mozambique and to request that, through its good offices, the crucial matter should be referred to the Security Council, in

of Mozambique if they were to regain their human dignity within the present generation.

776. In spite of Portugal's protestations to the United Nations that Mozambique was an extension of Portugal, that was not so and never would be. The simple and absurd phrase "overseas province" in itself reflected political and administrative discrimination and was geographically meaningless.

777. In the regional administration of the so-called "overseas provinces" the indigenous population, apart from the four hand-picked chiefs in the Legislative Council, had no access to any senior administration post nor was it admitted to any higher post of the legislative or executive system of Portuguese public administration.

778. Because Portugal did not put into effect laws which would offer fair chances of education to the indigenous African people of Mozambique, the result was the legal chicanery being openly practised in the colony, and the inadequacy of education for the African population remained chronic.

779. In the family circle, where education supposedly began, the system of *shibalo* (forced labour) disunited families. The mother was forced to cultivate large cotton and rice fields and the father was arrested and sent to forced labour, leaving the children without anyone to care for or educate them and without parental love.

780. In the social sector, the majority of the population in Mozambique was not admitted to public places such as hotels, restaurants, cafes, cinemas, etc., except as servants.

781. The Portuguese claimed that Mozambique was a province, yet they always used the discriminatory adjective "overseas"; there were customs barriers between Mozambique and Portugal and members of all races required a passport to travel from one to the other.

782. Portugal had enacted a number of laws concerning its so-called provinces; some of them were good, but had never been put into practice, especially those referring to the rights of the African population. Reverting to political and administrative discrimination, he said that Portugal had two distinct ministries, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Overseas Territories, the former responsible for the Portuguese European provinces, and the latter for the so-called "overseas provinces".

783. Racial discrimination was current in the medical services and, in the hospitals, white patients were allocated small double rooms, whereas Africans were put into large dormitories.

784. In the judicial sector, there were courts to try the Africans ironically called *Tribunais Privativos*, while the white settlers were judged in regular courts, proving once more the inequality of treatment between the *autóctone* and the *não-autóctones*.

785. Portugal had constantly and energetically refused to permit inquiry committees from the United Nations or any other international organization to visit its colonial Territories and examine freely the real situation. It was unbelievable that any country, proud of its internal administrations, if accused unjustly, should refuse to accept the visit of an international press committee to enquire into the validity of the accusations. That had never been accepted by Portugal.

of at least two members from each of the countries represented on the Special Committee, but excluding the United Kingdom and the United States, to visit Mozambique freely without being followed by the police censorship authorities, to enter whatever part of Mozambique it wished and to interview whomever it chose.

786. Equality in employment was non-existent and access to higher positions was available first to whites, then to mulattos and finally to the blacks.

787. Although the Portuguese colonial Government claimed that there was no forced labour in Mozambique, the fact remained that all government and private enterprises in Mozambique employed forced labour.

788. In the Mozambique Railways and other government enterprises, under the law against forced labour, the supply of forced labourers had been interrupted for the purpose of replacing them by voluntary workers with a maximum salary of twenty escudos daily. For two months a large deficit had emerged in the government accounts. Then the law had been secretly revoked by the Governor General who had ordered all local administrations to reintroduce the *shibalo*, the recruited workers thereafter being called *shibalo* volunteers and the six escudos they had been receiving daily was increased to eight.

789. The *shibalo* system would continue so long as United Kingdom colonialism and United States neo-colonialism existed in Africa. The British and Americans were responsible for that system in Africa, although they put the blame on Portugal, a small and under-developed European country, a mere pawn in the hands of larger Powers in Western Europe which supported another white brother nation in the family of colonial exploiters.

790. Those nations thrived and made Portuguese colonialism thrive with them on the sacrifices and misery of the Mozambican people through unscrupulous investments.

791. The big companies in Mozambique belonged to the British, Belgians and Americans who operated them through the Portuguese Government offices in Mozambique and more than 250,000 Mozambicans were sold yearly to work in the mines and farms of the exploiters in Rhodesia and South Africa.

792. The Convention of 1928 allowed agents of the mining companies of the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA) to recruit up to 150,000 Africans annually and established that 47.5 per cent of the sea traffic to and from the Transvaal should pass through the port of Lourenço Marques. That was highly profitable for the colonial Government of Portugal but it meant misery, suffering and exploitation to the indigenous African people. Not only was the port of Lourenço Marques one of the best in southern Africa but the colonial Government also collected taxes and wealth from each worker who brought back his salary to spend in Mozambique. The mortality of mine workers was sometimes as high as 456 per 1,000.

793. Until 1960, the Mozambican people had been suffering, but they had reacted intermittently against the barbaric so-called Public Security Police. When the independence of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi had been proclaimed, the Portuguese *Gestapo*—PIDE (*Policia Internacional de Defesa do Estado*)—had started a new wave of terror. That had been followed by a wave of imprisonment. Old men, women and young people had been crowded into gaols and some were still within the PIDE's torture

chambers. Innocent people committed without trial, families without bread and help, all were fighting desperately for their freedom. People like Dr. Agostinho Ilunga, Tomas Nhatumba and Deniz Mondlane were expatriated to Lisbon and were still in Portugal serving indefinite sentences. Prisoners of the PIDE often had to live on bread and water for ten days at a time.

794. It should be noted that in the interrogation room, the prisoners went through indescribable tortures, being left for thirteen or more days in standing positions without sleeping, while being watched by arrogant guards who were changed every four hours. The prisoners had no communication with the outside world and were not allowed to receive visitors.

795. Since 22 October 1965, the barbaric Portuguese régime had intensified its war of genocide in the districts of Tete, Manica e Sofala and Zambezia, arresting, torturing and killing people and burning the villages. Since then over 3,500 innocent and defenceless Africans had been killed by the Portuguese colonial troops, and many thousands were languishing in concentration camps in all parts of Mozambique. As a result, many Mozambicans had fled to Zambia, the United Republic of Tanzania and Malawi to take up refuge in those friendly African countries.

796. At that time, his organization had protested to the United Nations through its permanent representative in Zambia, pointing out the war of genocide being carried out by the Portuguese colonial Government against the oppressed African people of Mozambique. He had been surprised that no action whatsoever had subsequently been taken.

797. COREMO therefore wished to inform the Special Committee that, since it had failed to bring Portugal to its senses and to give the peoples of Mozambique the right of self-determination and self-rule, COREMO would be forced to liberate its country with the help of peace-loving and freedom-loving countries of Africa and elsewhere.

798. Portugal should realize that COREMO was well aware that the war would be long, but was confident of eventual victory. It would be better to fight the Portuguese for more than fifty years than remain under Portuguese domination for another 465 years. That determination should also be appreciated by the imperialist and neo-colonialist countries which were helping Portugal, materially, financially and otherwise, to perpetuate the war in Mozambique so as to safeguard their investments in southern Africa.

799. With the aid received from the NATO Powers and especially the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Portugal had been able during the past six years to construct twelve new military bases as well as maintain a force of about 46,000 troops in Mozambique.

800. Flying box-cars laden with Portuguese soldiers landed frequently at Lourenço Marques and Beira. Apart from the existing military air bases, civil airfields were being used by the Portuguese air force. Others, some with runways long enough to take jet aircraft and troop carriers, had been and were still being hastily built in the wild inland terrain throughout the country, with the use of African forced labour working from dawn to dusk under the ever-present threat of death.

801. Some 200 bush airstrips had been laid out in the territory, ready for landing troops and other security forces. All troops were armed with the latest auto-

matic rifles, mortars, heavy and light machine-guns and other forms of military equipment supplied to Portugal by its NATO allies. Portuguese farmers working in cottage communities in rural areas could freely buy sub-machine-guns or rifles and revolvers at their local stores, and ammunition also was readily available to white settlers. In view of Portugal's colonial policy, the aid being supplied to Portugal, mainly by NATO Powers, could only increase its determination further to enslave and exterminate the Africans.

802. In carrying out its oppressive policies, the colonial Government of Portugal was also backed by the fascist Government of South Africa and the white minority rebel Government of Southern Rhodesia, led by Ian Smith, which were also bent on the further enslavement of the African people, their principal aim being to suppress the liberation movements of Africa and entrench colonialism and imperialism.

803. Through agreements between the three colonial Governments, Mozambicans living in South Africa and Rhodesia were being kidnapped by the Portuguese secret police (PIDE) with the assistance of Vorster and Smith.

804. A recent eye-witness report from the interior of Mozambique described the brutal policy of destruction and extermination of the indigenous African population by the Portuguese colonialists and of the poisoning of food and water supplies. Other eye-witnesses had reported similar incidents. In January 1967, in the port of Lourenço Marques, a Portuguese supervisor had poisoned two casks of wine with sulphate of soda causing the death of thirty-three African dock workers. The criminal had not been brought to justice.

805. It was difficult to understand how the United Nations, which believed in peace, justice, dignity and human rights, could harbour a Member which proudly boasted that in Mozambique there were no Mozambicans, only Portuguese, and that Mozambique could not exist without Portugal.

806. Portugal had long spoken of its civilizing mission, the essence of which was to raise the moral and social levels of the African in its colonial possessions. The policy of *assimilados* had failed and the African people had rejected the alternatives of becoming Portuguese citizens or living as *indigenas*; they wished to live as free people in their own country.

807. Because of the inherent right of every human being to a government of his choice, all people had the right freely to determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development. COREMO, therefore, proposed that the statement that the colony of Mozambique was a province of Portugal should be rejected; that the widely circulated claim by the Portuguese Government that the African people enjoyed the same rights as any Portuguese citizens should be denounced as a deliberate falsehood; and that the economic exploitation to which the African people were subjected under Portuguese colonialism, which was marked by naked fascist repression, savage brutality and organized terrorism, should be strongly condemned.

808. It demanded the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees in Portuguese prisons in Mozambique, Portugal and other territories under Portuguese colonial administration, the immediate dismantling of all military bases detrimental to the interests of the African people in Mozambique

and the immediate granting of complete and unconditional independence to the African people of Mozambique.

809. Asked about the settlement of immigrants from the metropolitan country in Mozambique, the petitioner explained the difficulty of obtaining exact figures, but thought that about 1,250 Portuguese immigrants arrived in Mozambique each month, in addition to the troops who, on the completion of their two to three years' service in the country, were entitled to become settlers there. The number of Portuguese settlers was increasing so rapidly that many areas which before had been traditionally African were being cleared to make room for them.

810. Asked whether the twelve military bases mentioned by him were being or had been used by forces other than Portuguese and especially those of any NATO Power, the petitioner said that they were also used by South African and Southern Rhodesian forces and that the South African Government had recently sent in troops to be trained in guerrilla fighting. The air bases were primarily used by the South African and Southern Rhodesian air forces, which also used the civil air base at Lourenço Marques when training nearby. He had also heard from Portuguese deserters that, about a month previously, South African and Southern Rhodesian forces had been in action against the combatants in the Tete district. The bases could certainly also be used by the NATO Powers, because Mozambique was considered a Portuguese province and all the NATO allies had the right to overfly and use bases in each others' territory.

811. Asked whether troops of any other nationality were fighting with the Portuguese against the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that soldiers from the Federal Republic of Germany had been sent to Portugal and that some were being used in Mozambique as technicians. It had been reported that Spain also was sending technicians. Ian Smith was in contact with the Portuguese colonialists and there had been exchanges of soldiers between the Portuguese Government and South Africa.

812. Regarding COREMO's membership, the petitioner said that, while there were 152,000 official party members, since 1965 about 25,000 people had been living in the forests and mountains with the combatants and those should also be considered members of COREMO. It was difficult to give exact figures because many members had had to flee to Zambia and Malawi.

813. With regard to the methods the Portuguese used to kill the freedom fighters, the petitioner said that there had been many deaths after the Tete uprising when the villagers had been rounded up by troops. Some had been shot when crossing the Zambezi river and others kept for days in a concentration camp without food. Many members of political parties had been shot and their leaders taken in military aircraft to the Lourenço Marques concentration camp. In February 1966, thirty-five people had been shot, their bodies thrown into a pit and burnt. People were dying daily in the forests and mountains from untended bullet wounds; many refugees arrived in Zambia wounded, including a boy of fourteen who had to have a bullet removed from his leg on arrival. Men, women and children were all shot indiscriminately and the treatment of prisoners in the concentration camps was no different from that in in the German camps during the Second World War; it might, if anything, be worse.



814. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of the Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), said that the petition, although it should be considered as a whole, consisted of three parts. He would present the first part, and he and his two colleagues would then each present the part with which he was concerned.

815. Portuguese colonialism denied the people the most elementary human rights. Exploitation, oppression and repression were the principles upon which Portuguese policy in Mozambique was based. Ruthless racial discrimination was the order of the day in all relations between the settlers and the majority of the Mozambican people, who wished to regain their freedom and bring to an end such exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination. They had tried to obtain independence by peaceful means, through negotiation with the Portuguese Government, which, however, had only tightened its hold over Mozambique by sending more troops and declaring, in the words of Salazar quoted in *Life*, that "Portugal will not abandon her overseas Territories, in spite of the demands of the United Nations". In view of that attitude, FRELIMO had decided to resort to an armed struggle for freedom and independence. It had been necessary not only because of oppression and exploitation but also because Portugal had refused to admit the people's right to freedom and independence. That point must be stressed, because it justified all the moral and material support that could be given by those who genuinely loved freedom.

816. The Portuguese Government had put into operation an international propaganda machine aimed at convincing the world that peace, well-being and progress reigned in its so-called overseas provinces. To make certain that that image was accepted, it had enlisted the services of some unscrupulous foreign journalists and political figures willing to tell a false story for a free holiday or a few thousand dollars, who, on returning to their countries, had painted an idyllic picture of Mozambique where there was racial harmony, economic progress and peace.

817. Mr. Matsinhe, speaking as a member of FRELIMO, denounced the Portuguese Government for its policy of repression, which was costing the lives of thousands of innocent and peaceful people, whose only crime had been to desire a happy life, peace and freedom, in order to call the attention of the world to the Portuguese colonial problem so that it could exert strong pressure on Portugal to renounce its inhuman colonialist activities and its criminal war of systematic genocide.

818. The atrocities committed by the Portuguese colonialists against the Mozambican people were not a new development in the history of Portuguese oppression. The chapter of suffering had started with their first arrival. At the present stage of armed struggle, the savagery of the Portuguese knew no bounds and went beyond the limits of human decency.

819. When the Portuguese suffered heavy and humiliating losses from guerrilla activities and were unable to retaliate against FRELIMO's armed forces, they turned on defenceless and innocent people and indiscriminately tortured pregnant women, children and the aged to death in the vain hope of annihilating the national liberation movement.

820. Portugal, a Member of the United Nations, continued insolently, with the connivance of other Members that claimed to be staunch defenders of peace and

liberty, to disregard that Organization's resolutions. FRELIMO was convinced that, without the encouragement of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other NATO members, Portugal would not dare to show its present intransigence. It was economically a very poor country and without material and moral support it would be physically impossible for it to maintain such a costly war throughout its three colonies of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau).

821. Portugal had been condemned by the world for the monstrous and inhuman crimes it had committed against the African people. In order to hoodwink world opinion, it had recently instituted a military tribunal to try a number of Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO at the Portuguese army headquarters in Mozambique, under the chairmanship of Colonel Almor Baptista, assisted by an all-white jury of senior Portuguese army officers. The accused had not been prisoners of war, but thirteen Mozambican patriots accused of being members of FRELIMO. Their only crime had been that they were members of a nationalist movement. The first three, tried on 11 March 1966, were Matias Zefanias Mboa, sentenced to five years' imprisonment and fifteen years' preventive detention, Luis Bernardo Honwane, a well-known writer and journalist, sentenced to twenty-three months' imprisonment and one year's preventive detention, and José Gomes Neto, sentenced to twelve months' imprisonment. Judgement on the remaining ten patriots had been pronounced on 25 March 1966, when the court had sentenced Joel Monteiro Guduane to four and a half years' imprisonment and fifteen years' deprivation of political rights. The others had been acquitted for lack of evidence.

822. Dissatisfied with the judgement of its own fascist military court, the Portuguese Government had immediately decided to institute another military tribunal to judge those who had been acquitted, had given it stricter instructions and had selected the most obedient members of the military establishment to serve as judges. That was one clear illustration of the odious machinations of the colonial authorities. Another was the fact that hundreds of Mozambican patriots had been arrested at the same time as the thirteen sent to that farcical military tribunal, and that thousands of Mozambican men and women had been sent to prisons and concentration camps in various parts of Mozambique. Why then had the court dealt with only thirteen, and where were the rest? The new military tribunal had not only meted out severe sentences to those acquitted by the first court, but had also retried and imposed stricter sentences on the others. Joel Monteiro Guduane's sentence of four and a half years' imprisonment had been changed to five years, plus an indefinite period of preventive detention. The others had been awarded sentences ranging from six months' to three years' imprisonment. In 1964, the Portuguese had announced the arrest of five other Mozambican patriots, Daniel Malhayeye, Bombarda Tembe, Jose Nkovane, Jose Lameke and Alexandre Machel, also accused of being members of FRELIMO and of having plotted to overthrow the Portuguese colonialist Government. Soon after their arrest, the Portuguese Press had been handed out sensational fabricated stories of their so-called crimes; since then nothing was known of their whereabouts. What had happened to them; and why had they not been included among the thirteen sent to court?

Knowing the Portuguese sense of justice, it could only be concluded that they had all been murdered.

823. FRELIMO's policy so far in connexion with Portuguese civilians and soldiers who fell into its hands had been to apply the best humanitarian standards, as laid down in international conventions. But, if the Portuguese continued to treat civilian and military patriots as they did, appropriate steps would have to be taken to force them to correct their behaviour.

824. The show of justice that the Portuguese colonialists were presenting to the world was not convincing enough to hide their true nature. They were and always had been cowardly assassins and criminals, who revelled in torturing, maiming and killing defenceless people, and had no respect for the most elementary human rights. They had publicly refused to grant permission to members of an international association of jurists to send a delegation to the trial of the thirteen patriots. Fearing that the true picture of the situation might be exposed, they had also barred foreign journalists from attending, the right to do so having been exclusively reserved to members of the Portuguese Press under the control of Salazar's fascist censorship.

825. Since the Special Committee's last appearance at Dar es Salaam, cases of atrocities involving individual Mozambicans had been reported, including the torture of old people, women and children in an attempt to extort confessions of complicity with freedom fighters or to secure information on FRELIMO guerrilla movements. Thousands of innocent Mozambicans of all races and tribes had been the victims.

826. In 1966, a group of Portuguese soldiers had arrested the Paramount Chief of the district of Maniamba, in Niassa Province, and had accused him of being a member of FRELIMO and of harbouring guerrillas. In an attempt to extract the information they wanted, they had beaten and tortured him, to no avail. They had then buried him alive up to the neck and had threatened to let him die of suffocation if he did not speak, but even that had not frightened him into giving any useful information. Hours later, however, he had begun to weaken, and fearing that his end was near he had decided to talk. The Portuguese soldiers had dug him out and with his last breath he had confessed that he was a member of FRELIMO because he was convinced that it would liberate Mozambique. He had told his torturers that they could do what they liked with him, but it would not alter the fact that Mozambique would be free, for the people would fight until the Portuguese left the land. With those words, he had collapsed and died.

827. A young Mozambican girl had told of an experience she had undergone in the village of Mueda, Cabo Delgado. When asked why she had decided to join the armed struggle against the Portuguese, she had replied that in May 1967 her family had been surprised, while tilling their fields, by a group of Portuguese soldiers, who had demanded information on FRELIMO guerrilla movements. Since the family had refused to betray the freedom fighters, the Portuguese had cut open the pregnant womb of the girl's sister and extracted the foetus. Cutting open the abdomen of one of her uncles, they had placed the foetus in it, laughing hilariously as if it had been a very funny joke. They had then killed as many of the villagers as they could. The girl had escaped miraculously and joined the guerrillas, determined to avenge her family's death and help to free her land.

828. Those cases were only two of thousands of examples of cruelty by the Portuguese in Mozambique. They felt themselves weak and resorted to a system they had used throughout the centuries because they were unable to conquer the determined Mozambicans who wished to be free.

829. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that his people often asked what the attitude of the United Nations was, whether the people represented in it really cared, and whether it had a role to play in the revolution. He reminded the Special Committee of the position taken by the FRELIMO representatives when they had appeared before it in 1965 and had asked it to take a much more positive attitude.

They had said then:

"The time of condemnations and platonic censures belongs to the past. We believe that all the future condemnations of Portugal's policies should be accompanied by a clear programme of direct action. Our people are tired of hearing that another international organization has voted on another motion of condemnation censuring Salazar's colonialist policies. For these resolutions do not serve even to attenuate the misery in which our people live. . . . These resolutions do not give the people any hope for even a remote possibility of a better life."

In 1966, they had repeated the request for more effective action, again without success. They had taken action themselves by proclaiming an armed struggle in September 1964, and some two years later they had achieved important successes, of which a few examples could be cited.

830. Mr. Mutaca, speaking as a member of FRELIMO, said that, at the beginning of the armed struggle in September 1964, the Mozambican people inhabiting certain areas had decided to establish alternative village settlements in order to prevent the Portuguese armed forces from destroying their property. That had been one of several defensive measures that the people had been forced to adopt as a precaution against Portuguese air bombing such as had been experienced in Angola.

831. In abandoning their homes, the people had taken with them food-stuffs, household utensils and livestock to enable them to survive under the difficult conditions that lay ahead. Settling in the forests, mountainsides and river valleys, they had begun to cultivate the land, planting as much as they could under the guidance and protection of the freedom fighters. At the end of the first year of war, they had been able to produce several times more bushels of rice, maize, beans and other agricultural products than before. At times, the freedom fighters had been unable to protect the civilian population from indiscriminate and ruthless air attacks, and sometimes even direct invasion by hundreds of Portuguese soldiers, who had ravaged everything in sight. Such attacks had often resulted in mass migrations of old men, women and children seeking shelter in Malawi, Zambia and the United Republic of Tanzania. There were thousands of Mozambican refugees in those States, many of them being directly assisted by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

832. Not only those taking part in FRELIMO's military programme but also hundreds of thousands of civilians, who believed that the best way to hasten the destruction of the enemy was to stay and contribute by

direct action and labour, had chosen to remain in the country.

833. At first, the economic activities of the people living in the liberated and semi-liberated areas had continued without any visible control or guidance by FRELIMO. Nor had the Frente supervised the people's efforts to provide minimum educational, social and medical services: they had decided to organize their agricultural work so as to support such services, and in so doing had made use of whatever talents were available locally. The FRELIMO leaders, however, noting the difficulties encountered by the civilian population in producing for their own needs and for those engaged in the armed struggle, had formulated a number of agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes to meet the situation.

834. Thus, in Cabo Delgado District, they had revived the agricultural producers' co-operatives that had been deliberately discouraged or stopped by the Portuguese. In 1965, a petitioner, Mzee Lazaro Kavan-dame, had told the Special Committee of the difficulties he had encountered in Cabo Delgado District in trying to help the people by establishing such co-operatives among African peasant farmers. He was now back in Mozambique, not only helping the people to reorganize their economic life but also directing political and military programmes aimed at helping the people to attain immediate independence.

835. The people of Cabo Delgado were producing more cereals, beans, oil seed and small livestock than ever before. In spite of constant harassment by Portuguese bandits sent by the desperate and decadent colonial administrators of Lisbon, the people of Cabo Delgado were fighting courageously on all three vital fronts: political, military and economic. During 1966, the people had cultivated more land than ever before and had planted crops of more direct use to them than the cotton and sisal which the Portuguese colonialists had forced them to produce.

836. The people must first be organized politically and a programme of military action must then be launched in view of the Portuguese Government's refusal to discuss their demand for freedom. In the part of the country that had severed its relations with the Portuguese administration, the people were sufficiently free to remodel their economic life in accordance with their needs and wishes. Having cultivated the land to produce what they wanted, they worked harder and grew more. During the current agricultural year, the variety and volume would be bigger than ever before, especially in the areas of Mocimboa do Ruvuma, Macó-mia, Nangade, Sagal, Muidumbe, Miteda, Mutamba Dos Macondes, Chia and Negumano in Cabo Delgado District.

837. To encourage more agricultural activity in that province, various techniques had been devised in addition to the organization of co-operatives. It had been necessary to redistribute as much arable land as possible to those eager to increase the acreage under cultivation, including the areas set aside by the Portuguese colonialists for the exclusive cultivation of cotton and sisal. It had also been necessary for FRELIMO to help the people to acquire simple working tools, which could not be bought in Mozambique because Portuguese and Asian traders were not allowed to move about without the constant presence of the Portuguese army. FRELIMO had therefore had to buy thousands of hoes, hatchets and

pangas and distribute them among the farming population. In 1966, it had distributed in Cabo Delgado District alone 5,000 hoes, 5,000 hatchets and 5,000 pangas, which had greatly helped to expand the acreage of cultivated land. The most common crops in Cabo Delgado were sorghum, rice, cassava, millet, maize, beans, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts, palm oil, tobacco, coffee and ground-nuts. There were many kinds of hardwood which, under normal peaceful conditions, could be converted into commercial timber for domestic use and export.

838. The cultivation of cotton and other non-consumer crops had been suspended until more territory had been liberated. But for the intensified air attacks against cultivated areas, production would have been much higher; but everything possible was being done to alleviate the effects of those bombardments, which were not only directed against crops but also intended to exterminate the civilian population.

839. The fight for liberation was as well advanced in Niassa District as in Cabo Delgado. In the former, the population density was much lower than in Cabo Delgado, owing to the fact that the region was extensive and that a higher proportion of the population had had to flee to the United Republic of Tanzania and Malawi in the past two years because of the ruthlessness with which the enemy had bombarded villages and crops. The people who had remained had nevertheless intensified their agricultural activities and had produced much more than before. As in Cabo Delgado, the soil was rich and the climate favourable and practically the same kind of crops were produced. To enable the people to cultivate more land, the same kind of programme had been established. Agricultural co-operatives, bush schools, clinics and some rudimentary social services had been organized. In 1966, 4,000 hoes, 4,000 hatchets and 4,000 pangas had been imported.

840. As in Cabo Delgado, commercial activities had had to be drastically curtailed when the armed struggle had begun. The Portuguese colonial army would not allow any commercial relations between freedom fighters and Portuguese or Asian traders. Consequently, whenever the armed struggle had begun in any province or district, the Portuguese authorities had ordered the closure of business establishments except for those directly serving the military.

841. Since the people must continue to live as normal a life as possible in spite of the war, they had had to establish their own shops in which some of the most essential goods could be bought, including salt, oils, textiles and some household equipment. All other economic activity in Niassa District was the same as that in Cabo Delgado.

842. The plans for further economic development in the liberated and semi-liberated areas of Mozambique were designed, *inter alia*, to improve the people's cultivation techniques, intensify trade in and between the districts, export surplus produce to neighbouring African States, exploit timber, improve local textile production techniques and develop wood-carving. The people were skilful workers in iron and silver. Ways and means were being studied of improving and expanding those traditional crafts in order to produce goods for export that would earn convertible currency.

843. A start had already been made in training people to take over the management of cottage industries using local iron, silver, copper and hardwood for the production of simple household goods such as hoes,

pangas, hatchets, bedstands, needles and ornamental trinkets. The section of FRELIMO dealing with industrial development and production had recently been studying the various kinds of rubber produced in Mozambique to determine which kind should be encouraged for export. It had also been experimenting with various techniques of apiculture to improve the production of honey, which was a rich source of vitamins and energy for people in the liberated areas.

844. During the past two years, FRELIMO had been preoccupied with the need to acquire convertible foreign exchange. One of the best ways of doing so was to export agricultural produce and cottage industry products. It was now in the process of reorganizing the work of the traditional carvers of black hardwood, whose goods were of world-wide renown. They had so far been exploited by unscrupulous traders and foreign tourists, but it was hoped to organize the sale of Makonde art objects to enable the people to reap the benefits of their work.

845. During 1966, 500 tons of cashew nuts, 100 tons of sesame seed, 100 tons of ground-nuts and 10 tons of castor oil seed had been exported. It was hoped to export more, and also cereals, such as maize, rice, sorghum and millet and legumes, during 1967.

846. FRELIMO intended to continue to build up a stronger economic base in all the districts which fell under its control each year and in which the people were free to engage in agriculture, industry and commerce. The people of Mozambique were eager to work harder because they knew that the more they produced the better their lives would be and the sooner their country would be free.

847. Mr. Mondlane, speaking on behalf of FRELIMO, said that the people in the liberated areas were in great need of social services of all kinds, including medical services. When the Portuguese army had been forced to retreat, the official health services, administrative services, schools and missionary institutions had been withdrawn. Immediately after the beginning of the armed struggle in some areas, the Portuguese administrative centres and mission stations had been turned into garrisons for the Portuguese army and any medical services which had remained had been reserved for wounded soldiers.

848. That situation had forced FRELIMO to provide some alternative services to those Mozambicans who had chosen freedom and were lucky enough to find themselves in areas controlled by the liberation forces. It had accepted the responsibility of giving as much assistance as possible to all those living in liberated and semi-liberated areas.

849. A medical system had been established to plan, organize and direct such medical services as could be afforded. The services were directed by two white Mozambican doctors of Portuguese descent, a married couple educated in Lisbon, and assisted by a team of Mozambican medical aides, nurses and nursing aides, most of them trained in Mozambique.

850. Several health centres had been established in each liberated area, to give different types of medical assistance. Some were limited to administering first-aid to casualties, or treating those with simple health problems. Those who could not be treated adequately in the first-aid centres were transferred as quickly as possible to centres equipped with better medical facilities and given better care by more experienced medical

officers. Every liberated district and *circunscrição* had several medical centres staffed by different types of medical officers. However, the lack of adequately trained medical staff and of funds for buying the minimum equipment necessary for even a modest bush clinic, together with the constant difficulty of finding moderately priced drugs and medical supplies, limited the medical services needed by the hundreds of thousands of Mozambicans living in the liberated and semi-liberated areas. So far, however, the only real material support had been that given to those Mozambicans who had been forced to flee to neighbouring African States. Since most Mozambicans did not want to become refugees, the population in Mozambique would continue to suffer for a long time if that policy was not changed.

851. There had been some exceptional cases of States acting on the Committee's resolutions and sending a few boxes of drugs and medical supplies. That assistance, however, had been inadequate, since the goods sent were often surplus materials and, coming from temperate climates, not always suitable for treating tropical diseases, among the most common of which were malaria, yaws, scabies, protein deficiency diseases, bilharziasis, hookworm, intestinal parasitoses and pneumonia.

852. The United Republic of Tanzania and Kenya had rendered valuable assistance in the speedy supply of vaccines during epidemics among the displaced population of Mozambique. During the past two years, 100,000 people had been vaccinated against smallpox.

853. As was well known, it was impossible to establish and maintain any medical services, even modest ones, without funds, and because the people were at war the lack of funds was even more acute. It was therefore imperative that the United Nations or individual States should give special attention to financing the medical services. Those responsible for their direction were constantly bombarded with requests from the various medical centres for more drugs and medical supplies, clothing, vehicles, etc., for which funds were needed, and without which the medical workers were unable to save lives.

854. In addition to the two Mozambican doctors directing the medical programme, the medical staff of 400 consisted of three kinds of officers. The first kind included medical aides, who were graduates of Mozambican medical training centres and who, after working in the Portuguese system for a number of years, had decided to join the active fight against colonialism. A few were recruited every year, and they formed a valuable addition to the medical programme. The second group was composed of those who had graduated from the ordinary schools of nursing in Mozambique and who, after working for some time within the colonial medical services, had also decided to join in the fight. That group, representing the largest number of medical staff, was extremely useful, since its members had been trained to handle almost all conceivable types of cases.

855. The third group was composed of graduates of FRELIMO's own nurses' training school within the Mozambique Institute. That group was growing more rapidly than the others because its training was under FRELIMO control. The first thirteen nurses had graduated in 1966 and had all returned to Mozambique to work among the 800,000 people living in the 75,000 square miles of liberated and semi-liberated territory. Another class of nurses was about to graduate from the

Mozambique Institute, and after a short period of practical training they would join the others in Mozambique.

856. There was still a limit to the number of young candidates that could be enrolled each year, due mainly to the scarcity of those with an adequate academic background to follow the course. To minimize that academic handicap, which it was believed had been created intentionally by the Portuguese for obvious reasons, a secondary school programme had been launched within the Mozambique Institute.

857. The first African Mozambican physician was about to graduate and would shortly join FRELIMO at Dar es Salaam to participate actively in the programme being promoted by his two white fellow-countrymen. He was certain to be only the first of many African doctors who would join the ranks of the freedom fighters.

858. A well-organized programme of education had been included as an essential part of the action programme to facilitate the operation of which the Mozambique Institute had been established. FRELIMO's educational section co-ordinated all educational institutions and programmes. The idea of the Mozambique Institute had been conceived in 1962 and launched the following year. In 1963, a secondary school centre had been established; thirty-five students had been enrolled, and it had been hoped finally to increase their number to fifty-two. Within a few months, however, many more had sought places, and the residential quarters had been forced to take in more than 100. A nurses' training course had been added to the academic secondary programme. A document was annexed to the petition giving further details concerning the Mozambique Institute, from which it would be noted that two more primary school courses had been established, both of them to cater for the needs of Mozambican refugee children in Tanzania and neighbouring independent States and of some selected children brought out for the purpose.

859. The most important preoccupation of FRELIMO in that connexion was the planning, establishment and directing of schools in the liberated and semi-liberated areas, a task that had already begun and that was expanding every year as the fight for liberation progressed. There were more than 10,000 Mozambican primary school children attending classes in about 100 bush schools, with an average of 250 pupils per teacher. Those children were privileged in that they had someone who, although ill-equipped to teach them, was able to share with them the little he did know, when there were many more thousands in both the liberated and occupied areas with no teachers at all.

860. The people of Mozambique were in the third year of the armed struggle, and were still suffering. One third of the country was at war, while the other two thirds were preparing to join in as soon as conditions were favourable. As long as the people were convinced of their right to be free, no matter what the Portuguese might do, they would triumph.

861. Asked for more details concerning the organization in the free zones under the effective control of the freedom fighters, the steps being taken to mobilize a greater number of people and intensify the fight for national liberation, and the organization of the other aspects of the people's lives, the petitioner replied that the organization could be divided into three phases. The first, which was sometimes called "illegal" but

which he preferred to call clandestine, covered the organization of the masses to prepare them for military action and applied mostly to the African population. The second phase was that of military action, which was undertaken as soon as the people were ready. There was a distinct division of the population into two groups: the administrators, army and police, on the one hand, and the masses, on the other, with certain liberal Europeans and Asians remaining uncommitted. The Portuguese troops and police dropped objects resembling bombs, intending to frighten the people and make them surrender but, in fact, they merely encouraged them to go into the forests and join the freedom fighters. The Portuguese administrative organization then broke down for lack of money usually obtained from taxes, while the people in the free zones established their own administrative system, which represented the third phase, that of reconstructing the social and other services necessary for daily life, organizing agricultural work, etc. Sometimes the dividing line between the white community and the mass of the population was not very clearly defined. European and Asian farmers and missionaries often wished to remain in contact with members of the liberation forces. On the other hand, the Portuguese army sometimes occupied large farms and mission stations. Where the administrative organization worked successfully in the free zones, the Portuguese army was very careful not to interfere. The administrators were often the traditional leaders and chiefs, although they could not always command enough respect among the people, and other leaders had to be chosen to form the administrative structure. Unlike France and the United Kingdom, Portugal had never considered Africans suitable for high administrative posts, and there had not been one African District Commissioner under their régime. The line between black and white was therefore clear, the former with some fanatical farmers, constituting the army and paramilitary organizations and the latter forming the new administrations in the free zones.

862. Asked whether FRELIMO's military successes had had an important political impact on the non-liberated areas of Mozambique and whether it was possible that a mass resistance movement might grow up within them, the petitioners informed the Committee that the armed struggle in the northern third of Mozambique had had considerable influence on the other two thirds of the country. It was significant that, in 1964, the Portuguese Government had been forced, for the first time, to appoint a soldier as Governor General. It had already done so in Angola in 1961 and in Guinea (Bissau) in 1963. In no case had any such military Governor General remained in office for more than two years. In any country, the budget was the most sensitive indicator. The Portuguese budget for 1967 provided for a 25 per cent increase over 1966 for the administration of the overseas "provinces". Of a budget of £252 million, £98 million had been earmarked for the colonial wars. The 120,000 men of the Portuguese armed forces in the Territories under Portuguese administration were to cost £43,750,000 in 1967, as against £31 million in 1966. For purposes of comparison, the item covering health and education for 1967 amounted to £34 million. In addition to those items, there had been numerous special provisions for expenditure on the overseas "provinces".

863. With respect to the situation in Mozambique itself, it was notorious that, in the southern half of

the country, people were constantly being harassed by the police and the army. It was estimated that some 10,000 people had been arrested or had disappeared, thirteen of whom had been brought before the courts. FRELIMO had approached the International Red Cross which, in 1966, had sent a mission to Mozambique. The mission had seen many thousands of prisoners, all wearing FRELIMO uniforms. The attempt had thus been made to persuade the Red Cross that all the prisoners in Portuguese hands were "terrorists". It had not been shown any "civilian" prisoners. The Archduke of Hapsburg, after a visit to Mozambique, had stated that the Portuguese authorities had succeeded in containing the "terrorist" movement and had wiped out any support it might have had in the southern part of the Territory. That statement was incorrect; there were thousands of FRELIMO members in the, as yet, non-liberated areas. It was, nevertheless, true that the Portuguese had made every attempt to annihilate them and had been prepared to destroy whole villages in order to be certain of wiping out FRELIMO leaders whom they knew to be among the general population. The police were ubiquitous in those areas. No meetings of more than five people were permitted. Those facts would be a sufficient reminder to anyone who had suffered under colonial rule.

864. Asked whether the movement had embryonic information services which could spread information in African countries on its work and on the situation in Mozambique, the petitioners said that FRELIMO had an information service that operated from three different bases: Dar es Salaam, Cairo and Algiers. The one at Dar es Salaam published weekly war dispatches indicating the problems that were being faced and the victories won. It also produced at least once a month a publication summarizing events during the month and containing political information, such as the extent to which the United Nations resolutions were being implemented, the actions of the Western Powers with regard to Portugal, etc. Radio Tanzania broadcast communiqués in English, Swahili and the languages of Mozambique.

865. The Cairo centre published summaries in English of the material produced at Dar es Salaam, which appeared in Middle East newspapers. Radio Cairo also had a section dealing with Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau).

866. The Algiers centre concentrated on publications in French for circulation in Europe and maintained contact with the other French-language agencies.

867. Countries interested in FRELIMO's activities made a special effort to receive and broadcast relevant material, and cuttings of articles published by friendly countries were sent in from various parts of the world. FRELIMO was in constant contact with as many newspaper groups as possible in those Western countries which followed the Portuguese line, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. Some newspapers in those countries were willing to publish the facts, but they were less enthusiastic than those in socialist countries, and most Western newspapers were pro-Portuguese.

868. Giving further details on the strengthening of the military and police apparatus in Mozambique and on the activities of the PIDE, the petitioners said that Portugal was steadily expanding military establishment in Mozambique in response to the increased activities of the liberation movement. Every three months or so,

the Portuguese Government had to vote a supplementary appropriation to meet the rising cost of the war. About a year ago, the number of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been about 16,000; presently, it was approximately 65,000, although the Portuguese Government admitted to only 45,000. But besides the army, there were some 15,000 police; and there was also a so-called volunteer corps consisting of practically all adult white settlers and any Africans who could be persuaded or coerced to join them. Recently, the term of military service of Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique had been increased from two to three or four years, depending on the needs of the situation.

869. There were about 1,000 detainees in prisons or concentration camps in Mozambique. The number was not larger because, when freedom fighters were captured by the Portuguese, they were mostly killed outright. There were two types of concentration camps: regular concentration camps in areas dominated by the Portuguese, and so-called "protected villages" in areas where the liberation movement was active. Those were villages surrounded by barbed-wire and minefields, the inhabitants of which were guarded by soldiers and escorted by them to work in the fields. The villages had practically no assistance from outside; there were no schools or medical services, and villagers were not allowed to leave the villages. Most of the crops grown were used to supply the Portuguese army. In southern Mozambique, there was a notorious concentration camp at Babana in which some seventy-five leaders of the liberation movement were imprisoned. FRELIMO had asked the International Red Cross to visit the camp and inspect the conditions in which prisoners were held.

870. Asked whether private firms maintained their own security forces in Mozambique, the petitioners replied that there were no such private defence forces in Mozambique, and it was unlikely that the Portuguese authorities would allow them, since there were no powerful private companies such as those in Angola. There were some United States companies exploiting oil and gas, but they were not yet sufficiently strongly established to require a defence force. FRELIMO's fight would discourage the investment of private funds for the setting up of further companies.

871. Asked which were the main factors that enabled Portugal, a small, backward European country, to continue its domination in Mozambique and its defiance of the United Nations decisions, the petitioners replied that Portugal was too weak to carry on a war in its colonies without outside support. As a member of the European community, it encouraged countries to send journalists and politicians on so-called fact-finding missions; they subsequently wrote articles and made speeches giving a biased view of the conditions there. The NATO Powers had pointed out that aid provided under the NATO system should not be used south of the Tropic of Cancer. That might technically be correct; Portugal might not be using equipment supplied by NATO in Africa, but the fact that it was able to use it in its own country freed Portuguese equipment for use elsewhere. It also received indirect aid from banks, and European-owned companies based in Portugal were manufacturing weapons which could be freely used. The NATO countries said that weapons should be examined to check the serial numbers, so that a protest could, if necessary, be made to Portugal, but that was almost impossible in guerrilla warfare. Arms might also be manufactured by another country under a NATO patent. There was, in any case, no restriction on the

use of NATO-trained personnel. Specialized training was being given in counter-guerrilla techniques and the Portuguese officers who completed those courses were immediately sent to serve in Africa. One of the Portuguese doctors working in the free zone's health services had originally been sent to Africa as a doctor in the Portuguese army. He had travelled on a mission to Lisbon on a NATO passport, had been transported in a NATO ship to London, and, once there, had decided against returning to Africa to fight against his brothers. The Ghana Mission in London had then helped him to return *via* Accra to Mozambique, where he had joined the liberation movement.

872. An official document published by the Portuguese Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Lisbon, analysing Portuguese achievements in 1966, made the following reference to the vote in the United Nations:

"In the vote on the resolution, these countries voted in favour of Portugal: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as the other NATO countries; with two exceptions, all the Latin American countries abstained and some of the African Asian countries absented themselves deliberately. In all, 45 did not support the resolution against Portugal. However, it is not the numerical aspect which interests us . . . What is of special interest is to know and note which were the real forces in the world among those which voted for or against us. We must underline this fact because it is incontrovertible that in the last vote in the United Nations, an anti-Portuguese draft resolution was not approved by the United States, nor by the United Kingdom or France or Brazil, which means that it was not approved by all those countries which have major responsibilities and great weight in the politics of the West; therefore it can be affirmed that among the major Powers and especially those which hold a veto in the Security Council, only the Soviet Union supported the resolution."

With that type of support, it was understandable that Portugal continued to suppress the African people.

873. In reply to a request for additional information on the extent of the assistance provided to Portugal by its allies, the petitioners replied that the newspapers had reported that the United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company was to start boring a new oil well to the south of Inhassoro. The American-owned Firestone Portuguese was to invest £1,875,000 in a new tyre factory to be built at Beira. The United Kingdom firm Gill and Duffus, in a joint venture with Peirce Leslie and Co., had opened a plant for dehusking cashew nuts on 10 December 1966. The new factory would have an initial capacity of 6,000 tons of raw cashew nuts a year, as reported in *The Times* of 10 December 1966. The British-owned firm Sena Sugar Estates Ltd., had produced 113,868 tons of sugar (or 70 per cent) of the 163,669 tons of Mozambique output for 1965-1966. The Swiss firm Nestle was reported in the *Diário da Manhã* of 18 January 1967 to be opening a plant at Lourenço Marques with an initial production of 7,500 tons of condensed milk per year and an initial investment of £500,000. Mining investments by two Japanese firms were being planned. The United States-owned Mozambique Gulf Oil Company, in a joint venture with South African firms, was going to build a 359-kilometre pipeline to feed natural gas from Pande (southern Mozambique) to the industrial complex of

Witwatersrand. That, it was claimed, would make South Africa a serious competitor with Western industrialized countries. A daily volume of 200 million cubic feet of gas at prices four times lower than in South Africa was contemplated. There was also a £130 million hydro-electric scheme for which a United Kingdom consortium, including English Electric and AEI, was preparing proposals. The scheme, which would be larger than Kariba, was to be built on the Zambezi in Mozambique.

874. Portugal's NATO allies were a great source of material support to it. Since NATO troops had been removed from France, a new naval base had been built in Portugal and had been inaugurated on 23 February 1967. United Kingdom, United States and Netherlands forces had attended the inaugural ceremonies. That was further evidence of Western approval of Portuguese policy in Africa.

875. Asked for details on the extensive Portuguese propaganda campaign referred to in their statement, the petitioners replied that they would mention the agencies, individuals and countries which were co-operating with the Portuguese in that campaign. In 1961, when active resistance to Portuguese rule had begun in the colonies, the Portuguese Government had retained a number of agencies in various Western countries such as the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States and Canada. The agencies were mainly public relations units and legal firms of high calibre and cost. In the United States, for example, they had engaged Selvage and Lee, a large coast-to-coast firm which, between 1961 and 1964, had earned an average of \$2 million per year from its Portuguese Government account. That firm fed information favourable to Portugal to leaders of public opinion and mass media and lobbied United States Congressmen and representatives in the Canadian Parliament. It had published many pamphlets against FRELIMO and other nationalist organizations and had gone to the extent of supplying photographs of alleged FRELIMO atrocities which had, in fact, been perpetrated by the Portuguese armed forces. It had arranged for journalists and editors to visit the Territories under Portuguese administration to "write what they saw". Needless to say, they had seen only what the Portuguese authorities had wished them to see. By mid-1965, the Portuguese Government had decided that Selvage and Lee were too expensive. It had therefore engaged Downs and Roosevelt Inc., a firm that concentrated on influential people rather than the population in general. The "Roosevelt" in the firm's title was a son of a former United States President, Theodore Roosevelt, which was an indication of how well-connected the firm was.

876. An example of the type of activities in which the firm engaged might prove enlightening to the Special Committee. The Mozambique Institute had originally been founded with a grant from the Ford Foundation. Early in 1966, a rumour had reached the Portuguese Government that FRELIMO was about to apply to the Foundation for a further grant. Downs and Roosevelt had engaged a very important United States lawyer—a former Under-Secretary of Defense—who had approached the trustees of the Ford Foundation saying that he had heard the Foundation intended to make a grant to FRELIMO to enable it to buy arms from China. The result was that the Ford Foundation guaranteed that it would not make any grants to organizations within Territories under Portuguese ad-

ministration without the prior approval of the Portuguese Government.

877. To give another example, one of the petitioners had received a communication from an old acquaintance, a United States lawyer, asking him to come immediately to Nairobi in order to present his side of the case to a group of thirty-two lawyers, including his acquaintance, who had been sent by Downs and Roosevelt, at the Portuguese Government's expense, on a tour of Portuguese colonies in Africa. Inspired newspaper articles and statements in Switzerland, France, the Scandinavian countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries indicated the activities of similar firms.

878. In 1966, Mr. Drew Middleton, a correspondent of *The New York Times*, had passed through East Africa. Attempts had been made to persuade him to meet FRELIMO. He had answered that he was interested only in visiting the newly independent countries of Africa. From Dar es Salaam he had gone to Mozambique and had written a series of articles in praise of the Portuguese régime there. As in the case of many other journalists, Mr. Middleton's expenses had been covered by Downs and Roosevelt.

879. The petitioners were asked whether certain United States aircraft reportedly delivered to Portugal during 1966 were being used in Mozambique. In reply, the petitioners stated that the aircraft concerned were eight bombers delivered to the Portuguese by the United States Central Intelligence Agency early in 1966. The petitioners had given some details concerning them during the Special Committee's series of meetings in 1966. The pilot, a United Kingdom national named John Hall, had been arrested in the United States and accused of flying military aircraft without the authorization of the United States Government. The action by the United States Court, however, had been independent of the Government because of the division of power between Congress and the Judiciary. Early in 1967, the pilot had been acquitted after he had explained that he had been working for the Central Intelligence Agency. Surprise at his acquittal had been expressed by many newspapers in various parts of the world.

880. Asked whether the white settlers in Mozambique had prepared programmes and plans for the Territory and, if so, who was to carry them out and finance them, the petitioners said that the plans and programmes of the white settlers in Mozambique were part and parcel of those of the white settlers in southern Africa as a whole. They were attempting to build a *laager* or stockade, within which they could continue to enjoy their material and other privileges. Various countries in other parts of the world, eager to take advantage of the material resources of southern Africa, were abetting them. Many countries in Western Europe and North America were doing so and, more recently, Japan had joined them.

881. The idea was to maintain an area in southern Africa, in which white men would be supreme and enjoy all possible power and advantages. With the assistance of their friends abroad, they hoped to continue the colonial economic system.

882. Until the end of the Second World War, the colonial Powers had been more frightened of one another than of the people they ruled. Portugal, which had maintained that attitude longer than most of its partners, had consistently refused to allow foreign invest-

ment in the Territories under its control. Since the liberation movements had begun, that attitude had changed and Portugal had actively encouraged such investment. For example, the railways in Mozambique were largely controlled from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which meant that ultimate control resided in the United Kingdom and the United States. All the harbour installations of Lourenço Marques and Beira were foreign-owned. More than half a million workers from Mozambique were employed under contract in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, while many others were working for foreign employers in Mozambique itself. The agricultural resources of the Territory were also being tapped, by means of plantations and large farms producing food for the white settlers or crops with a high cash value. Such plantations were owned by foreign capital and worked by forced labour. Maritime resources, e.g., the lobster fisheries, were similarly controlled by United Kingdom, United States and Japanese interests.

883. Considerable interest had recently been shown by foreign companies in exploring the mineral resources of the Territory and in assessing the volume of known resources. Surveys of gold, copper, bauxite, oil and natural gas resources were being carried out by firms from the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western countries. All profits from such resources benefited in the first place the foreign shareholders, in the second the Portuguese Government and what little remained in Mozambique was largely enjoyed by the white settlers.

884. It appeared that a large project for the development of the Zambezi valley was contemplated. It would cost several hundred million pounds and would be financed by various groups from all parts of the West. It would be about twice the size of the Aswan Dam project. He warned companies that were considering taking part in the construction work that FRELIMO would do everything in its power to hinder it. Unless the employees of such companies were willing to act as Portuguese counter-insurgent troops also, they would find it impossible to carry out their commitments.

885. Mozambique had a population of 7 million, of whom about 100,000 were Europeans and between 15,000 and 20,000 were Asians. The Europeans were mainly Portuguese. In addition, there were between 15,000 and 16,000 soldiers who came for a minimum of two years and then returned to Portugal.

886. Portugal might well be trying to change the balance in the racial composition of the population, since it felt insecure because of the number of Africans. The Portuguese had started a project to send as many settlers as possible, but they had been poor people, sent by a poor Government to a poor land. The settlers had been attracted by the rich neighbouring lands in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and indeed in those countries there were more Portuguese than in Angola and Mozambique put together. The Portuguese had then decided to send out as many soldiers as possible in a last-minute attempt to fill the Territories with Europeans.

887. There was, however, no chance of the Europeans in Mozambique making their own unilateral declaration of independence. The free African world was in contact with that Territory and the Europeans would not dare to do such a thing. However, it was



possible that the Western Powers, which had invested so much money in the Portuguese Territories, might encourage the white settlers to declare their independence and provide them with the resources to do so. FRELIMO would, however, strongly oppose such a move.

888. The Portuguese Government was encouraging private individuals and companies to acquire large tracts of land in fertile areas, including those occupied by Africans. The policy was based on the production of the crops and raw materials required by Portuguese industry, particularly cotton, rice, sisal, wheat and tobacco. If an individual or company wished to use land for growing such crops, then no matter what its present use—unless it was held by European settlers—it would be taken away from the former holders and either sold to the individual or company in question or handed over to them. The criterion was always the estimated benefit to the Portuguese economy as a whole.

889. In the past, certain areas of Mozambique had been reserved for so-called *indigenas*, meaning Africans who lived within a tribal society. Since 1961, however, the system had been abolished and the status of *indigena* was no longer recognized. All land was now placed at the disposal of the Governor General and the all-European Council, which could reallocate it to anyone who could prove that he would make the land yield a given amount of income per year. It was of course difficult for Africans to provide any such proof, and very many had lost their land as a result.

890. In some areas, the Portuguese authorities were trying to compel the Africans to grow cotton or rice, which they were forced to sell to concessionary companies set up with the approval of the Portuguese Government.

891. In liberated areas, FRELIMO tried to organize co-operatives which cultivated the land in common, cared for the crops and distributed the produce to the various individuals concerned. But the system was only provisional, since FRELIMO could not be sure of retaining control of the areas until complete independence had been achieved. FRELIMO helped farmers as much as it could by providing hoes and other tools and advising on farming methods. That was why it had invited agronomists and experts from other countries, for example, from the United Arab Republic, to help reorganize that part of its programme.

892. In reply to a question as to whether there had been any progress in the implementation of the General Assembly resolutions on Territories under Portuguese administration, the petitioners replied that the resolutions had not been applied at all by certain Member States. On the contrary, Western interests had increased their investments in Portugal and Africa during the last twelve months, particularly in Angola.

893. Asked for information on the respective implementation by the two Germanys of the Security Council's resolutions of the Portuguese colonies, the petitioners said that all their statements regarding military help to Portugal applied to the Federal Republic of Germany and not to the German Democratic Republic. FRELIMO had been in contact with the Government of the German Democratic Republic and with some private organizations in the Federal Republic. The German Democratic Republic helped FRELIMO particularly by providing educational and

laboratory equipment and had also promised to send a science teacher. The Government of the Federal Republic had shown no interest in the liberation movement since it supported Portugal. However, FRELIMO had contacted a number of private groups and student organizations in the Federal Republic, some of which had protested against their Government's policy towards Portugal. They had also sent school books for refugees from Mozambique.

894. In reply to a question concerning what action they considered the United Nations should take to break the present deadlock, the petitioners replied that FRELIMO would like more support in its efforts to build a nation. Its most radical need was for the United Nations to recognize it as the true and legal Government of Mozambique, and expel Portugal if it persisted in clinging to the Territory. The Special Committee should prepare the United Nations for the eventuality of FRELIMO's applying for membership as the legal Government.

895. On the question of what further aid was needed, the petitioners said that the principal need was for simple means of helping the people of Mozambique to help themselves: nothing elaborate was required. Such simple tools as hoes and hatchets were in very short supply. There were no longer any stores or traders in the liberated areas. Another necessity was textiles for clothing. Their people were perfectly capable of paying for such items, but they were not available. They appealed to countries with textile industries to make cloth available. Some States (particularly the socialist countries) were already supplying textiles to the liberated area but more was required. They emphasized that they were not asking for material for uniforms but for normal civilian clothes. Another simple but very important item in short supply was chemicals for making soap.

896. There was a great need also for technical assistance in education. People with a minimum technical knowledge were required, not experts. FRELIMO was short of book-keepers and organizers. Although it had some economists, they were very young and inexperienced. They would be very thankful if the United Nations could supply assistance of that kind. FRELIMO had, for some time past, been trying to establish a school of public administration. Assistance in carrying out that project would be of incalculable value to the people of Mozambique.

897. Asked whether graduates of the Mozambique Institute going abroad for further studies had any problems, on their return, in finding an outlet for their new skills and knowledge, the petitioners replied that before the establishment of FRELIMO in 1962, there had been fewer than fifteen Mozambicans in higher educational institutions abroad. Between 1962 and 1967, the number had risen to 150, of whom about seventy were in Eastern Europe and about sixty in the United States. There had so far been no difficulties when students returned from abroad because the Mozambique Institute always had something for them to do. The situation of Mozambican students thus differed from that of students from some other countries. The Mozambique Institute always needed teachers and administrators to replace staff temporarily on loan from other countries. All the graduates had returned to the Institute except one, and there were still hopes that he would. Of those due to graduate in 1967, again only one had said that he did not want to re-

turn, while some others would go on to post-graduate courses. They hoped to find more countries that were willing to accept Mozambican students for post-graduate courses. Recently, the Institute had applied to Canada for a special course in administrative finance for an economics graduate, but it had been told that Canada had no places in its programme for students not from independent African States.

898. Replying to a question concerning the assistance given to FRELIMO by the specialized agencies, and in particular by UNESCO, the petitioners said it was difficult to answer because FRELIMO was receiving help from many sources—United Nations agencies, Governments and private groups and individuals—some of whom might be embarrassed if their help was mentioned and others hurt if it was not. Most help to refugees, in education and other sectors, was provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) through the host country in which the refugees were sheltered. Help was also received from countries which were concerned at the situation in Mozambique. That help might either be channelled through the United Nations, or provided bilaterally. The countries providing educational assistance included the socialist countries of Eastern Europe. India was sending drugs and medicines, textiles and bandages. Much help was also coming either direct or through OAU from African countries, including Algeria, Kenya, the United Republic of Tanzania, the United Arab Republic and many others. A great deal of assistance, however, was still needed from the United Nations. UNESCO had not yet provided any assistance, but it was expected to do so in the near future.

899. There were particular conditions attached to the special UNHCR arrangements for education which made it difficult for students in Mozambique to make the maximum use of them: one was that the funds must be used exclusively in Africa. That made it difficult to find school places, first because there were a relatively small number of places available in African countries, which tended to need all the places there were for their own people; and, secondly, because African educational institutions were often modelled on the United Kingdom and French systems and demanded academic qualifications which Mozambican students lacked.

900. The Mozambique Institute aimed at providing sufficiently wide background knowledge to enable students to benefit from educational facilities abroad. But before they could pass the specific qualifying examinations of other countries, they usually needed an additional half-year course. It was impossible for the Institute to prepare students specifically for, say, the Cambridge School Certificate or the French *Baccalauréat*. That was why FRELIMO was particularly grateful to those countries, especially the Eastern European countries and the United States, which were willing to make arrangements whereby people with no certificates could, in a short time, be accepted into their higher educational systems. He hoped that other countries would be similarly willing to adapt their academic programmes to the needs of refugee students from Mozambique or other Territories striving for their liberation.

901. Asked what they considered the specialized agencies, especially UNESCO, could do to assist in

providing the refugees with educational facilities, the petitioners said that FRELIMO and the refugees from Mozambique had received very little assistance from the specialized agencies. They were, nevertheless, very grateful for what they had received. Aid came from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in two forms: first, assistance to refugees in the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia which was channelled through national organizations in those two countries. Since such aid did not involve FRELIMO, he suggested that members should apply for further information on the subject to the Tanzanian delegation. There were, however, many thousands of other refugees from his country in Malawi and, so far as they knew, they did not receive any such assistance. They could give no reason why that should be so and suggested that the Special Committee should approach the Government of Malawi so that aid might be obtained for refugees in that country. The second form of assistance, which came more directly, consisted of assistance given by specific Governments and institutions abroad which was channelled through the High Commissioner for Refugees. Although the names of such Governments and institutions were not secret, they felt that it would be more appropriate for the Committee to obtain details from the High Commissioner for Refugees.

902. The General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for aid to be given to refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration and a special fund had been set up for that purpose. Eleven students from Mozambique were being boarded and educated at the Mozambique Institute by means of grants from that fund. FRELIMO had originally requested that the United Nations should finance an additional teacher for the Institute but the request had been rejected in favour of supporting the eleven students. Since the need for teachers was still very great, they availed themselves of the opportunity of renewing that request. FRELIMO was using its own limited resources to employ teachers and support students and had also approached several Governments for assistance. A number of Governments had agreed to help, and India, for example, was financing two teachers at the Institute. They thought that the United Nations could do much more in that connexion and repeated that the need for teachers and equipment was very grave.

903. FRELIMO had been trying to contact the World Health Organization (WHO) to obtain supplies of drugs and assistance in training nurses at the Mozambique Institute. They believed that some indirect assistance had in fact been obtained. Under its regulations, WHO could assist areas not represented in the United Nations only if requested to do so by the Secretary-General. They hoped that the General Assembly would adopt a resolution authorizing the Secretary-General to make such a request. The matter was particularly urgent because there were epidemics of various contagious diseases, particularly smallpox, in the area of Mozambique under FRELIMO control. Although FRELIMO had made every endeavour to obtain vaccine, it had been able to vaccinate only 100,000 people out of a total population of 800,000 in that area. That situation was highly dangerous for the neighbouring countries of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Malawi, all Members of the United Nations.

904. With regard to the number of refugees, the petitioners said that the estimates of those who had fled from Mozambique since 1964 were: 50,000 to the United Republic of Tanzania, 10,000 to Malawi and 1,500 to Zambia. A certain number of those had since returned home; the exact figure was not known, but it was not a large proportion. The United Nations Office at Dar es Salaam had given somewhat lower figures. The reason for the discrepancy was that the United Nations figures took into account only refugees in camps or who had been identified, but many refugees had relatives or friends in the countries of asylum because the populations were largely of the same race and language on both sides of the border, and the local tradition was that anyone in need could nearly always find someone to help him. That of course became impossible when the number of refugees amounted to tens of thousands but it was still true that there were large numbers who had not been identified and were not included in the official figures.

905. Refugees in Malawi had no help because the Government of Malawi did not assume any responsibility for the refugees and encouraged them to return to Mozambique. But rather than return or remain in Malawi where they were not welcome, many refugees went to the United Republic of Tanzania. That was not fair to the refugees, nor to the United Republic of Tanzania, nor to the refugee organizations which had to arrange for transport. Something should be done to induce Malawi, which was a Member of the United Nations, to recognize that those people were in need and should be helped.

906. The rate of flow into the United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi and Zambia was highly irregular: it depended on the operations of the Portuguese authorities in the Territories bordering on those countries. When the Portuguese authorities suspected the presence of the liberation movement in an area, their first reaction was to launch a campaign of terror in an attempt to frighten the local inhabitants. That usually induced a few inhabitants to flee, but most stayed. When the liberation movement had begun its operations, the Portuguese Air Force had first carried out simulated bombing which had caused an additional number to seek refuge: but the majority still stayed. Finally, the Portuguese had started real military operations, killing people and burning their huts and trying to herd the whole population into protected villages, a technique they had learnt from some of their Western allies. That had produced a much larger flow of refugees. In every case, however, the volume of the flow depended also on how close the area affected was to the border.

907. FRELIMO did what it could to persuade the inhabitants to stay where they were and, as a result, although operations by the Portuguese Air Force had increased, the number of refugees was declining. That situation might change, however, because it had been reported that the Portuguese Government had decided to wipe out the whole population of certain areas.

908. The main problem was to define the term "refugee". There was a certain discrepancy between the definitions used by the United Nations and that used by relief organizations in other parts of the world. Of the thousands of people who had had to leave their homes, only those who had sought refuge abroad, for instance in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, were considered by the United Nations

as refugees, and received assistance. Those who stayed in Mozambique received none. The help given to the people who went abroad was an inducement for them to do so. However, FRELIMO had set up institutions through which the United Nations could help Mozambicans, using its own definition of the term. The United Nations could also help by training Mozambicans in school and public administration, and WHO could give medical assistance.

*Petitioners concerning Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea*

909. Mr. Pinto-Bull speaking on behalf of the Front de lutte pour l'indépendance nationale de la Guinée dite portuguese (FLING) said that his party considered itself exclusively a national liberation movement, i.e., its only goal was the Territory's real independence. It would then be for the people of Guinea (Bissau) to choose a political régime adapted to their ideas and economic needs. FLING eschewed all political and philosophical considerations and concentrated exclusively on strategy and tactics, in order to win the country's independence.

910. Guinea (Bissau) was of no economic or strategic interest to the Portuguese. Salazar was prompted to maintain a Portuguese presence there by his desire to avoid displeasing the army, which would have unfortunate repercussions on Portugal's domestic policy, and by senile obstinacy. In Salazar's view, any evacuation would involve a loss of prestige and above all might give the other African colonies under Portuguese domination the hope that they too might eventually be freed. That meant that as long as Salazar was in power—or, what amounted to the same thing, as long as power was in the hands of the army—there was absolutely no chance of seeing Portugal simultaneously adopt a policy of decolonization. It costs Portugal very little to maintain its presence in Guinea (Bissau). Its troops had abandoned the bush and occupied only the important centres, where they were subjected to no serious disturbances. It should, however, be noted that boredom and inaction weighed heavily upon the Portuguese troops, particularly those who were doing their military service. Several deserters had confirmed that the war was not popular with the people and in fact benefited only the career soldiers. That situation could easily be exploited if the liberation movement possessed the necessary means of propaganda.

911. In those circumstances, FLING considered that it should orient its activities towards terrorist acts in the towns. To that end, it was applying the so-called "troika" system. Each cell consisted of three men and was completely separated from the others; each man was connected only with his immediate chief, who controlled three cells and was in turn responsible to a single individual. The aim of the cells was terrorism, and they would act only by means of terrorist attacks. In addition to easily accessible installations (transformers, water-towers, electricity lines), the main targets were Portuguese army officers and administrators. Of course, the attacks would provoke blind and bloody repression, but they were necessary in order to incite the people of Guinea (Bissau) to unite in the struggle for freedom.

912. FLING was aware of the difficulties and obstacles it would encounter. It was asking for assistance and making a special appeal to its sister coun-

tries of Africa and Madagascar. It was not asking for money, for its members were solidly united by the privations they had suffered together. It was not asking for statements of intention. It was asking for acts, which would enable it to recognize its friends and its enemies. It called on all countries to vote for resolutions concerning Guinea (Bissau). It called for the strict implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and Security Council resolution 180 (1963) which confirmed the right of the peoples under Portuguese domination to choose their future freely. It called on the Western countries to accept and apply the embargo on arms destined for Portugal, in accordance with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). The assistance which the NATO countries were giving Portugal encouraged the latter to continue flouting United Nations resolutions and violating the Charter, its principles and the right of peoples freely to choose their own future.

913. On the other hand, the assistance of the African countries was essential to the people of Guinea (Bissau) as far as the supply of arms and explosives was concerned. FLING wished to obtain that assistance not from individual African countries but from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) as a whole. Clearly, if the OAU did not intervene in that sphere, the liberation movement would be forced to rely on non-African countries. Free foreign aid had already been offered, but it was not wholly disinterested.

914. FLING was counting on the Special Committee to give maximum publicity to the repression inflicted on the people of Guinea (Bissau) to stigmatize Portugal's attitude and behavior in the eyes of world opinion and to isolate Portugal completely at the diplomatic level. FLING's activities, combined with those of the Committee, would force Portugal to yield.

## 2. General statements<sup>145</sup>

915. The representative of Czechoslovakia said that the positive results achieved by the Special Committee during its African tour in 1966 had been duly appreciated by Czechoslovakia at the last session of the General Assembly. Czechoslovakia continued to pay close attention to the work of the Committee, which had been given the important but so far unfulfilled mandate of verifying the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and thus liberating millions of Africans and other peoples from colonial oppression and domination.

916. In the United Republic of Tanzania, a country lying close to the colonial and racial régimes of southern Africa, the Special Committee was once more realizing the seriousness of contemporary colonial problems. The international community, by adopting resolution 1514 (XV), had to exert every effort to liquidate colonialism in all its manifestations and forms. Colonialism had been generally condemned as one of the most negative and abusive phenomena in history created by forces of imperialist expansionism. It contradicted the concept of the dignity of man and of co-operation among nations and was the principal obstacle to the creation of a society of free men with equal rights. Experience also confirmed that it caused a division

of forces into those actively opposed to it and those trying to prevent its liquidation.

917. Czechoslovakia had always supported and continued to support measures leading to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. The sending of an observer to the last two of the Special Committee's African missions had been proof of its interest in the speedy solution of the remaining colonial problems and also an expression of its high appreciation of the work done by the Committee.

918. The particular importance of the question of the Portuguese Territories could not be over-emphasized. In the Territories under Portuguese domination lived approximately 12 million Africans, or about one quarter of the entire population suffering under colonial and racist régimes. The Special Committee had recently been given further evidence of the atrocities committed by the Portuguese in those Territories and it had been shown that, while Salazar's régime was denying the rights of the African population to self-determination and independence, it was strengthening colonial rule and oppression. It was stimulating the influx of Portuguese and other white immigrants, increasing the number of Portuguese troops deployed there and continuing its suppression of the African population which was fighting for its elementary rights. The Portuguese colonialists were supported by a network of international monopolies furthering their interests in those Territories. In addition, the Salazar régime enjoyed considerable support from various Western countries, mainly the members of NATO. That support was in direct opposition to the implementation of the resolution (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV)) and to Security Council resolution 218 (1965) and to General Assembly resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI). So long as Portugal continued to receive political, economic and military assistance from its allies, it would continue its present colonial policy and the brutal oppression of large sectors of the African population in its colonies. Both the petitioners' testimony and the Special Committee members' statements had stressed the urgency of the request addressed by an overwhelming majority of countries to Portugal's friends and allies that they should desist without delay from helping Salazar's régime in its policy of violating the political and economic rights of the African population in the Portuguese-administered Territories.

919. Operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2189 (XXI) drew attention to the consequences of the intensification of political and economic ties between Portugal, South Africa and the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, and called upon all States to withhold any support or assistance to the unholy alliance which represented a serious threat for decolonization in Africa and the free development of the African peoples. The petitioners' testimony had shown that support of the colonial racist régimes was increasing, that their development was actively supported by large numbers of foreign monopolies in that part of Africa and that the goal pursued by the alliance was to prolong and consolidate their domination over the colonial peoples and at the same time to threaten the achievements of those African peoples which had already achieved freedom and independence. The colonial policy of Salazar's Portugal was therefore only part of a similar plot by colonial,

<sup>145</sup> Additional statements on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration appear in chapter II of the Special Committee's report.

racist and pro-colonial forces in southern Africa. It should be pointed out that the Western Powers, which had been reluctant to support the action of the world community against the unholy alliance, were also responsible for the continuing deterioration of the situation. Among them, the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, was responsible for the continued existence of the minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.

920. The petitioners' statements had shown, however, that in spite of the support Portugal was receiving from various sources, the African patriots in the national liberation movements were continuing their fight for freedom. They were not only in a position to withstand and fight colonial armies numbering tens of thousands, but were also laying the firm foundations of their eventual independence in the liberated zones and encouraging the economic, educational and social development of their inhabitants. The results achieved by the national liberation movements had been appreciated by most of the members of the Special Committee and were winning general sympathy and support everywhere in the world.

921. The Special Committee's fact-finding visit to Africa in 1967 had provided new evidence to support its endeavours to achieve the implementation of the Declaration. In the past, it had done useful work in analysing colonialism in the contemporary world and had greatly contributed to the understanding of the problem both in general terms and in its many subtle aspects. Latterly, it had thrown much-needed light on the infrastructure upon which the colonial system of the exploitation of peoples and Territories rested and on the activities of foreign monopolies in colonial countries which, according to many of the United Nations resolutions, were impeding the colonial peoples' achievement of independence. At its last few meetings, the Committee had been provided with lists of companies responsible for the preservation of the colonial system and racial oppression in southern Africa.

922. In conclusion, he assured the Special Committee that the Czechoslovak Government would give due attention to the resolutions adopted by the Committee during its meetings in Africa. Czechoslovakia would do all in its power to further the noble goals of freedom, self-determination and independence for the colonial countries and peoples laid down in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Declaration and wished the Committee every success in its work in the interests of freedom.

923. The representative of Tunisia expressed satisfaction at the fact that during its current session the Special Committee had been able, at Kinshasa, Kitwe and, finally, Dar es Salaam, to hear petitioners and representatives of liberation movements from the Territories under Portuguese domination. The Committee had had an opportunity to hear their statements and ask them questions. It had thus been able to acquaint itself more fully with the situation in those Territories and to obtain information at first hand concerning the exactions and repression to which the African people were subjected. In Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea the most fundamental human rights were disregarded. Human dignity was trampled under foot and the Africans were denied all justice. From the extensive and concordant testimony which the Committee had heard it

was apparent that, despite the many decisions of the United Nations, Portugal was continuing its military build-up and further intensifying its repressive measures, thus obliging thousands of Africans to flee and take refuge in neighbouring countries. The latter were being threatened by Portugal because they were admitting the refugees and they were continually being subjected to violations of their frontiers and acts of aggression committed on their territory. Moreover, the statements made all confirmed that had it not been for the complicity of the great Powers and the pressures exerted by foreign economic and financial interests, Portugal, a poor country without resources, would have been unable to afford a war which had been going on for more than six years.

924. The Committee had received information concerning Portugal's war effort, the repressive measures it was applying in the Territories under its domination and the crimes it was continuing to commit against the inhabitants of those Territories. At the same time, it had gathered information on the activities of the liberation movements with reference to both their struggle against the colonial Power and their programme for the reconstruction of the Territories once they were liberated.

925. The representative of India said that, despite his awareness of the grimness of the situation, he felt a sense of cautious optimism. That was not generated by any indication of a change of heart on the part of the inhuman Salazar régime, since there was overwhelming evidence to show that it was actively engaged in intensifying its war of aggression in Africa, applying new and more barbaric methods of torture. Declaration after declaration had left no doubt whatsoever of that régime's criminal design. His optimism was based on the reports submitted by the petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), who had provided evidence of the heroic fight being carried on by the nationalists and their limited but real success. More than one half of Guinea (Bissau) and one fifth of the Territory of Angola were under nationalist control and, with regard to Mozambique, the Special Committee had been informed that an area containing 800,000 inhabitants had been liberated, that one third of the country had taken up arms against Portugal and that the remaining two thirds were expected to do so in the near future. According to conservative estimates, FRELIMO had 7,000 men and 3,000 "cadres" in its guerrilla forces. Portuguese administration had been brought to a virtual standstill in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. His delegation had been very much impressed by its visit to the Mozambique Institute where it had seen what fine work the nationalist movement was carrying out among the refugees. He wished to congratulate those brave freedom fighters, whose determination to oppose the colonial Power had only become stronger with the attempts to suppress them, and he wished them every success in their fight to regain their independence and dignity.

926. The grim realities of the situation were too obvious to be ignored. Portugal, intent on maintaining its illegal hold over its African possessions, was spending more and more money on what it called defence. Expenditure on development projects had diminished by 2.5 per cent from 1966 to 1967, while defence allocations had risen by 33 per cent, the largest increase since the Angola uprising in 1961.

The number of troops in the Territories under Portuguese domination was well over 120,000. Compulsory military service for all citizens had been extended to three years, with the possibility of a further extension of one year. Women were to be admitted into the armed forces for the first time in capacities other than as nurses. The modernization and expansion of the Portuguese Navy, which had been begun in 1964, was being accelerated by the purchase of additional corvettes, destroyers and submarines. Attempts were being made to ensure the self-sufficiency of the country with respect to armaments. All those facts clearly proved that the Portuguese Government had no intention whatever of renouncing its policy of enslaving the African people in its colonies. It had the audacity, in fact, to tell the world that its approach to its colonies was a form of decolonization. The Portuguese Minister for Overseas Territories had explained that decolonization could be achieved either through a process of cultural unification and "the integration of the colonized in the same social and political unity" or through the separation of the colonizer and the colonized, the latter taking over the management of their own affairs. He had stated that real decolonization only took place when integration or emancipation led to a real and profound transformation of the colonized. Salazar himself had said that his Government refused to adopt a policy that would lead to the disintegration of the nation, that the advantages of collaboration and the integration of vast areas and units were becoming increasingly evident and that the Portuguese nation, being integrated and multi-continental, satisfied fundamentally the real needs of all its peoples far better than if they were divided into impractical political units that would sooner or later become economically subject to other countries and ultimately lose their national independence.

927. In the face of such statements, and when it was realized that Portugal regarded its principles as being no less noble or honourable than those of others, it should be abundantly clear to all, including Portugal's friends and allies, that any attempts to solve the problem by appealing to that country were doomed to failure. The Governor of the National Bank of Portugal had stated that Portugal's very survival as a nation depended on its retaining sovereignty over its African Territories.

928. The various economic measures announced by the colonial Power to boost the economic role of the African Territories had not significantly changed the lives of the indigenous population, as had been amply testified by the petitioners. Even the Portuguese Press had acknowledged that the economic integration plan, intended supposedly for the benefit of all parts of the Portuguese empire, had in fact benefited only metropolitan Portugal itself. He was not surprised at that fact, since he was only too familiar with the ruthless methods of administration adopted by that country and its total lack of concern for the welfare of its dependent Territories, which were regarded primarily as suppliers of raw materials. Despite the abundant and rich mineral deposits in the colonies, the indigenous people remained primarily subsistence farmers or wage-earners.

929. As the people of India had realized, it was only after independence that a country was able to embark on a meaningful programme of economic development. The few measures which had been in-

roduced to improve living conditions and strengthen the economy of the Territories were primarily intended to attract European settlement. Ex-soldiers were being encouraged to settle in border areas. That deliberate and consistent policy of encouraging white settlement, supposedly in order to transplant Portuguese culture, was in fact designed to increase the proportion of Europeans in the population with a view to the effective suppression of the African nationalist movements. One of the petitioners had reported that 1,250 whites were arriving in Mozambique every month for permanent settlement. That policy, with its vicious implications, had already been condemned in General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) as a crime against humanity.

930. In that connexion, he warned of the possibility of another Southern Rhodesia in the Portuguese colonies. It was quite possible that the time would come when the white settlers would feel strong and audacious enough to make a unilateral declaration of independence. That might appear to be a somewhat far-fetched warning, but who would have predicted, forty years before, that a handful of whites in Southern Rhodesia would have been capable of defying the metropolitan country and the whole world? However, the successes achieved by the freedom fighters might well make it impossible for the Portuguese to continue their policy of settling whites in any appreciable numbers.

931. It was notorious that Portugal, the least developed country in Europe, was able to maintain and intensify its war in Africa only because of the active assistance it received from its friends and allies. Numerous appeals had been made to those Powers to stop aiding Portugal without any result to date. Nevertheless, he renewed that appeal, reminding those Powers that their own long-term interest would be jeopardized if they persisted in their short-sighted policy.

932. He paid a most sincere tribute to the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the very substantial help it had rendered to the Mozambique nationalists, both freedom fighters and refugees. That contribution was yet another practical manifestation of that Government's interest in liquidating colonialism in Africa and elsewhere. Similar tributes were due to the Governments and peoples of Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Guinea.

933. His delegation had consistently supported the right of the people in the Portuguese-dominated Territories to self-determination and independence. It condemned the inhuman policies of the Portuguese Government and the atrocities it had committed against the African people. India had made a modest contribution to the fight against Portuguese colonialism in the form of drugs, books, scholarships and teachers. His compatriots felt very strongly on that issue since they had themselves suffered under colonial rule for many years and had experienced Portuguese colonialism in a part of their country. He renewed India's pledge to support the just cause of the liberation of the Territories under Portuguese administration.

934. With regard to the future course of action to be taken, he believed that that was already well laid down in the General Assembly's resolutions. What remained to be done was to implement those resolutions. The only practical and effective way of dealing with the situation was for the United Nations to take

action to frustrate the evasive tactics of the Portuguese Government and to force it to comply with the verdict of the international community. That could easily be done if all Member States, especially those in a position to exert pressure on Portugal, had the will and intention to act effectively, thus fulfilling their responsibilities under the Charter and General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

935. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania thanked all the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee for their clear and factual material which had added to the already long chronicle of the brutal suppression of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination, a chronicle which had roused the indignation of freedom-loving people the world over. It was now seven years since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. The Declaration remained a constructive effort on the part of freedom-loving humanity to correct the crime committed by the aggressive forces of colonialism, to help the struggling masses in the colonized lands to regain their liberty and to restore peace.

936. The only response from the Portuguese imperialists had been increased brutality. It was thus inevitable that the patriotic forces of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) should have taken up arms for the achievement of liberation and the restoration of peace, for freedom and peace were indivisible and the fight against Portuguese colonialism was a fight for peace and liberty.

937. All the petitioners had stressed that Portugal could only continue and intensify its aggressive policy because of the support it received from its NATO allies. Those statements were corroborated by the weapons captured by the Angolan and Mozambican freedom fighters and exhibited before the Special Committee. The weapons had been manufactured in NATO countries. It was also well known that Portugal received war material from the United Kingdom and aircraft and submarines from France.

938. Portugal's NATO allies always maintained that whatever support Portugal received under NATO war for the purposes of European security. From the standpoint of the African people, the only support that Portugal needed was the support needed to eliminate the fascist and aggressive policies of the Salazar régime. The Portuguese people had only one enemy in Europe: the reactionary Salazar régime. There could thus be only one conclusion: that the weapons and support were given to Portugal to enable the imperialists' henchmen to maintain their stranglehold on the African lands which were being exploited by the giant capitalistic monopolies.

939. Portuguese aggression was an expression of the economic exploitation of those Territories and their peoples by foreign monopolies based in the Western countries. It was necessary to point out that the African people drew a distinction between the different kinds of investments. The question of foreign investments and capital was one that should be discussed only between equals, i.e., between the sovereign peoples of the countries concerned. When foreign investment was a factor impeding the attainment of independence by the people of a colonial Territory, and when foreign capital became an instrument, not of progress, but of suppression and exploitation, then it must be regarded as a negative factor which should be

opposed. That the activities of foreign financial interests of NATO countries in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) constituted an impediment to the liberation of the peoples of those Territories was not a matter of debate. The evidence had shown that certain foreign companies operating in Angola and Mozambique had gone to the length of maintaining private armies against the peoples of those Territories. Moreover, the activities of the foreign monopolies in all the Portuguese Territories in Africa directly contravened the decisions of the United Nations in various General Assembly resolutions. For example, the PETRANGOL Company, which exploited petroleum and other resources in Angola, had increased its output of jet fuel from 8,380 tons in 1962 to some 37,000 tons in 1965.

940. The petitioners had stressed the increasing co-operation between the members of the "unholy alliance" of Portugal, the *apartheid* régime of South Africa and the illegal minority racist régime in Southern Rhodesia. While, on the one hand, Portugal supplied the racist régime in Southern Rhodesia with what was necessary to frustrate the policy of economic sanctions, the Ian Smith régime had actively participated in the crimes being committed against the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. Again, while Portugal had supplied South Africa with slave labour, South Africa had been actively participating, especially from the Caprivi Strip, in the war against the heroic people of Angola, and in the East, against the people of Mozambique.

941. Another aspect of the inhuman policies pursued by Portugal in the name of colonialism was the threat to the peace and security of southern Africa. The Portuguese colonialists had launched brazen aggression against the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia. Portugal had also committed acts of aggression against the United Republic of Tanzania, killing several patriots. Those crimes against humanity must be strongly condemned by all who sincerely supported the cause of peace and the freedom of all peoples and should serve as a serious reminder to Portugal's allies who continued to supply and arm it.

942. He saluted the patriotic forces of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) for their heroic struggle against colonialism and imperialism. Theirs was a just and legitimate fight which must be supported by all the forces of freedom, peace and progress. The United Republic of Tanzania would continue to render all the support necessary for the successful conclusion of the struggle.

943. The representative of Poland said that his delegation had listened with care to the evidence of the petitioners from the African Territories under Portuguese domination who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam. It had also studied the working papers prepared by the Secretariat.

944. It was clear that, during the past year, the situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had taken a turn for the worse and that the crucial problem remained unchanged. Portugal continued to deny the African peoples' right to self-determination and also refused to recognize that the Territories under its administration were colonies for which it was accountable to the United Nations. The Portuguese armed forces were waging a criminal war against the people of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and the evidence showed that Portugal was intensi-

ying its colonial war and had raised the numbers of its troops in the three Territories to 120,000, while 40 per cent of its budget was allocated to the colonial wars. The militarization of the Territories was illustrated by the appointment of soldiers as governors in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). In addition, the period of compulsory military service had been extended and the Portuguese Navy and police forces in the colonies were being strengthened.

945. Portugal continued to exploit the human and natural resources of its African Territories and had taken steps to transform their economic and social systems in order to make them serve a war effort which far exceeded its own possibilities. The colonial wars against the African peoples were possible only because of the assistance fascist Portugal continued to receive from its NATO allies. The weapons captured by MPLA from Portuguese forces in Angola had all been manufactured in NATO countries. All the petitioners were unanimous in denouncing the military, political and economic assistance that the Federal Republic of Germany was providing to Portugal. The Federal Republic of Germany was selling arms and equipment to Portugal and its military instructors were training the Portuguese forces under arrangements between Bonn and Lisbon. The collaboration between the Federal Republic of Germany and Portugal also covered trade and capital investment in Angola and Mozambique. That clearly indicated that the fascist spirit which still prevailed in the Federal Republic of Germany was consistent with the fascist colonial policy of the Portuguese Government.

946. Portugal was receiving assistance on a growing scale from the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The unholy alliance of colonialism and racism in southern Africa was steadily increasing its co-operation with the support of its Western allies interested in preserving colonial strongholds in southern Africa. The situation in all those States and Territories could have been very different if the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States had complied with the many appeals and resolutions adopted by various United Nations bodies.

947. The exploitation of the Portuguese colonies constituted a source of profit not only for Portugal but also for the international monopolies, a list of which had been provided by the petitioners. In return for privileges which enabled them to reap enormous profits from the human and material resources of the African Territories, the international combines helped the colonial régimes to deny the African people the means of effective participation in the economic life of their countries. The petitioners therefore rightly claimed that the activities of those foreign interests were a serious obstacle to the freedom and independence of the Angolan and Mozambican peoples. Another feature of Portugal's colonial policy was the influx of foreign settlers to the Territories under its administration and the forcible exportation of African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

948. Poland unreservedly supported the national liberation movements and had been happy to learn of the successes already scored by the freedom fighters in liberating extensive areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was encouraging to learn that FRELIMO and MPLA had established their own administrations and social, medical and educational organizations in the liberated areas. The Polish delegation supported the demand for increased help and as-

sistance to the liberation movements from the international community, particularly the specialized agencies.

949. The representative of Yugoslavia thanked the representatives of the liberation movements for their very enlightening statements which had provided the Special Committee with new information on the situation in the Portuguese colonies, the new measures undertaken by the Salazar Government to thwart the justified wishes of the peoples for freedom and independence and on the intensified efforts of the liberation movements to rally the inhabitants of their respective Territories against the Portuguese colonialists. Most States Members of the United Nations had recognized the legitimacy of the armed struggle of the peoples still under colonial domination. And the resolute struggle of those peoples helped the progressive States to apply themselves with greater vigour to the final liquidation of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

950. The question of the Territories under Portuguese domination had been on the agenda of the United Nations for years, so that the conditions in the Portuguese colonies were well known. The Special Committee, through its debates and reports submitted to the General Assembly, had helped to make the world aware of those conditions. The material prepared by the Secretariat had revealed the frantic efforts of the colonialists, who were resorting to the most brutal means, including massacre, to perpetuate their domination of those Territories. In addition to intensifying the war against the indigenous populations by sending out thousands of fresh troops from Portugal, the Portuguese Government was seeking to alter the relationship between the European and the African populations by attracting greater numbers of settlers and offering them better facilities. Typical of that policy was the statement by the Governor of the Banco de Fomento Nacional that Portugal must divert to its African Territories the hundreds of thousands of emigrants now going to foreign countries. But it was obvious that in that particular respect the policy of the Lisbon Government was meeting ever greater difficulties, since Portuguese preferred to go to other countries rather than to the colonies where the African people were fighting for their liberation.

951. The problems of the Territories under Portuguese domination could not be viewed in isolation from what was happening in southern Africa and other parts of the world, where force was being used to obstruct the rights of the peoples to independence and to choose the system of government they desired. The colonial wars waged against the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the support of the racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and South West Africa and the attempt—under the cloak of independence—to impose feudal rule on the people of Aden were all part and parcel of the same policy of checking the process of decolonization and preserving the strongholds which were to be used as a springboard for interference in the domestic affairs of the newly liberated countries. For the same purpose, military bases were being set up in the colonial Territories to exercise pressure on independent African and Asian countries.

952. It was in that context that it might well be asked how it was possible for a small and backward European country like Portugal to wage colonial wars against the people of Africa, to rule Territories and populations which far exceeded those of Portugal itself, and even to threaten aggressive acts against inde-



pendent African States, including the United Republic of Tanzania. Specific proof had been provided that that situation was only possible because of the extensive economic, political and military assistance that Portugal received from its powerful NATO allies. The protests and denials of some members of NATO were not sufficient to prove the contrary. NATO weapons, in addition to arms, received on a bilateral basis, were still being used in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). It was irrelevant whether the Portuguese Government was doing that with or without the authorization of the NATO countries. What was important was that the Portuguese Government was actually using such weapons, and the only way to prevent it from turning NATO into its accomplice was to take practical steps to make it physically impossible for Portugal to use those weapons against the African peoples. So far, no such steps had been taken by the NATO countries. Those countries were in fact actually extending their economic commitments in the colonies under Portuguese domination, thereby helping Portugal to preserve the *status quo* and obstruct the people's fight for freedom.

953. The Special Committee would be failing in its duty if it did not draw the General Assembly's attention to the real causes of the dangerous situation in the Portuguese colonies and recommend effective measures to enable the peoples of those Territories to achieve their independence.

954. Yugoslavia fully supported the peoples and national liberation movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) and wished them every success in their legitimate struggle for freedom and independence.

955. The representative of Afghanistan said that six years had elapsed since the General Assembly had passed its historic resolution 1514 (XV), but many peoples—including those of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau)—were still fighting for their undeniable rights to self-determination and independence and were still subject to the most ruthless forms of colonial exploitation.

956. The Portuguese colonialists still denied the most elementary human rights and tried to convince the world that Portugal's African Territories were "overseas provinces" of Portugal.

957. The atrocities perpetrated against the indigenous populations of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had aroused profound indignation throughout the world. It was quite clear that Portugal was holding those Territories by force of arms and that Portugal, being a very poor country, could not wage such a costly war without the military, political and economic support it received from its allies, especially the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The close collaboration between those three racist régimes had strengthened the determination of Portugal to maintain its supremacy in the Territories under its administration. That unholy alliance was a very dangerous development which had had an adverse effect on the situation. It was evident that the three racist and colonialist régimes had formed a sort of "common market" in African manpower which was forced to move from one country to another according to the interests of the colonizers.

958. It was encouraging to see that the atrocities committed by the colonialists had aroused the indignation of the peoples of those Territories and that the liberation movements were successfully defending their

freedom. The information provided by the representatives of FRELIMO was of great significance. His delegation had learned with satisfaction that FRELIMO had succeeded in establishing agricultural, educational, social and medical programmes in the liberated and semi-liberated areas and he had been greatly impressed by his visit to the Mozambique Institute. He congratulated FRELIMO on its great achievements.

959. Afghanistan was opposed to colonialism in all shapes and forms and was therefore gravely concerned at the slow rate of progress in the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. It was indeed alarming that, despite years of discussion and the many resolutions passed by United Nations bodies, the racist régime of Portugal had not taken a single step to implement the General Assembly resolutions and had refused to co-operate with the United Nations.

960. The Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole had a special responsibility in the matter and it was essential that rapid means should be found to end the shameful and tragic situation.

961. The representative of Ethiopia said that numerous petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee at Kinshasa, Kitwe and Dar es Salaam had drawn attention once again to the atrocities, oppression and untold sorrow that Portugal had inflicted upon the defenceless peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), whose only crime was to demand their birthright—*independence*. The Ethiopian delegation had been deeply impressed by the fight the brave peoples of Angola and Mozambique were waging against the Salazar régime and congratulated the freedom fighters on the constructive work they were carrying out in the liberated areas of those Territories.

962. The war of extermination conducted by Portugal in the name of civilization was without parallel in recent colonial history. The archaic régime of Salazar, in flagrant violation of the Charter and many United Nations resolutions, deserved strong condemnation. But the United Nations had been considering the item for the past six years. In 1960, in resolution 1542 (XV), the General Assembly had decided that the Territories under Portuguese administration were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of the Charter. In 1965, the Security Council, in resolution 218 (1965), had decided that the situation in the Portuguese colonies seriously disturbed international peace and security. At its twenty-first session in 1966, the General Assembly had adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) which, *inter alia*, condemned the policy of the Government of Portugal as a crime against humanity and as violating the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and by exporting African workers to South Africa. It had requested all States to desist from giving assistance to the Government of Portugal that enabled it to continue its repression of the African peoples under its domination.

963. The policy of suppression pursued by Portugal in Africa was of concern to the whole international community. The world had to realize that the Portuguese colonialists were able to continue their evil policy, thanks not only to the connivance of the racist régimes in the southern part of Africa, but also to the support which Portugal continued to receive from its allies in Europe and elsewhere. Between 1961 and 1965, Portugal had spent 17,000 million escudos on the war in

Africa. In 1966, Portugal's total budget had been 17,410.3 million escudos, of which 4,011 million had been for overseas defence expenditure. That amount rose every year and increasingly heavier taxes were levied on the Portuguese population. Portugal itself was an under-developed country with a high national debt, and most of its defence expenditure was financed by help from outside.

964. It was most unfortunate that, despite the many appeals by the United Nations, Portugal continued to send troops to its African Territories to counter the action of the nationalist movements. It was deplorable that a Member State continued to challenge the authority of the United Nations. That was the kind of challenge which, if not faced in time, could break the backbone of the Organization.

965. It did not require much power of prophecy to foresee that the African peoples were bound to win in the end. No power on earth could change the course of history, nor could anyone turn the tide of freedom.

966. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted that the Special Committee was completing its consideration of the situation in the Territories in Africa which were under Portuguese administration. As it concluded the session which it had been holding away from Headquarters, it now had, thanks to the statements of the representatives of the liberation movements, a complete picture of the deplorable situation in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), which were being cruelly oppressed by the Salazar régime. The petitioners had given the Committee further proof of the fact that if Portugal was in a position to wage war against the African peoples under its rule, that was because it had the political, military and economic assistance of its partners in the "White States" bloc. South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal and certain States which were members of the militarist and colonialist NATO alliance were constantly violating the decisions of the United Nations concerning the Portuguese colonies.

967. The members of the Special Committee were now likewise aware that the imperialist foreign monopolies were continuing to plunder the Territories in Africa administered by Portugal. They could study the scope of the activities of the capitalist monopolies in those Territories and draw conclusions with regard to the effects of such activities on the agriculture and industry of the Portuguese colonies. Apart from the Portuguese capital invested in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau), the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, South Africa, Belgium and a number of other countries had very substantial interests there. Those Powers had to all intents and purposes taken possession of the diamonds, petroleum, iron ore, coal and bauxite of the Territories in question, as well as of their cotton, sugar, sisal, coffee and copra.

968. The fact that the foreign monopolies were giving aid and assistance to the reactionary Portuguese régime, which was continuing to defy the decisions of the United Nations, should surprise no one. The foreign capitalists ceaselessly exploited the resources which belonged by right to the African peoples. They had obtained extensive agricultural concessions and they enjoyed the advantage of cheap labour. The United Nations had denounced the activities of all those companies, which were contrary to the principles of the Charter and to the Declaration on the Granting of

Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Everyone knew, however, that when major financial interests were at stake, the international Powers turned a deaf ear to all appeals.

969. The representative of Italy recalled that his Government's position on the question of the African Territories under Portuguese administration had been stated on numerous occasions during the past few years, and it had repeatedly expressed to the Portuguese Government its conviction that, by refusing to co-operate with the United Nations in the matter, that Government was failing to meet its obligations under the Charter. Its concern had been intensified by recent fresh reports of discrimination and of the denial of the right of self-determination to which the people of the Territories were entitled.

970. With regard to the allegations that had been made concerning the role of members of NATO, his Government had no apology to offer. The fact that Italy had been a member of NATO since its inception had never prevented it from expressing its views freely on Portuguese colonial policies, or from strictly denying to the Portuguese Government assistance for carrying them out.

971. Rather than prolong the discussion on a point that had sometimes been raised more for petty political reasons than for real concern or conviction, he would turn to the substantive measures that the Special Committee and the United Nations as a whole should adopt.

972. One of the petitioners had told the Special Committee of the satisfaction expressed by the Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the fact that a large number of Member States had recently either abstained from voting or voted against resolutions on the matter. The interpretation and explanation of votes could, however, be given only by the voters themselves, and, moreover, his delegation did not share the satisfaction of the Portuguese Minister, since such a division of opinion did not enhance the Organization's effectiveness in dealing with one of its most complicated problems. The fact was that too often Member States were compelled to reserve their position on proposals that appeared too radical even when justified by the legitimate emotion aroused by the concern of the African peoples for their brothers still under colonial rule. His delegation had, during the Committee's series of meetings in Africa in 1966, stressed that point at length and had recalled how many Member States, in no way bound to Portugal by alliance or sympathy, had abstained from voting on resolutions on the subject thereby possibly creating the impression that they were supporting Portugal's policy. Since that was obviously not the case, the question must be asked again whether the right course of action had been chosen for implementing the provisions of the Charter and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

973. His delegation had advanced a reasonable answer to that question, during the Special Committee's previous series of meetings, by stating that the Committee should urge the enforcement of effective measures against the supply of arms to Portugal for colonial warlike actions, to help the people of the Territories through training for future independence and through direct assistance for their most urgent needs, to urge Portugal to heed the expressions of mounting concern by the international community and to continue to draw the attention of world public opinion to the serious problem created by the denial of the rights of self-

determination. In that connexion, he recalled that the Indian representative had told a petitioner that the Committee would not be discouraged by the passing of time because it was its duty to continue to debate the problem with all the determination deriving from the conviction that it supported a just cause. Impatience was understandable and justifiable in the prevailing circumstances, but it would lead nowhere if not accompanied by a sound assessment of the realities of the situation and the limitations of the Organization in its present form. That might be called a legalistic approach but, if legality meant fundamental respect for the Charter, that definition could be accepted.

974. The representative of the United States of America said that the United States believed that the Territories under Portuguese administration in Africa should be classified as Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of Article 73 e of the Charter, and their peoples should be given the opportunity to exercise fully and freely their right to self-determination. The United States, in conformity with the measures adopted by the Security Council, neither supplied, nor permitted to be exported, weapons or military equipment for use in those Territories.

975. With regard to the nature and role of United States business activities on the African continent, he had earlier emphasized the relatively modest amount of United States private investment in and trade with the Territories under Portuguese administration. A FRELIMO petitioner had made certain statements concerning the operations of some United States private firms engaged in public relations activities, supposedly in support of the Portuguese cause, which called for comment by his delegation since they bore closely on relations between the United States Government and private business.

976. The petitioner had cited the case of one such firm retained by the Portuguese Government that was, he had claimed, seeking to influence United States opinion in favour of Portuguese policy in Africa. The United States placed no restrictions on the distribution of information on the various sides of any issue, domestic or foreign, the only requirement being that a firm conducting such activities on behalf of a foreign Government must register its connexion with the United States Government so that it could be known to all. The United States Constitution contained guarantees to ensure the free dissemination of information as a fundamental democratic right, but the utterances of those private firms in no way reflected government policy, and often conflicted with it.

977. The petitioner had omitted to mention that there were also in the United States private organizations that supported with considerable zeal and effectiveness the cause of self-determination and independence for the people in various areas of southern Africa, some of which were strongly supported by private United States business, academic and professional circles. Representatives assigned to United Nations Headquarters must have come into contact with officials of such organizations, one of which published a periodical on Africa that had been quoted by two petitioners in support of arguments they were expounding.

978. The representative of Australia recalled that his Government's policy on the question of the Portuguese colonies had been explained in detail on a number of occasions. Australia was firmly committed to the principle of self-determination in all colonial

Territories. The fact that its views on the means of implementation might not accord with those of all other delegations should not obscure the strength of its commitment. It did not accept the premise upon which Portugal's policy towards its overseas Territories was based and was deeply concerned at its failure to acknowledge its obligations to their peoples. Australia disagreed in particular with the failure to transmit information on the Territories in accordance with Article 73 e of the Charter and had made those views known to the Portuguese Government at the highest level, making clear its belief that the Territories should be classified as colonial and that the principle of self-determination should be applied. It was disturbed at many of the aims and practices of the Portuguese authorities.

979. It was a matter for regret that no attempt was apparently being made to prepare the people for self-determination, self-government or independence, in accordance with the wish of the majority, and it was hoped that the Portuguese Government would accept the view that, by granting those rights, it would be acting in accordance not only with political realism but with generally accepted moral standards.

980. The representative of Iran said that the question had occupied the attention of the Special Committee from the very beginning of its meetings in Africa. Petitioners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau) had been heard and had given a vivid picture of the conditions in which their peoples continued to languish. The Committee had been told of the obnoxious measures adopted by the Portuguese Government in order to tighten its grip on those Territories and to frustrate the legitimate wishes of their peoples. Moreover, Portugal had sought to strengthen its links with the like-minded régimes of Southern Rhodesia and South Africa and to form what had been well described as an "unholy alliance". Portugal was the linchpin of the alliance. By its adamant and persistent refusal to implement the relevant resolutions, it had seriously challenged the United Nations.

981. Despite that depressing picture, his delegation had been greatly encouraged by the intensified activities of the various liberation movements. In Angola, GRAE and MPLA had stepped up their military and non-military activities. GRAE's work for the rehabilitation of the refugees from Portuguese oppression was striking. In addition, he had been highly gratified to learn that MPLA had further expanded its activities and had liberated many more Angolans from Portuguese subjugation. If those two organizations were to co-ordinate their efforts and adopt a united stand against the common enemy, the dawn of Angolan independence could not be long delayed.

982. FRELIMO's activities in Mozambique were also highly impressive. The nationalists, under the able and dynamic leadership of Mr. Mondlane, had, in the course of the preceding year, liberated even more of their country and people from the Portuguese colonialists. The Special Committee had also learnt with great interest of FRELIMO's national reconstruction activities. Even in the midst of its armed struggle, the movement was devoting considerable effort to the health, education, social welfare and economic development of its people. The Mozambique Institute, in particular, was a great monument to the self-sacrifice of a group of dedicated men and women and to the heroism of the Mozambique people. He earnestly hoped that the

liberation movement would receive all the aid it so richly deserved.

983. The fight waged by PAIGC appeared to be well on the way to achieving complete success, in which connexion the invitation extended by that movement to the Special Committee to visit the liberated areas was most noteworthy.

984. While fully recognizing the achievements of those liberation movements, he did not wish to discount the gravity of the problems involved. The nationalists were faced with a highly complex military and economic machine which Portugal had succeeded in building up to continue its exploitation of the natural and human resources of the Territories it controlled. It hoped that, by keeping the population at large in abject poverty and ignorance and by denying it the most elementary facilities for social development, it could be able to perpetuate its ruthless domination. In view of Iran's dedication to the cause of peace through justice, he took a most serious view of the situation and firmly believed that the social and economic ills inflicted by Portugal had to be eradicated so that the people of those Territories could enjoy their freedom and independence.

985. In that connexion, he drew the Special Committee's attention to a review of the book *The White Revolution* by His Imperial Majesty Shahanshah Aryamehr printed in the *Sunday News* of the United Republic of Tanzania on 18 June 1967. The author of the review had stated that the Shah felt that the only battles still worth fighting were those against ignorance, poverty and hunger and against social, economic and racial discrimination. Those words could fittingly be applied to the situation in the Territories under Portuguese administration where all those ills persisted.

#### D. Action taken by the Special Committee

##### 1. Consensus adopted by the Special Committee concerning the question of refugees from Territories under Portuguese administration

986. At its 518th meeting, the Special Committee adopted, as its consensus, a statement made by the Chairman concerning refugees from the Territories under Portuguese administration.

987. The text of the consensus adopted by the Special Committee at its 518th meeting on 1 June 1967 reads as follows:

"Since 1965 the General Assembly and the Special Committee have adopted five resolutions in which, among other things, they requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and other international relief organizations and the specialized agencies concerned to increase their assistance to refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered from military operations in those Territories. The first of these requests was contained in operative paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX) of 21 December 1965, and similar requests were subsequently made by the Special Committee in a resolution adopted on 22 June 1966 during its meetings in Africa (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619), and again by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966.

"The Committee notes with appreciation that the High Commissioner for Refugees has responded to

the above appeals by making some increases in the allocations for refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination, including provision for educational assistance.

"The Committee has nonetheless been deeply concerned by the statements of the petitioners concerning the insufficiency of the assistance which they are receiving from the specialized agencies of the United Nations and particularly of their great and urgent need for direct assistance in the fields of education and health. It accordingly expresses its regret that the specialized agencies have not yet to the knowledge of the Committee responded to the repeated appeals of the Committee and the General Assembly. The Committee therefore appeals to the specialized agencies and invites the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to make every effort urgently to intensify assistance to the above-mentioned refugees in consultation with the Organization of African Unity and through it with the national liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese domination."

##### 2. Adoption of resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration

988. At the 538th meeting, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia submitted a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413).

989. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of the sponsors, the representative of Tunisia said that the text incorporated the substance of the statements and testimony which had been heard. The sponsors of the draft resolution urged Portugal to apply without delay resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions. They requested all the great Powers to desist from giving the Portuguese Government any military or financial assistance whatsoever. They urgently recommended that the Security Council should take the necessary measures for the application of its resolutions and those of the General Assembly; finally, they appealed to all the specialized agencies to refrain, in the present circumstances, from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance. Those were the main features of the draft resolution which he had been asked to submit to the Special Committee. He hoped that all members of the Committee would support it.

990. The representative of India said that he supported the draft resolution. Its text was self-explanatory and most of its provisions had been included in previous resolutions adopted either by the Special Committee or by the General Assembly. The sponsors expected and hoped that all members would agree with the reasoning which had led them to draft it in its present form. He wished to emphasize two particular provisions: the first was operative paragraph 4, concerning Portugal's policy of settling foreign immigrants in the Territories and exporting African workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, which was a matter of grave concern to all the sponsors, because of its harmful effects on the living conditions of the African population. The second was the tremendous responsibility borne by Portugal's powerful friends and allies which was covered by paragraph 6. If Portugal's friends and allies realized their responsibility in the matter and decided to co-operate

to the full in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions, it would be almost impossible for Portugal to continue its oppressive measures. He therefore appealed to all countries to respect the spirit of the resolutions and not hide behind the legalistic argument that the General Assembly's recommendations were not mandatory. He added his own appeal to that of the Tunisian delegation that all members should take those factors into account and vote in favour of the draft resolution.

991. The representative of Chile said that, although he had not had sufficient time to examine the draft resolution in detail, it appeared at first sight to be one for which his delegation would be prepared to vote. He had, unfortunately, to leave the Special Committee very shortly and might not, therefore, be present when the vote was taken.

992. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation felt that the draft resolution was an objective summary and a step towards the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

993. The representative of Yugoslavia said that his delegation believed that the draft resolution reflected the views expressed by the majority of Special Committee members and by the petitioners. It therefore hoped that the majority of delegations would give it their full support.

994. The representative of Ethiopia said that, though his delegation believed that Portugal was intransigent, it was prepared to support the draft resolution which was yet another appeal to Portugal to grant to the people under its administration their inalienable right. His delegation supported every paragraph of the draft resolution.

995. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Special Committee was aware that Salazar was using the military bases and installations in the Territories under Portuguese domination to maintain his sway in those Territories, to kill Africans and to commit acts of aggression against the neighbouring free countries of Africa. The Committee should therefore include in the text of the draft resolution a provision denouncing that violation of the decisions of the United Nations concerning the establishment of bases in colonial Territories, for there was no question that Portugal was using its bases to exert pressure on neighbouring African States and to oppress the colonized peoples.

996. The draft resolution submitted by the Tunisian representative on behalf of the Afro-Asian countries and Yugoslavia took due account of the information gathered by the Special Committee in the course of its present session. However, some of its provisions might well be strengthened and made more complete. He was thinking in particular of operative paragraph 6, in which the Committee once again requested all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in NATO, to take certain measures. It would surely be appropriate to mention by name in that paragraph all the States which were systematically violating the resolutions of the United Nations. That would help to make the colonial Powers respect the United Nations resolutions concerning the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Such a denunciation should certainly include Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, which were parties to an unholy alliance and which were establishing a bloc of

"White States" on the African continent with a view to perpetuating the rule of the racists over that part of the world. It was impossible to ignore the danger inherent in the actions of the colonialists not only for the peoples of Africa who were struggling for their freedom but also for the newly independent African States, which were directly threatened by those forms of aggression.

997. The wording of the draft resolution was not entirely satisfactory to his delegation. However, since the draft as a whole was in accordance with the interests of the African peoples who were fighting for their independence, his delegation was ready to vote in favour of the text which had been submitted. It wished to assure the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea that it would not waver in its support of them and expressed its conviction that their struggle would lead them to victory.

998. The representative of Italy referred to the position taken by his delegation on a similar resolution adopted by the Special Committee at Algiers during its series of meetings in 1966, and on General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI). It would have no great difficulty in supporting those operative paragraphs of the present draft resolution that contained well-balanced provisions, but had reservations on many other, particularly operative paragraph 4.

999. He recalled the statement he had made on a similar point before the vote had been taken at Kitwe on the resolution concerning Southern Rhodesia (A/AC.109/248). His delegation also had serious reservations concerning operative paragraphs 6 and 8. The provisions of operative paragraph 6 would be tantamount to the imposition of sanctions, an exclusive prerogative of the Security Council. His delegation regretted therefore that it would be compelled to abstain from voting on the draft resolution as a whole.

1000. The representative of Bulgaria said that the draft resolution reflected the main ideas expressed during the Special Committee's discussions of the problem. First, there had been almost unanimous condemnation of Portuguese colonial policy as a crime against humanity, a definition—using a term first employed by the Nuremberg tribunal—that correctly compared Portugal's colonial crimes with the crimes committed by Nazi Germany during the Second World War. The Committee and the General Assembly should follow new lines of action on the basis of that condemnation, for instance, by appealing to governmental and non-governmental organizations to disseminate the truth about Portuguese activity and to mobilize their members for a world-wide moral boycott.

1001. The second main feature of the draft resolution was that it reflected the almost unanimous opinion that the assistance given by NATO States, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany, was the main reason for Portugal's stubborn and provocative attitude.

1002. Operative paragraph 3 condemned the activities of United States and West European monopolies and financial interests that exploited the human and material resources of the Territories and impeded progress towards independence. A complete list of those financial interests on which the petitioners had supplied valuable information should be furnished. The forthcoming discussion in the General Assembly would provide an opportunity to denounce once again the

pernicious role of the international monopolies that were the backbone of Portuguese colonialism, and to reveal the hypocrisy of the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany and other Western Powers that took an active part in the exploitation of natural and human resources in the Portuguese colonies.

1003. The third main idea was the legitimacy of the fight for national liberation waged by the people in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). The ninth preambular paragraph developed that idea further by noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements, both in their fight and in their reconstruction programme. The reference to the great work done by those movements in the liberated areas was significant. The same paragraph expressed the opinion of the majority of Member States that the armed struggle was the main weapon for achieving independence. The reference to the reconstruction programmes, made for the first time in a United Nations resolution, expressed appreciation of the constructive work of the liberation movements in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea (Bissau), and the paragraph expressed the willingness of the United Nations to assist them. That willingness was reflected in several paragraphs dealing with the role of the specialized agencies. The forthcoming session of the General Assembly would afford an opportunity to address further recommendations to the specialized agencies calling on them to render effective assistance to the national liberation movements. Account should be taken of the requests made by the FRELIMO and MPLA representatives for action by UNESCO, WHO, UNICEF and other bodies.

1004. The draft resolution appealed to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to desist from assisting Portugal and thereby contravening United Nations decisions. They should be told that there was no legal ground that permitted them to disregard United Nations decisions. Having condemned the financial interests operating in the Territories dominated by Portugal, the United Nations could not allow those interests to assist that country through two of its agencies.

1005. The representative of Finland recalled that the question under discussion had been the subject of considerable debate in the Special Committee, the General Assembly and the Security Council. In spite of numerous resolutions calling upon Portugal to cooperate with the United Nations, no progress towards self-determination for the peoples of the Territories could be discerned. Portugal had stubbornly refused to comply, and there was no indication that it intended to modify its policy.

1006. Finland was strongly opposed to all forms of colonial rule and had strictly complied with Security Council resolution 218 (1965). It had not offered and had no intention of offering any assistance to the Portuguese Government to continue its repression of the people of the Territories, and it had taken all necessary measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms for the purpose.

1007. His delegation had sympathized with the intention of the draft resolution, believing strongly that the people of the Territories should have the right to decide their own future. It could not, however, support all the measures proposed.

1008. In accordance with its well-known and unreserved support for the United Nations, it had the greatest respect for the Charter, which should be the principal basis for all the Special Committee's actions, and it would be unable to support any recommendation inconsistent with the Charter. It firmly believed that, under the Charter, only the Security Council was competent to determine what constituted a threat to peace and security. His delegation therefore regretted that it was unable to support the draft resolution and would abstain from voting. It did not believe, however, that all possibilities for arriving at a peaceful solution that would enable the peoples of the Territories to exercise their right to self-determination had been exhausted.

1009. His delegation had been impressed by the serious approach of some of the petitioners to the problem and complimented them particularly on their humanitarian, educational and social achievements.

1010. The representative of the United States of America said that it should be clear from previous statements which he had made that the United States, while adhering to its basic aim of self-determination for the people of the Territories, would not be in a position to support the draft resolution. Its difficulties were largely identical with those applying to previous similar drafts and they had already been explained at length during earlier votes on the subject. Fundamentally, it believed that the Portuguese Government must accept the responsibility for its policies in Africa. The heavy emphasis placed in the draft resolution on the possible effect of foreign factors was, in his delegation's view, unwarranted, particularly in the light of the firm and effective prohibition by the United States of the export of arms for use in the Territories. His delegation's reservations applied in particular to the paragraphs relating to the supply of arms and military equipment and also to those on the supposed activities and influence of foreign economic and financial interests. A further objection was that the draft resolution seemed to encroach in several respects on responsibilities that properly belonged to the Security Council.

1011. Finally, the United States could not support any steps that would violate the statutory responsibilities of the IBRD and other specialized agencies, and was opposed to any infringement of their prerogatives and autonomies as set forth in the agreements for their establishment.

1012. In view of those reservations, his delegation regretted that it would be compelled to vote against the draft resolution. His Government continued, however, to support the view expressed in it that the people of the Territories were entitled to the full and free exercise of the right of self-determination and independence, and would continue to oppose by all legitimate and practical means any limitation of that right, so basic to the political and social evolution of all mankind.

1013. The representative of Australia said that his delegation, while respecting the motives of the sponsors of the draft resolution, considered that one couched in terms of reason and persuasion might have been more effective. The last four paragraphs of the preamble did not justify or sustain the operative paragraphs that followed. Operative paragraph 3 made no attempt to differentiate between those commercial interests that exploited human and material resources and those that

did not. No one could deny the positive contribution of overseas investment to the exploitation, in the widest technical sense, of the natural resources of developing countries. Australia could not have reached its present stage of development without the assistance of overseas investors.

1014. Operative paragraph 4 was unacceptable on legal grounds, while operative paragraph 6 could usurp the authority of the Security Council. If the Special Committee were to adopt a resolution in terms so severe and critical not only of Portugal but also of other unnamed States, it would be likely to defeat its own purposes.

1015. The representative of Iran said that in line with the policy laid down by his sovereign, he considered that everyone, and particularly those Governments which were supporting the Portuguese colonial régime, should make continuing and co-ordinated efforts to bring down that economic and military structure in order that the peoples involved might be liberated. In that way the explosive situation resulting from Portugal's colonial policy could be averted. The primary objective of the draft resolution, of which his delegation was a sponsor, was to liberate the peoples under Portuguese domination by precisely such collective action. He earnestly hoped that, despite their differences in approach, all members would find it possible to vote for the draft resolution and so help to end Portuguese rule in Africa. The draft resolution also called upon the specialized agencies to play their part in the collective effort. He strongly urged the agencies concerned to do their utmost to assist the liberation movements.

1016. Although the international community should do all in its power to consolidate its efforts to overthrow Portuguese rule, it should be emphasized that the peoples of the Territories themselves should play their part and redouble their efforts.

1017. Finally, he reiterated the full, unflagging and unreserved support of his country for the liberation movements in the Territories under Portuguese administration.

1018. The representative of Venezuela suggested that the phrase "which is likely to constitute a threat to international peace and security" should be inserted in operative paragraph 7.

1019. His delegation had already stated the reasons why it could not accept the wording of operative paragraph 4, which reproduced the wording of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI), operative paragraph 3. The same considerations applied to operative paragraphs 6, 8 and 10. He therefore requested that paragraphs 4, 6, 8 and 10 should be voted on separately.

1020. His delegation also had reservations concerning operative paragraph 7 for it considered that in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, only the Security Council was competent to determine what acts constituted "acts of aggression".

1021. The representative of Poland said that the draft resolution, especially operative paragraph 6, reflected the views of the Polish delegation. With regard to operative paragraph 12, his delegation believed that the Special Committee could be of great assistance to the Secretary-General in his efforts to publicize the work of the United Nations concerning the question of Territories under Portuguese domination. He suggested that the words "...in consultation with the

Special Committee", should be inserted after "Secretary-General", in the first line of the paragraph.

1022. The representative of Tunisia, speaking on behalf of all the sponsors of the draft resolution, said that they were ready to accept the amendment proposed by the representative of Poland.

1023. At its 541st meeting, the Special Committee voted on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413), as orally revised, as follows:

(a) Operative paragraph 4 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Venezuela.

(b) Operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Australia, Finland, Venezuela.

(c) Operative paragraph 8 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 4, with 1 abstention, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Finland, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Venezuela.

(d) Operative paragraph 10 of the draft resolution was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 3, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, Italy, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Venezuela.

(e) The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.413) as a whole, as orally revised, was adopted by a roll-call vote of 17 to 2, with 2 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Italy.

1024. The text of the resolution on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251), adopted by the Special Committee at its 541st meeting on 20 June 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having examined the question of Territories under Portuguese domination,*

*"Having heard the statements of the petitioners,*

*"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Recalling also all the relevant resolutions concerning the Territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Deeply disturbed at the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions,*

*"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening international peace and security owing to the methods of oppression which continue to be used against the African peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination,*

*"Noting once more with deep concern that the activities of the foreign economic and financial interests in those Territories are being pursued as intensively as ever and continue to impede the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the African people,*

*"Noting further with deep concern that Portugal continues to receive aid and weapons from its military allies which it uses against the population of these Territories,*

*"Noting with satisfaction the progress towards national independence and freedom made by the liberation movements both by struggle and by a reconstruction programme,*

*"1. Reaffirms once again the inalienable right of the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination to achieve freedom and independence, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and the legitimacy of their struggle to achieve the enjoyment of this right;*

*"2. Strongly condemns the negative attitude of Portugal and its obstinate refusal to implement the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council, and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;*

*"3. Further condemns the activities of the financial interests operating in the Territories under Portuguese domination which exploit the human and material resources of the Territories and impede the progress of their people towards freedom and independence;*

*"4. Condemns as a crime against humanity, the policy of the Government of Portugal, which violates the economic and political rights of the indigenous population by the settlement of foreign immigrants in the Territories and by the exporting of African workers to South Africa;*

*"5. Urges Portugal to apply without delay the principle of self-determination to the peoples of the*

Territories under its domination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the relevant Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and calls upon it in particular to take the following action:

(a) To recognize forthwith the right of the peoples under its domination to self-determination and independence;

(b) To desist forthwith from all acts of repression and to withdraw all the military and other forces which it is using for that purpose;

(c) To proclaim an unconditional political amnesty and create the conditions which will enable authority to be transferred to freely elected institutions representative of the populations, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

*"6. Requests once again all States, particularly the military allies of Portugal in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), to take the following measures:*

(a) To desist forthwith from giving the Portuguese Government any assistance which enables it to continue its repression of the African people in the Territories under its domination;

(b) To take all necessary measures to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese Government;

(c) To stop the sale or shipment to the Portuguese Government of equipment and materials for the manufacture or maintenance of weapons and ammunition;

(d) To take the necessary measures to put an end to the activities referred to in operative paragraph 3 above;

*"7. Draws the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border its colonies;*

*"8. Urgently recommends that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning this question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965 and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966;*

*"9. Appeals again to all States to grant the peoples of the Territories under Portuguese domination the moral and material assistance necessary for the restoration of their inalienable rights, and to prevent their nationals from co-operating with the Portuguese authorities, particularly so far as investments in the Territories are concerned;*

*"10. Appeals once again to all the specialized agencies, in particular to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to refrain from granting Portugal any financial, economic or technical assistance as long as the Government of Portugal fails to implement General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);*

*"11. Expresses its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the help they have so far given, and requests them, in co-operation with the Organiza-*



tion of African Unity (OAU) and through it with the national liberation movements, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to those who have suffered and are still suffering from the military operations;

"12. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee, to promote, through the various United Nations bodies and agencies, the widespread and continuous publicizing of the work of the United Nations concerning this question, so that world opinion may be sufficiently aware of the situation in the Territories under Portuguese domination and of the continuing struggle waged by the peoples of these Territories for their liberation;

"13. *Requests* the Secretary-General to enter into consultations with the specialized agencies referred to in operative paragraph 10 of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee;

"14. *Decides* to maintain the question of Territories under Portuguese administration on its agenda."

1025. The text of the resolution was transmitted to the President of the Security Council on 20 June 1967.<sup>146</sup>

#### ANNEX\*

#### Territories under Portuguese administration: Question of refugees

##### Note by the Secretariat

#### I. ACTION TAKEN BY THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. During its visit to Africa, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on 22 June 1966 in which, among other provisions,

<sup>146</sup> *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for April, May and June 1967, document S/8023.*

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/AC.109/L.417.

it requested "the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and other international relief organizations to increase, in co-operation with the liberation movements of all the Territories under colonial domination, their assistance to the refugees of these Territories".<sup>a</sup>

2. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly, after having considered the report of the Special Committee on the question of Territories under Portuguese administration, adopted resolution 2184 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, in which it expressed its appreciation to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies concerned and other international relief organizations for the aid they have extended so far, and requested them "in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to increase their assistance to the refugees from the Territories under Portuguese domination and to the people who have suffered and are still suffering owing to military operations".

3. The following information on the assistance provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to refugees from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, has been summarized from the report of the High Commissioner to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, the UNHCR programme for 1967 (A/AC.96/342) and the report on UNHCR current operations in 1966 (A/AC.96/364). Information on UNHCR assistance to refugees in Macau is contained in the background paper on that Territory (see section 7 of this chapter).

#### II. REFUGEE SITUATION AND MEASURES TAKEN

4. During 1966, the flow of refugees from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, into neighbouring countries continued and by the end of the year the number assisted by the UNHCR had risen by another 100,000, that is, from 284,700 in 1965 to 385,600. The principal new influxes were from Angola into the Democratic Republic of the Congo and from Angola and Mozambique into Zambia. The following table shows the distribution of refugees in the four main countries of asylum.

<sup>a</sup> A/6300/Rev.1, chap. II, para. 619.

NUMBER OF REFUGEES FROM TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION SUBJECT TO UNHCR PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

Territory of origin	Country of asylum	At 31 December 1965	At 31 December 1966	
		Number	Number	Number who received rations
Angola	Congo (Democratic Republic of) .....	220,000 <sup>a</sup>	300,000 <sup>a</sup>	10,000
	Zambia .....		3,800	3,700
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	Senegal .....	50,000	61,000	21,000
	United Republic of Tanzania	14,700	19,000	16,000
Mozambique	Zambia .....		1,800	1,300
	TOTAL	284,700	385,600	52,000

Source: Report on UNHCR Current Operation in 1966 (A/AC.96/364) *passim*.

<sup>a</sup> According to the UNHCR, there were 270,000 Angolan refugees as at 1 January 1966 and during the year 30,000 more arrived. As reported previously (A/AC.109/L.293), the host Government puts the total number of Angolan refugees at 600,000.

5. Under the UNHCR proposed programme for 1967, global allocations amounted to \$US4.6 million as compared with \$3.5 million for 1966. UNHCR proposed allocations<sup>b</sup> for refugees

<sup>b</sup> As submitted to the sixteenth session of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme, held in October 1966.

from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, and Cape Verde amount to \$683,500 as compared with \$502,550 in 1966, which represents an increase of more than 35 per cent. The separate proposed allocations are shown in the table below. Details of the settlement programmes in the host countries are summarized in the following sections.

UNHCR 1967 ALLOCATIONS FOR REFUGEES FROM TERRITORIES  
UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

(United States dollars)

Refugees from	Country of asylum	UNHCR alloc- ation for 1967
Angola	Congo (Democratic Republic of)	50,000 <sup>a</sup>
Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea	Senegal .....	140,000
Mozambique	United Republic of Tanzania ....	172,900 <sup>b</sup>
Angola and Mozambique	Zambia .....	310,600
TOTAL		673,500

Source: UNHCR Programme for 1967 (A/AC.96/342)  
*passim*.

<sup>a</sup> This allocation includes also funds for the long-term settle-  
ment of other refugees besides those from Angola.

<sup>b</sup> \$127,300 for Lundo and \$45,600 for Rutamba (see para. 14  
below).

A. Refugees from Angola in the Democratic Republic  
of the Congo

6. During 1966, the number of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo increased by some 30,000, mainly into Katanga near Dilolo and in the Lower Congo region, where most of them passed through the reception centre at Songololo and at Kibentele in the east. Towards the end of the year, the influx had slowed considerably. Emergency assistance in the form of food and clothing was provided by two voluntary agencies to the newly arrived refugees and no UNHCR contribution was involved.

7. According to the reports of the UNHCR, the settlement of Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has continued on the same basis as in past years with assistance provided mainly from voluntary agencies (including the Protestant Mutual Aid, Caritas Congo, the Danish Council for Refugees and the League of Red Cross Societies). This aid, together with favourable local conditions, has made it possible for the majority of refugees to reach a minimum subsistence level about one year after leaving the reception centre.

8. Assistance from UNHCR sources to Angolan refugees in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to be of a

marginal character. During 1966, the Kimpese Agricultural and Vocational Training Centre, set up by the Congolese Protestant Relief Agency, was completed. The UNHCR has contributed \$20,000 to this project which was supplemented by a donation of \$13,565 from the Swedish Government. In July 1966, the UNHCR contributed \$33,000 towards projects aimed at training or settling on the land Angolan refugees now at Kinshasa, Matadi and other cities.

9. An allocation of \$50,000 has been made to assist measures by the Congolese Government, the ILO and other voluntary agencies, and it is hoped to complete the long-term settlement of the Angolan and other refugees who still need help.

B. Refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic  
of Tanzania

10. The UNHCR reports that as at 1 January 1966 there were about 12,000 refugees from Mozambique in the United Republic of Tanzania. During 1966, there was a further influx of some 7,000 refugees from that Territory, mainly in the areas of Mbamba Bay and Muhukuru in south-western Tanzania. As a result, the Tanzanian Government has decided to establish two new rural settlements, one for about 6,000 refugees at Muhukuru and another at Lundo, about twelve miles north of Mbamba Bay. At the same time, the settlement of Butamba has been modified, as only 6,000 refugees are now living there instead of the 10,000 as originally planned.

11. *Muhukuru settlement.* During 1966, the UNHCR allocated \$25,000 from the Emergency Fund for the Mozambique refugees at Muhukuru and \$10,729 for those at Lundo for temporary relief prior to their settlement on the land. The World Food Programme provided food, the Lutheran World Federation/Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service provided tools, seeds, vehicles and help towards the construction of buildings, and OXFAM contributed \$4,200. By the end of 1966, some 2,500 refugees had moved into the new settlement and others were coming in from surrounding areas.

12. *Lundo settlement.* The Government has drawn up a three-year programme for settling some 4,000 Mozambique refugees at Lundo. In 1966, the UNHCR approved an allocation of \$70,000 for this project, and of this, \$25,000 was made available in October to start the programme. By the end of 1966, the Government had surveyed and marked most of the land to be allocated to refugees who will receive three to five acres for each family of five which will enable them to become self-supporting.

13. For 1967, the UNHCR had allocated \$127,300 for this settlement. This is part of the three-year programme which is being financed as follows:

Source	In United States dollars (round figures)			Total
	1966 July- December	1967	1968 January- June	
Tanzanian Government .....	1,800	3,800	2,000	7,600
World Food Programme .....	10,000	87,500	77,500	175,000
Lutheran World Federation (in cash) Tanganyika Christian Refugee Ser- vice (in kind) .....	16,250	20,000	8,750	45,000
Other sources .....	3,750	5,000	1,250	10,000
UNHCR .....	9,000	22,000	7,000	38,000
	70,000	127,300	27,800	225,100
	110,800	265,600	124,300	500,700

14. *Rutamba settlement.* As the number of refugees at Rutamba is less than generally planned, the UNHCR 1966 allocation of \$192,550 was reduced to \$125,060. This amount has been fully disbursed. About 1,800 acres of the original target of 2,000 acres have now been cleared and plots have been allocated. It was expected that, after the April harvest

in 1967, it would be able to reduce the food rations provided by the World Food Programme. The UNHCR has allocated \$45,600 for this project in 1967, which brings its total allocation for Angolan and Mozambique refugees to \$172,900. The 1967 financing of the Rutamba settlement is shown below:

<i>Source</i>	<i>U. S. dollars</i>
Tanzanian Government .....	11,810
World Food Programme (in kind) .....	100,500
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service:	
In cash .....	43,760
In kind .....	15,000
UNHCR .....	45,600
TOTAL	216,670

### C. Refugees from Angola and Mozambique in Zambia

15. The UNHCR reports that as at 1 January 1966 there were an estimated 5,700 refugees in Zambia, which included 5,000 from Mozambique and 100 from Angola. During 1966, there were some 5,585 new arrivals and about 5,000 were voluntarily repatriated. The largest influx was from Angola and by the end of the year out of the 6,285 refugees in Zambia, 3,800 were from Angola and 1,800 from Mozambique. The Zambian Government plans to settle the refugees from Mozambique at Nyimba and those from Angola at Lwatembo.

16. *Nyimba settlement.* Under the original plan it was intended to settle some 2,000 refugees from Mozambique at Nyimba and \$114,200 was approved by the UNHCR from the 1966 programme for this purpose. With the expectation that the refugees would be able to become self-supporting by mid-1967, a further contribution of \$16,550 was to be made for this year. However, owing to the voluntary repatriation of some refugees and the arrival of others, progress of the settlement has been delayed, and the original allocations have been readjusted to carry over into mid-1968, when it is hoped the settlement will be self-supporting. The UNHCR will contribute a total of \$160,080 as follows: \$92,080 for 1966; \$49,100 for 1967 and \$18,900 from 1 January to 30 June 1968. The Zambian Government will contribute a total of \$95,503 and the World Food Programme a total of \$186,067.

17. *Lwatembo settlement of Angolan refugees.* Refugees from Angola began entering the Valovale district in Zambia in May and June 1966 and by the end of June numbered over 2,000. An emergency plan was drawn up by the Zambian Government for the period 1 June to 31 December 1966 at a cost of \$115,600 and towards this the UNHCR contributed \$28,000 from the Emergency Fund.

18. As the refugees do not wish to return to Angola, the Zambian Government plans to settle them at Lwatembo. This settlement project is expected to be completed by mid-1968 and includes land clearance, agricultural development, the provision

of medical and educational requirements, village establishment and basic needs such as food and clothing.

19. The UNHCR contribution for 1967 amounts to \$251,500. The over-all project is to be financed as follows:

<i>Source</i>	<i>1967</i>	<i>1968</i>	<i>Total</i>
		<i>1 January- 30 June</i>	
Zambian Government ...	34,680	(United States dollars) 4,645	39,325
World Food Programme	81,310	40,655	121,965
Zambian Red Cross ....	14,560	11,760	26,320
UNHCR/other sources..	251,500	28,500	280,000

### D. Refugees from Guinea, called Portuguese Guinea, in Senegal

20. During 1966, the influx of new refugees continued and by June they numbered approximately 56,700 and by December, 61,500, as compared with 50,000 at the end of 1965. Of the refugees who arrived between 1962 and the end of 1965, 20,000 were settled under the 1964/1965 programmes; the 1966 programme was expected to assist another 20,000 and the 1967 programme the settlement of the recently arrived 20,000.

21. The Senegal Government's current programme for the settlement of refugees in Cassamance Province aims at providing emergency relief to new arrivals, the transfer of certain groups away from the border area and further measures to integrate the entire refugee population, including the earlier arrivals. Towards this scheme, the UNHCR proposes to allocate \$123,650 which will be used as follows: food distribution, \$32,000; health services, \$14,000; education, \$40,000; transfer of refugees, \$5,000; tools, seeds and fertilizers \$8,000; wells and bridges \$21,650, and transport and community development \$3,000. In addition, the UNHCR will allocate \$10,500 for assistance to the over 1,200 refugees in Dakar and provide \$5,850 for a contingency fund.

22. The value of current 1963-1966 UNHCR refugee projects in Senegal amounts to \$2,125,571 of which \$425,571 is from the UNHCR and \$1,700,000 from other supporting contributions. The UNHCR contribution is reported to represent only a fraction of the total cost of the land settlement programme. The Government of Senegal, the League of Red Cross Societies, the United States Government, Catholic Relief Services and the local population have also contributed cash or services. The estimated value of the land alone provided by the Senegal Government at five acres to each family of six amounts to \$2,143,000. The food donated by the United States Government is estimated at \$245,000 and the contribution of the League of Red Cross Societies at \$55,500.

## CHAPTER VI\*

### ADEN

#### A. Action taken by the Special Committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session

1. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its meetings in 1966. On 22 March 1966, the Special Committee, acting on certain petitions from Aden, adopted a resolution whereby it deplored the action of the administering Power in effecting mass arrests of the Adeni people and called upon it to desist from these acts and cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory. The Sub-Committee on Aden submitted a report (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>1</sup> chap. VI, annex II) to the Special Committee on 18 May 1966. Following its consideration of the report, the Special

Committee decided to approve it and endorsed the recommendations contained therein.

2. On 15 June, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Aden in which it deplored the setting-up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, reaffirmed the view that the responsibilities of the administering Power could not be circumvented through any action by such a régime and deplored any defence arrangement that the Government of the United Kingdom might enter into with that régime. The Special Committee appealed to all States not to recognize independence that was not based on the wishes of the people freely expressed through elections under universal suffrage and called upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.4 and Corr.1.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

its acceptance of relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay. Reiterating previous conclusions and recommendations, the Special Committee again drew the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area. It requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections.

3. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly considered the report of the Special Committee covering its work in 1966 (*ibid.*, chap. VI) and heard petitioners from Aden. On 12 December it adopted resolution 2183 (XXI).

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

4. On 23 February 1967, in accordance with the above resolution, the Secretary-General appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden as follows:

Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela), Chairman; Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi (Afghanistan); and Mr. Moussa Leo Keita (Mali).

5. According to the terms of this resolution, the Special Mission on Aden is required to submit a report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee.

## B. Information on the Territory<sup>2</sup>

### *Political and constitutional developments*

#### *Constitution*

6. Aden Colony had its first legislative election in 1955; four members of an otherwise nominated Legislative Council were elected. In 1959, the Legislative Council was reorganized to include twelve elected members and eleven nominated and *ex officio* members. The Governor was assisted by a ten-member Executive Council. In the Aden Protectorate, the affairs of state and government were conducted by the traditional rulers with the advice of British resident advisers and political officers responsible to the Governor in Aden.

7. In February 1959, six States of the Western Protectorate joined in a "Federation of Arab Emirates of the South" with which the United Kingdom signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Protection. The Federation had a legislative body, the Federal Council, and an executive body of ministers, the Supreme Council. In 1962 the Federation was renamed "Federation of South Arabia", and by the end of that same year five more States had joined the Federation.

8. A new Constitution for Aden State came into force on 18 January 1963. Simultaneously Aden (ex-

cluding Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands) joined the Federation, thus raising the number of States to twelve. The Aden Constitution provided for a Legislative Council composed of a speaker, sixteen elected members, six nominated members and the Attorney-General, the Executive Council was replaced by a Council of Ministers, and the Governor's title was changed to that of High Commissioner.

9. Since 1963, five more States have joined the Federation. Under the amended Federal Constitution, each State is free to select its representatives in the Federal Council by whatever means it considers appropriate. Each State has six representatives, with the exception of Aden, which has twenty-four, and four smaller sheikhdoms with three, two or one representative each. The total number of representatives is 103. The Supreme Council consists of twelve ministers elected by and from the representatives in the Federal Council, each State being allotted one ministerial post for every six representatives. The chairmanship of the Supreme Council is held by ministers in rotation.

10. In June and July 1964 a constitutional conference was held in London and was attended by ministers of the Federation and of Aden State, as well as by delegates of States not in the Federation. The conference decided, among other things, to recommend the granting of independence to the Territory not later than 1968. On 7 December 1964 the Federal Supreme Council and the Aden Council of Ministers announced that they had agreed on the creation of a unitary sovereign State in South Arabia. On 12 August 1965, a supplementary treaty between the United Kingdom and the Federation of South Arabia was signed whereby the Federation's obligation to accept British advice was restricted to matters concerning external affairs, defence and the public service. In Aden State, the authority of the High Commissioner prevailed in matters of internal security as well.

11. The last Aden election was held in October 1964 but was boycotted by the main political parties. In March 1965, the leader of the Opposition in the Legislative Council, Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, was appointed Chief Minister and formed the Government. On 25 September, however, the United Kingdom Government suspended the Aden Constitution and Mr. Mackawee's Government was dismissed. Since then Aden has been administered directly by the Office of the High Commissioner.

12. At the request of the Government of the Federation, two British experts visited the Territory during 1965 and subsequently drafted constitutional proposals for an independent South Arabia. The United Kingdom, on behalf of the Government of the Federation, requested the transmission of these proposals to all permanent missions to the United Nations.

#### *Postponement of the August 1966 conference*

13. It will be recalled that in May 1966 the Government of the Federation of South Arabia announced its acceptance of the United Nations resolutions and decided to convene a conference of all South Arabian States and political groups to consider ways and means whereby the resolutions would be implemented (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VI, annexes I, III and IV). Invitations were addressed to the States not members of the

<sup>2</sup> The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 6 July 1966, for the year 1965.

Federation and to various political groups to attend the conference on 1 August 1966. Similarly a request was made to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for an observer to attend the conference. In June, however, the Qa'iti and Kathiri Sultanates rejected the invitation to attend the conference. In a letter to the Chairman of the Supreme Council, the ruler of Qa'iti stated that the Federal Government was not the party to call for such a conference because the United Nations resolution had been directed to the United Kingdom for implementation. A suitable atmosphere must first be introduced by lifting the state of emergency, freeing political detainees and establishing an effective United Nations presence. On 17 July, the South Arabian League (SAL) rejected participation in the conference and stated that the United Kingdom should have made an explicit declaration of acceptance of the United Nations resolutions. All governments and political parties and organizations in the area should enter into preparatory talks in order to determine and unify their stand as to the means, procedures and stages of implementing the United Nations resolutions. At the same time, the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) declared that the conference would not support the national aspirations of the people and that the people would fight all imperialist plans. On 19 July, the Supreme Council of the Federation announced that the conference would be postponed.

#### *Federal Council*

14. On 10 August 1966, the Federal Council opened its session with the participation of twenty-two representatives from Aden out of a total quota of twenty-four. Eighteen of these representatives had just been appointed by the High Commissioner to replace members who resigned in July 1965 in protest against the sending of a constitutional commission to Aden. The newly appointed members were reported to have agreed among themselves not to discuss in the Federal Council any questions relating to the future of the Territory; such questions were to be left for a national government, representing the people of Aden, to deal with. They were also reported to have asked the High Commissioner to form such a government and to create a national guard for Aden similar to the guards in other States of the Federation.

15. On 19 August 1966, one of the newly appointed members of the Federal Council, Mr. Ahmad A. Basendwah, was assassinated in Aden.

#### *Informal talks between certain opposition leaders and ministers of the Federation of South Arabia*

16. In July 1966, a delegation of six ministers of the Federation of South Arabia met in Beirut with leaders of SAL and two politicians who had previously belonged to FLOSY, namely Mr. Ahmad Al-Fadhli and Mr. Je'bal bin Hussein Al Audhali. Among other things, the conferees reportedly "viewed with concern secessionist attempts being made in some parts of the South" and affirmed their determination to realize the unity of South Arabia. The meeting also agreed that the cases against all political exiles should be dismissed and that steps would be taken to allow them to return to Aden. Immediately following these talks, Mr. Al-Fadhli and Mr. Al Audhali returned to the Territory.

17. Another round of talks was held in Beirut early in October 1966. In addition to those representatives

who had participated in the earlier talks, the ruler of Beihan State, Sharif Hussein Al-Habili, the exiled Sultan of Lahej, Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim and a number of exiled tribal leaders were present; the Sultan of Kathiri was reported also to have joined in the talks. The Federal Ministers reportedly sought to obtain opposition agreement on the establishment of a presidential system to replace the present governmental structure before independence. However, the meeting failed to produce any agreement on these proposals. The League stated that it could negotiate with the Government on the basis of two points: (a) there must be a sincere willingness to submit to the will of the people; and (b) the purpose of any conference that was held should be to draw up a detailed plan for bringing about the unity, independence and sovereignty of the Territory.

#### *Nationalist organizations*

18. The formation by FLOSY of a National Council representing freedom fighters and civilian sectors from all areas of the Arab South was postponed in July 1966.

19. In Hadhramaut, a political party supporting FLOSY has been active during the past year; it is the Arab Socialist Party whose Secretary-General, Mr. Said Al-Akbary, defined its objectives as being freedom, socialism and union of the Arab South with the North as a step towards complete pan-Arab unity. A new wider group was reportedly formed in Hadhramaut following meetings held in Mukalla, Qa'iti Sultanate, in January 1967. It is the Popular Democratic Front, sponsored by the Arab Socialist Party.

#### *Closing of the border with Yemen*

20. On 22 August 1966, the Government of the Federation of South Arabia ordered the closing of the border with Yemen and a ban was imposed on all trade and travel between the two countries. Over 100 Yemenis residing in Aden were said to have been deported by the Federal authorities. On 29 August 1966, federal security authorities announced that a further group of forty-three Yemeni residents had been deported from various States of the Federation and that more deportations would follow.

21. The border was reopened and normal communications were resumed on 7 December 1966.

#### *Treatment of detainees*

22. The question of the treatment of Aden detainees by the British military authorities was discussed in the Special Committee in October 1966 and in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session. Attention was drawn to a report by Amnesty International, published on 18 October 1966, in which torture was reported to have been inflicted on detainees. It was based on evidence collected by Dr. Salahedin Rastgeldi, a Swedish medical doctor who had visited Aden between 28 July and 4 August, investigated about 300 cases and obtained sworn statements from former prisoners or relatives of people in prison. His report was transmitted to the United Kingdom Government by the Swedish section of Amnesty International.

23. The representative of the United Kingdom stated in the Fourth Committee on 8 November 1966 that before the publication of the report of Amnesty International, the United Kingdom Secretary of State

for Foreign Affairs had sent a special representative to the Territory to examine the procedures for arrest, interrogation and detention and advise whether there were ways in which those procedures could be improved.

24. The representative of the Secretary of State, Mr. Roderic Bowen, visited Aden from 27 October to 8 November 1966. His report was published as a British Government White Paper on 19 December. In a speech to the House on 19 December, the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, stated the following:

"Among Mr. Bowen's recommendations are a number for dealing with complaints by detainees in the future and these recommendations have generally been accepted. Mr. Bowen did not investigate specific allegations of cruelty to prisoners but he has criticized the handling by the Aden Administration of some such allegations in the past. I must emphasize here that his criticism relates to a short period in the past and centres on the activities of three interrogators at that time employed in the Interrogation Centre and the control exercised over their activities. Investigations into these allegations will now be pursued to a conclusion. While these investigations take place I think it right that nothing should be said publicly to prejudice the position of any persons who may be implicated, before they have had an opportunity of giving their own account of what took place to the appropriate authorities."

#### *Developments in Hadhramaut*

25. According to press reports from Hadhramaut, a student demonstration broke out in Saiyun, the capital of Kathiri Sultanate, on 10 September 1966, while the High Commissioner was visiting the area. Shots were fired and several persons were wounded; a member of SAL was later arrested and charged with having fired the shots. On 12 September, a grenade exploded among demonstrating students in Mukalla, Qa'iti Sultanate, as they were protesting the Saiyun incident. One student was killed and many others were wounded. Following those events, a curfew was imposed on Mukalla and communications between Aden and Hadhramaut were cut off. Searches were carried out by the authorities in Mukalla and other towns, arms and ammunition were reported seized, many members of SAL were arrested and all newspapers were closed down. The Sultanate was placed under the control of a military committee appointed by the Qa'iti Minister of State, Mr. Ahmed Al-Attass. The Office of SAL in Aden expressed its regret at the incidents; it accused Mr. Al-Attass of distorting the facts and trying to damage the reputation of the League. It also accused the Arab Socialist Party of Hadhramaut and the Hadhramaut Trade Union Congress of inciting the students against it. On 21 November, a military court in Mukalla began the trial of fifty-six members of the League, eighteen of them *in absentia*.

26. The Sultan of Qa'iti, Awadh bin Saleh, died in October 1966 and was succeeded by his son, Ghaleb bin Awadh. The Minister of State, Mr. Al-Attass, reportedly declared on 20 November that some moderate politicians in Mukalla were working towards the formation of a National Assembly consisting of some thirty members from the six provinces of Qa'iti. The proposed National Assembly would deal with the prob-

lems posed by the impending attainment of independence by the Territory.

27. In April 1967, FLOS Y issued a statement warning against "a conspiracy" to separate Hadhramaut from the rest of the South.

#### *Incidents and demonstrations*

28. In September 1966, the High Commissioner issued an order banning passengers and crews of ships visiting Aden from disembarking or staying ashore during the hours of darkness. The order was issued under the state of emergency regulations. Incidents involving bomb explosions, grenade and gun attacks against British patrols, civilians and military posts and installations have increased in Aden and in other parts of the Federation of South Arabia. During 1966, over 500 incidents were reported to have occurred. Official casualty figures were as follows: 108 killed (including 14 British servicemen and 5 British civilians), and 876 wounded (including 319 British servicemen and 17 British civilians).

29. Beginning May 1967, the families of British military personnel and service-sponsored civilians were to be repatriated at the rate of about 500 persons a week. There are about 2,500 servicemen's families out of a total of 7,000 British families in Aden. According to reports, the evacuation process has recently been hastened owing to the worsening security situation.

30. Frequent general strikes and demonstrations have occurred in Aden. On 19 and 20 January 1967, the 128th anniversary of British occupation, on 11 to 14 February, on the occasion of the anniversary of the establishment of the Federation of South Arabia, and on 28 February and 1 March, following the death of three sons of Mr. A. Q. Mackawee in an explosion at his house, violent demonstrations and totally effective strikes were reported.

#### *Other developments*

31. In February 1967, it was reported that a majority of the States of the Federation of South Arabia had approved a new amended version of the draft constitution prepared by the two British constitutional experts (see para. 12 above). The Federation's Minister for External Affairs visited London and was reported to have asked the United Kingdom Government to guarantee the safety of the Federation after independence. On the other hand, FLOS Y has announced that it would create "a regular army of the revolution" and consider the formation of a government-in-exile.

#### *Economic conditions*

##### *Agriculture and livestock*

32. Arable land is very limited, the Territory consisting essentially of desert and barren mountains. The main agricultural products of the Federation are cotton and cotton seed, sorghum, millet, sesame, dates and vegetables, and some wheat, barley and coffee at the higher altitudes. The sesame seeds are used to produce cooking oil.

33. In 1965, the total acreage of cotton was 58,000 acres, compared with 68,000 acres in 1964. The decrease in acreage was due to the delaying of floods in the *wadis* which serve as dams and irrigation channels. The following table shows the acreage, production and value of principal crops during 1965:

	Area (acres)	Production (tons)	Value (pounds)
Cotton .....	58,000	36,000	2,988,000
Sorghum and millet ..	70,000	26,500	1,060,000
Wheat .....	8,500	4,700	206,800
Barley .....	4,000	3,000	120,000
Sesame .....	3,800	1,100	88,000
Dates .....	12,000	7,500	525,000

34. The livestock population and value was estimated as follows:

	Number	Value (pounds)
Cattle .....	71,000	2,840,000
Sheep and goats .....	4,500,000	18,000,000
Camels .....	194,000	11,640,000
Donkeys .....	44,000	440,000

The production of hides and skins amounted to 9,913 bales valued at £499,500.

35. Approximate expenditure by the Government on agriculture, veterinary services and irrigation services amounted to £304,978 in 1965-1966, as against £215,835 the previous year. In addition, £271,899 was approved for research stations and other capital expenditure under Colonial Development and Welfare schemes. In March 1965, the Government established a central wholesale produce market in Aden to facilitate storage, marketing and other auxiliary services for fruit and vegetable producers of the whole Federation. Funds available to the Agricultural Loans Board were increased from £165,000 to £190,000.

#### Fisheries

36. Fish landings showed a slight increase over the entire coast of South Arabia in 1965: production over the entire coast was 51,902 fresh tons; in the Federation it was 46,540 tons, an increase of 3,000 over the previous year. Most of the production was sold in Aden or exported in the form of dried salted fish. Cold stores were being built and modern fishing boats introduced in some outlying villages. In the Eastern Protectorate a pier and workshop were being constructed to enable fishing boats to be maintained and sheltered throughout the year.

37. The United Nations Special Fund has a project in the area for the biological survey of the Gulf of Aden. Sardine and tuna survey operations were carried out during 1965. Further exploratory fishing and scientific collection of data was to be undertaken under the project from 1966 to 1970.

38. There is a Department of Agriculture in the Qa'iti Sultanate. The expenses of the Department were just under £7,000 in 1965-1966. In Kathiri, no separate department exists, although some agricultural services are provided by the Administration. These services cost approximately £3,000 in 1965-1966.

#### Mineral resources

39. The administering Power has stated that there is little evidence of important mineral deposits in the Territory. The Pan American Hadhramaut Oil Company holds concessions for the prospecting and production of oil in Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra. A Joint State Affairs Organization has been formed in Qa'iti and Kathiri and is financed by the company. The two States have agreed that rentals paid by the company will be divided into four parts—two to go to Qa'iti, one to Kathiri and one to be frozen for the time being.

In case commercial oil is found, the States will receive 55 per cent of the profits and will have the option to take up 25 per cent of the issued capital of the producing company.

#### Trade

40. The port of Aden serves as an important trade centre for the whole Territory and for neighbouring countries. The value of goods imported through Aden from January to September 1965 was £72,957,034, compared with £69,704,649 during the same period in 1964. Exports from Aden were valued at £45,939,601 and £49,258,087 respectively for the same periods. The value of petroleum products accounted for 39.5 per cent of import values, and with ship bunkers for over 79 per cent of export values. The Department of Commerce and Industry of the Federation publishes a monthly trade bulletin as well as an annual statement of external trade.

41. According to a report prepared by the Aden Chamber of Commerce in September 1966, business and the economy as a whole suffered greatly as a consequence of the closing of the border between the Federation and Yemen in August (see paras. 20 and 21 above). A high percentage of Aden imports are re-exported to Yemen, while the Federation imports from Yemen qat, coffee, hides and vegetables.

#### Public finance

42. Total revenue in the Federation of South Arabia during the period 1 April 1965 to 28 February 1966 was £10,009,773, compared with £9,041,988 during the same period of 1964-1965. Of that total, the sum of £5,985,400 consisted of United Kingdom grants while the remainder accrued from local sources, including £2,228,412 from indirect taxes of £1,111,400 from departmental revenue and reimbursements. Public expenditure totalled £9,628,314 (£7,305,364 the year before) of which £3,954,568 was spent on the Federal Army and the Federal Guard. While budget estimates for 1965-1966 had exceeded £14 million, the 1966-1967 figures stand at £18,967,284; revenue estimates stand at £18,675,725, of which £12,617,121 are to be contributed by the United Kingdom. Nearly £9.2 million has reportedly been budgeted for defence. In addition to the increase in the annual contribution of the United Kingdom to the defence budget, a capital sum of £5.5 million is being spent on expanding and re-equipping the federal forces.

#### Economic development

43. The Federation's programme for road building was in abeyance in 1966 owing to lack of funds. Priority was given for the completion of the road to the Yemen border at Karsh and the road to Beihan which also connects most of the Federal States with Aden. During 1965, the mileage of bituminous surfacing was increased.

44. In the Eastern Protectorate, the 1963-1968 Development Plan incorporated previous development plans and is largely financed by Commonwealth Development and Welfare funds. A total of £2,100,000 has been committed for this period. Local state contributions have been of the order of £15,000 annually. Allocations for 1965-1966 were distributed as follows: 36 per cent for education, 20 per cent for agriculture and irrigation, 14 per cent for health, 12 per cent for roads, 7 per cent for co-operatives and marketing, 7 per cent for fisheries, 2 per cent for water supply, and

2 per cent for other public works. Qa'iti has had its own development programme since 1961 and, at 31 March 1966, the unspent balance of the Qa'iti Development Fund was £508,000, compared with £193,046 the previous year. The Special Funds for Harbour Development and Coastal Works totalled £330,000 against £300,000 in 1964-1965. In 1965, Qa'iti and Kathiri held balances totalling approximately £62,000 in joint development accounts, of which, however, £50,000 was committed to anti-famine measures.

### Social conditions

#### Public health

45. During the financial year 1965-1966, government expenditure on public health was estimated at £1,075,123 for recurrent outlays and £56,250 for capital outlays, or nearly 6 per cent of the total budget.

46. There were 8 hospitals in the Federation, 6 of which were in Aden itself, with a total of 919 beds. In addition there were 52 dispensaries or rural health units, 3 specialized units (maternity and child welfare centres and a leprosarium) and 3 mobile units for trachoma and malaria control. Of these facilities, the government-owned institutions were the following: Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Aden, Lahej District Hospital, Makhzan District Hospital (situated on the borders of Lower Yafai and Fahdli States), Lodar District Hospital (Audhali State), 5 Aden dispensaries and 45 rural health units. Non-governmental institutions in Aden included the British Petroleum Company hospital, 2 military hospitals, 3 clinics maintained by religious missions and 3 charitable dispensaries.

47. Medical and health staff were distributed as follows:

	Government	Mission	Private
Registered physicians	60	4	35
Nurses of senior training	55	8	25
Locally certificated nurses	38	—	—
Midwives of senior training	41	—	25
Certificated midwives	13	—	—
Sanitary inspectors	27	—	1
Laboratory and X-ray technicians	47	—	5
Pharmacists	1	—	14

48. Fourteen per cent of development funds in the Eastern Protectorate were allocated for health expenditure in 1965-1966. These funds are provided by the United Kingdom Government under the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Acts, the latest of which was extended until 31 March 1968. Expenditure on health in the Kathiri Sultanate was £11,881 in 1965. No other information on health conditions in the Eastern Protectorate is available.

#### Co-operatives

49. At the beginning of 1966, there were 75 co-operative societies in the Federation, their position being as follows:

	Number	Membership	Total funds (£'s)
Cotton marketing	6	7,401	232,982
Farmer credit	5	1,229	7,161
Thrift and loan	2	52	1,249
School saving	52	12,501	10,476
Consumers	6	830	1,178
Fishermen	3	132	567
Better living	1	40	122
	75	22,185	253,735

50. The marketing of cotton is carried out by the Cotton Producers' Associations which also undertake irrigation works and own agricultural machinery. They are run by committees drawn from their members. In 1965 the membership of these associations increased slightly over the previous year. The following associations existed at the beginning of 1966:

Cotton Producers' Associations	Membership
Audhali	953
Dathina	2,817
Ahwar	1,346
Yeramis	580
Fadhli	1,676
Bir Ahmad	29
	7,401

51. The Co-operative and Marketing Department is headed by a Commissioner; a number of its staff have attended co-operative courses in East Africa or the United Kingdom. Estimates of expenditure for the Department in 1965-1966 amounted to £69,050, while actual expenditure in 1964-1965 was £54,799.

52. In the Eastern Aden Protectorate, the estimated expenditure on the administration of the Co-operative and Marketing Department was £9,502 for the financial year 1964-1965. A number of officers of these co-operatives were receiving co-operative training in East Africa.

53. The existing co-operative societies were:

	Number	Membership	Total funds (£'s)
Thrift and credit	4	608	12,053
Thrift	4	1,122	349
Consumers	5	627	4,462
Marketing	1	230	2,449
	14	2,587	19,313

#### Labour

54. In July 1966, a protracted dispute between six Aden trade unions and the executive council of the Aden Trades Union Congress (ATUC) was reported settled following negotiations held in Cairo under the auspices of the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions. A joint committee representing the executive councils of both ATUC and the six unions was reported to have been formed on 13 August in implementation of the Cairo agreement.

55. According to unofficial sources, a trade union movement was established in the Eastern Protectorate towards the end of 1965. The Hadhramaut General Federation of Trade Unions, whose Secretary-General is Mr. Faysal Al-Attabi, consists of the following trade unions: the Union of Aviation Workers and Employers, the Union of Construction and Development Workers, the Teachers' Union, the Fuel Workers' and Employees' Union, the Union of National Organizations, Workers and Employees, the Municipal Workers' and Employees' Union, the Fishermen's Association, the Fuel Transport Association, the Customs Workers' and Employees' Union, the Bank Employees'



Union, the Agricultural Workers' Union and the Federation of Port Workers' Union.

### Educational conditions

56. The report of the administering Power for the year 1965 stated that approximately 18 per cent of expenditure on all forms of education in the Federation of South Arabia was met by the United Kingdom Government. Total expenditure for 1965-1966 was estimated at £1,164,180 (recurrent outlays) and £65,580 (capital outlays). In Aden State, expenditure on education in 1964-1965 was roughly £820,000, of which £70,000 was grant-in-aid. In addition, Aden received £55,000 from federal public works funds for the renovation of existing premises and the building of a state office.

57. In 1965, throughout the Federation there were 179 government and 67 grant-aided and private primary schools, compared with 152 and 17 schools respectively the previous year; and there were 24 government, 10 grant-aided and 6 private intermediate schools, compared with 20, 10 and 5 schools respectively in 1964. The administering Power reported the opening of a new school at Lahej.

58. Secondary and technical education was provided in 8 government and 8 grant-aided or private schools, compared with 6 and 8 respectively in 1964. There were also 3 government teacher-training schools.

59. The number of children attending schools in the Federation during 1965 is set out below:

	Government schools	Aided and non-aided schools
Primary .....	25,992	7,005
Intermediate .....	6,157	2,841
Secondary and technical .....	2,767	890
Teacher-training .....	191	—

60. In Aden State formal secondary education is provided for about 50 per cent of the boys and 42 per cent of the girls. In the remaining States of the Federation, only a limited number of those leaving primary schools gain entry to the intermediate schools and about 25 per cent of those leaving intermediate schools move to secondary education. Girls' education has moved forward during the last few years. There were 14 primary and 3 intermediate schools for girls in the States in 1965.

61. Fifty-nine students were on scholarships awarded by the Government, of whom 46 were in the United Kingdom.

62. In the Eastern Protectorate, educational expenditure in 1965 was as follows:

	£
(a) Qa'iti Sultanate .....	166,918 (recurrent) 89,395 (capital)
(b) Kathiri Sultanate .....	31,805 (recurrent) 36,366 (capital)
(c) Mahra Sultanate .....	Not available

63. The number of schools, teachers and pupils in Qa'iti and Kathiri during 1965-1966 is set out in the following tables:

### PRIMARY

	Schools			Pupils			Teachers
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
<i>Government</i>							
Qa'iti .....	86	10	96	10,252	1,973	12,225	310
Kathiri .....	8	3	11	1,211	289	1,500	46
<i>Government-aided</i>							
Qa'iti .....	5	2	7	507	267	774	24
Kathiri .....	21	3	24	1,800	317	2,117	64

### INTERMEDIATE

	Schools			Pupils			Teachers
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
<i>Government</i>							
Qa'iti .....	15	—	15	2,565	223	2,788	122
Kathiri .....	4	—	4	439	—	439	21
<i>Government-aided</i>							
Qa'iti .....	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Kathiri .....	2	—	2	93	—	93	5

### SECONDARY

	Schools			Pupils			Teachers
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
<i>Government</i>							
Qa'iti .....	1	—	1	209	—	209	13
Kathiri .....	1	—	1	40	—	40	3

	TEACHERS' TRAINING CENTRE						
	Schools			Pupils			Teachers
	Boys	Girls	Total	Boys	Girls	Total	
<i>Government</i>							
Qa'iti .....	1	1	2	46	14	60	7

64. In 1965-1966 22 students were on scholarships abroad, of whom 12 were from Qa'iti and 10 from Kathiri. They were attending universities in the United Kingdom, Lebanon, and Iraq. In addition, an unspecified number were studying privately.

### C. Consideration by the Special Committee

#### Introduction

65. The Special Committee considered the question of Aden at its 492nd, 493rd, 508th and 571st meetings on 28 February, 1 March, 6 April and 21 November 1967.

66. At the 492nd meeting, on 28 February 1967, members of the Special Committee expressed their deep sympathy to Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee on the occasion of the tragic death of his three children. At the 493rd meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that he had conveyed these statements to Mr. Mackawee.

67. At the 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Chairman informed members of the receipt of a letter dated 4 April 1967, from the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitting the text of a resolution on Aden adopted by the League of Arab States at its meeting held in Cairo in March 1967.

68. In a note dated 24 August 1967, the Secretary-General drew the attention of the Special Committee to a letter dated 11 August 1967 (see annex I below) from the representative of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General on the possibility of placing the island of Perim under United Nations administration. The views of the Arab States on the proposal were set out in a letter dated 31 August 1967 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen to the Secretary-General (see annex III, appendix VI below).

69. In a note dated 17 November 1967 (see annex II below), the Secretary-General set out the text of the reply he had sent to the representative of the United Kingdom in which reference was made to the letter from the representatives of the Arab States and to the comments on the proposal made by the Special Mission on Aden in its report.

70. The Chairman of the Special Mission on Aden presented its report (see annex III below) at the 571st meeting on 21 November 1967.

#### Written petitions

71. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Aden:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
The Port Workers' General Union, the Customs Workers' General Union, the Transport Workers' General Union and the Various Industries Workers' General Union, Mukalla, Hadhramaut .....	A/AC.109/PET.602

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Seven petitions from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY). .....	A/AC.109/PET.603
Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, FLOSY. ....	A/AC.109/PET.603/Add.1
Two petitions from Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, Head of Political Bureau, FLOSY. ....	A/AC.109/PET.603 Add.2
Mrs. Anisa Ahmed Muqbel Hamzi and Mrs. Kadria Abdo Turkey Muwati. ....	A/AC.109/PET.604
Mr. Abdul-Rahman Girgrah, President and Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi, General Secretary, United National Party of Aden. ....	A/AC.109/PET.605
Two petitions from the Association of Arab Women. ....	A/AC.109/PET.606
Mr. Jaffar Awad, Representative of the National Liberation Front for Occupied South Yemen. ....	A/AC.109/PET.607
Four petitions from the National Liberation Front for Occupied South Yemen. ....	A/AC.109/PET.607/Add.1 and 2
The Aden Trade Union Congress and six other groups. ....	A/AC.109/PET.608
Mr. Abdullah Salem Basendwah ....	A/AC.109/PET.609
Mr. Ali Alwan .....	A/AC.109/PET.610
The Aden Trade Union Congress and seven other groups. ....	A/AC.109/PET.611
Mr. Fawzy El Sayed, Secretary General, International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU) ..	A/AC.109/PET.613
Mr. Salih Sultan, Secretary of the Trainees' Union, UNESCO/Arab States Community Development Training Centre. ....	A/AC.109/PET.614
Mr. Salaheldeen Abulmagid, Chairman, General Syndicate of Agricultural Workers in the United Arab Republic .....	A/AC.109/PET.624
Mr. Ahmad Musaid and six others on behalf of "South Arabian people dwelling in Eastern Area, Saudi Arabia". ....	A/AC.109/PET.625
The Arab Students' Association, University of California. ....	A/AC.109/PET.633
Mr. Turki Abdelghani, President, Les Musulmans de France. ....	A/AC.109/PET.634
Mr. Saleh Mobarak and Mr. Salem Sayyed Awad on behalf of "The Mahara Students in the United Arab Republic". ....	A/AC.109/PET.635
Mr. Nawaz Cassim, Vice-President, Ceylon Moor Youth League. ....	A/AC.109/PET.636
The General Union of Workers in the Engineering, Metal and Electrical Industries, Cairo. ....	A/AC.109/PET.637
Mr. Wafik Meshref, President, Organization of Arab Students in the United States and Canada. ....	A/AC.109/PET.638
Mr. Abdulaziz Othman on behalf of "Aden Political Detainees". ....	A/AC.109/PET.639
The Standing Committee of the Union of Arab Women. ....	A/AC.109/PET.640

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Jyoti Shankar Singh, Secretary-General, World Assembly of Youth.	A/AC.109/PET.695
Mr. Ahmed Bin Ahmed Dagh, Secretary, Mayoonis United Society ..	A/AC.109/PET.697
The League of Yemen Students, USSR. ....	A/AC.109/PET.698
Mr. A. Mohammad, representative of South Arabian League. ....	A/AC.109/PET.699
Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President, South Arabian League .....	A/AC.109/PET.699/ Add.1
South Arabian League. ....	A/AC.109/PET.699/ Add.2
The Arab Socialist Union. ....	A/AC.109/PET.700
The Graduates Congress, Aden. ....	A/AC.109/PET.701
Mr. Ali Musaid, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, Government of the Federation of South Arabia .....	A/AC.109/PET.712

### *Statements*

72. The *Chairman of the Special Mission*, presenting its report (see annex III below), said that the Mission had endeavoured, at all times, to reflect faithfully the opinions which prevailed during the debates relating to this question in the Special Committee and the General Assembly and which were incorporated in various resolutions, in particular General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) setting forth the Mission's terms of reference.

73. The Mission regretted having been unable, due to the circumstances encountered by the Mission while carrying out its activities, to fulfil its mandate as was indicated in the report.

74. In approaching its task, the Mission knew that it entailed very serious difficulties, deriving mainly from the manner in which the administering Power was managing the Territory, leading it towards a form of government which did not represent the people's aspirations. However, the Mission's efforts seemed to have some chance of success owing to the fact that the United Kingdom had approved resolution 2183 (XXI) and its representatives had given their assurances, to the Special Committee as well as to the Mission, that they would co-operate in the implementation of the said resolution. The Mission's hopes in this respect were not fully realized because of the lack of a complete understanding demonstrated by the administering Power which, as indicated in its report, "seemed at times to choose a line of conduct not in harmony with the Mission's efforts".

75. In addition to laying a working basis with the administering Power, the Mission's efforts from the beginning were aimed at establishing direct contacts with all those who could contribute to the proper solution of this problem, with particular emphasis on the nationalist movements. The Mission had described in its report the difficulties it encountered in this respect. As could be clearly deduced from the debates and conclusions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, it was the Mission's conviction that the caretaker Government to lead the emerging country should not be an outgrowth or an extension of the so-called Federal Government which, because of its non-representativity, was a structure with no proper foundation, artificially sustained by the administering Power alone. In compliance with the relevant provisions of the resolution, the Mission understood that only a government with clean origins, broadly

based and, consequently, backed by a vast majority of the people, could ensure that the new State would accede to a genuine independence in peace and unity.

76. With respect to territorial integrity as well as in any other respects, the Mission was guided by the pertinent provisions of the resolution. Its attitude was always positive. Therefore, when the United Kingdom Government submitted its proposal on the internationalization of Perim Island, the Mission made it clear that it could not entertain this proposal since it considered it contrary to the provisions of the pertinent United Nations resolutions. The integrity of the Territory upon independence must be ensured.

77. During the last five days, the United Kingdom Government had taken decisions of paramount importance for the future of the Aden Territory. In this respect, he read the following letter dated 14 November 1967 sent to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom:

"I have been asked to inform you that my Government has now received an approach from the National Liberation Front in South Arabia addressed to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, through the High Commissioner, in which they have expressed a readiness to negotiate without preconditions about the transfer of power in the Territory. Mr. Brown has agreed to this proposal from the National Liberation Front for negotiations, and expects to make a public statement on the matter later today. I wish to recall in this connexion that the British Government has been ready to negotiate with nationalist forces in the Territory for over two months, and indeed has actively sought contact with them for much longer, and that up to the present time no other body representing the nationalist forces has been prepared to come forward in response to the High Commissioner's statement of 5 September.

"I have also been asked at the same time to acknowledge the receipt of the message which you conveyed through me on 9 November. Mr. Brown has had very much in mind the Mission's concern for a broad-based government, which he fully shared. Unfortunately, circumstances with which you as Chairman of the Special Mission will be familiar, have made this impossible to achieve."

78. The representative of the United Kingdom referred to an appeal made by the Mission through him to the United Kingdom Government to do everything within its power to negotiate with all the nationalist forces directly and not through any intermediary, so that the Territory could attain a genuine independence in peace and harmony. This appeal was in line with the urgent suggestion made by the Mission at the end of its report to the Special Committee and other appropriate organs of the United Nations.

79. It was the Mission's conviction that the principles underlying resolution 2183 (XXI) were still valid at this late stage of the decolonization process in the Territory. Often, this process was painful, even in its last phase, when the tragic conditions under which subjugated peoples had lived became more evident. It was certainly so in the case of Aden whose people had undergone considerable sacrifices which might extend beyond the colonial period, depending on the conditions in which this period came to an end. It was still possible to prevent such a development.

80. The Mission, identified as it was with the feelings and aspirations of this valiant people, wished them wholeheartedly a future of peace and prosperity. That undoubted was the feeling of the Special Committee as well.

81. The *Chairman*, speaking on behalf of the Special Committee, expressed appreciation of the conscientious efforts exerted by the Chairman and members of the Special Mission on Aden in the performance of their unusually difficult task. The difficulty of the task was evident from the fact that the Special Committee and the Fourth Committee had devoted very close and prolonged attention to the question of Aden over the years. The circumstances leading to the appointment of the Mission also testified to the complexity of that task. In paying tribute to the work of the Mission, he wished to express the confident hope that the report of the Mission would assist the General Assembly in taking whatever measures might be appropriate to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence in conditions of peace and harmony. In conclusion, the Chairman paid tribute to the Secretary-General for establishing the Mission in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), for his continuing interest in its work and for extending to it all the necessary facilities.

82. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation would reserve its full statement on the question of South Arabia and on the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden until those matters were debated in the Fourth Committee. Nevertheless, as representative of the administering Power, he believed that it would be inappropriate for the occasion to pass without his bringing the most recent information on the situation in the Territory to this Committee. He would, however, confine his remarks to a brief recapitulation of the main developments in statements of policy on South Arabia by the United Kingdom Government since the High Commissioner's statement of 5 September and to a very short comment on the report of the Special Mission.

83. On 5 September this year, the High Commissioner, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, made the announcement (see annex III, para. 268 below), the salient feature of which was a statement that the Federal Government had ceased to function and no longer exercised control in the Federation. The High Commissioner said that it was urgently necessary that a new government should take over, and he went on to say:

"I recognize the nationalist forces as representative of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective government formed by the nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government, internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the carrying out of United Nations resolutions and independence for South Arabia."

84. Two months elapsed. Talks started in Cairo between the two main political groups. Weeks went by, and no response was received from any of the nationalist forces to the High Commissioner's statement until 1 November. On that date, an announcement was made in Cairo that the groups negotiating there had reached agreement on the matters they had

so far discussed, and that shortly they would be able to reach an agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with the United Kingdom Government.

85. The following day, on 2 November, the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, made a statement in the House of Commons (see annex III, appendix XI below). In that statement the Foreign Secretary welcomed the announcement by the groups in Cairo and stated that he looked forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment. He recalled that conditions in south-western Arabia had been transformed since the summer, that a ground swell of revolt had overwhelmed the Arab State authorities in the Protectorate and that the Federal Government had ceased to function. He made it clear that in general terms the National Liberation Front (NLF) had played the major part and had established ascendancy in most of the States. The South Arabian forces had refused to take over political control, but had instead asked the United Kingdom Government to recognize the nationalists as representatives of the country as a whole and to express readiness to negotiate with them. Mr. Brown went on to announce that the objectives of the United Kingdom Government remained to withdraw its forces in good order and to leave behind, if possible, a united, stable and independent country. It had accordingly been decided to fix the date for independence in South Arabia during the second half of November, by which time all British forces would be withdrawn, and to make a further announcement about the precise date for independence by the middle of the month. Mr. Brown went on to say that it was quite clear to him that the radical nationalist and other groups in South Arabia must face their own problems and resolve them themselves. Finally, in that statement, the Foreign Secretary announced, in view of the changed international circumstances outside South Arabia, as well as the changes inside the Territory, the cancellation of United Kingdom plans announced in June this year to offer assistance from British naval and V-bomber deterrent forces after independence. He added that the question of United Kingdom aid after independence would be left for decision later.

86. On 7 November, one week after that statement by Mr. Brown and one week after the preliminary announcement on 1 November in Cairo of some measure of agreement between FLOSY and the NLF, the Foreign Secretary made a further announcement in the House of Commons. He stated that severe inter-factional fighting had been taking place in three areas of Aden during the previous few days. Casualties among the Arabs involved in the fighting (in which British troops had not been involved) had been heavy. It appeared that the NLF had gained the upper hand. On Sunday, 5 November, the NLF High Command had sent a message to their delegation in Cairo calling for a suspension of the talks in which they were engaged with FLOSY. The following day, on 6 November, the South Arabian army, which until this point had been using its influence to bring FLOSY and the NLF to agreement on the formation of a government, issued a statement (see annex III, para. 315 below). In that statement, they made it clear that they were siding unreservedly with the NLF. The Foreign Secretary in that statement again reaffirmed that the United Kingdom Government's prime interest since September on the political

front had been to see the emergence of a government which would be able to take over from the United Kingdom Government and with which the United Kingdom Government could negotiate.

87. Finally on 14 November, the stage was finally set for independence in a further statement by the Foreign Secretary in the House of Commons. This statement was made after the Special Mission had submitted its report to the Secretary-General. Because of its importance to this Committee, he would quote it in full:

"Since my statement to the House on 7 November, the situation in South Arabia has become clearer. In the course of talks between 7 and 10 November the officers of the South Arabian Forces told the High Commissioner that they fully supported the National Liberation Front which they said was in effective control. These officers also said that in areas from which British forces had withdrawn, the National Liberation Front themselves claimed at press conferences held on 8 and 10 November that they were exercising effective control and said that they wanted to enter into negotiations. They also demanded an end to violence against the civil community and called on the population to respect the persons and the institutions of the foreign community.

"On 11 November, the National Liberation Front sent me a telegram which they later published. In this telegram they asserted their claim to be a popular authority in control and said they had formed a delegation to negotiate with Her Majesty's Government on the transfer of political power. They asked for our agreement to open negotiations within a week. I replied immediately agreeing to open negotiations. They have now asked that these begin on or about 20 November and I have agreed. They will be held in Geneva. Lord Shackleton, who has a close knowledge of the problems of South Arabia, will lead our delegation.

"On 2 November, I told the House that by the middle of this month we should fix and announce a precise date for independence and withdrawal. I also said that it might be useful to vary the date a few days one way or the other if this would help us over starting negotiations with an emerging government. The High Commissioner, through his talks with the South Arabian Forces, is at this moment working out arrangements for the negotiations, and Her Majesty's Government has therefore decided, in order to help this process, that South Arabia should become independent and the withdrawal of our forces be completed by 30 November.

"There are important matters to be settled and preferably before independence. But if negotiations cannot be completed before independence, there is nothing to stop them continuing as between independent countries.

"Her Majesty's Government has not had an easy road to follow in bringing South Arabia to independence. I would like here to pay tribute to the many Britons, both civilians and military, who have devoted their labours and in many cases, to our great sorrow given their lives for this cause. I also grieve for the large numbers of South Arabians, who have suffered death or injury. The whole House will join me in hoping that South Arabia will enjoy a peaceful future."

88. It only remained for his delegation to report that the negotiations foreshadowed in that statement were expected to open in Geneva today.

89. United Kingdom Ministers and the High Commissioner had consistently made it clear that it was for the parties and peoples of South Arabia themselves to settle their political future, not for the United Kingdom Government; they had consistently declined to take sides as between the various factions, parties and groups. As the Foreign Secretary had said in reply to questions in the House of Commons on 7 November: "I have done my very best to avoid Great Britain being involved in the argument as to which nationalist group or groups should form the government." In this connexion he recalled that in his first statement on his arrival after appointment as High Commissioner in Aden on 9 June this year, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had issued the following appeal:

"We hope that all patriotic parties in South Arabia will co-operate in the government of the new State. I appeal especially to those political parties now using violent methods for political purposes to turn to peaceful political activity, to negotiation and to discussion between the parties leading to the formation of a fully representative caretaker government which will prepare the State for independence. I am willing to see the leaders of any party and shall do whatever I can to make these political discussions possible and to help towards agreement between the parties."

90. The Special Committee had before it the report of the Special Mission. Many members had received the full text of the report only recently and no doubt all delegations were also still studying this very full account. At this stage, his delegation wished to offer only a brief comment on the report of the Special Mission. The Special Committee had listened with great attention to the statement of the representative of Venezuela in presenting the report to the Committee as Chairman of the Mission and he wished to pay tribute to the efforts of the Mission which had extended over many months under his chairmanship. But it seemed obvious that the Mission had been prevented from carrying out its task by a number of circumstances and particularly the failure until too late of the two main political groupings in South Arabia to offer co-operation to the Mission, and the tide of events in South Arabia from August onwards. His delegation regretted that instead of giving the weight to those factors, the Mission had sought in the conclusion to its report to place responsibility principally on the United Kingdom Government. His delegation was bound to note at the same time that the report refrained from recognizing the consistent co-operation and help which they had received from his Government throughout their work. But, in fact, the report was itself the best witness on that point. All who had read through the whole report, and not limited themselves to the conclusions at the end, would have found ample and abundant proof of his Government's unremitting efforts to help and to co-operate with the Mission in its work, from the time of its appointment until the submission of its report. It was a matter of regret that the Mission felt that it had not been able—or to quote its own words "permitted"—to fulfil its mandate. But the crux of the matter was not what prevented the Mission from accomplishing its task. It was that throughout the eight

months of the Mission's continuous endeavours there had been a dangerous and rapidly shifting situation on the ground, and that his Government as the administering Power of the Territory had of course had the responsibility of dealing with it.

91. As he had stated previously, the negotiations referred to by his Foreign Secretary in his statement of 14 November, which he had quoted, were on the point of opening in Geneva. His delegation would wish to make a fuller statement on the South Arabian item and at the appropriate time in the Fourth Committee.

#### **D. Action taken by the Special Committee**

92. At the 571st meeting, on 21 November 1967, the Chairman stated that after consultations he wished to suggest that in order to enable the Fourth Committee to consider the question before the imminent accession of the Territory to independence the Special Committee should take note of the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden and transmit it to the General Assembly together with the statements made by members and the Chairman of the Mission.

93. At the same meeting, the Committee decided, without objection, to adopt the suggestion made by the Chairman.

#### **ANNEX I\***

##### **Letter dated 11 August 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to address you on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

This island has been a British possession since 1857, when a British expedition occupied it. No question of its ownership was raised in the discussions before World War I leading to the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914, which among other things defined and demarcated the western section of the frontier between the Yemen and South Arabia. Until 1937, Perim was administered by the Government of India. In that year, responsibility for it passed to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and was devolved as a matter of administrative convenience on the Governor at Aden. Perim had in this period a separate identity and administration from those of Aden. The entry of Aden Colony into the Federation of South Arabia in 1963 made it necessary to enact certain legislation which had the effect of defining Perim's distinct identity in that year. The main external economic links of Perim have been with Aden, where some of its inhabitants have worked and from which two lighthouses, important to navigation, have been administered through the Aden Port Trust, an independent body on which both government and shipping interests are represented.

The assumption of the United Kingdom Government had been that, when South Arabia became independent, Perim would adhere to South Arabia as geographical propinquity and economic ties suggested. My Government did, however, inform the United Nations when resolution 2023 (XX) was under discussion that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came.

However, discussion in the United Kingdom Parliament of the bill to provide for the relinquishment of Her Majesty's sovereignty over both Aden and Perim (which received the Royal Assent on 23 July) revealed a strong feeling in the House of Commons that Perim's position on a narrow inter-

national waterway was of major importance and justified arrangements to ensure that that waterway could not be closed by wrongful use of the island. There was a consensus of opinion that this could best be achieved by United Nations administration of Perim, and the United Kingdom Government undertook to put forward a proposal to this effect.

I should therefore be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Special Mission on Aden in order that they may consider on what basis the United Nations might undertake the permanent administration of Perim, in a way which would ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb. This is a unique proposal which could have important implications for the future, and the United Kingdom Government sincerely hopes that it will be given urgent consideration with a view to recommendations being made through the appropriate United Nations channels. In urging this proposal the United Kingdom Government has no doubt that it would be recognized that United Nations control of Perim should not impede but rather assist the economic and social development of the island with its 280 inhabitants.

I should like to emphasize that my Government has no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear in Parliament that the United Kingdom Government was completely opposed to keeping British sovereignty in Perim after South Arabia's independence, even for the desirable cause of internationalizing it. It wishes to have no more responsibility for Perim after South Arabian independence than that which any other Member State of the United Nations will have.

If the United Nations agrees to assume responsibility for the internationalization of the island, my Government would still attach importance to assuring itself that this was in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Perim.

(Signed) Leslie C. GLASS  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
of the United Kingdom of Great  
Britain and Northern Ireland to the  
United Nations

#### **ANNEX II\*\***

##### **Note dated 17 November 1967 from the Secretary-General to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 11 August 1967 concerning the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-Al-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

In a note dated 24 August 1967 (A/AC.109/260) I brought your letter to the attention of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. I also transmitted a copy to the Chairman of the Special Mission on Aden.

I enclose herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter dated 31 August 1967 (A/AC.109/267) in which the representatives of the Arab States have addressed to me their observations on the matter.

I also wish to inform you that this matter was the subject of comment in the report which the Special Mission on Aden submitted to me on 10 November 1967 in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI). I have transmitted the report to the Chairman of the Special Committee which will no doubt wish to take it up as soon as it is circulated as an official document.

The relevant paragraph of that report reads as follows:

"The Mission was equally insistent on the need to give practical effect to the principle of territorial integrity as defined in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), which affirmed that the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the islands

\*\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/260/Add.1.

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/260.

of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran, and other off-shore islands are an integral part of the Territory. In this connexion, the Mission had in mind that while the United Kingdom Government had voted in favour of the above-mentioned resolution, it had not taken the necessary practical steps to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence as one unit. Indeed, during August 1967 the United Kingdom Government submitted to the United Nations a proposal for the internationalization of Perim, a proposal which the Mission could not entertain as it considered it to be in contradiction with the resolutions of the United Nations. Further, although the Mission stressed the undesirability of extending aid to any of the States which did not accept the principle of territorial integrity, the United Kingdom Government pledged military and other assistance to the Eastern Aden Protectorate."

(Signed) U THANT  
Secretary-General

### ANNEX III\*

#### Report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden

LETTER DATED 10 NOVEMBER 1967 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE

I have the honour to refer to my letter dated 12 October 1967 (A/AC.109/277) transmitting to you a letter of the same date in which the Chairman of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden indicated *inter alia* when the Mission would expect to present its report.

I now transmit herewith, in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), the report submitted to me today by the Special Mission on Aden.

(Signed) U THANT  
Secretary-General

#### Report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden

Chairman: Mr. Manuel PEREZ GUERRERO (Venezuela)

#### CONTENTS

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL .....	
INTRODUCTION .....	1-18
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSION .....	19-37
II. STUDY OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROGRAMME OF WORK .....	38-45
A. Preliminary talks with the representative of the United Kingdom .....	39-41
B. Programme of the Mission .....	42-44
C. Communications from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen ..	45
III. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ADMINISTERING POWER BEFORE THE DEPARTURE FOR THE TERRITORY .....	46-97
IV. VISITS TO CAIRO AND JEDDAH .....	98-126
A. Contacts with political groups and organizations .....	98-124
(a) Cairo .....	98-108
(b) Jeddah .....	109-124
B. Contacts with Governments .....	125
C. Contacts with the League of Arab States .....	126
V. VISIT TO ADEN .....	127-149
VI. WORK OF THE MISSION AFTER LEAVING THE TERRITORY .....	150-204
A. Geneva .....	153-157

#### CONTENTS (continued)

	<i>Paragraphs</i>
B. London .....	158-159
C. New York .....	160-204
VII. WORK OF THE MISSION IN GENEVA, BEIRUT AND CAIRO .....	205-289
Introduction .....	205-207
A. Work of the Mission in Geneva .....	208-257
B. Work of the Mission in Beirut .....	258-277
C. Work of the Mission in Cairo .....	278-289
VIII. SUBSEQUENT WORK OF THE MISSION .....	290-307
IX. ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA .....	308-316
X. CONCLUSIONS .....	317-333

#### Appendices

	<i>Page</i>
I. Statement by the Special Mission on 17 March 1967 .....	180
II. Letter dated 6 March 1967 from the representative of Saudi Arabia to the Secretary-General .....	180
III. Communications from members of the "Federal Government" .....	181
IV. Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in the House of Commons on 11 May 1967 .....	182
V. Letter dated 16 August 1967 from the Mahra State Council at Al-Ghaidah to the Chairman of the Special Mission .....	182
VI. Letter dated 31 August 1967 from the representatives of Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Yemen to the Secretary-General .....	183
VII. Telegram dated 28 August 1967 from the South Arabian League to the Secretary-General .....	183
VIII. Extracts from statements by the National Liberation Front appearing in the Press in the Special Mission's arrival in Beirut .....	183
IX. Press extract handed to the Special Mission by Sheikh Mohamed Farid on 6 September 1967 .....	184
X. Letter dated 21 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Mission .....	184
XI. Statement by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland in the House of Commons on 2 November 1967 .....	185
XII. Petition and exchange of letters concerning the question of the detainees .....	186
XIII. Petition and exchange of letters concerning the Eastern Aden Protectorate .....	187

#### LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

New York, 10 November 1967

Sir,

We have the honour to submit herewith the report of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden in accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

In this connexion, we should like to refer to the Mission's communication of 12 October 1967 in which it was stated that the Mission considered it advisable to await the outcome of the meetings in Cairo between the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front before submitting its report.

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/281/ and Add.1.

We would like to take this opportunity of expressing to you our sincere appreciation of the most able and devoted assistance which all members of the Secretariat assigned to the Mission have provided at all times.

(Signed) Manuel PEREZ GUERRERO  
Abdussattar SHALIZI  
Moussa LEO KEITA

The Secretary-General  
United Nations  
New York

#### INTRODUCTION

1. By operative paragraph 5 of its resolution 2183 (XXI), the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General:

"in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and, in particular, for the purpose of determining the extent of the United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the elections and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;"

2. On 23 February 1967, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced the appointment of the Mission in the following terms:

"Under resolution 2183 (XXI), adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966, I was requested, in consultation with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the administering Power, to appoint a special mission to be sent to Aden.

"Following such consultations, I have appointed the United Nations Special Mission on Aden composed as follows:

"His Excellency Mr. Manuel Pérez Guerrero (Venezuela), Chairman of the Special Mission;

"His Excellency Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi (Afghanistan); and

"His Excellency Mr. Moussa Leo Keita (Mali).

"I trust that the Mission will proceed to its work as a matter of urgency and that all concerned will cooperate to the full in a spirit of constructive goodwill to enable the Mission to succeed in its most important task.

"As I said in my statement to the Special Committee on 9 February: 'It is my confident hope that the work of the proposed mission will be of assistance to the Special Committee and the General Assembly in enabling the people of Aden to attain their independence under conditions of peace and harmony.'"

3. The Mission held meetings at Headquarters in New York from 7 to 18 March, at which it considered its programme of work. During this period the Mission also had discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom, and with the Secretary-General. On 17 March, the Mission issued a press statement announcing that it would leave for London on 20 March for talks with the administering Power and that, on its way to Aden, it expected to visit Cairo and Jeddah in order to meet with representatives of the people who were outside the Territory.

4. The Mission visited London from 20 to 25 March. It had discussions with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Thomson, and with senior officials at the Foreign Office.

5. The Mission was in Cairo from 25 to 29 March. While in Cairo, it heard a group of petitioners. It also had useful talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and other officials, and met with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States, Mr. A. K. Hassouna.

6. The Mission arrived in Jeddah on 29 March and remained there until 2 April. In Jeddah it heard twenty-two groups of petitioners. The Mission also had talks with His

Majesty King Faisal Abdul Aziz and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry.

7. The Mission left Jeddah for Aden on 2 April, arriving there the same day. The Mission left Aden on 7 April in circumstances which are set out in paragraphs 147 to 149 below.

8. On 8 April, the Mission arrived in Geneva where it had discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom, including the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. William Rodgers. Following these discussions, the Mission decided that it would accept an invitation from the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to visit London on its way to New York.

9. The Mission arrived in London on 16 April and had discussions with Mr. Brown and officials of the Foreign Office; it departed for New York on 18 April.

10. Mr. Mamadou Moutar Thiam (Mali) accompanied the Mission as alternate member on its visits to London, Cairo, Jeddah, Aden and Geneva until its return to New York on 18 April, in case Mr. Keita found it necessary to return to Headquarters to attend meetings of the Security Council.

11. The Mission pursued its contacts with the representative of the administering Power in New York and a number of delegations. It also had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden who came to New York during the latter part of July in response to the Mission's invitation. Subsequently, the Mission had a useful exchange of views in New York with a delegation of FLOSY. On 29 July it announced that it would have further meetings with the elements concerned and that, for their convenience, the meetings would start at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 11 August 1967.

12. The Mission was in Geneva from 10 August to 1 September. During that time it heard the views of four groups representing various shades of opinion in the Territory. The Mission had talks with Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio and with the Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Geneva, Sir Harold Bealey. Being unable to meet the nationalist elements in Geneva and having regard to the inability of the United Kingdom Government to be represented at the appropriate level at any meetings to be held in Cairo, the Mission decided to proceed to Beirut and invited FLOSY and the NLF to join it there. It also invited the United Kingdom Government to send a delegation at the appropriate level for its meetings in Beirut.

13. The Mission arrived in Beirut on 1 September and had further talks with Lord Shackleton. It also heard a representative of the Aden Trade Union Congress and other spokesmen of various shades of opinion in the area. Following a request from FLOSY to meet with it in Cairo, the Mission decided to proceed to Cairo on 7 September in the hope that the NLF would be able to join in the meetings.

14. In Cairo the Mission had talks with FLOSY from 9 to 11 September. It also had an exchange of views with representatives of the United Arab Republic and with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States. The Mission returned to New York on 12 September to prepare its report.

15. Since 13 September the Mission has continued its contacts with the representative of the United Kingdom and has received communications from the High Commissioner on the development of the situation in the Territory. It has also been in touch with a number of delegations and with the Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. John Malecela.

16. In a public statement issued on 26 September, it expressed the hope that efforts undertaken between leaders of the nationalist movements of the Territory to settle their differences and to establish co-operation between themselves would be crowned with success. On 12 October it informed the Secretary-General and the Special Committee that before presenting its report, it considered it advisable to await the outcome of meetings which were being held in Cairo between FLOSY and the NLF for the purpose of co-ordination between the two fronts and the establishment of a basis for the transfer of power from the United Kingdom.



17. The Mission wishes to express its gratitude to the Governments of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic and the United Kingdom for their kind hospitality and the facilities they afforded the Mission during its visits to their countries.

18. The Mission also wishes to record its gratitude to the Secretary-General for his personal interest in its work and for making available the necessary supporting staff and facilities. Further, the Mission acknowledges with deep appreciation the services of the staff assigned to it from the Department of Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories and of the technical staff detailed from other departments of the Secretariat, as well as the assistance extended to it by the United Nations offices at the various places it visited.

#### I. BACKGROUND TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MISSION

19. The question of Aden was first examined in the United Nations in 1963 when the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples considered the situation in the Territory. In 1962, the Special Committee had distributed a number of petitions concerning the Territory, but it had not been able to begin any detailed examination of the Territory.

20. In 1963, after hearing petitioners and debating the question, the Special Committee established a sub-committee to visit Aden and the Protectorates and authorized it, if necessary, to visit neighbouring countries. The Sub-Committee was to ascertain the views of the population, especially those of the representatives and leaders of the various political parties, and hold talks with the administering Power. The Special Committee requested the Sub-Committee to make recommendations for the speedy implementation, in respect of these Territories of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the inhabitants.

21. The Sub-Committee on Aden was not permitted by the administering Power to visit the Territory and was unable to hold talks with the administering Power. Nevertheless, it visited Cairo, Sanaa, Taiz, Jeddah and Baghdad where it heard many petitioners from the Territory. On the basis of its findings the Sub-Committee made recommendations for the speedy implementation of the Declaration in the Territory. These were endorsed by the Special Committee and later by the General Assembly following its debate of the question at the end of 1963.

22. In its resolution on the Territory, resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, the General Assembly called upon the administering Power to repeal all laws which restrict public freedoms; to release all political prisoners and detainees, to allow the return of exiles and to cease forthwith all repressive action against the people of the Territory. The Assembly also called upon the administering Power to make the necessary constitutional changes with a view to establishing a representative organ and setting up a provisional government for the whole of the Territory in accordance with the wishes of the population, such legislative organ and government to be constituted following general elections to be held on the basis of universal adult suffrage and with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. The Assembly recommended that the elections should be held before the attainment of independence and that conversations should be opened without delay between the government resulting from the election and the administering Power, for the purpose of fixing the date for the granting of independence and the arrangements for the transfer of power. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to arrange for an effective United Nations presence before and during the elections. The Assembly also considered that the maintenance of the military base in Aden was prejudicial to the security of the region and that its early removal was therefore desirable.

23. After further examination of the question in 1964 the Special Committee adopted a resolution on 9 April in which

it deplored the refusal of the Government of the United Kingdom to implement resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and urged it to implement the measures outlined in resolution 1949 (XVIII) without delay. It also urged the United Kingdom to lift the state of emergency which had been declared at the end of 1963. The Special Committee again established a Sub-Committee on Aden and requested it to study and keep under constant review the situation in the Territory, establish contacts with the administering Power with a view to implementing General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII), arrange for visits to the Territory and make such other visits as necessary. In a further resolution adopted in May 1964, the Special Committee called the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of recent British military actions against the people of the Territory.

24. The Sub-Committee on Aden established in 1964 was again not permitted to visit the Territory nor was its offer to hold talks with the administering Power in London accepted. However, to meet the need for obtaining first-hand information it visited Cairo where it heard many politicians from the Territory. In its recommendations which were endorsed by the Special Committee, the Sub-Committee urged the administering Power to implement the General Assembly's resolutions, and in particular resolution 1949 (XVIII). It emphasized that the settlement of the question was not only in the interest of the prompt application of the Declaration, but also of the resolution of a dangerous situation which might be a threat to international peace and security owing to continued military actions.

25. During 1965 the Special Committee and its Sub-Committee continued to follow closely developments in Aden, calling upon the United Kingdom to implement the United Nations resolutions and drawing the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation prevailing in the Territory. In September 1965, the Sub-Committee expressed the view that the failure of the United Kingdom's efforts to hold talks could be attributed to the refusal by the United Kingdom to accept the provisions of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1963 which, it pointed out, not only set out principles, but also outlined the methods whereby self-determination and independence might be achieved. It also emphasized the pressing need for the United Kingdom to take practical steps, without delay, to implement this resolution while widespread support for it remained. The Sub-Committee's conclusions were endorsed by the Special Committee.

26. On 5 November 1965, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2023 (XX) on the question of Aden. By this resolution, the Assembly, deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation threatening peace and security in the area arising from the policies pursued in the Territory by the administering Power, deplored the administering Power's refusal to implement the resolution on the Aden question adopted by the Assembly and the Special Committee. It also deplored the attempts of the administering Power to set up an unrepresentative régime in the Territory so as to grant it independence contrary to previous General Assembly resolutions. The Assembly appealed to all States not to recognize any independence which was not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage. Reaffirming the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to self-determination and to freedom from colonial rule, the Assembly considered that the maintenance of military bases in the Territory constituted a major obstacle to its liberation from colonial domination and was prejudicial to the peace and security of the region, and that the immediate and complete removal of those bases was therefore essential.

27. Noting with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory were still being carried out, the Assembly urged the administering Power immediately to abolish the state of emergency, repeal all laws restricting public freedom, cease all repressive actions in the Territory (in particular military operations), release all political detainees and allow the return of those who had been exiled or forbidden to reside in the Territory because of political activities. The

Assembly reaffirmed those paragraphs of its resolution of 11 December 1963 dealing with the exercise of the right of self-determination and steps to be taken in connexion with elections, and it urged the administering Power to implement them immediately.

28. The Assembly also appealed to all Member States to render all possible assistance to the Territory in its efforts to attain freedom and independence, drew the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory, requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the specialized agencies and the international relief organizations to offer all possible assistance to the people who were suffering as a result of the military operations in the Territory and requested the Secretary-General to take such action as he might deem expedient to ensure the implementation of the present resolution and report thereon to the Special Committee.

29. The Special Committee continued to consider the question of Aden in 1966. On 15 June, while in Cairo, the Special Committee adopted the following resolution:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having considered the question of Aden,*

*"Having heard the petitioners,*

*"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965,*

*"Deeply concerned at the critical and explosive situation which is threatening peace and security in Aden and Aden Protectorates, arising from the policies pursued by the administering Power in the Territory,*

*"Deplores the refusal of the administering Power to implement the resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates,*

*"Recalling the various statements and declarations made by the administering Power concerning the Territory,*

*"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of the Territory to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);*

*"2. Deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory, with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;*

*"3. Calls upon the administering Power to declare unequivocally its acceptance of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in their implementation without delay;*

*"4. Reaffirms the view that the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power cannot be shifted or circumvented through any action by an unrepresentative régime referred to in paragraph 2 above;*

*"5. Declares, consequently, that the conference envisaged in document A/AC.109/161/Add.1/Rev.1 or any other conference of a similar nature is not in accordance with the terms of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly;*

*"6. Deplores any defence arrangement that the United Kingdom Government might enter into with the unrepresentative régime in the Territory and considers such arrangements as inconsistent with the objectives of the relevant General Assembly resolutions and a serious hindrance to the future free exercise of the right to freedom and sovereignty by the people of the Territory;*

*"7. Notes with deep concern that military operations against the people of the Territory are still being carried out by the administering Power;*

*"8. Urges the administering Power immediately to:*

*(a) Abolish the state of emergency;*

*(b) Repeal all laws restricting public freedom;*

*(c) Cease all repressive actions against the people of the Territory, in particular, military operations;*

*(d) Release all political detainees and allow the return of those people who have been exiled or deported for political reasons;*

*"9. Appeals to all States to render all assistance to the people of the Territory in their efforts to attain freedom and independence;*

*"10. Draws the attention of the Security Council to the dangerous situation prevailing in the area as a result of British military action against the people of the Territory;*

*"11. Again invites the Secretary-General to enter into consultation with the specialized agencies and other international organizations with a view to providing assistance to the refugees from the Territory of Aden and Aden Protectorates;*

*"12. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Special Committee and the administering Power, to appoint immediately a special mission to Aden for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections and of making a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;*

*"13. Decides to maintain the question of Aden on its agenda."*

30. On 5 August 1966, the Secretary-General reported to the Special Committee that, on the basis of the Special Committee's resolution, he had begun consultations on the appointment of the Special Mission with the Chairman of the Special Committee, the members of the Sub-Committee on Aden and with the representative of the administering Power. He also reported that, on 1 August 1966, he had received the following letter from the representative of the United Kingdom:

"Her Majesty's Government welcome the assistance and participation of United Nations in achieving Her Majesty's Government's declared policy of bringing South Arabia to independence as a united sovereign state by 1968.

"Her Majesty's Government accept the operative clauses of General Assembly resolution 1949 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2023 (XX) of 5 November 1965, subject to its being recognized, first, that Her Majesty's Government's responsibilities for security cannot be limited or abandoned; and secondly, that Her Majesty's Government are bound by their existing treaties with the Federation of South Arabia and the unfederated South Arabian States until these treaties terminate. In particular, Her Majesty's Government are constitutionally unable to give directions to the 'Federal Government' except in matters of external affairs, defence and the public service, and have no power to impose changes in the Federal Constitution.

"Her Majesty's Government will be glad to co-operate with a mission appointed by the Secretary-General, subject to agreement on its composition, for the purpose of recommending practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the above-mentioned resolutions of the General Assembly and, in particular, for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections subject only to the two reservations noted in the preceding paragraph.

"I should be grateful for your confirmation that any mission appointed will operate on the above basis."

The Secretary-General also reported that in his reply to this letter he had stated, *inter alia*, that when he undertook the necessary consultations with the Special Committee, he would bring to its attention the reservations recorded by the United Kingdom Government.

31. The Special Committee debated the report of the Secretary-General at its 462nd meeting on 16 August 1966. During the debate several delegations stated that they found unacceptable the conditions laid down by the United Kingdom Government concerning the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions on Aden and in particular the sending of a special mission there.

32. In a statement made at the 473rd meeting on 19 October 1966, the representative of the Secretary-General said that the Secretary-General had taken fully into account the views expressed by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Aden, on behalf of that Sub-Committee, and by the members of the Special Committee at its 462nd meeting, on the letter dated 1 August 1966 from the United Kingdom Government and in particular on the reservations stated in that letter. The Secretary-General had had several consultations on the subject with all concerned, particularly with the Chairman of the Special Committee and the representative of the administering Power. He would report on the outcome of his consultations as soon as possible.

33. On 1 November 1966, the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly began its consideration of the question of Aden. It had before it the chapter of the Special Committee's report on its consideration of the Territory during 1966.

34. The Fourth Committee began its consideration of the question by hearing the following groups of petitioners:

Mr. Abdul Qawi Mackawee, General Secretary, Mr. Mohamed Salem Basendwah and Mr. Saif Dhalee, members of the Political Bureau, Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen;

Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, President and Mr. Sheikhan Abdulla Alhabshi, Secretary-General, South Arabian League, Aden;

Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi, General Secretary, and Mr. Saeed Ali Yaremi, executive member, United National Party, Aden;

Mr. Ahmad Abdullah Al-Fadhli, President, and Mr. Je'bel bin Hussein Al Audhali, member, Front for the Liberation of South Arabia.

35. On 16 November 1966, the representative of the United Kingdom addressed a letter<sup>a</sup> to the Secretary-General in which, *inter alia*, he invited reference to the following extract from his speech in the Fourth Committee on 10 November:

"On 1 August, as you know, my delegation addressed a letter to the Secretary-General welcoming the assistance and participation of the United Nations in achieving the aim of early independence for South Arabia, and promising to co-operate with a Mission to be appointed by the Secretary-General. That letter stated two facts. We thought it right and necessary to state them. But this statement of fact has, I know, given rise to doubts and misunderstandings, and I have carefully studied the comments made in the Committee of Twenty-Four. I wish to remove the doubts and misunderstandings which have arisen by making the following formal declarations:

"By drawing attention to these two facts it was not, and it is not now, the intention of my Government in any way to place obstacles in the way of the Mission. On the contrary, my Government wishes to reaffirm its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in working out practical steps by which the relevant resolutions can be implemented, and it is our clear and confirmed intention to co-operate with the Mission to enable it to make a full and constructive contribution."

He also stated in the letter that the United Kingdom Government wished to reaffirm its readiness to co-operate with the United Nations in the full implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions at the earliest possible time and the working out of practical steps in this regard.

36. After a lengthy and thorough debate lasting almost five weeks,<sup>b</sup> the Fourth Committee, on 2 December, approved a

<sup>a</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6514.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1620th, 1622nd-1629th, 1633rd-1640th, 1649th-1653rd meetings.

draft resolution submitted by thirty-eight Member States, by a roll-call vote of 100 votes to none, with 3 abstentions. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Iraq, on behalf of the co-sponsors, made the following statement with reference to operative paragraph 7 of that draft resolution:

"Nothing in paragraph 7 should be construed as constituting a precondition to the appointment and/or dispatch of the Mission to Aden. But the co-sponsors strongly urge the administering Power to lift the state of emergency when the Mission is there so as to enable it to discharge its responsibilities on the basis of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 15 June 1966."

37. On 12 December 1966, the General Assembly adopted the draft resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee, as resolution 2183 (XXI) by a roll-call vote of 96 to none, with 3 abstentions.

[For the text of the resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

## II. STUDY OF THE TERMS OF REFERENCE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PROGRAMME OF WORK

38. The Special Mission met in New York from 7 to 18 March 1967. It began its work by a study of its terms of reference as set out in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly, and by a review of the developments which had led to the adoption of that resolution. On 9 March, the Mission had its first meeting with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon. The Mission also had contacts with a number of other delegations of countries in the region, particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. It also had consultations with the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Mr. John Malecela. On the basis of all the elements it had gathered, the Mission established a programme of work which it made public on 17 March 1967.

### A. Preliminary talks with the representative of the United Kingdom

39. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that his delegation was anxious to help in any way it could in the implementation of the Mission's task. He had in mind particularly the Mission's programme and the arrangements to be made in preparation for its visit to Aden. On behalf of his Government, he extended an invitation to the Mission to visit London at any stage of its work.

40. The representative of the United Kingdom emphasized that the problem at hand was not confined to Aden alone, but related to the whole of South Arabia. The work of the Mission was one of the most delicate tasks ever undertaken by the United Nations and needed the co-operation of everyone concerned. He hoped that the Mission, after taking a fresh look at the whole problem of South Arabia, would give a lead in bringing independence and prosperity to the Territory.

41. The Mission informed the representative of the United Kingdom that it realized the difficulties involved and expected the assistance of the administering Power which was the authority responsible for the Territory. It was anxious to know what steps the United Kingdom would take in order to facilitate its task under the resolution of the General Assembly. The Mission emphasized that its responsibility was not limited to Aden but covered the whole Territory. It would approach its task with complete objectivity.

### B. Programme of the Mission

42. From the outset, the Mission was aware of the extreme importance of creating conditions which would be conducive to the success of its visit to the Territory. Within this context, the Mission felt that it was necessary to conduct talks with the administering Power in London, where it could meet the authorities responsible for the affairs of the Territory. Among the important points which the Mission wished to discuss in London were its own freedom of action and movement

in the Territory, as well as the people's freedom of access to it. The Mission should be able to interview the detainees; it was necessary for it to ascertain the practical effects of some of the emergency regulations (such as those relating to the curfew and to protected areas) upon its future work; restrictions which would create an impediment to its activities would have to be lifted immediately. Resolution 2183 (XXI) had called upon the United Kingdom to take the necessary measures so that the Mission could discharge its responsibilities. The Mission was also conscious of the fact that the various resolutions of the United Nations had urged the United Kingdom to lift the state of emergency in the Territory.

43. The Mission was anxious that it should be thoroughly apprised of all factors relating to the situation in the Territory, so that it could give all elements of the problem due consideration. According to the information it had received, there were large numbers of people from Aden and the Protectorate of South Arabia living outside the Territory and certain leaders of important nationalist movements were residing in neighbouring countries. The Mission was determined to try and be informed directly of all points of view and was therefore fully prepared to visit any place and meet with any representatives of the people in pursuance of its objective. The opportunity given to the Mission, after its initial contacts, to visit Cairo in the United Arab Republic and Jeddah in Saudi Arabia was welcomed by it. On 16 March it decided to proceed accordingly and to inform the Governments concerned of its decision.

44. As an immediate step the Mission felt that it would be useful for it to make a declaration on its future work. On 17 March it issued a statement (see appendix I below) which was widely publicized by the United Nations Information Services in New York, the Middle East and other centres concerned. In it the Mission particularly stated the following:

"As it prepares to leave Headquarters, the Special Mission wishes to stress that it is proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly."

#### C. Communications from the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY)

45. As it began its work in New York, the Special Mission was informed that FLOSY had announced its decision not to enter into direct contact with the Mission. The head of the Political Bureau of FLOSY, Mr. Abdullah Al-Asnag, in a communication to the Secretary-General dated 12 February 1967 and circulated as a petition (A/AC.109/Pet. 603) of the Special Committee, expressed the point of view that United Nations intervention should be suspended "till the United Kingdom Government had put into effect prerequisites laid down by the General Assembly since 1963". On 14 March 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Mission the text of another communication from Mr. Al-Asnag dated 18 February 1967. The main terms of this communication were as follows:

"... FLOSY is therefore keen to unmask British colonial conspiracy against our country. A United Nations Mission should not proceed to the Territory, until Britain has shown sufficient respect/adherence to the requirements outlined above.

"FLOSY has sufficient jurisdiction to accuse the United Kingdom of not being honest in its claim for a United Nations visiting mission. It needs no evidence to convince world opinion that the United Kingdom has planted enough mines and explosives to ensure interruptions causing the United Nations mission to fail in its noble task.

"In order to bring the picture closer to you, FLOSY would enquire in simple terms as to how the people of the territory could express their opinion freely while the following conditions prevail:

- "1. The non-representative Federal Government is still in power, and the Sultans continue to exercise unlimited jurisdiction over farmers and tribesmen. In violation of United Nations resolutions, the United King-

dom Government has formally declared its financial, military and political aid to that puppet government. An annual subsidy of 5-1/2 million pounds sterling is allocated by the United Kingdom for the Federal Government in 1966 for a period ending 1970. According to the British declaration of intent the region is expected to attain independence in 1968.

- "2. British troops continue to maintain positions in several parts of the region, in order to suppress the peoples' resistance against the rule of feudal lords.
- "3. Air/land raids continue to be organized by the British Army and Air Force against the defenceless local population who look for salvation from the yoke of the Sultans.
- "4. An atmosphere of terror prevails. Public liberties are suppressed. Mass arrests are carried out daily involving workers, students and clergymen. Curfew orders are imposed frequently in addition to the state of emergency which was put into effect as far back as 10 December, 1963.
- "5. British expatriates continue to hold senior positions in the public service, which allows them adequate influence on their subordinates from the local population.

"Attention is brought to the seriousness of the five points mentioned above, coupled with the recent statements made in the British House of Commons by leaders from both sides. Special reference is made to the British undertaking in the area, certain financial and defence obligations towards the Federal Government, and the possible intervention by governments in the Middle East hostile to our cause. (Statements made by Edward Heath, Sir Alec and Dennis Healey during February, 1967.)

"You may imagine the extent of impossibility for people living under such conditions to come forward and express their free will to a United Nations mission that intends to spend a month or so in the region leaving behind a distressed population at the mercy of hostile power.

"You may also understand why British policy towards the region is based on two factors:

"(a) To ignore the effective clauses of the United Nations resolutions, after having rejected them all since 1963;

"(b) To pretend being anxious to co-operate with a United Nations visiting mission while holding on to abnormal and most difficult conditions which should cause the mission to fail in its duty.

"Under these circumstances, FLOSY is left with no alternative, but to declare that its co-operation will not be extended to the mission unless the administering Power has stood up to its real responsibility and taken immediate measures to eliminate the obstacles as outlined in the five points above, before the despatch of any United Nations mission to the Territory. It must be stressed here that the position taken by FLOSY can best be described as in full agreement with all United Nations resolutions passed by the General Assembly in respect of the region over the last four years.

"It should also be remembered that FLOSY leads today the nation's armed struggle against the colonialists and their stooges, the Sultans and Amirs. It has a task to fulfil towards the people and the country, and in this spirit, FLOSY asks that its position should be well understood by those directly concerned, and that fraternal governments may please continue their support to our national struggle.

"Our people are being told by FLOSY to organize strikes, demonstrations and public gatherings in order to illustrate their unshaken resistance against colonialism and neo-colonialism. The Liberation Army will maintain its sacred fight throughout the visit of the United Nations mission blowing off colonial military and economical enterprises..."

#### III. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ADMINISTERING POWER BEFORE THE DEPARTURE FOR THE TERRITORY

46. In London, the Mission began its work with discussions with senior officials at the Foreign Office, headed by Sir Denis

Allen, Deputy to the Permanent Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office. These were followed by a meeting with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Brown, and later the Mission met the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. George Thomson, who had just returned from a short visit to the Territory.

47. During these discussions, the Mission heard the detailed views of the administering Power on various aspects of the problems at hand. The Mission was anxious to elicit replies to several questions which had to be clarified before its visit to Aden.

48. The United Kingdom officials stated that the United Kingdom Government attached great importance to the Mission. They asserted that the United Kingdom Government was a strong supporter of the United Nations and believed that through the Mission the United Nations could play an important role in reaching a solution in South Arabia that would enable the Territory to achieve independence in accordance with the wishes of the people. It was looking forward to co-operating with the Mission and would give it every possible assistance.

49. The representatives of the administering Power stated that the aims of British policy in the Territory were those outlined in the resolution adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 which called for independence for South Arabia and the withdrawal of the British base. Independence had been the goal since the first attempts to form a federation in 1959. Early in 1966, the United Kingdom had announced its intention not only to grant independence not later than 1968, but also to withdraw its base and to undertake no defence commitments afterwards. This remained the clear policy of the United Kingdom Government.

50. The United Kingdom Government wished South Arabia to reach genuine independence in unity, embracing all parts of the Territory as quickly as possible. It hoped that South Arabia would achieve recognition by neighbouring countries and be admitted to membership of the United Nations at an early date. In the achievement of these aims, there were three general considerations to be taken into account: (1) the existing situation in South Arabia; (2) problems related to the constitutional arrangements to be made before independence (the British officials considered that the Mission would have a most important role to play in this connexion) and (3) questions related to the time-table of independence and the modalities of the transition to independence. In their view the Mission could advise on these matters, but the administering Power had the right and duty to formulate its own ideas.

51. The officials informed the Mission that the United Kingdom Government had been formulating proposals on those three aspects. These proposals had already been presented to the "Federal Government" but had not yet been made public, largely because of the impending arrival of the Mission. They emphasized that in putting forward these proposals there was no question of the United Kingdom prejudging the issues; the United Kingdom Government wished only to assist the Mission in its work.

52. The United Kingdom was not committed to any particular form of government in South Arabia and was not seeking to impose an unrepresentative form of government; it hoped to see a more broadly based government representative of the people as a whole. It was simply untrue that it had a neo-colonialist desire in South Arabia; its concern was to evacuate its military personnel and to leave behind a stable government with prospects for a good future.

53. The Mission hoped that the discussions in London would result in facilitating its difficult and delicate task. While the United Kingdom Government had responsibilities in the matter, so too had the United Nations. The Mission emphasized that it was with the United Kingdom authorities that it would have to deal while in the Territory; it was bound by the position of the United Nations regarding the "Federal Government", as set out in the various resolutions. It hoped the United Kingdom would understand the Mission's position and assist it in overcoming any difficulties that might arise. While being firm on principles as established in the United Nations resolutions, it would be practical about the ways and means of

fulfilling its tasks. The Mission noted with pleasure the United Kingdom's reaffirmation of its intention to grant full and genuine independence and to withdraw the military base. It would be necessary, however, to look closely at the way in which the United Kingdom intended to achieve these objectives. The Mission agreed that it was important that the new independent State be recognized as such and that it be able to meet the conditions required to become a Member of the United Nations.

#### *United Kingdom proposals*

54. The representatives of the administering Power stated that the United Kingdom Government, in making its proposals, had to bear in mind also the views of the existing "Federal Government". Although not necessarily the best government, the "Federal Government" had authority, including the responsibility for internal security, in all the States of the Federation except Aden. In Aden the United Kingdom exercised authority because of its special position. Increasing terrorism stimulated from outside was of great concern to the inhabitants. Responsible people in the Territory were concerned also about the situation in the neighbouring State of Yemen and the pressure which might be brought to bear on their country after independence. All these matters produced anxieties and pressures within South Arabia. Representatives of the "Federal Government" had, therefore, put forward certain proposals which the United Kingdom had considered; the United Kingdom had then formulated its own proposals.

55. The United Kingdom's proposals were the following:

(a) On 1 November 1967, British sovereignty over Aden State would end, the protectorate relationships would cease and the treaties would lapse. The United Kingdom believed there might be an advantage in choosing a date when the General Assembly was in session: the independent South Arabia could then apply for United Nations membership. It could become a Member State and establish its own external relations. The date of 1 November was considered the earliest date by which the existing administration in the Territory could be ready to assume full responsibility for internal security in Aden. Federal forces were being equipped so that they could take over this responsibility.

(b) On 1 November 1967, the British base would be formally closed, and the British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East would strike his flag. All British troops and stores would be withdrawn as rapidly as possible and within a matter of weeks, so that the whole process could be completed by the end of 1967. In consequence of these two proposals, from 1 November 1967, the South Arabian Government would have complete responsibility for foreign affairs, defence and all internal affairs, including internal security. It would enjoy all the attributes of independence. The United Kingdom would accord recognition to the new State, establish diplomatic relations with it and sponsor it for membership in the United Nations.

(c) The third proposal was designed to meet the real concern that if independence came as early as 1 November 1967, there might be pressure from outside and the new State might not be able to sustain its independence. As the programme for equipping the local forces, including an air force, would not be complete by that date, the United Kingdom, if so requested by the independent South Arabian Government, would station in the vicinity of South Arabia certain naval units with air capabilities for a period not exceeding six months. They would have a purely deterrent role, and no role whatsoever in regard to internal security in South Arabia.

56. The representatives of the administering Power stated that although these proposals had been made to the existing "Federal Government", the arrangements would be made with the independent government of South Arabia. The United Kingdom hoped that this would be a different government which would embrace all South Arabia and would be much more representative. It was stated that, in general these proposals were not considered adequate by the "Federal Government", both for the present and the future. The Federal Ministers felt that the proposed date of independence gave them little time to prepare to take charge of the internal

situation and to be ready to defend themselves afterwards. They had insisted on more time to consider the proposals. In the meantime, they would neither accept nor reject them but would consider them. The United Kingdom had agreed to give them more time to consider the proposals and to discuss them with the United Nations Mission.

57. The Mission stated that it would have to consider the implications of the date proposed for independence and of the proposals connected with it. While it would not wish to delay independence, it had to be assured that independence would be genuine and in accordance with the resolutions of the United Nations. The Mission noted that the United Kingdom wanted the new caretaker government to be as representative as possible. However, it repeated its reservations concerning any contacts with the "Federal Government". The questions raised by the Mission and the discussion on it are contained in the relevant sections below.

#### *Situation in South Arabia*

##### (a) Unity of the Territory

58. The Mission raised the question of the complete unity of the Territory as defined in the United Nations resolutions on Aden.

59. According to the representatives of the administering Power the wish of the United Kingdom Government was that all the States, including those outside the Federation, should join to form one unit. They stated that the United Kingdom had done what it could towards this end, especially with regard to the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. At first those States had not wished to join the Federation of South Arabia. Later they had been willing to do so, but now they were unwilling again. The new State could be federal, confederal or unitary. There were five separate administrations in South Arabia, the federal administration and four separate state administrations. The latter included one small State in the western area, Upper Yafei, which had traditionally taken an independent view. It would make no sense for five States to come to independence as separate entities.

60. The officials emphasized that only Aden State was a British Colony, while the other States were not in a colonial relationship with the administering Power, but in a treaty, or protected, relationship. They denied allegations that Aden had been forced into the Federation; it had become a member of the Federation in 1963 by a vote of its Legislative Council, although the majority had been narrow. It was not correct also that there were two separate entities, Aden and the Federation, which were in conflict. Aden was part of the Federation and the Constitution contained provision for the secession of Aden. Aden State, however, was not typical of South Arabia; its population was not only Arab; there were also Yemenis, Somalis, Indians and Pakistanis. The standards of democracy in Aden were also quite different from those up-country where "tribal democracy" prevailed.

61. They stated that the basic difficulty the United Kingdom faced in South Arabia was in bringing together the port of Aden and the hinterland; there were a number of differences between these two areas, one of which was constitutional. Aden was a great port with a large military base (which was now being evacuated) and an oil refinery. A relatively sophisticated political community had developed in Aden, whereas in the Protectorates traditional forms of government and attitudes had persisted. However, although there were differences of views between the traditionalists and the nationalists in Aden, no one had suggested that all should not form part of one country, or that the port and the hinterland should not be joined in one State.

62. The United Kingdom representatives stated that the island of Socotra was part of the Sultanate of Mahra, while Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands were colonies and Kamaran was a Protectorate. The intention of the United Kingdom was that all of these islands should attain independence on the same day as the remainder of the Territory. The inhabitants would have to express their views concerning their future. It was pointed out that the islands were small in population: Perim had 400 to 500 inhabitants, the Kuria Muria

Islands had between 120 and 150, and Kamaran had about 1,500. Perim was near the Yemen-South Arabia border, and it would be natural if it became part of South Arabia. Kamaran was off the coast of Yemen and farther away from South Arabia. The Kuria Muria Islands were also farther away; they had little connexion with South Arabia, having formerly been part of the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman. After having been ceded to the United Kingdom by the Sultan, the islands had been administered from Aden purely as a matter of convenience. The United Kingdom officials thought it unlikely that the inhabitants of the Kuria Muria Islands would wish to form part of South Arabia.

##### (b) Lifting of the state of emergency and release of the detainees

63. The Mission pointed out that the United Nations resolutions called for the lifting of the state of emergency, the release of the detainees and other related measures. It raised the question of action being taken on this matter not only because it was called for in the resolutions, but as a means of reducing tension in the Territory and creating favourable conditions in which the Mission could carry out its work (see paras. 85-92 below).

64. The Mission inquired about statements in the Press relating to the possibility of Federal troops being brought into Aden because of the situation that had developed there recently. It was concerned that no new element should be introduced which would complicate an already difficult situation. The Mission was informed that this question had been raised by the "Federal Government" which desired a period during which their troops would be in charge of security in Aden. As a matter of principle, however, the United Kingdom found this difficult to accept. As long as the United Kingdom held sovereignty in Aden and was responsible internationally, it should hold power. The Federal authorities had been informed that the transfer of this responsibility should coincide with the transfer of all other powers. This did not exclude the possibility that some Federal forces should gain experience in Aden before the final transfer. The United Kingdom's decision on this matter could be affected by the formation of a new interim government.

65. The Mission expressed the hope that these responsibilities would be transferred to a representative authority instead of the "Federal Government".

##### (c) Security problems

66. The United Kingdom representatives stated that security problems existed mainly in Aden State, although incidents still occurred outside Aden from time to time. To some extent this could create complications for the Mission, especially with regard to the holding of elections. For example, an attempt had been made recently to hold elections in Dathina State but these had to be called off as all the candidates were threatened with assassination.

67. Within Aden State there had been a real deterioration in the security situation and a tragic development of terrorism over the last few months, since the United Kingdom had made it absolutely clear that it would be withdrawing its military base and granting independence to the Territory. In those circumstances, violence made no sense. Violence had spilled over in all directions and had become increasingly internecine, being directed by one faction against the other and not so much against the British. However, the United Kingdom was confident that it could fulfil its duty to maintain law and order.

68. The Mission was informed that primary responsibility for security in Aden rested with the police. It was only when the police failed to cope with the problem that Federal troops were brought in. There had been an exception recently when troops had been brought in, in advance, following incitements to demonstrations from Taiz.

69. In reply to a question concerning the number of persons involved, the Mission was told that it was necessary to distinguish between persons involved in bomb-throwing and those involved in demonstrations. The number of demonstrators was large, but the number of bomb-throwers was small. These terrorists were made up of two elements: first, the convinced fanatics, anti-British and anti-colonialist, who thought that

violence was the only way to achieve their aims; these persons were motivated by genuine political reasons. Secondly, there were persons who had been hired to throw bombs. They were less important as they were not politically motivated and were not full-time terrorists. The strikes and demonstrations were organized by persons who went around from house to house ordering people to close their shops and to come out and demonstrate, or else they would be assassinated. The people were frightened and obeyed.

*Arrangements to be made before independence*

70. In reply to questions put by the Mission concerning the plans envisaged by the administering Power before independence, it was stated that the United Kingdom considered it desirable, particularly at the present stage, to attempt once again to bring together representatives of the various groups. Such attempts had been made in 1964 and 1965 but had not been fully successful. It was in the normal course of events in British colonies to convene a constitutional conference before independence attended by representatives selected on the widest possible basis; at the conference, the administrative, legislative and juridical measures to give effect to independence were discussed and decided upon. The British officials considered that ideally such a conference should be held not later than June 1967; representatives of the Eastern States should participate. The future of these States as well as of the islands should be discussed and decided upon. It would be desirable if the Mission could make recommendations concerning participation in a constitutional conference. In the past, some parties had been unwilling to participate, but it was possible that in the light of the Mission's approach they might change their views.

71. The United Kingdom understood that the "Federal Government" was preparing a new constitution to provide for the transition to independence and beyond. This was not primarily a matter within the administering Power's responsibility, and it would be for the "Federal Government" to present their proposals to the Mission. The United Kingdom hoped, however, that the Mission would be prepared to consider these proposals at least as representative of one point of view. They were based on the report prepared by two British constitutional lawyers, Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell, in 1966. The United Kingdom understood that the "Federal Government" had tried to take into account the procedures laid down in the United Nations resolutions. The proposals provided for a Council of Ministers, different representation for Aden, and the institution of universal suffrage. These constitutional proposals would have to be translated into law as a basis for elections. The views of the Mission thereon would be helpful as a basis for a constitutional conference; however, neither the United Kingdom nor the "Federal Government" expected the Mission to accept them as the only possible proposals.

72. The representatives of the administering Power believed that, in broad outline, the proposals of the "Federal Government" should be generally acceptable to the States outside the Federation and to the political parties in Aden. The report of the two constitutional experts had been sent to all States, including those outside the Federation. It was believed that the new proposals conformed closely to those contained in that report and therefore should command a wide measure of acceptance since there had been no strong criticism of the report by the other States or by the Adeni leaders outside the Territory. It was also remarked that the proposals provided for strong representation for Aden State and the Eastern States.

73. The United Kingdom officials stated that the federal rulers were very anxious to meet the Mission and to cooperate with it. Although in the past, the rulers had been reluctant to involve the United Nations, they now genuinely wanted to help. They wished to discuss with the United Nations Mission the proposals made to them by the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom representatives added that the rulers were willing to see the basis of government broadened, and that they were willing to accept compromise and accommodation with leaders of other groups.

74. The United Kingdom officials remarked that the federal rulers were sometimes referred to as British stooges or puppets. They were sometimes described as an unrepresentative group of feudal sultans. These descriptions were not accurate, as the Mission would see for itself. The rulers represented a traditional form of Arab life in the Protectorates which could be described as feudal, although this pattern was changing fast. It would not be surprising that if elections were to be held, they were elected. In general, they had a more representative character than was sometimes allowed. In Aden itself, most of the Ministers represented the middle class, the merchant, lawyer and teacher elements. There was a great deal of intimidation in Aden and people did not speak freely; nevertheless, these persons represented a significant trend in Aden society. However, there was a big gap in representation in Aden in that there were no representatives of the workers. The task was to fill this gap.

75. According to the British officials, the existing local governments, although they might be unsatisfactory from a constitutional point of view, exercised authority and maintained law and order. It was necessary to start from them and move towards more representative authorities. While the representative character of the Federation could be disputed, one could not dispute the degree of co-operation between the various States in such fields as social welfare, education and communications: it would be a pity if all this were to be discarded.

76. In reply to the Mission's questions concerning elections, the administering Power stated that the necessary arrangements could only be made by the existing authorities, except in Aden where the United Kingdom would perform those functions. In most of the remaining States, the responsibility lay with the "Federal Government". The United Kingdom anticipated that there would be an interim government before the new government arising out of elections. All parties were agreed that elections were essential; however, elections were something new and needed much preparation. The franchise had not yet been introduced, there was no Nationality Act and electoral boundaries had not been established. Furthermore the necessary staff to conduct the elections would have to be recruited and trained. These procedures would take a long time, and the sooner a start was made, the better. The "Federal Government" had established five committees to consider these questions and they had been working on them since December 1966. The results of this study would be worth considering by the Mission.

77. The United Kingdom noted that it was important also to take into account the state of terrorism in Aden, and the fact that in some parts of the Federation there was a certain amount of dissidence. Elections should be held in freedom, uninfluenced from outside, and linked with real independence. The Federal Ministers and the United Kingdom felt that elections should take place after the withdrawal of British forces from the Territory.

78. In reply to further questions, the Mission was informed that any of the political leaders abroad could return if they were willing to obey the law and not organize illegal demonstrations or violence. For instance, one of the FLOSY leaders, Mr. M. S. Basendwah, had recently returned to the Territory and the Government had been pressed to arrest him. However, in view of the previous undertaking given by the United Kingdom representative at the United Nations, the Government had decided to release him. They had suggested that he make a broadcast on the Aden radio, but he had declined this offer. He had then been placed on an aircraft and left the Territory. In general, the United Kingdom welcomed the return of these leaders. It was also recalled that in 1966 the Federal Ministers had made definite attempts to establish working relationships with the opposition groups, including the leaders of FLOSY.

79. In the view of the administering Power, the basic problem was to bring together all elements and to reach agreement. The United Kingdom itself was trying bilateral approaches to the nationalist leaders. The difficulty about persuading the leaders to return to Aden was the increasing intimidation. This had been recently exemplified by the abominable murder

of Mr. Mackawee's children, which had been aimed at dissuading him from coming back to the country and joining in the dialogue.

80. With regard to the question of a United Nations presence in the area, the administering Power felt that there were ways in which a form of United Nations presence could be useful, such as at the constitutional conference and in the supervision of the elections. In general, the United Kingdom favoured a continuing display of interest by the United Nations in the integrity of South Arabia after independence. The more this was assured and demonstrated, the less necessary a continuing British military presence should be. The best form of assurance for the security and integrity of South Arabia lay in recognition by other States and membership of the United Nations.

81. The Mission felt that it would not be realistic to think of holding the usual type of constitutional conference on the Territory since Aden did not fall into the normal pattern of decolonization. It would therefore be more practical to hold a different type of consultation, outside the normal pattern of a constitutional conference and under United Nations auspices. It stated that any constitutional proposals originating in the "Federal Government" would have little chance of being accepted by a widely representative body of opinion in the Territory.

82. The Mission pointed out that its position vis-à-vis the "Federal Government" was clearly set out in the resolutions of the United Nations. Consequently, the Mission could not accord any recognition to the "Federal Government" and all its dealings would have to be with the United Kingdom through the High Commissioner in Aden. The Mission would not have direct contact with the representatives of the Federal Authorities; however, it would listen to them as representing one shade of opinion in the Territory.

83. The Mission expressed the belief that the government to be established should be a new broadly based government and not an outgrowth of the "Federal Government".

84. The Mission hoped that it would be able to bring the various groups together for discussions on the interim measures to be taken before the independence of the Territory.

#### *Matters directly related to the Mission's visit to the Territory*

##### (a) Measures the United Kingdom might take to reduce tension

85. The Mission stated that it was anxious to find out from all sides what could be done to improve the atmosphere in Aden, especially during its visit. Aside from the fact that a reduction in political tension would facilitate the Mission's work in the Territory, it was possible that a temporary reduction could lead to something more permanent. On the other hand, the Mission was anxious that its visit did not become the occasion for increased violence. The United Kingdom could play a significant part in improving the atmosphere. Measures such as lifting the state of emergency and releasing the detainees were embodied in the United Nations resolutions (see para. 63 above). It would be timely if the United Kingdom could take these steps or other related steps to ease tension at the time of the Mission's arrival. If the United Kingdom could give some assurances in this regard, the Mission would convey them to the groups it hoped to meet in Cairo and other places, in order to promote some kind of understanding.

86. The United Kingdom representatives pointed out that the state of emergency existed because of the terrorism and violence promoted from outside. It enabled the Government to carry out its basic tasks of maintaining law and order and protecting life and property. The situation was not normal and was not wholly within the control of the High Commissioner and other local authorities. In large part, control lay outside Aden and South Arabia. The United Kingdom welcomed the Mission's intention to pursue this question in Cairo. The strikes, terror and bloodshed would stop only if direct orders were to be broadcast from Taiz and Sanaa that there should not be any demonstrations or violence during the Mission's visit to the Territory.

87. The officials pointed out that, although the state of emergency had been in existence since December 1963, it

had not prevented the holding of the state elections in Aden in 1964. The emergency powers were exceptional powers which were held in reserve and their application depended entirely on the situation.

88. With regard to the detainees, the administering Power stated there was a constitutional provision for a regular review of cases and large number of detainees had been released. It was not possible to release such persons as known multiple murderers. With regard to police and military patrols, these were necessary to maintain order. The number of patrols was directly related to the amount of violence. As long as FLOSYP called for an increase in violence during the Mission's visit to Aden, the administering Power had no alternative but to increase measures of protection. It was also difficult to prevent reprisals and acts of revenge.

89. The Mission also raised the question of lifting the state of emergency and releasing the detainees with the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Mr. George Brown stated that the United Kingdom would be prepared to take some risks and lift the state of emergency if there was some evidence that terrorism had subsided. If the Mission's conversations in Cairo should make progress he would be prepared to consider the release of the detainees provided the Mission took the responsibility.

##### (b) Freedom of access to the Mission in the Territory

90. The Mission pointed out that, for the proper performance of its work, it was of the utmost importance that it should enjoy free and unimpeded access to all shades of opinion in the Territory. Simultaneously it wished to be assured that any person or groups who wished to speak to it there would be able to do so freely.

91. The representatives of the administering Power replied that the Mission need only let the High Commissioner know its wishes in advance as to any place it wanted to visit. If the Mission wished, it could see those persons held in detention. On the second aspect of the matter, namely free access to the Mission by the people, it was stated that the United Kingdom would do its best to ensure that anyone who wished to see the Mission could do so and that riots and demonstrations did not prevent people from seeing the Mission. However, the United Kingdom could not control the willingness of people to come forward.

92. It was agreed that after the Mission had arrived in the Territory, it would work out the practical details of how to ensure its freedom of movement and the freedom of access to it in consultation with the United Kingdom authorities there.

##### (c) Itinerary

93. The Mission sought the suggestions of the administering Power as to what itinerary it might adopt once it had arrived in the Territory. The United Kingdom officials drew up a tentative itinerary which they emphasized should be regarded as a set of suggestions and should not be construed as interfering with the responsibility of the Mission to decide on its own itinerary. This approach was in complete accord with the views of the Mission.

94. The suggested itinerary provided ten days based in Aden, five days based in Mukalla and a further six days based in Aden. From these centres, visits to various places would be made by road and air.

95. The Mission pointed out that it could not reach a final decision at that stage and that it would discuss its plans further when it reached the Territory.

96. The representatives of the United Kingdom expressed the hope that the Mission would visit the Eastern Protectorate; although the main problem relating to violence involved Aden, the main constitutional problem involved the three Eastern States of Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra. The Mission was told that on 5 April, a meeting was due to be held in Qa'iti State, which would be attended by representatives of all elements of the population. This meeting would decide what position to take with respect to the United Nations Mission.

97. The Mission stated that it would inform the United Kingdom authorities in the Territory of its wishes and would expect them to make the necessary arrangements. The Mission



was assured that the United Kingdom would do everything within its power to that end.

#### IV. VISITS TO CAIRO AND JEDDAH

##### A. *Contacts with political groups and organizations*

###### (a) Cairo

98. Before leaving New York, the Mission had taken steps to inform the public that it was willing to meet with all representatives of the people and was anxious to establish contacts with political groups and nationalist leaders who were outside the Territory. Its statement of 17 March to that effect had been publicized by the United Nations Information Centre in Cairo.

###### *Views of FLOSY*

99. Since FLOSY had an office in Cairo, the Mission hoped that it might be able to make contact with its representatives there. But it soon became clear that FLOSY had not changed its attitude regarding direct contacts with the Mission. However, since their main office was in Taiz, Yemen, it remained a possibility that the Mission would be able to visit Taiz, if a meeting with the FLOSY leadership could be arranged before its return to New York. Therefore, while proceeding according to its original plan, the Mission envisaged a visit to Taiz after Aden.

###### *Views of the South Arabian League*

100. On 28 March, a deputation of SAL members and supporters led by Mr. Al-Gifri, President, Sheikh Mohammed Abubakr bin Farid, member of the League's High Command, and Mr. Adnan Kamei, Mr. Awadh S. Bawazir and Mr. Mohsen Abubakr, members of the Aden Bureau, was received by the Mission at the United Nations Information Centre in Cairo. A closed meeting was then held with the representatives of the party. Mr. Al-Gifri made a statement and answered questions put to him by the members. A summary of his statement follows.

101. Mr. Al-Gifri was gratified by the establishment of the Special Mission on Aden which was the culmination of efforts at the United Nations from 1963 for the achievement of independence in South Arabia. The League had had a pioneering role in bringing the question of South Arabia before the international community. He estimated the population of South Arabia at two million, of whom half a million were emigrants residing in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Emirates, the Coast of East Africa and countries of the Far East, particularly Indonesia. Those emigrants hoped to return to their homes some day and take part in building the future of their country.

102. The objectives of the people were three: independence, unity and the transfer of sovereignty and all powers to the people through free elections under the supervision of a neutral body. Those objectives were embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations.

103. Mr. Al-Gifri stated that his party was the oldest political party in the South, having been established in 1950. It had carried the burden of the political and military struggle and had been active in various aspects of social life. About 500 students had benefited from scholarships made available to them by the League for studies in the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia and other countries. The membership of the League included people from all walks of life.

104. He said that unanimity on the justice of the United Nations resolutions had been reached, both inside and outside the Territory. However, attempts were now being made to defeat some of the aims of the resolutions by separating Hadhramaut from the rest of South Arabia or creating from it a State loosely linked to the rest in a confederation. There were several organizations in South Arabia, the most important of which were SAL and FLOSY. The importance of FLOSY was in Aden only, on account of factors not related to the will of the people and which he would not care to mention. Although the League was more than anybody entitled to claim that it represented the people and its aspirations, it had no right to advance such a claim under the

present complicated circumstances. However, FLOSY had lately made such a claim and it was absolutely false and baseless. Free elections were the only way to ascertain who truly represented the people. The attempt to impose such representatives was contrary to the resolutions of the United Nations.

105. Mr. Al-Gifri stated that South Arabia was genuinely burning with resentment against colonialism, the rule of agents and dismemberment of South Arabia. Strikes and demonstrations would meet the mission, particularly in Aden. However, some were trying to exploit those feelings by imposing a boycott of the mission. This was against the interests of the people. To those who said a boycott was necessary because the United Kingdom had not carried out the resolutions of the United Nations, he replied that had they carried out those resolutions, there would have been no need for a mission to recommend ways and means to carry out the resolutions, or even to keep the question of Aden on the agenda of the United Nations. The Mission should go to Aden and prevent the United Kingdom from executing its plans to consolidate the Sultan's rule. Should it be unable to do so, it could at least uncover and expose those plans on the international level.

106. He suggested that the Mission's meetings with the people should be private and that it should visit most regions, not only Aden. In Aden there were about 80,000 citizens of the Yemen Arab Republic who owed their allegiance primarily to Yemen. He felt that South Arabia should not be dragged into an international conflict or into the conflict in Yemen. He appealed for the neutralization of South Arabia from those overpowering conflicts. The United Nations could do a great deal in this respect.

107. The President of the South Arabian League made the following basic proposal. A conference of all parties concerned should be held either in South Arabia, which would be preferable, or in a neutral country. It should aim at the following.

(1) A provisional constitution should be drawn up for the whole of South Arabia (the Eastern and Western Protectorates and the islands attached to them). This constitution would expire as soon as an elected constituent assembly had been established and had approved the permanent constitution.

(2) A caretaker government should be formed with the agreement of the parties concerned. It should administer South Arabia and prepare for general elections for a peoples' constituent assembly.

(3) A transitional period of one year should be proclaimed immediately after the conference had completed its task. Elections should be held shortly before the end of the period of transition.

(4) As soon as the caretaker government was formed, all political organs of government in the South, namely the "Federal Government" and the three governments of Hadhramaut, should be abolished. All their powers should be transferred to the caretaker government.

(5) An effective United Nations presence should be established during the period of transition, and should continue until the elected assembly had been established and a government appointed by it. The United Nations should supervise the elections to ensure their fairness.

(6) Security powers should be vested in the caretaker government as soon as it was established.

(7) The conference should accept the principle of compensation for the victims of oppression by the military forces of the British Government, whether their losses were personal or property losses, as well as for those who had been deported or exiled.

108. In reply to a question, Mr. Al-Gifri stated that the dissolution of the "Federal" and other Governments in the Territory should come after the formation of the caretaker government. If the Federation was to be dissolved first, there was a danger that each ruler could go back to his State and proclaim his own independence.

## (b) Jeddah

109. The purpose of the Mission's visit to Jeddah was directly related to the hearing of people from Aden and the Protectorates who were living in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In this connexion, while in New York the Mission had been informed by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations that there were large numbers of South Arabians employed in many walks of life in Saudi Arabia. The Mission had been invited, in the name of His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz, to visit the Kingdom in order to ascertain the views of those people (see appendix II below).

110. The Mission arrived in Jeddah during the night of 29 March 1967. On 30 March, the Mission issued an announcement through the Press and radio informing the people of the Territory residing in Saudi Arabia that it wished to hear their views in order to assist it in recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations concerning their future.

111. The Mission heard twenty-two individuals and groups of petitioners, including a deputation of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah. It received fourteen written communications and fifty-one telegrams from South Arabians living outside the Territory (thirty-eight from Riyadh, eleven from Taef, one from Kuwait and one from Baghdad). The Mission was also handed a petition signed by 1,400 South Arabians living in Saudi Arabia.

112. From 30 March to 1 April, the Mission devoted a major part of its time to meeting people from the Territory who had come to express their views and to reply to questions put to them by members of the Mission. The names of the petitioners and the groups they claimed to represent are listed below:

(1) Mr. Said M. Bamaz'ab, on behalf of people from Wadi-Rikha, Wadi-Irmah, Duhr and Saut (Qa'iti Sultanate);

(2) Mr. Ma'roof Al-Braiki, on behalf of people from Shabwah;

(3) Mr. Ali Elwi Al-Mihdar, on behalf of a large number of people from Markhah;

(4) Mr. Qasim bin Yaslem Amr, on behalf of South Arabians living in Mecca;

(5) Mr. Hussein Al-Kaf, on behalf of people from Wadi-Amid (Kathiri Sultanate) living in Raiyadh;

(6) Mr. Fadhil Mohsen bin Tawil, on behalf of South Arabian students;

(7) Mr. Abdul-Rahman Gueilani, on behalf of Hadhrami merchants;

(8) Mr. Omar M. Al-Awaithani, on behalf of South Arabians in Raiyadh;

(9) Mr. Abdul-Qawi Al-Yafei, on behalf of people from Upper and Lower Yafei and Radfan;

(10) Mr. Salem N. Mashjari, on behalf of people from the Al-Mashajiri tribe (Wahidi Sultanate).

(11) Mr. Hassan Al-Baiti and Mr. Omar Bateis, on behalf of South Arabians born in Indonesia and Malaysia and living in Saudi Arabia;

(12) Mr. Zannoon S. Adhal, on behalf of several Adenis who came to Saudi Arabia on pilgrimage;

(13) Mr. Mohamed Ali Al-Toomah, on behalf of people from Wahidi;

(14) Mr. Said Al-Awaithani, on behalf of South Arabians living in Medina;

(15) Mr. Saleh Al-Qarmushi, on behalf of people from Jordan;

(16) Mr. Soleiman S. Al-Muhammadi, on behalf of the Seeban tribes (Hadhramaut);

(17) Mr. Ali Salem Husamah, on behalf of people from the Upper Aulaqi Sultanate and Sheikdom;

(18) Mr. Mohamed Baharoon, on behalf of people from Lower Aulaqi;

(19) Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim Fadhl, on behalf of people from Lahej;

(20) Mr. Abubakr A. Bawazir, on behalf of South Arabians born in Africa and living in Saudi Arabia;

(21) Mr. Mohamed Salem Bawazir and Mr. Ali Abdul-Karim, on behalf of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah;

(22) Mr. Ahmad Salem Al-Dini, on behalf of the Raidah-Dine tribes (Hadhramaut).

*Views of the South Arabian League Office in Jeddah*

113. The League members in Jeddah supported the statement made by the President of the League in Cairo. They added that certain groups in Aden, for their own selfish reasons, were committing sabotage and terrorism in order to defeat the resolutions of the United Nations and to bring about the failure of the Mission. Broadcasts from outside inciting the people to violence should be stopped. As to the British, while professing to abide by the United Nations resolutions, they were doing their best to dilute those resolutions and install an agent régime in South Arabia.

114. The League submitted the following practical suggestions on the implementation of the United Nations resolutions:

(1) A general amnesty should be proclaimed, political detainees released and exiles allowed to return;

(2) The state of emergency should be lifted and public freedoms restored;

(3) The independence of the judiciary should be guaranteed and a law setting out judicial jurisdiction should be enacted;

(4) Human rights and fundamental political freedoms should be guaranteed by law.

115. Elaborating on the functions of a central caretaker government, the petitioners stated that all the armed forces of the Territory should be unified and placed under its command. It should prepare and decide the date of the general elections for a constituent assembly, and should enact a citizenship law. The Special Mission itself should be transformed into an effective United Nations presence. An adequate international force should be provided and all armed forces in South Arabia should be placed under the command of the United Nations to keep order and prevent civil strife during the period of transition. No independence should be recognized without the unity of the Territory.

*Views of other petitioners*

116. The views of the petitioners as a whole are summarized below. Wherever a particular view was held by one petitioner or more, specific reference has been made thereto.

117. The petitioners expressed happiness with the arrival of the Mission in Jeddah and warmly welcomed it. Many of them stated that a boycott of the Mission was against the best interests of the South. The task of the Mission was a difficult one, owing to the deteriorating conditions and various problems in the South. There was a dangerous situation which might lead to bloodshed on a large scale.

118. The United Kingdom's colonial policy had led to dismemberment and disunity in South Arabia. Nothing had been done by the British to unify the various parts of the region. A number of petitioners stated that the sultans were the allies of the British and had subjected the people to tyranny and oppression. They were now trying, through threats and bribes, to influence the people and falsify their wishes.

119. The opinion voiced by some petitioners was that the United Kingdom supported the United Nations resolutions in words only; in fact it shared the responsibility for the disorder and acts of terror and exploited them for its own ends. It had helped in forming terrorist gangs in Aden under different commands which were struggling against each other. In some cases, it was stated, British soldiers had secretly committed acts of sabotage and terrorism.

120. A number of petitioners drew attention to the complete lack of economic and social development in the hinterland of the Territory. There were no schools or hospitals and the people were poor. Those conditions had led to waves of migration from Hadhramaut. Estimates of the number of South Arabians in Saudi Arabia varied between 100,000 and

300,000. The representatives of the students denounced the educational policy of the United Kingdom in the Territory. They asked that schools which had been closed down by the authorities in Aden be reopened.

121. Some petitioners stated that South Arabians, if left to themselves, would solve their own problems. They did not want any intervention from any side. However, there was now a campaign of terrorism in Aden directed by a handful of people who did not represent the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory. Aden was inhabited by various foreign communities, particularly Yemenis. These were being deceived and exploited by outside forces. They were being incited to violence by broadcasts emanating from Taiz in Yemen and Cairo in the United Arab Republic. The strikes and rioting were not the work of South Arabians but of foreign immigrants in Aden. Two petitioners denounced FLOSY and accused it of being the agent of a foreign state. The mission was asked to visit all parts of the Territory, particularly the interior of Hadhramaut, in order to ascertain the real views of the people.

122. The basic aims stressed by the petitioners were independence, unity and prosperity of South Arabia. It was emphasized that the whole Territory, including the islands attached to it, should be brought together before independence. General support was voiced for the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations on the question of Aden, particularly resolution 2183 (XXI).

123. The petitioners supported SAL. In reply to questions, they all stated that they were in agreement with its objectives and principles, although only some of them were actually members of the League.

124. A number of petitioners referred to the need for the establishment of a strong army and for the unification of all the armed and security forces in the Territory under one command. A few demanded that the United Nations guarantee the country's independence. International forces, it was stated, should be sent to protect it from "external and internal pressures". Some demanded that the state of emergency be lifted, detainees be freed (particularly in Qa'iti and Kathiri), freedom of speech be restored and a general amnesty be proclaimed. During the period of transition, one petitioner said, a ban should be imposed on the use of firearms and all information media should be controlled by the Government to prepare public opinion for the elections.

#### B. Contacts with Governments

125. The Mission took advantage of its visits to Cairo and Jeddah to have contacts with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Saudi Arabia. In Cairo it had useful talks with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, and other officials. In Jeddah it had useful talks with His Majesty, King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz and senior officials of the Foreign Ministry. Those discussions enabled the Mission to have a clear understanding of the respective positions of the two Governments with regard to the problem of Aden.

#### C. Contacts with the League of Arab States

126. On its arrival in Cairo, the Mission was informed of the desire of the Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to meet with it. The Mission welcomed such a meeting. On 27 March, the Mission was received at the headquarters of the League of Arab States in Cairo by the Secretary-General, Mr. A. K. Hassouna and Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Sayed Nofal. At that meeting the Mission was informed of the views of the League of Arab States on the question of Aden and was presented with a copy of a resolution concerning Aden adopted by the League's council on 18 March 1967. The text of the resolution is as follows:

##### "THE SITUATION IN THE OCCUPIED SOUTH

"Having reviewed the situation in Aden and the Occupied South in all its aspects, and after taking note of the recent developments of the colonialist policy which aims at maintaining aggressive colonialism and at renouncing previous

pledges by the British Government to evacuate the area and recognize its independence, the Council of the League of Arab States at its 47th ordinary session decides to:

"1. Condemn British colonialism and hold it fully responsible for the assassination of nationalists, particularly during the recent period and for the atrocious crimes it has committed which have been condemned by the world conscience everywhere.

"2. Hail the Arab people in Aden and the Occupied South in their struggle against British colonialism for the attainment of their freedom and sovereignty, and express its sincerest condolences to the Arab struggler Abdul Qawi Mackawee whose sons fell martyrs in the battle of freedom, and to the families of all other innocent martyrs.

"3. Give maximum support to the Arab struggle in the area against colonialism and its agents and consolidate it by all material, moral and human means.

"4. Recommend that the Arab delegations at the United Nations continue to follow up and intensify the measures they may deem necessary for emphasizing the independence of Aden and the Occupied South, the complete evacuation of the colonialist forces, the liquidation of the military base, as well as the exercise of the right of self-determination by the struggling Arab people under the supervision of a neutral government during the transitional stage.

"5. Pledge support to the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) in its struggle, and to extend all material and moral assistance to it, being the legitimate frame of the struggle of the people of the area.

"6. Denounce the attempts of the British colonialist Government and those who co-operate with it which aim at impeding the withdrawal of the British authorities in 1968, and the liquidation of military bases in the area."  
(The head of the Saudi delegation objected to the fifth clause.)

### V. VISIT TO ADEN

#### Introduction

127. Following its discussions with the administering Power in New York and London, the Mission was encouraged to believe that its position on essential points had been understood by the administering Power and that the necessary conditions for its work would be created in Aden. The Mission had also hoped that, as the objectives of its visit became known to the people in the Territory, there would be a lessening of tension and an improvement in the political atmosphere. Unfortunately, these hopes were not realized.

#### Arrival of the Mission in Aden

128. On 29 March, when the Mission arrived in Beirut on its way to Jeddah, it was informed that the commercial flight on which it was booked to Aden on 1 April had been cancelled on account of the general strike called to coincide with the arrival of the Mission there.

129. While exploring other possibilities for travelling from Jeddah to Aden, the Mission addressed a cable to the Secretary-General of the United Nations informing him of the situation and requesting, as a standby arrangement, an aircraft of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza to fly the Mission to Aden. After having considered various alternative arrangements, the Mission decided that, in the interest of its work, it should travel in the United Nations aircraft which the Secretary-General had promptly placed at its disposal as requested.

130. Three days before its arrival in the Territory, the Mission issued an announcement for the Aden Press and radio which was carried ahead to Aden by an advance group of the Secretariat. The announcement read as follows:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden wishes to announce that it will be in the Territory of Aden from 2 April 1967. Further information concerning the Mission's stay will be announced in due course.

"During its stay in the Territory, the Mission wishes to hear the views of the people in order to assist it in recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the

relevant resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations concerning the future of the Territory.

"Persons wishing to present their views orally to the Mission should address requests for such oral presentations to the Chairman of the Mission at the Seaview Hotel. Similarly, those wishing to submit their views to the Mission in writing should direct their communications to the Chairman at the same address."

131. The Mission left Jeddah in the United Nations aircraft in the afternoon of 2 April 1967 and arrived at Khormaksar Airport in Aden at 2000 hours local time. It was met by the Deputy High Commissioner and other officials of the British administration in Aden. The Mission was driven under heavy security arrangements to its headquarters at the Seaview Hotel. The hotel had been requisitioned by the authorities under the emergency regulations; it was reserved for the sole use of the Mission and the British and local staff attached to it. The hotel was cordoned off with barbed wire and protected by large numbers of armed police who were also manning observation posts on and around it. Other buildings in the vicinity had also been vacated and no one was allowed to approach the hotel without special permission from the authorities. The telephone communications were also directed through a special switchboard operator by the authorities. There were several checkpoints which visitors had to pass in order to reach the hotel.

*Contacts with the British High Commissioner and attempts to draw up a programme of work*

132. The Mission held two meetings on 3 April 1967 with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Richard Turnbull. At 10.30 a.m. the High Commissioner called on the Mission at its hotel; following that initial meeting, the Mission was flown by helicopter to Government House where a meeting was held with the High Commissioner and other officials. The main questions discussed at these meetings were the programme of work of the Mission and the position of the Mission in relation to the "Federal Government". Later in the evening, the Deputy High Commissioner and two other officials met with the Mission and put before it a tentative itinerary containing suggestions for the Mission's visits to other parts of the Territory.

133. On its arrival at the Seaview Hotel, it became evident to the Mission that the security arrangements surrounding it were a great hindrance to any direct contact with the people. The hotel was located away from the centre of Aden and the tight security arrangements around it made it impossible for people to have free access to the Mission. The Mission was also informed that, for security reasons, it could not move about freely in Aden. Although responsibility for security rested solely with the administering Power, the manner in which security arrangements had been made gave the Mission no access to the people. The essential condition for ascertaining the views of the people was thus lacking. Consequently the Mission's first concern was to see how it could, with the co-operation of the High Commissioner, lessen the restrictions and make itself more accessible to the people.

134. During the discussions with the High Commissioner, he pointed out that the security measures were needed not only for the Mission's protection, but also to protect the petitioners themselves who were under immediate threat from FLOSY if they defied the boycott and came to see the Mission. He added that certain potential petitioners had received telephone calls threatening them with reprisals if they contacted the Mission. It was pointed out that should the Mission use any other place for its meetings with petitioners, the same problems would arise. The High Commissioner suggested that the Mission might use Government House for the hearings. He hoped that after a few days conditions would become normal again and that the matter could then be reconsidered. However, the suggestion to use Government House for the hearing of petitioners was not acceptable to the Mission.

135. The Mission concluded that in the situation prevailing in Aden, it could not proceed with the hearing of petition-

ers there before the restrictions imposed by the security measures were removed. It therefore considered visiting other parts of the Territory. However, a visit to the Western Protectorate had to wait until the position of the Mission regarding the "Government of the Federation" was clearly understood by the High Commissioner. The only alternative therefore was to visit first the Eastern Protectorate. The High Commissioner had suggested that the visit to that region should last five days: two in Mukalla (capital of Qa'iti), one on the island of Socotra, the best part of a day in Kathiri and the rest in Qa'iti. The Mission was also informed by British officials that two days' notice would be needed to prepare for a visit to any place outside Aden; further, because of the heavy rains which had fallen just before the Mission's arrival, it was necessary to wait until 12 April for the visit to Mukalla. This explanation was contradicted, however, in the written itinerary, dated 31 March 1967, given to the Mission by High Commissioner officials (see para. 132 above) in which it was clearly indicated that the visit to the Eastern Aden Protectorate could not begin before 12 April 1967, "due to administrative considerations".

136. At its meetings with the High Commissioner, the Mission explained that, in accordance with the terms of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee, it would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory. The High Commissioner, however, seemed to be anxious to lead the Mission into direct dealings with the "Federal Government". He extended an invitation to the Mission to meet with Ministers of the Federation at a luncheon in Government House. The mission could not accept the invitation. The High Commissioner, however, continued to advise strongly in favour of a meeting between the Mission and the Federal Ministers. He pointed out that the Mission was obliged to deal directly with the "Federal Government" while in the federated States. He added that responsibility for the security of the Mission during its visit to the federated States rested with the "Federal Government"; his own responsibility was limited to making the necessary material arrangements for the Mission's movements and deploying to that effect the resources available to him. The High Commissioner further explained that the Federal Ministers were extremely anxious to talk to the Mission and wanted, among other things, to seek its help in bringing the Eastern States into the Federation.

137. Having carefully considered the situation in which the Mission found itself—the tight security measures surrounding the Mission and the High Commissioner's efforts to bring it into contact with the "Federal Government"—it decided that before proceeding further with its work, it should address a letter to the High Commissioner to clarify the two points.

138. Accordingly, the following letter was sent to the High Commissioner on 4 April:

"In the light of the conversations the Mission had with you yesterday, I should like, on its behalf, to reiterate the Mission's position concerning the Government of the Federation of South Arabia.

"The Mission has already referred to the resolution which qualifies the Federal Government as unrepresentative. Indeed, the text of the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 15 June 1966 reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

" . . .

"2. Deplores the setting up by the administering Power of an unrepresentative régime in the Territory with a view to granting it independence contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1949 (XVIII) and appeals to all States not to recognize such independence as is not based on the wishes of the people of the Territory freely

expressed through elections held under universal adult suffrage;

“ . . .

“4. Reaffirms the view that the responsibilities which devolve on the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as the administering Power cannot be shifted or circumvented through any action by an unrepresentative régime referred to in paragraph 2 above;”

“Further, the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI), by which the present Mission was established, endorsed that resolution of the Special Committee.

“The Mission would like to make it clear that in carrying out its responsibilities it cannot take any steps which would involve it in any way with the Government of the Federation. This position, which was well known to the Government of the United Kingdom, was further stated by the Mission during its discussions in London at the Foreign Office. It appeared to the Mission that this was fully understood and that therefore all its official contacts in the Territory would be through you, as representative of the administering Power.

“If the Mission is again raising the question at this stage, it is because of the importance the Mission attaches to it and also because it has realized in the course of its conversations with you that the implications of this stand have not been fully appreciated. In these circumstances, you will agree that arrangements being made for the Mission to carry out its work in the Territory should not be in conflict with the mandate of the Mission as set out in the resolution. The Mission would therefore appreciate receiving from you a clarification of this matter so as to enable it to proceed with its work in the Territory.

“The Mission would also like to recall the statement made by Lord Caradon at the United Nations, which was noted by the General Assembly in resolution 2183 (XXI), in which, in response to statements made by various delegations, he gave an assurance that the United Nations Mission would have free and unimpeded contact with the representatives of all shades of opinion in the Territory. The representative of the United Kingdom also stated:

“ . . . only the mission could determine whether the situation prevailing in the Territory permitted it to carry out its tasks, and the most important thing was that it should go to Aden as soon as possible and accomplish what was called for in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution. Only the mission, after it arrived on the scene, could decide whether and how it should proceed with its work.”

“Having arrived in the Territory and observed the situation, the Mission has found that the necessary conditions to enable it to carry out its work effectively do not exist. In particular, the Mission is not satisfied that the requirements are being met to enable it to have free and unimpeded contact with the people. It would therefore like to know what steps you could take to establish the necessary conditions for the proper functioning of the Mission.

“The Mission is confident that in relation to the points it has raised you will take into account the assurances given by the United Kingdom in the General Assembly, which were reaffirmed by the United Kingdom Government during its discussions with the Mission in London, that it would give the Mission its full support in the discharge of its functions.

“The Mission is transmitting a copy of this letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations to inform him of the situation in which the Mission finds itself.

“The Mission would appreciate an early answer to the points raised in this letter.”

139. Meanwhile the Mission received the following communications (see appendix III below) from Federal Ministers:

(a) A telegram dated 2 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council welcoming the Mission to South Arabia;

(b) A letter dated 2 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council informing it that a revised draft constitu-

tion had been approved by the Government of the Federation of South Arabia and other State authorities;

(c) A letter dated 3 April from the Chairman of the Supreme Council stating that the Ministers were looking forward to greeting the Mission in person and to discussing in detail the problems that faced the country;

(d) Two letters dated 3 April from the Ministers of Education and Health containing general information on the activities of their respective Ministries and accompanied by various brochures and publications.

140. In addition the Mission received the following communications containing requests for hearings:

Name	Title
Mr. Nasser Hasson Mudaffar	—
Mr. Hussein Nasser Hassan	Student
Mr. Salem Mohamed Baras and Mr. Rabea Rajeh	South Arabian League of Hadhramaut
Mr. S. A. Alhabshi, Secretary-General; Mr. A. A. Al-Gifri and Mr. A. O. Kutbi, Executive Members Sheikh Mohamed Ajroomah	South Arabian League, Aden Delegate of the Armed Resist- ance Forces for the Libera- tion of South Arabia <sup>c</sup>
Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi	Secretary-General of the United National Party
Mr. Mohamed Hassan Obali	—
Mr. Ahmad Abdullah Al-Fadhli	—

141. The Mission agreed that consideration of the above communications should be postponed until it had received the High Commissioner's reply to its letter. While awaiting this reply, the Mission, on 5 April, decided that it should ask the High Commissioner to arrange for the following:

(a) A visit to the detention centre at Al-Mansoura,<sup>d</sup>

(b) A broadcast by the Mission to the people of the Territory.

A formal request to this effect was immediately conveyed to the High Commissioner.

#### *Visit to the Aden detention centre*

142. As requested by the Mission, arrangements were made for it to visit the detention centre. At 1700 hours on 5 April 1967 the Mission set out for Al-Mansoura in a convoy heavily protected by armed police and British military forces. Inside the camp, it had a brief meeting with the Commandant and his aides. It was informed that the number of detainees stood at 112 and that since the beginning of the emergency a total of 252 persons had been detained at one time or another. The detainees were currently separated into two main groups, FLOSY and the NLF, interned in four “blocks”. The Mission was informed that the separation was preferred by the detainees themselves and was designed to prevent clashes between the factions.

143. The Mission walked around the compound of the detention centre. It did not meet with any hostility from the detainees. They indicated to the Mission that, in accordance with the decision of their respective organizations, they did not wish to have any direct contacts with it under present conditions. However, one of the detainees from FLOSY, on behalf of his colleagues, handed the Mission a copy of a statement dated 24 March 1967, describing the conditions “of repression and terror” in which the country lived since the

<sup>c</sup> From a preliminary inquiry, the Mission understood that this request emanated from an organization other than FLOSY or the NLF.

<sup>d</sup> The Mission had been informed by the High Commissioner that 108 persons were detained at Al-Mansoura, a section of the Sheikh Othman Township, under the emergency regulations. The Mission requested and obtained a list of these detainees and their period of detention.

proclamation of the state of emergency in December 1963. In this statement the detainees declared that they stood by the provisions of the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1965 which contained "the minimum demands of the people". The British were trying to evade those provisions, particularly with regard to the so-called Government of the Federation. The detainees wondered how the Mission could investigate conditions in an area where authority was concentrated in a structure fought by the people with the force of arms and opposed by the United Nations itself. The Mission's visit under such conditions could not help in implementing the resolutions; therefore they called on all national organizations to boycott the Mission. In conclusion they made three points: (a) the United Nations resolutions of 1963 and 1965 should be implemented in letter and spirit; (b) any conclusions arrived at by the Mission under the conditions prevailing in the Territory would not be binding; and (c) pressure should be brought to bear on the United Kingdom to negotiate directly with FLOSY, the leader of the struggle and the true and legitimate representative of the people.

144. A detainee who stated that he belonged to the NLF spoke briefly to the Mission in order to explain the attitude of his colleagues and to stress their support of the position of boycott adopted by their leaders. He added that their views and demands would be expressed by the leaders themselves.

#### *Statement to the people of the Territory*

145. The Mission was informed by the representative of the High Commissioner that, as requested, it could go to the studios of the South Arabian Broadcasting Station at 2200 hours local time on 5 April to make a live broadcast and telecast of its statement to the people. However, in order to do so, it would have to travel first by helicopter to a place about 400 yards from the studio and then by car up a narrow road through a village. Adequate protection could not be provided at night for the trip by road. In this connexion, the Mission was told that the Deputy High Commissioner's car had been wrecked recently by a mine planted on that road. The Police Commissioner stated that he could not assume responsibility for the safety of the Mission. It was therefore agreed that the Mission record its statement on videotape at the Seaview Hotel. For technical reasons, however, it was said that the recording would have to take place not later than 1700 hours. After further discussion, it was agreed with the United Kingdom officials that the mission would record its broadcast the next morning and that it would be broadcast in the evening twice, first at 2000 hours and next at 2100 hours.

146. On 6 April at 1300 hours, the Mission recorded the following statement at the Seaview Hotel as arranged with the High Commission officials:

"I am speaking on behalf of the Mission on Aden and am expressing the thoughts of my two colleagues and myself. I have on my right Mr. Abdussatar Shalizi from Afghanistan, Asia, and on my left Mrs. Moussa Léo Keita from Mali, Africa. I am from Venezuela, Latin America. We have been appointed by the Secretary-General U Thant to constitute this Mission on Aden, South Arabia, in accordance with a resolution approved by the General Assembly last December.

"You may know that the question of the independence of Aden and the Protectorates has been on the agenda of the Special Committee of the United Nations dealing with the question of self-determination and independence of colonial territories and of the General Assembly for over five years. The three countries that we represent, together with many other countries of our three continents and also of the other parts of the world, have shown their deep concern in this matter which is important not only for the people of the Territory, who of course are the main objective of the efforts being displayed at the United Nations, but also in terms of the peace of the region and of the world.

"I should add that the resolution of the General Assembly under the terms of which the Mission was appointed by the

Secretary-General was supported by 100 members of the United Nations, with no country voting against it. Under that resolution, the purpose of the Mission is to go to Aden and to recommend practical steps for the full implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular to determine the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of free elections. Furthermore, the Mission is to consider recommending practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker—or transitional—government to carry out the administration and to assist in the organization of the elections. The three of us are determined to do our best to perform the task assigned to us by the United Nations in complete objectivity. This cannot be done without the full co-operation of all concerned, and we hope that such co-operation will be forthcoming.

"Since we were appointed at the end of last February, we have been discussing this problem in New York in close contact with the Secretary-General U Thant, also in London with the British Government as the administering Power, as well as in Cairo and Jeddah. Now, we have come to Aden, which is the goal of our mission. We know how difficult the problem is in view of the situation that prevails at the present time, but we are hopeful that through the efforts of the United Nations and the co-operation of everyone concerned, progress will be made towards reaching the objectives as set out in the resolutions of the United Nations: that is, the unity of the Territory and its achievement of a genuine independence in the shortest possible time. It is only when the people of this country will be able to decide by themselves, in complete freedom, their own destiny that the United Nations can feel assured that the principles embodied in the Charter and the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly have been fully applied to the Territory.

"In the Territory we have been in touch with the High Commissioner and his staff as the representatives of the United Kingdom, which is responsible to the United Nations as administering Power. It is with them that we will deal officially in the Territory, and not with the Federal Government. We insist on having the assurance from the administering Power that we will have full opportunity of free and unimpeded contacts with representatives of all shades of opinion. It is in this manner, and only so that the Mission will be able to discharge its responsibility. To this end, the Mission has let it be known by the Press and radio, and we repeat it here, that we would like to encourage anyone who wishes to get in touch with the Mission to do so. We will spend in Aden as much time as is necessary and visit as well the other parts of the area, if we are convinced that it will serve the purpose of our Mission.

"We appreciate the confidence that is placed in the Mission as representatives of the United Nations, and you may rest assured that the Mission will spare no efforts to live up to the expectations of the people, knowing full well the difficulty of our task and recognizing the fact that no peaceful solution of this problem can be reached without the unified efforts of the people of the Territory as a whole.

"Our visit yesterday to the detainees at Al-Mansoura was another reminder of how important it is for this country to be liberated from colonial rule. Once this goal has been achieved, the energy of these young people and their brothers outside the prison walls will be available to build up their own independent country in peace and unity. It goes without saying that these aspirations could not be achieved unless all come together to work for the common goal.

"As soon as we have established beyond any doubt that we can have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territory, the Mission will commence its study of the situation in the Territory, in accordance with the directives given to it by the General Assembly, and gather from anyone concerned such information and ideas as would contribute to the success of its assignment."

147. However, at 2000 hours, the scheduled time for the first broadcast, instead of its recorded message, the Mission heard over the television an announcement to the effect that if it wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory, it should address itself directly to the "Federal Government". That the "Federal Government" had anything to do with the Mission's broadcast had never been mentioned by the High Commissioner or his staff. The announcement therefore was a complete surprise to the Mission, particularly since the High Commissioner not only provided the necessary services and facilities for making the recording, but had originally offered to arrange for the Mission to go to the studio and make its broadcast live. Furthermore, Aden being a Non-Self-Governing Territory, the Mission had no doubt about the propriety of addressing itself directly to the High Commissioner. It immediately contacted the British liaison officer to try to obtain an explanation and notified the British liaison officer that it was taking a very dim view of the matter. It was told that the High Commissioner was investigating the reasons for not telecasting the Mission's programme.

148. The Mission noted with regret that the pattern of non-co-operation on the part of the High Commissioner was evident. No effort had been made to have the statement broadcast at 2100 hours as scheduled. Shortly after 2100 hours, the Mission met urgently to consider the new situation. Until that moment, many difficulties had arisen, but the Mission had tried to overcome them because it was counting on the co-operation and understanding of the administering Power. Foremost in its thinking was the need to maintain the confidence of all parties concerned and to avoid its actions being misinterpreted; it hoped that in due course it would be meeting with representatives of all groups, even with those who were boycotting it. This incident confirmed the consistently unco-operative attitude of the High Commissioner and other officials on the spot. The Mission could not help concluding that obstructions were being placed in the way of its proper functioning. The fact that free and unimpeded contacts with the people could not be assured, led the Mission to the conclusion that conditions as a whole did not permit it to discharge effectively its responsibilities inside the Territory at that time. In its view no useful purpose could be served by the Mission prolonging its stay, and it therefore decided to leave Aden without delay and explore other venues for the practical performance of its mandate. The Mission notified the British liaison officer that it was initiating preparations for it to leave Aden the next morning. It was simply told, on express instructions from the High Commissioner, that the latter was still investigating the matter.

149. The Mission left Aden on 7 April 1967 at 0800 hours. However, before boarding the aircraft, it was asked to submit to a search of its luggage "for security reasons". The Mission, after protesting against this action which violated the rules of international courtesy and diplomatic practice, submitted to it.

#### VI. WORK OF THE MISSION AFTER LEAVING THE TERRITORY

150. The Mission arrived in Rome on its way to Geneva in the afternoon of 7 April. The Mission's arrival at the airport in Rome coincided with that of the Secretary-General who was paying a brief visit to Rome from Geneva before beginning his tour of Asian countries. The Mission met with the Secretary-General at the airport before his departure. At this meeting, the Mission informed the Secretary-General of the circumstances which had given rise to its departure from Aden and of its intention to go to Geneva to consider its future programme of work.

151. On arrival at the airport, the Mission was met by the United Kingdom Ambassador to Italy, Sir Evelyn Shuckburgh, who presented to the Mission a personal message from the Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, inviting it to visit London as soon as possible for discussions on the situation in South Arabia. In his message, the Foreign Secretary stated that he would welcome the Mission's "first-hand account" of its visit to Aden.

152. While at Rome airport, the Mission also authorized for the Press the following statement which briefly set out some of the reasons for its departure from Aden:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden regrets having had to leave Aden after only a brief stay there. The decision of the Mission to leave the Territory, in the existing circumstances, was made after a number of experiences which clearly showed that the United Kingdom authorities there were unwilling to extend to it the co-operation due to it from the administering Power.

"The Mission has always made it clear to the United Kingdom authorities that its official dealings in the Territory would be with the High Commissioner as representative of the administering Power and not with the Federal Government. It has also made it well known that it must have free and unimpeded contacts with the people of the Territory.

"Yesterday an unfortunate event took place which could not have occurred if the United Kingdom authorities in Aden, who knew the position of the Mission and of its acceptance by the United Kingdom Government, had wished to co-operate with it and enable it to discharge its responsibilities. As is well known by now, the Mission in the performance of its duty recorded a broadcast of a very important statement it wished to make to the people of the Territory over radio and television. This recording was arranged yesterday through the High Commissioner's office and was due to be telecast and broadcast at 8 p.m. last evening. However, neither the telecast nor the broadcast took place as arranged and the High Commissioner and his officials surprisingly appeared to be completely unaware of what was going on. Further, the Mission learned from Aden radio and television newscast that if the United Nations Mission wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory it should address itself directly to the Federal Government. No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioners' Office.

"This and other incidents demonstrated that the local British authorities were unwilling to co-operate with the Mission in the performance of its task. In the circumstances the Mission concluded that no useful purpose could be served by the Mission prolonging its totally fruitless stay in the Territory. It therefore decided to leave Aden without delay and explore other venues for the practical performance of its mandate. It must be clearly understood that existing conditions in the Territory are not conducive to the proper performance of the functions of the Mission there. Free and unimpeded contacts with the people, essential prerequisites for its work, were not made available by the British authorities in the field. The Mission will now continue its work outside the Territory and submit its report on its findings."

#### A. Geneva

153. The Mission arrived in Geneva from Rome on 8 April. It had come to Geneva to examine the new situation and to consider how it would be possible for it to continue its work in the performance of its mandate and, in this context, to consider the invitation from the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary.

154. First, however, the Mission felt it necessary to set the public record straight concerning its visit to Aden and its departure therefrom, since many of the press reports had been highly inaccurate and misleading. The Mission, accordingly, held a press conference at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 10 April.

155. The Mission then thoroughly reviewed the situation in which it found itself. Taking into account the importance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly and what it had so far been able to accomplish, despite the difficulties and lack of co-operation it had encountered, the Mission decided that it should explore all possibilities of enabling it to continue with its work. In this context, it decided to accept Mr. Brown's invitation to have further discussions with him and to visit London for this purpose on its way

back to New York. Before taking this decision, the Mission had discussions with Mr. William T. Rodgers, United Kingdom Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

156. Before leaving for London, the Mission felt it would be useful to let the Foreign Secretary know in advance its views on the matters it expected to discuss. The Mission therefore set out in a memorandum some observations it wished to make about its approach to its work up to that point; it also indicated the lines along which it suggested all concerned should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden, on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions. This memorandum which was enclosed in a letter dated 15 April addressed to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary is set out below:

"I should like to take this opportunity to thank you on behalf of the members of the Mission for your kind personal invitation to come to London to discuss with you the difficulties the Mission encountered in Aden. The Mission's decision to accept your invitation has of course already been conveyed to you.

"It is the Mission's hope that during the forthcoming discussions it will be possible to overcome some of the difficulties that arose during its first visit to the Territory and to establish clear and agreed guidelines for the future work of the Mission.

"To facilitate our discussions, the Mission felt that it would be useful to let you know in advance some preliminary observations it would like to make about its approach to its task thus far and to indicate, albeit tentatively, the lines along which it suggests all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden on the basis of relevant General Assembly resolutions.

"The Mission's observations and suggestions are set out in the enclosure to this letter and we would appreciate reaching an understanding with you on the suggestions it has made. The members look forward to discussing them as fully as possible with you in London."

*"Preliminary observations and suggestions by the Special Mission on Aden"*

"1. It may be useful, at the outset, to recall the resolution under which the Special Mission was established, namely resolution 2183 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1966. By this resolution, the General Assembly endorsed the resolution adopted on 15 June 1966 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. These resolutions set out the tasks entrusted to the Mission and indicate the framework within which it should operate. The Mission is not a fact-finding mission; its task is to recommend practical steps necessary for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of elections. The Mission is further requested to consider recommending practical steps for the establishment of a central caretaker government to carry out the administration of the whole Territory and to assist in the organization of the elections.

"2. Before leaving New York, the Mission stressed that it was proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

"3. The Mission believed that in London it had reached certain understandings with the Government of the United Kingdom, as the administering Power, which would considerably assist it in carrying out its task. Among the most important of these understandings were the following:

"(a) That the Mission would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory;

"(b) That the Mission would have freedom of access to the people of the Territory;

"(c) That the people of the Territory would have freedom of access to the Mission;

"(d) That, subject to certain conditions, the United Kingdom Government would consider lifting the state of emergency;

"(e) That the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to consider the release of detainees if the Mission recommended it from Aden.

"4. In Cairo, the Mission heard Mr. Muhammed Ali Al-Gifri, the President of the South Arabian League, who outlined certain steps which, in the view of his party, would assist it in the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly on Aden. The Mission also had useful talks with the Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic and with senior officials at the Foreign Ministry. While in Cairo, the Mission explored every possibility of making contact with the leadership of FLOSY, which had already decided to boycott the Mission.

"5. In Jeddah, the Mission heard a large number of petitioners representing South Arabians living in Saudi Arabia, including representatives of the South Arabian League. It also had useful talks with His Majesty King Faisal and senior officials at the Foreign Ministry.

"6. Because of the cancellation of the commercial flight it had intended to use to travel to the Territory, the Mission, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, arranged for a special United Nations plane to fly it to Aden.

"7. On its arrival in the Territory, it was necessary for the Mission to take stock of the circumstances in which it found itself and carefully to prepare the ground for its future work. The Mission could foresee many difficulties, but it hoped that, with co-operation and understanding on all sides, they could be overcome. Of particular importance to the Mission was the need to maintain the confidence of all parties concerned. As a result of approaches made by the Mission before it arrived in the Territory, it entertained the hope that before it returned to New York it would be able to meet with representatives of all groups, even with those who were boycotting it. The Mission was therefore deeply conscious that its actions in the Territory should not be open to misinterpretation and that the key to success depended upon establishing and maintaining a climate of confidence on all sides.

"8. Soon after its arrival, the Mission had two meetings with the High Commissioner. At both, the Mission made it clear that while in the Territory it would deal officially only with him as the representative of the administering Power. However, the Mission could not escape the impression that the High Commissioner and his officials were directing it into dealings with the Federal Government and into activities that, at the very least, would have been interpreted as according recognition to the Federal Government. Because of this, the Mission felt it necessary to seek a clarification. It did so in the letter to the High Commissioner on 4 April, a copy of which is attached.

"9. In the same letter, the Mission also raised another matter on which it felt the need for further assurances. The Mission, in accordance with its terms of reference, had always stressed the need for it to have free and unimpeded contact with the people of the Territory. However, the situation in which it found itself in Aden, surrounded as it was by tight security arrangements, was not such as to lead it to believe that the necessary free contact between it and the people could be established. In spite of these difficulties, the Mission was directing its efforts towards establishing an appropriate basis upon which it could effectively proceed with its work, in particular the hearing of petitioners. Up to the time of its departure from Aden on the morning of 7 April, the Mission did not receive a reply to the above-mentioned letter.

"10. Some of the circumstances surrounding the Mission's departure and the reasons which compelled it to take that decision were set out in a press statement issued at Rome airport on 7 April (copy attached). Finding itself cut off from the people of the Territory, the Mission had arranged



with the High Commissioner's Office to make a radio and television broadcast of a very important statement it wished to make to the people. The statement was recorded (copy attached), but was not broadcast at the scheduled time. Instead, the Mission heard an announcement to the effect that, if it wished to use the facilities of the broadcasting services in the Territory, it should address itself directly to the Federal Government. This incident, taken together with the attitude of the High Commissioner and his officials, led the Mission to the conclusion that the local British authorities were unwilling to co-operate with it and that no useful purpose could be served by prolonging its stay in the Territory.

"11. After discussing these developments with the Secretary-General at Rome airport, the Mission proceeded to Geneva to reflect on the situation and to consider how it should proceed further with the performance of its mandate. It is in this context that the Mission has agreed to accept the Foreign Secretary's invitation to go to London.

"12. It should be clear from the above that, from the outset of its work, the Mission, basing itself on the resolutions of the General Assembly, established a carefully planned programme of visits and contacts to enable it to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it by the General Assembly. Now that the Mission's plans have not been realized and that it had to cut short its visit to the Territory, the Mission is of the belief that it must clarify the basis on which it can proceed further with its work.

"13. Therefore, the Mission would set out the main steps that should be taken in order to fulfil the objectives of the General Assembly resolutions on Aden. These are:

"(1) The creation of the necessary conditions to bring about a return to normal political life in the Territory—namely, the abolition of the state of emergency, the repeal of all laws restricting public freedom, the release of political detainees and the return of exiles;

"(2) The establishment of a central caretaker government for the whole Territory under transitional constitutional arrangements;

"(3) The holding of general elections in accordance with the provisions to be drawn up by the caretaker government;

"(4) The establishment of an effective United Nations presence in the Territory, whose functions would include assisting in the implementation of the measures provided for in (1) and (2) above and the supervision of the general elections provided for in (3) above.

"14. It is the hope of the Mission that it will be able to contact all the major political forces in the Territory and seek their co-operation in reaching agreement on the formation of a central caretaker government and on the transitional constitutional arrangements."

157. The letter, with the enclosed memorandum, was handed to Mr. Rodgers for delivery to the Foreign Secretary on 15 April. In handing the letter, the Mission explained the purpose of the memorandum. It also emphasized the importance it attached to the forthcoming discussions and to receiving satisfactory assurances on the matters raised in the memorandum.

#### B. London

158. The Mission arrived in London on 16 April and spent the whole day from 11 a.m. till midnight at Dorneywood in discussions with the Foreign Secretary. The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Thomson, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Rodgers, and senior officials of the Foreign Office also participated.

159. The Mission elaborated to the Foreign Secretary the problems it had raised concerning its future work in its letters of 4 and 15 April. The Mission also gave the Foreign Secretary a full and frank account of its stay in Aden and of the circumstances that had given rise to its decision to leave. The Mission took note of a number of clarifications on the position of the United Kingdom Government that it had received from the Foreign Secretary during this discussion.

It was agreed that the Foreign Secretary would send a detailed reply to the Mission's letter of 15 April and that, on receipt of that reply, the Mission would determine its future course of action.

#### C. New York

160. The reply to the Mission's letter and memorandum of 15 April was contained in a letter dated 26 April from the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary. The text of the letter is set out below:

"With your letter of 15 April you enclosed a memorandum containing some preliminary observations and suggestions by the Special Mission on how all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden and South Arabia. A number of detailed points arose from the memorandum and also from your letter of 4 April to the High Commissioner, and, in the annex to this letter I have set out the British Government's comments and observations on those detailed points.

"Most of the matters dealt with in the annex to this letter concern the past, but the future is more important than the past and I wish in this letter to try to set out some of the purposes on which I believe there was broad agreement between the Mission and the British Government when we discussed these matters on 16 April, and also to describe the main objectives of the British Government's policy in South Arabia.

"Paragraph 13 of the Mission's memorandum describes a number of steps and objectives for the future. There is nothing in this paragraph with which the British Government does not whole-heartedly agree.

"One of the main points on which there seems to be general agreement between us is that there should be established a new central caretaker government for South Arabia which would be both politically and geographically all-embracing. When the new central caretaker government assumed office, it would follow that the present government would automatically cease to function.

"Moreover, I have already made clear to the Mission my belief that as a first step towards the establishment of the caretaker government there should be a round-table conference representing all shades of South Arabian opinion. I hope that the United Nations can play a major role in this. If the conference is to be effective it is important that those participating should include representatives of all shades of opinion in Aden and elsewhere in South Arabia including those whose leaders are now abroad and including also those whose leaders are members of the various South Arabian Governments.

"I believe that the United Nations, through the Mission, could have a most constructive and valuable part to play in establishing the conditions in which such a conference could be held and I greatly hope that in its declared spirit of objectivity the Mission will seek to establish the widest possible contacts with all shades of opinion inside and outside South Arabia with this object in view.

"Paragraph 13 of the Mission's Memorandum also refers to certain other points about the steps that should now be taken. I gave the Mission my own views on certain of these points during the discussions on 16 April and I have the following to add:

"(i) It is easier to list the conditions needed to bring about a return to normal political life in the Territory than to create those conditions. Had the British Government, for its part, been able to create these conditions alone, it would certainly have done so long ago. Co-operation is needed from certain other parties who are at present intent on inflaming the violence which has led to the state of emergency. In passing, I should like to point out that the phrase 'the return of exiles' is inaccurate; there are no restrictions whatever on South Arabian citizens now living abroad returning to South Arabia. Lord Caradon has stated several times in discussions of this question at the United Nations that all South Arabians are free to return to their country and that the British Government is ready to lift

the state of emergency when there is evidence that terrorism has ceased. My predecessor and I have also made this clear in the House of Commons.

"(ii) The caretaker government must clearly be created first, before it can draw up provisions for the holding of general elections, but I am fully agreed that this is an essential objective.

"(iii) The Mission did not explain on 16 April what kind of effective United Nations presence in the Territory might, in their view, be established. This is one of the points which I shall most look forward to seeing developed in the Mission's report.

"I note that it is the hope of the Mission that they will be able to contact all the major political forces in the Territory for the purposes set out in paragraph 14 of the Mission's memorandum. This too is a point which the Mission did not develop in the discussions on 16 April and again I shall very much look forward to hearing their ideas about how this should be accomplished.

"In conclusion, let me state that we too believe that the key to success depends on establishing and maintaining a climate of confidence on all sides. To this end I think it may be helpful to the Mission if I summarize in five points the chief objectives of the British Government's policies for South Arabia. Our purposes are these:

"(a) We wish to see peaceful conditions restored and the emergency ended.

"(b) We intend as soon as possible to end colonial status in Aden and to withdraw from South Arabia.

"(c) We intend to withdraw the British base.

"(d) We wish to co-operate in achieving the purposes stated in the General Assembly resolutions and to work with the United Nations Mission to that end.

"(e) We shall continue to work for the early and full independence of South Arabia with a stable and representative government."

#### "MEMORANDUM

"(This annex deals with certain points raised in the Mission's letters of 4 and 15 April to the extent that they are not already covered by the letter to which it forms an attachment.)

"The British Government entirely understands that the Special Mission to Aden was operating on the basis of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly. They were also aware of the Mission's difficulty over relations with the Federal Government. They believe that the Mission for its part was equally aware of the constitutional situation resulting from the British Government's treaty obligations to the local governments in South Arabia. Thus, while the British Government fully understands that the Mission is more than a fact-finding Mission in the sense that its task goes beyond fact-finding to the recommending of certain practical steps, it considers it inescapable that the steps could only be practical if they were directly related to all the facts. Moreover, the British Government considered that the importance of the work of the Mission for the future of South Arabia and for the prestige of the United Nations was too great for it to be allowed to falter on a question of this kind. The British Government had also in mind that missions in other colonial Territories had not been deterred from contacts with local governments, e.g., last year in Spanish Equatorial Guinea. They therefore believed, and still believe, that with flexibility on both sides, the question of relations with the Federal Government need not be an insuperable obstacle to the Mission's objective, which the British Government entirely endorses, of consulting all groups and all shades of opinion in South Arabia.

"In the third paragraph of the Mission's memorandum, five points are listed on which the Mission believed that it had reached understandings with the United Kingdom Government. These five points are set out rather briefly and of course both the British Government and the Mission have their own full records of all that was said. The British

Government feels, however, that in order to put these five points in their context it should make certain equally brief comments on them:

"(i) In paragraph 3 (a) the Mission said that it would have official dealings only with the representatives of the United Kingdom in the Territory. The British Government understood this and the High Commissioner was indeed fully prepared to act as a channel for this purpose. But it was also the understanding of the British Government that the Mission was ready to listen to those of all shades of opinion in South Arabia, including those represented by South Arabians holding ministerial positions in the Federal Government. There is nothing in any United Nations resolution debarring the Mission from meeting members of the Federal Government and the question of United Nations or other international 'recognition' does not in any case arise in the context of the government of a Non-Self-Governing Territory. As explained by Lord Caradon in the United Nations, and as Mr. Thomson explained to the Mission in London, the Federal Government is however validly established as a matter of local law and has been treated as such in the United Kingdom's own legislation.

"(ii) Paragraphs 3 (b) and (c) of the Mission's letter concerned freedom of access. On the need for this there was no dispute and the British authorities in Aden wished to do their utmost to ensure that the Mission was free to go where it liked and see whom it liked. This included the detainees, although the latter unfortunately boycotted the Mission. The only limiting factor in this was the violence in Aden which laid on the local authorities a very heavy burden of responsibility for the safeguarding of the Mission from injury and death.

"(iii) In paragraphs 3 (d) and (e) of their letter the Mission referred to the lifting of the emergency and release of detainees. In this connexion the British Foreign Secretary made clear to the Mission during its first visit to London that he would consider lifting the state of emergency and releasing detainees if the Mission was able to secure during its visit to Cairo a public declaration that terrorism should stop, even though he realized that he could not expect such a declaration to end terrorism entirely.

"As a result of the long discussion with the Mission on 16 April, the British Government now understands more clearly the reasons why the Mission did not wish to make any early arrangements to see the petitioners who were asking to be heard by them during the four days they spent in Aden. These reasons are set out in paragraph 7 of the Mission's memorandum and the Foreign Secretary is only sorry that the basis of the Mission's thinking was not more clearly understood while it was in Aden. Had the Mission explained to the High Commissioner, during the two meetings mentioned in paragraph 8 of the memorandum, he would have understood that the Mission did not wish to prejudice any conceivable remaining chance that the political parties which had announced their boycott might after all change their minds. Since this was not clear to the High Commissioner, he was understandably puzzled that the Mission was taking no decisions to interview these people in Aden who asked to see them. It was for this reason that the High Commissioner persisted in his attempts to make what he hoped would be suitable arrangements for the Mission to meet petitioners. The fact that these petitioners consisted mainly of Ministers of the Federal Government and representatives of the South Arabian League, whose views had already been heard by the Mission in Cairo and Jeddah, was not of the High Commissioner's choosing: it was the inescapable consequence of the fact that other political parties had decided to boycott the Mission and, as the Mission discovered on its visit to the Al-Mansoura Detention Centre, that the members of those parties were carrying out the boycott instructions which had been issued to them. In this connexion, the British Government notes that even in the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April, the fact that the Mission was still hoping for a change of mind by the boycotting parties was not explained.

"The tight security arrangements referred to in paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum were unfortunately necessitated by the conditions of violence prevailing in Aden at the time of the Mission's visit. It would have been inconceivable that the security authorities should have taken any risk of death or injury of the distinguished members of the Mission. Had the Mission succeeded, while in Cairo, in bringing about a reduction in this violence, the security precautions could have been correspondingly diminished, but unfortunately the Mission was not able to achieve this result. Nevertheless, there is a strong possibility, which the Mission did not put to the test, that if the Mission had begun to hear the petitioners who wish to be heard, numerous other petitioners would have begun to come forward and the Mission might have acquired valuable knowledge about various important shades of opinion in the Territory.

"In the last sentence of paragraph 9 of the Mission's memorandum, mention is made of the fact that no reply to the Mission's letter to the High Commissioner of 4 April had been received by the Mission up to the time of their departure from Aden on the morning of 7 April. As was explained to the Mission on 16 April, this was because the High Commissioner, recognizing the importance of the Mission's letter, had rightly felt it necessary to report it at once to the British Foreign Secretary. The letter was considered in London with the urgency and thoroughness which its importance merited. The discussions in London on 16 April will, it is hoped, be evidence that the reply would have sought constructively to meet the Mission's preoccupations and requirements. It had not crossed the Foreign Secretary's mind that there was any possibility of such a sudden departure from South Arabia, and in fact he sent instructions for a reply during the night the Mission decided to leave. It would have been with the Mission on the day on which it left.

"The Mission was also able to discuss with the Foreign Secretary at some length on 16 April the circumstances relating to the Mission's attempt to make a radio and television broadcast to the people of the Territory. As the Mission will recall, the Foreign Secretary explained on 16 April that broadcasting services were under the direct authority of the Federal Authority. Here again, if the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties with the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks in the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise. The Mission did of course receive a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden and he is sorry that the Mission did not feel able to reconsider their decision to depart. He is particularly sorry that in the statement made by a spokesman for the Mission at Rome airport on 7 April the Mission should have put forward a rather one-sided account of this particular episode. For instance, the statement that 'No explanations were forthcoming from the High Commissioner' makes no mention of the fact that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6 April and the Mission did not accept any of the calls."

161. After considering the reply of the Foreign Secretary, the Mission met with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations. The Mission drew attention to some of the statements contained in the memorandum annexed to the Foreign Secretary's letter which were at variance with the facts and therefore unacceptable. The Mission stated that, in due course, it would make an appropriate reply to these statements. However, the Mission, in a forward-looking spirit, wished to address itself to the Foreign Secretary's letter and, in this connexion, drew attention to a number of points on which it would welcome further clarification and elucidation. The representative took note of this request and informed the Mission that he was about to go to London for discussions with the Foreign Secretary and that he would pass on to the Foreign Secretary the matters the Mission had raised.

162. On 8 May, the representative of the United Kingdom informed the Mission of the results of his discussions

in London. He stated that the United Kingdom Government, believing that the United Nations had a very important role in South Arabia, confirmed its support for the purposes of the resolutions of the General Assembly, and further confirmed that it wished to give the United Nations Mission every assistance and full support. The United Kingdom Government welcomed the intention of the Mission to pursue its endeavours to sound all sections of opinion in South Arabia, and agreed that in order to do so the Mission must have unimpeded access to all sections of opinion. The United Kingdom Government did not expect the Mission to deal formally with the "Federal Government" and other local authorities. All political contacts in South Arabia would therefore be arranged through the British authorities. This should not preclude or impede the declared intention of the Mission to sound all sections of opinion, nor exclude hearing persons holding positions of local responsibility. None of this could carry with it any implication of international recognition of the "Federal Government".

163. The representative of the United Kingdom also stated that, with a view to establishing a central caretaker government as required by the United Nations resolutions, it seemed essential to try to achieve an early round-table conference of all concerned. This might well require further endeavours to make preliminary contact with various groups representing political opinion in South Arabia. The United Kingdom Government would welcome and support United Nations initiatives to these ends. The United Kingdom Government hoped that such initiatives would lead on to the early independence of South Arabia under a stable and fully representative government. The United Kingdom Government did not want to continue the present state of emergency and would warmly welcome all efforts towards the restoration of peaceful conditions. The Government was ready to lift the state of emergency when there was evidence that terrorism had ceased. As the Secretary of State had told the Mission in London, he would take some risks over this, but any government facing such conditions as those in South Arabia would need evidence that violence was no longer being promoted. Finally, the representative of the United Kingdom stated that his Government had repeatedly promised that independence would be granted to South Arabia not later than 1968. This made it essential that all necessary steps should be taken as a matter of urgency.

164. After considering these further clarifications given on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, the Mission decided that it was now possible effectively to continue with its task and accordingly it intensified its efforts to establish contact with the leaders of nationalist movements outside the Territory.

165. The Mission conveyed these decisions to the representative of the United Kingdom, to the representatives of a number of Arab States and to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. In conveying these decisions, the Mission sought the support and co-operation of all in bringing the efforts of the Mission to a successful conclusion.

166. During the latter part of April following the Mission's departure from Aden, Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio in the British Government, visited the Territory. On 11 May 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, in a statement of policy on South Arabia delivered in the House of Commons and communicated to the Mission, announced that he was arranging forthwith for Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to take over the High Commissionership in South Arabia. The Foreign Secretary stated that the aims of the United Kingdom Government would be: (1) the orderly withdrawal of British military forces and the establishment of an independent South Arabia at the earliest possible date; (2) to work in close consultation with all concerned and especially with the United Nations for the establishment of a broad-based government by the time of independence; and (3) on the basis of these two principles to leave behind a stable and secure government in South Arabia (see appendix IV below).

167. On 12 May, the Mission was informed that FLOSY had decided to meet the Mission and that, to this end, representatives of the party would be coming to New York.

168. The Mission's comments on some of the statements contained in the memorandum enclosed with the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary's letter of 26 April were forwarded to the Foreign Secretary in a memorandum accompanying a letter dated 25 May. The text of the letter and memorandum read as follows:

"On behalf of the members of the Mission, I should like to thank you for your letter of 26 April 1967 which was in reply to the Mission's letter of 15 April sent from Geneva and which enclosed a memorandum containing some preliminary suggestions on how all should work for a satisfactory solution to the question of Aden on the basis of the relevant General Assembly resolutions.

"As you are aware, the members of the Mission, after careful consideration of your letter and its annex, were able to discuss its contents with Lord Caradon before his recent visit to London. The members have also carefully studied the additional clarifications provided by Lord Caradon following his discussions with you in London.

"As Lord Caradon has no doubt explained to you, the Mission cannot accept some of the statements contained in the annex to your letter of 26 April. While the Mission agrees with you that the future is more important than the past, it nevertheless feels obliged to reply to some of the statements concerning the past in order to set the record straight. The Mission's comments on these matters are contained in the memorandum accompanying this letter.

"The Mission, having taken into account the clarifications it has received from you on behalf of your Government, is continuing its efforts with a view to discharging its mandate as set out in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI). In doing so, the Mission has been imbued with a sense of the importance and urgency of its task and the welfare of the people of the Territory. As foreshadowed in the memorandum attached to its letter of 15 April, the Mission is now taking steps to contact the various political forces in the Territory in order to seek their co-operation in reaching agreement on practical steps for the implementation of the resolution.

"The Mission will, of course, keep Lord Caradon informed of developments."

#### "MEMORANDUM

*"Comments by the Mission on some of the statements contained in the annex to Mr. Brown's letter of 26 April 1967"*

"The annex to Mr. Brown's letter of 26 April contains some obvious misrepresentations of the facts as they actually happened, and several of the comments are likely to give rise to a wrong interpretation of the Mission's decisions, in particular that concerning its departure from Aden on 7 April. For example, it is stated that the Mission would have received the reply to its letter to the High Commissioner on the date on which it left, but this is at variance with the information given to the Mission during the night of 6 to 7 April that it would take *at least* another twenty-four hours for the Mission to receive that reply. Again it is stated that '... If the Mission had stayed a further twenty-four hours in Aden, he [the Foreign Secretary] is convinced that it would have been possible to overcome the difficulties of the broadcasting authorities to which one or two of the remarks in the text of the broadcast had unfortunately given rise' and that 'the Mission of course received a message from the Foreign Secretary to this effect before leaving Aden'. It is not true that the Mission received a message to this effect. What happened was that at the time when the baggage of the Mission members was being taken down, the Chairman was informed that a message was being received from the Foreign Secretary which would be ready for delivery to the Mission in an hour or so. The Mission had never been told that there

were a couple of 'objectionable remarks' in the text. In fact, the Mission was told during the night that the High Commissioner was still investigating the reasons for not telecasting the Mission's programme.

"There are other statements which do not correspond to reality, as for instance the statement 'that the High Commissioner personally made three attempts to telephone to the Mission on the night of 6 April and that the Mission did not accept any of the calls'. In fact, there was just one such attempt, at a time when the Mission was in session. Immediately after the Mission had concluded its session, it asked to see the British liaison officer with a view to communicating with the High Commissioner. When the liaison officer arrived, he told the Mission, on instructions from the High Commissioner, that the High Commissioner was still investigating the matter."

169. In reply the Mission received the following letter dated 27 June 1967 from the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom:

"It is clear that we must agree to differ on some of the facts of what happened in the past. But the important thing is to look to the future and I am glad to have learned in our recent conversation that you and your colleagues are determined to continue the execution of your important work. I should like to take this opportunity to repeat to you my good wishes for the success of your mission and the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to help in any way it can."

170. On 19 June 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, in a statement made in the British House of Commons, put forward certain proposals concerning the future of the Territory. In this statement he appointed 9 January 1968 as the date of its independence.

171. The Foreign Secretary emphasized that the proposals should all be taken together and were subject to reconsideration; they consisted of three main parts which are summarized below:

(a) The United Kingdom Government had decided to accept, in respect of Aden State, a draft Constitution circulated by the Federal Government and based on the recommendations drafted by two British constitutional advisers in January 1966. This draft Constitution would include provision for a more broadly based caretaker Government as soon as possible.

(b) The United Kingdom had decided to increase its military assistance to the South Arabian Armed Forces (the Air Force and the Army), including the assistance of a British military aid mission after independence. It was prepared to continue to support the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the Eastern Aden Protectorate for two years after independence. In addition, it would station a strong naval force including an attack carrier in South Arabian waters for the first six months after independence. A force of V-bombers would be stationed on the island of Masirah, off the Omani coast, within easy reach of South Arabia, for as long as the United Kingdom Government might determine after independence.

(c) The United Kingdom had decided to suspend trial by jury in Aden in respect of terrorists' offences, subject to suitable safeguards for the defence of the accused. Furthermore, it had decided to lift the ban on the National Liberation Front and to consider releasing some of the detainees.

172. The full text of the Foreign Secretary's statement was communicated to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom.

#### *Further discussions with the administering Power*

173. The Mission met with the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, on 14, 15 and 18 July. From 26 to 28 July it had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, who came to New York in response to the Mission's invitation.

174. The Mission informed the representative of the United Kingdom that it did not consider the policy outlined by the

United Kingdom Foreign Secretary, Mr. George Brown, on 19 June, wholly consonant with the resolutions of the General Assembly. The Mission was disturbed by certain features of the Foreign Secretary's statement which were not in keeping with the resolutions of the United Nations; according to these resolutions the Territory included, in addition to Aden, the Eastern and Western Aden Protectorates and the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands.

175. The military arrangements outlined by the Foreign Secretary might be interpreted as a continuation of British domination. In spite of the understanding established between the Mission and the United Kingdom on the necessity of implementing the resolutions of the General Assembly, it seemed that developments were taking a different turn and that the United Kingdom was embarking on a course which rendered the role of the United Nations and the Mission ineffective. Thus, the mandate given a member of the "Federal Government", Mr. H. Bayoomi, to form a new government, was in direct contradiction to the agreement on the need for a representative caretaker government to be established before independence.

176. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that two points were absolutely firm in Mr. Brown's statement: the date of 9 January for independence and the removal of the British military bases by that date. The certain purpose of the United Kingdom was to achieve the unity of South Arabia and to bring the Eastern States within a unified government. The purpose of the defence arrangements was to provide some security against outside aggression. They constituted an offer which would be subject to acceptance by the caretaker government. No British officers would remain in the South Arabian Forces after independence. There would be a number of technical personnel, including hospital staff, as part of a military advisory mission totalling less than fifty persons. The advisory mission would be under British control and subject to the British Embassy not to South Arabia. The purpose of the United Kingdom was to see a fully representative caretaker government established as soon as possible. If this could be achieved, all other matters would fall into place. The military arrangements would depend on whether a genuinely representative government were established or not. He stressed that there were important sections of opinion in the Territory other than FLOSY which must have their say.

177. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the idea of internationalizing Perim had been put forward during a debate in the House of Commons. It was a novel and far-reaching idea and there was no previous case similar to it. The Foreign Secretary had not wished to reject it but had said that he was prepared to look into it.

178. The Mission pointed out that Perim under the resolutions of the United Nations was considered as an integral part of the Territory (see para. 174 above). The Mission could not envisage any plan which would lead to dismemberment or the detachment of any part, however small, from the Territory.

179. The representative of the United Kingdom communicated to the Mission the text of a statement made by Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio, on 17 July 1967 and containing clarification on certain points arising from Mr. Brown's statement of 19 June. The text of Lord Shackleton's statement reads:

"I do not want there to be any misunderstanding regarding the intentions of Her Majesty's Government. It is unfortunate that there has been some misunderstanding, even at the United Nations, because the bill relates only to Aden, Perim and the Kuria Muria Islands: and there is fear (which I should not have expected) that we are going to give independence only to those. As it is made absolutely clear, and as I know your Lordships understand very well, it is the firm intention of the Government that all parts of South Arabia for which they are at present internationally responsible shall become independent.

"I wish I could give a guarantee of the stability and prosperity of every country in the world. There are other areas where dangers exist, both in unitary and federal

States. The fact that Mr. Bayoomi has been charged by the Federal Government with the formation of a new Government does not denote a perpetuation of the Federal Government. His task is to form a provisional Government in anticipation of the introduction of the Constitution for the independent Republic of South Arabia. I do not want this to be misunderstood. I am inclined to try to get away from the words 'Federal Government', and to talk about it as the South Arabian Government. But that means that there is a change from the existing Federal Supreme Council. If Mr. Bayoomi is successful in forming a government which will be more broadly based than the Federal Government, his government might carry South Arabia forward into independence. But it is our hope that it will be possible to reach agreement on the formation of a central caretaker government in accordance with United Nations resolutions, and one which would be all-embracing, politically and geographically. In this event, Mr. Bayoomi will have carried out a useful task in making possible the formation of a more broadly-based government. But the difficulties are great. I can only say that I admire his courage.

"The purpose of the naval force is to deter external aggression, obvious open aggression, against the independent South Arabia, and not to perpetuate—and this again, seems to have been misunderstood; it has been misunderstood both in the Labour Party and at the United Nations—any notion of British military dominance in the area. The air support from the naval force and the V-bombers stationed at Masirah will be given only at the request of the independent South Arabian Government. The decision whether or not to accede to the request must be one for Her Majesty's Government alone."

The Mission considered that Lord Shackleton's statement provided a useful clarification of some of the points raised in previous meetings with the representative of the administering Power.

#### *Meetings with FLOSY*

180. The arrival of the delegation of FLOSY was delayed until the first week of July. According to information received by the Mission, the delay was partly due to the crisis in the Middle East. From 11 to 19 July the Mission held a series of meetings with the delegation which consisted of Mr. A. Q. Mackawee, Secretary-General of FLOSY, Mr. Salem Zain and Mr. Ali Salamy.

181. At the outset of the discussions with the FLOSY delegation, the Mission gave an account of its recent contacts with the United Kingdom Government and clarified its views on the issues which had been the subject of these contacts.

182. Mr. Mackawee stated that the United Kingdom had not been serious in its intentions. The implementation by the United Kingdom of certain provisions of the United Nations resolutions was being shelved completely. First, instead of dissolving the illegal and unrepresentative "Federal Government", the United Kingdom wanted to reinstate the same régime through Mr. Bayoomi, a member of the "Federal Government", who had recently been asked to form a new Government. Secondly, although the United Kingdom had originally accepted to remove its military bases in the area, it had now declared that it would leave its forces in Arabian territorial waters. Thirdly, although the island of Perim was an integral part of the Territory, the United Kingdom was attempting to use the United Nations to implement its own plans which were at variance with the United Nations resolutions (see paras. 177 and 178 above). The FLOSY delegation submitted to the Mission the following memorandum:

"1. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to present this memorandum in the name of our struggling people in the Arab South—Aden, the Eastern and Western Protectorates, Islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Socotra and the other important off-shore islands, in an attempt to explain all the developments that have taken place in our territory since November and December 1966, during which our delegation attended the

United Nations ordinary session, where they shed a great deal of light on our cause, which has invariably been receiving the consideration and attention of the United Nations since November 1962.

"2. The United Nations has not isolated itself from our people's struggle against British colonialism and all its organs in the area. In fact, the United Nations has continued to play an effective and constructive role through its committees in foiling the imperialist plots hatched by the British Government in an effort to stem the mounting national tide in the area, since the eruption of the armed revolution of 14 October 1963, which was deemed by the people as a necessary means to resist foreign influence, when all other peaceful means to attain freedom and independence have failed.

"3. The Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, which truly represents the people of the area whose delegation is now on a visit to the United Nations to plead its cause before sixteen Member States, would like to restrict its consultations and presentations of the South's case to the events that have occurred in the over-all situation since the General Assembly's resolution of December 1966, when the United Nations decided to send a Mission to the area to study and recommend the best possible means for ensuring the implementation of the United Nations resolution adopted on 5 November 1965.

"4. Before discussing the basic problem, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, however, to point out one basic fact to all Member States of the United Nations, the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and all other sub-committees—an established fact borne out by events which shall be detailed later—namely that Britain is not at all serious in her offer of granting the people of the area real independence, but merely makes a pretence of doing so both inside and outside the United Nations in furtherance of her colonial plans, and imposing her influence on the area by means that are no way different from its time-borrowed traditional means.

"5. The British Government has evinced, through Lord Caradon, her United Nations representative during the General Assembly's last session (November-December 1966), more enthusiasm than other States for sending a mission from the United Nations to discuss the means of implementing the United Nations resolution, after Britain had strongly refused systematically to admit to the area any fact-finding mission from the United Nations. It had even denied admission to representatives of the International Red Cross Organization and the Red Crescent Organization of the Arab States. The stand of the British Government in suddenly deciding to welcome the admission of a United Nations mission has caused surprise, but the Member States, when supporting such an admission to the area, were in effect making a test to Britain's seriousness and true intentions as to whether or not she actually meant to grant the area its independence in execution of the United Nations resolutions *in toto*.

"6. Everything was from the outset crystal-clear to the Liberation Front. Suspicions and doubts surrounded Britain's stand from all directions. Britain, which had in the past refused permission for the fact-finding mission to visit the area and, likewise, refused to declare formally her unequivocal acceptance of the United Nations resolutions, agrees abruptly to admit a mission to Aden to study means of implementing the United Nations resolution! The Liberation Front had kept close watch on the situation. All the reports received by the Leadership Council from the area left no doubt that Britain had a plan for striking at the Revolution and obliterating the United Nations resolutions which the Liberation Front uphold, by taking the initiative of demanding the admission of United Nations mission under circumstances which ensured Britain's interests and perpetuated the rule of the puppet Sultans, and through means advantageous to Britain alone.

"7. As soon as the United Nations General Assembly decided to send a Mission to the area, Britain immediately put into effect its plan designed to distort the pertinent

facts and falsify all the basic aspects of the situation to the Mission and suppress any nationalist voice that may reach the ears of the Mission. It may be relevant in this connexion to outline the methods employed for this purpose by Britain through her forces and the Sultans in the spurious Federation Government which can be summed up as follows:

"(a) A series of suppressive measures were taken by Britain against the nationalists, many thousands of whom were put in prison throughout the South, among whom were tribal chiefs in Lahej, Subbeiha, Yafei, Radfan, Dhala, Beihan, Aulaqi, Hadhramaut, Haushabi; for no crime other than that they had refused to accept the money and arms with which Britain tried to purchase their support for the Sultans during the United Nations Mission's visit to the area. The Liberation Front has in its possession ample evidence which it is willing to produce at the appropriate time.

"(b) The British forces carried out various assaults on all the villages and towns of the South, arresting thousands of citizens, and using unethical means to search their houses and farms. By ignoring the existing realities in the area and the conditions of the Revolution which it is undergoing, the British forces imagine that such actions could suppress the armed popular resistance. They fail to see that this resistance is an integral part of the struggle of the people, and an expression of their absolute rejection of the British presence in the area.

"(c) The British Government recruited mercenaries to substitute them for the British soldiers at inspection points and in patrolling the cities during the visit of the United Nations Mission to the area. The reasons were twofold: to prove that the puppet 'Federal Government' was capable of ensuring peace and security in the area; and to provoke an armed clash between the Arabs.

"(d) British Intelligence planned a series of sabotages and assassinations against the nationalists to be carried out by her agents, using criminal and barbarous means. Not only did these gangs murder the nationalists, but also they blew up their houses. They even blew up a bus carrying a large number of students from Bilgis College. Seven girls less than ten years of age lost their lives in the incident. In addition, shops were looted and cars stolen from travellers. The purpose was to attribute these acts of terrorism to the revolution, and thus discredit it in the eyes of the United Nations Mission, and tried to prove to the latter that the situation is one of civil struggle between the nationalists themselves.

"8. In spite of all these designs, planned and executed by the British Government as part of a broad campaign to falsify the truth about the will of the people, to discredit the revolution, to distort the United Nations resolutions, and to paralyse any possible effective action by the United Nations Mission; in spite of all this, the people's firm stand and their full support of FLOSY defeated all the imperialist manoeuvres. In fact, our people succeeded in preserving their struggle at the same level which continues to have the support and sympathy of the United Nations.

"9. All these measures taken by the British (which have been described above) convinced FLOSY that the United Nations would not be able to have the true picture of the situation. Furthermore, it was thought that the arrival of the United Nations Mission to the area under the existing suppressive conditions would not permit the people to exercise their daily activities and to express freely their wishes and hopes. All these factors raised further doubts which led FLOSY to adopt a reserved attitude towards the United Nations Mission's visit, leaving it up to the Mission to discover for itself the British plots aimed at deceiving world public opinion, and to verify the extent of the seriousness and honesty of the British Government in implementing the United Nations resolutions.

"10. The attitude of FLOSY to the United Nations Mission was not one of hostility, as the imperialist circles tried to show. On the contrary, it was one of complete respect for the Mission, and deep appreciation of the good intentions of all the nations which supported the decision

to establish it. But the measures taken by the British, before and during the visit of the United Nations Mission to the area, arresting citizens and striking at all the elements which could give the Mission a true picture of the situation as well as the intensification of the British military measures, led FLOSY to take a reserved stand vis-à-vis the visit of the Mission.

"11. *The Arrival of the United Nations Mission to Aden.* As soon as the members of the United Nations Mission arrived at Aden on April 2, 1967, the British forces surrounded their hotel, transforming it into a military barrack, thereby preventing the Mission from getting a complete idea of the means of expression used by the people in their daily struggle against the imperialists. The people's response to the call of FLOSY for a general strike and the demonstrations held in all parts of the South during the visit of the United Nations Mission to Aden, proved beyond doubt that FLOSY is the true representative of the people of the area.

"12. During these manifestations of the people's will, the name of FLOSY was written on cars, walls and shops, and FLOSY's flags were hoisted everywhere. Signs appeared calling on Britain to recognize FLOSY as the sole representative of the people. If Britain persists in denying these manifestations, and if she had barred the committee from witnessing them, the facts of the situation were completely covered by the foreign press agencies, radio and television and were widely reported everywhere. So was the behaviour of the occupying forces towards the masses of the people who participated in the demonstrations expressing their will for complete and genuine independence.

"13. When the United Nations Mission asked to broadcast a statement to explain its purpose to the people, and to dissipate the confusion with which the British mass media had surrounded its visit, the British suggested to its puppet Government of the Federation to refuse to broadcast the statement, unless the United Nations Mission agreed to deal directly with it. The stand taken by the British Government in this respect proved the suspicion of FLOSY that this Government had intended to divert the activities of the United Nations Mission into a new course which would run counter to its original intentions and obligations of trying to find appropriate means for the implementation of the United Nations resolutions. Britain's aim was to manoeuvre the United Nations Mission into some kind of recognition of the Government of the Federation, by forcing it to deal with the latter. It chose to ignore that the purpose of the Mission was to find means of implementing the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965, which declared that the Government of the Federation was unrepresentative and illegitimate and would be abolished. The resolution also called for the establishment of a national Government, truly representative of the people.

"14. Britain was the first Government to call for and support the resolution creating the United Nations Mission to Aden. It pretended to be serious about granting the area its independence, and of removing her military bases from Aden and the South. Therefore, when the United Nations Mission was constrained to leave Aden abruptly, Mr. Brown, realizing the extent of the scandal, hurriedly contacted its members and promised to abolish the Government of the Federation. He further promised to form a provisional Government which would prepare for the election of a representative Government which would be legitimately entitled to receive sovereignty. These declarations were included in a statement made by Mr. Brown, in which he indicated that they were part of an agreement concluded by the United Nations Mission and himself. Pursuing his deceptive manoeuvre, he sent his Minister Shackleton to Aden and replaced the High Commissioner with someone else in a further attempt to hood-wink world public opinion.

"15. During the events of the Israel aggression against the Arab Nations, an aggression supported by Britain and the United States, Mr. Wilson hastened to make clear his Government's real intentions, declaring that he would reconsider

his previous commitment regarding the withdrawal of the British troops from Aden. On June 19, 1967, Mr. George Brown, the British Foreign Minister, addressing the British Parliament, in what he called a major policy statement, completely revoked his Government's previous declarations in the United Nations and her promises to the United Nations Mission during the latter's visit to London. Mr. Brown set up January 9, 1968, as the date when Aden will be given her so-called independence, and stated his Government's intentions to keep the illegitimate puppet Government of the Federation, and to hand over to her the exercise of authority. He further made clear his Government's policy to keep air and naval bases in the area, for the protection of the puppet régime. In fact, the British Government has already sent reinforcements from London to Aden. The first battalion of British commandos reached the area during the last week of June.

"16. In his statement of policy before the House of Commons, Mr. George Brown, by suggesting the internationalization of the Island of Perim, clearly aims at using it as a naval base in the future. This Island, together with the Islands of Kuria Muria, Socotra and Kamaran form an integral part of the territorial boundaries of the South, as specified by the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965.

"17. The British policy towards our area, which has now become crystal-clear, is no surprise to us. FLOSY has always emphasized that the British promises and offers are no more than political manoeuvres to avoid the pressure of world public opinion, an opinion which materialized in a series of resolutions condemning the British policy in the area since November 12, 1962.

"18. FLOSY intends to prove in "his memorandum that the latest British declarations regarding its policy in Aden and all the South, in fact defy the United Nations resolutions and run counter to the responsibilities of the United Nations Mission to Aden. In this respect we would like to emphasize the following points in Mr. George Brown's statements:

"(a) Mr. Brown's pronouncements frankly confirm his Government's intentions to support the illegitimate puppet Sultanate Government, and to keep naval and air bases in the area for its protection. Consequently, this proves Britain's aim to perpetuate its Protectorate agreements with the Sultanates, Amirates and Sheikdoms of the South, agreements which the United Nations has declared illegal.

"(b) The United Nations resolutions clearly call on Britain to evacuate immediately its occupation forces from the area. Yet Britain now declares its determination to keep their forces there in the form of naval and air bases in territorial waters to protect the spurious Sultanate Government of the Federation. This fact was made clear by Mr. Wilson in the first week of June, 1967, when he declared that he would reconsider his Government's former policy regarding the withdrawal of its troops from Aden. This, despite the fact that Britain had already stated both in the General Assembly and in the Special Committee of Twenty-Four that they would evacuate immediately its forces and remove all its military bases from the area.

"(c) Britain made January 9, 1968, the date for handing authority to the spurious Sultanate Government of the Federation. At the same time, it continues to discuss in the United Nations the practical means to implement the United Nations resolutions and to relinquish sovereignty over the area to a national representative Government.

"(d) Mr. George Brown promised the British Parliament that his Government will retain the island of Perim, even though the United Nations resolution of November 5, 1965, had drawn clearly and definitively all the geographical boundaries of the South, which include Aden, the eastern and western Protectorates, the islands of Kamaran, Perim, Socotra, Kuria Muria and other off-shore islands.

"19. These facts now presented by the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen give a clear picture of Britain's real stand and its criminal in-

tentions towards the people of the area. It plans to continue its domination of the people through granting phony independence to a handful of Sultans whose interests have been tied to the British presence in the area for more than a hundred and twenty-five years.

"20. *The Existing Situation.* British forces are still launching a brutal war against the citizens in all the regions of the South. The British air forces are continuously raiding the the villages in Radfan, Yafe'i, Audhali and Halimayn. The destruction of crops and the killing of cattle is still going on. Tens of thousands of citizens expelled from their homes by the British forces are still living in caves and under the trees in the areas bordering the Yemen Arab Republic. They suffer hunger and disease, while being barred from returning to their homes unless they consent to hand in their sons as hostages to the present authorities, to be held in custody as a guarantee for their relatives' loyalty.

"21. Arrests continue on an ever widening scale. In addition to the detainees in Aden, thousands of prisoners are subjected to the most outrageous and savage means of torture in the prisons of Aulaqi, Beihan, Fadhli, Lahej, Subeiha and Haushabi States. The unethical and revengeful treatment of their citizens by the British soldiers have been proved by the reports of the Organization of the International Amnesty and the Red Cross.

"22. In the light of the latest developments in the Arab lands, FLOSY has reconsidered its military strategy to bring it in line with the facts of the recent situation in the Arab homeland; since the joining together of the Arab army, the Liberation Forces and FLOSY's commandos in Aden and other fronts, as well as the occupation of the Crater town which remained under the control of FLOSY for a while. The forces of our Organization also controlled the regions of Dhala, Aulaqi, as well as the British camps in these two regions, after the withdrawal of the British forces at the wake of the fierce attack which our forces launched against them.

"23. *The Stand of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen.* Having described the nature of the struggle in the Occupied South Yemen, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to state clearly its position:

"(a) FLOSY is the sole representative of the people of the South, and therefore the British Government must negotiate directly with its representatives, regarding the future and independence of the area.

"(b) FLOSY does not recognize the Government of the Federation or any of its organs and institutions; the Front considers this Government illegitimate since it was created and imposed by British imperialism. It should, therefore, be dissolved immediately in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations resolutions and the decisions of the committee for the liquidation of colonialism.

"(c) Britain must evacuate all its military bases from the area, immediately and unconditionally.

"(d) FLOSY will not give up its armed struggle, and the battle will continue until we achieve all our objectives, namely the complete and real independence which the people are struggling for.

"24. FLOSY, explaining clearly its position, calls upon all freedom- and peace-loving nations to lend their moral and material support to the people of the South in their struggle for genuine independence, until they get rid of imperialism and the corrupt conditions existing in the area.

"25. In concluding its memorandum, the delegation of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen would like to stress anew that the people will resist with all their might all and every British manoeuvre and attempt to dominate them, and will continue this forceful resistance until they have brought these attempts to an end once and for all. The manoeuvres can in no way destroy the will of people who have been fighting for their independence for the last three years. On the contrary, they will only increase our determination to continue resisting imperialism with the force of arms until final victory is achieved."

183. The delegation of FLOSY considered the appointment by the United Kingdom of a time limit for independence as a means of influencing the work being undertaken by the Mission. It felt that the United Kingdom wanted to separate Hadhramaut from the rest of the Territory in order to retain British influence after independence. FLOSY was confident that if it were to form a caretaker government it would be able to rule the whole country effectively with the support of the people. FLOSY embraced all nationalist elements and was represented not only in Aden, but in all other States including those of Hadhramaut. The two principal parties in Aden, the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied South and the NLF, had dissolved themselves and merged into FLOSY; so had other groups. However, certain dissident elements of the NLF had decided to maintain their name. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues had recently had discussions with them, and an agreement had been reached for them to be unified within the framework of FLOSY and to have seats in the Supreme Command of FLOSY. The South Arabian League had no effective presence; its offices in the Territory had been closed. As to the United National Party, it had no membership at all: it was considered by the people as a stooge party, as was SAL. The British and the Sultans had hired gangs to carry out assassinations against the nationalists. The nationalists would have nothing against the Sultans if they accepted to live in the country as ordinary citizens.

184. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues pointed out that the provisions of the United Nations resolutions concerning a caretaker government and elections should have been implemented immediately after they had been adopted. They were sure that if elections were to be held, the people would give their solid support to FLOSY. But in the present circumstances the atmosphere was not conducive to free expression. The Sultans and their British advisers were at the head of the various States and many members of FLOSY were in detention. It was impossible to have fair and impartial elections until the British had evacuated the military base and the present unrepresentative government had been dissolved. A national government should first be established and elections deferred until the necessary atmosphere had been created.

185. The Mission reaffirmed its conviction that the unity of the Territory, including the Eastern Protectorate and the islands, should be preserved, and that the island of Perim could not be detached either by internationalization or otherwise. The Mission conveyed to the FLOSY delegation the assurance given by the representative of the United Kingdom that many features of Mr. Brown's statement of 19 June were subject to change and that only the date of independence and the withdrawal of the British military forces were to be considered as firm commitments. It also drew the attention of FLOSY to the statement of Lord Shackleton in the House of Lords as communicated by the British representative (see para. 179 above).

186. The Mission stated that it attached importance to the news furnished to it regarding the merger of the NLF with FLOSY. That development would have a very significant bearing on the formation of any government. Any attempt to form a government by the elements comprising the federal government would be considered totally unacceptable. The formation of a caretaker government had to be in accordance with the resolution; there should be interim constitutional arrangements formulated by the broadly-based caretaker government in order to pave the way for an elected government. The Mission agreed that the present atmosphere had to change before free elections could be held and noted that FLOSY was not against the holding of elections in due course.

187. The Mission stated that as a practical measure towards the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly, it was considering the possibility of having a second round of meetings with FLOSY and others, including the NLF. It did not contemplate any round-table conference as such, but rather a series of bilateral meetings with



elements concerned. In case of agreement among the various parties, the possibility of a round-table conference would not be ruled out. The meetings would take place at the United Nations Office at Geneva so as to facilitate access to the Mission by the various elements in the Territory. The objective of the Mission was to bring the various sectors together in order to find a common basis for the formation of a broadly-based national government. In the meantime, the Mission would continue its discussions with the administering Power to whose participation in the meetings in Geneva it attached great importance.

188. Mr. Mackawee and his colleagues stated that they had to report to the Revolutionary Council of FLOSY on these matters. They had embodied their preliminary views in a second memorandum which was submitted to the Mission. However, they felt that if any talks were to be held in Geneva, British participation should be on a policy-making level, and consequently the talks should be attended by a Minister in the British Government. This was also the view of the Mission. The text of Mr. Mackawee's memorandum, dated 17 July 1967, reads as follows:

"FLOSY wishes to conclude its discussions with you regarding the present situation in the South by submitting the present memorandum which contains points representing the basic position of FLOSY. This memorandum will help you understand all the issues referred to during the discussions which have taken place between the delegation and the mission since Tuesday, 11 July 1967. These points can be stated briefly as follows:

"1. The task of the delegation of FLOSY which is visiting the United Nations at the present time is to bring the question before the delegations of Member States during the special session of the General Assembly, in the light of developments in the area and the attitude of Great Britain. This attitude was evident in the statement of Mr. George Brown in the House of Commons on 19 June 1967. It is in full contradiction of the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965, to which FLOSY has reaffirmed its adherence on several occasions.

"2. The delegation's task has also been to meet with the United Nations Special Mission on Aden to present FLOSY's point of view regarding recent developments in the light of Mr. Brown's statement. Mr. Brown has outlined the policy of Great Britain in the manner previously stated by the Front, namely, that Great Britain is not serious in granting genuine independence to the area, the policy declared by Great Britain is a blow directed mainly against the United Nations resolutions and the terms of reference of the United Nations Mission, as indicated in the memorandum submitted by the Front to the Mission on 11 July 1967.

"3. The delegation of FLOSY has, during its discussions with the United Nations Mission, maintained that the Front is the legitimate and the true representative of the people of the area. The Front includes all national groups active in the area. The Front refuses to meet with any other group, as such other national groups do not exist.

"4. The Front's delegation has clearly shown to the United Nations Mission that the Sultans and the so-called League of South Arabia and the party of Bayoomi are individuals and agents financed by Britain. Their views do not differ from those of Britain.

"5. FLOSY's delegation has reaffirmed its position regarding the idea of round-table conference, namely that it is an old colonial plan aiming at undermining the revolution in the area. The Front rejects this idea completely and considers that the only parties concerned in the question of the South are Great Britain as the administering Power in the area, and FLOSY which leads the national and popular struggle; any solution should be the subject of a direct dialogue between Great Britain and FLOSY for the purpose of transferring sovereignty and independence to the people.

"6. The Front's delegation has indicated to the Mission that the independence which Britain is preparing to grant

on 9 January 1968, and to protect with naval and air bases, is a false independence. The people of the area, led by the Front of Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, shall resist it violently, since it is but an integral part of a colonial scheme aiming at preserving colonial influence over the area.

"7. The Front's delegation has pointed out to the Mission that it is necessary, in its opinion, to establish a national government truly representing the people in the South. After its visit to the area the Mission has no doubt become convinced that the Front is the legitimate and true representative of the people of the South. . . . The Front insists that the formation of any national government to take over sovereignty from Great Britain is the sole right of FLOSY as the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area. Furthermore, in the formation of such a government, the Liberation Front is entitled to select the sincere national elements which it considers ready to adhere to the principles and national charter of the Front, and capable of working seriously and honestly at the service of the people.

"8. The Front's delegation has stated that, in its view, it is necessary to hold general elections in all the Eastern and Western areas of the South. The delegation has maintained that the Front considers that, as a first step, and in order to ensure free and impartial general elections, it is first necessary to dissolve the puppet federal government, to abolish the Sultans' rule in all areas under their hereditary régime, to lift the state of emergency, to release all political detainees and to evacuate the British forces from the area. These steps should be implemented simultaneously and before holding any general elections in the area.

"9. The Front's delegation considers that any constitutional arrangements for the transfer of sovereignty to the people of the area should derive from one basic principle; namely that FLOSY is the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area. Therefore, any constitutional laws should necessarily be in accordance with this basic principle.

"10. The delegation has confirmed to the Mission that Britain has a scheme aiming at separating the Eastern region of the South and keeping the Island of Perim under its control. FLOSY categorically rejects this scheme. It considers that the geographical boundaries of the South as a whole are Aden, the Eastern and Western Protectorates, the Islands of Kuria Muria, Perim, Socotra, Kamaran, as well as other islands, as provided for by the United Nations resolution of 5 November 1965.

"11. The Front's delegation reaffirms that Britain has no serious intentions of granting genuine independence to the area. All it wants is to stop the armed peoples' revolution led by FLOSY so that it can extend its influence over the area through a nominal and false independence entrusted to a handful of its agents.

"12. The Liberation Front deems it necessary to point out to the Mission that the people consider themselves in a state of continuous war with Great Britain, as witnessed by the Mission during its visit to Aden. This war will stop only if certain conditions which the Front considers to be consonant with the aims of the revolution and the national struggle in the area are satisfied; it will not stop under conditions suited to the British side.

"13. The Front wishes to preserve the closest relations with the United Nations Mission. It deems it important to state that the Mission cannot play a positive and effective role in securing genuine independence for the people of the South unless the British side recognizes FLOSY as the legitimate and true representative of the people of the area and enters into a direct dialogue with it, under the auspices of the United Nations Mission regarding all the modalities of the transfer of sovereignty and independence.

"14. The Arabic text of this memorandum is the original."

189. Following its meetings with FLOSY, the Mission issued a press release, the text of which read as follows:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden, in furtherance of the task entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), held a series of meetings with the delegation of FLOSY from 11 to 19 July 1967. The exchange of views which took place has, in the opinion of the Mission, been useful. The Mission will pursue its consultations in accordance with its mandate."

*Conversations in New York with the British High Commissioner in Aden*

190. The Mission held meetings with the United Kingdom High Commissioner in Aden between 26 and 28 July. The High Commissioner stated that terrorism and intimidation in Aden were inhibiting political activity; there was also some degree of dissident activity in some of the States outside Aden. South Arabian army units would shortly take over internal security duties in Aden. However, there was a real danger that these forces would disintegrate. If the present structure of government and the organs of internal security were allowed to collapse, South Arabia would fall victim to anarchy and civil war. There should be no gap in authority and governmental control between the present "Federal Government" and the broadly-based caretaker government to be established.

191. The High Commissioner informed the Mission that three battalions of the South Arabian Army would take over internal security duties in Aden beginning on or about 1 October. By the end of December, they would be fully in charge of Aden's security. It would be better that independence should be granted only after all British forces had been withdrawn, not as soon as a caretaker government had taken office. Independence should therefore await the withdrawal of British forces, which meant awaiting the readiness of local South Arabian forces to take over from them. In any case, the local forces would have to take over security in Aden, whether or not there was a caretaker government and a political settlement.

192. The High Commissioner stated that the elements now comprising the "Federal Government" were very willing to co-operate with other groups to form a more representative caretaker government. Following an initiative by himself, the "Federal Government" had asked Mr. H. Bayoomi to try to form a more representative administration which would be better able to negotiate with the political parties on the formation of a caretaker government. This was in no sense an attempt to pre-empt the other political groups or to make the "Federal Government" the nucleus of the caretaker government. The intention had been to reshape the "Federal Government" so as to bring it more into line with the provisions of the new draft constitution. There would be a Prime Minister and the Sultans would be replaced by other representatives of the States. The Sultans would then return to their States, in accordance with the provisions of the new constitution, whereby nobody could be both the ruler of a State and a member of the "Federal Government". The objective was at the same time to strengthen the control of the "Federal Government" over the Federal forces. However, on 27 July the "Federal Government" had terminated Mr. Bayoomi's mandate to form a new government.

193. The Mission believed that any new constitutional arrangements should be the result of the consultations to be held under United Nations auspices between the elements concerned. It was for the representatives of the people within a caretaker government to decide on a constitution, probably on a provisional basis until an elected legislature could ratify it. Sir Humphrey, although he agreed in principle with the Mission, felt that the United Kingdom could not hold up much longer the introduction of the new constitution prepared by the "Federal Government", unless there were political discussions on the formation of a caretaker government.

194. Sir Humphrey Trevelyan enumerated six main political groups which in his opinion might be considered for representation in the caretaker government and should have a part to play in any negotiations to that end:

(a) The "Federal Party". This consisted mainly of State rulers with a few Adenis. They had little influence or credibility in Aden, but very considerable power in many of the States. He considered that any government of South Arabia which excluded them was unlikely to be able to establish itself or to take up the realities of power, and the result might well be civil war.

(b) FLOSY. It had more influence in Aden than in the States but its main weakness was the absence of its leaders from the country. These leaders were free to return as far as the United Kingdom was concerned, but they were afraid to do so for fear of assassination by the NLF. He said that influence of FLOSY had tended to decline in recent months in comparison with the NLF.

(c) The NLF. This had been a purely terrorist organization in the past, but was currently evolving a political wing. It was a growing power in Aden and had waged a largely successful campaign of violence against FLOSY. It also had some influence in certain of the States.

(d) SAL. The South Arabian League had a respectable history and good leaders, but now had a waning influence and it no longer had a very significant following in the country.

(e) PORF. The Popular Organization of Revolutionary Forces was the militant wing of FLOSY responsible for much of the violence, but its affiliations were not clear.

(f) The TUC. Trade union affiliations were divided between FLOSY and the NLF.

195. The High Commissioner stated that recent events had belied the FLOSY claim that the NLF had no separate existence, and any NLF leaders claiming to have reached an understanding with FLOSY were unlikely to have effective control of NLF activities on the ground. The position in individual States varied considerably. In Beihan, the Sharif had full control and there was no FLOSY or NLF activity; in Audhali the Sultan had real influence and the NLF had some following; in Dathina the NLF and FLOSY had roughly equal influence; in Lahej FLOSY was considerably stronger than elsewhere outside Aden and in Dhala the NLF was stronger and the Sultan's control incomplete. There was little party activity in Aulqi. The NLF was probably stronger than FLOSY in the Eastern Aden Protectorate. In his view it was now emerging as a genuinely national, indigenous South Arabian party not dependent on outside support. It seemed to have more support than FLOSY in the police and the army.

196. The High Commissioner emphasized that it was essential to recognize that the "Federal group" represented a genuine power interest in South Arabia. He hoped it would be treated on exactly the same basis as other political groups. He did not think FLOSY was capable of forming a government; any government formed around a FLOSY nucleus was unlikely to be able to wield real power in the country.

197. The Mission pointed out that, in accordance with its mandate, it could not recognize the existence of any "federal party or group". However, in line with its desire to hear all shades of opinion within the context of that mandate, it was prepared to receive the views of the traditional authorities, both in the western and eastern parts of the Territory. It would hear them in their personal capacity as spokesmen for particular shades of opinion, and not as office-holders in a particular governmental establishment, since the Mission was precluded from any official contact with a régime which the General Assembly had qualified as unrepresentative.

198. The High Commissioner said that most political groups recognized the desirability of holding elections, but in the present conditions in South Arabia it was impossible to hold elections before independence. The hope must be that the caretaker government could organize elections, perhaps with United Nations help as soon as possible after independence, although this would be a long and difficult job.

199. The High Commissioner considered that the three eastern rulers should be treated as a political group. The question of the Eastern Aden Protectorate uniting with the

rest of South Arabia was political rather than constitutional. He was prepared to encourage the three rulers to form a single delegation to meet the Mission and take part actively in discussions leading to the formation of a new government. He suggested that they might perhaps be offered one third of the seats in a caretaker government (the other two thirds perhaps going in equal proportions to Aden and the Western Aden Protectorate).

200. The Mission reiterated to the High Commissioner its concern for the integrity of the Territory and its reservations about the British promise of military and other aid to the eastern states. He replied that the United Kingdom had no power to compel the three eastern States to accede to South Arabia on independence. The United Kingdom had made it clear, however, that all development and other civil aid would be channelled through the South Arabian Government. It would consider provision of compensation for the loss of customs revenue which the eastern States would incur upon joining the rest of South Arabia. On the other hand, the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion should not be allowed to disappear, and the United Kingdom would continue financial assistance for the Legion for two years, if possible, channelling such assistance through the South Arabian Government. This offer of financial assistance was conditional on the establishment of a committee to control the Legion and the Eastern Aden Protectorate local forces and on the reaching of agreement with the South Arabian Government concerning co-operation between that Government and the Eastern Aden Protectorate on the use of these forces. All British representatives would be withdrawn from the Protectorate on independence and British protection would then cease. He hoped that the Legion would eventually be integrated with the South Arabian security and defence forces.

201. The High Commissioner added that the United Kingdom Government had reached no firm conclusions on the islands. If the United Nations did not accept that Perim be placed under international control, the inhabitants, if and when consulted, would probably opt to be part of South Arabia. Kamaran was more of a problem since it had never been under British sovereignty and was a long distance from South Arabia. British protection would in any case be withdrawn on independence. The Kuria Muria islands had never had any connexion with South Arabia; they had been presented to Britain by the Sultan of Muscat and were administered from Aden as a matter of convenience. Finally Socotra was even less of a problem since it was for all practical purposes part of Mahra State in the Eastern Aden Protectorate.

202. The High Commissioner could not lift the state of emergency until there was some understanding with the political parties that they would end the violence. Meanwhile the "Federal Government" was enacting a new public security law which would give the necessary powers to the British forces before independence and the South Arabian forces thereafter. Under this law no detention without trial would be permitted beyond detention for interrogation of not more than twenty-eight days.

#### *Communication from the South Arabian League*

203. The following cable from the Secretary-General of the South Arabian League, Mr. S. A. Alhabshi, was received by the Mission on 27 July:

"The South Arabian League, the twenty-year-old political party still functioning only for the freedom, unity and healthy popular rule of South Arabia, and which boldly announced its unqualified support and co-operation with your Mission from the beginning, while welcoming recent move of other political and concerned parties terminating their boycotting your Mission requests: firstly, to refer and consider its two statements, one by its President, Mr. Al-Gifri in Cairo early April, the other by its Secretary-General, Mr. Alhabshi, airmailed to you from Aden dated 17 April 1967; secondly, that any resolution be in conformity with its said two statements; thirdly, reasserts the extreme urgent necessity to convene a conference which it should attend; fourthly, that your Mission kindly inform

date of opening debate or talks which it is willing take part anywhere."

#### *Announcement by the Mission*

204. On 29 July the Mission issued the following communiqué:

"In a recent press communiqué, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden announced that it had held a series of fruitful meetings with a delegation of FLOSY (Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South Yemen) in New York and that it would pursue its consultations in accordance with its mandate. Subsequently, from 26 to 28 July 1967, the Mission had conversations with the British High Commissioner in Aden, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, within the context of resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

"The Mission considers it important that it should have further meetings with the elements concerned. For their convenience, these meetings will start at the United Nations Office at Geneva on 11 August 1967."

### VII. WORK OF THE MISSION IN GENEVA, BEIRUT AND CAIRO

#### *Introduction*

205. The Mission was in Geneva from 10 August to 1 September 1967. It heard the following groups representing various shades of opinion in the Territory:

- (a) The United National Party of Aden;
- (b) A delegation of the traditional authorities of the Western States;
- (c) A delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra State;
- (d) A delegation of the traditional rulers of Qa'iti and Kathiri.

206. On 17, 18, 24 and 25 August the Mission had discussions with Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio, who came from London for that purpose; it also had meetings with the representative of the United Kingdom in Geneva, Sir Harold Beeley.

207. In Beirut, where the Mission arrived on 1 September, the Mission had further talks with Lord Shackleton. It heard a representative of the ATUC, Mr. Ali Aswadi, and three other petitioners from the Western States. It left for Cairo on 6 September and departed for New York on 12 September. In Cairo, the Mission had further talks with a delegation of FLOSY and met with representatives of the Government of the United Arab Republic and with the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States.

#### *A. Work of the Mission in Geneva*

##### *Appeal by Mission to nationalist elements*

208. Upon its arrival in Geneva, the Mission was informed that the National Liberation Front had called for a strike in Aden in protest against "the Mission's decision to meet with Sultans and stooges". While regretting that the discharge of its mandate should have given rise to any misunderstanding on the part of one of the political elements concerned, the Mission was hopeful nevertheless that the NLF would reconsider its decision not to co-operate with the Mission.

209. In view of the foregoing, and in the absence of information from FLOSY as to when its delegation might be expected in Geneva, the Mission issued the following public statement:

"Following the announcement made in its press communiqué dated 29 July 1967, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden has arrived in Geneva in order to hold further meetings with the elements concerned at the Office of the United Nations. In the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI), the Special Mission is ready to hear all shades of opinion in the Territory. At the same time, in order to dispel any misunderstanding which may exist, the Mission wishes to make it clear that it continues to adhere strictly to the spirit and the letter of the above-mentioned General

Assembly resolution, the objective of which is to bring the whole Territory of Aden to genuine independence.

"The Mission is convinced that this purpose cannot be achieved without the full participation of all the nationalist elements. The Mission is equally convinced that at the present juncture the full and sincere co-operation of these elements as well as of the United Kingdom as administering Power, is required for the attainment of the objectives of the General Assembly resolution. As previously indicated, the Special Mission will begin its work on 11 August 1967. Elements wishing to consult with the Special Mission are requested to communicate with the Principal Secretary, Special Mission on Aden, Office of the United Nations at Geneva."

*Meetings with representatives of the United National Party of Aden*

210. The Mission met with Mr. Abdul-Rahman Girgirah and Mr. Hussain Ali Bayoomi, representatives of the United National Party of Aden on 21, 25 and 26 August.<sup>e</sup> They explained that the United National Party did not claim to represent the whole of South Arabia. Its activity and membership were confined to the State of Aden, where it had the support of the vast majority of Adenis. Nevertheless they were prepared to admit that the State of Aden had no viable alternative but to remain in association with the other States of South Arabia. Mr. Girgirah read out the text of a statement of policy previously conveyed to the Mission during its visit to Jeddah in March.

211. This document stressed the pledge of the United National Party to struggle for the freedom of South Arabia and its independence under a representative government. The United National Party believed in the need for co-operation between all individuals and political parties in establishing an independent government elected through the democratic process. It condemned the use of violence to impose a political solution, and was convinced that the best hope for South Arabia lay in the implementation of the United Nations resolutions.

212. The present situation of unrest and chaos was the result first of Great Britain's exploitation of the country and its neglect of the rights and aspirations of the people, secondly of the inadequacy of Adeni representation in the existing "Federal Government" and thirdly of the threat arising from "Egyptian imperialist ambitions". In order to remedy this situation, the United National Party statement outlined a number of constitutional measures which in its view would improve the present governmental structure and thus provide a suitable basis for the caretaker government envisaged in the relevant United Nations resolutions.

213. Mr. Girgirah affirmed that the presence of FLOSY, the NLF and SAL in the new caretaker Government would be highly desirable. He added that Mr. Bayoomi had recently attempted to form a new Government not on the basis of political parties but of personalities. His failure had been most unfortunate but the United National Party hoped that with the support of the Secretary-General, the Mission would succeed in uniting all the political elements and, in particular, FLOSY and the NLF. In his view, the claim of each of these parties that it was the sole representative of the people was unfounded.

214. The United National Party had thought in terms of an equal division of seats in a new South Arabian Parliament between Aden and the Western States. But if the Eastern States were to join the Federation the allocation could be one third for each component, notwithstanding the fact that Adenis were more sophisticated and more economically developed and more experienced in democratic life. The present Government was ready to give a pledge that it would hold elections under United Nations supervision within a reasonable time after independence. The United National Party was in favour of the Eastern States uniting with the rest of

South Arabia and was convinced that the United Kingdom Government could bring them within the framework of a new Government if it so desired. But it seemed that the United Kingdom Government was using the bad example of unrest, chaos and corruption in the Federation as a pretext to discourage them to join. The United Kingdom Government had also resorted to the tactic of refusing to compensate them for the loss of revenue which they would incur when, on joining the Federation, existing customs barriers were eliminated.

215. Mr. Girgirah assured the Mission that the United National Party would favour the dissolution of the present Government, provided that another structure was created in its place. The United National Party was prepared to make whatever sacrifice was necessary to assure the future of the country. To avoid a gap, Mr. Girgirah suggested that under the supervision of the United Nations and pending general elections, the civil servants be given authority to run the country. They were doing so at present and they were the healthiest and least corrupt element on the political scene of South Arabia. He also hoped that the United Nations recommendations would be made binding on all the parties and that the Government of the United Arab Republic would co-operate by putting the necessary pressures on the nationalist leaders concerned.

216. Mr. Girgirah and Mr. Bayoomi lodged a complaint with the Mission regarding the recent behaviour of the British troops in Aden; these troops had frequently subjected inhabitants of Aden to cruel and humiliating treatment, and such behaviour would clearly not contribute to a reduction of existing tension (see para. 252 below).

*Meetings with the delegation of traditional authorities from the Western States*

217. Between 21 and 26 August the Mission met with representatives of the traditional authorities of the Western States. The delegation was composed of Sheikh Mohammed Farid (Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdum), Sharif Qaid bin Hussein (Beihan), Amir Ali Mohammed Said (Wahidi), Sheikh Ali Atif (Lower Yafai), Sultan Saleh bin Hussein (Audhali), Naib Saleh bin Abdullah (Upper Aulaqi Sultanate), Sultan Nasser bin Abdullah (Fadhli). Accompanying the delegation as advisers were Mr. M. H. Obali and Mr. S. A. Naika.<sup>f</sup>

218. Sheikh Farid expressed the determination of the delegation to spare no effort to facilitate the task of the Mission and their conviction of the importance of ensuring the emergence in peace and unity of an independent South Arabia. Mr. Obali added that to this end the "Federal Government" was anxious to discuss with the other elements the draft constitution which it had recently prepared and circulated. Mr. Obali then read out the text of the following memorandum:

"We have the honour to submit for your information, and for the information of your colleagues in the United Nations Mission to South Arabia, the views of the States of the Federation of South Arabia on certain aspects of the situation in South Arabia today.

"First and foremost, I must emphasize that the States have accepted the United Nations resolutions without reservation and have publicly welcomed the appointment of a mission under your leadership. It is the intention of the States of the Federation of South Arabia to do all in its power to assist the Mission to obtain a resolution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

"It is the view of the Federated States, however, that it is of paramount importance that the ideals of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Rights of Man should be pursued by peaceful means, by democratic methods, and by orderly constitutional development. In particular it is desirable that constitutional development should evolve from within South Arabia and should not be imposed artificially by external forces; and that the steady progress of South Arabia to unity and independence should

<sup>e</sup> The petitioners addressed the Mission in their capacity as members of their party, although they were also connected with the "Federal Government".

<sup>f</sup> The members of this delegation were also connected with the "Federal Government".

not be hindered by campaigns of violence and bloodshed inspired by ambitious and self-seeking elements from outside our country. In pursuit, therefore, of full and genuine independence from the last vestiges of British imperial rule we strive to resist the campaign of violence, bloodshed and threats with the legitimate means at our disposal. We are determined that we shall not exchange the rule of one colonialist power for another and that South Arabia should not become a pawn in the selfish world of power-politics and international rivalries.

"The Federal Government has for more than eight years sought constitutional progress to independence and unity. We were working devotedly for these aims in the years before the issue of South Arabia was first raised in the Assembly of the United Nations. The Federation was created on the 11th February, 1959, and from that date began the culminating stages of South Arabia's peaceful development in independence and unity. Before 1959 South Arabia was divided into a number of sultanates, amirates and sheikhdoms and the British Crown Colony of Aden. The founders of the Federation foresaw even in 1959 that the unification of the various separate States in South Arabia was an essential pre-requisite for independence. As the years passed, other States joined the Federation including, in January, 1963, the State (or Crown Colony) of Aden. The creation of the Federation and the steady increase in the powers of the central Government led to the progressive divestment of power by the traditional rulers. These changes which laid the foundations for South Arabian independence and unity were not achieved by terrorism, bloodshed, threats and coercion but by the peaceful discussion and the freely-expressed wishes of the people of South Arabia.

"After the successful integration of the State of Aden with the Federation of South Arabia in January, 1963, the Federal Government sought constitutional talks with the British Government in order to move further forward towards complete unity and independence. At the constitutional conference held in London in 1964, it was agreed that a united South Arabia should become fully independent by 1968. After the conclusion of the constitutional conference in 1964 a determined effort was made to obtain agreement with all parties within South Arabia on the next step to be taken on the road to independence and unity. With the agreement of the Federal Government the British High Commissioner appointed constitutional advisers under the chairmanship of Sir Evelyn Hone, the first Governor-General of Zambia, to assist the people of South Arabia in formulating their views. The other two members of the advisory commission were a retired Chief Justice from the Republic of the Sudan and a distinguished academic constitutional lawyer from Manchester University. Unfortunately the Government of Aden, of which Mr. Abdul-Qawi Makkawee was Chief Minister at the time, declared this international commission to be *persona non grata* and placed every possible obstacle in its way. When it became clear that the British High Commissioner had failed in this attempt at conciliation and compromise the Federal Government decided to take the initiative and appoint constitutional advisers. Sir Ralph Hone, the world-renowned constitutional lawyer and Sir Gawain Bell, the well-known administrator and diplomatist, were accordingly appointed in September 1965, and after extensive visits throughout South Arabia and prolonged discussion in every State submitted their report *Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966*, early in 1966. This report was published in Arabic and English and was widely discussed in newspapers and by political parties. After public opinion had had a chance to form, the Federal Government called a constitutional conference to discuss the next stage of constitutional progress towards unity and independence. All political parties and all the States were invited to this conference scheduled to start on August 1st, 1966, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations was invited to send an observer. All the States in the Federation, the 'Upper Yafa' State, one of the States in the Eastern Aden Protectorate and several of the political parties accepted

the invitation but, owing to the intransigence of Mr. Makkawee and his colleagues and owing to the delay of the Secretary-General in appointing an observer from the United Nations, it was decided to postpone this conference. Subsequently, in November 1966, a conference was being held between the State authorities and the Federal Government at which the constitutional proposals submitted by Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell were studied in the closest detail. As a result of this study which lasted into February 1967, a revised constitution was proposed and was approved in principle by all the States within the Federation. We have pleasure in submitting to you now a copy of this draft constitution. It will thus be seen that despite the threats of subversion from outside South Arabia the Federal Government has made every effort to achieve constitutional advance by recognized constitutional means.

"The crime at Aden airport marked the beginning of a campaign of violence and viciousness in Aden which we shall never forget. The peace and security of this commercial and trading centre were destroyed by the action of cruel and ambitious men who had no thought for the welfare of South Arabia. In these last four years many loyal and true South Arabians have been assassinated—trade unionists, civil servants, traders, police officers and politicians—for no reason except that they sought freedom for their country. At the beginning of this campaign there may have been individuals in South Arabia who were not out of sympathy with this campaign although they had reservations regarding the violent methods used. It was felt that an aggressive campaign might be required to free South Arabia from a military base maintained by a colonialist Power. Some South Arabians expressed confidence that the campaign of violence and intimidation would end immediately it became clear that the British base would be removed. That confidence was, however, completely misplaced as the decision by the British Government to withdraw the base led to increased, not diminished, violence. It had been hoped that the announcement by the United Kingdom of the decision to leave South Arabia would lead to an immediate cessation of the campaign of terrorism and violence. To the surprise of some and to the consternation of all in South Arabia the campaign was intensified, not terminated, by the announcement of this decision. The violence was perpetrated in the name of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen, but was in fact financed, directed and managed by members of the Egyptian intelligence service in the Yemen. Aden is a peace-loving mercantile community and it cannot be denied that the campaign of violence and intimidation has been effective within this community. By their vicious methods and their ruthless contempt for humanity, the terrorists have undermined the morale of the population of Aden with the result that to the superficial observer the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen appears to have a measure of popular support within Aden. Despite this appearance FLOSY has in fact little popular support and relies entirely on intimidation for the fulfilment of its aims.

"It would be useful to the Mission if we provide in more detail our views on the standing of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen. First of all it should be emphasized that there is no justification either in history or in popular feeling for the description of South Arabia as Occupied South Yemen. Apart from certain sections of the Yemeni community working in Aden there is no one in South Arabia who regards his country as part of the Yemen. Furthermore when the present Secretary-General of FLOSY was Chief Minister of Aden under the British Colonial Government, he made his views clear on a number of occasions that he did not regard South Arabia and Aden as part of the Yemen. It was only after his departure from South Arabia that he adopted the Egyptian policy of describing South Arabia as the Occupied South Yemen. The other important point which we wish to place before you is that FLOSY has little democratic support. It is true that part of the Aden Trade Union movement and some of the office bearers in the Aden Trade Union Congress are sup-

porters of FLOSY. It is doubtful, however, if they represent the greater part of the trade union movement as, in complete breach of its own constitution no elections have been held by the Aden Trade Union Congress for more than four years. Although there has been constant pressure from the workers for fresh elections to be held the present office-bearers in the Congress have consistently refused to hold fresh elections with the result that six of the most important unions in Aden have divorced themselves from the ATUC and from FLOSY. The lack of popular support for the present leadership in the ATUC may be illustrated by the failure of the former Secretary-General of the ATUC, Mr. Abdulla Al-Asnag, now Chairman of the Politbureau of FLOSY to obtain re-election in 1965 as President of the Civil Aviation Employees Union; and it should be recorded that there have been four attempts by FLOSY to assassinate the present President of that Union, Mr. Husein Duqmi, who defeated Mr. Al-Asnag in the 1965 election for President and that Mr. Duqmi is now in hospital as a result of a further assassination attempt. It is therefore our view that FLOSY has little popular support except from certain sections of the migrant Yemeni community in Aden, and that it has no justification to claim to represent the people of South Arabia as a whole.

"Although we do not admit the justice of the claim of the FLOSY leaders to represent South Arabia, it should be made clear that we have endeavoured on a number of occasions to meet the leaders of all political parties including FLOSY in order to settle the problems of South Arabia in a spirit of conciliation and compromise. It is well known that a number of meetings have been held with the leadership of the South Arabian League in Beirut. Informal discussions have also taken place between Federal Ministers and SAL leaders in New York, Jeddah, Riyadh, London and Aden. At the same time similar invitations for discussions have been extended to the leaders of FLOSY. On one occasion Mr. Makkawee and Mr. Al-Asnag agreed to meet Federal Ministers in Beirut but at the last moment were prevented from attending this meeting. An invitation was sent to the leaders of FLOSY to attend the constitutional conference which was to be held in August 1966 but again the leaders of FLOSY refused. Subsequently efforts have been made to hold informal discussions with the leaders of FLOSY, but on every occasion the initiative has been frustrated by the obstinacy and obduracy of the Front leaders. Despite the failure of these attempts in the past we are still willing to discuss the future of South Arabia with the leaders of FLOSY if a meeting can be arranged through your mediation. If such a meeting could be arranged we would also willingly meet the leaders of the National Liberation Front as although we deplore the terrorist methods of this organisation we note that it is now less closely dominated by external elements than in the past. It therefore has a greater claim to be regarded as genuinely nationalist than FLOSY. We would also expect the leaders of the various political parties in Aden to be present.

"It is our view that if there had been no outside interference it cannot be disputed that South Arabia would now be in the final stages of constitutional development leading to complete independence and unity and that the work of the Mission would have been greatly facilitated. The campaign from outside has delayed not only constitutional progress but progress in the social services and economic development. Our opponents from outside South Arabia have not refrained from disrupting the education of our children especially in Aden by fomenting disturbances in schools and Mr. Makkawee has personally incited all the children in South Arabia to boycott the schools when his own daughter is being educated in the United Kingdom on a scholarship from the Federal Government. It is a matter for the deepest regret that the enemies of South Arabia carried their campaign to such lengths that they have endeavoured to destroy and hinder peaceful development in the rural areas by sabotaging water pumps in villages and farms and by placing mines in the fields to destroy agricultural tractors. Despite all the problems which have arisen as a result of this

external interference we have made substantial progress in all fields of development.

"Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would summarise our political attitude by stating that we seek to establish a free and democratic united Republic of South Arabia which would include the Upper Yafa State, the Qa'iti State, the Kathiri State, the Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra, and the Islands. To achieve this goal we support the United Nations proposal to establish a caretaker government to be responsible for the holding of elections under the supervision of the United Nations. It is our aim that full sovereignty should then be transferred by the protecting power to the Republic in a peaceful and orderly manner; and it is our wish that the independence and integrity of the Republic should be guaranteed by the United Nations. It is not the desire of the State rulers or the Ministers of the Federal Government to hold any office against the will of their people. It is our most earnest hope that your Mission will assist the people of South Arabia in obtaining the twin objectives of independence and unity for which our country has been striving for the last eight years."

219. Sheikh Farid stated that his colleagues supported wholeheartedly the resolutions of the United Nations. They were therefore in favour of holding general elections under United Nations supervision and were ready to accept participation in a caretaker government in which every political party would be represented. It was true that FLOSY enjoyed substantial support among the people of Aden State, but this did not justify its claim to represent the entire population of the country. According to Mr. Obali, the NLF enjoyed stronger support in the other States. As representatives of the existing authorities, they were ready to treat both factions as brothers but would not put up with their determination to achieve domination of the future government through violence and terrorism.

220. The delegation had been given to understand that the Mission was hearing them as spokesmen for traditional elements from the Western States and not as members of the "Federal Government". Sheikh Farid believed nevertheless that the "Federal Government" had not been without merit: it had for the first time given the people a sense of belonging to a common entity. Furthermore, removal of customs barriers by the "Federal Government" had improved the economic situation, as well as health and education. Thanks to the Federation, South Arabia had been set on the way to unity and to independence. Besides, the hereditary rulers were not only the embodiment of a tradition, they had assumed their powers as a result of the exercise of "tribal democracy". The Federation was a reality and any new structure must be built on it, with such changes as were necessary.

221. The delegation also stated that it attached the greatest importance to the question of the unity and integrity of the Territory. Hitherto the British had made no real effort to encourage the Eastern States to throw in their lot with the remainder of the Territory. This attitude was due to the British desire to keep a foot in the area and to use these States as a buffer between South Arabia and the neighbouring oil producing regions. The United Kingdom Government could still influence the Eastern States by stating unequivocally that, bound by the United Nations resolutions, it would desist from extending assistance and from financing the Bedouin Legion unless it were placed at the disposal of the country as a whole. On the other hand, the reluctance of the Eastern States to unite with the Western States was easy to explain. They were waiting for the result of oil prospection undertaken in the last few years, hoping to be able to negotiate from a position of strength at the appropriate time. They were apprehensive that the present unrest existing in the Federation would spread to their area. They were also fearful that in the event of a merger with the Western States, they would lose their customs revenue which accounted for 80 per cent of their income. It was the task of the Mission to see that the administering Power made a firm undertaking to ensure the integrity of the Territory.

222. The delegation suggested that a second round of talks, culminating, if possible, in a round-table conference, be held

in neutral territory closer to the area, possibly Addis Ababa, and that to this end the Mission make an appeal aimed at all parties concerned. The Mission should also fix a date, say 15 September or 1 October, for the ending of the state of emergency, detentions and violence. Further it asked the Mission to urge the various factions to stop fighting each other. The delegation also claimed to represent the true nationalists, who had the interests of their country at heart and were prepared to carry their responsibilities when others were trying to escape them.

223. The Mission took note of the suggestions made. It stated that it had already discussed with the United Kingdom Government on many occasions the question of the detainees and of lifting the emergency measures. Ever since its conversations in London, it had hoped to be able to persuade that Government to take the necessary measures in this connexion. The Mission had not lost contact with other political elements and was hopeful that its efforts would be fruitful.

*Meeting with the delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra*

224. The Mission met with the delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra on 21 August. The delegation also participated in a meeting held with the delegation from the other Eastern States on 1 September. The Mahra delegation consisted of Sultan Khalifa bin Abdullah bin Afrar (Chairman of the Mahri Tribal Council), Sheikh Abdullah bin Ashoor al Mahri (Secretary of the Mahri Tribal Council) and Sheikh Alawi bin Abdullah al Mahri (Member of the Mahri Tribal Council).

225. They stated that the Tribal Council was a genuine form of democratic government as it grouped the duly chosen representatives of seventy tribes. Sultan Khalifa had been elected chairman of the Council by these representatives. The people of Mahra had strong reservations about acceding to independence together with the South Arabian States. Mahra was, and had always been, a clearly distinct entity. Its population, language and traditions were different from those of both the other Eastern States and the Western States. Furthermore the Mahri people did not put much trust in a vague and ambiguous future government which would bring with it no promise of peace and stability. In any event, due to difficulties of communication they could not see how Mahra could be governed from Aden.

226. Mahra was desperately poor and in need of funds. The British had never made any serious effort to develop the country or contribute to its welfare and modernization. Their subsidy amounted to only South Arabian dinars 30,000 per year. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in Mahra which the British helped to maintain was only 130 men strong and lacked armament and equipment. The State suffered from a complete absence of schools and hospitals. The State needed international assistance to develop its resources. The United Nations had been instrumental in assisting underdeveloped countries and they would be grateful to the Mission if it could direct the appropriate international agencies to provide them with financial assistance, even at the cost of being placed under United Nations trusteeship.

227. They emphasized the desire of the people of Mahra to be left to build their own future by themselves instead of being subordinated to another government, and stressed the importance of a visit by the Mission to the area in order to acquaint itself with the prevailing conditions of poverty and isolation. They drew attention to a letter addressed by the Tribal Council to the Mission (see appendix V below).

228. The Mission took note of the great need for financial assistance for development as outlined by the petitioners. However, it explained that any United Nations assistance to promote social and economic development in the future would probably have to be channelled through the independent Government of South Arabia.

*Meetings with delegations from the other Eastern States*

229. The Mission met with Sultan Ghalib bin Awadh of Qa'iti, accompanied by Mr. Salim Awadh Safi and Mr. Abdullah Salim Ba'shan, and Sultan Hussain bin Ali of Kathiri, accompanied by Amir Abdul Majid bin Ali and Mr. Moham-

mad Abdul Rahman Ubaidillah, on 31 August and 1 September. The delegation of the Tribal Council of Mahra participated in the second meeting.

230. Sultan Ghalib stated that he had great hopes in the Mission. He and Sultan Hussain bin Ali were convinced that it was working with the sole interest of the people of South Arabia in mind. They were prepared to make great sacrifices provided it was for the good of their country and would contribute to a durable solution of the problem affecting the area. Nevertheless they were afraid that the interests of the Eastern States would be adversely affected by joining the Western States. Sultan Hussain emphasized that though they were not separatists, they were fearful of the consequences if they joined the Federation. The first concern of the Mission should be the maintenance of security and the cessation of hostilities. Chaos and unrest prevailed in the Federation whilst the Governments in the Eastern States were well established in accordance with Islamic law. The population of the Eastern States was more than half the total population of South Arabia and should not be subordinated to the wishes of elements from the Western States. Sultan Ghalib stated that he was most anxious to participate in discussions with the nationalist parties. However, these parties had no footing in the Eastern States.

231. The economy and livelihood of the Eastern States depended to a large extent on remittances sent home by some 400,000 emigrants, half of whom were working in Saudi Arabia. For this reason, they had no wish to alienate Saudi Arabia. The Sultanates had been in existence long before the British arrived and were the only form of government the people understood. The idea of a central government was totally foreign to them, constitutional reforms would have to be introduced gradually, on the basis of the Sultanate system, and linked to the growth of political understanding among the people.

232. Since the British presence was shortly to be terminated, they were concerned about what they should do to prepare themselves for the new situation. They would have passport difficulties for their nationals working abroad. They would be isolated and have no adequate means of communication. Mahra, for instance, could only be reached by air or by sea. In such conditions he wondered how Mahra could be governed from Aden.

233. Sultan Ghalib stressed the fact that the Eastern States had accepted the United Nations resolution and wished the Mission would come and visit their country to assist in its implementation. Such implementation should be carried out under the supervision of the Mission, in a free and democratic way. The Sultans were prepared to co-operate with the Western States, provided their interests and dignity were fully respected. However, they were very much exercised by the question of what their future would be as part of South Arabia if the present conditions of unrest, chaos and near civil war continued after independence. They were also preoccupied by the possible consequences, if the Mission failed in its attempts to bring together all the elements concerned.

234. Sultan Ghalib stated that they had come through Cairo in order to explain their problems to the Arab League. He drew attention to a communication which he and Sultan Hussain had submitted in this regard.<sup>‡</sup>

*Communication received from the United Kingdom concerning the island of Perim<sup>1</sup>*

235. The Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the Mission a copy of a letter dated 11 August from the representative of the United Kingdom on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim.<sup>1</sup> The text of the letter was as follows:

<sup>‡</sup>This document has been placed on the files of the Secretariat and will be available to Members on request.

<sup>1</sup>The United Kingdom letter has been reproduced in document A/AC.109/260. See also appendix VI containing a letter from thirteen Arab States on this question.

<sup>1</sup>Discussions of the Mission on this question are described in paras. 177, 178, 179, 182 and 185 above. See also appendix VII for a telegram from the South Arabian League on the subject.

"On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to address Your Excellency on the possibility of placing under United Nations administration the island of Perim, in a way which will ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea.

"This Island has been a British possession since 1857, when a British expedition occupied it. No question of its ownership was raised in the discussions before World War I leading to the Anglo/Turkish Convention of 1914, which among other things defined and demarcated the Western section of the frontier between the Yemen and South Arabia. Until 1937, Perim was administered by the Government of India: in that year, responsibility for it passed to Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, and was devolved as a matter of administrative convenience on the Governor at Aden. Perim had in this period a separate identity and administration from that of Aden. The entry of Aden Colony into the Federation of South Arabia in 1963 made it necessary to enact certain legislation which had the effect of defining Perim's distinct identity in that year. The main external economic links of Perim have been with Aden, where some of its inhabitants have worked and from which two lighthouses, important to navigation, have been administered through the Aden Port Trust, an independent body on which both Government and shipping interests are represented.

"The assumption of the United Kingdom Government had been that, when South Arabia became independent, Perim would adhere to South Arabia as geographical propinquity and economic ties suggested. My Government did, however, inform the United Nations when resolution 2023 (XX) was under discussion that Perim was not part of Aden State and that it would consult the people about their future when the time came.

"However, discussion in the United Kingdom Parliament of the bill to provide for the relinquishment of Her Majesty's sovereignty over both Aden and Perim (which received the Royal Assent on 28 July) revealed a strong feeling in the House of Commons that Perim's position on a narrow international waterway was of major importance and justified arrangements to ensure that that waterway could not be closed by wrongful use of the Island. There was a consensus of opinion that this could best be achieved by United Nations administration of Perim, and the United Kingdom Government undertook to put forward a proposal to this effect.

"I should therefore be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the Special Mission on Aden in order that they may consider on what basis the United Nations might undertake the permanent administration of Perim, in a way which would ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Bab-al-Mandeb. This is a unique proposal which could have important implications for the future, and the United Kingdom Government sincerely hopes that it will be given urgent consideration with a view to recommendations being made through the appropriate United Nations channels. In urging this proposal the United Kingdom Government has no doubt that it would be recognised that United Nations control of Perim should not impede but rather assist the economic and social development of the island with its 280 inhabitants.

"I should like to emphasise that my Government has no undeclared interest of its own with regard to Perim. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made it clear in Parliament that the United Kingdom Government was completely opposed to keeping British sovereignty in Perim after South Arabia's independence, even for the desirable cause of internationalising it. It wishes to have no more responsibility for Perim after South Arabian independence than that which any other member state of the United Nations will have.

"If the United Nations agrees to assume responsibility for the internationalisation of the Island, my Government would still attach importance to assuring itself that this

was in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants of Perim."

*Information received from the United Kingdom High Commission*

236. While in Geneva the Mission pursued its consultations with the administering Power. It was also interested to receive information from the British High Commissioner on the developments of the situation in the Territory, as well as his own assessment of those developments. A summary of the information received is set out below.

237. In a message dated 14 August, the British High Commissioner stated that there had been a two-day strike in Aden called by the NLF and FLOSY ostensibly in protest against unrepresentative parties at Geneva. He considered however that it was primarily a political demonstration. There were few casualties. The High Commissioner had no new information locally about the real intentions of either FLOSY or the NLF. In a message dated 16 August, the Mission was informed that there had been unrest in the Western State of Lahej, and that the State police had deserted and the ruler's brother who administered the State had fled to Aden. The situation had been taken in hand by a battalion of the South Arabian Army and Lahej was reported quiet. In the State of Dathina (which had no ruling family) there had been inter-tribal fighting and the administrator had resigned. There too, the Army had been put in control. The Sheikh of the small and remote State of Muflahi had been kidnapped. The High Commissioner found it difficult to assess how far those disturbances were due to "normal inter-Tribal disputes" and how far, specifically political influence had been involved; but he thought that local reasons were probably the more significant. They had taken place in the weaker section of the States, and he had no reason to believe that the South Arabian Army was unable to maintain essential internal security.

238. On 17 August, the High Commissioner informed the Mission that the South Arabian Army appeared to be generally in control of internal security in the affected States of Lahej, Dhala and Dathina and to be restoring the situation in the small State of Muflahi. The NLF might be controlling the civil administration in Dhala, but, as he had reported earlier, the reasons for unrest quite varied. Audhali and the States of the Western Protectorate further east were quiet and the South Arabian Army seemed wholly confident of its ability to restore and maintain order in the affected area.

239. The Mission was informed at a meeting with Lord Shackleton on 18 August that men of the liberation army of FLOSY had crossed the frontier post at Kirsh, between Lahej and Yemen and had taken the Fort. The South Arabian Army had moved on quickly and retaken possession of the Fort.

240. On 25 August the High Commissioner informed the Mission that a confused situation had developed in the States of Lahej, Dhala, Dathina and Muflahi. The South Arabian Army was in effective command of security, but the States administrations, which were never strong, were hardly functioning. The High Commissioner had heard of attempts by the NLF to form a combined administration for some of the States, but had no reliable information whether that amounted to anything in real terms.

241. The message said that both the NLF and FLOSY, in competition with each other, appeared to be separately trying to establish their presence on the Yemen border by force, but had not made any headway against the South Arabian Army. It went on to describe the clashes at Kirsh. In Aden, violence against the British continued, including a number of individual murders. All that seemed to be part of the competition for a dominant political position. In conclusion the High Commissioner's message stated that the situation in the Eastern Aden Protectorate had improved after the three States had succeeded in agreeing in principle about the arrangements for the control of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion.

242. On 30 August, the Mission received the following message from Sir Humphrey Trevelyan:

"There have been rapid developments here. The rule of Sultans in the Central and Western States of the Federa-



tion has been quickly eliminated following the withdrawal of British forces. Lower Aulaqi is now changing sides and we cannot predict how long the remaining States will take to go the same way. The Federal Government has virtually no control in the Federation and cannot be said to continue effectively in existence. The senior Arab civil servants with the agreement of the political groups are carrying on routine business. The Army are maintaining order on the surface in the States but are not opposing the activities of the political groups and have privately declared their political allegiance to them in general. They have publicly refused to accept a public proposal of one Federal Minister that they should take over Government. They say privately that they want us to negotiate with the groups. They are almost certainly split in their political allegiance between the groups, but these allegiances seem more to reflect the Tribal split than genuine adherence to one or the other group. The position in the States is very confused but in the main peaceful. Local administrations are beginning to grow up, but it is not yet possible to label them. In general, the Western and Central States of the Federation where the Sultans have been ousted seem to be predominantly the NLF, though the position in Lahej is indeterminate. Meanwhile the NLF and FLOSY are still contending for position in Aden. Cairo radio have called for a strike, while the NLF are pronouncing against it from the Mosques. The NLF seem to be stronger on the ground. The position of the Army is crucial and it is in everyone's interest that it should remain coherent.

"We may have to remove our representatives from the Eastern States sooner than we had planned, for reasons of air communications.

"The Mission will not in my opinion be able to establish a Government on the ground without an understanding with the NLF and would severely prejudice their own position if they propounded any solution without this. I am at the moment not in direct contact with NLF leaders, but I must warn the Mission that in view of the rapidly changing situation I may have to take some initiatives with the groups here, though I would try to associate the Mission with all attempts to reach a political solution."

243. The High Commissioner also informed the Mission about a press conference held by Mr. Qahtan Ash-Shaabi on 30 August, in which he said that the NLF leaders were prepared to meet the High Commissioner, provided the United Kingdom Government would make a public announcement that "the NLF was the true representative of the people". Mr. Ash-Shaabi had indicated that FLOSY was of no consequence and should not be admitted to the negotiations. He had said that "members of FLOSY would be permitted to live in peace in the NLF state" and "the South Arabian Army is the army of the NLF". He had also said the NLF would take Baihan and the Eastern Aden Protectorate in due course and that it believed in the ultimate unity of South Arabia with the Yemen, but only "in the long term".

*Discussions with Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio*

244. In discussions held between the Mission and Lord Shackleton, United Kingdom Minister without Portfolio, between 17 and 25 August 1967, the Mission re-emphasized that the United Nations considered that the Territory should be given independence as a whole. It was disturbed by the intention of the United Kingdom Government to maintain an armed establishment in the Territory and to continue subsidies to the Eastern States after independence; they were thus being encouraged to refrain from joining the rest of South Arabia. Under the resolutions, the question of ensuring the integrity of the Territory upon independence was a responsibility of the administering Power.

245. Lord Shackleton said that territorial integrity as such had never existed, since the Eastern States had never joined the Federation of South Arabia. The Eastern rulers were waiting to see what kind of government would emerge, since they did not wish to join the Federation or the "Federal Government" in its present state. They would probably agree to join a new government of the whole area, provided it was

sufficiently broad-based and had general support in the country, although they would be losing revenue from customs duties. With four fifths of the population living in Qa'iti State, the two other States would probably follow should the Qa'iti ruler agree to join South Arabia.

246. The United Kingdom Government was ready to co-operate in bringing the Territory to independence as one unit. However, its power to intervene in this situation had certain limitations; they had treaty relations with the Eastern States but were not responsible for their administration. It would take considerable military power to force them to join. As to the question of military aid to the Eastern States after independence, he himself had insisted on the necessity of continuing to support the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion for two years after independence. The Legion was the only effective authority in some places and recently it had been on the verge of disintegration. Without financial support, it would collapse and chaos would result. His Government would also continue to support the local forces of each of the three Eastern States.

247. The Mission noted the position of the United Kingdom in favour of the unity of the Eastern Protectorate with the rest of the Territory. Any other solution would be contradictory to the terms of the United Nations resolutions. The administering Power should make it clear that the Eastern States would not receive any assistance unless they were part of the whole country.

248. Lord Shackleton stated that the United Kingdom would be willing to compensate the Eastern States for the loss of customs duties and provide them with civil aid in case they joined South Arabia. But the real inducement for them to join would be the formation of a new government for South Arabia. All treaties would lapse on 9 January 1968. No new treaties would be signed and the United Kingdom would make every effort to encourage them to join.

249. Lord Shackleton drew attention to the reports which the High Commissioner was sending to the Mission on the situation in the Territory. It was not possible to evaluate from them with certainty the relative strength of the different forces, namely FLOSY and the NLF. The Army was quite an important element: it was unified, well disciplined and could have a stabilizing influence. His contacts with FLOSY were necessarily more limited than with other groups, but he was ready to contribute to the creation of a climate of mutual understanding. FLOSY and the federal leaders should both accept each other. The best hope for the formation of a caretaker government lay in an arrangement based on personalities rather than on political parties. The Sheikhs and Sultans were ruling with the consent of their people and could be deposed if their manner of governing was not satisfactory. He believed that when elections took place, some of them would probably be elected.

250. The Mission believed that the formation of a caretaker government could not be achieved without careful negotiations aimed at bringing the various elements together. In this connexion, the role of the British Government would be of major significance. The Mission still hoped that elements which had declined to participate would do so. It had been led to believe that FLOSY and the NLF might merge, but it looked now that they might have to come forward separately. However, it was essential that they should co-operate with each other as well as with the Mission.

251. Lord Shackleton said that the task of his Government would have been greatly simplified had FLOSY and the NLF been able to merge. There was no doubt that the NLF was very powerful, elusive and had great destructive power. As to the labour movement in Aden, it was split: one faction was inspired by the NLF, the other was associated with FLOSY. There was a continuing deterioration of the industrial and employment situation in the Territory.

252. The Mission drew Lord Shackleton's attention to the question of the behaviour of British troops in Aden and the complaints of brutal treatment which it had heard (see para. 216 above). It was perturbed by the reports it had received in this regard and was concerned about the political repercussions among the people. Lord Shackleton replied that it was always difficult to verify such allegations. As a whole

British troops had behaved well in Aden. There was a great deal of bitterness in the British Army after the incidents of 20 June in which several soldiers were shot down by local armed police. The bodies they had recovered had been mutilated. He conceded there might have been some display of "roughness" since then, but this was very difficult to prevent. He would convey the Mission's feelings to the British High Commissioner in Aden.

*Messages from FLOSY in response to the Mission's invitation*

253. On 12 August, the Mission received a communication from FLOSY to the effect that its leadership was awaiting the outcome of an important meeting of the national council of the Front to be held at Taiz, and for that reason could not avail itself of the opportunity to meet the Mission in Geneva. On 24 August the Mission received a message from FLOSY stating that the leaders of FLOSY would be ready to meet with the Mission before the end of August in Cairo or at any European capital to be selected by the Mission, preferably other than Geneva.

*Decision to hold meetings in Beirut*

254. In the light of recent developments in the Territory, and in the expectation that the nationalist movements which for different reasons had not felt able to come to Geneva, would agree to meet with the Mission at a place closer to the area, the Mission considered the possibility of holding meetings in Beirut and/or Cairo. In this connexion the Mission raised with Lord Shackleton the question whether it would be possible for a United Kingdom delegation at the appropriate level to be present in Cairo while the Mission was holding meetings there. Lord Shackleton stated that in view of the wider implications of this question he would convey the Mission's request to his Government.

255. Simultaneously the Mission decided to undertake urgent consultations on the subject directly with the Government of the United Arab Republic. One of the members of the Mission, Mr. Abdussattar Shalizi, left for Cairo on 26 August for that purpose and returned to Geneva on 28 August. As a result of his consultations, the Government of the United Arab Republic agreed to the Mission holding meetings in Cairo and gave assurances that it would make every effort to facilitate the Mission's work. Furthermore, the United Arab Republic Government would make possible the presence of a high-level representative of the United Kingdom Government in Cairo under the auspices of the Mission.

256. On 30 August, the Mission received a response from Lord Shackleton: after careful examination, the United Kingdom Government had decided that it would not be possible for a British Minister to go to Cairo in the present circumstances; in view of the situation in South Arabia, the High Commissioner in Aden could not attend either. However, in view of the importance attached to the Mission's contacts in Cairo, Lord Shackleton would be prepared to meet the Mission in any capital of the Middle East with which the United Kingdom had diplomatic relations, or in Geneva, to discuss the results of its work. The United Kingdom Ambassador in Geneva, Sir Harold Beeley, would join the Mission in Cairo if it was so desired.

257. Convinced of the importance of having a British Minister directly available for discussions during its consultations with the nationalist elements, and guided by the considerations outlined in paragraphs 253 and 254 above, the Mission decided to proceed to Beirut as envisaged. It accordingly issued the following communiqué on 31 August 1967:

"In the light of recent developments in the Territory, the United Nations Special Mission on Aden has decided to proceed to Beirut with the main purpose of facilitating its contacts with the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front, which it invites to join it there.

"The Mission is also inviting the United Kingdom Government to send a delegation at the appropriate level for its meetings in Beirut, which will begin on 2 September."

*B. Work of the Mission in Beirut*

258. Upon its arrival in Beirut, the Mission learnt that the NLF would continue to boycott it. Statements appearing in the Press and attributed to Mr. Q. Ash-Shaabi in Zingibar, South Arabia, as well as to NLF spokesmen in Beirut, purported to indicate in specious terms that the Mission had been disqualified by listening to the "Sultans and stooges" in Geneva, and that it was not serving the aims of the people.<sup>J</sup> Unfortunately, therefore, the Mission became increasingly convinced that its aim of meeting the two nationalist Fronts in Beirut would not be realized.

259. On 4 September, the Mission received a message that FLOSY would welcome a meeting with the Mission in Cairo. According to the message, there were many reasons which made it inconvenient for FLOSY to proceed to Beirut.

260. Having regard to the foregoing, the Mission issued the following press communiqué on 4 September:

"Taking into consideration the decision reached by the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen in response to the invitation issued by the United Nations Special Mission on Aden on 31 August 1967, the Mission has decided to proceed to Cairo on Wednesday, 6 September, in order to hold meetings there. With a view to achieving the desired harmony among the nationalist movements in the Territory, and in order to facilitate the complete and effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, the Mission earnestly hopes that the National Liberation Front will be able to join in these meetings."

*Discussions with Lord Shackleton, Minister without Portfolio*

261. On 5 September, Lord Shackleton arrived in Beirut and at a meeting with the Mission transmitted the following message from the High Commissioner, who had been in London for discussions with the United Kingdom Government:

"The situation in South Arabia has changed radically. The Federal Government neither functions nor has control of the Federation. All shades of opinion expect an initiative from me. If I take this initiative, we have a chance of peace. If I do nothing, we risk total chaos. This is why I am issuing the statement which Lord Shackleton has brought to you. I am sorry I could not consult you on this occasion. Believe me, I am anxious to work with you to bring peace to South Arabia and carry out the United Nations resolutions. I hope to have an early talk with you in the light of reactions to this statement, as the best way of continuing our common task."

262. He also transmitted the following text of a statement that the High Commissioner was expected to broadcast in Aden at about the same time the meeting was taking place:

"The British are leaving South Arabia and wish to leave the country at peace. On a number of occasions I have publicly stated that I hope to have discussions with leaders of political groups with a view to the formation of a Government fully representative of the people of South Arabia, which would replace the Federal Government. A new situation has now arisen, since the Federal Government has ceased to function and no longer exercises control in the Federation. It is urgently necessary that a new Government should take over. I recognize the Nationalist forces as representatives of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective Government formed by the Nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government, internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the execution of the United Nations resolutions, and independence for South Arabia. In order to begin these discussions at the earliest possible moment, I shall be glad to meet representatives of the National Liberation Front at a place to be mutually agreed. I sincerely hope that the discussions will lead to a peaceful independent South Arabia."

263. Lord Shackleton explained that in considering the initiative embodied in the above statement, the United King-

<sup>J</sup> For press reports on this matter, see appendix VIII.

dom Government had been reluctant to appear to be taking unilateral action, without prior consultation with the Mission. Further his Government had been unwilling to put off FLOSY which had in a sense lost the civil war. However, in view of the urgency of the situation his Government had authorized the statement in order that bloodshed may be avoided. The wording was so framed as to respond to the sentiments expressed by Mr. Qahtan Ash-Shaabi at his recent press conference.

264. He stated that the NLF had ousted the State rulers in the Western and Central areas of the Federation and had possibly gone as far as Beihan, Aulaqi and Wahidi. The NLF seemed determined not to deal with FLOSY, at least at that stage. This, in his view, was the reason for the unwillingness of the NLF to meet with the Mission. Lord Shackleton also mentioned that during his discussions in London the High Commissioner had refrained from accepting the view of the NLF that it was the sole representative of the people of South Arabia. The South Arabian Army was keeping order but had no wish to interfere with political activity or to take over political power.

265. In conclusion Lord Shackleton expressed the belief that there might still be opportunities for the Mission to play a crucial role, but that at that juncture and having regard to the situation on the ground there was no alternative but to leave the matter to the High Commissioner.

266. The Mission reiterated its position that the participation of the two nationalist elements, FLOSY and the NLF, was necessary for the formation of a solid caretaker government. It recalled that Lord Shackleton himself had only recently voiced the conviction that FLOSY should be included in any future caretaker government. The arrangements proposed in the High Commissioner's statement left open the question of integrating the Eastern States with the remainder of the Territory. The Mission also noted that the United Kingdom Government had not seen fit to consult it about its latest initiative in the spirit of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly. Finally the Mission expressed doubt whether the course of action initiated by the United Kingdom Government would in fact result in the avoidance of strife.

267. Lord Shackleton replied that it was still the objective of the British Government to establish a caretaker government with the assistance of the United Nations. However, a revolution had taken place, the "Federal Government" had collapsed, and the concern of the United Kingdom Government to avoid a gap between the dissolution of that Government and the formation of a new one had been overtaken by events. He was aware that the United Kingdom initiative would not be acceptable to everyone, but in his view the only alternative to negotiation was for the United Kingdom Government to ignore the recent developments, to do nothing, and thus run the risk of civil war. The High Commissioner would have no choice but to deal with the effective force on the ground. He considered that the NLF would be well advised to negotiate with other forces, particularly FLOSY, and to seek to bring in the Eastern States. Though it was the wish of the United Kingdom Government that the Eastern States should form part of the Territory, it had no control over them and all British officials had been removed from there.

268. On 6 September, Lord Shackleton met briefly with the Chairman of the Mission. He emphasized that in his broadcast, the High Commissioner had not excluded the possibility of FLOSY taking part in the proposed discussions. The High Commissioner's appeal had been addressed to all nationalist forces. The High Commissioner had issued supplementary announcements to that effect over Aden Radio. The final version of the High Commissioner's statement as broadcast had come to hand and was as follows:

"The British are leaving South Arabia and wish to leave the country at peace. On a number of occasions I have publicly stated that I hope to have discussions with leaders of political groups with a view to the formation of a government fully representative of the people of South Arabia, which would replace the Federal Government. A new situation has now arisen, since the Federal Government has ceased to function and no longer exercises control in the

Federation. It is urgently necessary that a new government should take over. I recognize the nationalist forces as representative of the people and am ready to enter into discussions immediately with them. These discussions will include the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of an effective government formed by the nationalist forces in place of the Federal Government. internal security in Aden, the withdrawal of British forces, the carrying out of United Nations resolutions and independence for South Arabia. I wish to begin these discussions at the earliest possible moment. In this connexion I am glad to note the readiness of leaders of the NLF to meet me to discuss these questions as reported after a press conference on 2 September. I shall be glad to meet them and I am ready to co-operate in arranging such a meeting. I sincerely hope that these discussions will lead to a peaceful independent South Arabia."

269. Lord Shackleton said that notwithstanding the fact that the British had been forced to enter into discussions on the ground so as to prevent bloodshed, they did not consider the situation solved. FLOSY was exercising influence in some areas of the Territory. Unless FLOSY and the NLF came together he thought it unlikely that there would be a solution. He expressed the hope that the Mission would continue its work. Should any progress be made during the talks of the Mission with FLOSY in Cairo, he and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan would wish to meet with it again at any mutually convenient place.

#### *Meeting with Acting President of Aden Trades Union Congress*

270. On 5 September, the Mission met the Acting President of the Aden Trades Union Congress, Mr. Ali A. Aswadi who submitted to it the following memorandum:

"The Aden Trades Union Congress wishes to inform you that the strange and artificial moves being in the area to isolate the revolutionary forces represented in FLOSY are the work of British colonialism and of its intelligence. These moves are directed towards two objectives:

"(i) To take advantage of the present circumstances of the Arab nation following the Israel aggression in order to hand over the area, if possible, to a band of criminals, assassins and bandits;

"(ii) To weaken and embarrass FLOSY locally and internationally and force it to co-operate with a group of killers, assassins and traditional friends of Britain within an interim government.

"Suffice it to say that while your Mission is on its way to Cairo in order to meet with the leaders of FLOSY, the United Kingdom for its part has announced its readiness to come to an understanding with a group which it brought to life under the name of the NLF. This is the proof that Britain is creating contradictions and complicating the Mission's task.

"I wish to take this opportunity to appeal to you on behalf of the workers of the Occupied Arab South to stop imperialist plots in our area by implementing all resolutions of the United Nations in letter and spirit; you would be contributing in bringing stability to our people and in sparing them the horrors of destruction, the seeds of which have been planted by colonialism. The United Nations would have earned the increasing appreciation of our people who are now looking forward to a better life."

271. Mr. Aswadi denounced the latest plans of British colonialism in the region. He said that the British authorities had resorted to the creation of feeble forces whose members wanted power only. They had surrounded these forces with a false aura of struggle, magnifying their importance and fabricating news about their alleged successes. British colonialism had failed to deceive the true revolutionaries and fighters into making them work with it; it had therefore resorted to a group of people who had broken away from the revolution. It had tried to give the impression that these people were the only forces in the country. Having tried without success the old method of reliance on its traditional friends among the federal rulers and ministers, the United Kingdom had brought to the fore forces which had already been rejected by the

people because they had fought against every revolutionary organism in the area.

272. He added that the astonishing ease with which the local rulers had fled their capitals, leaving behind their position and their power, was evidence of the clever way in which British colonialism was planning its moves and paving the way, through its powerful information media, to hand over the country to its new agents after having failed to reach a satisfactory solution accepted by all nationalist elements. The Front whose success had been hailed in the last ten days by Britain was nothing but a small group of opportunists who had been deceived by British policy.

*Meeting with Sheikh Mohammed Farid, Sharif Qaid bin Hussein, and Mr. M. H. Obali*

273. The Mission met with Sheikh Mohammed Farid (Upper Aulaqi Sheikhdom), Sheikh Qaid bin Hussein (Beihan) and Mr. M. H. Obali at their request on 6 September.

274. Sheikh Farid informed the Mission that they were convinced that the United Kingdom Government had persuaded them to proceed to Geneva on a false errand so that no Government would be functioning in the Territory while the British plot was being implemented. Explaining why they thought that recent developments were the outcome of a British plot, he said that the British authorities had not encouraged the South Arabian Army to take any action when the disturbances began. The High Commissioner had said at that time that as there were no governments in the States, he could not give instructions. This lack of opposition had emboldened the NLF to extend its activities and to occupy several States. That a deliberate plot had been hatched to this end was clear from the fact that FLOSY elements had been repulsed by the British when they attempted to occupy Kirsh and other places during the same period. It was perfectly clear in their view that the object of the United Kingdom Government was to put the NLF in a strong position so that when the time came for negotiation on the formation of a new government that movement would be given correspondingly larger representation. The implementation of the plot had begun only a few days after their departure from Aden for Geneva. Sheikh Farid added that while they were in Geneva they had asked the United Kingdom representative why the British authorities had not intervened against the NLF, and they had been told in reply that the British authorities had no right to intervene outside Aden. Sheikh Farid pointed out there was a clear contradiction between this attitude and the deliberate attempt to bring the NLF to power.

275. He added that further evidence of British complicity in the recent developments had been furnished by the kidnapping of the ruler of Wahidi who had accompanied them to Geneva. On his return, the ruler had been provided by the British authorities, at his request, with air transportation, from Aden to his home State. In Ataq, he was picked up by a Royal Air Force helicopter for the remainder of the journey. Since then he had been neither seen nor heard of, but the helicopter had been discovered undamaged and in mysterious circumstances.

276. Sheikh Farid handed the Mission an extract of a statement he had issued to the Press (see appendix IX).

277. In conclusion, Sheikh Mohammed Farid said they were convinced that the United Kingdom Government had encouraged the NLF to boycott the Mission. In their view, the NLF by itself could not stay in power; there would be a repetition of the situation in Yemen. The only solution lay in a coalition between the various political parties, and the last hope for South Arabia was in the Mission bringing pressure to bear on the United Kingdom Government not to proceed with its plans. The Mission should clearly condemn the British manoeuvre, persuade the parties to form a government and recommend United Nations supervision of elections to be held in the near future.

### *C. Work of the Mission in Cairo*

#### *Meetings with FLOSY*

278. From 9 to 11 September, the Mission held three meetings with a delegation of FLOSY, which consisted of Mr. A.

Q. Mackawee, Secretary-General of FLOSY, Mr. Basendwah, Mr. Taha Muqbil and ten other civil and military representatives of the movement.

279. The FLOSY delegation thanked the Mission for its goodwill towards the nationalists and emphasized its confidence in the Mission. It was convinced that the Mission's efforts were geared towards the achievement of an honourable solution to the problem of South Arabia. As had already been conveyed to the Mission, FLOSY remained the sole and true representative of the people of the Territory. This legitimate claim was substantiated by facts: the recent events and particularly the general strike of 5 September had given ample proof that FLOSY was the leader of the masses. The success of the strike not only in Aden but in the Territory as a whole had been interpreted by world opinion as a form of popular referendum in favour of FLOSY. Neither the British authorities nor any other group were real masters of the land.

280. FLOSY accused the British authorities of fomenting clashes between the nationalist elements so as ultimately to eliminate all of them. He held them responsible for the prevailing chaos, disorder and bloodshed. Their recent attempt to hand over the country to the Federal Army would have plunged it into civil war, and would in consequence have enabled the British to emerge as the victors from a disorderly situation. He outlined the position of FLOSY as it had recently been determined by the party's revolutionary council in Taiz. First, FLOSY had established itself as the dominant political element in the Territory and, as such, it had the right to form a central caretaker government. Secondly, FLOSY was prepared to incorporate the NLF, which was a party of minor importance, in this government and to co-operate with it, provided that FLOSY was entrusted with the responsibility of forming the government, but it could not grant representation to any other force in the country such as the sultans or others. Thirdly, FLOSY insisted that the Territory was an integral unit including both the Eastern States and the islands; the British intention to internationalize Perim was totally unacceptable. Fourthly, FLOSY considered that the sultans, the Ministers of the so-called "Federal Government", South Arabian League and all other bankrupt parties should be eliminated. Finally it was vital that all British forces should be immediately withdrawn and all British military bases removed.

281. The Mission observed that it was less concerned with evaluating the strength of the various elements, than with bringing them together and attaining the objectives of the General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI) and avoiding bloodshed. The Mission then asked to be informed about FLOSY's recent contacts with the NLF and hoped that the two nationalist parties could work together at reaching a settlement of their differences and thus facilitate the implementation of the resolution. Time was of the essence as the Mission had to report very soon to the Special Committee.

282. Mr. Mackawee stated that FLOSY was very open-minded about the question of discussions with the NLF. He recalled that at the time of his visit to New York he had given the impression that FLOSY and the NLF were about to come to an agreement. Things had changed and trouble had developed that had prevented the agreement from materializing. It had been eventually discovered that those who had claimed to represent the NLF Supreme Council had had no authority to commit that body. New contacts had been made, the latest one a few days before the Mission's arrival, but the NLF had no one in Cairo who could speak with authority. FLOSY was now waiting for an official NLF delegation from the Territory to enter into serious discussions. It would welcome any assistance the Mission could give in this matter, with the understanding that FLOSY was supreme in the Territory.

283. FLOSY was convinced the Mission was genuinely anxious to bring the colonial régime in Aden to an end, but stressed that there would be serious trouble unless that régime was replaced by the true representatives of the people. It was because of its own restraint and confidence in its strength, that FLOSY had accepted to meet with the Mission while others were boycotting it. The hostility of the United Kingdom Government towards FLOSY stemmed from the good relations which FLOSY maintained with Cairo and with the progressive Arab

countries; FLOSY was the only party having official representation in Sudan, Algeria, Syria and Iraq and was recognized by the Arab League as the sole legitimate representative of the people.

284. The Mission emphasized the importance it attached to co-operation between the nationalist movements. The division if it continued would make more difficult the attainment of the objectives of the United Nations resolutions. Further the United Kingdom had recognized that FLOSY should be represented in the negotiations for the transfer of power. It was time for all to sit together and try to work out their differences.

285. Mr. Mackawee informed the Mission that a special messenger of the NLF had gone to Aden to obtain authority to discuss "certain terms provisionally agreed upon". He had been delayed because of the strike but a reply was expected any time, as the agreed deadline was 9 September. Mr. Mackawee agreed on the necessity of sitting together with the NLF but so far the NLF had shown no sign of goodwill. However, Lord Shackleton's statements to which the Mission had referred were contradictory. By making tempting offers to the NLF, the United Kingdom was presumably encouraging the NLF in its refusal to meet with the Mission. There was very little FLOSY could do about the attitude of the NLF. Showing open-mindedness and tolerance FLOSY had always treated the NLF like a younger brother. It did not deny the NLF's existence but the question was the extent of its importance; it was of less importance than FLOSY. FLOSY was prepared to co-operate with the NLF but it could not budge from certain basic principles; because of its predominance it should be entrusted with the task of forming the caretaker government.

286. The Mission expressed its readiness to meet and hold discussions with the NLF if its leaders were to come to Cairo within a few days, but it could not be kept immobilized indefinitely. It reiterated that its task was to promote the emergence to genuine independence of South Arabia, with its human, territorial and national integrity unimpaired. In its view, an agreement between FLOSY and the NLF was very important even though it could not propose at that stage the manner in which this agreement should come about. In the final analysis it was up to the parties to decide, but it should be borne in mind that procrastination would only hurt the cause of South Arabia. In conclusion the Mission indicated that in the absence of a response from the NLF to its invitation it was preparing to leave for New York where it would submit its report. By so doing it was not closing the door; it would be ready to communicate further with FLOSY and to hold meetings in New York with the nationalists if there was a chance of a positive outcome. The Mission would be equally ready to go to Aden should a visit be necessary in the interest of the effective implementation of the United Nations resolutions concerning the Territory.

287. Mr. Mackawee stated his conviction that the Mission's recommendations would be formulated with the sole interest of the people of South Arabia in mind. He looked to the United Nations to put an end to the present disorder and bloodshed. It was the duty of the United Nations to do so if it wished to discharge its responsibility to the international community. Mr. Mackawee solemnly promised that should FLOSY take over the task of running the country, peace and freedom would prevail.

#### *Contacts with the United Arab Republic Government*

288. While in Cairo the Mission had a useful exchange of views with the United Arab Republic Presidential Assistant for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzy, and other senior officials. The Assistant to the President informed the Mission that the Government of the United Arab Republic as a United Nations Member and an Arab country was deploying its efforts to promote understanding among the nationalist leaders and cohesion between elements in the South. He hoped this would contribute to the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission welcomed the efforts of the United Arab Republic Government, and expressed itself in favour of collaboration between the leadership of the two nationalist movements. The success of its work depended to a great extent on

bringing together all important political elements in the Territory. It was essential that effective steps should be taken to bring the divergent views of these elements together so that a dialogue aimed at the formation of a caretaker government could be undertaken. The Mission was also anxious that the territorial integrity of the country should be preserved upon independence.

#### *Communications from the United Kingdom Government*

289. On 9 September, the Mission received the following message from Sir Humphrey Trevelyan:

"The following is my report on the situation here. As you are aware, I made it clear through Aden Radio that the expression 'nationalist forces' in my statement included both FLOSY and the NLF and that I was ready to have discussions with both. The South Arabian Army have now issued a statement declaring the area north of Aden and surrounding the Federal Capital to be a military controlled area. They have called for a cessation of interfactional fighting and have appealed to FLOSY and the NLF to come forward in answer to the British Government's call for negotiations, promising their support only to those who respond. I hope that this statement will have a stabilising effect on the present dangerous situation, that we can now move towards negotiations and that you will be able to persuade FLOSY to play their part accordingly. This would be a most valuable contribution to our task. I hope we can continue to keep in close touch and I shall send periodic reports of the situation as before."

### VIII. SUBSEQUENT WORK OF THE MISSION

#### *Introduction*

290. Following its return to New York, the Mission undertook the preparation of its report, while pursuing its contacts with the representative of the United Kingdom, the representatives of a number of Arab States and the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

#### *Consultations with the representative of the United Kingdom*

291. On 13 September 1967, the Mission was informed by the representative of the United Kingdom that the situation in the Territory was still confused, particularly in tribal areas. There had been armed clashes between the supporters of FLOSY and the NLF. The South Arabian Army was the only stabilizing factor, although there was still fear that it would disintegrate along factional lines. The Army had been making attempts to pacify the area in and around Aden and to get nationalist leaders to agree on a settlement. It had fixed the date of 20 September for the nationalist leaders to be ready to communicate to it their willingness to negotiate with the British authorities.<sup>k</sup> The representative of the

<sup>k</sup> The following is the text of the South Arabian Army statement broadcast on 9 September 1967, as transmitted to the Mission by the representative of the United Kingdom:

"A meeting of the commanders of the South Arabian Armed Forces was held at 1200 hours on 9 September 1967. The following officers attended 1 SAA (a) Aqid Nasir Buraik Aulahi (b) Aqid Muhammed Ahmad Aulahi (c) Aqid Muhammad Sa'id Yafi' (d) Aqid Ahmas Muhammad Hasana SAP (e) Aqid Abdul Hadi Muhammad Shihab (f) Aqid Abdullah Salih Aulahi.

"The following decisions were taken at the meeting:

"(i) To call on the High Commissioner to issue a statement that there is no ban on any NLF or FLOSY leaders entering South Arabia and that they may enter the area whenever they wish;

"(ii) To call on the leaders of the two fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia in order to meet a board composed of senior officers of the South Arabian Armed Forces for discussions about the decisions taken by the senior Arab officers on 6 September 1967, consisting in short of an end to fighting between the two fronts and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence for South Arabia.

United Kingdom felt that the Mission should also concentrate on the aim of getting the nationalist forces to work together and to enter into negotiations with the Army and with the United Kingdom Government. There was a dangerous situation "on the ground", and little hope of a solution unless the NLF and FLOSY reached an agreement between themselves. He believed that the Mission could still make a contribution in promoting unity and harmony among the nationalists.

292. The Mission emphasized that it was always prepared to do whatever it could for the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. It realized that the situation was still far from being solved. While preparing its report, it would still be available for meetings with the nationalists, particularly the NLF. It had been willing to prolong its stay in Cairo for that purpose and had not excluded further contacts in New York. If an agreement was to be reached between the parties concerned before the completion of its report, the Mission would welcome it.

293. The Mission reminded the representative of the United Kingdom that while in Geneva it had warned Lord Shackleton of the necessity of careful negotiations to bring the various elements together. However, an initiative had been taken later on by the United Kingdom Government without prior consultation with the Mission, and although the statement broadcast by the High Commissioner on 5 September had been slightly modified from the original version shown to it, the appeal contained in it was still more oriented towards the NLF than towards FLOSY. The appeal had stipulated that any negotiations should take place in Aden, while FLOSY wished those negotiations to be undertaken elsewhere. In the Mission's view the offer made by the High Commissioner in his broadcast might have contributed to the NLF decision not to alter its attitude of non-co-operation with the Mission. Finally, the decision of the United Kingdom Government not to send a British Cabinet Minister to Cairo had not been helpful in bringing the elements concerned together, as had been envisaged by the Mission.

294. In a letter dated 21 September 1967, the representative of the United Kingdom set out in detail the reasons and background of his Government's recent actions in South Arabia (see appendix X below). He stated that in the last week of August the situation had become extremely dangerous. The NLF and FLOSY had continued to contend for position; central authority had collapsed outside Aden, with persons acting in the name of the NLF taking over in most States. The Federal Government had ceased to be effective and the Army had refused to take over. Together with the Arab civil servants, the Army had pressed the High Commissioner to negotiate with the nationalist groups. There were no longer British troops in any of the States of the Protectorate. The South Arabian Forces had made it clear that if the British authorities could not at once agree to deal with the insurgents, they could not be responsible for the consequences.

295. The letter went on to say that the threat to order and public security had been a matter that had to be dealt with very rapidly; indeed it had not been physically within the power of the United Kingdom to hold the situation locally while efforts had been continued outside the Territory to get all the parties to agree to share power. This had been particularly so since the dominating insurgents of the NLF had flatly refused all suggestions, including that of the Mission, of discussions outside South Arabia with the Mission or with other factions, while FLOSY and others had been unwilling to negotiate in Aden on the only basis which had seemed possible in the short term. It had been feared that if the

"(iii) To appeal to President Abdul Nasser to use his popularity and influence to end fighting between the two fronts and to help the revolutionary forces unite to preserve their revolutionary gains in accordance with the real situation in the area.

"(iv) In view of the dangerous situation in the area, the two parties are requested to announce their replies on these requests before Wednesday 20 September 1967."

An announcer then quoted a High Commissioner spokesman as saying that, speaking on behalf of the High Commissioner, he confirmed that there was no restriction on NLF or FLOSY leaders entering the Federation.

British position was not made clear immediately, there would be rapid disintegration on all fronts, growing confusion and heavy bloodshed and human suffering; the divisions within South Arabia would be deepened. In order to hold the situation and make it possible for negotiations to take place before it was too late, the High Commissioner had been authorized to make his broadcast. He had made no distinction between the nationalist parties; he had been, and remained, ready to talk to any and all who would come forward.

296. Lord Caradon pointed out that the statement of the High Commissioner had been warmly welcomed on all sides in Aden and that the Army had since taken positive steps towards getting some compromise between FLOSY and the NLF. On 6 and 9 September, they had broadcast over Aden Radio a call to the leaders of the two Fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia to discuss an end to fighting between them and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence. The Army had arranged a local truce and the reciprocal release of prisoners and had some hope of extending this to the political field. The security situation had improved and there was some revival of commercial activity. The High Commissioner had been able to step up the release of political detainees, while the planned withdrawal of British forces had continued on schedule. In all these respects, the purposes of the United Nations resolutions were being progressively fulfilled.

297. The United Kingdom representative concluded his letter by stating that a new Government was urgently necessary in South Arabia. He foresaw more need for the close involvement of the United Nations, especially in helping to ensure that the wishes of the people found their full and free expression in determining the future of the country.

298. The Mission replied with the following letter dated 22 September 1967 to the representative of the United Kingdom:

"I would like, on behalf of the Mission, to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 21 September 1967, the contents of which have been duly noted. The Mission will refer to some of the points contained therein in the report which it is now preparing and the completion of which is its most urgent task. However, should circumstances warrant it, the Mission would be ready to undertake further discussions with those concerned in the hope of contributing towards the fulfilment of the objectives of resolution 2183 (XXI) and as long as its mandate continues to be in effect."

299. On 21 September the following message was communicated to the Mission from the High Commissioner in Aden concerning the situation in the Territory:

"The situation in Aden has considerably improved in the last fortnight. After a few days of inter-factional fighting, an inter-factional truce was arranged by the South Arabian Forces and now for some days there have been virtually no incidents of violence between the factions, and indeed very few against the British Forces. The South Arabian Army have taken over internal security in Little Aden and are taking over in Shaikh Othman and Mansura on 24 September. By this date the Mansoura Detention Centre will have been closed and only fifty detainees will remain in British custody. Locally there is some revival of confidence and hope for the future.

"The South Arabian Army have taken most useful action both in stopping inter-factional fighting and in stabilizing the situation around Aden. They have made it their principal aim to secure an agreement between FLOSY and the NLF, and are working hard to this end.

"In the Western Protectorate the situation is by no means clear. Inter-tribal fighting on traditional lines has broken out in a number of places, the political labels of the various factions being merely a reflection of old tribal antipathies. The NLF have a strong hold over the whole Central area and are predominant in the West, though there are areas of FLOSY influence, supported by reinforcements from the Yemen, in Western Lahej and the Radfan and one or two other places. There has been inter-factional fighting in Dhala. In the Eastern part of the Western Protectorate, FLOSY have at present the major influence in the towns of Wahidi, the Upper Aulaqi Sul-

tanate and the Aulahi Shaikhdom, though the NLF have considerable tribal support. The NLF appear to have taken over in Mukalla and claim to be expanding in their influence to other towns in the Qa'iti Sultanate. They may be expected to make a bid for power in Kathiri also very soon. In general, the situation is fluid, though the NLF seem to be the stronger.

"Both the NLF and FLOSY appear to be rather more willing to move towards an accommodation, the best hope of this being that it should be arranged through the South Arabian Army. We are encouraging them by every means possible to work towards an agreement between the parties."

300. In messages dated 23 and 24 September 1967, the High Commissioner informed the Mission that the South Arabian Army had just made a new attempt to bring the NLF and FLOSY together. Invitations had been issued to the two Fronts to meet by 30 September at Asmara or Khartoum, or possibly Beirut. In a pamphlet issued in Aden, FLOSY had proposed negotiations under the personal supervision of the President of the United Arab Republic, at Cairo, or if the NLF refused to go to Cairo, "in any Arab land—Taiz, Sanaa, Algiers, Baghdad, Damascus or Khartoum". An NLF leaflet issued in Aden later on stated that the NLF was ready to waive their insistence on meeting inside South Arabia and to meet as soon as possible outside.

#### *Public statement by the Mission*

301. The Mission took due notice of the above messages conveyed to it by the administering Power. Concomitantly, it was gratified to note from press reports that a joint statement had been issued in Cairo by representatives of FLOSY and the NLF, Mr. A. Q. Mackawee and Mr. Abdullatif Ash-Shaabi respectively, calling for an end to inter-factional strife as of Tuesday morning, 26 September 1967. The statement promised the reciprocal release of detainees and announced that the two Fronts would meet for discussions in Cairo beginning 3 October 1967. The delegations of FLOSY and the NLF would be fully empowered to conclude an agreement on national unity; on the formation of a central transitional government which would receive power from the United Kingdom; on the preparation of a programme of action for the period of transition, and on the preparation of a provisional constitution which would be applied during the transitional period.

302. Bearing in mind general developments in the area and the statements of the two nationalist movements, the Mission issued the following public statement on 26 September:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden has taken note of the recent efforts undertaken by the leaders of the nationalist movements of the Territory to settle their differences and to establish co-operation between themselves. The Mission considers that the importance of attaining these objectives increases as the date set for the independence of the Territory approaches.

"The Mission accordingly expresses the fervent hope that the efforts under way will be crowned with success and thus facilitate the effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolution in the interests of peace and unity in the Territory.

"The Mission is currently completing its report. However, if the situation demands, the Mission will be willing and ready to continue its assistance in bringing about the necessary understanding among the parties concerned."

#### *Further messages from the administering Power*

303. In a message from the High Commissioner dated 2 October, the Mission was informed that the NLF had issued a pamphlet in Aden in which it endorsed the statement issued in Cairo by Mr. Ashaabi and Mr. Mackawee, and called for a continuation of the inter-factional truce. The pamphlet said that national unity must be achieved by an agreement worked out by the NLF and FLOSY on the basis:

"(i) That the Fronts should reach a common attitude towards Britain;

"(ii) That a coalition Government of the two Fronts should be established according to the measure of the support they enjoy in order to receive sovereignty from Britain;

"(iii) That there should be agreement not to co-operate in any way with the South Arabian League, the Sultans or their representatives or Mr. Bayoomi's Party."

In conclusion, the pamphlet stated that the NLF would send a delegation to Cairo to put forward its point of view and details of its plans for co-ordination between the two Fronts.

304. On 3 October, the High Commissioner reported that the NLF Committee appeared to have established their control in the urban areas of the Qa'iti State both on the coast and in the Wadi Hadhramaut. A number of leading personalities in Mukalla connected with the former administration or with FLOSY had been arrested. The Qa'iti State had been nominally abolished and the provincial administration was being reconstituted. The NLF were also reported to have taken over the Kathiri State apparently at the request of the administration there. The Hadhrami Bedouin Legion and the State forces were reported to be co-operating with the NLF administration, but their precise relations with the NLF Committee were in doubt.

305. On 10 October 1967, the Mission received a further message from the High Commissioner informing it of his intention to issue a statement in Aden on 12 October, to emphasize the urgency of progress in securing agreement between the nationalists on an early negotiation with Britain. The text of the statement was as follows:

"The British Government welcome the Conference arranged between representatives of the two South Arabian political groups, FLOSY and the NLF. Independence is now imminent and there can be no advantage to South Arabia in the maintenance of the British presence. It is in the interests of the country that the British should soon withdraw and that South Arabians should assume the responsibilities of Government. The British Government wish to have good relations with the new South Arabia which will be completely independent.

"The preparations for the final withdrawal of British forces are now at an advanced stage and can be completed within a short period. The South Arabian Army has already taken over internal security in a large part of Aden and will soon have the military capacity to take over the remainder.

"The urgent decisions necessary before independence can, with good will, be taken quickly. The British Government sincerely hope that at the Conference in Cairo a representative body will be speedily formed to negotiate the final arrangements for independence. They are prepared to enter into negotiations immediately with any body set up by the Conference for this purpose."

306. The Mission took due notice of the messages from the High Commissioner without being in a position to ascertain for itself the developments in the Territory.

#### *Communication addressed by the Mission to the Secretary-General*

307. On 12 October 1967, the Mission addressed the following communication to the Secretary-General, reproduced in document A/AC.109/277.

"As you will recall, on 15 September 1967 Ambassador Abdussattar Shalizi informed you, on behalf of the United Nations Special Mission on Aden, that the Mission expected to submit its report by the end of that month.

"A few days later the Mission received reports to the effect that the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the National Liberation Front were to hold meetings in Cairo in order to discuss plans for co-ordination between the two movements and to establish a basis for the transfer of power from the Government of the United Kingdom.

"For all practical purposes the report of the Mission is complete in so far as its activities hitherto are concerned.

Nevertheless, before presenting its report, the Mission considers it advisable to await the outcome of the meetings, which have already started, in view of their significance. In a press communiqué issued on 26 September 1967, the Mission has expressed the fervent hope that the efforts under way will be crowned with success and thus facilitate the effective implementation of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, in the interests of peace and unity in the Territory.

"I would greatly appreciate your conveying the foregoing to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples for its information."

#### IX. ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE UNITED KINGDOM OF EARLY WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH ARABIA

##### *Communication from the administering Power*

308. In a message communicated to the Mission on 26 October, the High Commissioner stated that pointless violence had been renewed in the middle of October and that there had recently been a real danger that the armed forces might split on tribal lines. The stability of the South Arabian forces remained the paramount requirement, but they would be subjected to increasingly severe strains until a Government took charge.

309. The High Commissioner considered it urgently necessary that the parties in Cairo should come to agreement, take over the Government and negotiate final British withdrawal. It had been nearly two months since the United Kingdom had offered to negotiate its withdrawal with the nationalist groups and since the South Arabian Army had urged negotiations on them. The South Arabians must now be prepared to take on the responsibility of government without further delay. The country was in a dangerous state through want of leadership and direction. The High Commissioner hoped the Mission would strongly urge the parties to finish their negotiations in Cairo and take over the Government of South Arabia now.

##### *Agreement between FLOSY and the NLF*

310. On 1 November 1967, an announcement was made in Cairo to the effect that agreement had been reached between FLOSY and the NLF on matters they had discussed so far and on the formation of a common delegation to negotiate transfer of power from the United Kingdom Government. Consequently, the Mission sent the following message to FLOSY and the NLF:

"The United Nations Special Mission on Aden has learned with gratification news of the agreement reached between FLOSY and the NLF to establish full co-operation between themselves and to lay down a basis for negotiation of the transfer of power from the United Kingdom Government. The Mission congratulates all nationalists on this important achievement which is in the interest of peace and unity in the area. The Mission wishes you all success in your efforts to establish a representative government."

##### *Statement by the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom in the House of Commons*

311. On 2 November 1967 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made a statement in the House of Commons in which he announced "new and firm decisions" on the question of South Arabia. These decisions had already been communicated to the Mission by the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations on 31 October (see appendix XI below).

312. The Foreign Secretary stated that it was over eight weeks since the High Commissioner in Aden had declared his readiness to negotiate with the nationalists and since the South Arabian Forces had called upon the two factions to resolve their differences and to form a common front for negotiation with the High Commissioner. It was a month since the groups had finally started talks between themselves in Cairo. Despite appeals from many quarters, there had been no sign of any progress until 1 November. On the contrary

there had been increasing tension between the factions in South Arabia itself who continued to press for supremacy. The British Government had to take account of the consequences of this prolonged uncertainty with its constant danger that the divisions in the country might divide the South Arabian Forces. Only the night before had the groups negotiating in Cairo announced that they had reached agreement on matters they had discussed so far, and that they would shortly be able to reach agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with the British Government. The Foreign Secretary welcomed this development and looked forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

313. The Foreign Secretary recalled that, in his statement on 19 June (see para. 170 above), he had warned that events in Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle East in general could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider the proposals he had announced at that time. He had also made it quite clear that the British Government had serious doubts about the soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia. Since then events had justified those warnings and reservations. The United Kingdom retained the objectives it had often stated, namely to withdraw her forces in good order and to leave behind, if possible, a united, stable and independent country; but the events since June had caused it to reconsider how best to achieve those objectives.

314. The Foreign Secretary stated that:

"The independence of South Arabia would take place in the second half of November and all British forces would be withdrawn at that time. The precise date for independence and withdrawal would be announced by the middle of November. Early withdrawal would reduce any danger that British Forces might become involved and sustain casualties in any renewed violence by or among the South Arabian factions. He considered that the radical nationalists and other groups must face and resolve their own problems themselves. In those circumstances some things which the United Kingdom had expected to settle before independence might have to be left pending.

"He stated that early withdrawal would also help the South Arabian Forces; they were ready to take over fully now; the High Commissioner and the British Commander-in-Chief in Aden were satisfied that these forces would no longer expect the support of British units.

"The changed circumstances in Yemen had removed the danger the Federal Government and the Federal Armed Forces had faced in June and thus the British offer of deterrent naval and air forces for a period after independence had become irrelevant. Consequently the United Kingdom had cancelled its plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces although a substantial naval force was concentrated at Aden to cover the period of withdrawal and independence.

"With reference to the offer of financial support to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate Forces, they had always been subject to review if political circumstances made their continuance inappropriate. These questions would be left for decision later, when the future might be clearer. The formation and attitude of a new government would be important factors, but it was impossible to prejudge them.

"With reference to the island of Perim, the view of both the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Special Mission on Aden had been that the proposal for internationalisation could not be entertained since it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions. Moreover all Arab countries represented at the United Nations had sent a joint formal communication to the Secretary-General opposing the separation of Perim from South Arabia. It was clear that when the question was debated at the United Nations the proposal would be rejected. There was no question of retaining British sovereignty or responsibility for Perim after the independence of South Arabia. The island would stay with South Arabia, unless its inhabitants against expectation were to demand otherwise."



*Statement issued by the Armed Forces of the Territory on 6 November*

315. The following statement was issued by officers of the Armed Forces High Command on 6 November and was communicated to the Mission by the administering Power.

"They recognize the NLF as the only organization legally representing the people of South Arabia. They appeal to the NLF to enter into discussion with the High Commissioner to take over total power from Britain.

"They request that the British Government should recognize the NLF as the only representative organization of the people of South Arabia and to enter into negotiations with it to hand over sovereignty immediately.

"The South Arabian Armed Forces pledge their full support for the NLF.

"The South Arabian Armed Forces do not recognise any longer any other Front or Party claiming to represent the people of South Arabia and will oppose such Front or Party that stands against the will of the people which is represented only by the NLF."

316. The following message from the High Commissioner in Aden was simultaneously transmitted to the Mission:

"Inter-factional fighting, mainly in the areas under control of the South Arabian Army, has been intense in the last few days. This has been expected for some time, having followed a build-up of arms over a number of weeks. The Army tried without success to arrange a truce and finally, as you will have seen, declared yesterday that it supported only the NLF. It is generally considered that, though there have been some resignations, this decision will not seriously affect the Army's cohesion. Today the situation seems quieter and the Army appears confident, with whatever justification, that with the support of the NLF they will be able to deal with the FLOSY/PORF faction.

"Even before this, Adenis had given up hope of the Cairo Conference producing any agreement especially after the NLF command had telegraphed to their delegates in Cairo to withdraw. It now seems likely that, whether the NLF come forward to negotiate with us or not, they, with the support of the Army, will form the first Government on independence. Thus the disunity of the South Arabian factions has defeated all attempts to establish a caretaker Government representative of all of them and one group is emerging as, for the moment at any rate, the dominant political force. But one cannot of course prophesy events in South Arabia even in the shortest term.

"As you know, we have been supporting the Cairo Conference and had hoped that, long before this, it would have established a body with which we could conduct our final negotiations but the Conference did not proceed with the necessary sense of urgency and was overtaken by events on the ground. We can now only wait developments here."

#### X. CONCLUSIONS

317. At the time that the Special Mission on Aden undertook its assignment in March 1967, the situation in the Territory which the General Assembly in its resolution 2183 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 had described as critical and explosive had shown further deterioration. Disturbances and incidents involving loss of life, particularly in Aden, were occurring almost daily. The state of emergency in the "Federation of South Arabia" had been in force since December 1963 and hundreds of people had been placed in detention.

318. The Mission has approached its task with objectivity, constantly bearing in mind the letter and spirit of resolutions 2183 (XXI) and 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly, and of other relevant resolutions of the United Nations. It was bent on acting in consultation with and enlisting the co-operation of the administering Power, "the only authority responsible to the United Nations for the full implementation of the resolutions". Unfortunately, failure by the administering Power to establish a climate of confidence in the Territory added to the difficulties faced by the Mission—all the more so, since the administering Power at times seemed to choose

a course of action not in keeping with the efforts of the Mission.

319. The Mission was also guided by certain overriding considerations, such as the necessity of safeguarding the territorial integrity of South Arabia, the achievement of true and genuine independence by the Territory, the promotion of peace and harmony among all sections of the people, and the time-limit set for independence by the administering Power.

320. Having regard to this situation and bound by the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), the Special Mission endeavoured at the outset of its work to make as many contacts as were necessary and possible to enable it to assess conditions in the Territory. It was impressed by the need to proceed with a sense of urgency not only in order to forestall further aggravation in the situation but particularly to facilitate the full and effective implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions. Accordingly the Mission made efforts at all stages of its work to contribute to a reduction of existing tensions and to bring about the abolition of the state of emergency. Although later on as from September 1967, a substantial number of detainees were released, the maintenance by the United Kingdom Government of the state of emergency could not but have hampered normal political activity in the Territory and prejudiced the successful discharge of the Mission's task.

321. In the discharge of its task, the Mission constantly bore in mind that the "Federal Government" had been qualified in the relevant United Nations resolutions as an unrepresentative régime and therefore made it clear that all its official contacts in respect of the Territory would have to be made through the United Kingdom as the administering Power. During the discussions held in London during March 1967, the United Kingdom Government had given the Mission the assurance that it accepted these considerations as the basis for the Mission's activities in the Territory. Nevertheless that Government failed to ensure that the authorities in Aden co-operated with the Mission on that basis, or facilitated free and unimpeded contact with the people.

322. In its subsequent discussions with representatives of the United Kingdom Government, the Mission emphasized that the central caretaker Government as envisaged in the resolution of the General Assembly could not be an outgrowth of the "Federal Government". It should be a newly established Government which would take over upon the dissolution of the existing authorities, on the basis of agreement among the parties concerned. It pointed out that the process leading to independence could not be practically conceived along the traditional British pattern of decolonization. In the prevailing circumstances, there was no room for a constitutional conference but rather bilateral consultations aimed at an agreement of all parties concerned under the auspices of the United Nations.

323. The Mission was equally insistent on the need to give practical effect to the principle of territorial integrity as defined in General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), which affirmed that the Eastern Aden Protectorate and the islands of Perim, Kuria Muria, Kamaran and other off-shore islands are an integral part of the Territory. In this connexion, the Mission had in mind that while the United Kingdom Government had voted in favour of the above-mentioned resolution, it had not taken the necessary practical steps to ensure that the Territory acceded to independence as one unit. Indeed during August 1967 the United Kingdom Government submitted to the United Nations a proposal for the internationalization of Perim, a proposal which the Mission could not entertain as it considered it to be in contradiction with the United Nations resolutions. Further, although the Mission stressed the undesirability of extending aid to any of the States which did not accept the principle of territorial integrity, the United Kingdom Government pledged military and other assistance to the Eastern Aden Protectorate.

324. Likewise the Mission emphasized the contradiction between the pre-emptive military arrangements proposed by the United Kingdom Government and the provisions of the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission also expressed serious misgivings regarding the enactment of a new constitution

prepared by the "Federal Government" to be brought into effect on or before independence day.

325. The Mission directed its efforts at meeting as many groups as possible, representing different shades of opinion with due emphasis on the nationalist movements. While it had early contacts with SAL, it was unable to meet with FLOSY representatives in formal discussions during the first phase of its work. However, it succeeded in having such meetings after its return from Aden to New York. These contacts were later resumed in Cairo. On the other hand, the Mission was unable to meet with the NLF for lack of response from that movement. It heard the views of spokesmen for traditionalist elements and the United National Party.

326. The Mission was unable to hear all shades of opinion in the Territory, as it had intended to do, for the following reasons: (a) conditions in the Territory were not conducive to performing this task; and (b) not all elements came forward to meet with the Mission; in particular, the NLF did not wish to co-operate with it.

327. The Mission acted upon the provision that a central caretaker Government, in order to lead the country to independence in peace and unity, should be broadly representative of the people. The Mission made it clear to FLOSY and all concerned that only through co-operation could their efforts lead to genuine independence for the Territory in conditions of peace and harmony, as envisaged in the relevant United Nations resolutions. The Mission also conveyed to the United Kingdom Government in unequivocal terms the conviction that any negotiations aimed at the formation of such a Government should include both FLOSY and the NLF, and that any effort centred on one of them to the exclusion of the other would not meet the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2183 (XXI), and was fraught with dangers for the people of the area. In public statements, the Mission expressed the fervent hope that agreement between the movements would pave the way for the formation of a broadly based transitional government before the appointed date for independence.

328. While the Mission increased its efforts to bring the elements concerned together, events in the Territory were taking a different course. Since July, the administering Power has reported the "growing power" of the NLF. Since the end of August the NLF has reportedly "swept over nearly all the States outside Aden". According to the administering Power persons acting in the name of the NLF took over in most States. The Federal Army together with the Arab Civil Servants pressed the British High Commissioner to negotiate with the nationalist groups.

329. Ever since the Mission's contacts with the British High Commissioner in July, it became clear that the Federal Army would be led to play an essential role in further developments in the Territory. While the Mission had been unable to obtain an accurate account of developments, it was evident from the official reports of the administering Power that the Federal Army had gained control in the Western and Central areas, and that the civilian administrations had been carried out by civil servants under the over-all supervision of the Army. It was also reported that there were "Revolutionary Committees" of the NLF in many States. According to the British High Commissioner, the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion and the State Forces in the Eastern Protectorate co-operated with the "NLF administration" but their precise relations with the "NLF Committee" were in doubt.

330. In view of the developments resulting from the initiatives taken by the United Kingdom during the early part of September 1967, and having regard to the lack of response from the NLF to the desire for discussions, the Mission decided to keep the situation under constant review and to stand ready to extend further assistance in the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions.

331. The situation in Aden during the first week of November was confused; on 1 November agreement was reached in Cairo between FLOSY and the NLF which gave rise to optimism. However, heavy fighting was reported and the number of victims was very high. Later the Army declared that it recognized only one nationalist organization, the NLF, and that

it had taken control in all sections of Aden, with the exception of Crater. The optimism to which the agreement between FLOSY and the NLF in Cairo had led was shattered, since the Army is still under the control of the administering Power. The announcement by the Army that it will not recognize FLOSY as a nationalist element is a cause of serious concern. The civil war which has partially existed during the last few weeks could spread engulfing other parts of the Territory. Useless bloodshed and dismemberment of the Territory are a most disturbing possibility.

332. As a result of the circumstances explained above, the Mission was not permitted to achieve the fulfillment of its mandate under resolution 2183 (XXI).

333. In these circumstances, the Mission recommends to the Special Committee and other appropriate organs of the United Nations to urge the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Authority, to do everything within its power to ensure that the objectives of resolution 2183 (XXI) are realized and that genuine independence is achieved in peace and harmony. To that end, the administering Power should be requested to deal directly with the nationalist movements.

## Appendix I

### STATEMENT BY THE SPECIAL MISSION ON 17 MARCH 1967

The Special Mission on Aden has met at Headquarters from 7 to 16 March 1967 to consider its programme of work and the ways and means of carrying out its preliminary phases.

As an essential and basic principle, the Mission considers that it should be thoroughly apprised of all factors relating to the situation in the Territory and that it should be directly informed of all points of view of the people. To this end the Mission is fully prepared to visit any place and meet with any representatives of the people who might wish to address it.

On Monday, 20 March 1967, the Special Mission will go to London where it will establish contact with the administering Power as a preliminary step to its visit to the Territory. The Mission expects also to visit Cairo and Jidda on its way to Aden, in order to meet with representatives of the people who are outside the Territory. It intends to arrive in Aden towards the end of this month.

As it prepares to leave Headquarters, the Special Mission wishes to stress that it is proceeding on its assignment in a spirit of objectivity and with a sense of urgency and determination to do its utmost to further the objectives contained in resolution 2183 (XXI) of the General Assembly.

## Appendix II

### LETTER DATED 6 MARCH 1967 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to communicate to you the contents of a message from His Majesty King Faisal Bin Abdul Aziz in connexion with the special United Nations Mission which is due to visit Aden and South Arabia in the near future:

"Owing to the fact that a great number of people of South Arabia including the Federated Emirates and Hadhramaut, work in Saudi Arabia, we believe that their views should be taken with regard to the self-determination of their country. For this reason we address an invitation to the United Nations Mission which is due to visit South Arabia for the purpose of ascertaining the views of the people. Therefore, we request you to invite the said Mission in our name to undertake a visit to the Kingdom for this purpose."

Taking into account the fact that the visit of the Mission to Saudi Arabia has financial implications and considering that it has to operate within the limits of the budget decided by the General Assembly during its twenty-first session, I have no doubt that my Government, in keeping with its customs and traditions, will defray all the costs that the presence of the Mission in Saudi Arabia would entail including transportation.

May I request you to be kind enough to make the necessary formal arrangements so that the Mission may visit Saudi Arabia for no other reason than to ascertain the wishes of the people of South Arabia and Aden who are present in large numbers in Saudi Arabia and are employed there in many walks of life.

(Signed) Jamil M. BAROODY  
Deputy Permanent Representative of  
Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

of South Arabia that this provisional constitution would provide a representative government for South Arabia in conformity with the resolutions on South Arabia approved by the United Nations and would prove suitable for the caretaker government recommended by the terms of reference of your Mission.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan OBALI  
Chairman  
Federal Supreme Council

### Appendix III

#### COMMUNICATIONS FROM MEMBERS OF THE "FEDERAL GOVERNMENT"

##### A. Telegram dated 2 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

On behalf of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia it is my honour to welcome you and your colleagues of the United Nations Mission to South Arabia. All Ministers of this Government assure you of their fullest support and their whole-hearted co-operation in your praiseworthy efforts to bring independence to a United Republic of South Arabia and to free our beloved country from the perils that surround South Arabia at this time.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan OBALI  
Chairman  
Federal Supreme Council

##### B. Letter dated 2 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia desires to take all possible steps which may lead at the earliest date to the full and orderly implementation of the United Nations resolutions on South Arabia. It is our intention in accordance with these resolutions to strive towards the establishment of a united and fully independent Republic of South Arabia under a constitution guaranteeing human rights and freedom. In pursuance of this intention the Federal Government in 1965 appointed Sir Ralph Hone, a famous constitutional lawyer, and Sir Gawain Bell, a distinguished administrator, as constitutional advisers. These constitutional advisers spent a considerable period in South Arabia visiting every State and after careful study submitted their report in a book entitled *Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966*. I now have the honour to forward a copy of that report to you.

I have to inform you that on receipt of the report from the constitutional advisers the Federal Government held a conference with representatives of all the States comprising the Federation of South Arabia. During this conference committees were established to consider various aspects of the draft constitution prepared by Sir Ralph Hone and Sir Gawain Bell which is contained in the book *Constitutional Proposals for South Arabia, 1966*. After these committees had prepared their reports the conference between the Federal Government and the State authorities was reconvened and a revised draft constitution was approved. This constitution in the view of the Federal Government is suitable for adoption as the provisional constitution specified in the United Nations resolutions. This constitution has now been accepted in principle by representatives of all the States within the Federation and may be adapted for the three States in the Eastern Aden Protectorate for the State of Upper Yafa' and for the islands in order that the new United Republic of South Arabia which we seek to establish may comprise the whole of South Arabia. I now have the honour to forward to you a copy of the provisional constitution which we hope will obtain the support and commendation of the Mission from the United Nations.

You will note that the provisional constitution provides for a President, a single legislative chamber, the members of which would be freely elected, and universal adult suffrage. It is therefore the view of the Government of the Federation

##### C. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the Chairman of the "Federal Supreme Council" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to inform you that I have dispatched the following telegram to you:

[For the text of the telegram, see communication A above.]

I should now like to repeat that the Government of the Federation of South Arabia extends a warm welcome to you and your colleagues in the United Nations Mission to South Arabia. It is our heart-felt desire that your task should be satisfactorily achieved and for that reason the Government of the Federation of South Arabia is determined to give all possible assistance and co-operation to the Mission.

I have already forwarded a number of documents for you and I shall shortly be presenting a memorandum containing the views of the Government of the Federation of South Arabia on certain aspects of the situation in South Arabia. My ministerial colleagues and I now look forward to greeting you in person and discussing in detail the problems that face our country on its path to independence and unity.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan OBALI  
Chairman  
Federal Supreme Council

##### D. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the "Minister of Education" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have the honour to forward herewith for your information a copy of the Ministry of Education annual report for the year 1965, together with the annual summary for Aden State for 1966. The annual summary for the sixteen other states for 1966 is still being compiled.

It may be of interest to you to note that, despite criticism you may have heard levelled against the Federal Government, there has been steady progress. In 1963, prior to the absorption of Aden within the Federation, there were approximately 32,000 pupils in schools and institutions of Aden and the other states; there were some 700 teachers and the estimated expenditure on education was £840,000. At the present time after four years of federation these figures have increased to:

	£
Pupils .....	43,000
Teachers .....	1,650
Expenditure .....	2,237,175

I take the opportunity to assure you of my highest esteem.

(Signed) Mohd Hassan OBALI  
Minister of Education

##### E. Letter dated 3 April 1967 from the "Minister of Health" to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I wish to submit a brief summary of our activities in the field of health. Since the inception of the Federation in 1959 there has been steady progress in the field of health, particularly in the Protectorate. Prior to 1959 there was but one functioning hospital in the Western Aden Protectorate, and thirty-five health units. At the end of this year, we shall have seven rural hospitals and fifty health units, which will give medical coverage to the whole of our rural areas.

Since Aden entered the Federation in 1963, we have completed a new maternity hospital at Al Mansoura and a mental hospital of one-hundred beds in Sheikh Othman. The school medical service, which covers all of Aden, is now in the process of extending its activities to the States of Lahej, Fadhli, Yafai and Haushabi.

We are particularly proud of our training programme which has enabled us to staff all these institutions with South Arabians. Our nurse training school at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital provides three-year courses for nurses and a one-year course for practical nurses. Health assistants for the rural institutions receive a three-year training at our school at Mahkzan Hospital. Most of our senior nursing posts are now held by South Arabians.

We have eighteen doctors in the Federation who are South Arabians, seven of whom are taking post-graduate training in various specialities overseas.

I wish to mention briefly our Malaria Control Service, which is doing admirable work on the suppression of malaria, mainly in our cotton-growing areas.

Tuberculosis, one of our major problems, is being actively tackled by a TB Control Unit based at the Queen Elizabeth Hospital. There is registration of all cases of tuberculosis within the Federation, and a BCG campaign is being pursued in all areas. Trachoma is another disease which is yielding to our mass campaign organized by a mobile team.

One of our doctors, now studying public health in Beirut, is majoring in health education, and it is hoped that an active health education unit will be functioning later this year.

The medical services of the Federation of South Arabia compare most favourably with those of our neighbours, both in the Middle East and Africa. The problem of combating the disease load of our own people is one we feel confident of tackling. Unfortunately our services, which are free to everyone, tend to be inundated by the steady influx of our less fortunate brothers who come from Yemen for treatment. Thirty per cent of all our general beds and 50 per cent of all TB beds are occupied by sick people from Yemen. We gladly assist them in every way.

I enclose copies of our 1963 annual report. I regret that the 1964 and 1965 reports are still with the printers.

I and my staff will be at your service at any time to show you any of our institutions, both in Aden and in the other States.

(Signed) Sheikh Ali Atif Al KALADI  
Minister of Health

#### Appendix IV

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 11 MAY 1967

I have given the most careful thought to the situation in South Arabia and what we need to do in order to bring about the transition to independence with the best practicable results, the least harm to our own interests and the greatest prospect of a stable and assured future for South Arabia. In these discussions I have had the advantage of the advice of my noble friend Lord Caradon, the Minister of State at the United Nations, and of very many of the officials who are actually stationed there and therefore have first-hand experience of the situation in Aden and South Arabia.

The final stages of the transition to independence will increasingly give rise to important questions of an international and diplomatic character, as well as those of colonial administration. I have concluded that it would greatly help the Government in dealing with these problems to have available someone with wide experience both in international affairs and in the affairs of the Arab world. I am arranging forthwith for Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to take over the High Commissionership in South Arabia. Sir Humphrey has been our Ambassador in a number of important posts at a very significant time and these include two ambassadorships in Arab countries. In addition to being, as the House well knows, a man with an independent mind, I am confident he possesses the ability, experience and energy to accomplish the very difficult task, which he has agreed to undertake. He will take up his post in about ten days' time.

In making this appointment it will be necessary for me to recall the present High Commissioner, Sir Richard Turnbull.

Since there have been leaks which I must tell the House I deeply regret, and in consequence a lot of uninformed speculation on this change, I would like to make it clear that there is no truth in any suggestions that there have been differences between Sir Richard Turnbull and myself either personally or over policy. What is possibly more important is that the change casts no adverse reflection on Sir Richard to whom I should like to pay a special tribute. We should all be grateful to him for carrying out a task of the utmost difficulty with courage, resolution and high ability, after he had already completed a distinguished career in the public service.

Sir Richard Turnbull and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan are both public servants of notable distinction. The change is being made because I think that Sir Humphrey's experience and background will bring new and valuable assets to bear on the problems at this stage. As a result of all the consultations I have had, I have become convinced that the situation which will develop over the remaining months will require a different kind of background and experience from that which Sir Richard has had, and it is for that reason alone that I am making this change.

The new High Commissioner must clearly now be given time to settle in.

The House will understand therefore when I say that I believe that this is not the occasion to go into detail about the policy which I propose should be followed from here on. I realize, however, that the House will wish me to deploy and will wish to be able to debate a full statement of government policy. Discussions will take place through the usual channels immediately to arrange for such a debate to take place as soon as the House wishes after the recess.

I would like however today to assure the House that the policy I propose to pursue will be inspired by the aims announced by the Government which will be first, the orderly withdrawal of our military forces and the establishment of an independent South Arabia at the earliest possible date, secondly to work in close consultation with all concerned and especially with the United Nations for the establishment of a broad-based government by the time of independence, and thirdly on the basis of these two principles to leave behind a stable and secure government in South Arabia.

#### Appendix V

LETTER DATED 16 AUGUST 1967 FROM THE MAHRA STATE COUNCIL AT AL-GHAIDAH TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

The President and members of the Mahra State Council wish to convey their cordial and sincere greetings to you and wish you all success in your work. The Mahra administration for the mainland and Socotra wishes to state that they have unanimously decided to send a delegation consisting of Sultan Khalifa Bin Abdullah Bin Afrar as President, and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Ashoor Al Mahri and Sheikh Alawi Bin Abdulla Al Mahri. Sultan Khalifa is President of the Tribal Council of the Mahra State, while Sheikh Abdullah and Sheikh Alawi are prominent members of that Council. The said delegation would leave for Geneva on 17 August 1967 to have conversations with you concerning the future of the Mahra State. The delegation would inform you of all our aspirations and other matters we hope to realize for the general interest of our people.

The Mahra people as a whole strongly urge its State represented in the Council to take proper and practical measures within the framework of facts and realities as previously set forth in our letter to the United Nations dated 12 April 1967. We hope to arrive at a satisfactory solution with you which will fulfil the aspirations of the Mahra people, namely preservation of order and security and the provision of economic and financial means to promote progress and prosperity for our unfortunate people. We look forward to negotiating with you with a view to learning your views concerning the future of the Mahra State.

We deeply feel that you have undertaken international responsibilities concerning the fate of all under-developed and

backward peoples which are totally deprived of economic, social and administrative development. We consider you responsible before God and human conscience for supporting the rights of these deprived people. This delegation is accredited to discuss and negotiate with you and submit whatever it deems significantly important for the fate of both our State and people.

Finally we wish our delegation success in its mission and we earnestly request you to do everything to promote the legitimate right of our deserving people. May God help you to uphold justice.

(Signed) Sultan Khalifa Bin Abdullah BIN AFRAR  
President of the Mahra State Council

#### Appendix VI\*

LETTER DATED 31 AUGUST 1967 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVES OF ALGERIA, IRAQ, JORDAN, KUWAIT, LEBANON, LIBYA, MOROCCO, SAUDI ARABIA, SUDAN, SYRIA, TUNISIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND YEMEN TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

[For the text, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6828.]

#### Appendix VII\*

TELEGRAM DATED 28 AUGUST 1967 FROM THE SOUTH ARABIAN LEAGUE TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

In the name of our people in South Arabia we refuse the British suggestion to isolate Perim island from South Arabia and transfer its administration to United Nations. Britain suggestion contradicts General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and with United Nations resolutions passed in 1963, 1965 and 1966. We condemn the British proposal and demand the Secretariat to reject it. Kindly convey this cable to Member States and United Nations Special Mission on Aden.

SOUTH ARABIAN LEAGUE

#### Appendix VIII

EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENTS BY THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT APPEARING IN THE PRESS ON THE SPECIAL MISSION'S ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT

[Original text: Arabic]

##### A. From An-Nahar (Beirut), 2 September 1967

The NLF spokesman said that the Mission was now biased towards British imperialism, and therefore the Front would not meet with that Mission; the spokesman charged that the United Kingdom and the United States took advantage of the circumstances arising from the Arab set-back and were using the Special Mission on Aden to resume the dialogue between the nationalists on one hand and British imperialism and the Sultans on the other hand. This implied a disregard of the United Nations resolutions.

The aims of the Front, the spokesman continued, were to throw out the Sultans' colonial régime, and the elimination of the political, military and economic systems supported by the British and world imperialism, and to build up revolutionary systems through the peoples' struggle in Aden.

Mr. Awad and his colleague announced they were remaining for a while in Lebanon, and said that the present situation in the area had passed the stage of negotiations.

In a private interview with *An-Nahar*, the NLF delegates stated that their presence here was not the result of a planned arrangement to meet with the Mission, and that it was a mere coincidence.

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/PET.699/Add.2.

Mr. Awad denied having had any contacts with the Mission in Geneva. The Front had protested against the meetings between the Mission and the Sultans by proclaiming a strike in Aden on 11 and 12 August. The Front had a basic objection to the interference by the United Nations in the question of South Arabia.

Referring to the differences in concepts held by FLOSY and the Front, Mr. Awad said "we conceive of liberation as having a political, military and economic basis, while FLOSY considers it as having only a political and perhaps a military basis".

He labelled FLOSY as a "bourgeois" Front depending on external propaganda and diplomatic activities, while in fact it had no base among the masses inside the country.

[Original text: Arabic]

##### B. From Al-Hayat (Beirut), 2 September 1967

Mr. Jaafar Awad, the representative of the NLF, in an interview with *Al-Hayat*, stated today that the United Nations Mission was seeking only a political settlement, which should be rejected by the revolution. The question of South Arabia could be solved only through the peoples' armed struggle. Any political settlement, or any negotiation with British colonialism could therefore be achieved only when the revolution was fulfilled and the colonial, military, political and economic systems and institutions were eliminated, and only when authority was transferred to the people throughout the south.

The spokesman of the NLF then charged that the United Nations Mission was biased towards the British colonialism; that this was the reason why the NLF decided to boycott it. The United Nations resolutions represented only the minimum of the people's demands; the United Nations was unable to secure to any country true independence. Negotiations, he added, were not possible with the British and the Sultans.

After having accused FLOSY of negotiating with Britain and meeting with the international mission in Geneva, he added however, that he did not accuse FLOSY of being an agent, but that there were differences in their views; FLOSY and the United Arab Republic had respect for the Sultans because of a certain tribal position they had.

Mr. Awad denied any participation by the Front in negotiations with FLOSY to form a government.

He indicated that the Front was willing to co-operate with FLOSY, provided FLOSY showed willingness to work within the Front's concepts of liberation. He answered another question saying that the Front was interested in the establishment of strong relations with all revolutionary liberation movements.

The Front's statement charged that the United States and the United Kingdom were trying to liquidate the revolution in South Yemen; colonialism was also attempting after the Arab set-back to impose ancient political settlement plans, which would allow them to maintain their economic interests in the area. The statement charged that the international Mission disregarded the texts of the United Nations resolutions to which it was committed when it came to Aden last April.

##### C. Extract from the Daily Star (Beirut), 2 September 1967

The National Liberation Front said on Friday that it would not meet the three-member United Nations Mission on Aden.

An NLF spokesman, announcing this at a press conference here, said "We consider the mission to have become aligned to British imperialism and we do not agree to meeting it".

The spokesman, Mr. Jaafar Awad said that the decision to boycott the United Nations Mission, "which resumed its mission by meeting the sultans in Geneva", was taken by the NLF "in harmony with its former attitude that United Nations resolutions on Aden represented only a minimum of the people's basic demands . . .".

Mr. Awad said that the Front believed that "through popular struggle the people will realize all their rights to liberation without any conditions or bargaining".

In a statement read out at the conference, Mr. Awad attacked Britain and the United States and accused the mission of aligning with "world imperialism".

"It is not new for the revolution", he said in his statement, "that Britain and America exploit the circumstances of the setback and utilize the United Nations mission on Aden to re-start a dialogue between the nationalists on the one hand, and British imperialism and the sultans on the other."

He said that "this means ignoring provisions of United Nations resolutions to which the mission committed itself" when coming to Aden last April and which led to its withdrawal from there at the time.

This change, he went on, "affirms the extent of the power of world imperialists to dominate the United Nations".

Mr. Awad said that he and his colleague "are now staying behind in Lebanon".

Asked if he would agree to negotiate directly with Britain, he said that this "is possible only when the revolution's conditions are realized and after Britain liquidates its interests in the region".

In answer to another question, Mr. Awad said that the situation in the region had surpassed the negotiations stage. The NLF claimed control over twelve of the seventeen member States of the federation.

He criticized the Egyptian-backed FLOSY, the NLF's rival, and said that "it does not enjoy any popularity at home . . .". He said that Cairo was "one of the tributaries of the Arab revolution. . . . We are keen that our relations with Cairo be sound".

Mr. Awad said that the NLF was not aspiring to take over rule shortly "because we are not seeking power".

#### Appendix IX

PRESS EXTRACT HANDED TO THE SPECIAL MISSION BY SHEIKH MOHAMED FARID ON 6 SEPTEMBER 1967

"Britain is making a big mistake in thinking that one party can control South Arabia", South Arabia Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohamed Farid said tonight.

Commenting on the announcement earlier by Aden High Commissioner Sir Humphrey Trevelyan that the British were willing to start negotiations with the NLF, he said "this would lead to another Yemen".

"The only solution is a coalition between various parties which the United Nations is now working on. It is a big mistake to ignore these efforts", Sheikh Mohamed Farid told Reuters.

He warned that five of the seventeen States in the Federation would resist and the three States of Eastern Aden Protectorate would refuse to join the new State which was due to become independent on 9 January.

Asked what the chances were of the NLF taking over South Arabia, he said, "If they get everything they will lose everything".

He concluded by saying that the best way would be for them to work for a coalition which should include FLOSY, federal rulers and even the South Arabian League, a moderate party with waning support.

#### Appendix X

LETTER DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1967 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SPECIAL MISSION

In thinking over our discussions since the return of the Special Mission from Cairo, I thought it might be helpful to you and your colleagues if I set out in writing the reasons and background to our recent actions in South Arabia in confirmation of the full account given to you by Lord Shackleton in Beirut.

It may be helpful if I first present a resumé. You and we have all along shared a common goal: to achieve a stable and representative Government by the time of independence. It has never been easy to know how this aim could be realized. We have, as we have pointed out repeatedly in the

United Nations, never had administrative authority in the Protectorate and have had to take full account of the political realities in South Arabia at any given time. But we have steadily insisted that the basis of the Governments there must be broadened. From 1963 onwards we sought to arrange negotiations for constitutional advance. We encouraged the Federal Government in their decision to commission proposals for constitutional reform which would make co-operation by other elements easier. We arranged for the termination of all remaining Exclusion Orders in 1966 and did our best to encourage those other elements, as well as the Federal Government, towards negotiation. When the Federal Government, in 1966, accepted the United Nations resolutions, we welcomed this and did likewise, subject to certain stipulations enforced by our remaining responsibilities in some fields and our lack of constitutional power outside Aden State.

In the spring of 1967, when FLOSY was failing to respond to our repeated initiatives for conversations and our repeated request to FLOSY to deal with your Mission, we welcomed your Mission's intention to try to tackle FLOSY in Cairo and to secure their co-operation with the Mission. We were not able at that time to get into contact with the NLF (to this day the only direct contact with them has been when a Federal Minister introduced to a British official two men claiming to be the NLF whose identities were not made known to the official). But we did inform the Mission in March that our assessment was that the NLF was a growing factor, both absolutely and in relation to FLOSY, and urged you to take account of this.

We welcomed it when your own efforts finally included FLOSY representatives to visit you in New York in July. Our regret then was that the NLF, still growing in relative strength, made no response to your representations and that the FLOSY representatives, though they always spoke of negotiations with Britain, refused to meet me and refused any serious negotiation with Her Majesty's Government whether under the Mission's auspices or separately. Similarly they left New York before Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, of whose visit they knew, reached the United Nations, to have discussions with your Mission. You will recall that he assured you of all help he could give in what he regarded as a problem common to Britain and your Mission and in which the essential desiderata of each were the same.

We continued to give all help we could in your later discussions in Geneva and Beirut in August and September, and Lord Shackleton joined the Mission for discussions and consultations in both places. We regretted only that FLOSY, the NLF and SAL all failed to join in the discussions in Geneva.

In the last week of August, however, the situation in South Arabia was transformed in a manner beyond the control alike of the Mission and of my Government, and in a very short time became extremely dangerous. In Aden, the NLF and FLOSY continued to contend for position. Central authority collapsed outside Aden, with persons acting in the name of the NLF taking over in most States. By the end of August the Federal Government had come to have virtually no control in the Federation and had ceased to be effective at the political level, though the civil service and the South Arabian Forces continued to cohere and function. The Acting Chairman of the Supreme Council (many leading members of the Federal Government being in Geneva for talks with the Mission) on 28 August called on the South Arabian Army to take over. The Army refused but, together with the Arab civil servants who were trying to keep the administration running, pressed Sir Humphrey Trevelyan to negotiate with the nationalist groups. There were British troops still in Aden but no longer in any of the States of the Protectorate. The South Arabian Forces, for their part, made it clear that, if we could not at once agree to deal with the insurgents in the territory, they could not be responsible for the consequences. The threat to order and public security was a matter that had to be dealt with very rapidly. Indeed, it was simply not physically within our power to hold the situation locally while efforts were continued outside the territory to get all the parties to agree to share power. This was particularly so since the dominating insurgents of the NLF flatly refused all suggestions, including that of your Mission, of discussions outside South Arabia

with the Mission or with other factions, while FLOS Y and others were unwilling to negotiate in Aden on the only basis which seemed possible in the short term.

It was against this background (of which the Mission was informed on 30 August) that the High Commissioner returned to London on 3 September for urgent consultations. The assessment reached was that if we did not immediately make our position clear, there would be rapid disintegration on all fronts, growing confusion and heavy bloodshed and human suffering. The divisions within South Arabia would be deepened, perhaps irreparably. We regarded it as our duty to hold the situation so as to make it possible for negotiations to take place before it was too late. A quick decision was imperative.

Sir Humphrey Trevelyan was accordingly authorized to broadcast a statement recognizing that the Federal Government had ceased to function. He recognized the nationalist forces as representatives of the South Arabian people. Since one of the NLF leaders had just expressed readiness to negotiate with the British Government, Sir Humphrey referred to this in reaffirming his own readiness to meet the nationalist leaders for negotiations on the formation of a new government. He made no distinction between the nationalist parties: he was, and remains, ready to talk to any and all who will come forward (see para. 268 of this annex).

The situation was so urgent that Sir Humphrey Trevelyan had to fly back to Aden on 5 September and make his statement the same evening. Lord Shackleton flew to Beirut immediately and met the Mission to tell you of the statement and to explain the necessity of our initiative. He and Sir Humphrey Trevelyan, as Lord Shackleton reiterated in Beirut, remain continuously available for further talks with the Mission to discuss future action and co-operation in the light of events in South Arabia.

As we had hoped, Sir Humphrey Trevelyan's statement has injected the first elements of hope and peace into the changed situation in South Arabia which I have described above. The statement was warmly welcomed on all sides in Aden. The South Arabian Army have since taken positive steps towards getting some compromise between FLOS Y and the NLF. On 6 and 9 September, they broadcast over Aden Radio a call to the leaders of the two Fronts to come together in any part of South Arabia to discuss an end to fighting between them and negotiation on the resolutions concerning independence for South Arabia: they asked for a reply by 20 September.<sup>a</sup> The Army have arranged a local truce and the reciprocal release of prisoners and have some hope of extending this to the political field. They have stabilized the situation around Aden and protected the Federal capital. They are now taking over internal security in parts of Aden. At least for the moment, terrorism has diminished and there is some revival of commercial activity. As a direct result of the statement, the chances of an agreement between the factions or parts of them are better than they were previously. The improvement is sufficient to have enabled Sir Humphrey to resume and indeed increase the releases of political detainees which he had begun earlier, while the planned withdrawal of British forces has continued on schedule. In all these respects the purposes of the United Nations resolutions are being progressively fulfilled.

A breathing space has been produced, which must be used by all concerned to achieve a stable settlement in implementation of the United Nations resolutions. It is our view, and we believe that the Mission share it, that any solution in accordance with the United Nations resolutions would be welcome. Both the United Nations Mission and the British Government may still be able to help towards negotiations between the parties, especially by exercising any influence which can help to modify intransigence and bring the parties into negotiation. For our part, we will continue to press all concerned to this end and we hope and believe the Mission will do the same.

A new Government is urgently necessary in South Arabia. Independence is drawing rapidly nearer. We foresee more, not less, need for the close involvement of the United Nations with

developments in South Arabia, especially in helping to ensure that the wishes of the people find their full and free expression in determining the future of the country. These will continue to be our aims.

I have written in some detail both because it seemed important for the Mission to know exactly what happened and why, and because I wished it to be clear that throughout the process that I have described the aims and motives of my Government and of the Mission have remained the same.

(Signed) CARADON  
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the  
United Nations

## Appendix XI

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF  
THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN  
IRELAND IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 2 NOVEMBER 1967

Just as in Asia the pattern of our interest and obligation is altering, so in South Arabia we move towards a more Europe-based policy; so this is also true of the Middle East. Our long-declared decision to bring South Arabia to an early independence must be seen as part of the progress of which I spoke at the beginning of my speech—the ending of the imperial era.

Conditions in South Western Arabia as a whole have been transformed since the summer. The Government of the United Arab Republic has decided to withdraw its forces entirely from Yemen by the middle of December and the movement is well under way. In South Arabia, the Federal Government threw away the last chance they had of broadening their base. In consequence, a ground swell of revolt overwhelmed the Arab State authorities in the Protectorate, and the Federal Government ceased to function.

This was not the work of a single group. Many old divisions in tribes and States persist and it can be misleading to rely on political labels. In general terms, however, the National Liberation Front played the major part and has established ascendancy in most of the States.

The South Arabian forces and the federal civil service have held the structure of the Federation together. The forces refused to take over political control. Instead, they told the High Commissioner that the nationalists had in their view become representative of the country as a whole, and that it was imperative that Her Majesty's Government should recognize them as such and express readiness to negotiate with them. Her Majesty's Government accepted this judgement. The High Commissioner issued with my authority a statement accordingly on 5 September. The South Arabian forces immediately called upon the two factions to resolve their differences, and to form a common front for negotiation with the High Commissioner.

It is over eight weeks since that happened. It is a month since the groups finally started talks between themselves in Cairo. Despite appeals to them from many quarters there was no sign till, literally, yesterday evening that any progress was being made. On the contrary there was increasing tension between the factions in South Arabia itself, who continued to contest for supremacy. We had to take account of the consequences of this prolonged uncertainty, with its constant danger that the divisions in the country might divide the South Arabian forces. Last night, the groups negotiating in Cairo announced that they had reached agreement on matters they had discussed so far and would shortly be able to reach agreement on the composition of a delegation to negotiate with us. We welcome this, and look forward to negotiations at the earliest possible moment.

I told the House on 19 June of the measures Her Majesty's Government thought it right to take in the circumstances prevailing at that time. I warned the House, however, that events in Yemen, South Arabia and the Middle East in general could have effects which might make it essential to reconsider

<sup>a</sup> For the text of the Army broadcast, see footnote<sup>k</sup> of this annex.

the proposals I was then announcing. I also made it quite clear that the Government had serious doubts about the soundness and durability of the Federation of South Arabia.

Events since have justified those warnings and reservations. We retain the objectives we have so often stated—to withdraw our forces in good order and to leave if possible behind us a united, stable and independent country. But the events since June have caused us to reconsider how best to achieve these objectives and to take new and firm decisions.

Our first decision is that the independence of South Arabia will now take place in the second half of November and all British forces will be withdrawn from South Arabia at that time. We shall, by the middle of this month, fix and announce the precise date for independence and withdrawal. The precise date which will be in the second half of November will depend on events and on whether a few days either way will help us to start negotiations with an emerging Government.

It is quite clear to us that the radical nationalists and other groups must face their own problems and resolve them themselves. We can complete the removal of our forces from the country at any time after mid-November. Early withdrawal will reduce any danger that our forces may become involved, and sustain casualties, in any renewed violence by or among the South Arabian factions. In these circumstances, some things which we had expected to settle before independence may have to be left pending, but that must in the circumstances be accepted.

Early withdrawal will also help the South Arabian forces. In the changed circumstances they are ready to take over fully now. The High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief are satisfied that the South Arabian forces will no longer expect the support of British units.

Secondly, the changed circumstances in Yemen remove the danger the Federal Government and federal armed forces faced in June, which was that, in the difficult period immediately after independence, there might be the threat of organized military attack across their frontiers supported by modern air power. Thus, our offer of deterrent naval and air forces for a period after independence has become irrelevant. Consequently, we have cancelled our plans for naval and V-bomber deterrent forces, though as the House will know, a substantial naval force is concentrated at Aden to cover the period of our withdrawal and independence.

Thirdly, there remain the questions of the financial support offered to the Federal Government for three years after independence and the offer of support for the Eastern Aden Protectorate forces which was made last June. Those offers always carried the condition that they were subject to review if political circumstances made their continuance inappropriate. I think, however—I hope that the House will agree with me—that it would be right to leave these questions for decision rather later, when the future may be clearer. The formation and attitude of a new Government will be important factors, but it is impossible especially in the light of what I have just said to prejudice these at this moment.

One other related question, that of the clear opinion of this House, which I represented to the United Nations, that the island of Perim should be internationalized under the United Nations. I am sorry to tell the House that though the Secretary-General is not yet in a position to reply formally to our approach to him, both he and the Chairman of the United Nations Mission have said that the latter could not entertain the proposal since in their view it was contrary to the letter and spirit of the United Nations resolutions which include Perim in what they call the Territory of Aden.

Moreover, the delegates of all Arab countries represented at the United Nations sent a joint, formal communication to the Secretary-General in August, opposing the separation of Perim from South Arabia. It is, on that basis, clear that when the question is debated at the United Nations, the proposal we made will be rejected. There is, as I told the House in June, no question of our retaining sovereignty or responsibility for Perim after the independence of South Arabia. The island will, unless its inhabitants against expectation were to demand otherwise, stay with South Arabia.

## Appendix XII

### PETITION AND EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE DETAINEES

#### A. *Copy of letter dated 24 October 1967 to the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary and communicated to the Special Mission*

Based on the assurances given by the representatives of the Red Cross to us and our husbands that we will be allowed to visit the detainees in the normal manner, plus the fact that they will be permitted with all the facilities they had in Al Mansoura Prison, we were satisfied with their transfer to Steamer Point.

Since they have been transferred to Steamer Point we have not been allowed to see them in spite of our repeated inquiries from the Department of Labour and Welfare and the Red Cross representatives. Then the news came that they are being held in Fort Morbut and being tortured in the same manner of which Fort Morbut has become world famous. Their food is unhealthy and body torture is daily routine, which made them go on a hunger strike since the 20th instant. Such being the case we have started losing faith even in the Red Cross, which we think is in collaboration with the aims of the British Government to harm our husbands and sons.

We demand that our husbands and sons be released immediately in the same manner in which their colleagues were released, and in accordance with the United Nations resolution of 1965, which the British Government has recognized. We request all the world through the well-known organizations to protest against the latest British conspiracy in our country.

*(Signed with  
fingerprint)*

Mother of Abdo Al-Sayed, detainee no. 289,  
on behalf of the  
families of fifty detainees

c.c. High Commissioner, Aden  
Red Cross representatives, Aden  
Amnesty International, London  
Tripartite Mission on Aden, United Nations, New York  
Arab League, Cairo  
Reuters, Aden  
*The Observer*, London

#### B. *Letter dated 5 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

On behalf of the Special Mission on Aden I am transmitting a copy of a communication from Aden on the question of the detainees. We are sure that it will receive urgent consideration by your Government.

The Mission would be grateful to receive any further information and observations which your Government may wish to furnish on this subject.

*(Signed) M. PEREZ GUERRERO*  
Chairman

*United Nations Special Mission on Aden*

#### C. *Letter dated 20 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Mission*

I have now received information from my Government about the matters raised in the letter enclosed with your letter of 5 October concerning detainees in Aden.

As you and your colleagues in the Special Mission are no doubt aware, most of the detainees were released in September before the handover to the South Arabian Army on 24 September of the Sheikh Othman area, where the detention camp was situated. The remaining detainees, now only thirty in number, are the hard-core element whose release will have to take place later.

The remaining detainees were transferred from Al Mansoura to a new holding centre at Steamer Point. This is about half a mile away from the former interrogation centre at Fort Morbut. None of the remaining detainees is held at the Fort



Morbut centre. The Steamer Point centre has never been visited for interrogations which have now in any case ceased.

Visits to the new detention centre were suspended for a few days after the detainees were transferred there to allow the centre to settle down. But visits are now taking place normally. The detainee whose mother wrote the letter dated 24 October, a copy of which was received by the Special Mission, was in fact visited by his family on 1 October. The Red Cross representative visited the detainees early in October and seemed quite satisfied. There have been no complaints by the detainees themselves about their food. Any complaint from a detainee is recorded and examined by a High Commission officer under procedures established by the High Commissioner subsequent to the report made to the Foreign Secretary by Mr. Roderick Bowen, Q.C. I am authorized to say that the allegations of torture in the letter which you transmitted to me are completely baseless.

(Signed) CARADON

*Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations*

D. Letter dated 27 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission addressed to the petitioner

The Special Mission on Aden, upon receiving the copy of your letter of 24 October 1967 to the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom concerning the treatment of the detainees at Steamer Point, requested the British representative in the United Nations to furnish it with further information and the observations of his Government on the subject. The Mission has just received the reply from the United Kingdom Government:

[For the text of the reply, see communication C above of this appendix.]

(Signed) Manuel PEREZ GUERRERO  
Chairman

*United Nations Special Mission on Aden*

### Appendix XIII

#### PETITION AND EXCHANGE OF LETTERS CONCERNING THE EASTERN ADEN PROTECTORATE

A. Telegram dated 13 October 1967 from the Sultans of the Eastern States to the Secretary-General

As rulers of eastern Aden Protectorate States of Qa'iti, Kathiri and Mahra we must draw your attention to unwarranted air action by British Royal Air Force against loyal tribes which so far refrained from recognizing British backed minority group of terrorists collaborating with Whitehall policy-makers under name National Liberation Front. Since we have been virtually expelled by British Aden administration in August under pretence our presence in Geneva was required by UNations Committee on Aden, terrorists supported by British financed Hadhrami Bedouin Legion have been carrying out mass arrests in our States and killing or torturing innocent people. As Hadhramaut and Mahra which remained outside South Arabian federation represent almost two thirds of South Arabian region both in size and population we request you make arrangements for fact-finding mission to study situation on spot before widescale civil war breaks out. Between two terrorist groups NLF and FLOSY are in contradiction with UNation resolutions on Aden region and as such unbinding on us. Any reply may please be addressed care Jeddah Palace Hotel Jeddah.

Sultan Ghalib of Qa'iti State  
Sultan Hussein of Kathiri State  
Sultan Khalifa of Mahra State

B. Letter dated 20 October 1967 from the Chairman of the Special Mission to the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The attention of the Special Mission on Aden has been drawn to the enclosed telegram from Jeddah concerning the question of Aden. The Mission has received another communication from the National Liberation Front and other elements, which refers to some of the matters raised in this telegram. The Mission would be grateful to know what observations your Government may have concerning the problems raised in this communication.

(Signed) M. PEREZ GUERRERO  
Chairman

*United Nations Special Mission on Aden*

C. Letter dated 27 October 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Chairman of the Special Mission

I have now received information from my Government about the matters raised in the telegram of 13 October from the three Eastern Aden Protectorate Sultans enclosed with your letter of 20 October.

The allegations in the telegram from the three Eastern Aden Protectorate Sultans are wholly unwarranted. I explained to you in my letter of 21 September (see appendix X above) the circumstances in which control in South Arabia was taken over by the nationalist forces and particularly by the National Liberation Front. This process which started in the Federation extended fairly quickly to the States of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. It is quite untrue that we gave backing there either to the National Liberation Front or to any other nationalist group, any more than we did in the Federation; nor do we now have any intention of intervening between the groups or in support of either of them against anyone else.

There was no question of the Sultans being expelled from South Arabia. They went to Geneva to meet the United Nations Mission of their own free will, although of course they were encouraged to do this by the High Commissioner following the agreement between him and the Mission during his visit to New York. Far from us keeping the Sultans out of South Arabia for this period, the Mission will remember that both they and we urged the Sultans to get to Geneva as quickly as possible. In the event however the Qa'iti and Kathiri parties took their time in travelling via Beirut and Cairo, arriving in Geneva only at the end of August.

The air action by the Royal Air Force to which the three Sultans refer in their telegram was limited to three fire power demonstrations on 24 September at the request of the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion in the vicinity of three forts in the northern area of Qa'iti manned by the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion. The Mission will remember that Lord Shackleton explained to them that the Hadhrami Bedouin Legion was not only the only force which could maintain security in the Eastern Aden Protectorate, but also provided the only administration in much of the northern desert areas of Qa'iti. The three Hadhrami Bedouin Legion forts concerned in this incident are in this area where Qa'iti administrative control never operated and were being attacked by hostile tribesmen. Such evidence as we have suggests strongly that these disorders were not of a political character as the telegram from the three Sultans might imply, but were an outbreak of attempted looting which followed upon the political upheavals in the area.

I do not feel that it is for me to comment on the other matters raised in the Sultans' telegram, which are more properly for the Mission to consider than for the United Kingdom Government.

(Signed) CARADON  
*Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations*

## CHAPTER VII\*

## FIJI

**A. Action taken by the special committee in 1966 and by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session**

1. In 1963 and 1964, the Special Committee adopted resolutions concerning Fiji.<sup>1</sup> After considering the question of Fiji at its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>2</sup> chap. VIII, para. 120) in which it reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and called upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering Power, to implement immediately the following: the holding of general elections on the basis of one man, one vote, in accordance with the principle of universal adult suffrage, for the purpose of forming a constituent assembly which would be charged with the task of drawing up a democratic constitution; the formation of a representative government and transfer of full powers to that government; the fixing of an early date for the granting of independence to the people of Fiji; and the abolition of all discriminatory measures so as to foster communal harmony and national unity in the Territory. Moreover, it decided to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible.

2. At its eighteenth and twentieth sessions, the General Assembly adopted resolutions 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965 respectively concerning Fiji. It considered the report of the Special Committee on the Territory (*ibid.*, chap. VIII) at its twenty-first session and subsequently adopted resolution 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

**B. Information on the Territory<sup>3</sup>***General*

3. The Crown Colony of Fiji, situated in the South-West Pacific, comprises some 844 islands and islets, including numerous atolls. Almost 90 per cent of the total land mass of 7,055 square miles is contained by the islands of Viti Levu (4,010 square miles) and Vanua Levu (2,137 square miles). About a hundred other islands are permanently inhabited. The island of Rotuma (18 square miles), added to the Colony in 1881, lies several hundred miles north-west of Fiji.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.5.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. VII, para. 165; *ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. XIII, para. 119.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>3</sup> The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. Also used in the preparation of this section has been the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom under Article 73 e of the Charter on 12 August 1966, for the year ended 31 December 1965.

4. At the end of 1965, the total population was estimated to be 469,934, made up as follows:

Race	Number	Appropriate proportion of whole per cent
Fijian .....	194,998	41.49
Indian .....	235,338	50.08
European .....	10,755	2.29
Part-European .....	9,972	2.12
Chinese .....	5,531	1.18
Other Pacific races .	13,340	2.84
	469,934	

*Constitution*

5. Fiji's new Constitution, based on the agreement reached at the Constitutional Conference held in London from 26 July to 9 August 1965, was promulgated on 23 September 1966. The main features of the Constitution are set out below.

*Governor*

6. The Governor is appointed by the Queen on the advice of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. Executive power is formally vested in the Governor. Defence, external affairs, internal security and the public service, *inter alia*, are reserved to the Governor at his discretion and as his special responsibility.

*Executive Council*

7. The Governor appoints the non-official members of the Executive Council, which has a membership of six elected and four official members. The non-official members of the Executive Council are drawn from among the elected members of the Legislative Council, and the Governor is to ensure appropriate representation of the various communities in Fiji. The Constitution provides that, at the appropriate time, the Governor may appoint members of the Executive Council to be ministers with executive powers. At that time, the Executive Council will become a Council of Ministers.

8. The Governor is required to consult the Executive Council and, in general, to accept its advice, except when he considers it necessary to act against such advice in the interests of public order, public faith or good government. In such cases, he is required to seek the approval of the Secretary of State. However, he is not required to consult the Council on subjects specifically reserved to him.

*Legislative Council*

9. The Legislative Council consists of thirty-six elected members and four official members nominated by the Governor. Subject to the restrictions imposed by the Colonial Laws Validity Act, 1865, and by any provisions of the Constitution itself, such as a Bill of Rights, the Constitution gives the Legislative Council full power to make laws on any subject. The Constitution has a provision which prevents bills from being introduced without the consent of the Governor if

their effect would be to impose taxes or to increase expenditure or alter terms and conditions of service of public officers. The Governor is empowered to refuse assent, to reserve legislation, and to ensure that bills are passed by certification.

10. The Governor is required to reserve certain kinds of bills, e.g., bills which appear to him to conflict with international obligations or affect the Royal Prerogative, or bills which purport to amend the Constitution. The power of disallowance is retained by the Crown. Besides these restrictions on the powers of the Legislative Council, the Crown retains the power to revise or amend the Constitution and to make other laws for Fiji by Order in Council.

11. A Speaker, who has no vote, is elected by the Legislative Council either from within the Council or from persons qualified to be elected to the Council. The Council is also empowered to appoint a Deputy Speaker from among its members. The maximum life of the Council is five years. However, the Governor is empowered to dissolve the Legislative Council at his discretion. His power of prorogation is exercised after consultation with the Executive Council, though he is not bound by such consultation.

#### *Electoral system*

12. The thirty-six elected members of the Legislative Council are elected as follows: fourteen Fijians—nine elected on the Fijian communal roll, two elected by the Fijian Council of Chiefs and three elected according to the new cross-voting system; twelve Indians—nine elected on the Indian communal role and three elected by the cross-voting system; and ten who are neither Fijians nor Indians—seven elected on the general roll, and three by the cross-voting system.

13. The communal roll for Fijians includes the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders. The Chinese and any other minority communities are included on the general roll with Europeans. For the election of the nine members by the cross-voting system, Fiji is divided into three constituencies, each returning one Fijian (or Rotuman or other Pacific Islander), one Indian and one European (or Chinese or member of another minority group), each member being elected by voters of all communities.

14. The new Constitution provides for universal adult suffrage by enfranchising minority communities such as the Chinese, the Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders, and by abolishing certain qualifications and disqualifications concerning candidates and electors, such as the requirements relating to property or income for candidates and the literacy tests for voters.

#### *Political parties*

15. The two major political parties are the Federation Party and the Alliance. No information is available concerning the present membership of either party. The Federation Party claims to represent most of Fiji's Indian population. This party, *inter alia*, advocates early independence and demands a common-roll vote (i.e., one man, one vote) for all the people of Fiji.

16. The Alliance was formed in March 1966 and is made up of a multiracial combination of organizations such as the Fijian Association, the Fiji National Congress, the General Electors' Association, the Rotuman Association and associate members. Its stated aims are racial unity and progressive development under the

direction of the United Kingdom Government. It believes that, whatever its form of government, Fiji should remain a member of the British Commonwealth. In a formal statement of policy in July 1966, the Alliance declared that the agreed decisions of the London Constitutional Conference of 1965 were a fair and just basis for the establishment of democratic rule in Fiji whereby the people might proceed towards internal self-government.

17. There are also a number of minor parties such as the National Democratic Party.

#### *Recent developments*

##### *General elections*

18. The first general elections for a Legislative Council under the new Constitution were held in Fiji from 26 September to 8 October 1966. Out of a population of approximately 474,000, there were 154,635 enrolled voters. For electoral purposes the voters were divided among three communal rolls:

	<i>To represent</i>	<i>Approximate population</i>	<i>Voters enrolled</i>
Indian Roll . . . .	Indians only	273,500	74,445
Fijian Roll . . . .	Fijians, Rotumans and other Pacific Islanders	210,000	73,850
General Roll . . . .	Europeans, part-European, Chinese, and other minority groups	26,500	6,340

19. The elections were the first to be fought mainly on party lines. The Alliance Party, which emerged as the strongest group with a total of twenty-two seats, gained all the Fijian communal seats, all but two of the general communal seats and all but one of the cross-voting seats. The Federation Party won all nine of the Indian communal seats. Independents gained three seats. About 90 per cent of the Indian electorate and over 80 per cent of the Fijian and general electorate voted.

#### *Economic conditions*

##### *General*

20. The economy of the Territory is predominantly agricultural, the most important products being sugar and copra. Droughts and hurricanes, as well as the downward trend in world sugar prices, have produced serious difficulties for the economy. However, the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement enabled Fiji to dispose of 140,000 tons of sugar manufactured in 1965 at a price of £46.11.6d. per ton, which was approximately £26.0.0d. per ton more than the world market price.

21. Efforts to expand the tourist industry resulted in a record number of tourists visiting Fiji, whilst, in the sphere of secondary industry, several companies established local branches, such as a mill producing animal and poultry foods, a factory extracting fruit juices and packaging fruit for export, a sawmill, and a factory manufacturing packages, packaging materials and other paper products.

22. While domestic exports fell from an all-time high in 1964 of £23,120,846 to £17,575,078 in 1965,

re-exports at £3,441,783 were higher than the 1964 figure of £2,993,927. The economy of the Territory was further supported by tourist expenditure which, in 1965, was estimated to be at least £4,350,000.<sup>4</sup>

#### *Fiji Development Plan*

23. The Fiji Development Plan, 1966-1970, was published on 2 July 1966. The plan proposed capital expenditure of £20 million in the five years, with a further £1.8 million if that was financially and physically possible.

24. In addition to detailed proposals for government expenditure on agriculture (£580,000) and agricultural subsidies (£1,343,000), land development (£690,000), education (£2,068,000), medical services (£2,523,000), roads (£3,396,000), postal and telegraph services (£2,395,000), water supplies (£1,259,000) and government buildings (£1,567,000), the plan sets out a programme of surveys to give basic information on which future development can be based.

25. To meet the cost of the plan, it is hoped to draw £2,800,000 from general revenue, to obtain £7,700,000 from United Kingdom Colonial Development and Welfare funds and to raise £5,550,000 in local loans and £3,650,000 in overseas loans. It is expected that other sources of revenue will yield £800,000.

26. In a review of the plan by the Central Planning Office, it is stated that the traditional sugar and copra exports will not be able to support the long-term development of Fiji.

27. The plan looks forward especially to the development of tourism and forestry, and predicts that by the year 2000, Fiji's principal income earners will be wood products (£100 million), tourism (£35 million) and sugar (£20 million).

28. The new plan has been based on the general assumption that Fiji's population will increase from 450,000 to 1,200,000 between now and 2000 A.D., and that national production will rise from about £50 million to about £350 million. This implies an annual growth rate of 6 per cent in national income.

#### *Survey of transport system*

29. A survey of possibilities for a balanced, modern transport system to link the scattered islands of the Fiji group, as part of an over-all effort to promote economic and social growth, will be undertaken jointly by the Government of Fiji and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), with the United Nations acting as the executing agency.

30. Ways of applying the latest advances in transport techniques will be investigated in an effort to obtain the maximum effectiveness with the minimum investment. For example, specialists will examine the possible use of air-cushion vehicles (hovercraft) for coastal and inter-island shipping and the development of services using large cargo containers carried by landing craft. The plan of operation for the £1 million, three-year project was signed in July 1966.

#### *Social conditions*

##### *Labour*

31. More than half the total labour force is covered by some form of collective bargaining machinery and

<sup>4</sup>All monetary figures in this paper are in Fijian pounds. £111 Fijian equal £100 sterling or approximately \$280.

their terms and conditions of employment are set out in agreements arrived at by the normal process of negotiation. The general level of wages paid to an unskilled worker under those agreements is approximately two shillings per hour, whilst the average working week is forty-four hours.

32. In September 1965, a new venture was inaugurated in the setting up of a Joint Industrial Council for all the unestablished workers of government. This provides machinery for bringing together representatives of workers from throughout the public sector to discuss wages and conditions of employment with government officials.

##### *Housing*

33. It is estimated that the Housing Authority will have spent £300,000 on flat developments from about the beginning of 1966 to December 1967. The development is being undertaken at Suva and Lautoka.

##### *Public health*

34. There are twenty-four local sanitary authorities (including Suva City and Lautoka Town) working with the assistance of a medical health officer, a health inspector and several assistant health inspectors. In remote rural or island areas where the formation of a sanitary authority is not practicable, the Central Board of Health has executive functions.

35. The main hospital is in Suva and district hospitals are located at the three centres of Lautoka, Labasa and Levuka. There are also fourteen smaller hospitals and forty-six rural dispensaries distributed about the Territory. The three special hospitals are the Tamavure Tuberculosis Hospital, the St. Giles Mental Hospital (both in Suva) and the Fiji Leprosy Hospital on the island of Makogai.

36. The total recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 was estimated at £1,298,229, and capital expenditure at £293,978, compared with £1,040,643 and £254,600 respectively for 1964. Other notable items of estimated expenditure (some recoverable), were:

	£
South Pacific Health Service .....	9,070
Fiji School of Medicine .....	54,107
Fiji Leprosy Hospital, Makogai .....	60,956
Research Library .....	1,458
	<hr/>
	125,591

##### *Educational conditions*

37. In 1965, the full-time school roll passed the 100,000 mark for the first time, the total of 102,498 being made up as follows:

Primary .....	93,983
Secondary .....	7,566
Technical and vocational .....	696
Teacher training .....	253

This represented an increase of 5,773 over the 1964 total of 96,725.

38. In 1965, excluding 27 kindergartens, there were 639 schools scattered over 55 islands, with 3,128 teachers, of whom 2,503, or 80 per cent, were trained.

39. Government gross expenditure on education for 1965 was about £2 million, compared with £1,748,921 for 1964.

40. Primary school teacher training is conducted in three colleges, one run by the Government and two

by missions. The combined roll of the three colleges in 1965 was 253. No secondary teacher training is as yet undertaken in the Territory.

41. In 1966, the Higher Education Mission to the South Pacific recommended the establishment of a University of Fiji, which would serve the interests of the whole of the South Pacific region. The initial capital cost was put at £1,375,000, and operating costs at £356,000 a year.

### C. Consideration by the Special Committee

#### *Introduction*

42. The Special Committee considered the question of Fiji at its 546th, 555th, 558th, 560th and 561st meetings between 28 August and 15 September 1967.

#### *Appointment of the Sub-Committee on Fiji*

43. The Chairman recalled that, by its resolution of 7 September 1966 concerning Fiji (see para. 1 above), the Special Committee had decided "to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible". After considering the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. VIII), the General Assembly, by its resolution 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966, had endorsed the decision of the Special Committee and requested the Chairman of the Special Committee, in consultation with the administering Power, to appoint the sub-committee as early as practicable.

44. He had therefore been in consultation on the matter with the representative of the administering Power. However, in a letter dated 28 August 1967 (A/AC.109/261), the United Kingdom had stated that the United Kingdom Government did not regard a visit to Fiji by a sub-committee of the Special Committee as necessary. After receiving that reply from the administering Power, he had had further consultations with the members of the Committee, and many of them had felt that the sub-committee should nevertheless be appointed, in the hope that it would be able to assist the Special Committee in its consideration of the question.

45. He had therefore decided to appoint Bulgaria, Chile, Finland, India and the United Republic of Tanzania as members of the Sub-Committee. He hoped that the administering Power would reconsider its position in the matter, and he trusted that the Sub-Committee would be able to submit a useful report.

46. The representative of India thanked the Chairman for the confidence he had shown in India by naming it as a member of the Sub-Committee to examine the situation in Fiji. India would do its best to discharge its responsibilities as a member of the Sub-Committee, and it shared the hope that the administering Power would reconsider its decision and agree to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee.

#### *General statements by members*

47. The representative of the United Kingdom said that at the 1652nd meeting of the Fourth Committee his delegation had described the background to the present constitutional position in Fiji. He would therefore only recall the salient features of the position.

48. The population of Fiji (477,000) could be divided into three main groups: the Indian community,

representing 50.5 per cent of the population; the indigenous Fijian people and the Pacific Islanders (45 per cent); and the Europeans, Chinese and others (4.5 per cent). Because of the different distribution of age groups between the various communities, however, the pattern of actual enrolled voters was rather different and the Indians represented less than 50 per cent. The balance between the two largest communities was thus very delicately poised. For many years there had been only very limited effective integration on the political or social level between the two main communities. Until the introduction of the new Constitution in September 1966, political life had been based on the communities with exclusively communal representation and communal voting. The Constitutional Conference held in London in July-August 1965 had recognized that the aim should be a single common roll, regardless of community or race, but there had been wide divergencies of view about the rate and method of achieving that objective. The constitutional arrangements which had come into effect in September 1966 represented the best available compromise. Although there was still a substantial measure of communal representation and voting, three of the members drawn from each of the three main communities were elected on a cross-voting basis. In other words, each candidate for each of the nine cross-voting seats must seek election by the votes from all three communities. The aim was to encourage the political parties to develop a broader national, multiracial and multicommunal appeal. In view of the delicate communal situation in Fiji, the importance of those changes should not be belittled.

49. In the elections held in October 1966, as his delegation had already informed the Fourth Committee at its 1652nd meeting, some parties had sought and obtained support on a nation-wide rather than a communal basis. The Alliance Party, which had won twenty-two seats as against nine for the Federation Party and three for Independent members, had won all nine of the indigenous Fijian communal roll seats with 68 per cent of the vote in the contested seats and five out of the seven seats allocated to the third communal group, with 67 per cent of the votes cast. It had also won 40 per cent of the votes cast in the one third of the Indian seats which they contested, and obtained 47,309 votes in all the communal seats combined compared with 43,705 votes for the Federation Party. The Alliance Party won 57 per cent of the votes cast by all three groups voting together in the cross-voting constituencies. The figures showed beyond any doubt that the Alliance Party had obtained substantial support among all sections of the population and had secured a clear majority of all the votes cast in the elections, whether on a communal or cross-voting basis. Ratu Mara, leader of the Alliance Party, himself a Fijian, had appointed two Indian members of his party to the Executive Council, and an Indian member of the opposition Federation Party had been appointed Deputy Speaker of the Legislature. Other Alliance Party nominations to posts in the Executive Council had included Fijians and Europeans, so that the Council was in every sense multiracial, which was an encouraging sign. Thus, the new Constitution was already encouraging the growth of multiracial politics in Fiji.

50. In September 1967, a ministerial system had been introduced. Ratu Mara had become Chief Minister and the members of the former Executive Council

had become Ministers and had taken over full and formal charge of the departments for which they were responsible.

51. Another important development had been the unanimous adoption by the Legislature in 1966 of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, which should help to promote inter-communal co-operation and harmony. The question of land tenure had been a great source of tension between Fijians and Indians in recent years, since the landowner often belonged to one community and his tenant to another. The new law gave added protection to tenants with justice for landlords also and established a tribunal for the settlement of disputes.

52. The situation in Fiji was unique in many respects, since the indigenous inhabitants represented a minority, albeit substantial, of the total population, while the Indian majority formed a minority of the electorate. Each community had been apprehensive lest the other should secure a dominant position in the life of the country, to its own possible disadvantage. This apprehension lay behind much of the purely communal politics of the past. The problem was to find a framework in which people of different races, proud of their distinct cultural heritages and ways of life, could live together in peace, friendship and co-operation. The heritage of the past could not simply be swept away by a stroke of the pen, nor by a law of the Fiji Legislature, nor by a decree of the United Kingdom Government, nor by the application of a United Nations resolution which demanded that the problems should be solved by simply ignoring them. It would take time to solve such problems; to attempt to do so overnight would only accentuate them. The people of Fiji should be given time to grow accustomed to their new constitutional arrangements and to political parties with a multicomunal or non-communal approach, and time to build up trust and the habit of co-operation. Progress was, however, being made, as demonstrated by the introduction of non-communal voting arrangements, the success at the elections of a party approved by members of all communities, the formation of a multiracial government and the agreement of the legislature to a new law on landlords and tenants.

53. There was mounting evidence to show that the new Fiji Constitution was beginning to pave the way towards the objectives from which he was sure the Special Committee would not dissent. For that reason, his delegation had been unable to support General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), whose recommendations appeared to be misconceived and contrary to the declared objectives of communal harmony and national unity. Similarly, his Government did not agree that any useful purpose would be served by the visit of a United Nations mission to Fiji, especially in view of the unacceptable nature of recent resolutions concerning the Territory. Although the United Kingdom Government, as the administering Power, had taken the decision not to agree to such a visit, it had taken into account, *inter alia*, the declared view of the leader of the majority Party in Fiji, who had publicly stated that the Fiji Government did not agree that a United Nations mission should go to Fiji. He hoped that the honest differences of opinion which might exist on that question would not prevent the Committee from taking a fair and objective view of the declared objectives of the United Kingdom Government in the Terri-

tory and of the substantial progress which had been and was being made. Fiji had embarked on a great experiment in political harmony and racial co-operation and its people had a right to expect the Special Committee to show understanding, patience and forbearance so that the experiment might succeed.

54. The representative of India asked whether the United Kingdom representative could give the breakdown by communities of the former Executive Council, now the Council of Ministers.

55. The representative of the Ivory Coast, referring to operative paragraph 4, sub-paragraph (c) of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), said that the United Kingdom representative had mentioned only one measure, namely, the introduction of a cross-electoral system, taken in that connexion. He wondered whether there had been any others.

56. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would comment on those questions at a later stage in the debate.

57. The representative of India said that the working paper on Fiji prepared by the Secretariat (see paras. 1-41 above) was, inevitably, not as up to date as his delegation would have wished. The representative of the administering Power had described the most recent developments, but with some significant omissions.

58. The remarks made by his delegation in the Fourth Committee at its 1652nd and 1655th meetings, during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, were still valid. The administering Power had made very little effort to fulfil the provisions of various resolutions of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, concerning Fiji, in particular General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). It had not so far carried out any of the measures called for in operative paragraph 4 of that resolution, which were necessary to lead Fiji to independence as a unified and multiracial State, and had refused to allow a visiting mission to enter the Territory.

59. The present electoral system in Fiji discriminated against the indigenous Fijians and the Fijians of Indian origin to the benefit of the small but powerful European community. The latter, which represented less than 5 per cent of the population, had ten seats in the legislature out of the thirty-six filled by election. Moreover, under the electoral system, one European vote actually equalled nine indigenous Fijian votes and ten so-called Indian votes.

60. It was significant that the representative of the administering Power had not yet provided an answer to his question concerning the composition of the former Executive Council, now the Council of Ministers (see para. 54 above). However, he understood that, of the eleven members of the Executive Council, six had been members of the European community—or rather of the community which was neither Fijian nor Indian—three had been Fijians and two had been members of the so-called Indian community. In the Council of Ministers, the Europeans had four seats, the Fijians three and the so-called Indians one. The European community therefore retained a disproportionate share of power.

61. He agreed with the representative of the administering Power on the need to develop racial harmony in Fiji but differed from him with regard to the steps to be taken to achieve it. The administering Power

could not escape responsibility for the fact that there had been very little effective integration between the different communities on the political or social level. It had been its deliberate policy in Fiji, as elsewhere, to accentuate racial differences in order to retain its own position of dominance. The differences between the Fijian community and the community of Indian origin had been grossly exaggerated by the administering Power, and he was sure that, given the opportunity, the two communities would be able and willing to live in peace and harmony. In 1929, elections to the municipality in Suva had taken place successfully on a common-roll vote, yet the system had been discontinued. The success of the new cross-voting system was further proof that the communities could maintain a harmonious relationship.

62. His delegation submitted that it was wrong to refer to the people of Indian origin as the Indian community; they were no less Fijian than the indigenous Fijians themselves. Such unnecessary labels certainly did not promote communal harmony.

63. As the representative of the administering Power had said, both the main communities in Fiji agreed that the long-term aid should be a single common electoral roll, and his delegation had no reason to doubt that, if introduced immediately, it would be very beneficial for the people of Fiji as a whole. The Chief Minister, Ratu Mara, had already proved himself to be a very competent leader and was successfully working towards a multi-racial society.

64. Full powers had still not been transferred to the legislative and executive bodies in Fiji, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). No additional executive powers appeared to have been given to the members of the new Council of Ministers, and the Governor still retained very wide discretionary powers.

65. His delegation had been disappointed by the United Kingdom Government's refusal to agree to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji, since an overwhelming majority of the General Assembly had been of the opinion that such a visit to obtain first-hand information would serve a very useful purpose. A United Nations visit would also allay the fears which, according to the administering Power, some of the people of Fiji felt with regard to the possible repercussions of United Nations "interference". He was glad that the Sub-Committee on Fiji had been appointed despite the lack of co-operation by the administering Power. He hoped that the latter would reconsider its decision; otherwise, the members of the Special Committee would be entitled to draw their own conclusions.

66. The representative of Yugoslavia said that it appeared from the Secretariat's working paper (see paras. 1-41 above) and from the statement by the representative of the administering Power that there had been no change with regard to the decolonization of Fiji. The administering Power continued to pursue a policy which it alone considered useful and to disregard the provisions of the various relevant United Nations resolutions, especially General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). Such a situation was unacceptable and unsatisfactory. The administering Power's claims that its own policy of introducing a complicated constitutional and electoral system would solve the serious racial and communal problems in Fiji and bring the Territory to independence more swiftly and more effectively than the policy advocated in resolution 2185

(XXI) were unconvincing. Such a system could not bring independence, communal harmony and national unity to Fiji, but might result in a widening of the gap between the communities, which could then be used by the administering Power to justify the perpetuation of the colonial régime. In the latest elections in Fiji, the Europeans and their allies, who numbered only 6,340 out of 156,683 registered voters, had won almost 30 per cent of the seats in the Legislative Council. In the Executive Council, the Europeans, representing only 4.5 per cent of the population, had an absolute majority, while more than 50 per cent of the population was represented by only two members. In addition, the Governor had extremely broad powers. In contrast, resolution 2185 (XXI), by recommending various specific measures in its operative paragraph 4, had outlined the course which alone could secure the strengthening of communal harmony and national unity in the Territory and the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in respect of Fiji.

67. The negative attitude of the administering Power with regard to a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji only increased the doubts already voiced by most delegations in the Special Committee and in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly concerning its readiness to facilitate the rapid attainment of independence by the people of Fiji. There could be no other reason for the United Kingdom to oppose the visit of the Sub-Committee, whose only purpose was to study the situation in the Territory at first hand. His delegation fully supported the Chairman's decision to appoint a Sub-Committee despite the administering Power's opposition; it would still be able to make a substantial contribution to the study of the situation in the Territory.

68. The Special Committee should express its strong dissatisfaction with the refusal of the administering Power to implement the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and with its determination to pursue its colonial policy in Fiji, and should recommend to the General Assembly such measures as would ensure, without further delay, the implementation of resolution 2185 (XXI) and consequently of resolution 1514 (XV).

69. The representative of Chile said that his delegation had supported General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 3 of which provided for the setting up of a sub-committee to visit the Territory for the purpose of studying the situation there at first hand. He agreed with the Chairman's decision to appoint the Sub-Committee, despite the lack of co-operation from the administering Power. Chile was honoured to have been named as a member and would do everything in its power to fulfil the tasks entrusted to it.

70. Nevertheless, his delegation was not sure how the Sub-Committee was to operate. In his letter to the Chairman (A/AC.109/261), the representative of the United Kingdom had referred the Special Committee to the statement made by the United Kingdom delegation in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which had made it clear that the administering Power did not consider it necessary for a sub-committee to visit the Territory. Chile believed that such a visit would be most useful, since it would allow the Special Committee to become fully cognizant of the situation in the Territory, and it could then recommend whatever measures it deemed appropriate to accelerate the process of decolonization there.

71. The situation in the Territory was very complex. The majority of the population was not adequately

represented in the legislature or in the Council of Ministers. An electoral system based on a single electoral roll should be adopted as soon as possible, so that each sector of the population would have the representation to which it was entitled. The representative of the administering Power had told the Special Committee at a previous meeting that progress was being made and that the different population groups were gradually becoming integrated. The Chilean delegation nevertheless considered that progress in the Territory had been inadequate.

72. The representative of Poland said it was evident from the statement made by the United Kingdom representative in the Special Committee that the situation in the Territory had remained basically unchanged during the past year and that the administering Power had been continuing its own policy aimed at the perpetuation of its domination over the Territory. That policy was also reflected in other available documents, such as the Fact Sheets on the Commonwealth concerning Fiji, which stated:

“A Conference was held in London from 26 July to 9 August 1965 to work out a constitutional framework for Fiji which would preserve a continuing association with Britain and within which further progress could be made towards self-government.”

73. The premise that a “continuing association with Britain” was the only possibility open for the time being to the people of the Territory contradicted the position taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly on the basis of resolution 1514 (XV), which called for the granting of immediate independence to the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories.

74. The attitude adopted by the administering Power so far had been totally negative. It had rejected the recommendations of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), had refused to allow a United Nations mission to visit the Territory and had not made any declaration as to when the people of Fiji would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence. In particular, the administering Power had failed to implement the measures called for in resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4, sub-paragraphs (a) and (b).

75. Under General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), the Special Committee had been instructed to keep the question of Fiji under consideration and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session; it must therefore make a pronouncement on whether the policy of the administering Power was consonant with the provisions and recommendations of that resolution.

76. The representative of Bulgaria welcomed the establishment of the Sub-Committee on Fiji and said that his delegation was highly honoured to have been asked to serve on it.

77. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, pointed out to the representative of Yugoslavia that the course which was being followed by the United Kingdom Government was not “considered useful” by that Government alone; it had the full support of the majority party in Fiji and coincided with the latter’s views and wishes. In so far as General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI) called for the fixing of an early date for independence and the formation of a constituent assembly, it in no way reflected the publicly stated views of either the Alliance Party, which was supported by

the majority of voters, or the opposition party, the Federation Party, at the present time. His delegation could not accept that matters of such vital importance to the future of the Territory could be decided either in the Special Committee or in the General Assembly in isolation from and in disregard of the stated wishes of the representative organs of public opinion in the Territory.

78. At the next meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the representative of India had said that the immediate introduction of a single electoral roll throughout the Territory of Fiji would have been very beneficial. That was not the view taken by the United Kingdom, which felt that this system, if introduced prematurely or precipitately, would do more harm than good. It was better to concentrate on measures which, though possibly less spectacular, were more useful, and to act by stages. The electoral system which had been put into effect already represented considerable progress. It should also be pointed out that, following the local consultations which had been held in 1965 and 1966, steps had been taken to institute a single common roll in some municipalities in 1966, with the best of results. That system might shortly be extended to other municipalities, subject to local wishes and the necessary legislative proposals.

79. Another point raised by the representative of India concerned the Indian community in Fiji. He had stated that the first Indians to arrive in Fiji had been brought there forcibly by the Europeans. That assertion was totally at variance with the historical facts. The Indians who had gone to Fiji at that time had done so quite voluntarily after having, of their own free will, signed a contract on the expiration of which they were free to return to India with passages paid; only about one third of them had chosen to do so.

80. The representative of India had also asked why Fijians of Indian origin were always referred to as the “Indian community”. Ninety per cent of the Indian community had been born in the Territory, but they were usually described as the Indian community and so described themselves, to distinguish them from the indigenous Fijians. These communal problems would not be solved by changing labels. He objected to the Indian representative’s unwarranted assertion that the United Kingdom had deliberately fostered and encouraged tension between the two communities. Such statements were not calculated to promote the solution which both the United Kingdom Government and the Indian Government were seeking.

81. What must be done was to endeavour to promote inter-communal harmony and co-operation. The two main political parties in the Territory had avoided communal titles and had appealed for—and obtained—broad-based support. As he had already had occasion to stress, the situation in Fiji was not exactly comparable with any other, because of the near-equilibrium between the two main communities, although some rather similar cases—for example, Guyana and Mauritius—showed that such problems could be overcome. What was needed was time and patience.

82. The representative of the Ivory Coast had asked what had been done to abolish discrimination, with particular reference to General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4 (c). The representative of the United Kingdom pointed out that discrimination based on race, origin, political or religious belief, or



colour was prohibited under section 13 of the 1966 Constitution. It was not clear what particular type of discrimination was referred to in resolution 2185 (XXI), paragraph 4 (c); if it was the 1966 Constitution that was being criticized, it was too soon to consider modifying it, because both the United Kingdom Government and the local party supported by the majority of Fiji voters considered that the Constitution must be allowed time to prove itself. If the representative of the Ivory Coast was referring to economic and social conditions, the difficulties experienced in those fields were not necessarily due to discriminatory legislation; in any case, steps had been taken to improve the situation, and mention might be made, in particular, of some legislative reforms, particularly those concerning relations between landlords and tenants, which he had described in detail in his earlier statement. Many primary schools were operated on a multi-racial basis, 231 of the 581 schools at primary level being interracial. The case of Fiji was unique, and barriers to inter-course inevitably existed because of the presence of two distinct societies, in almost equal numbers, one indigenous and the other established for at most three or four generations, whose culture, language and customs differed. That gave rise to difficulties, of a kind not confined to Fiji, that were not easy to overcome, but even so it could hardly be said that discrimination in social relations existed in the Territory. The barriers to integration were not the same thing as deliberate discrimination.

83. The representative of India, speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the United Kingdom had replied, although somewhat unconvincingly, to several points which he had raised but had left aside two very important factors. The first was the preponderant share of power held by the small European community in Fiji. The European community constituted only 4.5 per cent of the population but had 55 per cent of the seats in the Executive Council, while the remainder of the population, or 91 per cent of the inhabitants, had the other 45 per cent. He had asked a question on that point which the United Kingdom representative had not answered. He had merely talked about the difficult situation which prevailed in the Territory, but had refused to acknowledge that that situation was due solely to the policy of the colonial Power. The results achieved in some cases by the United Kingdom in the matter of decolonization did not place it above all criticism, and there were other cases, especially Southern Rhodesia, where it had failed to take the necessary measures and where there was justification for doubting its goodwill. The United Kingdom representative's statement that the system of a common electoral roll had been successfully employed in some municipalities in Fiji only served to prove the validity of the Indian delegation's claim that the system would work well in Fiji. If the system had been found satisfactory in several cases there was no reason why it should not be employed throughout the Territory. The reply given by the United Kingdom representative to his objection to the people of Indian origin being called the "Indian community" was far from satisfactory. In addition to the example he gave earlier of an Englishman being called a Rhodesian in Rhodesia, the Englishmen who went to Gibraltar also became Gibraltarians and did not remain Englishmen. He paid a tribute to Chief Minister Ratu Mara and said that because of the leadership provided by people like him, his delegation was convinced that a common roll, if

introduced in Fiji, would have only beneficial consequences for the Territory.

84. The United Kingdom apparently did not have any objection now in principle to visiting missions, as it had agreed to a visiting mission with respect to one of its colonies. In the case of Fiji, it had simply stated that the Special Committee had all the information it needed and that a visiting mission would not produce anything new. If the Sub-Committee would find that the facts in Fiji corresponded to the situation described by the administering Power, why was the United Kingdom afraid of having a visiting mission go to the Territory? As Fiji was not yet independent, it was the British Government which did not want a visiting mission to go to the Territory and not the people of Fiji. The reasons for the reluctance of the British Government were only too obvious.

85. Once again, he regretted that the United Kingdom representative had failed to answer those two important questions.

86. The representative of the United Kingdom said the comments made by the representative of India proved that any difference of views between the two countries related less to the objective than to the speed with which it could be attained.

87. The representative of India had said that 55 per cent of the members of the Fijian Council of Ministers belonged to the European community. Of the six Europeans members among the eleven members of the Council of Ministers, three were expatriate officials appointed by the Governor. These could not be regarded as members of the resident European community in Fiji. In addition to the three expatriate officials and one other official, there were seven members of the Council drawn from among the elected members of the legislature, chosen by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister, and three of these were also Europeans.

88. The representative of India said he was pleased to note that the United Kingdom representative had finally given the Committee the information concerning the composition of the Executive Council which he had previously refused to provide.

89. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, contrary to the implications of the Indian representative's statement, he had received the information in question only that very morning.

#### **D. Action taken by the Special Committee**

90. At the 560th meeting, on 14 September 1967, the representative of Iraq introduced a draft resolution on Fiji (A/AC.109/L.429) jointly sponsored by Afghanistan, India, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Syria, United Republic of Tanzania, and Yugoslavia. He urged the administering Power to reconsider its position and realize the benefits which could result from a visit to the Territory by the Sub-Committee on Fiji. The draft resolution contained neither drastic measures nor unrealistic requests, and the sponsors hoped that it would receive overwhelming, if not unanimous, support.

91. The representative of Yugoslavia said that the draft resolution was actually a reaffirmation of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI); the sponsors had decided to submit it because that resolution had not been implemented by the administering Power. His delegation believed that the measures recommended in resolution 2185 (XXI) were the only correct means

of accelerating the process of decolonization and realizing the objectives of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in Fiji. He hoped that the members of the Special Committee would give the draft resolution the consideration it deserved.

92. The representative of Syria said that the draft resolution, which reproduced the tenor of previous resolutions that the administering Power had failed to implement, was highly relevant and deserved the fullest support. It rightly drew attention to the administering Power's policy of maintaining national division and encouraging discriminatory practices, thereby hindering any kind of progress.

93. The representative of Chile said that the draft resolution under consideration reflected the concern felt by his delegation. It expressed regret at the administering Power's failure to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2185 (XXI) in the Territory and urgently appealed to the administering Power to reconsider its refusal to allow a visit by a sub-committee to the Territory. The draft resolution was a realistic one; his delegation fully endorsed the principles set out in it and would give it its unreserved support.

94. The representative of Bulgaria recalled that his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI). Having carefully studied the documentation prepared by the Secretariat and listened attentively to the statement of the administering Power, he regretted to note that the latter had not taken the necessary action to implement resolution 2185 (XXI). The draft resolution before the Committee clearly reflected that state of affairs. His delegation would therefore vote in favour of it and hoped that it would be supported by the great majority, if not all, of the members.

95. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he had studied the draft resolution thoroughly and had also listened carefully to the statements of the representatives of Bulgaria, Chile, Iraq, Poland, Syria and Yugoslavia in support of it; he regretted, although he was not surprised, that the progress and the new and hopeful trends which his delegation had mentioned in its statement of 13 September (558th meeting) had been ignored, despite the fact that some delegates had recently met the Chief Minister of Fiji and heard from him at first hand of these facts and of his efforts to promote interracial harmony. He appreciated the respect felt for the General Assembly's resolution but it ought to be possible to acknowledge the hopeful experiment in train in Fiji and to allow some flexibility of opinion or at least a suspension of judgement. The United Kingdom had already clearly explained its position on resolution 2185 (XXI), and, in particular on paragraph 4 of that resolution, in the Fourth Committee. It had stated its belief that the recommendations made in the resolution failed to take account of the progress achieved and that it sought to impose a solution unacceptable to at least one of the main Fiji communities. It had therefore been unable to support it. The draft resolution had the same defects, and his delegation would have to vote against it for that reason.

96. The draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.429) was adopted at the 561st meeting on 15 September 1967 by a roll-call vote of 17 to 3, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

*Abstaining:* Finland, Italy, Sierra Leone.

97. The representative of Australia recalled that, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, Australia had voted against resolution 2185 (XXI) and had given a detailed statement of its views on the very complex question of Fiji. His delegation therefore regretted that the resolution which the Special Committee had adopted merely repeated what had already been said in resolution 2185 (XXI), without taking any account of the important changes in the Territory during the past year. In the course of the debate, the members of the Special Committee had not accorded due importance to the political advances which had been achieved in the Territory, particularly the results of the latest elections and the formation of a new Council of Ministers. Nor had they taken note of another important fact mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement, namely, the unanimous adoption by the House of Assembly of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, which marked an encouraging advance towards the settlement of a most complex question that lay at the very heart of the difficulties experienced by Fiji. Australia was not opposed to the principle of "one man, one vote", on which its own political system was based, as was the electoral system it had introduced in New Guinea. It recognized, however, that in Fiji the problem was not quite the same, because of the existence of a number of distinct communities. For that reason, his delegation had hoped that the Special Committee would go deeper into the problem and not merely adopt a resolution similar to previous ones, without taking account of the actual situation.

98. The Chairman said that, following the adoption of the resolution concerning Fiji, he would like to make an appeal to the administering Power. At its previous session, the General Assembly had endorsed the decision of the Special Committee to appoint a sub-committee to visit Fiji for the purpose of studying at first hand the situation in the Territory, and had requested the Chairman of the Special Committee, in consultation with the administering Power, to appoint the sub-committee as early as practicable. The Chairman of the Special Committee had approached the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, who had subsequently informed him, in a letter dated 28 August 1967 (A/AC.109/261) that the United Kingdom Government did not regard a visit to Fiji by a sub-committee of the Special Committee as necessary and was unable to agree to a visit by the sub-committee as then proposed. On behalf of the Special Committee, he urgently appealed to the administering Power to reconsider its position, and he wished to assure the people of Fiji that the Special Committee took a keen interest in their well-being and would do all in its power to protect their interests.

99. For several years, the Special Committee had been asking the United Kingdom to allow it to send a visiting mission to Aden. The United Kingdom had always refused, and what had happened in that Territory was now history. If the administering Power had acceded to the Special Committee's requests and

allowed it to send a visiting mission to Aden, the bloodshed could perhaps have been avoided. The United Nations was in a position to make a significant contribution to the process of decolonization. One need only mention as an example the case of Equatorial Guinea, and to some extent Aden. He therefore hoped that the inhabitants of Fiji would appreciate that it was in their interest that a visiting mission should go to the Territory and that they themselves would appeal to the United Kingdom to reconsider its decision and allow the newly established Sub-Committee to visit Fiji.

100. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he would transmit the resolutions just adopted by the Special Committee and the Chairman's appeal to the United Kingdom Government, which would study them carefully.

101. The resolution (A/AC.109/274) adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Fiji at its 561st meeting on 15 September 1967 reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having considered the question of Fiji,*

*"Having heard the statement of the administering Power,*

*"Recalling General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 1951 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963, 2068 (XX) of 16 December 1965, 2105 (XX) of 20 December 1965, 2185 (XXI) of 12 December 1966 and 2189 (XXI) of 13 December 1966,*

*"Noting with regret that the administering Power had not yet taken effective measures to implement*

the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

*"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Fiji to freedom and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);*

*"2. Reaffirms its view that the administering Power must expedite the process of decolonization in Fiji by holding elections on the basis of one man, one vote and by fixing an early date for independence;*

*"3. Regrets that the administering Power has not yet taken measures to implement General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI);*

*"4. Deeply regrets the negative attitude of the administering Power in refusing to agree to the visit by the Sub-Committee on Fiji to the Territory in accordance with operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2185 (XXI);*

*"5. Urgently appeals to the administering Power to co-operate with the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and to reconsider its decision concerning the visit of the Sub-Committee on Fiji in order to facilitate the work of the Special Committee;*

*"6. Urges the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of resolution 2185 (XXI) and, in particular, operative paragraph 4 thereof;*

*"7. Decides to keep the question of Fiji on its agenda."*

## CHAPTER VIII\*

### EQUATORIAL GUINEA

#### A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

1. The Special Committee first considered Fernando Póo and Río Muni in 1963.<sup>1</sup> The item was taken up again in 1964 and the Special Committee adopted a resolution which is contained in its report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.<sup>2</sup>

2. At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider these Territories, but included relevant information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.<sup>3</sup>

3. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2067 (XX) on 16 December 1965. In the fifth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the General Assembly noted that the Territories of Fernando Póo and Río Muni had merged and were named Equatorial Guinea. In the second operative paragraph of the resolution, the General Assembly requested the administering Power to set the earliest possible

date for independence after consulting the people on the basis of universal adult suffrage under the supervision of the United Nations.

4. In 1966, the question of Equatorial Guinea was considered by the Special Committee at its meetings both in Africa and at Headquarters. At its 451st meeting, held on 20 June 1966, the representative of Spain, on behalf of his Government, invited the Special Committee to visit the Territory so that either the Committee or a representative group of its members could ascertain the conditions in the Territory.

5. At its 454th meeting, on 21 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>4</sup> chap. IX, para. 79), the operative paragraphs of which read as follows:

*"1. Notes with satisfaction the open invitation made to it by the administering Power to visit Equatorial Guinea;*

*∴∴*

*"3. Decides to send to Equatorial Guinea, as soon as practicable, a sub-committee to ascertain the conditions in the Territory with a view to speeding up the implementation of General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2076 (XX)".*

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.6.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. XIII.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IX.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. X.

6. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea visited the Territory in August 1966 and subsequently submitted its report to the Special Committee (*ibid.*, chap. IX, annex).

7. At its 482nd meeting, on 18 November 1966, the Special Committee adopted the Sub-Committee's report and endorsed the conclusions and recommendations contained therein.

8. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2230 (XXI) on 20 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

9. On 16 May 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a preliminary report to the Special Committee (see annex to this chapter below).

10. In a letter dated 18 September 1967, addressed to the Secretary-General (A/6802), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain announced that the constitutional conference on Equatorial Guinea would commence on 30 October 1967.

### B. Information on the Territory<sup>5</sup>

11. Information on constitutional development, as well as political, economic, social and educational conditions in the Territory, is contained in the report of the Special Committee's Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea which visited the Territory in August 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex). Supplementary information which has become available since that report was issued is given below.

#### *Constitutional developments*

12. In a letter dated 27 December 1966 (A/AC.109/217), the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that the Council of Ministers of Spain, in the course of a meeting held on 22 December 1966, had decided to appoint immediately an inter-ministerial commission entrusted with the task of preparing as soon as possible for the holding of a constitutional conference on Equatorial Guinea. The inter-ministerial commission was reported to have completed its work on 12 July 1967.

13. In the meantime various party leaders and officials of the autonomous régime visited Madrid for talks with Spanish Government officials on the constitutional issue. These included Mr. Bonifacio Ondó Edú, President of the Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea; and Messrs. Pastor B. Torao Sikara, Atanasio Ndong Miyone and August Daniel Grange Molay, leaders of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE); and a special committee of the Territory's General Assembly headed by the Assembly's President, Mr. Enrique Gori Molubela. This special committee was reported to have drawn up draft amendments to the Basic Law governing the autonomous status of the Territory.

14. The referendum on the Spanish Constitution was held on 14 December 1966 in Equatorial Guinea, as in other Spanish Territories. The results were reported to be as follows: registered voters, 113,256;

<sup>5</sup> This section was previously reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.422. It is based on: (a) information collected by the Secretariat from published sources; and (b) information transmitted by Spain under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 June 1967 covering the year ended 31 December 1966.

votes cast, 91,031; in favour, 63,521; against, 24,354; invalid, 3,156.

#### *Economic conditions*

15. Cacao and coffee remain the most important crops cultivated in the Territory. Figures for the output of cacao in 1966 were 31,223 tons (28,570 tons for Fernando Póo and 2,653 tons for Río Muni). This compared with a 1965 output of 32,499 tons (28,931 tons and 3,568 tons for Fernando Póo and Río Muni respectively). Figures for the output of coffee in 1966 were 6,400 tons, of which 5,000 tons were produced in Río Muni and 1,400 tons in Fernando Póo. This compared with a 1965 output of 6,664 tons, of which 5,336 tons were produced in Río Muni and 1,328 tons in Fernando Póo.

#### *Budget*

16. Figures available for 1966 indicate a total expenditure of 2,021 million pesetas,<sup>6</sup> of which 500 million pesetas come under the ordinary budget for Equatorial Guinea, while 1,521 million pesetas represent aid from the Government of Spain. The latter is divided between the Budget of State Aid and Collaboration (*Presupuesto de Ayuda y Colaboración a la Guinea Ecuatorial*), and the Economic and Social Development Plan, accounting for 1,150 million and 371 million pesetas respectively.

#### *Health*

17. Figures for 1966 indicate a total of 1,635 beds in the four principal hospitals, the leprosarium in Micosmeseng and other smaller hospitals in the Territory. The largest hospital is that of Santa Isabel, which at the end of 1966 had 425 beds and was served by nine doctors, three midwives and ninety-six nurses. It was reported that the School for Nurses at Santa Isabel was making good progress in the training of indigenous nurses.

#### *Education*

18. At the end of 1966, there were 147 elementary school centres and 32 primary school centres in the Territory, the corresponding figures for 1965 being 145 and 32 respectively. At the end of 1965, there was a total of 271 teachers, of whom 17 were Europeans and 6 were qualified indigenous teachers. The remainder were auxiliary teachers. Information on the total number of teachers in 1966 is not available. In the secondary schools there were 31 teachers and 986 pupils during the 1965-1966 school year, compared with 19 teachers and 691 pupils in 1964-1965. These figures do not include the "La Salle" Professional Centre for vocational and technical education which is maintained by the Provincial Council of Río Muni at Bata. It was reported that a School for Vocational Training was to be established at Santa Isabel under the administration of the Provincial Council of Fernando Póo, with aid in this respect from the Spanish State.

### C. Consideration by the Special Committee

#### *Introduction*

19. The Special Committee considered Equatorial Guinea at its 551st to 554th, 556th and 557th meetings held at Headquarters from 5 to 12 September 1967.

20. In a letter dated 22 August 1967 (A/AC.109/259), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain

<sup>6</sup> The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168; 60 pesetas = \$US1.00.

to the United Nations requested that he be authorized to participate in meetings of the Special Committee at which Equatorial Guinea would be discussed. The Committee decided without objection to accede to that request.

*Written petitions and hearings<sup>7</sup>*

21. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Equatorial Guinea:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
General Secretary, Idea Popular de la Guinea Ecuatorial (IPGE) .....	A/AC.109/PET.578
Mr. Pastor Torao Sikara, President General, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) .....	A/AC.109/PET.702
Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga, Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) .....	A/AC.109//PET.702/Add.1
Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE) .....	A/AC.109//PET.702/Add.2
Mr. Bienvenido Abaga Ondjigui .....	A/AC.109/PET.897

22. At its 552nd meeting on 6 September 1967, the Special Committee heard Mr. Saturnino Ibongo Iyanga and Mr. Rafael Evita, representatives of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE).

23. Mr. Ibongo, speaking on behalf of the Movimiento Nacional de Liberación de la Guinea Ecuatorial (MONALIGE), congratulated the Spanish Government on its work of decolonization in the Territory of Equatorial Guinea, which was more or less in accordance with the directives of the United Nations.

24. MONALIGE desired the independence of the Territory and, faithful to the resolutions of the United Nations, particularly General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI), as well as to the wishes of the people of Equatorial Guinea, it would oppose, by all available political means, any result of the constitutional conference which did not provide for independence as a minimum. MONALIGE deplored the inertia shown by the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea in dealing with reports submitted by groups representing various shades of political opinion in the Territory, as well as the unwillingness of the Governing Council to accelerate the process of independence. The irresponsibility, inactivity, incompetence and unrepresentative character of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea must have been obvious to those members of the Special Committee who had visited the Territory the previous year. There could be no justification for the delay in convening the constitutional conference.

25. A document which had arrived that very morning, September 6, addressed to the Special Committee and signed by high officials in Fernando Póo and Río Muni, denounced the manoeuvres to which the indigenous and Spanish authorities in Equatorial Guinea had resorted in order to slow down the process of independence. According to that document, the Spanish Government had made no official declaration indicating that it had taken into account the wishes

of the people concerning the holding of a constitutional conference and the fixing of a date for that conference, despite the fact that the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex, para. 292) clearly stated that the majority of the people wanted independence without delay. Moreover, although the representative of Spain had stated on 10 December 1966 at the 1665th meeting of the Fourth Committee, that a constitutional conference would be held early in 1967, that conference had still not materialized. According to the Spanish Press, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations had addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in December 1966 announcing the appointment of an inter-ministerial commission to prepare for the constitutional conference, but so far nothing was known about the progress made in that preparatory work. In a statement to the Spanish Press on 3 December 1966, Mr. Ondó Edú, the President of the Governing Council, had once again requested Spain to prepare the Territory for independence. In order to divert the attention of the people of the Territory, as well as world public opinion, the Spanish Government had invited the members of the Standing Committee of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to Madrid in March 1967 and had persuaded them to set up a special committee to consult the population on the political future of the Territory; that had been done in an attempt to avoid convening the constitutional conference which would inevitably result in the independence of the Territory. The Guinean special committee had not made public any conclusions, although it had completed its consultations in May. It was known that the Spanish members of the Guinean special committee had destroyed part of the material collected, on the instructions of the Spanish Government, since the people consulted had been overwhelmingly in favour of independence. Such manoeuvres had given rise to a great deal of public indignation. It was understood that the Spanish Government had obtained the signatures of certain members of the Governing Council and the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to a document requesting an extension of the time-limit for the submission of the Guinean special committee's report. It was also understood that the Spanish Government had obtained the signatures of certain members of the autonomous Government to a document requesting Spain to retain the present autonomous régime after July 1968 for economic reasons, as well as on the pretext that the people were not yet ready for independence. The Spanish Government was, in the meantime, encouraging subversive activities by certain capitalist groups in Fernando Póo which were trying to separate the latter from Río Muni, in complete disregard of the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in particular resolution 2230 (XXI), operative paragraph 5. The Spanish Minister of Industry had visited the Territory from 27 July to 2 August 1967, but the reasons for his visit were not yet known. In paying tribute to him, the Vice-President of the Governing Council had reaffirmed the statement he had made to the Spanish Press on 16 May 1966, but the Spanish Minister of Industry had made no reference whatsoever to its contents. The document had gone on to say that the people of Equatorial Guinea were more than ever convinced that the Spanish Government, despite its promises to the contrary, did not wish to grant independence to the Territory and was using every means available to evade its responsibilities, although it was clear that the overwhelming majority of the people of Equatorial Guinea

<sup>7</sup>The following petitions were circulated after the Special Committee had completed its consideration of Equatorial Guinea: A/AC.109/PET.702/Add.2 and A/AC.109/PET.897.

wanted independence. The Spanish Government would no doubt try to justify its position and would probably submit false testimony to the United Nations General Assembly signed by Guineans who had been paid vast sums of money to do so or perhaps, as it had done before, would bring some of them to address the General Assembly in terms dictated by the Spanish Government, while claiming to be the true representatives of the people of Equatorial Guinea. Such manoeuvres had to be prevented. Negotiations with the Spanish Government were impossible in practice, and the only recourse left open to the people of Equatorial Guinea was to appeal to the United Nations, in the hope that independence could be achieved by peaceful means.

26. Another document had been received, signed by all the members of a commission from Fernando Póo. They rejected those representatives in the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea who claimed to represent the people of Fernando Póo but acted under the orders of the Spanish Government, and they denied the assertion that Río Muni wished to separate from Fernando Póo. The authors of the document claimed that their highest aspiration was that Equatorial Guinea should become independent immediately as a single and sovereign State, and they expressed implicit trust in the Special Committee to help them achieve that aim by July 1968.

27. Since the autonomous Government and the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea were subordinate to the Government of Spain, it was up to the latter to invite the various political groups to send their representatives to the constitutional conference. MONALIGE would be ready to participate by sending a delegation as soon as the date of the conference was announced. He invited Spain to set a date for the constitutional conference; to declare categorically that the conference would only decide upon the final date for independence, which should be not later than 1968; and to announce to the Special Committee that it would dissolve the present autonomous Government and allow the democratic election of a Government truly representative of the people. He appealed to members of the Special Committee to exert pressure on the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory.

28. In reply to a question, the petitioner said that the autonomous Government and Assembly were not representative. First, the political situation in the country when the Basic Law had entered into force in January 1964 had been very different from the present situation. At that time many of the country's leaders had been outside the Territory. They had now returned but were no longer members of the Government. Secondly, the electoral machinery employed at the time had not been truly democratic, as was clear from the report of the Visiting Mission.

29. The parties currently allowed by Spain to engage in political activities were MONALIGE, MUNGE and IPGE. Although all three parties advocated independence, only the President of the Governing Council and the Vice-President, a member of MONALIGE, had spoken out in favour of independence.

30. Many members of the Special Committee had visited Equatorial Guinea and knew that the Governing Council and almost all members of the Assembly were against independence, although the population was for it. Consequently, the Government did not represent the wishes of the people.

31. Speaking as a member of MONALIGE, Mr. Evita said that, although the members of the autonomous Governing Council, who were inhabitants of Fernando Póo (Mr. Enrique Gori, President of the Governing Council and Vice-President of the General Assembly, Mr. Gustavo Watson, Minister of Health, Mr. José Luis Maho, Minister of Information and Tourism, Mr. Ramón Borico, Minister of Industry and Mining, and Mr. Aurelio Itoha, Minister of Labour and Social Affairs) might claim to be the legal representatives of the people of Fernando Póo, they were merely individuals carrying out the orders of the Spanish Government, which had appointed them and was maintaining them in office against the wishes of the people, who had often sought to remove them. That could readily be proved, since none of them had been elected by the people of Fernando Póo.

32. In answer to a question concerning the representation of MONALIGE in the Governing Council or in the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea, Mr. Ibongo said that MONALIGE had no representatives as such in the Assembly or in the Governing Council. At the time of the elections, the party had not been officially recognized or allowed to present candidates. The present Vice-President of the Governing Council was a member of MONALIGE. With regard to other parties, he said that one member of the Governing Council was a militant member of the *Movimiento de Unión Nacional de la Guinea Ecuatorial* (MUNGE). Before becoming a Council member, he had been Chairman of the political junta. To the knowledge of the petitioner, there were no members of MUNGE in the Assembly. The elections had not been conducted on a party basis. According to the Spanish principle of organic democracy, they had been conducted on the basis of representation of economic, social and professional groups. Political ties had only been taken into account later, when the political climate had changed. Any member of the Assembly who belonged to MUNGE did so by choice and not from expediency.

33. Replying to a further question on the subject of the alleged plan to separate Fernando Póo and Río Muni, the petitioner said that the manoeuvres for their separation dated back to 9 March 1965, when the present chairman of the Fernando Póo delegation had visited United Nations Headquarters and drawn up a ten-point document, demanding the separation of the two Territories. The document was probably in the hands of the Special Committee, since it was mentioned in that body's report. It was possible to believe that Spain would respect the unity of the Territories; however, the ten-point document had been written before the representative of Spain had made his statement. That time lapse might explain the doubts concerning current manoeuvres. Those manoeuvres existed, but were the work of certain members of the Governing Council from Fernando Póo, whose positions had been made clear. He noted that according to a statement made by the representative of Spain, the separation of Río Muni and Fernando Póo was not official Spanish policy because the unity of the Territory was recognized from the geopolitical standpoint. However, in Equatorial Guinea there were individuals and groups possessing certain interests, and the socio-economic realities of the country also had to be taken into account.

34. Asked for further information relating to alleged efforts to dismember the Territory, Mr. Evita said that the document he had submitted earlier stated that the people of Fernando Póo had no doubt whatever

that the manoeuvres were ordered and directed by the Spanish Government, hiding behind the Union of Cocoa Growers, a capitalist group to which all business firms in Fernando Póo belonged and among which, as the main ones most dedicated to these stratagems, were Frapejo, Mora, Vivanco, Amilivia, Cunha Lisboa, Potau, and so on. Those firms, under the protection of the Spanish Government, were endeavouring to transform Fernando Póo into another Rhodesia.

35. Commenting on the remarks of the petitioners, the representative of Spain observed that one of the petitioners, Mr. Evita, had been somewhat separated from the realities of Equatorial Guinea because he had lived outside the Territory for eight years as a student. That doubtless explained why he had made an unacceptable comparison between Equatorial Guinea and Southern Rhodesia. His delegation categorically rejected that accusation and all others tending to discredit the autonomous authorities of the Territory, because they were not supported by facts. Those members of the Special Committee who had visited the Territory were in a position to evaluate such accusations.

36. He was surprised at the flippant assertion that nothing but obstacles were being placed in the path of the people of the Territory to prevent their stating their views freely. The petitioners themselves had recognized that there were political parties; indeed, they had claimed to represent them, although his delegation maintained that they were acting as individuals. It was difficult to understand how, during an election, the people of Equatorial Guinea could be unaware of who was to represent them or how to make a choice between candidates.

37. The petitioners had described the Assembly and Governing Council of Equatorial Guinea in very harsh terms. That attitude was hardly in accord with their statement that both the President and Vice-President of that Council had publicly declared their support for the Territory's independence, and had been reported in the Spanish and local Press. It was difficult to understand how the President and Vice-President could be accused of dubious manoeuvres at the behest of the Spanish Government when they had defended points of view similar to those of the petitioners. Furthermore, some of the people to whom the petitioner had referred had previously appeared before the Committee as petitioners. That proved that his Government had not placed obstacles in the path of any political leader from Equatorial Guinea coming to the United Nations to express his views. As he had stated at an earlier meeting, his Government considered that, at the Fourth Committee's next meeting, a group composed of official persons and other political figures not members of the Assembly or Council should be invited to attend as representatives of Equatorial Guinea. He had expressed no reservations as to the number or nature of the persons composing such a group. That was apparently not the attitude of the petitioners, who had repeatedly said that they were the only true and valid representatives of the Territory.

38. The insinuation that the delay in holding the constitutional conference was an integral part of Spanish stratagems to prevent the people of the Territory from expressing their desire for independence, was a further blatant contradiction. If such was the case, why should the conference be delayed? His Government had repeatedly stated that it would abide by the decisions of the people of the Territory and had stressed that

it did not intend in any way to oppose their independence.

39. The petitioners had said that the Spanish Government had unilaterally created the autonomous régime in 1963. Yet, it had been created to ensure that the people of the Territory would be properly represented and its existence must be recognized, since it had been approved by 62,603 votes to 29,986 in a popular referendum. As to the alleged manoeuvres to dismember the Territory, he had already explained to the Special Committee that his Government's policy was precisely the opposite. He had been gratified by Mr. Ibongo's explicit recognition of that fact.

40. The petitioners had received a letter dated 1 September 1967, posted in Equatorial Guinea and obviously intended to be read out to the Committee. That proved that there was no censorship and that the Territory's postal services were efficient.

#### *General statements*

41. The representative of Spain said that he wished to inform the Special Committee of the latest steps taken by Spain with a view to the holding of the constitutional conference which was to decide the future of Equatorial Guinea. In 1963, the Guineans had approved the autonomous régime which was now in effect and which formed part of the process leading to independence, and General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 had recalled the administering Power's intention to grant independence to the Territory as a single entity. He reminded the Committee that, once the Spanish Government had endorsed the idea of a constitutional conference, it had decided to set up an inter-ministerial commission to formulate the Spanish Government's position for the purposes of the conference and to hold talks with the elected representatives of the people of Equatorial Guinea and with the opposition leaders in the Territory. The Spanish inter-ministerial commission had completed its work on 20 May 1967. The Standing Committee of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea had set up a special committee to consult the population and the political organizations in the Territory and to prepare a report, so that the Assembly would be in a position to give instructions to the delegations to the constitutional conference. The Guinean special committee had been unable to complete its work by the dead-line which had been set, because so many people had had to be consulted and so much documentation had had to be studied. It had therefore requested a new dead-line, to which the Spanish Government had agreed.

42. His delegation acknowledged that there had been some delay in comparison with the original plans, but it felt that that did not affect the substance of the problem and that it was better to take some time, in order to allow certain Guinean leaders to spell out and reconcile their ideas, rather than to rush those concerned into taking positions which might run counter to the objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI).

43. The Spanish Government would set a date for the constitutional conference as soon as the official delegation of the Territory was ready to participate and would submit a detailed report to the Special Committee or to the General Assembly after the conference. If it had not been found possible to hold the conference by the time the Fourth Committee met, the Spanish Government hoped that a Guinean delega-

tion would be allowed to explain to the Fourth Committee why the constitutional conference had been delayed, so that its members might have some objective information concerning the situation in the Territory.

44. He reaffirmed his Government's intention to hold the constitutional conference. There was lively political activity and free expression of opinions in Equatorial Guinea. Spain maintained a balance between the Provincial Council of Fernando Póo and the Provincial Council of Río Muni, in order to avoid tensions which might divide the Territory. Measures had also been taken on 31 January 1967 to increase social and trade-union benefits for workers in the Territory, and the Spanish Government was trying to create conditions which would enable Equatorial Guinea to take over its own future in conformity with United Nations guidelines.

45. The representative of Venezuela said that his delegation had supported resolution 2230 (XXI) in the General Assembly and had been convinced that efforts would be made to establish a favourable political climate for democratic elections, as the administering Power had promised, and that power would be transferred to the Government which was thereby elected. According to a document submitted to the Spanish Government in January 1967 by the leaders of MONALIGE (A/AC.109/PET.702, annex C) the people of the Territory were unanimously in favour of attaining full independence as soon as possible, but at the same time hoped that the ties between Spain and Equatorial Guinea would be strengthened; they wished to form a single unitary State in which the natural aspirations of the different ethnic groups would be respected; and they requested the administering Power to convene the proposed constitutional conference without delay. The people of Equatorial Guinea had expressed a desire to attain independence not later than July 1968 and his delegation, which had always defended their right to self-determination and independence, deplored the fact that resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been implemented. He urged the administering Power to do everything possible to set an early date for the convening of the promised constitutional conference. Although he recognized the good faith of Spain, which had repeatedly expressed its readiness to allow the people of Equatorial Guinea to exercise their rights to self-determination and independence, he believed that it should take dynamic action in order to arrange for true representation of the people and should not wait patiently for the report of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea on that subject. If by the beginning of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly a date had still not been set for the constitutional conference, he suggested that representatives of the people of the Territory should be invited to appear before the Fourth Committee. It was imperative that the economic, social and educational development of the country should be encouraged, but their political progress towards self-determination and independence was the paramount concern.

46. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation had always believed and still believed that the people of Equatorial Guinea, like any other people still under the colonial yoke, had the right to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). According to that resolution, all colonial peoples should be granted independence immediately without any conditions or reservations. Seven years

had elapsed since the adoption of that resolution and yet the people of Equatorial Guinea had still not attained independence, despite the repeated assurances of the representatives of Spain that independence would be granted if the people wished it. From the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea, which had visited the Territory in 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex), it was clear that all political parties and all sections of the population contacted by the Sub-Committee in the Territory were unequivocally in favour of independence. There were some differences of opinion as to the date on which independence should be granted, but no political party, no section of the population and no official representative of Equatorial Guinea had felt that independence should be delayed beyond July 1968. The wishes of the population had been noted in the penultimate preambular paragraph of resolution 2230 (XXI), in operative paragraph 6 of which the General Assembly had requested the administering Power to set a date for independence and for that purpose to convene a conference in which the various political parties and sections of the population would be represented. The responsibility for setting a date for independence therefore lay solely with the administering Power and that date should be not later than July 1968. The Committee had now been told that the people of Equatorial Guinea were not ready to discuss the matter and that their so-called representatives had asked for the conference to be postponed *sine die*. That could only result in the postponement *sine die* of the granting of independence to the people of Equatorial Guinea, who had already declared themselves to be unequivocally in favour of independence not later than July 1968. The explanations given by the administering Power for the delay in convening the conference were not convincing and it was clear from the statement made by the petitioner at the previous meeting that MONALIGE was opposed to Spain's delaying tactics. His delegation fully shared that view and was opposed to any manoeuvres designed to delay the granting of independence to Equatorial Guinea. The Special Committee should ask the administering Power to implement General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) unconditionally and to set a date immediately for the granting of independence not later than July 1968.

47. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that his delegation, and indeed the Special Committee as a whole, had always striven to ensure the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) but all efforts in that direction had so far met with very little co-operation, and in some cases with complete defiance, on the part of the colonial Powers.

48. The Spanish Government's announcement in 1966 of its intention to convene a constitutional conference had been welcomed as a positive move, but the Committee's expectations had been short-lived. There still appeared to be no possibility that specific terms of independence could be settled or even defined in the near future. Before the Territory had been visited by the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea in August 1966, the Spanish Government had given the impression that all was well and that the people were content with the existing state of affairs. The Sub-Committee had found, however, that there was virtual unanimity among the people in favour of independence without delay. The reason why operative paragraph 7 had been included in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) was simply that Equatorial Guinea was a colony and that, as the Sub-Committee had ascertained, the people



did not enjoy freedom of political activity. In some cases, fines had been imposed for displaying placards demanding independence, and it was clear that political activities along party lines were being strongly discouraged by the colonial authorities.

49. The autonomous Government of Equatorial Guinea had already been condemned by his delegation and others as unrepresentative of the people, and the petitioners who had appeared before the Special Committee at its 552nd meeting had confirmed that it was so. In a country where there were not more than three African lawyers and five African doctors, it was an insult to the Africans to say that there was an elected member of the General Assembly of Equatorial Guinea to represent the interests of lawyers and another to represent the medical profession. As stated in the report of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. IX, annex, para. 289), the electoral system limited participation to only a small minority of the adult population in the election of representatives to governmental organs. It was distressing, therefore, to be told that the autonomous Government represented the masses of the people of the Territory, and at the same time it was understandable that some members of that colonial institution should try to impede the holding of a constitutional conference which might lead to independence. According to the representative of Spain, it was the autonomous Government, rather than Spain, which was delaying the holding of the conference. His delegation agreed with the petitioners that the autonomous Government should be dissolved, as it did not represent the people and was incapable of bringing about changes that could lead to independence, even though there were certain elements within it which were determined to serve the true interests of the people of the Territory as a whole.

50. His delegation had welcomed the attitude taken by Spain when it had invited the Special Committee to send a visiting mission to Equatorial Guinea and had later announced the convening of a constitutional conference which would lead the Territory to independence. Yet, seven years after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), Spain had still not decolonized a single territory in Africa. It would be in Spain's interests to ensure the peaceful decolonization of the Territories under its domination. Spain should remember that the autonomous Government did not represent the masses of the people, but rather the interests of Spain; consequently, the contention that the conference could not be convened because the autonomous Government had been slow in responding to the Spanish proposal was unacceptable. It was for the administering Power to set a definite date for the constitutional conference and to invite representatives of all political parties, as well as the autonomous Government, to participate.

51. It was doubtful whether Spain would in fact grant independence to Equatorial Guinea by July 1968, as had been requested. The people of Equatorial Guinea had their own political parties to represent them and they were dedicated to the cause of freedom. He appealed to Spain not to make the struggle for liberation a bitter one, but to implement the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) without further delay and set an early date for the convening of the constitutional conference, which should fix a date not later than July 1968 for the independence of the Territory.

52. The United Republic of Tanzania would continue to support the people of Equatorial Guinea until final victory had been achieved, and he hoped that they would work towards that goal without fear or intimidation.

53. The representative of Chile said that there were no economic, social or educational obstacles to the early attainment of independence by Equatorial Guinea, but there were certain political difficulties. His delegation hoped that Spain would implement the provisions of operative paragraphs 4 and 6 of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) as soon and as fully as possible, so that the people of Equatorial Guinea would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence in accordance with Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

54. In his statement (see para. 41 above), the representative of Spain had indicated that some progress had been made towards the convening of a constitutional conference with the establishment of an inter-ministerial commission, but the results had not been as positive as might have been desired. No date had yet been set for the convening of the conference, which was so urgently necessary. He appealed to Spain to do everything in its power to ensure that the conference was held as soon as possible, since it was only in such a forum that all differences of opinion could be discussed to the benefit of the Territory.

55. As for operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2230 (XXI), his delegation was gratified to note that to a large extent sub-paragraph (a) had been implemented, since there were practically no restrictions on political activities in the Territory and a number of political leaders who had been living in voluntary exile had returned and were now participating in political activities. He deplored the fact that, because the constitutional conference had not yet been convened, it had not so far been possible to institute an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage, in accordance with sub-paragraph (b)—a step which was essential before sub-paragraph (c) could be implemented.

56. The petitioners had said (see para. 27 above) that the sole purpose of the constitutional conference should be to set a date for independence; however, he did not think that that was realistic. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had found during its visit to the Territory that there were many different opinions concerning the purpose of the constitutional conference. In addition to setting a date for independence, it should draw up an adequate constitution for Equatorial Guinea and work out an electoral system in accordance with the recommendations of the General Assembly. The conference should bring together all sections of the population and should include in its agenda all questions relating to the political future of the Territory, as the leaders of MONALIGE had stated in a document addressed (A/AC.109/PET.702) to the Head of the Spanish State (see para. 21, above).

57. The representative of Mali recalled that, when the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had visited Madrid, the Spanish Government and Press had made much of the fact that the administering Power, on its own initiative, was inviting a United Nations body to co-operate with it in promoting the independence of a people under its rule. Following the Sub-Committee's visit to the Territory, it had seemed that Equatorial Guinea was well on the road to independence. The administering Power and the people of the Territory

had stated their agreement that a date should be fixed for independence; the people had seemed to favour July 1968, and the administering Power had expressed no objections.

58. It seemed from the statement made by the representative of Spain (see para. 41 above) that the administering Power was more concerned about certain supposed difficulties faced by the population in assimilating documents than about its own responsibilities. The administering Power should take steps to carry out the undertakings it had made. Certain divergences of views among the population were not a reason for delaying progress towards independence and postponing the convening of a constitutional conference. The problems which faced the political leaders of a Territory during the period immediately preceding independence were minor, the major problem being that of accession to independence. Such problems could be resolved after Equatorial Guinea had become a sovereign nation. The administering Power must not encourage internal controversies in order to delay independence. It was the responsibility of the administering Power to take the initiative in convening a constitutional conference, while the people of the Territory must make whatever preparations were necessary for their participation in the conference.

59. There were other questions which might be raised, such as the administering Power's obligation to restore political rights and allow all opposition leaders to return to their country. With regard to designation of the delegations to a constitutional conference, the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had made specific recommendations. New methods of popular consultation must be used to ensure that the inhabitants were genuinely represented. He wished to assure the people of Equatorial Guinea of his country's support in their struggle for independence.

60. The representative of Uruguay said that the representative of Spain (see paras. 41-44 above) had attempted to justify the delay in convening a constitutional conference in pursuance of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI). He had described the difficulties which had arisen and had suggested that representatives of the people should be allowed to explain the situation to the Fourth Committee. He had also mentioned efforts to avoid tensions between Fernando Póo and Río Muni.

61. Other speakers had referred to the political advances that had been made in the Territory, and he did not think that the Spanish Government could be accused of trying to delay independence. What it had been doing was to consult the people and, having found differences of opinion among them, it was faced with the question what action to take when political, economic or social reasons hindered progress to independence. The administering Power was aware of its responsibilities under the United Nations Charter. Spain could not be condemned for acting as it had done, even though it might be thought to have made mistakes. The explanations given should be recognized as valid; however, that did not affect the responsibilities of the administering Power vis-à-vis the United Nations, including its obligation to grant independence as soon as possible, even under conditions that were not perfect.

62. The administering Power had perhaps refrained from telling the Special Committee the whole truth out of an understandable desire to avoid aggravating the differences in the Territory. It was possible that some

of the divergences of view reflected antagonisms between Fernando Póo and Río Muni, which could create difficulties for the emerging nation. Despite that, his delegation considered that Spain had an overriding responsibility to ensure the Territory's accession to independence, and he appealed to the administering Power to fix a date for a constitutional conference as soon as possible with that end in view.

63. Important political progress had been made and, now that a stage of political maturity had been reached, the Territory should receive its independence.

64. The representative of Mali noted that the representative of Uruguay had referred to differences between Fernando Póo and Río Muni. As a member of the Sub-Committee which had visited the Territory, he could state that no such differences existed. The unitary nature of the Territory was established in the Basic Law. The Sub-Committee's discussion both with political leaders and with the people had shown that the people of Equatorial Guinea wished to achieve independence as a single entity. While there might be certain factions within both the recognized political parties dominated by one ethnic group or another, that did not affect the basic principle of the national unity of Equatorial Guinea.

#### **D. Action taken by the Special Committee**

65. At the 556th meeting, the representative of Mali introduced a draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.427) co-sponsored by Afghanistan, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Sierra Leone, Tunisia, United Republic of Tanzania and Yugoslavia.

66. The representative of Mali, speaking on behalf of the sponsors, said that the draft resolution was largely a reiteration of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI), taking into account the views expressed during the debate. The dominant concern of members of the Committee was that the administering Power should be firmly committed to a continuation of the normal process of liberating Equatorial Guinea, and the stage had now been reached where independence was the immediate, short-term goal. The Committee was therefore entitled to expect the administering Power to take such practical steps as the convening of the constitutional conference referred to in resolution 2230 (XXI), and the main purpose of the draft resolution was to help Spain to take that essential step.

67. Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

68. In operative paragraph 3, the Special Committee expressed regret that the constitutional conference called for in General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been held and that, contrary to the expectations of the majority of delegations, and especially the members of the Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea, the administering Power had not followed up the welcome initiative it had taken in asking for the co-operation of the United Nations with a view to hastening Equatorial Guinea's attainment of independence.

69. Since resolution 2230 (XXI) laid down what was virtually a step-by-step procedure for the administering Power to follow—including the institution of an electoral system based on universal adult suffrage

and the holding, before independence, of a general election for the whole Territory on the basis of a unified electoral roll—operative paragraph 3 contained an appeal to the administering Power to comply with that resolution without further delay. While he recognized that Spain had begun to put some of the practical provisions of that resolution into effect, the time factor was all-important.

70. In view of the imperative need for the Committee to ensure that a constitutional conference was held, operative paragraph 4 urged the administering Power to convene such a conference immediately. In view of the sponsors, the steps taken so far by the Spanish Government which had been described by the representative of Spain in his statement (see paras. 41-44 above), such as inter-ministerial meetings and the preparatory activities already under way, should be integral parts of the process of convening the conference and not preliminaries to it. Such activities could very well continue after a date had been set for the convening of the conference.

71. Operative paragraph 5 set July 1968 as the latest date for independence. The Sub-Committee's consultations and hearings of petitioners in the Territory had seemed to indicate that that date had been agreed upon by all strata of the population and by the administering Power itself.

72. Lastly, operative paragraph 6 would maintain the item on the Special Committee's agenda because the Committee was the United Nations organ primarily responsible for decolonization and was in duty bound to follow developments in the Territory very closely as decolonization proceeded.

73. The representative of Yugoslavia said his delegation believed that the draft resolution took fully into account the actions previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly, the Committee's debates and the views of the petitioners and of the administering Power. The people of Equatorial Guinea, like all other peoples still under colonial domination, had the right to self-determination and the speedy attainment of independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Unfortunately, certain measures which the General Assembly had requested in its resolution 2230 (XXI) had not yet been taken, and the explanations given by the administering Power for the delay were unsatisfactory. The Committee should therefore make every effort to ensure that the people of the Territory would be able to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and that was the purpose of the draft resolution.

74. The representative of Spain said that his Government had always given ample proof of its desire to co-operate with the Special Committee. It had, on its own initiative, granted the people of Equatorial Guinea an autonomous régime enabling them to prepare for political evolution; it had invited a Sub-Committee of the Special Committee to visit the Territory; and it had announced to the Committee its intention of convening a constitutional conference to examine the aspirations of the people and prepare the way for free and democratic elections on the basis of adult suffrage. There was no justification, therefore, for calling his Government's intentions into question because of the delay in convening the conference. The obstacles which prevented Spain from opening the conference on the date originally scheduled had been noted by the repre-

sentative of Uruguay. There were differences of opinion in Equatorial Guinea regarding the Territory's future and the way to prepare for it; to bring those differences into the open might make the positions of the political groups at the constitutional conference more inflexible. His Government had therefore preferred to seek some agreement among Guinean leaders before the conference, in order that positive and constructive results might be achieved at the conference itself.

75. The Special Committee had recently heard petitioners (see paras. 22-34, above) claiming to represent MONALIGE, a political party which had addressed a communication signed by 30,000 persons (A/AC.109/PET.702, annex C) to the Head of the Spanish State (see para. 21, above). That document had stated the gratitude of all Guineans for the understanding shown by the Spanish Government concerning the people's desire for independence, expressed a desire for the maintenance of close ties between Equatorial Guinea and Spain in the future, and acknowledged that the autonomous Government set up by Spain, although not accepted as representing the entire people of Equatorial Guinea, was part of such representation and should participate in the constitutional conference along with representatives of MONALIGE, the MUNGE-IPGE coalition and other economic and cultural organizations. The opposition group therefore recognized the Spanish Government's good faith and regarded the procedure which had been set for holding the conference as adequate. There was no conflict of principle between the Spanish Government and the different political groups in Equatorial Guinea regarding representation of the people at the proposed conference; there were only differences of opinion. He could not agree with the position adopted by some delegations, which seemed to be asking the Spanish Government to overlook those differences of opinion and to convene the constitutional conference unilaterally, even at the risk of confronting the conference with extremely difficult situations.

76. It was worth noting that the Territory of Equatorial Guinea did not in any way benefit the Spanish economy or the Spanish State; on the contrary, it constituted a considerable financial burden, which Spain was willing to bear because it was aware of the grave responsibility it had assumed towards the people of the Territory.

77. Having received no instructions from his Government with regard to the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.427), he reserved his delegation's position, except to state that, in his Government's view, the date to be set for the independence of Equatorial Guinea was a matter for the constitutional conference to decide.

78. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said his delegation continued to believe that the Spanish Government had the responsibility to convene a constitutional conference regardless of the differences existing among the people; those differences represented non-antagonistic traditions and could be overcome only when the Territory's colonial status had been ended. The document cited by the representative of Spain indicated the people's anxiety for the early convening of a constitutional conference by the administering Power. He hoped that the Spanish Government would show its spirit of co-operation by accepting and implementing without further delay whatever resolution the Special Committee might adopt for the elimination of colonialism from Equatorial Guinea.

79. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation supported the draft resolution, which constituted a fresh attempt to promote the aims of previous resolutions, including General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI). His delegation had noted the Spanish representative's statements of Spain's goodwill, co-operative spirit and desire for a peaceful and just solution to the problem of Equatorial Guinea; it therefore hoped that Spain would do its best to implement the provisions of the draft resolution before the Committee.

80. The representative of India recalled that, ever since its independence, his country had consistently supported colonial peoples in their aspirations to freedom and independence. It was in that spirit that India had co-sponsored the draft resolution before the Special Committee. His delegation appreciated the co-operation extended by the Spanish Government to the Committee, by inviting it to send a visiting mission to the Territory, and extending all facilities to the Mission during its visit.

81. He had noted with satisfaction the Spanish Government's declaration recognizing the right of colonized peoples to self-determination and independence. It was precisely because of the expectations roused by that declaration that his delegation was disappointed to learn that the constitutional conference planned for early 1967 had not yet been convened, and that there had not been any tangible progress towards independence for the people of Equatorial Guinea. Since the purpose of the conference had been to set a date for the independence of the Territory, it was very disappointing that it had not been possible to convene it for various reasons. His delegation had considered carefully the reasons given by the administering Power which were somewhat different from the reasons given by the petitioners who had appeared before the Committee. He hoped the conference would be convened without any further delay. The Sub-Committee on Equatorial Guinea had recommended that the Territory should become independent by July 1968, since that was the desire of the overwhelming majority of the population. He hoped that the Spanish Government would render every possible assistance to enable the people of the Territory to achieve their cherished goal within the time-limit they themselves had set.

82. The representative of Italy said that he was prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution. However, with regard to operative paragraph 5, he was of the opinion that it was for the people themselves to set the date of their independence.

83. At the 557th meeting, draft resolution A/AC.109/L.427 was adopted by a roll-call vote of 19 to none, with 3 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Ethiopia, Finland, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Poland, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* None.

*Abstaining:* Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America.

84. The representative of Australia, explaining his vote, said he regretted that his delegation had been unable to support the resolution because of its operative paragraph 5 which set the target date of July 1968 for the independence of Equatorial Guinea. No United Nations body could arbitrarily set a date for the in-

dependence of a non-self-governing people; that must come as the result of a decision by the people of the Territory in co-operation with the administering Power.

85. The representative of Spain thanked the Special Committee for having allowed him to participate in its deliberations, and took note of the voting and of the draft resolution that had been adopted.

86. The representative of Mali said that his delegation had not been able to take part in the voting for reasons beyond its control and would like the summary record to indicate that it would have voted for the draft resolution.

87. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/270) adopted by the Special Committee on the question of Equatorial Guinea at its 557th meeting on 12 September 1967, reads as follows:

*"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*"Having considered the question of Equatorial Guinea,*

*"Having heard the statement of the petitioner,*

*"Having also heard the statement of the administering Power,*

*"Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,*

*"Recalling further the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966,*

*"1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Equatorial Guinea to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);*

*"2. Regrets that the constitutional conference as provided for in paragraph 6 of resolution 2230 (XXI) has not been convened;*

*"3. Requests the administering Power to implement without further delay the provisions of resolution 2230 (XXI), in particular, paragraph 4 thereof;*

*"4. Urges the administering Power to convene immediately the constitutional conference referred to above;*

*"5. Further requests the administering Power to ensure that the Territory accedes to independence as a single political and territorial entity not later than July 1968;*

*"6. Decides to maintain the question of Equatorial Guinea on its agenda."*

88. At the 564th meeting, on 27 September 1967, the Chairman drew attention to a letter dated 18 September 1967 (A/6802), in which the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General that on 15 September 1967 the Spanish Government had decided that the constitutional conference to determine the future of Equatorial Guinea would convene on 30 October 1967.

#### ANNEX\*

##### Question of Equatorial Guinea

##### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. Resolution 2230 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Equatorial Guinea, adopted by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session, reads as follows:

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/237.

*"Question of Equatorial Guinea"*

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

2. By letter dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations. This letter is reproduced below:

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2230 (XXI) on the question of Equatorial Guinea, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.

"In this connexion I wish to note that operative paragraphs 3 to 8 are addressed to your Government as the administering Power for the Territory in question. I wish also to refer to operative paragraph 9 by which the General Assembly requested me to take appropriate action, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to ensure the presence of the United Nations in the Territory for the supervision of the preparation for the holding of a general election and to participate in any other measures leading towards the independence of the Territory.

"I note that, as you informed me in your letter of 27 December 1966, the Spanish Council of Ministers has decided to appoint immediately an interministerial commission entrusted with the task of preparing as soon as possible the holding of a constitutional conference of Equatorial Guinea. The text of your letter has been circulated as a document of the Special Committee (A/AC.109/217). I should appreciate it if your Government would inform me as soon as practicable of the results of the Constitutional Conference.

"I should also welcome an indication from your Government as to the appropriate time for initiating the consultation envisaged in operative paragraph 9 of the resolution concerning the establishment of a United Nations presence in the Territory."

3. At its 508th meeting on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided, in the light of its programme of work for 1967, to request the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in operative paragraph 9 of the above-mentioned resolution. By a letter dated 11 April 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations that, having regard to this decision, he would appreciate receiving at an early date the information requested in his letter dated 19 January 1967.

4. By letter dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 January 1967:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January transmitting to me the text of General Assembly resolution 2230 (XXI) relating to Equatorial Guinea.

"In 1963, as you are aware, the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea approved by means of a referendum the autonomous régime now in force, which is part of the process leading to independence. In order to enable the United Nations to verify the political progress being made by the Territory, the Spanish Government extended an invitation last year to a visiting mission, which sought the views of various persons concerning the future of Equatorial Guinea but was unable, as can be seen from the text of resolution 2230 (XXI) itself, to make a comprehensive survey of opinion in the Territory. It should be noted, in this connexion, that on 24 August 1966, the Assembly of Equatorial Guinea expressed its disagreement with the interpretation given to the visit.

"Last December, on instructions from the Spanish Government, my delegation announced in the Fourth Committee that a Constitutional Conference was to be convened in which the various political sectors and groups of Equatorial Guinea would be represented. A specially appointed Interministerial Committee has already initiated talks with representatives of those sectors and groups.

"The Constitutional Conference, which will be held very shortly, as soon as the preparations are completed, will determine what the people wish, and it is in accordance with those wishes that the procedures and time-table for completing the process begun in 1963 will be established. It should be noted that the Spanish Government promised some time ago that if a majority of the inhabitants of Equatorial Guinea wished to alter their present status, Spain would be fully prepared to consult with the Guinean people concerning their future.

"The decisions adopted by the Constitutional Conference will be submitted to the people of Equatorial Guinea for approval on the basis of universal adult suffrage. The Spanish Government will keep the United Nations Secretariat informed of the proceedings and results of the Constitutional Conference."

5. In submitting this preliminary report, the Secretary-General wishes to state that he will report to and consult with the Special Committee as appropriate in the light of further developments pertaining to the implementation of operative paragraph 9 of the above-mentioned resolution.

## CHAPTER IX\*

## IFNI AND SPANISH SAHARA

**A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly**

1. Ifni and Spanish Sahara were first considered by the Special Committee in 1963.<sup>1</sup> The item was taken up again in 1964 and the Special Committee adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's report to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session.<sup>2</sup>

2. At its meetings in 1965, the Special Committee did not specifically consider these Territories, but in-

cluded relevant information on them in its report to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.<sup>3</sup>

3. At its twentieth session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2072 (XX) of 16 December 1965, which urgently requested the Government of Spain to take immediately all necessary measures for the liberation of the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara from colonial domination and, to this end, to enter into negotiations on the problems relating to sovereignty presented by these two Territories.

4. At its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee again considered these Territories and adopted a resolution which is contained in the Special Committee's

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.7.

<sup>1</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/5446/Rev.1, chap. XIII.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Nineteenth Session, Annexes*, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. IX.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, *Twentieth Session, Annexes*, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. X.

report to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>4</sup> chap. X, para. 243). The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

"1. *Invites* the administering Power to expedite the process of decolonization of the Territory of Ifni and, in collaboration with the Government of Morocco, to make arrangements for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. *Requests* the administering Power to establish without delay appropriate conditions which will ensure that the indigenous population of Spanish Sahara is able to exercise its rights to self-determination and independence;

"3. *Invites* the administering Power to make arrangements, in consultation with the population of Sahara, the Governments of Mauritania, Morocco and any other parties concerned, for a referendum which will be held under United Nations auspices to enable the indigenous population of the Territory freely to exercise its right to self-determination, and to report thereon to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples before the referendum is held;

"4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the progress of the implementation of this resolution and to report thereon to the Special Committee."

5. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966. In the eighth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the Assembly noted the decision of the administering Power to apply in full the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2072 (XX). The Assembly further noted, in the ninth preambular paragraph of the resolution, the statement of the administering Power on 7 December 1966 relating to Spanish Sahara, in particular with regard to the sending of a special United Nations mission to the Territory, the return of exiles and the free exercise by the indigenous population of its right to self-determination.<sup>5</sup>

6. The operative paragraphs of this resolution read as follows:

"1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable right of the peoples of Ifni and Spanish Sahara to self-determination in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"2. *Approves* the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, and endorses the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 16 November 1966;

"3. *Requests* the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

"4. *Invites* the administering Power to determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the

aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Mauritania and Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination and, to this end:

"(a) To create a favourable climate for the referendum to be conducted on an entirely free, democratic and impartial basis, by permitting, *inter alia*, the return of exiles to the Territory;

"(b) To take all the necessary steps to ensure that only the indigenous people of the Territory participate in the referendum;

"(c) To refrain from any action likely to delay the process of the decolonization of Spanish Sahara;

"(d) To provide all the necessary facilities to a United Nations mission so that it may be able to participate actively in the organization and holding of the referendum;

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of recommending practical steps for the full implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in particular for determining the extent of United Nations participation in the preparation and supervision of the referendum and submitting a report to him as soon as possible for transmission to the Special Committee;

"6. *Requests* the Special Committee to continue its consideration of the situation in the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session."

7. At its 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in the above resolution concerning the appointment of a special mission to Spanish Sahara. A report of the Secretary-General to the Special Committee containing correspondence between him and the Government of Spain relating to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) is reproduced as an annex to the present chapter.

## B. Information on the Territories<sup>6</sup>

### 1. IFNI

8. Reports on the referendum held on 14 December 1966 on the Spanish Constitution indicated the following returns in Ifni: registered voters: 9,907; votes cast: 9,598; in favour: 8,229; against: 265; invalid: 106.

9. A total of 39.2 million pesetas<sup>7</sup> was spent during the period under review on housing and public works. Of this total, 12 million pesetas was spent on hospitals, schools and other public buildings; 23 million pesetas on the completion of port installations in Sidi Ifni; and 4.2 million pesetas on housing.

<sup>6</sup> This section was previously reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.420. This information has been derived from published sources and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the administering Power under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 June 1967.

<sup>7</sup> The local currency is the Spanish peseta, which is equal to \$US0.0168; 60 pesetas = \$US1.00.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Fourth Committee, 1660th meeting, paras. 1-4.

## 2. SPANISH SAHARA

*Constitutional developments*

10. Results of the voting in the referendum on the Spanish Constitution held on 14 December 1966 were reported to be as follows: registered voters: 19,724; votes cast: 18,423; in favour: 17,027; against: 960; invalid: 436.

11. On 11 May 1967, a decree was promulgated setting up a General Assembly or *Yemā'a* composed of tribal chiefs and forty representatives elected freely in the tribal units of the Territory. It would also include the president of the *Cabildo* and the mayors of El Aaiun and Villa Cisneros. The *Yemā'a* would have advisory functions on matters affecting the Territory, particularly those concerning economic and social development. It would meet every two months, but the Governor General and also the President of the *Yemā'a*, supported by one third of the membership, would have the power to summon extraordinary sessions on urgent matters.

*Population*

12. The population of Spanish Sahara at the end of 1966 was reported by the administering Power to be 33,512. Of this total, there was a reported urban population of 7,195; 4,188 for El Aaiun; 2,330 for Villa Cisneros; 381 for Semara and 296 for Guera. These figures apply to the indigenous population.

*Economic and social developments*

13. Expenditure for the 1966 budget totalled 621,870,521.98 pesetas, broken down as follows:

	<i>Pesetas</i>
Administration .....	68,044,539.60
Agriculture .....	13,292,114.33
Education .....	28,085,410.03
Communications .....	15,772,131.17
Health .....	24,968,756.30
Public works .....	213,918,151.66
Mining .....	17,092,478.34
Police .....	42,458,040.40
Other .....	198,238,900.15
TOTAL	621,870,521.98

14. It was estimated that social and economic expenditure in the Territory amounted to 380,950,000 pesetas. This included roads, power and water supplies, telecommunications, irrigation works and the completion of port facilities in Villa Cisneros and El Aaiun, as well as expenditure on education and public health.

15. On 18 May 1967, Spain was reported to have taken the first formal step to begin the development of Spanish Sahara's phosphate deposits through an international consortium. The Spanish Government was reported to have granted a contract to the International Minerals Chemical Corporation of Illinois (IMCC), a fertilizer company, to become associated with the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Industria (INI) and European capital in the venture estimated to cost initially \$US175 million. The IMCC is reported to hold a 25 per cent interest in the Sahara enterprise, 20 per cent going to European firms and 55 per cent being held by the Spanish State through the INI. The consortium would have to develop a mining complex in the Sahara and build both a conveyor system and a loading port to process and move phosphate ore from the deposits, calculated at 1.4 thousand million tons.

C. *Consideration by the Special Committee**Introduction*

16. The Special Committee considered Ifni and Spanish Sahara at its 552nd, 553rd, 559th and 560th meetings held at Headquarters from 6 to 14 September 1967.

17. In letters dated 22 August (A/AC.109/259), 25 August (A/AC.109/264) and two letters dated 28 August (A/AC.109/262 and A/AC.109/265), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain, the Permanent Representative of Mauritania, the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Morocco and the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United Nations respectively requested that their delegations be authorized to participate in the discussions of the Special Committee on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara. The Special Committee decided without objection to accede to these requests.

*Written petitions*

18. The Special Committee had before it the following petitions concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Comité de libération du Maghreb arabe .....	A/AC.109/PET.582
"The Representatives and Notables of Spanish Sahara" .....	A/AC.109/PET.583
Mr. Ezrolili Breika, Front de libération du Sahara sous domination espagnole .....	A/AC.109/PET.692 and Corr.1

*General statements*

19. The representative of Spain said that he believed the difficulties arising in connexion with the decolonization of Ifni could be solved through negotiations, which had already begun, between the Governments of Spain and Morocco, as his delegation had already stated in a letter dated 18 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General (see annex, below, para. 7).

20. As stated in a second letter, also dated 18 April 1967 (see annex, below, para. 4), respect for the wishes of the inhabitants formed the basis of his Government's policy concerning Spanish Sahara, and he reaffirmed that the principle of self-determination would be applied to the Territory. The Spanish Government had taken a very important step towards the political evolution of the Territory by establishing, pursuant to a decree of 11 May 1967, a General Assembly of Spanish Sahara, which included forty indigenous deputies elected directly by the indigenous inhabitants on the basis of universal adult suffrage, in addition to the representatives elected in accordance with the traditional procedures of the Territory. His delegation attached great importance to the offer made by his Government regarding the visit of a special mission to the Territory. The terms of that offer were reproduced in his delegation's second letter referred to above and it would be seen that the difference between that offer and what had been requested by the General Assembly was purely procedural. If a climate of peace, stability and tranquility prevailed, it would be possible to devise a satisfactory formula to overcome any differences which existed.

21. The representative of Morocco said that, although, for procedural reasons and in a spirit of conciliation, his delegation had agreed to the simultaneous discussion of the questions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, these

Territories presented problems of a very different nature. The fact that Spain was making a series of statements on the various Territories under its administration should not be taken as an indication that all the Territories had the same character. The statement which had just been made by the representative of Spain deserved serious scrutiny and his delegation would comment on it at a later stage.

22. The representative of Venezuela reaffirmed his delegation's view that the process of implementing General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) must be accelerated. For that reason his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolutions concerning those Territories. In operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2229 (XXI), the General Assembly had made specific recommendations to the administering Power concerning the holding of a referendum in Spanish Sahara under United Nations auspices, but those recommendations had not so far been carried out. There were no doubt many difficulties arising from the special characteristics of the Territory. The statements made to the Fourth Committee during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly by petitioners from Spanish Sahara had been contradictory and, in addition, certain vested interests were at stake and other parties were involved without whose co-operation it would be difficult to set up an effective procedure for a referendum. It was regrettable, in the circumstances, that it had so far not been possible to implement operative paragraph 5 of resolution 2229 (XXI) concerning the appointment of a special mission. Spain had once again stated its intention of accepting a visiting mission provided that its mandate was merely to study conditions in the Territory and its political, economic and social development. The visit of such a special mission to Spanish Sahara would make an important contribution to the work of the Special Committee and the General Assembly, since it would provide first-hand information on the basis of which practical measures could be recommended to ensure the full implementation of the relevant resolutions. Every effort should be made to ensure that such a mission was appointed and sent to the Territory as soon as possible.

23. On the question of Ifni, he hoped that the consultations with the Government of Morocco, recommended in operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2229 (XXI), would be sufficiently constructive to allow the decolonization of Ifni in the near future, and he urged the parties concerned to implement that provision without delay.

24. The representative of Mauritania said that he had listened with close attention to the statements of the various delegations. His delegation had taken note of the decision of the countries concerned that they would seek a solution to the problem of Ifni on a bilateral basis; it found in that decision a confirmation of the fact that Ifni and Spanish Sahara represented two essentially different situations.

25. The position of Mauritania with regard to Spanish Sahara was well known. By reason of its geographical position, that Territory was an integral part of Mauritania. Moreover, from the ethnic and religious point of view, it did not differ from the independent portion of Mauritania. In fact, so-called Spanish Sahara was inhabited exclusively by Moorish tribes which were mostly nomadic and were in no way different from the other tribes living in the north-western part of Mauritania. Their language derived from a dialect spoken only in Mauritania. Furthermore,

those tribes were of the same race as the inhabitants of Mauritania and had the same religion, customs and culture. The frontier separating them was entirely artificial. The Mauritanian character of Spanish Sahara and the fact that it belonged to Mauritania were clear from the *White Book* issued in 1960 by the Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

26. For the Mauritanian Government and people, it was beyond doubt that so-called Spanish Sahara was an integral part of Mauritania's national territory. That position, adopted by Mauritania long before its accession to independence, was not, therefore, based on any political calculations; it represented the will of a nation anxious to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

27. It should not, however, be concluded from that position that Mauritania opposed equitable application of the principle of self-determination to the peoples living in Spanish Sahara, because the Mauritanian people was convinced that its cause was just and had confidence in its brothers who still lived under colonial domination. In accepting the principle of self-determination, Mauritania was demonstrating its deep attachment to the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations and its desire to facilitate the Special Committee's difficult task of decolonization.

28. Moreover, the firm and friendly ties existing between Mauritania and Spain enabled Mauritania to envisage the possibility that at the proper time it could work out, by agreement with the administering Power, the formula that would permit the people of so-called Spanish Sahara to exercise their right of self-determination.

29. Mauritania wished to live in friendship and maintain amicable relations with all the countries of the world, particularly with its neighbours. Furthermore, it believed in the value of dialogue and the need for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. It was in that spirit that it had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI). That resolution, however, represented for Mauritania only a compromise between the different conflicting positions and did not make it sufficiently clear that, on the question of whom the Territory belonged to, Mauritania was the only country directly concerned. It was essential to take the necessary steps, in conformity with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants of so-called Spanish Sahara and by a procedure acceptable to all parties concerned, to liberate the Territory from colonial domination, so that it could become an element of stability in the region. Such a solution would ensure peace and harmony among the nations bordering on that part of north-western Mauritania.

30. The representative of Morocco recalled that he had already stated at a previous meeting the reasons why his delegation had accepted the compromise adopted by the Special Committee for the consideration of the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, a matter which closely involved Morocco's vital interests. Since an attempt might be made, however, to create a distinction in status between those two Territories, his delegation deemed it necessary to recall that the colonial Power held control over the various regions of Morocco by virtue of a "protectorate treaty" which invested that Power with administrative authority over the northern zone and, in the south, over the provinces of Tarfaya, Ifni and Río de Oro, although Morocco's sovereignty extended to all those Territories. After an initial series of negotiations, Spain had recognized the independence



of the northern zone and effected a transfer of power. In 1958, new negotiations had been undertaken with a view to the return of so-called Spanish Sahara and Ifni to Morocco; unfortunately, although those negotiations had progressed far, they had not produced a final solution. Nevertheless, the fact that some parts of Moroccan territory remained under Spanish administration did not mean that Spain had restored to Morocco all of the territory over which Morocco had rights. Not all parts of that territory were under the same administration: some of them were administered by the Khalifate, others by the Spanish administration of Tetuan, by Spanish officials or by the military authorities. The difference in administration did not, however, alter in any way the terms of the treaties or the legal status of those Moroccan territories. That principle was recognized by the United Nations, which, whenever it had dealt with a Non-Self-Governing Territory, had expressly called upon the administering Power to do nothing that might violate the territorial integrity or alter the legal status of the Territory in question.

31. His delegation had been deeply gratified to hear the Spanish representative's statement that the problems involved in the decolonization of Ifni could be resolved through a frank and open dialogue between Morocco and Spain. Morocco, reaffirming its confidence in the administering Power, hoped that the two countries would be able to reach an amicable settlement of the problems still pending between them. In fact, the dialogue with Spain had already been undertaken; the two Heads of State had exchanged messages during the year and, in his last letter, General Franco had reaffirmed his desire to settle the problem of Ifni in a spirit of friendship and co-operation with Morocco.

32. With regard to Spanish Sahara, Morocco had already given a detailed explanation of its position to the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Since gaining independence, Morocco had been seeking the return of that Territory by every means possible. It had repeatedly expressed its desire that the problem should be settled in the same spirit of understanding which had already enabled Morocco and Spain to settle a number of problems in the past. Since the dialogue had not reached a successful conclusion, however, Morocco had been obliged to seek other solutions. In June 1966, at the Addis Ababa meeting of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Morocco had stated its reasons for adopting that new attitude. It had not changed its basic position, but was simply searching for a new procedure that would enable it to obtain the liberation of the peoples of southern Morocco. It had therefore asked Spain to hold in so-called Spanish Sahara, under the auspices of the United Nations, a consultation of the people which would enable the inhabitants of the Territory to express their will. The unilateral measures taken by Spain in Río de Oro and the institutions it had established there no doubt provided grounds for optimism, but Morocco hoped that Spain would co-operate with the United Nations with a view to holding in complete honesty and sincerity and in complete freedom, a referendum which would enable the peoples concerned to make their wishes known. Morocco had always attempted to settle its problems with its neighbours by dialogue. Spain also had declared its willingness to adopt such a policy, and past events gave Morocco every reason to hope that useful co-operation with Spain could be established.

33. The representative of Algeria said that the discussions of Ifni and Spanish Sahara in the United Nations showed that problems could best be solved through mutual understanding. The United Nations had a duty, wherever possible, to facilitate the solution of problems through negotiation between the parties concerned, and the question of Ifni clearly lent itself to such a solution, the parties being the administering Power and Morocco. A similar approach should guide the settlement of the question of so-called Spanish Sahara. Any solution of that problem, as was generally recognized, must take into account the interests and aspirations of the people of the Territory. The statements which the Special Committee had heard from the representatives of Spain, Morocco and Mauritania encouraged the hope that a solution could be reached in conformity with the terms of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI). However, he wished to draw the Committee's attention to its responsibility for ensuring the strict implementation of that resolution. Although everyone recognized the delicacy of the task entrusted to the administering Power, to the other parties concerned and to the Special Committee, the Committee had a duty to consider what measures were necessary for the implementation of the resolution.

34. Many ethnic, economic and cultural ties linked Algeria with so-called Spanish Sahara, and his country had a keen interest in the matter, since the successful decolonization of the Territory was essential for the development of friendly relations among the independent countries of the region. The Committee must continue its task objectively and without undue timidity. In that connexion, he paid tribute to the diligence, patience and understanding shown by the Chairman in his consultations with the parties concerned.

35. Algeria remained open to all suggestions which would take into account the responsibilities of the administering Power, the nature of the positions adopted by Morocco and Mauritania, and the Charter principles of the liberation of peoples, peace and good-neighbourliness. There was a measure of common ground among the Powers concerned; it was recognized that the problem of Ifni and that of the Sahara were different in nature, and the parties had also agreed to take note of the statement made by the administering Power, although in so doing they were not expressing any value judgement regarding the measures taken by Spain in the Sahara, since those could only be assessed in the context of the implementation of resolution 2229 (XXI). Responsibility for the fact that the Special Committee had not been able to take the measures envisaged in that resolution must be borne by the various parties concerned. The Committee should now recommend that all interested parties, including the General Assembly, consider the short-term and long-term measures necessary for the implementation of resolution 2229 (XXI). In the light of the statement of the administering Power, it should be possible to ensure the dispatch of a mission to the Sahara, and the question of the implementation of the other provisions of operative paragraphs 4 and 5 could then be considered.

36. The representative of Morocco said he had already indicated his Government's reservations regarding the suggestion that Ifni and so-called Spanish Sahara were different in nature. Morocco's position had always been that those areas formed a single territory. Two other portions of Morocco formerly under Spanish administration had already been returned,

and the problem of Ifni was in process of solution. It was his hope that the problem of so-called Spanish Sahara could represent the fourth stage in the process and be solved either in the same manner or differently. However, his delegation had always made it clear that the geographical situation of various areas did not affect their status as integral parts of independent Morocco. The attitude which his delegation had taken in order to facilitate the Special Committee's debates must not be taken to imply acceptance of the thesis that so-called Spanish Sahara had a status different from that of Ifni.

37. The representative of Spain welcomed the constructive tone of the statements of the preceding speakers and those made at the previous meeting. The views of his delegation on the Territories of Ifni and Spanish Sahara had been stated in the past and were to be found in the Special Committee's reports and in the records of the Fourth Committee and the General Assembly. In the case of Ifni, what was important was that a dialogue had been initiated. With regard to Spanish Sahara, his delegation attached importance to the fact that the General Assembly had accepted the principle of self-determination for the Sahara—a principle advocated by the Spanish Government. That meant that, when the time came, the Saharans could choose to form an independent nation or follow whatever course they wished, since it was not only the interests of indigenous peoples, but also their aspirations, that must be paramount.

#### D. Action taken by the Special Committee

##### *Consensus adopted by the Special Committee*

38. At its 560th meeting on 14 September 1967, the Special Committee decided, on the proposal of the Chairman, to adopt the following consensus concerning Ifni and Spanish Sahara:

"The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples heard the statement of the representative of Spain in which he indicated that a dialogue had already been initiated at a high level between the Governments of Spain and Morocco with regard to Ifni. This dialogue is in line with paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) which:

'3. Requests the administering Power to take immediately the necessary steps to accelerate the decolonization of Ifni and to determine with the Government of Morocco, bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population, procedures for the transfer of powers in accordance with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).'

"The Committee hopes that the two parties will continue the dialogue in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution.

"With regard to Spanish Sahara, the Special Committee notes with regret that the provisions of resolution 2229 (XXI) have not so far been implemented by the administering Power. In view of the limited time available to the Committee, it has not been possible for the Committee to have a full debate on this question.

"The Special Committee therefore agrees that the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara be referred to the Fourth Committee for consideration at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, in order to

envisage the necessary measures for the implementation of the above-mentioned resolution.

"Subject to any decisions by the General Assembly at its twenty-second session, the Special Committee will further consider this item during its meetings in 1968."

#### ANNEX\*

#### Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara

##### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara reads as follows:

##### *"Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara"*

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

2. In a letter dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations. The letter reads as follows:

"I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2229 (XXI) on the question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting, on 20 December 1966.

"I wish to refer, in this connexion, to operative paragraphs 3 and 4, which are addressed to Spain as the administering Power for the Territories in question. I wish also to refer to paragraph 5, by which the General Assembly requested me, in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara. I should appreciate receiving at an early date the views of your Government concerning the proposed mission."

3. At its 508th meeting, on 6 April 1967, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples decided, in view of its programme of work as established for 1967, to request the Secretary-General to expedite the consultations envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) concerning the appointment of a special mission to Spanish Sahara. In a letter dated 11 April 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations that, having regard to this decision, he would appreciate receiving at an early date the information requested in his letter dated 19 January 1967.

4. In a letter dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 19 January 1967:

"I have the honour to refer to the topic of the Sahara, referred to in your letter of 19 January 1967. I have dealt with the subject of Ifni in a separate note, since the two matters are quite unrelated.

"As my delegation has repeatedly stated, respect for the wishes of the inhabitants of the Territory forms the basis of Spanish policy concerning the Sahara.

"On 18 November 1966, a deputation of Saharans handed the (then) Under-Secretary for Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories two communications<sup>a</sup> in which the representatives of the indigenous population stated that it was for the latter themselves to decide freely concerning their future. The first of these documents was signed by all the tribal chiefs. The second contained the signatures of the 14,000 Saharans who of a total population of 27,000 inhabitants, were of voting age at that time.

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/239.

<sup>a</sup> See A/AC.109/PET.583.

"However, Spain, which in taking this position is acting in accordance with the principles of the United Nations, cannot allow conflicting interests to interfere with the wishes of the people of the Sahara.

"Your Excellency wished to know my Government's views concerning the contents of paragraph 5 of resolution 2229 (XXI), in which the General Assembly requests Your Excellency 'in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint immediately a special mission to be sent to Spanish Sahara'.

"Allow me, Your Excellency, to quote the exact wording of the Spanish proposal concerning a possible visit to the Sahara Territories. It may be of use to recall it. The representative of Spain stated in the Fourth Committee on 7 December 1966: 'As proof of its sincere intention of applying the principle of self-determination to this Territory (the Sahara), the Spanish delegation is willing to hold conversations with the Secretary-General with a view to considering the appointment of a commission to visit the Spanish Sahara.'

"And so that there should be no doubts concerning the scope and purpose of any such visit, Mr. Piniés made the following points, which we consider essential: 'The Commission would observe the situation in the Territory directly and objectively, and would be able to form an opinion concerning the problem. A group of impartial and disinterested persons, not representing any countries that have shown a direct interest in Spanish Sahara or harbour any territorial ambitions concerning it, would assess actual conditions in the Territory, which would no doubt provide an opportunity for seeing what Spain has accomplished up till now, becoming acquainted with future plans and ascertaining the wishes of the inhabitants of the Sahara regarding their future destiny, which they will make known in due time by means of the process of self-determination.'

"If Your Excellency will compare Spain's very clear proposal with the wording of resolution 2229 (XXI), you will readily see that this is one of the reasons why we were obliged to vote against the resolution. We felt that we were entitled to expect a response more in keeping with the scope of our invitation.

"The Spanish Government is not withdrawing its proposal; but it does consider that our offer must be dealt with strictly as it stands, within the bounds clearly defined. I myself stated in the plenary that the United Nations visit should be made . . . in an atmosphere entirely free from passions and in the absence of any prejudices or preconceived attitudes. Unfortunately the situation created by extraneous elements is quite different from what we asked for. A veritable torrent of high feeling has been unleashed, creating acute tensions; and preconceived attitudes are becoming dangerously complex. In view of that situation, Spain cannot forget that under Article 73 of the Charter it has the duty to guarantee a system of peace and security in that Territory. And it hopes that reason will prevail so that our proposal of December 1966 may be carried out with the prudence and efficiency intended.

"I can assure Your Excellency that, in keeping with its policy, my Government is resolved to allow the indigenous inhabitants—and them alone—to freely exercise their right

to self-determination. To this end steps are already being taken to apply the necessary practical measures to enable the people of the Sahara to decide their future in complete freedom."

5. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General, in acknowledging the letter of the Permanent Representative of Spain, stated as follows:

"As you are aware, the above-mentioned resolution envisages that the appointment of the special mission would be made in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee. Accordingly I am now inviting the views of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

"When the views of the Special Committee are available, I shall in the light of those views and within the context of operative paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned resolution be ready to discuss with you all matters relevant to the appointment of the special mission."

6. In a letter of the same date addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, in transmitting the letter of the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, the Secretary-General stated as follows:

"As you are aware, operative paragraph 5 of the above-mentioned resolution envisages that the appointment of a special mission should be made in consultation with the administering Power and the Special Committee. Accordingly I would appreciate receiving an indication of the views of the members of the Committee on the matter."

7. In another letter, also dated 18 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations dealt separately with the references in General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI) to Ifni. The text of the letter reads as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January 1967 enclosing General Assembly resolution 2229 (XXI).

"I am replying separately with regard to the resolution's references to Ifni, which, as my delegation pointed out on more than one occasion during the last session of the General Assembly, presents an entirely different problem from that of Sahara.

"My Government's position with regard to Ifni has often been stated in the Special Committee, the Fourth Committee and the plenary General Assembly. It is a very clear position which is entirely consistent with the principles approved by the United Nations and is based on respect for the self-determination of peoples and the friendly co-operation of States.

"In view of the special characteristics of the Territory of Ifni—which distinguish it fundamentally from Sahara—the Spanish Government, as it has made abundantly clear on previous occasions, is prepared to enter into negotiations with the Government of Morocco 'bearing in mind the aspirations of the indigenous population'—in the actual words of the resolution in question—in order that an agreement may be reached which satisfies all the interests involved and, at the same time, faithfully observes the guiding principles approved by the United Nations for dealing with this question."

## CHAPTER X\*

### GIBRALTAR

#### **A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly**

1. The Special Committee began its consideration of Gibraltar in 1963 and 1964. On 16 October 1964, at its 291st meeting, the Committee adopted a consensus

in which it noted that "there was a disagreement, or even a dispute, between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain regarding the status and situation of the Territory of Gibraltar" and invited the above-mentioned Powers to begin talks without delay, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, in order to reach a negotiated

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.9.

solution in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) giving due account to the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Territory. The United Kingdom and Spain were further requested to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly of the outcome of their negotiations.<sup>1</sup> The texts of notes exchanged between the two Governments were reproduced as appendices to the report of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its twentieth session.<sup>2</sup>

2. In resolution 2070 (XX), adopted on 16 December 1965, the General Assembly invited the Governments of Spain and of the United Kingdom to begin without delay the talks envisaged under the terms of the above-mentioned consensus and to inform the Special Committee and the General Assembly at its twenty-first session of the outcome of their negotiations.

3. The Special Committee again considered the question of Gibraltar at meetings held during November 1966 at which time it had available the texts of further correspondence between the two Governments.<sup>3</sup> On 17 November 1966, it adopted a resolution whereby, taking into account the willingness of the administering Power and the Government of Spain to continue the negotiations, it: (a) called on the two parties to refrain from any acts which would hamper the success of the negotiations; (b) regretted the delay in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) with respect to the Territory; (c) called on the two parties to continue their negotiations in a constructive way and to report to the Special Committee as soon as possible, and in any case before the twenty-second session of the General Assembly; and (d) requested the Secretary-General to assist in the implementation of the resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>4</sup> chap. XI, para. 66).

4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

## B. Information on the Territory<sup>5</sup>

5. Information on the Territory is contained in the reports of the Special Committee to the General Assembly at its eighteenth, nineteenth, twentieth and twenty-first sessions. Supplementary information is set out below.

### *Constitutional developments*

6. There were no constitutional changes effected during the period under review.

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twentieth Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23, document A/6000/Rev.1, chap. XI, appendices.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, documents A/6242, A/6277 and A/6278.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>5</sup> This section was originally reproduced in document A/AC.109/L.419. This information has been derived from published sources and from the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter, on 1 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

### *Negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom*

7. An account of the state of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom appears in the report of the Secretary-General of 17 July 1967 (see annex I to the present chapter).

### *Economic conditions*

8. Gibraltar, which has no agriculture or other primary resources, is largely dependent on tourism, re-exports and the work provided by the dockyard, the Departments of the Armed Services, the Government and the City Council.

9. In particular, efforts are being made to develop the tourist industry. They include the expansion of hotel and restaurant facilities, the promotion of various types of business and other conferences and festivals, the construction of an aerial ropeway to the top of the Rock, etc.

10. The main sources of government revenue are customs and excise. Revenue for the year 1965 totalled £1,848,407 and expenditure amounted to £2,536,800, which included expenditure met out of the Improvement and Development Fund amounting to £518,618. The largest item of expenditure in 1965 was on social services (including rehousing and town planning), amounting to £1,294,800.

11. Following a visit of the Chief Minister, Sir Joshua Hassan, and the Minister without Portfolio, Mr. Peter Isola, to London in July 1965, the United Kingdom Government announced that it was making available £1 million in Colonial Development and Welfare grants for development in Gibraltar over the next three years and also a further £200,000 in Exchequer loans, should they be required. In addition, £100,000 would be made available as a special grant-in-aid. This was not actually brought to account until early 1966. The total of £1,100,000 in grants and £200,000 in loans during the years April 1965–March 1968 compares with a Colonial Development and Welfare allocation of £400,000 previously made available for the three years ending 31 March 1966. It was announced in November 1966 that the United Kingdom Government was allocating a further £600,000 in addition to the £1 million previously allocated in Colonial Development and Welfare grants for an expanded development programme. The United Kingdom Government had also agreed, subject to parliamentary approval, to provide a special grant-in-aid of £100,000 to Gibraltar's budget in 1967.

### *Social conditions*

12. It is estimated that approximately two thirds of the labour force consists of alien non-domiciled workers, the majority of whom live in neighbouring Spanish territory and who enter daily by road from La Linea or by sea from Algeciras under frontier documents issued and controlled by the authorities on both sides of the frontier. Since 1964, however, the flow of workers from neighbouring Spanish territory has tended to diminish, while the influx of other non-Spanish labour has tended to increase.

13. In 1965, there were eight doctors practising under government and local authority services and eleven private doctors in Gibraltar. Recurrent expenditure on public health in 1965 was £274,875 by the Government and £33,691 by the local authority. Capital expenditure was £7,612 and £1,820, respectively.

*Educational conditions*

14. Education in Gibraltar is compulsory and free in government schools for children between five and fifteen years of age. As at the end of 1965, primary education was provided in twelve government schools and three private schools. In addition, there were six government secondary schools and two technical schools, the latter being the Gibraltar and Dockyard Technical College for boys and the Commercial School for girls. There is no higher education in Gibraltar, but Gibraltarians with the necessary qualifications are granted scholarships and grants for further study overseas, mostly in the United Kingdom.

15. Total enrolment in schools as at the end of 1965 was 5,125 children out of a total population of 25,270 civilian residents. Of this number, 3,315 were enrolled in primary schools, 1,686 in secondary schools and 124 in the technical schools.

16. Recurrent government expenditure on education in 1965 was £208,663, while capital expenditure relating to buildings amounted to approximately £20,000, with new works started but not completed estimated at about £90,000.

**C. Consideration by the Special Committee***Introduction*

17. The Special Committee considered Gibraltar at its 543rd to 550th meetings held at Headquarters between 22 August and 1 September 1967. It had before it a report by the Secretary-General concerning the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 (see annex I below).

18. In a letter dated 22 August 1967 (A/AC.109/258), the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations requested that his delegation be allowed to participate in meetings of the Special Committee at which Gibraltar would be discussed. The Committee decided, without objection, to accede to that request.

*Written petitions*

19. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions concerning Gibraltar:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. Julian Palomo Jiménez .....	A/AC.109/PET.645
Sir Joshua Hassan, Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Mr. P. J. Isola, Deputy Chief Minister, and others ..	A/AC.109/PET.704
Mr. Daniel Fernandez .....	A/AC.109/PET.705
Mr. Alfredo Bentino .....	A/AC.109/PET.706
171 petitions concerning Gibraltar	A/AC.109/PET.714-883
Mr. Carlos Manuel Larrea, President, and eighteen members of the Instituto Ecuatoriano de Cultura Hispánica .....	A/AC.109/PET.884
Mr. Andrés Townsend Ezcurra, Secretary-General of the Latin American Parliament .....	A/AC.109/PET.900

*General statements*

20. The representative of the United Kingdom said that most of the developments concerning the question of Gibraltar which had occurred since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) on 20 December 1966 were fully covered in the Secretary-General's

report (see annex I below). It might be useful, however, to recall the salient features of the current situation and to outline the main developments which had led up to it. Three main conclusions could be drawn—the first negative and the other two positive. The first conclusion was that, to his delegation's regret, the continued negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not taken place. Secondly, by its decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government had made an important contribution towards the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI) and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and the Special Committee. Thirdly, the result of the referendum would be an important new factor in deciding on the appropriate steps to be taken thereafter. His statement would be in the nature of an interim account, and a fuller report to the Special Committee, as required under General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), would be made when the result of the referendum was known. The Special Committee might, therefore, wish to suspend any substantive judgement on the longer-term aspects of the Gibraltar question until then.

21. A few days before the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), the Spanish Government had rejected a United Kingdom proposal that the various legal issues which had emerged during the negotiations should be referred to the International Court of Justice and had reverted to its earlier proposal that Gibraltar should be incorporated in Spain under a bilateral convention and "statute". Following the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI), the United Kingdom Government had taken the initiative in proposing a further round of talks to discuss possible methods of decolonizing Gibraltar, and the Spanish Government had agreed that those talks should take place on or about 18 April 1967. Six days before the talks had been due to begin, however, the Spanish Government, without any prior consultation, had published an order establishing in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar a prohibited air zone in which all flying was banned, thus hampering access to Gibraltar. The timing of the announcement was clearly not accidental; indeed, similar restrictions on access to Gibraltar had been introduced on two earlier occasions: first in October 1964, the day after the Special Committee had adopted its consensus recommending negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, and again in October 1966, five days before a further round of bilateral talks between the United Kingdom and Spain had been due to begin. It was with such acts in mind that the Special Committee, in its resolution of 17 November 1966 (A/6300/Rev.1, chap. XI, para. 66), had called upon the two parties to refrain from any acts which would hamper the success of negotiations, and that the General Assembly had included in its resolution 2231 (XXI) the final preambular paragraph regretting the occurrence of certain acts which had prejudiced the smooth progress of negotiations. Since the declaration of the prohibited air zone in April 1967 had clearly and deliberately introduced a new element into the situation in Gibraltar and had been designed to prejudice the interests of the people of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom Government had considered it a matter of priority to establish the practical implications of that announcement before proceeding with the consultations, and it had therefore postponed the talks. The effects of the prohibited air zone on civil aircraft had already been discussed in the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the matter would be raised in that

organization by the United Kingdom as a dispute within the terms of article 84 of the Chicago Convention. In the course of discussions held at Madrid between 5 and 8 June 1967 at the suggestion of the United Kingdom Government, the Spanish representatives had declined to discuss the question of the prohibited air zone without prior acknowledgement by the United Kingdom Government of Spanish sovereignty over the territory on which Gibraltar airfield was situated. It was clear, therefore, that the prohibited air zone would in fact interfere with air navigation at Gibraltar. The Spanish Government's repeated allegations, during the past year, that United Kingdom aircraft had violated Spanish air space had all been fully investigated by the United Kingdom Government, and in only three instances had the allegations proved justified. Gibraltar airfield had been used by British aircraft for many years, yet, significantly, it was only in the past year that such allegations had been made so repeatedly and with such studied publicity.

22. Those were the reasons why the negotiations called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not taken place. His Government's position on the issue was clear and consistent; it favoured talks, it deplored the obstruction of talks by the Spanish Government, and it regretted the imposition by the latter of obviously unacceptable pre-conditions for the holding of further talks on political matters, or even on the prohibited air zone. After the referendum, there would still be a wide range of subjects for fruitful discussion between the two Governments.

23. The principal element in the present situation was the United Kingdom's announcement that a referendum would be held in Gibraltar. The terms of the referendum had been communicated to the Secretary-General and were reproduced in his report (see annex I below, paras. 15 and 16). There were two choices offered to the people of Gibraltar, namely, to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966, or voluntarily to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its present responsibilities. The announcement of the referendum had been immediately welcomed by the elected representatives of the people of Gibraltar and by public opinion generally in the Territory. It was most important that the people of Gibraltar should be asked to say where their own interests lay, since those interests, according to Chapter XI of the Charter, were paramount and since General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called upon the United Kingdom and Spain to take them into account. The United Kingdom Government had offered the Spanish Government facilities to explain its proposals to the people of Gibraltar and try to convince them that the arrangements it proposed would be in their best interests, and had also expressed its readiness to welcome a nominee of the Spanish Government to observe the referendum, but so far the Spanish Government had declined both invitations as unacceptable and had stated its disagreement with the referendum and its unwillingness to concede any validity to its results. The Spanish Government had likewise rejected a further offer by the United Kingdom to consider any views it might wish to put forward on the formulation of the first alternative in the referendum. The United Kingdom still hoped, however, that the Spanish Government would decide to accept the offers, but

even if it did so the position of the United Kingdom Government would remain one of complete impartiality as between the two alternatives presented in the referendum, in order to allow the people of Gibraltar a completely free choice.

24. The second alternative offered in the referendum was obviously a limited choice. Under the Treaty of Utrecht, Gibraltar could not be alienated from the British Crown without first being offered to Spain. Thus, the practical choices open to the people of Gibraltar were restricted. Similarly, the area of British responsibilities referred to in the second alternative reflected the United Kingdom Government's concern for legitimate Spanish interests in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar. It had been made clear, however, that if the people chose the second alternative the United Kingdom Government would be ready to discuss with their representatives any appropriate constitutional changes which might be desired.

25. The referendum would be held on 10 September, and the entitlement to vote would be restricted to persons of Gibraltar origin resident in the Territory who were over the age of twenty-one years. Out of a total resident population of some 25,000 therefore, about 12,000 persons would be registered as eligible to vote in the referendum, and the United Kingdom Government hoped that a high proportion would in fact do so.

26. As for the purposes of the referendum, the United Kingdom Government regarded it as an important, though not necessarily a final, stage in the process of decolonization. Moreover, it did not represent a final and irrevocable option on the part of the people of Gibraltar regarding the issue of incorporation in Spain; for even if a majority elected to retain the link with the United Kingdom, the people of Gibraltar would still retain the right to express by free and democratic choice their desire to join Spain. That undertaking went beyond the requirements of the Treaty of Utrecht. His delegation could only regret that the Spanish Government had not so far welcomed or recognized that important new step by the United Kingdom Government.

27. The referendum could be considered a significant step forward in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2; for it sought to establish, by popular vote, whether the Spanish proposals of 18 May 1966 were in accordance with the interests of the people of Gibraltar themselves. That question could not be determined by any outside body without reference to those whose future was at stake. The United Kingdom Government believed that, once that point had been clarified, further progress could be made towards the realistic achievement of the objectives of the General Assembly resolution, and it was fully prepared to hold further talks with the Spanish Government on the subject of Gibraltar.

28. Because the referendum was such an important step towards decolonization, the United Kingdom Government was most anxious that it should be conducted in conditions of absolute impartiality. To that end, it would welcome the presence of a Spanish observer, and he was glad to say that the Government of certain Commonwealth countries and certain States Members of the United Nations had agreed to nominate independent observers. The United Kingdom

had also informed the Secretary-General that it would welcome the presence of any observer whom he might wish to send to Gibraltar for the referendum. That seemed especially appropriate in the light of Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), and particularly of operative paragraph 3.

29. One reason advanced by the Spanish Government for its unwillingness to accept the referendum was that it would cause the reversion clause of the Treaty of Utrecht to come into operation, although in fact the holding of the referendum could not entail any interruption of British sovereignty over Gibraltar or any alienation of Gibraltar from the British Crown. However, the main criticisms of the Spanish Government seemed to centre on the unfounded assertion that the referendum violated resolution 2231 (XXI) and earlier resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Special Committee by implying that the people of Gibraltar were to say whether General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) did or did not apply to Gibraltar. It was clear from the terms of resolution 2231 (XXI) that almost all Member States agreed that Gibraltar was a Territory within the scope of resolution 1514 (XV). The referendum would simply ask the people of Gibraltar to state whether or not it would be in their interests to be incorporated in Spain, on the terms offered by the Spanish Government. The clarification of their wishes on that point was certainly a step towards decolonization and was entirely consistent with General Assembly resolutions 2231 (XXI) and 1514 (XV).

30. The Spanish Government's concern with resolution 1514 (XV) seemed to rest exclusively on paragraph 6 of the Declaration. However, it was clear that, in framing paragraph 6, its authors had been essentially concerned not with the risks of dismemberment in sovereign States but with the possibility of dismemberment of existing Non-Self-Governing Territories or of such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo which, in December 1960, had barely emerged from colonial status. If paragraph 6 of the Declaration had any relevance to Gibraltar, it could only apply to the attempts of the Spanish Government itself to disrupt the territorial integrity and unity of Gibraltar by laying a claim to the southern part of the isthmus, which had been a part of Gibraltar for more than 100 years.

31. The United Kingdom Government had no doubt as to its legal sovereignty over Gibraltar, and indeed had offered to refer the Spanish Government's claim to the International Court of Justice and abide by its ruling.

32. Even if paragraph 6 of the Declaration could be interpreted as referring to the national unity of mature sovereign States, the Spanish case depended entirely on the thesis that Gibraltar was not a Non-Self-Governing Territory but a part of Spain. That view had certainly not been endorsed by the United Nations. On the contrary, the United Kingdom Government, year after year, had submitted information on Gibraltar under Article 73 e of the Charter, and the status of Gibraltar as a Non-Self-Governing Territory had been accepted in every competent organ of the United Nations.

33. If the Spanish Government really believed that Gibraltar was under Spanish sovereignty, Spain should accept the offer to resolve the question in the highest

judicial organ of the United Nations. If, on the other hand, the argument was that Gibraltar was geographically a natural part of Spain, then by the same token it must be accepted that Lesotho and Swaziland were natural parts of South Africa, or Ifni a natural part of Morocco.

34. Moreover, the United Nations had not accepted the proposition that in the case of Gibraltar decolonization could only be brought about by integration with Spain. It was true that the Spanish Government had a standing in matters affecting Gibraltar, and that standing was recognized in the resolutions and was accepted by the United Kingdom Government.

35. While the Treaty of Utrecht limited the possibilities for decolonization through the normal formula of independence, there were other avenues of decolonization consistent with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). Integration with Spain would constitute decolonization only if it took place demonstrably in accordance with the wishes of the people of the Territory. To transfer Gibraltar to Spain against their wishes would not be decolonization, but a flagrant breach of all the principles of the Charter and of General Assembly resolutions.

36. There were other features of resolution 1514 (XV), besides paragraph 6 of the Declaration, that might be recalled. It was stated that all peoples had the right to self-determination and that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation was a denial of fundamental human rights, and the importance of the freely expressed will of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing Territories was emphasized. It was against that background that one should view, first, the referendum, which allowed the people of Gibraltar to express their views as to where their interests lay in regard to one possible road to decolonization and, secondly, the Spanish proposition that such matters should be negotiated by the United Kingdom and Spanish Governments.

37. In implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), his delegation had endeavoured to present as full an account as possible of developments regarding Gibraltar on an interim basis. Its statement could not be considered a final report under the terms of the resolution, since that must await the outcome of the referendum. As for expediting the decolonization of Gibraltar, enough had been said to demonstrate that the referendum represented definite progress in that direction. The Spanish Government had been given an opportunity to explain its proposals to the Gibraltarians and had been invited to nominate an observer to the referendum. Moreover, the people of Gibraltar had been given a continuing option to modify their status by joining Spain. The United Kingdom Government had thus given full proof of its intention to take account of the interests of the people of the Territory. It would also be recalled that it had taken the initiative in arranging for a resumption of negotiations in April 1967. It could only regret that continued negotiations had been obstructed by the actions of others. Furthermore, whatever the results of the referendum, the United Kingdom Government still believed that there was a whole range of issues concerning Gibraltar that could be explored in direct talks with the Spanish Government within the framework of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). It would be ready to take part in such negotiations, once the referendum had been held.

38. The representative of Spain said that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), taken in conjunction with resolution 2070 (XX) and the Special Committee's consensus of 16 October 1964, not only made it quite clear that Gibraltar should be decolonized but also specified the manner in which the process should be conducted.

39. The colonial situation in Gibraltar called for the application of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), as the United Nations had requested. That resolution contained a Declaration consisting of seven paragraphs, the first of which stated that the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation was contrary to the United Nations Charter. However, the United Kingdom and the petitioners appearing before the Committee had said that the inhabitants of Gibraltar were not subjugated by the United Kingdom. The second paragraph set forth the principle that all peoples had the right to self-determination; however, neither the Special Committee nor the General Assembly had specified that that principle should apply to the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar. Indeed, the 1964 consensus and General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) merely stated that Spain and the United Kingdom should bear the interests of the inhabitants in mind. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 set forth principles for guaranteeing self-determination in cases to which paragraphs 1 and 2 applied. Consequently, only paragraph 6, supplemented by paragraph 7, offered a solution for the situation in Gibraltar. In connexion with paragraph 6, he would point out that the interpretation which the United Kingdom representative had placed on the implications of the scope given to it by the Assembly was not in keeping with the facts, as the records of the debates would suffice to show.

40. Continued British presence on a portion of Spanish soil was tantamount to the dismemberment of Spain's national unity and territorial integrity. As long as such dismemberment persisted, the colonial situation in Gibraltar would also persist, whatever formula was used to disguise it.

41. Although the United Nations did not consider the civilian inhabitants of Gibraltar to have the necessary qualifications for self-determination, it had laid down one important condition for the return of that Territory to Spain, namely, that the interests of the inhabitants should be respected by both the United Kingdom and Spain. That decision was quite in keeping with the statement contained in the report of the 1966 Special Committee on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.<sup>6</sup>

42. From the very outset, the Spanish Government had offered to respect the interests of the people of Gibraltar and had made a number of suggestions to the United Kingdom as to how those interests might be safeguarded. The United Kingdom Government had not stated what the interests of those inhabitants would be until 14 June 1967, when it had indicated that it considered one of the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar to be the right to take a decision regarding sovereignty over a Territory which it occupied. That decision by the United Kingdom had prompted Spain to request an opportunity to make a statement in the Special Committee.

43. When the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) had opened in London on 18 May 1966, his Government had proposed to the United Kingdom that two agreements should be concluded, one governing the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar and the other safeguarding the United Kingdom's interests. On the signing of those agreements, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) would have become applicable, ending the dismemberment of his country's national unity and territorial integrity. The five meetings which had ensued had been negotiations in name only, and all the United Kingdom had done was to create obstacles to the process of decolonization, invoking legal and historical arguments and raising marginal issues. It had adduced new colonial rights over Spanish territory even more extensive than those conferred by the anachronistic Treaty of Utrecht, and it had finally proposed that the International Court of Justice should examine its colonial rights over the Rock before the United Nations resolutions were implemented. During the Special Committee's consideration of the situation in Gibraltar in November 1966, he had drawn attention to the United Kingdom's reluctance to negotiate and to the fact that it had gone so far as to claim sovereignty over a part of Spanish territory adjacent to the Rock, thereby committing a new act of aggression against Spain's territorial integrity.

44. The United Kingdom delegation had thereupon attempted to justify its proposal to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice by presenting a long list of accusations against Spain. Those accusations had already been advanced in 1965 as a pretext for refusing to negotiate, and again in 1966 to mask the United Kingdom's unwillingness to negotiate. It had come as no surprise that they had again been put forward during the present debate as an excuse for the United Kingdom's decision to break off the London negotiations on 13 April 1967.

45. His Government interpreted the Special Committee's resolution of 17 November 1966 as a clear indication that the United Nations felt that the decolonization of Gibraltar should proceed through negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, and not through recourse to the International Court of Justice. His Government had therefore explained to the United Kingdom why the question could not be submitted to the International Court and had proposed the immediate opening of negotiations for the drafting of a statute to protect the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar. The statute was to have become a formal agreement between the two countries, duly registered with the United Nations.

46. General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had requested the United Kingdom to refrain from hindering the decolonization of Gibraltar, which should be undertaken "in consultation with the Government of Spain" and by means of negotiations "taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory". The provisions of the resolution were identical to those of the Spanish Government's proposal to the United Kingdom six days earlier. By that stage, it had been clear that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) provided the only means of solving the question of Gibraltar, bearing in mind the interests of its inhabitants. The United Kingdom had never told Spain what those interests were and had not allowed the Gibraltarians themselves to do so.

<sup>6</sup> See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes*, agenda item 87, document A/6230, para. 502.



47. In 1963 and 1964, Mr. Hassan and Mr. Isola, petitioners from Gibraltar, had requested the Special Committee to safeguard the inhabitants' right to self-determination; however, that right was to be exercised exclusively in order to perpetuate the colonial situation in the Territory which, as the petitioners had admitted, did not affect them. It was not until 17 December 1966 that Mr. Hassan had told the Fourth Committee what rights the inhabitants of Gibraltar wished to see protected. That had been the first indirect information regarding those rights which his Government had received. Mr. Hassan's statement at the 1679th meeting of the Fourth Committee had confirmed the existence of two types of interests in Gibraltar: those affecting the Gibraltarians themselves, and those of the United Kingdom, which were best described as limited sovereignty over a military fortress on Spanish soil. On 18 May and 13 December 1966, his Government had proposed separate solutions to the problem of those different interests. If the United Kingdom had been ready to comply with General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), it would have been easier to solve the question of the purely Gibraltarian interests. At no time, however, had the United Kingdom given any indication that it was ready to open a civilized dialogue with Spain, as requested in the resolution. United Kingdom aircraft had continued to violate Spanish air space, and Spanish protests had been ignored. Furthermore, on 5 January 1967, the United Kingdom had informed his Government that it had acquired the right to avail itself of Spanish air space in the area of the Rock by virtue of its construction of a military airfield adjacent to Gibraltar. The United Kingdom had already attempted to colonize another part of Spanish territory on 12 July 1966, and its attempt to establish so-called rights in Spanish air space, on behalf of military aircraft operating from the Gibraltar airfield, had come sixteen days after the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI).

48. The United Kingdom's claim and its endeavours to encroach on Spanish air space had made it more urgent than ever that Spain should protect its air space against military use by foreign countries. His Government had previously requested the establishment of a prohibited zone for air navigation in Spanish military air space around the Straits of Gibraltar. The United Kingdom's insistence on maintaining its base in Gibraltar demonstrated the strategic importance of the region. His Government had therefore approved a ministerial order establishing the prohibited air zone in Algeciras on 11 April 1967. The United Kingdom had used the existence of the prohibited zone as a pretext for disrupting the London negotiations, and the United Kingdom representative had attempted to show that the prohibited zone was a further example of Spanish hostility which was allegedly preventing negotiations. Such tactics were merely a repetition of those used in 1965 and 1966, when the United Kingdom had unsuccessfully attempted to persuade ICAO to condemn the prohibited zone as illegal. By submitting the problem of a prohibited zone to a technical organization concerned exclusively with civil aviation, the United Kingdom had tried to disguise the exclusively military nature of the airfield, which was registered as a military airfield with ICAO. Moreover, the permission of the Royal Air Force was necessary for overflights of the area.

49. The United Kingdom had subsequently rejected a Spanish proposal for the joint modernization of the Gibraltar airfield, despite the fact that it was situated

on territory usurped from Spain. By so doing, the United Kingdom had sacrificed the civilian traffic through the airfield, which would have brought many advantages to all parties concerned.

50. The Middle East conflict had given clear proof of the need for Spain to establish the prohibited zone. The policies of the United Kingdom and Spain in regard to that conflict had been different, and if it had spread, the possibility of the military involvement of Gibraltar could not have been overlooked. The bombing of Gibraltar during the Second World War had caused many victims in the neighbouring Spanish city of La Linea. So long as a military base outside its control existed in Gibraltar, the Spanish Government must emphasize that it did not agree with the use made of that base.

51. It was common knowledge that the United Kingdom had interrupted the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar and had decided to hold a referendum in the Territory, without previous consultations with Spain as required in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). The referendum was to be held in September 1967, and the United Kingdom had requested Spain and the United Nations to send observers. The questions to be put to the Gibraltarians amounted simply to asking them whether or not they wished to continue their present colonial status. The decision to hold a referendum violated not only the colonial Treaty of Utrecht but also the United Nations resolutions. It had been taken without consulting the Spanish Government, as operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI) required. The Spanish proposal that both countries should consult the Gibraltarians regarding the interests they wished to see safeguarded had met with no reply until 31 July 1967, although a Foreign Office spokesman had stated on 5 July 1967 that the United Kingdom would proceed with the referendum as planned. On 8 July the United Kingdom had indicated that it would not reply to the Spanish proposal; on 31 July, nevertheless, the United Kingdom Government had replied and had attempted to prove that the referendum was not a violation of General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI). The reply was the most curious document yet received by Spain in connexion with the decolonization of Gibraltar. It stated that Gibraltar could not be considered part of Spain until the International Court of Justice so decided and that operative paragraph 6 of the Declaration did not, therefore, apply to the colonial situation in Gibraltar. It was clear, however, that the United Kingdom had taken a step greatly affecting the decolonization of Gibraltar and directed more against Spain than towards helping the Gibraltarians.

52. The referendum was tantamount to a defiance of the United Nations, whose decisions were not only ignored by the United Kingdom but were also subjected to the decisions of the inhabitants of Gibraltar after the referendum.

53. In April 1964, the United Kingdom had granted the British inhabitants a constitution setting up a "government" by promoting the Mayor of Gibraltar to the rank of Chief Minister. His delegation had denounced that stratagem in documents submitted to the Secretary-General. The United Kingdom had thus attempted to create the impression that the principle of self-determination was being applied to Gibraltar, in the hope that the Special Committee would not renew its examination of the question. Although the adoption of resolution 2070 (XX) had marked the failure of

that attempt, the referendum which the United Kingdom was now organizing was nothing more than the culmination of the 1964 manoeuvre. The United Kingdom Government had published an Order in Council on 28 June in connexion with the referendum, in which it was stated that the Order in Council was to be construed as one with the Constitution set out in the Gibraltar Constitution Order of 1964. That was an admission that the referendum was a part of the Constitution of 1964, which had been designed to present the Special Committee with a fait accompli. His delegation was sure that the Committee would not be deceived by such shabby tactics. The so-called United Kingdom policy of decolonization in Gibraltar was merely a series of manoeuvres designed solely to guarantee the permanence of the United Kingdom presence on the Rock. The United Kingdom was attempting to obtain the United Nations approval for its policies; when it failed to do so, it defied the Organization's decisions.

54. The United Kingdom was linking its own interests in the referendum with the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, by forcing the latter to defend the United Kingdom's military interests at the entrance to the Mediterranean, in order to defend a particular way of life which they wished to preserve.

55. Petitioners from Gibraltar had expressed a desire that the military base in Gibraltar should continue, and the United Kingdom was now attempting to have the perpetuation of that base requested by the majority of its subjects on the Rock. It was doing so because it had two specific political objectives in organizing the referendum: first, to defend its military base, and, secondly, to convert its dispute with Spain into a dispute between Spain and the inhabitants of Gibraltar. In an attempt to defend its base, and believing that Spain would agree to permanent United Kingdom sovereignty, the United Kingdom had been fully prepared to abandon the inhabitants. On 23 May 1966 the Foreign Secretary, speaking in the House of Commons, had excluded the inhabitants of Gibraltar from the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, and on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom had proposed to Spain the reduction of the so-called Gibraltar government to a municipality. Such action would have been tantamount to abandoning the stratagems employed in introducing the 1964 Constitution, which the United Kingdom was now trying to revive by means of the referendum. Moreover, when the Special Committee's resolution of November 1966 had completely ignored the inhabitants of Gibraltar, the United Kingdom had not protested but had merely abstained from voting. Yet, when Spain demanded the decolonization of the Rock in accordance with United Nations recommendations, the United Kingdom immediately invoked the interests of the inhabitants. It was natural that it should do so, since the sovereignty over the military base which the United Kingdom was now forcing the inhabitants of Gibraltar to defend was an essential part of its interests. As recently as 25 July 1967, the United Kingdom Minister of Defence had told the House of Commons that his Government intended to maintain its garrison, the airport, the shipyard and other installations in Gibraltar. The United Kingdom's prime military objective could hardly have been better expressed. The second aim of the referendum—that of setting the inhabitants of Gibraltar against Spain—emerged clearly from a statement by the Foreign Secretary to the House of Commons on 23 May 1966 to the effect that the aim of the negotiations with Spain

was not the decolonization of Gibraltar, but rather the institution of civilized relations between Spain and Gibraltar. The United Kingdom was, in fact, employing its ancient tactics of "divide and rule". As in many other parts of the world, the United Kingdom was deliberately creating a complicated and explosive situation on the Rock. Its sole aim was to make sure that the dispute did not appear for what it was, namely, a colonial dispute between an occupying Power and a partially occupied country, but rather as a conflict between Spain and 25,000 peace-loving people who did not wish to be absorbed by Spain.

56. The referendum was based on the idea that the administering Power had obligations only towards colonized people who were in the process of being decolonized. In the eyes of the United Kingdom, the colonized people were the British inhabitants of the Rock, despite the fact that, in 1963, the latter had themselves told the Special Committee that they were not the victims of colonization.

57. The United Kingdom was attempting to persuade the United Nations and Spain that the Gibraltarians, subjects of Her Majesty installed after the occupation, should decide the future of the Territory. It was trying to prove that those subjects were the sole population of Gibraltar and the sole victims of the Gibraltarian colonial situation. According to that argument, Article 73 of the United Nations Charter would take priority over Article 2 (4), to which paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples conformed. The interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, when bound up with the specifically military interests of the United Kingdom, were tainted with colonialism, and it was at that point that they were questioned by Spain.

58. When the Special Committee had considered the question of Gibraltar in 1964, it had been shown that the population established in Gibraltar after the British occupation had been virtually prefabricated by the United Kingdom. It was therefore important to know exactly who would be eligible to vote in the referendum. Of the current population of approximately 24,500, some 4,000 were United Kingdom or Commonwealth nationals, and approximately 2,000 were foreigners, mostly Spanish citizens. Thus, there were approximately 18,500 "true" Gibraltarians, all of whom were British subjects, entitled to vote in the referendum, a "true" Gibraltarian, according to the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance of 1962, being a person registered as a Gibraltarian. However, only persons born in Gibraltar on or before 30 June 1925, together with their wives and legitimate dependants, were eligible for inclusion in the register. The 1925 date was significant, since the first Indian child of parents who had settled in Gibraltar had been born after that date; naturally, the United Kingdom authorities had not wanted that child to enjoy the same privileges as the other British subjects who had come to the Rock to take the place of the expelled Spanish population. Furthermore, the same Ordinance provided that the Governor in Council might order the deletion from the register of any person if he was satisfied that such person had, within ten years of being registered, shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal towards Her Britannic Majesty. Although 13,572 persons had been eligible to vote in the election held in Gibraltar in May 1967, almost one half had abstained, despite the fact that the election had been vital for the future of the Rock. In the cir-

cumstances, the outcome of the referendum was already clear, and no useful purpose would be served by sending either Spanish or United Nations observers merely to prove that a population controlled by London voted as London had decided.

59. The persons inscribed in the register did not, however, constitute the entire population of Gibraltar. Five thousand Spanish workers worked in Gibraltar but were not permitted to live there. Many of them were the descendants of workers who had also worked in Gibraltar. However, they and their families, totalling some 60,000 persons, would not be allowed to participate in the referendum, nor would the descendants of the true Gibraltarians expelled in 1704 living in the town of San Roque or the neighbouring peoples of El Campo. As the Mayor of San Roque had stated in 1964, any decision which ignored the fact that the Campo de Gibraltar was united geographically, demographically and economically with the Rock would be nonsensical. In view of the composition of the electoral roll, the United Kingdom could hardly invoke Article 73 of the Charter while ignoring Article 2 (4) of the Charter and paragraph 6 of the Declaration.

60. Furthermore, many of those inscribed in the register had acquired a "*piéd noir*" mentality and had become agents, rather than victims, of the colonial situation. The Gibraltarian publication *Vox* had intimated that the result of the discussions in the Special Committee on the question of Gibraltar was a foregone conclusion in favour of Spain; it had stated that Gibraltar must never disappear into "alien hands" and had called on the United Kingdom to adopt a "tougher policy". That was hardly the voice of a victimized people wishing to safeguard its interests.

61. In the circumstances, the United Kingdom's sole obligation towards the Gibraltarians was to facilitate free entry into the United Kingdom for those who did not wish Gibraltar to be decolonized—an obligation which the United Kingdom Government did not wish to assume. On the contrary, the United Kingdom immigration laws refused entry to the British subjects it wished to maintain on the Rock. An evasive reply had been given to a question asked in the House of Commons concerning the establishment of an entry quota for Gibraltarians, and the Home Secretary had clearly stated that Gibraltarians would not be allowed to enter the United Kingdom without restriction. Therefore, if the decolonization of Gibraltar took place in accordance with the foreseeable results of the referendum, it would be the first time that the loyal subjects of an occupying Power had decided upon the destiny of a colonial Territory, an arrangement which his Government expected that the United Nations would reject.

62. Fortunately, some Gibraltarians appeared to be more interested in preserving the cultural, social, religious and economic identity of the inhabitants of the Rock than in defending the military interests of the United Kingdom. According to a letter published in the *Gibraltar Post* of 12-13 August, the local Press had refused to publish a petition sent by a Gibraltarian to the United Kingdom Government concerning the untimeliness of the referendum. The tone of the letter gave some indication of the coercion probably exercised not only on the writer but on all Gibraltarians who felt that the best interests of Gibraltar would be served by Spanish-British understanding. The petition, which had been printed by *Vox* in its issue of 15 August 1967, had stated, *inter alia*, that no rational Gibraltarian

should be asked to accept alternative (a) of the referendum, since the proposals did not set out terms of settlement which could be effectively accepted, and that, with regard to alternative (b), the suggestion that a negotiated solution between the United Kingdom and Spain would result in a severance of the links between Gibraltar and Britain and the abolition of democratic institutions in Gibraltar and would absolve Britain of its responsibilities was alarming, since Gibraltar would have to look mostly to the United Kingdom, following a settlement, for guarantees of the settlement and for its continued protection. The petition had gone on to express serious doubts concerning the extent to which the interests of the Gibraltarians were being advanced by the referendum, and had stated that those interests lay in a negotiated solution of existing differences, a solution which appeared to be excluded by the terms of the referendum as it stood. It had concluded by requesting the United Kingdom Government to reconsider its decision to hold a referendum and by further requesting that, if the referendum must be held, it should be with the express approval of the United Nations and with the full participation of Spain, which should bind itself to accept the result. If neither of those alternatives were possible, it requested that the terms of the referendum should be redrafted to meet the objections expressed.

63. The Spanish Government could not in all honesty ignore the terms of that petition, and it was ready to protect the religious, cultural, economic and sociological identity of the inhabitants of Gibraltar from all the consequences of decolonization. With that end in view, the Spanish Government had, in May 1966, proposed to the United Kingdom the signing of an agreement to protect the interests of all the inhabitants of Gibraltar, whether or not they were inscribed in the register. In December 1966, it had reiterated that proposal and explained the need for establishing a statute for the inhabitants of Gibraltar. In July 1967, in its memorandum commenting on the United Kingdom referendum, the Spanish Government had proposed that the two countries should jointly consult the Gibraltarians on the interests they wished protected after the decolonization of Gibraltar. However, none of those proposals had been accepted, because they were based on the fact that Gibraltarian interests were distinct from the British interests involved. It was surely time to separate United Kingdom military and imperialist interests in Gibraltar from the specific interests of the Gibraltarians themselves. After that was done, Gibraltarian interests could be examined by Spain and the United Kingdom under the supervision of the Secretary-General and, once defined and guaranteed, they would fall within the scope of paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Needless to say, the United Kingdom referendum was not the most appropriate method of discovering what those interests were. The Special Committee and the General Assembly should therefore request it to refrain from holding the referendum. There were, after all, many interests involved; some non-Gibraltarian residents might well feel that they would wish to leave Gibraltar after decolonization, and Spain would be willing to examine their cases individually and to provide economic and other assistance if necessary. In addition, many British subjects, whether on the register or not, might not wish to remain in a Territory no longer under British sovereignty, and in that respect the United Kingdom Government had an obligation to allow them free entry to the United Kingdom. The interests of all who wished

to remain on the Rock would be fully protected under the statute proposed by Spain.

64. The representative of Venezuela recalled that his delegation had stated its views on the question of Gibraltar on many occasions in the Special Committee and the General Assembly. It considered that the problem was one to which General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), and particularly paragraph 6 of the Declaration, was applicable. Basing itself on that paragraph, the General Assembly had decided that the most effective way of solving the problem was to invite the parties concerned to negotiate, a decision confirmed in its resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI). If the colonial problem of Gibraltar had not fallen within the scope of paragraph 6, the United Nations itself would have had the responsibility of supervising the Territory's evolution towards self-determination. It was precisely because the problem affected the territorial integrity of a Member State that the General Assembly had asked the parties to negotiate, thus achieving the decolonization of Gibraltar through the recognition by the United Kingdom of Spain's rightful sovereignty over the Territory.

65. History offered many examples of the kind of territorial ambitions which had brought about the situation in Gibraltar. Paragraph 6 of the Declaration provided a safeguard for countries which were unable to defend their rights or had had to acquiesce in the annexation of a part of their territory. When that paragraph had been adopted, the sponsors had made it clear that it meant that the principle of self-determination could never affect the right of any State to territorial integrity. It had also been pointed out that many territorial disputes could not be resolved through the application of the principle of self-determination because an equally important principle—that of the territorial integrity of a country—would then be violated. The referendum which the United Kingdom planned to hold in Gibraltar contravened paragraph 6 of the Declaration, and also the provisions of the Charter guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Member States. The words "the interests of the people of the Territory" in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) were meant to indicate that the solution to the problem of Gibraltar could not be subject to the wishes of the population, because a colonial situation of the kind existing in Gibraltar affected the territorial integrity of a State. The principle of self-determination could not be used to set the seal of approval on the plundering and injustices of the past. The Special Committee would be acting contrary to the interests of the international community if it allowed that principle to be used to perpetuate a colonial situation so gravely affecting Spanish territorial integrity. The decolonizing activities of the United Nations were guided by two basic principles: the defence of the inalienable right of peoples to freedom, self-determination and independence, and defence of the equally essential right of States to claim territories seized from them by force.

66. It was surprising and paradoxical that, while the United Kingdom was planning a referendum in Gibraltar, it was persisting in its refusal to hold one in the six Caribbean Territories, whose peoples' right to self-determination did not affect the territorial integrity of any country. The referendum could never affect the General Assembly's definition of the problem of Gibraltar; its only possible purpose was to grant the population of Gibraltar the right to perpetuate a colonial situation which violated Spain's territorial in-

tegrity. The Spanish Government agreed that the interests of the people of Gibraltar must be adequately safeguarded in the decolonization of the Territory and had proposed the drafting of a special statute guaranteeing those interests.

67. The representative of Iraq said that his delegation had welcomed the Special Committee's decision to give the question of Gibraltar the priority it deserved. The statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain, and a study of the relevant General Assembly resolutions, showed the urgency and importance of that question, and the United Kingdom's request that detailed discussion of it should be postponed until after the referendum had been held could not, therefore, be entertained. If the Special Committee did not examine all pertinent information before the referendum was held, it would be helping the United Kingdom to disregard the role of the United Nations and frustrate the hopes of both colonial and freedom-loving peoples.

68. He agreed with the views expressed by the representative of Spain at the previous meeting in challenging the validity of the referendum, which violated the provisions of the General Assembly's resolutions and was based on a unilateral decision by the administering Power. Spain was right not to recognize the results of the referendum, and the presence of a United Nations observer would be pointless if the referendum was conducted in the manner proposed. Furthermore, the administering Power had not recognized the fact that the relevant resolutions required consultations between it and the Spanish Government. The questions to be put to the voters were unacceptable, in that they neglected the decisions of the United Nations and were tantamount to asking the voters to decide Gibraltar's constitutional future.

69. The administering Power had a duty to do its utmost to liquidate its powers in Gibraltar; to that end, it should be dismantling its military, naval and air base, instead of planning unilaterally to hold a referendum. The base was a real threat to Spanish sovereignty, to international peace and to neighbouring countries. It was easy to understand what the United Kingdom hoped to gain from the referendum, the results of which were a foregone conclusion, since the decision to hold it, the date, the type and number of voters eligible to participate and the issues to be voted upon had all been decided unilaterally without consultation with Spain. All that was needed to make the referendum appear legitimate and authentic was the presence of a United Nations observer, but to send one would be an act of capitulation to the administering Power and an endorsement of its defiance of the United Nations.

70. His Government had placed high hopes in the negotiations between the two countries. The Spanish Government's willingness to implement General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2231 (XXI) in good faith had been made crystal clear in documents and statements to the Committee. Spain's numerous practical suggestions had been met by the evasive stratagems of the administering Power. The referendum was a transparent manoeuvre threatening the whole future of the area. The United Kingdom's insistence on implementing similar illegal plans in other parts of the world, in defiance of United Nations decisions, had not ended in the victories which it had expected. He therefore hoped that the United Kingdom would reconsider its decision and negotiate an agreement with Spain, thus

proving to the world that it genuinely wished to assist in the liberation of all colonial peoples and areas in co-operation with the United Nations.

71. His delegation wished to stress that it considered General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) in its entirety to apply to Gibraltar, the future of which was governed by paragraph 6 of the Declaration.

72. The representative of Chile said the statements made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain showed clearly that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) was not at present being implemented. Since the adoption of that resolution, no progress had been made in the process of decolonization in Gibraltar and negotiations had not been continued. That was a matter for serious concern. Furthermore, the forthcoming referendum did not comply with the terms of United Nations resolutions since the only alternatives offered to the population of Gibraltar were acceptance of the proposals of the Spanish Government as a basis for agreement, or a continuation of the present colonial status under the United Kingdom. In the consensus adopted by the Special Committee on 16 October 1964, the United Kingdom and Spain had been invited to begin talks in order to reach a negotiated solution in conformity with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), giving due account to the opinions expressed by the members of the Committee and bearing in mind the interests of the people of the Territory. In resolution 2070 (XX) the General Assembly had invited the two Governments to begin the talks without delay, and in resolution 2231 (XXI) it had reaffirmed resolution 2070 (XX) and the consensus of October 1964.

73. From the decisions of the General Assembly, it was clear, first, that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable; and secondly, that a certain territorial claim existed and that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) should be taken into account. None of those decisions had called for the speedy recognition of the principle of self-determination in respect of the population of Gibraltar, despite the fact that that was one of the basic principles proclaimed in resolution 1514 (XV). The reason for that was clear: the General Assembly was aware that self-determination could, in the case of Gibraltar, lead to the disruption of national unity and territorial integrity. Furthermore, the inhabitants were not like other peoples subject to the colonial yoke, to whom the United Nations gave the choice of freedom. The General Assembly had therefore called for negotiations between the two parties to the dispute, taking into account the interests of the people, rather than for a referendum to determine their wishes.

74. Regrettably, however, negotiations had not taken place and the United Kingdom had decided unilaterally to hold a referendum which had so many limitations that its validity could hardly be upheld, even if the United Nations had called for it. The United Kingdom had arbitrarily decided who should vote, since the voting register was subject to the will of the Government. For various obscure reasons, some of those who had been born and now resided in the Territory, as well as the Spanish workers who had to leave the Territory before nightfall, would not be allowed to vote. Moreover, of the alternatives offered in the referendum, one was based on preliminary considerations which should have preceded negotiations, and the other amounted to a maintenance of the *status quo*. The referendum was therefore contrary to the letter and spirit

of the General Assembly resolutions and the 1964 consensus of the Special Committee. It was important that negotiations should be held between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain with a view to the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV), taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and his delegation would support any proposal reaffirming that opinion.

75. The representative of Syria said that resolution 2231 (XXI) reaffirmed that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory to which resolution 1514 (XV) was fully applicable, and that the process of decolonization should be expedited. The liquidation of the colonial presence in Gibraltar was essential in the interests of international peace and security, since it was used by the colonial Power mainly as a military base and posed a permanent threat to the independence and integrity of the developing nations of Asia and Africa, as well as to their sovereignty over their natural resources. Secondly, since the Territory belonged historically and geographically to a sovereign State from which it had been severed by conquest, the administering Power and the original owner of the Territory had been called upon to conduct negotiations concerning the process of decolonization, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory.

76. The United Kingdom had clearly been determined in advance to break off the negotiations and to ignore the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI), yet it had claimed that its attitude had been precipitated by Spain's harassment of its Air Force. No United Nations resolution, nor any rule of international law compelled Spain to give up its sovereignty over its air space, especially when foreign air activities were admitted to be of a military nature. The fact that Spain had granted permission for such activities in the past did not mean that it had permanently abandoned its sovereign rights. The United Kingdom's argument was irrelevant and its intimidation of the Spanish population in the vicinity of the frontier, together with its attempts to link Spain's protests to the question of decolonization were no indication of its good faith.

77. The administering Power had then unilaterally announced the holding of a referendum, thus arrogating to itself a power not conferred upon it by the United Nations resolutions concerning Gibraltar, which had called for negotiations rather than a referendum. The people were to be offered a choice of allowing the United Kingdom to retain its present responsibilities, which appeared to indicate a new phase of colonization rather than decolonization, or of passing under Spanish sovereignty. The Territory was, however, fundamentally Spanish and Spanish sovereignty had only been suspended as a result of force; force could not eliminate sovereignty, if international relations were to be guided by the United Nations Charter.

78. The United Kingdom claimed that it cared for the interests of the population, yet it wished to perpetuate its conquest and retain Gibraltar as a military base for the purposes of colonial expansionism and imperialist domination, using the innocent inhabitants as manpower. The Government of Spain, on the other hand, pledged to respect the individual rights of the inhabitants, their freedom of religion, the freedom of their Press, their security of domicile and of employment, as well as to preserve their municipal institutions and to allow them to retain their British nationality.

79. The representative of the United Kingdom had claimed at the previous meeting that the Special Com-

mittee had been aware of the steps it had taken and had referred to the communication from his delegation to the Secretary-General reproduced in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Secretary-General's report (see annex I below). That was not, however, the proper way to consult the Special Committee. The referendum was, in fact, an ultimatum. In essence, the United Kingdom had announced that it had decided to hold a referendum, the results of which were a foregone conclusion because of the way in which it had been organized, and that its decision admitted of no appeal.

80. Perhaps the administering Power could explain why the electoral register of Gibraltar had been closed to all those born after 30 June 1925 and why the Governor in Council had been empowered to delete from the register the names of those who had proved by act or speech to be disloyal to the Queen, so that out of a total population of 25,000 or more, only some 13,000 would be consulted as to the future of the Territory. He wondered whether the Gibraltarians of Pakistani or Indian origin would be eligible to vote, and why the 5,000 Spanish workers who contributed daily to the economy of Gibraltar were denied any right of residence, and consequently of the vote. The representative of the United Kingdom accused Spain of prejudging the referendum, yet he himself had done that when he had asserted that the Gibraltarians did not wish to come under a Spanish régime. If he was sure of that, then the referendum was merely a formula to legalize the unlawful occupation.

81. The United Kingdom representative had stated that his Government was ready to negotiate with Spain after the results of the referendum were known. Since, however, the referendum involved a decision on sovereignty, which was Spain's major interest, there would be nothing left to be negotiated if the results of the referendum were favourable to the United Kingdom, as the United Kingdom representative expected. In the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory, and in the interests of Spain, justice should be done.

82. The representative of the United Kingdom, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it had emerged very clearly from the statements of the Spanish and other representatives that Spain's entire case rested on the central assumption that Spain had a right to Gibraltar. It was argued that, because of that right, the present status of the Territory was an infringement of Spanish territorial integrity and that, as a result, Article 2 (4) of the Charter and operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) were applicable. The great flaw in that argument was that Spain had no right to Gibraltar at all. Only if the United Kingdom were to relinquish sovereignty over Gibraltar to a third party would Spain have any such right. The relinquishment of sovereignty could not arise from the actual holding of a referendum.

83. Spain had no right to Gibraltar: no legal right, no political right, and no right in cultural, economic, social or human terms. The Territory did not belong to Spain and had not belonged to Spain for more than two and a half centuries. Gibraltar was British; before that it had been Spanish and before that Arab territory, as its very name showed. It had been British for longer than it had been Spanish and the United Kingdom's possession of it was not an infringement of Spanish territorial integrity; still less was it a threat to that country's political independence. Spain's whole case rested on a single spurious claim and if it was contended that the situation in Gibraltar conflicted with

Spanish territorial integrity, it was for Spain to explain its refusal to submit the question to the International Court of Justice.

84. A whole edifice of argument had been constructed on the claim that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) was enshrined in resolution 2231 (XXI). It was true that resolution 1514 (XV) was recalled in that resolution, but there was no reference to operative paragraph 6 of it. The consensus of the Special Committee adopted on 16 October 1964 affirmed that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to the Territory. Yet, there was no prejudgement and no singling-out of one facet of the resolution to the total exclusion of others. Indeed, scrupulous care had been taken in framing the resolutions and the 1964 consensus to avoid making prior judgements. If any such judgement had been made, it had been to acknowledge Gibraltar's status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, which was clearly incompatible with Spain's assertion that Gibraltar was part of Spain's natural territory, illegally occupied by the United Kingdom.

85. There was no mystery in the fact that the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance set July 1925 as the deadline for birth in the colony as a qualification for Gibraltarian status. There was no justification for the unworthy insinuation which the representative of Spain had sought to make in that connexion. The Ordinance had been passed only five years earlier and had been intended to revise an Order in Council, much of which had been in force since 1885. When the Ordinance had been enacted, the opportunity had been taken to advance the qualifying date of Gibraltarian status by a convenient period, namely a quarter of a century, from 1900 to 1925. The intended effect had simply been to extend Gibraltarian status to various people, irrespective of their origin, who had settled in Gibraltar and made it their home since 1900 and before 1925.

86. As to the Spanish representative's suggestion that there was something sinister in the Governor's powers under the Ordinance, those powers were precisely parallel to those in the United Kingdom, whereby the Government was enabled to confer British nationality by means of naturalization and even, in certain circumstances, to revoke such naturalization. There was nothing unusual about such a provision. In actual fact, that power under the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance had never so far been used.

87. As to the suggestion that, because the 1967 Order in Council providing for the referendum contained a general reference to the 1964 Gibraltar Constitution, the referendum was in some way part of that Constitution, it was readily apparent that the connexion was solely on a plane of technical and verbal interpretation. The referendum was quite distinct in its provisions from the Constitution.

88. It was very clear from Chapter XI of the Charter and from the relevant United Nations resolutions that it was the interests of the inhabitants of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar which mattered. The Special Committee's consensus on 16 October 1964 referred expressly to the "interests of the population of the Territory". Spanish citizens who worked in Gibraltar by day but slept in Spain at night were not inhabitants of Gibraltar and not, by any normal definition, part of its population. To allow them to vote in the referendum would accord neither with the Charter nor with the relevant United Nations resolutions. The existing regulations provided that persons of both United Kingdom and Spanish origin would be excluded from the

referendum. The omission of the United Kingdom personnel in Gibraltar, civilian and military, helped to account for the gap, to which the Syrian representative had drawn attention, between the figure of 25,000 and the figure of some 13,000 who were expected actually to be eligible to vote. Moreover, the figure of 25,000 included minors and children. He wondered whether those arguing that Spanish daily workers in Gibraltar should be allowed to vote would also advocate that United Kingdom residents there should be allowed to vote in a referendum to decide how the inhabitants of the Territory viewed their interests. Obviously, the proper and right course was to confine the vote to the true inhabitants of Gibraltar, which was precisely what had been done.

89. The allegation that the referendum conflicted with the United Nations resolutions was also unjustified. The mere fact that the resolutions did not specifically require a referendum did not mean that the referendum was contrary to them. Indeed, resolution 2231 (XXI) expressly required Spain and the United Kingdom to take account of the interests of the Gibraltarians. The sole purpose of the referendum was to give such people an opportunity to express their views. His Government had sought to conduct the referendum in co-operation with Spain, but the latter had refused. There would be impartial Commonwealth observers, and the United Kingdom would welcome a United Nations observer. The referendum was neither more nor less than a consultation of the Gibraltarian people, by democratic means, about their own view of their own interests—a matter on which clear and definite evidence was obviously needed if the requirements of the General Assembly resolutions in 1966 were to be met. The United Kingdom, as the acknowledged administering Power of an acknowledged colonial Territory, was holding a formal and democratic consultation of the peoples of that Territory, precisely in the manner so often advocated in the Special Committee.

90. The representative of Spain observed that the fact that Gibraltar still bore the imprint of its Arab past in its name was no justification for the United Kingdom's assertion that it did not belong to Spain. The names of many Spanish cities were the precious inheritance of a glorious Arab past whose treasures Spain preserved with pride. The United Kingdom might equally well suggest the return of Guadalajara or any other Spanish city to the Arabs. The United Kingdom's contention that Gibraltar had belonged to Spain for only two and a half centuries was surprising. The Hispanic nation had begun to take shape at the time of the Greek, Phoenician, Carthaginian and Roman settlements. It had grown accustomed to occupations and when the Arabs had arrived they had been welcomed. They had merged with the Spaniards to create a race which, to the benefit of mankind and history, had settled in Spain and spread to the Americas.

91. The shameful and deplorable history of Gibraltar showed how, in 1704, the United Kingdom had treacherously taken advantage of Spain's weakness to impose the Treaty of Utrecht. Nevertheless, the concessions under that Treaty had been limited by a series of conditions: there was to be no open communication by land and there would be no extension across the Territory; all that had been ceded was a military fortress. No jurisdiction had been involved. Yet, the first act of the United Kingdom on occupying the Terri-

tory had been to seize the Rock and then to expel the Spanish inhabitants. Although another population had started to take shape on the Rock, it had never been sufficient to satisfy the needs of the United Kingdom's military base. From the seventeenth century to the present day, the Spanish population, which still had to go to the Rock to earn its daily bread and to maintain the ties with the town which his country still considered Spanish, had not been allowed to sleep in the city and re-establish its roots on the Rock. In 1830, the United Kingdom had declared Gibraltar a Crown Colony and a gradual invasion of the surrounding area had taken place until, in 1909, the first wall of shame in Europe had been built. A municipal council had been established in 1923 and, in 1946, before Spain had joined the United Nations, the United Kingdom had started to submit information on the Territory, possibly as security for its own rights. If those rights had been truly legal, the United Kingdom would have overlooked Article 73 of the Charter, omitting Gibraltar from the list of Non-Self-Governing Territories in its possession. When Spain had been admitted to the United Nations on 14 December 1955, it had expressed reservations regarding the submission of that information. It should not be forgotten that Gibraltar was not a Territory but a Rock, the mountain of Djebel Tarik, the Rock of Gibraltar.

92. The United Kingdom representative had tried to show that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) contained the principle of the maintenance of territorial integrity. That principle had been clearly defined to mean that no country whatever could be dismembered; it did not apply exclusively to countries which were still colonial possessions. In 1963, when the Special Committee had been debating whether Gibraltar should be included in its agenda, the United Kingdom had immediately requested that the Committee declare itself incompetent to deal with the question on the grounds that it was a matter in which the United Kingdom was sovereign. The United Kingdom had become a victim of its own actions. It had claimed that, by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht, it was sovereign over the Territory whereas, in 1830 it had declared it a Crown Colony and in 1946 had stated that it was a Non-Self-Governing Territory. The aim of that skilful manoeuvring was to ensure a solution favourable to the United Kingdom's own interests.

93. When, in 1963, the Special Committee, through lack of time, referred the question to the General Assembly, the United Kingdom had informed the petitioners from Gibraltar who were then present that the Special Committee had decided not to take a decision on the matter. That had been a further manoeuvre by the United Kingdom to ensure that the people of Gibraltar would not be surprised to learn that the question was to be taken up again in 1964. The Committee had adopted a consensus in 1964 to the effect that a dispute existed, that Gibraltar was a colonial Territory and that it should be decolonized through negotiations, with due regard for the interests of its population. In April 1964, before the consensus had been adopted, the United Kingdom had announced its intention of naming a Chief Minister, who was also the President of the Assembly and the Mayor. The Committee, however, had reached its consensus despite the facts placed before it by the United Kingdom. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 2070 (XX) in 1965 had been followed in 1966 by the adop-

tion of resolution 2231 (XXI). It was curious that the United Kingdom should now contend that it had an absolute right over Gibraltar, that Gibraltar was not part of Spain, and that Spain had no rights whatsoever in that connexion. It was the United Kingdom which decided who should have the right to vote and argued that the provisions of the law in Gibraltar were identical with those in the United Kingdom. But whereas the United Kingdom was not a colony, Gibraltar was and the circumstances were therefore not the same. Chapter 218 of the Gibraltarian Status Ordinance stated that the Governor in Council might, in his absolute discretion, order that the Registrar should delete from the Register the name of any person who had been registered by virtue of an order made by the Governor in Council, if the Governor in Council was satisfied that such a person had, within ten years of being so registered, showed himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards Her Majesty. That showed how the Governor of Gibraltar, subject absolutely to his own discretion, could do whatever he wished with the Register.

94. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said he would like to know whether, as reports in the Press indicated, the Government of Spain would be prepared to settle the question of Gibraltar on the following basis: the United Kingdom would recognize Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar and Spain would agree to the presence of a British base on Gibraltar.

95. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the logical consequence of the Spanish representative's assertion that Gibraltar was not a Territory but a Rock was that General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could not be applicable to it, something which revealed the inherent contradiction in the Spanish position.

96. The proposals to which the Soviet Union representative had referred had been made on 18 May 1966 by the Spanish Government and constituted the first of the two alternatives to be put before the inhabitants of Gibraltar in the referendum.

97. The representative of Spain recalled that Spain had become a Member of the United Nations in 1955, some ten years after the United Kingdom had declared Gibraltar to be a Non-Self-Governing Territory, and had only been able to express its reservations since that time. When, in 1963, the Special Committee had taken up the question of Gibraltar and the United Kingdom representative had invoked the Treaty of Utrecht, the Spanish delegation had merely observed that it wished the reversion clause in that Treaty to be borne in mind, and careful account to be taken of operative paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

98. He reminded the Soviet Union representative that a copy of the Spanish Red Book had been transmitted to the Soviet Union delegation, including the proposals made by Spain, on 18 May 1966.

99. There were two elements at stake in Gibraltar: first, the interest of the inhabitants themselves, and secondly, the military interests of the United Kingdom. His delegation had expressed its surprise in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session that the Soviet Union proposal relating to the elimination of foreign military bases had not referred

to bases in Europe. Spain had then raised the specific case of Gibraltar. It had even stated that it was prepared to have the base in Gibraltar dismantled; since, however, the offer his Government had made to the United Kingdom had been turned down, it was ready to abide by any decision the United Nations might take.

100. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics observed that the Spanish Red Book contained information only up to 1965 and that the proposals he had referred to had been made in 1966.

101. The representative of Spain said that the proposals made by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966 had been described in the 1671st meeting of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

102. The representative of Syria said he was somewhat bewildered by the statement of the United Kingdom representative to the effect that Gibraltar was British and could be nothing else, and that Spain had no right whatsoever to the Territory. If that was so, logically there would be no need for a referendum nor for Spain to be a party to any negotiations. Furthermore, the United Kingdom had stated that it wished to assess where the interests of the population lay; however, United Nations resolutions called not for an assessment of those interests but for their protection; he would like to know whether the United Kingdom, like the Government of Spain, had pledged to respect those interests.

103. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, while his delegation considered that Spain had no rights with regard to Gibraltar, that did not exclude recognition of the fact that there were legitimate Spanish interests in Gibraltar and that within the framework of United Nations resolutions a dispute existed and negotiations were necessary.

#### **D. Action taken by the Special Committee**

104. At its 546th meeting, the Special Committee had before it a draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/L.423). This draft resolution, after recalling the request contained in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) to take into account the interests of the people of the Territory and noting the declared intention of the administering Power to consult the people of the Territory about their view of where their interests lay by means of a referendum to be held on 10 September 1967, as well as noting the statement by the administering Power that in accordance with the requirements of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) it intended to make a full report to the Special Committee following the referendum, would have the Special Committee decide to resume discussion of the question of Gibraltar as soon as the full report of the administering Power was received.

105. At its 546th meeting, the Special Committee also had before it a draft resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424), which *inter alia* would have the Special Committee declare that the holding by the administering Power of the envisaged referendum would contradict the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and would constitute an attempt to ignore the principle of national unity and territorial integrity embodied in paragraph 6 and the final part of paragraph 7 of resolution 1514



(XV). At the 548th meeting, a revised text of the draft resolution was submitted to the Special Committee, finally co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq, Syria and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), the main change being that the second part of the above-mentioned operative paragraph concerning national unity and territorial integrity would appear separately in revised form as a preambular paragraph.

106. The representative of Iraq, introducing the original resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424), said it was not too late for the administering Power to come to grips with the realities of the situation and to realize that no practical benefits were to be expected from the execution of the unilaterally arranged referendum in Gibraltar, for it would be contrary to the very spirit of the United Nations Charter and the relevant United Nations resolutions. The three-Power draft resolution contained all the necessary elements for a peaceful and legally sound solution to the problem, through the process of negotiations and discussions that had been so strongly supported by an impressive majority of the General Assembly a few months before.

107. The representative of Uruguay said that the critical issue before the Special Committee was the referendum, which had been decided upon by the United Kingdom unilaterally and which represented a direct departure from the system of bilateral negotiations called for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

108. Turning first to the implications of the referendum with respect to the Utrecht Treaty, he recalled Professor Oppenheim's dictum that conquest consisted in taking possession of enemy territory by military force in time of war and was only a method of acquiring territory, when the conqueror, after having firmly consolidated the conquest, formally annexed the territory. On the basis of that statement, the 1704 occupation did not give the United Kingdom any rights over Gibraltar because: (a) Spain was not then in a state of war with Great Britain and Gibraltar was not an enemy territory; (b) the occupation of Gibraltar, far from having the character of a military conquest in time of war, was limited to a mere foreign violation of Spanish sovereignty; (c) there had been no intention of conquest on the part of Britain; (d) Admiral Rooke had acted on his own and taken possession of Gibraltar on behalf of Queen Anne; (e) Spain had reacted immediately by claiming its sovereignty over Gibraltar; (f) after having sought to recapture Gibraltar by force in 1704, 1727, 1779 and 1783, Spain had continued to maintain its claim, using the peaceful means of diplomacy and finally resorting to the United Nations; (g) Britain had never executed a formal act of annexation.

109. According to the *British Encyclopedia* of Adam and Charles Black, the conquerors of Gibraltar had defended the interests of Charles, Archduke of Austria, later Charles III, but even though on 24 July 1704 his sovereignty had been proclaimed over the Rock, Admiral Rooke, under his own responsibility, had given the order to raise the British flag. In other words, Great Britain, which was not at war with Spain and which intervened only to defend the rights of the pretender to the Spanish throne, had become the owner of the Rock which had been conquered on behalf of Archduke Charles.

110. Such was the title which appeared nine years later in the Treaty of Utrecht. Spain, vanquished and powerless, felt obliged to sign an instrument whereby it yielded, to the Crown of Great Britain, the city, the castle, the port and the fortress of Gibraltar. Despite that territorial segregation, conditions and limitations were established in the Treaty of Utrecht which seriously undermined the present claims of the United Kingdom. For example, in article X of the Treaty, the King of Spain maintained that the properties had been yielded to Great Britain without any territorial jurisdiction and without any open communication by land with the surrounding country. That article also stated that, if at any time the Crown of Great Britain deemed it appropriate to dispose of the property, the Crown of Spain would have the first choice to redeem the Rock of Gibraltar. Therefore, assuming that the Treaty of Utrecht could be applicable in the light of modern international law, the United Kingdom could not unilaterally change the status of Gibraltar. By doing so, it would be violating article X of the Treaty.

111. However, the Treaty of Utrecht was obsolete and completely at variance with modern international law. It dated back to the time when legal instruments were drafted in an atmosphere of prejudice and rancour and when armed battles were used as legitimate instruments in relations among States. As Professor Oppenheim had stated, the international situation had undergone major change because of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the United Nations Charter. To the extent that those instruments proscribed war, Professor Oppenheim had continued, they also invalidated the conquest of a State which, running counter to its obligations, had recourse to war. Professor Oppenheim's view was confirmed by another Cambridge professor, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, a member of the International Court of Justice, who had stated that, since in contemporary international law war was forbidden, the results of an illegal action, such as a treaty imposed as a result of the violation of international law, could not be valid.

112. It was therefore obvious that title to Gibraltar in favour of the territorial dismemberment of Spain could not be invoked on the basis of the violent conquest of 1704 nor on the basis of a treaty that was intended to render that conquest valid in 1713. There would still be an objection to the referendum in any case, because article X of the Utrecht Treaty gave a preferential option to Spain to recover the territory. Accordingly, any referendum organized by the British who inhabited the territory was devoid of legal or practical value.

113. Turning next to the implications of the referendum with respect to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), he observed that the latter laid down two criteria, based on different principles but having the same purpose of promoting and facilitating the freedom and independence of colonial countries and peoples. Although the principle of self-determination was the primary basis for the liberation of peoples, there were certain peculiar colonial situations, such as those of Gibraltar and the Malvinas Islands, to which the criterion of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a State must be applied. In some such cases, a referendum might serve to perpetuate, instead of abolishing, the rule of colonial Powers over territory belonging to other countries. Uruguay, whose devotion to law and justice was unquestionable, had taken that position at the time of the adoption of General Assembly resolu-

tion 1514 (XV) and had therefore supported paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Even if the meaning of that paragraph had not been clear—which was not the case—the records of past debates would show that the intention of its sponsors and supporters had been to avoid the automatic and indiscriminate application of the principle to self-determination, which in exceptional cases could violate the principle of the territorial integrity of States recognized in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. The importance of paragraph 6 of the Declaration had been categorically reiterated by the General Assembly one year later, in its resolution 1654 (XVI), in which the Assembly had expressed deep concern that acts aimed at the partial or total disruption of national unity and territorial integrity were still being carried out in certain countries in the process of decolonization. The Special Committee itself had been set up under the same resolution, one of the main reasons for its establishment being the need to defend national unity and territorial integrity in the course of decolonization.

114. Much more could be said concerning the implications of the referendum with respect to the provisions of the Charter and the well-established principles of contemporary international law. The vital point, however, was that the proposed referendum would constitute a violation of the principle of non-intervention in a domestic matter affecting the jurisdiction of Spain. Since the question of Gibraltar had been submitted to bilateral negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, any unilateral act by either party which could affect the political future of the territory in dispute was a departure from the agreed procedure and an unlawful intervention in the domestic affairs of the other country. Paragraph 7 of the Declaration set out in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) made that point clear and left no room for ambiguous interpretation. Consequently, the referendum could not be regarded as a valid instrument of decolonization.

115. Turning lastly to the implications of the referendum with respect to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), he noted that a reading of that resolution could lead to only one conclusion, namely, that the General Assembly wished Gibraltar to be decolonized through bilateral negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory. It was significant that the resolution in question, like resolution 2070 (XX), of which it was basically a reiteration, made no specific mention of the principle of self-determination and referred to the interests, rather than the will or the wishes, of the people, thus departing from the terminology normally used, the obvious purpose being to place the problem within the context of paragraph 6 of the Declaration. Thus, in the case of Gibraltar—paradoxical as it might appear—decolonization was intended to benefit, not the British inhabitants of the Rock, but the Territory itself or, in other words, the parcel of land of which Spain had been deprived in violation of its national unity and territorial integrity. The referendum was therefore contrary to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), which provided the only practical means of a settlement through a bilateral understanding that would safeguard the interests of the people, without, however, confusing those interests with the political motive of perpetuating colonialism. That resolution had the unanimous support of the peoples of Latin America, as was evidenced by the

Declaration adopted at the Second Plenary Session of the Latin American Parliament in May 1967.

116. His delegation had often expressed its appreciation of the United Kingdom's contribution to decolonization, and it earnestly hoped to hear at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly that the last vestige of colonialism in Europe had been eliminated by agreement between the United Kingdom and Spain. Gibraltar might be insignificant in itself, but it constituted the southernmost geographical boundary of Spain, and the presence of an alien Power on the Rock was a scar on Spain's territorial integrity and an insult to its sovereign dignity as a State. The Treaty of Utrecht was no longer valid under contemporary international law, and his delegation was confident that the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) would lead to the return of Gibraltar to Spain. Gibraltar could not escape decolonization, and the two Governments would surely be able to agree on provisions to protect all the interests of the inhabitants.

117. His delegation would not vote for any draft resolution condemning or censuring the United Kingdom, since to do so would not be constructive and would jeopardize the continuation of the bilateral negotiations.

118. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that the position with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) was still unclear. The statement made by the administering Power at the beginning of the discussion of Gibraltar (see paras. 20-37 above) had not provided any information which would help the Committee to formulate constructive recommendations.

119. In approaching the colonial question of Gibraltar, his delegation was guided mainly by General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), together with other relevant resolutions of the Assembly. Particular importance should be given to the interests of the people, including their long-term interests. The Committee must ensure that the colonial Power's activities did not jeopardize the future of the Territory and its residents. Such considerations had caused his delegation to support General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), which, in operative paragraph 2, called upon the two parties to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people, and asked the administering Power to expedite the decolonization of Gibraltar in consultation with the Government of Spain. The terms of that paragraph had clearly not been complied with. It was distressing that recriminations should have been given prominence in the debate, and that the United Kingdom representative had placed so much stress on the alleged establishment of a prohibited air zone in the vicinity of Gibraltar. The question of Spanish air space was solely within the jurisdiction of the Spanish Government, and such matters were in any case not within the purview of the Committee, which was concerned with the decolonization of Gibraltar.

120. Resolution 2231 (XXI) called for consultation between the Governments of Spain and the United Kingdom, and the organization by the colonial Power of a referendum in Gibraltar would not further the implementation of that resolution. His delegation had always supported the principle of the consultation of colonial peoples; however, when a referendum was held, it was assumed that the object was to determine the interests of the people—both their immediate and their long-term interests. It was clear that the holding

of the referendum further jeopardized the possibilities of consultations between the United Kingdom and Spain which might lead to the decolonization of Gibraltar.

121. Secondly, all the indigenous inhabitants of the Territory should participate in any referendum. In the present case, as a result of the activities of the colonial Power, the indigenous population had been largely excluded. In any case, since the colonial Power had acted unilaterally, it was impossible to determine who would participate in the referendum and how large a part of the population would be excluded. The colonial Power had retained the right to exclude any individual who, in the view of the colonial authorities, might not support their interests.

122. Thirdly, the aim of a referendum must be decolonization. It was distressing to note that part of the referendum under discussion was aimed at perpetuating the colonial status of Gibraltar.

123. He had dwelt on the question of the referendum because it was essential for the Committee to ensure that the referendum procedure, which was one of the means by which decolonization could be effected, was not abused. The United Kingdom representative had said that the type of colonization best suited to Gibraltar could not be prejudged. That might be true, but the General Assembly had called upon the colonial Power to enter into consultations with the Spanish Government to ensure not only decolonization but also the type of decolonization and the process followed. The administering Power, utilizing a means of decolonization, had in fact jeopardized the process of the decolonization of Gibraltar. Thus the referendum would defeat the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). He therefore agreed with those who called for the resumption of negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain to ensure the full implementation of the General Assembly resolutions, taking into account the interests of the people as a whole.

124. Another aspect of the problem was the fact that Gibraltar was a military stronghold of the United Kingdom. His delegation had always opposed the establishment of military bases in colonial territories. The question arose whether a free referendum could be held under such conditions; if the United Kingdom had been interested in the decolonization of Gibraltar, a first step would surely be the removal of the military base. In view of some of the powers that had been vested in the Governor, one could not but be apprehensive about the role that the presence of the base would play in the referendum.

125. The United Kingdom representative had tried to give the impression that the United Kingdom was concerned with the interests of the people. In fact, the administering Power was always interested in perpetuating its own interests. Thus the United Kingdom Government, because it suited its interests, had contended for many years that Southern Rhodesia enjoyed internal self-government when in fact it was only the small white minority which exercised power. The Committee should not be deceived by claims that the United Kingdom was seeking to ascertain the interests of the population. In the case of the Caribbean islands, the wishes of the people had not been ascertained before the proposed new arrangements came into effect, and those arrangements had now proved to be a failure. The appropriate lessons should be learnt from the

troubles in the Caribbean area and in Southern Rhodesia. He urged the United Kingdom to consider the wisdom of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and realize that the proposed referendum would not lead to the complete solution of the problem.

126. The administering Power had invited the United Nations to send an observer to Gibraltar. That would be inconsistent with the expressed views of the Committee, since it had insisted that the United Nations should be involved in a positive way with regard to the remaining colonies and not just as a passive observer of activities with which it disagreed. It would therefore have been wrong for the Secretary-General to consent to the United Kingdom's request. In the case of other Territories, the administering Power had refused to allow visiting missions. The United Kingdom Government could not use the United Nations Secretariat to obtain approval for its actions from the United Nations.

127. It would undoubtedly be in the interests of the Committee if the terms of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) were to be faithfully implemented. He appealed to the United Kingdom to co-operate with the United Nations in deed and not merely in words.

128. The representative of Australia said that his delegation had been disappointed that the bilateral negotiations which were to have continued following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had come to nothing. Having listened to the statements of the representatives of the United Kingdom and Spain, he understood the Spanish case to be that Spain was the legitimate sovereign Power with respect to Gibraltar and responsible for its inhabitants. It was his understanding that, if Spain were to enjoy the full exercise of that sovereignty, it would respect the individual rights of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, their freedom of religion, the freedom of their Press, and their security of domicile and employment. The essence of the Spanish case was the assertion of sovereignty. The United Kingdom, for its part, maintained that it was the sovereign Power, and that it had primary responsibility for the future of the people of Gibraltar, although Spain had an interest in the situation by virtue of the Treaty of Utrecht.

129. The Australian view was that the United Kingdom exercised sovereignty over Gibraltar both *de jure* and *de facto*. Should Spain obtain a ruling from the International Court of Justice to the effect that Spain was the sovereign Power, that would naturally affect Australia's position. It must be borne in mind that the United Kingdom was prepared to submit the question of sovereignty to the International Court and that the Spanish Government had declined to accept that procedure.

130. Other Governments represented in the Committee took the view that Spain was the sovereign Power. That naturally led them to different conclusions from those of his delegation.

131. Australia did not consider that the Committee was competent to take decisions on questions of sovereignty, and would be unwise to attempt to assume such competence. The United Nations body competent to consider such disputes was the International Court.

132. There had been a tendency in the Committee to misinterpret General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). In the discussions in the Fourth Committee at the General Assembly's twenty-first session, a deadlock

had been avoided when Sierra Leone had submitted an amendment introducing the words "taking into account the interests of the people of the territory" in the draft resolution. That amendment had rendered the resolution acceptable to the Australian and other delegations.

133. Furthermore, the representative of Ceylon in the Fourth Committee had expressed some surprise that the sponsors of the draft resolution had forgotten to refer to the interests of the people and had been obliged to suspend the meeting to decide whether there should be such a reference. That representative had also reminded the Committee that every people had the right to self-determination and the right to decide their own future. Those views were still as relevant as they had been the previous November. The Fourth Committee's debate had demonstrated the importance which the General Assembly as a whole attached to the right of Gibraltarians to decide their own future. Resolution 2231 (XXI), and Spain's proposal that it should negotiate a statute with the United Kingdom, had obliged the latter to consult the people of Gibraltar regarding their future. The United Kingdom's decision to hold a referendum was entirely consistent with the General Assembly resolution and a transfer of sovereignty to Spain without the prior agreement of the people would have been a repudiation of it.

134. The representative of Spain had suggested that the people of Gibraltar were a "prefabricated population", but, whatever their origins, they did exist as a separate society and the General Assembly had acknowledged that by insisting that their interests should be properly safeguarded in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain. The Gibraltarians were neither Spaniards nor Englishmen but a people with its own customs, institutions and history. It existed as truly and fully as the population of Singapore, which had developed only after 1819. The Gibraltarians were as entitled to the right of self-determination as other similar groups elsewhere and that had been the view of the General Assembly in adopting resolution 2231 (XXI).

135. An important Spanish argument had been that the 5,000 Spanish workers formerly employed in Gibraltar had been denied voting rights in that colony. If that argument were accepted it could be taken to apply to other migratory workers employed temporarily in countries other than their own. As to the Spanish suggestion that the descendants of the residents of San Roque, expelled from Gibraltar in 1704, should be entitled to vote in the referendum, it was extremely difficult to understand how it could be implemented or justified.

136. Much had been said about Gibraltar's use as a military base, and some rather unfounded allegations had been made, but Gibraltar's contribution to the successful prosecution of the Second World War was noteworthy in that connexion. The allied Powers, later the United Nations, had been very thankful to have Gibraltar as a base for the maintenance of the free system of government which had produced the United Nations.

137. The representative of Spain, and those supporting his views, had claimed that the United Kingdom's retention of Gibraltar was a partial or total disruption of Spanish national unity and territorial integrity and, as such, incompatible with the Charter. Yet, operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) had been intended

to apply, not to historical territorial claims between sovereign Member States but to the disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of Non-Self-Governing Territories. If the Spanish interpretation of that operative paragraph were accepted, it would follow that every historic claim of one sovereign State against another would be a matter to be discussed by the Committee. It would mean that nearly every European country could lay claim to some part of another European country's territory on historic grounds. The dangers of such a doctrine were obvious.

138. Operative paragraph 2 of resolution 1514 (XV), concerning the right of all peoples to self-determination, was more directly related to the question before the Committee. By holding a referendum, the United Kingdom would be allowing the Gibraltarians to exercise that right. It had been argued that the absence of any specific reference to self-determination for the Gibraltarians in the relevant General Assembly resolutions implied that the Assembly had concurred with the Spanish contention that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable to the Gibraltar situation. The Assembly had, however, recognized that the United Kingdom was the colonial Power vis-à-vis the people of Gibraltar and not vis-à-vis the people of Spain. Moreover, as a colonial Power the United Kingdom had responsibilities under Chapter XI of the Charter towards the people of Gibraltar which, while they might not be specified in every resolution, were nevertheless continuing responsibilities.

139. His delegation had welcomed the United Kingdom's arrangements for the presence of impartial Commonwealth representatives during the referendum and hoped that the Secretary-General would comply with the request that a United Nations observer should also be present.

140. His Government's view was that sovereignty over Gibraltar, both *de facto* and *de jure*, lay with the United Kingdom, which was therefore the colonial Power and responsible for the future of the people of the Territory. As the colonial Power, the United Kingdom was seeking to ascertain the wishes of the people by means of a referendum, while simultaneously seeking to ensure that its bilateral treaty obligations to Spain were respected. The United Kingdom's actions were quite consistent with the letter and spirit of resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2231 (XXI) and the referendum was a step forward in the process of decolonization. For those reasons, his delegation urged the Committee to await the results of the referendum before taking further action.

141. The representative of Tunisia said that the problem of Gibraltar, while undeniably colonial in nature, was exceptional in that two administering Powers were involved in the dispute. The United Kingdom had long recognized the Special Committee's competence to attempt to find an appropriate solution.

142. There were two essential provisions in operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI); first, the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory must be taken into account in the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain and, secondly, the United Kingdom must expedite the process of decolonization in consultation with the Government of Spain. The fact that Spain was named as the partner of the administering Power was of particular importance and went beyond the mere fact that Spain had a common frontier with

the Territory. It was not for the Special Committee to prove that Gibraltar belonged to Spain; the statements by the representative of Spain and the documents provided by that Government had given sufficient proof of that. The Committee was all too familiar with colonial claims to territories conquered by force and with the various political and legal arguments advanced in attempts to justify them.

143. While his delegation did not wish to level any accusations, the question arose as to why the negotiations indicated in resolution 2231 (XXI) had not been concluded. It was significant that Spain's adoption of a decree establishing a prohibited air zone in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar was in absolute conformity with its right of sovereignty. His delegation could not consider that decree as having jeopardized the success of the negotiations which were to have begun on 18 April 1967. The International Civil Aviation Organization had taken note of the matter but had taken no measures which could be construed as censure of Spain. The decree had, however, led to the disruption of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom and the latter had subsequently decided to hold a referendum in Gibraltar. That decision had particularly surprised his delegation since, when the United Nations had requested the United Kingdom to hold referendums on other occasions, it had refused to do so, alleging that the peoples of the Territories for which it was responsible had already determined their wishes through elected representatives. Furthermore, whereas the United Kingdom had requested the United Nations to send an observer to Gibraltar for the referendum, whenever the Special Committee had urgently requested the United Kingdom to allow visiting missions to go to Territories under its control, it had always met with a categorical refusal. His delegation did not believe that the referendum could provide a solution. It was apparently intended to enable United Kingdom citizens in Gibraltar to determine their future status and, consequently, could not be considered as fulfilling the requirements of resolution 1514 (XV). The referendum could in no way prejudice the final solution of the problem and the Committee could not take it upon itself to recognize it.

144. There were certain prerequisites for any solution to the problem of Gibraltar. First, such a solution must respect resolution 1514 (XV), particularly operative paragraph 6 of it; secondly, it must respect resolution 2231 (XXI) and especially the provision that Spain and the United Kingdom should continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Territory. Spain's assurances that those interests would be safeguarded were satisfactory and the process of decolonization should not be further delayed. The existence of a colonial enclave in an independent country was anachronistic and even dangerous, particularly when it was used for military purposes.

145. The representative of Spain observed that, whereas the Australian representative had stated that the question of Gibraltar was a dispute over sovereignty, the United Kingdom itself had conceded that the Special Committee was competent to examine the problem—a colonial problem with Spain as the sole victim.

146. As to the question of the interests of the people of Gibraltar which had arisen during the Fourth Committee's debate the previous year, he himself had pointed out at the time that it had been Spain which had first undertaken to safeguard those interests. It

was to those "interests" that resolution 2231 (XXI) had referred.

147. Although the Australian representative had raised the question of whether the Spanish population of Gibraltar should participate in the referendum, it appeared that he had not read the Spanish statement in that connexion with any care. As that statement pointed out, from the time when the Spanish population had moved to San Roque on its expulsion from Gibraltar and had later begun to work in Gibraltar, it had never been allowed to spend the night in the Territory. The Australian representative could readily imagine what would have happened had his own ancestors been forbidden to spend the night in Australia. The Spanish population lived outside Gibraltar and was forced to leave the city at night—a situation which had lasted for 260 years.

148. As to the references to the use of Gibraltar as a military base during the Second World War, the Australian representative must concede that nobody could know what would have happened had Spain decided to neutralize Gibraltar and prevent the establishment of a military base in the Territory. That base had been built, not in Gibraltar but on the isthmus which was under Spanish sovereignty. If the Australian representative was so anxious to defend the population of Gibraltar, his Government might well ask the United Kingdom to dismantle the military base there. It would then remain to be seen how the civilian workers at the military base could continue to exist.

149. The representative of the United Kingdom, introducing his delegation's draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423), said that he had no wish to be provocative or dogmatic. He was seeking an agreed way forward. He understood the concern of the members of the Committee but wished to make it clear that he was not asking them to reach a conclusion nor even to approve the proposals explained by his delegation. His immediate objective was a simple and limited one—namely, that no decision should be taken until the voice of the people of Gibraltar had been heard. Indeed, it would be contrary to the most elementary principles of justice and to the fundamental principles of the Charter to deny the people concerned the right to speak in their own cause. He could not conceive that any United Nations body could take a decision that conflicted with that principle. The Special Committee, more than any other, had the duty to take account of the wishes of the peoples it was concerned with and not deliberately to refuse them an opportunity to be heard.

150. The issue was not a legal one and the United Kingdom Government had offered to submit any legal issues to judicial decision. There was no question of any action which would contravene the Treaty of Utrecht; nor was there any question of power politics or ideologies. He simply asked the Committee not to prejudice the question until the views of the people had been fairly given and heard.

151. He invited the Committee to reflect on the attitude adopted by the two Governments directly concerned. He felt that in the speeches made so far justice had not always been done to the policies pursued by the United Kingdom. There had been no welcome in the Committee for the United Kingdom's willingness to submit the legal questions to international judicial decision and to abide by the result. The United King-

dom Government had even declared its readiness to enter into negotiations with the Spanish Government with a view to Gibraltar's becoming a part of Spain, should the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of that solution. That new and very important commitment did not seem to have been accorded the recognition it deserved. The United Kingdom Government had gone even further in stating—and that was surely an act without precedent—that if the people of Gibraltar opted by a free and democratic vote to retain their links with the United Kingdom, they would be free at any time to change their minds and vote for joining Spain. However, he had not heard in the Committee any acknowledgement of the importance of that new pledge.

152. As to the referendum, the United Kingdom had invited the Spanish Government to participate in the formulation of the first alternative, to explain its own proposals direct to the people of Gibraltar and to send an observer—not the acts of a Government antagonistic to Spain. Unfortunately, the Spanish Government had not responded in kind.

153. There were close and long-standing ties between the British people and the people of Gibraltar, and public opinion in Britain on the question of Gibraltar was intense. However, the problem was not being approached in a spirit of narrow nationalism, and all political parties in Britain were agreed that the people of Gibraltar had the right freely to express their views and to have those views taken into account. Decolonization could never mean the incorporation of Gibraltar in Spain against the inhabitants' wishes. Their rights were not to be bartered away and a denial of those rights would be intolerable. The British people were no more prepared to see the Gibraltarians' liberties spurned than their own. The British people were determined to defend the liberties of the people of Gibraltar, including their liberty to choose the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain. The first necessity was that the people should be heard. When the choice had been made and the facts were thus before the United Nations, then whatever the result of the referendum there would be a wide range of matters for negotiation between Spain and the United Kingdom.

154. It had been said that the United Kingdom Government had not favoured the system of referendum elsewhere. That was quite true. In keeping with its parliamentary tradition, the United Kingdom preferred the method of adult suffrage, free elections and negotiation with the leaders so elected. That was good enough for the British people themselves, although others might find democratic parliamentary procedures strange. However, the case of Gibraltar was unique, and the wish of the people must be openly and freely expressed in the clear light of world publicity. The United Kingdom would have liked Spain and the United Nations to send observers; however, failing that, the presence of observers from Commonwealth countries would provide the necessary guarantees of the fair and proper conduct of the referendum to be held on 10 September.

155. While the United Kingdom Government had been very ready to report, to explain and to co-operate with the Committee and with the Spanish Government, it could not share or shirk its responsibility as the administering Power, and surely no one could dispute the United Kingdom's right to consult the

people of a territory under its administration on a matter of fundamental importance to their future.

156. The attitude of the Spanish Government, on the other hand, had been strangely and misguidedly negative. It had neither welcomed the offers of the United Kingdom Government nor taken the opportunity to put its case to the people of Gibraltar. Nor had Spain sought by generosity and understanding to win over the Gibraltarians. Instead it had deliberately sought to alienate them and to antagonize the United Kingdom. It seemed determined not to allow negotiation except under duress. Surprisingly enough, its policy seemed to be designed to alienate the sympathies of the people of Gibraltar. It was unfortunate that the Spanish Government should attempt to achieve its aims by such methods and pressure and coercion, which were out of place in the modern world, and especially unpopular at the United Nations.

157. In conclusion, he invited the Special Committee to remember the resolutions which nearly all had supported; not to deny the importance of the people's interests; and to reserve judgement until the voice of the people had been heard. Only after the administering Power had made its full report would the Committee be in a position to deliver a considered opinion. A vote for the resolution presented by the United Kingdom would not be a vote for Spain or the United Kingdom or even for the referendum, for which his Government took full responsibility. It would be a vote for reserving judgement until the missing factor was available—namely, the voice of the people concerned. It would be astonishing if the fundamental right of the people to be heard before a decision was taken were to be denied at the United Nations and by the Special Committee.

158. The representative of Spain, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he wished to make clear some particulars of his Government's policy. His Government was in no way opposed to letting the people of Gibraltar express their views. Four years previously, the Committee had heard some petitioners who had been officials of the United Kingdom administration, subject to the authority of the Governor and employed at the military bases which had been established in the Territory after its population had been expelled.

159. He was surprised that the United Kingdom representative should again refer to the proposal to bring the matter before the International Court of Justice. The truth was that the United Kingdom Government was trying to find loop-holes, for decolonization questions were not matters to be submitted to the International Court of Justice.

160. He read out an article, published in the United Kingdom Press on 25 August, which mentioned movements of United Kingdom air force and naval units to Gibraltar; the presence of those troops at the time of the referendum gave reason to wonder whether the people would be able to express their wishes freely.

161. He also read out a cable he had received from his Government stating that it had denied a Norwegian military aircraft permission to fly over Spain on its way to Gibraltar, where it was to have participated in NATO military manoeuvres on 9 September. His Government had declared that it did not allow overflights of its territory by NATO aircraft because Spain was not a member of NATO, which wished to make

use of military bases, such as Gibraltar, situated in usurped Spanish territory.

162. With regard to the referendum, he wondered what discretionary power the Governor had to manipulate the electoral rolls. In the first place, enrolment was subject to a cut-off on the date of birth, which had been set at 30 June 1925; in the second place, the Governor could decide to remove from the rolls the name of any person who had been disloyal to the Crown. Perhaps the United Kingdom had similar laws, but the United Kingdom was not the colony of anyone, whereas Gibraltar was a colonial Territory.

163. It was surprising to find that during the Second World War those loyal subjects of the British Crown had had to be completely evacuated from Gibraltar, while 13,000 Spanish workers had continued to go there to work and help the British. Apparently the United Kingdom Government had not considered it safe to allow those subjects to remain at their post when the Territory of Gibraltar was under attack. The use of the Territory for military purposes had resulted in the bombing of its railways, and there had been many victims.

164. The representative of Mali noted that the negotiations which had been held between the administering Power and Spain in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) had not yielded the expected results. His delegation regretted that the Special Committee had decided to apply the method of consensus in settling the Gibraltar problem; that was tantamount to referring the question back to the Powers concerned, which were, by definition, opposed to each other. By resorting to that method, the Committee, which should take jurisdiction in all decolonization questions—and the level of development of the Powers concerned did not change in any way the colonial nature of the case—seemed to be trying to relinquish its responsibilities under resolution 1514 (XV).

165. As to the referendum which the United Kingdom was proposing to hold in Gibraltar, his delegation doubted the usefulness of such a consultation, the results of which were quite predictable. The Special Committee should ask the administering Power to refrain at present from any new initiative which was not covered by resolution 2231 (XXI). If the parties could not reach agreement, consideration should be given to finding means by which the United Nations could facilitate the search for a negotiated solution.

166. He was surprised that the administering Power should have expressed willingness to invite United Nations observers to be present at the consultation of 10 September in Gibraltar, whereas the United Kingdom had recently rejected the dispatch of United Nations observers to another Territory under its administration. There was a blatant contradiction in the attitude of the United Kingdom Government; respect for the will of the people, which was being flaunted in Gibraltar, was scarcely consistent with the policy pursued in Southern Rhodesia, where the people of Zimbabwe had never had the opportunity freely to express their views on their future and where the democratic rights of the indigenous inhabitants were systematically trampled on. In reality, the United Kingdom was trying to maintain its domination over Gibraltar, which might be of negligible importance in the perspective of global thermo-nuclear strategy but which consti-

tuted an essential link in a chain of military bases directed against young developing nations.

167. The draft resolution sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay was, in his delegation's view, a minimum text. The unilateral breaking off of the negotiations recommended in resolution 2231 (XXI) was a fait accompli which the Committee could not accept. In any event, he attached particular importance to operative paragraph 2 of the proposed text, which he read out, and to operative paragraph 4. He believed, as did the sponsors of the draft resolution, that some United Nations machinery should be set up to facilitate the success of further negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom.

168. The representative of Syria supported the draft resolution sponsored by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay. The decolonization process in Gibraltar was at a standstill because the administering Power had failed to respect the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolution 2231 (XXI), which had been adopted without opposition. The United Kingdom would do better to comply with those resolutions instead of resorting to stratagems; it was in that spirit that the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom representative (A/AC.109/L.423) should be considered.

169. His delegation condemned the referendum which the United Kingdom was preparing to hold in Gibraltar. It did not, of course, oppose the idea of consulting the people; however, the proposed referendum was merely a trick designed to evade the real question, that of sovereignty.

170. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stressed the military aspect of the question of Gibraltar. The base and the military installations in the Territory were important parts of the strategic apparatus of the United Kingdom and its NATO allies. Moreover, the military aspects of the problem had been the central point of the discussions held between the United Kingdom and Spain, as was clear from the Secretary-General's report (see annex I below). No solution that served the interests of the peoples involved—either the inhabitants of the Territory or the peoples of the United Kingdom and Spain—could be reached so long as the Territory remained a military stronghold of imperialism, and the bastion for the suppression of the national liberation movement of the peoples of the Near East, Asia and Africa.

171. The question of eliminating the Gibraltar military base had never been raised by the parties during their negotiations concerning the future of the Territory. On 18 May 1966 Spain had expressed readiness to accept the presence at Gibraltar of the United Kingdom base, the status of which would be the subject of a special agreement, and to participate "enthusiastically" in the use of the base, in co-operation with the United Kingdom or with "the defence organization of the free world". That position of the Spanish Government obviously bore no relation to the interests of the Spanish people and the other peoples of the Mediterranean region, whose security would be seriously threatened by the presence of stockpiles of NATO rockets and atomic bombs in the Territory. The nuclear weapons which the NATO countries were preparing to install in the region would be used to support various forms of provocation and aggression against the peoples of Africa and the Middle East and the other peoples

as well. The fact that Gibraltar was torn away from Spain and converted into a British colony and then into a military base, which had been for centuries used for carrying out the colonial policy of the British ruling classes, did not raise any doubts in the Committee. But the deal which the Franco régime was proposing to make with the United Kingdom on the question of Gibraltar did not remove the possibilities of using the Gibraltar base for continuation of the same colonialist and imperialist policy, only now in interest of "the defence organization of free world". The representative of the United Kingdom claimed that the forthcoming referendum in Gibraltar was aimed at enabling the people of the Territory to exercise its right to self-determination. However, that statement was nothing else but manoeuvre. If the British Government cared so much about the self-determination of the people of Gibraltar, why did it withhold that right from the people of Zimbabwe? Moreover, there were no doubts about the validity of a referendum held under conditions of military occupation; the result of the proposed referendum would certainly be what the colonial Power wanted. The real purpose of the referendum was to maintain colonial rule over the Territory in one form or another, a fact which the United Kingdom representative did not trouble to conceal, and thus to preserve its military base in Gibraltar. The problem of decolonizing Gibraltar could not be separated from that of dismantling the military base and demilitarizing the area. Any effective measure to end the colonial status of the Territory implied first of all the liquidation of the base and the air and naval military installations now situated there.

172. The representative of Spain, speaking in exercise of the right of reply, pointed out that the Spanish Government's statements and proposals mentioned by the representative of the Soviet Union were no longer valid. The proposals of 18 May 1966, referred to by the Soviet representative, had been superseded by other proposals which he himself had formulated on 14 December 1966 in the Fourth Committee, at its 1671th meeting.

173. The new Spanish proposals made no mention of any joint use of the Gibraltar base by Spain and the United Kingdom. Indeed the Spanish Government had rejected the United Kingdom proposal of 12 July 1966 concerning joint use of the base. Similarly, on 17 June, as was indicated in the Secretary-General's report, the Spanish Government had formally invited the United Kingdom Government to renounce all military use of the airfield situated on the isthmus connecting Gibraltar with the rest of the peninsula.

174. Spain had asked the United Kingdom Government to draw a clear distinction between its military interests and the interests of the people of the Territory. Spain hoped that sovereignty over Gibraltar would be returned to it, but it understood the concern of the United Kingdom Government, which wanted to be able to use the military base during the transition period that would precede the restoration of Spanish sovereignty over the Territory. For its part, Spain held that it had complete freedom to make whatever proposals it deemed appropriate, so long as the United Nations had not adopted any resolution on the subject. He wished to assure the Soviet representative, however, that the granting of a military base to the United Kingdom had not been envisaged in the Spanish proposals of 14 December. Lastly, he stated that Spain

would be prepared to support any proposal that might be submitted by the Soviet or any other delegation for the dismantling of the Gibraltar military base.

175. The representative of the United Kingdom, exercising the right of reply, said he wished to deal with the four points raised during the meeting. Naval manoeuvres took place constantly in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, as everyone knew; they included operations not only by United Kingdom vessels but also by NATO vessels and by vessels of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. There was nothing exceptional about those activities, and the fact that a change of mine-sweeping personnel, arranged long before, was to take place at about the same time as the referendum was quite unconnected with the matter under discussion.

176. As to the question of the register for the referendum, the United Kingdom believed that the genuine inhabitants of Gibraltar, as distinct from those who were not permanent residents, should have the right to vote and so to express their views. The voting regulations were designed to bring this about. If there was any doubt about the fairness of the referendum, the Spanish Government and the United Nations were invited to send observers. In any case, the presence of Commonwealth observers should constitute a sufficient guarantee.

177. With respect to permission for Spanish workers to stay and spend the night in Gibraltar, there were certain restrictions regarding outside residents, as the restricted size and limited accommodation of Gibraltar required, but the necessary permission to enable Spanish workers to live and sleep in Gibraltar had been readily given for years. The number of such applications granted, which had for some time been about 1,500 a year, had begun to decrease only when the Spanish Government had created difficulties and imposed restrictions.

178. Lastly, in reply to the Malian representative, he said that the United Kingdom, far from clinging to its Territories in Gibraltar or elsewhere, had for twenty years made a greater contribution to ending colonialism than any other country; indeed 99 per cent of the inhabitants of the former British colonial empire now lived in independent countries.

179. The United Kingdom had always upheld the principle of consultation and consent, and it therefore believed that the inhabitants of Gibraltar should not be denied the right to express their views freely and to have those views taken into account.

180. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics took note of the Spanish representative's statement that the Spanish Government had withdrawn its proposal of 18 May 1966.

181. In his view, the demilitarization of Gibraltar depended not on Spain but on the United Kingdom, and so long as it had not been effected, the will of the people could not be freely manifested; a people in chains could not express its will.

182. The representative of Spain, returning to the question of permission for non-residents to stay overnight in Gibraltar, pointed out that permission was given only to domestic servants and to nuns working in hospitals and not to Spanish workers. Since the Immigration and Alien Ordinance had been passed in 1845, Spanish workers had been unable to reside per-



manently or stay in Gibraltar which, but for that fact, would have a typically Spanish population like the rest of the area.

183. The representative of Mali said that, while entirely agreeing with the United Kingdom representative's arguments concerning decolonization and the right of self-determination, he wished to state his delegation's position on certain points.

184. In the first place, while the United Kingdom might justifiably pride itself on having contributed to the liberation and decolonization of a large percentage of the peoples of States Members of the United Nations, the fact remained that, in doing so, it had merely given those people their due and rectified a state of affairs that was incompatible with the normal course of history.

185. Decolonization was an ineluctable process, in keeping with a new situation in which world problems and power relationships had to be viewed in the light of changed conditions. There were two possible attitudes: to withstand the tide of history, as some countries, like South Africa and Rhodesia, were still doing, or to go along with history, as many others had done.

186. His delegation had not accused the United Kingdom of seeking to cling to its colonial positions. As the result of the question raised by the representative of Uruguay, his delegation had simply been led to consider certain historical factors and to reflect on the strategic importance of the Mediterranean—known as *Mare Nostrum* at the time of the Romans—which had served as a justification for many conquests and military occupations. That consideration had prompted it to say that Gibraltar and the Suez Canal were the two keys to the control of the Mediterranean. His delegation had therefore been very disturbed to hear that British naval vessels were being fitted out there a few days before the outbreak of hostilities.

187. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he greatly appreciated the spirit in which the representative of Mali had spoken, but pointed out that it was not correct to say that the main concern of the United Kingdom was to maintain its position in Gibraltar. If the International Court of Justice found the United Kingdom's claim to be legally unsound, the United Kingdom would accept its judgement.

188. Furthermore, if the inhabitants of the Territory wished to be associated with Spain, immediate action would be taken to give effect to their wish.

189. The United Kingdom Government felt an absolute obligation to the people with whom it was associated. It believed that it had an obligation to consult them and to take their wishes into account. The circumstances of Gibraltar were certainly unique. But neither the Special Committee nor any other United Nations committee or council could ever say that the inhabitants of any territory, whatever the circumstances, had not the right to be heard before decisions were taken concerning them.

190. The representative of Iraq, introducing a revised text (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1) of the draft resolution submitted by Chile, Iraq and Uruguay, with the addition of Syria as a fourth co-sponsor (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1/Add.1), said that the sponsors had taken the suggestions of certain delegations into account and believed that the new text would be generally accept-

able, since it contained no condemnation and asked for nothing that had not already been approved by the overwhelming majority of Member States. They trusted that the Spanish delegation would be able to accept the text and felt that it was now for the United Kingdom to show goodwill.

191. The draft resolution aimed only at the implementation of the existing resolutions and should therefore be readily accepted by the administering Power and unanimously adopted by the Committee.

192. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he opposed in the strongest terms the wholly partisan draft resolution set out in document A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1. In purporting to deal with territorial claims, it exceeded and offended the mandate of the Special Committee. With regard to the referendum, it contravened the General Assembly resolution which required that the interests of the people should be taken into account. The revised draft reinforced his argument that no final decisions should be taken at the present time. It would be a grave departure from United Nations traditions and the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter, and from the principles of elementary justice, to deny a hearing to the people principally concerned. Their liberties should not be denied or betrayed but respected and protected. He accordingly urged that judgement should be reserved and impartiality maintained until the people of Gibraltar had been able freely to express their own views.

193. The representative of Afghanistan said that the interest of the inhabitants of Gibraltar demanded that the Special Committee should base its decision on resolution 2231 (XXI), in which the General Assembly had taken the view that under the prevailing circumstances the continuation of negotiations between the administering Power and Spain was the most effective means of achieving a workable solution to the problem of Gibraltar. No matter how great the difficulties, the Government of Spain and the Government of the United Kingdom should try to resume their negotiations in order to expedite the decolonization of the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar. Since the revised version of the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) reflected more accurately the aims and purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), it had his delegation's general approval.

194. Nevertheless, he believed that the sponsors might be well advised to alter operative paragraph 2 to read: "*Declares* that the convening by the administering Power of the proposed referendum has not been envisaged by resolution 2231 (XXI)". In that way the paragraph would make a statement of fact instead of taking a negative approach to the holding of a referendum. A referendum held in conditions of justice and equity was the most effective means of ascertaining the will of the people living under colonial domination. In a United Nations text the use of the concept of referendum as it was at present intended in operative paragraph 2 of the four-Power draft resolution should be avoided. The General Assembly had asked for negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom. It was difficult to anticipate the results of those negotiations. If the holding of a referendum was the outcome, reached with the agreement of the Government of Spain, the decision should be respected.

195. For those various reasons he would vote in favour of the four-Power draft resolution but would abstain on operative paragraph 2 if it was put to the vote separately. He would abstain on the draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423) submitted by the United Kingdom.

196. The representative of Syria believed that the criticisms levelled against the revised draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), of which his delegation was a sponsor, had no justification. First, by conceding that the question of Gibraltar was a colonial question, the United Kingdom itself recognized that it came within the competence of the Special Committee. Thus, the Special Committee could not be reproached for dealing with the question. Secondly, operative paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution provided expressly for safeguarding the interests of the inhabitants. Thirdly, as the representative of Afghanistan had implied, the holding of a referendum was a unilateral step outside the process of negotiations stipulated so clearly in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

197. The representative of Sierra Leone said that the two main issues raised during the Special Committee's discussions on the question of Gibraltar had related, first, to General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), operative paragraph 2, and, secondly, to paragraph 6 of the Declaration contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

198. His delegation had sponsored the amendment which had led to the inclusion in resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2, of the words "taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory" because it believed that the question of Gibraltar could not be simply a matter for negotiation between the United Kingdom and Spain. The interests of the people of any Territory could certainly be ascertained by consultation in the form of a referendum; in the case of Gibraltar, the question was whether the administering Power should have consulted Spain first. It had been stated that Spain had been invited to participate in the referendum and had rejected the opportunity to do so. Thus, the issue appeared to be one of interpretation by the two Powers involved. In any event, his delegation could not support the wording used in paragraph 2 of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1).

199. With regard to paragraph 6 of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, his delegation considered that that provision, like General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) as a whole, was directed specifically at Non-Self-Governing Territories; consequently, Spain's claim of disruption of its territorial integrity was not relevant and could not be discussed by the Committee, which was competent to discuss only colonial questions. If Gibraltar was a colonial Territory, the Committee was competent to discuss it, but it must treat it entirely as a colonial question. He could not, therefore, support the fifth preambular paragraph of the joint draft resolution.

200. His delegation could support the other paragraphs of that draft resolution; it naturally regretted that interruption of the negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain and hoped that those two Powers would resume negotiations in order to determine how to solve the problem. However, it could not support

the draft resolution as a whole and would abstain from voting on it.

201. His delegation also had difficulties with regard to the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423). While it could not reject the idea of a referendum, it questioned the way in which the referendum was to be carried out. However, it felt that the Committee was not yet in a position to pronounce itself on the Territory. Since the referendum was to be held on 10 September and the Committee envisaged closing its session by 15 September, it was unlikely that the full report envisaged would be available before the end of the current session. Consequently, he could not support that draft resolution and would abstain from voting on it.

202. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that, while his delegation supported the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) in principle, it had certain reservations, particularly with regard to the fifth preambular paragraph. Its interpretation of paragraph 6 of the Declaration differed substantially from that given by the sponsors of the draft resolution, so far as its applicability to Gibraltar was concerned. In his delegation's view, paragraph 6 was applicable only to colonial Territories, and to link it with the question of the sovereignty of independent States would be bound to have far-reaching consequences. While his delegation had hoped that operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution could be improved, it would not press its objections and would support the draft resolution as a whole, subject to its reservations on the fifth preambular paragraph.

203. His delegation could not agree with the purpose of the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423), since it involved tactics far removed from the co-operation for which the Committee had repeatedly called. Moreover, the Committee had already described the proposed referendum as "untimely". His delegation would prefer to abide by the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

204. The representative of Australia said that there were three points in the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) which his delegation could not accept. First, since his delegation understood paragraph 6 of the Declaration to apply solely to the disruption of dependent Territories, it could hardly be taken to apply to Gibraltar, and the fifth preambular paragraph was therefore out of place in a resolution on that Territory. Secondly, with regard to operative paragraph 2, his delegation could not agree that the holding of the referendum would contradict the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI); it seemed a very sound idea to hold a referendum in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of Gibraltar at the present stage. Finally, his delegation felt that the words "safeguarding the interests of the population", which represented the essence of the matter, were not given sufficient emphasis in operative paragraph 3.

205. His delegation could not, therefore, support the joint draft resolution and would vote against it. In the belief that the referendum was one stage, and a necessary stage, in the process of decolonization, it would vote for the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423).

206. The representative of Mali said that his delegation would have to vote against the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423), the purpose

of which was simply to take the question of Gibraltar out of the Special Committee's hands. It was no accident that the draft resolution made no reference to General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), the charter of decolonization; that omission was evidence of the United Kingdom's desire to divest the problem of its colonial nature. Moreover, the United Kingdom text contained nothing positive which would promote a solution. To express regret that no progress had so far been made would be tantamount to an admission of failure, since it would emphasize that the negotiations recommended in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had not resulted in an agreement. Nor was it proper for the Committee to "note" the declared intention of the administering Power to consult the people, since many members of the Committee had criticized that intention; it would be more appropriate for the Committee to express its disapproval of the administering Power's intention. While the Committee did not oppose consultations—quite the reverse—everything depended on how they were carried out. With regard to the seventh preambular paragraph, it was precisely because the Committee had heard the views expressed concerning the referendum and other questions relating to Gibraltar that it must call on the administering Power to continue its negotiations, as envisaged in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), and not to embark on a course of action which the Committee could not fully endorse. The last preambular paragraph—the key paragraph of the draft resolution—was particularly dangerous, since it implied that General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called for a report on the referendum, whereas in fact it had not even mentioned the possibility of a referendum. With regard to the operative paragraph, he agreed with the representative of Sierra Leone; it was no accident that the referendum was to be held just before the opening of the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, to which the Special Committee must report. The Committee should take much more positive action than was recommended by the United Kingdom.

207. In his delegation's view, the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) represented the bare minimum that was acceptable, particularly since it overlooked the Committee's responsibility to urge the administering Power to refrain from any action which was not endorsed by the Committee. Nevertheless, his delegation would vote in favour of it.

208. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that his delegation would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1), since it provided for negotiations between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population thereafter. It would vote against the United Kingdom draft resolution (A/AC.109/L.423) because the holding of the referendum would result in the perpetuation of United Kingdom domination in Gibraltar and the maintenance of its military base there.

209. The representative of Bulgaria thanked the sponsors of the joint draft resolution for their efforts to take into account the views of other members. His delegation would support that draft resolution, although it believed that no correct solution to the problem of Gibraltar could be found until the military bases in the Territory were dismantled.

210. With regard to the United Kingdom draft resolution, his delegation had always defended the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and insisted that an administering Power, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV), should enable the people of a dependent Territory to exercise that right freely. However, a referendum organized and conducted under military occupation could have only one result, namely, the perpetuation of the colonial situation in one form or another and the continued presence of military bases in the Territory.

211. At the 500th meeting, the draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom (A/AC.109/L.423) was rejected by 10 votes to 3, with 11 abstentions. The revised draft resolution co-sponsored by Chile, Iraq, Syria and Uruguay (A/AC.109/L.424/Rev.1 and Add.1) was adopted by a roll-call vote of 16 to 2 with 6 abstentions, as follows:

*In favour:* Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Chile, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.

*Against:* Australia, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

*Abstaining:* Ethiopia, Finland, India, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, United States of America.

212. The representative of Italy, speaking in explanation of his vote, said that his delegation's position on the question of Gibraltar, which had been made clear by its support of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), was that the best way to solve the dispute was through negotiations between the administering Power and Spain, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory. The fact that he had voted in favour of the joint draft resolution should not be taken as an unqualified endorsement of a certain interpretation of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) which, although worthy of further consideration, was not universally accepted either in the Special Committee or in the General Assembly. Rather, his delegation would emphasize the last preambular paragraph of resolution 2231 (XXI), regretting the occurrence of certain acts which had prejudiced the smooth progress of the negotiations. His delegation would have preferred a different formulation for operative paragraph 2 of the resolution which the Committee had adopted, in order to avoid creating obstacles to a resumption of the negotiations between the two Governments. He sincerely hoped that the decolonization of Gibraltar would not be a source of contention and controversy, but would help to promote harmony among all the countries in that region.

213. The representative of Tunisia said that his delegation was opposed, not to the holding of a referendum as a means of determining the views of the population, but rather to the manner in which it was being organized by the administering Power. General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) had called for negotiations between the United Kingdom and Spain, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory, and had made no mention of a referendum. His delegation had therefore been unable to support the United Kingdom draft resolution. He hoped that the Special Committee would not recognize the results of the forthcoming referendum as valid and that a solution acceptable to all would be found.

214. The representative of Spain said that his Government fully accepted the results of the vote in the Special Committee. It hoped, in a spirit of co-operation

and friendship, to reopen negotiations with the United Kingdom Government immediately with a view to the decolonization of Gibraltar.

215. The text of the resolution (A/AC.109/266) adopted by the Special Committee at its 500th meeting on 1 September 1967 reads as follows:

*“The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*“Having examined the question of Gibraltar,*

*“Having heard the statements of the administering Power and the representative of Spain,*

*“Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960,*

*“Recalling further General Assembly resolutions 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 and 2070 (XX) of 16 December 1965, and the consensus adopted on 16 October 1964<sup>7</sup> by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*

*“Considering that any colonial situation which partially or totally disrupts the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),*

*“1. Regrets the interruption of the negotiations which were recommended in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI);*

*“2. Declares that the holding by the administering Power of the envisaged referendum would contradict the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI);*

*“3. Invites the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain to resume without delay the negotiations provided for in General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI) with a view to putting an end to the colonial situation in Gibraltar and to safeguarding the interests of the population upon the termination of that colonial situation;*

*“4. Requests the Secretary-General to assist the Governments of the United Kingdom and Spain in the implementation of the present resolution, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-second session.”*

216. By identical letters dated 1 September 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of this resolution to the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Spain, for the attention of their respective Governments.

217. The text of a communication dated 6 September 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, in reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 1 September 1967, is reproduced as annex II.

218. Subsequently, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom and the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed letters to the Secretary-General, dated 25 October and 30 October respectively, which are reproduced as annexes III and IV to the present chapter.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. X, para. 209.

## ANNEX I\*

### Question of Gibraltar

#### REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2231 (XXI) of 20 December 1966 on the question of Gibraltar. The resolution reads as follows:

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

2. In identical letters dated 19 January 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of the resolution to the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Spain to the United Nations. The text of the letters reads as follows:

“I have the honour to transmit herewith, for the attention of your Government, the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) concerning Gibraltar, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.

“In this connexion I wish to note that operative paragraph 2 of this resolution is addressed to your Government and to that of [Spain/United Kingdom]. I wish also to note that the General Assembly has requested me to assist in the implementation of the resolution. In expressing the hope that the present negotiations between the parties concerned will prove to be successful, I stand ready to offer assistance, as requested by the General Assembly, in the implementation of the resolution.”

3. In a letter dated 30 January 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 19 January 1967:

“I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 19 January 1967, in which you transmit for the attention of my Government the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) concerning Gibraltar, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1500th plenary meeting on 20 December 1966.

“The Spanish Government asks me to convey to you its appreciation for the help you are willing to give for the better fulfilment of resolution 2231 (XXI). My Government, for its part, is also willing sincerely to fulfil the recommendations in that resolution.

“In this connexion, it wishes to inform you of the following:

“1. On 14 December 1966, Spain—which had rejected the proposal that the question of Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice, considering it to be contrary to General Assembly resolutions 1514 (XV) and 2070 (XX)—proposed to the United Kingdom:

“(a) That the two countries should without delay start negotiations on the ‘statute’ to protect the interests of the residents of the territory of Gibraltar after the end of the colonial situation in Gibraltar. This ‘statute’ would be registered with the United Nations.

“(b) If Spain and the United Kingdom cannot reach agreement on the ‘statute’, the Spanish Government is willing to submit for the consideration and eventual approval of the Secretary-General of the United Nations a draft ‘statute’ for the inhabitants of Gibraltar, in which they would be granted all the rights of any human community, except the right to possess a piece of Spanish territory, since that would be contrary to resolution 1514 (XV), which in paragraph 6 advocates respect for the territorial integrity and national unity of colonized countries.

“(c) In its desire to reach a constructive solution to the problem of Gibraltar, the Spanish Government is willing to negotiate with Her Britannic Majesty's Government a provisional agreed arrangement to safeguard the United Kingdom interests in Gibraltar which the United Kingdom wishes to protect, to the extent that the maintenance of these interests is not contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or

\* Previously reproduced under the symbols A/AC.109/254 and Add.1.

the resolutions which have been or may be adopted by the the General Assembly.

"(d) As a further guarantee offered by Spain for United Kingdom and Gibraltarian interests, the Spanish Government undertakes to submit to the International Court of Justice any difference which may arise in the interpretation of any treaty or treaties between Spain and the United Kingdom constituting the new 'status' of Gibraltar, after paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) has been applied to it.

"2. On 17 December 1966, after the text of resolution 2231 (XXI) had been adopted by the Fourth Committee—which already knew the position of my Government regarding the proposal that the question of Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice—the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Caradon, said that the United Kingdom was ready 'to continue the negotiations'.

"The Spanish Government is therefore awaiting the reply of the United Kingdom to the latest proposal made to it on 14 December. As you will see, the Spanish proposal was in line with operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI), which called upon the two parties 'to continue their negotiations, taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory'.

"3. In operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI), the General Assembly asked the United Kingdom 'to expedite, without any hindrance and in consultation with the Government of Spain, the decolonization of Gibraltar'.

"In his statement before the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on 11 November (document A/AC.109/SR.475), the representative of Spain had told the Committee how, after the start of the negotiations recommended by resolution 2070 (XX), on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom had proclaimed its sovereignty over Spanish territory adjacent to Gibraltar, where it had illegally constructed an airfield that it was using for military purposes, with consequent violations of Spanish air space, against which the representative of Spain protested.

"The Spanish Government considers that the gesture made by the United Kingdom on 12 July 1966 constitutes aggression against Spanish sovereignty and is therefore a serious obstacle placed by the United Kingdom in the way of the negotiations on Gibraltar.

"Consequently, it regrets to inform you that, after the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI) by the General Assembly, on 5 January the United Kingdom sent the Spanish Government a *note verbale*, a copy of which is enclosed. As you will see, the United Kingdom rejects the just observations made by my Government in a note of 30 November 1966, which is also enclosed, and reveals its determination to continue using for military purposes an illegal airfield situated in Spanish territory adjacent to Gibraltar. For your information, I enclose a list of United Kingdom military aircraft which have used this airfield since 12 July 1966 and diagrams of the five latest violations of Spanish air space committed by the above-mentioned United Kingdom military aircraft.

"The Spanish Government, which replied to the United Kingdom Government in a note of 16 January 1967, also enclosed, requests me to draw your attention to the persistence with which the United Kingdom, by its attitude threatening Spanish sovereignty, is putting deliberate obstacles in the way of the negotiations on Gibraltar."

4. In a letter dated 23 February 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a photocopy of note No. 60 of 17 February from the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid addressed to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of violations of Spanish air space. In the same letter, the Permanent Representative of Spain also transmitted a photocopy of *note verbale* No. 47 of 20 February from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid, protesting a violation of Spanish air space.

5. In another letter, dated 27 February 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted

to the Secretary-General a photocopy of *note verbale* No. 49 of 24 February 1967, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid, concerning violations by British military aircraft of Spanish air space.

6. In a *note verbale* dated 4 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a note dated 16 March 1967, from the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid addressed to the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in reply to two notes of the Spanish Minister dealing with alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft.

7. In a letter dated 18 April 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations stated as follows:

"Spain understands the need for decolonization, since my country was the first to experience a colonial phenomenon on its own soil. However, it cannot conceive of a different yardstick being used so that, while the Spanish Government is accelerating the political development of its African territories, the delays being placed in the way of the decolonization of Gibraltar are impassively allowed and accepted.

"In this connexion, I would remind you of my letter dated 30 January 1967, in which my Government, mindful of operative paragraph 3 of resolution 2231 (XXI), requested your assistance in overcoming peacefully and constructively the obstacles which the United Kingdom Government is creating during the course of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom, even after the approval of the above-mentioned resolution 2231 (XXI), for the decolonization of Gibraltar in agreement with Spain.

"Since 16 October 1964—the date on which the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples recommended the solution of this problem—my Government had to ask the United Kingdom Government nine times to start negotiations, before it agreed to do so; the offers made by Spain on 19 May 1966 have so far been ignored.

"The United Kingdom Government has still not replied to the latest Spanish proposals of 14 December 1966 and this is paralysing the negotiations. At the same time, this silence has been accompanied, on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, by an attempt to remove the case of Gibraltar from the process of decolonization and from the competence of the United Nations General Assembly, by proposing instead that the International Court of Justice should pass judgement on the colonial legal titles on which the United Kingdom is basing its presence on a piece of our territory.

"This attitude towards the repeated decisions of the United Nations is serious but there is another fact to which the Spanish Government must draw your attention. After the start of the negotiations, on 12 July 1966 the United Kingdom proclaimed its sovereignty over an additional piece of Spanish territory, depriving it of its former neutral character and using it for military purposes in such a way that Spanish air space is being continually violated by United Kingdom aircraft. As it has repeated on various occasions, my Government therefore considers this to be not only a United Kingdom policy of opposition to the principle of decolonization but also a form of active colonialism which claims, in the middle of the twentieth century, that a State can seize a territory without so far having any legal title to authorize such an appropriation.

"My Government, which wishes to undertake the process of decolonization with the assistance of the United Nations, also hopes that the Organization will help us to eliminate from our soil a colonial situation which is already ripe to disappear and is threatening the territorial integrity and national unity of Spain."

8. On 21 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General the following communication:

"I have the honour to inform you of the position reached by Her Majesty's Government in seeking to meet the request in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) about Gibraltar.

"On 29 March, Her Majesty's Government invited the Spanish Government to talks to be held in mid-April in pursuance of resolution 2231 (XXI). On 3 April, the Spanish Government accepted this invitation and agreed that the talks should start in London on 18 April.

"On 12 April, the Spanish Government published an Order declaring a new prohibited area for aircraft in the vicinity of Gibraltar. This measure appears to be designed to impede access by both civilian and military aircraft to Gibraltar. This is a further example of an act prejudicing the smooth progress of negotiations, the occurrence of which was regretted in resolution 2231 (XXI) and a hindrance to the implementation of that resolution. Her Majesty's Government were not consulted by the Spanish Government or informed of their intention in advance of the publication of the Spanish Order.

"The practical implications of the Spanish Order have yet to be established. But it has clearly introduced a new element into the situation. Her Majesty's Government therefore informed the Spanish Government on 13 April that they had decided to postpone the talks due to be held on 18 April.

"Her Majesty's Government intend to review the question of consultations in accordance with resolution 2231 (XXI) as soon as the implications of the measure announced in the Spanish Order are clear. Her Majesty's Government intend in any case to pursue the objectives recommended in resolution 2231 (XXI), having regard to that and other relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the United Nations Charter, the interests of the people of Gibraltar, the obligations of Her Majesty's Government under the Treaty of Utrecht and the legitimate interests of Spain."

9. In a letter dated 20 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations informed the Secretary-General of the position of the Spanish Government. The text of the letter reads as follows:

"My Government instructs me to inform you of the following:

"*Primo*—On 29 March 1967, the United Kingdom Government officially informed the Spanish Government, in the attached memorandum,<sup>a</sup> that it was willing to resume on 18 April 1967 the negotiations on the decolonization of Gibraltar recommended by resolution 2231 (XXI). These negotiations had been suspended since 14 December 1966, because since that date the United Kingdom has not replied to the Spanish proposal that discussions should start without delay on a statute which would protect the interests of the Gibraltarians, as a prerequisite for the decolonization of the Rock.

"The protection of the interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar, which Spain has always posed as a condition for ending the colonial situation in Gibraltar, was recommended by the United Nations.

"*Secundo*—On 3 April 1967, Spain accepted the date of 18 April for the resumption of negotiations with the United Kingdom for the purpose of decolonizing Gibraltar.

"On 12 April, the Spanish Government, in exercise of its sovereign right and for reasons of military necessity and public safety, in accordance with the Chicago Convention of 1944, declared that the air space over the Campo de Gibraltar and its territorial waters were prohibited to air traffic.

"You are already aware of the violations of Spanish air space denounced by my Government, since I informed you of them in my notes No. 14 of 30 January, No. 23 of 23 February and No. 24 of 27 February.

"When the Spanish Government was preparing to send its delegation to resume negotiations with the United Kingdom, the latter—taking as a pretext the above-mentioned Spanish declaration of 12 April and confusing the defence of our sovereignty with the problem of decolonization—

orally informed the Ambassador of Spain in London on 14 April that it had decided to adjourn the negotiations *sine die*.

"On 17 April, the Permanent Mission of Spain informed you of the Spanish decision to establish the above-mentioned prohibited area.

"*Tercio*—Spain's affirmation of sovereignty over this area provoked a reaction from the United Kingdom on which my Government will not comment; it believes, however, that the measure taken by Spain in no way justifies the interruption of the negotiations recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.

"*Quarto*—On behalf of the Spanish Government, I therefore request you to inform the United Kingdom that its suspension of the negotiations has created a serious obstacle to the decolonization of Gibraltar and urge it to resume negotiations without delay.

"My Government trusts that you will realize the importance we attach to this, because we hope thus to implement resolution 2231 (XXI) and at last really set in motion the promised decolonization of Gibraltar."

10. In a letter dated 21 April 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a statement concerning the British airfield at Gibraltar and the Order of the Spanish Government establishing a prohibited zone for air navigation in the immediate vicinity of Gibraltar.<sup>b</sup>

11. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom a copy of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Spain dated 18 April 1967 and invited the views of the United Kingdom Government regarding the representations contained in it. In his letter, the Secretary-General reiterated his readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

12. In a letter dated 15 May 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of Spain that he had invited the views of the Government of the United Kingdom regarding the representations contained in the Permanent Representative's letter of 18 April 1967. In his letter, the Secretary-General reiterated his readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI).

13. On 19 May 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Secretary-General the following communication:

"In my letter of 20 April, I informed you that the United Kingdom had adjourned the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar *sine die*. The United Kingdom Government used as a pretext for this adjournment the establishment by Spain of a prohibited area for air navigation in Algeciras and asked the Council of ICAO to recommend to my Government the postponement of the entry into force of this prohibition.

"The Council of ICAO considered the United Kingdom complaint on 10, 11 and 13 May 1967 and decided to take no action on it. I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of the discussions held on the aforesaid dates.

"Consequently, Algeciras duly became a prohibited area on 15 May, and my Government sent the United Kingdom Government a note verbale, dated 17 May, which I also have the honour to transmit herewith with the request that the present letter and its annexes should be circulated as working documents.<sup>c</sup>

"Spain is willing to continue without any delay the negotiations for the decolonization of Gibraltar recommended in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI)

<sup>b</sup> At the request of the United Kingdom representative, the letter and its annex were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 1 May 1967.

<sup>c</sup> At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the letter and its annexes were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 22 May 1967.

<sup>a</sup> At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter and the memorandum attached to it were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 25 April 1967.

and again requests you to remind the United Kingdom of its obligation to comply with this resolution."

14. In a letter dated 5 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a *note verbale* dated 3 June 1967 from the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed to the United Kingdom Embassy in Madrid concerning a violation of the prohibited area of Algeciras by British military aircraft.<sup>d</sup>

15. In a letter dated 13 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter dated 15 May 1967:

"I have the honour to refer to Your Excellency's letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 15 May 1967, with which was transmitted a copy of a letter dated 18 April 1967, addressed to you by His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Spain.

"The suggestion in Mr. Aznar's letter that Her Majesty's Government has created 'obstacles . . . during the course of the negotiations between Spain and the United Kingdom' is a distortion of the facts. Rather it has been the Spanish Government which, by its declaration of a prohibited area relating to flying near Gibraltar on 12 April, has created such obstacles. This action was announced only six days before the Anglo-Spanish talks were due to open, upon the invitation of my Government, and thereby recalls in timing and evident intent the Spanish announcement of 5 October 1966, about the closure of Gibraltar's land frontier to vehicular traffic.

"The Spanish Government again criticizes the United Kingdom proposal that the legal issues in dispute over Gibraltar should be submitted to the International Court of Justice. But it was the Spanish Government which, in 1966, put forward a large volume of argument of a legal nature in support of its case over Gibraltar. My Government's proposal for a reference to the International Court of Justice was therefore not only in accordance with the United Nations Charter and General Assembly resolution 171 (II) but also an appropriate response to the case put forward by the Spanish Government.

"I now wish to inform you that Her Majesty's Government, far from wishing to delay the fulfilment of the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), have reached a decision which will assist and expedite this process. The decision is to hold a referendum at Gibraltar. The nature of the referendum, the background against which it will take place and the arrangements contemplated for it are all set out in the enclosed statement.

"In reaching this decision, my Government have had special regard to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter which expresses the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of a Non-Self-Governing Territory are paramount.

"Also they are acting in full accordance with the purposes of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) which, as you will recall, called on the two parties to continue their negotiations, 'taking into account the interests of the people of the Territory' and asked Her Majesty's Government to 'expedite the process of decolonization'.

"The position as regards consultation with Spain is explained in paragraph 3 of the statement. Although it has not yet been feasible in the circumstances there described to hold talks on the decolonization of Gibraltar with the Spanish Government, my Government are currently informing the Spanish Government of their decision to hold a referendum and inviting them to make any suggestions which they may think fit on the formulation of Alternative 'A' in the referendum, and to explain more fully to the Gibraltarians the Spanish proposals for the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain.

"In your letter of 15 May you were kind enough to state your readiness to extend appropriate assistance in the im-

plementation of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI). My Government would much welcome the presence of any observer whom you might wish to send to Gibraltar for the referendum."

16. The text of the statement on Gibraltar enclosed with the letter dated 13 June from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom (para. 15) reads as follows:

"On 20 December 1966, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted resolution 2231 (XXI), calling upon Britain and Spain to continue their negotiations about Gibraltar, taking into account the interests of the people of Gibraltar and asking Britain, in consultation with Spain, to expedite the decolonization of Gibraltar. Both Spain and Britain voted for this resolution. In explaining why Britain had voted for it, the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations said that Britain could never agree that decolonization would mean the incorporation of Gibraltar into Spain against the wishes of the people, and also that nothing could prejudice the question of the type of decolonization which would best fit the circumstances of Gibraltar.

"Her Majesty's Government have been considering their policy towards Gibraltar in the light of the resolution. In doing so they have regard to the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 73, which expressed the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of a Non-Self-Governing Territory are paramount. They have also had regard to their obligations under the Treaty of Utrecht.

"As is known, Her Majesty's Government duly arranged to hold talks with the Spanish Government in pursuance of the United Nations resolution. The first meeting between delegations of the two countries was to have taken place in London in April. Her Majesty's Government greatly deplore the action of the Spanish Government in announcing, on the eve of the talks, a prohibited area to flying in the vicinity of Gibraltar. This new restriction was plainly aimed against the economy of Gibraltar. Such action was in clear conflict with the terms of the General Assembly's resolution, which regretted the occurrence of acts which had prejudiced the progress of the previous Anglo-Spanish negotiations. The talks were postponed in order to enable Her Majesty's Government to consider the new situation. Her Majesty's Government raised the matter in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and have also attempted to resolve the problem in bilateral talks with the Spanish Government. But these talks ended in failure on 8 June, and Her Majesty's Government have therefore taken steps to bring the matter before the Council of ICAO once more, this time as a dispute under article 84 of the Chicago Convention.

"But Her Majesty's Government have not been deterred by the difficulties which Spain has made over the holding of talks from pursuing the objectives of the United Nations resolution.

"Her Majesty's Government firmly believe that decolonization cannot consist in the transfer of one population, however small, to the rule of another country, without regard to their own opinions and interests. Her Majesty's Government therefore think that the next step in pursuance of the United Nations resolution should be to give the people of Gibraltar an opportunity to express their views, by a formal and deliberate act, on what would best serve their interests.

"Her Majesty's Government have accordingly decided that a referendum should be held in Gibraltar in which the people of Gibraltar should be invited to say which of the following alternative courses would best serve their interests:

"(A) To pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Government on 18 May 1966; or

"(B) Voluntarily to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its present responsibilities.

"If the majority of the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of the first alternative, Her Majesty's Government will be

<sup>d</sup>At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the letter and its annexes were circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 6 June 1967.

ready to enter into negotiations with the Spanish Government accordingly.

"If the majority of the people of Gibraltar vote in favour of the second alternative, Her Majesty's Government will regard this choice as constituting, in the circumstances of Gibraltar, a free and voluntary relationship of the people of Gibraltar with Britain. Her Majesty's Government will thereafter discuss with the representatives of the people of Gibraltar any appropriate constitutional changes which may be desired.

"If the majority vote for the second alternative, provision would also be made for the people of Gibraltar to retain the right at any future time to express by a free and democratic choice the desire to modify their status by joining with Spain, in which event Her Majesty's Government would be ready to approach the Spanish Government accordingly.

"Her Majesty's Government attach great importance to the referendum being held impartially. They wish the people of Gibraltar to be able to think calmly where their interests lie and to express their choice free from pressures of any kind. They would greatly welcome the presence of any observer whom the Secretary-General of the United Nations might wish to nominate for the referendum. They are ready to welcome an observer from Spain too and to give the Spanish Government facilities to explain their own proposals to the people of Gibraltar if they so wish. Her Majesty's Government also have in mind to invite observers from one or two other Commonwealth countries.

"It is Her Majesty's Government's intention to hold this referendum in the course of this year and as soon as suitable arrangements have been made for the registration of persons entitled to vote. These arrangements will necessarily take some time and Her Majesty's Government's present expectation is that the referendum will be held early in September."

17. In a letter dated 19 June 1967, the Secretary-General informed the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations that he was inviting the views of the Government of Spain on the proposals contained in his letter of 13 July 1967 and would communicate further with him when the views of that Government were available.

18. In a letter of the same date, the Secretary-General transmitted to the Permanent Representative of Spain a copy of the United Kingdom representative's letter dated 13 June 1967 and invited the views of the Government of Spain on the proposals contained in that letter.

19. In a letter dated 19 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of a *note verbale* from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Embassy in Madrid, concerning three violations of the prohibited zone of Algeciras by British military aircraft.\* In the same letter the Permanent Representative of Spain referred to the Anglo-Spanish talks held in Madrid from 5 to 8 June 1967 stating:

"I take this opportunity to inform you that on 5 June discussions between Spain and the United Kingdom opened in Madrid, at the request of the United Kingdom, to consider the possible effect on the operation of Gibraltar airport of the establishment of the prohibited area of Algeciras by the Spanish Government on 12 April, which I reported to you on 17 April.

"At these discussions, which ended on 8 June, the United Kingdom requested the assistance of Spain in ensuring the normal operation of the airport of Gibraltar, giving as a pretext for its request a desire to protect civil aviation. Yet on 5 June two United Kingdom fighter aircraft stationed in Gibraltar violated Spanish air space adjacent to the Rock by flying over the prohibited area.

"The Spanish Government expressed its agreement to the establishment of a practical system to permit the normal

operation of the airport of Gibraltar, provided that it was purely civilian in nature.

"The United Kingdom, determined not to sacrifice its military requirements—which, in the final analysis, are what it is defending in Gibraltar and what keeps it there—refused even to consider the Spanish proposal, announcing that it would refer the matter again to the Council of ICAO, under article 84 of the Chicago Convention."

20. In a letter dated 22 June 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General a photocopy of a *note verbale* dated 20 June 1967 from the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the United Kingdom Ambassador in Madrid concerning eight new violations of the prohibited area of Algeciras.†

21. In a letter dated 5 July 1967, the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations transmitted the following reply to the Secretary-General's letter of 19 June 1967:

"... I would inform you that the Spanish Government has delivered to Her Britannic Majesty's Government an aide-mémoire stating its views on the proposed referendum which the United Kingdom intends to hold in Gibraltar in September next. I am forwarding to you herewith a copy of the Spanish aide-mémoire with the request that it should, together with this letter, be circulated as a working document and taken into account and reproduced in the report which it is your intention to make to the Committee of Twenty-Four on developments in Gibraltar subsequent to the adoption of resolution 2231 (XXI) by the General Assembly.

"1. As you will be able to confirm, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after breaking off the Spanish-British negotiations recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations, has decided to hold a referendum in Gibraltar without first consulting the Spanish Government, thus contravening resolution 2231 (XXI), paragraph 2.

"Furthermore, the questions to be put in the referendum, by their essence, violate resolution 2231 (XXI) and earlier resolutions on this subject, in that they imply that the application or non-application to Gibraltar of resolution 1514 (XV), already decided upon by the United Nations, is subject to the wishes of the British civilian inhabitants of the Rock. The decisions of the General Assembly in this connexion are very clear. The colonial situation in Gibraltar must be liquidated by the United Kingdom in consultation and negotiation with Spain, the country which is the victim of this colonial situation, simply taking into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, which the Spanish Government has always been willing to respect.

"The Spanish Government has given many proofs that it is favourably disposed towards the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock. I may remind you that on 18 May 1966 Spain proposed to the United Kingdom the conclusion, *inter alia*, of an agreement to be registered with the United Nations, under which the inhabitants of Gibraltar would be guaranteed the maintenance of their British nationality, of their individual rights—freedom of religion, freedom of the Press, security of domicile, security of tenure of their employment, and so forth—and of their municipal collective institutions.

"As Her Britannic Majesty's Government did not accept this offer and in its negotiations with the Spanish Government made no mention whatever of the interests of the Gibraltarians, the representative of Spain in the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly proposed to the United Kingdom, on 14 December 1966, the immediate negotiation of a statute which would protect the interests of the Gibraltarians, as a step preliminary to the application to Gibraltar of resolution 1514 (XV).

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government, without replying to this proposal, now takes the unilateral decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar in which the Gibraltarians will ostensibly be voting on whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) applies to the Territory, when the fact that this resolution

\* At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1967.

† At the request of the Permanent Representative of Spain, the text of this letter was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 29 June 1967.



does so apply has been decided by the United Nations. In these circumstances, it would be improper for the United Nations to send observers.

"2. The Spanish Government believes that it is your responsibility to oversee the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI), which the United Kingdom has violated by breaking off the Spanish-British negotiations and deciding to arrange a referendum in the terms described in the United Kingdom document of 14 June 1967, which was forwarded to you by the representative of the United Kingdom. My Government therefore requests you to secure compliance with resolution 2231 (XXI).

"3. I would also request you to inform the Committee of Twenty-Four that the Spanish Government does not agree to the referendum which is planned by the United Kingdom and does not concede any validity to the results of it.

"Spain, in its reply to the United Kingdom, suggests a formula whereby the negotiations would continue and the two countries would jointly ascertain what were the true interests of the Gibraltarians which should be protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization.

"4. Finally, I wish to inform you that the reasons given by Her Majesty's Government for breaking off its talks with my Government are invalid. The fact that the complaint which the United Kingdom believes it has with respect to the prohibited area for air traffic, established by Spain on 12 April, is to be submitted by the United Kingdom itself to ICAO shows that Spain's decision to prohibit the flight of military and civil aircraft over a part of Spanish territory has nothing to do with the decolonization of Gibraltar."

22. The text of the memorandum enclosed with the letter dated 5 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Spain reads as follows:

"1. Her Britannic Majesty's Government, in a document dated 14 June 1967, informed the Spanish Government of its decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar, in which the civilian inhabitants of the Rock will be asked to decide:

"(A) Whether they wish to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms of the proposals made by the Spanish Government on 18 May 1966, or

"(B) Whether they wish to retain their link with Britain, with democratic local institutions and with Britain retaining its responsibilities in Gibraltar.

"These responsibilities, in the view of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, derive not only from the Charter of the United Nations, but also from the Treaty of Utrecht.

"In reply to the communication in question, the Spanish Government wishes to make the following observations:

"2. The United Kingdom's decision to hold a referendum in Gibraltar in the manner proposed is a violation of both the letter and the spirit of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and of earlier resolutions on this subject.

"It contravenes the letter of the recommendations of the United Nations, since it was taken at a time when, by decision of the United Kingdom, the Spanish-British negotiations were in abeyance, and without there having been any prior consultation with the Spanish Government or with the United Nations itself. The mere fact of being advised of the measure after it has been taken does not, in the view of the Spanish Government, constitute consultation by Her Britannic Majesty's Government. The offer to Spain to send an observer to watch the referendum and explain its views to the inhabitants of Gibraltar is quite unacceptable, since it would imply the Spanish Government's approval of a unilateral decision by the United Kingdom that is contrary to the rights and interests of Spain and to the decisions taken by the United Nations.

"3. The United Nations has recommended that the decolonization of Gibraltar should be effected through the application to this Territory of resolution 1514 (XV) in its entirety, and consequently of paragraph 6 thereof, which states that 'any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations'. Furthermore, it was

recommended to Spain and the United Kingdom that, in the negotiations aimed at resolving the colonial situation in Gibraltar by mutual agreement, account should be taken of the interests of the inhabitants of the Rock, whose right of self-determination—since they did not fulfil the requisite conditions—had not been recognized by the United Nations, despite the express request made to the Committee of Twenty-Four in 1963 and 1964 and to the Fourth Committee in 1966 by the petitioners representing them.

"In its proposal of 14 June 1967, the United Kingdom appears to be pursuing the same aims and policies as in April 1964, when it granted to Gibraltar the Lansdowne Constitution—namely, to ensure the British presence on the Rock and to use the inhabitants as a screen for its military interests.

"Such a policy has already been rejected by the United Nations. In October 1964, the Committee of Twenty-Four recommended that the decolonization of Gibraltar should be achieved by negotiation between the United Kingdom, as the colonial Power, and Spain, as the country a part of whose territory was colonized.

"Now, in 1967, the United Kingdom, persistently disregarding not only the political decisions of the United Nations but also the present legal status of the Rock, is taking a further, and the most serious, step in Gibraltar. Under resolution 2231 (XXI), it is not for the United Kingdom independently to consult the wishes of the Gibraltarians; it is for Spain and the United Kingdom to negotiate together, taking into account the interests of the Gibraltarians.

"4. The questions to be put in the proposed referendum also contravene the spirit of the recommendation of the United Nations on the manner in which the colonial situation in Gibraltar should be terminated.

"To ask the Gibraltarians whether they wish 'Great Britain to retain her responsibilities in Gibraltar' is tantamount to asking them whether they want the present colonial situation, which has been specifically and expressly condemned by the United Nations, to continue. This is an attempt to saddle them with the responsibility for the perpetuation of that situation, so that they—and not the United Kingdom—will appear to be the cause of the halt in the decolonization process.

"Again, to ask the Gibraltarians whether they wish to pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms of the proposals made by Spain of 18 May 1966 is tantamount to leaving it to them to decide whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) should apply to the colonial case of Gibraltar—a matter which has already been decided by the United Nations. What is more, the Spanish Government, in its 1966 proposals, never envisaged that the Gibraltarians, individually or collectively, should be compelled to abandon either their status as subjects of Her Britannic Majesty or the Territory of Gibraltar. The sole purpose was that the Territory should be returned to Spain in a civilized manner through the application to it of resolution 1514 (XV), thus ending the dismemberment of Spain's national unity and territorial integrity. In order that this return of the Rock to Spain might be effected peacefully and to the benefit of all concerned, the Spanish proposals suggested the conclusion of certain agreements to prevent the decolonization from adversely affecting the interests of either the Gibraltarians or the United Kingdom.

"In the final analysis, the putting of these two questions means conferring on the civilian inhabitants of the Rock the responsibility for deciding, through their preference for one sovereignty or the other, whether or not the Territory they inhabit should be returned to Spain. This manoeuvre involves a clear violation—the most serious and decisive yet—of the present legal status, as laid down in article X of the Treaty of Utrecht, which unequivocally gives Spain a prior claim to recover Gibraltar in any circumstances where British sovereignty may cease, if only for a moment.

"5. The measure adopted by the United Kingdom on 14 June 1967 has nothing to do with the decolonization of Gibraltar. The decolonization advocated by the United Nations is not one which maintains privileged positions at the

expense of the natural populations but, on the contrary, one which eliminates imperialism and unjust situations.

"The Spanish Government believes that, as a result of the United Nations debates in which the process of decolonizing the Territory of Gibraltar was initiated, the civilian inhabitants of the Rock included in the roll of Gibraltarians were defined as having certain interests that ought not to be adversely affected by the termination of the colonial situation. These inhabitants replaced the true population of Gibraltar, which was expelled by England in 1704 and settled in the town of San Roque del Campo de Gibraltar, where its descendants still reside. Their interests, which have been stated to the Committee of Twenty-Four by their legitimate representatives, cannot be left out of account in the decolonizing process; for the fact is that the word 'Gibraltarians' means not only the British subjects established at the United Kingdom military base and subject to the jurisdiction of a fortress that is British because of the cession of sovereignty made by Spain, and not because it is the home of subjects of the United Kingdom, but also those dispossessed inhabitants and the 5,000 Spanish workers and their families who constitute a substantial proportion of the Rock's labour force and therefore of the life of Gibraltar. These Gibraltarian workers, who are prohibited by discriminatory colonialist legislation from residing in Gibraltar, should also be remembered in the decolonization process. Thirty-two million Spaniards are also affected by the perpetuation of the colonial situation at Gibraltar, and their rights, their interests and their security are ignored by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in the document of 14 June 1967.

"Article 73 of the Charter of the United Nations is completely misconstrued by the United Kingdom when it offers this referendum to the British civilian population included in the roll of Gibraltarians. It is true that this Article states that the interests of a people subjected to colonial domination are paramount, but in the case of Gibraltar what has been colonized is not a Gibraltarian population composed of British subjects, but a Spanish territory and Spaniards.

"6. The referendum which the United Kingdom proposes to hold is obviously based on the totally inadmissible premise that the interests of the Gibraltarians include that of deciding whether or not resolution 1514 (XV) should apply to Gibraltar. The Spanish Government holds the view that the inhabitants of Gibraltar should have the opportunity to inform Spain and the United Kingdom what their true interests are, in order that they may be safeguarded by the two countries to which the United Nations has entrusted this responsibility. However, these interests do not include the right to dispose of a piece of territory which must revert to Spain if the colonial situation in Gibraltar is to be truly ended.

"During the year which has elapsed since 18 May 1966, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, in its talks with the Spanish Government, has systematically avoided specifying what the interests of the Gibraltarians are and has not replied to the Spanish proposal of 13 December 1966, suggesting the immediate negotiation of a statute to protect those interests.

"The Spanish Government is therefore of the opinion that it is only within the framework of the Spanish-British negotiations that agreement can be reached on such a procedure as will enable Spain and the United Kingdom jointly to establish what are the interests that the inhabitants of Gibraltar wish to see protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization. To this end, the formula proposed by Her Britannic Majesty's Government in its document of 14 June 1967 should be replaced by another compatible with the decisions adopted by the United Nations.

"If Her Majesty's Government carries out its unilateral decision of 14 June 1967, it will have chosen a course contrary to that indicated by the United Nations, with all its attendant consequences. The Spanish Government will then have no further obligation towards Gibraltar, since the United Kingdom will have violated article X of the Treaty of Utrecht if, as a result of the manifestation of the wishes of the civilian population, the matter of sovereignty becomes

open to question. In this event, the devolution clause of article X of the Treaty of Utrecht would become operative. Thereafter, and until such time as this clause is brought into full effect, Gibraltar can only be for Spain a piece of Spanish territory illegally occupied by 18,000 aliens supported by the military force of the United Kingdom."

23. On 7 July 1967, the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed a letter to the Secretary-General in which were contained the views of his Government concerning the matters raised in the letters addressed to the Secretary-General by the Permanent Representative of Spain on 19 May, 5 June, 19 June and 22 June 1967 (see paras. 13, 14, 19 and 20 above). Extracts from the letter of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom are reproduced below:§

"I have the honour to enclose a memorandum giving a balanced account of the ICAO Council's proceedings from 10 to 13 May and of the bilateral talks about the prohibited area between Britain and Spain which took place in Madrid from 5 to 8 June. I also enclose a copy of Her Majesty's Government's note No. 146 of 18 May which replied to the Spanish note No. 115 and explained the reasons for the postponement of the talks which had been due to start on 18 April.

"The Spanish notes Nos. 131, 142 and 146 contained allegations about flights by British military aircraft. I am authorized to say that the British authorities have investigated these allegations and that my Government is satisfied that on none of the occasions cited was there any infringement of Spanish rights. When formal replies are made to the Spanish allegations, copies will be communicated to you.

"Sr. Aznar's letter of 19 June gives a misleading account of the Spanish attitude during the bilateral talks in Madrid about the prohibited area from 5 to 8 June. As you will see from the first annex to this letter, Spain did not agree to establish a system to permit normal airport operations provided that it was purely civilian in nature. Rather the Spanish delegation refused to go on talking about aeronautical matters which the British delegation had gone to Madrid to discuss unless Britain first made far-reaching concessions in the political field. The first of these conditions was that Britain should agree to acknowledge Spanish sovereignty over the territory on which the airport is situated. The imposition of such an extreme (and, as the Spanish Government well knew, unacceptable) pre-condition for even continuing the discussions brought the talks to a premature and regrettable end."

24. In a letter dated 17 July 1967, the Secretary-General addressed the following communication to the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom:

"I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 13 June 1967 in which you conveyed to me, *inter alia*, the decision of your Government to hold a referendum in Gibraltar on the basis set out in the enclosed statement, and informed me that your Government would welcome the presence of any observer whom I might wish to send there for the referendum.

"As you will recall, I stated, in my letter dated 19 June 1967, that I was inviting the views of the Government of Spain regarding the proposals contained in your letter and would communicate with you further when those views were available. I now transmit herewith for the information of your Government, a copy of a letter dated 5 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations, in which are contained the views of the Government of Spain.

"Taking into account the differences of view between your Government and the Government of Spain as expressed during the current exchange of correspondence concerning

§ At the request of the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom, the text of this letter and its annexes was circulated to all Permanent Missions of the States Members of the United Nations in a *note verbale* from the Secretary-General dated 11 July 1967.

the question, and having regard to the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), I intend to submit a report on the whole matter to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

25. In a letter dated 4 August 1967 the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom wrote to the Secretary-General in reply to his letter of 17 July 1967 (see para. 24 above). The text of the letter and its enclosures are as follows:

"I have the honour to acknowledge your letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 17 July 1967, with which were enclosed a letter and an aide-mémoire from His Excellency the Permanent Representative of Spain about the referendum which is to be held in Gibraltar on 10 September 1967.

"I now have the honour to enclose the text of an aide-mémoire communicated by my Government to His Excellency the Ambassador of Spain in London on 31 July 1967.

"Since this is directly relevant to the exchange of correspondence concerning the forthcoming referendum incorporated in Your Excellency's report of 17 July 1967 to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (A/AC.109/254), I should be grateful if you would arrange for this letter and its enclosure also to be circulated in a documentary form to members of the Special Committee."

*Text of British aide-mémoire communicated to the Spanish Ambassador in London on 31 July 1967 in reply to the Spanish aide-mémoire of 3 July 1967*

"Her Majesty's Government regret that the Spanish Government has adopted a critical attitude towards their decision to hold a referendum at Gibraltar. They also note with regret the Spanish Government's refusal to accept their invitation to send a Spanish observer to follow the progress of the referendum and their offer to provide facilities to enable the Spanish Government to explain their proposals to the people of Gibraltar.

"2. Her Majesty's Government repeat that, as they have already explained, the referendum is the next step in pursuance of United Nations resolution 2231 (XXI). The referendum will not, as the Spanish Government suggests, violate either United Nations resolutions on decolonization in general or United Nations resolutions specifically concerning Gibraltar.

"3. On the contrary, Her Majesty's Government's decision to hold a referendum is in full accordance with the spirit and letter of Article 73 of the United Nations Charter, which lays down the responsibilities of Members of the United Nations towards Non-Self-Governing Territories for which they have responsibility. Gibraltar is such a Territory and therefore, according to Article 73, Britain is under an obligation to recognize the principle that the interests of its inhabitants are paramount. The referendum will give the Gibraltarians an opportunity to express, by a formal and deliberate act, their views as to where their interests lie. It is essential to ascertain these views, since it would clearly be wrong for either Britain or Spain to determine arbitrarily, without reference to the people, where their interests lie. And in May 1966 (during the Anglo-Spanish talks about Gibraltar), the Spanish Foreign Minister himself said:

'No one better than the inhabitants themselves could explain their needs to Spain through the British Government that represents them.'

It is surprising, therefore, that the Spanish Government should now fail to support the British decision to consult these same inhabitants by means of a referendum.

"4. The Spanish aide-mémoire of 3 July invokes United Nations resolution 1514 (XV). But this invocation is based on one paragraph only of that resolution, a paragraph which is not in any case relevant to the situation in Gibraltar. It thus gives an incomplete and misleading interpretation both of the resolution and of its application to Gibraltar. The asserted relevance of paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) presupposes, on Spain's interpretation of the para-

graph, that Gibraltar is part of Spain—a disputed point. If the Spaniards draw legal inferences from this, we are ready to test such contentions in the highest judicial organ of the United Nations, but Spain refuses. Until Spain agrees to settle this crucial point by reference to the International Court of Justice, it cannot be argued that paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 is relevant to Gibraltar.

"5. The Spanish Government appears to have misunderstood the nature of the referendum, since it apparently supposes that its being held will signify the lapse, either permanent or temporary, of British sovereignty over Gibraltar. What will in fact happen will be that the people of Gibraltar will express their views as to where their interests lie, in the knowledge that if they express the view that their interests lie in passing under Spanish sovereignty the British Government will negotiate with Spain to bring this about. This expression of views involves no lapse in British sovereignty and therefore does not bring into operation the clause of article X of the Treaty of Utrecht under which Spain has a reversionary right to sovereignty over Gibraltar should British sovereignty be terminated.

"6. Article 73 of the United Nations Charter quite clearly refers to the interests of the 'inhabitants of non-self-governing territories', the United Nations Special Committee of Twenty-Four consensus of 16 October 1964 refers to the interests of the 'population of the Territory' and General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) refers to the interests of the 'people of the Territory'. It is therefore clear beyond any doubt that the United Nations Charter and the later consensus and resolution on Gibraltar are concerned specifically with the interests of the people living in the Non-Self-Governing Territory of Gibraltar. These are the people whose interests, according to the United Nations Charter, must be paramount and these are the people who will be consulted about their interests in the forthcoming referendum. The Spanish claim that the term 'Gibraltarian' covers a wider category of people than the inhabitants of Gibraltar itself is not supported by the Charter, the consensus or the resolutions, and it is thus not relevant to the question of the application of United Nations resolutions to Gibraltar.

"7. The Spanish Government criticizes the formula by which Her Majesty's Government propose to consult the Gibraltarians about where they judge their interests to lie. It is regretted that the Spanish Government did not avail itself of the opportunity offered it by Her Majesty's Government to comment on the formulation of the alternatives by which the people of Gibraltar would pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to Her Majesty's Government on 18 May 1966, and it is disappointing that the Spanish Government have put forward no alternative formula. The existing formula therefore stands. But Her Majesty's Government hope that, in the light of the clarification of the purposes and consequences of the referendum contained in the above paragraphs, the Spanish Government will now decide to accept Her Majesty's Government's invitation to send an observer to the referendum and to take up Her Majesty's Government's offer to make facilities available to the Spanish Government to explain their proposals to the Gibraltarians."

26. By a letter dated 15 August 1967 the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations transmitted to the Secretary-General additional information which was promised in his letter of 7 July (see para. 23 above). The text of this letter and its enclosures are as follows:

"I have the honour to refer to paragraph 3 of my note No. 110 of 7 July 1967, about Gibraltar, in which I undertook to communicate to you my Government's formal replies to the allegations contained in notes Nos. 131, 142 and 146 from the Government of Spain addressed to Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid concerning flights by British military aircraft.

"I now have the honour to enclose copies of the notes delivered by Her Majesty's Embassy at Madrid on 22 July, 28 July and 11 August 1967, in reply to these communications from the Spanish Government."

## I

*United Kingdom Government's reply dated 22 July 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 131*

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 131 of 3 June and the statement made by Sr. Sedo, Leader of the Spanish delegation at the Anglo-Spanish talks in Madrid on 7 June, has the honour to state the following.

"In the note it was alleged that on 26 May a formation of two Hunter aircraft of the Royal Air Force violated Spanish air space. This note was accompanied by a radar plan position map showing the tracks of three aircraft.

"In the statement of Sr. Sedo it was alleged that on 1 June a Valletta aircraft of the Royal Air Force violated Spanish air space.

"These two allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were infringed on either occasion.

"But Her Majesty's Embassy are instructed to take this opportunity to express the regret of Her Majesty's Government for an infringement of Spanish rights which took place on 2 June. On that date a Shackleton aircraft of the Royal Air Force overflew the northern part of the isthmus not for emergency reasons but because of an error of judgement by the pilot. Although the Spanish authorities have not complained about this flight, Her Majesty's Government wish them to be aware of what happened."

## II

*United Kingdom Government's reply dated 28 July 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 142*

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 142 of 15 June about the alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft on 2, 5 and 6 June, has the honour to state the following.

"All these allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were violated on any of these occasions.

"Her Majesty's Embassy is instructed to state that the British military authorities have carefully examined the photographs purporting to relate to the charts attached to the Spanish Government's note. Unfortunately, it is not possible to interpret these photographs because of excessive clutter and sea returns. Secondly, because of scale distortion in setting up the radar display it is not possible to establish an accurate reference point. Lastly, two of the photographs show times other than those quoted in the Spanish charts, and do not appear to relate to the flights listed in the Ministry's note."

## III

*United Kingdom Government's reply dated 11 August 1967 to Spanish Government note No. 146*

"Her Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in reply to the Ministry's note No. 146 of 20 June about eight alleged violations of Spanish air space by British military aircraft on 7, 8 and 9 June, has the honour to state the following.

"All these allegations have been carefully examined. As a result of these investigations, Her Majesty's Government are satisfied that the aircraft in question followed the established procedures and that no Spanish rights were violated on any of these occasions.

"Her Majesty's Embassy is instructed to state that the British military authorities have carefully examined the photographs purporting to relate to the charts attached to the Spanish Government's note. Unfortunately in three cases no

aircraft trace is visible. For the rest, the aircraft traces are in general indistinct and are not related to any clearly identifiable reference points."

27. By letter dated 17 August 1967, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations wrote to the Secretary-General transmitting information supplementary to the Spanish note of 5 July 1967 (see paras. 21 and 22 above). The text of this communication and its enclosure follows:

"As a supplement to our note No. 121 of 5 July on the question of Gibraltar, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the memorandum dated 14 August 1967 sent to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Madrid in reply to the aide-mémoire addressed to the Spanish Government by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom on 31 July 1967.

"I should be grateful if you would have this note and the memorandum circulated as a working document to all delegations and issued as an addendum to document A/AC.109/254 containing your report to the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples."

*Memorandum*

"1. Having studied the aide-mémoire of Her Britannic Majesty's Government of 31 July 1967 setting forth the views of the United Kingdom on the Gibraltar referendum and on its scope, the Spanish Government is more than ever of the opinion that the questions included in the referendum violate General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI), the United Nations Charter and article X of the Treaty of Utrecht.

"2. The facts are as follows:

"(a) Her Britannic Majesty's Government, after unilaterally breaking off negotiations with regard to Gibraltar, has violated operative paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (XXI) by deciding to hold the said referendum without previously consulting the Spanish Government.

"(b) The reference to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter is not pertinent. Article 73 certainly states that the interests of a people subjected to colonial domination are paramount, but what has been colonized in the case of Gibraltar—as may be seen from the last paragraph of resolution 2231 (XXI)—is not a Gibraltarian population composed of British subjects, but Spain and Spaniards.

"The interests of the inhabitants of Gibraltar cannot lie in maintaining a disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain.

"(c) The Spanish Government cannot take seriously the United Kingdom assertion that a ruling by the International Court of Justice is necessary before Gibraltar can be regarded as part of Spain.

"The Treaty of Utrecht, article X of which the United Kingdom still invokes as giving it title to Gibraltar, was signed between Spain and England. Maintenance in force of this colonial Treaty jeopardizes the national unity and territorial integrity of Spain, and represents a colonial situation on Spanish soil. It was precisely in order to do away with such situations, past or future, that paragraph 6 was included in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV); and as the Committee of Twenty-Four agreed on 16 October 1964, that paragraph must be applied to Gibraltar.

"(d) If the referendum as phrased does not presuppose for a moment the transfer of British sovereignty over Gibraltar to the British inhabitants of the Rock—as Her Majesty's Government now maintains—it is impossible to understand why those inhabitants should be asked to choose between Spanish and British sovereignty in replying to the questions put before them.

"(e) The Spanish Government reminds the Government of Her Britannic Majesty that the reason why the 5,000 Spanish workers—in earlier times 14,000—and their families do not live on the Rock is that they have been prohibited from doing so by the British authorities under a discriminatory policy which dates far back and which is reflected in the Immigrants and Aliens Ordinance of 1885. These

workers are prevented from voting in the referendum by that prohibition, and not by General Assembly resolutions 2070 (XX) and 2231 (XXI).

"3. In its memorandum of 3 July 1967, the Spanish Government stated that Spain and the United Kingdom should negotiate a procedure that would enable them to establish what are the interests that the inhabitants of Gibraltar wish to see protected at the conclusion of the process of decolonization called for by the United Nations. Those interests have nothing to do with the purely British interest in maintaining sovereignty over a military base on Spanish soil, which lies behind the questions the Gibraltarians are to be asked to vote on.

"Accordingly, the Spanish Government, while confirming the statements in its memorandum of 3 July 1967, takes this opportunity once again to invite Her Britannic Majesty's Government to agree on a formula which would replace the proposed referendum and enable the two countries to ascertain what are the interests of the Gibraltarians themselves, with a view to embodying safeguards of those interests in a Spanish-United Kingdom agreement, to be registered with the United Nations.

"Such an agreement would make it possible to preserve the social, cultural, religious and economic identity of the civilian inhabitants of the Rock, protecting it from the negative features of decolonization."

#### ANNEX II\*

##### Letter dated 6 September 1967 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. TR 300 GIBR of 1 September 1967, with which was enclosed the text of the resolution of the Special Committee adopted on 1 September and expressing the majority view of members of the Special Committee on the question of Gibraltar.

The referendum, which is to take place in Gibraltar on 10 September, is in no way invalidated by this opinion of the Committee of Twenty-Four. It will give the inhabitants of the Territory an opportunity to express their views on where

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/268.

their own interests lie. It was decided upon by the United Kingdom Government in accordance with its powers and responsibilities as the acknowledged administering Power in Gibraltar. The right of the Administering Authority so to consult the inhabitants on a question vital to their future must be beyond dispute. Such a free and democratic consultation of the people of a Non-Self-Governing Territory about their interests is being undertaken with respect to Article 73 of the United Nations Charter under which the interests of the inhabitants are paramount.

I wish at the same time to invite attention to the recommendation contained in General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) that the interests of the people of Gibraltar should be taken into account, and to point out that a consultation of the people of Gibraltar about their own view of where their interests lie is fully consistent with the terms of that resolution and calculated to further its objectives. The result of the referendum will establish an important additional element required for the implementation of resolution 2231 (XXI), and my Government will consequently make its full report in accordance with the provisions of resolution 2231 (XXI) when the results of the referendum are available.

I shall be grateful if you will arrange for the circulation of this letter as a document of the Special Committee.

(Signed) CARADON

#### ANNEX III\*

##### Letter dated 25 October 1967 from the Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Secretary-General

[For the text of the letter, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6876.]

#### ANNEX IV\*\*

##### Letter dated 30 October 1967 from the representative of Spain to the Secretary-General

[For the text of the letter, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, Annexes, agenda item 23, document A/6882.]

\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/279.

\*\* Previously reproduced under the symbol A/AC.109/280.

## CHAPTER XI\*

### SWAZILAND

#### A. Action previously taken by the Special Committee and the General Assembly

1. Until Botswana and Lesotho attained independence towards the end of 1966, it was the practice of the Special Committee and the General Assembly to consider Swaziland together with the two other former High Commission Territories, then known respectively as Bechuanaland and Basutoland. Among the various reasons for so doing were the administrative links formerly existing between them and the fact that certain problems, including problems arising from their landlocked position in southern Africa, were common to all three. Chief among the problems with which the Special Committee and the General Assembly were concerned were their great need for external assistance in the development of their economies and social services, their economic dependence on South Africa and the threat to their territorial integrity and sovereignty resulting from this dependence and from the racial

policies of South Africa. In regard to the third problem, the General Assembly, in resolutions adopted in 1962, 1963 and 1965,<sup>1</sup> solemnly warned that any attempt by South Africa to annex or encroach upon the territorial integrity of the Territories would be considered as an act of aggression. In the same resolutions, the General Assembly also drew attention to the unsatisfactory economic and social situation in the Territories and requested that additional economic, financial and technical assistance commensurate with their needs should be furnished to them through United Nations programmes of technical co-operation and the specialized agencies. In 1965, following the receipt of a report of an economic mission to the Territories, the General Assembly, in resolution 2063 (XX), decided to establish a Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, to be made up of voluntary contributions. It also requested the Special Committee to consider what measures were necessary for

<sup>1</sup> General Assembly resolutions 1817 (XVII) of 18 December 1962, 1954 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963 and 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

\* Previously issued under the symbol A/6700/Add.10.

securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories and, in addition, requested the administering Power to return to the indigenous inhabitants all land taken from them.

2. At its meetings in 1966, the Special Committee again considered the three Territories together, bearing in mind the forthcoming independence of Basutoland and Bechuanaland, which attained independence on 30 September and 4 October respectively. On 9 June 1966, the Special Committee adopted a resolution (A/6300/Rev.1,<sup>2</sup> chap. VII, para. 237) by which, after drawing attention to the urgent need of the three Territories for United Nations technical and economic assistance and expressing grave concern at the threat to their territorial integrity and economic stability created by the racist régime in South Africa, it *inter alia* appealed to all States to contribute to the Fund established by the General Assembly, considered that continued efforts should be made to provide economic, financial and technical assistance through United Nations programmes and specialized agencies, and decided to establish a sub-committee with a view to studying and suggesting all necessary measures for securing the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the three Territories as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 2063 (XX).

3. On 9 September 1966, the Sub-Committee, composed of representatives of Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Iran, Italy, Madagascar, Mali and Uruguay, unanimously approved its report, which the Special Committee adopted by consensus on 15 September, following its consideration of that report.

4. At its twenty-first session, the General Assembly had before it a report of the Special Committee which included the text of its resolution of 9 June 1966 and the Sub-Committee's report,<sup>3</sup> as well as a report, submitted by the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX), concerning the Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland.<sup>4</sup>

5. Having examined these reports, the General Assembly adopted resolution 2134 (XXI) of 29 September 1966.

[For the text of this resolution, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Supplement No. 16.]

## B. Information on the Territory<sup>5</sup>

### General

6. Swaziland covers an area of about 6,700 square miles and is bordered on three sides by South Africa and on the fourth by Mozambique. The population at the date of the last census, taken in May 1966, was 374,697, comprising 362,463 Africans, 8,006 Europeans and 4,223 other non-Africans.

7. Under new constitutional arrangements which came into force on 25 April 1967, Swaziland is internally self-governing under United Kingdom protection, although certain powers are reserved to Her

<sup>2</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-first Session, Annexes, addendum to agenda item 23.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, chap. VII and appendix III.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, agenda item 23, document A/6439.

<sup>5</sup> The information presented in this section has been derived from published reports. Also used in the preparation of this section has been the information transmitted to the Secretary-General by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland under Article 73 e of the Charter on 29 September 1966, for the year ending 31 December 1965.

Majesty's Commissioner pending the attainment of full independence. The Territory is a constitutional monarchy, with a Prime Minister and a cabinet and a bicameral Parliament, the lower House of Assembly being elected by universal suffrage. In elections held on 19 and 20 April 1967, all the seats in the lower House were won by the Imbokodvo, the party which represents the Swazi Nation under the Ngwenyama, who is the King of Swaziland. The opposition parties are the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and the Swaziland United Front (SUF), the last having been formed at the time of the elections. The United Swaziland Association, which is largely composed of Europeans, did not contest the 1967 elections. Details of the present constitutional arrangements and proposals for independence are set forth in the following section.<sup>6</sup>

8. The economy of the Territory is predominantly agricultural, the principal industries being sugar, wood pulp and forest products, citrus, pineapples, rice and livestock. Iron ore and asbestos deposits are mined by two companies. The Territory is economically linked with South Africa, with which it shares a common currency and customs union. Apart from secondary industries concerned with processing the Territory's agricultural products, industrial development is limited to a few light manufacturing and service industries.

### Relations with South Africa

9. For various reasons, including its close economic ties with the land-locked Territory, South Africa in the past sought unsuccessfully to incorporate Swaziland together with the two other former High Commission Territories. Since 1963, however, this claim has been abandoned and replaced by an offer of "guardianship" and economic assistance. The offer has, however, been regarded by many as suspect because of South Africa's racial policies.

10. The position of the majority Imbokodvo Party in Swaziland towards South Africa has been one of good-neighbourliness and independence. In May 1966, the leader of the Imbokodvo, now the Prime Minister, explained that his party's foreign policy after independence would be based on a "healthy, good understanding with neighbouring States and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries". He added that his party accepted the economic and geographical facts of Swaziland's position in southern Africa. It would maintain close economic ties with South Africa and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique and it would also seek membership of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations. Commenting on South Africa's racial policies, he said that although the Swazis would not interfere in the internal affairs of another country, they would eliminate racial discrimination in their own country. In a statement to the Press of South Africa on 27 November 1966, he is reported to have said that he hoped to have talks with the South African premier upon Swaziland's independence so that he could explain plainly his country's policy towards South Africa. In the meantime, in preparation for independence, Swaziland is reported to have enlisted the aid of South Africans in training its administrative personnel.

<sup>6</sup> For information on the constitutional provisions prior to April 1967, see Official Records of the General Assembly, Nineteenth Session, Annexes, annex No. 8 (part I), document A/5800/Rev.1, chap. VIII, paras. 146-153.

*White paper of October 1966*

11. Until 25 April 1967, Swaziland was governed according to a Constitution adopted in 1964. As previously noted, in the elections to the Legislative Council held in 1964, the Imbokodvo (the party which represents the Swazi Nation under the Ngwenyama) won all the elected seats except for six of the eight seats which, under the 1964 Constitution were reserved for Europeans. Following the election, the Imbokodvo called for the early emergence of Swaziland as an independent State with the Ngwenyama as its King.

12. In August 1965, the Swaziland Constitutional Committee, comprised entirely of members of the Legislative Council under the chairmanship of Her Majesty's Commissioner, was appointed to make detailed recommendations for a new constitution after hearing the views of political parties and groups not represented in the Council. The Committee's report was submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies and was tabled in the Legislative Council for discussion in March 1966. The report, which largely reflected the views of the majority Imbokodvo, proposed a new constitution under which Swaziland would attain internal self-government. It envisaged that Swaziland should become a constitutional monarchy, with the Paramount Chief as Head of State and a bicameral Parliament, the lower house, or House of Assembly consisting of twenty-four members elected by universal suffrage from eight three-member constituencies, six appointed by the King and the Attorney-General as an official member; the upper house would consist of a Speaker and twelve members, half chosen by the House of Assembly and half appointed by the King. The Swazi National Council, a traditional body, would continue to advise the King on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom, including questions relating to land belonging to the Swazi Nation and to mineral rights, control over both of which would be vested in the King in trust for the Swazi Nation. Details of the finally agreed constitutional proposals are given in paragraphs 24 to 43 below.

13. The Legislative Council unanimously endorsed the majority recommendations in April. Representations about various matters were made by members of the public and interested bodies, including the two opposition parties, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress and the Swaziland Progressive Party, which protested regarding their non-representation on the Constitutional Committee and rejected the Committee's recommendations on the ground that they were designed to entrench the conservative elements represented by the Imbokodvo. These parties, which had not gained a seat in the Legislative Council in the 1964 elections, called for the holding of a fully representative constitutional conference.

14. In a White Paper,<sup>7</sup> published in October 1966, the Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that the United Kingdom Government had taken full account of these representations in considering the report. After further consultations held between him and the Swaziland Government, final agreement had been reached, without the necessity of convening a constitutional conference, both on the draft of the Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement and on the form of the internal self-government (Protected State) Agreement

and on the form of the internal self-government constitution (except on the question of minerals).

15. According to the White Paper, the main issue on which it had not proved possible to reconcile the views of the Government of Swaziland and the United Kingdom related to the central control of the grant or refusal of mineral rights. Under the 1964 Constitution, the ownership of minerals in Swaziland was vested, subject to existing rights, in the Ngwenyama in trust for the Swazi Nation. The power to grant or refuse mineral rights was, however, vested in Her Majesty's Commissioner acting after consultation with the Ngwenyama and the Executive Council. The Legislative Council had power to legislate on minerals, as on all other matters, except those which the Constitution specified shall continue to be regulated by Swazi law and custom.

16. The Swaziland Constitutional Committee recommended that the power to grant mineral rights should be vested in the Ngwenyama and that for the purpose of advising him in the exercise of this power there should be a committee appointed by him after consultation with the Swazi National Council. The position of the Swaziland Government was that not only ownership but also control of Swazi Nation land was vested in the Ngwenyama. Therefore, the grant or refusal of mineral rights was similarly an inseparable function of the ownership of minerals. The Swaziland Government conceded that it would be possible to review the arrangements proposed by the Committee when the independence constitution was being considered.

17. The Secretary of State, while agreeing that under the new Constitution, the power to grant mineral rights should be vested in the Ngwenyama, held that since the Government would already be in the hands of a cabinet drawn from a Parliament mainly elected on the basis of universal suffrage, the Ngwenyama should exercise that power on ministerial advice. The Constitution could also provide that before giving its advice, the cabinet would be required to consult the Swazi National Council or a committee thereof. In the Secretary of State's opinion, the central Government, which was responsible for other aspects of the economic development of Swaziland, should also control mineral development. In the absence of agreement on the question under consideration, the United Kingdom Government decided to include in the Constitution provisions on the lines indicated by the Secretary of State.

18. The White Paper recorded that representations had been made urging that the Territory should be divided into single-member constituencies. The Secretary of State, however, accepted the Committee's proposal that under the new Constitution, Swaziland should be divided into eight constituencies, each returning three members to the House of Assembly, and that this should be done by dividing each of the four existing constituencies into two, each containing as nearly as practicable the same number of adult inhabitants. This proposal was a compromise between those who wanted to retain the existing number of constituencies and those who wanted single-member constituencies. The principal objection to the latter suggestion was that, with a total electorate of about 120,000 and twenty-four elected members, the number of voters in each constituency would be so small as to make the members subject to disruptive local pressures and to open the way to intimidation and corruption. The alternative

<sup>7</sup> *Swaziland Constitutional Proposals*, Cmnd. 3119 (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1966).

would have been to reduce the number of elected members, but this was not considered desirable.

19. Finally, reference was made in the White Paper to the provisions relating to the amendment of the Constitution. Under the draft Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement, Her Majesty would retain the power to amend or replace the Constitution, but before exercising this power there would normally be consultation with the Swaziland Government. The Constitution would set out the procedure to be followed by that Government before a request could be made to Her Majesty to exercise the power of amendment. The Swaziland Government had expressed the hope that except in abnormal circumstances Her Majesty would not exercise that power until the specified local procedure had been complied with, and that Her Majesty would favourably consider amending the Constitution at the request of that Government once the specified procedure had been carried out.

20. Following the publication of the White Paper, one of the opposition parties, the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress, issued a statement in Dar es Salaam on 26 October 1966. The party strongly condemned what it described as a unilateral action by the United Kingdom Government, done without consulting the people and the political movements of Swaziland in order to safeguard British interests and entrench reactionary and tribal forces. It repeated a demand, which it had previously made in August, for the holding of a constitutional conference representative of the broad masses of the Swazi people.

21. The following paragraphs (24-43) summarize the proposals contained in the White Paper which came into force on 25 April 1967.

#### *Swaziland (Protected State) Agreement*

22. The fundamental problem with which the Swaziland constitutional Committee was concerned was the restoration of what the Swazis regarded as the original treaty relationship between Swaziland and the United Kingdom established in the nineteenth century and the recognition of the kingship of the Ngwenyama. To meet the general wishes of the Swazis in these matters, the Secretary of State informed the Committee in the course of its deliberations that the United Kingdom Government proposed to grant Swaziland internal self-government in 1966 and that, subject to Her Majesty's approval, the United Kingdom Government would be willing to arrange for the conclusions of an Agreement with the Ngwenyama which would have the effect of turning Swaziland into a Protected State with the Ngwenyama recognized as King of Swaziland. The Secretary of State also made it clear that the United Kingdom Government wished Swaziland to attain independence by not later than the end of 1969.

23. The Agreement, which came into force on 25 April (see paras. 24-43, below), stipulates that Her Majesty will reserve to herself the power to amend or replace the Constitution, and powers and jurisdiction in respect of the United Kingdom's continued responsibility for external relations, defence and other matters specified in the Constitution. All powers and jurisdiction except those specified in the Agreement will be renounced. Provided that the United Kingdom is satisfied that conditions then prevailing in the Territory do not preclude the grant of independence at that time,

Swaziland will become independent by not later than the end of 1969.

#### *Internal self-government constitution*

24. Under the new Constitution as outlined in the White Paper and embodied in the Swaziland Constitution Order, 1967, the Ngwenyama is recognized as King of Swaziland and Head of State. The succession is governed by Swazi law and custom. The King appoints the Prime Minister and other ministers and has the right to be informed and consulted by his ministers on all matters of government. He acts on ministerial advice except where the Constitution or any other law specifically provides otherwise. However, he has the right to require the Prime Minister to reconsider in the cabinet any matter submitted to him.

25. Provision is made for the office of Her Majesty's Commissioner. Assisted by a deputy, Her Majesty's Commissioner retains responsibility for external affairs, defence and internal security. He is empowered, however, to delegate any part of these responsibilities to a minister designated by the Prime Minister; such delegation may be made subject to conditions and may be revoked.

26. Her Majesty's Commissioner will retain, until a date to be appointed by him, responsibility for the Public Service, in consultation with the Public Service Commission or the Judicial Service Commission; after that date, the two commissions will become executive and he will cease to have this function. The Public Service Commission is appointed by Her Majesty's Commissioner in his discretion, and after that date by the King in accordance with the advice of the Judicial Service Commission.

27. Her Majesty's Commissioner retains certain powers of financial control for the purpose of ensuring proper financial administration or securing compliance with a condition attached to a financial grant made by the United Kingdom Government to the Swaziland Government.

28. Her Majesty's Commissioner is also empowered to require the Swaziland Government to introduce and secure the passage of legislation which he considers necessary or expedient in the interests of any of his responsibilities. If the Government fails to do so, he has power to make an order which has the force of law. He also has the power to require the Government to take executive action which he considers necessary or expedient for the discharge of his responsibilities, or, if it fails to do so, he has the power to exercise any lawful function of the Government for that purpose.

29. The Constitution provides for the establishment of a Consultative Council, consisting of Her Majesty's Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioner, the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister, for the purpose of consultation between Her Majesty's Government and the Swaziland Government on the exercise of the reserved powers by Her Majesty's Commissioner.

30. The Swaziland Parliament has two houses: a House of Assembly and a Senate. The House of Assembly consists of a Speaker, twenty-four elected members, six nominated members, who are appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented, and the Attorney-General, who has no vote.



31. The Senate consists of a Speaker and twelve members, half elected by the members of the House of Assembly and the other half appointed by the King to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented.

32. All persons of the age of twenty-one years, except criminals and the insane, are qualified to register as voters, if they are citizens of Swaziland or citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies fulfilling a three-year residence qualification, or if their husband or parent possesses Swazi citizenship.

33. Swaziland is divided into eight three-member constituencies, delimited and kept under review by a Delimitation Commission consisting of a judge of the High Court of Swaziland as chairman and two other members appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.

34. Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Parliament has full power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Swaziland, exercisable by bills passed through both houses and assented to by the King. The House of Assembly has exclusive power to initiate legislation on taxation and financial matters and is generally responsible for initiating legislation on other matters, but has no power to legislate in respect of Swazi law and custom, unless authorized by the Swazi National Council. The senate has power to initiate legislation on matters other than taxation and finance and Swazi law and custom.

35. Each house is empowered to refer a bill back to the other house for further consideration, but the Senate may not delay the passage of an appropriation bill. In the case of a "money bill" other than an appropriation bill, if the Senate fails to pass the bill within thirty days from the date it leaves the House of Assembly, the House of Assembly may submit the bill to the King for his assent.

36. Each Parliament will last for five years, unless dissolved earlier. The power to prorogue or dissolve Parliament is vested in the King, who will normally act on ministerial advice, but who may act in his discretion if the House of Assembly passes a vote of no confidence in the Government or if, in the event of the office of Prime Minister falling vacant, there is no reasonable prospect of finding a person for appointment who can command a majority in the House of Assembly.

37. Subject to the powers conferred on Her Majesty's Commissioner, executive authority is vested in the King. There is a cabinet consisting of the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and up to six other ministers. There may also be assistant ministers. The function of the cabinet is to advise the King in the Government of Swaziland, and it is collectively responsible to Parliament for any advice given to him. The King appoints as Prime Minister the leader of the political party, or coalition of parties, enjoying the support of the majority of the members of the House of Assembly. The Deputy Prime Minister, other ministers and the assistant ministers are appointed by the King in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.

38. The prerogative of mercy is vested in the King acting in accordance with the advice of a committee consisting of the Attorney-General and three ministers appointed by the King in his discretion to advise him on the exercise of this prerogative.

39. The Swazi National Council will continue to advise the King on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom and connected with Swazi traditions and culture. Swazi Nation land will be vested in the King in trust for the Swazi Nation. Provisions relating to minerals will be made on the lines of those indicated in paragraph 17 above.

40. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary and an integrated judicial system for the Territory. It contains a code of fundamental rights and freedoms, enforceable by the High Court.

41. Provisions relating to the position of the King, the code of fundamental rights, the judicature, the Public Service and Judicial Service Commissions and the procedure for amending the Constitution are entrenched and alterable only if supported by 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint sitting of both houses of the Parliament and thereafter supported by two thirds of all votes validly cast at a referendum.

42. Certain other important provisions are also entrenched and cannot be altered unless supported by 75 per cent of the members present and voting at a joint sitting of both houses of the Parliament. These include, *inter alia*, the composition and powers of the Parliament and the maintenance of the existing status and powers of the Swazi National Council.

43. According to the information transmitted by the United Kingdom, the position regarding the revision of the Constitution is that, so long as Swaziland remains a protected State, the Swaziland Government cannot submit to the United Kingdom Government any proposal for altering these provisions referred to above unless the specified degree of support has been obtained. However, the Constitution can still be amended by Her Majesty in Council, irrespective of whether the local procedures have been carried out, though there will normally be consultation with the Swaziland Government before any amendment is made. It is, of course, the intention that the local procedures described will be the necessary prerequisite for any amendment of the Constitution after independence.

#### *Entry into force of new constitutional arrangements*

44. On 24 April 1967, four days after a general election had been won by the Imbokodvo Party, the Ngwenyama signed an Agreement with the United Kingdom conferring on Swaziland the status of Protected State. The Agreement, the draft of which was contained in the White Paper of October 1966 (see paras. 22-23 above), came into operation on 25 April 1967. The internal self-government constitution, as outlined in the White Paper (see paras. 24-43 above), is set out in the Swaziland Constitution Order 1967, which was brought into force also on 25 April.

45. Having become the King of Swaziland and Head of State under the new Constitution, the Ngwenyama named Prince Makhosini Dlamini, leader of the Imbokodvo, to be the Territory's first Prime Minister. He also nominated six members of the House of Assembly to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented (one Swazi and five Europeans). The remaining member of the House is the Attorney-General, an official, who has no vote.

46. On 1 May, when it met for the first time, the House of Assembly elected a Speaker as well as six. The remaining six members of the Senate were ap-

pointed by the King (four Swazis and two Europeans) to represent interests not otherwise adequately represented.

47. On 16 May, in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, the King appointed the remaining members of the cabinet (including the Deputy Prime Minister and six other ministers) and four assistant ministers.

#### *1967 elections*

48. In October 1966, the Government began to make preparations for the holding of elections to the new House of Assembly which was to be set up in accordance with the proposed Constitution. The elections took place on 19 and 20 April 1967, and the Imbokodvo won all twenty-four elected seats (representing eight three-member constituencies), gaining over 79 per cent of the votes cast. The Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) received 20 per cent and the few remaining votes were shared between the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and the Swaziland United Front (SUF). [These three parties and the Swaziland Democratic Party (SDP)—which subsequently merged with the Imbokodvo—likewise failed to win any seats in the 1964 elections when the Imbokodvo won all the elected seats except for six which were won by the United Swaziland Association (USA). The latter did not put forward candidates in the 1967 elections.]

49. The Imbokodvo, which describes itself as the political arm of the Swazi Nation and therefore a national movement, stated in a manifesto prepared for the latest election that its objectives were independence in 1968 with the Ngwenyama as King and Head of State; a free democracy based on the best Swazi traditions and modern constitutional law with an independent judiciary; a non-racial State with foundations of absolute equality and non-discrimination; internal peace and harmony; the maximum progress and development in all fields in the shortest possible time; the rapid expansion of free enterprise economy to enable as many citizens as possible to become economically active. The party further stated that its external policy would be based on the principles of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. It would cultivate friendly and mutually beneficial relations with other States and seek membership of the United Nations, the Commonwealth and the Organization of African Unity.

50. In their election manifestos, the three opposition parties, like the Imbokodvo, promised their supporters a modern non-racial and independent Swaziland with a democratically elected Parliament under the constitutional monarchy of the Ngwenyama. However, they called for major constitutional changes, to end the three-member constituencies and reduce the power of Swaziland's traditional forces, especially the King.

51. The NNLC further promised the Swazis that it would modify the present electoral system immediately after winning the election by introducing sixty single-member constituencies; expand educational and medical services in order to meet the needs of the Territory; embark on a policy of Africanization of the public services; achieve full employment within five years through the extension of industrialization and mechanization of agriculture; and continue to encourage the trade union movement. The NNLC also claimed

that the Imbokodvo intended to turn Swaziland into a "Bantustan" satellite of South Africa.

52. At a pre-election rally held at Manzini early in April 1967, the NNLC adopted two resolutions which, among other things, accused the Imbokodvo of launching "a vicious campaign which encouraged chiefs to refuse permission for meetings of the opposition parties" and demanded freedom of speech and assembly.

53. Following the defeat of his party, Mr. Ambrose Zwane, leader of the NNLC, sent a cable to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, demanding suspension of the "fraudulent constitution" and fair elections. Mr. Zwane stated that his party should have representation in the new legislature proportionate to the number of votes obtained. Subsequently, the Prime Minister of Swaziland made it clear that he would not recommend Mr. Zwane to the King for nomination to the House of Assembly, in spite of the fact that the NNLC's 20 per cent poll represented a proportionate increase of 8 per cent on a doubled electorate, since the 1964 election. The NNLC later reiterated its demand for a constitutional conference and further elections before independence.

#### *Question of independence*

54. On 2 May 1967, the Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations stated in a written answer to a question in the United Kingdom House of Commons that it remained the intention of the United Kingdom Government, as stated in the White Paper of October 1966 (see paras. 22-23 above) that Swaziland should become independent by not later than the end of 1969.

55. On 11 May, Mr. Ambrose Zwane, leader of the NNLC, was reported to have renewed demands for a revision of the present Constitution before full independence. With no response from the United Kingdom Government to these demands, Mr. Zwane on 1 June called a Territory-wide strike to begin on 5 June.

56. Faced with his first potential crisis, the Prime Minister of Swaziland was reported to have warned civil servants that they would be dismissed instantly and lose all their retirement benefits if they joined the strike. He also warned strike organizers that intimidation would be regarded as a serious criminal offence. He said that there were constitutional channels through which people could agitate for a change in the Constitution.

57. On 2 June, Mr. Zwane announced that he would cancel the strike because he believed that the United Kingdom Government was ready to talk with the leaders of the NNLC about the revision of the Constitution. But he was told on 6 June by Her Majesty's Commissioner that his constitutional objections should be raised with the Swaziland Government.

58. On 7 July after he had formally opened the new Swaziland Parliament, the King announced that his Government was asking the United Kingdom to grant independence to the Territory in September 1968 instead of before the end of 1969.

#### *Localization of the public service*

59. On 17 May 1966, the Swaziland Government released the report<sup>8</sup> of a special commission, headed

<sup>8</sup> Swaziland, *Report of the Localization Commission*, Mbabane, January 1966.

by Mr. T. C. Luke of Sierra Leone, which had been appointed to inquire into the localization of the civil service. At the same time the Government issued a statement announcing its acceptance of most of the commission's recommendations.

60. The main recommendations of the commission stressed the urgent need to find large sums of money for the expansion of education at all levels in order to meet the needs of a national public service. In the meantime, it recommended that in view of forthcoming independence, at least some of the higher policy-making posts and many more lower posts should be filled by Swazis. In 1965, out of 2,400 posts, 600 were occupied by European or African expatriates.

61. In its statement, the Government said, *inter alia*, that it fully recognized the need to provide extra posts whereby local officers could gain experience and training and that such posts would be created without delay. First steps had also been taken to improve secondary education.

62. In its first report on public service training programmes, which was published in April 1967, the Government stated that in 1966, sixty-seven local officers had been appointed to supernumerary training posts in the civil service. It had also sponsored 107 new trainees on courses abroad, financed by way of scholarships, and twenty-two others on correspondence courses. Nearly 2,800 persons had been enrolled in courses held by government training institutions in Swaziland. In addition, twelve private trainees had begun courses overseas. The Government also stated that the main difficulty had been the shortage of persons qualified to enter training institutions, and that financial stringency would apparently make it impossible to continue to expand certain training programmes in 1967, notably the supernumerary training grades scheme.

### *Economic conditions*

#### *General*

63. Despite its small size, Swaziland is relatively well endowed with natural resources, possessing good soil, a favourable climate, a fairly abundant water supply and rich mineral deposits. Slightly more than half of the total land area is held by Swazis under communal ownership and nearly half is owned on individual tenure, mainly by Europeans.

64. The economy is predominantly agricultural, the principal cash crops being sugar, rice, citrus and pineapples, tobacco, and cotton. The first four are grown mainly in the European farming areas under irrigation. Apart from tobacco and cotton, other dry-land crops are maize, the staple diet of the Swazis, kaffir corn, millet, potatoes, vegetables and ground-nuts. Cattle-raising is traditional among the Swazis, the cattle being either exported alive or slaughtered at a recently established abattoir and cannery at Mbabane. There is also a large wood pulp industry based on three major forestry enterprises and two large mining undertakings engaged in the extraction of asbestos and iron ore. The iron mine, a joint project started in 1961 by the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa, a British company and the Commonwealth Development Corporation, operates under a contract calling for the supply of 12 million tons of ore to Japanese iron and steel companies over a period of ten years beginning in 1964. The iron ore is exported

through Mozambique. Apart from secondary industries processing the Territory's agricultural products, such as two sugar mills, fruit and meat canning and cotton ginning, there are a number of light manufacturing or service industries. A government-financed industrial estate exists near Mbabane and other measures have been taken to encourage industrial investment.

65. As already stated, the Territory shares in a common customs union and currency area with South Africa, Botswana and Lesotho, and much of its trade is by necessity with South Africa. Because of the free exchange, data on imports are not exact, but it is estimated that in 1965 Swaziland's imports, including cereals and other food-stuffs which are imported to supplement the Territory's own production, amounted to about £13.2 million. Exports, which can be ascertained more accurately, were valued at £15.1 million, an increase of 33 per cent over 1964 due mainly to increased mineral production. It may be noted that, of the total exports by value, 17 per cent went to South Africa, 37 per cent to the United Kingdom and 46 per cent to other countries. Statistics recently released by the Government show that exports in 1966 were worth £19 million, an increase of 27 per cent over the previous year resulting chiefly from the further expansion of the sugar, livestock and mining industries. As a result of the opening in 1964 of a railway line to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique for the export of iron ore, the Territory's dependence on South Africa for its transit trade has decreased. A £2.15 million bulk sugar terminal and wharf at that port was opened on 3 December 1966, a project which was partly financed by loans from the Swaziland Sugar Association.

66. One of the two principal economic problems which face the Swaziland Government is the need to reduce the imbalance between the European farming sector, which is relatively heavily capitalized and oriented towards cash crops, and the Swazi agricultural sector, which is predominantly concerned with subsistence farming and has remained generally static despite substantial injections of development capital in recent years. Allied to this is the second problem, namely, a very substantial annual budgetary deficit amounting to an estimated £1.2 million or nearly one third of expected territorial revenue in 1966-1967, which was covered by grants-in-aid from the United Kingdom. According to a speech delivered by the then Secretary for Finance and Development to the legislative Council on 20 February 1967, the financial position of the Government has shown improvement as indicated by the fact that a smaller budgetary deficit, totalling about £960,000, is expected to occur in the current financial year. This deficit will again be met by the United Kingdom. Apart from these grants-in-aid, Swaziland also received financial assistance for its development expenditure in the form of funds made available by the United Kingdom under the Overseas Development and Service Act and its predecessors. In February 1966, the United Kingdom Government announced that development allocations under the Act had been made totalling £3.9 million for 1965-1968, representing an increase of £1,238,000 over the previous three years.

67. In recognition of the extensive need of Swaziland for development financing and technical assistance to improve the economic and social condition

of its people, the Special Committee and the General Assembly (see paras. 2 and 3 above), have in several resolutions recommended that the Territory should receive special consideration from the United Nations and its specialized agencies in the allocation of economic, financial and technical assistance under their programmes of technical co-operation. Details of such assistance rendered to Swaziland are given separately below. In addition, the General Assembly in 1965 decided to establish a fund for the economic development of Swaziland, together with the now independent States of Botswana and Lesotho, to be made up of voluntary contributions. So far, however, the contributions pledged have not been sufficient to enable the fund to be brought into operation.

68. Swaziland's developmental needs were also studied by an economic mission of the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development in late 1965, the report of which is not yet available. Replying to a question in the House of Commons on 5 May 1966, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. John Stonehouse, said that, pending consideration of the mission's recommendations, the Swaziland Government had prepared proposals for the use of the development funds made available for the period up to 31 March 1968 and that these were under consideration.

69. On 16 November 1966, the question of increasing the scale of economic aid to Swaziland was again raised in the House of Commons. Replying, the Minister of Overseas Development said that development aid from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund for 1965-1968 was at a considerably higher level than for the three previous years. No proposals for further economic aid were then under consideration, but the amount of budgetary assistance for 1967 would be considered shortly, and allocations of development aid for the period beginning on 1 April 1968 would be considered later.

70. According to a speech delivered by Her Majesty's Commissioner to the Legislative Council in October 1965, the development plan for 1965-1968 proposed by the Swaziland Government is concentrated on raising living standards, particularly those of the rural Swazi population, and on reducing the annual budgetary deficit. The steps being taken to achieve these objectives are set out in the following sections.

#### *Development of agricultural production*

71. The Swaziland Government has been seeking to raise the living standard of the rural Swazi population partly by promoting the rapid expansion of agricultural production in the Swazi areas. The main feature of the development programme for this sector is the establishment of rural development areas in which it is proposed to concentrate and co-ordinate intensive development projects based on self-help, and the introduction of pilot settlement schemes for selected Swazi farmers, which are designed for the production of high-value cash crops on a basis of leasehold tenure. The programmes also include: a major cotton-growing campaign for the coming season; encouragement of Swazi farmers to grow sugar-cane and pineapple; promotion of new forestry development and assistance to the declining tobacco industry in Southern Swaziland; creation of a statutory livestock producers' trust with the object of acquiring shares in the Swaziland Meat

Corporation which operates an abattoir and cannery constructed in 1965; the possible establishment of a dairy control board; and enlargement of the Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank's resources.

72. By August 1966, the Government had already established eight rural development areas and hoped to set up one additional area in each district per year. In announcing this, the Director of Agriculture said that there were possibilities of great improvement in agricultural production in view of the Swazis' desire for economic advancement and as a result of developments in other sectors, notably the improvement of communications, hydroelectric power, the expansion of local industries, improved credit facilities and the establishment of the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre (SACUC).

#### *Improvement of agricultural skills*

73. The Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre, affiliated to the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (the former UBBS) was opened on 4 November 1966, as an expansion of the Malkerns Agricultural College and Short Course Centre. It was expected to cater for 134 full-time students and up to 32 short-term students. Three government certificate courses in agriculture, forestry and home economics, each with the duration of two years, had been offered at the Malkerns College since June 1966, and a full programme of short courses launched throughout the year. Moreover, the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had already decided to offer in 1967 a three-year diploma course in agriculture. By November, fourteen full scholarships had been awarded to agricultural students by non-governmental organizations in Swaziland and one by the International Women's League for Peace and Freedom. In addition, two commercial firms in the Territory, Usutu Pulp Company and Peak Timbers Limited, had provided twelve all-embracing scholarships for forestry students.

74. On 12 May 1967, the Principal of the SACUC was reported to have stated that since its establishment in late 1966, the institution had developed beyond expectations. It opened with an enrolment of 43 students, but within less than a year had acted as host to more than 1,200 people attending courses, seminars and meetings of all kinds. It had been involved not only in the teaching of agriculture and forestry but also in teaching other subjects ranging from geography to business management. In order to meet the increasing demands made upon it, the institution had acquired additional land and buildings. The Principal said that many of his students suffered from lack of basic education which, if they had received it, would have enabled them to understand more easily the seventeen different agricultural and related subjects offered at the institution.

#### *Provision of agricultural credit*

75. The Swaziland Credit and Savings Bank was opened at Mbabane on 14 August 1965, at a time when the agricultural industry was suffering the effects of severe drought and stock disease. By the end of November 1966, the Bank had received nearly 200 applications for loans totalling about £150,000. Of these, only about seventy applications totalling approximately £35,000 were either withdrawn or rejected for various reasons.

76. According to a statement by its Manager in November 1966, the Bank's capital resources consisted of a grant of £170,000 from the Commonwealth Development and Welfare Fund, £300,000 borrowed from the commercial bank and about £35,000 transferred from the Agricultural Revolving Loans Fund, a fund established to assist small farmers. These, with savings bank balances of £51,000, made a total of over £550,000, all of which, except for a loss on operations amounting to £20,000 and half of the savings bank deposits, was available for lending. Loans sanctioned so far, less repayments, totalled £60,400. Steps were taken in 1966 to establish two branches of the bank and two weekly agencies.

#### *Development of water supplies*

77. Swaziland is well watered compared with other parts of southern Africa, and water is therefore regarded as one of the Territory's more valuable economic assets. Five rivers, rising in South Africa, flow through the Territory and have been used for irrigated farming, especially of sugar and rice, and for hydro-electric power production. Owing to the rainfall pattern, however, the possibilities of further increasing the irrigated area are limited without the use of water storage and the study of water potential.

78. The Government is seeking to develop Swaziland's water resources on a large scale and is undertaking a comprehensive hydrological survey of the whole Territory. With the information already available, it is also investigating possible sites for storage dams on the main rivers. The Government is moreover studying the international implications involving the large-scale development of river resources and is considering the recommendations submitted to it by a commission established to review the existing law relating to the control and use of water throughout the Territory. An application for assistance in the preparation of a comprehensive water development plan for Swaziland was submitted to the United Nations Special Fund for consideration.

79. Early in October 1966, the Sand River dam, with a storage capacity of 33,000 acre-feet, was opened at Tshaneni. It was constructed by the Commonwealth Development Corporation at a cost of £1 million. The dam will expand the total area under irrigation in the Komati area from 20,000 to some 35,000 acres.

#### *United Nations assistance to the Territory*

80. In June 1966, the Special Fund component of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided \$US462,000 to meet part of the cost of an aerial geophysical survey of the Territory; this project, which will cost a total of \$US834,000, the difference to be paid by the Government, will be completed within four years.

81. In early 1967, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) approved a loan to Swaziland to assist in financing the expansion programme of the Swaziland Electricity Board. The programme is scheduled for completion in 1971 at a total estimated cost of \$5.45 million, of which the IBRD loan will cover \$2.75 million. Additional loans of \$750,000 will come from other sources and \$1.95 million will be provided by the Board. The programme will more than double the present capacity of the public power supply system in the Territory.

82. The representative of UNDP in Swaziland announced in June 1967 that the UNDP had earmarked £400,000 for a two-year study in Swaziland's Usutu River basin, which covers a large portion of the Territory, while the Swaziland Government would make a contribution of some £200,000. The object of the project was the appraisal of the land and water resources of the Usutu River basin and the preparation of a detailed plan for the development of its irrigation and power potential. In drawing up the plan, account would be taken of the effect of irrigation agriculture on the Territory's traditional pattern of land tenure and the settlement of Swazi farmers on irrigated allotments.

83. Details of projects approved for 1967/1968 under the Technical Assistance component of the UNDP are as follows:

<i>Approved category I programme</i>	<i>Cost (\$US)</i>	<i>Experts</i>		<i>Fellowships</i>		<i>Equipment, services and supplies (\$US)</i>
		<i>No.</i>	<i>Months</i>	<i>No.</i>	<i>Months</i>	
UNTA economic programming and projections <sup>a</sup> ...	44,000	1	24			
UNTA statistics <sup>a</sup> .....	44,000	1	24			
UNTA public administration	3,600			1	6	
ILO human resources development .....	20,600	1	6	1	24	
FAO economic analysis <sup>a</sup> ...	47,600	1	24	1	6	
FAO rural institutions and services <sup>a</sup> .....	40,200	1	24	1	12	3,000
UNESCO teacher training..	91,600	2	48	1	6	
WHO tuberculosis control <sup>a</sup>	63,055	4	48			500
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>354,655<sup>b</sup></b>					

<sup>a</sup> Projects continuing from the 1965-1966 biennium.

<sup>b</sup> Representing an increase of \$76,119 over the previous two years.

84. In January 1967, the Administrator of UNDP authorized an allocation of \$US45,000 from the Revolving Fund for two additional experts in the fields of nutrition education and home economics and agricultural extension.

85. Under the 1966 Regular Programme of Technical Assistance, an expert was sent to the Territory, on a two-year appointment, to advise the Government concerning community development. In 1966, the United Nations Bureau of Technical Assistance Opera-

tions also sent to Swaziland a Dutch associate economics expert and a Danish associate statistician, each on an initial assignment of one year, under the associate expert scheme. This scheme results from agreement between the United Nations and the donor Governments whereby experts with adequate educational qualifications but limited experience are supplied as assistants to senior United Nations experts at no cost to the United Nations or to the receiving Government.

### *Social conditions*

#### *Elimination of racial discrimination*

86. In March 1967, on the basis of a proposal by one of its members, the Legislative Council unanimously adopted a motion, stating that "in view of the fact that it is common knowledge that forms of subtle discrimination still exist in Swaziland, the Government should investigate its extent and take what action it considers necessary to remedy matters". It is also provided that a race relations board be created by the Government as a permanent body comprising "three reputable citizens of Swaziland who will have the task of investigating reports of discrimination which are redressed to them or investigating discrimination where they think it might exist".

#### *Labour*

87. The principal occupations in Swaziland are agricultural, forestry, mining, construction and public service. Apart from a few small secondary or light industries, the chief industrial employers are the sugar mills, a wood-pulp factory and a fruit cannery. Since many Swazis are whole- or part-time farmers, the number seeking paid employment varies, depending especially on agricultural conditions. In 1965, which was a year of severe drought, about half the male Swazis of working age were in paid employment. Of these, 24,426 were registered as being employed in Swaziland and about 6,460 were working in the mines of South Africa. In addition, 4,555 foreign Africans were employed in Swaziland. Whereas there is a marked shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers, there is growing unemployment among unskilled workers. This is due partly to a decline in the number of Swazis who can obtain employment in South Africa, but mainly to a progressive increase in the number of unskilled Swazis seeking employment (averaging about 2,000 per year) which results from a movement into the urban areas. Another factor is the increasing mechanization of production which leads employers to seek skilled rather than unskilled workers.

88. In combating the problem of emerging unemployment, the Government has also stressed the urgent need for a comprehensive and intensified industrial training programme to enable the Swazis to play their full part in the Territory's industrial development. At the Government's request, Professor T. N. Tolani, a technical training expert from the International Labour Organisation (ILO) was sent to Swaziland in 1965 to prepare such a programme.

89. Early in 1966, the Government was reported to have accepted Professor Tolani's recommendations, under which a national council would be set up to advise the Government on all industrial training matters. The council would consist of representatives of Government, employers and workers, and would absorb or replace existing bodies. The Council's first task would be to determine priorities for a national

training programme. The council's day-to-day work would be carried out by an industrial, vocational training and trade testing branch, which would be created in the Department of External Affairs and Labour.

90. Professor Tolani recommended that the Swaziland Trade Training Centre, which at present provides a three-year course for artisans, be up-graded into an Industrial Training Institute, with modern facilities for the training of all classes of industrial workers, from the apprentice to the supervisor. He also recommended the expansion of clerical training facilities, mainly at the Swaziland Staff Training Institute, as well as at the Mbuluzi Home Economics Teacher Training and Housecraft Centre. He emphasized the need to train instructors before the main training programme was initiated, Professor Tolani has since been invited to return to Swaziland to assist in the implementation of his proposals.

91. Apart from three brief disputes, involving 388 workers and resulting in a loss of 310 man-days in 1965, labour-employer relations were undisturbed, according to the information transmitted for that year. Because of a reported lack of support for the National Joint Consultative Council, particularly on the part of the trade union representatives, it was decided to replace it by a statutory Labour Advisory Board. A law establishing a Labour Advisory Board consisting of the Labour Commissioner (Chairman), four employers' representatives, four employees' representatives and two other officials, was enacted in August 1966. Following an inquiry in 1964, which recommended that statutory wage regulation should be introduced in certain industries in which trade unions were not well established, wages councils have been appointed for the wholesale and retail distributive trade, the sugar milling industry and the building industry.

### *Educational conditions*

92. The development of education poses a special problem for Swaziland because of the difficulty of reconciling two apparently conflicting requirements. On the one hand there is an urgently felt need to expand and improve educational facilities in order to increase the participation of Swazis both in the public service and in the economy, and on the other hand there is the desire to reduce the budgetary deficit which makes Swaziland dependent on foreign aid. To achieve the first objective within the severe financial limitations, the policy of the Swaziland Government is to expand secondary education while maintaining the existing primary system at the highest possible standard of efficiency; only under extraordinary circumstances, such as a localized increase in population, it is felt, can new primary schools be established or existing ones enlarged in the immediate future.

93. According to the report of the Director of Education, public expenditure on education amounted to £783,213 in the fiscal year 1964/1965 (an increase of £61,641 over the preceding year), of which £437,618 was budget expenditure and £159,730 a Colonial Development and Welfare grant. In addition, expenditure by religious missions totalled £163,268. The budget estimates for 1966/1967 show the allocation for expenditure on education under the ordinary budget, amounting to £630,368. On the basis of the information transmitted by the United Kingdom, budget expenditure on education, taken as a proportion of total territorial revenue excluding grant-in-aid, has remained constant at about 20 per cent, and the

actual amount of such expenditure has increased substantially. Expenditure on education from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund has also increased substantially, but a reliable estimate of such expenditure in 1966/1967 is not available.

94. The following table shows the situation in regard to schools and pupil enrolments during 1965:

	Schools	Enrolment	Teachers
Primary education <sup>a</sup> . . . . .	332	49,513	1,376
Secondary education <sup>b</sup> . . . . .	32	2,930	182
Teacher training <sup>c</sup> . . . . .	3	159	19
Technical and vocational training <sup>c</sup>	3	106	19

<sup>a</sup> Including 316 African schools with 47,631 students and 1,290 teachers.

<sup>b</sup> Including 25 African schools with 2,383 students and 138 teachers.

<sup>c</sup> For Africans only.

95. Examination results obtained by students in the primary, secondary and teacher-training schools in 1965 were as follows:

	Entries	Passes
Standard VI . . . . .	2,117	1,275
Junior Certificate . . . . .	491	256
Standard for entry to University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland . . . . .	99	74
Overseas Cambridge School Certificate . . . . .	99	96 <sup>a</sup>
Primary Lower Certificate . . . . .	24	22 <sup>b</sup>
Primary Higher Certificate . . . . .	49	40 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Of these, 9 passed in the first class, 32 in the second, 33 in the third and the rest obtained G.C.E. "O" level.

<sup>b</sup> Including 13 passes, 8 partial passes and 1 supplementary pass.

<sup>c</sup> Including 21 passes, 10 partial passes and 9 supplementary passes.

96. In 1965, three primary schools were rebuilt or enlarged and several new ones constructed, mostly by private concerns. Capital improvements were completed at four secondary schools and plans were made for extensions at these and ten other schools. Facilities for primary teacher training at two colleges were expected to be considerably expanded in 1966.

97. The policy of progressive integration of the various races at the primary level introduced in 1962 has continued. The introduction of a common syllabus for all races was expected to reach Standards II-IV in 1966 and Standard V in 1967. It was decided that limited integration should begin in the secondary schools in 1966.

#### University education.

98. Swaziland shares with Botswana and Lesotho in a jointly owned university located in Lesotho. Established in 1964 by the acquisition of the premises of a Roman Catholic College, it is financed partly by the three Governments, partly by the United Kingdom and partly by funds from other sources, notably the United States of America. Apart from its courses for resident students, which are designed specifically to meet the needs of the three countries, the University has an extensive extra-mural programme and provides courses in Swaziland at the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre, which is affiliated to it.

99. In 1965, the number of students in residence at the University was 220, of whom 30 were from Swaziland. For the first time, students who had completed their first two years of the four-year degree course, sat for the Part I examinations. Out of the total entry of 74 students, 54 passed and 6 were allowed to repeat.

100. As the result of the emergence of Botswana and Lesotho, a commission was established in 1966 to review the role of the University and the arrangements concerning its financing. The commission is composed of Sir Roger Stevens, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Leeds, as its chairman, one ministerial representative from each of the three participating countries and five other members, mostly drawn from the United Kingdom Ministry of Overseas Development. The commission's terms of reference were as follows:

(a) To review the higher education needs of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland;

(b) To recommend arrangements which would meet those needs, and in particular to advise on the role which could be played by the University;

(c) To recommend to the three Governments and the United Kingdom Government the arrangements which they should adopt to provide the capital and recurrent financing required by the University during the period ending 31 March 1970.

The commission began its work on 1 August 1966, but its report is not yet available.

101. Apart from the necessity of changing the name of the University in view of the independence of Botswana and Lesotho, other changes were made in its charter and statutes eliminating the restriction whereby the University could previously award only bachelors degrees, and providing for the inclusion of the principal of the Swaziland Agricultural College and University Centre as an *ex officio* member of the University Council.

102. During the year, the University Grants Committee, on which Swaziland is represented, recommended a recurrent budget of £270,000 for the provision of grants in 1966/1967, to which Swaziland was expected to contribute £81,000.

103. On 2 November 1966, the University was reported to have appointed a commission of inquiry into the causes of a one-day strike by almost all the 285 African students on 14 September. The Students' Representative Council had demanded the immediate resignation of the Dean of Students Affairs, Mr. Christopher von Nispen, who, it had been claimed, had done nothing to improve food and dining-room conditions.

104. The University closed for approximately six weeks on 15 September after a severe water shortage which had preceded the students' strike. When the University resumed lectures on 1 November, thirteen students, including all members of the Students' Representative Council, were barred from entering the campus. The Vice-Chancellor said that he had decided that they must be temporarily excluded from the University, as their return would not be conducive to the peaceful resumption of academic activities. On 25 November, it was reported that the water supply of the University had improved but that strict economy would be necessary until a new water storage dam could be completed.

### C. Consideration by the Special Committee<sup>9</sup>

#### Introduction

105. The Special Committee considered Swaziland at its 561st, 568th and 569th meetings held in New York between 15 September and 23 October 1967. The Special Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General concerning the Fund for the Economic Development of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (A/AC.109/273).

106. In his report, the Secretary-General stated that the total amount of contributions to the Fund as of 10 September 1967 was approximately \$18,560 made up of the following contributions: Cyprus, £100 (\$280); Democratic Republic of the Congo, \$2,500; Jamaica, \$980; Kuwait, \$2,000; Liberia, \$6,000; Libya, \$4,000; and Pakistan, \$2,800. Furthermore, two Governments (Denmark and India) had indicated that they would contribute to the Fund when it became operational. Finally the Secretary-General reported that as the contributions pledged had been insufficient, it had not been possible to bring the Fund into operation.

#### Written petitions

107. The Special Committee had before it the following written petitions:

<i>Petitioner</i>	<i>Document No.</i>
Mr. S. J. Zwane, Chief External Representative, Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC)	A/AC.109/PET.601 and Add.2
Mr. Ambrose Zwane, President, NNLC	A/AC.109/PET.601/Add.1
Prince Mafahlefehle Dlamini, Chairman, Swaziland Immigrant's Association	A/AC.109/PET.623

#### General statements

108. The representative of the United Kingdom recalled that, in the past, the Special Committee had always considered the question of Swaziland in conjunction with that of two former Non-Self-Governing Territories, Basutoland and Bechuanaland. Since those two Territories had achieved independence in 1966, under the names of Botswana and Lesotho, the Special Committee would now consider the situation in Swaziland separately for the first time.

109. Swaziland, which had recently become a Protected State, was bound on the north, south and west by the Republic of South Africa and on the east by Mozambique, to which it had access by road and rail. According to the census taken the previous year, Swaziland had 375,000 inhabitants, of whom all but 12,000 were Africans. The country was marked by a strong sense of ethnic unity and by vigorous national traditions and institutions, which had their focus in the King, until recently known as the Ngwenyama.

110. In the past twelve months there had been some very important political developments in the Territory, which augured well for Swaziland's future. Those twelve months had seen the introduction of internal self-government, the holding of general elec-

tions under a new constitution, the signature of a bilateral agreement between the United Kingdom and Swaziland whereby Swaziland became a Protected State and the Ngwenyama was recognized as King, and lastly, a declaration by the newly elected Government of its intention to seek independence for Swaziland in September 1968.

111. Those constitutional developments had been the outcome of discussions held by a constitutional committee that had met in 1965 and 1966 and represented all shades of opinion; the Committee's majority recommendations had been unanimously approved by the Legislative Council in being under the 1964 Constitution. In the course of the Constitutional Committee's deliberations, the United Kingdom Government had made it clear that it was ready to give Swaziland internal self-government and also wished to see Swaziland attain independence by 1969 at the latest. The United Kingdom Government had thus no difficulty in accepting the Constitutional Committee's proposals. Only one point had proved controversial, and that was the exercise of control over minerals in the Territory. Whereas the Constitutional Conference had recommended that the King should exercise that power in consultation with the traditional authority in the Territory—the Swazi National Council—the United Kingdom Government had taken the view that it would be proper for the Cabinet, which was the executive organ under the new Constitution, to tender advice in the matter to the King.

112. The only other question on which the two main political parties in the Territory had failed to agree was that of electoral constituencies. Under the 1964 Constitution, the Legislative Council was composed of twenty-four members, of whom twelve were elected on a national roll and returned from four constituencies. Each of the constituencies elected three members, one of whom had to be a European. One suggestion made to the Constitutional Committee was that the Territory should be divided into single-member constituencies, but the proposal had been rejected on the grounds that, if a constituency was too small, the candidate would be exposed to pressures and that that would encourage corruption and intimidation. The compromise solution proposed by the Constitutional Committee to the United Kingdom Government and accepted by the latter was that the number of constituencies should be increased from four to eight, and that each should return three members. That was the system embodied in the new Constitution, which had come into effect on 25 April 1967. It should also be mentioned that the 1967 Constitution abolished the earlier electoral system whereby the Swazi and European members had been elected from separate rolls and certain seats in the Legislative Assembly had been reserved for Europeans. The new House of Assembly, elected during 1967, had twenty-four members elected by universal adult suffrage, regardless of race. The voting had been restricted to Swaziland citizens and to the limited number of United Kingdom citizens who could establish a qualifying residential period in the Territory. In addition to the twenty-four elected members, the House of Assembly had six members appointed by the King of Swaziland, in his discretion.

113. Under the 1967 Constitution, Swaziland also had a Senate, half of whose members were appointed by the House of Assembly, and an Executive Cabinet whose ministers were appointed by the King on the advice of the Prime Minister. The latter was appointed

<sup>9</sup> This section includes those portions of the statements made on Swaziland in the Special Committee which relate to the question in general; those portions which refer specifically to the consensus adopted by the Special Committee are given in section D.



by the King as the elected member in the House of Assembly most likely to command a majority.

114. Although the Kingdom of Swaziland had become a Protected State on 25 April 1967, when the Constitution as a whole had come into effect, the constitutional provisions regarding general elections had been applied earlier, so that the elections for the new House of Assembly had been able to take place on 19 and 20 April. Two main parties had submitted candidates: the Imbokodvo and the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC). Eighty per cent of the electorate had participated in the ballot. The Imbokodvo, all of whose candidates were Swazis, had obtained 79.4 per cent of all votes cast, and won all the seats. The NNLC, which was the main opposition party, had polled only 20.2 per cent of the votes. It was impossible to tell whether, as its leaders claimed, the party would have gained seats in the House of Assembly under a single-member constituency system. In any case it was apparent that the Imbokodvo commanded the support of the overwhelming majority of the people and that the establishment of an Imbokodvo Government, under the leadership of Prince Makhosini Dlamini, reflected the wishes of the population. During recent weeks, the NNLC had apparently exchanged views on the subject with the Prime Minister of Swaziland and his colleagues. It might be that those direct contacts would lead to some agreement on the outstanding points at issue. At the present stage of Swaziland's development, it was clear that any change in the electoral system before independence could not be a matter for unilateral decision by the administering Power but must be a matter for the Swazi people.

115. On the subject of independence, it should be recalled that even before the Constitutional Committee had completed its work, the United Kingdom Government had made known its wish to see Swaziland independent by the end of 1969 at the latest. The Government that had taken office in April 1967 had declared its intention of seeking independence in September 1968. It had been part of the election programme of the Government party to apply, upon independence, for membership in the United Nations. According to the latest information available, it was very possible that the question of independence might be placed before the Parliament of Swaziland at its forthcoming session.

116. Until recently, the economic situation in Swaziland had been a source of concern, as reflected in General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX). However, Swaziland had a more broadly based economy than the other former dependent territories covered in that resolution. Swaziland had important deposits of asbestos and iron ore. An iron extraction plant opened in 1964 was due to supply 12 million tons of ore to Japan over the next ten years. Asbestos had for some time been an important source of government revenue. The demand for power had led to an increase in the hydro-electric power plant's capacity. Secondary industries had been developed in recent years, and included a meat cannery and a cotton ginnyery. Sugar and forest products represented the most important export commodities for Swaziland, which had an assured quota under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement of over 130,000 tons a year. Most exports showed a steady rate of expansion.

117. The expansion and diversification of the economy, which had been most notable in the past two or three years, had been stimulated by the provision of

basic infrastructures in communications and power. Despite that economic expansion, the United Kingdom Government had to continue to subsidize Swaziland with grants to enable it to balance its budget, but in a few years Swaziland should be able to do so. Besides that budgetary aid (£1.5 million in 1966 alone) the United Kingdom Government furnished Swaziland aid in the form of grants, loans and technical assistance amounting in all to two-and-a-third million pounds sterling in 1966, of which £1 million was in grants and technical assistance. His Government expected to maintain its aid at that level until the end of the 1968-1969 financial year. After that, the amount and form of aid would be negotiated at the time of the Territory's independence.

118. That encouraging information showed that Swaziland had a very promising future. It had strong national traditions and unity, as the homeland of the Swazi nation. Those traditions and that unity would be great assets for the newly independent State. The new constitutional arrangements, which reflected the various shades of opinion in the country, represented an impressive attempt to blend with the traditional institutions of the Swazi people the requirements of modern democratic government based on universal adult franchise and responsible cabinet administration. It was now for the elected Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini Dlamini, and the members of the Swaziland Parliament to recommend a precise date for independence. Of course, economic independence should wherever possible go hand in hand with political independence. The expansion and diversification of Swaziland's economy augured well for the future of that Territory as an independent member of the world community.

119. The representative of Venezuela was happy to see that Swaziland had arrived at a turning point in its development and that it was on the road to independence. He thanked the United Kingdom representative for the valuable information he had supplied.

120. The representative of Tunisia requested details on the economic relations existing between Swaziland and its neighbours, South Africa and Mozambique. Difficulties might well arise in Swaziland's relations with those two countries when it became independent. He asked in particular whether South African capital was invested in Swaziland.

121. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the problems arising from Swaziland's geographical position were similar to those of Botswana and Lesotho. One difference was that Swaziland had access to the sea by the railway which connected the Territory to the port of Lourenço Marques in Mozambique. The relations between Swaziland and South Africa paralleled those which South Africa had with Lesotho and Botswana. Some 6,000 Swazis were employed in South Africa.

122. The question of relations between South Africa on the one hand and Swaziland and the former Non-Self-Governing Territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland on the other hand had been dealt with in the report of the Mission which had visited the three Territories in 1965.<sup>10</sup> He drew particular attention to chapter I, paragraph 2, of that report. Investments by South Africa in Swaziland were considerable but there was no exact statistical information available, partly because Swaziland belonged to the same

<sup>10</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes*, agenda item 23, document A/5958, annex.

currency and banking area as South Africa. Membership of the same currency area gave Swaziland the advantage of access to a source of international capital quite apart from capital of domestic South African origin. Moreover, private investment in Swaziland had been stimulated by large scale public investment and development aid, which had built up the infrastructure of the Swaziland economy to a point where the Territory had been able to attract private investment on a productive scale. The great bulk of the aid had come from the United Kingdom. He had given full information on that matter in an earlier statement and would only add that such aid had increased steadily in recent years; investments by the Commonwealth Development Corporation had totalled £2,109,000 in 1964 and £2,634,000 in 1965. The Commonwealth Development and Welfare grants allocation for the triennium 1965-1968 had been £3.9 million. In *per capita* terms, United Kingdom bilateral aid to Swaziland in 1965 had amounted to £18.49 per head of the population.

123. Swaziland had also received considerable aid from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA). For example, in 1964 the Bank had granted a loan of about £1.5 million towards the establishment of hydroelectric plants and it had approved a further loan of nearly £1 million for the expansion of that project in April 1967. Swaziland also received a loan of £1 million from IDA during the period 1960-1963 for road construction purposes.

124. Thus, the basic expansion of Swaziland's economy in recent years had been financed mainly by funds from the United Kingdom and from international institutions rather than from South Africa. The investment of recent years, however, had had the effect of attracting private investment, much of which came from or through South Africa. In many cases, private investment was undertaken in partnership with public investment.

125. Again, there could be no precise figures for the volume of Swaziland's trade with South Africa. The great bulk of Swaziland's imports came from or through South Africa, a fact which was inevitable in view of Swaziland's geographical position. With regard to exports, whereas in 1961 more than half the total exports of the Territory had gone to South Africa, less than one fifth of its total exports had gone to South Africa in 1966; although Swaziland's exports had more than tripled in value, the level of exports to South Africa had remained steady.

126. The existence of the currency union also meant that Swaziland had virtually no foreign exchange problems. It was thus able to service external debts without regard to the balance of payments, and that had facilitated the raising of foreign loans for development purposes from places other than South Africa. Swaziland also benefited from being part of the South African customs union in that it received a fixed proportion of South African customs and excise duties. Available evidence suggested that income received by Swaziland from that source was no less than it would be if it levied duties itself. The customs union relieved Swaziland of the burden of administering its own customs and excise system. Moreover, the fact that there was no balance-of-payments problem did not affect the fairly large surplus which Swaziland earned in its trade balance.

127. Thus, the economic relations between Swaziland and South Africa were such as were inevitable between two closely adjacent countries at different stages of economic development. In certain fields, Swaziland had a special relationship with South Africa which appeared to be of benefit to both parties. There was no evidence to support the view that the relationship between the two countries made Swaziland the victim of exploitation by South African or other foreign firms. The Government of Swaziland regarded outside investment as an indispensable aid to further development.

#### D. Action taken by the Special Committee

128. At the 568th meeting, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that, following informal consultations with a number of delegations, he had prepared a draft consensus on the question of Swaziland, which read as follows:

"Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the previous General Assembly resolutions relating to Swaziland, and having examined the petitions submitted to it, the Special Committee reaffirms its previous resolutions and recommendations and calls upon the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples.

"The Special Committee also requests the administering Power to take immediate steps for the return to the indigenous inhabitants of all the land taken from them.

"Further, the Special Committee requests the administering Power to take all appropriate actions to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence and to protect its territorial integrity and sovereignty in the face of the interventionist policy of the racist régime in South Africa.

"Moreover, the Special Committee urges the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to implement fully, with the co-operation of the United Nations bodies concerned, the recommendations of the Secretary-General as endorsed in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

"Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General contained in document A/AC.109/273 that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends to the General Assembly that the Fund be dissolved, and that, subject to consent of the donor Governments, the funds outstanding be made available to the UNDP for expenditure in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland."

129. At the 569th meeting, the Chairman said that a revised text of the consensus he had previously introduced had been circulated to members. The last sentence of the text would now read:

"Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/273) that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends that subject to the

consent of the donor Governments, the General Assembly should decide to transfer these contributions to the General Fund of the UNDP in the light of the latter's expectation and desire to provide increased assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland."

130. The representative of the United Kingdom stated, with regard to the draft consensus before the Special Committee, that his delegation was somewhat surprised not to have been asked to participate in the consultations which had taken place. Perhaps as a result, the consensus did not seem to him adequately to reflect the view expressed by his delegation. In particular, the recommendation that the United Kingdom Government should grant independence without delay ignored the fact that the question of independence had already been decided. Moreover, the consensus made no mention of the recent achievement by Swaziland of full internal self-government and its attainment of the status of a protected State.

131. With regard to the reference in the second sentence to land taken from the indigenous inhabitants, his delegation had commented in the past on similar points in earlier resolutions and did not need to repeat those comments. He would point out, however, that the question of land ownership was now entirely within the competence of the elected Government of Swaziland and, under the agreed Constitution, the United Kingdom Government no longer had the power to carry out the request contained in that sentence even if it wished to do so. He understood that it was generally accepted in Swaziland that existing occupiers of land should not have their security disturbed, whatever the history of the acquisition of the land. The Constitution, moreover, included provisions for protection from deprivation of property. It also included provisions for protection from discrimination which might be equally relevant to the request in the draft consensus.

132. With regard to the request for action to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Territory, that was the responsibility of his Government until independence was reached, but his delegation had no reason to believe that the territorial integrity of Swaziland was threatened. With regard to the fourth sentence, he thought that the information which he had given showed that the whole tendency of the United Kingdom's aid and development policy recently had been in the direction advocated in the draft.

133. In the light of those comments, his delegation could not but dissociate itself from the consensus. Moreover, the procedure of consensus hardly seemed suitable in such a case, and the right course might be for delegations which supported the draft to submit a draft resolution which could be put to the vote.

134. The Chairman, replying to the United Kingdom representative, said that he had yet to see either a resolution or a consensus of the Special Committee accepted by the United Kingdom delegation as representing its views. As for the question of whether the Special Committee should proceed by consensus or by a resolution, he pointed out that on several occasions in the past, decisions had been adopted by consensus with the Special Committee taking note of any reservations expressed. If, however, the United Kingdom representative insisted that the Special Committee should adopt a resolution in the present instance, and if he was supported by the majority of members, then the Special Committee would, of course, proceed accord-

ingly. When he had originally submitted the draft consensus, after consultation with certain members, he had known that some delegations would express reservations concerning it.

135. The representative of Finland, without entering a formal reservation, said that his delegation had doubts concerning some points in the revised draft consensus, particularly the request to the administering Power to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Swaziland and to take appropriate action to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence. He pointed out that his delegation had abstained from voting on General Assembly resolution 2134 (XXI).

136. The representative of Italy, also without entering a formal reservation, said that his delegation, too, had some doubts concerning the validity of the request to the administering Power to protect the territorial integrity of Swaziland in the face of the interventionist policies of South Africa. That was largely a problem for Swaziland after independence.

137. The representative of Venezuela said that, in general, he shared the views which had been expressed. He proposed that the order of the requests to the administering Power in the third sentence, after the words "to take all appropriate action", should be reversed.

138. The representative of the United States of America said that his country continued to support the right of the people of Swaziland freely to express their desires and, unhampered by outside influences, to govern themselves in accordance with those desires. He welcomed the fact that Lesotho and Botswana had already attained independence and had Governments elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage and full racial equality, and he hoped that, in contrast with South Africa, they and Swaziland would provide enduring examples of multiracial co-operation in achieving economic, social and political progress. The serious economic, social and political difficulties which would face Swaziland should not be minimized, but the future Government of Swaziland would be in the best position to determine how they could be overcome. The revised draft consensus did not take a full and realistic account of all the elements of the situation and his delegation did not entirely agree with its conclusions. It therefore asked that its reservations should be recorded.

139. The representative of Australia said that, in view of the brief debate that had been held on the question of Swaziland, it would probably be better to proceed by a draft resolution rather than by consensus. The revised draft consensus raised considerable difficulties for his delegation, since it did not take sufficient account of the great progress made towards independence during the previous year or give due weight to the geographical situation of Swaziland, which raised great economic and political problems. He failed to see how the administering Power could implement the substantive measures recommended. His delegation therefore wished to reserve its position.

140. The representative of India expressed his delegation's appreciation of the revised draft consensus and supported the amendment proposed by Venezuela. His delegation had no reservations concerning the revised draft consensus but would have preferred it to include an indication that the people of Swaziland had expressed the wish to become independent by September 1968, and not before the end of 1969.

141. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, although his delegation had frequently found it difficult to accept a consensus or resolution without reservations, it believed that, given the favourable omens and prospects in relation to Swaziland and its early achievement of independence, a form of consensus acceptable to all delegations including his own could have been achieved if there had been an opportunity for consultation with the administering Power. If it was the general wish of members to proceed by consensus instead of by a resolution, and to adopt the formulation under consideration, his delegation would not raise any formal objection, provided that it was made clear in the records that the United Kingdom felt obliged to dissociate itself from it.

142. The representative of Uruguay said that it was the responsibility of the Special Committee to seek international guarantees to ensure that Swaziland and the former Territories of Basutoland and Bechuanaland might achieve independence free from all pressure from or intervention by neighbouring States or Territories, especially those ruled by non-African minorities or majorities. That was an insuperable problem in the case of Territories entirely surrounded by enemies. It had been accepted that the responsibility of the administering Power extended only up to the time when the Territories achieved independence and it had been hoped that international guarantees would then be forthcoming. The Special Committee would like to ask the administering Power to do everything possible to protect those Territories. It had been argued, however, that it would be an insult to the newly independent States if undue emphasis was placed on the need for international assistance in solving their legal, political and economic problems and in defending them against their neighbours. The Venezuelan amendment clarified that point and made it possible for his delegation to support the revised draft consensus, on the understanding that it was not a demand imposed upon the administering Power but simply a request to it to protect the people until they achieved independence. After that, it would be the responsibility of the international community to provide the necessary guarantees.

143. At its 569th meeting, the Special Committee adopted the revised draft consensus, as amended by Venezuela, it being understood that the reservations expressed by some members would be reflected in the record of the meeting.

144. The text of the consensus concerning the question of Swaziland adopted by the Special Committee at its 569th meeting on 23 October 1967 reads as follows:

“Recalling General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and the previous General Assembly resolutions relating to Swaziland, and having examined the petitions submitted to it, the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples reaffirms its previous resolutions and recommendations and calls upon the administering Power to grant independence to the Territory without delay and in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people.

“The Special Committee also requests the administering Power to take immediate steps for the return to the indigenous inhabitants of all the land taken from them.

“Further, the Special Committee requests the administering Power to take all appropriate action to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Swaziland in the face of the interventionist policy of the racist régime in South Africa and to enable the Territory to enjoy genuine and complete independence.

“Moreover, the Special Committee urges the administering Power to take the necessary steps to bring about the economic independence of the Territory vis-à-vis South Africa, and in particular to implement fully, with the co-operation of the United Nations bodies concerned, the recommendations of the Secretary-General as endorsed in paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) of 16 December 1965.

“Finally, noting from the report of the Secretary-General (A/AC.109/273) that the total amount of contributions to the Fund established by General Assembly resolution 2063 (XX) has been insufficient to enable the Fund to become operative, the Special Committee recommends that subject to the consent of the donor Governments the General Assembly should decide to transfer these contributions to the General Fund of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the light of the latter's expectation and desire to provide increased assistance to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.”