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President: Mr. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

Present: Representatives of the following countries: Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay.

Representatives of the following specialized agencies:

International Labour Organisation, World Health Organization, International Refugee Organization.

Report of the International Refugee Organization (E/2005) (*concluded*)

1. The PRESIDENT invited the Council to continue its consideration of the report (E/2005) of the International Refugee Organization (IRO), together with the draft resolutions submitted by the United States delegation (E/L.235) and by the Soviet Union delegation (E/L.237).
2. On behalf of the Council, he welcomed the Director-General of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) and invited him to introduce the Organization's annual report for 1950.
3. Mr. KINGSLEY (International Refugee Organization) said that the year 1950 had been notable in the history of the Organization for four outstanding developments.
4. In the first place, the western reception countries had removed many immigration restrictions affecting refugees and had liberalized selection criteria to a marked degree. That development had been so striking that, during the year, the Organization had actually resettled 10,000 refugees over and above the number considered to be resettlable, on the basis of established criteria, at the beginning of the year. In addition, the Organization would re-establish more than 142,000 refugees during the current year.
5. Secondly, 1950 had been marked by the first major success in resolving the most difficult problem confronting IRO, namely that of making suitable permanent arrangements and of finding havens for the handicapped, the

sick and the aged. At the beginning of the year, the problem presented by the so-called "institutional hard core" had appeared well-nigh insoluble. However, by the close of the year, with the assistance of co-operating governments and of the Church groups and voluntary benevolent societies which played so large and constructive a role in the Organization's programmes, suitable arrangements had been made for more than two-thirds of the entire institutional group of some 35,000 persons.

6. The third major development of the year had been the assumption by the governments of Western Europe, Germany and Austria of responsibility for the continuing care and maintenance of those refugees who were neither institutional cases nor in process of resettlement. Under agreements negotiated with the governments concerned, the responsibility for more than 111,000 refugees was transferred to the local authorities in the countries of asylum, and a programme of local settlement and integration had been developed for those who would remain where they were. The Organization had thus ceased to operate a large number of refugee camps, and its installations had been restricted to hospitals and rehabilitation centres, selection and processing camps, and emigration centres. The housing, clothing and feeding of hundreds of thousands of refugees, which had constituted so prominent a part of the programme in the first two years, had thus assumed a secondary importance after the middle of 1950.

7. Finally, an important new development in the year under review had been the use by Member Governments of IRO, of the Organization's migration machinery for the transportation and settlement of non-eligible migrants on a reimbursable basis. The first contract of that kind had been entered into during the year with the United States Displaced Persons Commission for the processing and movement to the United States of 54,000 ethnic Germans and *Volksdeutsche*. Similarly, at the request of the Netherlands Government, IRO ships returning from Australia had repatriated more than 50,000 Dutch civilians and soldiers returning from Indonesia. The IRO had continued to make reimbursable arrangements of that kind at the request of Member Governments and was currently engaged in moving some 90,000 European migrants to the United States, Canada and Australia.

8. The advantages of such a development to all parties were manifest, since Member Governments had been able to take advantage of the experienced IRO migration staff and of its charter fleet of specially converted migrant ships on a cost basis. In that connexion, he stressed that the charter fleet did not enter into competition with normal commercial shipping companies and that such travel arrangements had been made only for those migrants who had no other possibilities of transport. The Organization had vastly benefited by the opportunity of maintaining a larger, more flexible and more economical fleet in operation, particularly in view of the fact that fewer lost ship-days were involved than would have been the case had movements been restricted to refugees. Moreover, such arrangements for return journeys had substantially reduced the costs of transporting refugees to Australia and had thus made it possible for the Organization to resettle many more refugees within the limits of its original funds.

9. Commenting generally on the Organization's work, he expressed the belief that never before in history had such a tragic human problem been tackled by the international community and that never before had it been dealt with by such humane, democratic and expeditious measures. The results achieved were a lasting tribute to the democratic world, for, although membership in the Organization had been limited to eighteen governments which had borne the major burden of the work, there was scarcely a government in the Western Hemisphere which had not made some contribution towards the solution of the problem. He was happy to say that the specific task before IRO had very nearly been completed and that the Organization was, in fact, now in process of liquidation.

10. Since its inception on 1 July 1947, more than a million and a-half refugees and displaced persons had been actively assisted by the Organization and very nearly one million had been repatriated or established in new homes in new countries, most of them overseas. That constituted the largest organized overseas migration in history, and it had been achieved through the active support and co-operation of governments, of the Churches and voluntary benevolent societies, of individual citizens of good will, and through the untiring efforts of a devoted international staff of forty different nationalities. To execute that programme, IRO had assembled, converted and operated under charter the largest peace-time passenger fleet staff directed by a single authority, supplemented by charter planes which transported compassionate cases which could not safely travel by sea. As a result, 191,000 refugees had been resettled during 1950, including a high proportion of cases requiring special welfare assistance. During that same period, the Organization had repatriated 2,900 persons and had transported some 60,000 non-eligible persons at the request of Member Governments and on a fully reimbursable basis.

11. Out of the ten or twelve million displaced persons at the conclusion of the Second World War nine millions had been repatriated before IRO had been established. The Organization had been responsible for repatriating some 70,000 persons, but it had steadfastly refused to force repatriation on displaced persons against their will.

For practical reasons, the problem of repatriation was one of the most difficult problems facing IRO. However, an average of 179 persons per month had been repatriated during the past year.

12. Referring further to the reduction in the care and maintenance responsibilities of the Organization, due both to the sharp reduction in the refugee population as a result of resettlement activities and to the generous action of European governments in assuming the care of those who would remain on their soil, he said that, at the end of the period under review, the number of installations for which IRO made provision had been reduced from 700 in 1947 to 88, and the population receiving full care and maintenance from 719,000 in 1947 to 80,000. There had, of course, been further reductions since the period covered by the report, and the Organization had closed its offices in Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Ireland, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Uruguay, Peru, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

13. With regard to the problem of the institutional group, he observed that the response to the appeal he had made at the end of 1949 on behalf of that group and to the programme developed by the General Council of IRO had been immediate. Thousands of cases had been accepted by the countries of Europe and by Israel, the United States, Canada and New Zealand, and the number of remaining institutional cases had been reduced by the end of the year to less than 8,000. Progress had continued since that date and it was now possible to affirm that, by the time IRO was liquidated, suitable arrangements would have been made for the entire group—in some cases in the country of present residence—and generous and significant contributions towards a final solution of that problem had been made by many nations.

14. In saying that the specific international problems of the displaced persons which had led to the establishment of the Organization would have been substantially solved within the next four to six months when IRO ceased to function, he had not intended to imply that he believed the refugee problem would then have been solved, or that difficult and pressing international problems would not remain in respect of displaced or unassimilable populations. The refugee problem was a reflection of world-wide tensions, and he drew attention to the fact that, for the past eighteen months, IRO had been resettling a number of the new refugees who had come into Western Europe, thus reducing their pressure upon countries of first asylum. He was convinced that some way must be found to assist the international migration of those homeless people, even though their numbers could not at present justify the continuance of an organization on such a large scale and of such a specialized nature as IRO.

15. When IRO ceased to function, there would be established in Europe and elsewhere some 400,000 refugees and stateless persons who would require international protection of the type happily provided for in the Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and in the organization of his

office. There would, however, be other relatively small groups, such as those in Shanghai, the Middle East, Austria or Italy, who would require material assistance, as well as legal protection, if they were to survive. The precise magnitude of those special problems could more easily be determined nearer the time when IRO would cease to function, and it was then the intention of the IRO General Council to address a memorandum on the subject to the next meeting of the General Assembly.

16. Mr. CHA (China) drew the Council's attention to paragraph 54 of the IRO's report referring to the 3,954 refugees still behind the bamboo curtain on the mainland of China. He believed that the statement that the Organization was continuing its efforts in that connexion was evidence of the fact that IRO was not evading its responsibilities, although it was hard to tell when some measure of success might be achieved. The fate of those refugees certainly merited the Council's attention in view of the fact that the Chinese Communist puppet regime had shown no interest in the efforts of IRO to save those people.

17. His delegation wished to avail itself of the opportunity to express its appreciation of the help which IRO had given in repatriating refugees of Chinese origin, particularly the victims of Japanese aggression in South-East Asia. He noted that, up to 31 July 1951, 11,200 such refugees had been repatriated through the good offices of IRO to Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Borneo and Indo-China. He also understood that a number of refugees of Chinese origin were still in Europe, mostly in Italy, awaiting repatriation. He was sure that IRO's efforts to assist those refugees would be remembered with gratitude by his fellow-countrymen.

18. He would like to call the attention of the Council to the Chinese refugees who had escaped to Hong Kong in search of freedom and were living in camps, and who had not yet been given the opportunity of receiving such help.

19. Mr. BEITH (United Kingdom) said that his delegation commended the clear and comprehensive report submitted by IRO. It believed that IRO had been successful in its task and generous in its relationships with other United Nations bodies, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine and the Near East and United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

20. He realized that the task of bringing such an Organization to a close was far from easy. It was to be expected, however, from the far-sightedness of the Organization's financial policy in the past that existing funds would suffice to cover its diminishing activities. His Government had noted with satisfaction the way in which the London office had been brought to a close, following satisfactory liaison with government departments.

21. His Government had noted with regret the considerable time-lag in the transfer of documents necessary for the resettlement of refugees from the offices of IRO to that of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. It believed that such documents should be transferred immediately they ceased to be required by

IRO and provided they were not required by the governments of the countries in which refugees were resettled.

22. He would not discuss the baseless charges against the occupation authorities in Germany contained in the Soviet Union draft resolution (E/L.237), such political accusations being irrelevant to the practical considerations with which the Council was at present dealing.

23. Mr. VAN DER SCHUEREN (Belgium) noted that, through its work in resettling refugees in the overseas countries, the IRO had become a specialist body on questions of migration. It was for that reason that a number of governments had already concluded agreements with it, whereby it was to take charge of the organizational side of non-refugee emigration. Incidentally, IRO had taken an active part in the Preliminary Conference on Migration convened by the International Labour Organisation. In view of its experience in that particular field, it would be regrettable if use were not made of IRO's specialized staff and if its fleet, specially fitted out for that purpose by Belgian firms, were disbanded.

24. As far as the question of resettlement was concerned, the Belgian delegation, while noting with appreciation the generous attitude shown by certain immigration countries, renewed its appeal to the other countries to receive a fair share of the so-called "hard core" refugees.

25. It expressed its gratitude to the International Tracing Service for its valuable work, and trusted that its files would be carefully preserved when it was taken over by the Allied High Commission.

26. In conclusion, the Belgian delegation hoped that the United Nations, IRO and the High Commissioner's Office would make a point of avoiding any interruption in the work of protecting refugees.

27. Mr. ZONOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that he proposed to refer only to the activities of IRO and its Member Governments, and not to the technical questions which other speakers had taken up with a view to demonstrating the best method of transporting human cargo.

28. The Economic and Social Council had already on numerous occasions examined the refugee problem, one of the sequels of the war, in the course of which millions of persons had been driven from their homes and sent into exile. Although several years had elapsed since the end of the Second World War, a large number of those displaced persons, the victims of German fascism, had not yet been able to return to their homelands.

29. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten, as was admitted in paragraph 37 of IRO's report (E/2005), that most of those displaced persons had been repatriated before IRO had begun operations.

30. The text of resolution 62 (I) of 12 February 1946, whereby the General Assembly had established IRO, clearly showed that its basic task was the early return of the refugees to their countries of origin; and that formula had been repeated in subsequent decisions. At a meeting held in April 1947 in Moscow of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the importance of the problem had been recognized and decisions had been adopted to

ensure the return of the refugees and displaced persons to their countries of origin.

31. In spite, however, of the General Assembly resolutions and of the undertakings they had given, the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and France had made every effort to induce IRO to establish a plan whereby the repatriation of the refugees would be rendered more difficult. The result of such a policy was that, despite the statements made by the Director-General of IRO, the problem was still far from being solved.

32. Missions from countries whose nationals were in camps in Germany and Austria had found their task hampered by all manner of restrictions. They had been able to make contact with the individuals concerned only in certain premises and in the presence of the police of the occupation authorities. Contrary to the decisions taken in Moscow, the occupation authorities had imposed strict Press and radio censorship in the camps, preventing displaced persons in them from receiving any information from their countries of origin. Since 1 February 1951, the United States occupation authorities had prohibited the broadcasting from the Salzburg radio station of any news from the Soviet Union. Similar restrictions had been imposed on the showing of films, and a constant campaign against repatriation was being conducted in the camps by the occupation authorities. Soviet citizens in the United States camps, wishing to return to their own country, were subjected to a preliminary interrogation, which often resulted in their being prevented from leaving the camp.

33. IRO and the occupation authorities were encouraging fascist organizations which were conducting libellous campaigns against the Soviet Union. He cited some specific instances which showed that Soviet refugees desiring to return to their native country had been subjected to ill treatment. Furthermore, IRO and the occupation authorities had admitted that war criminals, former collaborators with German fascism, were now being called in to take charge of the refugees in the camps.

34. Again, it was possible to read in the *New York Times* of 12 August 1951 that organizations of refugees from the Soviet Union had evolved plans for anti-Soviet propaganda, to be financed from funds supplied by the American committee for the liberation of the Russian people. The Russian people stood in no need of liberation. It was also known that a veritable propaganda campaign was being conducted in the camps for displaced persons, describing the blissful life awaiting the refugees in the far-distant countries of resettlement. Everybody was aware, however, of the true living conditions of refugees who had settled in the United States, and those conditions had, for example, been described in a series of articles appearing in the *Daily Compass* during October 1950.

35. Ever since its inception, IRO had been taking steps to prevent repatriation and had served the political aims of certain circles by providing cheap labour for American and other colonizers, while hundreds of thousands of

displaced persons were still living in appalling conditions in camps. The selection and transportation of that living merchandise was being effected quite openly by recruiting missions from various countries which visited displaced persons' camps. At the end of the previous year, a statement had appeared in the Austrian Press to the effect that the recruitment of displaced persons was not conducted on the basis of humanitarian considerations but solely for business interests. Furthermore, a number of Soviet citizens who had returned home from such camps had described the methods of recruitment, and he quoted instances to show that a high standard of health was a pre-requisite for resettlement in Australia. An article in the *Reader's Digest* of October 1948 had stated that conditions like those of a labour market existed in displaced persons' camps in Europe; catalogues resembling commercial catalogues were drawn up with a schedule of prices corresponding to skills and physical qualifications; in some cases, it was stated, whole families were resettled; in others, fares were paid by relatives already in the country of resettlement, while in a few instances those resettled consisted of small groups of refugees who had some particular qualifications for which a special need existed in the United States, were between 18 and 25 years of age, and accustomed to a hard life. That was striking testimony on the part of a journal which could not be said to entertain exaggerated sympathy with displaced persons.

36. Furthermore, IRO was playing a part in the provision of refugees and displaced persons to be engaged for subversive activities. In that connexion, he quoted an article in the *New York Times* of 26 August 1949 in which a member of the House of Representatives had said that the intelligence service had requested authorization for 15,000 refugees to enter the United States. A committee of Congress had approved that measure after hearing representatives of the intelligence service say that certain refugees would be able to supply useful information. In addition, the United Press had reported, on 14 May 1951, that the Director-General of IRO had requested the President of the United States to encourage the arrival of refugees from the People's Democracies since they would doubtless prove to be a valuable source of information.

37. Such refugees and displaced persons were also being recruited for the armed forces, with a view to their being engaged in the struggle against liberation movements, more especially in Asia. A Reuter dispatch had reported that the occupation authorities were recruiting displaced persons from Eastern Europe. Moreover, citizens of the Soviet Union who had returned home had borne witness to the fact that recruiting for the Foreign Legion was taking place among displaced persons in the principal French towns, and, in that connexion, he cited an instance of a Soviet citizen who had received news from his son, who had been sent to Indo-China with the Foreign Legion and had afterwards been known to be in hospital in Morocco. Those reports, all of which had a factual basis, were irrefutable proof of the true position.

38. The statement in the IRO's report that, whereas only some 71,000 persons had been repatriated by the end of 1950, more than 800,000 had been resettled or, in other

words, sent overseas as cheap labour, was clear evidence that the Organization was not carrying out the General Assembly's instructions. The fact that the number of displaced persons resettled was out of all proportion to that of those repatriated in 1951 was even more striking testimony to the true circumstances.

39. The statement made by the Director-General of IRO implying that the problem of refugees was virtually solved was in open conflict with the report (E/2036) by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which referred to the new generations growing up in displaced persons' camps. The latter statement seemed to place the situation in a more realistic light.

40. It was on the basis of those considerations that the Soviet Union delegation had submitted its draft resolution (E/L.237) which recommended effective measures for solving the refugee problem.

41. Mr. KOTSCHNIG (United States of America) said that the outstanding record of IRO, as shown in its report, supplemented by the clear statement by its Director-General, was one of which that Organization and the Council itself might well be proud. It provided the best example in recent history of what could be achieved through international co-operation in the face of great difficulties.

42. It was true, however, that the problem of refugees had not been completely solved. New refugees were, indeed, arriving in the free world every day. There did not, therefore, appear to be any actual contradiction between the statement contained in the report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to which the Soviet Union representative had referred, and that made by the Director-General of IRO.

43. His Government wished to address a word of particular appreciation to IRO in the person of its Director-General and his able staff, and had accordingly submitted a draft resolution (E/L.235) to that effect, which he urged the Council to adopt. In that connexion, he wished to thank the French representative for having withdrawn his delegation's draft resolution in favour of that of the United States delegation.

44. Needless to say, his delegation found the Soviet Union draft resolution, based as it was on allegations which would not stand close examination, entirely unacceptable. The submission of such proposals no longer even served propaganda purposes, since it was only too well known that the vast majority of refugees did not desire repatriation and that new refugees were arriving in a continuous flow from the countries of Eastern Europe.

45. The Soviet Union representative's allegation that the United States was recruiting displaced persons to increase its own labour force was all the more ridiculous when it was remembered that only a few days previously the Soviet Union delegation had asserted that there were some 14 million unemployed in the United States. Those two statements were obviously incompatible. Naturally, it was not always easy for displaced persons to adjust themselves to a new way of life in the countries in which they were resettled; but, apart from a few difficult cases, most displaced persons had adapted themselves very

satisfactorily to life in the United States, where they received equal treatment in the matter of wages, and other opportunities similar to those enjoyed by United States citizens. To the Soviet Union representative's charge that the resettlement countries were using the refugees for military purposes, he would merely reply that, under United States law, all immigrants of military age were subject to military service if they wanted to obtain United States citizenship, but that no discrimination was practised against displaced persons.

46. The Soviet Union delegation wished all obstacles to repatriation to be removed. But the greatest of those obstacles being the conditions prevailing in the countries of origin, it was plain that the responsibility did not lie with the reception countries. He felt that the penultimate paragraph of the Soviet Union draft resolution was particularly objectionable in that it would clearly endanger any relatives of displaced persons who were still in the countries of origin.

47. Mr. BIRECKI (Poland) said that the Polish delegation had consistently maintained that IRO's policy, through its opposition to repatriation, had perpetuated the misfortunes of displaced persons who were the victims of Nazi crimes. The justification for that attitude was to be found in the report itself, which admitted that the effect of the obstacles put in the way of the repatriation missions had been to bring repatriation virtually to an end at the time when IRO had been established.

48. The effect of IRO's policy, which placed in charge of camps individuals whose lurid past made it impossible for them to return to the countries they had betrayed, and dangled before the eyes of refugees the prospect of a rosy future in countries far away or near at hand, had been to create a virtual slave market for the countries interested in the cheap labour thus made available.

49. But the chief concern was to create a military reserve, as was proved by the Act, passed on 13 April 1951 by the United States House of Representatives, making military service compulsory for all immigrants between 16 and 26 years old, most of whom were displaced persons from Germany.

50. Displaced persons' camps in Germany, under the auspices of IRO, had been used as recruiting centres for the secret services of States openly preparing further aggression. Incidentally, the Polish delegation had already referred on several occasions to the existence, within Germany itself, of military organizations subject to American and British orders and composed of displaced persons; the strength of those organizations was at present approximately 10,000. The mask had now been removed, and there was no further mention of repatriation. In December 1950, the Polish repatriation centre in Hanover had been obliged to suspend operations; and on 15 June 1951 the United States authorities had requested the closing-down of the Polish repatriation mission at Frankfurt. The Polish Government had protested vigorously against such measures, which had been taken in violation of General Assembly resolutions.

51. IRO announced proudly in its report that, in the field of emigration, it had acquired so much experience that it had become a sort of human transport agency.

The countries interested in obtaining cheap labour were vying with one another for its services. Since the activities in question were on a reimbursable basis, it might well be asked what decisions had been taken by the United Nations to turn IRO, which was invariably represented as a humanitarian institution, into a shipping agency. It was quite clear that the real purpose of establishing IRO had been to set up an organization specializing in problems of emigration which were closely bound up with the military requirements of the North-Atlantic Treaty countries.

52. There was a statement in the *New York Times* of 23 August to the effect that, under the Mutual Security Act, credits of 30 million dollars were being earmarked to keep the IRO mass transportation fleet in operation after the Organization was wound up, so that the programme of transferring surplus manpower from the over-populated countries to the under-developed areas could be carried on. That clearly showed that the operation had a military purpose behind it.

53. The report revealed with astonishing audacity that 111,000 refugees of the so-called "hard-core" category had been placed in the charge of the local authorities in Western Europe, Germany and Austria. The treatment meted out to those poor wretches, incapable of being employed on war production for reasons of health or age, spoke volumes on the "fine ideals" of the capitalists. But, even in the case of the sick and disabled, IRO showed itself hostile to repatriation, and the delegation of the Polish Red Cross in Germany had been obliged to make repeated complaints to IRO officials on the subject.

54. The report referred to "unaccompanied children". That term concealed a real tragedy, for in reality IRO, by preventing children who had been forcibly separated from their mothers from being returned to them, was perpetuating the most odious of the crimes committed by the Nazis. The fact that the sick and disabled, children and old people had become pawns in the policy of the western Powers was a disgrace to humanity.

55. The Director-General of IRO appeared to be much concerned about the fate of the people to whom he referred as new refugees. Those were in reality people who had fled their country where they were to be prosecuted for offences under common law, if not for treason; the United States and the other signatories of the North-Atlantic Treaty were eagerly welcoming such persons and treating them as heroes.

56. When the United States representative said that migration was chiefly taking place from east to west, he no doubt forgot that tens of thousands of Poles were being repatriated from Western Europe to Poland and the other side of the Atlantic to assist in the reconstruction of their country. The best elements were thus returning to the People's Democracies, while the United States welcomed traitors with open arms.

57. The displaced persons who had been driven from their homes by the Nazi aggressors and forced to work for Hitler's war machine against their own countries were at present being used by the North-Atlantic Treaty countries to meet the needs of a war economy directed, once more, against those countries.

58. The only solution to that tragic situation was to repatriate all those who had been torn from their homes during the Nazi occupation. The Polish delegation therefore supported the Soviet Union draft resolution.

59. Mr. MEYKADEH (Iran) congratulated the International Refugee Organization on its report; that report provided evidence of very extensive humanitarian activities, as a result of which millions of people had been given a ray of hope and a means of livelihood at the most tragic moment of their lives.

60. The refugee problem did not arise in Iran, but his delegation was glad to see that IRO was concerned with the plight of refugees all over the world, without distinction of race or religious belief. Within the modest limits of its resources, Iran was doing everything it could to help IRO extend its work, which was above all partisan considerations.

61. Mr. CALDERÓN PUIG (Mexico) said that his country had always regarded the refugee problem from the humanitarian standpoint and had given asylum to political refugees. He congratulated the Director-General of IRO on his report.

62. Deliberately leaving aside the political questions which had been dealt with by other speakers, he said that he agreed with the Belgian representative that the IRO fleet, which had enabled a big emigration programme to be carried out in an emergency, might very profitably be put at the disposal of the body whose task it would be to deal with normal migrations of workers.

63. The tragic problem of the refugees had to a large extent been solved by IRO, and the Director-General of that Organization and his colleagues would be able to retire, on the expiry of their office, with a sense of duty done. The problem, however, remained, and the tragic, wandering figure of the refugee would disappear only when international harmony had been restored, making possible a real application of human rights.

64. Mr. NOSEK (Czechoslovakia) said that the "refugee problem" had been purposely aggravated by the western capitalist countries in their attempt to use "refugees" as material for the realization of their war plans. The western imperialists knew that the workers in the capitalist countries would never fight against the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies, which had made such tremendous sacrifices during the Second World War in order to achieve better living standards for all workers. At the end of the war, the war-mongers of the west had glimpsed a source of manpower for their armed forces in the impoverished and disappointed inmates of the so-called "refugee camps". The United States Secretary of State, Mr Dean Acheson, at a Press conference on 23 June 1949, had actually admitted that the State Department was very happy to see the formation of the so-called national committee for free Europe, which supported politically bankrupt persons from the People's Democracies. Last spring, the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Mr. McCloy, had announced that the United States Government would actively help political refugees from the Soviet Union.

65. The main body of the refugees who were supported by the United States Government were people whom the German fascists had abducted in thousands from Eastern Europe during the Second World War and whose repatriation had been prevented by the Anglo-American occupation authorities. Many such refugees were Nazi informers, spies, *agents-provocateurs*, assistants of the German Nazi murderers, members and collaborators of the Gestapo and other war criminals, who had fled from the advancing Red Army and from partisan units which had liberated territories in Eastern Europe from the Nazi yoke. The common refuge of those war criminals was Western Germany, where the United States military authorities had shown a touching concern for them. Such "refugees" were accompanied by bankrupt Munich politicians in whose empty slogans and speeches the peoples of Eastern Europe had ceased to believe and who were now leading a slanderous propaganda campaign against their own countries in an effort to prepare war against them and sabotage their peaceful work of reconstruction.

66. The western imperialists were making a similar misuse of so-called expelled Germans in Western Germany. They had not created conditions for complete economic and political equality between those Germans and old settlers and purposely fostered a feeling of insecurity amongst them. Most of the so-called "refugees" from Eastern Europe had been settled in the northern regions of Western Germany, Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, as well as in Bavaria, all of which were mainly agricultural districts where the possibility of securing a permanent living was very limited. In some cases "political refugees" were accompanied by young people who had fled to the west out of foolishness or love of adventure. Naturally, what they found in Western Europe in no way corresponded to their conception of adventure. Thus, in June 1951, at a Press conference held in Prague, some of those ill-advised young refugees had explained that they had fought in the French Foreign Legion in Indo-China, but had escaped to the side of the Viet-Minh and returned to Czechoslovakia. Their experience of the appalling conditions in the refugee camps of Western Germany, of the barbarous methods of the French Foreign Legion and of the French way of waging war against the Viet-Minh—which could only be compared with the bestialities committed against the Korean people by the American aggressors—had prompted their escape home to Czechoslovakia, where they were now engaged on peaceful work of reconstruction.

67. Refugees also supplied many spies and terrorists who, after training in American camps, were sent into the People's Democracies to destroy what had been built and to terrorize and murder peaceful citizens. Thanks to the vigilance of the population and the security authorities, all such terrorists were soon arrested and brought to trial.

68. All those refugees, massed in West German refugee camps formed, together with German fascists, an aggressive army poised against the peaceful countries of Eastern Europe. The imperialists made no secret of that fact,

which had actually been admitted by Senator MacCarran in a television interview on 17 August 1951.

69. IRO had served the interests of the capitalists of the Western Hemisphere and had failed to fulfil its allotted task of assisting the repatriation of refugees and persons abducted by the fascist armies. The results of IRO's activities, as outlined in its report, were most unsatisfactory. It was stated in paragraph 37 of that report that most of the 10 or 11 million persons who had been "displaced" during the war had returned to their own countries before IRO had begun operations in July 1947. Since then, up to the end of 1950, only 71,695 had chosen to be repatriated and had returned home with the assistance of IRO. It was further stated, in paragraph 6, that only 2,917 refugees under IRO's mandate had chosen to return home and been accepted during 1950. Of those, 607 were overseas Chinese. Such an unsatisfactory state of affairs was to be ascribed to IRO's failure to discharge its humanitarian task and its persistence in settling refugees in the capitalist countries instead of repatriating them. Thus the report stated, in paragraph 1, that 879,403 refugees had been resettled in new homes in many parts of the world.

70. The Czechoslovak delegation could not accept the United States draft resolution, which proposed that the Council should express its appreciation of the manner in which IRO had carried out its assigned duties and spoke of the great contribution made by that Organization towards the alleviation of human suffering, whereas the facts proved beyond all denial that IRO had, in fact, prevented those who wished to return home from doing so. His delegation, on the other hand, fully supported the Soviet Union draft resolution.

71. Mr. BERLIS (Canada) congratulated IRO on the outstanding work it had accomplished and paid a tribute to the way in which its Director-General and Secretariat had guided its affairs. His delegation was particularly pleased with the passage in paragraph 10 of the report, which stated: "The programme of the International Refugee Organization has been the first great test in peace-time of the notion that practical international problems can be dealt with successfully and efficiently on a large-scale operating basis by a co-operative international administration." IRO's work had been a great and successful experiment involving the lives of many human beings and depending on the good will of governments, international bodies and individuals. Its task had been efficiently carried out and would reach a successful conclusion within a few months. His delegation, which was particularly gratified that Canada had been able to play some part in the work, would support the United States draft resolution.

72. Mr. BERNSTEIN (Chile) said that he would like to pay tribute to the governments of those countries which had given asylum to sick or infirm refugees, and also to congratulate IRO on the admirable way in which it had accomplished its task.

73. In view of the serious accusations made during the meeting on the subject of repatriation, he would be glad to have particulars of the work of the repatriation

missions and of the number of refugees who had returned to their countries of origin during the last few months.

74. Mr. ROCHEFORT (France) felt sure that history would recognize the magnitude of IRO's achievements and would find it surprising that such serious charges could be levelled against the governments and people which had accomplished them.

75. No human endeavour could, of course, be perfect; but it would be reasonable to say that, on the whole, the work carried out by IRO had a profound humanitarian value, and it certainly seemed surprising that those who made it their business periodically to criticize IRO's activities should paint them in such sombre colours.

76. Having presided at the last session of the General Council of IRO, he bore witness to the fact that there had never been any suggestion of traffic in human beings, or of labour exchanges dealing in cheap manpower, or of compulsion for military purposes. As for the alleged sabotage of repatriation, he drew attention to the statements made by the French representative to the General Assembly in 1949 (A/PV.264) when replying to accusations levelled against his Government. Those statements had given detailed information which showed that the French authorities had granted the repatriation missions facilities for visiting the camps, for distributing newspapers and for arranging film shows and broadcasts. They completely contradicted the accusations that had been made, and had not been challenged since, a fact of which the French delegation once again took note.

77. He also recalled that, at the last session of the General Assembly, the French authorities had been accused of arresting a certain number of Spanish Republican refugees guilty of subversive activity, and he had then pointed out that, faced with the option of remaining in France under supervision or of being deported to one of the Eastern European countries, the vast majority had preferred to remain in France under supervision, which proved that they were not as unhappy in France as the Soviet Union representative would have one believe.

78. Mention had been made of displaced persons being recruited by force for the Foreign Legion. It was true that the Foreign Legion, as its name implied, was open for enlistment to foreigners, but who really believed that force was used to get people to enlist in it? The Soviet Union representative had cited the case of a Soviet citizen alleged to have been beaten because he wanted to return to his own country. Such one-sided statements were not enough to support an accusation.

79. But the best answer to such accusations was the policy of IRO and of France with regard to the "hard-core" cases, for which, since 1948, the French delegation had been asking for a special financial effort. That had now been made and, as a result, hospital beds had been endowed and sanatoria and old people's homes had been established. It might well be asked what ulterior motive France might have in keeping those poor disabled or consumptive creatures within its borders. It could hardly be described as a military motive.

80. It was true that the receiving countries owed much to refugees, for those countries had gained valuable

experience and were the richer for it, since the solution of the problem had required them to open wider their frontiers and to make their regulations more humane.

81. In conclusion, he would like to pay a special tribute to Mr. Kingsley, who had directed the Organization so effectively. The European countries were particularly grateful to him for having prepared the way for future action by inaugurating an emigration programme which was still one of their most vital concerns.

82. Mr. BEITH (United Kingdom), while expressing his delegation's full support of the United States draft resolution, proposed that the latter part of the last paragraph from the words "and to request the Secretary-General to transmit his resolution . . .", be deleted, since the procedure outlined would be followed in the normal course.

It was so agreed.

83. Mr. HADI HUSAIN (Pakistan) expressed his delegation's whole-hearted support for the United States draft resolution, since the experience of his country in dealing with 6 million displaced persons from India at the time when Pakistan had been establishing itself as an independent State had made him fully aware of the tremendous work which IRO had accomplished.

84. Mr. REYES (Philippines) paid a tribute to the great humanitarian services which IRO had rendered and expressed support for the United States resolution.

85. Mr. DESAI (India) said that his country fully appreciated the difficulties involved in the resettlement of refugees and considered that IRO had done an excellent job. His delegation would vote in favour of the United States draft resolution.

86. Mr. CARBONNIER (Sweden) said that, although his country was not a member of IRO, it had followed the activities of that organization with great interest and had much appreciated the work of IRO when collaborating with it in settling certain refugees in Sweden. His delegation felt that IRO had made a substantial contribution towards the alleviation of human suffering. It would therefore support the United States draft resolution.

87. Mr. ALFONSIN (Uruguay) said that his delegation considered the work accomplished by IRO to be entirely satisfactory, and offered it his congratulations. Uruguay had contributed towards IRO's humanitarian work to the full extent of its resources, and its delegation would vote for the United States draft resolution.

88. Mr. CABADA (Peru) expressed his delegation's gratitude for the work done by IRO, particularly during the past year. Prompted by those sentiments, he would support the United States delegation's draft resolution.

89. Mr. ZONOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), replying to the French representative, who had said that history would bear witness to the achievements of IRO, observed that the real history of the IRO refugee camps would be written by those who had lived in them. Answering the French representative's charge that his

(Mr. Zonov's) criticisms of IRO's activities were purely destructive, he would say that, in his opinion, there was nothing destructive about the exposure of crimes perpetrated in refugee camps. In response to the French representative's request for facts and details in support of the Soviet delegation's accusation, he would reply that the Soviet Union had already given such information and was ready to repeat it. For example, a Soviet citizen in an American camp in Austria who had said he wished to be repatriated to the Soviet Union had been beaten. Soviet Union citizens had been made to fight in the French Foreign Legion to help in the suppression of the liberation movement of the peoples of Asia. To such facts should be added those put forward by the Czechoslovak representative.

90. The United States representative had said that it would not be a matter for surprise if the United States delegation found the Soviet Union draft resolution unacceptable. On the contrary, the Soviet Union delegation was very much surprised, since both their countries had signed agreements concerning refugees and both had voted for General Assembly resolution 62 (I) governing the work of IRO.

91. The United States representative had further asked how his country could be accused of using refugees as a cheap source of manpower and at the same time fostering unemployment. The connexion between the two was not far to seek; cheap refugee labour was imported in order to bring pressure to bear on the home labour market, refugees being usually prepared to accept any conditions of work.

92. As to the United States representative's contention that refugee movements seemed to take place only from east to west, it should be pointed out that tens of thousands of Armenian settlers in the United States had returned to their native country and that, during the past year, 6,500 refugees had been similarly repatriated.

93. The French representative's reference to the many refugees who were unable to work and were looked after on humanitarian grounds was hardly valid, since such refugees represented only a small proportion of those settled in France.

94. The real solution to the problem was repatriation and not resettlement and for that reason the Council should adopt the Soviet Union's resolution.

95. Mr. KOTSCHNIG (United States of America) said that the Soviet Union representative had misunderstood his previous statement about the movement of refugees from west to east. He had not implied that there was no movement whatsoever from west to east; he had said only that it was on a comparatively small scale. For example, it was known that between fifty and sixty Polish families had returned from the United States to Poland, but such figures should be compared with the 6 or 7 million people of Polish descent living in the United States.

96. Mr. BIRECKI (Poland) said that he did not wish to leave the Council with the erroneous impression that might have been created by the United States representative's statements. Even if only fifty Polish families had returned to Poland from the United States, the Poles, some 50,000 in number, who had returned from France, and the 25,000 who had returned from Belgium, should also be taken into consideration. Furthermore, migration from west to east did not take place to Poland alone. The Soviet Union representative had already cited the case of the thousands of persons who had returned to his country, and the Czechoslovak representative could do likewise.

97. The PRESIDENT declared the debate closed and put to the vote the United States draft resolution (E/L.235), amended by the deletion of the second part of the last paragraph beginning with the words: "and to invite the Secretary-General . . .".

The resolution, as amended, was adopted by 15 votes to 3.

The Soviet Union draft resolution (E/L.237) was rejected by 15 votes to 3.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.

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