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**ECONOMIC AND
 SOCIAL COUNCIL**
OFFICIAL RECORDS



**THIRTEENTH SESSION, 539th
 MEETING**

THURSDAY, 6 SEPTEMBER 1951, at 3 p.m.

PALAIS DES NATIONS, GENEVA

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President: Mr. Hernán SANTA CRUZ (Chile).

Present: Representatives of the following countries:
 Belgium, Canada, Chile, China, Czechoslovakia, France,
 India, Iran, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
 Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United
 Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United
 States of America, Uruguay.

Representatives of the following specialized
 agencies:

International Labour Organisation, Food and Agriculture
 Organization of the United Nations, United Nations
 Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, World
 Health Organization.

Technical and financial assistance to Libya (E/2042)

1. The PRESIDENT invited the United Nations Commissioner in Libya to introduce the Secretary-General's report (E/2042).
2. Mr. PELT (United Nations Commissioner in Libya) thanked the Council for granting him the opportunity to present a brief account of the measures which the United Nations and the specialized agencies had taken to provide Libya with technical assistance since he had last addressed the Council over a year ago.
3. Had the United Nations programmes of technical assistance not been established, a similar local programme would have had to be launched for Libya in order to enable the United Nations to deal with the logical consequence of the General Assembly's resolution 289 (IV) to make Libya an independent State by the end of the year. He had good reasons to believe that, notwithstanding the short time left, the purpose of that resolution would be achieved within the appointed period.
4. The Libyan National Assembly would complete the Libyan constitution in the course of the current month, and the plan for the progressive transfer of powers from the United Kingdom and France as administering States would go into effect about the middle of the month,

supported by the plan for a budget and a civil service of the new Libyan Government. Plans to issue before the end of the year a single Libyan currency to replace the different currencies at present in circulation in that country were in an advanced state of preparation. An independent Libyan Government would be functioning towards the end of December, after elections had been held earlier that month. The Libyan people had shown a real determination to carry out their share of the implementation of the General Assembly's resolutions relating to Libya—namely, the establishment of their constitution and of government machinery. To do so they had required the assistance of the Commissioner and the Council for Libya as well as of the administering Powers. Once they had achieved independence, they would require considerable external financial and technical aid.

5. The hard fact was that Libya was an extraordinarily poor country with a marginal agricultural economy which provided the inhabitants with a national income estimated by technical assistance experts at approximately 35 dollars per head per annum. Documents submitted to the Council showed that that figure was one of the lowest for average *per capita* income in the countries of the Near and Middle East. The budgets of the federal Government and the provincial administrations for the year following the attainment of independence would show a total deficit of approximately 5.6 million dollars, or over 30 per cent. Those budgets provided for only modest expenditure on economic development.
6. Libya's exports were far from sufficient to balance its import requirements. Libya was suffering from the consequences of insufficient educational and training opportunities for its indigenous population, despite the great educational improvement brought about by the United Kingdom and France as administering Powers. As a result, the new State lacked trained personnel to fill the technical and senior administrative posts required for carrying on its normal governmental activities. A number of those posts would therefore have to be filled by specialists of non-Libyan origin who would serve as Libyan civil servants.

7. He had placed those facts before the Council when he had last addressed it over a year ago. At its eleventh session, the Council had adopted resolution 322 (XI) "*Recognizing that the people in Libya stand in great need of assistance in the development of their economy and in the establishment of an efficient public administration in order to create an independent and economically viable State*", drawing the attention of the Secretary-General, the executive heads of the specialized agencies and the Technical Assistance Board (TAB) to "the special need for early action in Libya", and requesting "the Secretary-General to present to the fifth regular session of the General Assembly specific proposals as to the procedure which would enable Libya to continue to receive technical assistance after its independence has been achieved and before it has become a Member of the United Nations or of a specialized agency participating in the expanded programme". Accordingly, the Secretary-General had presented appropriate proposals to the General Assembly, and the General Assembly had adopted resolution 398 (V) recognizing "the special responsibility of the United Nations for the future of Libya" and "the need for continuing technical assistance to Libya without interruption, even after the attainment of its independence", requesting the Council and the specialized agencies concerned "to consider Libya, as soon as it shall be constituted an independent State . . . as eligible to continue to receive technical assistance in such form as the Government of Libya may request, from the expanded programme of the United Nations"; instructing the Technical Assistance Board "to be mindful of the economic unity and independence of Libya"; and recommending that "the need for preparing a complete plan for the economic, social and cultural development of Libya shall be borne in mind by the appropriate authorities when requesting technical assistance for Libya or when considering requests for technical assistance for Libya".

8. The United Nations and the specialized agencies participating in the work of TAB had approved a number of requests for the provision of technical assistance to Libya submitted by the administering Powers, requests for which the agreement of the local Libyan territorial governments and of the Provisional Libyan Government had first been secured. The Libyan leaders had readily agreed, for they looked to the United Nations and the specialized agencies to bring them impartial and competent aid in meeting their administrative, economic and social problems.

9. He would not go into the details of the assistance given to Libya by the United Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Labour Organisation, the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the International Monetary Fund, since they had been brought to the attention of the Council in connexion with the report on the expanded programme of technical assistance (E/2054 and Add.1/Rev.1). He would merely recall that the United Nations and the specialized agencies had so far provided, or were about to provide, over sixty experts and technicians for Libya and had earmarked or awarded nearly fifty fellow-

ships and scholarships for that country. Limitations on such assistance had been imposed only by the availability of personnel and Libya's capacity for absorption. The United Nations and the specialized agencies had given wholehearted support to requests for aid to Libya in full accordance with the relevant resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly. Their aid to Libya was one of the most constructive and helpful examples of implementation of the United Nations plans for helping under-developed countries.

10. The first phase of technical assistance to Libya—namely, the drafting of a balance sheet of the present economic position and of the country's potentialities—had been completed in July. Reports and recommendations had been prepared on the general economy, agriculture, public finance, wool, viticulture, vital statistics, public health, education and irrigation. The second phase, that of drafting an economic and social development plan, had been started as soon as the balance sheet had been completed and the work was well under way. In connexion with the plan, a report was being prepared on war damage. Throughout the planning and implementation of technical assistance to Libya by the United Nations and the specialized agencies, the relevant recommendations of the General Assembly had been carefully observed. When that task was completed at the end of the year, the new Libyan State would have analyses and recommendations comprising a frank and realistic appraisal of its own resources and a plan for its economic and social development. It would be for the Libyan Government itself to decide whether that plan was to be adopted.

11. But all that was not enough. Financial assistance had to be provided to enable the new State to implement the decisions of the United Nations. The General Assembly had made no specific provision for financial aid to Libya. He understood that the Council and the General Assembly were not favourably inclined towards the establishment of a United Nations grant-in-aid programme to supplement technical assistance activities. And yet Libya required such grants-in-aid, and that raised a number of problems.

12. The economic and social needs of a country as poor as Libya with its lack of trained personnel and of experience in administration could be met only to a very small extent, if at all, by private investment loans requiring the payment of dividends and the eventual repayment of the capital. Libya's financial requirements related to basic development of agriculture, education and public health, which offered no immediate returns. He had therefore felt it his duty to call upon those Powers, whether they were Members of the United Nations or not, which he had presumed would be willing to consider offering financial assistance to the new State. He had approached Egypt, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States. He was glad to report that from all of them, albeit in varying forms and degrees, there had been positive commitments to help the new State by providing capital or making annual contributions to help carry out its economic development as well as to maintain its ordinary administrative budget. Detailed agreements embodying the exact conditions under which that aid

would be forthcoming were still being negotiated with the Libyan Government. He had been assured by the Powers which were willing to contribute and by the Libyan Provisional Government that those arrangements would be compatible with Libyan independence and sovereignty. Needless to say, all such offers of help should be in accordance with the general principles of technical assistance and the financing of development in under-developed areas laid down by the Council.

13. It would have been extremely helpful to Libya if the United Nations and the specialized agencies had directly participated in financial assistance for the economic development of the country. Provision by them of such financial assistance, in addition to technical assistance, would have afforded concrete proof to the new State of the interest taken in it by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. It would have lessened the misgivings of those who considered with some uneasiness the financial help being given by advanced countries to under-developed countries. However, he was not intending to propose the establishment of a special United Nations fund for aid to Libya, for he fully realized the insurmountable difficulties that the introduction of an entirely new feature into the United Nations programme for Libya would entail. He had decided to follow that policy, even though the people of Libya had hoped that the United Nations would complete its decision to make Libya independent by providing the necessary financial assistance. It was only natural that the people of Libya should entertain such hopes without regard to hard facts.

14. He hoped that the assistance of the United Nations and the specialized agencies in implementing development programmes in Libya would be as substantial as possible, both in regard to the scope of the programmes and to the amount of experts and materials made available. Under the terms of General Assembly resolution 289 (IV), he was empowered to make suggestions to the Council about measures the United Nations might adopt, during the period before the attainment of independence, for the solution of Libya's economic and social problems. His duties in Libya were rapidly drawing to an end. The United Nations and the specialized agencies had assisted Libya within the limits of their resources. It was their clear duty to continue such assistance after the country had attained independence. The leaders and the whole people of Libya greatly appreciated that assistance. In fact, they looked to the United Nations to help them establish and develop their governmental services and to plan and carry out their economic and social development so that ultimately they could stand on their own feet and achieve a progressively increasing standard of living. Under those circumstances, he would depart somewhat from his strictly appointed task to suggest that the Council reiterate its continued interest in Libya as a special responsibility of the United Nations; that it request the Technical Assistance Board to bear that responsibility in mind; and that, in accordance with the agreement which TAB had already reached regarding the initial years of Libya's independence, the country should be relieved of the necessity for paying the local costs of such technical assistance as it might request.

15. Mr. LEDWARD (United Kingdom) congratulated the United Nations Commissioner in Libya upon his clear account of the situation in that country. The report showed that a certain amount of progress had been made. It was all the more creditable that the good work had gone ahead in spite of difficult circumstances, of which little mention had been made in the report. After the Council's general discussion on technical assistance and measures to improve public administration under items 32 and 33 of the agenda, it was most instructive to turn from the general to the particular and to examine the provision of technical assistance to a specific country, such as Libya, which was a very poor country with a very unfavourable climate, about to attain its independence. To meet the urgent need for assistance in public administration, the United Nations and UNESCO had made every effort to train a civil service in its initial stages. Without going into details on the country's problems, which were already described in TAB's report, he would point out that diversification of the country's economy was essential to enable it to become economically viable and to make the best use of its resources. Nor was it necessary to mention in detail all that the United Kingdom had done as the administering Power in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, both alone and in collaboration with the United Nations, to further the country's development when first making their request for assistance more than a year ago, the United Kingdom authorities had stressed the need for drawing up a twenty-year plan for the development of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in accordance with a careful estimate of the capacity of those territories for development. His Government was glad that the United Nations experts in Libya in dealing with Libya's problems were now turning from the piecemeal to the planning approach. It was unfortunate for Libya that one year had gone by before that had happened. He hoped that work on such a plan would soon be under way and that the country would benefit greatly thereby.

16. The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration (TAA), WHO, FAO and UNESCO had all done outstanding work of great value to Libya. The United Kingdom Government hoped that the United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF) would also play a part in the development of the country before the end of the year. It was most important that there should be no interruption in the provision of technical assistance to Libya at the moment when it attained independence. One of the purposes of General Assembly resolution 398 (V) was to prevent such an interruption, and that was also the main purpose of the draft resolution submitted jointly by the delegations of France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom (E/L.261). The draft resolution recalled the special responsibility of the United Nations for the future of Libya, and also the General Assembly's recommendation that technical assistance to Libya should be continued without interruption and requested TAB to continue to grant assistance to Libya after it had attained independence and before it had become a Member of the United Nations or of a specialized agency participating in the expanded programme of technical assistance; it also proposed that the

Council take note of the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) and transmit it to the General Assembly.

17. Mr. DE SEYNES (France) joined with the United Kingdom representative in congratulating the United Nations Commissioner in Libya and thanking him for his very clear and impartial report. Some of the problems mentioned in the report were particularly prominent in the Fezzan—the part of Libya under French administration.

18. Technical assistance to Libya was important for several reasons: first, because it was essential in order to carry out the wishes of the General Assembly and to enable Libya to attain independence; secondly, because in that country technical assistance was being applied to a particularly barren land. Hence it was fortunate that the machinery of technical assistance had been ready to operate satisfactorily during the relatively brief period of Libya's preparation for independence.

19. With regard to the situation in the Fezzan, he referred to chapter III of the report¹ of the Commissioner in Libya to the General Assembly which gave detailed geographical, demographic and economic information.

20. The real problem in the Fezzan was to prevent a hostile natural environment from driving men from the regions where they had gained a foothold. It was necessary to maintain existing possibilities of life and to prevail over the desert as far as possible. Unfortunately, modern technical methods offered only limited possibilities for such action. As an example, he mentioned the difficulties of exploiting the water lying at varying depths in the sub-soil of the Fezzan.

21. In addition to the difficulties due to local conditions, there were other obstacles to the organization of a technical assistance programme. It was difficult to recruit experts with the necessary qualifications and experience; it was also difficult to persuade the local population to contribute to the expense of carrying out a technical assistance programme. Finally, the budgetary resources of the Fezzan were very meagre; in 1951/52 they had hardly exceeded 150,000 dollars.

22. He was glad that, in spite of those serious difficulties, efforts had been made to establish the fundamental conditions essential for the development of the territory. He pointed out that the French Administration had worked to the same end in collaboration with the United Nations Mission in Libya. Efforts had been mainly concentrated on education, hygiene, health and social conditions.

23. The results to be expected in education were extremely modest. For the time being, all that could be done was to give the population the rudiments of a fundamental education and to acquaint them with modern agricultural methods and technical progress in certain branches of light industry.

24. The difficulties of improving hygiene and health were equally great. In 1943, 95 per cent of the population had been suffering from trachoma and 25 per cent

from malaria. Thanks to the efforts made by the French Administration in collaboration with the United Nations, the incidence of trachoma had now been reduced to 50 per cent and malaria had practically disappeared.

25. The French Administration had also endeavoured to introduce measures for the protection of health, the teaching of hygiene and the supervision of nutrition. Mothers and children had been first to benefit thereby.

26. In the social field, the French Administration had concerned itself with the structure of indigenous society. He mentioned by way of example the experiment made in the Fezzan in connexion with the Djebads, who drew water from the wells for the landowners. The position of the Djebads, who were bound to the landowners by contract, was a kind of servitude. Under the terms of their contract they received one-quarter of the grain harvest obtained through their work, which was just sufficient to prevent them dying from starvation, and the inevitable result was that they were perpetually in debt. In 1947, the French Administration had decided to revise all contracts binding the Djebads to landowners, the respective shares being fixed henceforth at one-third and two-thirds. New lands rendered fertile through artesian borings had been allocated to the Djebads with full title of ownership. Moreover, the French Administration had repaid landowners for debts contracted by the Djebads, so as to make the latter completely independent. That social reform had been steadily extended and would continue after Libya had gained its independence.

27. He shared the hope of the United Kingdom representative that the efforts made by the United Nations to provide Libya with technical assistance would not be relaxed when the independence of that country had been established.

28. In conclusion, he wished to supplement the Secretary-General's report on technical assistance to Libya with some recent information regarding the Fezzan. The French Administration had just made a further application for experts to the United Nations. Among others, the following were required: an expert on general economy, who would be responsible for co-ordinating the whole mission; an expert on the financing of development projects; an expert on mineral resources; an expert on the training of labour, particularly for industries processing agricultural products; an agronomist specializing in questions of agricultural credits and co-operatives; and an expert on underground water resources. In addition, contacts had recently been made with UNICEF, with a view to drawing up a new programme for the Fezzan.

29. Mr. ISMAIL (Pakistan) said that the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) gave a brief but clear account of the technical assistance which the United Nations and the specialized agencies had given to Libya in accordance with the General Assembly's recommendation. He had noted with great interest the statement of the United Nations commissioner in Libya that the United Nations and the specialized agencies had provided or were about to provide over sixty experts and technicians for Libya and had earmarked or awarded nearly fifty fellowships or scholarships for that country. He was not

¹ See *Official Records of the General Assembly*, fifth session, Supplement No. 15 (A/1340).

quite sure whether the results of technical assistance so far provided for Libya could be evaluated at the present juncture, but there was no doubt that such technical assistance was of great importance for the economic development of under-developed countries such as Libya. Since the United Nations had a special responsibility for Libya's future, he agreed that that Organization and the specialized agencies should continue to provide such technical assistance as the Libyan Government might request after the country had attained its independence; that was essential to provide a firm basis for economic and social progress there.

30. With reference to the final paragraph in the Secretary-General's report, he would suggest that the Secretary-General should take steps to provide for tours for the prospective employees of the department of agriculture and that he should ensure that experts who might be sent to Libya should be persons with as wide a knowledge as possible of conditions in Libya and with sympathetic understanding of the problems of the country.

31. Since his delegation considered that Libya required substantial financial as well as technical assistance, he had noted with pleasure the statement of the United Nations Commissioner in Libya that negotiations were in progress to obtain financial assistance for Libya from the countries he had mentioned. His delegation would have preferred the financial assistance required for the development of Libya to have been given by the United Nations, but in view of the Commissioner's statement and of the decision taken earlier in the session on the question of the establishment of an international authority for financing economic development, he did not consider it necessary to comment further on that point. The draft resolution submitted by his delegation jointly with that of France and the United Kingdom drew attention to the special responsibility of the United Nations for Libya's future and to the part which TAB should play in Libya's development. He hoped that the Board would continue to pay special attention to the provision of technical assistance for Libya.

32. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) wished to associate his delegation with the expressions of appreciation of the able statement made by the United Nations Commissioner in Libya. The United States delegation had little to add to what had already been said on the item. He could only reaffirm the interest the United States Government took in the development of Libya as it moved towards independence. The provision of technical and financial assistance, especially after the country had attained independence, was vital for achieving real progress in Libya. He had been much impressed by the way in which the United Nations and the specialized agencies had provided experts on different subjects and granted fellowships to Libya. He had noted that, although the report contained an account of the assistance to Libya given by the United Nations and various specialized agencies, there was no mention of any assistance from the International Labour Organisation. He understood that three experts had been sent to Libya by that Organisation. He supposed that there had

merely been a mistake of omission, which would be rectified.

33. The programme of assistance to Libya should not be considered a short-term venture. Several years must elapse before its results would be evident. He hoped that, after the country had attained independence, its government would be encouraged to request technical assistance from the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and that it would make use of all the assistance it could obtain from the international organizations. The General Assembly had recognized "the need for continuing technical assistance to Libya" and had significantly added the words "without interruption, even after the attainment of its independence". Being of opinion that the Council should reaffirm that principle of continuing assistance, he would vote in favour of the joint draft resolution of France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom.

34. Mr. BERNSTEIN (Chile) said that for some time past the Chilean Government had been giving careful consideration to Libya's economic problems and to the provision of technical assistance to that country. It had participated in the discussion on those matters at the third and fourth sessions of the General Assembly and had helped to draft General Assembly resolution 398 (V). The Chilean delegation was therefore particularly interested in the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) and the introductory statement just made by the United Nations Commissioner in Libya. It appreciated his frankness and greatly admired the work he had done in Libya. The Chilean Government was satisfied that the administering Powers in Libya had fulfilled their duty of guiding Libya towards independence.

35. Libya's principal problems were the extremely low *per capita* income, the excess of imports over exports and the lack of native-born administrative officers and of indigenous inhabitants suitable for United Nations fellowships. That shortage was due to the extremely low level of education. That fact was to be ascribed to a particularly bad chapter of colonial history; Libya had become a colonial territory in 1912 and throughout its existence as a colonial territory had remained extremely backward, no measures having been taken to promote hygiene or to train the natives for the civil service.

36. The case of Libya afforded clear proof that technical assistance without corresponding financial assistance might be useless. He hoped that the United Nations might quickly discover means of providing Libya with financial assistance. The United Nations had a special responsibility for Libya, since it would be the first country to be created an independent State by the organization. Therefore, it should certainly give Libya technical assistance and, if possible, financial assistance. He was generally in favour of the joint draft resolution, which was in accordance with General Assembly resolution 398 (V) and repeated the clause in that resolution as to the need for continuing technical assistance to Libya without interruption even after the attainment of its independence. The draft resolution made no mention, however, of the clauses in the General Assembly's resolution concerning the need for a complete plan for the economic,

social and cultural development of the country and recommending TAB to bear in mind the economic unity and independence of Libya. To make good that omission, he would propose the addition at the end of the penultimate paragraph of the draft resolution of the words "bearing in mind the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolution 398 (V)".

37. The PRESIDENT suggested that the observer representing Egypt who had requested to be allowed to take part in the debate should be permitted in accordance with the rules of procedure to do so, but without the right to vote.

It was so agreed.

38. AZMI Bey (Egypt) said that his country was deeply interested in the Libyan situation because Libya was an Arab country. The United Nations had recognized Egypt's interest in Libya in appointing it a member of the United Nations Council for Libya. His Government considered that the United Nations had a special responsibility for the future of Libya, particularly in the field of technical assistance, and was therefore paying close attention to, and was prepared to co-operate in, that work. As it had informed the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, it was ready to bear a share of the deficit in the Libyan State's budget once that deficit and the share for which other States would be responsible had been determined.

39. Egypt was proud to assist all Arab countries in the fields of culture and education and would willingly assume special responsibility for education in Libya.

40. As to the question of the currency to be adopted for Libya, he wished to enter reservations regarding the currency system in course of preparation and reserved his Government's verdict on the question whether those measures were in conformity with the General Assembly resolutions.

41. He added that, were Egypt a member of the Council he would have voted for the joint draft resolution of France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom and support the amendment submitted by the Chilean delegation.

42. Mr. YU (China), expressing appreciation of the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) and the introductory statement made by the United Nations Commissioner in Libya, said that his Government had been the first Member of the United Nations to support the movement for Libyan independence. It had given such support unwaveringly since the Peace Conference in Paris in 1946. Consequently, his delegation had noted with pleasure the progress made by the United Nations Commissioner in co-operation with the authorities administering the country towards the attainment of its independence. Libya, being the first independent State for whose creation the United Nations would be responsible, should be given all possible assistance by the United Nations and the specialized agencies. At the present time when the independence of many nations was menaced, it was particularly gratifying that the United Nations should be engaged on making a new State truly independent. He congratulated the United Nations Commissioner in Libya on the progress he had achieved

and hoped that it would be continued, so that Libya might soon become a truly democratic and independent member of the United Nations.

43. Mr. DELHAYE (Belgium) recalled that his country's representatives in various organs of the United Nations had invariably voted for any proposals designed to promote Libya's economic development, both before and after the achievement of independence. Such was the case, for example at the eleventh session of the Council (413th meeting) during the vote on the joint resolution of the Chilean and United States delegations, and at the fifth session of the General Assembly, when resolution 387 (V), and paragraph 4 of that resolution in particular, had been put to the vote.

44. The Belgian Government had accordingly studied with great interest the report by the Secretary-General on the technical assistance furnished to Libya to date and had pleasure in congratulating the United Nations Commissioner on some remarkable achievements in that field.

45. During the present session, Belgium had been one of those countries which had voted for the continuation of the United Nations technical assistance programmes and it was likewise in favour of Libya's continuing to receive the aid granted under those programmes.

46. He recalled the statements made to the General Assembly, at its fifth session, by the Belgian representative, on the question of reparations, which was governed by part VI of the Treaty of Peace with Italy, and on the economic and financial provisions relating to Libya, appearing in General Assembly resolution 388 (V) of 15 December 1950, and added that no objection had been made at the time to the observations of the Belgian delegation either at the meetings of the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee or in the General Assembly itself.

47. Mr. INGLÉS (Philippines) said that, since Libya was about to become an independent State as a result of direct action by the United Nations, his delegation agreed that the responsibility of the United Nations for its development should not cease with the proclamation of national independence. The United Nations and the specialized agencies should continue to give it particularly generous assistance under the expanded programme of technical assistance, but there should be no interference with the new State's sovereignty. He had been pleased to note from the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) that substantial assistance had already been given to Libya to help prepare the way for the attainment of independence. Since, without a special mandate being given by a competent organ of the United Nations, Libya would not be eligible for technical assistance from the United Nations or the specialized agencies after it had become independent and before it became a member of one of those agencies, he would support the joint draft resolution in its entirety. The Philippines delegation would support all action to give effect to the General Assembly's decision that Libya should be made a unified independent State. Success in Libya would testify to the efficacy of international co-operation in helping the peoples of dependent or Non-Self-Governing Territories to regain their political and economic freedom, and would further demonstrate

the efficacy of the United Nations expanded programme of technical assistance.

48. Mr. ADARKAR (India) said that he had noted with pleasure that the administering Powers in Libya had taken more or less adequate steps to ensure that Libya received sufficient technical assistance from the United Nations and the specialized agencies. But the General Assembly's directives concerning Libya had not been fully observed; for, although considerable technical assistance had been granted, that country had not received the financial assistance it urgently needed to achieve a viable economy. The Secretary-General's report (E/2042) made no mention of financial assistance to Libya.

49. As Libya would be the first independent State to be set up under the ægis of the United Nations, he had been particularly glad to hear the United Nations Commissioner's statement on his negotiations concerning the provision of the financial assistance Libya needed. For the foregoing reasons, he agreed with the principle of the Chilean amendment, but instead of that text wished to propose that the first part of the second paragraph of the joint draft resolution be amended to read, "*Having taken note of General Assembly resolution 398 (V) asking the Economic and Social Council, among other things, to consider . . .*". He also would propose the addition after that paragraph of a new paragraph reading "*Noting further that further steps are under consideration by administering and other governments to aid Libya so as to establish her financial viability*". In view of the great interest of the statements made at the current meeting, he would finally propose that after the words in the final paragraph "*Transmits the report to the sixth session of the General Assembly*" there should be added the words "*together with the proceedings of the Council on this subject*".

50. Mr. MEYKADEH (Iran) said that, both as a member of the community of Moslem countries and as a Member of the Economic and Social Council, his country supported all measures which might facilitate the building of the new State of Libya. Hence he accepted both the joint draft resolution of France, Pakistan and the United Kingdom (E/L.261) and the Chilean amendment. He considered that the amendments proposed by the Indian delegation were both practical and logical and deserved consideration by the Council.

51. Mr. DE SEYNES (France), Mr. ISMAIL (Pakistan) and Mr. LEDWARD (United Kingdom) accepted the Indian representatives amendments to the joint draft resolution.

52. In reply to the PRESIDENT, Mr. BERNSTEIN (Chile) said that, although he would prefer a reference to General Assembly resolution 398 (V) in the operative part of the draft resolution, he would withdraw the amendment he had proposed in favour of the first amendment suggested by the Indian representative.

53. Mr. MOROSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation was unable to obtain a clear picture from the Secretary-General's report on technical and financial assistance to Libya (E/2042) as to what specific assistance had been given for the economic

development of Libya and as to what had been achieved in the economic, educational and health fields in that territory. The information given in the report was too scanty to enable his delegation to regard it as satisfactory.

54. During the General Assembly's discussion on the subject, several delegations had pointed out that not only technical assistance but also financial assistance to Libya was necessary. The report did not disclose whether financial assistance had been given. Several speakers in the General Assembly had also urged the use of technical assistance to bolster Libya's export trade. It would be obvious that assistance of that sort was one-sided and the General Assembly had never contemplated development along such narrow lines, especially as it wished to see Libya independent by the end of 1951. At that time, too, several delegates—and notably the Egyptian representative—had stressed that the grant of technical and financial assistance should not be the means of conferring any political control over that country, that its purpose should be to promote and not to impede Libyan independence and that technical assistance should be given without any interference in the country's internal affairs. The report did not reveal whether such conditions and important principles had been respected.

55. Information was available to show how the United States had organized an intensive campaign for the penetration of Libya by business corporations, the aim of which was clearly to promote not the interests of the independence of the country but those of the corporations concerned. An endeavour had also been made to use Libya as a military base in preparation for war, an undertaking not covered by any clause in the General Assembly resolutions.

56. Thus, while his delegation had no objection whatever to granting financial and technical assistance to Libya, it held that such assistance should be afforded on the basis of the principles governing technical and financial assistance to under-developed countries and should have for its object not the furtherance of the interests of foreign business concerns or warlike preparations but an all-round development of the economy of the country, so as to provide a sound basis for its independence. Libya should not continue to be merely a producer of raw materials and an appendage of another State as had been the case under the former Italian regime and as was still the case.

57. As a country that in the past had suffered greatly from oppression, Libya should now enjoy such assistance as the United Nations could furnish for the purpose of ensuring its full political and economic independence.

58. The Secretary-General's report being far from clear and the joint draft resolution before the Council failing to throw sufficient light on the actual extent of the assistance to be granted to Libya, his delegation would abstain from voting on the resolution.

59. The PRESIDENT declared the debate closed and put to the vote the French, Pakistani and United Kingdom delegations' joint draft resolution (E/L.261), as amended by the Indian representative.

The resolution, as amended, was adopted by 15 votes to none, with 3 abstentions.

60. Mr. PELT (United Nations Commissioner in Libya) said that independence when it came would not only be a cause for rejoicing; Libya was faced with an extremely onerous task and, even after it had gained independence, would require much technical assistance. The resolution just adopted and the statements made in the course of the discussion, for which he thanked the Council and its individual members, would therefore be a source of encouragement to the people of Libya.

61. Mr. TAUBER (Czechoslovakia) explained that his delegation had abstained from voting on the draft resolution because the Secretary-General's report (E/2042) contained no specific proposals, more especially in regard to the development of industry in that country. The agreements between the United Kingdom, the United Nations and FAO on technical assistance for Libya were intended as a safeguard for the interests of certain Powers. There was no denying the fact that Libya was being used as a strategic base. He quoted, in that connexion, an article from the newspaper *Arev* of 22 December 1950, according to which the creation of the eighth Arab State would enable the United Kingdom to consolidate her position in Libya in the event of another world war. The same newspaper had claimed that United States military bases had already been established in Libya. For those reasons the Czechoslovak delegation had been unable to support the draft resolution.

62. The PRESIDENT thanked the United Nations Commissioner for his lucid report and wished him continuing success in his mission until Libya had achieved its independence.

Programme of work

63. The PRESIDENT said that, provided the twenty-three agenda items outstanding could be despatched at the present reasonable rate, the session could be brought to a close by 20 September. He had received certain suggestions, more especially regarding item 36, which some representatives thought should be referred to the Co-ordination Committee, but as the question appearing under that head had already been examined by the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Organization and Operation of the Council and its Commissions, he felt that to avoid duplication and to enable the discussion to be followed by the President of the Council himself, it should be dealt with in the Council itself.

64. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America), stressing the importance of item 36, pointed out that only one-third of the Members of the Council had been represented on the *Ad Hoc* Committee. It therefore seemed desirable that all the delegations to the Council should have an opportunity of expressing their views and he believed that that could best be achieved by reference of the item to the Co-ordination Committee on which all Members could be represented. That Committee would shortly have terminated the work assigned to it and would thus be able to take up item 36 of the agenda with little delay.

65. Mr. ABELIN (France) recalled the proposals which his delegation had submitted to the President. The French delegation disagreed with the United States representative. It considered that, in view of its importance, item 36 should be discussed as early as possible in plenary meeting. It would emphasize the fact that a reorganization of the Council's work could only serve to reinforce its authority and increase its means of action. If the question were referred to the Co-ordination Committee, the heads of delegations might, he feared, be prevented by other work from taking part in the discussion. He therefore ventured to urge the United States representative to fall in with the French view that the discussion on item 36 should take place at the beginning of the following week, in plenary meeting, since several heads of delegations with observations to make would doubtless have to leave Geneva before 15 September.

66. The PRESIDENT explained that according to the proposals submitted to him by the French delegation, item 9 should be referred to the Economic Committee, while its other suggestions related to the order in which that delegation thought the outstanding items of the agenda should be dealt with.

67. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) emphasized that much detailed discussion would be necessary on item 36 and contended that, by passing it first to the Co-ordination Committee for early action, the Council would save time and its discussions on the subject would be materially shortened through having before it the Co-ordination Committee's report. He could not therefore support the French representative's proposal.

68. Mr. ABELIN (France) said that what he wished to avoid was repetitive discussions on item 36, one in the Co-ordination Committee and the other in plenary meeting. Moreover, if certain particular aspects of the question required additional study by a committee or by the Secretariat, the Council could perfectly well refer them to one or the other after deciding the policy to be followed.

69. Mr. YU (China) supported the United States representative's proposal.

70. Mr. LEDWARD (United Kingdom) believed that all members were anxious that a decision be taken on item 36 before the end of the session, but much ground would have to be covered first, so that it seemed advisable to refer the matter to a committee of the whole. It was purely a question of convenience to refer it to the Co-ordination Committee, as the subject lay outside the latter's terms of reference. True, such a course involved a certain risk of duplication, but it gave a fair chance of shortening the discussion in plenary meeting.

71. The PRESIDENT submitted that the important consideration was not which committee should deal with the matter but whether it was desirable that item 36 should be discussed by a committee while the Council itself was dealing with other outstanding items.

72. Mr. LUBIN (United States of America) thought that that procedure offered considerable advantages. The range of item 36 was wide and the details to be considered very numerous; again, a decision on one section of the question might well affect decisions on others. It might therefore even prove advantageous to hold a second discussion in plenary meeting.

73. Mr. VAN DER SCHUEREN (Belgium) thought that the Council should first take a decision on the French proposal to refer item 9 to the Economic Committee. Should the Council decide to refer that question to the Economic Committee, it could then proceed immediately to examine item 36 in plenary meeting. Conversely, should the Council decide to deal with item 9 itself, it would be advisable to refer item 36 to the Co-ordination Committee.

74. Mr. ABELIN (France) agreed with the Belgian representative that the decision to be taken on item 36 depended on that adopted for item 9. The proposal to refer item 9 to the Economic Committee should therefore be put to the vote first.

75. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the Belgian representative's proposal that the Council should first decide upon the French proposal to refer item 9 to the Economic Committee.

The proposal was rejected by 5 votes to 4.

76. The PRESIDENT put to the vote the United States proposal that item 36 of the agenda should be referred to the Co-ordination Committee.

The proposal was adopted by 7 votes to 5, with 4 abstentions.

Economic development of under-developed countries (E/2003) (continued):

(c) Land reform

77. Mr. ARKADIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that, in resolution 401 (V), the General Assembly had taken the view that land-tenure conditions in under-developed countries and territories impeded economic development and thus depressed standards of living, especially those of agricultural workers and tenants and of small and medium farmers.

78. In accordance with that resolution, the Secretary-General's report (E/2003) analysed the various shortcomings of land-tenure systems and of agricultural methods in under-developed countries and territories, in relation to the low standards of living of workers, tenants and farmers. The report was interesting in that it brought out clearly the agrarian structure of many of those countries, and particularly the fact that large tracts of land were owned by foreign monopolies, which impeded economic development, depressed standards of living and hampered any increase in the vital industry of food production. It thus supported the conclusion of the General Assembly.

79. For example, in Latin America as a whole, about 1.5 per cent of the individual land-holdings exceeded

15,000 acres while the total of those holdings covered some 50 per cent of all agricultural land. It must further be emphasized that the existence of large estates did not promote large-scale cultivation for the simple reason that the owners did not employ modern techniques and scientific methods, preferring to make their money by the time-honoured expedient of exploiting others.

80. The report recorded that not only in the Caribbean and throughout Latin America but also in South-East Asia, in Ceylon, and in parts of East Africa, the agrarian structure was dominated by large estates which offered the farm population unsatisfactory conditions of employment and no degree of responsibility or initiative in management. It was also stated in the report that in Bolivia, Chile, Guatemala and Peru there was a system of patron-tenant relationship under which tenants received a piece of land for cultivation in return for a specified number of days work per week on the estate. That system was associated with a low social status and an extremely low living standard for the farm workers.

81. A characteristic of those lamentable conditions was the part played by foreign capital and foreign holdings. United States capitalists had been particularly active in seizing estates in under-developed countries. There had in recent years been a tremendous flow of such capital into sugar plantations and banana plantations in Cuba and in the Philippines. Since the Second World War, 270 million dollars had been invested in banana plantations in Central America and investment of United States capital in the agriculture of South American countries had been rapidly increased. It was significant that the profits on such investments had increased fourfold since the war.

82. United States capital also controlled immense areas of crop-land in many of those countries; for instance, 75 per cent of the acreage under sugar-cane in Cuba was in the hands of United States capitalists and 4 million hectares of Mexican land was controlled by United States corporations. British and United States firms such as United Fruit, the American Coffee Corporation, Gracies, and so forth had obtained control of land and processing industries in South American countries; among other things the fat and butter industries in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil were in their hands. United States corporations had also been negotiating with Brazil for the erection of rubber-processing plants, and a few years previously United States interests had negotiated with Brazil for the exploitation of timber resources in that country and had sought to obtain the mining rights in the Amazon River region.

83. The fact was that, throughout Latin America, United States corporations were so organized as to constitute a veritable state within a state. Again, certain United States and United Kingdom citizens owned immense holdings in Mexico, where some of them resorted to every possible means of squeezing land out of the peasants, sometimes going as far as to use force to achieve their ends. The United States newspaper baron Hearst owned in Mexico an estate of approximately 500,000 hectares of agricultural land. United States

capitalists exploited the peasants throughout Latin America by offering low prices for land and agricultural products and by charging extremely high prices for any agricultural equipment supplied to those peasants.

84. The situation was very similar in Africa, where, for instance in Tunisia, one-fifth of the agricultural land was in the hands of foreign corporations. In South-West Africa, 13 per cent of the white population controlled 40 per cent of the best agricultural land.

85. In Asia, the position was much the same. The mining wealth of Malaya was in the hands of British capitalists, who also owned 75 per cent of the rubber plantations. In fact, British investment in Malayan rubber plantations amounted to £200 million sterling and the net annual profits to £2,500,000 sterling.

86. In those countries it was also true that the land was not equitably distributed, a small number of large landowners controlling much of it, while small farmers had to be satisfied with a miserably inadequate part of it. There was also a vast number of landless agricultural workers, many of them destined to submit to the poverty conditions of share-cropping. In Brazil, for example, in 1940, the large landowners, representing 1.46 per cent of the landowners, had owned 48.1 per cent, while a third of the small landowners had owned less than 1.5 per cent of the available agricultural land. Similar anomalies existed in Turkey.

87. The Czechoslovak representative had rightly pointed out that large landowners in under-developed countries left much of the land idle; foreign monopolists who seized land in those countries did the same. The result was that agriculture stagnated, and many agricultural labourers were without work. Reference to those facts had also been made by the representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

88. The Secretary-General's report (E/2003) made clear that, in Latin America, land was cultivated only in the following proportions: in Argentina 20 per cent; in Brazil 10 per cent; in Colombia 7.5 per cent; in Mexico 16.7 per cent; in Peru 10.4 per cent; in Nicaragua 10.1 per cent. If the percentages of the land cultivated were compared with the total land available, the situation was even more unsatisfactory. In Argentina only 10 per cent of the available land was cultivated; in Bolivia 0.3 per cent; in Brazil 2.2 per cent; in Chile 7.9 per cent; in Colombia 2 per cent; in Peru 1.3 per cent; in Mexico 10.2 per cent. The situation was no better in Africa. In Algeria only 2.6 per cent of the total area, representing 12.1 per cent of the land suitable for cultivation, was worked. In French West Africa the corresponding figures were 2.1 per cent and 28.6 per cent, in Kenya 2.8 per cent and 11.8 per cent, in Madagascar 8.5 per cent and 11.8 per cent. Although things were somewhat better in certain countries in Asia, they were still unsatisfactory: in Indonesia 5.8 per cent of the total area was cultivated, in Malaya 16.2 per cent, in Thailand 10 per cent, and in Turkey 18.5 per cent. In Africa 5.9 per cent of arable land was sown to crops and about 50 per cent remained to waste. The effects of foreign landownership upon agriculture and food production in the under-developed countries were obvious.

89. Agricultural production in the countries of Southern Asia was 2 per cent lower in 1949/50 than it had been in 1948/49. That fall particularly affected products like rice and grain, the 1949 harvest amounting, in the latter case, to 93 per cent of the pre-war level. Those countries had therefore been obliged to import 6.7 million tons of cereals in 1949, whereas before the Second World War they had exported nearly 2 million tons per annum.

90. The agricultural situation in Africa was almost as bad, various documents published on the subject showing that the *per capita* output and consumption there were very low, even compared with other under-developed countries. A table giving comparative figures for the production of certain agricultural products by continents was to be found on page 5 of the *Review of Economic Conditions in Africa* (E/1910/Add.1/Rev.1). The table showed that, in Africa, agricultural production per area unit was just over half the average output for the world. The situation in the countries of Latin America in that field was hardly any better, as reference to the *World Economic Report, 1949-50* (E/1910/Rev.1) would show, agricultural production in that area having decreased, particularly so far as cereals were concerned. The same was true of the Middle East, the fall being especially marked in the case of wheat, maize, oats and certain other cereals.

91. As for the United States representative's statement, it was doubtful whether he really had land reform at heart. For how could the United States capitalist monopolies, which had laid hands upon the natural resources of various countries and were exploiting the labour of hundreds of millions of men in the under-developed countries, initiate land reform? It was somewhat surprising to observe the concern they appeared to show for the needs of landless peasants, and the peoples of countries such as those of Latin America, caught in the ruthless grip of United States monopolies. Such peoples would be able to assess the feigned concern of those monopolists at its true value. In Africa, where United States monopolies were scrambling for markets and strategic positions, as in the Middle East or in Asia where they were trying to obtain oil, strategic metals and rubber and buying up landed property, the population would find it hard to believe the sincerity of the United States representative's statement in the Council. It was a proof of the fear which the masses, those masses of peasants and agricultural workers which United States monopolies were exploiting in alliance with the big landowners, inspired in certain quarters.

92. It was not the first time that United States monopolies had tried to disguise their aims beneath a cloak of altruism. The "economic co-operation" and the "aid" granted to, or thrust upon, certain countries was cover for United States capital which was being invested in Latin America and other regions. In exchange for that aid, United States monopolies were being granted privileged treatment and even military bases. The methods used might vary somewhat according to circumstances but the objectives remained the same: those monopolies, as always, were trying to exploit to the maximum the resources of such countries and to

amass colossal profits. At the present time, aware of the serious problems which, in many under-developed countries, beset millions of human beings struggling for land, work and bread, they were endeavouring to assume a pose of compassion and assistance. The peoples concerned would not let themselves be duped, since facts had long shown them that it was not to the United States monopolies that they must look for work and bread.

93. He did not wish to dwell long on the so-called land reform carried out by the United States occupation forces in Japan; he would merely mention that that reform had not only failed to remove the class of big landowners, the samurai, but had actually strengthened it, for use in the service of the United States occupation authorities. Similarly, there was no need to mention that the land reform which, under international agreements, was to have been carried out in Western Germany had not been put into effect by the United States authorities; on the contrary, the semi-feudal land system of the Junkers had been strengthened and extended. It was common knowledge that United States monopolies had spent hundreds of millions of dollars to maintain the Kuomintang in China. At the time when the Kuomintang had been all-powerful in China, the group of large landowners, which represented under 10 per cent of the population, possessed 70 to 80 per cent of the cultivable area. The peasants on the other hand, constituting 90 per cent of the population, held only 20 to 30 per cent of the land. In addition, nearly 70 per cent of smallholders had been obliged to become tenant-farmers under extremely onerous conditions.

94. All those facts were well known, and by supporting the Kuomintang United States monopolies had been helping to preserve despotism and destitution in the towns and countryside of China. The United States of America had never made the slightest attempt to improve the position of the Chinese peasant in any way, however slight, and cared very little what became of him.

95. Had the representatives of the Chinese People's Republic been members of the Council, as the Soviet Union delegation had justly demanded that they should be, they would have been able to describe the methods required for successfully solving the land problem, and how tens of millions of poor peasants were at the present moment obtaining not only land but the opportunity of employment and of progressively improving their living conditions and economic and cultural position.

96. The facts he had mentioned provided food for thought and reflection. Concrete examples of that kind showed up in their true light the statements of the United States representative, which reflected the views of United States monopolies.

97. What he had said of China applied equally to the peasants and agricultural workers of the Latin American countries. It was a well-known fact that in those countries United States capital held full sway and dictated policy. That had been the situation for decades. Had there been a single reform, however insignificant, and had the great mass of the peasantry found its situation the slightest whit improved as a result of the interest taken

by United States monopolies in that sphere? The information given in the report submitted to the Council, and the supplementary data furnished by various speakers, made it quite clear that the answer was in the negative. As in the past, the peasants in the Latin American countries did not possess any land and lived in wretched poverty. Hence the peoples in the under-developed countries would realize fully after digesting that information that it was not through United States monopolies, but only by their own efforts, that they were likely to acquire a plot of land and to achieve a standard of living fit for human beings.

98. Turning to the French representative's statement at the 536th meeting, he said that it had been an attempt to turn attention to the land question in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. Evidently the French representative was ignorant of the essential facts; and he had been obliged to fall back on the testimony of writers known to be actively concerned in the preparation of a new world war. He had tried to use such data to draw tendentious political conclusions. After confusing the question of allocation of land in the Soviet Union among the people with the question of the reorganization of Soviet agriculture, he had drawn the conclusion that the example of the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies could not be used as a model by the French Government, and said he greatly preferred the land system at present prevailing in France as calculated to safeguard the peasants' material welfare. Yet it was common knowledge that the main features of that system were poverty for the peasants, the exploitation of hundreds of thousands of workers, and ruin for the small landowners. In recalling the background of the question for the benefit of the Council, the French representative's real intention had been to distract the Council's attention from the importance and topical nature of the problem of land reform for hundreds of millions of peasants in the capitalist countries and the under-developed countries. Instead of talking about past ages, it would have been more apposite to have dealt with the more pressing aspects of the problem, especially the forms it was taking in France at the present time.

99. The main point of any discussion of land reform was the practical outcome of such reform for the masses of peasants who were not landowners. A study of the way in which that particular situation had developed in France and the French colonial territories indicated that the peasants were being dispossessed of the land, whether they were landowners or merely tenant farmers. Thus for example, in the French colonies, the French monopolists were taking advantage of their predominant position to obtain a stranglehold on landed property and were running large-scale agricultural undertakings. The stranglehold took the form either of barefaced robbery or of ostensibly legal measures. As an example of the former, in 1926/27, as a sequel to the violent repressive measures taken after the rising of the Riffs, 40,000 hectares of land had been confiscated from the rebels. As an example of the second measure, there were the spoliations carried out under the pretext of public policy. He quoted figures as to the extent of such spoliation in Algeria. Prior to the Second World War, the natives

had been dispossessed of two-thirds of the cultivable area, while a mere 70,000 Europeans possessed more than 2.5 million hectares. In Tunisia, 8 per cent of the area suitable for cultivation was in the hands of fewer than 700 European settlers. Nor did those figures take any account of the vast territories belonging to the State. In French West Africa, two concerns had been granted 7 million hectares; while on the Ivory Coast, 3 million hectares of forest lands had been confiscated from the natives.

100. Clearly the position was not exactly ideal; and it must be recognized that, even in France itself, if left much to be desired. According to the 1946 census figures, about half the total number of French peasants owned no land. The infiltration of French capital and monopolies into agriculture tended more and more towards the expropriation of the small landowners, who were obliged to mortgage their lands, while their bankers became the *de facto* owners of the farms. According to the data compiled by Mr. Waldeck-Rochet, mortgages taken out by the French peasantry amounted to 50,000 million francs, while interest was as high as 10 per cent. In 1892 there had been 5,702,000 farms in France, whereas in 1929 only 3,942,000 had remained, and by 1946 a further 879,000 had disappeared.

101. He went on to quote data published by the *Institut national de la statistique*, showing that 3 per cent of agricultural holdings in France covered one-third of the cultivable area, while 55 per cent of the total of farms accounted for only one-tenth of that area. Out of one hundred agricultural concerns, ten held as much land as the other ninety. Most of the small and medium farmers and *métayers* were living in poverty. In his book entitled *L'agriculture française, son tragique déclin—son avenir* Marcel Braibant described the decline of French agriculture over the last 75 years. A former Minister of Agriculture, describing the living conditions of the French peasants, stressed the primitive housing conditions of agricultural workers; while in his book *La Tragédie paysanne*, Marcel Braibant brought out parallel instances, and stated that in many parts of France, the families of peasants were living under conditions no better than those of the cattle. He described the dirt and discomfort of their dwellings, and the unhygienic conditions prevailing throughout the country districts.

102. On the whole, it was fair to say that French agriculture was definitely on the downward path. The grain crop in 1949/50 had been between 10 per cent and 13 per cent lower than the average crop for the five preceding years. In the same way, purchases and use of fertilizers and agricultural machinery were falling off, owing to a constant increase in prices, taxation and farm rents. In the face of that situation, it seemed not unlikely that the French peasants would hold a rather different opinion from the French representative as to the benefits of the land system practised in France. To say the least, the system could hardly be described as exemplary.

103. Most delegations had thought to inform the Council of what their countries had accomplished in the way of land reform or the improvement of agriculture. The

Soviet Union delegation wished to submit a similar statement, particularly since some had attempted to describe the situation in the Soviet Union without having troubled to make a prior study of the economic, social and political documents which had been published there on the subject. In 1917, about 150 million hectares of land, which had formerly belonged to the big landowners and the church, had been handed over to the people. Since then, the Government and people of the Soviet Union had worked unceasingly to organize farming and, at the present time, the agriculture of the Soviet Union, organized logically in accordance with the socialist concept, had the most up-to-date technical methods and equipment at its disposal. There were about 250,000 collective farms, or producers' co-operative groups, with tractors, threshing machines and other agricultural machinery of the latest models. Their equipment was repaired and serviced by 8,400 machine-tractor stations in all parts of the Soviet Union. In the five-year period from 1946 to 1950, the following amounts of farm machinery had been made available to agriculture: 536,000 tractors, calculated in terms of 15 horse-power, 93,000 combine-harvesters, of which tens of thousands were motorized, 341,000 tractor-ploughs, 254,000 tractor-drills, as well as a great number of other agricultural machines. The "sovkhoses", or State farms had also been expanded. They were of various kinds, some mainly concerned with grain production, others with livestock and others with market-gardening; they, too, were well supplied with up-to-date technical equipment. The actual work on the land had gone hand-in-hand with research work and technical improvements. Particular attention was given to problems of agriculture and irrigation in a number of workshops, testing and research stations and farming institutes; in addition, schools had been opened for the training of agricultural specialists. Under the last five-year plan, very advanced vocational training had been given to 2,300,000 specialists in tractors and other farm machinery. At the present time, the Soviet people had an agricultural system which was improving steadily in both quantity and quality, and whose productivity was constantly increasing. Whereas before the First World War the total grain harvest in Russia had been less than 5,000 million poods (1 pood = 36 pounds avoirdupois) in 1950 it had exceeded 7,600 million poods. In 1950, 6.6 million hectares more land had been brought under crop than in 1949.

104. The total cotton harvest for that same year was of 3,750,000 tons, exceeding by 650,000 tons the target set for 1950 within the framework of the five-year plan. During 1947/48, the area sown had been increased by 20 million hectares, a figure which would be appreciated to the full only if it was realized that, before the war, the total area under crop in France had been a little over 20 million hectares. He would not say more about the proportions which Soviet agriculture had assumed, nor would he expatiate upon the gigantic prospects opened up by the Soviet Union's schemes—particularly that for the construction of an enormous irrigation system, which would cover an immense area as soon as the new hydropower stations at present being built were in operation.

105. Turning to the documents and additional material before the Council, he stated that they showed the full immediacy and importance, from both the political and economic standpoints, of the problem of land reform. Some of the conclusions drawn in the Secretary-General's report seemed to be directed against land reform; such an interpretation might, for example, be placed in the passage in the report linking the success of land reform with the relationship between demographic, agricultural and other factors. That conclusion could also be drawn from the statement to the effect that the benefits of land reform would be nullified, if the necessary agricultural machinery were not made available to the new smallholders. The report also pointed out that the splitting up of large estates, under intensive cultivation, might reduce yields. It concluded, moreover, that land reform would not by itself provide a remedy for the most serious defects of the situation, or ensure full employment for landless agricultural workers.

106. The Soviet Union delegation considered that, in the light of the facts he had enumerated, the Economic and Social Council should give the most careful consideration to that serious problem, as it was of primary concern to the peoples of the whole world. It would appear that the problem was not to be solved by the work of organizations such as FAO and UNESCO. The Economic and Social Council should draw up concrete and immediately applicable recommendations which would enable an improvement to be made without delay in the position of farmers and agricultural workers. His delegation considered that the Polish draft resolution pointed the way. It advocated measures on the lines of the decision taken by the General Assembly on 20 November 1950 in resolution 401 (V). The Polish delegation had achieved its object, which was to help the Council to take a definite and useful decision. Its draft resolution had the merit of bringing out clearly the underlying causes of the problem and of explaining why the agricultural situation in under-developed countries was so unfavourable. It pointed out, in particular, that in those countries, as in colonial territories, arable land was for the most part owned by big landowners who were non-resident or by foreign monopolies, who were steadily dispossessing the small proprietors. The Polish draft resolution also showed that the system of large landed properties was the principal cause of the poverty of agricultural workers and of small and medium farmers, and that it also resulted in large areas being left uncultivated. That was not conducive to increasing agricultural production in general, or output of foodstuffs in particular. The recommendations contained in the Polish draft resolution provided an answer, both to the questions with which the General Assembly was concerned, and to the real needs of the situation. The Soviet Union delegation hoped that any solution adopted by the Council would cover the following points: the organization of assistance to small and medium farmers; the provision of agricultural machinery, seed, fertilizers and credit at low rates of interest; the establishment of machinery repair-shops, available to small and medium farmers, and of factories and workshops for the manufacture of the necessary equipment; the improvement of the working and living conditions

of the rural population. The Polish draft resolution contained recommendations on those lines and the Soviet Union delegation would therefore vote for it.

107. Mr. CORLEY SMITH (United Kingdom) recalled that the Czechoslovak representative had stated at the previous meeting that the policy of the United Kingdom Government was responsible for the present agricultural situation in Egypt and he had, in particular, stated that there was maldistribution of land, an excessive proportion of the land being devoted to cotton-growing. He wished to point out that his Government was not in any way responsible for agricultural policy in Egypt. It was true that the United Kingdom bought cotton from Egypt but it also bought cotton from a dozen or more other countries.

108. His Government, on the other hand, did accept responsibility for agriculture in Malaya but, contrary to what he had understood the Czechoslovak representative to have stated, there was no acute shortage of land there and no Malay had any difficulty in obtaining land for cultivation. In fact, during the last fifty years there had been a considerable influx of persons into Malaya from other Asian countries, in particular China and India. That influx might perhaps partly be due to the fact that Malaya had one of the highest standards of living in Asia, which in its turn was partly due to the introduction of rubber production. He was surprised that the Czechoslovak representative had been so unsympathetic towards efforts for recovery in Malaya from the effects of the Japanese occupation. Whereas houses could be rebuilt as fast as men could work, the speed at which rubber trees grew could not very well be altered. However, the standard of living in Malaya was high and would have returned to normal even more rapidly had not non-Malay communist guerillas hampered progress ever since the end of the Japanese occupation.

109. He had been surprised to hear the Polish representative mention the United Kingdom in connexion with land reform. The position of farmers in the United Kingdom was better than it had been for generations and the farming system there was one of the most highly mechanized in the world. He could assure the Polish representative that he had not met a single farmer in the United Kingdom who wished to see a campaign launched for collectivization of his land.

110. Much had been heard of the land reforms in the Soviet Union and of their alleged benefits to the agricultural population. The Council might profitably consider the methods used to bring about those reforms, since by implication they were being recommended for adoption by Council members. Ever since 1917 the agrarian policy of the Soviet Union Government had been completely cynical, and characterized by series of doctrinal somersaults. Lenin's land decree of 26 October 1917 recognizing the seizure of the land by the peasants merely recognized a *fait accompli* in which the Communist Party itself had taken no part. Four months later a law was passed which provided the legal basis for eventual abolition of peasant ownership of the land. The first attempt at collectivization by persuasion had failed. Lenin had stressed in 1919 that the transition

from independent small farming to large-scale farming must be a very gradual and lengthy process; careless administrative and legislative measures would hamper it, while it could only be assisted by the peasantry being helped to improve their agricultural techniques. Mr. Stalin's policy of collectivizing by decree involved use of the very methods Lenin had condemned. In spite of the communist slogan "Enrich yourselves!" and the early policy of representing the kulaks as honest and thrifty farmers, the Communist Party Congress in 1927 called for the development of collectivization and issued directives for an "offensive against the kulaks". By the winter of 1929/30 some 500,000 kulaks had been exiled and expropriated, and by March 1930 58 per cent of all farms in the Soviet Union were collectivized. The process had, however, been accompanied by widespread death and famine, since the peasants slaughtered their livestock when faced with forcible dispossession. In November 1929, the Central Committee of the Communist Party decided on a systematic programme for collectivization under the leadership of urban proletarian elements, and 25,000 city workers "with sufficient experience in the realm of political organization" were dispatched to the countryside. The 1929 harvest was poor but the grain collections were 51 per cent greater than in 1928. The figure was achieved at the cost of great shortage and famine in many villages, while the hardships had been aggravated by the urban proletarian workers' ignorance of agricultural matters. In December 1929, Stalin bluntly declared that the Soviet Union had embarked on a policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Yet in an article in *Pravda*, in 1930, he denounced the bureaucratic decreeing of a collective farm movement from above, and gave as an example the attempts made in a number of districts in Turkestan to outstrip the advanced districts of the Soviet Union by threatening to use military force and to deprive of irrigation water and manufactured goods peasants who were unwilling to join collective farms.

111. The Soviet Government had attempted to explain away the measures used by saying that there had been mistakes. The Great Soviet Encyclopædia of 1938 stated that the decision to collectivize the peasants by force had been taken by leftist deviationists and that only in 1938 did it become clear that the real inspirers and organizers of the left-wing deviations were the right-wing Trotskyist counter-revolutionary *bloc*.

112. In view of the methods used in the Soviet Union, he deeply sympathized with the Indian representative's earlier defence of the uneconomic man. Was a change, however economically desirable, worth the millions of deaths which had been required to make it possible?

113. The Polish representative had expressed surprise that certain governments, including those of the United States and the United Kingdom, had welcomed with enthusiasm that representative's introduction of the question of land reform and agricultural improvement. The question was of very great interest to the United Kingdom Government, which was always conscious of the need for reform, in its home and overseas territories, realizing as it did that existing conditions were not perfect.

114. All the members of the Council, except those from Eastern European countries, had admitted that their countries fell short of the ideal in certain respects. But, although for three years he had heard statements by the Polish delegation advocating reforms of all types in almost every part of the world the Polish delegation had never even hinted, any more than had the Soviet Union delegation, that any reform was required in the Soviet Union. That was one of the reasons why the Secretariat had not submitted an analysis of the effects of land reform during the previous generation in the Soviet Union. He did not blame the Secretariat for the omission because had the Secretariat included a single honest criticism in any statement the Soviet Union delegation would have attacked it; for no representative of the Soviet Union would, or indeed could, ever admit to any imperfections in the system which obtained in his country. A further reason for the omission was lack of information.

115. His Government was keenly interested in land reform and of agricultural improvement, because those matters were vital to more than half of the world's population. Two years earlier, when the programme of technical assistance had been under discussion, the United Kingdom delegation had adopted the view that a larger percentage of the available funds should be allocated to FAO. He regretted that that view had not met with universal approval, because the fact must be faced that there was not sufficient food in the world at present to feed the population of the world adequately.

116. He therefore welcomed the United States revised draft resolution (E/L.246/Rev.2), although he had been right in fearing that its presentation would lead to passionate diatribes and long propaganda statements containing no constructive elements and attacking all peoples not directed by communist governments.

117. There was much in the Polish draft resolution (E/L.247) which he would have been prepared to support, but that proposal had never been intended for adoption. It included allegations which were completely untrue and which its sponsors knew to be quite unacceptable. He would refer particularly to the attacks on the colonial Powers. The assertion in the Polish draft resolution that "In most of the under-developed countries, as well as in colonial and Trust Territories, the greatest part of arable land belongs to big landowners, to absentee landlords and foreign corporations" was completely unfounded, as far as territories under United Kingdom administration were concerned. Similar remarks could be made on paragraph 3 of the preamble. As for paragraph 2 of the operative part, it could be asked to whom the recommendations were meant to apply. He wondered whether the Polish representative was recommending, for example, that the Soviet Union Government should restore their land to the dispossessed Chechens, to the peoples of the Baltic States, or to the Volga Germans? Did it apply to the Germans deprived of their land, rightly or wrongly, by the Polish Government since the Second World War. Most representatives of Member Governments in the United Nations came from countries consisting of areas of land which had been alienated during the previous three centuries if not more

recently. He wondered what in fact was meant by alienation. It was hard to conceive of handing back, for example, the West Indies to the Caribs and sending the Africans, Europeans and Asians back to where they came from. He was more concerned with alienation of land in recent times than land alienated through the centuries.

118. The Polish representative had concentrated his attack on the British African territories. Africa was a large under-developed region with considerable agricultural problems. It was true that land alienation had taken place in Kenya; leaving aside forest land and lakes, 5.25 per cent of the area of the country had been alienated, mostly under the act of 1902. The Polish representative had also referred to Tanganyika. The actual figure for land alienation in that area was 0.91 per cent, of which approximately one-half had been alienated by the Germans before 1914. In Uganda less than 0.5 per cent of the land had been alienated. Looking at the situation as a whole, it was astonishing how little land in the British African territories had been alienated. The policy of the United Kingdom in that respect was to prevent large-scale alienation.

119. Like other countries, the United Kingdom had reason to be less proud of certain phases of its policy through the centuries than of others. He would not apologize for the land reforms of the mid-eighteenth century, for which the current Government in the United Kingdom could hardly be considered responsible any more than the present Polish Government for the policy of Poland in the same period which had led to that country's partition or, more recently, for the policy which had led to the partition of the country in 1939 between the Soviet Union and Germany.

120. In order to summarize the guiding principles of his Government's policy on land alienation, he quoted, by way of example certain extracts from an official proclamation of the United Kingdom Government concerning its policy with regard to the Protectorate of Uganda:

" 1. These rural lands are held in trust for the use and benefit of the African population.

" 2. Although, under the laws of the Protectorate, the right is reserved to the Governor to appropriate areas which he considers are required for forests, roads, townships and for other public purposes, it has been agreed that the Governor shall in every such case consult the African Local Government concerned and give full consideration to its wishes.

" 3. It is not the intention of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Protectorate Government that the Protectorate of Uganda shall be developed as a country of non-African farming and settlement.

" The broad lines of this policy have been observed in the past in Uganda with the result that, out of a total of 80,371 square miles, less than 500 square miles are now in non-African hands. Of this latter area only 115 square miles of freehold and 61 square miles of leasehold represent alienations by the Crown. The remainder represent purchases from Africans in Uganda

after the 1900 Agreement and before the legislation was passed in 1906 prohibiting such transfers without the consent in writing of the Governor. With a view to ensuring the security on tenure of the individual African, under the authority of his African local government, the district councils of these governments are being asked to draw up by-laws governing land tenure in accordance with tribal custom, such by-laws being subject to the approval of the Governor. The terms of this pronouncement have been approved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on behalf of His Majesty's Government."

121. The Polish representative's arguments concerning the serious problem of land reform in Africa were completely unfounded. The system of land tenure in Africa was different from that existing anywhere else in the world. He (Mr. Corley Smith) would have thought that the Polish and Soviet Union representatives might have shown a little more sympathy towards the system of land tenure in Africa since it was based on a communal ownership, but he presumed that they condemned it as deviationist, since it had not been forced upon the people but had grown naturally out of their national institutions.

122. Although he sympathized with the objectives of the United States draft resolution, he felt that, in his speech, its sponsor had laid unduly great stress on the individual ownership of land. He did not deny that the latter system had produced excellent results in the United States, mainly because a great amount of suitable land was available and because the method of landholding in the United States was suited to the customs and mentality of the people concerned. But he was convinced that the United States representative had no intention of forcing that system upon an African population with a completely different background.

123. In his account of native administration in the British African territories, Lord Hailey had pointed out that, in an agricultural community, there was no greater source of unrest than a system of tenure which might subject the peasantry to exploitation by landlords or money-lenders and no greater menace to society than the dispossessed land-holder who could find no alternative livelihood in industry; those had hitherto not existed in the African indigenous economy, but unless a suitable form of land tenure were evolved, they were likely in future to become common in the more densely populated and intensively cultivated areas of Africa. The position in Africa could be understood only if the traditional African concept of communal land tenure was taken into account. It was only the increasing pressure of population—as a result of modern medical services, the rule of law, the abolition of slaving and of tribal warfare—and the decreasing area of cultivable land as a result of the spread of the tsetse fly—that made any other system of land tenure necessary; but the concepts of freehold and leasehold which Europeans and Asians had brought with them were quite new to the African. It should also be noted that the system of shifting agriculture was traditional in Africa.

124. The United Kingdom Government was at the moment studying the new problems of land tenure arising from the changing situation. Its first step was to

analyse and examine the extent and nature of the problem in a number of different communities and areas. The land problem, because of the traditional form of tenure, was inextricably linked with the structure of African society. Economic progress could only be achieved with the willing co-operation of the local people. The obvious solution was to devise new systems of land tenure which would gradually replace the old traditional one. The United Kingdom was attacking the problem by experimental methods. The Gezira group-farming plan, referred to the previous day by the French representative, was only one of several pilot projects which had been under way for several years; the United Kingdom Government was anxious to investigate all the various methods of effecting transition from the old tribal system to modern practices. But he was sure the Soviet Union representative would be pleasantly surprised to learn that in 1950 the average income of tenants participating in the Gezira project was between £270 sterling, and £300 sterling although unfortunately those figures were not typical of Africa as a whole. But there was no doubt that the project had produced excellent results. Certain faults had been found in the system which was now being tried out with certain variations in other areas. In the meantime the best procedure was to continue to recognize the traditional African system and, where necessary, to establish, side by side, as an interim measure, a form of leasehold tenure for Africans based on the European concept. That was the approach which was currently under consideration in certain British African territories.

125. The concept of individual ownership, he repeated, was not traditional in Africa; the United Kingdom Government was therefore not faced, in respect of its African territories, with the problem which had confronted the Soviet Union in carrying out its land-reform programme. The Council would no doubt agree that it was as wrong to impose a system of individual ownership on a people with communal traditions as to force a collective system on farmers with individualistic instincts. The need for developing new land-tenure systems in Africa was already freely acknowledged, although there were other problems, the solution of which on a large scale

would contribute much more than land reform to the prosperity of the agricultural population. He would mention only five of those problems: the tsetse fly, which hindered development over vast areas; livestock and plant diseases; soil erosion; the development of disease-resistant food and cash crops; and the reluctance of the indigenous population to adopt improved agricultural practices. Still, as he had said, the need for new land-tenure systems was recognized. And in that connexion he had been particularly pleased to hear the French and other representatives speak of the possibility of utilizing co-operative methods. The co-operative system had originated in the United Kingdom and his Government was actively promoting it in its colonies. He urged the governments in under-developed countries to consider the wide variety of problems which could be met by co-operative solutions. But co-operation was not automatically successful and was fraught with many great problems. The history of co-operation in the United States of America showed how the mistakes previously made in the United Kingdom had been repeated in that country. Many more mistakes would undoubtedly be made, but he suggested that governments should seek guidance, for example, under the programme of technical assistance. The United Kingdom had already established co-operative development departments in most of its colonial governments to guide and encourage those who wished to organize co-operatives, for financing production, transport, distribution or for other purposes.

126. He expressed thanks to those responsible for drafting the report. It contained certain imperfections and certain points with which his delegation disagreed, but it was unusually pithy, perhaps because the number of drafters had been small. It laid due stress upon the multiple problems impeding agricultural progress throughout the world. He would be prepared to suggest the addition of a further paragraph to the United States revised draft resolution urging governments to give the report their earnest consideration.

The meeting rose at 7.50 p.m.