# Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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
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# The U.S. Approach to the 2019 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting

# Working paper submitted by the United States of America

- 1. The NPT Review Conference (RevCon) in 2020 will mark the 50th anniversary of the Treaty's entry into force. This is an opportunity for all NPT Parties to reflect on what they have accomplished to realize the shared benefits embodied in the NPT, to reaffirm their commitments to the NPT, and to rededicate themselves to preserving and further strengthening the NPT regime.
- 2. The United States seeks a positive outcome that reflects consensus on as broad a basis as possible. We believe that such consensus is possible if all NPT Parties focus on the tremendous benefits they all gain from the Treaty and avoid dwelling on divisive issues that the RevCon cannot resolve. Our overall approach to the 2019 Preparatory Committee (PrepCom), and the rest of the review cycle, is to emphasize the common interest all NPT Parties have to maintain and strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects. The central provisions of the NPT relating to nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy reflect shared interests of all NPT Parties, and should not be treated as competing priorities.
- 3. The United States will continue to emphasize the central role of nonproliferation in achieving the full benefits of the Treaty. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a direct and fundamental benefit of the NPT to all its Parties, nuclear-weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) alike. An effective nonproliferation regime is a key element in building a security environment conducive to progress on nuclear disarmament, and facilitates cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy by building confidence that peaceful nuclear programs will not be misused or diverted for weapons.
- 4. At the 2017 and 2018 PrepComs, NPT Parties voiced strong support for the Treaty and its critical role in international security. This collective recognition of the value of the NPT needs to be maintained and strengthened during the 2019 NPT PrepCom and beyond.







# **Addressing Proliferation and Compliance Challenges**

#### North Korea

- 5. North Korea's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs remain significant threats to the nonproliferation regime, regional stability, and to international peace and security. Although North Korea committed to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula at the June 2018 Singapore summit, it has yet to show it is ready to take the necessary steps to achieve this goal.
- 6. Although the February 2019 Hanoi summit did not result in an agreement on denuclearization, we remain ready to engage with North Korea on the implementation of its commitments.
- 7. Until the final, fully-verified denuclearization of the DPRK is achieved, we call on all NPT Parties to voice strong opposition to North Korea's unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs and to maintain the strict diplomatic and economic pressure that has been successful in bringing North Korea to the table.

#### Iran

- 8. The United States is seeking a comprehensive, negotiated solution that permanently and irreversibly denies Iran all pathways to nuclear weapons. However, we cannot focus on Iran's nuclear ambitions alone. Any new deal must also address Iran's ballistic missile development and proliferation, support for terrorism, destabilizing regional behavior, and the foreign hostages (including both Americans and Europeans) Iran continues to hold.
- 9. Given Iran's history of noncompliance, its past unlawful pursuit of nuclear weapons, and serious questions raised by the discovery of Iran's secret nuclear archive, thorough IAEA verification and monitoring remains essential. Any new questions regarding Iran's past nuclear weapons program must be addressed in a clear and straightforward manner.

## **Syria**

10. Since 2011, when the IAEA Board of Governors found Syria to be in non-compliance with its NPT safeguards agreement for construction of an undeclared reactor well-suited for production of weapons-grade plutonium, Syria still has refused to provide the IAEA the information and access it needs in order to address all unresolved questions regarding Syria's undeclared nuclear program. It is important that NPT Parties speak with one voice about the need for Syria to cooperate with the IAEA and remedy its non-compliance.

# **Promoting the Additional Protocol**

- 11. The combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol (AP) has become the *de facto* standard for verifying that States are meeting their NPT safeguards obligations. The United States will continue to promote the universalization of the AP as a key step to strengthening the international nonproliferation regime and improving the international security environment, and as a protection upon which *all* nuclear suppliers should insist in their civil-nuclear cooperation programs. This is the mark of a responsible nuclear supplier.
- 12. The AP was developed in response to the IAEA's experiences in dealing with clandestine nuclear activities in Iraq and North Korea in the 1990s, and it is specifically designed to facilitate the IAEA's provision of assurances of the absence

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of undeclared nuclear activities. Cases of noncompliance have posed grave challenges to the NPT, and the AP is central to resolving those cases, and deterring or detecting future cases of noncompliance.

13. Currently, 134 countries have brought an AP into force, and an additional 14 countries have signed the AP but have yet to bring it into force. Over two-thirds of NNWS Parties to the NPT have an AP in force, including over 85 percent of those countries with nuclear facilities under safeguards.

# **Expanding the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy**

- 14. An effective nuclear nonproliferation regime builds confidence that peaceful nuclear programs will not contribute to nuclear proliferation. This confidence, built on a strong nonproliferation and export control foundation including state-of-the-art nuclear safeguards, safety, and security facilitates the widespread and diverse benefits that can flow from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology.
- 15. The 2019 PrepCom and the 2020 RevCon will be opportunities to highlight how the NPT and the nuclear nonproliferation regime have made possible thriving international cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology.
- 16. The United States aims to draw attention to and build upon the NPT's success in this area. To that end, we encourage other NPT Parties to include a wide range of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in NPT-related consultations, and to think creatively about how to expand cooperation on peaceful uses, during this NPT review cycle and beyond. The United States will seek opportunities to extend these benefits in ways that are sustainable and that enhance the ability of states to meet the highest international standards for nonproliferation, safety, and security.

# Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament

- 17. At the 2018 NPT PrepCom, the United States submitted a Working Paper that proposed a new approach to disarmament, which we are calling Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND). We invited dialogue on those aspects of the security environment that underscore the continued relevance of nuclear weapons, with the goal of identifying and pursuing effective measures to help create a security environment that would be conducive to further nuclear disarmament.
- 18. After extensive consultations, the United States has developed operational plans for an international dialogue on the CEND approach, which is the subject of a separate U.S. working paper at the 2019 PrepCom. Promoting this dialogue and approach will be a major U.S. priority at the 2019 PrepCom.

## **Addressing NPT Withdrawal**

19. Since North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, three NPT RevCons have been unable to reach consensus on the principle that NPT Parties should be prepared to take action in order to discourage withdrawals. It is time for NPT Parties to demonstrate that withdrawing States will be held responsible for violations of the NPT they committed prior to withdrawal, block them from diverting the fruits of peaceful nuclear cooperation to weapons, and preserve the near-universality of the NPT.

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