



Security Council

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Letter dated 20 March 2019 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

In accordance with Security Council resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), in which the Council requested the African Union to report regularly on activities related to the implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (see annex) and his report on the situation in Somalia (see enclosure 2).

For your information, please also find attached the strategic concept of operations of the Mission for 2018–2021 (see enclosure 1) and the communiqués adopted by the Peace and Security Council of the African Union at its 806th and 827th meetings (see enclosures 3 and 4).

I should be grateful if you would bring these documents to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) António Guterres



Annex

[Original: English]

I wish to inform you that the African Union Peace and Security Council, at its 827th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 13 February 2019, considered and endorsed the strategic concept of operations of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for the period 2018–2021 (see enclosure 1). The strategic concept of operations was developed pursuant to the communiqué adopted by the Peace and Security Council at its 782nd meeting, held in Nouakchott on 27 June 2018 (S/2018/725, annex), in which the Peace and Security Council called for the development of a new concept of operations for AMISOM, aligned to support the implementation of the Somali transition plan and concurrent activities, and pursuant to Security Council resolution 2431 (2018) on the drawdown of AMISOM troops.

I also wish to recall that the Peace and Security Council, at its 806th meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 7 November 2018, took note of my report on the situation in Somalia for the period from August to October 2018 (see enclosure 2) and the joint African Union-United Nations report on the operational readiness assessment of AMISOM*.

In that regard, please find enclosed the communiqués adopted at the 806th and 827th meetings of the Peace and Security Council (see enclosures 3 and 4).

The above-mentioned documents provided a very useful baseline for the fifth joint African Union-United Nations review of AMISOM, scheduled for March 2019. I look forward to the continued enhancement of coherence and convergence between the African Union and the United Nations, to ensure a common direction by the Peace and Security Council and the Security Council in the renewal of the mandate and authority of AMISOM by the end of May 2019.

I would be most grateful if the present letter and its enclosures could be transmitted to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Moussa **Faki Mahamat**

* On file with the Secretariat and available for consultation.

Enclosure 1

African Union Mission in Somalia strategic concept of operations, 2018–2021

[Original: English and French]

PREAMBLE

1. The production of this Concept of Operations (CONOPs) is pursuant to the 782nd Communiqué of the African Union's Peace and Security Council (PSC) meeting held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 30th June 2018, which renewed the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) until 29 May 2019. It directed AMISOM to take all necessary measures to enhance its operational effectiveness and to better align its operations with political developments and the security environment through a development of the Mission's CONOPs. Using the Operational Readiness Assessments (ORA) of AMISOM and of the Somali Security Forces (SSF), the 2018 AU-UN Joint Review, the National Security Architecture (NSA) and in particular the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), this CONOPs is specifically designed to enable AMISOM to effectively implement its mandate, geared towards transitioning and handing over of security responsibilities to the Somali Security Forces (SSF).
2. This AMISOM 2018 CONOPs is different from previous CONOPs because it charts a clear path to an end state, which is a transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security institutions. Covering the period 2018 – 2021, this CONOPs is informed by a realistic political analysis, clear major assumptions and threat analysis, addressing both military strengths and the political economy of al-Shabaab. It has been developed jointly and in close consultation with the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), Federal Member States (FMS), the United Nations (UN) and other key international stakeholders. It will be periodically reviewed, using monitoring and evaluation metrics, to assess its delivery against the evolving political and security situation in Somalia. The implementation of this CONOPs requires, inter alia, the availability of the required resources and support, reconfiguration of AMISOM, the force generation followed by the enhancement of the capacities and capabilities of SSF and political will by all stakeholders.

I. BACKGROUND

3. In light of the challenges faced by AMISOM in implementing objectives set out in its previous CONOPs, it was decided at the June 2018 African Union (AU) PSC meeting in Nouakchott, that a new CONOPs be developed for AMISOM based on an extended timeline, aligned to support the implementation of the STP. This was further highlighted in the outcomes of the 2018 AU-UN Joint Review, where it was assessed that the implementation of the STP is contingent on collectively addressing the challenges identified by the ORA of SSF, and providing appropriate logistical support for the tasks related to the transition.
4. The report of the AMISOM's ORA conducted in September 2018, emphasized that support for the transition should include enabling the reconfiguration of AMISOM uniformed personnel, as well as the deployment and expansion of its civilian component to key locations to better provide support to AMISOM's military and police operations. This was underscored in the 26th MOCC outcomes, which also stressed the importance of enhancing the capacities and capabilities of the SSF

through AMISOM-led combat-mentoring to ensure effective joint operations in support of the STP.

5. Pursuant to the Somali Council of Ministers' and National Security Council decisions that approved the STP in April and June 2018 respectively, the Plan provides for the gradual conditions-based handover of security responsibility from AMISOM to SSF. The STP which outlines key priorities, milestones and indicators, is organized into three constituent parts, namely, operational activities, institutional capacity building and supporting activities.

II. CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION

6. Overall, and since the election of President Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmaajo" in February 2017, Somalia has made noticeable progress. In this context, the role of AMISOM has been vital in supporting and maintaining the conditions for political processes to take place. To this end, there has been a consolidation of the federal system and introduction of essential political reforms. These reforms include agreements on the Political Roadmap for 2020, adoption of the STP, agreement on an electoral model and successfully meeting the benchmarks for the IMF Staff-Monitored Program, an essential pathway for debt relief.
7. Currently, the Federal government and the FMSs are undertaking a constitutional review process. The process is expected to resolve Somalia's pending issues, namely power and revenue sharing arrangements, and the completion of state formation. A key part of achieving these critical tasks has been the establishment of the Federalization Negotiation Technical Committee (FNTC). This has been set up by the National Security Council (NSC) with the task of supporting the delivery of the fundamental pillars for Somalia's long-term stability. The FNTC also offers a more inclusive platform for coordination and dialogue between the FGS and the FMSs, thus fostering a more constructive atmosphere.
8. Somalia is gradually moving towards economic recovery. At the heart of its economic agenda has been the Federal Government's ability to institute policy frameworks and facilitative measures. These have improved the performance of the economic and financial sector in Somalia. The result of such measures has also registered encouraging economic successes, particularly the Federal Government's performance on the IMF Staff Monitored Programme (SMP). Additionally, Somalia's cooperation with International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank has enabled progress in its fight against corruption, and assisted in the regular payments of its civil servants' salaries. In September 2018, the European Union (EU) accelerated its direct budgetary support of €100 million to Somalia while the World Bank provided grants worth US\$80 million. While Somalia is on an upward trajectory, progress remains reversible due to the overall fragility of its political landscape.

III. THREAT ANALYSIS

9. The overall operating environment in Somalia remains dangerous and difficult due to the volatile security situation, despite a slight reduction in violent incidents against civilians and humanitarian workers since 2014. This notwithstanding, al-Shabaab continues to demonstrate its resilience by conducting sustained deadly terrorist attacks against AMISOM, Somali security forces and civilians.

10. **Political context.** Somalia remains one of the world's most conflict-affected states, suggesting the existence of multiple threats to the country's stability. For nearly three decades of chaos and conflict, political instability has been one of the biggest challenges/threats to Somalia and a key driver and protector of complex interests of the Somali elite. Currently, the nascent federal system remains weak and political instability remains extant. Meanwhile, the Federal government continues to face challenges from the leaders of FMS who are increasingly united in their opposition to Mogadishu on a number of issues including resource-sharing and foreign policy, specifically in relation to the Gulf Crisis. The very recently culminating effect of this was the decision by the majority of FMS leaders to officially suspend cooperation with the Federal Government (Garowe CIC Communiqué 24 Oct 2018).
11. At the federal level, political tension is often maintained by the perpetual push by some opposition/MPs for a cabinet reshuffle and the sacking of the Prime Minister, leading to frequent threats of impeachment or no-confidence motions. Similarly, at the FMS level, particularly Galmudug and Hirshabelle, political instability has caused threats of no-confidence or impeachment votes, and have led to the toppling of some elected leaders. This is made worse by the fact that politics in Somalia is intensely clan-driven. In fact, clan divisions, coupled with the proliferation of arms in the country and the absence of rule of law present a chronic impediment to the prevention of violence and armed conflict. This situation is not expected to change significantly in the short term.
12. Furthermore, external interference in Somalia's internal affairs, especially by non-African actors, threatens to disrupt the peace and state-building efforts currently underway in Somalia. The geo-strategic importance of Somalia has ignited competition mostly by some Western countries and the Gulf States.

A. Security Threats: Presence of Armed Opposition Groups.

Al-Shabaab

13. Al-Shabab remains the most active armed opposition group in Somalia and poses the biggest threat to FGS and AMISOM. It has continued to direct its attacks against AMISOM in a bid to force its TCCs to withdraw their forces from Somalia. Al-Shabaab's main strategic objectives are to overthrow the Federal government and to establish an Islamic state in Somalia on the basis of Sharia law and to expand this ideology across East Africa. It tries to achieve this by engaging in acts that undermine the ongoing process aimed at establishing fully functioning government in south-central Somalia, as it believes this threatens its support base and sources of financing. Unsurprisingly therefore, the group has been quick to retake territories lost to FGS and AMISOM in the recent years, in order to increase income from seaports and taxes originating mainly from agricultural activities. Furthermore, al-Shabaab establishes strict legal regimes in areas under its control and influence, with a view of instilling fear and mistrust in the local population as well as providing a dispute mechanism system that is lacking from the federal authorities.
14. Commanding between 4000 to 7000 active combatants including foreigners, the al-Shabaab still maintains control of about a fifth of Somalia, mainly in the ungoverned rural areas and small towns in southern and central Somalia, with strongholds in the Juba Valley, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, and Upper Gedo. To ensure a steady flow of fighters, the group has engaged in an aggressive child recruitment campaign

as well as attract foreign fighters and thereby provide in Somalia a potential safe haven for ISIS elements leaving Syria and Iraq to regroup and consolidate.

15. One of al-Shabaab's main strengths is its ability to provide alternative governance, including justice under sharia law, basic services - including health, education and food relief - in areas under its control. By maintaining an almost parallel administration with the FGS and the FMS, they have developed strong governance mechanisms that undermine efforts to extend state authority to newly recovered areas. Hence, when AMISOM/SNA recover areas, the local populations expect the provision of services to continue, but this is often not the case.
16. The group's access to bomb making equipment and technical expertise makes it a highly dangerous organization. Over the years, al-Shabaab has transitioned to an insurgency, deploying a combination of terrorism, asymmetric and unconventional tactics on AMISOM, FGS and civilian targets, often highly mobile and launching conventional attacks on targeted FOBs. With a significant number of its forces spread across AMISOM's AOR, and with the MSRs still not under AMISOM/SSF control, the militant group is well able to conduct sustained attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs), remote-controlled VBIED (RCVBIED) and pressure plates - backed by other tactics including hand grenade/mortar attacks, suicide bombs and assault capabilities in the more complex attacks, ambushes and targeted assassinations. These actions constrain the freedom of movement of AMISOM, SSF and civilians, including humanitarian actors on the MSRs.
17. As evidenced by the 14 October 2017 bombing in Mogadishu that killed over 500 people, al-Shabaab remains capable of employing sophisticated techniques to conduct complex attacks using, for example, suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (SVBIEDs). From 1 January - 12 October 2018, a total of 334 IED incidents was recorded in AMISOM AOR, with Sector 1 having the highest number (197). There were 19 complex attacks recorded, 6 of which occurred in Sector 1. The highest numbers of IEDs incidents were in Sectors 1 and 3 and the lowest in Sectors 5 and 6. These attacks mostly targeted AMISOM and SSF.
18. In addition, al-Shabaab has shown the ability to temporarily take ground from the SNA and AMISOM using a combination of VBIEDs, "technical", direct and in some cases significant assaults, and small arms fire, supported by IEDs or mines which are used to disrupt re-enforcing units or quick reaction forces (QRF) and inflict casualties. These attacks typically are preceded by a shaping phase of IED emplacement on QRF routes and the concentration of al-Shabaab fighters in the vicinity of FOBs. The decisive phase typically involves an assault on positions with VBIEDs and the fixing of QRFs with IEDs and IDF. This has most recently been demonstrated with multiple takeovers of SNA positions in Daynunney, Goofgaduud Buray and Buulo Mareer. These instances showed al-Shabaab is able to overcome and exploit SNA tactics, techniques and procedures to inflict maximum casualties.

Islamic State in Somalia

19. With the demise of Islamic State self-proclaimed caliphate in Iraq and Levant (ISIL/Daesh) in 2017, the group has been looking for footholds in Africa, particularly Somalia, where it already has an active affiliate. The Islamic State-linked group in Somalia (ISIS) counts roughly 100-200 men and operates mostly in the northern Puntland region, and is "for hire" in Mogadishu. Most recently, the group has become

active in capital city, claiming responsibility for several assassinations in the city, which have targeted security forces. In spite of being a relatively small armed group compared to al-Shabaab, the persistent presence of ISIS remains a concern.

20. Currently, ISIS and al-Shabaab operate as rivals, as the latter is committed to fight any ideological competitor within Somalia, hence its determination to defeat the challenge of the Islamic State in Somalia. This notwithstanding, there is potential for tactical cooperation between the two militant groups on the battlefield. Such a partnership could pose a bigger threat to government and AMISOM forces. Beyond terrorism, experts have raised an alert over the re-emergence of the threat of piracy off the coast of Somalia. In 2017, piracy incidents for example doubled compared to the previous year though this remains well below the 2010-2016 norms. Well resourced, Somali pirate networks are still capable of launching sophisticated attacks.

B. Socio-economic and Humanitarian Threats.

21. The general socio-economic and humanitarian situation in Somalia constitutes a serious threat. With about 70 percent of the population under the age of 30, 67 percent of total population unemployed, and with around 50 percent living below the poverty line, poor and disillusioned youth with limited opportunities striving for what seems to be unattainable dignity become easy prey for al-Shabaab recruiters. With this demographic trend unlikely to be reversed in the near-term, this threat is likely to remain if not grow. Furthermore, the coverage of basic social services in Somalia is extremely low, mainly due to the absence or low capacity of existing government structures. The impact of this is felt most strongly among the internally displaced people who continue to be affected by cyclical disease outbreaks.
22. This situation is further compounded by the fact that Somalia is prone to recurrent drought, floods and other natural disasters which the government currently cannot address without significant external assistance. For instance, in 2017 when Somalia faced a major drought, only a concerted international aid effort averted the deaths of hundreds of thousands of some of the most vulnerable people on earth. Such cyclical disasters often force AMISOM to focus efforts and resources to facilitating and enabling humanitarian delivery and lifesaving activities at the expense of operations against al-Shabaab.

C. Operational Environment (OE).

23. Environmental factors should be a determinant factor in planning operations in Somalia. The South-central climate revolves around the dry and rainy seasons. The rainy season is usually from April to June and the dry season from October to early December. Temperatures range from moderate to hot, characterized by high humidity at the coast. Regarding the terrain, south-central Somalia is dominated by the Shabelle and Juba river systems which have extremely fertile river valleys and are therefore the most populous areas. Away from the river valleys, the terrain is semi-arid to arid and extends to mountains in the west towards Ethiopia. Moreover, the infrastructure in AMISOM AOR is extremely poor following decades of instability and a lack of investment. Roads are in poor state of repair and often tracks have been created but have many potholes. In addition, bridges crossing major rivers have not been maintained and their continued use without major attention is limited. The suitability of most roads in the wet seasons is doubtful. This impact negatively on the ability to deploy and sustain troops by road.

IV. STRATEGIC END STATE

24. A significantly degraded military and related capacity of al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in Somalia, leading to a stable, federal, sovereign and united Somalia whose citizens enjoy access to economic opportunities, justice and the rule of law, with Somali own institutions assuming full responsibilities.

V. EXIT STRATEGY

25. The STP provides for the gradual but clear conditions-based handover of security responsibility from AMISOM to SSF. AMISOM's drawdown and exit strategy is therefore based on the progressive implementation of the STP, anchored to a comprehensive approach to security and focused on ensuring the building of an SSF capable of undertaking sustained joint operations with AMISOM as well as to enhance their capacity to provide sustainable security environment in the country; including securing recovered areas, main population centres and MSRs. Consequently, the focus for SSF development should include both SNA, SPF, Darwish and regional forces to ensure there are forces capable of assuming security responsibilities from AMISOM by December 2021. In this regard, AMISOM will continue to work in close coordination with the FGS, SSF and leadership of FMS and their regional forces in the implementation of the STP.

VI. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

26. The following are general assumptions:
 - a. The overall political and security environment continues to improve across Somalia, allowing AMISOM to carry out its mandate and support the implementation of the STP;
 - b. Force generation of the SSF will be undertaken in a timely manner by the FGS, and supported by relevant partners to allow for a gradual and progressive takeover of the security responsibilities from AMISOM;
 - c. AMISOM Troops and Police Contribution Countries (TCCs/PCCs) will continue to provide adequate numbers of suitably trained and equipped personnel up to 2021;
 - d. There will be continued and predictable support including funding for AMISOM's sustainment during the transition implementation process;
 - e. AMISOM and SSF operations will be sufficiently supported by humanitarian and stabilization actors in a sequenced and coordinated manner;
 - f. Functional local administration will be established by the FGS in the areas recovered from al-Shabaab with the assistance of AMISOM and other partners.
 - g. AMISOM will reconfigure to best support the STP.
 - h. No additional resources will be provided by current international partners and so any additional requirements will need to be addressed through other funding sources.

VII. AMISOM COMPONENT OPERATIONS

27. The section outlines the key objectives and tasks of the three AMISOM components (Military, Police and the Civilian element which includes Mission Support and Strategic Communications) to support the implementation of the STP in line with AMISOM's mandate. It further demonstrates AMISOM's efforts to maximize the opportunity for success in support of the STP through, inter alia, the reconfiguration of AMISOM uniformed personnel and deployment and expansion of the civilian component to prioritized areas in consultation with key partners to provide improved support to military and police operations.

VIII. MILITARY COMPONENT

28. The AMISOM CONOPs 2018 - 2021 provides a roadmap on tasks that the military component will undertake in the period through to 2021, during which transition of security responsibilities to SSF will be realized. The development of the CONOPs is informed by relevant mandating documents, the National Security Architecture (NSA), the STP, the relevant ORAs, a comprehensive threat(s) analysis, force capability and sustainable and predictable resourcing. This CONOPs is therefore aligned to STP pillars of operational, institutional and support elements anchored in a Comprehensive Approach to Security (CAS).
29. The CONOPS has three phases, during which there will be the enhancement of the capacity and capability of SSF to effectively transition security in the build up to national elections in 2020/2021.

1) Objectives

30. Enable gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSF contingent on abilities of the SSF and the attendant political and security situation in Somalia.
31. Reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other AOGs, including through mitigating threats posed by IEDs and the degrading of al Shabaab through sustained joint military operations against it.
32. Assist as appropriate SSF to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization coordinated with Community Recovery and Extension of State Authority and Accountability (CRESTA/A).

2) Planning Assumptions

33. A fully comprehensive approach is required to ensure that timely planning at all levels will facilitate an effective, timely and efficient transition.
34. The FGS and FMS will continue to work in partnership, recognizing priority areas for transition and resourcing these activities accordingly.
35. SSF will generate the required number of trained, equipped and sustained forces to operate jointly with AMISOM in all sectors during transition.
36. Adequate logistic support will be provided to those eligible SSF to undertake joint operations with AMISOM

37. UNSOS will continue to support SSF (10,900 involved in joint planning with AMISOM) within the 8 mandated categories of support.
38. UNSOS and TCCs will ensure operational serviceability of the key Equipment remain above 75% in order to provide an effective AMISOM military component capability and effectiveness.
39. Three additional military utility helicopters will be provided in Phase I & II and three more Helicopters will be provided in Phase II & III.
40. All FOBs vacated by AMISOM will either be handed over to SSF or collapsed thus denying their use to the enemy.
41. A joint and proactive strategic communications strategy designed to keep the population informed and on side, and defeat negative al-Shabaab messaging.

3) Tasks

42. Reconfigure itself to best support the STP
43. Conduct joint operations to degrade al-Shabaab and other AOGs, secure MSRs and key population centres and establish new FOBs and vacate and handover or collapse other FOBs with the view to transferring security responsibilities to SSF and eventually exit.
44. Conduct CIMIC activities & assist SSF in facilitating the government to carry out service delivery after establishing appropriate security measures.
45. Provide force protection of AMISOM including protecting other UN personnel & humanitarian agencies.
46. Receive and handover defectors to appropriate authorities.
47. Protect Key Leader Engagement (KLE) during political dialogue and reconciliation.
48. Assist in capacity building of SSF through combat mentoring.
49. Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

4) Scheme of Implementation

50. To carry out its mandate, the military component will utilize its current ground, air and maritime resources and assets, with a robust counter IED capability, well-coordinated Mission Support. Additional capabilities may be requested as appropriate within the STP period and when the situation deems it necessary. The sectors will establish mobile forces to, inter alia, conduct targeted joint operations to deny al-Shabaab freedom of movement and action including disrupting AS financial sources, using available resources. All major operations in Al Shabab strongholds will be underpinned by the clear, hold and build concept, requiring multi-dimensional (military, Police and Civilian) approach including coordinated planning of all the components and the FGS.

5) Phases

51. **Phase 1 - up to 30 June 2019:** Reconfigure AMISOM to enable AMISOM to degrade al-Shabaab, secure Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR, hold and secure Leego, protect key population centers identified especially along the MSRs, collapse or consolidate existing FOBs and build ones (where appropriate jointly with SSF) and commence a multi-faceted transition from AMISOM to SNA/SSF. The Military component will deploy Battalion strong points, and FOBs of not less than Combat Teams, at appropriate positions along or within the vicinity of MSRs, to undertake relevant operations including an aggressive and active defence, to secure the MSRs and any agreed main population centers therewith. Capacity will be built to launch offensive operations, within limits of such positions. Such operations will continue in all the phases as and where the positions will still be held by AMISOM and will involve SSF as much as possible.
52. **Phase 2 - July 2019- December 2020:** Increase SSF leading operational role, continue to degrade al-Shabaab, build and hold positions along MSRs and continue to strengthen population centers with Somali or AMISOM police gradually taking over security of the main population centres. Forces will be further reconfigured to set conditions for transition success.
53. **Phase 3 - January 2021 – December 2021:** Somali Forces in the lead in all sectors, AMISOM forces consolidate to support key hubs, conduct targeted disruption/support operations and prepare for exit By December 2021, possibility of establishing Standby Reaction forces of Battle group strengths, to support and respond to any major threat to protect the key institutions in the Regional capitals within AMISOM AOR.

6) Key Enablers

54. **Information and Intelligence:** The Component will optimally utilize the current ISR capability to enhance military component operations, strengthen an effective command and control of the asset. Noting that the current platform is limited in coverage to only Sector 1, parts of sectors 3 and 5, It is requested that additional capabilities be added to the platform to enable it extend its coverage and effectiveness including IED detection and Infra-Red and SAR. Extend, where possible, ISR coverage to entire AMISOM AOR, integrate with COE platforms. Establish intelligence sharing mechanism.
55. **MEU:** Fully operationalize MEU by UNSOS. TCCs to immediately provide specialists personnel to operate the MEUs equipment as previously allocated.
56. **Aviation:** The Military component currently has three medium armed helicopters, effectively operating west of River Juba. As the Mission and Military Component re-configures, AMISOM shall require three Military Utility Helicopters, within the period Jan 2019 up to Dec 2019, and three attack combat helicopters by Jan 2020. The Helicopters will be provided according to the Statement of Unit Requirement which has been jointly developed by AU and UNSOS. These helicopters will be under the control of the FC. The assets will strategically posture to support operations and movement of forces especially QRF, conduct CASEVAC and ammunition resupply, including during Operations. If UN helicopter hours are substantially cut, look to donors/others for the provision of helicopters to support operations and movement of

forces especially QRF, conduct CASEVAC and ammunition and other key logistics during operations.

- a. **Air:** There is an urgent requirement to deploy additional military utility helicopters to operate from its main base at Baledogle Military Airport, located in Sector 3 and also from forward operating bases as may be determined by the Force Commander. These helicopters should be able to provide troops insertions and extractions, armed escort, quick reaction response, search and rescue, air reconnaissance, support for airmobile operations, logistical re-supply, patrol observation and monitoring flights, air to ground fire support, armed patrols, limited CASEVAC to AMISOM troops including in low, medium and high threat areas, and landing zones where there is no ground support or where airfield security cannot be guaranteed, as approved by the Force Commander.
 - b. The Unit to be deployed will operate day and night in support of operations conducted by AMISOM. The Unit must be able to operate in the whole AO and deploy out of the Unit's based location at least two military utility helicopters up to 30 days. The Unit should also deploy with three Forward Air Controller (FAC) teams and have the ability to detach such teams with the associated communications (air to ground) equipment to supported units. The Unit must be able to sustain its personnel and equipment. The aircrafts must possess forward air refuelling capability as well as capacity for 24/7 operations.
57. **Maritime:** The grey water capabilities of AMISOM, especially the medium coastal patrol boats including the Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs) will continue mitigate on the current maritime threat in immediate AMISOM locations and facilities along Somalia Coast, including Mogadishu Airport, key strategic Seaports of Mogadishu, Marka, Barawe and Kismayo and entry points along the vast coastlines. The current marine components with limited assets in Mogadishu and KDF SBUs in Kismayo to continue to provide to port defense. Tasks of these assets will include harbour defense, protection of key installations along and adjacent to the coastlines, provision of in theater escort to own logistics supply vessels. The Maritime elements will coordinate their operations closely with the Somali Coast guard.
58. **International Partners:** International partners will continue to support and encourage AMISOM to enhance its effectiveness through capacity building, mentoring and training. It is envisaged that this support will facilitate implementation of STP & UNSCR 2431. Robust support to the force generation and training of SNA should be enhanced since the generation of security forces to enable draw down, hand over and exit of the AMISOM troops is one of the keys to success of the STP.

7) Reconfiguration

59. Reconfiguration of AMISOM forces will be undertaken to realign forces (in operating space, sizes and tasks) to execute the mandated tasks. . Reconfiguration will address force posture, create mobile forces and quick reaction force, equipment, tactics, technique and practices (TTPs) to match the current and predicted threats of al-Shabaab and other AOGs, as SSFs are continually capacitated. Throughout the three phases of the STP, AMISOM forces will gradually and continually reconfigure its force structure and troop strength to comply with guidelines provided by UNSC and AUPSC in order to combat the asymmetric threat of the enemy and support civilian

stabilization activities. Clear tasks, and respective resources with timelines will be specified in the detailed military CONOPs. This reconfiguration supports a new approach to countering al-Shabaab and enabling the delivery of the STP.

8) Re-Sectorisation

60. The sector boundaries will remain as currently constituted focusing on force protection, the security of the MSRs and key population centres during Phase 1 and consideration for re-sectorisation in the subsequent phases following assessment.

9) Drawdown

61. The current troop level of AMISOM will be reduced by 1000 by 28 February 2019, in line with UNSCR 2431 paragraph 5 and of PSC Communiqué of the 782nd meeting paragraph 13, taking into account the commencement of implementation of Phase 1 of the STP, as well as of the political and security situation, threat analysis, logistical implications and time constraint.

10) Somalia Security Forces (SSF)

62. **Somalia Security Forces (SSF):** There are currently 10,900 approved SNA who have been approved to receive logistics support from the UNSOS, when they are in joint operations with AMISOM. Within the context of joint operations, AMISOM Sectors will operate with SSF. The SSF constitute the SNA, Darwish and the respective regional State Forces currently located in each of the six AMISOM Sectors and are actively engaged in joint operations. As outlined in the STP, the SSF will, on their own or in joint operations with AMISOM forces, conduct operations to liberate al-Shabaab held areas. SSF will jointly co-locate with AMISOM forces for mentorship, and where capable or relevant (other areas may be taken over by Somali or AMISOM Police Force) take over security of locations vacated by AMISOM when/if all conditions are met.
63. **SSF Tasks:** The following tasks will be performed by SSF in all phases:
- a. Jointly clear, hold and secure MSRs.
 - b. Maintain presence in all SNA sectors.
 - c. Jointly conduct targeted operations to degrade al-Shabaab.
 - d. Protect population centres and key government installations.
 - e. Take over FOBs vacated by AMISOM where appropriate.
64. **Force Generation:** The FGS will generate troops to undertake the tasks in Phase 1 consisting of personnel from the SSF. The FGS will retrain and restructure 18,000 troops to partake in tasks as articulated in the NSA.
65. **Coordination of joint operations:** The Force Commander and the CDF-SNA will exercise the operational control over all Joint Operations. To ensure effective planning and control, Joint Operations Centres will be established at the AMISOM/SNA Sector levels.
66. **Command and Control:** The Force Commander has OPCON of all AMISOM forces and has the authority to move forces from one sector to another, as dictated by operational exigencies. The multi-national Sector Commanders shall have TACOM of the forces assigned to them and will retain OPCOM of their contingent forces. A uni-national Sector Command shall have OPCOM over the forces in their sector.

With regard to SNA forces, they are OPCON to the relevant operational commander of the SNA. SNA and AMISOM forces will conduct joint operations under the operational control of SNA CDF and AMISOM FC.

IX. POLICE COMPONENT

67. AMISOM police is mandated to support the capacity building of the Somali Police at Federal and State levels through mentoring, training, advising and provision of operational support in line with the NSA and the Somali STP. In the previous CONOPS, AMISOM police focused on supporting the establishment of the State police and building the capacity of both the Federal and State Police, which significantly improved their capacity to provide relative peace and security Mogadishu and in the State capitals.
68. Despite this progress, the ORA of the Somali police conducted 2017 revealed significant capability gaps in terms of personnel numbers, basic police infrastructure, logistics and skills. Additionally, there is a need for AMISOM police to support Somali police to either re-establish or extend basic policing services to population centres outside Mogadishu and State capitals.
69. There is therefore a critical and urgent need to provide support the Somali police to address the identified gaps. To this end, AMISOM Police, Somali police and partners have initiated strategies and programmes such as the Joint Police Programme (JPP) and Police Professional Development Board (PPDP).
70. Accordingly, this Police CONOPS outlines the strategic and operational interventions that will address the capability and capacity gaps of the Somali police to progressively take lead and assume full control of internal security responsibilities, which will enable the extension of State authority, rule of law and access to justice in Somalia. To achieve these goals, AMISOM police will re-configure itself, particularly in the area of deployment and resources.

1) Objectives

71. Enhance the capacity of the Somali police as they continue to take lead in the delivery of policing services to the people in Somalia in a professional and accountable manner with due regard to human rights.
72. Promote community-policing initiatives in population centers to mitigate security threat including violence extremism and other acts of insurgencies.

2) Planning Assumptions

73. AMISOM police strength will increase as envisaged in UNSCR 2431.
74. UNSOS will provide timely and adequate logistical support to AMISOM police to support the expansion of Somali police operations in the population centres.
75. AMISOM military, SNA, AMISOM police, Somali police and other security agencies will cooperate and coordinate their operations to ensure no security vacuums exist in the country.

3) Tasks

76. Train, mentor and provide operational support to the Somali police in line with the NSA and the STP.
77. Support the Somali police in the provision of policing services to population centers to enable government conduct its functions, stabilization, extension of State authority and Rule of Law.
78. Provide support to the Somali police in securing the 2020/2021 electoral process.

4) Centre of Gravity

79. To enhance the capacity of the Somali police to consolidate and gradually take full control of internal security responsibilities through mentoring, training, advising and provision of operational support.

5) Capacity and Capability

80. The authorized minimum strength of AMISOM police is 1,040 including five Formed police Units (FPU. The ORA conducted for AMISOM police came out clearly, that the Police Component have the required competencies to support the capacity building of the Somali police. However, its operations are hampered with inadequate operational equipment for both IPOs and FPU. Currently, the FPU rate of COE serviceability is below 30%.

6) Somali Police Capacity and Capability

81. Somalia operates a federated system of policing comprising Federal and the State police. In 2017, an ORA conducted for the Somali police revealed the strength of the Federal Police as 7699 with approximately 90% deployed in Mogadishu. The combined strength of the State Police in Kismayo and Baidoa is 1060, while other States have regional forces performing police functions. Additionally, the ORA revealed serious gaps in terms of Somali police personnel numbers, skills, infrastructure and operational logistics. However, AMISOM police, Somali police, UNSOM and partners have initiated strategies and programmes to address the identified gaps, amongst these are the Joint Police Programme (JPP), Police Professional Development Board (PPDP), Sub Working Group on Police (SWGPP) and other capacity building initiatives.

7) Regional Forces

82. AMISOM Police, UNSOM and UNDP are supporting the FGS to conduct ORA of the Regional Forces in all five FMS, namely Puntland, Jubaland, Galmudug, Southwest and Hirshabelle, to determine their numbers, capability, gaps and needs, in line NSA, which seeks to raise the combined strength of Federal and State Police to 32000 and in support of the STP.

8) Execution of Police Concept of Operation

83. **Police Commissioner's Intent:** To reconfigure AMISOM police deployment and resources to support the capacity building of the Somali Police to take full policing responsibilities in line with the NSA and the STP.

84. **Main Effort:** To train, mentor, advice and provide operational support to the Somali Police in line with the NSA and the STP.
85. **Police Re-configuration:** AMISOM police will re-configure its deployment to support the Somali police to consolidate policing in Mogadishu and FMSs as well as expanding to population centres. Among the key tasks of AMISOM police are to support the capacity building and institutional development initiatives for the Somali police with a view to reforming and restructuring the police institutions at both the Federal and State levels.
86. AMISOM Police will therefore continue to mentor, train, advise and provide operational support to Somali police in Benadir region, and FMSs in line with the mandate and in support of the transition plan. This includes facilitating the extension of State authority, stabilization, rule of law and access to justice in Somalia. AMISOM police will also support the Somali police to provide security before, during and after the 2021 electoral process.

9) Scheme of Implementation

87. Aligned to the STP, the Police CONOPs will be implemented in three phases that span from November 2018 to December 2021 as follows:

Phase I – November 2018 to June 2019:

88. **Objective:** Support the implementation of Phase I activities of the transition plan and consolidate policing in Somalia.
89. The focus of this phase will be to reconfigure AMISOM police deployment to support the Somali police in consolidating policing in Somalia, recruiting, training and deploying police personnel to population centers such as Jowhar, Beledweyne, and Mogadishu-Leego-Baidoa-MSR among others.
90. Additionally, AMISOM police will support the Somali Police in reforming and restructuring the institution including the provision of refresher and specialized courses to enhance effectiveness, efficiency and accountability.
91. AMISOM police will also support the FGS in completing the ORA of the regional forces with a view to determining their numbers, capacities, and capabilities, which will inform the FGS regarding their package and integration policy (see Annex C for details).

Phase II - July 2019 – December 2020

92. **Objective:** continue providing support to the Somali police as they take lead in the implementation of the STP, consolidation of policing and provision of policing services in Federal and FMSs as well as expanding AMISOM police operations to other State Capitals and districts.
93. In this phase, AMISOM Police focus will be to expand its operations to other population centres including Galmudug State, and Dhobley in Jubbaland State to support the Somali Police as they take lead in providing security to the populace.
94. Emphasis in this phase will also be to support the recruitment, training and deployment of prospective police officers to augment the strength in Galmudug State

and Geedo Region in Jubbaland as well as to continue consolidating policing in Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo and Beledweyne.

95. Furthermore, AMISOM police will support the Somali police to provide security during the 2020-2021 general elections.

Phase III - January 2021 – December 2021

96. **Objective:** ensure the Somali police is able to take the lead in consolidating policing services at both Federal and FMS in support of stabilization, extension of State authority and Rule of Law.
97. AMISOM Police will continue supporting the Somali police through mentoring, training, advising, and providing operational support as they continue taking the lead in providing police services in Benadir Region and FMSs in support of stabilization, extension of State authority and Rule of Law. (See Annex C for details).

10) Coordination and Collaboration

98. The AMISOM Police will continue to cooperate, collaborate and coordinate with the UN, FGS/FMSs and various International partners in the implementation of this CONOPS through various mechanisms such as Joint Police Programme Joint Police Programme (JPP), CAS strands/Sub working group (SWG/PPDP).

11) Command and Control:

99. The Police Commissioner reports to the SRCC and exercises operational control (OPCON) over all AU Police personnel and assets. The Police Commissioner (PC) also ensures that there is coordination with other AMISOM component, the Somali Police, and international partners for effective operations. The PC is assisted by the Deputy Police Commissioner (DPC) with 4 coordinators who report to the PC through the DPC. AMISOM Police advisors, trainers and mentors report through their respective coordinators. The FPU also report through the Operations/FPU coordinator while with the support services personnel report through the Police Chief of Staff. In accordance with his or her Command Directive, the PC is authorized to make such in-mission appointments, post police personnel and establish a police chain of command and control, and management to meet operational and administrative exigencies.

X. CIVILIAN COMPONENT

100. AMISOM civilian component consists of mission leadership/management, substantive, and mission support sections. However, this section will cover only the tasks and activities of the substantive units, which include: Political Affairs; Protection, Human Rights & Gender; Civil Affairs; Humanitarian Liaison; Security Sector Reform and Public Information. To provide support to the police and military components, the civilian personnel will be involved in all phases of the implementation of the STP, undertaking substantive functions relating to political, CIMIC and community engagement, human rights compliance and accountability. This will also include a broader representational and coordination role with the FGS, regional authorities, the UN as well as humanitarian partners, civil society, and other entities.

1) Objectives

101. The primary objective of the civilian component is to support AMISOM's military and police tasks; by focusing on efforts that enhance the AMISOM's transition and eventual drawdown in line with the STP, with the aim of the SSF assuming security responsibility by December 2021.

2) Planning Assumptions

- a. UN logistical support to a minimum of seventy (70) AMISOM civilian staff in all AMISOM AOR continued to 2021.
- b. Security conditions in each sector will allow civilians to operate across the AMISOM AOR.
- c. AMISOM and SSF operations are sufficiently supported by humanitarian and stabilization partners in a sequenced and coordinated manner.

3) Tasks

Humanitarian Liaison, Service Delivery and Early Recovery

- a. Facilitate the inclusion and sequencing of basic lifesaving services and humanitarian support in AMISOM's military and police transition plans and activities.
- b. Support efforts aimed at enhancing early recovery initiatives particularly in recovered areas.
- c. Facilitate CIMIC and other community engagement activities to promote good relations between AMISOM and the local communities.
- d. Assist in identifying community needs in newly recovered areas, including through Rapid Assessment Missions (RAM)
- e. Identify and implement QIPs and Peace Strengthening Projects within AOR.

Accountability, Human Rights Compliance and Gender

- a. Provide advice to the mission leadership on all aspects of compliance with IHL, IHRL, child and women protection and gender issues and support AMISOM/ SNA forces to carry out their mandate in full compliance with international law and UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP);
- b. Monitor compliance with IHL, IHRL and other applicable Rules and Code of Conduct and address cases of violations, in particular allegations of violations and abuses against civilians and children;
- c. Support the mission's efforts to mitigate and minimise civilian casualties including the implementation of the Force Commander's Directives;
- d. Support the full operationalization of the AMISOM CCTARC Amends programme;
- e. Continue to mainstream gender considerations in AMISOM activities;

- f. In collaboration with UN and other partners, conduct capacity building activities, including training, mentoring for the security sector actors in protection, IHL/Human Rights and Gender.

Security Sector Reform

- a. Provide technical support to AMISOM military and police efforts in the reform of the Somali security forces as stipulated in the NSA and STP;
- b. Provide support to AMISOM military at sector and FOB levels on handling of al-Shabaab defectors at the transitory stages and support the Somali Defectors Rehabilitation Program at both federal and regional levels in collaboration with the relevant partners;
- c. Provide support to the relevant government institutions in enhancing policies, mechanisms and processes for the management and oversight of Somali Security forces at federal and regional levels, in collaboration with the UN and other stakeholders.

Political Processes

- a. Monitor and report on political and related developments in Somalia, particularly in AMISOM's AOR, affecting the implementation of the mission's mandate;
- b. Support the good offices of the SRCC during political and diplomatic engagements;
- c. Liaise with government authorities at the FGS and FMS levels and act as AMISOM's political representation at the regional level;
- d. Continue to act as the mission's Focal Point on STP implementation related matters at both federal and state levels;
- e. Support to the political processes, as may be required, including reconciliation, federalisation, constitution review and election processes, in collaboration with the UN and other international partners.

4) Scheme of Implementation

102. Aligned with the STP, the Civilian Concept and initiatives will be implemented in three phases, spanning from January 2018 to December 2021. This will entail conducting a range of crosscutting activities in support of the three lines of efforts, which include: operational, institutional capacity building and support activities, with focus on the STP prioritized areas.
103. Phase 1 (January 2018 to June 2019), will be dedicated to developing the Implementation Plan, reconfiguration and reorganization of the civilian component to deploy to all AMISOM Sectors (and capitals of the FMS'). Phase 2 (July 2019 to December 2020) activities will focus on capacity building for local institutions, enhancing CIMIC and community engagement including support to dialogue and reconciliation. Lastly, Phase 3 (January 2021 to December 2021) activities will be geared towards facilitating AMISOM's drawdown and transition to Somali-led security process.

104. The effective delivery of the civilian component's mandated tasks requires its presence in all FMS within the AMISOM AOR. Nevertheless, resource constraints and shifts require a degree of flexibility with regards to prioritized geographical locations, as well as functions. There is also a commitment to progressively increase the employment of national staff.
105. As a first step towards its support to the implementation of the STP, and in addition to existing civilian presence and coverage of Mogadishu and Banadir region as well as utilization of Community-Based Liaison Officers that currently cover Galmadug, AMISOM will deploy civilian personnel across four locations, namely: South West State (Baidoa); Jubbaland (Kismayo); and Hirshabelle (Jowhar and Beletweyne). Thus AMISOM will have civilians deployed across five of its six Sectors (with the exception of Doubley in Sector 2) and the FMS capitals, and will consider FGS' and the local administration's requests to increase its capacity beyond the utilization of CBLOs in Galmudug where it does not currently have troops.
106. Additionally, the current and expanding AMISOM police engagement and potential support of AMISOM military to SSF across all of its AOR also necessitate that consideration should be made for additional civilian deployment in Galmudug. In Phase 1, AMISOM will deploy 3 International Staff and 1 National Staff in each of the four locations. In Phase II, civilian efforts will focus on core thematic areas, while in Phase III, civilian configuration will be informed by the evolving situation on the ground.
107. The civilian deployment concept will comprise of Civilian Sector Teams (CSTs) deployed to enable the mission to focus its efforts to support the transition, while also providing a more coordinated, collaborative and balanced manner alongside the UN and other key stakeholders. The CSTs will be multi-activity teams with a diverse array of functions to support the delivery of transition process.

XI. MISSION SUPPORT

108. Mission support facilitates the provision of essential support to AMISOM components, and in accordance with the STP, ensures effective logistic support to sector logistic hubs, battalion logistic locations, police team sites and FOBs, and support to AMISOM's future operations. AMISOM support is a coordinated effort between UNSOS, AMISOM and partners with clearly defined responsibilities.

1) Objectives

109. Provide a logistics support framework to enable operations in support of AMISOM components (Civilian, Military and Police) in order to undertake/ implement their operational and mandated objectives as laid out in the 2018 strategic CONOPs.
110. Provide logistical and administrative support through a flexible support network to support the implementation of the STP including mobile operations and stabilisation activities.

2) Planning Assumptions

111. UNSOS will continue to provide logistical support to AMISOM in accordance with the AU – UN MOU on the provision of support to AMISOM, through the Support Implementation Agreements (SIA) and the Concept of Mission Support.

112. UNSOS will provide targeted non-lethal combat support package to 10,900 SSF engaged in joint operations with AMISOM.

3) Tasks

Phase I (2018- 30 Jun 2019):

113. Provide logistical support for the establishment of new FOBs & Police hubs (AMISOM & SSF) and mobile operations including deployment of military utility & attack helicopters. To achieve this, the following tasks will be undertaken:
- a. Continued logistics support including for mobile and targeted operations
 - b. Provision of materials for the establishment of FOBs and Police Hubs
 - c. Provision of enhanced Medical support
 - d. Support the troop drawdown
 - e. Deployment of new COE as per revised operational requirements (motorized/mechanized)
 - f. Deployment of additional enablers (military utility and attack helicopters)
 - g. Support for police ORA

Phase II (Jul 2019 – Dec 2020):

114. Provide continued logistical support for the establishment of additional FOBs & Police hubs (AMISOM & SSF) in newly recovered areas and to mobile operations. Provide logistical support to the Police expansion to Hirshabelle and Galmagduud as well as logistical support to the Electoral process. The following tasks will be undertaken:
- a. Continued logistics support including for mobile and targeted operations
 - b. Support the establishment of new FOBs along the opened MSR
 - c. Support the establishment and sustainment of AMISOM Police Hubs
 - d. Support joint operations between AMISOM and SSF
 - e. Support the establishment of new FOBs if applicable (AMISOM/SSF)
 - f. Support election process
115. Phase III (January – December 2021): Continued logistical support to AMISOM and SSF operations as well as the Electoral process. The following tasks will be undertaken:
- a. Continued logistics support including for mobile and targeted operations
 - b. Support relocation of troops and COE
 - c. Support expansion of existing camps
 - d. Support closure of FOBs
 - e. Support elections process

4) Scheme of Implementation

116. The support network consists of the Mombasa Support Base (MSB), Mogadishu Logistic Base (MLB), Sector Logistic Hubs, Battalion logistics locations, police team sites and FOBs and other agreed locations. Ground resupply is the primary mode of transport with air resupply and barge operations remaining as options by exception. The operational logistic network comprises of three levels, as follow:
117. **Sector Logistic Hubs:** The sector logistic hubs and the sector warehouses are co-located with the Sector HQs. UNSOS will deliver logistic supplies in accordance with the agreed logistical requirements. Sector logistic hubs distribute supplies to the

Battalion logistic locations, Police team sites and FOBs. Reserves are maintained as per agreed standards.

118. **Battalion Logistic Locations:** AMISOM determines the Battalion logistics locations taking into consideration operational requirements. UNSOS will deliver logistic supplies in accordance with the agreed logistical requirements. Sectors are responsible for the delivery of support from the battalion logistic locations to FOBs.
119. **SSF Unit locations:** UNSOS will deliver logistic supplies to SSF Unit locations where SSF is not able to provide through their own means of delivery.

5) Support to AMISOM

120. In accordance with the 2016 MOU, UNSOS provides the following main categories of support to AMISOM: fuel and lubricants, rations, CITS, MOVCOM, GIS, explosive threat management capacity, medical, aviation services, public information support, training, catering, general stores, cleaning and furniture, engineering and field defence stores, construction of Sector HQs, transportation services, welfare, general supplies and camp services (for details, see AMISOM-UNSOS Mission Support Concept in Annex E)

6) Support to SSF

121. Support to SSF is provided from various sources that include FGS, AMISOM, UNSOS and partners. The delivery of support to SSF is the primary responsibility of FGS supported by the following entities.

XII. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS

122. In support of the transition process, the Public Information Unit (PIU), with the support of the AU/UN Information Support Team, will implement a robust and comprehensive communication strategy of the AMISOM Transition Process, while rebuilding trust for AMISOM within various communities in Somalia. The strategy will communicate operational, capacity building and stabilization efforts aimed at rebuilding Somalia.
123. The approach to be adopted in implementation of communication in support of this CONOPS will focus on the impact of AMISOM's activities in the transition process, with the primary target of winning hearts and minds of the Somali audience. As a core activity, the approach will also include a campaign to counter violent extremism narrative. Outreach activities will be undertaken at the federal and regional levels for wider engagement of the Somali population, with the youth and women targeted as a key demographic at the grassroots. Digital media and field technology will also be further utilized for faster, competitive and effective communication.

1) Objectives

124. To effectively communicate the implementation of the Transition Plan; to highlight key milestones and recast strategy to support stabilization and peace restoration efforts in Somalia; to proactively share credible information to discredit and counter extremist groups' propaganda, and to manage communication crises from arising issues in the Mission.

2) Planning Assumptions

125. The Transition Plan and key activities will be implemented as spelt out in UNSCR [2431 \(2018\)](#).
126. AMISOM will continue to receive logistical support for Strategic Communication from the UN and donor partners as spelt out in UNSCR [1910 \(2010\)](#) and subsequent resolutions.
127. The communications team will be informed in a timely manner on matters regarding military and police operations as well as CIMIC and quick impact projects for comprehensive and impact driven support.

3) Tasks

128. In order to provide effective communications support in the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, the following tasks will be undertaken in a sequenced manner in line with the three STP phases:
 - a. Information campaign against extremism
 - b. Undertake activities to enhance visibility of the Mission and understanding of its mandate in general, with a focus on the transition process.
 - c. Ensure enhanced coordination in messaging between AMISOM, the government, UN and other partners.
 - d. Provide capacity building training in Media and Communication for officers drawn from the Information Ministry, the SNA and the SPF
 - e. Impact driven media coverage targeting the Somali Security Forces capacity building and takeover of responsibility for security from AMISOM.
 - f. Timely communications on measures taken to address sexual exploitation and abuse, human rights observance and protection of civilians in the conduct of operations, decisively and effectively addressing emerging issues.
 - g. Focus communications to showcase increased role of the SSF in the handling of security responsibility and continued AMISOM drawdown.

4) Scheme of Implementation

129. The strategic communications team will undertake wider outreach activities at the grassroots level in order to facilitate public discourse. This will include roadshows, town hall meetings, public/school debates, drama, poetry competitions et al.
130. Radio, the most effective means of mass communication in Somalia, will be used to facilitate information dissemination and participation in issues of national interest including elections both at the government and federal member states level as well as improved livelihood projects.
131. Field technology and digital media will also be used to enhance the gathering and dissemination of information in an effective and timely manner. Particularly for the information campaign to counter violent extremism, digital media will be used to quickly respond to issues and influence perception.

132. AMISOM's support contractor, IST will be reconfigured to have Somali Outreach teams embedded in the communities and to provide for mobile teams and capability to cover operations.

XIII. COORDINATION MECHANISMS

133. Strategic coordination of support between AU, UN, T/PCC and partners is imperative to achieve the successful levels of support to AMISOM. Operational coordination of support between AMISOM, UNSOS, SSF and partners is critical to ensure effective delivery of required support for successful conduct of joint operations.
134. In this regard, a number of internal and external coordination mechanisms exist at both the leadership and working levels to facilitate mission management. These include bi-weekly AMISOM Senior Mission Leadership Team (SLMT) Meetings, Sector Commanders Conferences, Gender Focal Point meetings at MHQ and SHQ level, Civil-Military Working Group meeting, logistic coordinating meetings and Project Review Committee meetings.
135. Coordination with the UN will continue primarily through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum (SLCF) between AMISOM and UNSOM/UNSOS. In addition, AMISOM will maintain the regular joint meetings between the AU-UN teams.
136. Coordination with the broader group of partners, including with the FGS and the FMSs will continue to be undertaken through the CAS Strand mechanism. This mechanism includes FGS-led mechanisms such as the National Stabilization Coordination Forum, Planning and Delivery Teams, FMS Stabilization Forums, thematic mechanisms like the Working Group on Children in Armed Conflict and Protection and Human Rights, NGO Consortium and the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, as well as the operationalized AU-Somalia Taskforce.

Enclosure 2

Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the situation in Somalia

[Original: English and French]

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC), during its 782nd meeting held in Nouakchott, Mauritania, on 27 June 2018, reiterated the importance of periodic reporting on developments in the situation in Somalia and activities of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This report is submitted pursuant to the PSC Communiqué, as well as to paragraph 9 of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), adopted at its 8321st meeting on 30 July 2018. In the resolution, the Council requested the AU to keep the UNSC regularly informed, through the Secretary General, on the implementation of AMISOM's mandate, and regularly report to the Council, through the provision of oral updates and written reports.

2. This report covers major developments in Somalia during the period between August and November 2018. It also covers aspects relating to the activities of AMISOM.

II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

3. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) continues to record significant progress in its efforts towards stabilization, reconciliation and state building. It also continues to make great strides in its international and regional relations and building on the positive momentum emerging across the Horn of Africa, which contributes to consolidation of peace in the region. In particular, the tripartite meeting between the President of Somalia, the President of Eritrea, and the Prime Minister of Ethiopia in Asmara, Eritrea, on 5 September 2018, added to the momentum. This landmark meeting signaled a new era in regional diplomatic relations and resulted in a Joint Declaration on Regional Security and Economic Cooperation.

4. The adoption of the Somali Transition Plan (STP) and the concerted implementation serves as a demonstration of the Federal Government of Somalia's (FGS) commitment to take ownership of political, economic and security tasks in the country.

5. In line with its mandate and tasks outlined in the Communiqué of the 782nd meeting of the PSC on Somalia as well as United Nations Security Council Resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), AMISOM continues to support the FGS's security and stabilization efforts, to enhance the implementation of the political, stabilization, reconciliation and peace-building processes. To this end, AMISOM, together with members of the International community, continue to support the consolidation of the federal system and introduction of essential political reforms, including agreements on the Political Roadmap for 2020, implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP), and most importantly, the agreement on the electoral model.

6. The legislative branch of the FGS is playing a pivotal role in the oversight of government activities, and in contributing to facilitation of political processes. The House of the People was in recess and only reconvened on 10 September 2018. Legislation that is critical to the realization of the political process and agreements on the National Security Council (NSC) processes is currently in Parliament ready to be enacted. In order to propel inclusive politics, as elaborated in the National Development Plan (NDP), the Government has lined up 43 draft legislations of which 23 are before the Parliament, and have also developed 29 policies and established 17 agencies to guide these processes. So far, there is optimism that the Parliament would facilitate enactment of essential legislations to propel

realization of the Political Roadmap including, for instance, the holding of universal elections in 2020 in the country.

7. The constitutional review process is also ongoing, with the first five chapters of the Constitution already drafted and another five chapters expected to be completed by December 2018. In accordance with the commitments of the FGS, the Federal Justice Model that has been endorsed by the Cabinet, as well as the Agreements on the Distribution of Power are due to be tabled before the next NSC. Furthermore, the Constitution review proposals on fiscal federalism and the revised Constitution are scheduled to be tabled before the National Security Council by January 2019. This is expected to be followed by other required processes leading to the completion of the Provisional Federal Constitution by December 2019.

8. In following the timelines set for federal elections in 2021, the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) continues to demonstrate its ability to manage and facilitate the required processes. As part of such efforts, the NIEC conducted five bi-elections, facilitated temporary registration of 22 political parties, and executed its activities with 34% of 2018 budget funding, 26% of which is provided for by the FGS and 8% by the international community. Following the June 2018 agreement on an electoral model (proportional representation-closed list) for the 2020 universal elections, the FGS is working towards completing the electoral law. The FGS has also finalized the voters' education curriculum which seeks to empower the Somalis, including people with special needs; identified 1673 voting centres using Geographic Information System (GIS), and adopted a biometric registration system. As a next step, the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC) is in the process of verifying the voters' centres and establishing offices in the regions.

9. Whilst the FGS continues to record considerable progress as highlighted above, its relationship with the Federal Member States (FMS) needs to be further improved. It is worth noting that most of the FMS are due for elections in the coming months. Thus, the political campaigns currently playing out have exacerbated mutual suspicions that have in turn caused some political tensions between the FGS and FMS.

10. As a result, the Council for Interstate Cooperation (CIC), a forum of FMS leadership, set up to deliberate and agree on FMS interests, has met four times with leaders of the FMS, reiterating the need to accelerate the FGS' pace and progress on the implementation of political agreements, including the National Security Architecture. This issue received more attention at the 3rd CIC meeting held in Kismayo, Jubbaland which culminated with the issuance of a strongly worded CIC Communique on 8 September 2018. The Communique highlighted political, security and implementation challenges hampering the relationship between the FGS and FMS. In response, the Office of the President of the Federal Republic of Somalia, H.E. Mohamed Farmaajo's called for an emergency NSC meeting on 17 and 18 September 2018 in Mogadishu. The FMS leaders declined to attend the meeting and instead called for "third-party" mediation which the Somalia Prime Minister, H.E. Hassan Ali Khaire rejected.

11. As part of efforts to address the impasse, members of the Upper House (Senate) of the Federal Parliament in September took steps to mediate between the FGS and FMS by dispatching committees to Jubbaland, South West, Puntland, Galmudug and Hirshabelle states. In this regard, the members of the Senate held extensive discussions with regional leaders and took note of their concerns. Additionally, the Somali Prime Minister, in October, formed a Ministerial Committee comprising the Ministers of Finance, Security, Interior, and Constitution to address concerns raised by regional states through the CIC.

12. Notwithstanding the above-mentioned efforts, there has not been a breakthrough to remove obstacles to smooth relations between the FGS and the FMs to date. Instead, the fourth CIC meeting held from 20 to 24 October in Garowe, Puntland brought up critical

conclusions. These include the formation of Interstate security forces drawing from regional Darwish forces; establishment of Interstate Security Council mechanism that is responsible for the implementation of the STP and the establishment of a Security Fund that will serve as a pool for the budgets that will be allocated to support the Interstate forces. These positions represent some divergence from the STP, which FMS' endorsed in June 2018. Additionally, establishing an Interstate Security Council mechanism will serve to duplicate the role of the NSC. This could potentially create a parallel system that will be difficult to manage from both a political and financial perspective.

13. Additionally, the CIC leaders have reiterated that they will not cooperate with the FGS as long as it fails to address their stated grievances. In this regard, the CIC leaders have called for the holding of a National Consultative Conference within 45 days in Dhusamareb, Galmudug State to address these issues. This on-going stalemate distracts the FGS and FMS from the implementation of the STP and other key priorities of the transition process. If not adequately addressed, the current strained FGS and FMS relations may continue to deteriorate and could result in serious repercussions on the political process in Somalia, especially reconciliation, constitution review, and federalism.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

14. The overall security situation remains volatile and unpredictable as Al Shabab continues to resort to the use of IEDs/VBIEDs as a weapon, noting its limited capacity to effectively target AMISOM troops using other means. Al Shabab continues to maintain its presence in south and central Somalia, utilizing IEDs/VBIEDs as its primary weapon. Additionally, Al Shabab conducts limited ambushes along Main Supply Routes (MSRs), and uses other asymmetric tactics, including mortar attacks, suicide bombs, complex attacks as well as targeted assassinations to instill fear in the population. The terror group, whose strength is estimated between 5,000 and 7,000 fighters distributed in various regions, successfully infiltrated unrecovered areas within Juba Valley, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Upper Hiraan and Upper Gedo and hence restraining the freedom of movement of AMISOM, Somalia Security Forces (SSF), and civilians, including government officials and humanitarian actors.

15. The ability of Al Shabab to occupy key terrain with fighters concealed within local populations to launch asymmetric attacks and deny security forces access to such areas continues to be a serious challenge for AMISOM and SSF. Equally, the alleged presence of an estimated 150-180 pro-Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) fighters in the Qandala Mountains in Puntland, is also a cause for concern. Additionally, and noting the presence of the local Puntland Al-Shabaab group assessed to be around 600 fighters, there is a likelihood of increased attacks, predominantly using IED/VBIED backed by suicide and small arms attacks as well as possible assassinations.

16. In the recent past, Al-Shabaab has demonstrated the ability to attack and overrun certain SNA positions using a combination of conventional and asymmetric tactics in order to inflict maximum casualties and impede possible intervention. This was confirmed when Al Shabab launched temporary takeovers of SNA positions in Daynunney, Goofgaduud Buray and Buulo Mareer. In addition to its ability to move relatively unhindered across certain areas, Al Shabab provides alternative government and service delivery to populations under its control and further generates considerable revenue through forced taxation.

17. Since the adoption of the STP, the FGS has been undertaking operational planning for the implementation of the STP, particularly the priorities under Phase One. This is being done in addition to reforms that include reorganization of command and control measures, distribution of weapons and ammunition, and training of SSF. Furthermore, 1727 officers from the National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) were merged into the Somali Federal Police Force as part of structural reforms to enhance security in Mogadishu and

across the country, as well as eliminate overlap and duplication of functions between various security forces and institutions.

18. In August 2018, the SNA 14 October Brigade launched Operation Badbado on three axis aimed at capturing Balcad, Marka and Busra. Additionally, SNA liberated the coastal areas that connect Mogadishu to Marka (the capital of Lower Shabelle region) in September 2018. SNA forces backed by AMISOM troops also launched joint operations against Al Shabaab bases between Balcad and Afgooye in Lower and Middle Shabelle regions to enhance security of the main road between these districts. These operations are in line with STP objectives and part of on-going efforts aimed at enhancing security around Mogadishu city.

IV. ECONOMIC SITUATION

19. Amidst the challenging political and security environment in Somalia, economic activity is rebounding from the effects of the drought in 2017. The implementation of a good fiscal plan as part of its reform agenda, a good rainy season, backed by sustained remittances and grant inflows, Somalia's growth in 2018 is projected to increase with inflation also expected to ease. Recent economic progress has enabled Somalia to be eligible for pre-arrears clearance in July 2018. This signaled a major step towards debt relief.

20. Additionally, and as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen its ties with various international partners, President Mohamed Abdullahi "Farmaajo" traveled to China to attend the 7th Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). A notable outcome of this visit was the signing of a MoU that enables Somalia to join the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as an Agreement on enhancing Economic and Technical Cooperation with China.

21. On 26 September, the European Union announced its first ever direct budget support to the Federal Republic of Somalia of a total of €100 million. The funds are expected to be disbursed from the fourth quarter of 2018 until 2021 to support federalism. This support is aimed to gradually increase the FGS's ability to provide basic services for the Somali people. The budget support programme is part of a broader international response to the FGS's positive track record on policy reform and implementation. It came a day after the World Bank announced its first International Development Assistance (IDA) financing (worth \$80 million) in more than 30 years for the FGS. It also follows a recent positive interim assessment by the International Monetary (IMF) of its third Staff Monitored Programme (SMP). The SMPs for Somalia will help maintain macroeconomic stability, rebuild key economic institutions, and build a track record on policy and reform implementation.

V. AMISOM RECONFIGURATION

22. In compliance with the timeframes for the implementation of AMISOM's priority tasks outlined in the Communiqué of the 782nd Meeting of the PSC and UNSCR 2431, the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA) was conducted by the AU and the UN, in collaboration with partners. The ORA was aimed at identifying required enabling capacities and requirements within the authorised AMISOM troop ceiling, the mapping of the AMISOM police and civilian components and identification of gaps to inform future planning processes. Additionally, it provided the baseline for the reduction of 1000 troops, reconfiguration of AMISOM and development of a new AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPS) to support the implementation of the STP. The AMISOM ORA Report is attached to this Chairperson's Report.

23. Subsequently, AMISOM developed its new CONOPs in line with the requirements spelt out in the Communiqué of the 782nd Meeting of the PSC and UNSCR 2431, noting the outcomes of the AMISOM ORA. The new CONOPS seeks to re-align AMISOM's

objectives in support of the STP for the next three years. The new CONOPs also highlights key tasks of AMISOM's military, police and civilian components, in support of the STP, the National Security Architecture and other main government priorities contained in the four FGS Roadmaps, primarily that of Security and Justice and Inclusive Politics. These include undertaking targeted operations against Al Shabaab to facilitate stabilization and extension of state authority, support to inclusive governance and political processes and SSF capacity building, whilst ensuring compliance to human rights. Furthermore, the CONOPs takes note of personnel to tasks, including Mission enablers and multipliers, and complementary efforts that are required where possible.

24. The drawdown of 1,000 troops will see the AMISOM Military Component strength reduced from of 20,586 in October 2018 to 19,586 by February 2019. Included in this figure is the reconfigured strength of 129 staff officers in FHQ and 84 staff officers in Sector HQs. In line with the fulfilment of UNSCR 2431 to drawdown AMISOM Military Component by 1,000, the proposal put forward by AMISOM is as follows: UPDF – 0; KDF –229; ENDF – 301; DNDF – 129; and BNDF – 341. Additionally, the AU Commission is planning to ensure each AMISOM Sector HQ is multinational and include staff officers from different countries within each sector.

25. Having a multinational AMISOM Sector HQ is a first step towards achieving fully multinational AMISOM sectors. This plan will be phased to prevent any adverse impact on operational effectiveness of the Force. As a result of the reduction and as part of reconfiguration, AMISOM will hand over some FOBs to SSF as part of efforts to transfer security responsibility to the FGS. Additionally, agreed FOBs will also be closed to realign AMISOM forces to focus on key priorities of phase one and subsequent phases of the implementation of the STP and protection of own forces.

26. As part of the reconfiguration plan, AMISOM intends to ensure maximum effectiveness of its forces through the formation of sector level Quick Reaction Forces (QRF) which will be able to move at short notice. To keep pace with any consequence of the 1000 troop reduction, each Sector is expected to constitute an agile and highly mobile force to fill the gap following the drawdown and collapse of some of the FOBs. The mobile force will undertake search and destroy operations or attack identified Armed Opposition Groups, which are out of range of the FoBs' areas of influence.

27. Two types of QRF is envisaged, including combat team size force to respond to attacks in the main administrative or population centers within reach from the launching positions. The second type of QRFs will be light, constituted at company size level, and heli-portable. This will ensure ability to attack targets of opportunity, interdicting Al Shabab, support AMISOM and/or SSF troops under attack, far off from launching positions, where the ground based QRFs cannot reach. Certain force enablers, including helicopters for rapid deployment and/or extraction, with night capability shall be required. In the same vein, sector boundaries will remain as currently constituted with focus on force protection, security of MSRs and key population centres during phase one and consideration for re-sectorisation in the subsequent phases based on the outcomes of relevant assessments as may be required.

28. AMISOM, in coordination with partners and in support of the SSF, will continue to conduct joint offensive operations. It is expected that the relevant partners supporting the capacity building of SSF and institutions will also undertake the training, equipping and sustaining of SSF, with combat mentoring support from AMISOM, to the extent that the SSF are developed into a mission capable force ready to take over from AMISOM by the time the gradual drawdown of AMISOM forces begins.

29. AMISOM police is also reconfiguring its existing IPOs and FPU's to provide enhanced support to the implementation of the SPF by splitting the FPU's into smaller complements to facilitate expanded AMISOM police presence in key locations. Once the

additional outstanding two FPUs are also deployed in the mission area, they will be deployed in their key and intended locations to support the implementation of the STP.

30. In addition to existing civilian presence and coverage of Mogadishu and Banadir region as well as utilization of Community-Based Liaison Officers that currently cover Galmadug, plans are underway to expand and deploy civilian personnel to South West State (Baidoa), Hirshabelle (Beletwyne, Jowhar), and Jubbaland (Kismayo) Thus AMISOM will have civilians deployed across five of its six Sectors (with the exception of Doubley in Sector 2) and the FMS capitals, and will consider FGS' and the local administration's requests to increase its capacity beyond the utilization of CBLOs in Galmudug where it does not currently have troops. Additionally, the current and expanding AMISOM police engagement and potential support of AMISOM military to SSF across all of its AOR also necessitate that consideration should be made for additional civilian deployment in Galmudug.

31. The civilian component will cover the following substantive functions: (1) political, (2) stabilization and (3) human rights compliance and accountability. Furthermore, the civilians deployed in the sectors will ensure contact engagement and visits to key FoBs within each sector they are deployed to and ensure interaction with the local authorities in each location. Also, civilians will perform a broader representational and coordination role with engagements with regional authorities, humanitarian partners, civil society, and other stakeholders as well as providing support and guidance to the police and military components.

VII. AMISOM SUPPORT TO SOMALI SECURITY FORCES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STP

32. As part of ongoing efforts to ensure effective implementation of the STP, AMISOM completed the relocation of its troops and Formed Police Units (FPU) that were stationed in the Mogadishu Stadium to Aljazeera II training camp. This culminated in the handover of primary security responsibility of the Stadium and its environs to the Somali Police Force (SPF). Although not included as a priority in the STP, Planning for the relocation of AMISOM troops from the Academy in Mogadishu is on-going, alongside operational planning for the clearing and securing of the Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR, as stipulated under Phase I of the STP, which is at an advanced stage.

33. In addition, plans to support the SPF to recruit train and deploy four hundred (400) State Police officers to secure the Mogadishu-Baidoa MSR and Leego, in coordination with the EU and other international partners, is on-going. AMISOM is in the process of preparing to support the Hirshabelle Police Administration in the recruitment, training, and deployment of 800 prospective Hirshabelle State Police. The completion of the recruitment and training is scheduled to commence in November 2018, and the subsequent deployment of the State Police recruits will mark the establishment of the Hirshabelle State Police forces. This will in-turn contribute to facilitating expansion of state authority, as well as implementation of stabilization programs in Hirshabelle.

34. AMISOM Police continue to mentor and assist the SPF in close collaboration with UNSOM - Notably, AMISOM has so far mentored 2,228 Federal and State Police personnel on various police themes as part of efforts to enhance policing skills of individual Somali police officers. Furthermore, AMISOM supported six (06) specialized police courses namely counter-terrorism (Training of Trainers) –Sexual and Gender Based Violence and child protection, middle level management, traffic management, strategic management and refresher courses between August and October for 599 Federal and the State Police.

35. Significant progress was registered in the reactivation and building of institutional and individual police capacities, and in the provision of operational support to the SPF. Notably, AMISOM, in support of the FGS and FMS and in close coordination with UNSOM, UNDP, UNSOS, completed the ORA of the Jubbaland, Southwest and Galmudug

Regional Forces. The outcome of the ORA of regional forces served the dual purpose of determining the operational capabilities of the regional forces. It also serves to inform the FGS and FMS of the support package required for these forces - in line with the decisions of the NSC of December 2017 and February 2018, as well as UNSCR 2431. Plans are currently underway to extend the ORA to Hirshabelle and Puntland regional forces before December 2018.

36. With regard to infrastructural support for the SPF, AMISOM, through its Police Component, renovated two Police Stations in Mogadishu and constructed another one in Jubbaland State. Equally, AMISOM assisted the SPF in the implementation of various community policing programs, including prevention and countering violent extremism and radicalization, for police personnel, youth and elders in Mogadishu and FMS.

37. Furthermore, AMISOM continues to mentor and provide operational support to SSF during joint operations. Indeed, AMISOM, in coordination with SSF and relevant partners, successfully conducted various targeted joint operations, including patrols, route clearance, sea port and airport security as well as convoy escorts as part of the implementation of the Somali national security plans and the STP. Equally, some small scale offensive operations were conducted to assist the SSF to protect Somali authorities and help them carry out their functions of government. These operations ensure security for key installations and infrastructure and also help create the enabling environments for the authorities to facilitate stabilization, reconciliation and peacebuilding processes as part of implementation of the STP.

38. Similarly, AMISOM and other partners are supporting the FGS' efforts to elaborate detailed plans for the implementation of the STP. However, delays in the generation of SSF capabilities to take the lead in these operations with the support of AMISOM is likely to hinder timely take-over and holding of Leego and the clearing and securing of the Mogadishu-Leego MSR. Notwithstanding, AMISOM is undertaking additional operational tasks, including consideration to hold and secure Leego, whilst supporting capacity-building efforts to generate required SSF capacity to sustain and secure Leego and the MSR once cleared by AMISOM and SSF. This is a demonstration of AMISOM's commitment to support the priorities under Phase one of the STP and to guarantee progress as well as timely implementation and realization of the transition.

VIII. PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS

39. AMISOM continues to conduct its operations in strict compliance with International Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL) and the United Nations Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). AMISOM conducts IHL and human rights trainings for its uniformed personnel to ensure that AMISOM operations are conducted in compliance with applicable rules and the AU compliance and accountability framework. As part of Pre-Deployment and in-Mission Training, AMISOM provides pocket guides of AMISOM's Rules of Engagement, Codes of Conduct and Directives on the Use of Force to its personnel in AU official and P/TCCs languages.

40. Such measures, among others, have helped in reducing civilian casualties (CIVCAS) by AMISOM. For instance, of the 112 cases of CIVCAS recorded during the reporting period, only 03 were attributed to AMISOM, which the mission is currently investigating to ascertain the circumstances and verify the allegations. AMISOM continues to raise awareness on the Civilian Casualty Tracking and Analysis Cell (CCTARC) and the importance of CIVCAS prevention and mitigation.

41. Substantial progress is being made in enhancing enforcement of AU's zero tolerance policy on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA). Equally, AMISOM's closer coordination and cooperation with Somali civil society organizations is encouraging and remains critical to ensuring enhanced monitoring, analysis, and reporting on

conflict-related sexual violence in full compliance with the AU's Zero's Tolerance Policy against all forms of misconduct and abuse.

42. Appropriate measures are also put in place to deal with disengaged fighters in accordance with the AMISOM Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) for handling of detainees in case armed personnel will surrender or disengage during an operation.

43. In keeping with its mandate, efforts were made to increase AMISOM's protection activities ranging from specialized trainings, monitoring of human rights violations to ensuring timely reporting, verification of allegations, investigations and advocacy, using communication materials, and conducting workshops and field visits to prevent and address violations. AMISOM has also engaged in capacity building support to the SSF at federal and FMS levels on IHL, IHRL, Protection of Civilians, Child Protection and Gender. Additionally, AMISOM has been providing technical and advisory support to various FGS ministries on protection related issues.

44. To ensure joint planning and coordination on IHL and IHRL compliance and accountability issues, AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS continue to hold the regular HRDDP Working Group meetings. The AMISOM Force Commander's Directives are issued to all operational commanders prior to military operations outlining all feasible precautions to prevent and/or minimize civilian casualties during the operations. In addition, risk assessments on the likely implications of CIVCAS of any planned offensive operation are undertaken prior to the conduct of such operations. Such risk assessments generally incorporate practical pre-offensive, in-offensive and post-offensive measures that may be undertaken to minimize civilian casualties. The Police also have their Directives on the Use of Force (DoUF) which serves as a guide for the conduct of police operations as appropriate.

VIII. STABILISATION AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

45. To ensure appropriate coordination and collaboration, AMISOM, together with other stabilization partners, participates in stabilization meetings hosted by the Stabilization Coordinator at the FGS Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs. These meetings provide important opportunities for inclusive planning of stabilisation and other follow up activities. For instance, an outcome of one of such meetings included the need to protect civilians in Marka following the planned military operations in that location. Accordingly, the Ministry of Interior and Federal Affairs, supported by AMISOM and other stabilization partners, resolved to undertake a needs assessment mission in order to inform decisions on priority areas for intervention.

46. Consistently, AMISOM continues to engage the FGS in the implementation of the national stabilization programmes through the facilitation of the Benadir Regional Administration Workshops on stabilization. These workshops are essentially organized to, among other things, evaluate the new national stabilization strategy and its linkages with the Wadajir framework and determine predictable and sustained international partners' support for effective implementation.

47. In addition, AMISOM continues its assistance in the provision of basic social needs throughout its area of operation. Boreholes and clean drinking water were provided to vulnerable people in Galmudug. Furthermore, AMISOM constructed schools, renovated hospitals, and provided equipment to police stations in Kismayo, Mogadishu, and Baidoa and facilitated the acquisition of a power generator for the Beletweyne local administration.

48. Consistent with its mandate, AMISOM continues to provide security and logistical support to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. In this context, and in coordination with the FGS and the humanitarian community, AMISOM supported immunization campaigns as well as administration of routine vaccines against tetanus and measles.

49. Significant efforts have also been made to ensure effective civil-military engagement and coordination. Prompted by the limited visibility and/or limited humanitarian access in various communities, AMISOM has facilitated and even provided humanitarian assistance and support to vulnerable populations throughout its area of operation. While AMISOM has been able to provide some level of assistance, particularly with respect to immediate life-saving assistance and early recovery support, there is an urgent need for dedicated support to enhance the FGS' capacity to be able to withstand climatic and humanitarian shocks.

IX. UNSOS SUPPORT TO AMISOM

50. In line with UNSCR 2431 (2018), the STP, AMISOM facilitated implementation of key activities under Phase One of the Transition. In this regard, AMISOM, in coordination with UNSOS, supported all joint AMISOM/SSF operations and completed the relocation of all UN-owned equipment from the Mogadishu Stadium to Jazeera II. Moreover, the Mission Enabling Unit (MEU) facilitated and supported the construction of facilities at Jazeera II. Efforts are also underway to identify an appropriate site within MIA to construct a transit site to facilitate the relocation of AMISOM troops from the Academy.

51. Likewise, significant improvements were registered in the supply of rations and fuel since the resumption of the barge operations, reducing backlogs in rations delivery to Barawe and Marka. UNSOS continues to support AMISOM operations through timely provision of fuel, rations and Field Defence Stores as well as coordination and support to AMISOM troop rotations. However, the continued reliance on air delivery of logistics support to certain areas due to IED/VBIED threat, poor road network and adverse weather conditions remains a serious challenge.

52. As part of efforts to expedite deployment of civilians into the regions of Somalia, AMISOM undertook assessments across the sectors to facilitate the expansion and deployment of AMISOM civilian teams to undertake substantive tasks and support military and police operations. In the same vein, AMISOM also facilitated the implementation of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) through robust procurement and project management support. These are all part of efforts to support the work of the military, police and partners in stabilizing Somalia. The finalization of the Joint Support Operating Centre (JSOC) Standing Operating Procedures serves a good step to guide the operations of the JSOC and ensure effective delivery of services for the effective implementation of the STP.

X. OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

53. In line with the priority tasks outlined in the Communique of the 782nd meeting of the PSC on Somalia and UNSCR 2431, AMISOM has ensured implementation of initiatives within the prescribed timeframe. These include conduct of the AMISOM ORA by 15 September 2018 and CONOPs development by 1 November 2018, as well as submission of the first quarterly report to the AU PSC and UNSC by 15 November 2018. To maintain this momentum, the AU Commission has already started discussions with the UN Secretariat on the initial processes for the conduct of the Mid Term Review of AMISOM which is expected to be completed by 31 January 2019.

54. As AMISOM continues to make notable progress in implementing the priority tasks of outlined in the Communique of the 782nd meeting of the PSC on Somalia and UNSCR 2431, there is a growing expectation for AMISOM to reconfigure and align its current capacity and capabilities to the STP and other government priorities and plans. However, more accountability is also needed from the FGS in terms of its relationship with the FMS, implementation of the NSA, including integration of regional forces as well as finalization of the constitutional review and national electoral processes.

55. In the same vein, encouraging efforts continue to be made in ensuring early and sustained coordination between AMISOM and UN towards enhancing parameters to facilitate coordinated decision making and aligning operational efforts in the promotion of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. In this respect, AMISOM convened several coordination meetings, including the monthly Senior Leadership Coordination Forum (SLCF) with UNSOM/UNSOS and the strand 1 meeting within the Comprehensive Approach to Security framework and mechanism. These meetings continue to ensure AMISOM, UN and relevant partners are able to align their operational efforts to a common set of strategic priorities as best as possible in order to ensure optimum support to the FGS and FMS.

56. There are huge demands and expectations upon AMISOM to deliver on the STP and other key FGS priorities. In this regard, UNSOS support package to AMISOM needs to be tailored to support AMISOM mobile combat operations. UNSOS should also be in a position to facilitate the establishment of new FOBs in the context of the STP and the reconfiguration of the Mission.

57. In light of the above, the Peace and Security Council may wish to consider:

- a. Emphasizing that success in Somalia hinges on all the key stakeholders, namely FGS, FMS, AMISOM, UN and other partners working closely together to realize a peaceful and reinvigorated country;
- b. Encouraging the FGS to make progress in the implementation of the NSA as well as force generation, training, retention of SSF personnel to lead joint operations with support by AMISOM to take over Leego – which must be implemented before the end of June 2019;
- c. Urge the FGS and FMS to ensure constructive dialogue to resolve the concerns that exist currently to ensure more collaboration in implementing federal and regional priorities;
- d. Reiterating the importance of a conditions based draw-down and transition of security responsibility to the FGS and SSF to ensure that the gains already achieved are not lost;
- e. Emphasizing that the STP remains the framework for transition, including the importance of remaining within its principles and parameters, while being flexible and pragmatic as the priorities and timelines of the STP may shift as progress is achieved and conditions change;
- f. Urging all stakeholders to implement the recommendations/gaps identified in the SNA ORA;
- g. Reiterating the importance of protecting political processes, and providing space for dialogue and reconciliation across Somalia to help facilitate inclusive politics and strengthen governance processes;
- h. Welcoming the development of the new AMISOM CONOPs, which will subsequently be submitted for consideration by the PSC.

Enclosure 3**Communiqué of the 806th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 7 November 2018**

[Original: English and French]

COMMUNIQUÉ

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 806th meeting held on 07 November 2018, adopted the following decision on the situation in Somalia and on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM):

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Somalia, as well as statements made by H.E. Ambassador Mohamed Idriss Farah, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Djibouti to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of November 2018, as well as by Dr. Admore Kambudzi, Acting Director for Peace and Security on behalf of the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security H.E. Ambassador Smail Chergui. Council **also takes note** of the briefings made by the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the Commission in Somalia and Head of AMISOM, H.E. Ambassador Francisco Madeira and the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Somalia and Head of UNSOM, Professor Nicholas Haysom. Council **further takes note** of the statements made by the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the AU, H.E. Ali Shariif Ahmed; the Permanent Representative of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the AU, H.E. Ambassador Woinshet Tadesse of Ethiopia, in her capacity as representative of the Chairperson of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and by the representative of the European Union (EU);
2. **Recalls** all its previous decisions and pronouncements on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, in particular Communiqué [PSC/MIN/COMM.3 (DCCLXXXII)], adopted at its 782nd meeting held on 27 June 2018 and Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM (DCCLXIX)] adopted at its 769th meeting held on 30 April 2018. Council **further recalls**, in particular, paragraph 13 of the Communiqué of its 782nd meeting in which Council emphasized the need for the reconfiguration of AMISOM to be consistent with the implementation of the Somalia Transition Plan (STP), as well as paragraph 16 in which Council requested the Commission to work closely with the UN to undertake, within the next three months, a comprehensive review of AMISOM multidimensional capacities and capabilities; as well as paragraph 22 in which Council called for the development of a new AMISOM Concept of Operations;
3. **Reiterates** the importance of periodic reporting by the Commission on developments in Somalia and on the progress being made in the implementation of the AMISOM mandate, particularly as it relates to AMISOM's support to the STP as requested in the Communiqué of its 753rd meeting;
4. **Commends** the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) for the significant progress achieved in its efforts towards inclusive politics, including the development of legislative frameworks for the 2020 elections, resource sharing with federal member States, constitutional review, programmes for de-radicalization and counter violent extremism, security sector reform, economic recovery, in the context of the new political dispensation in the Horn of Africa. In this respect, Council **welcomes** the improving neighborly relations with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti, as well as the warming up the country's diplomatic relations with the Gulf States. Council **further commends** the FGS for the on-going efforts in implementing the STP, which is a

demonstration of the FGS' commitment to take full ownership of security responsibilities in the country;

5. **Also commends** AMISOM and its Police and Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) for the progress made so far in implementing the priority tasks outlined in the Communique of the 782nd PSC meeting, referred to above, and [2431 \(2018\)](#) of the UN Security Council in support to the STP, towards transition and drawdown of AMISOM;

6. **Further commends** the Commission and AMISOM for facilitating the conduct of the AMISOM Operational Readiness Assessment (ORA), development of the new AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs) 2018-2021, and submission of the first quarterly report to the AU PSC for its consideration and transmission to the UNSC within the required timeframes. Council **welcomes** the development of the new CONOPs and **looks forward** to its consideration and adoption as soon as possible;

7. **Takes note** of the findings and observations of the ORA, including the identification of capacity gaps and enabling requirements to inform future planning, as well as providing a baseline for the reduction of 1,000 troops by February 2019, reconfiguration of AMISOM and development of a new AMISOM CONOPs to support the implementation of the STP;

8. **Also takes note** of the timing for the AMISOM Mid-Term Review in early 2019, as well as the conduct of Joint Operations with Somalia Security Forces (SSF), reduction of 1000 troops and reconfiguration process of AMISOM to support the implementation of the STP and AMISOM CONOPs. Council **requests** the UNSC, taking into account the calendar of activities at the AU, to postpone the consideration of the proposed Mid-Term Review of AMISOM to March 2019, after the completion of the AMISOM reduction of 1,000 troops;

9. **Emphasizes** that the STP, endorsed by Council at its 769th meeting, provides the most viable pathway for AMISOM's trajectory for transition and handover of primary security responsibilities to the Somali National Security Forces (SNSF). In this regard, Council **stresses the need** to ensure that any alignment or flexibility that AMISOM is expected to apply during the transition process is within the framework of the STP;

10. **Also emphasizes** that successful transition in Somalia is hinged on close collaboration among all the key stakeholders, namely, FGS, Federal Member States (FMS), AMISOM, UN and other partners. In this regard, Council **urges** the FGS and FMS to engage in constructive dialogue to resolve their current political differences, with a view to ensuring more collaboration and synergy, in implementing federal and regional priorities that will contribute towards the preservation and consolidation of peace and security in the country;

11. **Underscores the importance** of its upcoming visit to Somalia and the need to engage with all stakeholders, assess the situation, and support ongoing initiatives in support of the resolution of the current tension between the FGS-FMS, further emphasizing the importance of a peaceful resolution of any differences, in order to successfully held the Somali people in turning a new page in its political history, from decades of conflict, through the on-going trajectory of stability, peace, development and prosperity;

12. **Notes with concern** that although there is many training programmes for Somalia national defence forces under the facilitation of several stakeholders, there is limited visibility of their results and the coordination of these stakeholders with AMISOM, which is expected to facilitate combat mentoring for the trained Somali national defence forces personnel. In this regard, Council **encourages** the FGS to expedite implementation of the National Security Architecture and strengthen the

linkages across force generation, training and retention of SSF personnel to lead joint operations with the support of AMISOM;

13. **Stresses** the importance of a conditions based draw-down and transition of security responsibility to the FGS and SSF, in order to preserve the momentum and gains already achieved. In this regard, Council **reiterates its call and support** for sustainable and predictable financing of AMISOM, in order to ensure that the Mission has the required capabilities to effectively support the transition process. In the same context, Council **stresses the need** for the United Nations Support Office to Somalia (UNSOS) support package and delivery to be tailored to support AMISOM to deliver on the STP priorities, particularly through the reconfiguration of the Mission and the undertaking of mobile combat operations;

14. **Pays tribute** to the heavy sacrifices made by AMISOM T/PCCs, especially those that have paid the ultimate price for the promotion of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. In the same context, Council **wishes** quick recovery to all those AMISOM personnel who are nursing injuries;

15. **Reiterates** its gratitude to the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners for their continued support to AMISOM operations against Al Shabaab, as well as for their support to the efforts of the FGS;

16. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit this Communiqué and his Report on Somalia, as well as the AMISOM ORA Report to the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3), as well as to the UN Secretary-General for circulation to the members of the Security Council as working documents, as appropriate;

17. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.

Enclosure 4**Communiqué of the 827th meeting of the Peace and Security Council, held in Addis Ababa on 13 February 2019**

[Original: English and French]

COMMUNIQUE

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU), at its 827th meeting held on 13 February 2019, adopted the following decision on the consideration and adoption of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for 2018 – 2021:

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the Concept of Operations (CONOPs) of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for 2018 - 2021, as well as statements made by H.E. Ambassador Hermann Immongault, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Gabon to the AU and Chairperson of the PSC for the month of February 2019, as well as by H.E. Ambassador Smail Chergui, AU Commissioner for Peace and Security;
2. **Recalls** all its previous decisions and pronouncements on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM, in particular Communiqué [PSC/MIN/COMM.3 (DCCCCVI)] adopted at its 806th meeting held on 07 November 2018, Communiqué [PSC/MIN/COMM.3 (DCCLXXXII)], adopted at its 782nd meeting held on 27 June 2018 and Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM (DCCLXIX)] adopted at its 769th meeting held on 30 April 2018. Council **further recalls**, in particular, paragraph 22 of the Communiqué of its 782nd meeting in which Council called for the development of a new AMISOM Concept of Operations (CONOPs) aligned to support the implementation of the Somali Transitional Plan (STP) and concurrent activities;
3. **Commends** the continued progress made by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), including the commitment of the FGS to fulfil the requirements in facilitating effective implementation of the Somali Transition Plan which forms the basis of the 2018-2020 AMISOM CONOPs, in the context of the new political dispensation in the Horn of Africa;
4. **Also commends** the Commission and AMISOM for finalizing the 2018-2021 AMISOM CONOPs as well as AMISOM and the Police and Troop Contributing Countries (P/TCCs) for the progress made so far in implementing the priority tasks outlined in the Communiqué of the 782nd meeting of the PSC, and UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) [2431 \(2018\)](#) in support to the STP, towards reconfiguration, transition and drawdown of AMISOM;
5. **Recalls** the decision of the UN Security Council, as contained in resolution [2431 \(2018\)](#), on the reduction of 1000 AMISOM troops by 28 February 2019;
6. **Also emphasizes** that the successful implementation of the AMISOM CONOPs 2018 – 2021 and the STP will largely depend on the effective generation of the Somali Security Forces required for the gradual and progressive takeover of security responsibilities from AMISOM, continued provision of required trained and equipped personnel by Police and Troop Contributing Countries and availability of required and predictable resources for AMISOM's sustainment to support the FGS in the implementation of the STP. In this regard, Council **calls on** the UN and all stakeholders to continue supporting AMISOM and the FGS in the provision of

resources required for the effective implementation of the AMISOM CONOPs 2018 – 2021 and the STP.

7. **Commends** the ongoing joint consultations and coordination between AMISOM and the FGS, within the framework of the AU-Somalia Task Force, to facilitate effective implementation of the STP and the AMISOM CONOPs 2018 - 2021;
 8. **Pays tribute** to the great sacrifices made by AMISOM T/PCCs, especially those that have paid the ultimate price for the promotion of peace, security, stability and reconciliation in Somalia. In the same context, Council **wishes** quick recovery to all those AMISOM personnel who are nursing injuries;
 9. **Reiterates** its gratitude to the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners for their continued support to AMISOM, as well as to efforts by the FGS;
 10. **Endorses** the AMISOM CONOPs 2018-2021 and **directs** the Commission to facilitate its implementation and report regularly to Council on the progress made;
 11. **Requests** the Chairperson of the Commission to transmit this Communiqué and the AMISOM CONOPs 2018 – 2021 to the African Members of the UN Security Council (A3), as well as to the UN Secretary-General for circulation to the members of the Security Council as working documents, as appropriate;
 12. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.
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