## ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL

### FIFTY-FIFTH SESSION

Summary records of the meetings held at Geneva from 4 July to 10 August 1973

## 1859th meeting

Wednesday, 4 July 1973 at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. S. A. FRAZÃO (Brazil)

E/SR.1859

#### AGENDA ITEM 1

#### Opening of the session

1. The PRESIDENT, declaring open the fifty-fifth session of the Economic and Social Council, said that the quality and quantity of work to be accomplished could well make that session a landmark in the Council's history.

2. At the close of the previous session, all members had, he thought, shared the conviction that the Council was striving to regain earlier audacity, vigour and sense of responsibility, and was preparing, through the rationalization of its working methods, to fulfil its role of helping to build global prosperity through global co-operation. Those purposes were benefiting from the current international political détente, which it was hoped would lead to new decisions in multilateral economic co-operation. The détente could not be restricted to improving relations amongst the holders of international power but must extend into the area of world economic co-operation for the benefit of all.

3. The Council's awareness of the unsatisfactory state of world economic co-operation showed that it was confronting the challenge of the myriad economic, commercial and financial problems engendered by increasingly complex world interrelationships. Better knowledge of those interrelationships would enable the Council to master their interaction and to lay down comprehensive concepts and conceptual parameters for the negotiated solutions from which the collective sentiment of participating in prosperity and security must stem. Those aims could only be achieved if the Council had faith in the validity of its own efforts.

4. In recent sessions the Council had devoted itself to timely issues and had thus opened up new approaches to problems for which mutually beneficial solutions were being sought. The commencement of the debate on collective economic security had helped to blaze a new trail in that direction. Indeed, the Council had adopted a more affirmative approach to its vast responsibilities in accepting that the provincial and parochial should make way for a new and more enlightened sense of globalism and interdependence.

5. Practical decisions were, of course, needed, but they must be taken in isolation: they must be part of a comprehensive programme of action. Man was the prime mover of his future in seeking a new expression of economic and social justice under the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations. Certain uncontrollable forces of history could not be disregarded, but they should become less unpredictable as the international community advanced in its knowledge of the interactions he had mentioned and developed a sense of unity of purpose.

6. The destiny that bound the nations together for good or ill compelled them to persist in the struggle for a new balance of economic vectors. Collective political will remained the sole instrument for making economic development a less hazardous venture and expansion a more stable commodity.

7. It was often argued that to attempt to correct national weaknesses by international co-operation was vain. Such co-operation was admittedly no magic potion, but it could help national economies to find their own solutions to their particular problems. Moreover, it was becoming increasingly clear that international co-operation could help developed countries with their own problems of economic expansion and monetary stability. The outer limits of global prosperity were fixed only by the international community's capacity for imaginative creations.

8. The Council had a heavy and complex agenda before it and he urged members to give the Chairmen of the sessional committees all possible co-operation. His advice to members was to concentrate attention on the items requiring policy decisions with an over-all impact. The Council could not be a body that issued directives with a bearing on the prospects of development and expansion and at the same time a purveyor of administrative advice on every minor controversy arising in its machinery: it must be selective if it was to have an impact on those areas where its contribution was most needed.

The problems of the world economy were inextricably 9. and increasingly linked to each other, and improved methods of analysis were needed to find integrated solutions for frequently conflicting trends. That meant that there was a need to strengthen the Council. The call for global solidarity through a revitalized Council would be meaningless, however, unless members were prepared to tackle courageously the basic economic and financial problems afflicting the world. It must be recognized that the world economy was in a crucial period of transition, that the financial crisis was far from being checked, and that those problems were interrelated and could not be solved by superficial measures enacted in exclusive circles. He was confident, however, that the elements of disruption would ultimately release the creative instincts for progress and change and would lead to solidarity in development and expansion, once the fallacious assumption that nothing would change if the status quo could be patched up in good time was dismissed.

10. The United Nations had been instrumental in the birth of many independent States. National independence, however, was only a first step towards the attainment of national goals and actual participation in international policy decision-making. With a few exceptions where development had succeeded in putting down roots, economic independence remained a dream. The real gap between rich and poor nations was increasing. For some years, the Council had avoided looking problems in the eye: it had delegated power through institution-building without assuming its role of policy-making. By shelving the basic issues, it had failed to command the confidence of the developing world or the active interest of the industrial countries. Moreover, it had developed an almost paranoiac fear of the art of negotiation as a means of discharging its responsibilities under Chapter IX of the Charter. The most important contribution that the Council could make to improve the world economic and social order was to become a forum for negotiation from which broad guidelines could emerge and subsequently be further developed.

11. In the conduct of international affairs and in the pursuit of consensus there was no substitute for discussion. A Council engaging in a process of quasi-permanent negotiation would probably be the ideal instrument for ensuring the type of international economic co-operation capable of overcoming critical situations that could be resolved only within accepted parameters encompassing global development and prosperity. He felt it useful to make that point, since the first exercise of review and appraisal of the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade at Council level provided a special challenge to the Council's negotiating abilities. To some extent the Council's future was linked to its success in influencing the correct implementation of the International Development Strategy. He earnestly hoped that members would make every effort to appraise all that had happened since the inception of the Strategy with its inherent problems.

12. The data available on the first two years of the Second Development Decade showed that the goals of the Strategy were far from being attained and that the policy measures envisaged in 1970 remained largely theoretical. He was not convinced that the international community was confronted by fatalistic trends with unavoidably disruptive effects. Never in the course of history had the mind of man been so fertile in questions; never had he harvested so many answers. There was no reason to assume that the present behaviour of the world economy could not bring about a new, more dynamic and more effective phase in international co-operation. The new results emerging in the trade and monetary fields should encourage new patterns of balanced growth, benefiting both the developed and the developing world. The negotiations already under way or envisaged should foster the cause of economic development and security. It was thus extremely important for the Council itself to review and appraise the implementation of the International Development Strategy. That exercise should provide ample opportunity for a re-commitment by the international community to the philosophy and objectives of the Strategy. At the same time, the Council must keep abreast of the new developments and anxieties that the multidisciplinary concept of development brought in its train. It was an accepted tenet that growth per se did not provide all the answers and "development" must be understood as the sum total of its many components, but it was also clear that no development, whatever its conceptual basis, could take place without growth. It would be wrong to lose sight of the fundamental premises or to insist upon the final aims while attempting to downgrade the very means that made it possible to achieve those aims. The Council should receive impulses from different sectors, including conflicting trends, and through a process of negotiation aiming at consensus provide the necessary synthesis for action required by the system and by those organs which should be instrumental in the implementation of the Strategy.

13. He had used the word "consensus" advisedly as the desirable goal of negotiation, since he was convinced that present-day economic realities made it indispensable, for the sake of all parties concerned, that the Council should not take the easy path of mechanical or accidental majorities. The economic process operated through a complex system of interactions and feed-backs that made it necessary for every decision to be weighed in terms of efficacy and feasibility. The Council could not possibly fulfil its role under the Charter unless it developed a more sophisticated decision-making process. Consensus was the price to be paid for the political commitments necessary to its deliberations. In the past, the Council had seldom "decided" in any real sense; when it had attempted to do so, its decisions had more often than not become part of the dead wood of unenforced resolutions. The time had come for members to re-appraise the crucial process of decision-making within the Council. Whether the present session was to become a landmark in the history of international economic co-operation would largely depend on the manner in which the Council approached the problem of consensus, since it was clear that it would not succeed in obtaining the right political commitments if it continued to resort indiscriminately to voting procedures without exhausting every possibility of consensus. Members

must negotiate on every possible occasion, bilaterally, multilaterally, within groups and between groups.

14. The question of the Council's relationship with the specialized agencies and other organs of the United Nations system was an important subject. The role of the Council was clearly laid down in the Charter and the operational links between the agencies and the Council were defined in the existing basic agreements, which, incidentally, the Council had decided to review. Despite the accepted supervisory powers of the Council in all subjects explicitly mentioned in Chapter IX of the Charter, a kind of loose interaction had developed between the Council and those bodies. The Council had failed to play its central role; as a consequence all the other organs had acted as if they were not part of the whole. The problem was to redress that situation in such a way that the respective duties and responsibilities were correctly discharged but with a deeper feeling of interdependence, conducive to a workable arrangement whereby the Council would contribute from the centre of the system to the objectives and purposes of the agencies. The point, however, was not only to recognize the Council's central role, but for the Council to be technically prepared and politically motivated to play it. Only then could the Council expect to dispel the concern of the agencies, which were entitled to receive a stimulating contribution that would add to their respective performances and in no way hinder their actions.

15. He hoped that his successors as President would take every possible advantage of section VII paragraph 15 of Council resolution 1768 (LIV) of 18 May 1973 on the rationalization of the work of the Economic and Social Council and act as catalysts for integrated programmes within the system. He also trusted that they would promote confidence in an improved and invigorated exchange of ideas between the Council and the agencies. From the Council's side, a better knowledge of what the agencies were doing would help to avoid the numerous instances of initiatives duplicating programmes that were being successfully carried out by the agencies. From the agencies' side, a fuller appreciation of the purpose of the Council in evaluating their programmes in a global and interdisciplinary perspective would undoubtedly bring about the partnership between the Council and the agencies that was indispensable to any serious effort to rationalize the Council's work.

16. On behalf of the Council, he welcomed the Secretary-General and stressed the Council's deep confidence in his personal action, leadership and diplomatic skill.

17. In its present period of renewal the Council needed the Secretary-General's presence and it needed through him to enrich its dialogue with the technical departments of the Secretariat. In that connexion he thanked the technical services under the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs and his colleagues for the inspiring ideas and documentation made available to the Council.

18. The SECRETARY-GENERAL said that the Council was embarking upon one of the longest and most important sessions of recent years. Not only did 1973 mark the first review and appraisal of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade but, closely related to that, important negotiations were either under way or about to open. Matters of which the United Nations had long been aware, but which had too often been laid aside, were coming to a head. Uncertainties beset not only the concerted efforts to break the hold of poverty on the developing world but even the basic system of commercial and monetary exchanges between the great established trading nations. It was hardly to be wondered that "collective economic security", an idea long dormant, had finally taken form. That idea had been brought before the Council at its fifty-fourth session and would rank high in its forthcoming deliberations.

19. That proposal to extend an old idea to a new domain came at a most appropriate moment. The momentum of international life was not divisible into parts. The idea of a community of nations with interests encompassing the welfare of all Member States must either progress or regress; it did not lend itself to survival in conditions of stagnation. The will to collective international action had not been as strong in recent years as might have been wished. Despite the long and patient work of conciliation, tensions in the Middle East continued to run high. Even where there had been notable achievements - for example, the important movement towards peace in Asia and the remarkable progress in East-West détente - Governments had often ignored the international machinery which had been created to achieve just such results. The ideal of collective preventive diplomacy to forestall conflict or to mediate between the parties still needed the discipline of repeated practice. Over the past few years, however, there had been concrete evidence that increased co-operative action in the economic and social domain greatly facilitated the international community's ability to reduce political tensions. There was a growing realization of the interrelatedness of many problems. As a result, it was being increasingly seen that those problems required study and action in global terms and required collective responsibility.

20. The goal of ensuring the economic security of all Member States through collective action was indeed ambitious, but it was not beyond the power of the United Nations. The tools for such a task would appear to be to hand; a joint assessment of the social and economic forces at work, an appraisal of where they would appear to lead and how they interacted; a disposition to heed alarms emitted by early warning systems and to prepare for emergencies before they arrived; a sensitivity to equity among Member States and throughout society as a whole, and, finally, a readiness to formulate codes of conduct in pursuit of concerted action designed to bring the community closer to the achievement of agreed goals. A plan of work that could give real life to the concept of collective economic security was not impossible to envisage.

21. Such an extension of the international community's will to tackle common problems jointly would be particularly appropriate at that time. The present era was one of negotiation. Two of the most important negotiations were under way or would begin shortly. One concerned the future shape of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund on Reform of the International Monetary System and Related Issues (Committee of Twenty). The

other negotiations, to begin in the autumn of 1973, would deal with world-wide trading arrangements and would be held under the auspices of GATT. Those were merely the first steps in a thorough-going readjustment of international economic institutions that would go on for many years. If that were so, as he believed, the international community would need beacons to guide it through the maze of issues in a rapidly changing world.

22. The importance of the monetary and trade talks, and above all the link between them, should not be underestimated. More was involved than the interests of the trading Powers. The developing countries had an enormous stake in the outcome. Greater access of their exports to the large industrial markets and ample flows of development capital were two indispensable foundations for the accelerated development of those countries. The outcome of the trade and monetary negotiations would help to determine whether the emerging nations would be able to pursue economic and social growth in a world economy that was open and hospitable, or in one fragmented by barriers not of those nations' own making. That aspect deserved special attention.

23. The importance of the trade and monetary issues to the developing countries was again underlined in the review and appraisal of progress under the International Development Strategy. There were many keys to the development of the emerging nations; not all of them were yet known. But the conclusion of trade and monetary arrangements that took sympathetic account of the special problems of the poor countries would have such an effect that it would obviously be an immediate remedial step that the world community could take. It was perhaps to be regretted that the Committee on Review and Appraisal had not brought its deliberations to a conclusion, but had left it to the Council to draw up the final balance sheet on the first two years of the Second Development Decade and to recommend new steps to be taken. But even the most cursory survey of the results so far attained made it plain that the United Nations faced a major task in breathing new life into the global development effort. The growth rates of many countries that lagged behind the average; debt burdens which were threatening to get out of hand; aid levels that fell gravely short of the target; expectations, which if current trends prevailed, were doomed to bitter disappointment: all those required immediate and critical attention.

24. Other features in the current scene would need careful scrutiny. An extraordinary flowering of technology had brought changes that sometimes appeared to proceed at breakneck speed and had tended to give rise to distortions in the development of some of the poorer countries. Managerial ingenuity had been able to devise new forms of business organization – the multinational corporations – which, whatever their undoubted merit, had raised questions of sovereignty, control and accountability which were adding to current uncertainties about the future and which also tended to impinge on international relations.

25. Sustained efforts were under way to translate much of the consensus of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, into programme terms. The report of the first session of the Governing Council of the UNEP would be before the Council for careful consideration. Two important conventions, one on the Prevention of Marine Polution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matters, and the other on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna, had already been drawn up and were in the process of being signed and ratified. Others were in preparation. Those endeavours demonstrated the international community's ability to act when the will to do so existed.

26. Unfortunately, excessive zeal for what were perceived as vital national interests prevented similar progress in another field of international concern. Knowledge of the oceans and the sea-bed had made enormous strides and had shown clearly the great potential benefits which must be used for the good of all mankind, History was full of examples of missed opportunities. The international community should not again proceed at such a pace that by the time agreement was reached it was largely academic. It was estimated that with proper management the world fish catch could double in 10 years. Offshore oil held one of the keys to new energy supplies, and new mineral reserves could do much to abate any remaining fears of a shortage of metals.

27. If there was any lingering doubt that those resources would be needed - and needed soon - the growing knowledge of the demographic evolution of the world should dispel it. The Council had already played an important part in the establishment and furtherance of United Nations population programmes and would no doubt continue to give them the policy support and direction that they required. But there should be no illusions about the speed with which the rate of population growth would be reduced and levelled off. The prospect was still that the world population would double in 30 years and continue to increase thereafter. That situation called for preparation for an inevitable enlargement of the human family. The World Population Conference to be held at Bucharest in August 1974 should throw further light on the problem in all its dimensions.

28. The best way to prepare for the uncertain problems of the future might be to tackle the known needs of the present with all possible courage, resources and ingenuity. Development of the poorer countries remained the priority task of the entire United Nations system. The Council would, he was sure, be as concerned as he was by the stubborn persistence of mass poverty and unemployment. In such circumstances generous material aid from the international community should be combined with imaginative social programmes by the Governments concerned for a massive onslaught on an evil which in itself constituted a powerful impediment to progress.

29. Even such a brief survey demonstrated the awesome magnitude of the tasks and the pitfalls which would be encountered unless the international community was organized to deal with them intelligently, capably, and with the sense of statesmanship and moderation which had characterized it at its best.

30. The first and most obvious block to effective action would be a failure of political will to seek solutions to global problems in an international context. Legitimate national interests were always present and endeavours to strike a proper balance between those interests and the welfare of all mankind must be increased. Without abdicating national responsibilities, members would then become partners in a joint effort and spokesmen for the international community as a whole. The importance of the interests at stake would put the cohesive power of the Organization to the test. Once again it would be necessary to show that the will to compromise and to concert action in support of a higher international goal had become a motive as deeply entrenched in international life as the defence of national interests.

31. A more subtle, and perhaps equally dangerous, pitfall loomed ahead unless the United Nations avoided the temptation to take up issues as they arose, piecemeal and fragmented, and to search for easy, swift and glib solutions to problems that were inherently complex and which together formed a pattern of interrelationships in which no part could be separated from the others. No single problem could, in the long run, be resolved in isolation. It was one of the perplexities of international life that the everdeepening interdependence of States had been matched by the growing complexity of the essential economic, social, technological and political interrelationships.

32. The United Nations system was at the apex of a pyramid of relationships which were in constant motion and to which sudden unexpected jolts could be as dangerous as prolonged stagnation. The task of the United Nations, and more specifically of the Council, was to ensure that Government of Member States moved toward agreed goals at a steady pace and rhythm in conditions of equilibrium. In practice, that meant a process of continuous negotiation, in which the task of the international community was to analyse the economic and social forces acting upon the international scene, to define their relation to each other and to fit them into patterns from which agreement could be woven. If it were to work as effectively as it ought, the system must at all times be able to see each part in relation to a clearly understood conception of the world as it was at present and where, in its collective wisdom, the community hoped to see it move.

33. Any dispassionate appraisal of the United Nations system must admit that it was better equipped to deal with the parts than with the whole, and any comfort to be derived from the knowledge that it disposed of unrivalled specialized expertise must be weighed against an acute awareness that it was in danger of losing its way through excessive fragmentation. It was not enough for each of the various parts of the United Nations system to work well by itself. What was needed, and might be more important, was the over-all coherence and direction of the system. After years of parallel development and increased efficiency in each organization, the United Nations had come to realize the urgent need for planning and working collectively. The usefulness and effectiveness of the system as a whole could be greater than the sum of its parts.

34. In the United Nations itself, growth had been erratic and had been marked by centrifugal tendencies, resulting in

more sectoral autonomy at both the intergovernmental and the Secretariat levels. The time had come for Governments seriously to explore ways to halt and to reverse that trend.

35. The strength of the United Nations system could not be marshalled to its best advantage unless the Council, as the supreme organ responsible under the General Assembly, for the co-ordination of all the system's economic and social activities, assumed in full the responsibility allotted to it in the Charter. His understanding of some of the decisions adopted at the Council's fifty-fourth session was that that was precisely what Governments were determined to do. The task had grown immeasurably both in complexity and in importance since it had first been formulated and its difficulties had probably been compounded during recent years. Those considerations, however, could no longer stand in the way of a reassertion of the Council's constitutional authority within the system, which would be greatly strengthened by the increased representativeness it had gained through the enlargement of its membership. Since the Council had decided to meet the challenge, he was ready to assist it with every means at his disposal.

36. The Council had recently shown a resurgence of spirit which, if sustained and guided in the right direction, could contribute immeasurably to its revitalization and to the important role of leadership and co-ordination it was called upon to play.

37. The Council's first function was to provide the conceptual framework for the entire system of United Nations organizations. It would have to deal with all the major issues with which the system was concerned, to analyse their component parts, to try to determine their relationships with other issues, and to address its conclusions and recommendations to the system as a whole. After a period of continuing and rigorous analysis, the Council's work of synthesis would direct attention towards matters which might otherwise have been overlooked. That would be a demanding task but one for which the Council was eminently fitted.

38. Additional benefits would also flow from such a role. The best organizational and jurisdictional decisions were those which emerged from a rigorously analytical conceptual framework in which the substantive tasks fell into a logical set of priorities. Opportunities would not be lacking to translate any new insights the Council might gain in such a process into appropriate practical action within the United Nations system as a whole.

39. One such opportunity would present itself shortly when the Council undertook its review of basic agreements with the specialized agencies and IAEA. He would submit his recommendations on that subject for the Council's consideration at the appropriate time. The report he had been asked to submit in preparation for that review would be comprehensive and forthright. The views requested from the executive heads of the agencies would no doubt be equally frank and would help the Council in its important tasks.

40. Another major step forward which should enable the Council to play an important practical role in co-ordinating

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the directions of the various programmes undertaken by the United Nations system was the institution of the biennial policy review of operational activities, which should enable the Council to exercise its role of leadership of the entire system, on the basis of its unique and intimate knowledge if the changing goals of one of the major undertakings of the United Nations in the economic and social sphere. Operational activities were part and parcel of the total effort of the system in the economic and social field and must therefore at all times be fully consistent with the policies, goals and objectives determined by the General Assembly and the Council under Chapters IX and X of the Chapter.

41. He was confident that the gradual institution of a well-conceived programme budgeting system with its capacity for forward planning would provide a valuable tool, not only for analysis but also for co-ordinated programming direction. He hoped that the Council, in assigning tasks to its own subsidiary bodies, would call upon them to state their recommendations in the form of precise programme objectives, so as to enable him to prepare, for its consideration and decision, proposals for the most effective and economical means of achieving the stated objectives. Programme budgeting would thus provide both governing bodies and the Secretariat with an important new tool to enable them to view the system as an integrated whole. If all applied that procedure faithfully, they would discover the advantages of their interdependence and be less tempted to a proliferation that might lead to fragmentation of the system.

42. The final word on the shape and content of such analytical work and the operational programmes would of course be determined by the combined views and influence of Governments of Member States as expressed in the councils and governing bodies of the organizations of the system. The diversity of the influences determining the attitude of Governments in the international sphere also came into play in their decisions regarding the United Nations system. The complex network of institutions that had been created did not make it easy for individual Governments to co-ordinate their policies; Governments had been known to endorse in one forum directives which they deplored in another. Some of those contradictory influences were inevitable in an organization of the size and diversity of the United Nations system, but there was room for more coherent approaches to United Nations work programmes by Governments themselves. Member States must be made constantly aware that the effectiveness of the United Nations family in pursuing global goals depended in large measure on its ability to schedule its work in a rational and co-ordinated manner. The system had become so large that it might be difficult for Governments to keep abreast of all its workings at all times. He hoped that a revitalized Economic and Social Council, in the exercise of its full authority under the Charter, would increasingly become a forum to which Governments looked for advice and guidance.

43. He had tried to touch on the most important items on the Council's agenda. He must state frankly that the Council had an opportunity which might never present itself again. Its responsibilities were clearly set out in the Charter, its will to assume them appeared evident and the time had come for it to shoulder them in all sincerity.

44. In the political sphere, despite the many serious situations that still persisted, the world was experiencing a climate of relative *détente*, but in the economic and social sphere the situation was becoming increasingly critical. Despite undeniable successes, there were far too many human beings who were not protected from poverty and from all the scourges which the Charter had intended to eliminate. The technological and scientific means were available to raise the standard of living and improve the welfare of each inhabitant of the planet; and sufficient financial and human resources could be released if there was the desire and the will to allocate them to works of peace.

45. The Council must find the means to overcome the difficulties and misunderstandings which all too often paralysed the United Nations. If there was one organ which, because of its mandate and its composition, could give a new direction to such action, it was the Economic and Social Council. While it was meeting, people were dying and others suffering because the international community had not yet found the remedies for the deteriorating situation. The current session could make an invaluable 'contribution to the community of nations if it marked the beginning of a new, genuine and concerted effort. In that task, it had his best wishes and full support.

#### AGENDA ITEM 2

#### Adoption of the agenda (E/5357)

46. Mr. CORDOVEZ (Secretary of the Council) said that the manner in which the provisional agenda had been drawn up was explained in document E/5357, which also provided annotations to the provisional agenda.

47. In resolution 1783 (LIV), of 18 May 1973 the Council had requested the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to draw up appropriate recommendations on the role of those organizations in the programme for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination during its meetings at the fifty-fifth session to submit them to the General Assembly at its twenty-eighth session through the Council at its resumed fifty-fifth session. The Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations should, however, consider the matter at its first meeting at the present session, since the Council secretariat had been informed by the Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political and General Assembly Affairs that the Third Committee of the General Assembly would be unable to consider the recommendations made under the appropriate item on its agenda if the matter was not discussed until the resumed fifty-fifth session. As the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations would be acting as a sessional committee in that respect, the Council might wish to consider its report in plenary.

It was so decided.

48. The PRESIDENT informed the Council that the Bureau recommended that since, in accordance with para-

graph 2 of Council resolution 1630 (LI) the report prepared for the item on export credits as a means of promoting exports from developing countries (E/5291) was also being submitted to the Trade and Development Board, the whole item should be referred to UNCTAD in order to avoid duplication. If there were no objections, he would take it that the Council adopted the Bureau's recommendation concerning that item.

#### It was so decided.

49. Mr. KELETIGUI (Niger), supported by Mr. DELGADO (Senegal), referring to agenda item 20 (Aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened with famine) drew attention to the tragic situation of the Sudano-Sahelian populations and asked that consideration of the matter should be given the highest priority. The rains had started and many roads were already cut, thus increasing the difficulties of moving the food supplied by other countries from the ports into the famine-threatened interior. Despite the many appeals for the loan of aircraft to transport food, some 300,000 tons were still deteriorating in the ports.

50. The PRESIDENT said that he fully appreciated the concern of the representatives of the stricken countries and would recommend that the Co-ordination Committee should give high priority to consideration of that item.

51. If there were no further comments, he would take it that the Council wished to adopt the provisional agenda with the amendments already agreed upon.

The provisional agenda (E/5357), as amended, was adopted.

52. Mr. MACKENZIE (United Kingdom) expressed appreciation of the full annotations to the agenda supplied by the secretariat. He hoped that the decision taken by the Council at its 1851st meeting concerning the elimination from the agenda of items for which documentation had not been circulated by the specified date would not be overlooked. He realized, of course, that the fitty-fourth session had ended only four days before, and that it was therefore impossible to provide documentation requested at that session by the specified time. He hoped that the secretariat would report on the matter in due course.

53. Mr. CORDOVEZ (Secretary of the Council) said that steps had been taken to ensure the full implementation of the Council's decision, which was a useful complement to the secretariat's new system of documentation planning and control. The secretariat was submitting to the Council a report indicating the dates of the documents circulated for the fifty-fifth session.<sup>1</sup> It had obviously been impossible to meet the six-weeks rule for the documents requested at the fifty-fourth session. A number of meetings of subsidiary and associated organizations had also been held less than six weeks before the opening of the current session.

#### Organization of work (E/L.1550/Rev.1)

The PRESIDENT said that, before inviting del-54. egations to comment on the organization of work, he wished to inform them that, with regard to agenda item 18 (Relations with the World Intellectual Property Organization), the Bureau recommended that the Council should adopt the following procedure: the item should be referred to the Co-ordination Committee to decide whether it appeared desirable for the United Nations to enter into a relationship agreement with WIPO under Articles 57 and 63 of the Charter; if it was so recommended, the Council should establish a negotiations committee, the members of which would be nominated by the President, to draft such an agreement and submit its report to the Council as early as possible. If there were no objections, he would take it that the Council agreed to that procedure.

#### It was so decided.

55. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) requested that, in view of the important humanitarian nature of the situation of the Sudano-Sahelian populations, the President should issue an appeal to Governments and organizations to accelerate aid to the victims.

56. Mr. CUBILLOS (Chile) supported that proposal and suggested that the Co-ordination Committee should discuss it as the first item on its agenda.

57. The PRESIDENT said that he would prepare a draft appeal to be submitted to the next meeting of the Council and would recommend that the Co-ordination Committee should discuss it as the first item on its agenda.

58. Mr. NAIK (Pakistan) supported those proposals.

59. The PRESIDENT said that in paragraph 8 (c) of his report on the subject (E/5360), the Secretary-General had indicated his willingness to submit an analysis of the draft WIPO agreement, comparing it with existing agreements. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Council wished to authorize the Secretary-General to circulate such a document.

It was so decided.

60. The PRESIDENT, referring ot agenda item 24 (Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations), drew attention to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution 2980 (XXVII) of 14 December 1972 which envisaged consultations to be held between the Council and the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples on appropriate measures for co-ordination of the policies and activities of the agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system in implementing the relevant resolutions of the Assembly. In accordance with the decision of the Council, in resolution 1621 A (LI), paragraph 4, that, pending the entry into force of the amendment to Article 61 of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Later circulated to the Council as document E/5355/Add.1.

Charter, all substantive items on the agenda of a session should be allocated to the sessional committees, the Bureau recommended that the Council should authorize the Chairman of the Co-ordination Committee, to which item 24 would be allocated, to work out the necessary arrangements for such consultations and prepare the report called for in the General Assembly resolution for the Council's approval. The negotiating team would consist of an equivalent number of countries nominated by the party concerned and the Council respectively. In the absence of any objection, he would take it that the Council wished to adopt the Bureau's recommendation.

It was so decided.

The organization of work (E/L.1550/Rev.1) was approved.

The meeting rose at 5.15 p.m.

## 1860th meeting

Thursday, 5 July 1973, at 10.45 a.m.

President: Mr. S. A. FRAZÃO (Brazil)

E/SR.1860

#### AGENDA ITEM 20

# Aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened with famine

1. The PRESIDENT read out the draft of the appeal to be addressed on behalf of the Economic and Social Council to the Governments of Member States, organizations and programmes of the United Nations system and other international organizations, requesting them to furnish additional assistance to the Sudano-Sahelian populations.

2. Mr. ROUGÉ (France) said that France was among the countries most deeply distressed by the tragic plight of the Sudano-Sahelian populations. The idea of providing assistance directly to the Governments concerned or of channelling it through FAO seemed, however, to conflict with the decision already taken at inter-agency co-ordination meetings to centralize all international aid through the permanent Inter-State Committee at Ouagadougou.

3. Mrs. TALLAWY (Egypt) said there appeared to be a problem of moving the foodstuffs already received by some countries to the area in which they were needed. It would, therefore, be advisable to add to the second part of the appeal a sentence concerning the provision of rapid transport facilities. Moreover, all assistance supplied by the international community, whether under short-term or longer term arrangements, should be co-ordinated.

4. The PRESIDENT said that the proposed text duly reflected the Council's concern at those transport difficulties, to which attention had already been drawn. That was why stress was laid on the need for facilities for transporting foodstuffs by air. It would be for the Co-ordination Committee to decide what other measures should be proposed to the specialized agencies. For the moment, what was important was to demonstrate that the Council was dealing with the problems as a matter of priority.

5. Mr. VAN BELLINGHEN (Belgium) supported the comments of the representatives of France and Egypt. It was necessary to be specific and since the chief need was for a number of large-capacity aircraft capable of landing on small air-strips, an approach should be made to Governments which possessed such equipment.

6. Mr. DRISS (Tunisia) said that the appeal read out by the President fully met the concern that had been expressed at the previous meeting.

7. Mr. SCALI (United States of America) said he unreservedly supported the appeal. His Government had already taken emergency action and had made a number of aircraft available. It was impossible to launch too many appeals to awaken the conscience of mankind and the one proposed by the President would be very useful not only in solving a short-term problem but in encouraging Governments to take the necessary medium- and long-term measures.

8. The PRESIDENT read out the final text, the second paragraph of which had been amended in the light of the observations of the French and Belgian delegations.

"The Economic and Social Council recognizes that the assistance already furnished by the international community to aid the Sudano-Sahelian populations affected by the drought, and threatened with famine, although generous, has not proved sufficient to meet the continuing plight of those affected by the catastrophe and is concerned that all possible further action be taken with the utmost sense of urgency by all sources of external aid. The Council intends to give high priority attention to the full and fast implementation of its resolution 1759 (LIV).

"On behalf, and under instructions of the Economic and Social Council, I therefore urgently appeal to Governments of States Members, the organizations and programmes of the United Nations system and other international organizations to furnish additional emergency assistance, either directly to the Governments of