

even though the real value of the Agency's technical assistance programme had been eroded by inflation and currency instability. The nuclear information programme had also been greatly expanded.

35. The Council had frequently demonstrated the importance which it attached to its responsibilities for co-ordination within the United Nations system. The fact that IAEA worked closely with other organizations showed that it was strongly in favour of co-ordination when co-ordination led to positive results. But co-ordination should not become an end in itself, and he repeated his view that no new co-ordinating bodies should be established. Co-ordination should be improved through the reinforcement of working relations, including the exchange of information.

36. During the year, the United Nations had again raised the question of the division of responsibilities between the two organizations in regard to prospecting for nuclear

materials, but that had been satisfactorily resolved by the Committee on Natural Resources, which had reaffirmed the provisions of Council resolution 1550 (XLIX) on that subject.

37. Finally, he expressed regret that at a time when there was much talk of rationalization, the current session of the Council was scheduled to continue for six weeks. IAEA would find it difficult to ensure its representation over such a long period.

38. The PRESIDENT pointed out that the Council proposed to conclude its consideration of various items on the agenda in order that it might subsequently hold shorter sessions. It was for the various bodies and organizations concerned to take the measures necessary to conform to the programme of work established by the Council for its sessions.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.

1863rd meeting

Friday, 6 July 1973, at 3.25 p.m.

President: Mr. S. A. FRAZÃO (Brazil)

E/SR.1863

AGENDA ITEM 3

General discussion of international economic and social policy, including regional and sectoral developments (continued) (E/5310, E/5311, E/5312, E/5313, E/5314, E/5315)

1. Mr. SANTA CRUZ (Chile) said that, in the rich countries, the *per capita* GNP and international trade as a whole were increasing rapidly and would continue to do so since the cold war was ending and East-West trade was already a reality. He welcomed the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe being held at Helsinki and agreed with the Finnish representative (1862nd meeting) that it was closely connected with the problems under consideration by the Economic and Social Council. The agreements between the United States of America and the Soviet Union, and between the two Germanies were a positive sign of the new political and economic situation. That prosperity, however, which unfortunately was not always shared by the population as a whole, was accompanied by monetary chaos – whose consequences for innocent victims had recently been brought to the attention of the Council – growing inflation and a struggle to obtain advantages from the forthcoming multilateral trade negotiations within GATT. The Managing Director of IMF (1860th meeting) had emphasized the importance of combating inflation and had advocated a return to an agreed international monetary system, which might be based on SDRs, but which should favour all countries.

2. In the developing world, however, the situation was steadily deteriorating, a fact which had been repeatedly pointed out by the representatives of Chile in the General Assembly and at the fifth special session of the Trade and Development Board, when they had said that the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, which had been hailed as a triumph of international co-operation, had been reduced, through selfishness and the evasion of historic responsibilities, to a mere piece of paper.

3. The Director-General of FAO (1861st meeting) had expressed his pessimism concerning the agricultural sector, the present difficulties of which had its roots deep in the past. In at least 42 of the developing countries, the growth of agricultural production was less than that of the population. It could hardly be otherwise in view of their backward rural structures and the deplorable living conditions of workers. Any crisis, such as the drought in the Sahelian region, became a real catastrophe and it was difficult for even external aid to reach the people. The Director-General of FAO had repeatedly drawn attention to that situation, but the only response had been a reduction in the real value of FAO's budget, which was particularly affected by the financial crisis in the UNDP. His call for the creation of buffer stocks had met only with approval in principle and there had been no response at all to the proposals made by some developing countries for the creation of international machinery to stimulate the establishment of such stocks and participate in their distribution.

4. The Chairman of CDP, introducing the report of his Committee (E/5293), had drawn attention to many interesting problems and had suggested means of accelerating development, but his list of elements of international co-operation to further such development was no different from that put forward by the developing countries in the Declaration and Principles of the Action Programme of Lima¹ and at the third session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and by the Latin American countries in their appraisal of the Second Development Decade at the fifteenth session of ECLA and in the Trade and Development Board.

5. The problem of access to world markets for commodities and manufactures was still not resolved, external financing was decreasing in real terms and was much lower than debt servicing and there was little progress in the transfer of technology and in shipping. In fact, nothing had changed in the unjust international division of labour and the gap between the rich and poor countries continued to widen. The lack of progress in international co-operation for development was due to a complete absence of political will on the part of the countries which held the keys to the world economy. Moreover, the developing countries were adversely affected by the monetary situation. Even the Managing Director of IMF had thought it necessary to point out that the development of the poor nations was more important than any other world problem.

6. The United Kingdom representative (1862nd meeting) had put forward the old recipe for a solution to those problems – that of private investment, which had hampered international co-operation in 1953 and had led to the rise of multinational corporations. The States parties to the Cartagena Agreement were ready to discuss that problem, which was on the agenda of the present session of the Committee on Invisibles and Financing related to Trade, and on certain conditions to accept private investment which really served development.

7. The statement made by the Netherlands representative at the 1861st meeting, which endorsed all that had been said by the developing countries in the United Nations, was an example of the new attitude for which those countries were hoping from the West and which reflected the concern of the post-war generations throughout the world. The Netherlands representative had also reiterated the position adopted by his delegation at the sixteenth session of the UNDP Governing Council² with regard to direct assistance to national liberation movements. His statement had indeed brought a breath of fresh air into the Council chamber.

8. The forebodings concerning the forthcoming multi-lateral trade negotiations to be held under the auspices of GATT expressed by the developing countries at the third session of UNCTAD were justified by the lack of benefit those countries had obtained in the Kennedy Round and the way in which the industrial Powers had tried to define the objectives and methods of negotiation and, in par-

ticular, the treatment to be given to the developing countries, in which they showed a complete lack of co-operation and political will with respect to the proposals made by the developing countries for participation in those negotiations. Although the suggestions made by the Group of 77 concerning such participation had been included in UNCTAD resolution 82 (III)³ and General Assembly resolution 3040 (XXVII), they had not been discussed in GATT because the developed countries had ruled that GATT could not discuss documents of other organs, even the General Assembly, the supreme forum for all international co-operation.

9. The fundamental principles which the developing countries considered should govern their participation in the trade negotiations were: preferential treatment for developing countries in all sectors of negotiation, strict application of the principle of non-reciprocity, and compensation for any losses suffered as a consequence of those negotiations, in particular the effect they might have on the generalized system of preferences. Yet, only two months before the Ministerial Meeting at Tokyo, those principles had still not been accepted, nor had it been agreed to include in the objectives of the negotiations the principle of additional benefits for the trade of the developing countries, including increased participation in world trade, access to markets for products of particular interest to the developing countries, a more equitable international division of labour and the establishment of complementary economic objectives such as development financing, promotion of industrialization, shipping facilities and transfer of technology. No benefits could be obtained from tariff reductions unless the necessary infrastructure existed. If such difficulties continued the developing countries would obtain nothing from the trade negotiations. The developing countries were therefore anxiously awaiting a statement to be made by the Director-General of GATT concerning the so-called new economic order which the market-economy countries hoped would result from those negotiations.

10. The Secretary-General (1859th meeting) had drawn attention to the problems connected with the sea in connexion with the items on the environment and on marine co-operation on the Council's agenda. That concern was justified, since the United Nations was about to undertake some of the most far-reaching international negotiations in history at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the second session of which was to be held in Chile in April and May 1974. The work of the Council was highly important to the success of that Conference and to the implementation of any agreements reached there.

11. An instance of the effects of marine pollution on the environment in general and on a developing country's economy in particular, was that of the giant tanker which had recently discharged 35,000 tons of oil off the Chilean coast. He would refer to the matter in greater detail in the current meetings of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

¹ *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session*, vol. I, *Report and annexes* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.D.4), annex VIII, F.

² See DP/SR.384.

³ *Proceedings of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Third Session*, vol. I, *Report and Annexes* (United Nations publication, Sales No. E.73.II.D.4), annex I, A.

the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, to prepare for the Conference.

12. The Secretary-General's report on marine co-operation (E/5332) was an important study and the practical suggestions in paragraphs 14-20 were worthy of detailed consideration by the Council. He would refer to them under the appropriate agenda item, but wished to express forthwith Chile's interest in the possible creation of an information centre on matters concerning the ocean, with special emphasis on the development of coastal zones. The fact that Chile had increased its fish catch from 50,000 to 1 million tons since the extension of its territorial waters to 200 miles was proof of the importance it attached to the development of its coastal resources and of its marine wealth in general. His delegation also welcomed the Secretary-General's offer to prepare periodic studies on such questions in relation to economic development.

13. The process of restructurization, reorganization and rationalization of the work of the Council, especially in relation to the co-ordination in accordance with the Charter, of the activities of the specialized agencies and those of its own subsidiary organs, would lead to a revision of the whole United Nations system in the economic and social sphere and thus rationalize the work of all parts of the system. The Secretary-General (1859th meeting) had rightly said that it was not enough for the various parts of the United Nations system to work well individually; what was needed was that they should work well together. The President of the Council (*ibid.*) had emphasized the value of negotiation leading to a consensus. Those two statements, wise as they were, inspired in him somewhat contradictory reactions, for it was obvious that multilateralism was being increasingly abandoned as a system of international co-operation, and that was tantamount to the abandonment of the Charter as an instrument and guide for such co-operation. In following the evolution of the United Nations agencies connected with development, he had noticed that their resources were growing less from year to year and with them the assistance they provided; that new and original programmes were either not introduced at all or met with resistance; that great world problems, particularly monetary and trade problems, were discussed in small circles and not brought before the Council, to which the Charter had assigned a fundamental role. The system appeared to him to show that obsolescence of the statutes and methods of work of a once valuable body and its rigid and discriminatory structure, were bringing it very low. The question of multinational corporations, perhaps the most complex phenomenon of the day and a serious threat to peace, had been brought before the Council, not by one of the great Powers, but by a small country which, in order to be heard at all, had had to show the wounds inflicted on it by such corporations. Moreover, the ILO had refused to discuss the matter despite the exceptional importance of the problem to the workers of the world. The recommendations of the General Assembly, the Council and UNCTAD in favour of the developing countries were not being implemented, nor were those proclaimed with great solemnity such as the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. Economic groupings had been developing rapidly, greatly increasing their GNP of members and trying to divide the

developing world either by preferential treatment in trade and financing or by granting to some countries with which they had special relationships the greater part of the funds of UNDP, to which the whole international community contributed.

14. The Secretary-General had rightly spoken of the need to revitalize the Council, which was no longer playing the important role assigned to it by the Charter. The Council must regain its original role of directing economic and social policies at the world level. In its early years, the Council's achievements had included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the establishment of the regional economic commissions, the introduction of technical assistance for economic development, directives to ensure full employment, assistance to refugees and the establishment of UNICEF. The Council had drawn the world's attention to the problem of under-development, which until that time had been ignored. Those efforts had been largely brought to an end by the intensification of the cold war and the virtual division of the world into two camps. Now that that period was over, there was no reason why the whole world could not co-operate within the United Nations to eliminate under-development and bring about a more equitable international division of labour.

15. With regard to the co-ordinating role of the Council, it was clear that the proliferation of bodies and programmes could in no way be imputed to the majority of the Members of the United Nations, developing countries which at that time had not been Members of the Organization or had had little voice in it. The agreements on relationships between the Council, IBRD and IMF had been so drafted as to strip the Council of practically all influence on the policies of those bodies, despite the clear jurisdiction over all economic and social matters – which certainly included monetary problems – that the Charter had assigned to the Council. Yet when the Council wished to discuss such matters, which were vital to the economic and social life of the whole world, it was told that they were outside its competence.

16. Again, the Havana Charter adopted by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, convened by the Council in 1947, had not satisfied the developed countries of the West, which had therefore established GATT, outside the United Nations and hence outside the Council's influence. Moreover, in the early years of the United Nations, the great Powers had transferred a whole series of important topics from the Council to the specialized agencies.

17. When the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance had been set up, the special account set up had been divided among the specialized agencies to dispose of as they thought fit. The idea that the account should be directed by the Council had been rejected.

18. The reasons for the breakdown of the system were perfectly clear, as was the responsibility of those who had brought about the proliferation of bodies within the United Nations system and had made any real co-ordination by the Council impossible. The countries responsible for world trade and monetary affairs had abandoned the Council and the results were now being felt.

19. It would be extremely difficult now, with the vast machinery that had been set up, to do what had not been done in the early stages, when there had still been room for manoeuvre. Moreover, if the Council had not yet proved itself capable of co-ordinating the machinery of the United Nations itself, it could scarcely be expected to bring about better co-ordination among the various bodies of the system. That task would require a conscientious international approach, together with the abandonment of power politics and zones of influence. It would also need a sure vision of the unity of mankind's fate, a full knowledge of the potential of each body and an iron will.

20. It would be nothing short of miraculous if the political will existed to transform the Council into a forum of discussion and decision; to make a real attack on under-development and on the present discriminatory system of world trade by laying down guidelines for UNCTAD and GATT; to make a serious study on why the Bretton Woods system had failed and to help members and IMF to create a monetary system conducive to equitable and continuously-expanding trade and to accelerated development of the third world; and for the Council to become the leader in the attack on poverty and unemployment and to decide to exercise the co-ordinating role assigned to it by Article 63 of the Charter.

21. If that could come about, then the United Nations system would indeed be revitalized, at no greater cost than at present and in any case with far less money than that spent on destruction or on activities which could well wait for better times. The Council's role would then be that suggested by the Secretary-General and the President. The 54-member Council should also act as a parliamentary committee for all Governments of the world and prepare for the broader discussion of problems by the international community meeting in the General Assembly. Hitherto the General Assembly had acted as if the Council did not exist. That state of affairs could only be remedied, for the benefit of all, if the Council carried out its preparatory role.

22. The specialized agencies, too, should change their methods of work which in many cases no longer met the needs of their members. Decentralization of their activities was essential; moreover, their staff often needed re-training in modern techniques.

23. The whole apparatus of development aid needed to be made more flexible, experts should be more efficient and the present heavy administration should be made more simple. The Council should provide guidelines for co-ordinated action contributing to a realistic, intelligent identification of problems and to a flexible way of tackling them that would be acceptable to all countries. Thus the Council could become the instrument for bringing to the world the visionary concept of collective economic security outlined by the President (1859th meeting).

24. His own country was facing serious economic, financial and political problems which were closely linked with the Council's responsibilities and with the agenda of its current session. Chile was typical of the countries mentioned in section A, paragraph 7 of the Quito Appraisal approved by ECLA at its fifteenth session (E/5275 and

Corr.1, part III, resolution 320 (XV)), which embodied the principle that international aid to countries carrying out the structural reforms needed to achieve integrated development should not be subject to restrictions, and that the countries should not have to face hostility and economic aggression from abroad. Section F (a), paragraph 53 of the Appraisal stated that developing nations undertaking social changes and structural reforms might require unrestricted financial and technical assistance from the international community, but that there had been recent cases in Latin America in which that had not been the approach taken and that the level of external co-operation extended to such countries had actually fallen. The United States of America had reserved its position on paragraph 7 but all the other members of ECLA had accepted both paragraphs.

25. The President of Chile had described to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session⁴ the series of acts that had amounted to a serious economic blockade of his country, whose Government had made a tremendous effort, in full conformity with the International Development Strategy, to give its people a better life, redistribute income, initiate a massive educational programme and improve health and housing. In accordance with numerous resolutions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and FAO, the Chilean Government had liquidated the great rural estates and had regained the free disposal of its natural resources. The economic blockade, coupled with the almost complete cessation of medium-term and long-term credit and the huge increase in the price of food imports, meant that Chile had to spend over \$400 million every year for food, capital goods, machinery and spare parts. The renegotiation of Chile's external debt, to be discussed shortly by the Group of Ten would prove a test of the international community's sincerity, and particularly that of the countries which had subscribed to the Quito Appraisal.

26. Chile's external debt amounted to over \$4,000 million, with debt servicing totalling over 30 per cent of the value of its exports. If Chile was unable to renegotiate its debt on favourable conditions, the amount needed to service that debt, together with the sums needed to import food at inflated prices, would consume practically all its foreign exchange earnings.

27. Chile was a typical example of a country justifying the international action called for in General Assembly resolution 3039 (XXVII), in which the Assembly requested the Trade and Development Board to study, through its Committee on Invisibles and Financing related to Trade at its sixth session, the problems deriving from the burden for the developing countries represented by the servicing of their external debt, including the desirability and feasibility of the establishment and operation of a special fund for the financing, and/or compensation, of the interest on that debt. The Council would also have to examine that matter when discussing financial problems.

28. Chile's political difficulties were also due to its having had the temerity to retrieve its natural resources, which

⁴ See *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-seventh Session, Plenary Meetings*, 2096th meeting.

were being exploited by the great multinational consortia. Fortunately the tremendous force and determination of Chile's workers and the loyalty of its armed forces had enabled it to retain its proud tradition of liberty and democracy, which could all too easily be lost in the presence of poverty, need and strong external pressures.

29. The Council would recall that the Chilean delegation had earlier brought to its notice the attempt by ITT in Chile to prevent President Allende's Government taking office and later to bring it down. That denunciation had resulted in the adoption of Council resolution 1721 (LIII), in which the Secretary-General had been requested to appoint a study group of eminent persons to study the role of multinational corporations. That group was to meet in September 1973.

30. Chile's accusations had recently been verified by a sub-committee of the United States Senate, which had also shown that the CIA had had a hand in the affair. He mentioned that because he hoped that the study group would not forget that, after long discussion, the decision had been made to include in its terms of reference the impact of multinational corporations and international relations as well as on economy and trade. All countries should take a serious view of the dangers presented by certain private corporations which recognized neither fatherland nor law and whose immense resources enabled them to influence national policies. Those corporations were attacking the very concept of the nation State on which the United Nations was based.

31. Mr. MAHEU (Director General, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) said that he wished to make some comments on the subject of development assistance, which continued to be prominent among UNESCO's activities.

32. Talk of an "aid crisis" was certainly exaggerated and defeatist. Objectively, what was needed was an admission that some concepts and practices must be revised and to a greater or lesser extent changed, in order to move international action in favour of the developing countries into a new phase in which it would be more responsive to the realities of the present-day world. The first change that should take place related to the evaluation of the possibilities of "aid" and the results which could be expected from it. The limits of aid were now better known and all illusions must be firmly eliminated from "strategies" which were often over-optimistic. For example, it was clear that public aid would not reach the levels envisaged. In 1971, it had constituted only 0.35 per cent of the GNP of the industrialized countries, or exactly half the target set for the Second Development Decade; according to the latest report of DAC that figure had fallen to 0.34 per cent in 1972. Generally speaking, the real money value of the various forms of assistance was declining in relation to the economies of the developed countries. Since those economies were continuously expanding, the decline must be attributed to political determination, and it was that factor that was serious.

33. While agreeing with those who had appealed for greater awareness of the obligations and interests of

international solidarity, he considered that it was the duty of international organizations, if not to bow before harsh political realities, at least to take them into account as a basic factor in evaluating their resources and setting their development assistance targets. It was quite clear that, in present conditions, aid was not capable of playing an immediate and major role in eliminating the gap between the developed and the developing countries. In particular, international aid was bound to constitute an element of secondary quantitative importance in over-all development efforts.

34. That fact led to two general conclusions. The first was that international organizations could not be held responsible for the widening gap separating the developing from the developed countries, since they had not been provided with the resources for decisive action. The second was that international action must direct its efforts more towards reaching and correcting the actual causes of the evil.

35. It was well known that certain measures which related, not to the concept of assistance proper, but rather to a far-reaching reform of international economic relationships, would be more immediately and radically effective than aid. Among such measures were improvement of the terms of trade to the benefit of the developing countries through methodical reorganization of world trade, beginning with commodities; a massive reduction, through a new patents system, of the high cost of the transfer of technology to those countries; and a revision of the conditions of operation of foreign technology in the interest of strengthening the national economy and not, as was too often the case, in the interests of stateless multinational corporations. That would, of course, be a difficult and lengthy undertaking, but it did not mean that aid would become secondary in the over-all strategy of international development action. On the contrary, it would assume a new and extremely important role. The situation which had existed in the 1960s no longer prevailed, and a new phase was opening with needs, possibilities and responsibilities which required new attitudes.

36. Firstly, it was not more clearly realized that financial and technical assistance were especially useful if their aim was to facilitate the establishment of strengthening of the recipient countries' structures and cadres for their own development. Since it was intended to increase their potential rather than their present performances, such aid was necessarily medium-term or long-term and was therefore particularly suitable for action by the specialized agencies.

37. Secondly, it was becoming increasingly evident that international assistance -- though naturally provided at the request of, and in co-operation with, the Governments concerned -- should not contribute to the systematic consolidation of the economic and social *status quo*. The distribution of the GNP among the citizens of individual countries should be as much a matter of concern as inequalities in the GNP of different countries. Development was therefore objectively linked to change, and assistance from international organs should be channelled principally towards innovation enterprises. That was where it would pay

the greatest dividends and where international organizations could best serve Governments.

38. Thirdly, international systems should be adapted to the new concepts and profound changes which had emerged in the situation and attitudes of recipient countries. The contribution of international organizations should increasingly be seen as a means of promoting the maximum mobilization and optimum utilization of national resources. On an average, the national effort accounted for about 80 per cent of the development process; the 2 per cent represented by international assistance was best used in furthering that national effort and should therefore be increasingly integrated into the national system.

39. The value of co-operation in the preparation and adoption of policies, strategies and plans was becoming increasingly apparent. UNESCO had had experience of such co-operation for some years in the key areas of educational, scientific and cultural policies. That new relationship between national authorities and international organizations could no longer be referred to as aid or assistance, but constituted co-operation in the form of joint research, in which the role of the international organization was primarily to encourage and perhaps to expand that research, but not to direct it.

40. Fourthly, the more such co-operation became part of the national development process, the more it would naturally have to give prominence to the consideration of cultural factors. That was because culture blended with awareness of national personality. It was impossible to conceive of development without those motivating forces or outside the national community. Cultural development was therefore emerging increasingly as an essential dimension of over-all progress. Only in that light could answers be given to the questions: development for what? development for whom? development by whom? Development was not a matter for technocrats; technology, politics and culture were indissolubly united. That was why development was a total human undertaking and the business of everyone.

41. The importance of those rather abstract considerations could be seen in UNESCO's experience in education and culture over the last 10 years. In education, the main objective during the First United Nations Development Decade had been the linear expansion of educational systems. It was now recognized by all that the problems of the present and of the near future could not be solved by such expansion. It led to such socially intolerable contradictions as the absence of any connexion between education and employment; the prohibitive cost of a sector benefiting only a fraction of the population and thus jeopardizing the development of other sectors; the unsuitability of the subjects taught in relation to real situations; the rigidity of structures; and internal inefficiency resulting in an increasing number of "dropouts".

42. An International Commission on the Development of Education had been set up in 1971 to help member States to reconsider the role of education and the forms and resources which should be assigned to it. The main idea set out in the Commission's report, entitled *Learning to be*,

was that education was no longer defined in relation to a particular amount of knowledge and duty that had to be assimilated and applied, but was invented and lived as an existential process of individuals and society learning, through the variety of their experiences, to express themselves, to communicate, to question the world and to become more and more themselves. The true nature of education was total and continuous, and the new education should therefore go beyond the confines of institutions, programmes and methods in which education had become progressively fragmented and frozen.

43. Those concepts had aroused lively interest and UNESCO had received a number of requests for assistance in the identification and critical analysis of the problems and in seeking alternatives to present systems which would take into account the possibilities of out-of-school education and new educational techniques, duly adapted to national characteristics, to the need to democratize access to education and to the requirements of continuous education.

44. It was in those circumstances that the joint research in the preparation and elaboration of national policies and plans had begun. Governments and the UNESCO secretariat both had much to learn in that new and difficult kind of co-operation, but they were convinced that it was the authentic and realistic road to take. On the one hand, it led to the establishment of original strategies and systems conforming as closely as possible to the realities of each country and avoiding blind imitation of foreign models, thus providing education with internal and external efficiency and producing considerably better results. At the same time, because such research was being carried out with the assistance of an international organization, it would not remain isolated but would become part of common experience which could be of use to all. Those were encouraging prospects and it was to be hoped that they would be realized in the operational activities of specialized agencies, for such activities, particularly those financed by UNDP, were often subject to a technocratic approach and cumbersome bureaucratic routine which were serious handicaps to the full success of the agencies' efforts.

45. Culture – a word which at one time could not have been uttered in a gathering of economists and politicians – today lay at the very heart of politics. An increasing number of people had come to realize that culture provided a source of balance or hope in relation to certain unfavourable aspects of their situation. For example, at a time when individuals were being de-personalized, culture enabled them to regain their identity and the capacity to create and express; when new systems of mass communication were turning individuals into passive spectators, culture enabled them to know their place in the world, to evaluate events and to react; when they were in danger of becoming conditioned beings, culture enabled them to choose, to refuse bondage and to prefer reflection to reflex action; when urbanization cut them off from their roots and traditions, culture enabled them to reforge their links with their own patrimony; and when post-industrial man wondered what he was doing in the world, it was culture that could help him find an answer.

46. Thus, culture was now both lived and received; it represented the equality of daily life and gave meaning to it and to the search for the eternal. That was why it had now become an essential dimension of over-all development, which it alone could make truly humanistic. Nevertheless, a sufficient degree of objectivity and rationality was necessary if those responsible for over-all development were to integrate culture into their own measures. UNESCO was endeavouring to promote that rationality through experimental research on facts, basic reflection on concepts, and management studies on structures and methods of action. That, again, was a long-term enterprise, but the number of requests for assistance relating increasingly to fundamental problems of cultural policy confirmed the view that UNESCO's approach was in accordance with the urgent and profound requirements of Governments.

47. Mr. ARCHIBALD (Trinidad and Tobago) said that, in view of the immensity of the tasks assigned to the Council under the Charter, it was clear that its first priority must be efficiency, so that it could perform what was within its ability with despatch and thoroughness. The Council could be either the master of its responsibilities or the servant of its obligations, but the complexity and cumbersome nature of the agenda suggested that the latter case still applied.

48. It might well be asked why the agenda was so cumbersome and whether the Council could properly digest the documentation before it. All appeals for the reduction of its documentation had been in vain. The Council had, without question, taken many vital decisions, had drawn attention to many of the major issues of modern times and had certainly assisted member countries to achieve a better understanding of social and economic problems. Nevertheless, the Council's prestige remained in doubt. One reason might be that the agenda was not drawn up in the most appropriate fashion. For example, items 5 (The problem of mass poverty and employment in developing countries), 14 (The impact of multinational corporations on the development process and on international relations), 15 (International environment co-operation), and 20 (Aid to the Sudano-Sahelian populations threatened with famine), could have been grouped together for immediate discussion. Other major issues, such as those covered by

agenda items 4 (Second United Nations Development Decade: review and appraisal of progress in implementing the International Development Strategy, including a further discussion of collective economic security), 10 (Science and technology), 17 (Co-ordination), 18 (Relations with the World Intellectual Property Organization), 19 (Marine co-operation) and 24 (Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the specialized agencies and the international institutions associated with the United Nations) could have formed a second category, while reports considered annually by the Council could have been placed in a third group. As far as the general discussion of international economic and social policy was concerned, he dared not query the place and purpose of that exercise.

49. The Council should not consider itself bound by the stereotype of debate and subsequent resolution in dealing with the vast variety of subjects which might come before it. A case in point was that of United Nations pensioners: in his view, all members of the secretariats of the United Nations system, past and present, should have the right to request the Council to hear them on any matter concerning their welfare and the conditions of their work. It should be borne in mind that the decisions taken in the Council and other United Nations bodies depended largely on the organization and morale of the various secretariats for their effective implementation.

50. A subject, which, surprisingly, had been omitted from the agenda, but which could be discussed under items 6 (Development planning and projections) and 12 (Mobilization of financial resources), was the world currency crisis. The Council might wish to consider the fact that meaningful forward planning was not possible on the basis of outmoded exchange rates.

51. He had chosen to concentrate on the Council's work because its efficiency and impact were factors of great significance. His delegation would, of course, have an opportunity to discuss other substantive issues under the various agenda items.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.