Department of Economic and Social Affairs

1963 report on the WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION

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PREFACE

The Economic and Social Council, in its resolution 830 A (XXXII), decided that an analytic *Report on the World Social Situation* should be issued biennially, beginning in 1963, covering, in alternate editions, social conditions and social programmes, on the one hand, and urgent comprehensive social problems, on the other. The present report, the first in the new series, has as its main task the summing-up of trends in social conditions and social programmes since 1950. Because of the nature of the data available, especially census data, the period covered in effect tends to be the 1950-1960 decade, although consideration of subsequent developments has not been excluded.

Chapters II to X present a review on a sector-by-sector basis of changes in levels of living and of policies and measures adopted to improve social conditions, while chapters XI to XIV are devoted to regional surveys of trends and programmes in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The report should be read in conjunction with the *Compendium of Social Statistics* [1] which contains statistical data showing trends in sectoral fields over the decaded Despite the progress achieved during the period in the compilation of statistical data, for much of the world and for many of the component factors of the level of living, statistical information is still absent or incomplete or unrepresentative.

This report has been prepared in the Bureau of Social Affairs in co-operation with the International Labour Office, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and the World Health Organization. Each of these agencies has contributed material within its field of competence. The United Nations Secretariat has assumed responsibility for shortening, revising or rearranging such material for editorial purposes.

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[1] *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.XVII.3).

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Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Some of the more important indicators of the world social situation show a solid upward trend since 1950 but, in general, social advance has been uneven in the different components of development, as well as in the different countries and the different social groups within countries. In the economically less developed regions, progress was particularly outstanding in some of the indicators of health and education. It was less satisfactory with regard to food consumption, which showed but a slow upward trend. It was unsatisfactory with regard to housing, employment, personal income and consumption, which — in particular among the poorer classes in the poorer countries — showed little evident improvement at all. The "revolution of rising expectations" in these countries advanced faster than the levels of living.

The drop in death rates — perhaps the most spectacular achievement statistically recorded in the 1950-1960 decade — has had greater meaning for the quantity than for the quality of living. It will be noted in the chapter on health conditions of this report that, at the end of the decade, there were still an estimated 150 million persons in the economically less developed countries suffering from bilharziasis, 500 million from trachoma and over 250 million from filariasis—debilitating diseases whose very names are hardly known in the industrially advanced countries; in the latter countries, heart disease, cancer, mental illness and accidents (particulary from motor vehicles) have been the object of growing concern.

The quantity of education has increased everywhere and literacy rates have risen significantly. The expansion of education has been accompanied by shortages of teachers, equipment and buildings, often by a lowering of the quality of instruction, and by much discussion of the purposes and content of education in an age of rapid social and technological change. The coexistence in some countries of an increasing number of educated unemployed with a serious shortage of personnel in various technical fields has shown the need for a better adaptation of educational systems to economic requirements.

While, according to census data, the percentage of literates increased in the 1950-1960 decade, in a number of countries the absolute number of illiterates also increased substantially—owing to rapid population growth—and with present trends will continue to increase during the next two or three decades. This contrast between progress in terms of averages or percentages and regression in terms of absolute numbers appears in other social indicators for these countries. In fact, as far as it is possible to judge from the scanty evidence on hand, there has been a substantial increase since 1950 in many parts of the world in the numbers of those in conditions of special need — the homeless, the unemployed, the blind and crippled, children without families, youthful delinquents and aged derelicts — whether or not national rates in percentage terms would, if known, show an improvement for these categories.

In some aspects of development, such as health, the gap between the less developed countries and the economically advanced countries narrowed; in others, such as educational enrolment, it remained about the same; in still others, such as consumption of material goods, it widened. In per capita national income — which has limited value as an indicator of social progress — the gap widened considerably in absolute terms but, in relative terms (percentage gains or rates of growth), the picture was obscured by the fact that the fastest growth generally took place in middle-income countries, most of which, like Bulgaria, Greece, Israel, Japan and Yugoslavia, could be classified, depending on the criteria or frame of reference used, as either economically "less developed" or economically "more developed". Thus: (*a*) countries with per capita income levels from $700 to $2,000 or more with one or two exceptions had moderate (1.5 per cent per annum to 3.5 per cent) or low (0.5 per cent to 1.5 per cent) rates of growth of per capita national income, with a median around 3 per cent; (*b*) countries in the middle range of $200 to $700, while showing considerable variability, had a median rate of growth of between 4 and 5 per cent per annum and included nearly all countries with a very high rate of growth; (*c*) countries with per capita incomes below $200, as far as can be determined from the limited data available, had a median of about 2 per cent, ranging from zero or below to around 3 per cent, with a few outstanding exceptions that exceeded these rates. The poorest countries thus grew at the slowest rate. The middle-income countries with rapid growth of per capita national income were, in a number of cases, countries that had been going through a considerable demographic and social transition within the last few decades, with fertility rates and dependency rates substantially lower than in 1930 (for example, countries of southern and south-eastern Europe, Israel and Japan). It is perhaps significant that the very fastest-growing countries were nearly all ones that had been defeated in the Second World War or had been severely devastated, and that appeared to grow rapidly in the 1950's as if in a kind of compensatory movement for the setbacks of the 1940's. Finally, countries with centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe and Asia generally grew faster than countries with market economies or mixed economies, but some of the fastest-growing countries had no general development plans at all (e.g., Austria, Federal Republic of Germany, Geece, Israel, Japan). In the economically less developed countries, an important factor in rapid growth of per capita national income appeared to be the good fortune of having a resource

like oil that was in high demand on the international market during the period; and an important factor in disappointing grwth rates was the misfortune of having a principal export commodity or group of commodities that failed to maintain their relative prices in the international market.

While trends in income distribution are difficult to detect, it would seem safe to say that, with certain exceptions, there has not been notable improvement, either in rich countries or in poor countries, in the correction of mal-distributions that were evident in 1950. In many less developed countries, growth in national income appears to have been shared disproportionately by the minority already well-to-do, while in richer countries certain disadvantaged minorities have continued to lag behind the majorities in growth of income. In general, inequality of income distribution has been highest in countries where there has been considerable imbalance between economic and social indicators, and where diffusion of income (as well as expansion of income) has been hindered by rigidities in the social-economic system. The chief improvements in income distribution have occurred in the relatively small number of developing countries that have carried out really effective land reforms or tax reforms, and in those European countries that during the last decade or so have absorbed their unemployed.

It is hardly necessary in the present context to call attention again to the unprecedented rate of population growth in recent years in the economically less developed areas, a rate that has had important implications for growth of per capita national income and of other aspects of economic and social development. This acceleration of growth, which is still gaining momentum as a result of continuing decline in death rates without change in birth rates, has now become the object of world-wide discussion. On the basis of 1960 census data that have become available thus far, it would appear that the world population increased by an estimated 485 million people, or by 19 per cent between 1950 and 1960 — about the same increase in absolute numbers as in the 100 years between 1750 and 1850, and the same percentage increase as between 1930 and 1950. In the regions the increase was as follows: Middle America, 29 per cent; Oceania, 26.5 per cent (affected by immigration); South America, 26 per cent; Africa, 23 per cent; Asia, 21 per cent; Northern America, 19 per cent; the USSR, 18 per cent; and Europe, 8 per cent. Population growth during 1950-1960 exceeded the highest estimates that had been made, and projections into the future are now being revised, including the projection of a world population of 6 billion people by the year 2000.

With few exceptions, the estimated or recorded birth rates in Africa, Asia and Middle and South America remained in excess of 35 per 1,000 and the gross reproduction rates were over 2.0, the majority lying within the range of 2.7 to 3.2. By contrast, no major country in Europe, Northern America and Oceania has a birth rate as high as 30 per 1,000 or a reproduction rate of 2.0. It should be noted, however, that there are wide variations in birth rates in the economically less developed areas (ranging from 35 to 55 or 60 per 1,000, compared with a range of 15 to 25 in the industrialized countries); these variations imply the existence of fairly extensive fertility controls and argue against the common belief that the populations reproduce themselves at the biological limits. In fact, fertility controls or population controls, often related to economic circumstances, have long been exercised in one form or another in pre-industrial societies. The problem that is creating controversy today is not whether families in densely populated, less developed areas should control fertility at all, but whether the State should intervene in certain circumstances to promote greatly increased fertility control, through the use of modern contraceptive methods currently employed in the economically developed countries, or by other effective means.

A second remark needs to be made about the world demographic situation, in the present context: namely, that no universal generalization can be laid down regarding the favourable or unfavourable effect of population growth upon economic growth. The effect depends upon the rate of growth, the level of technology and availability of resources, as well as other factors. In some cases, where resources have been scarce and technological levels low, as in much of Asia, rapid population growth during the period under review has appeared to inhibit income growth; the scarce resources — particularly of land—have had to be subdivided among a rapidly growing population. It is especially in such areas that governmental concern about continuing high birth rates has become acute. In other cases, where there have been more plentiful resources to develop and higher levels of skill and technology, population growth or growth of the labour force apparently has been favourably associated with growth of per capita national income. In western countries, for example, relatively high rates of increase of the labour force between 1949 and 1959 have been associated with relatively high rates of increase of labour productivity (output per worker).

In all regions, urban population has been growing much more rapidly than rural population, owing to extensive rural-urban migration. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, many metropolitan areas doubled in population within the last decade, and some projections envisage a doubling of the urban population in general in these regions between 1960 and 1975. Urban industries and services have not, as a rule, been expanding as rapidly as the urban population, and a number of countries have been concerned to slow down the rate of migration or even return some of the recent migrants to the countryside, where poverty and unemployment are less degrading to the individual, less costly to the State, and less conspicuous. It is now generally accepted that solutions to problems of excessive urban population cannot be found without a co-ordinated effort to improve economic and social conditions in rural areas through regional planning and rural development programmes. The rural populations will remain the majority population in most of the less developed countries for some years to come, and any improvement in their production and welfare will be of double benefit by helping to ease the urban situation.

In the industrialized countries, urbanization has taken place at roughly the same rate as in the less developed countries, in the sense that about the same proportion of the population has shifted from rural to urban residence, but rates of urban growth have been less marked

because the urban base was much larger at the beginning of the period and over-all population growth has been smaller. At the same time there has been a marked slowing-down or actual decline in rural population. As much as 15 per cent of the total labour force shifted out of agriculture in the 1950-1960 decade in some of the middle and higher income countries, and several of the countries in the higher income category now have 10 per cent or less of their populations engaged in agriculture (compared with 50 to 80 per cent in less developed countries).

In fact, under the impact of rapid technological change, and particularly in recent years of automation, the "developed" countries are undergoing structural changes as rapidly or more rapidly than the "developing" countries. Needs for manual labour are fast declining and older skills becoming obsolescent. In some of the most highly industrialized countries, in sectors such as agriculture, coal-mining and textile manufacturing, where increase of productivity has now far outstripped increase in demand, there is a serious problem of unemployment (or of under-employment disguised in various ways), in spite of extensive out-migration. Manpower surpluses in these sectors, and in unskilled labour in general, coexist, as in less developed countries, wth a scarcity of skilled manpower for newer, expanding industries. This situation, which has both social and economic implications, has led to demands for a massive new approach to occupational training and re-training and the promotion of much greater mobility both of labour and of industry, in the circumstances of a swiftly changing modern technological society.

These problems apply particularly to the highly industrialized populations of North America, but are beginning to appear in western Europe. In the latter region there has been a remarkable expansion of private consumption since 1950, particularly of automobiles, household appliances, television sets and other manufactured products, in response to previously pent-up demand, and, with expanding production, unemployment has been greatly reduced, in many cases wholly eliminated.

In both North America and western Europe, social security since 1950 has significantly expanded, particularly to include the self-employed, and has now reached practically universal coverage in many of these countries. Working hours have become shorter, while at the same time the question of how the additional leisure time should be spent has itself become a matter of some concern. Certain persistent or emerging social problems occupying public policy-makers in these regions, in addition to problems already noted, deserve to be mentioned:

(*a*) The persistence in some countries of minorities living in sub-standard conditions, often in urban or rural slums, composed largely of groups suffering some degree of ethnic discrimination or of geographic or cultural isolation, and tending to be left behind with technological and structural change;

(*b*) The aimless, satisfaction-less lives of many of the aged, arising from their lack of role and status in modern society;

(*c*) Restlessness among youth; the failure of programmes to prevent juvenile delinquency in these countries; the problem of young persons leaving school early who are confronted with the declining demand for unskilled labour;

(*d*) The psychological strains, loss of amenities, waste of time and energy and the health hazards deriving from urban congestion, urban sprawl, and automotive traffic;

(*e*) The widespread concern deriving from world ideological conflicts and the threat of nuclear warfare.

In the countries of eastern Europe and the USSR, not all of these problems exist in the same form or degree. Full employment has been maintained, coverage of public services has continued to expand, and material production generally has risen very fast. Levels of personal consumption of goods, as contrasted with public consumption of services, however, have risen but slowly — more slowly than in other countries of Europe — particularly on the part of the still large agrarian populations.

Among the less developed regions, there are a number of obvious differences in the main problems. In Africa, the rapid emergence of new élites with the attainment of independence, the transformation of traditional social relationships and of the traditional nature of the labour force, and the organizational and training problems attending the creation of new nation-states, are likely to overshadow other preoccupations for some time. In Asia, problems of generalized poverty and heavy pressure of population upon resources are more prominent than elsewhere. At the same time, there is more comprehensiveness and continuity in development planning than in other less developed regions. National policies directed towards change of social structures and class relationships are more clearly defined and also more diverse than elsewhere, ranging from systematic adaptation of traditional forms to new needs (Japan) to the systematic uprooting of traditional forms and their replacement by new ones (mainland China). Latin America and the Middle East show vigorous but unbalanced forms of development, wide urban-rural gaps, serious problems of rapid and concentrated urbanization and acute social tensions. In both regions, political instability has been a factor inhibiting investment and planning for development. Nevertheless, in both regions there is an emerging tendency towards development planning, and social objectives are given consideration in the planning context. In some countries of the Middle East, substantial progress has been made in the reduction of income inequalities through land tenure reform.

In all of these less developed regions, the following problems are present:

(*a*) Heavy dependency ratios and high investment requirements for social and economic development arising from rapid population increase;

(*b*) Increasing uneasiness at the prospect that some of the gains in the quantitative indices of social development may not be contributing as effectively as expected to over-all development — badly planned and ineffective education, social security helping only a favoured minority, and health achievements increasing population pressure faster than production;

(*c*) A growing gap between the minorities within the "modern" economy and the masses outside it;

(*d*) Conspicuous consumption of wealth amid great poverty — wealth often based on quick profits, speculative forms of investment (as in real estate), or inherited property, which do not generally reflect much contribution to the economic and social development of the country;

(*e*) The various social problems attending rapid urbanization;

(*f*) Failure thus far of the strategies for rural development to revolutionize the situation of the rural masses on a scale matching the size of the problem;

(*g*) The outflow of qualified professional personnel from the very countries where they are most needed.

In perspective, the 1950-1960 decade might be described not so much as a period of achievement as a period of promise. Some of the most important social programmes, such as those in education and community development, will pay off only in the future. It is significant that, on an unprecedented scale, Governments have made deliberate and conscious national efforts to advance economic and social development during this period. At the same time, a new international ethic of mutual aid and a new system of international assistance took form; the international community played a central role in the initiation of the world-wide movement for development.

Perhaps the most striking aspect of change in the less developed countries has not been the change in material things, but the change in ethos and general attitude: the appearance of women in occupations where previously they were completely excluded and the fact that, in the Middle East, for example, there are now more girls in school than there were boys in 1950; changes in attitudes towards natural and social science; acceptance of the very concept of economic and social development — a concept still somewhat of a novelty in the universities of some of the most highly advanced countries; the search for scientific principles of development.

Planned development is now one of the major themes of the United Nations Development Decade and will no doubt receive increasing emphasis. The need for balanced and integrated economic and social development has been widely recognized. It will be necessary to ensure that the formulation of economic and social development plans does not become an end in itself, while their execution is neglected. A plan drawn up in a national capital may have little reality at the level of the subsistence farmer. Problems of communication, motivation, and popular participation in development merit better understanding.

The inadequacy of financial resources has been a principal obstacle to social advancement in most countries. It has been widely observed that reduction of expenditure on armaments would make available vast resources for economic and social development. Not only in developed but also in some of the less developed countries, military expenditures represent a large part of national budgets, and it has been estimated that the world is spending approximately $120 thousand million annually on military account. The talents of a large proportion of the world's scientists are expended on research into the development and use of armaments. All who comment upon the subject point to the great advantages that would accrue to human welfare if such resources, backed by modern science and technology, could be diverted to economic and social development, but there has been little apparent progress since 1950 in this essentially political problem.

The chapters that follow in this 1963 *Report on the World Social Situation* take up, first, the developments since 1950 in the several social sectors. Following the sectoral chapters, the report enters into the question of social problems and trends in the economically less developed regions of Latin America, the Middle East, Asia and Africa. In these regional chapters, while the focus is upon social questions, the attempt has been made to understand these questions in their total context. It has been a major thesis of United Nations work in the last decade that the problems in one particular field or area cannot be understood merely in terms of the variables operating within that field; in particular, it has been emphasized in various resolutions of the Economic and Social Council and of the General Assembly, and in various reports by the Secretary-General, that economic and social factors are so inextricably interwoven that no proper explanation of developments in the one field can be made without reference to trends in the other. For this reason, in the regional chapters consideration has also been given to economic forces that have direct bearing upon social trends.

Chapter II

WORLD POPULATION TRENDS

POPULATION GROWTH

The decade 1950 to 1960

In 1960 and 1961, censuses of population were conducted in countries comprising more than half the population of the world. The results of most of these censuses were available by mid-1962; from them the most reliable estimate of world population for midyear 1960 was put at 2.995 million, an increase of 485 million people, or about 19 per cent over the corresponding figure of 2,510 million for 1950. In round numbers, the population of the world increased by one-fifth in ten years, from about 2,500 million to 3 thousand million, a gain of 500 thousand million persons. The population of the world was thus growing during the past decade by an amount (500 thousand million) which was approximately the same as what is estimated to have been the total world population in the middle of the seventeenth century.

A comparison has been made of recent census returns with pre-census expectations for fifty-one countries, each with at least half a million population and containing about 90 per cent of the population enumerated in the 1960-61 censuses.[1] The data disclose that, for the total of the fifty-one countries, census results exceeded expected numbers by 40 million. Most of the unexpected population increase[2] occurred in two countries, India and Pakistan, where 32 million more people were enumerated than anticipated on the basis of previous estimates.

A regional comparison discloses that, in northern and western Europe, central Europe, northern America (i.e., the United States and Canada), and Oceania, slightly *fewer* persons were enumerated than expected. In general, it was only in the less economically advanced regions that population growth was greater than expected. The unanticipated increase was about 3.5 million in Africa, 2 million in South America, 2 million in East Asia, and 1.5 million in South-East Asia, in addition to the 32 million already mentioned for India and Pakistan. For many countries in these regions, population estimates had been made by assuming the population to be growing at the same rate as in the past, thus neglecting the effect of lowered levels of mortality.[3] In view of the limited accuracy of vital statistics in these countries, it is usually not possible to specify with precision the extent to which the unexpected increase is genuine or merely the result of progress in the quality of the statistics.

The distribution of world population growth from 1950 to 1960 by regions is shown in table 1. The outstanding facts shown by this table are:

(*a*) All the regions and sub-regions of the world, without exception, gained in population between 1950 and 1960. The smallest ten-year rate of increase (7 per cent, the equivalent of 9 million persons) was registered in northern and western Europe.

(*b*) The majority of the half-billion additional population was concentrated in Asia, which is estimated to have gained 293 million people, or 60 per cent of the total world increase. This immense increase in the population of Asia was due essentially to the large size of Asia's population at the beginning of the period. In 1950, already more than half of the world's population was living in Asia. The population of Asia is estimated to have grown by 21 per cent from 1950 to 1960 — a rate only slightly above the world average of 19 per cent and below the 26 per cent of South America and the 26.5 per cent of Oceania. The percentage distribution of the world's population by region as estimated for 1920, 1950 and 1960 is shown in table 1.

(*c*) Although the regional rates of population growth for the decade ranged from 7 per cent in northern and western Europe to 29 per cent in middle America, there was no sharp segregation of regions — such as one might expect — into the economically advanced with low rates of growth and the under- or less-developed with high rates of growth. Oceania, comprising principally Australia and New Zealand, with its 26.5 per cent increase, was one of the fastest growing regions, and northern America's 19 per cent increase was as great as that estimated for total world population. Both the Soviet Union and south-central Asia showed increases of 18 per cent, slightly less than the world average.

Any appraisal of the significance of these estimated population increases should be made with due regard to their approximate nature in the case of the economically less developed regions, especially Africa and Asia. Reliable estimation of population growth during the decade requires reliable estimation of population both at the beginning and at the end of the decade. The fact that many countries in these regions have just completed their first population census and that others still have never conducted a census indicates that estimated increases must be somewhat less than solidly based. The doubtfulness of the estimated increase in the population of China (mainland), based as it is on only one census, deserves special mention, because the great size of the population of China

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[1] Dorothy Good, "Preliminary Results of 1960 and 1961 Censuses", *Population Index* (Princeton, N. J.), vol. 28, No. 1, January 1962, pp. 3-9. The fifty-one countries reported a total population of 1,480 million compared with an estimated 163 million in the nineteen countries not yet reporting.

[2] Because of improved census enumeration practices, increases in the *reported* population in some cases reflect more complete enumeration as well as actual population growth.

[3] It should be noted that some countries with *fewer* people enumerated than expected were found in all regions of the world.

Table 1

WORLD POPULATION BY REGIONS, 1920 TO 1960 BY DECADE

	Adjusted estimates of mid-year population [a] *(millions)*					*Numerical increase*	*Decennial percentage increase*				*Percentage distribution of total world population*		
	1920	*1930*	*1940*	*1950*	*1960*	*1950 to 1960 (millions)*	*1920 to 1930*	*1930 to 1940*	*1940 to 1950*	*1950 to 1960*	*1920*	*1950*	*1960*
WORLD TOTAL	*1,811*	*2,015*	*2,249*	*2,510*	*2,995*	*485*	*11.3*	*11.6*	*11.6*	*19.3*	*100.0*	*100.0*	*100.0*
Africa	*141*	*157*	*176*	*206*	*254*	*48*	*11.3*	*12.1*	*17.0*	*23.3*	*7.9*	*8.2*	*8.5*
North Africa	47	53	61	71	88	17	12.8	15.1	16.4	23.9	2.7	2.8	2.9
Tropical and southern Africa	94	104	115	135	166	31	10.6	10.6	17.0	23.0	5.2	5.4	5.4
America	*208*	*244*	*277*	*329*	*405*	*76*	*17.3*	*13.5*	*18.8*	*23.1*	*11.5*	*13.1*	*13.5*
Northern America	117	135	146	167	199	32	15.4	8.1	14.4	19.2	6.5	6.7	6.6
Middle America	30	34	41	51	66	15	13.3	20.6	24.4	29.4	1.6	2.0	2.2
South America	61	75	90	111	140	29	23.0	20.0	23.3	26.1	3.4	4.4	4.7
Asia	*966*	*1,072*	*1,212*	*1,386*	*1,679*	*293*	*11.0*	*13.1*	*14.4*	*21.1*	*53.3*	*55.2*	*56.1*
South-West Asia	43	47	53	60	77	17	9.3	12.8	13.2	28.3	2.4	2.4	2.6
South-Central Asia	326	362	410	472	559	87	11.0	13.3	15.1	18.4	18.0	18.8	18.7
South-East Asia	110	128	155	175	214	39	16.4	21.1	12.9	22.3	6.0	7.0	7.1
East Asia	487	535	594	679	829	150	9.9	11.0	14.3	22.1	26.9	27.0	27.7
Europe (excluding the USSR)	*329*	*356*	*381*	*395*	*427*	*32*	*8.2*	*7.0*	*3.7*	*8.1*	*18.1*	*15.8*	*14.2*
Northern and western Europe	115	122	128	133	142	9	6.1	4.9	3.9	6.8	6.3	5.3	4.7
Central Europe	112	120	127	128	139	11	7.1	5.8	0.8	8.6	6.2	5.1	4.6
Southern Europe	102	114	126	134	146	12	11.8	10.5	6.3	9.0	5.6	5.4	4.9
Oceania	*8.8*	*10.4*	*11.3*	*13.0*	*16.5*	*3.5*	*18.2*	*8.7*	*15.0*	*26.9*	*0.5*		*0.5*
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	*158*	*176*	*192*	*181*	*214*	*33*	*11.4*	*9.1*	*— 5.7*	*18.2*	*8.7*	*7.2*	*7.1*

SOURCE: 1961 *Demographic Yearbook*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.XIII.1. The countries and territories included in each region are listed in the *Demographic Yearbook*. The regional location of most of the principal countries of the world may be seen by referring to table 2 below.

[a] Estimates for North Africa and Asia represent revisions of previous estimates.

(mainland) gives its estimated rate of growth special importance in any estimate of world population growth.

Generally speaking, the rates of population growth for the major regions and sub-regions of the world reflect natural increase i.e., the excess of births over deaths. Migration had an appreciable effect only in Oceania, northern and western Europe and northern and middle America. The effect was really considerable only in Oceania, where about 30 per cent of the total growth was due to the net immigration of over a million persons, mainly from northern and western Europe. Since northern and western Europe's population in 1950 was ten times greater than that of Oceania, its million or so emigrants represented a loss of less than 1 per cent even though they added almost 8 per cent to the population of Oceania. Although 2 million persons migrated from Europe to northern America, the effect of this movement on population growth in the areas of emigration was also proportionately small.

Migration into northern America was responsible only to a very limited extent for its 19 per cent population growth as a region during the decade. Net migration into the United States during the decade, estimated at 2,660,000 [4] (mostly from Europe and middle America), constituted an increment of only 1.6 per cent to the 167 million 1950 population of northern America. The almost half a million net migrants from Puerto Rico to the United States, together with another 200,000 or so from the British West Indies to the United Kingdom, could not have detracted much more than 1 per cent from middle America's decennial rate of growth.

Statistics on population growth are itemized for selected countries in table 2.[5] Differences in rate of population growth, of course, do not necessarily imply different patterns of fertility and mortality. Migration can also have a significant effect, especially on countries with small or moderate-sized populations. And in the economically less advanced regions, the differences may find their explanation partly in the uneven quality of the available statistical evidence.

Only a few countries with very trustworthy population statistics can be found in Asia. One of these, Japan, increased its population by only 12 per cent during the decade because of its extremely low birth rate. Another is Israel, where heavy immigration was responsible for a phenomenal 68 per cent increase. Reported increases for most other countries of Asia must be regarded as approximate at best. The low ten-year population increase

[4] *Current Population Survey*, United States Bureau of the Census, Series P-25, No. 227.

[5] The data in table 2 were all used in the preparation of the *1961 Demographic Yearbook*, being either the official figures of table 4 or the adjusted estimates used in compiling the world and regional estimates of table 2. The adjusted estimates have been selected only where the official figures appear to misrepresent the population growth during the decade, whether because of error or incomparability. While all known inaccuracies have been adjusted, in the case of both the official figures and the adjusted estimates there necessarily exists a considerable range of reliability and comparability.

Inclusion in this table was determined principally by size of population. However, a few large countries with obviously untrustworthy data have been omitted, and some smaller countries have been added, e.g., Ireland and Israel, where population has been unusually affected by migration.

Table 2

POPULATION OF SELECTED COUNTRIES [a] BY REGIONS, MID-YEAR 1950 AND 1960 (thousands)

	1950	1960	Increase 1950 to 1960	
			Number	Percentage
AFRICA				
Northern Africa				
Algeria	8,753	11,020	2,267	25.9
United Arab Republic (Egypt)	20,448	*25,929	5,481	26.8
Morocco	8,953	11,626	2,673	29.9
Tunisia	3,555	4,168	613	17.2
Tropical and southern Africa				
Congo (Leopoldville)	11,258	14,150	2,892	25.7
Ghana	†5,020	*6,691[c]	1,671	33.3
Nigeria	†29,169	35,091	5,922	20.3
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of	6,320	8,320	2,000	31.6
South Africa	12,447	*15,780	3,333	26 8
Tanganyika	7,733	9,239	1,506	19.5
AMERICA				
Northern America				
Canada	13,712	17,814	4,102	29.9
United States of America	152,265	*180,670	28,405	18.7
Middle America				
Jamaica	1,403	*1,621[c]	213	15.5
Cuba	5,520	6,797	1,277	23.1
Dominican Republic	2,131	*3,014[c]	883	41.4
Guatemala	2,805	3,765	960	34.2
Mexico	25,826	34,988	9,162	35.5
Puerto Rico	*2,218	*2,361	143	6.4

Table 2 (continued)

POPULATION OF SELECTED COUNTRIES [a] BY REGIONS, MID-YEAR 1950 AND 1960 (thousands)

	1950	1960	Increase 1950 to 1960	
			Number	Percentage
AMERICA *(continued)*				
South America				
Argentina	†16,965	20,001	2,883	17.0
Brazil	51.976[c]	65,743	13,767	26.5
Chile	6,073	*7,340[c]	1,267	20.9
Colombia	11,334	14,132	2,798	24.7
Peru	8,521	*10,857	2,336	27.4
Venezuela	†5,014	7,259	2,245	44.8
ASIA				
South-West Asia				
Iran	16,276	20,182	3,906	24.0
Iraq	5,278	7,085	1,807	34.2
Israel	1,258	2,114	856	68.0
Turkey	20,947[c]	*27,829[c]	6,882	32.9
Central-South Asia				
Ceylon	7,678	9,896	2,218	28.9
India	†368,819	433,386	63,567	17.2
Pakistan	†75,500	*92,727	17,227	22.8
South-East Asia				
Burma	18,489	20,662	2,173	11.8
Indonesia	76,000	92,600	16,600	21.8
Philippines	†20,570	†27,500	6,930	33.7
Thailand	†20,000	†25,517	5,517	27.6
East Asia				
China (mainland)	†556,000	†687,000	131,000	23.6
Japan	82,900	93,200	10,300	12.4
EUROPE				
Northern and western Europe				
Belgium	8,639	9,153	514	5.9
France	41,736	45,542	3,806	9.1
Ireland	2,969	2,834	—135	—4.5
Netherlands	10,114	11,480	1,366	13.5
Sweden	7,014	7,480	466	6.6
United Kingdom	50,616	52,539	1,923	3.8
Central Europe				
Austria	6,935	7,081	146	2.1
Czechoslovakia	12,389	13,654	1,265	10.2
Germany [b]	68,734	72,818	4,444	6.5
Hungary	9,341	9,999	658	7.0
Poland	24,824	29,703	4,879	19.7
Switzerland	4,694	*5,351[c]	657	14.0
Southern Europe				
Italy	46,603	49,361	2,758	5.9
Romania	16,311	18,403	2,092	12.8
Spain	27,868	30,128	2,260	8.1
Yugoslavia	16,346	*18,643	2,297	14.1
OCEANIA				
Australia	8,179	10,275	2,096	25.6
New Zealand	1,908	2,372	464	24.3
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS	181,000	214,400	23,400	18.5

SOURCE: 1961 *Demographic Yearbook*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.XIII.1, table 4. Table 4 may also be referred to for qualifying comments on population coverage and boundary definitions.

[a] The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.

[b] Comprising the Federal Republic of Germany, Eastern Germany, East Berlin and West Berlin.

[c] Census results.

* Provisional.

† Adjusted estimate—see foot-note 5, p. 7.

of 12 per cent reported for Burma must, for example, be viewed with caution. Burma's last regular census was in 1941, although a partial census was taken in 1953 and 1954. The uncertainty of the reported 24 per cent growth of the population of China (mainland), with only one population census, the census of 1953, has already been mentioned.

In middle America, lower fertility together with emigration seems responsible for the smaller population growth registered in the Caribbean (principally in Cuba, Puerto Rico and Jamaica) than in Central America. Lower rates of increase are also generally found in temperate South America than in tropical South America. Lower fertility is the explanation at least in Argentina. Uruguay is also thought to be characterized by a slow rate of population growth caused by low fertility. However, data for Uruguay, where no population census has been conducted since 1908, have to be used with reservations.

Population growth 1920 to 1960 by decades

Sharply contrasting with the rapid growth of world population from 1950 to 1960 (19 per cent) is the much lower rate of growth during the preceding three decades, which was consistently between 11 and 12 per cent, as shown in table 1. The abrupt change to a higher rate of growth in the aftermath of the Second World War signifies a process of acceleration which still continues. Growth was greater in the second half of the past decade than in the first half (the five-year rate of growth was 10.1 per cent from 1955 to 1960 and only 8.3 per cent from 1950 to 1955); in all probability the growth in the second half of the past decade portends a still more rapid rate of increase for the decade of the 1960's, particularly in view of the continuing mortality decline.[6]

Trends in the rates of growth in the different regions of the world were in no wise uniform. Several distinct trends should be noted. The rates of growth in the more industrialized regions of the world slowed down during the 1930's (in most cases, because of lower fertility) and then recovered their pace in the post-war period. The recovery was especially pronounced in the Soviet Union, northern America and Oceania, where population growth in the 1950's exceeded that of the 1920's. In Europe, where the continental average rate of growth was about the same in the 1950's as in the 1920's, regional differences had evened out markedly.[7] Both in the 1950's as in the 1920's, southern Europe was growing fastest and northern Europe slowest, with central Europe in between. But in the 1920's the range of variation was greater, from 6 to 12 per cent for the decade, as opposed to from 7 to 9 per cent in the 1950's. Northern and western Europe and central Europe were then growing faster than in the 1920's, while southern Europe's rate of increase had slowed down.[8]

Middle America and all the sub-regions of Asia, on the other hand, were increasing at an accelerating rate throughout the entire period from 1920 to 1960.[9] This acceleration was due to a decline in mortality, which was slow at first and later increased in pace.

South America, Argentina excluded from the totals, appears to have experienced a constant population growth of about 23 per cent per decade between 1920 and 1950 and then to have entered a phase of more rapid growth (26 per cent) in the 1950's. Argentina, the second-ranking country on the continent in size of population, did not follow this pattern, behaving instead more like northern America or Europe. Argentina's decennial increase dropped from 33 per cent in the 1920's to only 19 per cent in the 1930's, partly as a consequence of a falling crude birth rate (31 per 1,000 population for the 1920's and 25 per 1,000 in the 1930's), and also because net immigration declined from about 920,000 in the 1920's to 165,000 in the 1930's. As a consequence, the rate of growth for South America as a whole, with Argentina included as in table 1, fluctuated similarly to the trend in northern America, although at a substantially higher level.

The estimates in table 1 on population growth for Africa are based on the most meagre information. Errors in estimating the African population are of too great a magnitude to justify the use of these figures for drawing precise conclusions concerning the trend in the rate of growth.

In terms of the re-distribution of world population by regions, the net result (see table 1) of this complex pattern of differential growth has been to increase the share of the world's population in the economically less advanced countries at the expense of Europe and the Soviet Union. While northern America and Oceania maintained their position, Europe and the Soviet Union together dropped from almost 27 per cent of the world's population in 1920 to slightly over 21 per cent in 1960. The differences between Europe and the Soviet Union on the one hand and northern America and Oceania on the other hand find partial explanation in migration to the "New World" and also in the greater loss of life in Europe and the Soviet Union during the Second World War.

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6 Although the rapid growth in world population has been due primarily to a decline in mortality rates rather than to an increase in birth rates, the evolution of vital statistics under this trend necessarily shows a large increase in the absolute number of births — roughly from about 79 million in 1937 to 103 million in 1957, according to estimates available for these years. The annual number of deaths during that interval dropped only very slightly, from an estimated 57 million to about 54 million in 1957.

7 Different countries within the same European geographical region continue to show widely varying rates of growth. Also, certain countries geographically classified in either central Europe (Poland) or in southern Europe (Yugoslavia) show common demographic characteristics such as still relatively high fertility and low mortality (although the fertility has been declining substantially in the last two or three years).

8 Since the regional rates of population growth are calculated from regional totals of population data, they are strongly influenced by the weight carried by the demographic situation in countries which account for significant percentages of the regional totals. Thus, it may be noted that the faster rate of population growth in central Europe is due to a large extent to a higher rate of natural increase in one country (Poland), while the slowing of the rate of population growth in southern Europe can be explained to a large extent in terms of the decrease of the birth rate in another single country (Italy); in the latter case, Italy's net emigration balance has also affected the regional growth rate.

9 With the exception of South-East Asia during the 1940's, where undoubtedly the ravages of the war had the same retarding effect on population growth as in Europe and in the Soviet Union.

Mortality

The present situation

Table 3 presents approximate average annual crude death rates and birth rates for major regions of the world for the period 1956-60.[10] A contrast can be seen between the low mortality of the economically advanced regions (northern America, Europe, Oceania and the Soviet Union), none of which has a higher average crude death rate than the 11 per 1,000 of northern and western Europe, and the economically less developed regions, where the lowest death rate is 15 per 1,000 in middle America. The death rates of the regions of low mortality are grouped closely together in the range of 8 to 11 per 1,000, whereas the rates in the regions of high mortality range widely from 15 to 27 per 1,000.

Table 3

ESTIMATED AVERAGE CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES [a] FOR THE WORLD, BY REGIONS, 1956-1960

	Birth rate	*Death rate*	*Rate of natural increase*
WORLD	*36*	*18*	*18*
Africa	*47*	*25*	*22*
Northern Africa	45	23	22
Tropical and southern Africa	48	27	21
America	*34*	*13*	*21*
Northern America	25	9	16
Middle America	42	15	27
South America	42	19	23
Asia	*41*	*22*	*19*
South-West Asia	48	22	26
South-Central Asia	41	24	17
South-East Asia	41	21	20
East Asia	40	20	20
Europe	*19*	*11*	*8*
Northern and western Europe	18	11	7
Central Europe	19	11	8
Southern Europe	21	10	11
Oceania	*24*	*9*	*15*
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	*25*	*8*	*17*

SOURCE: 1961 *Demographic Yearbook*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.XIII.1, table 2.

[a] Births, deaths or natural increase per year per 1,000 population.

Even wider variations of death rates are found among the countries within the regions of high mortality. Some countries in these regions have quite low death rates at present, due to remarkable improvements in the conditions of health during recent years. In general, these are countries with a relatively small population. The most populous countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America [11] have, as a rule, higher death rates, which account for the relatively high estimated average regional rates for these parts of the world.

Variations by country within each region are illustrated by table 4, which gives crude death rates (as well as crude birth rates and rates of natural increase) for selected countries with a population of 500,000 or more, having either fairly complete registration data or reliable estimates from such other sources as sample surveys.[12] In interpreting the statistics for countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, it is necessary to bear in mind that the countries for which reliable data are available generally have better conditions of health than those for which data are lacking. For example, six of the seven countries listed for Africa and five of the six listed for middle America have death rates lower than the estimated averages for their regions. Three of the four South American countries in table 4 are substantially below the estimated South American average crude death rate and ten of the twelve Asian countries report lower death rates than the 2.2 per 1,000 estimated as an average for Asia.

Despite the absence of data for most of the countries with the highest mortality, it is clear that there is a wide variation of country death rates within the (economically under-developed) high mortality regions. On the other hand, the countries of the low mortality regions have uniformly low mortality, their crude death rates ranging only from 7 or 8 per 1,000 to 12 or 13. These are industrialized countries which have long enjoyed relatively low mortality rates, partly as a consequence of their relatively high average income and levels of living, and also because these were the countries where modern medical

[10] In many areas of the world, death registration statistics are either non-existent or very inadequate. The general rule has always been that countries with high mortality have poor vital statistics. The average crude death rates shown in table 3 for the regions with the highest mortality should be accepted as no more than approximation.

The crude death rate, defined as the number of deaths per year per 1,000 population, is the most frequently used measure of mortality and the easiest one to obtain. However, because it does not allow for differences in age structure of population, it tends to understate the difference in mortality between the economically more advanced and less advanced countries. In general, the more advanced countries have a larger proportion of their population in the older ages, where the probability of death is greatest.

[11] The expression "Latin America" is used in this chapter as the aquivalent of middle and south America i.e., all of America south of the United States of America.

[12] Except in the case of Europe, very few countries with adequate data have been omitted from table 4. Because almost all the countries in Europe have fairly complete vital statistics, some curtailment of European entries has been made for the sake of brevity. In each sub-region of Europe the five countries selected for table 4 include those with the highest and lowest death rates and those with the highest and lowest birth rates.

Experience has shown that vital statistics are collected most accurately by a registration system under which births, deaths, etc. are registered at the time of, or within a short time after, occurrence. Registration data only from countries with systems classified "complete" on the basis of information supplied by the national statistical services to the Statistical Office of the United Nations have been included in table 4. Such data are preferably tabulated by year of occurrence (code "co") except for countries whose registration system is characterized by late registration. In these latter countries data by year of registration (code "cr") are more indicative of recent trends than are data by year of occurrence, with invariably taper off for the latest reported years.

In the absence of adequate registration data, the best substitute is census or sample survey data obtained directly (code "cs") from households on births and deaths which have occurred during, for example, the preceding year. Another alternative, even less precise, is the indirect (code "ii") inference of births and deaths from census or sample survey data on age structure, children ever born to women who have passed the reproductive ages, etc.

Table 4

LATEST CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES,[a] FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Date	Birth rate	Death rate	Rate of natural increase
Africa				
Congo (Leopoldville)	1955-58	43[cs]	20[cs]	23
Guinea	1955	62[cs]	40[cs]	22
Mali	1960	56[cs]	30[cs]	26
Mauritius ex. dep.	1960	39.6[cr]	11.3[cr]	28.3
Sudan	1956	52[cs]	19[cs]	33
Tunisia	1959	47	26	18.9
Uganda	1959	42[cs]	20[cs]	22
America				
Northern America:				
Canada	1961	26.0[co]	7.7[co]	18.3
United States	1961	23.4[co]	9.3[co]	14.1
Middle America:				
Costa Rica	1960	50.2[co]	8.6[co]	41.6
El Salvador	1961	49.6[co]	11.4[co]	38.2
Guatemala	1960	49.5[co]	17.5[co]	32.0
Jamaica	1960	42.7[cr]	8.9[cr]	33.8
Mexico	1960	45.0[cr]	11.4[cr]	33.6
Puerto Rico	1960	31.0	6.7[co]	24.3
South America:				
Argentina	1960	22.3[co]	8.1[co]	14.2
Brazil	1950	43.0[i]	20.6[i]	22.4
British Guiana	1960	43.0[cr]	9.5[cr]	33.5
Chile	1960	35.4[co]	19.9[cr]	23.5
Asia				
South-West Asia:				
Cyprus	1960	25.8[ii]	5.7[ii]	20.1
Iran	1959	45[cs]	25[cs]	20
Israel[b]	1961	22.0[cr]	5.7[cr]	16.3
Central South Asia:				
India	1958	39.1[cs e]	19.2[cs e]	19.9
Nepal	1954	45[ii]	30[i]	15
Central-South Asia:				
Federation of Malaya	1960	40.9[co]	9.5[co]	31.4
Indonesia	1953-54	40	20	20
Singapore	1961	35.5[co]	5.9[cr]	29.6
Thailand	1955	48.9[i]	18.0[i]	30.9
East Asia:				
China (mainland)	1957	34[cs]	11[cs]	23
Hong Kong	1961	34.3[cr]	5.9[cr]	28.4
Japan	1961	16.8[co]	7.4[co]	9.4
Europe				
Northern and western Europe:				
Belgium	1960	16.9[co]	12.9[co]	4.0
France	1961	18.4[co]	11.0[co]	7.4
Netherlands	1961	21.2[co]	7.6[co]	13.6
Sweden	1961	13.9[co]	9.8[co]	4.1
United Kingdom	1961	17.8[d]	12[d]	5.8
Central Europe:				
Austria	1961	18.5[co]	12.0[co]	6.5
Czechoslovakia	1961	15.8[co]	9.2[co]	6.6
Hungary	1961	14.0[co]	9.6[co]	4.4
Poland	1961	20.7[co]	7.6[co]	13.1
Switzerland	1961	18.1[co]	9.3[co]	8.8

Table 4 (continued)

LATEST CRUDE BIRTH, DEATH AND NATURAL INCREASE RATES,[a] FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Date	Birth rate	Death rate	Rate of natural increase
Southern Europe:				
Bulgaria	1960	17.8[co]	8.1[co]	9.7
Italy	1961	18.8[co]	9.4[co]	9.4
Portugal	1961	23.6[co]	10.7[co]	12.9
Romania	1961	17.5[co]	8.7[co]	8.8
Spain	1961	21.3[co]	8.6[co]	12.7
Yugoslavia	1961	22.6[co]	9.0[co]	13.6
Oceania:				
Australia[e]	1961	22.8[cr]	8.5[cr]	14.3
New Zealand	1961	27.1[cr]	9.0[cr]	18.1

SOURCE: For Guinea, "Demographic Factors related to Social and Economic Development in Africa", *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, vol. II, No. 2, June 1962. For Tunisia, S. Bahroun, Les problèmes de la démographie tunisienne, République Tunisienne, Secrétariat d'Etat au Plan et aux Finances, *Bulletin de statistique et d'études économiques*, New Series, No. 13, January-March 1961, pp. 6-11. For Thailand, Jean Bourgeois-Pichat, "An attempt to appraise the accuracy of demographic statistics for an underdeveloped country: Thailand", United Nations Seminar on Evaluation and Utilization of Population Census Data in Asia and the Far East, Bombay, 1960 (document E/CN.9/Conf.2/L.13). For Costa Rican crude birth and death rates, "Principales Hechos Vitales Ocurridos en Costa Rica", No. 25, Año 1961, Departamento de Estadísticas Sociales, San José. For remaining countries, 1961 *Demographic Yearbook* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62. XIII. 1). table 3.

[a] Births, deaths and natural increase per year per 1,000 population.

[b] Jewish population only.

[c] Rural India only.

[d] Data tabulated by year of occurrence for England and Wales, but by year of registration for Northern Ireland and Scotland.

[e] Excluding full-blooded aborigines.

Registration data:
cr = complete, by year of registration
co = complete, by year of occurrence

Non-registration data:
cs = data obtained directly from census or sample survey
ii = data estimated indirectly from information on age structure, children ever born, etc.

science and health technology were first developed and first applied on a wide scale.

A remarkable feature of the variations of death rates within the regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America is that in these regions are found not only the countries with the highest death rates but also some of those with the lowest crude death rates in the world. The range of variation is from an estimated 40 per 1,000 for Guinea to 5.7 for Cyprus and for the Jewish population of Israel. In addition to Cyprus and Israel, four other countries (Japan and Puerto Rico with death rates around 7, and Singapore and Hong Kong with rates around 6) have lower crude death rates than the lowest countries (the Netherlands and Poland with 8) in the regions of low average mortality. Furthermore, these are not mere isolated exceptions; in all the high mortality regions, there are other countries with moderately low mortality, i.e., a crude death rate no higher than, for example, Belgium's 13 per 1,000.

The explanation for the low crude death rates in many African, Asian and Latin American countries is twofold. First, although the registration of vital statistics in these countries is reported to be " relatively complete ", in most of them registration is *less* complete than it is in the countries of Europe, northern America, and Oceania. Secondly, the countries in the high mortality regions, because they either have high fertility, or (like Japan and Cyprus) have had high fertility until recently, are characterized by a relatively large concentration of population in the young ages, where mortality is low. It is for this reason that Hong Kong, Israel,[13] Puerto Rico, Cyprus, Japan and Singapore have crude death rates lower even than that of Sweden, although Sweden at present has the world's lowest mortality as measured by the expectation of life at birth.[14] For all of these countries, except Hong Kong, recent data on age-specific mortality and on the age structure of the population are available. The proportion of their population in the ages 65 and over is only 2 per cent in Singapore and 5 or 6 per cent in Puerto Rico, Israel, Cyprus and Japan, compared with 11.5 per cent in Sweden.

Standardizing their 1959 age-specific mortality rates to Sweden's 1959 age-sex structure for the same year

[13] Israel, of course, is a special case. Its youthful population is due to immigration and is not related to fertility.

[14] The best single measure of the level of mortality is life expectancy at birth—i.e., the average years of life to which new-born children may look forward assuming exposure throughout their lives to current age-specific mortality rates. This measure is not affected by the age structure of the population. However, the data necessary for this index are often not available. Life expectancy has the further disadvantage of generally being computed for census years only and not readily lending itself to the comparison of trends among countries not having their censuses in the same years. These technical difficulties have been partly overcome here by the use of approximate life expectancy estimates within a range of five or ten years.

demonstrates that the greater youthfulness of their populations is responsible for their lower crude death rates. If the other countries mentioned had Sweden's older age structure, their crude death rates would be greater than Sweden's.

Country and year	Percentage of total population aged 65 years and over	Registered crude death rate	Death rate standardized to Sweden's sex-age structure
Sweden, 1959	11.5	9.5	9.5
Israel, 1959	4.7	5.9	10.2
Puerto Rico, 1960 ..	5.4	6.7	9.6
Cyprus, 1954	6.4	7.2	11.6
Japan, 1959	5.6	7.4	13.1
Singapore, 1957	2.1	7.4	16.8

Nevertheless, the countries of relatively low mortality within high mortality regions may be said to have remarkably low mortality indeed, considering that they are generally much less advanced economically than the countries of the low mortality regions, and considering also that their transition from high mortality began, in most cases, only quite recently. The most significant change that has occurred with regard to mortality since the Second World War is that much of the health technology developed in the industrialized countries has now become accessible to the inhabitants of under-developed countries where industrialization has yet made little headway.

Trends

Table 5 shows average registered crude death rates and infant mortality rates [15] where available for selected countries for the last four or five years of the 1950's, as compared with the last years of the 1930's. Life expectancy at birth is also presented for most of the countries. The inclusion only of countries with relatively complete death registration statistics dating back to the pre-war period has necessarily — even more than in table 4 — limited coverage to countries with low mortality. Whereas the world average crude death rate for 1956-60 is estimated at 18 per 1,000, only one of the countries in the table (Guatemala) has a recorded crude death rate greater than 13 for 1955-58.

More typical of Asian mortality than the statistics for Asian countries listed in this table are the estimates of approximate expectation of life for the years 1955-58, which it has been possible to make for some of the countries lacking satisfactory death registration statistics. India, Burma and Cambodia are estimated to have a life expectancy at birth ranging from 35 to 44 years, while the estimate for the Philippines and Thailand is in the range of 45 to 49 years. The Federation of Malaya, with the lowest estimated life expectancy (50 to 54 years) of any Asian country in table 5, has a greater life expectancy than any of the countries just mentioned.

15 The infant mortality rate (number of deaths under one year of age per one thousand live births) has the advantage of being independent of the age structure. It is a readily available figure, although often incomplete and understated for many countries.

Table 5

PRE-WAR AND RECENT REGISTERED CRUDE DEATH AND INFANT MORTALITY RATES, AND RECENT LIFE EXPECTANCY, FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Crude death rate [a]		Infant mortality rate [b]		Approximate expectation of life at birth (both sexes) in years [c]
	1935-39 [d]	1955-58	1935-39	1955-58	1955-58
AMERICA					
Northern America					
Canada	9.9	8.1	68.4	31.0	70-74
United States	11.0	9.4	53.2	26.4	65-69
Middle America					
Costa Rica [e]	20.0	9.8	142.7	85.5	60-64
Guatemala	26.5	20.6	103.8	98.6	45-54
Jamaica [f]	16.6	9.3	127.3	58.7	60-64
Mexico [f]	23.3	12.9	127.6	78.8	55-59
Puerto Rico	19.1	7.1	122.9	53.8	65-69
South America					
Argentina	11.6	8.4	98.8 [g]	61.8	60-64
Brazil	...	...	...		45-54
Chile [f]	23.3	12.5	240.8 [h]	121.6 [i]	55-59
Venezuela [f]	17.8	9.9	135.3	67.5	-
ASIA					
Ceylon [j]	24.5	10.1	182.8	68.5 [k]	55-59
China: Taiwan	20.2	8.2	144.5	34.4	60-64
Cyprus	14.4	6.2	122.7	31.0	70-74
Federation of Malaya	20.7 [l]	11.7	149.6	77.2	50-54

Table 5 (continued)

	Crude death rate[a]		Infant mortality rate[b]		Approximate expectation of life at birth (both sexes) in years[c]
	1935-39[d]	1955-58	1935-39	1955-58	1955-58
Israel[m]	8.2	6.3	60.6	37.8	70-74
Japan	17.4	7.9	110.4	38.8	65-69
Singapore	22.3	7.5	155.1	44.2	60-64
EUROPE					
Northern and western Europe					
Belgium	13.0	12.0	83.7	36.6	65-69
England and Wales	12.0	11.6	56.4	23.6	70-74
France	15.7	12.0	66.7	35.0	70-74
Netherlands	8.7	7.6	38.4	18.4	70-74
Sweden	11.8	9.6	44.2	17.1	70-74
Central Europe					
Austria	13.6	12.4	91.0	43.4	65-69
Czechoslovakia	13.2	9.6	115.4	32.1	65-69
Hungary	14.4	10.3	139.0	60.0	65-69
Poland	14.0	9.1	136.0	75.5	60-64
Switzerland	11.6	10.0	46.0	24.4	70-74
Southern Europe					
Bulgaria	14.0	8.8	148.0	68.2	65-69
Italy	14.0	9.8	104.2	49.5	65-69
Portugal	16.1	11.2	144.2	87.5	60-64
Romania	19.8	9.6	181.8	78.1	60-64[o]
Spain	17.7	9.5	122.1	52.1	60-64
Yugoslavia	16.2	10.6	140.3	99.7	60-64
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.	17.6[k]	7.7	184	48	65-69[o]
OCEANIA					
Australia[l,p]	9.6	8.8	39.1	21.4	70-74[r]
New Zealand[l,r]	9.0	9.0	32.3	19.7	70-74[q]

SOURCE: "The Situation and Recent Trends of Mortality in the World", *Population Bulletin of the United Nations* No. 6, Sales No. 62.XIII.2.

[a] Deaths per year per 1,000 population.

[b] Infant deaths per 1,000 live births.

[c] Number of years of life which the average person, subject to the age-specific mortality rates prevailing in the time period specified, could expect.

[d] 1935-38 in the case of the countries of Europe.

[e] Prior to 1939, rates exclude death of infants occurring before registration of birth.

[f] Data by year of registration rather than year of occurrence.

[g] Registration incomplete outside Federal Capital and principal cities. 1938-39: excluding province of Santa Fé.

[h] Rates computed on live births registered within two years of occurrence.

[i] Rates computed on live births adjusted for under-registration.

[j] According to test of death registration, 89 per cent complete in 1953.

[k] 1955-57.

[l] 1940.

[m] Jewish population only.

[n] 1938-40.

[o] 1957-58.

[p] Excluding aborigines.

[q] 1956-58.

[r] European population only.

The poverty of vital statistics in Africa is such that no reliable measures of the changes in death rates during the last two decades are available for any except a few of the smallest countries in that region. Hence no country in Africa is included in table 5. A recent analysis of available data on mortality in Africa during the post-war period led to the following conclusion:

" ... in spite of their deficiencies, the statistics make it appear that mortality rates have considerably declined in the past decade. A few examples for areas where data are available over a period of years will illustrate the change. As regards areas with better statistics, the death rates of Mauritius, Bathurst (Gambia) and the urban registration areas of Ghana declined from the 1946-50 levels of 19, 21 and 23 respectively to around 15, 12 and 21 in 1958. This trend is noticeable even

in some countries with relatively incomplete statistics. "[16]

Among the countries included in table 5, it is clear that the only ones not recording a substantial decline of death rates during the twenty-year interval are those where mortality was already so low in 1935-39 as to leave little room for improvement. In a recent United Nations study of mortality in the world,[17] which included analysis of available information for countries lacking adequate statistics, countries were grouped according to pre-war mortality level and the average improvement of mortality from 1935-39 to 1955-58 was estimated for each group. It was found that no clear trend over the last two decades could be discerned for countries with the highest pre-war mortality (i.e., those generally not included in table 5). With the exception of this group, composed of countries which have yet made relatively little headway either in economic development or in modern health practices, there is a marked tendency for countries which were lagging in the decline of mortality before the Second World War to catch up with the pace-setting countries. For example, the group of countries with the lowest pre-war mortality (an average expectation of life at birth of 60 years or more) gained on the average only six or seven years in life expectancy as compared with an average increase of about fifteen years in countries with fairly high mortality (a pre-war life expectancy of only 40 to 50 years).

Average 1935-39 life expectancy at birth	*Average increase in life expectancy at birth from 1935-39 to 1955-58*
1. *Low mortality* (life expectancy 60 years or more)	6 to 7 years
2. *Medium low mortality* (life expectancy from 50 to 60 years)	about 10 years
3. *Medium high mortality* (life expectancy from 40 to 50 years)	about 15 years
4. *High mortality* (life expectancy less than 40 years)	no clear trend

The prospect for the future

Before the Industrial Revolution, the people of the western countries probably suffered from death rates as high as or higher than the average regional rates now observed in Asia and Africa. Expectation of life at birth at the beginning of the nineteenth century was somewhat less than 40 years, even in the countries where conditions of life were most favourable. Annual death rates fluctuated widely under the impact of recurrent epidemics, famines and other catastrophes. Since that time, stabilization and general reduction of death rates have brought the expectation of life up to more than 70 years in the most advanced countries of Europe, northern America and Oceania. Greatest progress has been made in reducing the mortality of children and young adults; rates for these age groups have been cut to one-tenth of their former levels or less. Proportionately smaller reductions have been achieved in the mortality rates for persons past middle age, and also for infants in the first weeks of life.

Since the end of the Second World War, it has become increasingly evident that certain public health measures (insect control, excreta disposal, pure water supply) can be very effective in lowering mortality rates even in countries at a relatively low level of economic development and industrialization. A study comparing recent mortality trends in under-developed areas with historical trends in the West has concluded that "the mortality experience of the western nations provides little precedent for the changes taking place in a growing number of the areas usually classified as 'under-developed'." Not only were "the western nations... at a relatively advanced industrial stage before their mortality declines became rapid", but also recent trends among the under-developed areas "approach or exceed the most rapid ever encountered among the nations with lowest mortality today."[18]

Now that many countries in a very early stage of industrialization have crude death rates the same or even lower than those of highly industrialized countries and an expectation of life exceeding 60 years in some cases, the question arises as to how much lower mortality rates in the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa can be expected to fall without the prior achievement in these parts of the world of levels of income and education on a par with those of the economically developed nations at present. In most of the Asian, African and Latin American countries where death rates have fallen so low, illiteracy has not yet been eradicated. Per capita income lags behind — in most cases far behind — that of northern and western Europe, not to mention northern America and Oceania.

Fertility

The present situation

Fertility is about twice as high, on the average, in the developing as in the developed parts of the world. Approximate crude birth rates for major regions of the world for the years 1955-60,[19] as shown together with the death rates in table 3, bring out a decided contrast between

16 "Demographic Factors related to Social and Economic Development in Africa", *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, vol. II, No. 2, June 1962.

17 "The Situation and Recent Trends of Mortality in the World", *Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 6*, Sales No. 62.XIII.2.

18 George J. Stolnitz, "Comparison between Some Recent Mortality Trends in Under-developed Areas and Historical Trends in the West", from *Trends and Differentials in Mortality*, New York, Milbank Memorial Fund, 1956.

19 The reservations noted above with regard to the estimates of regional crude death rates apply also to the birth rate estimates. The statistics are often inadequate, particularly in the regions where fertility is highest. The crude birth rate is also affected to some extent by the age structure of the population and, therefore, is not a perfect measure of the level of fertility. The crude birth rate corresponding to a given set of age-specific fertility rates will vary with the proportion of the total population in the reproductive ages, especially with the proportion in the most fertile ages.

However, there is no such systematic tendency, as in the case of mortality, for the crude birth rate either to overstate or to understate the difference in fertility between the economically more advanced and less advanced countries. The proportion of the total population in the child-bearing ages is influenced more by changing levels of fertility than by the actual level of fertility that

the fertility levels of the economically advanced regions and the economically less developed regions similar to that which was observed in the preceding section with reference to mortality. No economically advanced region has a crude birth rate higher than 25 per 1,000, which is the average rate in the Soviet Union and in northern America. No under-developed region as a whole has an estimated birth rate lower than the 40 per 1,000 of east Asia. Moreover, even at the level of individual countries, the sharp difference between developed and less developed countries persists in the case of fertility (unlike mortality); intermediate fertility prevails only in a few geographically scattered countries. With few exceptions, the estimated or recorded birth rates of countries in Africa, Asia and Central and South America exceed 35 per 1,000 population and gross reproduction [20] rates exceed 2.0.

Among the less developed regions as a group, the variation in estimated birth rates, from 40 per 1,000 in east Asia to 48 in tropical and southern Africa, is perhaps less pronounced than in the case or mortality. In view of the approximate character of the data, the relatively small differences in estimated birth rates for Latin America, Asia and Africa are not necessarily significant. Among the economically advanced regions, the range of variation in the birth rates from 18 to 25 is much greater than in the death rates, which are closely bunched together between 8 and 11 per 1,000. In Europe (excluding the Soviet Union) regional birth rates varying from 18 for northern and western Europe to 21 per 1,000 for southern Europe are markedly lower than the 24 or 25 per 1,000 estimated for Oceania, the Soviet Union and northern America.

Within each region the component countries are more homogeneous in the birth rates of the component countries than in their death rates. Although in the regions of high fertility, for example, there are decidedly different levels of fertility, the range of variation rarely extends below 35 per 1,000. Very few countries of either low or intermediate fertility are found in these regions. The most conspicuous case, as shown in table 4, is that of Japan, its birth rate of 16.8 per 1,000 in 1961 being less than half the estimated average for Asia, and its gross reproduction rate being close to 1.0; if maintained over a period of years, this level of the gross reproduction rate would imply a long-term stability of Japan's population. The highest birth rate among the Asian countries listed in the table is that of Thailand, estimated at 48.9 for 1955, but the rates are probably even higher in some countries of Asia that are not included in the table. The birth rate of China (mainland), reported at 34 per 1,000, is uncertain in view of the apparent lack of a sufficient statistical basis for exact measures of the vital rates in that country.

Data on fertility in Africa are too inexact for comparisons among countries to be made with any degree of assurance.[21] Two countries with supposedly accurate registration statistics, Mauritius and Réunion, report birth rates of 40 and 44 respectively, but the populations of these countries are scarcely typical of the vast majority of African populations of the continent. New data [22] from censuses and sample surveys, which have become available only in recent years, permit the calculation of estimated birth rate levels for most of the countries of Africa. While these estimates are not precise, they suggest that in north Africa and in south and east Africa the average birth rate may be about 45-46 per 1,000, while in west Africa it appears to be in the low 50s. Estimates for individual countries within the west African region cover a considerable range. Fertility levels in Cameroun, Central African Republic and Gabon, which are situated in the equatorial rain forest region, appear to be only moderate in level, while much higher estimates are shown for the countries to the northern part of the region, including Ghana, Nigeria and those countries which were formerly part of French West Africa. The estimates for west Africa are derived largely from sample survey reports on births having occurred during the year preceding the survey, and some evidence has been presented to suggest that this method leads to an overstatement of the birth rate in Africa.[23] Efforts to evaluate and adjust the survey reports on births during the past year in the light of other available data, however, have not resulted in any significant lowering of the reported birth rates for most of the countries of west Africa.

In middle America, birth rates are noticeably lower in the Caribbean (Puerto Rido at 31.0 and Jamaica at 42.7) and in Mexico (45) than in Central America, where recor-

prevails. The high fertility generally characteristic of the less economically advanced countries leads to a larger proportion of the population in the younger ages, including the younger reproductive ages, and to a smaller proportion in the older ages, including the older reproductive ages. The net effect on the proportion of the population in the entire reproductive age span may be in either direction and usually is not very great.

The low level of fertility typical of the economically developed countries represents historical declines from higher pre-industrial levels. Since declining fertility, while it continues, results in proportionately fewer children and proportionately more persons in the adult ages, the advanced countries, provided that their fertility was still declining, would consistently have relatively more persons in the reproductive ages than the under-developed countries. However, as will be observed below, the rise of fertility in northern and western Europe and especially in northern America and Oceania since the 1930's has largely obliterated this temporary situation.

20 The "gross reproduction rate" is a fertility index representing the number of female children born to the average woman who survives through the reproductive ages and reproduces in accordance with current age-specific fertility rates. It is similar to the life expectancy at birth as an index of mortality in that it is independent of variations in the age structure of the population. Likewise, the data necessary for its computation are not available for long-range trends in many countries and are not available at all for most countries which still do not have very complete civil registration systems.

21 The discussion in this paragraph relates to the indigenous population. The fertility of the European population is generally much lower. Since, however, the European population constitutes only a very small percentage of the total population (except in the Republic of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia), its lower fertility does not affect total fertility to any significant extent.

22 The new data summarized in this paragraph have been obtained from "Demographic Factors related to Social and Economic Development in Africa", *Economic Bulletin for Africa*, Vol. II, No. 2, June 1962, and from the fertility study to be published in *Population Bulletin of the United Nations, No. 7*, under the title "The Situation and Recent Trends of Fertility in the World".

23 Frank Lorimer, "Analysis of African Demographic Data as an Aid for Economic and Social Planning", Economic Commission for Africa Seminar on Population Problems in Africa, 29 October-10 November 1961, Cairo, United Arab Republic, E/CN/ASPP/L.6-E/CN.9/CONF.3/L.6, 10 August 1962.

ded rates are bunched around 50. Within South America lower crude birth rates are found in the temperate than in the tropical parts.

For countries in northern and western Europe, the range extends from Sweden's 14 to the Netherlands' 21. In central Europe, Poland has the highest birth rate, almost 21 per 1,000, and Hungary with only 14 has the lowest. In southern Europe, the birth rate is highest in Portugal with almost 24 and lowest in Romania, where it is 17.5 per 1,000. In Oceania, New Zealand's birth rate of 27 per 1,000 is higher than Australia's 23, while in northern America the Canadian birth rate of 26 exceeds the 23 of the United States.

Factors associated with levels of fertility in under-developed countries

As stated by the Secretary-General in a recent report,[24] the idea that the vast majority of inhabitants of the developing countries exercise little control over their fertility and that they procreate at rates near the limit of their physiological capacity is found in much of the current literature on population problems of such countries. Yet the wide differences of fertility levels among developing countries suggest that this idea is not realistic. It is true that birth rates and gross reproduction rates may be influenced greatly by factors affecting biological capacity to produce living offspring, including the general state of health and nutrition and the prevalence of diseases more or less closely linked with pathological sterility, sub-fecundity and pregnancy wastage, notably venereal diseases and debilitating illnesses. The role of such factors in bringing about differences of fertility levels among the developing countries cannot be fully assessed on the basis of existing data; this question needs to be examined by collecting more data on morbidity and nutrition an studying their relation to fertility in the developing countries. Present information, however, suggests that other factors play important parts in determining fertility levels in these countries.

If the differences in fertility were caused mainly by factors connected with the state of health of different populations, one would expect to find an inverse association between fertility levels and appropriate indicators of health status. Although comparison between fertility and mortality levels reveals no consistent association, mortality rates are much too crude an index for this purpose, and no conclusions can be drawn. The question of a possible association between fertility, health, and nutritional status is an important one, however, and deserves to be studied further.

The associations between fertility levels and various indices of the degree of social and economic development of countries were also studied. Again, among the countries with gross reproduction rates higher than 2.0, little consistent association could be found between the levels of these rates and indices of the degree of urbanization, average per caput income, the illiteracy rate of the populations, the circulation of newspapers and other media of mass communication.

The implication of these findings is that fertility levels in the developing countries are determined to a large extent by cultural traits that have not been greatly affected by the social and economic changes of the modern era. Among the cultural traits that may be important in this connexion are various customs directly affecting reproductive capacity and performance, including notably the prolonged lactation practised by many pre-industrial peoples in Africa and elsewhere, which tends to prolong the temporary sterility of mothers after child-birth; also polygamy, the traditional prohibition of widows' remarriage in Hindu society, and the restrictions imposed by some societies on cohabitation of husbands and wives within certain intervals after termination of pregnancy, during periods of traditional fasting, during certain phases of the moon, etc. But possibly more important in their influence on fertility are more fundamental characteristics of culture which affect the values attached to family life and children, the spirit of thrift, prudence, and self-discipline, and the disposition to attempt control of one's own destiny. Differences in such characteristics may be reflected in behaviour patterns that are relatively restrictive or liberal as far as procreation is concerned.

The means of restraining fertility that have been widely adopted in the West — delayed marriage, and, in modern times, the use of contraceptives — are known to have little currency in the developing countries generally at present. Other means, however, have long been known and practised widely in different parts of the world. In the present state of knowledge, it is not clear to what extent the conditions of "natural fertility" prevail in the developing countries generally, i.e., to what extent behaviour relating to birth of children is independent of considerations of the consequences for welfare of the family or of the number of children already born and the number desired. Adequate understanding of the determinants of fertility requires research on the relevant attitudes, values and patterns of behaviour in each society. Hardly more than a beginning of research in this field has yet been made in the economically less developed regions of the world.

Trends

The average crude death rate for the world in 1937 has been estimated by the United Nations at 26 per 1,000 and the 1937 world birth rate between 34 and 38 per 1,000.[25] A comparison of these estimates with the 1956-60 rates of table 3 shows the following picture:

	1937	*1956-60*
Crude birth rate	34-38	36
Crude death rate	26	18
Rate of natural increase	8-12	18

It appears that the world average birth rate remained practically unchanged and that the jump in the rate of natural increase from about 10 per 1,000 to 18 per 1,000

24 United Nations, "The World Demographic Situation with Special Reference to Fertility" (document E/CN.9/167), paras. 22-26.

25 *World Population Trends, 1920-1947*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 49.XIII.3.

in two decades has been exclusively the consequence of declining mortality, the world crude death rate having dropped from about 26 to 18 per 1,000.

For the first countries to develop economically — mainly those of northern and western Europe, northern America and Oceania — the fertility level of the 1930's does not serve as an altogether suitable point of comparison with the present. In the 1930's, the culmination of the secular trend of declining fertility was reinforced by the cyclical effect of postponed births and deferred marriages of the depression years, with the result that the secular trend overshot its mark, so to speak. In these countries the crude birth rate is now generally higher than in the 1930's and during the post-war baby boom it was considerably higher.

Table 6 presents average crude birth rates for the principal industrialized countries in 1925-29, 1935-39 and 1955-59 and, in addition, the average gross reproduction rate for 1955-59. An interesting feature to be observed in this table is the tendency for birth rates in Europe since the 1920's to converge towards the level now prevailing in northern and western Europe (about 18 per 1,000), which is substantially lower than the 25 per 1,000 found in the Soviet Union, northern America and Oceania. In the late 1920's birth rates were still very high in southern Europe (30 per 1,000 on the average), with central Europe moderately high at 23 and northern and western Europe lowest at 19. As the rates subsequently declined most sharply in the European countries where they had been highest, the range of variation had shrunk by 1955-59 to the point where southern Europe, although still highest with a rate of 21 per 1,000, was not much above the level of 18 reported for northern and western Europe. Even this small remaining difference is exaggerated by the failure of the crude birth rate to take into account differences in the age structure of the population. The countries where the fertility decline is more recent have a larger proportion of population in the younger reproductive ages. The gross reproduction rate at 1.3 is identical for all three regions of Europe. The interregional differences in crude death rates that still remain in Europe relate essentially to differences in age structure, which trace their origin back to a time when there existed genuine fertility differences.[26]

Also shown in table 6 is the post-war recovery on the part of the countries which had low fertility before the 1930's and even lower fertility during the depression years. Of 13 countries in Europe where the birth rate was below 25 per 1,000 in 1925-29, all but one (Germany) experienced a decline in the birth rate between 1925-29 and 1935-39. The exception of Germany, where the average birth rate fell from 19.1 in 1925-29 to 16.3 in 1930-34 and then rose again to 19.4 in 1935-39, may have been the result of the policy of the Nazi régime. In most of these countries, the birth rate rose to a peak shortly after the second World War, from which it subsided to some extent in more recent years, but without falling as low as it had been during the 1930's. Exceptions were Denmark and Finland, where the 1955-59 birth rate was below the 1935-39 average, and Sweden, where it was at the same level in 1955-59 as in 1935-39. The rates of the remaining ten countries were somewhat higher in 1955-59 than in 1935-39 (or than in 1930-34 in the case of Germany).

On the other hand, of the nine European countries (all in central and southern Europe) with 1925-29 birth rates higher than 25, all except Poland recorded successively lower rates in 1935-39 and lower yet in 1955-59. The case of Japan is similar, with declining fertility from 1925-29 to 1935-39 and again from 1935-39 to 1955-59, but Japan is unique for the magnitude of the decrease in the rate from 34.1 in 1925-29 to 18.2 in 1955-59.

Very marked is the divergence of the recovery pattern in Europe as compared with northern America and Oceania. The post-war fertility recovery in Europe was, after all, very moderate. Even though crude birth rates in the late 1950's were higher than in the late 1930's, only in Ireland had they risen so much as to exceed the 1925-29 level. By way of contrast and perhaps because of their cultural history, lower population density, and less population pressure, birth rates in Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand in 1955-59 exceeded the 1925-29 levels, generally by a substantial margin.

For very few of the less industrialized countries are trustworthy date available for the years covered by table 6; where they are available, there appears to have been little change in fertility, both during the last decade and over the longer time-span covered by the table.[27] Among the less industrialized countries, only a handful report decreasing birth rates. As a matter of fact, there was a general tendency of increase in registered rates in the less industrialized countries after the Second World War. A recent analysis of demographic trends in Latin America, however, casts doubt on any "significant rise in birth rates of the region" and suggests that the increases indicated may be merely a reflection of improving registration.[28] In some instances, however, particularly in the Caribbean area, the rise of the recorded rates may represent a genuine increase of fertility. Among independent republics in Latin America, "birth rates fell sharply around 1930 in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a lesser extent or more recently in Chile, Cuba and southern Brazil."[29] Of special interest is Puerto Rico, where a fast pace of economic development was accom-

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26 Even as far back as 1925-29, the intermediate position of central Europe in regard to fertility appears to have been somewhat misleading. The middle-range crude birth rate of 23 is derived by averaging together the high birth rates of east central European countries (Poland, Hungary and the eastern part of Czechoslovakia) and the low birth rates of west central Europe. From a demographic point of view the use of only two regions, northern and western Europe and southern and eastern Europe, would seem more appropriate for classifying European demographic data of the late 1920's.

27 Where differences in fertility levels exist among developing countries, it would appear that they are not generally the result of recent developments, but are of long standing, and that they have persisted in spite of recent changes in other features of the demographic, social and economic conditions of the countries concerned. It should be noted, however, that differences in levels of fertility among under-developed countries have not received enough attention in demographic studies.

28 "The Demographic Situation in Latin America", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. VI, No. 2, October 1961, p. 13.

29 *Ibid.*

Table 6

AVERAGE CRUDE BIRTH RATES AT SELECTED DATES AND AVERAGE GROSS REPRODUCTION RATES FOR 1955-59 FOR SELECTED [a] COUNTRIES

	Crude birth rate (live births per 1,000 population)			Gross reproduction rate
	1925-29	1935-39	1955-59	1955-59
NORTH AMERICA				
Canada	24.5	20.4	27.9	1.9
United States [b]	20.1	17.2	24.6	1.8
ASIA				
Japan	34.1	29.3	18.2	1.1
EUROPE				
Northern and Western Europe	*18.6*	*15.9*	*17.6*	*1.3*
Belgium	18.9	15.5	17.0	1.2
Denmark	19.8	17.9	16.8	1.2
Finland	22.8	20.2	19.9	1.4
France	18.5	15.1	18.4	1.3
Ireland	20.3	19.4	21.1	1.7
Netherlands	23.4	20.3	21.2	1.5
Norway	18.5	15.0	18.1	1.4
Sweden	16.3	14.5	14.5	1.1
United Kingdom	17.6	15.3	16.4	1.2
Central Europe	*23.2*	*20.1*	*19.0*	*1.3*
Austria	18.4	14.7	16.8	1.2
Czechoslovakia	22.9	17.1	18.5	1.3
Germany [c]	19.1	19.4	16.4	1.1
Hungary	26.6	20.1	17.8	1.2
Poland	32.9	25.4 [d]	27.1	1.7
Switzerland	17.8	15.4	17.5	1.2
Southern Europe	*30.3*	*24.9*	*20.7*	*1.3*
Bulgaria	34.2	24.1	18.7	1.1
Greece	29.7	26.5	19.3	1.1
Italy	27.2	23.2	18.1	1.1
Portugal	31.7	27.1	23.6	1.5
Romania	25.4	30.2	22.9	1.3
Spain	28.7	21.9	21.2	1.3
Yugoslavia	33.9	27.9	24.6	1.4
OCEANIA				
Australia	21.6	17.2	22.6	1.6
New Zealand [e]	20.2	17.4	24.9	1.9

SOURCE: Data prepared for the fertility study to be published in *Population Bulletin of the United Nations No.* 7, under the title "The Situation and Recent Trends of Fertility in the World".

[a] The Soviet Union is not included in this table beacuse data have not been published for the year concerned. The 1960 *USSR Statistical Yearbook* gives a crude birth rate of 47.0 for 1913 and 31.3 for 1940 with no data for the intervening years.

[b] For 1925-29, birth registration states only, which included 95 per cent of total population in 1932. For 1935-39, excluding Alaska.

[c] For 1925-29 and 1935-39, territory of 1937; for 1955-59, Eastern Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, East Berlin, West Berlin.

[d] For 1935-38.

[e] European population only.

NOTE ON COMPARABILITY: In the case of almost half the twenty-seven countries listed in table 6, the average crude birth rates for the three different time periods are not completely comparable. The nature of the non-comparability is specified in the above footnotes for the United States of America and for Germany. Details concerning the remaining countries may be obtained from the *Demographic Yearbook*.

panied by a drop in the crude birth rate from 39 in 1950 to 31.5 in 1960.[30]

Results of a fertility study currently in process at the United Nations suggest that post-war increases of recorded

[30] However, a substantial part of the decline is the result of the heavy and selective out-migration which lowered the number of married women in the ages 15 to 29 and with spouse present by 12 per cent between 1950 and 1960 while the total population was increasing 6 per cent. Depending on the relative completeness of birth registration in 1950 and 1960 (a matter which is still under investigation), no more than one-third and perhaps only one-quarter of the decline in the crude birth rate represents lower age-specific rates among married women with spouse present.

birth rates in a number of Asian countries were probably genuine, since they were accompanied by higher marriage rates. However, these increases were in most cases only temporary; as a rule, the birth rate subsequently declined. There are several Asian countries (in addition to Japan, already mentioned) where the birth rates have recently fallen below pre-war levels, especially Israel (Jewish population), Cyprus and Singapore. In the last few years, evidence of some decline of fertility has also appeared in China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya and particularly in the Ryukyu Islands.

The prospect for the future

The pre-industrial fertility history of the regions now characterized by low crude birth rates, being largely also a pre-statistical history, is clouded with obscurity. During most of the nineteenth century, birth rates between 30 and 34 per 1,000, somewhat lower than the 40 to 45 commonly found in today's countries of high fertility, apparently prevailed in most countries of northern and western Europe. In Germany and especially in Finland, however, rates were higher, whereas in France they were lower. Birth rates close to or above 40 were typical of eastern Europe at that time, while in the United States the birth rate is estimated to have attained a level of about 55 in 1800.

While the initial reaction of birth and death rates to the changes of the very early stages of the Industrial Revolution is unclear, scattered evidence has been unearthed indicating in some instances somewhat higher fertility accompanying the early stages and in other instances fertility fluctuating in response to changing economic conditions. The eventual changeover from high fertility to the present low levels is generally thought to have been an eventual consequence of the social, economic and cultural changes which were associated in the west with the Industrial Revolution. Of great demographic significance is the fact that, in most cases, the decline in fertility followed *after* a considerable decline of mortality. Decidedly falling death rate were being reported in some European countries by the middle of the nineteenth century or slightly earlier, yet the birth rates in northern and western European countries did not, as a rule, begin to fall until the last quarter of the century. Decreases of birth rates also followed within varying lengths of time after decreases of death rates in northern America and Oceania and more recently in southern and eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan.

This sequence of declining mortality and fertility, known as the "demographic transition", is commonly cited as historical precedent for an expectation that the present decline of mortality in less developed countries will be followed sooner or later by a decline of fertility as they progress in economic and social development. If it is granted that the precedent is relevant, questions arise as to the degree of social and economic development that must be reached before fertility would decline and how rapidly and how far the decline would go. Research on these questions has been directed towards identifying causal factors in the western fertility decline and assessing the probable strength of these factors in developing countries where fertility is now high. Although such research has not yet led to any very definite conclusions, it is pertinent to mention some considerations and hypotheses that have been brought forth.

(*a*) One hypothesis is that declining mortality was an important cause of the subsequent decline of fertility in the West. Since mortality was reduced principally in the younger age groups, the former balance between births and surviving children was upset. Whereas ten live births, for example, might previously have resulted in only five or six persons surviving young childhood, now eight or nine would survive. To the extent that such an increase in family size was not desired, a motive was created for parents to limit births. If this were a primary cause of fertility decline, one would expect that the extraordinary rapid declines of mortality observed recently in less developed countries might soon be followed by substantial decreases in their birth rates. However, there is little factual basis for assessing the importance of this factor in the past declines of fertility in countries where it is now low, or its potential future importance in other countries.

(*b*) Among other factors believed to have been important but equally difficult to evaluate objectively are the increasing material wants and rising aspirations for advancement in social and economic status (for oneself and/or one's children) stimulated by increasing real incomes and changes in traditional ways of life, in the course of industrialization and urbanization. A large number of children is considered a handicap in efforts to satisfy such new wants and aspirations — particulary with the shift from the rural familial system of production to the urban factory wage-earner system (along with legal restrictions on wage-earning employment of children, which further limit the possibility of their contributing to family income).

It is difficult to judge whether the motivation for limitation of births resulting from these factors will be stronger or weaker, in general, in newly developing countries with high fertility at present than it has been in the western countries. Perhaps such highly attractive products of modern industry as automobiles, mechanical refrigerators and television sets may have a stronger appeal to consumers than the products of nineteenth and early twentieth century industry had in western countries, and thus might generate stronger motivation for family limitation. The desire for "modernization" may also be more articulate. On the other hand, the countervailing strength of motives for having many children is likely to vary with the traits of national culture and existing social institutions.

(*c*) The importance of rising levels of popular education and increasing employment of women outside the home, as factors conducive to declining fertility, can be estimated more easily by statistical analyses. Comparative fertility indices for urban and rural areas, population groups classified by educational level, and economically active and inactive women have demonstrated the importance of these factors in the decline of fertility in the West, and similar indices have been obtained for some of the developing countries. The data of the relationship between fertility and education, showing that the well-educated classes generally have fewer children than the illiterates and persons with little education, are particularly significant in view of the strong emphasis on educa-

tion in the development plans of many developing countries at present. The data which have been obtained suggest, however, that the average educational level of the people in most of these countries would have to be raised very considerably to have a great effect on their birth rates (assuming other factors to be equal) and such an achievement in educational development cannot be made very quickly.

When and if the people of the economically developing countries desire to limit births, they will have at their disposal more convenient and more efficient techniques than were known in the West a century ago. Moreover, the Governments of some of these countries are actively attempting to encourage family planning and to educate the people in family planning methods. These are factors which may tend to speed the decline of fertility in these countries. On the other hand, it is believed by many that only fundamental changes in economic and social circumstances can have a great effect on the attitudes and behaviour of the people in this respect, and that premature governmental efforts to promote family planning are at best futile. This belief will be tested by experience during the years ahead in countries such as India and Pakistan, where the Governments have undertaken programmes in favour of family planning.

Whether or not moderation of fertility through economic and social conditions is considered to be the way to solve population problems of developing countries, the question must be faced in all of these countries as to whether their economic production and provisions for education and other social requisites can be expanded rapidly enough to outpace the accelerating growth of population which results from the declines of mortality while fertility remains high. In some respects, the obstacles in the way of such a solution for today's developing countries appear to be greater than those which the industrializing countries of the West faced in the past. For one thing, they do not have the easy outlets for emigration which were open in America and elsewhere overseas to the European peoples. Also, they have to vie with powerful, established competitors in the world markets for industrial products. On the other hand, they have the advantage of being able to draw on the experience and matured technology of the nations which preceded them in industrialization, and they have the benefit of arrangements for international co-operation and assistance on an increasing scale.

An effort is being made in these developing countries to telescope into a short period of time an economic and social evolution that took over a century in the countries where it first started. One aspect of this process, the acceleration of the transition from high to low mortality, was noted above. A similar tendency of acceleration in the decline of fertility was observed during the interval between the two world wars in southern and eastern Europe.[31] Since the Second World War, still more rapid declines of fertility have occurred in a few countries, including Japan, the Ryukyu Islands and Puerto Rico. These examples suggest the possibility that, once the birth rate begins to fall, it may fall faster than it did in the past in Europe and countries of European settlement overseas; but it is hazardous to guess what the rate of fall may be, or where it will start if it does start.

Future population growth

Long-range population projections are fraught with uncertainties. Experience in this field has, generally speaking, been characterized more by failure than by success. Before the 1930's, future growth of population in the industrialized countries was often overestimated because not enough allowance was made for the effects of declining fertility. After this experience, many projections made during the 1930's and 1940's erred on the opposite side, because they were unduly influenced by the very low fertility levels of the 1930's. The projections made at that time indicated stationary or declining population for various industrial countries within the next generation or so. However, history reversed its course and these projections were invalidated by the higher fertility of post-war society in the West. The difficulties have been compounded by the unexpected rapidity of mortality declines and, therefore, of population growth, in the economically less developed parts of the world since the Second World War. Population projections made during the post-war period, especially for the less developed countries, have generally been found to be too low.

A case in point is the set of United Nations projections published[32] in 1958 — prior to the 1960 and 1961 population censures. These consisted of "high", "medium" and "low" projections up to the year 2000 for the world, regions, and each country. By 1960, however, the "high" projection of 2,920 million for the world as a whole for that year was already 2.5 per cent lower than the estimated actual population of 2,995 million.

The "high" projection was considerably too low for South-Central Asia, South-East Asia, East Asia (except Japan), the Pacific Islands and each region in Africa. On the other hand, this projection exceeded the actual 1960 population for temperate South America, South-West Asia and Japan. The differences for the other regions were not large in percentage terms.

What caused the error of the "high" projection in the regions where it was too low? The unexpectedly rapid decline of mortality in Africa, much of Asia, and the Pacific Islands is a partial but not complete explanation. The error was also due partly to underestimation of the population in the starting period, about 1950. In some African and Asia countries where no censuses had as yet been taken, or where earlier census enumeration had been defective, the results of the 1960 and 1961 censuses showed the population to have been previously underestimated.

For the year 2000, the "high" projection made in 1958 indicates a world population total just short of 7,000 million — an increase of 130 per cent over the estimated 1960 figure. It is evidently possible, in view of recent

[31] *The Determinants and Consequences of Population Trends* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 53.XIII.3), p. 72.

[32] *The Future Growth of World Population*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.XIII.2. Two more recent United Nations publications on projections of populations of individual countries of South-East Asia and the Far East are: *The Population of South-East Asia (including Ceylon and China: Taiwan) 1950-1980*, Sales No.: 59.XIII.2; *The Population of Asia and the Far East, 1950-1980*, Sales No.: 59.XIII.3.

experience, that this projection for the year 2000 might turn out to be too low, if mortality continues to decline more rapidly than was assumed for the projection (and possibly also if the population was still being underestimated as of 1960 for some areas). Such an eventuality is by no means certain, however. The very rapid recent decline of mortality in less developed countries may prove to be only a passing phase of the long-range trend, and even if it continues, its effect may be offset by that of declines in fertility exceeding those assumed for the "high" projections during the remainder of the twentieth century. Some of the factors which might bring about relatively rapid declines of fertility during the next few decades in areas where fertility is now high were mentioned above.

For a shorter-range future prospect, the differences between the projected and actual numbers for 1960 have more definite implications. It now appears easily possible that the population in 1970 may exceed the "high" projection for the world as a whole, for Africa and for the greater part of Asia.

The increases in the world total population indicated by the "high" projection were 17 per cent between 1950 and 1960 and 20 per cent between 1960 and 1970, whereas the actual increase between 1950 and 1960 is now estimated at 19 per cent. If the projected increase of 20 per cent for the decade of the 1960's should be realized, from the estimated 1960 total of 2,995 million, the population in 1970 would rise to approximately 3,600 million instead of the 3,500 million shown by the "high" projection. A still higher estimate for 1970 would, of course, be obtained if the rate of growth during the 1960's should again exceed the rate of the "high" projection, as it did during the 1950's. This would be the result if mortality should continue to fall faster than expected without an equal decline of fertility in the world as a whole between 1960 and 1970.

Table 7 shows, for each region, the estimated percentage increase of population between 1950 and 1960, and the increases corresponding to the "high" projection, made in 1958, for 1950-1960 and 1960-1970. For northern America and Oceania, it was assumed for the projection that the immigration and the high fertility observed in the early post-war years were temporary and would gradually disappear, so that by 1975 the gross reproduction rates for these regions would be reduced to 1.5 and migration would be zero. In fact, immigration has continued to be substantial and fertility has actually increased somewhat instead of falling. How fertility and migration will behave during the 1960's is, of course, uncertain. Should they remain at the present levels, the population of Northern America and Oceania would grow during 1960-70 by larger percentages than indicated by the "high" projection in table 7.

The "high" projection for northern and western Europe assumed that the rate of population growth would increase gradually until 1975 from the moderately low level that prevailed during the late 1940's and early 1950's, when the effect of emigration outweighed the relatively high post-war fertility. In actual fact, the net effect of changes in the rate of emigration, fertility and mortality in that region during 1955-60 was to produce an immediate change-over to the higher rate of growth that was not expected to be reached until 1975. As a consequence, the actual rate of growth exceeded the projected rate for 1955-1960. If these tendencies should continue, the rate of population growth in northern and western Europe during the 1960's would again exceed the rate of the "high" projection.

Table 7

INCREASE OF POPULATION ACCORDING TO THE "HIGH" PROJECTION, 1950-60 AND 1960-70, ESTIMATED ACTUAL INCREASE, 1950-1960, FOR THE WORLD BY REGIONS

Region	*Estimated population increase, 1950-60 (per cent)*	*Increase according to the "high" projection (per cent)*	
		1950-60	*1960-70*
WORLD TOTAL	*19*	*17*	*20*
Africa	*23*	*19*	*24*
America	*23*	*22*	*22*
Northern America	19	17	14
Middle America	29	29	31
South America	26	25	28
ASIA	*21*	*17*	*22*
South-West Asia	28	28	27
South-Central Asia	18	16	22
South-East Asia	22	19	23
East Asia	22	17	21
Europe	*8*	*8*	*8*
Northern and western Europe	7	5	6
Central Europe	9	9	8
Southern Europe	9	9	10
Oceania	*27*	*23*	*19*
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	*18*	*19*	*18*

SOURCE: 1950-60 estimated increase from table 1 above; 1950-60 and 1960-70 projected increases calculated from data of table I-A of *Future Growth of World Population*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.XIII.2.

For South-Central Asia, South-East Asia, East Asia (without Japan) and the Pacific Islands, the excess of the estimated actual 1960 population over the "high" projection was due, as already mentioned, partly to a mortality decline more rapid than anticipated, and partly to deficiencies in previous population estimates. If the unexpectedly rapid decline of mortality during the 1950's is not counter-balanced by a slower decline in the 1960's, and if the levels of fertility are not greatly reduced, population in these regions will increase between 1960 and 1970 by larger percentages than indicated by the "high" projections in table 7. The same considerations apply in lesser degree to the projected increase for Central America. In the case of the Caribbean region, an additional factor is the upward trend of the birth rates for some of the countries during the 1950's. It is difficult to foresee whether or not this trend will continue during the next decade.

In general, the prospects for population growth during the 1960's appear to be similar to the pattern of the 1950's: large increases in Africa, most of Asia, most of Latin America and possibly Oceania; more moderate growth in Northern America, temperate South America, and the Soviet Union; relatively slow growth in Europe and Japan. It bears repeating, however, that no certainty can be ascribed to predictions in this field.

Chapter III

HEALTH CONDITIONS

Introduction

During the decade which ended in 1960, the medical and biological sciences continued to provide new weapons to attack and to prevent disease, and some of those recently discovered were enlarged in range. There were major break-throughs in virology; unexpected potentialities were discovered in heart and vascular surgery; outstanding achievements were recorded in the field of chemotherapy. The decade also saw the launching of vast campaigns against malaria, yaws, smallpox and tuberculosis, and the reinforcement of efforts to reduce maternal and child mortality. Much of this achievement is reflected in the narratives and statistics in the individual country reviews of the Second World Health Situation Report for the period 1957-1960.[1]

Many of the most recent advances in medical technique, however, are as yet available only to the few. High costs, shortages in personnel and the limitations of the administrative machinery have determined the patchiness of their distribution.

In order to assess the present health situation, however, one must look beyond the contributions of these newer advances, and recognize the continuing effect of the discoveries of the previous decade and of their much wider deployment. One must also align with them the benefits that have accrued from social, educational and economic improvement. Of the various determinants of health, the social and economic factors, though long recognized, have been amongst the last to be given due weight.

The general state of health

The health of the world was better in 1960 than it had been in 1950. While precise comprehensive information is lacking for a large proportion of mankind and no single index of the level of health has been devised for even the statistically most advanced countries, the broad trend in world health is unmistakable.

The crude annual death rate is the most widely available indicator of the level of health, although its usefulness is restricted, for purposes of international comparison, by differences in the age-sex structure of populations. The discussion in chapter II of the striking downward trend of mortality in the very great majority of economically under-developed countries is focused on the relation of declining mortality to population growth, but it also serves to show the great advances made in disease prevention and cure.

Together with the rude death rate, the infant mortality rate (deaths under one year of age per 1,000 live births) is commonly used as another indicator of the level of health, but it is not available with any degree of accuracy for many parts of the world. Nevertheless, the average infant mortality rate for ninety-four territories (including eleven in Africa, thirty-two in the Americas, twenty-nine in Europe and nineteen in the western Pacific) had declined from 65.4 in 1950 to 48.6 in 1959.[2] Generally speaking, a greater degree of improvement has been noted in the death rate between four weeks and twelve months, than in the rate for the first four weeks of life. The former rate is more susceptible to the effects of environmental improvement and of better infant care, and reflects the reduction in mortality from respiratory and bowel infections, in the eradication of which modern therapy has played so great a part. Reduced mortality in this age range is becoming more and more evident in the less developed countries. In countries which have reduced their infant mortality rate to between 20 and 24, the main target for further reduction lies in the first four weeks of life, and in the ante-natal period itself, where the causes of death which have to be dealt with tend to be less tractable.

In the *Compendium of Social Statistics*, three other indicators of trends in mortality are presented in tabular form. The first of these is the Proportional Mortality Ratio (table 12), a relatively recent addition to the list of indicators, which expresses the number of deaths at the age of fifty or over as a percentage of deaths of all ages. If everyone in a community were to survive to the age of fifty, the community's proportional mortality ratio would be 100. Examples may help to illustrate and define the differences in the experience of individual countries. The ratio for Austria in 1950-52 was 79.6, and by 1960 had risen to 85.9. Comparable rates for Canada over the same years were 71.8 and 76.7 respectively. But, in the case of Nicaragua, a rate of 21.8 in 1950-52 had only risen to 24.2 by 1960, whereas in Hong Kong the very low ratio of 18.9 which was the territory's experience in 1950-52 had improved to 41.8 by 1960. Broadly speaking, the nearer the ratio is to 100, the better the mortality record in early and middle life, which in its turn can be regarded as attributable to and reflecting a satisfactory standard of public health provision and achievement.

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[1] This World Health Organization publication, which is based in the main on information provided by Governments, has been extensively used in the preparation of this chapter. Other sources drawn upon include the *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.XVII.3), the Annual Reports of the Director-General of the World Health Organization for 1960 and 1961, and the *Bulletin* of the World Health Organization.

[2] World Heath Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957-1960, Official Records No. 122*, p. 9.

Another yardstick is the expectation of life at birth, which is discussed in chapter II.[3] Its calculation is mirequent and is usually based on censuses which may only take place at five- or ten-year intervals. However, when the statement of expectation is available and comparisons are made with earlier estimations, it can be one of the most vivid indicators of progress. It is perhaps of little interest to the inhabitants of the United Kingdom to be informed that, for a male child born there, the expectation of life at birth has increased over the decade 1951-60 from 66.8 to 68.1, while for a female the gain of years has been greater, the expectation having risen from 71.5 to 73.8. But for the Indian to know that, in 1950, the expectation of life of a child at birth was 32, and in 1960 was 42, and is likely to be 46 in 1965, is not only a promise of longer life, but a symbol of the significant change which has occurred in the morbidity and mortality experience of the sub-continent.

Classification of deaths by cause and identification of deaths caused by the infectious and parasitic diseases provide direct indications of the health situation in countries possessing appropriate statistics. Since most infectious and parasitic diseases are preventable, a high death rate from both of these causes usually signifies an unsatisfactory standard of living. The proportion of deaths from these diseases among deaths from all causes gives a good indication of the level of health for a particular locality or population group. This index is probably more reliable for periods of a decade or longer, because it can be disturbed in the short run by such unexpected events as a major influenza epidemic. Even with this reservation, it is possible to note that progress has been made during the past ten years, particularly in the less developed areas. For the Netherlands, where the trend is typical of many European countries, the percentage of deaths from infective and parasitic diseases among deaths from all causes was 1.0 per cent in 1960 as against 3.6 per cent in 1950-52. Countries with high indices which nevertheless registered improvement over the decade were: Guatemala, where the percentage fell from 37.1 per cent to 24.3 per cent; Singapore, with comparative figures of 13.5 per cent and 8.8 per cent; and Brazil, where in Rio de Janeiro the order of improvement was from 20.2 per cent to 12.6 per cent.

More significant, perhaps, than this comparison between general mortality and that caused by the infectious and parasitic diseases is the death rate for children between the ages of one to four.[4] This rate, which happily is almost universally declining, may well express the diminishing effect of the toll which the communicable diseases were wont to take of child life. It reflects the advantages of modern methods of treatment, the results of active public health immunization programmes and an improvement in the environmental and social milieu. In such countries as Australia, Canada, Denmark and the United Kingdom, the rate now ranges from 1.3 to 0.9 per 1,000 at risk in this age group. But, in the countries of Latin America, rates of from 10 to 19 per 1,000 are not uncommon, and in certain areas of Africa they are even higher. These figures are a measure of the social and environmental differential, but it would be a mistake to discount the possibility and even the fact of notable improvement. In Mexico, a rate of 29.8 per 1,000 at risk in 1950-52 had fallen to 19.0 in 1957-59, while in Ceylon the reduction was from 24.4 to 12.4.

The facts of mortality are the record of disease and accident in curtailing human life. They enable us to discern trends and movements, but they do not enable us to know the precise causes of death, or their respective share in the total mortality. This is only possible where there is an adequate system for the accurate recording and registration of deaths. Even where the cause has been clearly determined — and the pathologist has confirmed the diagnosis of the physician — there still remains the difficulty of going beyond that diagnosis and unravelling the other factors which have contributed to the final event. A death from pulmonary tuberculosis is an expression of the pathogenic activity of the tubercle bacillus, and of the failure of resistance in the human being who has succumbed. But in the background there are other causal factors, including heredity, environment, occupation, social maladjustment on the part of the individual and economic stress.

Prevalence, control and prevention of the major diseases

It is therefore necessary to look at certain main causes of mortality with greater care. Only by so doing is it possible to discern the interplay of the various etiological factors concerned, and to assess their comparative importance. It will be more helpful and illuminating if, in relation to a limited number of those diseases, an analysis is made both of the mortality they cause and the statistics of their incidence in the community as a whole. In doing so, it may be possible to learn something of the trends which are becoming evident with regard to these diseases and of the reasons for the changes which have assumed the dimensions and direction of a trend. It may also be possible to note the programmes of public health activities which the community has formulated to deal with the situation.

The major epidemic diseases

A concerted effort has been made by Governments to ensure maximum security against the spread of what are known as the "pestilential diseases" (smallpox, plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus and relapsing fever). The machinery used, which had its organized beginnings over a century ago, is that of the International Sanitary Regulations (WHO Regulations No. 2 and amendments), to which more than 180 States, Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories now subscribe and agree to operate. In the *Report on the World Social Situation* published in 1957,[5] it was possible to say that, apart from smallpox, there had been no recent serious outbreaks of these diseases. That statement was still true in essence with respect

[3] See *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963*, table 11.

[4] *Ibid.*, table 14, for its movement in seventy-five countries.

[5] United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3.

to plague and yellow fever at the end of 1960. During 1961, there were outbreaks of yellow fever in Ethiopia and Peru.[6] There are, however, countries where plague still lingers amongst the indigenous wild rodents, notably in India, Central Africa, South America, Siberia and Mongolia. Residual insecticides have made it possible to reduce the incidence of plague amongst human beings to almost insignificant proportions.

PLAGUE: REPORTED CASES AND REGISTERED DEATHS, 1950-1959

	Cases	*Deaths*
1950	41,621	23,193
1951	15,025	18,444
1952	11,925	6,439
1953	7,323	2,252
1954	1,900	1,127
1955	1,312	545
1956	917	527
1957	681	322
1958	405	288
1959	294	68

[6] World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General* (1961), *Official Record No. 114*, p. 6.

While these reservoirs of infection persist in areas which often are only sparsely inhabited, there is still a small but potential risk to the human beings who live there. Moreover, travel may spread the disease to more populous areas. The trend of human plague morbidity and mortality over the decade is clear from the table opposite, which sets out such information as it has been possible to collect on a world-wide basis.

Yellow fever, like the plague, is also heavily reduced in incidence, and owes its perpetuation and occasional recrudescence to the continuing infection of monkeys. There are vast areas of South America and Africa where yellow fever persists as an enzootic phenomenon.

The position of cholera, smallpox and typhus is different. Table 15 in the health chapter of the *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963* gives the total numbers of officially recorded cases of these diseases by countries from 1950 to 1960. In the case of snallpox, it also attempts to indicate the actual type of the disease, since variola minor or alastrim has an almost trivial mortality as compared with variola major. The number of cases of smallpox throughout the world fell markedly between 1950 and 1960. The total for the former year was 335,208 and for the latter 59,478, a reduction of approximately 82 per cent, and this decline is obvious in all regions, as can be seen from the following table.

SMALLPOX INCIDENCE, 1950-1960

*Region**	*1950*	*1951*	*1952*	*1953*	*1954*	*1955*	*1956*	*1957*	*1958*	*1959**	*1960***
Africa	40,801	25,454	27,372	18,217	20,229	21,374	17,989	33,214	13,603	13,789	15,058
America	21,485	9,221	9,301	8,930	11,979	8,348	6,389	6,220	4,339	4,896	4,757
South-East Asia	245,628	363,541	89,597	41,884	50,264	46,349	51,411	83,475	174,004	49,763	36,757
Europe	279	420	344	96	124	163	18	150	27	25	54
Eastern Mediterranean	23,784	44,602	16,324	8,854	8,087	5,981	10,290	31,169	51,131	9,419	2,838
Western Pacific	3,231	46,684	5,419	6,759	4,825	1,412	789	218	56	68	14
TOTAL	335,208	489,922	148,357	84,740	95,508	83,627	86,886	154,446	243,160	77,960	59,478

* As defined by the World Health Organization.
** These figures are subject to further correction.

Smallpox, while appearing in occasional imported cases which modern methods of communication have tended to facilitate, is no longer endemic in Europe or North America. Foci of the disease still exist in Asia, Africa and South America and these, from time to time, become active and cause an interruption of the declining trend. Smallpox is one of the diseases whose eradication is feasible, and since 1958 the World Health Organisation[7] has sponsored and encouraged programmes directed to that end. Mass vaccination campaigns have become one of the features of public health activities in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Venezuela and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Considerable organization is necessary to ensure the success of such programmes. Vaccine must be stable under tropical conditions and WHO has therefore assisted in the production of freeze-dried vaccine in Asia and Africa. Teams of vaccinators must be trained, and effective education of the public must also be undertaken.

In the present century, cholera has appeared in epidemic form only in Asia, except for the epidemic that occurred in Egypt in 1947. Cholera has not been seen in the Western Hemisphere since 1911, nor in Europe since

[7] World Health Organization, Eleventh World Health Assembly, 1958, *Official Records No. 87*, pp. 41 and 508.

CHOLERA: REPORTED CASES AND REGISTERED DEATHS, 1950-1959

	Cases	*Deaths*
1950	211,943	130,481
1951	116,652	74,849
1952	123,287	79,740
1953	233,922	143,017
1954	36,470	31,948
1955	40,400	28,125
1956	66,581	43,491
1957	64,910	59,101
1958	95,811	62,556
1959	42,749	18,796
1960	32,827	12,806

1923. The facts of mortality and morbidity for the period 1950-1960, as far as they have been ascertained, are given in the table at the foot of page 25, and both show a marked decline.

India and Pakistan are the two most important endemic areas and, although the trends there have been favourable, the situation is still unstable. One disturbing feature of the past two years has been the increased incidence of another cholera-like disease, due to a special micro-organism, the El-Tor Vibrio, whose existence has been known for over sixty years.[8] This disease, which had been endemic but of limited incidence in a mild form in certain areas, such as the Celebes, has recently spread elsewhere in Indonesia and several other countries in the western Pacific, and has acquired increased virulence in the process. This rapidly emerging and entirely unexpected development is a reminder of man's ignorance of many biological processes of micro-organisms.

Several species of rickettsial organisms, normally conveyed from one host to another by lice, fleas, ticks and mites, cause various types of typhus fever. Of all the communicable diseases, these are probably the most easily controlled by modern insecticides, which have changed the whole epidemiological picture of classical louse-borne typhus. Because of their variety, world figures for the mortality and incidence of these infections are particularly difficult to obtain.

The three "pestilential" diseases under discussion — smallpox, cholera and typhus — have all experienced satisfactory morbidity and mortality trends during the past decade, which are probably due to a number of synergistic factors. Safe water supplies, improvements in environmental sanitation, stricter adherence to the principles of food hygiene, public-health vaccination programmes, availability of antibiotics and insecticides and rising standards of education have all played a part. Furthermore, the operation of the Quarantine Regulations has been responsible for confining these diseases to their endemic areas and for limiting if not preventing their spread elsewhere.

Far ahead of the pestilential diseases in the present-day ranking order of mortality come malaria and tuberculosis. The past decade has seen a notable advance in the means available to control these scourges, and in administrative efforts to deal with them.

Malaria

Whether or not it is true that malaria was in the past the disease which laid a creeping paralysis on the life of nations and civilizations, there is no reason why it should do so in the modern world. A combination of scientific discoveries, international co-operation and executive enthusiasm and vigour has made the eradication of malaria a feasible proposition.

For many years, the most that countries aimed at in their anti-malarial activities was to control or contain the disease within certain limits, and to reduce its seasonal incidence. Today the complete eradication of malaria is being recorded in an increasing number of countries. Even where that desirable final goal has not been reached, a measure of the achievement is to be seen in the number of lives saved and in the growing numbers of people now living under the cover of malaria eradication programmes.

Many of these programmes date only from 1957, though the idea of world-wide eradication was first promulgated by the Eighth World Health Assembly in 1955.[9] The programmes owe their inception to the appreciation of the power of the residual insecticides to bring about an interruption in the transmission of malaria, where previously the closed cycle of man and mosquito had served to preserve the life of the malarial parasite. With this knowledge WHO was able to launch its campaign for world-wide eradication of malaria.

In the early stages of the campaign, there was perhaps an incomplete appreciation of the administrative, educational and financial effort which would be required to ensure success. But, with increasing experience, it became clear that an anti-malarial campaign using residual insecticides was in effect an almost military operation, requiring careful planning and organization, and the sequential institution of a series of phases of attack, consolidation and maintenance which in the end would achieve eradication. In recent years, the use of residual insecticides has often been reinforced at the consolidation phase by chemotherapy, either with anti-malarial drugs in tablet form or by the addition of medicated salt to the diet. Under exceptional circumstances chemotherapy may be the sole method of attack.

Malaria, however, remains and will continue to remain for some time the "number one" problem of most countries in the tropical and sub-tropical belts of the world but, by the end of 1960,[10] sixty countries were known to be fully engaged in malaria eradication, and in another nineteen, national health authorities were on the point of adopting their final plans.

Morbidity and mortality returns for malaria can only give a limited amount of information on the current position of the disease. An attempt to state the endemic presence of malaria is in fact made in table 16 of the health conditions section of the *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963*. It is a record of the number of officially reported cases of the disease between 1950 and 1960, but the data are neither complete nor wholly reliable. Large changes, when apparent, may be significant, but no attention should be paid to minor variations.

Before the era of country-wide spraying or eradication programmes, the incidence of malaria ranged from 20 to 100 per 1,000 of the population in the temperate and sub-tropical areas where the disease was established, and was between 100 to 200 per 1,000 in the tropical areas. In many of these areas, as a result of eradication efforts, the incidence is now at the level of 0.2 per 1,000 per year.[11]

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[8] World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General*, 1961, p. 6.

[9] World Health Organization, Eighth World Health Assembly, 1955, *Official Records No. 63*, p. 31.

[10] World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director General*, 1961, p. 3.

[11] World Health Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957-1960*, p. 23.

Another method of indicating the trend of malaria morbidity is to state the size of the previously exposed population which is now covered by malaria eradication schemes. Of a total population of 1,420 million living in malarious areas of the world (four countries are not included in that total),[12] 710 million or 50 per cent are now covered by malaria eradication programmes. For the remainder of the population in the malarious area, malaria has already been eradicated for 22.33 per cent, leaving 27.7 not yet protected. A large proportion of the latter population is in Africa, where approximately 147 million out of the population of 167 million in the malarious areas are not yet benefiting from a malaria eradication programme.

Malaria eradication programmes can constitute a major administrative undertaking for a country's health services, and absorb a considerable proportion of the health budget. There have been frequent attempts to estimate the net value of these programmes. The study of the economic effects of such schemes usually takes into account the effect upon agriculture and industry, the cost of the necessary medical care and the value of the lost manpower. None of these is easy to define precisely or to measure, but it is important that attempts should be made to do so, not only in respect of malaria but with a view to applying the principles ultimately arrived at in the study of other diseases where the question of eradication or control is at issue.

Apart altogether from the specific results of malaria eradication operations, which can be seen in increased work output, improved agricultural achievement, lengthened expectation of life, and higher rates of population increase, there is one other noteworthy outcome of these activities. Very often the administrative machinery which has been devised, and the manpower recruited for the purpose are available for other public health purposes, such as smallpox vaccination, local censuses and health education. These can thus become the constituents of a more comprehensive public health service.

Tuberculosis

Tuberculosis, which so recently was numbered amongst the " captains of the men of death ", has shown a declining trend in mortality throughout the past decade. Actually the fall in mortality commenced much earlier, and in certain countries has been continuous for more than half a century: the rate of decline has recently decreased in momentum.

The average death rate from tuberculosis for all countries whose records are available to the World Health Organization was about 58 per 100,000 population in 1950, and had fallen to 19 by 1958, or to one-third of the previous rate. In all regions of the world, the available information exhibits the same downward tendency, and the most recent death rates range from 28 per cent to 45 per cent of those current in 1950.[13]

Only a decade ago, when this trend was already noticeable, it was held to reflect advances in the general standard of nutrition, housing, sanitation and economic status, as well as the beneficial results of the earlier ascertainment of cases of the disease and their organized institutional treatment. More recently, the active and effective chemotherapy, which has undoubtedly become the mainstay of treatment during the past ten years, has contributed to the decline.

Through the classical research studies carried out by the Madras Chemotherapy Centre, it is now established that one year's domiciliary treatment using chemotherapy is as effective as a year of institutional treatment,[14] and does not expose the patient's family and associates to a special risk of infection. More than 90 per cent of advanced cases of the disease, living under socio-economic conditions which are far from favourable, can thus be treated at a small fraction of the cost of maintaining them is hospitals.

Despite these favourable trends the status of tuberculosis as a major cause of death and disability is undiminished in certain countries. In others again, the morbidity data indicate a declining trend, which may be attributable to the efficiency of the case-finding, the success of chemotherapy, and the protective and prophylactic value of vaccination with BCG. In these changing circumstances, it is necessary to obtain information about the prevalence of tuberculosis in the community by local epidemiological studies. On the basis of the data so collected, which should be fully informative as to the social and economic repercussions of the disease on the patient and his family, control policies can then be formulated.

The triumphs of modern medicine appear likely to facilitate the treatment of certain conditions in the patient's home, and to make it possible to reserve the use of hospital care for investigation, operative treatment and emergencies. Tuberculosis is one of the conditions which can be dealt with in this way. It presents fewer problems from this aspect than certain other illnesses, but the mere fact that it is an infectious disease demands that the control programme should look not only to the treatment of the patient, but should be vigilant about protecting those persons with whom he lives, works and associates.

The " eradication " of tuberculosis, in contradistinction to its control, has recently been advocated in certain quarters. The idea is no doubt the result of the highly successful schemes of chemotherapeutic control and prophylaxis, which are now so much a part of the modern approach to the disease considered as a public health problem. Nevertheless tuberculosis in a community can be a highly pervasive and persistent infection, and therefore not easy to track down and eliminate. But a progressive reduction of the disease can be expected over the next decade.

Leprosy

In the 1957 *Report on the World Social Situation*,[15] the total number of persons throughout the world suffering from leprosy was placed at between ten and twelve

[12] Mainland China, North Korea, Outer Mongolia and North Viet-Nam.

[13] World Health Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957-1960, op. cit.*, p. 14.

[14] *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 1961, vol. 24, pp. 129-175.

[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

million. There have been even higher estimates, but all such figures were and remain largely conjectural. It is evident, however, that leprosy is still a universal disease and that perhaps not more than 20 per cent of its victims are receiving treatment of any kind, despite the fact that treatment with the sulphones has been available since about 1945. These drugs made it possible to abandon the old method of prolonged segregation in leprosaria, and to replace it, with considerable financial advantage, by regular supervised treatment at out-patient clinics or on a domiciliary basis. This new policy, advocated by the WHO Expert Committee in 1953,[16] involves a more intensive programme of case finding leading to early diagnosis, the registration of cases, and mass treatment with sulphones. Selective and temporary segregation is only required for infectious cases. Campaigns along these lines have been launched in many countries, but although the number of hospital and colony beds reserved for leprosy has often been reduced, progress has been relatively slow. The control of leprosy will continue to require the expenditure of much time and money, and the date of its eradication as a disease is still remote.

Certain potentially useful administrative tendencies are to be seen in the integration of leprosy campaigns in the general health services, and in the special interest in the protection of child contacts. Recently the social needs of leprosy patients have been given consideration, more particularly in attempts to reduce the incidence of the deformities characteristic of the disease, and to rehabilitate patients so that they can return to be useful members of the community. These efforts, however, should not take precedence over intensive case finding and early treatment, which are ultimately the most effective means of obtaining both clinical and social improvement.

These three diseases — malaria, tuberculosis and leprosy — have all been and are the objective of mass campaigns directed at their control or eradication. The success of these and other similar campaigns, if not overwhelmingly complete, has nevertheless been so considerable that economic and social benefits are beginning to accrue. Moreover, in the field of public health practice, the campaigns are promoting an association, if not an integration, of preventive and curative medicine.

Other communicable diseases

The association mentioned above will often tend to bring within the preventive and therapeutic net many other diseases, particularly in the tropical and subtropical areas. Yaws, trachoma, bilharziasis, filariasis and the trypanosomiases are notable examples.

Yaws

In the treatment of yaws, the use of a repository preparation of penicillin by one intramuscular injection suffices to cure 80 per cent of all cases. It is therefore a disease highly amenable to organized mass campaigns.

The second International Yaws Conference in Nigeria in 1955 [17] estimated that, of the 400 million people living in the rural areas of the tropical belt, some 200 million were exposed to the risk of infection with endemic treponematoses, particularly yaws, and that there were at least 50 million active yaws cases in the world at the time, and many more domiciliary and other contacts susceptible to infection.

During the previous five years some 50 million people had been examined and 15 million treated, either for active signs of the disease or prophylactically. The effort to eliminate yaws, as a most crippling disease in children and adolescents, has continued. By 1960, some 75 million persons living in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania had been examined in initial treatment surveys, while 275 million re-examinations had been undertaken. In many large areas, the incidence of active yaws has been reduced from approximately 25 per cent to 2 per cent, with less than 0.1 per cent of infectious cases.

The disappearance of yaws in such communities has not only improved the health of the people; it has added to their well-being, increased their productive work potential, and has often established their faith in the efficacy of the health services and led to enthusiastic participation in the extension of these services.

Trachoma

Since the publication of the *Report on the World Social Situation* in 1957, the fifty-year search for the cause of trachoma has been crowned with success. The discovery of the trachoma virus by T'Ang and his co-workers in Peiping has brought effective immunization against the disease within the range of early possibilities. There will still remain, however, the question of bringing the vaccine into use in the vast control programmes which will be necessary.

Trachoma is one of the most universal diseases, and no continent is exempt from its ravages. It can probably claim one-sixth of the world's population or approximately 500 million persons as its victims, and the socio-economic consequences of its prevalence are enormous. It is not uncommon to find, in countries where it has its maximum incidence, that more than 1 per cent of the adult population are totally blind, more than 10 per cent so blind that they are incapable of any work for which sight is essential, and another 10 per cent have serious impairment of vision. Before active control measures were instituted in Tunisia, it was estimated that trachoma and the associated seasonal conjunctivitis caused the loss of 20 million work days annually.

When it was discovered early in the decade that certain sulphonamides and antibiotics were effective in the treatment of trachoma, many countries decided, with WHO advice and assistance, to embark upon control programmes. Amongst these countries were Egypt, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Spain, China, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Most of these early programmes were directed to the discovery and treatment of cases, and within that scope were successful. But history has repeatedly shown that trachoma disappears from a community only with improvements in hygiene and in the standard of living and, where these remain at a low level, the treatment of cases

16 World Health Organization, *Leprosy*. First Report of the Expert Committee, Technical Report Series No. 71.

17 World Health Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation, 1957-1960*, p. 24.

may have little or only temporary effect in reducing the incidence of the disease.[18]

Control programmes must therefore take into account not only ascertainment and treatment, but also the general sanitary situation, which is often reflected in the size and vigour of the insect population, the socio-economic and educational level of the community, and the availability of good maternal and child welfare services. A concentration of effort upon the pre-school child is probably the most rewarding approach to the solution of the problem. Trachoma is one of the diseases in which child care, education and insistence on the elementary principles of hygiene can yield most gratifying results.

Bilharziasis

Bilharziasis, which is caused by a parasitic worm harboured by certain species of fresh-water snails, is transmitted into the human body through contact with infested water. The disease so caused is characterized by the intensity of its morbid symptoms, and results in an enormous amount of ill health and disability which, if not reflected in the mortality returns, at any rate is associated with lowered human efficiency and, in children, may result in mental retardation. It is widely distributed throughout Africa, the Caribbean, parts of Central and South America, China, the Philippines and Japan. It is also to be found in Iraq, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula.

The disease favours rural and agricultural areas with sluggish streams or where the water requirements have necessitated the introduction of irrigation schemes, and where poor environmental sanitation is found combined with indifferent standards of living. Estimates based on a number of recent surveys suggest that sufferers from bilharziasis throughout the world number at least 150 million. Even this estimate may fall short of the facts, because the incidence in many countries is of the order of 40 to 50 per cent.

Recent surveys by WHO advisory bilharziasis teams have demonstrated not only the spread of the disease in its recognized endemic regions, but its extension beyond their boundaries to areas previously immune. The opening of rural areas for agricultural production by perpetual irrigation, and the extension of transport facilities can both further the spread of the disease.

This is not to say that control measures are valueless, but they require to be energetically carried out, and they are not cheap. They include ecological measures against the snail; use of molluscicides; engineering operations directed to the improvement of the irrigation system, or the reconstruction of water courses. In endemic areas, it is imperative to avoid contact with polluted water, either by drinking or washing. This presupposes active and repeated health education of the public. There is also the possibility of mass chemotherapy, but so far no completely satisfactory drug for this purpose has been available.

Nevertheless, attempts to control the disease have not been without success. In the Philippines, following a pilot project to which three international agencies, WHO, FAO and UNICEF, all gave assistance, active measures of the kind described reduced the snail population by 95 per cent in three years. This reduction was accompanied by a significant decrease of infection, particularly in children under the age of ten. Concomitantly, there were economic benefits from land reclamation and increased rice production.[19]

The extent of the effort required can be seen in the United Arab Republic, where the snail control staff numbers 1,800, and two million cases of the disease are treated annually by 200 rural health centres, 180 dispensaries and several mobile units. Nevertheless, the potential gain from their activities is great, for in heavily infected areas, loss of productivity can be as high as 33 per cent.

Filariasis[20]

Under the generic title of filariasis are grouped a number of diseases of great social importance because of the disablement, disfigurement and blindness they cause. Broadly speaking, they fall into two main groups; those associated clinically with elephantiasis and conveyed to human beings by mosquitoes, and the "blinding filariasis" onchocerciasis, in which several varieties of simulium flies act as vectors. These diseases occur in almost every tropical and sub-tropical country, and are even to be found in some of the relatively cooler regions of southern Europe and Australia. It has been estimated that over 250 million people are affected by the filariases, but this again is probably an understatement because of the existence of latent forms of infection. Onchocerciasis, with its frequent ocular manifestations leading to blindness, has a most sinister reputation and has led to the depopulation of territories by mass emigration. In certain areas it has proved a complete obstruction to any form of economic development.

The methods of control are closely related to those used for malaria, but complementary measures, which include chemotherapy, may be necessary. One persistent handicap is the reluctance of patients to submit to a full course of treatment. Another handicap in the difficulty in obtaining blood specimens containing the pathognomonic microfilaria at the appropriate time of night.

Trypanosomiasis

Just as with filariasis, human trypanosomiasis appears in two main forms which, because of their geographical distribution, are named respectively African and South American trypanosomiasis. They are diseases caused by several species of minute protozoa, called trypanosomes, and are characterized by irregular and chronic fever, skin eruptions, local oedema, glandular swellings and physical and mental lethargy; they sometimes result in death. The trypanosomes are spread by tsetse flies in Africa, and by winged bugs (sometimes popularly known as

[18] F. Maxwell Lyons, "Recent Advances and Present Trends in Trachoma Control" (WHO Regional Office for Europe, EURO 158.1/8).

[19] *Bulletin of the World Health Organization*, 1961, vol. 25, p. 603.

[20] World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General*, 1961, pp. 16 and 17.

"kissing" bugs) in South and Central America. They are blood parasites whose primary hosts are animals which serve as reservoirs. Oxen, goats, sheep, pigs and dogs are probably the main hosts, though the "big game" animals have also been under suspicion. In South America, the burrowing armadillo is probably the most important reservoir. The terminal stage of the African disease in human beings is "sleeping sickness", whereas in South America the clinical manifestations of Chagas disease, as it is called after its discoverer, are usually local and acute and affect more particularly infants, children and young people. More recently, Chagas disease has been suspected as the cause of sudden death from heart failure in men over forty years of age.

Here, then, are two forms of disease wich affect the lives of many hundreds of thousands of human beings. Their *modus operandi* in the social and economic fields are very different. In Africa, where the tsetse fly inhabits vast territories, the tendency has been for human populations to emigrate into areas free of the fly, and to overcrowd these areas, with all the disadvantages of diminished agricultural yield and food supply which ensue. In the attack on the tsetse fly which is necessary to reclaim the deserted lands, African experience has not been uniformly successful. Two methods were available; the first was to kill off the animals which provided the tsetse fly with its food, a procedure leading to a considerable diminution in the local wild life; the second was to raze the forests and bush which gave the fly harbourage. More recently the use of risidual insecticides has been introduced with some success, and the assistance of chemoprophylaxis has been invoked. But complete scientific prophylaxis must await more accurate knowledge of the ecology of the tsetse fly. Nevertheless, progress can be reported, and although numerous endemic foci of African trypanosomiasis still exist, their potential dangers are diminished.

Chagas disease has been found in many South and Central American countries, and its causal trypanosome has been recovered from animals, but not from human cases, as far north as California and Texas.

In Brazil, an enormous amount of work has been done in the control of the disease, using for this purpose the existing anti-malarial services. The residual insecticides applied to houses and their outbuildings have proved to be effective in reducing the number of bugs and in keeping them at a relatively low level. The common reservoir host, the armadillo, remains to be dealt with. Common sense suggests that the floors of houses should be proof against armadillo invasion and that, wherever possible, human habitations should not be sited in the vicinity of the animals' burrows.

In the recital of diseases so far, there has been an emphasis on pathological conditions prevalent in tropical and subtropical areas. Tuberculosis, with its universal field of operation, has been the sole exception. Nevertheless, though countries in the temperate zones have largely escaped the parasitic diseases of the tropics and have been spared the wider range of bowel infections and worm infestations, in earlier epochs they frequently suffered the onslaughts of the "pestilential" and similar diseases, and have survived to see them "eradicated", or at least so controlled as to be negligible.

With the wannig importance of the communicable diseases, the mortality experience of these countries began to assume another pattern. There has, however, never been a complete antithesis between the diseases of the economically developed and of the less developed countries. A number of pathological conditions have always been shared in common and, as the expectation of life in the less developed countries increases, that congruence in certain aspects of pathology is likely to be more marked.

Virus diseases

Amongst the acute diseases common to both the developed and less developed areas are some of the virus infections, of which influenza and poliomyelitis may be selected as examples.

The use of cultures made of live tissues has changed the face of virology in little more than a decade. Now that many viruses can be cultivated and harvestd, the making of effective prophylactic vaccines against such diseases as influenza and poliomyelitis has become possible on a large scale.

Influenza

During the decade 1950-1960, there were three epidemics of influenza, in 1950-1951, 1952-1953 and 1957. None of these attained the dramatic intensity of the Great Pandemic of 1918-1919, but each in its way had its repercussions in the industrial and economic fields. The epidemic of 1957 was in fact a pandemic. Because of its apparent origin in central Asia, the disease was named Asian influenza, and modern methods of transport and the movements of human beings rapidly brought it to Europe and thence to the Americas. The 1957 epidemic occurred at a time when the mass manufacture of an influenza vaccine had become a practical proposition, although ultimately its use was restricted by the rapid march of events. The epidemic also gave the WHO influenza programme an opportunity, through its world-whide network of laboratories and observers, to keep *au courant* with the spread of the epidemic, and to make available the first strains of the new virus from which the vaccine was ultimately derived.

Poliomyelitis

Half a century ago, the viruses of poliomyelitis were widespread throughout the world. Infection, which was very general in many countries, occurred usually in infancy or early childhood, and the maximum attack rates of the paralytic forms of the disease were recorded in the 0-4 age group. Epidemics were rare events in all but the most isolated communities because of the prevalence of early acquired immunity. But, with improved sanitation and higher standards of living, the age of first exposure to the virus gradually rose, and epidemics of the disease began to appear in the age groups that had previously been protected. These epidemics in the developed countries of the West were characterized by increased numbers of paralytic cases in older children and even in adults. In some of the less developed areas, improvements in sanitation and the associated cessation of early acquired infection and subsequent immunity, have led to a similar

sequence of events, and to major epidemic manifestations of the disease.

In 1954, extensive controlled trials showed that inactivated poliomyelitis virus vaccine was both safe and effective. Since then it has been used with considerable success to immunize millions of children and adults. However, the use of inactivated poliomyelitis vaccine in nationally organized campaigns was not without its difficulties. Three or four injections might be necessary, and the vaccine was relatively expensive. As a result of further research, the attenuated live poliomyelitis virus vaccine was developed. This vaccine was cheap; it was administered orally, and not by injection; and could be quickly brought into use in the presence of an epidemic situation.

Live orally administered poliomyelitis vaccine has been widely used in Czechoslovakia, Israel, Hungary, Poland, Singapore, South Africa and the USSR, with most encouraging results. In Czechoslovakia, not a single case has been reported since the end of the immunizing campaign in 1960. In Israel, the vaccine was used in the early stages of an epidemic, and immediately brought it to an end.

The use of these two types of vaccine has undoubtedly contributed to the great decline in the incidence of poliomyelitis cases in the past decade.

Such combined data as are available from 130 countries and territories show that, for the period 1951-1953, the average annual number of cases reported was 85,670. By 1960 this total had become 37,372. Many countries where poliomyelitis vaccine has been used extensively have experienced dramatic falls in the number of cases. For example, in Canada and the United States, the average annual number of reported cases for the period 1951-1953 was 46,162. In 1960 the comparative total was 4,071, a reduction of approximately 90 per cent.

But such experience was not universal. In thirty American countries, apart from Canada and the United States, 4,844 cases were notified annually in the period 1951-1953, as compared with 5,830 in 1960. In seventeen other countries in the western Pacific region, difference in comparison with the experience of Australia and New Zealand was equally marked. The number of reported cases had, in fact, increased from 3,478 in 1951-1953 to 6,398 in 1960.

Nevertheless, the achievements of the decade are great and without parallel. A disease, which in previous decades had become a formidable and treacherous destroyer of human life, happiness, physical capacity and economic security, is now under control.

Chronic and degenerative diseases

It would be interesting to have a list of the chief causes of death, country by country, for the whole world. Such a comparative presentation, however, is only possible for countries that are known to have adequate machinery for reasonably accurate complete registration of causes of death. In such countries, heart diseases now appear as the leading cause of death.

In general terms, they are responsible for from one-quarter to even more than one-third of the total mortality. Malignant neoplasms, or more popularly the cancers, are the second most common cause of death, and their frequency ranges from 14 to 22 per cent of all deaths. Vascular lesions affecting the central nervous system rank third, and their share of the total mortality is between 11 and 16 per cent. Accidents are the next most frequent cause, and are responsible for from 4 to 7 per cent.

Each of these causes has exhibited a rising trend over the past decade. For the developed countries, they represent the major fields of mortality which hinder the further extension of the life span and together with the care of old persons, they have become a major concern to health authorities. With the increase in the expectation of life due to rising standards of living and better hygiene, these causes are also growing in importance in less developed countries.

Cardiovascular diseases [21]

In the cardiovascular group, the diseases that have achieved the greatest notoriety are hypertension and arteriosclerosis, which includes coronary thrombosis. In 1958, these two conditions accounted in a series of twenty-six countries, where reliable data were available, for 15 per cent of all deaths in the 35-59-year age group, and for 40 per cent of the mortality in the 50-54-year age group. Epidemiological studies show that coronary thrombosis has increased in frequency. Mortality from this cause in the United States was at the level of 20 per 100,000 persons in 1930, and 70 per 100,000 in 1949. It has also been stated that this form of cardiac emergency is much less frequent among Bantus, Nigerians and Japanese. The truth is that, apart from such well known facts as the unusual proneness of the Japanese to cerebral haemorrhage rather than to coronary thrombosis, little exact information is available concerning the trend of the cardiovascular diseases in populations throughout the world. Studies of these diseases against the many national ecological patterns of life would throw light on the predisposing causal factors. It is in the field that, under WHO sponsorship, national research organizations are collaborating to obtain the comparative data on which to base further fundamental research. Among the factors which have been suggested as playing a part in the development of hypertension and arteriosclerosis are: heredity, consumption of foodstuffs rich in fats and particularly in cholesterol, lack of physical exercise, mental stress, and the undue consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Inasmuch as statistics in certain countries identify these diseases with the wealthier classes, whose physical activities are less, their appetites grosser and their addiction to alcohol and tobacco more in evidence, it has been suggested that these are in essence the diseases of the affluent society.

Medical science has been active in providing appropriate remedies for these conditions, but what is needed is a more positive approach to their prevention, not necessarily by any continuing prophylactic meditation, but by more rational modes of living.

The cancers

It has been roughly estimated that the cancers cause some two million deaths annually and that, at any one

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21 World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General*, 1961, p. 32.

time, five million persons are suffering or have suffered from their manifestations. Although the mechanisms which transform an innocent cell into a malignant one and thus set on foot the cancerous processes are still, in the main, hidden from us, there are certain physical, chemical and biological factors which affect the location of cancers in the body, and their characteristic distribution amongst populations in various parts of the world.

Skin cancers are common in areas of intense sunshine. Malignant growths of the respiratory system are associated with such a personal habit as cigarette smoking, and the local incidence of atmospheric pollution. Bladder tumours are common in the United Arab Republic in those areas where bilharziasis is prevalent.

Epidemiological studies of these differences in incidence are now regarded as of importance in the world-wide investigation of the cancer problem. WHO has been responsible both for the initiation and support of investigations and comparisons of this kind.

Many of these have been and are concerned with the rising incidence of lung cancer, which has become a major health hazard in many countries.[22] National experience differs as to both the current incidence of the disease, and the date when the so-called epidemic phase began. In some countries, notably England and Wales, there is pathological evidence which suggests that the increase started at least forty years ago; in others, such as Chile and Japan, it has been observed only during the past ten or fifteen years. The level to which the death rate from lung cancer rises varies greatly from country to country, even when allowances have been made for differences in the age and sex structure of the population. For two North American countries, namely the United States and Canada, the rate was 15.3 and 21.2 per 100,000 population respectively. Chile had a death rate for this group of diseases of 6.5 per 100,000, and Venezuela one of 5.1. In the Eastern Mediterranean area, the rates recorded were generally low, the United Arab Republic (region of Egypt) with a rate of 2.2 per 100,000 in 1957 being typical. In the same year, however, the Jewish population of Israel had a rate of 13. Death rates for the majority of European countries are generally much higher. Annual rates of the order of 50 per 100,000 are not uncommon, and in England and Wales the 1960 rate was an unprecedented 85.6 per 100,000 for males and 13.2 for women. But unexpected and inexplicable differences were encountered in Finland and Norway, with rates of 27.6 and 8.6 respectively.

In the western Pacific area, the death rates were much higher in New Zealand and Australia than they were in Japan, but all had increased since 1950.

More accurate diagnosis only partially accounts for this continuous and persistent upward trend. There are potent carcinogenic factors at work. One of these, namely the excessive smoking of cigarettes, has been statistically associated with the disease in a number of studies. Atmospheric pollution has also been accused as a causal factor. While there is need for more extensive epidemiological studies of the incidence of the disease, there is an even greater urgency to determine more precisely the active morbific agents and to eliminate them. For the time being, national efforts to reduce the future incidence of the disease have had to concentrate on education, and such minor social restrictions as the banning of smoking in places of public resort and assembly. The remote possibility of death from cancer of the lung is as yet only a feeble psychological deterrent, especially in young people.

In the broad field of cancer prevention, reliance is placed on the removal of carcinogenic hazards in industry; on the control of ionizing radiations; on constant vigilance about the presence of noxious carcinogenic substances in food additives, pharmaceutical and cosmetic preparations; on efforts to limit the general pollution of the atmosphère, and also on the reduction of cigarette smoking.

Together with these activities, which connote considerable efforts in health education, many countries have embarked upon the full registration of all cases of cancer, and have instituted various programmes designed to ensure early diagnosis and prompt treatment of the disease in individual patients. Apart from cancer of the lung, the forms of the disease which are most appropriate for the modern methods of " screening " are those to which women are particularly liable, namely cancer of the breast and of the uterus. In some countries, for example, Norway, the USSR and the United States, mass screening has been undertaken for population groups above the age of 35, or for specific groups, notably for women who have borne more than one child.

With modern methods of radiotherapy, improved surgical techniques and the advent of chemotherapy in this field, high cure rates are often obtained, much suffering can be prevented, and productive years added to the life of the individual victim.

Mental health

Although the mental disorders do not figure largely in the death returns, they affect the national health statistics wherever the latter record the totals of beds in mental institutions and of patients admitted to them. In the developed countries of the west, it is not uncommon to find that from one-third to one-half of the total hospital accommodation is allocated to mental illness and deficiency. This burden of hospitalization has become heavier in recent years as a result of the prolongation of life and the associated increase in the psychoses of senility.

But changes in the field of mental health have gathered momentum in the last decade.[23] The mental hospital has always had two purposes, the custodial and the therapeutic, and over the years a balance has been struck between them. The recent advances in psychiatry itself, and in the use of physical and chemotherapeutic methods of treatment have disturbed that equilibrium and, in consequence, the therapeutic functions and achievements of the institutions have begun to yield somewhat unexpected results. The effect of these measures has enabled the mental hospital to open its doors both literally and figuratively. The " open " door has become a " revolving "

[22] World Health Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957-1960*, p. 13.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

door through wich patients go and return voluntarily, if necessary, for short-term treatment. This trend has brought about the transfer of many individuals with a history of mental illness from custocial care in an institution to the open life of the community. Obviously this transfer opens up both great possibilities for the individual, but places equally great responsibilities on the community.

The domiciliary treatment and surveillance of patients and their integration with the life that surrounds them will require acceptance and understanding on the part of the community as a whole, as well as of the families so intimately concerned. All this postulates widespread education of the public, and the organization of comprehensive social and medical services at the local level which will support the efforts of the hospital, the clinic, and the family in maintaining the patient in good mental health. Happily, many of the advances in psychiatric therapy have made it possible for the general public to assimilate its idea about mental illness with those which it now holds about the treatment and prognosis of other forms of sickness.

The existence of this modern approach has been perhaps most marked in the United Kingdom, where it is envisaged that the logic of the present therapeutic policies should lead, say in fifteen years, to a reduction of some 40 per cent of the existing mental hospital accommodation. Other countries where a similar outlook has been the rule for some years included France and the Netherlands in Europe, and Ceylon in South-East Asia. In the Netherlands, the objective has been to build up local psychiatric services which will co-ordinate domiciliary and hospital care over the whole country. The same new concept of community mental care has also found acceptance in France. In Ceylon, the majority of admissions to hospitals are now on a voluntary and temporary basis. The open door policy has been introcuded, and structural alterations have removed in great part the prison-like atmosphere.[24]

Mental ill-health is not limited in its incidence to the developed countries. It occurs universally, although information regarding both its frequency and the types of its manifestations in the less developed countries is only now being ascertained with any degree of accuracy by the use of modern epidemiological methods.

Accidents

The first half of the twentieth century has seen changes in the list of chief causes of death. Some of these have come about slowly. Others, like coronary thrombosis and lung cancer, have emerged more dramatically. In this latter category must now be included those fortuitous occurrences comprised under the general title of accidents, and in particular those for which the vast expansion of motorized traffic is to blame. For every fatal accident, there are many non-fatal ones which cause prolonged or even permanent disability.

Statistical information on the age distribution and causation of accidents is more readily available and more reliable for the economically developed countries.[25] Throughout childhood, apart from the first year of life, accidents are the outstanding cause of death. Between 1 year and 4 years they are, on an average, the cause of 30 per cent of all deaths, and between 5 and 14 they are responsible for 38 per cent of the whole mortality during this period of life. Accidents remain the most frequent cause of death between the ages of 15-44 in many countries, although in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom they have fallen to second or third place. Except at the extremes of life — in infancy and in old age — the male is always more accident-prone than the female.

Accidents, however, are not the special perquisite of the developed countries. They are as universal in their incidence as they are diverse in their causation.

In the majority of developed countries motor-vehicle accidents are responsible for the largest share of accidental deaths. This is especially true for Australia, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany ans the United States of America, each country having a male death rate of over 30 per 100,000. Among European countries, the lowest recorded male death rate (namely, 10 per 100,000) is that of Norway. In general terms, motor-vehicle accidents account for nearly one-half of all accidental deaths, this ratio being much higher amongst men than amongst women.

Falls are the second most common cause of accidental deaths in the same countries, and the female rates generally exceed those for male. This feature is well marked for Denmark and Norway, where the female death rates are about 20 per 100,000, as compared with Italy and the Netherlands, whose rates are about 6 and 9 per 100,000 respectively. To some extent, these rates reflect the difficulties which elderly women — remembering always their greater expectation of life — encounter in housing conditions which are unsuited to their physical abilities.

Accidental drowning appears to be third in the ranking of accidental deaths and, as might be expected, the death rate for males is much higher than for females.

Venereal diseases

Finally, in this catalogue of diseases with a social connotation, there are the venereal diseases.[26] The incidence of syphilitic and gonococcal infestions reached a post-war peak in most parts of the world in 1946-1948. Shortly thereafter, the resumption of normal family life and the introduction of potent antibiotics caused clinicians and health administrators to feel that these venereal diseases could be eliminated as public health problems, or at least controlled. Indeed the use of long-acting penicillin preparations was largely responsible for the rapid decline in new cases of venereal syphilis which occurred between 1950 and 1955. Although a fall in reported cases of gonorrhoea was observed initially, this trend did not continue, and the incidence remained high in Europe, the Americas, the eastern Mediterranean, South-East Asia and the western Pacific, and the reservoir of infection increased considerably in Africa.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

The success of antibiotics in the treatment of individuals undoubtedly led to an increasing public indifference to the acquisition and treatment of these infections. On the other hand, only limited emphasis was given to the epidemiological and social aspects of the problem of venereal disease in general and, in point of fact, certain health administrations reduced their established programmes. Since 1955, a recrudescence of venereal syphilis has been reported in seventeen out of twenty European countries studied by WHO, and between that date and 1960 the reported new cases have at least doubled in Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Turkey and Yugoslavia. In Africa, early syphilis has shown an increase in fifteen out of thirty countries or territories studied. In the western Pacific Region, syphilis is increasing, particularly in Australia, Burma, Hong Kong and Singapore. In more than half of twenty-two countries of the Americas, significantly increased case rates were reported. The record of gonorrhoea is similar, and in many countries worse. The information that has become available in recent years suggests that these increases are particularly marked in teenagers. Health administrations are again beginning to realize the importance of the venereal diseases. They require epidemiological inquiry and therapeutic programming but, above all, educational activity. They require also a sympathetic understanding of the social malaise which the present situation reflects.

Health protection and promotion

To an increasing extent man is able, given the financial resources and suitable guidance, to improve the environment in which he is placed. The day has passed when the sordid squalor which accompanied the Industrial Revolution could be readily tolerated. This renewal of interest in physical surroundings comes not only from a desire for improved amenities; it is also a rediscovery of the importance of the environment to health.

Many countries suffer a heavy burden of illness due to the bowel diseases and the common infections of the respiratory tract. Both, and particularly bowel diseases, are associated with indifferent sanitary conditions. These and other countries with higher standards of sanitation find themselves faced with new hazards to health arising from industrialization and urbanization.

Environmental sanitation

The essentials of a good sanitary environment are numerous, and include water supply, sewage and refuse disposal, clean air, radiation protection, housing and town planning, control of overcrowding, noise prevention, vector control and food hygiene. Of all these, certainly at the national level, the adequacy of the water supply both in quantity and quality, and its protection from pollution by excremental fouling or industrial wastes, remain the paramount desiderata. Accurate data on water supplies in all countries, or even in all urban areas, are amongst the most difficult of all the health statistics either to obtain or to interpret.

Any given figures, except in Europe and North America, are usually mere approximations and only serve to indicate the greatness of the deficiency. As a result of the growing interest in water supplies, WHO commenced in 1959 a programme of assistance[27] designed to foster community water supply projects under central national organizations legally and financially able to handle the launching of programmes meeting the industrial and other needs of social and economic development. WHO is actively co-operating with fifteen countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia along these lines.

The *modus operandi* varies. Where it is a question of organizing national programmes, it is customary to send a team composed of engineers and management and financial experts to advise on the whole undertaking. Where it is a question of the reorganization or extension of existing services, or the establishment of schools for technicians and artisans, water engineers alone may suffice. In the background, however, there is always the question of finance. In an increasing number of cases the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has given assistance, a recent example being the loan of two million dollars to Jordan in respect of the Amman water supply. The United Nations Special Fund has also provided funds for engineering studies of long-term construction plans for water supply and sewerage in the Calcutta metropolitan district. In the rural field, a scheme has been completed in Kenya whereby, with WHO and UNICEF assistance, a community of 4,000 persons in four villages and occupying 782 farms has been provided with a piped and chlorinated water supply. A feature of the work was the voluntary contribution of local labour to the digging of trenches and the actual work of construction.

When a water supply adequate for consumption and trade purposes is made available, there remains the question of sewage disposal. This is a matter which many communities tend to shelve, because of the capital outlay involved, but it is likely to become more and more urgent under the pressure of urbanization.

Atmospheric pollution

The abatement of atmospheric pollution is, in a certain sense, a more sophisticated matter than the satisfaction of the elementary needs just described, and it is more particularly the aim of the industrialized countries. Although the problem of air pollution by smoke has existed for many centuries, it is only comparatively recently that the products of simple combustion have been regarded as costly nuisances. The great smog that occurred in London in December 1952 furthermore provided convincing additional evidence of the mortality that could be caused by such an occurrence.

The problems of air pollution, however, are no longer limited to those which arise from the discharge of domestic and industrial smoke into the atmosphere. With the increase in the number of internal combustion engines, new circumstances arise, of which the recurrent smogs of Los Angeles with their irritative propensities are a notorious example.

Much research is in progress to develop, *inter alia*, methods for the continuous recording of the many atmospheric pollutants, to unravel the complex meteorological

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27 World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General* (Geneva, 1960), *Official Records No. 105*, p. 16.

situations which can give rise to smogs, to devise means for the control of industrial effluents, and to isolate and possibly to neutralize the pollutants which have pathogenic effects on human beings.

The positive approach to the control of air pollution includes site selection for factories and zoning of industry; introduction of equipment which will, within limits, deny undesirable substances access to the air; selection of appropriate fuel and its utilization, and legislation directed to ensure clean air. The abatement of atmospheric pollution is now actively pursued in a number of countries. The United Kingdom, for example, has adopted legislation designed to give the country the benefit of a clean air policy. The establishment has been proposed of an Institute of Occupational Hygiene in the University of Santiago, Chile, with the support of the Special Fund. WHO, through its Expert Committee on Environmental Sanitation, and a European Conference on Air Pollution are seeking to co-ordinate research in Europe with similar research elsewhere.

Radiation

In the Health chapter of the 1957 *Report on the World Social Situation,* the problems arising from the effect of ionizing radiations and the industrial use of atomic energy were considered at some length. Whereas, in earlier years, public interest in the subject had been concentrated on the testing of atomic weapons, emphasis was beginning to be placed on the much broader question of the radiation health of the community, as affected by its exposure to ionizing radiations from various sources. The problems included the effects of radiation on heredity, and the obvious desirability of reducing radiation hazards wherever possible before they became a direct danger to man's health. Because medical radiation is one of the principal sources of man's radiation exposure, particular attention was given to the risks inherent in various medical radiological procedures, and to advice on their mitigation.

An increasing recognition of the various problems in this field is now being exhibited by Governments, in the appointment of advisory committees and the organization of inspectorial and supervisory services.

The ramifications of these problems are exceedingly wide, including such matters as the radiation of foodstuffs, the transport of radioactive materials, the disposal of radioactive waste from nuclear powered ships, the protection of workers in industry, and the collection of vital and health statistics which may be of assistance to human geneticists in their inquiries.

During the final years of the decade, there has been, under the auspices of the several specialized agencies concerned, intense activity in research, in the exchange of information and in the training of personnel. The agencies have realized the continuing character of the problem and, by adopting a co-ordinated and balanced approach to their solution, have helped materially to place radiation in its true perspective as a public health problem.

Urbanization and health

Many countries of the world today are faced with problems created by the rapid concentration of people, production and services in towns, cities and metropolitan areas.[28]

Some causes of ill-health are more characteristic of the countryside than of the cities; these can be brought to the cities by immigrants and can persist or spread because of the conditions under which the migrants live. Trachoma and intestinal parasites come within this group. Overcrowding and the dirt of slum houses predispose to other bowel infections, tuberculosis, infections of the respiratory tract and venereal disease.

A more detailed study of the social etiology of these conditions reveals that they are essentially the problems which arise from or are associated with inadequate water supplies, unhygienic housing conditions, poor selection of residential and industrial sites and atmospheric pollution. Other contributory factors which must be taken into account include the lack of educational and recreational facilities, the often unsatisfactory conditions of work places, and the growth of vehicular traffic. All these bring in their train disease and ill-health, both physical and mental, with which an overburdened public health service may find it difficult to deal.

Health departments must be prepared to take their part in the establishment and implementation of government policies for regional and urban development which are now beginning to emerge, based on co-ordinated social, economic and physical planning. The health departments will require to be strengthened in order to do so. Both technological and psychological preparation is necessary, for the health staff will be working very often in fields traditionally foreign to them, and will have professional and administrative associations with men and women trained in other disciplines. The problems of urbanization are great and will inevitably be greater, but they can only be solved by a combined operation of this kind.

Housing

Implicit in the problem-complex created by urbanization is the question of the housing conditions under which people live — though bad housing is not limited in its incidence to the towns.[29] It can be an endemic disease of urban and rural communities alike. Not only do many inhabited dwellings fail to satisfy the requirements for a residential environment, but there is the continuing need to cope with the existing shortage caused by the movement and growth of populations. Recent surveys and inquiries also suggest that there is still much haphazard planning of housing facilities, and a tendency to lower both building and accommodation standards in order to increase the volume of construction and to stretch the limited investment resources.

Housing problems differ in their health aspects as in other aspects in the various parts of the world. In the developed areas of Europe and North America, the actual shortage has been greatly diminished since the Second World War, but not sufficiently to enable any country to slow down its intensive building programme. These countries also have before them the question of the re-

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[28] For trends in urbanization during the period under review see chapters I, V, and XI-XIII.

[29] For detailed information on housing, see chapter V.

newal of much obsolescent property, and the elimination of their slums. Certain countries have sought to deal with the overspill of their metropolitan areas by the creation of new towns, which in their turn have thrown up troublesome problems of social adjustment. In the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the clamant need is to deal with the cumulative effect of population growth and changing urban-rural relationships.

There is, however, ample evidence of the urgent attention which Governments are giving to the solution of their housing problems. The international agencies have also contributed by stressing the need for the acquisition of additional information on every aspect of housing. WHO has organized surveys in various countries in South-East Asia an in Latin America and, in addition, has reviewed the fields in which further research is indicated.[30] These suggested fields of inquiry are not limited to the technical questions of design and construction or the siting of houses and area planning. They include studies of the physiological needs of the occupants and of the social problems which may arise.

Nutrition [31]

The direct relationship of nutrition to the health of the individual and the community is obvious. Economic conditions can still cause extreme undernutrition, but more frequently nutritional disease and dificiency are causally related to traditional dietetic habits or to ignorance. These pathological conditions may appear in the form of the classical avitaminoses and protein deficiencies, of which kwashiorkor is the most serious, and may be associated with and aggravated by heavy bowel infestation. Endemic goitre is also still found in many parts of the world. In general, however, the existence of these conditions is well known to Governments, whose approach to the problems in these days is soundly based and practical. The results of dietary surveys, the study of food habits and scrutiny of the components of the national diet are all taken into account by those concerned in the formulation and carrying out of policy. For example, in the prevention of protein malnutrition in infants and children, which is the world's most important nutritional problem, the joint programme of FAO, UNICEF and WHO has been most effective and acceptable to Governments.[32] Its chief purpose is the production of cheap and suitable protein-rich food. The practical results of the programme are perhaps most advanced in Guatemala, where the Institute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama (INCAP) has developed its own particular mixture of vegetable protein, called Incaparina, and in Nigeria and Uganda, where mixtures of vegetable protein and skim milk have become well established.

Provision of medical care

During the decade 1950-1960, many factors influenced popular and governmental attitudes towards the whole subject of medical care, and largely dispelled the previous apathy which reigned in respect of its organized provision. The most important factor was perhaps the changing social attitude towards disease, and the increasing recognition given to community responsibility for its cure and prevention. But other factors, such as the increasing cost of medical care, influenced the organizational trends which are now becoming discernible. In some instances, it has been a matter of breaking the resistance to previously formulated ideas as to the methods of provision, or of extending those methods if already established. In others, there may have been the development of a new ideology.

In the more developed countries, the official health departments, with their established interests in environmental sanitation and communicable disease control, are now entering the field of medical care.

This new interest may be revealed mainly in legislative measures for control and supervision, or in the direct operation of medical care services for the more vulnerable groups of the population, such as indigents, war veterans, the aged or the mentally ill.

More often, however, Governments are assuming responsibility for the provision of medical care as an integral part of the general programme of social services and security. In some countries, the responsibility assumed by the Government is for the full operation of the medical care services. In others, it is restricted to paying subsidies to voluntary or charitable institutions, or to making statutory contributions to sickness insurance schemes, which have been organized on either a compulsory or a voluntary basis. Whatever the form of governmental intervention, the obvious trend is for more of the taxpayers' money to be used directly in the financing of medical care programmes.

This tendency, however, does not necessarily militate against the concept of pre-paid medical care. Voluntary sickness insurance, as exemplified by countries like the United States of America, is becoming increasingly popular. Thus in 1960, about 75 per cent of the population of the United States was covered by some form of sickness insurance as compared with 50 per cent in 1950, and 10 per cent in 1940. On the other hand, many countries have included in their statutory schemes of social security the provision of medical care benefits, either in cash or in the form of services. Of 101 countries recently surveyed, seventy-five had established social security schemes by 1960. Or these seventy-five, seventy-two included maternity benefits amongst the benefits provided, and forty-six gave medical benefits or some form of medical care. In nine countries, medical care was a public service financed from general taxation. It is interesting to note that, although sickness benefits were known in Europe towards the end of the nineteenth century, the great majority of the schemes mentioned have been put into operation since the end of the Second World War.

Provision of health services and regionalization

In the application of both medical care and public health policies, increasing use has been made of regionalization.[33] This concept, first put into practice in the

[30] World Health Organization, *Expert Committee on the Public Health Aspect of Housing*, Technical Report Series, No. 225, Geneva, 1961.

[31] See also chapter IV.

[32] World Health Organization, *Annual Report of the Director-General*, 1960, p. 25.

[33] World Health Organization, *Second Report on the World Health Situation 1957-1960*, p. 31.

early thirties of the present century, has gained wider acceptance during the past decade. It envisages the provision of a comprehensive system of health services on a regional basis, with the central authority exercising a supervisory, co-ordinating and financial function rather than playing an executive role. Its most devoted protagonists are to be found in eastern Europe, notably Czechoslovakia and the USSR, but other developed countries in Europe and the Americas are either experimenting with the idea, or, as the United Kingdom, have already adopted it for the national hospital services.

Concomitantly with regionalization, the concept of the "integration" of curative and preventive health services is also gaining ground. Preventive and curative medicine are not easily "integrated" in the strictest sense of the term, but their co-operative association is inescapable since they are complementary parts of a whole.

Hospital services

In certain countries, this association of preventive and curative medicine is finding a focal point in the hospitals. It is only in a limited number of territories or in special circumstances that all medical care services are centralized in or radiate from the hospital. Yet unquestionably the ivory tower of the hospital is beginning to crumble, and a better co-ordination of the institution with ambulatory and domiciliary medical care is being established.

Other old concepts regarding hospital services are being revised. In spite of the fact that an ageing population demands more hospital care, the average length of stay in the diagnostic and therapeutic institution is tending to diminish rather than to increase. The specialized hospital for the treatment of a disease entity or group is losing ground, and many of the services they provided, including those for mental illness, the chronic diseases, tuberculosis and the infectious diseases, are coming under the wing of the general hospital. In particular, beds for infectious diseases and tuberculosis have become redundant on a very large scale and have been redeployed advantageously. One country which was faced with the necessity of making extensive provision for the post-war increase in tuberculosis fortunately built its new sanatoria with a view to their ultimate use for other purposes, and now uses some of them for the treatment of mental disease.

An increase in the number of beds allocated to the mental disorders, however, is not everywhere necessary. Mention has already been made of the trend in this field, which seeks, wherever possible, to substitute community care for institutional treatment.

The available statistics on hospital provision as indicated by the number of inhabitants per hospital bed are given in table 17 of the *Compendium of Social Statistics*. Although there is still a wide range in the standard of provision, it is obvious that there has been a very considerable increase in the number of hospitals in many countries during the past decade. But this quantitative improvement does not give the whole picture. Hospitals can still be concentrated in the large towns and remain relatively inaccessible to the inhabitants of the rural areas. The needs of these areas, however, are being met by the development of health centres, usually with a small number of beds. All the local health services are often based on these units. Many developed countries are also beginning to organize hospital services in echelon from the periphery to the centre, thereby facilitating economical concentration, in terms of equipment and personnel, of the more specialized forms of treatment.

Availability of health personnel

Table 17 of the *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963* also records another ratio which is used to give some indication of the standard of health service provision. This is the population per physician ratio. It is of limited significance, however, though it serves broadly to underline the grave differences which still exist between the developed and the less developed countries. In Europe and the eastern Mediterranean area, the range is from one qualified doctor to 410 habitants, which is the figure in Israel, to 1 per 3,500 population, which represents the position in Turkey. The modal ratio, however, is about 1 to 900. In Argentina and the United States, it is 1 to 730 and 1 to 800 respectively, but countries like the Dominican Republic and El Salvador have ratios at or about the one physician to 5,000 population mark. India and Ceylon, with ratios 1 to 4,900 and 1 to 4,700 are below European standards but are far in advance of Nepal with one doctor to 72,000 and Indonesia with 1 to 40,000. Africa also gives evidence of very low levels of doctor availability and one doctor to 13,000 persons, as in the Congo (Brazzaville), constitutes a relatively high level of provision. In Ghana, there is one doctor for every 21,000 inhabitants and 1 to 38,000 in Nigeria.

These figures have the further significance that, broadly speaking, a deficiency in doctors is usually accompanied by a dearth of health personnel in other grades.

Previously, the acute shortage of physicians has been met by training persons generically described as "medical assistants", who have a shorter and more pragmatically orientated course of training than the qualified doctor. These medical assistants have worked with great acceptance and success in many parts of the world, but the tide would now appear to be setting against them, for many of the schools which previously trained them are either closing down or are concentrating on a full medical curriculum. This tendency emphasized the need for training large numbers of auxiliary workers who have received relatively short periods of training, but who are able nevertheless to be of considerable assistance in nursing, midwifery and sanitation. The incorporation of these auxiliary workers in the health teams, together with the professionally trained physicians, nurses or sanitary engineers, has enabled many countries to extend their health services to larger sections of the population.

It is, however, abundantly clear that further steps must be taken to meet the needs of the emerging countries for doctors and other health personnel of all grades. This cannot be done overnight, but the record of India during the past decade is an example of what can be achieved. Between 1955 and 1960, the number of medical schools in India was increased from 42 to 60, and the number of student places from 3,500 to 6,400. Such an expansion is the result of careful planning, and requires for its execution considerable international co-operation. This has been one of the main fields of activity of WHO, which has regularly assigned professors and lecturers in subjects

throughout the whole health field in many parts of the world. In 1960, 90 teachers in 16 different subjects were made available to 24 countries.

The past ten years have not only seen an increase in the number of medical schools, but have been characterized by new ideas and procedures in medical education. Many experiments now in progress have been motivated by the realization that some steps had to be taken to organize medical curricula in the light of the future needs of the community with regard to medical care. While, in some countries, general practitioners seem to have been relegated to a minor role of activity, yielding place to the specialists, this cannot be the trend of evolution, more especially in the developing countries. In most countries, therefore, the general practitioner must continue to be the backbone of the medical care services, and much thought is being given to the place of general medical practice in the health programmes of the future. There is clearly a need for a new type of general practitioner, better qualified to deal with the problems of preventive and social medicine, mental health and family pathology. His relationship to the hospital and its specialists and his place in the health team still require to be worked out.

Planning for the health services[34]

Professional education in the health field is fundamental for the development of health and medical care services, but long-term planning is equally important for their phased evolution. Planning has a much wider connotation than the health services alone. It has as its objective the social, economic and technical development of a country, and health fits into this "grand" design precisely because of its social and economic implications.

This was the case with the USSR, where planning was initiated in 1921, and assumed the form of five-year plans in 1929. Similarly, in India the development of the health services has been regarded as part of the national development plan since 1938. In 1946, the well-known Bhore Report emphasized the need for rural development and rural health services, through, wherever possible, integration of preventive and curative services and free provision of medical care to the individual. These ideas were incorporated in the first five-year development plan which was launched in 1951, and were repeated in the second plan ending in 1960, and find their place steadily expanding and becoming more comprehensive in the third plan, which is now operative. Other countries which early adopted planning as their approach to the solution of public health problems were Czechoslovakia and the United Arab Republic, and to this list must now be added many other countries, including Cambodia, Ceylon, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Finland, Iran, Mauretania, the Republic of Korea, Turkey and Yugoslavia. Even where the planning of the health services has not been tackled comprehensively, there are many examples of planning for more limited purposes. The most conspicuous examples are to be found in relation to the planning and rationalization of hospital services which is taking place in many countries in Europe and North America. Apart from hospitals, specific planning would appear to have been directed to the organization of health services, with particular reference to the combination of the preventive and curative aspects of medicine in the rural areas, not only in the tropics, where the need to do so is paramount, but also amongst the rural communities of Europe. The creation and subsequent multiplication of a suitable type of rural health centre, which should be the focal point of all health services and medical care activities, would appear to be the objective of a number of countries.

A description of the experiences of pioneers in this field, and a statement of the principles of health service planning are to be found in the recently published fourth report of the WHO Expert Committee on Public Health Administration.[35]

Planning leads by a series of steps to the formulation of policy and later to its execution. But between these points there are at least two other phases, namely, the financing of the plan and its its programming.

At the national level, the statement of health expenditure does not necessarily give an idea of the extent of the planning or the amount of programming which is in hand. A statement of national expenditure on health is not yet available to any extent in a standardized form. This is due to a number of reasons, which are not limited to the financial resources of the country, but include such matters as the extent to which the cost is distributed amongst central and local authorities. A few countries, however, are beginning to give their health budgets a more rational form of presentation by dividing the expenditure into two parts: the first covering the development of a plan or of services, the second covering the maintenance of existing services and including the cost of maintaining the new services of the plan as they become available.

Even where statements of expenditure on health services are available, they are not necessarily informative or suitable for purposes of international comparisons. There is a very great difference in the level of expenditure in individual countries. Furthermore, in addition to the governmental expenditure on health, there is also the expenditure of the public on its personal self-medication and on health care privately obtained. It is clear that, for the purpose of programming, financial information does not give any clear and useful information or any indication as to trends.

If the programme of the health services is looked at on a world-wide basis, the existence of certain of these trends can be detected, and an idea can be obtained of what is now regarded by countries as constituting their most important pressure points. On this matter the budgets of WHO are both informative and instructive.

A comparison of the programmes and budgets of 1950 and 1960 discloses a noteworthy variation in trend. The International Health Conference, which met in New York in June 1946 and drew up the constitution of the World Health Organization, agreed that, in order to attain its objectives of "the achievement by all peoples of the highest possible level of health", the Organization should have twenty-two carefully defined functions, some of which were obviously of greater urgency than others.

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.

[35] WHO, *Planning of Public Health Services*, Fourth Report of the Expert Committee on Public Health Administration, Technical Report Series, No. 215, Geneva, 1961.

The First World Health Assembly in 1948[36] assigned priorities to certain subjects — malaria, tuberculosis, venereal disease, maternal and child welfare, nutrition and environmental sanitation. Most Governments which at that time were seeking the assistance of WHO made requests that were in accordance with this listing of priorities.

But, by 1950, the general policy of the organization, taking into account the wishes of Governments, began to move away from this somewhat narrow and restrictive pattern, to a system which endeavoured to provide any form of assistance needed by Governments for the general promotion and care of health. In this endeavour, the organization was greatly assisted by the institution in the second half of 1950 of the United Nations Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance.[37]

The departure from the previously somewhat stereotyped pattern of assistance was indeed considerable. New projects included, *inter alia*, such matters as the establishment in association with FAO of a Brucellosis Centre in South Africa, the provision of medical literature and teaching material in many countries, the organization of an Inter-American Seminar on Biostatistics, studies of endemic goitre, the preparation of plans for a 200-bed children's hospital and the strengthening of national teaching institutions.

By 1960,[38] the scope of the Organization's interest included radiation and isotopes and the organization of courses in radiation protection; the more detailed survey of public health administration, with special emphasis on rural health units; the organization of medical care in general, and more specifically the study of hospital statistics and of hospital administration. The range of interests was also broadened to include occupational health, the provision of health laboratories, the epidemiology of the mental disorders and cardio-vascular disease, as regards both causation and surgical treatment. The whole gamut of problems concerned with professional training in the health field was constantly under review.

The enlarged membership of the Organization and the application in the health field of many of the scientific discoveries of the previous decade were together responsible for a threefold increase in the Organization's budget between 1950 and 1960.

One has only to consider the tremendous efflorescence of new therapeutic discoveries, the development of techniques for the cultivation of viruses which brought the control of poliomyelitis within the bounds of practical possibilities, and the combined triumphs of surgeon, anaesthetist and physiologist which enlarged the scope of cardiac surgery, to realize the strides which research has made and the avenues of preventive and curative medicine which it has opened up. Other trends in research were also beginning to manifest themselves; a ministry concerned with the welfare of war veterans might instigate an inquiry into the effect of lower-limb amputation on longevity; a food ministry might wish to know more about the nutrition of the population at its various levels of family size and economic status; or a labour ministry might seek to ascertain the reasons underlying minor industrial illnesses and the absences they caused.

In 1958, WHO began to participate energetically in the research field. Its entry was facilitated by a special grant of $300,000 from the Government of the United States of America, which was applied to a study of the role of WHO in research and the preparation of a plan for the furtherance of research under the Organization's auspices. From this has sprung WHO's medical research programme to supplement national efforts in the same field. It will deal mainly with communicable diseases — especially those prevalent in the tropics — and with virus diseases, problems of nutrition, cancer, cardiovascular disease, health problems arising from the use of ionising radiations and studies in human genetics.

These trends in planning, programming and research are of importance in relation to the United Nations Development Decade. The resolution of the General Assembly regarding the Development Decade included among the approaches and measures designed to accelerate the social and economic advancement of Member States those which aimed at "the elimination of illiteracy, hunger and disease, which seriously affect the productivity of the people of the less developed countries" and those directed to promote "education in general and vocational and technical training in the developing countries... in the fields of... health". In addition, it advocated the intensification of research and the progressive introduction of statistical facilities.

The policy of WHO on these matters has sought to attain the following objectives:

(*a*) Preparation of national plans for the development of public health programmes for the Decade, and the co-ordination of these with other related plans in the social and economic fields;

(*b*) Concentration upon the education and training of professional and auxiliary staff which would strengthen the health services, with specific and measurable targets appropriate to the predetermined needs;

(*c*) Establishment of a small number of indices of the current national health situation, as baselines from which to guage the extent of progress towards certain goals already set as target figures;

(*d*) Appropriation of additional national resources for control of disease and health improvement.

In most countries, the attainment of these objectives postulates increased allocation of the national resources to the health sector. Information regarding the proportion of total governmental funds which is donated to health services is incomplete. It is known, however, that the proportion varies considerably from country to country. Furthermore, the distribution between the several parts of the health service of the funds provided also varies, and depends on the local situation, and on the relative degree of priority and urgency which may be assigned to each part. There is evidence that much more thought is being given to the study of these questions, and WHO continued to explore them through its expert committees, and to give guidance and assistance wherever it is sought.

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[36] World Health Organization, First World Health Assembly, 1948, *Official Records No. 13.*

[37] World Health Organization, Programme and Budget Estimates, 1950, *Official Records No. 18.*

[38] World Health Organization, Geneva, 1959, *Official Records No. 97.*

Chapter IV

FOOD AND NUTRITION

This chapter presents a brief review of trends in food production and nutrition during the last decade and of prospects for the future. It also deals with measures taken by Governments, sometimes with international assistance, to improve the nutritional status of the population of the world.

Food production, food consumption and nutrition

The food and nutrition situation in most less developed regions of the world has been characterized during the last decade by the increasing pressure of population growth in relation to available agricultural resources. The early 1950s witnessed the beginning of what has been defined as the population explosion. Advances in the field of medicine and public health have been rapidly reducing mortality rates without any parallel decreases in birth rates. Indeed, economic and social development, which would be likely to reduce birth rates, has often been slowed down by increasing population pressure. For these regions of rapid population growth, in the absence of any revolutionary changes in the methods of agriculture, even the maintenance of existing levels of food consumption, not to speak of improvements in the diet, calls for strenuous efforts.

Food production

Tables 1 and 2 show the trend of total and *per capita* food production since the beginning of the decade. The average for the five-year period 1948/49 to 1952/53 has been taken as the basis for comparison with the situation around 1960/61. It can be seen that total food production has increased by around 20 per cent in Africa, where the rate of expansion is very slow, and also in North America, where deliberate checks have been introduced to slow down food production. This increase was around 40 per cent in the Far East and Near East, and more than 50 per cent in eastern Europe. On the other hand, *per capita* figures show quite a different picture. The increase in population numbers has severely limited the quantitative and qualitative improvement in diets which could have been expected as a result of increases in food production. In Latin America, for instance, *per capita* food production continues to be below the pre-war levels; although in exceptionally good years, such as 1958/59, it has reached pre-war levels. In spite of the largest annual increases of total production in the Far East, *per capita* production rose to pre-war levels only towards the end of the decade. In the Near East, however, *per capita* production is now about 10 per cent above the low levels prevailing in the pre-war period. In Africa a rather stationary situation with some ups and downs has prevailed.

Thus the major food problem in the less developed countries at the end of the last decade continued to be under-production. The considerable technological progress made in the decade 1950-1960 in the field of food and agriculture and in related fields appears to have benefited the more developed regions. It has been proposed, accordingly, that during the present decade—the "Development Decade"—action be focused in the less developed regions on the diffusion of advanced agricultural techniques (such as chemical fertilizers, better seeds, soil improvement, better farming implements and pesticides); on bringing new arable land under cultivation; on production incentives, such as fair and stable prices, land reforms, credit and marketing facilities; on basic institutions and services, such as agricultural administration, research and extension, education and training; and on better storing, processing and distribution of food.

Food supplies for human consumption

Table 3 shows the trends in the *per capita* food supplies for human consumption in terms of calories and proteins in different countries. In most under-developed regions, the caloric intakes show a slow but steady upward trend. In the Far East, for instance, most countries show increases of the order of 100 to 300 calories *per capita* per day during the past decade. In the few Near Eastern countries for which information is available, increases of the same order of magnitude are to be noted. In Latin America, the caloric levels show only a slight upward trend.

Although from the quantitative viewpoint there have been some improvements, the picture regarding quality, as reflected by protein of animal origin, is quite different. In the worse-fed regions, very little progress, if any, has been attained in this direction. For instance, few countries in the Far East have increased to any substantial degree their intake of animal protein in the last ten years. In Latin America there seems to be a slight increase in the intake of animal protein.

The data on which estimates of this nature are based are, however, of an approximate nature only; therefore they do not exclude small changes from one year to another, or from one country to another, which in this context have little or no significance.

It is not easy to make projections for the future from these trends, since so many factors difficult to foresee are involved. Perhaps the most that can be said is that, unless drastic changes occur, the less developed regions may continue to satisfy their quantitative needs in spite of increasing population numbers, but probably at the expense of the quality of the diet, by diverting agricultural and economic resources from the production of foods of animal origin to less expensive vegetable foods.

Differences between individual countries must, of course, be expected.

Surveys on diets and nutritional status

Most information on food supplies for human consumption is based on statistics on production, trade and distribution. In addition, data on diets and nutritional status are obtained through detailed surveys, usually carried out among samples of various sections of the population. The results of such surveys, however, are not representative of the total population for most countries; and this is especially true of developing countries, where wide-spread incidence of malnutrition is well known, although the surveys may provide some reasonably accurate indices of the incidence of various types of malnutrition present in the areas surveyed. Thus, the actual numbers or the percentages of the total population affected by malnutrition and under-nutrition can only be estimated roughly. Furthermore, the seriousness of the situation cannot be judged only by the number of severe clinical cases. Even sub-clinical conditions are likely to impair the optimum growth, health an efficiency of affected individuals.

The Far East is probably the region having the largest numbers and the largest proportion of the population suffering from varying degrees of nutritional deficiences. Insufficient intake of proteins, in relation to quantity and especially to quality, results in much protein malnutrition, particularly among children, although the degree of incidence varies widely among the different countries. In some countries, vitamin A deficiency leads to much blindness, while in other countries anaemia, rickets, pellagra, beriberi and other deficiency diseases are often prevalent.

In Latin America also, protein malnutrition is wide-spread, especially in the Caribbean and Central America. Vitamin A deficiency is also found, often in association with protein deficiency. Anaemia and endemic goitre are among other deficiency diseases prevalent in some parts of the region.

The main nutritional problem in Africa likewise is protein malnutrition, which is wide-spread in most of the continent, and is particularly serious among persons subsisting on cassava and plantains. The variations in the nutritional problems among the different countries, and even within different sections of the same country, are often as great as in many other regions.

Protein malnutrition and marasma appear to be almost inevitably associated with diarrhoea in the Near East. Anaemia is the most common deficiency disease, while pellagra still occurs in some rural areas where maize is the chief food consumed. Avitaminosis A and mild forms of ariboflavinosis are also wide-spread in the region.

On the other hand, in the economically advanced regions such as western Europe and North America, the problem is often too much rather than too little food consumption. Problems of malnutrition may, however, exist to some extent here and there, even in countries with high average levels of food consumption.

Projections indicate that hunger will still persist [1] as a major world problem at the end of the present decade, particularly in the Far East, even under the best foreseeable conditions. Malnutrition will be even more difficult to eliminate. It is believed unlikely that livestock production in low-income countries can keep pace with rising potential demand, and the shortage of animal protein will therefore continue. On the other hand, with improved food technology and the development of new sources of food, the quality and quantity of diet may improve appreciably; for example, it has been indicated that the seas and oceans, which cover 90 million square miles of the earth's surface, could provide much more food for human consumption than is at present derived from this source; it is expected, however, that, with fuller development, every acre of sea could yield one to three tons of organic plant and animal matter a year.[2] Finally, the unwillingness of the peoples of the less developed regions to accept undernourishment would in itself serve as a stimulus for improved nutrition.

1 See Food and Agriculture Organization, *Agricultural Commodities Projections for 1970*, Rome, 1961.

2 See Food and Agriculture Organization, *Fish — The Great Potential Food Supply* (Rome, 1961), p. 47.

Table 1

TOTAL FOOD PRODUCTION *

	Pre-war average	*Average 1948/49-1952/53*	*Average 1953/54-1957-58*	*1961/60*
		(1948/49-1952/53 = 100)		
Western Europe	95	100	120	135
Eastern Europe and USSR	97	100	123	153
North America	72	100	109	153
Oceania	87	100	108	128
Latin America	80	100	117	130
Far East except China (mainland)	98	100	120	138
Near East	87	100	125	141
Africa	81	100	125	121
All above regions	86	100	117	134

* Adapted from FAO, *State of Food and Agriculture*, 1961.

Table 2

PER CAPITA FOOD PRODUCTION [a]

	Pre-war average	*Average 1948/49-1952/53*	*Average 1953/54-1957/58*	*1960/61*
		(1948/49-1952/53 = 100)		
Western Europe	104	100	115	124
Eastern Europe and USSR	92	100	113	132
North America	86	100	100	102
Oceania	106	100	96	103
Latin America	107	100	104	102
Far East except China (mainland)	117	100	110	118
Near East	103	100	112	113
Africa	99	100	104	98
All above regions	100	100	107	114

[a] Adapted from FAO, *State of Food and Agriculture*, 1961.

NATIONAL FOOD AND NUTRITION POLICIES

Trends in food and agriculture policies during the past decade can best be considered by groups of countries. In North America (particularly the United States), efforts have been made to reduce the costly burden of agricultural surpluses to more manageable proportions and to channel food surpluses as an aid to the economic and social development of less developed countries. In western Europe, important developments have taken place in the evolution of a common agricultural policy for the European Economic Community. In the USSR, a much more intensive form of agriculture, involving drastic modifications in agricultural production policies, is foreshadowed in a new perspective plan. In the economically less developed countries, there is growing emphasis on agricultural planning; an increasing number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are not only drawing up plans for the development of the agricultural sector but also are relating these plans more and more with plans for over-all social and economic development.[3] Although nutritional considerations are often not brought into agricultural planning, a beginning has been made in the integration of nutrition into health plans in the context of over-all social and economic development. Corresponding administrative measures, such as the formation of national interdepartmental food and nutrition committees, have also been taken in some instances.

The serious and urgent nature of the food and nutrition problems, as brought about by the importance of the malnutrition problems and faulty dietary habits found by the medical, public health and other field personnel in most of the developing regions, and the need for concerted and co-ordinated effort for the improvement of food supplies, are linked to an increasing number of requests for FAO's assistance in the formulation of national food policies oriented towards better nutrition. In some cases, assistance has also been requested in the formulation of regional policies. A noteworthy example of this occurred in Central America, where an FAO expert helped to lay the basis of a programme for the solution of one of the main nutritional problems in the area—namely, the shortage of protein of good quality.

International attention has been given to these matters with increasing intensity during the past few years. For instance, in June 1960, a Technical Meeting on Nutrition in Food Policy and Planning in Asia and the Far East was convened in Bangkok by FAO. The meeting discussed the technical as well as the organizational aspects of the formulation of food policies and plans from the viewpoint of nutritional improvement, taking into account all the varied but interrelated factors—technichological, economic and social. In September 1961, the Fourth Inter-African Conference on Food and Nutrition, held in Douala, Cameroun, in-cooperation with WHO, discussed the same problems with special reference to Africa, and suggested lines of action most likely to be successful under the conditions prevailing in the region, especially the establishment of a Regional Food and Nutrition Commission for Africa.

Both meetings have been highly successful in focusing the attention of all persons responsible for development planning, not only on the nutritional aspects of the problem, but especially on the interrelationships of different aspects. Accordingly, efforts are being made to hold similar conferences in other regions. The Fifth Conference on Nutrition Problems in Latin America, planned for early 1963, will consider mainly nutrition in connexion with food and health policies and plans in that region.

The degree to which such regional meetings yield immediate results is closely linked with the relative interest of individual Governments in planning their economies, and especially in planning for agriculture in relation to nutritional needs. There are, however, indications that whenever plans for economic and social development are formulated, nutrition begins to play a more important policy role.

INCREASING SUPPLIES OF PROTECTIVE FOODS

As already indicated, protein malnutrition is most frequent among deficiency diseases. Suitable sources of

[3] See Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture* (Rome, 1962), p. 56.

protein-rich foods of animal origin (such as milk, meat, eggs and fish), which could easily prevent this serious form of malnutrition, are usually scarce and expensive. In many countries it is, for a number of reasons, impossible to produce sufficient of these animal foods at a reasonably low price, and it is expected that this will remain so for a long time to come.

Considerable amounts of vegetable foods high in protein, such as pulses and nuts, are consumed in some countries; but even they are not always available in sufficient quantities, or their preparation in forms suitable for infants and young children is not well known.

In general, in less developed countries, fresh protein-rich foods must be preferred for feeding vulnerable groups; but problems of agricultural and horticultural production, and of transportation and storage may make it desirable to look for cheap processed foods instead, whenever their production is feasible, because of existing local sources and the possibility for both proper quality control and low-cost manufacture. On the other hand, processing makes the commonly used foods somewhat more expensive, but this may often be offset by better keeping quality, ease of handling and storage, and prevention of waste.

So far, seven potential protein-rich foods of high biological value have been studied in more detail in a number of countries by FAO in co-operation with WHO and UNICEF. These are: soy products, cotton-seed flour, ground-nut flour, fish flour, sesame flour, sunflower-seed flour and coconut protein. The last three products have been investigated only to a limited extent.

Cotton-seed, ground-nuts, sesame and coconut are of particular interest, since ordinarily they are processed for their oil, and the protein-rich residues, by-products of the oil production, are used mainly for animal feed or for fertilizer. If it is economical to use these materials for such purposes, it should certainly be economical to use them for human foods, if carefully controlled processing could provide products suitable for human consumption. Even if a small part of this production could be diverted to human use, a substantial contribution to improving the quality of diets would be made, but many difficulties, mostly technical, will have to be overcome. Many residues of this kind contain much impurity and dirt, or have been processed in such a way that the protein has lost part of its digestibility and biological value. The final product will have to be acceptable to the potential consumer after having been incorporated in suitable diets or foods typical for the region or area, and this is not always easy. Education programmes to popularize such foods are usually necessary.

Much of what has been said here has been brought to the attention of Governments, either through Regional FAO Conferences or through more specialized seminars and meetings, such as the Regional Nutrition Meetings and Conferences organized by FAO and WHO, the FAO Fish-in-Nutrition Conference held in Washington, D.C., in September 1961, the FAO/CCTA Technical Meeting on Legumes in Agriculture and Human Nutrition held at Bukavu in the Congo in 1958, the FAO Regional Seminar in Food Technology held in Mysore, India, in 1958 and others.

Many Governments, having become aware of the protein malnutrition problems in infants and young children, have taken action accordingly, sometimes with the assistance of the international agencies concerned. Greater milk production and milk conservation have been undertaken in many less developed countries; neverthe-

Programmes to produce and to promote the use of these countries.

Programmes to produce and to promote the use of some of the cheaper types of high-protein foods (fresh or processed), such as cheaper varieties of fish and fish-flour, ground-nut or cotton-seed products, within the economic means of the poorer section of the population, are being carried out by a number of Governments in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Cotton-seed flour products are being promoted, or are under study, in the Central American countries, and in countries in the Near East (including Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and the United Arab Republic). Fish flour is being produced, or its production is being studied in, for example, Chile, Federation of Malaya, Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru and Senegal. Ground-nut flour products for human consumption are manufactured in India and West Africa. These programmes are, however, still being conducted on a limited scale.

As the technical problems are gradually solved, educational programmes are needed to introduce the unfamiliar foods to the public and to ensure their acceptance. These "promotion" programmes use, to a considerable extent, the methods employed by commercial firms in popularizing new food products. FAO has assisted several Governments in such programmes, and may be able to expand this type of activity through the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, of which more will be said below.

The role of the health authorities in introducing new foods particularly rich in protein to the vulnerable groups, through the medium of hospitals, health centres and dispensaries, is not to be underestimated.

Education and training in nutrition and home economics

Poor dietary patterns leading to malnutrition are caused by lack of available food supplies, by lack of money to buy enough of the foods necessary for good nutrition, or by poor choice and use of available foods. Directly or indirectly, education in food and nutrition can help to counteract each of these causes.

Nutrition education is a necessary complement to other measures aimed at improving nutrition, because it teaches people to take advantage of these measures. For example, the introduction of enriched rice, the marketing of cheap kinds of fish or of dried skim milk are no guarantee that people will actually buy and eat these products. Personal tastes, established cooking practices, conservatism of the community elders or beliefs about ill-effects of certain foods are likely to inhibit their acceptance. For example, the belief that consumption of animal protein foods by nursing mothers makes their milk toxic for young babies leads to much unnecessary malnutrition in a number of countries. Such a belief would not disappear just because more fish or eggs became available.

*Table 3**

ESTIMATED CALORIE AND PROTEIN CONTENT OF NATIONAL AVERAGE FOOD SUPPLIES PER CAPUT

Region and country	Calories				Total protein				Animal protein			
	1948/49-1950/51	1954/55-1956/57	1957/58-1959/60	1960/61	1948/49-1950/51	1954/55-1956/57	1957/58-1959/60	1960/61	1948/49-1950/51	1954/55-1956/57	1957/58-1959/60	1960/61
	Number per day				Grammes per day				Grammes per day			
EUROPE												
Austria	2 670	2 900	2 980	3 010	77	85	87	88	30	42	45	47
Belgium-Luxembourg	2 890	2 970	2 920	2 930[b]	84	88	87	87[b]	38	44	46	47[b]
Denmark	3 240	3 360	3 390	3 340[b]	105	91	93	94[b]	60	52	57	59[b]
Finland	2 980[a]	3 160	3 110	3 090[b]	96[a]	98	94	93[b]	52[a]	55	53	52[b]
France	2 800	2 890	2 920	2 940[b]	92	95	97	98[b]	40	47	50	52[b]
Germany, Fed. Rep.[c]	2 730	2 990	2 940	2 940	79	79	79	80	32	43	46	48
Greece[d]	2 490	2 720	2 890	2 900[b]	76	87	93	93[b]	17	23	26	27[b]
Ireland[d]	3 340	3 540	3 510	3 570[b]	96	99	97	96[b]	47	54	57	57[b]
Italy	2 350	2 550	2 670	2 740	70	74	78	80	19	23	26	28
Netherlands	2 930	2 940	2 950	3 080	82	80	79	80	39	43	44	47
Norway	3 100	3 160	3 010	2 980[b]	99	89	84	82[b]	53	50	50	49[b]
Portugal[d]	2 320	2 450	2 440	2 420	67	70	71	70	21	23	26	27
Spain	2 490[e]	2 250	2 600	2 750[b]	70[e]	71	71	74[b]	18[e]	20	20	20[b]
Sweden	3 110	2 980	2 930	2 920	87	84	81	81	52[e]	53	52	53
Switzerland	3 170	3 130	3 060	2 980[b]	96	93	89	85[b]	51	52	51	51[b]
United Kingdom	3 130	3 260	3 290	3 290[b]	90	86	86	87[b]	45	50	51	52[b]
Yugoslavia[d]	2 690[f]	2 780	2 900	2 970[b]	87[f]	89	95	96[b]	20[f]	22	26	26[b]
NORTH AMERICA												
Canada	3 110	3 150	3 110	3 150[b]	93	97	94	96[b]	57	63	63	65[b]
United States[d]	3 180	3 150	3 110	3 120	91	94	92	92	61	66	65	65
FAR EAST												
Ceylon[d]	1 990[f]	2 070	2 030	2 150	43[f]	44	45	47	8[f]	8	9	9
China, Taiwan[d]	1 980	2 210	2 330	2 310[b]	43	53	57	56[b]	8	13	14	14[b]
India	1 630[a]	1 840	1 860[g]	...	44[a]	49	50[g]	...	5[a]	6	6[g]	...
Japan[h]	1 900	2 100	2 210	2 240	49	63	67	68	9	15	17	18
Pakistan	2 010[a]	1 990	1 980	2 080[b]	48[a]	46	46	48[b]	8[a]	8	7	7[b]
Philippines[d]	...	1 820[f]	1 870	1 950	...	44[f]	47	49	...	13[f]	14	15

AFRICA AND NEAR EAST												
Israel	2 680[j]	2 870	2 780	2 770[h]	88[j]	88	84	83[b]	34[j]	31	33	34[b]
Libya[k]	...	...	2 180[i]	...	...	...	53[i]	...	...	...	10[i]	...
Cyrenaica	...	...	2 100[m]	...	...	...	55[m]	...	...	...	17[m]	...
Mauritius[d]	...	2 290[i]	2 270	2 350	...	47[i]	46	44	...	10[i]	11	12
Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Federation of Southern Rhodesia	...	1 450[n]	...	...	...	75[n]	...	...	...	16[n]	...	...
South Africa[d]	2 640	2 590	2 640	2 560[i]	73	74	73	72[i]	27	31	30	30[i]
Syria	...	...	2 330[n]	...	...	...	78[o]	...	...	...	17[o]	...
Turkey	2 510	2 780	2 830[q]	...	81	88	90[q]	...	15	14	14[q]	...
United Arab Republic	2 370	2 570	2 580[q]	...	70	75	76[q]	...	12	13	13[q]	...
OCEANIA												
Australia	3 220	3 230	3 210	3 260[b]	97	91	91	93[b]	66	59	61	61[b]
New Zealand[d]	3 360	3 400	3 440	3 490	100	103	106	110	67	70	72	75
	1948	*1954-56*	*1957-59*	*1959*	*1948*	*1954-56*	*1957-59*	*1959*	*1948*	*1954-56*	*1957-59*	*1959*
	Number per day				*Grammes per day*				*Grammes per day*			
LATIN AMERICA												
Argentina	3 240	3 070	3 090	2 950	110	97	98	91	66	58	57	48
Brazil	2 180[p]	2 580	2 650[o]	...	55[p]	65	67[o]	...	15[p]	18	19[o]	...
Chile	2 370	2 540	2 570[o]	...	73	77	77[o]	...	23	26	26[o]	...
Colombia	...	...	2 200[q]	...	...	...	48[q]	...	...	...	23[q]	...
Ecuador	...	2 170	2 230	...	...	52	56	...	...	13	18	...
Mexico	...	2 380	2 440	...	...	64	68	...	...	17	20	...
Paraguay	...	...	2 500	...	...	...	68	...	...	...	26	...
Peru	...	...	1 970	2 060	...	...	49	52	...	...	12	13
Surinam	...	...	...	1 810	...	...	...	41	...	...	...	14
Uruguay	2 670	2 960	...	...	91	96	...	...	59	62	...	...
Venezuela	...	2 010	2 190	2 300	...	54	62	64	...	21	25	27

* See FAO, *Production Yearbook*, 1961, vol. 15, table 95.
[a] 1949/50-1950/51.
[b] 1959/60.
[c] From 1959/60 onward, including the Saar.
[d] Calendar years instead of split years.
[e] 1952/53-1953/54.
[f] 1952-53.
[g] 1957/58-1958/59.
[h] Refers to fiscal year, April-March.
[i] 1955-56.
[j] 1950/51.
[k] Whole territory of Libya, including Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan.
[l] 1959.
[m] 1957-58.
[n] 1951-53.
[o] 1957.
[p] 1948-50.
[q] 1956-58.

Evidence exists that education in nutrition can modify such attitudes and beliefs, can teach people to like new foods, and can show them the way to include these foods in their traditional diets, thereby leading to a substantial improvement in food consumption and nutritional status.

It is now generally recognized that merely increasing food production does not by itself provide a solution to the varied and complex problems of under-nutrition or malnutrition. Moreover, higher income or increased prosperity alone does not also automatically ensure better nutrition, unless the people are educated in basic nutritional principles. Increased prosperity often leads to increased consumption of foods high in calories but poor in protein, vitamin and mineral content, such as sugar, refined cereals and sweetened beverages. This raises the quantity of food consumed, but leaves the quality unchanged or makes it even poorer. Moreover, haphazard adjustments in diet resulting from increased purchasing power without education often result in wasteful use of food and money resources.

The increasing trend towards urbanization, which is taking place especially in less developed regions, improved transport and, in many areas, the shift from a subsistence to a cash economy, are causing millions of people to purchase their food in the market instead of producing it on their own farms. Since in every country the cost of food is a major item of expenditure (in labour or cash) in most households, and since the poorer the family the higher the percentage of the income which must be spent on food, the benefits of a wise use of resources are obvious, from the economic as well as the health point of view.

In this context, a major objective of nutrition education programmes is to promote the consumption of new foods of local or regional origin, which have a high nutritive content and are at the same time economically within the reach of local communities. A recent seminar has suggested that local production of protective foods could be stimulated by developing the use of school gardens and school food programmes as demonstration units.[4]

In the decade before the Second World War, the influence of diet on health was gradually being realized as the science of nutrition developed. Doctors, nurses and dietitians instructed patients and mothers attending clinics in the right way to feed themselves and their children. This pioneer effort, although a great step forward, relied principally on the printed "diet sheet", which listed the foods to be eaten at each meal. If a mother could not afford the eggs and meat and milk recommended, special assistance was often sought on a temporary basis.

During the intervening years, and especially during the past decade, the whole approach and attitude to education in nutrition has gradually changed. Understanding of the relationship between good nutrition and health, welfare, working capacity, and the economic and social development of a country is spreading throughout the world. It is now recognized that education in nutrition must go further than telling people what foods are required for a good diet. Education programmes must also tell people how to grow, select, purchase, preserve and use these foods to get the most for their money, and must teach them, through practice, to like the new foods and to replace, once and for all, bad food habits by good ones.

Education in nutrition can reach more people and be most effective if it is carried out through already established services in the community, such as schools, home economics and agricultural extension services, health, welfare and community development services.

Home economics programmes, for which FAO has major responsibility within the United Nations family, offer a practical contribution to the improvement of nutrition. There has been growing recognition of the need to teach elementary aspects of homemaking in primary schools in developing countries, since most girls leave to become wives and mothers without entering secondary schools. Thus, during the last ten years, more countries have started to include this subject in primary-school curricula for girls, and to a lesser extent for boys. The time devoted to this subject varies from one to two hours per week during one year of schooling, to ten hours per week in the last two years of primary school. Other countries, particularly those where few specialized home-economics teachers are available, combine home-making with other subjects. The extent and effectiveness of such integration depends, however, upon the training, interest and ability of individual teachers. Home economics is now taught to girls in some secondary schools in a number of countries, either as a compulsory or an elective subject, and is sometimes offered as an examination subject. In only a few instances is home economics offered to secondary schoolboys in co-educational institutions.

In adult education programmes for women, home economics is usually included as a major component. Particular attention should be given to the education of mothers in the principles of good and practical feeding of infants and pre-school children, in consultation and co-operation with medical and public health authorities. Home economics extension services direct their work towards families and help to train women in the techniques of food production and utilization. Community development programmes are opening up opportunities for home-making training, with emphasis on how best to produce and prepare food for family consumption.

There is thus an increasing demand for workers with adequate training in home economics, including nutrition, to organize, conduct and supervise or teach in programmes directed to the needs of schoolchildren, youth and adults. Home economics is being ever more frequently included in the training of primary and secondary schoolteachers and of community development and non-specialized village-level workers. Specialized home economics training is offered in colleges and at a number of universities in several parts of the world. Departments of Home Economics are sometimes established within faculties of agriculture, which offer opportunities to integrate training programmes with programmes for agricultural development.

A new development during recent years is the establishment of integrated programmes of education in nutrition in schools and communities, combined with

[4] See "Report of the UNICEF/WHO/FAO Regional Seminar on Nutrition Education", Mexico, October 1961.

school meals, school and community gardens, small livestock units and sometimes fish ponds. Many of these programmes have been stimulated by the decision of the UNICEF Executive Board, in 1957, to give support to activities of this kind designed to improve the nutrition of mothers and children through improvements in local food production and consumption. These programmes, which are sometimes strengthened by co-operative organizations (e.g., co-operative school gardens) and supervised credit programmes, require co-ordination of the activities of several disciplines at both the national and local levels, and particularly of agriculture, health and education. UNICEF offers equipment, supplies and stipends to Governments wishing to start such programmes on a pilot basis, on the understanding that they will eventually be taken over and extended by the Government concerned. FAO and WHO co-operate in planning these programmes and contribute technical assistance for their implementation, at the request of a Government. About twenty-five countries are now receiving help in establishing these integrated programmes, and in the next few years many more Governments are likely to request such aid.

The increased interest of Governments in the development of national nutrition programmes, and the rapid spread of applied nutrition programmes, have made the problem of training nutrition workers important to Governments. FAO, WHO and UNICEF have helped with training in nutrition through regional courses and seminars and through national programmes, but this training has mostly been *ad hoc*. It has been possible to provide a limited number of fellowships for training at universities or colleges in the fellow's region or abroad, but these have made only a small contribution towards meeting training requirements.

In view of the urgency of the need for adequately trained personnel, a survey of the present scope of training schemes in nutrition, the areas of training where great-est emphasis is needed, and of ways in which UNICEF, in co-operation with other international organizations, could provide greater help, was carried out in selected countries of Africa and Latin America and in India in 1960. The survey revealed that, in most countries, the teaching of human nutrition is almost wholly neglected in institutes, colleges and universities concerned with agriculture. Ignorance of human nutrition and human food needs is widespread and is often the result of a certain preoccupation with cash crops, with almost no thought for the ultimate purpose of food production. The need for educating agricultural students in human nutrition has been emphasized also by a FAO/WHO Symposium on Education and Training in Nutrition in Europe (1959).

The survey has shown that the teaching of nutrition in schools of medicine and public health is also often inadequate and largely theoretical. Training in nutrition, both basic and applied, should be incorporated in the curriculum. Whenever possible, nutrition should be a basic and compulsory course for all students.

Recommendations of the survey are being vigorously followed up, and it is expected that permanent training facilities will be considerably expanded during the next few years. This should help to meet the considerable need for training highly qualified specialists in nutrition programmes and teachers in colleges of agriculture, medicine, public health and other relevant disciplines.

Supplementary feeding programmes

Supplementary feeding may be defined as the organized provision, for special groups, of foods or meals additional to ordinary family diets in order to make up for nutritional deficiencies. Supplementary feeding programmes are generally undertaken for the benefit of " vulnerable groups ", a term applied to mothers, infants and children, since they have special nutritional needs and suffer ill effects much more readily if their diet is deficient.

In the world as a whole, supplementary feeding still reaches only a small percentage of mothers, infants and pre-school children, and it will be difficult to improve this situation very substantially in the near future, at least in rural areas. Maternal and child health centres are the most convenient and, indeed, almost the only available channel for food distribution to these groups; moreover, distribution of milk through these centres encourages attendance, bringing children within reach of medical attention in the crucial post-weaning and pre-school ages. In many developing countries, however, there are as yet only a few such centres.

The supplementary feeding of children attending school is practicable on a much wider scale. Prior to 1950, school feeding was carried out on an extensive or systematic basis in only a few countries. In recent years, however, surplus dry skim milk made available through UNICEF and various voluntary agencies, as well as through bilateral agreements, has enabled many Governments throughout the world to establish school feeding programmes. In many countries, the programme has been limited to the distribution of one glass of milk daily. In others, a simple supplement, such as bread or the local equivalent, is served, or children may be encouraged to bring some food from home to eat with their milk at school. In a few countries, the milk is part of a meal made from other locally available foods. The type of programme carried out depends in large measure on the resources of the country concerned, and on the initiative of those actually engaged in carrying out the programme. These programmes have contributed to a wider and better appreciation of the importance of diet to child health and development. Distribution of dry skim milk through schools has proved to be an excellent way of utilizing a surplus product without interfering with normal trade. In several instances, it has in addition helped to promote the development of local dairy industries.

In 1958, FAO, with the co-operation of UNICEF and WHO, organized regional school-feeding seminars for countries in South America, Asia, and the Far East. These seminars agreed that the utmost importance should be attached to associating a school feeding programme with education in nutrition, as part of the regular curriculum, and on other measures to improve diets, including extension of the programme to the home and the community. The co-operation of national and local agricultural, health and educational authorities is essential.

At the request of UNICEF, FAO and WHO carried out a survey on the use of dried skim milk during the period November 1958 to March 1959. One of the main

conclusions of the survey was that dry skim milk distribution associated with nutrition education was providing valuable results, and that it should be continued and, where possible, extended. Local food resources should be developed so that the programmes could be continued independently of outside help. Reference has already been made to the policy of expanded aid to maternal and child nutrition adopted by the UNICEF Executive Board in September 1957, the primary purpose of which is to increase the production and consumption of nutritious foods at the village level, in conjunction with supplementary feeding and education in nutrition.

In considering the future of supplementary feeding programmes, a distinction should be made between the relatively few countries where such programmes for the vulnerable groups are already firmly established on local resources, and the many countries where programmes started in recent years have been supported in large measure by the supply of food from abroad. No doubt programmes will continue in the former countries and, in many cases, will be improved and extended. In the latter countries, however, most programmes are in a critical stage of development, and a number of factors will determine their future.

First and foremost is the problem of food supplies. The most wide-spread and serious problem of pre-school children is protein-calorie malnutrition, caused by improper feeding priorities and shortage of good quality protein for the lower-income groups. Dry skim milk has for this reason been a most valuable asset for feeding programmes. In most countries which have received free milk for this purpose, indigenous milk supplies are grossly inadequate and economic considerations preclude the purchase of supplies at commercial prices from exporting countries, at least in the quantities needed to maintain programmes at anything like their present level. The development of adequate alternative supplies of low-cost nutritious foods will be a long-term effort.

FAO, WHO and UNICEF embarked a few years ago on a programme to develop and promote the use of new, cheap protein-rich foods suitable for child feeding.

At the local level, school and community efforts can make a useful contribution to the production of "protective foods" such as vegetables, fruits, poultry, fish and small animals which can supply vitamins, minerals and protein to accompany the high-calorie staples usually emphasized in large-scale production efforts. The content of these programmes should, of course, vary for each country according to the possibilities for developing the local dairy industry and for promoting the local production of adequate foodstuffs—it being understood that the distribution of skim milk from foreign sources and the promotion of protein-rich products are only temporary measures.

The nutrition problem is thus being tackled in many different ways, and continuous and intensive efforts will be needed on the part of all concerned, whether at the international, national or local levels. Training of workers who will be needed to implement programmes will require more and more effort.

Research and studies on nutrition problems

Many problems concerned with food and nutrition in developing countries have already been defined clearly enough to permit practical programmes to be started. Others still require investigation before effective solutions can be suggested. Governments and international agencies are, within the limits of their resources, putting increasing emphasis on the study of some of the more pressing problems.

The problems of food and nutrition which are of fundamental importance in many developing countries have already been mentioned, and include those of finding out what food is actually available to the population, what people eat and why, what their nutritional status is, how to make the best use of available foods and to improve daily consumption.

Much attention is now being given to the food aspects of studies in social anthropology, and especially to possibilities of deliberately promoting more rapid and desirable changes in food patterns than those already taking place. An international conference on Malnutrition and Food Habits, held in Mexico in 1960, sponsored by the World Federation for Mental Health, the Macy Foundation, WHO, FAO and UNICEF, dealt with topics of this kind.

Because protein deficiency (kwashiorkor) is one of the most serious nutritional problems in the world today, much attention has been given by Governments, United Nations agencies and universities to defining this condition and its causes, to ways of prevention and treatment, and to research on the processing, properties and safety of a number of inexpensive protein-rich foods which may alleviate the shortage for vulnerable groups. Much of this work has the additional value of throwing light on human protein requirements.

During the past few years, the Rockefeller Foundation, with the advice of FAO and WHO, has allocated funds to the Sub-Committee on Protein Malnutrition of the Food and Nutrition Board of the National Research Council of the United States to enable grants to be made to a number of scientists in developing countries for research projects to study various aspects of protein deficiency in relation to protein-rich foods.

Research is needed before new protein-rich foods, whether indigenous or imported, can be recommended for children. Such research must include the protein and amino-acid content of the foods, their digestibility, their biological value when eaten singly or in combination with other foods, the efficacy of the processing methods in protecting their nutritional value, the effects of other treatment likely to be given to them during their domestic preparation (e.g., by boiling or baking), their bacterial content, their keeping qualities, and the presence of traces of any additives used in their processing which may have toxic effects on children. A Protein Advisory Group, composed of eminent nutritionists and pediatricians, and sponsored by UNICEF, FAO and WHO, studies the findings of research and advises the heads of the three United Nations agencies on measures to combat protein malnutrition, and on the health and safety aspects of individual protein-rich foods. In particular, this group advises on the suitability of foods whose manufacture will be supported by the United Nations agencies, or which will be

supplied by UNICEF for supplementary feeding programmes.

Although a beginning has been made and certain methods and provisional standards recommended, much remains to be done in this field of research if new cheap protein-rich products are to be made available in quantities sufficient to have an appreciable effect on the world protein malnutrition problem.

Another important problem requiring further investigation is that of preventing waste and facilitating distribution and year-round availability of supplies through simple and inexpensive methods of preservation. However, the problems of improving traditional methods of preservation, in particular, have scarcely been touched, although these offer possibilities of processing foods within the economic reach of populations in developing areas. Products such as dried meat (known in some parts of Africa as *biltong*), dried fish (already prepared in many countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa), and fermented or hydrolized fish and legume products, such as fish sauces and pastes, soya sauces and curds and *tempe* (all common in Asia) are at present usually prepared by long and often unhygienic processes. Through the application of modern science and techniques, much might be done to speed up and improve preparation, resulting in products which are of higher nutritive value, as well as cheaper and safer.

The rapid increase of programmes in applied nutrition and home economics has created an urgent need to develop sound planning procedures and to evaluate the progress of these programmes on a continuing basis. A recent type of study, in which Governments and the United Nations agencies have begun to co-operate, is that of determining methods for the continual evaluation of field programmes in nutrition and home economics.

A fundamental field of research, much of which still remains to be explored, is the establishment of valid formulae for estimating human nutrient requirements. Recommended allowances or standards set up in developed countries with temperate climates are not necessarily applicable to populations of different race and physique, living in varied climatic conditions and with completely different ways of life. To facilitate expert critical examination of findings already available, FAO, in co-operation with WHO, has convened a number of technical committees on calorie, protein and calcium requirements and has published the conclusions. It is evident, however, that much more research on nutrient requirements is needed.

FAO provides a small direct contribution to research in its fields of interest, through the award of research fellowships for the training of top-level scientists in research work in various fields of interest to FAO. During the six years since this plan was instituted, fifty-eight fellowships have been awarded in fields with which FAO is concerned, including nutrition. However, the principal role of the United Nations agencies in food and nutrition research is to assist Governments in developing research facilities, and to encourage and co-ordinate this work.

Within the intensified medical research programme of WHO, a co-ordinated research programme is under way on the nutritional anaemias, beginning with the iron deficiency anaemias and also including the megaloblastic nutritional anaemias. A second co-ordinated research programme has been started on hypovitaminosis A, with particular reference to blindness caused by this deficiency. Research on nutrition requirements of protein during pregnancy and lactation is in preparation. Finally, the important interrelationship between malnutrition and infection is soon to be considered for research.

Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign and World Food Programme [5]

According to recent forecasts, the prospect for the current decade is that continuing food surpluses will coexist with continuing food shortages and malnutrition.[6] Therefore, the steadily increasing determination of Governments, as well as of the general public, to make fuller use of abundant supplies of food in some areas to relieve want and to foster economic and social development in the less developed countries, even though so far quite small in scale compared with other bilateral programmes, is potentially a development of very far-reaching significance. The growing interest in these problems in the United Nations, the gathering support for FAO's Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign, and the new developments in the Food-for-Peace Campaign in the United States are all indications of a growing world-wide awareness of the problem of extreme disparities between the more developed and the less developed regions of the world. The fuller utilization of food surpluses for the economic and social development of the less developed regions has thus appeared in recent years as a powerful new supplement to existing bilateral and multilateral aid programmes, although it is recognized that the use of food surpluses cannot in itself provide the ultimate long-term answer to the problem of food deficiency and malnutrition in the less developed countries.[7]

A notable new development is the experimental World Food Programme, jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the FAO. The programme is designed to explore methods of using the surplus food production of the more developed countries to aid economic and social development in the less developed countries, and to combat hunger and malnutrition generally, and famines and other emergencies more specifically. Three types of project

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5 See also Food and Agriculture Organization, *Development through Food: A Strategy for Surplus Utilization, Rome, 1961; ibid., Uses of Agricultural Surpluses to Finance Economic Development in Under-developed Countries: A Pilot Study in India,* Commodity Policy Studies No. 6, Rome, June 1955; *The Fourteenth Semiannual Report on Activities of the Food-for-Peace Program,* Message from the President of the United States to the 87th Congress, 1st Session, House Document No. 223, Washington, 1961; *Fifteenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on under Public Law 480,* Message from the President of the United States to the 87th Congress, 2nd Session, House Document No. 385, Washington, 1962.

6 See Report of the Joint Session of the United Nations Commission on International Commodity Trade and the FAO's Committee on Commodity Problems, Rome, 7-14 May 1962.

7 See Food and Agriculture Organization, *State of Food and Agriculture, 1961,* foreword.

under which food aid may be provided by the World Food Programme are:[8]

(*a*) Meeting emergency food needs and emergencies inherent in chronic malnutrition (including the establishment of food reserves);

(*b*) Assisting in pre-school and school feedings; and

(*c*) Implementing pilot projects, including the use of food as an aid to economic and social development, particularly in the context of labour-intensive projects and rural welfare.

The Freedom from Hunger Campaign launched by FAO is an intensification of efforts already under way for increasing food production, improving nutrition, and raising levels of living of the rural populations. The main objectives of the campaign so far have been to arouse public awareness of the dimensions of the problem of hunger and the need for accelerating over-all economic and agricultural development; and to stress the need for more co-operative action between countries in the food and agriculture sector.[9]

[8] Paper by the Food and Agriculture Organization on "World Food Program" presented to the Sixth FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East in connexion with item 6 (*d*) (iii) of the Provisional Agenda, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaya, 15-29 September 1962.

[9] *The United Nations Development Decade. Proposals for Action — Report of the Secretary-General* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.B.2), p. 43.

Chapter V

HOUSING, BUILDING AND URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING

Introduction

This review of development and trends in housing, building and urban and regional planning has two main objectives. The first is to analyse briefly developments and progress in the past ten years with a view to assessing the main achievements — or shortcomings — in this area of social and economic development. The second and probably the more important objective is to seek, from the experience and knowledge already acquired, to define the future direction of national and international policy if greater progress is to be made in matching improvement in housing and related facilities and in the general physical environment with population growth and movement, and with economic growth and rising social expectations.

During the nineteen-fifties, continuing concentration of population in and around urban and industrial centres and increasing use of motor vehicles have resulted in a host of physical planning problems, and have put a great strain on housing and community facilities and on economic and social development. Urban and regional planning has concentrated, first, on the selection of the geographical areas or regions to be developed; and second, on decisions regarding the types of development needed in a particular region and on the development standards and desirable characteristics for the component districts of each region. The scope of active physical planning still varies from one country to another, owing to local conditions. Four major trends are, however, clearly discernible in recent years. First, physical planning has necessarily gone beyond city development, extending into full urban and regional planning as a means of co-ordinating and stimulating balanced national development at the physical level. Second, it has begun to be closely connected with resource development planning, as a logical step towards integration with general economic programming.[1] Third, it has increasingly become an indispensable government function, since balanced development plans require co-ordination and supervision of individual or sectoral activity. Fourth, it has transcended the architectural type of land-use planning, and now takes social, economic and administrative considerations into account in order to ensure balanced development.

Developments and trends in housing, building and physical planning are analysed separately, but the three sectors are directly interdependent in the creation of an adequate physical environment for social and economic development.

[1] See the several articles in *Housing, Building and Planning*, Nos. 12 and 13, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.7; and the recent article by M. Miller, "The scope and content of resource policy in relation to economic development", *Land Economics*, vol. XXXVII, No. 4, November 1961.

General trends in housing, building and urban and regional development (1951-1961)

Dwelling production in relation to population and national resources

Housing has been defined in several United Nations reports[2] to mean dwelling units which meet minimum building standards of safety, health and comfort and enjoy easy access to place of employment and to related residential services of adequate standards, including water and waste disposal systems, electricity, communications and transport, shopping, cultural and recreational facilities. Standards regarding both the dwelling structures themselves and the related community facilities vary considerably from country to country, since they are determined nationally, regionally or locally in accordance with technical, social, economic, health, traditional and climatic considerations.

Administrative records and processes, set up for the enforcement of safety and health standards or in connexion with levying of property taxes, are the source of most available statistical data on annual house-building. The standards involved in this source of information usually apply to the structural condition of dwellings completed or approved for building, and to some major features relating to health, including natural illumination and ventilation, and such community facilities as water supply and sewerage systems. A general review of trends in the production of officially adequate dwellings is thus possible, subject, however, to a number of observations. For example, the returns for many less developed countries reflect only developments in major urban areas. The data are sometimes faulty, so that a precise knowledge of the method employed in their collection and analysis is necessary in order to avoid unfounded conclusions. A third major shortcoming, which is in fact inherent in the source and cannot be overcome directly, is that the data cannot give a complete picture. For example, they do not take into account community facility standards, other

[2] The Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development that was convened by the Economic and Social Council and met in New York from 7 to 21 February 1962, endorsed the following definitions: "The terms 'housing', 'community facilities' and 'urban development' used by the Group of Experts connote the physical environment of contemporary society, urban and rural. This embraces all parts of a residential community and its location within a given geographical area; the roads, public services and utilities which serve the community; its relation by means of transport to other structures, scenes and activities of contemporary society; and the general physical pattern to which all these conform. 'Housing' thus constitutes the physical environment in which the family, the society's basic unit, must develop." *Report of the ad hoc Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.1).

than the few basic utilities which are required for sanitary or similar reasons. These other community services and environmental standards will therefore be considered under the heading of urban and regional development and planning.

Dwelling needs result from a number of causes including replacement of dwellings that are demolished either because they are physically worn out or because the land they occupy is required for other purposes; housing of net additions to population, whether through natural increase or migration; and improvement of housing standards.[3] It is almost impossible to obtain statistics on dwelling demolition or conversion, or to separate numerically the reasons for it. Annual house-building may be related either to the total population estimated for each year or to the total housing stock. These ratios may be compared with the average annual increase of population to determine the extent of net improvement in housing supply. They provide a rough indication of development in housing supply and of probable improvement in over-all housing standards or levels; but assumptions on demolition and distribution of the accumulated stock must be made, or the relations between rents or building costs and incomes examined, before conclusions may be drawn about actual improvement of housing conditions in the widest sense. These questions are examined in the following subsections, which deal separately with conditions in the developed and in the less developed areas of the world.

Dwelling supply in Europe, North America and Oceania

Housing production and economic conditions. Satisfactory levels of housing output have been achieved and sustained in the most developed countries of Europe and in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States over the past decade, by comparison with population growth and the housing stock itself. This has been the result both private efforts and sustained government action, which has successfully co-ordinated housing and related improvement with economic growth and development. The improvement of housing and related conditions has been in the forefront of government policies during the decade and has received an adequate share of available investment resources as these expanded. This was due partly to the sheer magnitude of housing shortages after the Second World War and also, more importantly in the long run, to acceptance as a principle of social and economic policies of public action, intervention, assistance and encouragement to the improvement of housing and related conditions. Housebuilding has continued to increase relatively to over-all economic activity in most developed countries, but not as much as other kinds of construction.[4]

With few exceptions (among them Austria, Ireland and the United States), dwelling construction stood at considerably higher figures in 1960 than in 1950. Employment in construction was also generally greater at the end of the decade; however, in a number of countries, especially in the centrally planned economies of eastern Europe, building employment did not expland nearly as much as dwelling production over the decade, mainly because mechanization and industrialization of building processes were introduced to reduce labour requirements. Increases in industrial employment surpassed those in building employment in the countries with centrally planned economies and in several free-enterprise European countries, particularly Denmark, Finland and the United Kingdom.[5] Most developed countries have maintained high levels of employment throughout the decade, and all witnessed increases in building wages. In the free-enterprise countries of Europe and in the United States, building wages have generally increased more than prices of building materials and components, which have also increased. Urban building-land prices have also risen markedly in the free-enterprise economies.[6] A long-term trend towards higher costs is implicit in increasing standards of accommodation and equipment. Countries where household central heating has not been common (e.g., the United Kingdom) are now showing a trend towards it even in public housing in the lower-income groups. Many countries (e.g., the Scandinavian countries and the Federal Republic of Germany) consider that current dwelling sizes need to be increased, particularly in social housing.

As a result of the foregoing trends, input-price indices for house-building increased from 100 in 1953 to between 114 (Italy) and 131 (Austria) in 1960, in the developed free-enterprise countries.[7] These rising input factors and rising demand for scarce capital resources have given special point during the decade to measures to reduce real building cost by greater productivity through technical development and rationalization, and by planning the demand on building resources so as not to inflate costs. The trend in the ratio between the cost of an acceptable dwelling and the average wage-earner's income is a critical index of real building cost, which determines not only total investment in dwellings but also the extent to which public funds must subsidize rents. There is some evidence of a favourable trend in the more developed countries in this ratio which, if continued through rising productivity both in building and in other economic activity (since both contribute to a more favourable ratio) can profoundly affect the capacity of countries to expand their housing and related investment, and to bring industrialized housing within reach of the average family. The difference in the degree of subsidization required is already striking between countries where a minimum social dwelling costs five or six times a wage earner's annual income and those where it costs three or four times.[8]

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[3] A preliminary discussion of the "Proposed Methods of estimating Housing Needs" (E/CN.3/274) has taken place in the Statistical Commission and is reported on in "Progress Report on Development of Statistics for Social Programmes" (E/CN.3/296).

[4] See table 9 in the *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe,* 1960, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.II.E.5.

[5] Compare table 11 in the *Annual Bulletin... ibid.,* with table 6 in the *Statistical Yearbook, 1960,* United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.XVII.1.

[6] "European Seminar on Urban Development Policy and Planning", Warsaw, Poland, 19-29 September 1962 (United Nations, SOA/ESWP/1962/1-ST/ECE/HOU/9).

[7] Except for Portugal, which only increased to 101, and possibly Spain. See the *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe, 1960.*

[8] *Financing of Housing in Europe* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.II.E.3), p. 2.

Rent-income ratio. As has been reported in previous studies, [9] the increased government control and financing that occurred in Europe during the Second World War, and the years immediately following it, succeeded in reducing rents in relation to income. In most countries with centrally planned economies, this policy has been continued, although in Poland, Yugoslavia and eastern Germany there have been rent increases designed to ensure adequate return to cover maintenance and repair requirements, which is a difficult question with all low-rent or no-rent policies. In the free-enterprise countries, the rent-income relation has again been allowed to rise, in order to diminish subsidy expenditure, to stimulate private investment in rented dwellings and to cover increased maintenance costs. The extent of this reversal of policy is illustrated by comparing changes in the rent and general consumer price indices between 1938, 1953 and 1960. In Austria and Spain, the rent index (1953= 100) rose less than the general consumer index between 1953 and 1960; in the other west European countries, it rose between 9 and 103 points above it. The difference rose least in the United States between 1953 and 1960 (4 points), but even there, the 1938 indices were 53 for general prices and 70 for rent. The difference between 1953 and 1960 was greatest in Italy (91), where the 1938 indices stood at 2 for general prices and at 6 for rentals.[10]

In most European countries, housing has continued to be supplied or aided by Governments, but in smaller proportions than in the previous decade. In countries with centrally planned economies, national, regional and local governments have taken on wider functions in building and financing housing. This represents a departure from an earlier policy, whereby the bulk of housing was provided by industrial or agricultural enterprises so as to ensure that the limited amount of housing being provided was closely co-ordinated with economic development. The undertaking, with economic growth, of a higher volume of housing to meet general needs inevitably shifted responsibility for the provision of housing from economic enterprises and ministries to local government bodies. Another new policy emphasis was that of expanding the house-building efforts of individuals and co-operatives, as building materials became more freely available, to release supplementary personal resources and efforts. State assistance to the individual and co-operative sector has included the reduction of cost by the supply of fully developed land either free of charge or at economical rents, of building materials and equipment either free or at cost, and of free plans and technical assistance; by tax exemptions, and by government loans.

In the free-enterprise economies, extensive state assistance has also continued to be provided to individuals, organized groups and specialized institutions by means of favourable lending policies, outright building subsidies or sale of developed building sites.[11] The general picture, in free-enterprise and in centrally planned economies alike, has been an increased volume of housing as economic and social conditions improved, and a growing emphasis on the stimulation of individual or private activity with, in some countries (notably the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom) a reduction in the public financing of housing as private capital resources for housing increased. Most free-enterprise countries began during the decade to lift rent controls, in order to reduce the gap requiring subsidy between old and new rents, and to encourage private investments in rental housing and more economical use of available dwellings. That such policies were possible is indicative of the extent to which the acute post-war shortages were reduced during the decade.

Dwelling supply in Africa, Aisa, and Latin America

Housing production and economic conditions. In the past decade, housing output has lagged behind gross needs in some less developed countries of southern Europe and most countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. If a comparison is made with trends in the developed countries, the lower rate of building in the less developed areas is found in combination with a much higher rate of population growth, and an even higher rate of urbanization. In terms of the existing stock, trends are no better, since the stock is known to include a large proportion of substandard dwellings, probably as much as a half or two-thirds. What makes the situation most alarming is the fact that residential building takes just about as large a part of gross national product as it does in the developed countries, and an even larger part of construction and investment.

Availability of resources for house-building in the developing countries varies considerably with the degree of technological and economic development achieved; but, generally speaking, it offers a particularly sharp contrast with the developed countries, because development itself has not been taking place in a balanced manner. Thus, certain types of professional personnel, such as architects, are relatively abundant in some less developed countries (e.g., in Latin America); but this personnel cannot work intensively on housing programmes because other necessary resources are lacking. House-building in less developed countries usually occurs at three technological levels. The great majority of family dwellings, particularly in rural areas, are produced by small-scale craftsmen or by unaided self-help and mutual aid. Such building is guided by very primitive and usually inadequate standards with respect to water supply, disposal of excreta or waste, ventilation, illumination or safety. At a second level, usually confined to urban areas, small contractors construct simple one-family houses in permanent materials. At a third level, in the large cities, reasonably equipped building contractors engage in large-scale residential construction, often in multi-storey form.

The greatest single lack is in the production of dwellings for the lower-income groups which meet the economic and social requirements of the average wage-earning family; this lack is particularly evident in urban areas, where the absence of such dwellings in permanent materials sooner or later results in squatters' settlements, *bidonvilles* or shanty-towns. Even such countries as India, where energetic efforts have been made to provide housing of this type, the housing situation continues to deteriorate under the pressure of population growth and migration,

[9] Particularly in *Financing of Housing in Europe.*

[10] Table 15 in the *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe,* 1960.

[11] *Ibid.*

which in turn accelerates the depreciation of already obsolescent dwellings. The situation is deteriorating even faster in other developing countries where demographic, economic and social change are as rapid and house-building is less. The relatively high investments in housing and related services have failed to be directed into low-cost housing. In fact, in many cases investments have been channelled to the production of expensive dwellings, often as a speculation against currency depreciation. The three technological levels of house-building referred to correspond to the three economic and social levels at which housing and related programmes must be expanded, if over-all improvement in housing conditions is to take place. During the past decade, at each level measures appear to have been neglected which could have effectively expanded the total volume of house-building.

Traditional building of one's own house has continued to be undertaken without public aid, supervision or technical advice and, in particular, it has not been actively encouraged in urban areas. The injection of a small monetized sector as a device for bringing improved and more permanent methods into this largely non-monetized activity could immeasurably increase its contribution to housing improvement both in quality and in volume, particularly through its extension to urban areas. The production of small family dwellings by small-scale contractors has been accompanied neither by rigorous public research, development of minimum economical standards, and greater efficiency and productivity of contracting management and labour, nor by the creation of savings-for-homes institutions to provide a focus for small savings. Larger building operations have not been subjected to critical review of standards and social and economic objectives, so as to ensure that investment resources in building are utilized in accordance with desirable social and economic criteria. Measures such as the foregoing are, however, heavily dependent for their success on trained personnel at administrative and technical levels, and this represents a major deficiency in most developing countries.

Cost-income ratios. The relationship of dwelling cost to *per capita* income is the key to housing policy in developing countries as it is in the more developed countries. Unless this ratio can be reduced to a tolerable level, large housing programmes will remain beyond personal and national incomes. If in fact the ratio between the cost of an average dwelling and *per capita* income is ten to one, it would require virtually all investment resources in a typical developing country to build ten dwellings per 1,000 inhabitants per year, which has been estimated as the annual housing needs of developing countries.[12] Such an equation postulates an average dwelling cost and a firm national income estimate; these are two elusive elements to define in absolute figures. Nevertheless, the equation is helpful, since it emphasizes the need to relate the realization of a national housing policy, in terms of size, cost, design and amenity of dwelling, to the economic resources of the nation and of each economic category, of which the largest category only enjoys a meagre and often uncertain cash income. The problem has recently been strikingly put in one less developed area. A study[13] of the housing needs and problems of West Africa poses the question whether the mass of the African population can ever be housed. It is pointed out that 73 per cent of the population cannot afford a rent of more than 2,500 CFA per month;[14] yet at present it is not possible, with current technology, to build a one-room dwelling with sanitary equipment for less than 25,000 CFA. It is this dilemma which has prevented the expansion, in all less developed areas, of housing for low-income families, which often are already paying rents equivalent to 2,500 CFA for one-room lodgings and shacks.

It seems necessary to make a fresh attack on the complex factors involved, starting, however, from the overriding economic criterion fixing the cost per dwelling which can be afforded by the mass of the population. The possibilities of subsidizing rents are limited, in view of the small size of the monetary sector in most developing countries. The primary need is for communal services, particularly potable water and human waste disposal. A developed building-lot on which a family can erect its own temporary structure is the first step towards achieving improved housing conditions. Given the necessary public intervention and funds, this can be provided for every urban family at a rent it can afford. The next steps towards achieving various improved shelter standards must be made through maximum use of non-monetized resources; mobilization of personal savings with a home as a tangible objective; intensive research into economical design; improved use of local materials in place of expensive imported materials; and increased productivity of building labour and management. During the last decade, in many developing countries, little progress was made along these lines. The technical and financial problem of producing satisfactory dwellings within reach of the mass of the population places in relief what is ultimately a major limiting factor: the cost of providing developed building lots and minimum shelter will always be large compared to average income. Even at the most favourable ratio,[15] a dwelling costs at least one year's income of a worker. This requires provision of long-term credit facilities at reasonable charges. There is not sufficient accumulation of capital in most developing countries to enable the total credit required to be found from internal sources.

Even if, during the last decade, the technical and financial problems had been solved, the necessary accumulated funds were lacking to release the physical resources. These funds could revolve very quickly, given the high rentals already being paid in developing countries and given a decision to restrict credit per dwelling to an especially favourable ratio of credit to income. If five or six years revolvement of funds were feasible, the total amount of capital funds would be relatively small, by comparison with the sums required if the problem were approached in terms of twenty- or thirty-year loans as it is in the developed countries. The monthly rent cited

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12 *Report of the ad hoc Group of Experts on Housing and Urban Development.*

13 *Afrique* (Bagot, Paris), November 1962, pp. 40-41.

14 260 CFA francs approximately equal $ US 1, which equals five NF.

15 "Housing in Africa: Problems and Policies", United Nations, document E/CN.14/HOU PA/3.

earlier of 2,500 CFA is equivalent to just over $ US 10 per month or $120 per year. This is also a rent which could be paid by most workers in the monetary economy of Latin America. This rent is, in fact, sufficient to repay a loan of $ US 500 in five years at 4 per cent. Such a sum, if expended on land, communal services and, if possible, a minimum of shelter, would go far to represent a major improvement in the living conditions of a family in most developing countries. Provision of the initial accumulated credit of $ US 500—which is the missing factor — could therefore launch a rapid revolvement process, which could mobilize physical — and indeed financial — resources now latent or dormant.

Housing design and building technology

Europe, North America and Oceania

Since the end of Second World War, urban population growth has been twice as fast as total national population growth in most countries, thus greatly increasing urban housing and planning requirements in recent years, particularly in the large metropolitan areas. In some countries, these needs have been met primarily through private and local action. Where direct government influence on housing design and building technology has been exercised, this has been done in a number of ways over the last two decades. Firstly, Governments have actively developed or supported technical research, exchange and education. Secondly, government building, operation and financing grew considerably in all countries until the 'fifties, and has continued to grow in the centrally planned economies of Europe. At the same time, Governments have elaborated economically and socially more adequate design specifications, and have encouraged modern mass-produced construction. Thirdly, housing design specifications, which had originally been introduced to ensure minimum standards, were supplemented after the Second World War by maximum specifications, as a means of enforcing economy in the use of scarce building labour and materials. Again, some relaxation of these measures has taken place in many European countries in the 'fifties, as economic conditions have allowed more resources to be invested in improved housing accommodation. Fourthly, governmental planning and land-use control have been extended very considerably throughout the post-war period, and with them the use of general design specifications has increased.

The major external urban design trends of the decade toward more multi-family buildings, greater residential densities and improved site-and-community-planning, have especially, although not exclusively, affected countries with large metropolitan developments.[16] The following statements, made for the United Kingdom, are generally valid for other countries with large urban and suburban growth (such as France, Italy, the USSR or the United States):

> "As the main demand has been for urban housing, development of ideas in planning and design since 1946 has been most noticeable in housing schemes..." "An outstanding trend in post-war housing has been the improvement in the layout of estates..." "Quality of design has been high in the new towns. Much thought was given to individual house design, to layout and grouping of houses, to landscaping and to community amenities or the relationship of houses to shopping centres, schools and other public buildings. In large older towns much more thought than formerly has been given in recent building to such questions as orientation for sunlight, space between high blocks to allow daylight to reach the lowest floors, and to balanced mixing of tall, medium-height and low dwellings, of housing and public building, of private and public open spaces. The uniformity and monotony of a good deal of earlier building is now avoided..."[17]

Several trends in design are common to all countries in Europe and North America. While designers have sought greater economy or efficiency in layouts and volumes, with a marked tendency to reduce the height of ceilings, and to cut down circulation areas and separate spaces for special or less-frequent activities, statistics show that floor area is on the increase in terms of the total housing stock.[18] This, of course, should be expected as the result of governmental policy to extend improved housing conditions to the lower-income sectors, as well as from the increasing income in many of these countries on the part of the buyers and renters of houses and apartments. Housing design has also become more and more concerned with space-economy in the placing of furniture and domestic equipment, such as refrigerators and washing machines. Built-in cupboards or storage spaces also have been increasingly planned in modern design.

The trend towards rationalization and mechanization of building processes has also continued in Europe and North America. In most developed countries, this trend is associated with the need to economize labour and, in view of larger output requirements, to increase its productivity. In many countries, Governments have been particularly active in stimulating these developments, which simultaneously allow non-inflationary wage increases to building labour and continuing expansion of demand for building equipment. Site-assembly operations have been simplified in most countries, a development that has required modular co-ordination of materials and components, especially of doors, windows and other elements. Development of new materials has not taken place equally in all countries, but new materials have been extensively developed for walling. Walling and flooring elements are increasingly either pre-fabricated or pre-cast on site in urban building.

Africa, Asia and Latin America

Housing design and building technology trends vary widely between the less developed countries, because of considerable differences in climatic requirements and in

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16 *Housing in the Northern Countries*, Ministry of Housing, Copenhagen, the State Housing Board, Helsinki, the Housing Directorate, Oslo, and the National Housing Board, Stockholm (Copenhagen, 1960).

17 *Housing in Britain* (Central Office of Information, Revised, August 1960), pp. 18-19.

18 This may be seen to some extent in table 6 in the *Annual Bulletin of Housing and Building Statistics for Europe, 1960*, but not fully, because of the tendency to reduce number of rooms.

economic, social and technological development. Nevertheless, they do share major over-all problems, such as low *per capita* income, high population-increase rates, accelerated concentration of population in the larger cities and scarcity of administrative and financial resources, and this explains why their general approach to design and technology often coincides.

As has been noted earlier, a common feature of design and technology is the sharp contrast of standards and specifications between traditional housing and modern, contemporary dwellings and facilities. Thus, for example, in Japan, whose economy is exceptional in that it is largely industrialized and has continued to expand at high rates during the 'fifties, most new housing is still built of wood, which although cheap neither meets modern requirements for heat preservation in winter, nor stands up adequately to the hazards of earthquakes, typhoons, fire, termites or rot.[19] Similar situations obtain in many other countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where cultural patterns are still largely determined by the older peasant-like way of life—even in the newly grown urban areas—and where administrative and financial resources are lacking for a rapid major change in housing design and technology. Three major approaches to design and technology have been developed to meet these conditions.

The oldest of these, dating from before the Second World War, is the direct introduction of modern designs and methods from the developed countries, with only slight adaptations to local conditions. This approach is still spreading as urban growth continues. A number of new building methods have been successfully introduced, including mechanization and pre-fabrication on site; but, by and large, much still remains to be done regarding site-work organization, modular co-ordination and standardization of materials, components and fixtures. This approach to design is particularly successful for urban middle-income requirements. Cost problems and administrative problems increase enormously, however, when this approach is applied to very low-income groups. Consequently, this approach has been almost entirely abandoned in rural housing, and new solutions for both urban and rural low-income groups have been tried in its stead.

Another approach is to combine older cultural and economic conditions with the new technology. Owing to meagre family incomes and the shortage of investment funds, there has been a wide-spread trend toward one-storey and occasionally two-storey designs, which can be put up with unspecialized, cheap labour, or with labour or materials supplied in part by the beneficiaries themselves. Most designs and methods developed during the 'fifties have been based on readily available materials, components and fixtures, which are produced in many less developed countries, such as brickware, modern cement products (for instance, blocks, roofing elements and piping) and sanitary and stove equipment. Nevertheless, some tendencies to evolve new materials and components are evident, including metallic or light concrete structures, stabilized-earth elements, light-weight panelling and standardized fixtures. Most of these innovations, however, are isolated experiments, and the results are not usually made widely available.

The place of self-help and mutual-aid schemes has not yet been clearly defined. In some instances, these schemes are uncritically regarded as a complete substitute for further expansion of the specialized building and building-materials industry, and may lead to neglect of training specialized building workers. In any case, much still remains to be done to improve the designs employed by these schemes, particularly in the design of the physical environment and community aspects. The danger that these methods may lead to the creation of a new kind of slum has been pointed out on many occasions, and is indeed implicit in the fact that the designs themselves are often of "minimal" character. Nevertheless, the approach has allowed growing numbers of very low-income families to be reached by some improvement.

The third approach to housing design and technology, developed to a lesser degree during the 'fifties, is that of attempting only partial improvements to existing designs—consisting very often only in the addition of sanitary features. Many ill-housed, low-income families have invested considerable effort or even cash in their dwellings, as for example in the cool climates of several Latin American countries, where firm adobe building in the Spanish colonial tradition is the rule. This is often the case in both rural and urban areas, and particularly in the small towns. Often, partial improvements are introduced by sanitary inspectors, agricultural extension workers or community development workers. Little research has been done on the design and technology of these improvements in the less developed countries.

The immediate problem in the developing countries of producing an acceptable minimum dwelling in permanent materials is now beginning to be isolated as a major objective of technical, economic and social research. In a sense, this is a problem of the dissemination and application of the known results of research, given the development of large-scale housing programmes in which to apply these results. It is partly a question of simple and rational design, but the main cost reductions will come from the development of local materials to replace expensive imported materials and from the more productive use of local building labour.

Urban and regional development

Readily available data on some of the most salient features of urbanization illustrate that urban concentration, especially in the larger towns, is increasing in almost all countries. This trend is largely due to internal migration from rural to urban areas, and from small towns to big cities, which has in many cases rapidly accelerated during the nineteen-fifties. The various factors underlying rural-urban migration can be expected to persist in coming decades.

Diminished employment opportunities in rural areas, brought about by improved rural productivity and mechanization and population growth, are generally foremost among the long-term factors. In industrially developed countries, although the flow of people into towns is an important element in increasing housing and urban development needs, the migrants are, as a rule,

[19] Japan, Ministry of Construction, Housing Bureau, *Housing in Japan*, 1961, p. 7.

relatively well adapted in quantity and quality to the continuing expansion of urban employment. By contrast, in less developed countries, large numbers of ill-equipped persons drift into the larger towns before industrial development has opened up corresponding employment opportunities.[20] In recent years, the salient feature of the urbanization process is that the expansion of urban population takes place mainly in the larger cities, resulting in gross over-concentration of people and economic activities in a few cities, rather than a more rational distribution whereby secondary cities would share population gains and profit from industrial programmes.

As previously indicated, the 'fifties were critical years for the recognition of this problem and the formulation of comprehensive development plans aimed at solving problems of housing and urban facilities simultaneously with industrial expansion — in some cases including decentralization of economic activity — as well as betterment of rural conditions. Most inhabitants of developing countries still reside in rural areas. Since there is no indication that rural living conditions will markedly improve while such a large proportion of the population remains engaged in agriculture, the massive rural-urban movements which have been taking place since the Second World War are not likely to slacken. On the contrary, it is most probable that rural populations will be drawn more and more into this process. Greater mechanization and industrialization — to which most developing countries are strongly committed — necessarily will lead to an increased flow of population into urban areas.

Recent measures to check the flow or rural migrants to urban areas have been mainly of three kinds. The first is the implementation of rural improvement programmes, including development of agriculture, establishment of industries in villages, land reform, rural electrification and community development. Some countries (such as the Federal Republic of Germany and Yugoslavia) are combining land reform with the decentralization of new industries, away from congested centres of population, in what are now mainly rural areas. On the whole, rural improvement programmes have not significantly slowed down the pace of rural migration to cities.

The second, of which Israel and the Netherlands provide good examples, is a rapid increase in urban and regional planning as a means of achieving more balanced distribution of population. However, as historical parallels with earlier European and North American experience become more evident, greater efforts have been directed, in many less developed countries, towards avoiding disorderly and wasteful urban growth and sprawl. Although the administrative machinery is inadequate and well trained personnel are still lacking, master plans have been drawn up for the majority of national capital cities and for a number of large urban areas. At the same time, there has been increasing interest in the decentralization of new industries, and the establishment of industrial estates as a means of co-ordinating industralization and urbanization policies.[21] Good examples of this are provided by India and Italy. Both these types of programmes sharpen the need for regional planning.

Thirdly, greater attention has been given to the decentralization of economic and administrative activities so as to open up new under-developed areas or to divert the flow of migration away from large urban centres. This has given rise to new towns designed to slow the growth of primate cities, such as the new towns in the London region; to relocate productive activities, as in Ciudad Bolivar, Venezuela; or to open up remote areas, as in the building of the new capital city of Brazil. In many countries of Asia and Latin America, numerous satellite towns have been built or are under construction with industrial areas and with their own residential facilities.

In countries with centrally planned economies, government planning at the national, regional and local levels has been a major element in post-war industrial and urban growth, and physical planning has been closely associated with economic and social development. In countries with private-enterprise economies, government control of physical development has been on the increase, particularly at the local level, but balanced regional and national development still presents major problems for the future in countries where large industrial and urban complexes had taken form before the Second World War (such as France, the United Kingdom and the United States). In these countries, economic activity and population tend to concentrate progressively in greater conurbations. This has tended to depress the older built-up areas more rapidly, while also greatly increasing pressure on land, building resources and income in new urban and suburban areas.

While government controls have, in some cases, imposed more organic development of neighbourhoods and localities in new urban areas, there has been accelerated sprawl and "overspill" in these countries during the last decade, impelled by increasing housing construction, which itself has been stimulated by government aid. A special problem has been caused by the growing difficulties of road transportation with the expansion of private automobile use. As a means of combating these problems, roads have been multiplied, experiments have begun on new methods of collective transportation, government-assisted industrial estates and apartment blocks have been introduced into the suburbs, and large-scale renewal of older built-up areas has been carried out. The Scandinavian countries provide especially good illustrations of these measures.

Trends in the organization and financing of housing, building and urban and regional planning

Housing and the construction industries

Europe, North America and Oceania

Among countries with centrally planned economies, there was a slight increase in direct building by state

20 "Various observers of urban growth in Africa, Asia and Latin America have concluded that these regions are 'over-urbanized' for their degree of economic development, particularly of industrialization — that the cities, as a whole, do not have the productive economic base that would be commensurate with their size and their proper functioning in the total economy." *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3).

21 *The Physical Planning of Industrial Estates* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.B.4).

bodies at the end of the decade but, in many of these countries, such building had fallen off in intermediate years relatively to total house-building. There was also a slight but steady trend during the period toward more building by co-operatives. In countries with free-enterprise economies, on the contrary, there were marked increases in privately financed dwelling construction. These trends were largely the result of government policy, and involved considerably different financial and administrative arrangements.

The countries with centrally planned economies share a number of over-all financial and economic features, although these differ in many details. Since there is no private money market in these countries, housing investment is necessarily carried out either by government bodies or by the population, individually or grouped in associations, usually with financial aid from the Government. In several countries (notably Poland and the USSR) there has been a shift away from direct residential building by state economic enterprises during the 'fifties towards increased building by specialized bodies and by individual citizens or associations. In addition, state funds and other types of aid to building by individuals and associations were increased. Increased real incomes have also helped these sectors to expand their participation in house-building.

Eastern Germany and Yugoslavia excepted, all European countries with centrally planned economies tend to centralize housing-investment funds in the government budgets, although some smaller separate funds for housing may also exist (for example, surpluses earned by state economic enterprises in excess of their targets). In eastern Germany, in 1958, the collection of housing-investment funds was made the responsibility of the local housing administration by means of centrally allocated bond issues. In Yugoslavia, proceeds from the central special fund for housing, which is fed by a 10 per cent levy on salaries and wages against the budgets of the administration, or from the profits accounts of enterprises, are redistributed to communal and republican budgets for housing, and then to the actual builders.[22]

State house-building is carried out by specialized building bodies that are answerable to a specialized ministry or belong to a specialized building organization, which lays down standards and specifications. These bodies receive contracts from local administrations, social and cultural bodies and, to a decreasing extent at the end of the decade, from state economic ministries or entreprises. The building bodies also supply individuals and associations of citizens with technical direction and assistance.[23] This latter arrangement is used extensively for rural housing, where the collective-farm organizations may participate in carrying out the work, or in financing the housing thus built. Private housing construction of this type is mainly carried out for owner-occupation, but may be rented or sold.[24] As already remarked, state aid for private housing includes technical direction, low-cost materials and components and developed urban land, in addition to loans, which normally carry low interest and amortization charges in order to maintain a low ratio between repayment and income.[25]

Although increased needs have required channelling of increasingly large amounts of resources into housing and community facilities in the free-enterprise countries of Europe and North America since the Second World War, much of the effort has been carried out through the expansion and improvement of existing mechanisms and institutions. Countries such as Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States had already begun to evolve specialized building industries and wide-reaching financial and administrative organizations before the new requirements made themselves felt as urgent problems. These countries have met new requirements over the years by a largely planned and generally co-ordinated expansion of the existing mechanisms. Some other countries, such as France, Italy and Spain, have developed new organizational machinery to a greater extent, particularly in the form of semi-public specialized building bodies.

A variety of measures have been used in the post-war period: central government co-ordination controls; loans, grants-in-aid, subsidies and guarantees; local authority planning, control, financing, subsidy, building and management; large-scale private or semi-private building and financing; and public or private research and education. The institutional and administrative structures vary considerably in purpose and scope from country to country.

Thus, central government health and safety standards have been applied to housing in the European free-enterprise countries for many years, and rent controls, subsidies and public building became wide-spread before the Second World War. Only in the post-war period, however, have central house-building programmes been resorted to generally; these were originally regarded as tools to limit housebuilding to the quantitative and qualitative levels felt to be compatible with economic recovery and expansion, and later as permanent instruments to serve future economic, social and physical development. It is now an established practice in all the developed free-enterprise countries of Europe, North America and Oceania to estimate the regional and local volume structure of housing needs and supply as a basis for economic and financial measures. This function is carried out centrally, but the responsibility may be entrusted to central-planning bodies which have no executive functions; to housing or multiple-interest ministries with supervisory or operational functions; or to non-ministerial statutory corporations, institutes or agencies, which are mainly concerned with implementation.[26] Since a large amount of technical and economic and financial information is required for adequate analysis and forecasting for even general short-term programmes, most countries have extensive arrangements for liaison between government and private bodies.

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22 *Financing of Housing in Europe*, pp. 32-38.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 64-65.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 70-71.

26 See the "Report on the Seminar on Housing Surveys and Programmes with a particular reference to problems in the developing countries", held at Zagreb, Yugoslavia, October 1961. United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.E/Mim.8.

The contracting of works and financing are shared by the Government and private sectors in free-enterprise countries, and thus provide a basis on which to establish distinctions regarding institutional and administrative arrangements in the field of housing. In the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the Government has taken a large share in contracting works; that is, in specifying, ordering and financing construction through local government bodies. In the 'fifties, however, a shift away from this system was noticeable in the United Kingdom. Local governments are now required to obtain the greater part of their investment funds from the private capital market rather than from the Public Works Loan Board, and may only obtain subsidy funds on more stringent terms. However, works are increasingly being carried out by private investors and the New Town Development Corporations that have been set up to build new towns. Another way in which the Government may intervene directly in contracting works is through semi-public housing bodies; these may be established at the national level, as are the National Housing Institute in Spain or INA-Casa in Italy, or at the local level, as the *Habitations à loyer modéré* (HLM) system in France.

Investment funds for local government bodies which undertake construction may be supplied to a large extent by the central government; and, again, local government bodies may be utilized, as in the Netherlands, where the building associations are financed to a great extent by the municipalities. Central public or semi-public financial bodies are important in Finland and Norway, where the ARAVA (Housing Board) and the Housing and Smallholdings Banks, respectively, supply favourable loans to individuals, co-operatives and non-profit institutions. In the United States, the Public Housing, Urban Renewal and Community Facilities Administrations make loans to local governments or private bodies undertaking approved projects.

Government building and financing bodies at the national or local levels tend to be developed when private initiative or capacity is lacking. As has been noted, a major trend of the 'fifties in the free-enterprise countries of Europe, North America and Oceania has been the increased importance of private investment in housing, coupled with central government stimuli, such as subsidiary lending, tax concessions and investment guarantees. A notable example has been the Federal Republic of Germany, where public funds declined from over 50 per cent of total investment in housing to little more than 20 per cent at the end of the decade. There has been a marked increase in rental housing in some countries, such as Belgium and the United States; but, for the most part, increased private house-building has meant greater house-ownership, the dwellings being put up by private builders for immediate sale.

Africa, Asia and Latin America

The double standard of housing design and technology in the less developed countries implies a parallel in the institutional framework, on which the greatest emphasis has been laid in the last few years. An important development has been that of attaching an increasing number of new schemes or programmes to existing administrative and financial bodies, so extending and re-orienting their operations. Such bodies have been evolved in many less developed countries to meet the requirements of the modern or developed parts of the economy. They constitute an important resource of specialized personnel, administrative organization, and tried techniques or methods, very often well adapted to the country's conditions.

These institutions have not, however, been extended to meet newly emerging national needs. They vary considerably from one area to another, owing to differences in stages of economic and social development, and to differences in the foreign origin of the mechanisms adopted by each country. Nevertheless, there is a wide-spread recent trend toward setting up central government planning bodies to co-ordinate and guide economic, social and physical development. The first important contribution of the new bodies to housing improvement has been that of defining its broad national context, undertaking or encouraging quantitative projections of needs, and relating them to over-all economic, social and administrative possibilities of growth.

The modern or monetized part of Latin American economic institutions and administrative arrangements has been largely influenced by continental Europe. High and middle-cost urban house-building is carried out by private firms of small or medium size, the latter usually also engaging in commercial or industrial building. These firms, as a rule, carry out works for government or semi-public bodies, which often draw up their own specifications but seldom carry out their own building. The housing finance structure in most Latin American countries includes specialized national house-building corporations or institutes, financed by direct allocations from the national budgets and by compulsory-purchase bonds; by private, semi-public or government-owned mortgage banks relying for investment funds to a great extent on compulsory-purchase bonds; by direct house-building or housing-bond-purchase by social security funds, savings banks and insurance and investment companies; or by direct house-building or compulsory housing-bond-purchase or specific tax contributions to housing built by private firms and persons.

In spite of long-standing legislation, local government building and financing have been slow to develop, except in the larger cities. Co-operative housing schemes have also grown slowly, with the exception of those for such special groups as the railway trade unions or professional armed-forces personnel. Of late, temporary building co-operatives have been successfully combined with aided self-help schemes. Until recently, savings and loans schemes had been developed only on the continental European contractual basis in a few countries, but the United States association system has now been introduced in several countries. These organizational arrangements cater mainly for urban housing, which is greatly dependent upon them and, on a limited scale, for publicly financed rural housing. In recent years, the national housing corporations have considerably extended their operations into lower-cost housing, applying minimum standards and aided self-help methods for unfinished units.

In Africa, many newly independent States have inherited home-financing institutions, which provide the

mechanism and the skilled personnel from which the new States can develop savings and loan and mortgage institutions catering for the new housing needs. What is required is to redefine their objectives as African institutions capable of being the focus for developing savings for homes within the economic reach of the population with regular monetary incomes. Such re-orientation of objectives will occur only with the clarification of housing policies in general, including the emergence of housing ministries or similar central administrative bodies concerned with defining and implementing housing and related policies and programmes.

Unless housing and related services, particularly in urban areas, receive the necessary administrative and investment priority, *bidonvilles* and shanty-towns will develop in the few rapidly growing African cities and towns as yet free of such settlements. Once established, the eradication of such settlements becomes extremely difficult, if only because people readily become accustomed and inured to such living. If new urban dwellers are given the opportunity from the outset to acquire good standards of urban living in terms of decent housing and essential services, this will have a marked effect on their propensity to save. Many African countries are now at the stage of urbanization where vigorous and coherent policies for the provision of housing and essential services can ensure an orderly and beneficial process of urbanization, such as other developing countries failed to achieve.

Urban and regional planning

Europe, North America and Oceania

As already indicated, physical development has been increasingly influenced by government planning in Europe. This is especially so in most countries with centrally planned economies, where it has been facilitated by several special institutional and administrative arrangements. Four major features are apparent. First, land in most of these countries is owned either by the State or by collective enterprises that are subject to a large measure of government control. Second, the location, size, type and repercussions of all major activities are planned so that they may be brought into line with national objectives. Third, planning and co-ordinating agencies are woven into a coherent structure that distributes responsibility systematically among national, regional and local authorities, and provides specific means for co-ordinating plans at the several levels of government. Finally, specialized government agencies have been developed to set up unified standards and specifications for all major types of construction.

As an example of the general arrangements for planning in socialist countries, the methods used in the USSR and, as a particular example, in the Uzbek SSR, will serve to illustrate the general approach to physical planning.[27] In Uzbekistan, the State Planning Commission, attached to the Council of Ministers, is organically tied to the planning units of the ministries, to the planning commissions of the regions, and to the state and regional Statistical Boards. The regional planning commissions are in turn tied to the local or district planning commissions. The regional planning commissions are also linked to the planning units of enterprises and institutions directly or through the local planning commissions. Vertically, the State Planning Commission of the Republic ties into the All-Union State Planning Commission, and the Republic Ministries into the corresponding All-Union Ministries. It is thus possible to plan upwards from the lower units, once the general directives for new plans are adopted by the All-Union authorities and passed down. Detailed physical planning is the primary responsibility of the local planning units, but it is successively integrated, stage by stage, at each planning level by its inclusive territorial planning body.

Generally, physical planning has not been fully integrated into economic and social planning in the private-enterprise countries of Europe, much less in North America and Oceania. In Europe, central authorities lay down broad principles for town and country development, the actual physical planning being left largely to the local government authorities, which are responsible for preparing plans for their urban areas. They are also empowered to control land use and to expropriate land for development purposes. Supervision and co-ordination of local authorities' activities in this field are entrusted to different ministries, such as the Ministry of the Interior in Finland, the Ministry of Municipal Affairs in Norway, the Housing Ministry in Denmark, and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing in the United Kingdom. Physical planning bodies at the national level have been established in only a few countries; for example, the Ministry of Territorial Planning in France and the Central Service for the National Plan in the Netherlands.[28] In general, permanent regional-planning authorities have not as yet been developed in these countries.

Local authorities have been empowered and encouraged to reach agreements among themselves on interlocal development measures and plans, financed largely through local authority budgets and such established extra-budgetary resources as public bonds, or through *ad hoc* grants from national bodies.[29] In a number of instances, however, specific regions have been organized separately for special major redevelopment. The provincial and local administrations are usually represented in these bodies, and also contribute to them from their own budgets as, for example, in France and Italy. In the United States, the most striking difference is that each municipality, regardless of size or importance, has full authority in land-use planning and control as well as in establishing building regulations, and no co-ordinating mechanisms have so far been devised. Regional authorities have been created in many instances, but are mainly concerned with sector planning as, for example, the Port of New York Authority.

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27 See *Report on the World Social Situation*, "Planning for balanced social and economic development in Poland" (United Nations, E/CN.5/346/Add.1 and E/CN.5/346/Add.5/Rev.1).

28 Thus the expanded metropolitan planning authorities in Greater London and Greater New York have not been incorporated into co-ordinated national development planning. See *Land Use in Urban Environment*, ed. by Department of Civic Design, University of Liverpool, Liverpool University Press, 1961.

29 *Report on the World Social Situation*, "Planning for balanced social and economic development in the Netherlands" (United Nations, E/CN.5/346/Add.6).

This type of arrangement has resulted in conflicts between the central city and suburban municipalities over development plans. Federal activities related to community planning are restricted to such activities as provision of assistance for urban renewal, housing and community facilities, transportation, rural development and recreation.[30]

Africa, Asia and Latin America

Many countries in Africa and Asia have formed central economic planning bodies for the purpose of speeding up economic and social development. Although local and communal organization is strong in many developing countries, the general tendency is to place physical planning on a regional basis, in order to put the meagre specialized staff to best use and also to concentrate more effectively on the large migratory movements associated with the early stages of economic change. In several countries, semi-autonomous regional development corporations have been established in recent years, along more or less the same organizational and financial patterns as those already existing in Europe and North America. At the same time, single and multi-purpose national development corporations with their own regional divisions have been introduced, and the central economic planning bodies are increasingly interested in setting up regional or provincial planning units. Thus there is a variety of separate trends from country to country and within each country.

In Latin America, while city planning has been undertaken in almost all countries, including Mexico and the Caribbean, there has been very little planning on a regional scale, partly because academic training for physical planning is provided almost entirely by schools of architecture. In the last decade, there has been a tendency to introduce inter-disciplinary training and research into these schools. Where regional planning exists, there is as yet no device for co-ordinating physical planning with economic change. Puerto Rico is exceptional in this respect. Since the inception of the Central Planning Board in 1942, urban and regional planning have been integrated with economic development plans. In Colombia, Panama and Venezuela, regional planning is a function of central-planning offices answering directly to the Chief Executive, but is not highly developed, nor is it fully co-ordinated with economic planning.

In several countries, the central government supplies technical assistance for planning to the smaller municipalities. In Chile and Peru, special corporations were founded during the last two decades for specific areas, with rehabilitation or new development as their major purpose. At the same time, central agencies, in or under the Ministries of Public Works, were charged with setting up and co-ordinating plans of local bodies. National development corporations were also established to carry out investment programmes drawn up by central government agencies. While the provincial governments in Argentina have full responsibility for physical planning, no regional planning corporations have as yet been founded.

The influence of government on the physical development of regions in less developed countries has usually been limited to indirect economic and financial measures, involving a minimum of actual physical planning. At best, the scarcity of specialists, administrative arrangements and funds has permitted only city planning or national machinery for broad questions of land use. Most countries have not been able to set up intermediate and regional planning machinery.

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[30] W. C. Dutton, Jr., "Federal or State Aid in Relation to Planning", *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, March 1961.

Chapter VI

EDUCATION

In this chapter, educational progress[1] during the decade under review is examined in terms of two main indicators — level of literacy and school enrolment. Formal education is then surveyed in greater detail, with further sections on equality of opportunity and on international aid. Some general conclusions can be derived at that point on policy and planning. The concluding section attempts to forecast the principal lines of development for the future.

In the fifties, in every region of the world, provisions for education at all levels expanded faster than the numbers of school-age children. Progressively, more children have been enrolled in school and they have tended to stay there for a longer time. Popular demand for education and official policies in favour of education are two ways of stating the social cause of the change. The expansion of education has required the allocation of growing sums of public money (national budgets for the purpose seem to register an average annual rise of about 14 per cent), and the very fact of rapid educational progress in the fifties is in turn a consequence of increasing resources. To some degree, too, the expansion of education has been fostered by international aid, which was greater and more extensive than ever before.

The pattern of educational advancement has been varied. The greatest effort appears to have been made at the primary school level but, by the middle of the decade, this led to corresponding pressure for more secondary and higher education. The quantitative expansion has posed problems in terms both of teachers and of school plant, and the record of the past ten years is full of national examples for meeting critical shortages by emergency measures. With the growth in enrolment, particularly at secondary and higher stages, educators have been faced with problems of form and content, of standards and objectives, which have provoked a fresh examination of the relationship between schooling and life in a complex technological age.

In spite of remarkable progress during the fifties, education in most parts of the world has not kept pace with the demand or with national aspirations. The situation is most serious in less developed regions, where newly independent countries face formidable problems in many fields. They have a vital need to educate their people to undertake for themselves the tasks of government, to raise the standard of living and to play their role in world affairs. Moreover, where demands on education are heaviest, the total resources for all forms of development, including education, are usually the most limited. But even in advanced educational systems a similar problem has been evident, as the need for expansion has exceeded available resources.

This issue has stimulated study of the role of education in the process of social and economic development. During the decade, there has been increasing acceptance of the idea that national educational systems should be planned within the wider framework of social and economic planning. This implies a broadening of the scope of educational policy and administration, from short-term decisions on how to achieve balanced development of the various educational sectors, to a longer-term view that the system should be shaped by forecasts of the nation's future needs in manpower, its projected productivity and consumption, and its over-all goals for political, economic and social development.

By the end of the decade, an idea gaining more general currency was that the planning of education within this complicated framework, though the responsibility of each country, could be greatly facilitated by international action and co-operation with a regional focus.

Literacy

By tradition, the level of literacy in the adult population is taken to be a fair indicator of the range and effectiveness of an educational system. Apart from difficulties of definition and measurement, which hamper comparability of data for international purposes, the literacy rate among adults is really an indicator in the past tense, reflecting education previously obtained by those who are now adults.

UNESCO has published a world-wide statistical study of the extent of illiteracy around 1950. The data were obtained from census enumerations, sample surveys and, where necessary, informed estimates. The study contains the following summary statement on the magnitude of the problem at that time:

> "It is estimated that there are about 700 million adult illiterates in the world today. They represent about 44 per cent of the total world population 15 years old and over. Almost half of all the countries and territories (97 out of 198) are believed to have 50 per cent or more illitarates among their adult population . . .
>
> "By far the larger portion of the world's illiterates are to be found in certain parts of Asia and Africa. However, the problem of illiteracy is certainly not confined to these regions. At least one country in the Western Hemisphere has more than 15 million adult illiterates, another has over 5 million, and 8 other

[1] Detailed statistics on educational development in different parts of the world will be found in the *Compendium of Social Statistics: 1963* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.XVII.3) where there are tables on illiteracy, enrolment and teachers.

countries have each 1 million or more. Similarly, there are 10 European countries each of which has at least 1 million illiterate persons 15 years old and over." [2]

It would be most instructive to put beside this review a similar situation report for 1960. However, results of the 1960 cycle of censuses are not yet available for enough countries, and some years must elapse before a report can be made. From information gathered by UNESCO in its literacy surveys, it is nevertheless possible to give some partial answers to the question of how far illiteracy has been overcome in the past decade.

The percentage of illiteracy was reduced during the decade in such countries as India, Pakistan and the Sudan, but percentage gains were apparently not large enough to prevent the absolute number of illiterates from rising. In other countries, such as Cambodia, Cuba, Indonesia, Italy, the Philippines and the Republic of Viet-Nam, there was a more substantial reduction in illiteracy. From the admittedly inadequate data it would appear that, between 1950 and 1960, for the world as a whole, the proportion of illiterate adults declined but the total number of illiterates either remained stationary or rose.

Most countries with illiteracy problems have continued to regard the extension of primary schooling as the most effective means for bringing adult illiteracy to an eventual end. A somewhat broader approach to the question is represented by the policy of other countries, such as that of the Government of Pakistan, which refer to the inseparable relationship between literacy and social education for adults, primary education for children, and general economic and social development for the whole country. In such countries, the State has made deliberate efforts to foster adult literacy campaigns. Some idea of the extent of provisions for adult illiterates may be obtained from the table below, which contains data from thirty-two Member States replying in 1961 to a UNESCO questionnaire.

Table 1

ENROLMENTS IN ADULT LITERACY CLASSES IN THIRTY-TWO COUNTRIES, AROUND 1960

Number of countries	*Estimated total population (in millions)*	*Estimated total number of illiterate adults (in millians)*	*Percentage of illiterates enrolled in courses*
9	533	231	Under 1
9	102	28	1 to 3
8	147	29	3 to 10
6	151	26	Over 10

Statistics of enrolments in adult education classes tend to be unreliable. Using the table with due caution, one may remark that only the countries entered in the last two rows of table 1 (over 3 per cent of enrolment) are likely to be making any impression on the literacy rate, in view of the population increase. Probably it is necessary to provide courses for at least 10 per cent of the illiterate group in order to achieve real progress.

[2] UNESCO, "World Illiteracy at Mid-Century; a Statistical Study", *Monographs on Fundamental Education — XI* (Paris, 1957), p. 13.

In certain countries there is evidence of vigorous and successful programmes during the fifties to combat illiteracy among adults. One approach is that of a massive campaign such as Cuba initiated in 1959. This was conducted on a national scale with revolutionary fervour, all possible resources being called upon to reach the goal in view. It is reported that, by 1961, the illiteracy rate was reduced from 18 to 4 per cent and a follow-up campaign was begun to ensure permanent literacy. A different approach is exemplified by the Philippines, where the illiteracy rate fell from 50 per cent in 1941 to around 37 per cent in 1950 and 25 per cent in 1957. Here adult literacy work forms an integral part of the national educational structure, classes are conducted by government and private agencies alike, and the objective is to use literacy for broader purposes of community development. A final example of successful programmes during the fifties may be found in Italy, where the problem was concentrated mainly in the southern regions and Sardinia. Courses in adult education organized by the Ministry of Education and the National Union for the Literacy Campaign involved the teaching of literacy skills together with more general education of civic and economic significance. Steady progress was achieved, but in 1959 it was found that a fairly large group of "recalcitrant illiterates" still remained (about 2 million, or 6 per cent of the adult population). In 1960 a new approach was employed through the use of television; results reported so far indicate that this modern approach to an age-old problem would justify study by other countries.

PROVISION FOR FORMAL EDUCATION

The large increase in numbers of children enrolled for formal education was one of the most noticeable trends of the nineteen-fifties. The trend was apparent in all regions of the world and in almost all countries; it was to be seen at every level of education.

The numbers of children and young people who were receiving some kind of formal education rose from about 257 million at the beginning of the decade (about 25 per cent of the population aged 5 to 24 years) to about 417 million by 1959/60 (about 35 per cent of the population aged 5 to 24 years). Although world population in the age group 5 to 24 years had increased by some 16 per cent in the decade, enrolment had expanded by about 62 per cent.

The increase in actual numbers enrolled was greatest in primary education, but percentage increases in enrolment in secondary education (an expansion of 100 per cent) and higher education (71 per cent increase over the same period) were much higher than in primary, although the increases involved smaller numbers of students.

Table 2

WORLD ENROLMENTS, 1950-1959

Level of education	*Estimated enrolments (millions of students)*		
	Around 1950	*Around 1959*	*Percentage change*
Primary	208	321	54
Secondary	42	84	100
Higher	7	12	71
TOTAL	257	417	62

Secondary-school enrolments as a percentage of children in the 15 to 19 age group rose from 18 per cent in 1950 to 30 per cent in 1959; as a percentage of the population aged 10 to 19 years, the increase was from 8 per cent to 14 per cent. The upward trend continued in 1960; it reflected both popular demand for secondary education and government policy in making greater provision for secondary schooling. A similar trend was in evidence in higher education: world figures for enrolment showed an increase from 7 million students in 1950, about 3 per cent of the population aged 20 to 24 years, to 12 million in 1959, or almost 5 per cent of the 20 to 24 age group.

The general picture of enrolment concealed, however, wide variations in enrolment rates at all levels in the different regions of the world, and also among countries in the same region. In Europe (with a few exceptions in the south and east), North America and Oceania, enrolment for primary education per child population showed little or no percentage increase because most countries had already established universal primary education. Actual numbers of children in primary school in these countries changed in accordance with changes in the size of the child population. Some increase in enrolment was also due to extension of the period of compulsory schooling, but this change affected enrolment in secondary more than in primary schools. Thus the more developed countries contributed a larger share of the increase in secondary enrolment but little of the increase in primary.

The most dramatic changes in enrolment have been in some of the less developed regions, where increases have taken place concurrently with big increases in population. In Latin America, Africa and Asia, in spite of relatively great difficulty in providing school facilities, most countries succeeded in increasing the proportion of the child population enrolled in school.

Primary education

The major preoccupation in primary education in the fifties in most countries of the world has been how to provide school places for greatly increased numbers of children. In countries where primary education was already established as universal and compulsory, provision has had to be made for the rapidly mounting numbers of children of primary school age. In most of these countries also, numbers in primary schools have been increased by government policies to lengthen the period of compulsory schooling. As a rule this has carried compulsory schooling into the secondary level. Countries where this prolongation has been carried out are too numerous to list but include Bulgaria, Canada, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the USSR.

In Europe, North America and the USSR, compulsory full-time education in 1960 varied from ten years or more (in Canada, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States) to seven or eight in most European countries, and at the lower extreme to five or six, or in some instances to as few as four years. Most countries with the shorter period were, at the end of the decade, considering official measures for prolonging compulsory schooling to between six and nine years. It may be noted that government measures for prolonging education endorsed a popular trend already in existence. Rising standards of living and increased industrialization have resulted in parental eagerness to leave their children longer in primary school and, where possible, to allow them to go to secondary schooling and beyond.

In the less developed and newly independent countries, where the principle of universal education was accepted but not yet enforced, the effort has been to provide schooling of as many years as resources would allow, for an increased proportion of children of primary-school age. In some regions where provision before 1950 was very small, there has been a remarkable expansion of primary education. In Africa, for instance, enrolment at this level was only 17 per cent of the 5 to 14 age group in 1950; by 1959 it had risen to 28 per cent. In Asia, it rose from 25 per cent of the same age group in 1950 to 42 per cent in 1959, and in Latin America from 38 per cent to 49 per cent over the same period. As the numbers of children in the age group were increasing throughout the decade, these percentages represented in many cases very large increases in the actual numbers of children for whom primary schooling was provided.

Table 3 shows the progressive improvement in the enrolment ratio over the decade.

The figures in table 3 illustrate the gap that still remains between developed and less developed countries in respect of educational opportunities for children. In fifteen countries of Asia alone, in 1959 87 million children were receiving no education at all, and a further 65 million were receiving only a limited amount of schooling under conditions of great hardship and poverty. The same picture was true for many parts of Africa and some countries of Latin America. By the end of the decade, it was apparent that, unless special effort and resources could be marshalled, universal primary education could not be established in many parts of the world in the foreseeable future.

This was the situation revealed by UNESCO's Regional Meeting of Asian Member States on Primary and Compulsory Education, held in Karachi from 28 December 1959 to 9 January 1960. In essence, it amounted to a recognition that the rate of progress during the fifties was not great enough to justify the hopes that these nations were pinning on their educational development.

Throughout the decade all countries have increased their budgets for education, and in many countries also the proportion of national income spent on education; the larger part of these funds has been devoted to primary schooling. Essentially, the problem has been to provide sufficient teachers and class-rooms. To some extent, increased enrolments have been accommodated by the emergency device of the shift system, where two or even three shifts of children are served by the same class-rooms and teachers. While frequently mentioned in official reports in the early 'fifties, this measure seems to be on the wane.

A UNESCO/International Bureau of Education survey made in 1955 found that new class-rooms were being constructed at an annual rate of about 5 per cent of existing accommodation, the range being between 4 per cent and 10 per cent. Because of the heavy costs involved, national

Table 3

DISTRIBUTION OF 155 COUNTRIES BY PRIMARY ENROLMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE 5 TO 14 AGE GROUP, 1950 AND 1960

Continent (or region)	Year	Total number of countries	Number of countries having an enrolment ratio of: 19 per cent or less	20-39 per cent	40-59 per cent	60 per cent or more
Africa	1950	37	22	10	4	1
	1960		12	11	10	4
America, North	1950	24	1	5	5	13
	1960		—	3	3	18
Northern America	1950	5	—	—	—	5
	1960		—	—	—	5
Middle America	1950	19	1	5	5	8
	1960		—	3	3	13
America, South	1950	13	—	3	5	5
	1960		—	1	5	7
Asia	1950	32	13	10	5	4
	1960		4	8	13	7
Europe	1950	33	—	—	7	26
	1960		—	—	5	28
Oceania	1950	15	—	1	3	11
	1960		—	1	1	13
USSR	1950	1	—	—	—	1
	1960		—	—	—	1
TOTAL	1950	155	36	29	29	61
	1960		16	24	37	78

Table 4

DISTRIBUTION OF 114 COUNTRIES BY PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO IN PRIMARY SCHOOL, 1950 AND 1960

Continent (or region)	Year	Total number of countries	Number of countries having a pupil-teacher ratio of: 25 or less	26-30 per cent	31-35 per cent	36-40 per cent	41-45 per cent	46 per cent or more
Africa	1950	23	4	4	5	2	2	6
	1960		2	3	9	3	1	5
America, North	1950	13	2	4	3	—	—	4
	1960		1	8	2	1	1	—
Northern America	1950	1	—	1	—	—	—	—
	1960		—	—	1	—	—	—
Middle America	1950	12	2	3	3	—	—	4
	1960		1	8	1	1	1	—
America, South	1950	11	1	2	3	2	3	—
	1960		1	3	3	3	1	—
Asia	1950	27	4	3	4	7	5	4
	1960		4	6	4	5	4	4
Europe	1950	30	3	10	10	4	1	2
	1960		9	10	7	4	—	—
Oceania	1950	9	3	2	3	1	—	—
	1960		2	3	4	—	—	—
USSR	1950	1	—	—	1	—	—	—
	1960		1	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL	1950	114	17	25	29	16	11	16
	1960		20	33	29	16	7	9

authorities appeared sharply aware of the need to study existing conditions, to forecast future requirements and to plan their building programmes. About half the fifty-six countries covered by the 1955 survey reported such planning activities.

One example may be taken from the United Kingdom. In 1949, the Ministry of Education set up a branch with general responsibility for the investment programme and economic planning, and concerned in more detail with the plans of building projects submitted by local educa-

tion authorities. Administrative procedures involved in school building were simplified, and research by the Ministry's development group into the problems of educational needs, design, cost and construction helped local authorities to deal more efficiently with their building schemes. This programme continued throughout the decade and produced a marked reduction in building costs, while in fact improving the quality of school premises.

Some indication of trends in teacher supply may be obtained from table 4. National averages for the pupil-teacher ratio conceal the wide variations found within a single country. With its limited coverage, the table shows that, during the period 1950-1960, when enrolments rose fast, most countries succeeded in finding enough teachers to staff their classes. On the whole, the trend was towards smaller classes, as may be seen from the totals for the beginning and the end of the decade.

This favourable situation clearly does not exist in the African countries included in the table, which have shifted towards larger classes. Moreover, a more detailed examination of national reports from other regions indicates that the supply of teachers has remained a serious problem. In the early part of the decade, the shortage was so great that most countries had to take emergency measures. Standards of entry to teacher-training institutions were lowered, shorter courses were offered and special inducements were offered for recruiting students. By the end of the decade, some countries, Denmark for example, were able to remove emergency measures and revert to regular systems of training, in which quality weighed more than quantity. But this was by no means the rule, and the expanding school systems of Africa and Asia were still faced with the quantitative problem of finding teachers for the children not yet in school or for replacing teachers who left the profession.

Increases in the enrolments of teacher-training institutions have been general, whether by the building of new colleges, enlargement of existing ones or even, in some cases, by a policy of consolidation which replaced small, scattered colleges by a larger central institution. However, the mere expansion of physical plant has not met the major problem. It has been found increasingly difficult to obtain students, or to ensure that graduates do in fact remain in the teaching profession. This trend has been particularly evident in Africa, where teacher-training centres were traditionally a means of access to further education, and recruitment was therefore no great problem. During the fifties, secondary education became more widespread, forming a direct preparation for higher education, and thus progressively competed for recruits with the teacher-training system. A separate trend in Africa has been wastage in the teaching profession itself; large numbers of qualified teachers have abandoned the schools for posts in government service or private enterprise. The operation of these two factors has been less marked in other regions, but it is generally the case that developing countries found it as difficult in 1959 as in 1950 to produce enough qualified teachers.

A consequence of this continued shortage has been that the attention of public authorities has been drawn to the status of teachers. A number of countries reported measures during the fifties which were designed to improve the standing of the profession; these included increased periods of training; security of tenure; and better material conditions. However, to judge from the surveys and recommendations of important teachers' organizations, progress in this direction cannot be regarded as satisfactory.

The movement for curriculum reform in primary schooling continued during the decade. This was partly inspired by developments at the secondary level, expressed as a demand for the raising of primary education standards. For one thing, there was considerable experimentation in the earlier teaching of modern languages. The other influence, evident mainly in newly independent countries, was the political need for a content of schooling more closely related to national conditions and aspirations. While this affected all levels of education, the primary school curriculum was usually selected as the first point of reform.

Secondary education

As was remarked earlier, the expansion of secondary education during the fifties was relatively more rapid than that of primary. The proportion of the 15 to 19 age group enrolled in secondary schools doubled between 1950 and 1959, so that about a quarter of the young people at that age were given the opportunity of education.

Some idea of the varying rates of progress may be obtained from table 5. From the countries covered by the table, it may be seen that there was a steady rise in enrolment ratios, most pronounced in the Americas, Asia and Europe, but starting also in Africa. Owing to the imperfect and approximate nature of these ratios (the 15 to 19 year age group does not correspond precisely with the actual — or ideal — secondary-school age group), they do not accurately reflect actual achievements and requirements, but they give a rough idea of relative magnitudes and trends and the need for further progress.

In practically all countries, a process of democratization was at work by which secondary education was coming to be regarded as a right (in some cases a compulsory duty) for all children; the idea of secondary education as the prerogative of a chosen few (with discrimination in favour of an elite or in favour of boys) was declining more rapidly in some countries than in others. This trend was strengthened both in developed and less developed regions by the demands of economic development for a better-educated, more skilled population. Pressure on secondary education was also caused by the great shortage of teachers both for the expanding primary schools and for every other level of education.

The new demands and the rapid growth in enrolment caused educational authorities to re-examine the aims, form and content of secondary education. Modifications of the secondary course were undertaken by most countries and this trend increased towards the end of the decade. The passage from primary to secondary schooling was simplified, often by a reclassification of school grades or the abolition of entrance examinations; at the same time, secondary school courses were modified to suit the varying needs of a wider range of young people and the changing requirements of the different countries.

Table 5

DISTRIBUTION OF 142 COUNTRIES BY SECONDARY ENROLMENT AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE 15-19 AGE GROUP, 1950 AND 1960

Continent (or region)	*Year*	*Total number of countries*	*Number of countries having an enrolment ratio of*			
			9 per cent or less	*15-24 per cent*	*25-49 per cent*	*50 per cent or more*
Africa	1950	35	34	1	—	—
	1960		30	5	—	—
America, North	1950	22	13	5	2	2
	1960		4	7	6	5
Northern America	1950	4	1	—	2	1
	1960		—	1	—	3
Middle America	1950	18	12	5	—	1
	1960		4	6	6	2
America, South	1950	12	6	6	—	—
	1960		—	7	5	—
Asia	1950	27	16	9	1	1
	1960		7	9	10	1
Europe	1950	33	3	7	13	10
	1960		1	3	13	16
Oceania	1950	12	6	3	2	1
	1960		1	7	1	3
USSR	1950	1	—	1	—	—
	1960		—	—	1	—
TOTAL	1950	142	70	32	18	14
	1960		43	38	36	25

In 1950, the majority of secondary schools (carrying students for periods of from four to seven years) organized education in three parallel lines: the first preparing students to enter university or some form of higher education; the second providing general studies (usually in part as a preparation for teacher-training); and the third leading to some form of technical or vocational training. A type of secondary education less favoured in 1950 provided all students with a fairly broad programme for the first half of the secondary course, and divided into two or three streams (general, technical or university preparatory) in the second half of the course.

By the end of the decade this situation was reversed. The structure most widely used in 1950 was least popular by 1959, and vice versa. Secondary education has moved in the direction of a longer period of common general education, permitting postponement of the choice among the several more specialized programmes of study until later in secondary school. The broad trend was towards a blurring of the distinction between academic and vocational education. Many countries were working towards comprehensive or multilateral secondary schools, in which students could have an open choice between vocational, pre-vocational and academic studies, with more freedom of movement than previously between programmes, and more opportunities for students choosing teacher-training or technical studies to enter universities. The list of countries which made changes or began experiments along these lines would be very extensive, but includes countries as different as France, India, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Yugoslavia.

The experiment in Sweden was especially extensive. Between 1950 and 1960, the comprehensive school was gradually introduced in all parts of the country. It covered a nine-year period of compulsory schooling from age 7 to 16, spanning primary and lower secondary schooling on a unitary basis. The nine-year period was divided into three stages and selection of subjects to be studied took place only in the third stage. Emphasis was laid on the importance in a democratic community of free choice by the student of the courses to be followed in the latter stage of education, and on the need to provide equal quality of secondary education in rural and urban areas.

Another example of the reorganization of secondary education may be found in the USSR. Initiated in 1958, its purpose is to bring education into close conjuntion with productive labour. Atter completion of the compulsory eight-year school, which covers primary and secondary courses and provides a foundation of general educational and polytechnical knowledge, the student may continue his education in one of the following ways: (*a*) at a general secondary evening school for factory and farm workers, with a three-year course of instruction; (*b*) at a general secondary polytechnical school, which provides a three-year course of secondary education combined with practical work training in some branch of the national economy or culture; (*c*) at a secondary technical or other specialized school which furnishes as a rule a four-year course, comprising both general secondary education and specialized secondary education, with practical training at the relevant enterprises or institutions. In addition, there are urban and rural vocational schools with a course of study ranging from one to three years (depending on the speciality) which provide training

for young people who wish to go to work without getting a complete secondary education.[3]

Reforms in syllabuses, curricula and examinations were increasingly common in many countries throughout the period. In some instances, the traditional final examination giving access to higher education was relaxed or abolished for certain secondary-school branches. Authorities attempted to raise the prestige or modern and technical courses by creating new certificates and founding new institutions for these studies.

Technical education at secondary level (as distinct from higher forms of technical training) received greater attention throughout the decade. The general trend was to increase the amount of general education before technical courses begin, while at the same time technical programmes were enlarged and attempts made to improve the training of technical teachers. Many countries increased the emphasis on maintaining the standard of general education for technical students, and included such subjects as mathematics, science and languages in the courses of study. In some countries, these courses were designed to provide a qualification for at least some students to enter higher technical training on a university level. Such developments were taking place in Chile, India, Morocco and Yugoslavia, as well as in many other countries.

One of the results of these policies and of attempts to combine theoretical with practical on-the-job training has been a changing view of apprenticeship. But such new programmes were not developed in all countries: in some parts of the world there still persisted old ideas of narrow technical training in particular skills instead of broader secondary education for all children who finish primary school.

In general, technical education on the secondary level was gaining ground in the 'fifties, and in many countries efforts were being made to raise the standard of technical education and to give it equal status with the more traditional academic education. The allied question of what balance was necessary between technical, specialist and general education at the secondary level was one which was still undetermined in many countries by the end of the decade.

Higher education

The diversity of higher education — encompassing all formal education beyond secondary schooling, such as universities, teacher-training colleges, advanced commercial and business-training colleges, and a variety of specialized institutions — makes assessment of educational statistics difficult at this level. The general trends, however, are clear. Expansion of higher education was a world-wide phenomenon in the 1950's. This expansion occurred in developed countries, such as the USSR and the United States, where the rate of enrolment was already high in 1950, as well as in Africa and Asia. In terms of percentage enrolment, the trend was very marked in many countries of Africa and Asia, where there had been little provision for higher education at the beginning of the decade. Enrolment increases in European countries ranged from 25 per cent to 50 per cent, even though in some of these countries, especially the USSR, the number of young people of higher-education age was actually less at the end of the decade than at the beginning. Relative to the secondary-school population, it may be noted that higher education enrolments were in general one-sixth in 1950 and one-seventh in 1959. Owing to the relatively small number of children born and to the interruption of primary and secondary education during the Second World War in many European countries, the swelling of higher education enrolments was slower there in the last decade than it will be in coming years, when the wave of children born after the war will reach higher-education age.

Higher education expanded by the establishment of new faculties, schools and special institutes, or by the increase in programmes and by a greater intake of students in existing institutions. All these were developed both within and outside the traditional university structure. Some developments were in traditional fields and others in the expanding fields of science and technology. Expansion in enrolments in the traditional subjects of arts and letters was very rapid; in science, medicine and engineering it was variable and often relatively slow, mainly because faculties dit not increase their intake; for study in the newer subjects it was uneven, but was notably more rapid in social sciences, including higher commercial studies, and in the field of education. In Brazil and Egypt,[4] for example, numbers of students in social science increased by over 400 per cent; in Chile, they increased by 80 per cent. In India, students enrolled for studies in education increased by more than 300 per cent, and in Japan by 200 per cent. Health and welfare services as new fields for university study developed very slowly indeed.

By the end of the decade, also, students who had taken the new technical courses at secondary school were beginning to enrol for higher education. Professional and technological schools, independent of universities, were important before the 'fifties in a number of countries, such as Brazil, France and the Soviet Union. In these countries, and in others where higher technical education was a more recent development, there was a considerable increase in the number and scope of programmes of study. This was partly due to the upgrading of some courses of study and the recognition of others as being on a par with university work. While the full effect of the expansion of technological education will not be seen for some years to come, one may cite the example of the USSR, where higher education enrolment increased over the decade by 127 per cent, of which the greater part was for technological studies.

Other ways in which higher education expanded were by the establishment of growing numbers of extension centres, usually as branches of universities and other institutions, and through the increasing numbers of

[3] *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow) 22nd Year, No. 1, 1 January 1959, text 5; Act of 24 December 1958 to strengthen the link between school and life and to provide for the further development of the system.

[4] See also footnote 2, chapter XII, on Social Development in the Middle East.

evening and correspondence courses at higher level in the developing countries of the world.

Although definitions of what constitutes a university vary in different countries, it is possible to make some tentative conclusions about university expansion during the 'fifties. Of approximately 600 universities in existence at the end of the decade, 160 had been founded since 1950, and at least one-third of these were in Asia. Of these new universities in Asia, sixteen were founded in India, fifteen in the Republic of Korea, and eight in Indonesia. There was hardly a country in South-East Asia which did not establish a university during the decade. The trend was also strong in Latin America. In Brazil, thirteen new universities were founded in addition to the twelve existing in 1950, and this was accompanied by a 94 per cent increase in all university enrolment. In Egypt, the addition of a new university, as well as the expansion of faculties in existing universities, enabled universities to accommodate 174 per cent more students in 1960 than in 1950. The total expansion of higher education enrolments in Egypt in the period was 219 per cent. In India, too, the addition of new colleges and universities was accompanied by a doubling of enrolments. In most countries, the simultaneous expansion in enrolment and in numbers of institutions brought great problems of staffing, organization and provision of equipment. The difficulties associated with expansion were especially marked in less developed countries. When provision for primary and secondary education was so desperately needed, it was often difficult to decide what priority should be given to higher education. University graduates and technicians in many fields were required in increasing numbers in these countries. But there was also a problem of how many graduates could be absorbed at an early level of economic development. One question facing many countries was whether to build new universities and colleges, or to send higher students abroad; the former alternative was, for all countries, much the more costly, because of high expenses for services, buildings, payments to students, and especially salaries for the necessary expatriate staff. The question has been decided in many of the less developed countries in favour of establishing their own universities, not only as prestige symbols, but as a practical step providing research institutions geared to national needs and a centre which could be reservoirs of talent for the nation's cultural, social, administrative and political life.

Another question beginning to receive serious consideration towards the end of the decade was what type of university and what organization of studies was most appropriate for all countries — developed and less developed — in the new age that was seen to be emerging. By 1960, this and the allied questions of whether universities and other institutions of higher education throughout the world should gear their education to a standardization of culture (which increasing industrialization seemed likely to spread), although hotly debated, remained unanswered; many people, however, expressed the view that more steps should be taken in higher as in other fields of education to ensure that age-old cultures (in Africa, Asia and the Americas as well as in Europe) should not be lost or neglected in efforts to reorganize and modernize education for a technical age.

A further difficulty in higher education which remained unresolved during the past decade was the problem of admissions. As a rule, at the beginning of the last decade, admission to higher education was a routine matter for those who reached a certain standard and, where necessary, could pay the fees. In recent years, however, higher education has not expanded as rapidly as secondary education, and many more students were applying to universities than could be admitted. This created a serious admissions problem for which no solution has been found. It also meant that many institutions were compelled to raise the standard of requirements for admission. In the new technical and scientific fields of higher education also, standards of entry were fixed at a higher level in some countries than earlier in the decade. However, this trend is by no means general; other institutions have admitted more students than they can teach effectively, resulting both in over-crowded classes and a high rate of drop-outs.

Associated with the problem of admissions, and also unsolved by the end of the decade in most countries, was the problem of how to channel students into the fiels of study would supply the qualified manpower most needed by expanding economies. Tendencies in some countries (in Latin America and the Far and Middle East, for example) towards over-enrolment in traditional faculties, such as arts, law and medicine, were apt to lead to under-employment among graduates in these subjects, whilst there was under-enrolment and consequent shortages of graduates in the fields of engineering, agriculture and other fields of technology. Few countries were willing to solve this problem by direction, though some attempted partial solutions by means of special grants and easier admissions to the faculties to attract students where they were most needed.

Expansion of higher education during the decade was also affected by changes in teacher-training programmes. In 1950, primary-school teachers were generally trained either at secondary-school level or at non-degree-granting higher level, whereas secondary-school teachers were given little professional training. A number of countries have since created new courses for training secondary teachers and a few have shifted primary-school teacher-training to the higher level. In most countries, training systems transferred to or existing in higher education were reorganized and new types of training established: courses were extended, curricula and syllabuses revised and new institutes and faculties of pedagogy set up. Major developments on these lines, moving teacher-training (secondary or primary) into a more advanced branch of higher education, took place in at least fifteen different countries, including the USSR, the United Kingdom and parts of the United States.

In less developed regions where secondary educational systems were still developing, as in central Africa and Asia, for example, the training of primary teachers did not for the most part shift to higher education, and few of these countries were able to train secondary teachers fast enough to meet the growing need.

Equality of opportunity in education

Preceding sections have shown the progress accomplished in providing better opportunities in education for

children and young people. Nevertheless, various factors continued during the 'fifties to make for inequalities, and some reference to these is needed to complete the review of the educational movement.

Discrimination in education in some areas (related to sex, race, colour, language, religion, political opinions, national or social origins) constitutes a serious problem in terms both of human rights and of educational efficiency. The question was fully studied and discussed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, and was then taken up by UNESCO; this phase of international action was completed in 1960, with the adoption by UNESCO's General Conference of a Convention and Recommendations against discrimination in education. It would be impossible to assess in general how far the nations of the world progressed between 1950 and 1960 in removing discriminatory measures, although some significant examples occurred of government action in this direction. The international programme drew widespread attention and this may be taken as a sign of progress during the decade.

Inequalities in the provision of education occur widely, and do not necessarily reflect discriminatory practices (for example, inequalities are common between different parts of the same country when education is locally financed and dependent on local decision and resources). All efforts to expand educational enrolments and improve the quality of education tend to reduce existing inequalities; and to this extent, the movement in the 'fifties was positive.

The schooling of girls has traditionally been beset by various obstacles. The table below sets out some relevant figures at the three levels of education (but with different countries covered at the different levels).

Table 6

TRENDS IN ENROLMENT OF GIRLS IN THREE LEVELS OF EDUCATION, 1950 AND 1960

Level of education	*Year*	*Total number of countries*	*Number of countries where the percentage of girls in total enrolment was:*				
			20% or less	*21%-30%*	*31%-40%*	*41%-45%*	*46% and over*
Primary	1950	131	16	19	15	10	71
	1960		7	12	23	12	77
Secondary	1950	119	26	17	21	17	38
	1960		12	20	24	11	52
						41% and over	
Higher	1950	62	25	23	11	3	
	1960		16	25	14	7	

It will be seen that there was a steady tendency for girls to make up a larger percentage of enrolments, and a growing number of countries reached the 45 per cent level, which may be regarded as reasonable evidence of equality. At primary-school level the progress is very marked, owing no doubt to schemes for compulsory education and to the removal of social or economic obstacles. At secondary level the improvement in enrolment of girls was considerable, since these percentages relate to a school population which doubled during the decade. The higher-education figures cover a limited number of countries but also reflect some progress.

Despite these changes, one may nevertheless remark that by 1960 there was still a serious problem in regard to the education of girls. The proportion of women among teachers was evidently high at the beginning of the decade. No marked changes in ratios of female to male teachers have been reported during the decade. In many countries, 60 per cent or more primary-school teachers are women. At the secondary level, the percentage of women is lower. Only in higher education is it clear that women are discriminated against or not encouraged as teachers.

Another factor making for inequality in education is rural environment. In most industrialized and developing countries, provision for schooling has usually been better, both quantitatively and qualitatively, in urban than in rural areas. Economic, social and at times purely geographical conditions are responsible for this state of affairs. In many countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia, rural schooling is shorter than urban, offering little or no opportunity for continued education. Also, in those regions, most rural, teachers are poorly trained and classroom materials lacking.

Alternative policies for equalizing the educational opportunities of rural children include: replacement of small rural schools by central schools, using buses to collect children from a wide area; provision of boarding-schools, and creation of "nuclear school" systems, in which a central school handles the higher primary grades and provides specialized services for a surrounding network of one-teacher schools. The first two policies are too expensive for large-scale application in the countries in which the rural lag in education is most serious. The third has been used with success for several years in Peru and other Andean countries, where its expansion has been limited mainly by difficulties in finding qualified health, social welfare and other specialists for the central schools. Educators, particularly in Latin America, are giving more attention to training rural teachers who will be qualified to teach several grades simultaneously in a one- or two-teacher school. Such a system has long been applied successfully in the rural areas of such countries as Canada and the United States, although most educators

prefer consolidated schools with one grade per teacher where conditions permit.

International aid for education

One of the most noticeable trends of the fifties was the growing importance of international aid in the field of education. Educational assistance is provided through many channels: the programmes of the United Nations system, bilateral agreements between Governments, special programmes set up by universities and by unofficial institutions and organizations. No general data are available on the total extent of educational aid, but one useful indicator may be found in fellowships for study abroad. The diagram below, taken from the thirteenth edition of UNESCO's *Study Abroad* (1962) indicates the growing number of fellowships reported during the period under review. It is probable that other forms of international co-operation and assistance, such as the provision of funds, experts and equipment for education, have evolved in a similar manner.

In terms of United Nations programmes, the two major developments during the 'fifties were the establishment of the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in 1950 and the start of operations by the Special Fund in 1959. The former made possible a large number of projects which touched almost all branches of education —primary, secondary, technical, higher, adult, as well as administration, supervision and research. In certain countries, such as India, the Philippines, Thailand and Yugoslavia, technical assistance of this type contributed visibly to national development plans for education. The trend of integrating aid into broad development programmes continued throughout the decade, and is visible in the terms of reference of the United Nations Special Fund. In the field of education, the Special Fund directs its work to specific clearly defined parts of the educational system judged to be of special importance from a pre-investment point of view.

One remaining aspect of international aid for education deserves mention: special or *ad hoc* programmes set up in response to an emergency situation. A significant example has been the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which began operations in 1950. From an early stage, responsibility for the education of the Arab refugee children was shared between UNRWA and UNESCO, and this international programme has continued to provide schooling for over 100,000 children and young people.

Policies and planning

Any attempt to generalize concerning trends in government policy in the 1950s must finally come to grips with the whole question of changing attitudes to education as a "social institution". Implicitly or explicitly, during the decade there seems to have been greater and greater emphasis throughout the world on a conception of educa-

Figure 1



Evolution of the number of fellowships listed in Study Abroad, 1948–61.

Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *Study Abroad, XIII-1962*, Paris, 1961, p. 648.

tion as a basic tool of organized society in forming the type of citizen and worker it will require in the near future. Growing concern with the needs of a technological society for educated manpower, the drive for high levels of living, political preoccupations with the creation of cohesive national States, and awareness both of the tightening interrelationship between peoples and the acceleration of social change have all been factors leading to active involvement in education by higher and higher levels of government. This, in turn, has led to an increasing attention to administrative organization and control of educational institutions.

The interest of the State in planning and supervising the education of future citizens has influenced the schools in many ways: greater efforts to realize " equal educational opportunity " through proportionately higher monetary and other grants to certain administrative regions, to schools and to individuals in most need; growing concern with and control of private education arrangements; more interest in the educational process itself through aid to educational research; and increasing direct action in the reform of school organization and teaching methods. The principle of equal educational opportunity, deriving from the humanist conception, has been re-phrased in terms of the need to train greater and greater numbers of youth; the argument being that the larger the number of educated persons produced by the schools, the wider the field and the more efficient the process of selection of persons suitable for training for the higher levels of complex economic activities.

One of the most evident results of this world shift in governmental attitudes towards education has been the development of emphasis on the " planning " of education and its concomitants of increasing government expenditure on education, and concern with the productivity of the educational system. The concept of planning has been used to cover a great variety of situations and programmes. In 1950, the current preoccupation was with educational reform or " reconstruction ", and the change of terms has more than linguistic significance. A survey recently concluded by UNESCO and the International Bureau of Education showed that, of seventy-five countries canvassed in 1961, some 40 per cent make provision for the organized general planning of education and another 20 per cent are considering measures for doing so. In nearly all of these countries, there is a tendency to lay down long-term development programmes for economic and social progress, in which educational programmes play an important part.

Some examples may illustrate present variations of practice. India has been committed since 1951 to a policy of over-all educational planning as part of the Five-Year Plans. Plans are developed under the authority of a central Planning Commission; the execution of educational programmes is the responsibility of state authorities and, where pertinent, of the central Ministry of Education. Although education is largely in the hands of each state's government, the planning mechanism ensures some measure of central control, because the central government makes grants for specific projects.

In France, four-year development plans of economic scope were introduced in the early 'fifties. The educational component of these plans is provided by the research, administrative and supervisory branches of the Ministry of Education, which make forecasts as a basis for economic planning. The development of education is thus seen as a continuous process in harmony with, but not controlled by, the needs of economic development.

A recent example of deliberate educational planning may be found in Colombia. As from 1957, the Ministry of Education has evolved an integral five-year plan covering all levels of education and providing for school building, teacher training and a nutrition campaign. The plan is legally enacted and forms the basis of the central government's budget for education. Co-ordination with other government activities is ensured, both at the stage of formulating the plan and when annual budgets are prepared.

Both the United Nations (especially through its regional economic commissions) and UNESCO have given increasing attention to educational planning. An important example of this, occurring at the end of the decade, was the series of regional conferences on education in Asia, Africa, the Arab States and Latin America. These conferences endorsed the principle of planning as a basis for national policies in education and saw in the mechanism needed for planning a fruitful area for international co-operation and assistance. The conferences also traced in outline several regional development plans for education, which set common targets and priorities. The substance of the regional plans may well provide the means of forecasting future developments — a point examined later — but their significance here is that so many Member States of the United Nations have reached agreement on the desirability of planning.

In the detailed execution of educational administration, it is not easy to disengage general trends. During the 'fifties, there was increasing recognition of the need for special training for administrators in education to replace a hitherto strictly empirical preparation. This is evident in national programmes as well as in the international programme of UNESCO. Another tendency has been towards a diminution of the role of private schools. Particularly in the case of newly independent countries, but visible also elsewhere, the rapid expansion of enrolments has involved the State in increased support for private schools; this has led to an increased control through financial and legal means, and at times to a takeover by the State. Either course of action has meant change in the public administration services.

While the past decade has been termed a movement from educational " reform " to educational " planning ", national reports have constantly referred to specific reforms in school systems, and a few cautious generalizations may be ventured about their direction. Most generally, it would seem that efficiency, with certain undertones of economizing, has been the objective sought by administrators, if not by the teachers themselves or by research workers.

There has been growing emphasis on easing the passage of pupils through the school system. Class examinations, with resultant failures and a high wastage rate, were characteristic of developing school systems around 1950. In African and Latin American countries, while there may not in fact have been a great change by 1959, the prin-

ciple of automatic promotion has recently gained currency.

Similarly, there has been greater concern with selection procedures at critical points in the school system. In Europe, the question has been one of deciding the criteria and timing of selection, wich reference mainly to the structure of the secondary-school course and to admission to higher education. Countries in Asia and Africa have shown concern for setting up scientific selection procedures, partly in order to ensure that scarce school resources are effectively used. In North America, problems such as the ability grouping of students, teaching of the gifted and the enrichment of the curriculum have come to the fore.

Measures affecting the content of education have shown at least two trends. In curricula reform, there has been a growing emphasis on scientific and technological subjects, with an implicit diminishing of the place of the humanities. More recently, attention has been given to possibilities of speeding up the process of education, i.e., to bring about the same achievement in a shorter time, or to reach a higher level of achievement in the same time. To some extent, this has been a question of re-examining curricula and teaching methods. A further development has come from study of the learning process (as distinct from the teaching process), with important new possibilities opened up by such techniques as teaching machines and "programmed" instruction, which are designed to facilitate the process of learning.

Finally, some remarks may be made about the financing of education. Government expenditures on education increased steadily throughout the decade. This trend was, no doubt, the result of increasing demands and needs, but two aspects of the process are noteworthy. The first was the appearance of special government programmes in areas previously regarded as unsuitable for official action. An example from the United States is federal aid to educational research and to education programmes which contribute to national defence. And, secondly, one may note the arguments being put forward for a definite and large share of national wealth to be spent on education. From initial research into the economics of education and the place of education in economic development, the past decade has seen the beginning of a policy by which education becomes a lever of social and economic progress rather than a result.

Perspectives

The immediate objectives of educational planning have been primarily quantitative. Clearly, enrolment in terms of age cohorts or decisions as to the proportion of pupils to be provided for at each of the levels of the educational pyramid are exercises which lend themselves more readily to the process of planning than do changes in teaching methodology or revisions of the content of the curriculum. Neither aspect of development has been omitted in the regional plans referred to above, but universal compulsory primary education remains a major goal. In the plans of the newly emergent African countries, in particular, priority appears to have been shifted, at least temporarily, to the provision of education at the secondary level. This is a response both to the consequential needs of the vastly increased number of primary-school leavers completing the course, and also to the urgent demands upon general secondary education for a greatly increased output of potential middle- and higher-level administrative, professional and technical personnel.

With quantitative goals as the main objective, it seems clear that the major problem within the developing countries over the next decade will be the provision of the teachers to deal with increased enrolments. Here also lies the core of the qualitative problem, since the skill of the teacher determines the level of reponse of the pupil. Consequently, one may expect great attention to be paid to the status of teachers — intensive programmes of teacher training and the training of training-college staff — and also considerable experimenting in the field of methodology, in the hope of finding solutions, other than simply increasing personnel, to the problem of staffing the class-room. Thus, in Asia and Africa particularly, one may look forward to research and experimentation into the use of programmed instruction to remedy the weaknesses of teaching staff. The development of mass media and of technique whereby teaching groups may fluctuate between very large and very small numbers may also be expected to become the subject of much experiment.

The regional programmes of the Latin American, Asian and African countries all involve problems of selection for education at the secondary level, and much activity may be anticipated in the field of measurement.

There is an increasingly international approach to educational problems, techniques and achievements, which finds expression in the newest of the educational sciences — comparative education — a field in which there may be wide development, both as a university discipline and in its application as a means of prognosis during the shaping of educational plans.

Finally, there may be considerable activity in developing the relationship between general education and vocational training. In the emergent countries, the consolidation of a sound system of general secondary education preparatory to vocational and technical training would appear to be the immediate goal of most plans. In the more developed countries, the demands of technology are likely to confuse still further the issue between a broad-based liberal education and even earlier specialization. An extension of the period covered by both secondary and higher levels of education may perhaps be forecast as one expensive but otherwise practical solution to this problem.

Chapter VII

MANPOWER AND EMPLOYMENT

EMPLOYMENT TRENDS

The world's labour force expanded between 1950 and 1960 by about 150 million 118 million in the less developed continents of Africa, Asia and Latin America, and only 36 million in Europe, North America, Oceania and the USSR combined. The estimated average annual rates of expansion of the labour force in these two groups of countries were 1.6 and 1.0 per cent per annum, respectively, while the world average was 1.4 [1] per cent.

The employment situation developed favourably during the same period, at least in the economically more advanced countries, although Canada and the United States were hard hit by the business recessions of 1954, 1957-58 and 1961. The trends in employment revealed by available official statistics are shown in table 1.

Table 1

MEDIAN ANNUAL RATES OF INCREASE IN EMPLOYMENT IN REPORTING COUNTRIES, 1953-60 [a]

	Economically developed countries	*Less develloped countries*	*All reporting countries*
Manufacturing employment..	2.5 [28]	2.1 [16]	2.4 [44]
Non-agricultural employment	2.6 [24]	2.1 [15]	2.5 [39]

[a] The number of reporting countries is shown in brackets.

The rate of growth of non-agricultural employment in less developed countries might appear reasonably good in relation to the rate for the economically developed countries. But it should be noted that the rate in question has been computed on the basis of only fifteen countries, among which none of the larger countries is included (for lack of suitable data); moreover, the data in most cases refer to the small " modern " or " organized " sector only. This would justify the assumption that the greater part of the increase in the labour force continued to be channelled into agricultural and other " traditional " occupations, where, in most of the countries concerned, there was already an abundant supply of labour. The consequences were more rural unemployment, overt or hidden in the form of underemployment, a continuing drift to the towns in search of work, a swelling of the services sector and rising urban unemployment on account of the relatively small absorption of labour involved in the high rates of growth of the " modern sector ".

Table 2

CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF EXPANSION IN NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT, 1953-60

Range of increase (per cent per annum)	*Countries*
Up to 1	Belgium, France, Singapore,[a] Tanganyika,[b] United Kingdom.
Over 1, up to 2	Cyprus, Eastern Germany, Malta, Norway, Sierra Leone, Uganda, United States of America.
Over 2, up to 3	Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Kenya, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Rhodesia, Poland, Puerto Rico, Romania, Republic of South Africa, West Berlin.
Over 3, up to 4	Austria, Fiji, Philippines, Southern Rhodesia, Turkey.
Over 4, up to 5	Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Italy, USSR.
Over 5	Bulgaria, Israel, Japan, Yugoslavia.

[a] Employment decreased rapidly during 1957-60 in the sample of establishments covered (scope: 77,000 persons in 1953).

[b] Decrease: employment declined rapidly in 1957, 1959 and 1960.

Employment levels expanded in the economically developed regions of the world between 1950 and 1960 at a rate considerably in excess of the growth in the labour force. Non-agricultural employment in eighteen European countries showed a median annual average rate of increase between 1953 and 1960 of 2.4 per cent per annum, or four times the estimated rate of growth of the European labour force (0.6 per cent per annum in 1950-60). For twenty-four economically developed countries as a group, the median annual increase from 1953 to 1960 in non-agricultural employment was 2.6 per cent and in manufacturing 2.5 per cent (twenty-eight countries), whereas the labour force of North America (Canada and United

[1] Long-term trends in the composition and distribution of the labour force were dealt with in some detail in the *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3). Additional information on the working population and its occupational distribution may be found in ILO, " Population and Labour Force Projections ", *International Labour Review*, April 1961; the same periodical has published a survey of population and labour force in Africa and Asia in the December 1961 and October 1962 issues, respectively. Other employment and labour force trends relevant to this chapter are discussed in part I of recent reports of the Director-General of the ILO to the International Labour Conference (" Automation and other technological developments ", 1957 Report; " Current Problems and Trends ", 1959; " Youth and Work ", 1960, and " Older Workers ", 1962). See also, for regional treatments of employment questions, ILO, *Reports of the Director-General* to the Seventh Conference of the American States Members (Buenos Aires, 1961) and to the Fifth Asian Regional Conference (Melbourne, November 1962).

States), USSR, Europe and Oceania combined expanded at an annual rate of 1.0 per cent (1950-60).

Table 3

MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT TRENDS: CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF EXPANSION, 1953-60

Range of increase (per cent per annum)	*Countries*
Decrease	Argentina, Canada, Singapore, United States.
Increase:	
Up to 1	Belgium, eastern Germany, France, Ireland, Malta, Norway, Sweden.
Over 1, up to 2	Finland, United Kingdom, Guatemala, Italy, Mexico, China (Taiwan), Tanganyika, Uganda.
Over 2, up to 3	Australia, Denmark, Hungary, Kenya, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Switzerland.
Over 3, up to 4	Austria, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Puerto Rico, Republic of South Africa.
Over 4, up to 5	Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Northern Rhodesia, West Berlin.
Over 5	Bulgaria, Hong Kong, Japan, Southern Rhodesia, Yugoslavia.

Although transfers from agriculture[2] made a very substantial contribution to the expansion of non-agricultural employment, not only was the net growth in the labour force absorbed, but the reserve of unemployed labour was also heavily drawn upon. North America was an important exception.

Countries with rapidly growing economies have suffered recently from wide-spread labour shortages. In the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the total number of foreign workers reached 350,000 in 1960, most of them arriving under official agreements with Italy, Spain and Greece.

As economic growth and technical progress moved forward in the 1950s, employment in the services sector tended to expand at a faster rate than industrial employment. In certain new branches of the industrial sector, such as the metal trades, electronics and the chemical industry, the labour force increased rapidly, while it declined in some of the traditional industries, such as textiles and food.

These trends are a reflection both of a growing demand for services and of technical progress; technical progress until now has affected industrial manual employment more than non-manual employment, while creating the conditions for the development or expansion of industries manufacturing new products.

In both the services and industrial sectors, one of the most important trends was the growth in the numbers of non-manual workers and the changes in the nature of non-manual employment. In 1956, the United States recorded for the first time a majority of non-manual over manual workers, and an increase in the number of scientific, technical and managerial personnel at the same time that the rate of growth of the number of office employees slowed down. Between 1947 and 1957, the number of the former increased by 60.6 per cent and that of the latter by only 22.8 per cent. In the USSR, the number of professional staff and technicians increased by 200 and 250 per cent respectively between 1941 and 1956.

UNEMPLOYMENT AND UNDEREMPLOYMENT

Unemployment was lower at the end of the decade than in 1950 in the great majority of the economically developed countries, and in most cases had declined to quite low levels. From 1960 to 1961, annual average unemployment declined in New Zealand and all European countries, except Spain and Yugoslavia. There was some increase in the Republic of South Africa and Australia, as well as in Canada and the United States. However, conditions improved considerably in the latter part of 1961 in North America and in the early months of 1962 in Australia.

Unemployment, especially in urban areas, presented a serious problem for some less developed countries in the 1950's,[3] but underemployment continued to be quantitatively far more important. In India, about 22 million in a total rural labour force of 115-120 million were occupied less than twenty-two hours per week, while the urban underemployed numbered some 3.2 million, or 14 per cent of the gainfully employed population in the towns. About the same time, i.e., at the beginning of the Second Five-Year Plan (1956-61), the number of totally unemployed was 5.3 million and increased to 9 million as the Third Five-Year Plan (1961-66) came into force. In Japan, some 2.6 million persons were judged underemployed in 1955; unemployment, on the other hand, did not seem to exceed 1.2-1.5 per cent of the whole labour force in 1950-60. In the Philippines, the number of underemployed working less than twenty hours a week represented no less than 8.5 per cent of the total labour force, while another 7.1 per cent were totally unemployed. In East Pakistan, there were 17 per cent underemployed and 10.3 unemployed in large towns.

In the Middle East, North Africa and southern Europe, it has been estimated that the degree of agricultural underemployment varies from 28 to 64 per cent. In Italy, the average underemployment in the country as a whole was 29 per cent in the last decade, although it was 49 per cent in the south; unemployment, on the other hand, varied between 8 and 11 per cent of the total labour

[2] It has been estimated that the reduction in labour requirements in agriculture in the six countries included in the European Economic Community from 1956 to 1971 may be of the order of 25 per cent — or some 3 million workers. Thus, 50 per cent of young persons from rural families who were under fourteen years of age in 1956 will need employment outside agriculture.

[3] The following developing countries reported increased numbers of unemployed: Algeria, Cameroun (1955-58), Congo (Brazzaville) (1953-60), Ghana (1954-60), Mauritius, Morocco (1953-60), Nigeria (1956-60), Northern Rhodesia (1952-60), Sierra Leone, Republic of South Africa, Bantus (1953-60), Southern Rhodesia, British Guiana, Chile, Haiti (1953-60), Surinam (1955-60), Burma, Ceylon, Cyprus, India, Pakistan, Singapore (1953-60), Malta, Turkey, Yugoslavia (1952-60).

force, affecting some 1.7 to 2 million persons. Of the total Egyptian labour force of about 7 million, 3.9 per cent were considered to be totally unemployed in 1957-58, with much higher joblessness (7.1 per cent) in large cities than in smaller towns (4.8 per cent).

In Puerto Rico, in spite of fast economic development, unemployment increased from 13.1 per cent in 1950 to 15.9 per cent in 1952, declining by stages to 13.2 per cent in 1957 and continuing above 1950 levels throughout the decade. In Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica, unemployment rates at various times in the 1950s have exceeded 18 per cent of the labour force, with underemployment affecting as many as 40 per cent of the workers according to some estimates. Chile and Venezuela have been faced with open unemployment which, as in the case of urban areas in Brazil, is partly due to important internal migrations causing increases well above absorption levels in the supply of labour in the cities.

North-east Brazil is the centre of a major unemployment problem, with some 500,000 urban unemployed and underemployed in the major coastal cities of the region and large pockets of rural underemployed labour in the stagnating economy of the interior. The periodic migrations of this surplus manpower acquired substantial proportions in years of severe drought, such as 1952 and 1958, when some 300,000 persons fled the area each year, attracted by the not too certain job opportunities in the coffee-growing and industrial areas of the south-east. Close to 700,000 unemployed, casually employed and underemployed persons are estimated to have settled in the shanty-towns of Rio de Janeiro — the hillside *favelas*.

Large movements of refugee workers also took place in Europe, either in uncontrolled form or in pursuance of detailed clearance arrangements agreed upon by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, and by Denmark, Norway and Sweden. These arrangements, some of which have existed since immediately after the Second World War, are designed to allow the greatest possible mobility to the manpower of the signatory countries and to help migrant workers to find suitable jobs through the public employment-office networks. The members of the European Coal and Steel Community agreed, in 1957, to exchange skilled coal and steel workers, through their respective employment services, on the basis of known demand in the industry. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation adopted various decisions in the course of the decade with a view to reducing obstacles to the free movement of nationals of member countries for purposes of employment.

On 1 September 1961, new regulations of the European Economic Community came into force for the six countries concerned, setting forth "first measures" to effect the free movement of workers within the Community in implementation of the relevant provisions of the Treaty of Rome. In these regulations, the relationship between free movement, employment opportunities and vocational training is stressed, and thus the need to direct each country's efforts towards the achievement of a co-ordinated employment policy within the Community.

In the United Kingdom, the present Industrial Management Corporations continue the regional industrial development work in localities of England, Wales and Scotland where a high rate of unemployment exists or is imminent. In the USSR, the movements of labour to new industrial regions have become considerable in the course of the decade, and regional differences in wages have become an essential short-term means of bringing about a more rational distribution of labour. In Japan, the geographical areas covered by placement operations were extended in 1960 to bring about internal compensation. These measures were combined in some cases with a regional development programme designed to bring employment to workers in areas with an excess of labour.

In Africa, some 200,000 persons have been leaving Upper Volta every year. About 150,000 able-bodied male workers were absent from Nyasaland in 1960, most of them in Northern Rhodesia. Immigrants into Ghana from neighbouring territories have been estimated at 350,000 to 400,000 annually in recent years.

Large pools of urban unemployment occur in some countries as a result of progress in primary education in rural areas, which leads to migration to urban centres in excess of employment opportunities. Thus, in the Western Region of Nigeria, if the present rate of unemployment among school-leavers continues, there should be a backlog of some 800,000 unemployed school-leavers by 1966.

In India, the Third Five-Year Plan estimates the backlog of the "educated unemployed" (largely persons who had some secondary education) in 1961 at nearly one million. In the Philippines, in 1956 the unemployed included over 20,000 college graduates, almost 60,000 persons who had had some university training and well over 200,000 who had completed their secondary education.

Consequences of structural and technical change for employment

During the past decade, economic growth has become a universally recognized objective of government policy. Countries with low and high levels of national income have formulated policies with a view to accelerating the annual rate of increase of physical production, measured in terms of gross national product. The United Nations General Assembly, in proclaiming the 1960s as the United Nations Development Decade, set as an objective the attainment by 1970 in each developing country of a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent. The industrial countries in the organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have adopted a similar goal, and the USSR and other countries with centrally planned economies have placed increased emphasis on maintaining the high growth rates in output essential to the expansion of consumer products and services.

Preoccupation with the growth rate has caused increasing concern with the "structural" aspects of employment policy. Structural changes and the need to adjust production and employment to these changes are features of every dynamic economy; the more rapid the growth of an economy, the more change it is likely to have to absorb. Measures to promote economic growth have thus brought into sharp focus the various problems of labour adjustment, the reactions to structural change of the

workers concerned and the search for measures which might promote an easier adaptation of labour. Thus, concurrently with government policies to promote growth, certain types of labour policies have been given special importance, such as "re-adaptation" aid to workers, regional development policies, occupational training and measures designed to provide future reserves of trained manpower.

Technical progress was one of the major features of the 1950's. In industrially advanced countries, the utilization of advanced forms of mechanization — generally called automation — grew rapidly in importance. In developing countries, the modernization of industry spread unevenly, but in forms which corresponded to all possible stages of mechanization. The advisability of wide-spread mechanization in developing countries in the light of efforts to maximize employment became a major subject of controversy. No less controversial has been the debate in economically advanced countries about the effects of automation on employment and, in the last years of the period under review, Governments, industrialists and labour have paid particular attention to displacement problems and to important shortages of high-level and skilled personnel for modernizing and for new industries.

The effects of technical progress on the work required in simpler forms of mechanization are well known but, in more complex forms — and more particularly, automation, including all the concomitant innovations — it was only in the fifties that the considerable occupational repercussions began to be realized. In its early forms, mechanization increases the division of labour and simplifies the tasks involved, but the more recent evolution of production techniques has eliminated a large number of irksome routine jobs and has created new jobs, which are often more technical and demand more judgement and responsibility. One example is the spectacular development of the functions of the technician (half ways between the university-trained engineer and the skilled worker). The consequential rearrangement or combination of duties upsets the established hierarchy of the trades and professions. In many cases, the distinction between manual and non-manual labour becomes much more difficult to draw. In industry, at an advanced stage of mechanization, tasks of control and maintenance are more and more given precedence over direct production work, as is knowledge concerning equipment and materials over the skill and aptitudes of the craftsman. Planning, design, organization and preparation acquire increasing importance. While some traditionally non-manual jobs (for example, the mechanical handling of information in offices), are monotonous and demand hardly any qualifications, new occupations of a technical or semi-technical character are appearing at the same time as the rationalization of clerical and administrative work requires staff endowed with more specialized training than that acquired by most office personnel.

As technical progress accelerates, the countries in which it appears (as well as those which must face the competition of highly productive modern plant in other countries or the declining value of their raw materials abroad) are faced with two basic employment problems: on the one hand, finding jobs for displaced workers when displacement becomes inevitable, and choosing, according to national circumstances, between labour-intensive and capital-intensive methods of production; and, on the other hand, training and retraining personnel for industries that are increasingly dependent on scientific and technical manpower as well as on new skills.

With increasing modernization and development of competitive products, older industries are now employing fewer workers. Textile employment, for example, has been shrinking rather rapidly in some western European countries, Canada and the United States. As a result of the displacement of domestic by foreign textiles and the rising productivity brought about with new equipment, employment in the industry fell by 18 per cent in Italy, 10 per cent in France and 9 per cent in the United States between the pre-war years and 1954. In the next four years, textile employment decreased even further. This is partly explained by the savings in labour and the increase in productivity effected through modern machinery. In France, all processes in spinning would require twenty-three workers for 10,000 spindles with 1948-49 equipment but, with modern 1958-59 equipment, it was estimated that only fourteen workers were required; as a result of the introduction of improved techniques and machinery, cotton textile production increased by 13 per cent in the period 1951-56, but this was accompanied by a reduction of 26 per cent in the labour force employed. In Japan which, like the Federal Republic of Germany, rebuilt its textile industry after the Second World War, the average number of workers per 100 looms in a weaving mill decreased from 110 to 26 between 1947 and 1956.

The problem facing the less developed countries, which must choose between efficient production with capital-intensive methods and the need to maximize employment by labour-intensive methods, is shown in the case of India. It was there estimated that, for the same amount of capital, thirty-four times more workers are employed in a hand-weaving cottage-type industry as there are in a large modern factory. The redundancy implications of modernization must be considered both in their social context and in relation to the need to compete in the export market. In India, some 180,000 workers would become redundant if all non-automatic looms were immediately replaced by modern automatic looms; it was recognized that the pace of replacement of outworn or obsolete machinery should be gradual, so as to coincide with the provision of alternative employment for staff inevitably displaced. The Indian Working Group on the Cotton Textile Industry came to the conclusion in 1960 that modernization to the maximum possible extent on a national scale is not possible, because of the vast expenditure involved and the large percentage of the labour force that would have to be reabsorbed; still, no mill should be allowed to exist below a minimum level of modernization.

As the new or expanding industries develop automation, they also require less personnel, particularly production personnel. In the United States, for example, although the electronic industry had a production increase of 275 per cent between 1947 and 1952, the increase of personnel involved was only 40 per cent. In the electrical industry, employment of production workers dropped from 925,000 in 1953 to 836,000 in 1961. From 1953 through 1960, there was a 17 per cent increase in manu-

facturing production, with an accompanying decline of 1.6 million in the number of production workers.[4] In the USSR, the number of workers employed on automatic equipment in machine construction grew between 1948 and 1959 at the average annual rate of 15.6 per cent, against 11.4 per cent for workers handling non-automatic machines and 8 per cent for those using hand-tools or simple machines.[5]

Towards the end of the 1950's, efforts to deal with the various aspects of the employment problem brought to the fore the question of the impact of automation on the basic structure of occupations and its consequences. In 1957, this interest was reflected internationally in discussions at the ILO Conference.[6] Various studies were carried out under the auspices of the European Coal and Steel Community, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the Economic Commission for Europe, the ILO and national labour departments. In the United States, events touched off by the down-turn of the business cycle in 1961 combined to raise the question of automation to the level of primary national concern. The President's Advisory Committee on Labour-Management Policy, set up in 1961, studied *inter alia* the benefits and problems incident to automation and other technological advances. The Committee's report[7] contains eleven major recommendations for accomplishing, by "a combination of private and governmental action, the necessary advancement of automation and technological change without detrimental sacrifice of human values". These include action to promote a higher rate of economic growth, better information on present and future job opportunities and requirements, improved educational facilities (e.g., to reduce the drop-out rate among primary and high school students), provision of adequate vocational training and re-training programmes, and staggering of changes "so that potential unemployment will be cushioned by expected expansion of operations and normal attrition in the work force..."

Needed skills — new skills — obsolete skills

The needs for personnel created by the rapid technological evolution in industry has not been matched by a corresponding increase in the numbers graduating from the universities and technical institutes in the required specialized fields. Some more developed countries have estimated that their need for such specialist personnel will soon be very much greater than the numbers at present graduating. In all countries, but particularly in the less developed regions, the shortage of high-level technical personnel is critical. This is why the General Assembly, at its eleventh session, adopted resolution 1824 (XVII), designed to promote the training of national technical personnel.

In India, the over-all shortage of qualified technicians and scientists was estimated at about 9,800 in 1960. In Japan, the New Long-Range Economic Plan, 1961-1970, estimates that "about 170,000 scientists and engineers will be short of requirements during the ten-year period". In Africa, the shortage of scientific personnel is acute; the proportion of doctors is as low as one per 60-80,000 inhabitants in Niger, Chad and Upper Volta, and one per 103,000 in Ethiopia. The number of high-level manpower compared with the whole population was during the decade, in Nigeria, as little as 0.1 per cent, little more than 0.3 per cent in Ghana, and 0.5 per cent in India and the United Arab Republic against 2 to 5 per cent in more highly developed countries. In Latin America, there were in the 1950's no more than 16,000 agronomists all told as against the 42,000 which the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimated would be needed in the region. In Peru, the national universities were reported unable to train more than 3,000 of the 5,000 engineers that the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) recommended should be made available by 1965. And, in Argentina, one of the conditions for achieving the economic development targets envisaged by ECLA in 1956-67 was that Argentine universities should double the number of engineers trained each year, so as to achieve the goal of 10,000 additional engineers by 1967. The shortages — and in some countries, the simultaneous presence of large pools of educated unemployed — are of such importance that a growing number of countries are taking special measures to cope with them.

Young people tend increasingly to go in for scientific or technical training. But, in most industrialized as well as in developing countries, the number of would-be scientific or technical students is still very seriously limited by shortages of premises and teaching staff, by early desertion from school and training, by insufficient vocational guidance and the exaggerated prestige of liberal professions, and by financial reasons which prevent young persons from taking up careers that require long years of instruction.

"Disguised" manpower shortages in the form of misemployment of the available skilled workers and employment of workers with inadequate qualifications (in teaching, for example) have been the necessary accompaniment of real shortages in many countries with varying degrees of industrialization. Shortages of skilled workers, for example, have often led employers to underemploy the more highly skilled workers or to overemploy less skilled ones. Thus, the shortage of technical workers, which has developed at an alarming speed in nearly every country, has frequently caused the employment of engineers on jobs requiring less qualifications than those for which they were trained and the employment of less skilled workers in jobs too difficult for them. The underemployment of skilled workers seems to have been common, even in under-developed countries where the shortage of workers of intermediate levels were generally more serious than those of highly skilled workers, and the low standard of

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[4] Examples taken from Walter Buckingham, "The Great Employment Controversy", and Walter P. Reuther, "Policies for Automation: A Labor Viewpoint", in *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 340, March 1962, special issue devoted to automation.

[5] See "Manpower training should be effected on a scientific basis", *Sotsialistitcheskij troud*, No. 11, 1961, pp. 108-117.

[6] Based on the *Report of the Director-General*, Part I, "Automation and other Technological Developments; Labour and Social Implications".

[7] United States President's Advisory Committee on Labour-Management Policy, *The Benefits and Problems Incident to Automation and other Technological Advances: report*, Washington (US Govt. Print. Off. 1962).

training among the less skilled workers greatly limited the possibilities of providing them with technical jobs.

One of the principal remedies for an unbalanced employment market has clearly consisted in developing methods of vocational training, based on accurate forecasting and planning, designed to absorb the unskilled labour surpluses and to assure the upgrading of employed workers. Various countries have done this to the best of their means. At the same time, however, some have also made the most of the existing human resources, trying to improve the geographical mobility of workers and to facilitate their vocational retraining. But, in many cases, systematic efforts of this kind have been made only at the very end of the period under consideration.

Opportunities for study for persons already at work include evening and correspondence courses. These are used on a large scale in the USSR: in 1956-57, 1.6 million pupils were taking courses of graduate or technician standard. Since 1958, when the public education system was expanded and the links between schools and real working life were strengthened, the vocational and technical schools have provided both day and evening classes, and advanced education has been spreading through correspondence and evening classes. In the Federal Republic of Germay, this method is also used, and a number of engineering schools have held five-year evening courses leading to a diploma.

There has also been a growing trend towards multipurpose training in order to facilitate transfers from one occupation to another; such transfers will become mose common as industry introduces more and more new techniques with a scientific basis. In the Federal Republic of Germany, trades have been regrouped. In France, the certificates of vocational aptitude have been standardized to eliminate regional variations; apprentices in metal trades and mining are now taught two trades, e.g., they may be fitters and turners, or fitters and milling-machine operators. In the USSR, workers learn up to three different trades.

In some countries voung people working in industry can obtain further training on full or part pay by using the facilities to be found side by side with the traditional education system. Examples are the "co-operative" education system in the United States, the upgrading courses in France and the "sandwich" courses in the United Kingdom, in which spells of wage-earning employment alternate with periods of study. Much more important in regard to the numbers involved is the practice of "day-release" from industry for study purposes; the number of apprentices taking advantage of this in the United Kingdom rose from 42,000 in 1938 to 448,500 in 1956-57. The trend in the 1950's has been, in most industrially advanced countries, to provide facilities for a really big expansion of technical education at the advanced level and, at the same time, to ensure that persons studying science and technology combine sound academic education with immediate grasp of shop-floor problems, acquired through personal acquaintance with the actual production processes and the people engaged in them. One of the most striking examples of this trend is to be found in the USSR, where the 1958 Act stipulates that advanced studies must be associated with productive work.[8] In the Federal Republic of Germany and France, various steps have been taken in recent years to encourage the optimum combination of theory and practice in training. Concern is not limited to the lack of utilitarian perspective in theoretical training: in 1960 the Armand-Rueff Committee recommended better training in the humanities for French engineers, and expansion of opportunities for secondary and advanced education for children from working-class or rural homes.[9]

In industrialized countries, the retraining of adult workers with a view to a change of occupation became a major feature of the policy of reconversion of industrial activity and the fight against unemployment. In France, retraining facilities have existed since 1946, in close harmony with other schemes for accelerated training and upgrading of skills; a special manpower retraining fund was created in August 1954 to assist industrial firms developing *ad hoc* retraining schemes for their own workers and even for those of other employers. In Canada, the Technical and Vocational Training Assistance Act of December 1960 provides for the training of instructors and the retraining of unemployed workers. In the United States, the Area Redevelopment Act of May 1961 initiated major legislative action in support of federal and state retraining programmes in areas of substantial and persistent unemployment. A common characteristic of most retraining programmes is the particular attention paid to providing training broad enough to facilitate greater occupational mobility. In western Europe, coalminers and steel-workers have received additional unemployment benefits and have been provided with special retraining and resettlement facilities as a result of their Government's commitments under the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty.

In less developed countries, efforts to improve occupational mobility have primarily been concentrated on methods of teaching and training, for the most part because of the general low level of funds. Also, less developed countries have not encountered the kind of conversion problems found in industrialized countries and so have not had to give particular attention to vocational retraining problems.

The time factor is an important element in the provision of skilled manpower for economic development in Asia, and certain attempts have been made to create types of accelerated vocational training programmes, especially with regard to craftsmen and semi-skilled labourers. The popularity of "sandwich" apprentice courses and correspondence courses is increasing, and various types of these schemes exist. In India, time off from work for technical study is ensured to the worker by government legislation.

It is, however, realized that accelerated training is only a partial answer to the problem of creating an adequately trained labour force at all levels of skill. Faced with high illiteracy rates, Asian countries have been actively

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8 Of *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), 22nd year, No. 1, 1 January 1959, p. 10, text 5: Act of 24 December 1958 to strengthen the link between school and life and to provide for the further development of the system of national education in the USSR.

9 *Documents officiels et Bulletin officiel de l'Education nationale* (Paris), No. 25, 29 September 1960.

stepping up programmes for the spread of education. At the same time, countries in the region have taken the position that in the schools " the work experience of every student should include a quota of manual work and should not be confined to so-called dignified or white-collar work ".[10] The Ten-Year Plan of Ceylon carries this point further and goes on to state, " the long-term solution to this problem lies in changing the educational system. Thus, industrial training must begin at school with a distinct bias in favour of manual and practical work... From the practical classes in schools, students may be directed to special trade schools... The immediate need, then, is to make provision for a system of trade schools and higher technical education.[11]

Steps have been taken along these lines in various countries to introduce vocational and technical training in government schools.

However, as the training of the semi-skilled worker is usually undertaken on the job, employers also have a substantial part to play in this field. Over a long period, Argentina and Brazil and, more recently, Colombia, Chile, Venezuela and Peru are examples of Latin American countries where the industrial community has created or helped to create national training networks of considerable scope. In Asia, however, the initiative appears to have been left mainly to Governments. In most countries, lack of interest on the part of employers in general was, until recently, one drawback to the creation of wide-spread vocational training programmes on a voluntary basis. In various countries of the region, following the lack of success of the voluntary apprenticeship schemes, legislation has been enacted to give the Government authority to promote such training programmes in industry. In India, employers with 500 or more employees are required by law to provide in-plant practical training, and those with less than 500 employees can send their workers to local institutes being set up by the Government. In some countries, however, including for example India, Japan, Pakistan and the Philippines, various large industrial concerns, both public and private, have begun apprenticeship training programmes.

With the spread in Asia of the idea of industrial estates, technical education and vocational training are being carried to the areas and to the groups within the population that have the greatest need for them.

In addition, both in India and Japan co-operative schemes exist whereby larger enterprises assist smaller firms by training workers in their centres. In Japan, co-operative methods of training go a step further; smaller firms pool their resources to organize vocational training on a co-operative basis. Trainees are trained in the workshops of the member concerns, and also receive theoretical instruction. Part of the cost of the schemes is met by the Government of Japan, and government centres are placed at the disposal of trainee groups for theoretical instruction. By April 1960, 514 mutual vocational training organizations were approved by the Government and 42,606 workers were being trained.

Development action in African countries and, to some extent, in other regions has given rise to new labour " mobilization " schemes and to experiments designed to solve problems of unemployment and lack of training and to carry out economically important projects. Most schemes seek to associate the population with the implementation of tasks of national interest; for example, in early 1960 the work camps for former unemployed persons in Tunisia provided occupations for some 120,000 persons; national service schemes, generally operating in rural areas, have been established in the Malagasy Republic, Mali, Morocco, Senegal and in the United Arab Republic (where, in addition, combined rural centres have been in existence since 1955). Many of these schemes are specifically designed to train youth, while providing them with useful work including schemes in the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Ghana, and the Ivory Coast. Some schemes combine civic, military and occupational training and are obligatory for young unemployed persons.

In the light of the growing number of countries adopting various forms of compulsory labour services for use in economic development tasks, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations indicated that such schemes appeared to be contrary to the 1930 and 1957 Forced Labour Conventions; the Committee also expressed the view that it should be possible " to adopt a policy for the creation of employment and to have recourse to techniques of persuasion ".[12]

Development plans in the Asian region assign an important role to community development programmes for the mobilization of rural manpower and other local resources.[13] Voluntary labour by the rural population is essential to the success of these ventures, and lack of such labour has generally been their most important drawback. For example, according to official estimates the " people's contribution " to community development programmes in India between 1952 and 1959 averaged out at less than 0.1 per cent of the national income per year, which indicates that the voluntary mobilization of idle rural labour has not been impressive. In order to improve the situation, a proposal has been made in India to encourage the organization of labour co-operatives to undertake contract work for local construction projects.

The creation of employment as a planned objective of development

Only a few development policies of less developed countries, whether these are expressed in formal plans, general programmes or statistical projections, include built-in employment objectives. In most, increase of national income and diversification of the economy appear more prominently than employment creation, which tends to be regarded as a by-product of development. Employment

10 Interim Report of the National Education Commission, Ceylon, 1961, Sessional Paper No. 1, 1962.

11 Government of Ceylon, National Planning Council, Ten-Year Plan, pp. 381-382.

12 ILO, Forty-sixth session of the International Labour Conference, *Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations* (Geneva, 1962), Part III : " Forced Labour ", pp. 212-216.

13 *Community Development and Economic Development, Part I. A Study of the Contribution of Rural Community Development Programmes to National Economic Development in Asia and the Far East,* United Nations publication, Sales No.: 60.II.F.6 (Part I).

targets are often low; and, in the implementation of plans, many countries have encountered difficulties in absorbing the unemployment backlog, without taking into account the normal increase of the labour force through population growth.

A group of experts appointed by the ILO recently studied existing development plans from the point of view of employment, as part of its examination of possible measures to expand employment opportunities in developing countries. The following employment targets were noted:

Table 4

EMPLOYMENT TARGETS IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS

Country	*Estimated increase in labour force during plan period*	*Employment targets*	*Plan period*
	(in millions)	*(in millions)*	
Ceylon [a]	1.33 (1957-68)	1.39 (1957-68)	1959-68
Greece	0.235	0.330	1960-64
India [b]	5.5	5.5	1951-56
	10	9.6	1956-61
	17	14	1961-66
Italy	2	4	1955-64
Japan [c]	4.81	3.61	1958-62
Pakistan	2	[d]	1958-60
	2.5	[d]	
Philippines [e]	0.63	1.44	1955-65
	1.40	1.50	1957-61
Poland	0.950[f] (1951-55)	2.2[g]	1949-55
	0.420[f]	0.6[g]	1955-60
	1.29[f]		1960-65
United Arab Republic		0.5	1957-60
	0.825	0.825	1960-65

[a] Unemployment in 1959 estimated at 340,000 to 450,000.
[b] Unemployment at beginning of Second Five-Year Plan, 5.3 million; at beginning of Third Five-Year Plan, 9 million.
[c] Average unemployment in 1957 was 520,000.
[d] The stated objective is to absorb the increased labour force and to relieve partially the existing backlog of unemployment (77-88,000 at the beginning of First Five-Year Plan).
[e] Unemployment estimated at the beginning of 1955-59 programme, 1.37 million; 1.20 million at the beginning of 1957-61 programme.
[f] Working population.
[g] Non-agricultural employment.

The experts considered these employment targets and their significance within the total development effort, and came to the conclusion that "all countries formulating plans and programmes for their development should, on the one hand, make full estimates of the available supply of labour and its expected growth from all sources, over the period concerned; and, on the other, express their targets in terms of employment to be created, as well as in terms of investment, output and income ".[14] The experts suggested the following main elements of policy, with a view to achieving a mutually reinforcing increase of both employment and the rate of economic growth:

1. The need to raise the level of investment;

2. Exploration of all opportunities for increasing the number of jobs created by a given level of investment through more labour-intensive types of investment, as long as such investments are consistent with the growth objectives;

3. Local and national initiatives are needed to plan and organize schemes for using unemployed and underemployed labour more fully, both in rural and urban areas, in certain types of productive activities requiring little in the way of equipment, material or scarce skills;

4. Measures to raise the productivity, especially of scarce resources, by methods requiring little new investment, so as to increase the supply of investment goods and consumer goods needed to support a higher level of employment;

5. Measures to make it as easy as possible for people to move to places where there are jobs, to promote geographical balance in the growth of employment through appropriate regional distribution of productive activities, and to provide vocational training facilities;

6. National and international measures to increase export earnings, to abate excessive fluctuations in them, to economize the use of foreign exchange, and to increase the inflow of foreign capital; this would avoid employment expansion being checked by balance-of-payments difficulties.

MANPOWER PLANNING

The observations of the ILO experts reflect the growing consciousness in industrially advanced countries, as in some developing countries, of the need to formulate employment objectives in relation to desired rates of economic growth and, also, to take into account the training and educational requirements for the attainment of these objectives. This awareness was particularly marked in the late 1950s, as increasing attention was paid to the assessment and forecasting of manpower needs and resources in relation to economic, technical and social factors.

Naturally, the problem has appeared to be of greater importance in the case of certain strategic manpower groups, whose training requires a long time and very careful planning, this being particularly the case of high-level scientific and technical personnel.

Towards the end of the decade, the number of surveys and statistical inquiries on present and future needs for high-level scientific and technical staff increased in industrially advanced countries. These were frequently carried out on behalf of the educational authorities although, on occasion, the initiative in this field was taken by employers' organizations. Various international organizations have also considered the problem and publicized their findings with a view to promoting action. Thus, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation launched its own surveys concerning the employment of highly skilled personnel; it also engaged, together with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the ILO, in research concerning the best methods to be applied in assessing present and future needs.

[14] ILO, *Employment Objectives in Economic Development*, pp. 38-39.

To achieve optimum utilization of their skills, engineers and scientists must be supported by adequate numbers of well-trained auxiliary scientific personnel and middle-level to high-level technicians, who are often much more scarce than personnel with full university training. Furthermore, the need for qualified staff is not limited to scientific and technical personnel, but is also felt in the medical and teaching professions and in management, and there is also a need for economists and public administrators, to cite the most obvious examples.

Several countries have undertaken to determine their future manpower needs at all levels of skill, while at the same time trying to establish accurate forecasting of manpower supply. These estimates are generally established in close association with economic planning, since well-defined plans and draft programmes for development allow much more precise determination of manpower requirements; conversely, this improves the possibilities for building well-reasoned employment objectives into development plans.

In centrallyplanned economies as, for example, in the USSR, manpower planning is an integral part of economic planning. In France, since 1946, the Manpower Committee attached to the General Planning Commission has been responsible, for the study of manpower problems, the search for full employment solutions within the framework of economic plans and the study of adequate means to give each branch of economic activity the manpower needed to achieve the production targets defined in the plan.

In other countries, however, such planning is a much more recent development, and it is only in the last few years that a number of Governments have established machinery for the elaboration of employment policy and, more often, of manpower-policy which takes into account the need both to satisfy manpower requirements of the various economic sectors and to ensure that available manpower is used as far as possible in accordance with the skills and aptitudes of each worker.[15] Thus, in India, the Manpower Committee created in 1956 and, assisted by a Directorate of Manpower and by the officials responsible for manpower questions, in the various ministries and state governments, undertakes the collection of information on manpower supply and demand in strategic sectors, the establishment of projections of future needs, the determination of such new requirements as result from the execution of the Five-Year Plans, the study of employment and unemployment problems and the formulation of employment objectives and policy.

In the United Arab Republic, a special unit responsible for population and manpower questions was set up in 1957 within the framework of the National Planning Commission; in 1961, this was supplemented by the establishment of two commissions to deal respectively with the supply of skilled manpower and technicians. The Employment Council established in Japan in 1958 submitted, in 1959, recommendations concerning employment policy over the following ten to fifteen years. More recently, in 1960-62, other similar bodies responsible for several or specific aspects of employment and manpower planning have been established in Belgium, Chile, Colombia, Israel, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland and Sweden; in some cases, these bodies have received assistance from international organizations.

It will be evident from the above that it is best to base action for full employment and development of vocational education and training on systematic manpower planning. Such planning should comprise the determination of the amount and types of employment that a country should achieve in a given period, and, on the basis of such employment targets, establishing of the amount and types of vocational education and training needed in that period as regards skilled workers, foremen and management personnel. During the decade, the experience of the countries mentioned above and the needs of other less well-endowed countries have also shown that manpower planning and general educational planning need to be developed in close harmony, within the total national development programming effort.

[15] *Population Growth and Manpower in the Philippines*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.XIII.2. A similar study on population growth and manpower in the Sudan is now in course of preparation.

Chapter VIII

LABOUR: INCOME, WORKING CONDITIONS, LABOUR RELATIONS

This chapter deals with the main developments in the field of labour during the last decade and, more particularly, with questions of income, working conditions and labour relations. All these aspects of the labour situation have evolved within a framework set by many different factors — historical, economic, social and political — and the framework is, of course, far from being the same in every country.

PRICES AND WAGES

Consumer prices

A study of the consumer price index in more than 100 countries for the period 1950-1960 (or 1950-1959 or 1951-1960) shows that during this period the index fell in only four countries, namely, Angola, Burma and the Philippines (where it fell by from 1 to 4 per cent) and the USSR (where it fell by 25 per cent). Prices also fell in Bulgaria (1952-1959) and Czechoslovakia (1953-1960). For the world as a whole, the median rise over those ten years was approximately 41 per cent. The figures for the different regions are as follows: Africa — 46 per cent, America — 31 per cent, Asia — 33 per cent, and Europe — 47 per cent. For the economically advanced countries as a whole, the median rise was 44 per cent. A classification of the various countries by percentage rise is given below:

RISE IN CONSUMER PRICES, 1950-1960

No change	Haiti.[a]
Percentage rise	
Less than 10 per cent ..	Cape Verde Islands, Ceylon, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mozambique, Panama, Portugal, United Arab Republic.
From 10 to 20 per cent.	Ecuador,[a] Hong Kong, Iraq, Luxembourg, Mauritius, Singapore,[a] Switzerland.
From 20 to 30 per cent.	Belgium, British Guiana, British Honduras, Canada, Congo (Leopoldville),[a] Costa Rica, Federal Republic of Germany, Fiji, Ghana, Honduras, India, Lebanon, Malaya, Netherlands,[a] Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Syria, Trinidad,[b] United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia.[a]
From 30 to 40 per cent.	El Salvador, Gibraltar, Greece, Italy, Malta, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, Uganda.[a]
From 40 to 50 per cent.	Austria, Barbados, Grenada, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Northern Rhodesia, Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Tunisia, United Kingdom.
From 50 to 60 per cent.	Algeria, New Zealand, Norway, St. Vincent,[a] Somalia,[a] Sudan, Sweden.
From 70 to 80 per cent.	Australia, Chad, Finland, France, Sierra Spain, Thailand.
From 70 to 80 per cent.	Australia, Chad, Finland, France, Sierra Leone.
From 80 to 90 per cent.	Iceland, New Caledonia, Poland, Senegal.
From 90 to 100 per cent.	Cameroun, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Iran, Ivory Coast, Madagascar.
100 per cent and over...	Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, Israel, Laos, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, China (Taiwan), Republic of Korea,[a] Republic of Viet-Nam, Turkey, Uruguay.

[a] Nine-year period.
[b] Eight-year period.

Although the particular situation prevailing in each country sometimes had a strong influence on the movement of prices (especially in countries suffering from chronic inflation), prices have also been influenced by certain factors which have had an effect all over the world, except, for instance, in the countries of eastern Europe, where the price level has not followed the general trend.

In Poland the price index rose by 80 per cent, but this rise occurred almost entirely between 1950 and 1953. In 1960 the price index was 2 per cent lower than in 1953. In other eastern European countries, consumer prices, which are fixed by the State, have been reduced several times since 1950. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the price index fell by 5 per cent and 14 per cent respectively between 1953 and 1960, while in Bulgaria it fell by 29 per cent between 1952 and 1959.

In most industrialized countries, the rise in prices between 1950 and 1960 occurred to a very large extent before 1953. Between 1950 and the end of 1952 consumer prices rose quite sharply in a number of countries, as a result, in particular, of the rising trend of commodity prices caused by the Korean war. Generally speaking, they remained fairly stable during the next two and a half years, partly because of the fall in commodity prices after the end of the war.

Between 1955 and 1961 consumer prices rose steadily and even rapidly in a certain number of countries, but in most cases the rate of increase declined appreciably in 1958. This decline, which was only of short duration, coincided with a more or less general slackening in business activity all over the world, except in Europe. The upward movement resumed in 1959, but again a reverse trend set in very shortly with the result that in 1960 prices showed only a small increase, particularly in the economically advanced countries. In 1961, the upward move-

ment became considerably more marked, particularly in western Europe and Africa; but it was in South America that inflation was most serious and most persistent. In Central America and in several eastern European countries, by contrast, there was a slight fall in prices. The price index has also declined in Malaya and Tunisia, while it remained practically unchanged in Ceylon and Mauritius.

The fluctuations in the general price index in the different countries have, on the whole, closely followed variations in foodstuff prices. In most countries, and particularly in the economically less advanced countries, foodstuffs account for a high proportion of consumer's expenditure so that their cost has a strong influence on the general price index. In the industrialized countries, the price of services seems, generally speaking, to have risen more than the price of goods. While rents have often shown the biggest increase among the main items included in the index, the price of clothing has in most cases shown a slightly smaller increase than the average for the main items.

Comparison between the 1960 and the 1959 indices (annual averages) shows that the median increase for eighty-six countries was 1.6 per cent. Increases greater than 10 per cent were reported in eight countries (Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Chile, Paraguay, Republic of China, Uruguay, Yugoslavia); in twelge other countries Algeria, Chad, Iran, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Syria and Turkey), the increase was between 5 and 10 per cent. The fifty-five countries in which prices rose by less than 5 per cent include all the economically advanced countries. During the period 1960-1961 the median increase was much greater, being 2.9 per cent. The larger median increase, by comparison with the period 1959-1960, was due mainly to the rise reported in approximately half the countries included in the group, in which it varied between 0 and 5 per cent. There were, for instance, sizable increases in eleven economically advanced countries, apart from Austria, Denmark, Iceland and Japan, where the rise was between 5 and 10 per cent. The eleven countries were Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Republic of South Africa, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. Among the industrialized countries which did not follow the general trend were Australia, Canada, Finland, Sweden and the United States, where prices rose less in 1961 than in 1960.

Real wages

During the period 1950-1960, money wages rose more than consumer prices in practically all the countries which provided information on this subject. Out of fifty such countries, including twenty-six economically advanced countries and twenty-four developing countries, the only exceptions were Honduras (non-agricultural industry and manufacturing) and Argentina (manufacturing). Of the forty-eight countries which reported a rise in real wages in non-agricultural industry, or in manufacturing, when the information provided related only to that sector, seven (including three economically advanced countries) had a rise of less than 2 per cent per year (22 per cent in ten years), while in the remaining forty-one, the rise was greater (see table 1).

The median annual rates of increase in real wages during the ten years in question [1] were as follows:

MEDIAN ANNUAL INCREASE IN REAL WAGES, 1950-1960

	Non-agricultural industry (annual percentage)	*Manufacturing (annual percentage)*
Economically advanced countries ..	3.3 (20[a])	2.7 (23[a])
Developing countries	3.8 (14[a])	2.4 (19[a])
All countries	3.5 (34[a])	2.6 (42[a])

[a] Number of countries covered.

It is evident from these figures that real wages have risen appreciably; an annual rise of 3.5 per cent means a total increase of 41 per cent in ten years. Since, moreover, the median rise in consumer prices in some 100 countries [2] was approximately the same (i.e., 3.5 per cent a year), it is evident that money wages have risen on the average by 7 per cent a year. That was so, in particular, between 1959 and 1960 and between 1960 and 1961 (provisional data).

The rate of increase in real wages has risen in recent years.[3] During the period 1958-1960, the rise was greatest in mining (forty countries), with a median increase of about 6 per cent during this two-year period; in manufacturing (forty-one countries) and agriculture (thirty-eight countries), the median increase was also about 6 per cent; in building (thirty-four countries), it was 5 per cent. The corresponding figures for Europe (fifteen to eighteen countries) were as follows: manufacturing — 10 per cent; building and agriculture — about 8 per cent; and mining — 7 per cent. The fact that real wages rose almost as much in agriculture as in industry is of particular interest both from the social and from the economic point of view.

The continuous upward trend of wages was due partly to more frequent use of collective bargaining and partly to automatic adjustments based on changes in the cost of living and intended to offset the practically uninterrupted rise in prices. Another factor, however, played an important part in some industrialized countries, particularly where there was a shortage of skilled labour, namely, the higher bonuses paid by employers over and above the wages fixed by collective bargaining. The rise in real earnings thus generally exceeded the rise in wage rates.

According to a study made by the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, the amount of extra

[1] Although the figures quoted for some countries do not cover the whole of this period, they cover at least four or five years, that is, up to 1958 or even later. As far as possible, the figures for average hourly earnings per worker have been used, but in some cases it has been necessary to take weekly earnings, or, occasionally, average wage rates.

[2] See the section on the trend of consumer prices above.

[3] It should be remembered in this connexion that family allowances and the various indirect payments are not usually included in the statistics, so that the real growth of the workers' total purchasing power has been more rapid in some countries than the increase in real wages proper.

Table 1

RATES OF INCREASE IN REAL WAGES
(Annual percentage)

1950-1960

Average annual increase in real wages	*Economically advanced countries*		*Developing countries*	
	Non-agricultural industry	*Manufacturing*	*Non-agricultural industry*	*Manufacturing*
Less than zero (decrease).	—	Republic of South Africa	Honduras	Argentina, Honduras
Less than 2.0 per cent ..	Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Republic of South Africa	Australia, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand	Dominican Republic	Brazil, India, Mexico, Peru, Philippines
Between 2.0 and 2.9 per cent	Australia, Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom [a]	Belgium, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States	Ghana	Burma, Ghana, Guatemala, Singapore
Between 3.0 and 3.9 per cent	Austria, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Netherlands	Austria, Canada, Hungary	Cyprus, Peru, Philippines, United Arab Republic	Ceylon, United Arab Republic
Between 4.0 and 5.9 per cent	Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany, France, New Zealand	Czechoslovakia, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Japan, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden	Ceylon, Costa Rica, Republic of Viet-Nam, Singapore, Trinidad, Venezuela	Cyprus, Morocco, Puerto Rico, Republic of China
6.0 per cent or more ..	Bulgaria, Eastern Germany, Poland	Bulgaria	Tanganyika	Colombia, Tanganyika
Median rate	3.3	2.7	3.8	2.4
Number of countries ..	20	23	14	19

[a] Men only.

earnings resulting from this spontaneous movement of wages (" wage drift ") in certain European countries during the period 1953-1960 was as follows:[4]

Country	*Extra increase in earnings as a percentage of the increase in wage rates*
Denmark	17 (1953-1960)
Federal Republic of Germany	7 (1953-1960)
Netherlands	8 (1952-1959)
Sweden	22 (1952-1959)
United Kingdom	5 (1952-1959)

As a general rule, real wages rose appreciably during the ten years in question in countries where there was a relatively large increase in national production and income. It is interesting to find that in the economically advanced free-enterprise countries the annual rate of growth of the economy was between 3 and 4 per cent, whereas the increase in real wages (in non-agricultural industry in sixteen countries and in manufacturing in five other countries) generally varied between 2 and 4 per cent (in fourteen cases out of twenty-one). Of these countries, where the rate of economic growth was above average (for example, Belgium and the United Kingdom) were also those with the lowest increase in real wages, while countries where the rate of economic growth as above average (for example, the Federal Republic of Germany and France) had a larger increase in wages. It should be noted, however, that this was not the case everywhere. In Italy, for instance, where the growth of the economy was rapid, the annual increase in real wages was relatively small (1.5 per cent of the wage rate in non-agricultural industry and 1.9 per cent of earnings in manufacturing). On the other hand, it should be noted that family allowances were increased very considerably.[5]

In the planned economies of eastern Europe, the annual rate of economic growth was about 6-8 per cent during

[4] W. Fellner, M. Gilbert, B. Hansen, R. Kahn, F. Lutz and P. de Wolff, *The Problem of Rising Prices* (OEEC, Paris, June 1961). These figures merely serve to indicate a general order of magnitude, the definition of " wage rates " varying from country to country.

[5] See " Recent Trends in Industrial Wages ", *International Labour Review*, vol. LXXI, No. 5, May 1955.

the period 1950-1960. The average annual increase in real wages was between 5 and 10 per cent (6.1 per cent in the USSR for the period 1952-1960, 5.6 per cent in Czechoslovakia and 7.6 per cent in Poland for the period 1953-1960, and 10.1 per cent in Bulgaria for the period 1952-1959). In Hungary it was 3.7 per cent for workers in manufacturing (1950-1958). The rise in real wages in these countries was achieved by means of an increase in earnings accompanied by one or more reductions in state-controlled prices during the period under review.

Although data are available for only a limited number of countries, the twenty-four developing countries are found to compare favourably with the twenty-six economically advanced countries in a classification by annual increase in real wages. Table 1 shows that twelve of the twenty-four countries in the first category are classed among those in which the average rate of increase was 4 per cent or more, as against ten of the twenty-six countries in the second category. One must, however, beware of giving this fact greater importance than it deserves, bearing in mind that in a number of developing countries wages were very low at the beginning of the period and, generally speaking, still are, despite the considerable percentage increase in certain cases.

Labour's share of the national income

It is very clear from the statistics of income distribution that there is a general tendency for labour's share of the national income to increase. This trend is evident in the developing as well as in the industrialized countries and is perhaps even more marked in the former than in the latter.

This is certainly due to the fact that the relative size of the wage-earning labour force is increasing more rapidly in the developing than in the industrialized economies, but from the statistics at present available it is hardly possible to state precisely what role is played by this factor.

Trends in wage differentials

In the economically less developed countries, a fairly wide range of wage differentials seems to be characteristic. The explanation is that skilled workers are rare in relation to the growing demand, so that wage differentials provide workers with an incentive to specialize and to acquire the knowledge and skills most needed by the economy. This is a very common phenomenon, which can be observed today in most developing countries.

The tendency towards a narrowing of wage differentials, which is characteristic of most economically developed countries, has often been described.[6] From the institutional point of view, which is not without importance, the causes undoubtedly are the improvement in trade-union organization and the growth in the political power of the least skilled categories of workers, who are the most numerous. But there are also economic causes, which are more profound and seem to be universal in effect: they are the appreciable rise in the educational level of new entrants to the labour market and the contraction of the potential supply of unskilled labour.

Thus, in the field of wages, too, a narrowing of the income spread seems to be the rule, in the long run at least. It should be noted, however, that sizable wage differentials are not only to be found during the first stages of economic development. It is well known, for example, that in the United States, despite the long-term trend towards some narrowing of wage differentials, they are still much larger than in most western European countries, particularly the Scandinavian countries, where the levelling of wages has gone furthest.[7] On the other hand, in many western European countries where wage differentials based on skill were decreasing, this trend has slowed down considerably or even been reversed since 1950.[8] The long-term trend towards a narrowing of wage differentials will perhaps be counteracted by factors working in the opposite direction. That will be the case, in particular, as long as the need to modify the structure of the labour force so as to meet requirements makes itself felt. Thus the present shortage of highly skilled labour in the economically advanced countries — a direct consequence of the speed of technological progress — seems likely to have an important impact on the trend of wage differentials in the years ahead.

Wage policies

Although in most economically advanced countries the authorities have succeeded in recent years in maintaining a fairly satisfactory balance between supply and demand under conditions of full employment, they have not always succeeded in avoiding some rise in prices. Faced with the danger that this upward trend might take the form of a permanent inflation liable to interfere with the attainment of their principal economic objectives (maintenance of a high level of employment and an economic climate favourable to expansion), several Governments seem to be moving towards a wages policy, or even an incomes policy, regarded as part of a broader policy of economic stabilization and expansion.

The Joint Wage and Price Council set up in Austria in 1957, which consists of representatives of the Government, the employers, the trade unions and the farmers, is a typical example of collaboration for the purpose of relating wage and price policy to economic growth.

In the Netherlands, where there has been a system of statutory wage-fixing since the end of the last war, the year 1959 was marked by the introduction of a considerably more flexible policy than had hitherto been followed. The

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[6] See, among others, Muntz, "The Decline in Wage Differentials based on Skill in the United States", *International Labour Review*, June 1955; Dunlop and Rothbaum, "International Comparisons of Wage Structures", *ibid.*, April 1955; *Economic Survey of Europe, 1955* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 56.II.E.2), p. 153 ff.

[7] D. J. Robertson, *The Economics of Wages and Distribution of Income* (London, Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 87; S. M. Lipset, "Trade Unions and Social Structure: I", *Industrial Relations* (Berkeley), vol. I, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 85-88.

[8] W. Fellner *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-55; S. M. Lipset, *op, cit.*, p. 88.

new " differential wages policy ", the application of which is still the responsibility of the Board of State Conciliators, differs from the old policy in that it is no longer primarily linked to economic development in general, but to the development of the different branches and, in some cases, of individual enterprises.

In the United Kingdom, the Government has tried three times since the last world war to persuade the trade unions to accept a policy of wage restraint. In July 1961, faced with an increasing disparity in the growth of personal incomes and national production, it ordered a wage pause in the public sector and made known its opposition to any inflationary wage increase in the private sector. These measures were regarded by the Government as a first step towards the introduction of a new long-term economic policy.[9] With that end in view, a National Economic Development Council was set up, consisting of representatives of the Government, employers' associations and trade unions. The Council's principal task will be to work out a long-term economic development policy and, in particular, to ensure that personal incomes are kept in line with national production.

In the United States, the Government had until recently taken no steps to lay the foundations for an incomes policy. This was due, among other things, to the fact that public opinion was not prepared for this step, to the existence of very marked regional differences and to the limited importance of the public sector. The new Federal Government, in its desire to maintain both stable prices and a growing economy, instituted a policy designed to keep the total increase in wages and profits in line with productivity. While recommending employers and workers to take the public interest as their criterion and appealing to their good sense and public spirit, the United States Administration seems determined to bring strong pressure to bear on employers and workers to accept the Government's economic policy. This policy, which has already given positive results in one particular case, when steps were taken in 1962 to prevent a proposed increase in steel prices, is meeting strong resistance both from employers and trade unions.

But attempts to impose some restraint on prices and wages have been made in several other countries. In France, for example, the Government's policy in the matter since the end of 1958 has been aimed both at bringing wage increases under some control by relating them to increased productivity and by opposing escalator clauses pegging wage rates to the price index, and at stabilizing prices. In March 1961, the Government asked employers to limit wage increases during the year to 4 per cent. A new step towards the adoption of a genuine wages and incomes policy seems to have been made in 1962 when the Government decided to hold consultations under the auspices of the Commission supérieure du Plan with a view to establishing a wages policy which would take account of the growth in national income.

Until recently, the authorities in the Federal Republic of Germany had had little occasion to lay down an incomes policy. Since the end of 1959, however, the Government has become increasingly concerned at the excessive rise in personal incomes and, although it still seems committed to the principle of giving market forces free play, it has been trying since 1961 to restrain price rises and wage increases. In Sweden, as in Denmark and Norway, where the situation is more or less comparable, negotiations by central bodies are at present the basic feature of the wage-fixing machinery. Although in Sweden it is regarded as axiomatic that the State should neither interfere in nor seek to guide collective bargaining, the Swedish Government has on several occasions expressed its views on the size of permissible increases which may be a sign that it is moving towards a policy of greater intervention in wage questions.

The few examples given above reveal a tendency — even in free-enterprise countries — towards greater government intervention in economic affairs; this applies, for instance, to incomes and, more particularly, to wages. With the centralization and co-ordination of economic decision-making, there has been a steady increase in the number of bodies set up for purposes of co-operation and consultation, on which the State, employers' associations and trade unions are represented.

In most developing countries, Governments have come to take a more active part in wage-fixing during the last decade and to assume greater responsibility for ensuring that wage-earners are adequately paid.

Several Governments have, for instance, tried to encourage voluntary collective bargaining between employers' and workers' representatives, either through collective agreements or through the intermediary of wages boards, labour boards or similar negotiating machinery. Sometimes collective bargaining has been encouraged by making provision for compulsory arbitration or for conciliation, as is the case in almost all Latin American countries and in a growing number of African and Asian countries.

Despite some recent progress in collective bargaining, the number of collective agreements in developing countries is, generally speaking, still very small, and in recent years the Governments of many countries have had to supplement the devices for encouraging voluntary collective bargaining by statutory wage-fixing machinery. There is now minimum wage legislation and machinery for fixing minimum wage rates in almost all Latin American and North African countries and in most countries in Asia and Africa south of the Sahara. Several countries have accepted the principle that the task of applying the minimum wage regulations should be carried out jointly by employers and workers, on a footing of equality.

Apart from the encouragement of collective bargaining and other procedures for wage negotiation, conciliation and arbitration, and apart from the fixing of statutory minimum wages, Governments have necessarily exercised a strong influence on wage rates because of their dominant position as employers in many countries, an influence which extends not only to the minimum rate for unskilled workers, but to wage rates throughout the whole range of occupations. This is the case, for instance, in several African countries, where 20-30 per cent of all wage-earners are employed in public service and where private employers have found it necessary to keep up with the wage levels fixed by the Government.

[9] See *Incomes Policy, the Next Step*, Cmnd. 1926, London, HMSO, February 1962.

The Governments of several developing countries have been compelled to take steps to contain inflationary pressures as much as possible. Wage control has been among the methods most frequently used to combat inflation. It was used, for instance, in Bolivia during the stabilization programme carried out towards the end of 1956, in Chile during the monetary reform programme of 1956-1958 and in Argentina in connexion with the efforts the Government has been making since 1958 to achieve economic stability. But, as the experience of recent years has shown, any attempt at wage restraint in countries where the level of wages is still very low arouses opposition and leads to a deterioration in the social climate, particularly when it does not form part of a broader programme of economic development. The Ceylonese National Wage Policy Commission has stated that a policy of restricting wage increases in certain cases is economically unsound and socially unacceptable unless it is accompanied by certain other measures, for example, a more general policy of economic development and a policy of restricting consumption in such a way as to ensure that the most prosperous groups of the population make an adequate contribution to investment.[10]

Since in most countries which have embarked on economic development such development is increasingly becoming the subject of systematical planning and comprehensive programming, some Governments are coming to believe that wage-fixing should form part of the planning process and that representatives of employers and workers should be very closely associated with the introduction and application of this policy.[11]

Conditions of work

While the industrialized countries are striving to establish levels of living and conditions of work conducive to the development of the human personality, most of the economically less developed countries are still working to secure the protection of their workers, particularly those in the traditional sectors of their economies, against conditions of employment prejudicial to their health and to community and family life. It is impossible, within the limits of the present section, to give a detailed account of developments in working conditions in all their different aspects during the past decade; examples will merely be given of the developments that have occurred with regard to hours of work, occupational safety and health, and a systematic programme for making work human. Because of lack of space, no reference will be made to developments in other and no less important aspects of conditions of work social services for workers, for example.

Hours of work

During the last decade there has been a general reduction in normal hours of work (unaccompanied by any reduction in workers' income) in many countries, particularly in the economically developed countries. This trend was set in motion by a number of economic and social factors, the most important being the steady rise in productivity, which provided further opportunities for a reduction of hours of work and the need to give workers a greater share in the benefits of this advance in the form of more leisure.

During the period under review, the normal working week was reduced to less than forty-eight hours, either by collective bargaining (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, United Kingdom), or by legislation (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia), or by a combination of both (Norway, Sweden, Switzerland). In Canada and the United States, where the forty-hour week has been the general rule in industry in recent years, there has been a steady increase in the number of workers whose normal working week is forty hours or less, and a thirty-five and even a thirty-hour week is being demanded in certain industries. The USSR has extended the seven-hour day (six hours for underground work) to all employees, industrial workers and workers on state farms.

Although the stage of a forty-eight-hour week has been reached, if not surpassed in most countries, in a number of developing countries it is still a target to be achieved.

Most of the developing countries fear that too rapid a reduction in hours of work will slow down development and postpone the introduction of social improvements which are a no less desirable objective than a shorter working week. However, there have been a few cases in some of these countries where hours of work have been reduced in order to promote development, to meet special conditions in particular sectors or industries,[12] or to distribute the work more evenly over the labour force.

The figures for actual hours of work which have been provided by twenty-nine countries (table 2) and which cover either the non-agricultural sector or manufacturing only, show that between 1950 and 1960 hours of work were reduced in about half the countries concerned and that the reduction was proportionately the same in most of the sixteen advanced countries as in the thirteen underdeveloped countries for which information is available.[13]

The statistics show that, in some of the countries concerned, the amount of paid overtime worked as a result of the expansion of activities more than offset the reduction in *normal* hours of work (that is to say, the standard working week fixed by collective agreement, statute, regulations or the custom of the country). In order to maintain or increase the total output of undertakings, employers have usually resorted to overtime as a means

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[10] *Report of the National Wage Policy Commission,* sessional paper No. VIII (Ceylon, Government Press, August 1961), para. 190.

[11] See, for example, International Labour Organisation, Governing Body, *Report of the African Advisory Committee,* second session, Tananarive, 3-13 April 1962 (G.B. 152/4/6), para. 70 ff.

[12] For example, in the petroleum industry of Venezuela, the most important industry in the country, normal hours of work were reduced to forty-four a week for wage-earners and to forty hours for salaried employees under a collective agreement signed in 1960.

[13] For fifteen of the countries, the available figures relate only to manufacturing; they must therefore be used with caution as a guide to changes in the hours worked by non-agricultural workers in general. This applies particularly to the developing countries, where only a small proportion of non-agricultural workers may be covered by the statistics and where the trend with regard to the number of hours actually worked may differ considerably between the industrial undertakings covered by the statistics (usually the largest) and other sectors such as commerce and services.

of avoiding a reduction in the actual hours of work. This trend has been particularly noticeable in most of the economically advanced countries in recent years because of the increasing difficulty of recruiting new workers, particularly skilled workers. For this reason, the trend towards a reduction in hours of work, although marked, is not clearly reflected in recent statistics of actual hours of work. Another point to bear in mind is that, in a few countries, business activity in 1960 was below the record level attained in 1950, so that there was a decline in the average number of actual hours of work. In Canada and the United States, for example, the number of workers employed in manufacturing in 1960 was substantially lower than in 1955/1957 and 1959, but in other economically advanced countries employment figures continued to show a steady rise. In view of these facts, it is difficult to compare the average actual hours of work per worker in 1950 and in 1960 because the significance of the figures differs from one group of countries to another.

The changes in actual hours of work that have occurred since 1950 must be considered in relation to the total length of the working week (see table 3 below).

The largest increases were recorded in manufacturing in Portugal, Puerto Rico and Yugoslavia, where the number of actual hours of work was relatively low in 1950 and continued to be so in 1960, except in Yugoslavia, where it rose from 172 per month in 1951 to nearly 200 in 1954 and then remained fairly stable. The number of actual hours of work has also risen appreciably in Japan since 1950, particularly in manufacturing, although the Japanese working week was already one of the longest.

The largest reductions in the average number of actual hours of work were recorded in the developing countries where the working week had been relatively long (Ceylon, Malta, Philippines, Singapore. The number of actual hours of work was still relatively high in these countries in 1960, except in the Philippines, where the largest reduction occurred, the working week having declined from forty-nine hours in 1951 to forty-three in 1959.

If we consider the changes in hours of work which have occurred during the last decade, some trends may be discerned. Most of the countries which have reduced or are reducing working hours gradually and in stages adopted a flexible procedure, that took account of the special conditions in each branch of industry and even in individual undertakings. In some cases, for example, the parties concerned were given considerable latitude to determine the most satisfactory solutions, while joint committees were often given the task of deciding how the new standards should be applied.

The recent reductions in hours of work have usually also led to a redistribution of working hours within the week and ultimately to a working week of five or five and a half days. There was also a tendency, although this was not so widespread, to consider working hours in relation to longer periods of time and even on an annual basis, and to reduce hours of work by granting compensatory days off during the year.

Thanks to the progress of science and technology, it is now possible — for the first time in many countries — to fix normal hours of work, not in the light of economic necessity or the need to protect the workers' health, but on the basis of a free and deliberate choice between more income and more leisure. In the present decade, this will certainly be a basic issue of social policy, particularly in the economically advanced countries. The leisure thus made available, instead of being used for another job — as recent observation has shown is often the case — should serve as a means of enabling workers to raise their cultural level and to participate more actively in social life, so that it provides a real opportunity for social betterment.

Table 2

INCREASE OR DECREASE IN ACTUAL HOURS OF WORK, 1950-1960

Variation	*Increase*	*Decrease*
Less than 2 per cent	*Finland, Guatemala, Haiti,* Ireland, *Italy, Republic of China,* United Kingdom	*Austria,* Cyprus, United States of America
From to 4 per cent	France, Japan, Mexico	*Czechoslovakia,* Federal Republic of Germany, *Sweden, Switzerland,* United Arab Republic, West Berlin
From 4 to 6 per cent	*Puerto Rico*	*Canada,* Ceylon, Singapore
6 per cent or more	*Portugal, Yugoslavia*	Malta, Philippines
No change	*Argentina, Netherlands* [a]	

[a] Males only.

NOTE: The countries italicized are those for which the figures relate only to manufacturing; in the other cases, the figures relate to the majority of non-agricultural industries. The variations were normally calculated on the basis of figures covering the entire decade, except in a few cases, where they covered a period of 7-9 years.

Table 3

AVERAGE NUMBER OF ACTUAL HOURS OF WORK IN 1960

A. *Non-agricultural industries*	
Actual hours of work per week	
Less than 40 hours.....	New Zealand
From 40 to 42 hours.....	United States of America
From 42 to 44 hours.....	Philippines (1959)
From 44 to 46 hours.....	Cyprus, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Haiti, Ireland (1959), West Berlin
From 46 to 48 hours.....	Malta, Mexico (1958), Peru, Singapore, United Kingdom
From 48 to 50 hours.....	United Arab Republic
More than 50 hours.....	Japan
B. *Manufacturing*	
Actual hours of work per week	
Less than 40 hours.....	Puerto Rico, United States of America
From 40 to 42 hours.....	Canada, Czechoslovakia, New Zealand, Portugal (1959)
From 42 to 44 hours.....	Austria, Cyprus, Norway, Philippines (1959)
From 44 to 46 hours.....	Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ireland, Peru, Republic of South Africa [a]
From 46 to 48 hours.....	Ecuador (1959), Malta, Singapore, Switzerland, United Kingdom
From 48 to 50 hours.....	Colombia, Netherlands,[b] United Arab Republic
More than 50 hours.....	Japan
C. *Actual hours of work per day or per month*	
Non-agricultural industries....	Ceylon, 8.6 per day
Manufacturing.....	Brazil, 199.5 per month (1959) Ceylon, 8.5 per day Italy, 8.1 per day Republic of China, 9.4 per day Sweden, 168 per month (1959) Yugoslavia, 200 per month

[a] European production-process and manual workers.
[b] Males only.

Occupational safety and health

New occupational safety and health risks have developed in the last ten years as a result of scientific progress, the introduction of new techniques and the spread of industrialization, and call for unremitting efforts to ensure that the workers are adequately protected. The introduction of automation and other modern industrial methods, the use of new products and new substances, the emergence of new factors, such as radiation in the work environment, noise and increasing air pollution, are constantly facing industry with new problems.

The protective measures necessitated by the use of radioisotopes have been very carefully studied; various standards have been established by national and international bodies and are being applied in different branches of economic activity. A number of other questions have also been the subject of detailed research during the period under review and the results obtained have already led to the development of practical standards for application in industry; for instance, standards for lighting and the control of noise and air pollution.

Thanks to this and other work in the same field, some of the classic occupational diseases are gradually disappearing. However, fresh problems are constantly appearing with the use of new substances; they must be studied methodically and preventive measures must be adopted from the outset.

In many countries, whether highly industrialized or not, new industrial undertakings are usually planned to give workers the benefit of good safety and health standards, whereas older undertakings, in which modifications are difficult, present a problem to which the inspection services are frequently unable to find a satisfactory solution.

Despite all the efforts that have been made, a study of the statistics on the frequency rate, severity and total number of industrial injuries is far from satisfactory. According to a recent study, the long-term rate of decline in the injury rate is beginning to level off, which suggests that, with the preventive methods now in use, a steady annual decline in the number of work injuries cannot be secured.[14] Millions of workers are victims of occupational accidents each year, which means a loss of hundreds

14 *75 Jahre Unfallstatistik, Technischer Jahresbericht* (*Berufsgenossenschaft der chemischen Industrie*, Heidelberg, 1960), p. 22.

of millions of days of work. According to a statistical study by the ILO [15] covering nine industrialized countries,[16] the number of days lost as a result of temporary incapacity due to industrial injuries is five times higher than that of days lost owing to strikes, and amounts to over one-third of days lost as a result of unemployment.

Generally speaking, it can be said that, during the period under review, there was an annual increase in the total number of occupational accidents in many countries, particularly in those affecting young workers. However, it is clear from the above-mentioned ILO study that although there has been a steady rise in the industrial accident rate in many countries, the fatal injury rate has shown a slight decline.

Efforts to improve occupational safety and health have so far been mainly directed towards the physical factors, which are generally well known and relatively stable and therefore identifiable and susceptible of modification. There is thus reason to believe that the technical knowledge needed to prevent mechanical accidents resulting from the use of machinery or equipment is now generally available. The only way to improve occupational safety and health still further is by proper training, preferably at school or during the vocational training course, or by the scientific organization of work. The prerequisite for any action in these areas is co-operation between management and labour and, as this is motivated by respect for the dignity of the worker as a human being, it is often the basis of good labour relations.

Further efforts must be made to co-ordinate the research already done in any field likely to affect occupational safety and health and to ensure the practical application of its results.

The scientific approach to making work human

The idea of seeking to adapt man's working environment to his needs and capabilities is not particularly new; but research into the physical and mental capacities and limitations of human beings in order to obtain precise information which can be used in designing tools, processes and a working environment better adapted to human capacities is of relatively recent origin. Anyone who has studied the organization of work knows that, today, good planning and the scientific programming of operations play a large part in the smooth running of an industrial undertaking. At the present time, this principle is being increasingly applied to the main factor in production, namely, man himself. Making work human, or ergonomics,[17] are the terms used to describe this new way of dealing with the problem of man and his work.

The results of this new line of research are being applied increasingly widely in industry, as is shown by the fact that a number of undertakings have recently established permanent departments to study the scientific adaptation of work in their own particular field with a view to applying the principle in their own workshops, both in the manufacturing process and in the design of the products themselves. Some employers' organizations have advocated a wider application of this new approach to the problem of man and his work, as have some national trade unions, which have been active in informing their members about the value of ergonomics as a means of improving conditions of work.

The combined application of the technical sciences and the human biological sciences — physiology, anthropometry and psychology — for the purpose of achieving the best possible adaptation of the worker to the job and the job to the worker is likely to have much more far-reaching consequences than the advantages which can be measured immediately in terms of the increased efficiency and greater well-being of the workers.

However, the combined and co-ordinated application of the technical, human and social sciences to ensure the best possible adaptation of man to his work and *vice versa* might be of vital assistance to countries which have only just started on the road to industrialization. During the period under review, many scientific studies of the adaptation of workers from rural areas to jobs in industry have indeed been carried out, for instance, in a number of African countries. India has a special project under which three regional labour institutes are to be established where such matters as the special problems of work and workers will be studied by physiologists and psychologists. However, very little has so far been done in this field. It is obvious that most of the conclusions reached in the economically advanced countries and many of the techniques they have employed are applicable (or partly applicable) only to the environment in which they have been tried out. On the other hand, basic scientific methods are universally applicable: whenever such methods have been employed in countries with no experience in the field, they have produced quick results.[18]

Rural workers

The flight from the land has continued during the last ten years. The decline in the number of agricultural workers was particularly marked in the most developed countries. It is estimated that, between 1950 and 1959, the decline exceeded 30 per cent in a number of countries, namely, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany [19] and Sweden. It was from 20 to 30 per cent in Belgium, Denmark, Norway and the United States, and from 10 to 20 per cent in Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. It is continuing even in the last-named country, in which the agricultural population represents only about 5 per cent of the total population.

The agricultural population is still increasing in most developing countries, though usually at a slower rate than the population as a whole. The number of persons leaving rural areas in search of other occupations is not yet high

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15 See "Industrial Injury Trends over Three Decades", *International Labour Review*, vol. LXXXIII, No. 3, March 1961.

16 Belgium, Finland, France, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.

17 See "Ergonomics : the Scientific Approach to Making Work Human", *International Labour Review*, vol LXXXIII, No. 1, January 1961.

18 H. Laugier, *La promotion humaine dans les pays sous-développés* (Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1960).

19 The percentage in this country may have been influenced by the large number of refugees who settled temporarily on the land around 1950.

enough to offset the natural growth of the farm population. The only Asian country to show a downward trend in the absolute numbers of the farm population is Japan, where the farm population, after having shown little rise or fall for a number of years, began to decrease perceptibly from the mid-1950s[20] (at the rate of approximately 400,000 persons yearly from 1957) as a consequence of the growing demand for labour in the secondary and tertiary sectors, a demand caused by the rapid expansion of the economy and by the shortage of young recruits in urban areas.[21]

The low level of income and wages in agriculture was the principal cause of the rural migration which occurred during the period under review. The statistics published by the FAO in 1959[22] covering forty countries from different regions show that in about two-thirds of these countries the *per caput* income originating in agriculture was only 40 to 60 per cent of the income originating in other sectors and that in about one-fourth of these countries the ratio was even lower than 40 per cent. According to these figures, differences in income were generally the greatest in the economically less developed countries, such as India and Pakistan, and in some countries of Latin America and Africa which have an important mining industry or are in the process of rapid industrialization.[23] They tended to be less pronounced in the northern and western countries of Europe and in Canada,[24] but were on the contrary very considerable in the United States (in which the ratio was less than 40 per cent). The only countries in which income was higher in the agricultural than in the non-agricultural sectors were Australia, Ceylon and New Zealand, which are all three large exporters of agricultural products.

A survey of the movement of wages in agriculture from 1948 to 1957 published by the ILO[25] shows that the disparity between the average wages paid in agriculture and in industry was similar to that between income in agriculture and other sectors.

Generally speaking, it may be said that in almost all countries wages are lower in agriculture than in other branches of activity and that there is no uniform trend towards an increase or a decrease in this disparity.

Handicrafts and small-scale industries

General conditions in handicraft and small-scale industries[26] have scarcely changed during the past ten years. The rise in levels of living and the constant improvement of transport facilities have generally favoured the expansion of modern industry at the expense of traditional handicraft undertakings, manufacturing similar articles or articles of the same type. In particular, this development has been detrimental to handicraft undertakings engaged in food processing and in the manufacture of tobacco and textiles, which for the most part are located in rural areas. The resulting decrease in employment in these traditional handicraft industries has to some extent been offset by the establishment of small-scale mechanized undertakings manufacturing similar products. The expansion of small-scale undertakings in the chemical and mechanical industries has also created new employment opportunities. Lastly, the establishment, especially in the urban and suburban areas, of a growing number of small-scale undertakings in the tertiary sector engaged in the installation, maintenance and repair of durable consumer goods (transportation equipment, radio and television receivers and household articles) has continued during the past ten years. It should be noted, however, that the expansion in these fields of activity has necessarily been slow because of the scant improvement in levels of living and the limited increase in sales of durable consumer goods.

A survey of the condition of small-scale industries in developing countries indicates that, on balance, the volume of employment has increased in this sector during the past ten years. The experiments recently carried out in India serve to illustrate the enormous obstacles to expansion in this branch of activity. During the past ten years, the Indian Government has followed a policy aimed at promoting the development of handicrafts and small-scale industries. Despite the efforts made, the share of the national income attributable to this sector decreased from 10 per cent in 1947 to 8 per cent in 1960,[27] although the total value of the products manufactured by the industries in question increased substantially in absolute figures. Similarly, while the total volume of employment in India's small-scale industries increased, the proportion of the economically active population employed in this sector declined. Dynamic methods are needed to encourage small-scale industry to move into new productive activities, to use new techniques and to adopt new organizational methods so that it can absorb a growing proportion of the constantly expanding labour force.

In the developing countries, the wages of workers in handicraft undertakings and small-scale industries are always substantially lower than those of workers in large manufacturing undertakings. This difference is mainly due to the low level of productivity. In Venezuela, the earnings of workers in family undertakings engaged in processing unrefined sugar are one-seventh of those of workers in modern refineries.[28] In India, workers in small-

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20 Food and Agriculture Organization, *The State of Food and Agriculture 1961*, p. 53.

21 "Outflow of Agricultural Labour Force", *Japan Labor Bulletin*, vol. 3, No. 7, October 1961.

22 *The State of Food and Agriculture 1959*, pp. 95-97.

23 The ratio was, for example, approximately 40 per cent in Argentina, Ecuador, India and Panama, approximately 30 per cent in Brazil, Chile and Puerto Rico, and less than 30 per cent in Honduras and the Republic of South Africa.

24 The ratio was, for example, approximately 60 per cent in the Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium and Canada and approximately 80 per cent or more in Denmark and the United Kingdom.

25 See "Wages in Agriculture, 1948-1957", *International Labour Review*, vol. LXXX, No. 5, November 1959, pp. 430-441.

26 Handicraft and small-scale industries are undertakings engaged either in the processing and transformation of a product or in the provision of services (installation, maintenance and repair). Undertakings in which the owner works with members of his family and a few paid workers or sometimes only with the latter are regarded as handicraft industries; undertakings organized according to industrial principles and not employing more than fifty persons are regarded as small-scale industries.

27 *The Eastern Economist* (New Delhi), 8 September 1961, p. 453.

28 Ministry of Economic Development, "1953 Manufacturing Census", Caracas, 1959.

scale industries generally do not earn more than 600 rupees a year,[29] or less than half the annual wage of workers in larger manufacturing undertakings, which in 1959 was estimated at approximately 1,300 rupees.[30] In Japan, the wages paid in 1961 in small-scale industrial establishments were 50 per cent lower than those received by workers in large manufacturing undertakings. As a consequence of the serious labour shortage in recent years, however, there has been a gradual narrowing of the gap between large- and small-scale undertakings.[31] The case of Israel also shows that, in manufacturing, full employment is one of the factors affecting variations in wage level according to the size of the undertaking; in that country, differences between small- and large-scale undertakings are generally less than 10 per cent, workers in the latter being, of course, the better paid.[32]

Working conditions in the manufacturing industries of developing countries are in general less satisfactory in small-scale than in large undertakings. Work places are often dark and poorly ventilated, work space is confined and poorly arranged, social services are lacking, hours of work are long and no recreational or housing facilities are provided for the workers. In this respect, a number of small-scale industries are caught in a vicious circle, low productivity being both the cause and the result of the unfavourable working conditions prevailing in this sector. If it is to be fully effective, social policy in the matter must be accompanied by measures to increase the earning capacity of the workers concerned. In this connexion, it should be pointed out that, in some countries such as Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, India and Japan, a special effort is being made through the adoption of the appropriate administrative measures to bring the benefits of modern science, better management and rational organization within the reach of small-scale industries and to overcome the obstacles to their development, thus helping to increase the volume of employment in this sector.

Industrial estates, which in some countries are specially intended to encourage the development of small-scale industries, have the advantage of improving working conditions in those industries. Housing for the workers is available on many of these estates and this means better living conditions for the workers concerned. The movement for the establishment of these estates has gained considerable ground in recent years, particularly in India, the Federation of Malaya, Nigeria and in some countries of Europe and America; this is an important development, because these estates contribute to an improvement in working and living conditions, which, in turn, is conducive to a rise in the productivity level of small-scale undertakings.[33]

Labour relations

The development of systems of labour relations during the past decade reflects the deep changes which the irresistible pressure of technological progress and economic growth has brought about in the organization of production throughout the world.[34]

Employers' and workers' associations

In most economically advanced countries, employers' and workers' associations today enjoy a well-established legal and social status and have become an indispensable part of the machinery for determining conditions of work. In many of these countries, they have taken on additional functions relating to the formulation and application of state economic and social policy during the past decade. Having acquired the status of collaborators with the State and industry, the trade unions, like the employers and their organizations, are gradually taking more interest in how public institutions work and are intensifying their activities both at the national and the international level.

These changes are taking place against different institutional backgrounds, for trade union structure and functions are, of course, far from being the same in all countries.

The powerful trade union movements in several countries of western Europe and North America, Australia and New Zealand have devoted their efforts for fifty years to consolidating their position and expanding their membership. Although trade union pluralism is still characteristic of the trade union situation in some of these countries (Belgium, France, Ireland and Italy, for instance), the idea of a greater co-ordination of trade union activities seems to have made headway in many industrialized countries. For instance, in addition to the trade union movements of the Scandinavian countries, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom, which were to all intents and purposes united before 1950, the trade unions of other countries continued their efforts to achieve unity in some cases successfully. In the United States, the American Federation of Labour and the Congress of Industrial Organizations joined forces in 1955. In Canada, the two principal trade union associations, the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada and the Canadian Congress of Labour, united in 1956 to form the Canadian Labour Congress, which includes some 80 per cent of the trade unionists in the country. After breaking off relations in 1954, the three workers' federations of the Netherlands resumed their collaboration a few years later.

Separate consideration must be given to the unitary

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[29] State Statistical Bureau, *Economic Survey of Small Industries* (State of West Bengal, 1954), p. 8; Bureau of correspondence of the ILO in India, *Handloom Weaving in India with Special Reference to Madras State* (1959), p. 18.

[30] *Yearbook of Labour Statistics* (ILO, Geneva, 1961), p. 300.

[31] *Wage difference by scale of establishments (manufacturing industries)*

Number of workers	*Wage level for :*		
	1957	*1959*	*1961*
Over 500 workers	100	100	100
100 to 499 workers	70.8	69.6	73.6
30 to 99 workers	56.0	56.1	62.6
5 to 29 workers	42.9	44.3	50.9

Source: Mitsubishi Economic Research Institute, *Monthly Circular*, December 1961, p. 32.

[32] Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical abstract of Israel, 1961* (Jerusalem, 1961).

[33] See also *Physical Planning of Industrial Estates*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.B.4.

[34] See International Labour Conference, 45th session, Report of the Director-General, Part I: *Labour Relations. Existing Problems and Prospects for the Future*, ILO, Geneva, 1961.

trade union organizations of the USSR and the other eastern European countries, where, in view of the functions entrusted to the trade unions, trade union unity is an essential feature of trade union organization. In effect, in these countries, in addition to their educational and mobilizing role, the trade unions have long performed certain legislative, administrative and judicial functions normally assumed by the State. These functions have been further expanded during recent years. The reforms made since 1956 in the organization and methods of economic planning and in the structure and organization of industry in the countries of this region have had a profound impact on trade union activity. In the USSR it has been recognized that the central trade union organizations should take a more active part in the discussion, within administrative and economic organizations, of problems relating to production, labour and living conditions.[35] The same view has been taken in several other countries of this region, for example, in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. In Poland, the part played by the trade unions in the direction of the economy has also been considerably extended following the 1958 reforms of the system of worker participation in the management of undertakings. The Yugoslav trade unions have given up various administrative and public functions, but in recent years have come to play an increasing part in the procedures of investigation, consultation or arbitration which form part of the country's legislation and practice at all levels.

While in many countries there has been an uninterrupted increase of trade union membership, a tendency towards a levelling off in trade union growth has appeared in certain countries. During recent years, slight decrease in union membership has even been recorded in some industrialized countries. This phenomenon has been interpreted as a reflection, among other things, of the changes that have taken place in the labour market since the end of the last war as a consequence of technological progress. These were, on the one hand, a stabilization or even a reduction of the labour force in basic industries and certain mass-production industries, in other words, in a sector which, in the past, was a trade union stronghold, and on the other hand, a steady increase in the proportion of non-manual workers and the entry of women into the labour market in large numbers. Hence the past decade has seen large-scale recruiting campaigns launched by trade union organizations in several countries, particularly among the non-manual workers. But although there is already evidence of factors which are likely to make for a higher degree of unionization among non-manual workers in the years to come, on the whole, trade unionism among non-manual workers has hitherto progressed much more slowly and has been less complete than among manual workers.

Because of the growing part played by the trade unions in the economic and social life of the industrialized countries, in the past decade the centralization of trade union power, trade union democracy and the relations between trade unions and their members have been subjects of heated debate in many countries. Thus, the campaigns organized in some countries against certain abuses have occasionally resulted in the enactment of new legislation (in the United States and in some provinces of Canada, in particular). The question of trade union security, that is to say, or the clauses in collective agreements providing for the compulsory membership of all workers in the signatory trade union, was still very much to the fore, especially in countries such as Canada and the United States, where the trade unions regarded these clauses as vital to the defence of their positions in collective bargaining. France and Switzerland are among the countries in which the clause in question has been prohibited during the last decade. Lastly, in some countries of trade union pluralism, such as Belgium, a number of recent collective agreements reserve certain advantages exclusively to union members without precluding the employment of workers who are not members.

There was concern in many industrialized countries during the 1950's over the "apathy" of workers towards unions and particularly over the decline in rank-and-file participation in trade union work. The proliferation in some countries of "wild cat" strikes, called by the workers or the local union officials without the authorization or even against the advice of the higher trade union organs, is a symptom of unrest among the rank-and-file. Hence, the unions have been trying to encourage their members to take an increasingly active part in union work. For instance, in the United Kingdom, where "wildcat" strikes became increasingly prevalent during the second half of the decade, the Trades Unions Congress is encouraging its affiliated unions to undertake a fundamental review of the structure and purpose of the trade union movement. In other countries, France and Italy particularly, the trade unions have been endeavouring to set up and stimulate the work of sections at the level of the undertaking.

In the developing countries during the last decade trade unions had to face problems of another order. While in some of these countries, particularly in Latin America and in southern Europe, trade unions were organized long ago, in most of the countries of Asia and Africa they are a recent innovation, often dating from the early post-war years. Despite the remarkable progress made by the trade union organizations in these countries during the period under review, unions are developing relatively slowly there on account of the many difficulties which they have to overcome: the small number of wage earners in relation to the total labour force; the continued predominance of the traditional economic sector; underemployment; low wages; illiteracy; an unstable, unskilled labour force; and in many cases serious unemployment. Particularly in Africa, they also have to contend with the negative effects of racial discrimination and other social prejudices. Other problems are the inadequacy of union funds and the division of the trade union movement along political or ideological lines, which on occasion takes the form of union rivalry.

Although the multiplicity of trade unions resulting from conflicting ideological and political views is still one of the main features of the trade union movement in most of the Latin American countries, the efforts made in the past ten years to unite the trade union movement or secure a greater co-ordination of trade union activities

[35] Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union dated 17 December 1957, *Trud* (Moscow), 19 December 1957.

bore fruit in some countries, such as Argentina and Chile. In India, the representatives of four trade union federations, who met in 1958 at the suggestion of the Minister of Labour to study the question of trade union relations, adopted an Inter-Union Code of Conduct. In general, the multiplicity of trade unions is a very great practical problem for the developing countries. In several Asian countries, such as Burma, Ceylon, India and Indonesia, almost all trade union federations have acknowledged political affinities or connexions with political parties. The same is true of several African countries.

The "political character" of trade unions in most of the developing countries is easily explained by the low standards of work and of living prevailing in these countries. As a result, the trade unions will probably continue for some time to come to devote much attention to political action for the improvement of such conditions by means of legislation or other government measures. It should also be remembered that the trade unions in Asia and Africa were generally formed while the countries concerned were under foreign rule. Once independence had been won, the trade unions, which had been associated closely with the struggle for independence, found themselves either dominated by the party in power or more or less closely attached to one or other of the rival political factions if there was a split in the nationalist movement.

United trade union federations, collaborating closely with the Government and supporting its economic and social policy, were formed in the 1950's in several African countries, for example, in the United Arab Republic, Ghana and Guinea. These systems are based on the theory that, in countries which have just attained independence, trade union activities must be conducted within the framework of the economic development programme; that calls for complete trade union unity and the orientation of the trade unions towards a labour-management and economic policy in keeping with the requirements of development. Under this theory, "Protest trade unionism" has no meaning in a country which is struggling for its economic development and in which the fate of the working masses is closely bound up with the nation's development capacity. In other countries — in Senegal, for example — in which a similar view of the role of trade unions prevails, the means used to achieve these objectives have been more flexible and stress has been placed on the voluntary character of trade union unity and discipline. Thus, while the trade union movements in several economically developing countries follow the historical pattern of the now industrially advanced countries, in other words, they defend workers' rights and interests against both employers and the State, a close collaboration has apparently been established between the established regime and the trade unions in many other countries, the trade union organizations being called upon to assist the Government in its economic and social policy and to enlist the support of the workers for government development plans. This search for a new definition of the trade union function that would take the requirements of economic development into account is one of the most important developments in the field of labour relations during the past decade.

The problem of the union leadership, which is closely linked with the question of the political activities of trade union organizations in the developing countries, has received attention in several of these countries. This applies, in particular, to the problem of leaders recruited from "outside" who have played a very important part in many Asian and African countries. Thus, during the last decade the activities of these leaders were brought under legislative or administrative control in several Asian countries.

Trade unionism does not seem to have made much progress during the past decade among the workers in small-scale undertakings in the developing countries, where it was also generally weak in large undertakings. In the Philippines, less than 10 per cent of the undertakings employing twenty to fifty workers had trade unions three years ago. Even although Japan was industrialized much earlier and the principal trade union federations have made several attempts to establish federations of the workers in small- and medium-scale undertakings, a few years ago only about 5 per cent of the workers employed in undertakings with less than thirty workers were union members, whereas the corresponding figure for undertakings employing more than 500 workers was over 90 per cent.

In contrast to the growing importance of the agricultural trade union organizations in the industrialized countries, the history of agricultural trade unions in the developing countries during the past ten years has, on the whole, few encouraging features. In many countries, however, the situation is changing rapidly and there is a marked increase in union membership, particularly among plantation workers. For instance, in the Federation of Malaya, where not long ago there were seven different unions, all of which were fairly small and had inadequate financial resources, today the National Union of Plantation Workers, a single united union, has over 100,000 paying members, making it one of the strongest plantation workers' organizations in the whole of Asia. In Ceylon, the number of plantation workers in trade unions rose from 87,000 in 1950 to 590,000 in 1959. Considerable progress in organizing plantation workers has also been made in India, Pakistan, Kenya, Tanganyika, Colombia and Costa Rica.

It is through the training of future trade union leaders and large-scale programmes of workers' education that the trade unions will be enabled to assume a more constructive role in the economic and social life of their countries. It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the striking aspects of trade union development during the past ten years has been the rapid extension of workers' education programmes. In the developing countries, these programmes have often been focused on the nature and institutions of the new society coming into being as a result of transition from traditional to the more highly organized way of life demanded by industrialization, whereas in the industrialized countries they have given increasing attention to new subjects, such as the economic and social implications of technological progress and the participation of the workers in economic and social life both within the undertaking and at the national and international level.

The trade union training programmes, which a number of workers' organizations in the industrialized countries of Europe and North America started several decades ago, have been expanded and improved during the period under review.

Despite the obstacles to the development of workers'

education in the economically less advanced countries (high illiteracy rates among workers, inadequacy of teaching equipment, very limited union funds, lack of teaching staff, very low level of living, etc.), notable progress has been made in some of these countries. In certain cases, commendable action has been taken by universities or the public authorities. In 1958, the Indian Government, in co-operation with the Indian trade union movement and on the recommendations of international experts, initiated a workers' education programme under which more than 1,500 instructors and 17,000 workers had been trained by November 1961. In the Philippines, the Workers' Education Centre of the University of the Philippines, which receives state subsidies and trade union support, has trained more than 2,000 trade unionists and conducted five training courses for trade union leaders, in which 119 trade unionists from twelve Asian countries took part. In several other countries, for example, in the United Arab Republic, the public authorities have provided facilities and funds to assist the trade unions with their workers' education programme.

Like the trade unions, the employers in the industrialized countries were called upon to play an important part in the determination of state economic and social policy, during the past decade, and this part is formally recognized in a number of countries, in which employer's organizations participate in the work of the various consultative bodies. Where labour-management relations are concerned, the defensive attitude which the employers formerly adopted towards trade union development has increasingly given way to a policy of co-operation. Institutions subsidized by the employers have also increased their educational activities and research work, particularly in the area of business organization and management.

The experience of the economically advanced countries appears to indicate that employers' organizations have an important part to play in such countries. The views of these organizations may, for example, carry great weight in the preparation and execution of national development plans, which are becoming increasingly common in the economically advanced countries. The work of some employers' organizations in recent years in the field of vocational training and social services, for example, in Brazil, also shows that there is much scope for action by employers in countries where industry is developing.

Labour relations at the level of the undertaking

There have been significant developments in labour relations at the level of the undertaking during the period under review as a result of the changes in the structure of the larger production units. Thus, with the growth of personnel services, substantial progress has been made in the study of relations within an undertaking, in the scientific organization of work in many other matters affecting employees. In recent years increasing attention has been given to the induction and integration of new recruits in undertakings, particularly of those coming from agricultural areas.

Methods of associating the workers in the running of the undertaking have varied considerably. In addition to the systems of co-operation which have existed since the end of the last war in some nationalized undertakings in western Europe, particularly France and the United Kingdom, reference may be made to the system of co-management adopted at the beginning of the decade in the coal-mining and iron and steel industry of the Federal Republic of Germany and to the new forms of organization based on workers' management which have been tried out in Yugoslavia since 1950. In the USSR and Poland, the years since 1957 have brought new and important developments in the increased association of workers' representatives in the running of undertakings.

Nevertheless, in most industrialized countries, workers' co-management has not gained ground and has even been opposed by both sides in many cases. Trade unions in the western European countries have directed their efforts towards the progressive extension of joint consultation and co-operation in economic matters. In fact, in these countries and in North America, Australia and New Zealand, various systems of joint consultation have been in effect for some considerable time.

In the economically developing countries, in which joint consultation is much less general, some advances have been made during the decade. Thus, works committees have been set up by legislation in the United Arab Republic, Burma, India, Pakistan, Tunisia and many countries of Africa south of the Sahara. In other countries, for example, in the former British territories in Africa, there has been an attempt to promote joint consultation through collective agreements. In India joint management committees with equal representation of management and personnel have been set up since 1958 on an experimental and voluntary basis in certain major public and private undertakings. Lastly, in Israel, where there are workers' committees and joint productivity councils in a number of private undertakings, joint management councils have recently been formed in undertakings belonging to the workers' movement (*Histradrut*).

In general, much undoubtedly remains to be done in the developing countries to overcome the present difficulties and to establish better co-operation at the level of the undertaking. The task is enormous, especially if it is borne in mind that the situation just outlined applies only to the large industrial establishments of these countries. In small industrial, commercial, handicraft and agricultural undertakings — in which, it should be emphasized, the great majority of the workers continue to be employed despite economic growth and technological progress — labour relations are still largely characterized by job insecurity, low income and wage levels, poor business and labour management, weak trade unions or even none at all, and the absence of a stable and skilled labour force.

Labour disputes and their settlement

The history of labour conflicts in the 1950s provides a second illustration of the influence of the economic development process and technological progress on labour relations. Thus, technological progress and automation were the issue in the strikes which occurred during the 1950's, for example, those affecting the Canadian Pacific Railway in Canada between 1955 and 1958, and more recently, the steel industry, civil aviation and the railways in the United States. Often the threat of unemployment, particularly in industries faced with the need

to reduce their labour force, has been a major cause of strikes by the workers of the industrialized countries, for example, in Belgium and Japan during the recent depression in the coal industry.

In developing countries, in which strikes have been mainly caused by low wages and poor working conditions, the decade saw the adoption in many countries of special measures to avert labour disputes which slow up development. Thus, in many countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, lockouts and strikes are not permitted before conciliation and arbitration procedures have been instituted, while in certain other countries the right to strike has been subjected to much more drastic limitations which, on occasion, amount to the more or less complete negation of the right.

In general, the history of labour disputes during the last decade shows that the strike weapon continues to be widely used by the workers in many countries (see table 4). The very large number of man-days lost in 1959 was largely attributable to disputes occurring in a few countries (United States of America, Argentina, Italy, Japan, India, United Kingdom, Canada and France) which alone accounted for more than 96 per cent of the total. On the other hand, 1960 was, on the whole, the quietest year in the whole decade from the viewpoint of strikes, except in Africa, where in some countries (including Rhodesia, Tanganyika, Kenya and Nigeria) the number of man-days lost as a result of labour disputes was twice, and sometimes even three times as great as the previous year. The Scandinavian countries, the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, New Zealand and Switzerland have had a relatively small number of labour disputes in recent years.

Methods of settling labour disputes have received increasing attention in most countries during the last decade. While voluntary conciliation and arbitration procedures were applied in many economically advanced countries, in the developing countries the public authorities are, on the contrary, becoming more and more inclined to resort to compulsory conciliation and sometimes to compulsory arbitration of economic disputes. In general, despite notable exceptions, Governments, both in the industrialized countries as well as — and more especially — in the countries in the early stages of industrialization, seem to have played an increasingly active part in this field during the decade.

Table 4

NUMBER OF WORKERS INVOLVED AND MAN-DAYS LOST OWING TO LABOUR DISPUTES

Year	*Industrialized countries*[a]		*Developing countries*[b]	
	Number of workers involved (in thousands)	*Working days lost (in thousands)*	*Number of workers involved (in thousands)*	*Working days lost (in thousands)*
1949	12,292	85,987	1,474	9,971
1950	8,649	77,102	977	17,620
1951	8,567	45,260	1,181	6,412
1952	9,251	87,445	1,073	5,946
1953	12,387	55,468	1,057	5,598
1954	6,964	40,557	928	7,532
1955	8,158	49,945	786	8,179
1956	7,462	59,512	1,924	15,714
1957	9,396	46,868	1,817	12,224
1958	6,988	43,426	1,473	16,069
1959	7,129	95,806	2,348	18,024
1960	7,292[c]	36,499[c]	1,121[c]	8,115[c]

[a] Namely, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States of America.

[b] Namely, Argentina, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, India, Israel, Pakistan, Philippines, Puerto Rico and Republic of South Africa.

[c] Provisional figures.

Collective bargaining

The contents of the collective agreements concluded in the United States, Canada and most of the western European countries during the 1950's, whether they deal with reclassification of surplus labour, payment of special compensation to workers dismissed as a result of staff cutbacks, job security clauses, reduction in hours of work, or the sharing of profits resulting from increased productivity, reveal the vital part which collective bargaining can play in an era of rapid technological development. In these countries, collective agreements are, to an increasing extent, becoming true industrial charters defining the rights and duties of the signatory parties and regulating every aspect of labour relations down to the smallest detail. The long-term trend towards a decrease in the number of bargaining groups and an expansion of their field of competence in labour-management and personnel matters continued during the last decade. But this centralization of collective bargaining has been accompanied by an increase in the number of collective agreements concluded at the level of the establishment or undertaking. This is true not only of countries like the United States where there has always been collective bargaining at this level but also of countries where bargaining is still traditionally industry- or nation-wide. This has occurred, for example, in Belgium, France, Italy and some other countries of western Europe. The workers of the industrialized countries, where technological progress has made it necessary for many decisions to be taken within each production unit, seem to be seeking to strengthen trade union control at the level of the establishment or undertaking.

In most developing countries, the number of collective agreements concluded has been limited. A recent innovation, collective bargaining has become an accepted feature of industrial life only in the few countries where economic development has reached a fairly advanced stage, for example, in Japan, Israel and, to a lesser degree, in Argentina and Mexico. However, a number of other countries have made significant progress in the matter during the last decade. In the Philippines, for example, collective agreements have been concluded in many sectors of industry since the enactment, in 1953, of a law to stimulate the establishment of trade unions and promote good labour-management relations. Collective agreements are also numerous in the plantation industries in Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, and, to a lesser extent, in Indonesia. In Cuba the Ministry of Labour's register listed more than 4,800 collective agreements at the end of February 1960. In Venezuela over 680 were signed in 1959. Some progress has been made in India, Morocco, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and several countries or territories of Africa south of the Sahara.

In most of these countries the Governments have taken steps to facilitate collective bargaining. There is no need to repeat the reasons, set out in another part of this chapter, why these measures have so far had little success in most cases. In view of the dominant part played by the Government in the countries concerned and the other characteristics of the labour market, collective bargaining is unlikely to make the same progress in the developing countries in the years to come as it has made in most of the countries which have long been industrialized. Moreover, even in the latter countries, as technological progress begins to make its impact on the organization of production, it is becoming evident that collective agreements cannot solve all problems and must be supplemented, and sometimes replaced, by legislative or administrative action. At a time when the traditional distinction between collective bargaining and legislative or administrative action is losing much of its importance, the co-ordination efforts at a higher level than that of bargaining between employers and workers often seemed to be required. The past decade has seen the development, both in the economically advanced countries and in the developing countries, of a new form of bargaining, parallel to and supplementing collective bargaining, namely, bargaining between the national authorities and the employers' and workers' associations.

Consultation and co-operation at the industrial and national levels

Whether the bodies concerned are bipartite or tripartite, standing or *ad hoc,* voluntary or statutory, the system of consultation and co-operation at the industrial and national levels seems to be firmly established in most of the industrialized countries and to be making headway in the economically developing countries.

More national agreements between employers' and workers' organizations have been concluded in several western European countries during recent years; for example, in the Scandinavian countries and particularly Denmark and Sweden, where such agreements form the backbone of the system of labour-management relations. The agreement on peaceful relations between the employers' associations and the workers' unions in the Swiss machine and metallurgical industries, which was renewed in 1958, and the new wage agreement signed in September 1960 in the French textile industry using natural fibres, are based on the same principle. An important national joint agreement on " social planning " was signed in Belgium on 11 May 1960 by the representatives of inter-occupational workers' and employers' organizations. As a result of an agreement between the country's principal labour and management organizations, the first session of the Irish Joint National Employer-Labour Conference took place at Dublin in May 1962. Recent agreements of a similar type have been concluded in several developing countries, for example, in India where an Industry Code of Conduct was adopted in 1958, in the Philippines where the National Labour-Management Congress adopted a set of guiding principles for labour-management relations in 1956, in the Federation of Malaya where the main employers' and workers' organizations signed a declaration defining the principles of a joint policy of labour-management relations in 1958, in Kenya where an agreement was concluded in 1961 inaugurating a National Joint Council for Industry, and in Venezuela where a joint declaration on social policy was signed in 1958 by the Federation of Chambers and Associations of Commerce and Production, on the one hand, and the Joint Trade Unions Committee, on the other. Many general tripartite organs of co-operation have also been established during the 1950's in most of these countries.

At a time when technological progress is transforming the economic and social structure of industrialized countries, nation-wide consultation and co-operation on a tripartite basis seems destined to become more important than ever. This is borne out by the recent experience of several western European countries in regard to wage and income policy, described in a previous section of this chapter. Even in countries where collective bargaining forms the backbone of the system of labour relations, there is a growing awareness of the need for greater co-ordination at the national level. The President's Advisory Committee on Labour-Management Policy established in the United States in January 1961 and the National Economic Development Council established in January 1962 by the United Kingdom Government are examples of this trend. Lastly, close collaboration between the public authorities and workers' organizations on many regional or central councils is one of the main features of countries with centrally planned economies.

One of the major trends of the time is the increasing part which employers' and workers' organizations are being called upon to play throughout the world in the formulation and application of decisions on economic and social policy at the national level. Several recent examples, some of which have been mentioned in this chapter, suggest that in the developing countries Governments are becoming more and more aware of the constructive contribution which these organizations can make to the preparation and execution of development plans and, specifically, to the institution and application of a labour policy, designed to improve living and working conditions and promote economic development and a more equitable distribution of national income.

Chapter IX

SOCIAL SECURITY

This decade has witnessed the continued evolution of established social security systems, including certain major reforms and structural reorganizations: the extension of various schemes to categories of the gainfully occupied population not previously protected, notably self-employed persons and workers in agriculture; the provision of medical care for members of the families of insured persons and for pensioners and their dependants, where they had not previously been eligible; and a general tendency to liberalize benefits and to provide for the systematic adjustment to changes in economic conditions of those paid in cash. New schemes have been introduced and, in developing countries, long-term programmes, to be applied by stages, according to branches, categories of persons covered or regions of application, have been planned and in most cases the initial phase of the programme has been carried out. Action has been taken to promote the equality of treatment of national and non-national residents under national social security schemes, and to ensure social protection for migrants and their dependants, thus facilitating the mobility and proper distribution of workers.

At the international level, the adoption of the Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention by the International Labour Conference in 1952 constituted a landmark in the history of social security. Designed to take account of conditions obtaining in developing as well as in highly industrialized countries and covering all branches of social security, it has been ratified by thirteen member States of the International Labour Organisation and its influence is apparent in much of the social security legislation of the last decade.

Extension of social security

The total number of persons covered by social security schemes and the degree of protection available to them have considerably increased within the last decade. In the countries of Europe and North America, there has been a recent tendency to include the self-employed in the existing schemes, or otherwise to bring them into the national system, at least for pensions, despite the financial difficulty of covering persons who have no employer to share the cost, as well as the special problems of administration and control. Austria, Belgium, Italy and Luxembourg have extended their pension insurance schemes to persons working on their own account and in some cases also to members of the liberal professions. France and the Federal Republic of Germany extended old-age insurance to independent workers in agriculture in 1952 and 1957 respectively. In 1961 France enacted a sickness, maternity and invalidity insurance scheme for farmers, which includes benefits in kind for the dependants of the insured persons and covers unpaid family workers. Luxembourg has recently applied sickness and maternity insurance to independent workers, including those engaged in agriculture, and Italy, to artisans, small traders and farmers. Yugoslavia has set up a health insurance scheme for agricultural producers; it provides benefits both for the insured persons and for members of their families. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have extended social insurance protection to members of handicraft and farmers' co-operatives and to at least some members of the liberal professions, and Czechoslovakia and Hungary have similarly extended family allowances. Allowances are now provided in respect of the children of self-employed persons in Austria. Within the period since 1950 Bulgaria, Greece, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden have extended the coverage of persons protected for medical care, so that social security pensioners are eligible for benefits.

A few European countries have filled in gaps in the contingencies covered. The Netherlands has established old-age and survivors' insurance schemes for all residents, and Ireland a contributory old-age benefit scheme for employees and medical services for insured persons and their dependants and for persons of limited means. Denmark has introduced a family allowance scheme for all residents. Switzerland has added invalidity to the contingencies covered by pension insurance. Norway now provides medical care for all residents through a compulsory insurance scheme, which replaces voluntary insurance.

Since 1950, Canada has set up an old-age security scheme and a hospital insurance scheme for all residents, and has introduced invalidity pensions for persons of small means who become permanently incapacitated. The United States has extended its old-age and survivors' insurance system to include invalidity and has widened the range of persons protected, which was originally restricted in effect largely to urban employees, to include almost the whole gainfully occupied population.

All countries in Latin America have by now enacted social security legislation and have implemented their schemes at least in part, so that they afford protection in one or more contingencies for some categories of the gainfully occupied. The dispersed settlements, difficulties of communication, inadequate administrative and medical personnel and facilities outside the large cities, as well as limited financial resources, have made it necessary in most instances to apply social security legislation gradually by regions and contingencies. Furthermore, in Latin America and in developing countries in other parts of the world, there is a striking contrast between industrial undertakings organized on modern lines and the traditional small handicraft industries and shops, and it is usually administratively impossible, even within a city or other limited region, to include at the outset all workers in

the social security scheme, so that in the early stages restrictions in scope have been made on the basis of occupation and size of establishment.

The first Latin American countries to introduce social security schemes in principle (though not in practice) covered all employees, with specified exceptions, notably persons engaged in agriculture and in domestic service, in all contingencies. Countries introducing their first schemes at a somewhat later date, however, started with protection in a limited number of contingencies and are extending the application of their schemes both by regions and contingencies as circumstances permit. Branches of social security covering the immediate needs of wage-earners for protection in case of sickness, maternity and employment injuries lend themselves to gradual application more readily than those covering old age, invalidity and death of the breadwinner, which involve considerable record-keeping and are better applied on a broad basis when the requisite administrative facilities and techniques have heen developed and when the possibility of sound financing in ensured. Thus, the newer schemes in Latin American countries usually start with coverage for sickness, maternity and employment injury benefits. Since 1950, El Salvador and Honduras have implemented their social security legislation as regards these three contingencies. Nicaragua, however, has introduced a scheme covering not only these contingencies but also old age, invalidity and death. Only a few Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay) have family allowance systems.

One particular form of social security, unemployment insurance, can be successful only in countries where the employment market is well organized; in any case, it can only mitigate the effects of short-term unemployment and is not considered a suitable measure to combat the effects of the structural under-employment generally prevalent in developing countries. Well-developed unemployment insurance schemes thus are found in most industrialized countries, but are few and of limited scope elsewhere. In Latin America, a limited degree of protection in unemployment is provided in Chile, Ecuador and Uruguay.

Within the last twelve years, a number of Latin American countries (including Colombia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela) have extended the application of their social security schemes on a geographical basis. In addition, Mexico afforded social security protection to agricultural workers in 1954. In the same year, Argentina included members of the liberal professions in its social security system and Uruguay extended the scope of its pension scheme. The laws of several other Latin American countries either envisage the insurance of persons working on their own account at some future date or provide for it on a voluntary basis.

Asian countries have also been devoting increasing attention to social security in the last decade. In south-west Asia, Cyprus in 1956 introduced a social insurance scheme covering all employees except those on farms with fewer than five workers, for pensions, sickness, maternity and unemployment. Israel enacted social security legislation in 1953 to provide pension and maternity insurance for all residents and has since introduced family allowances for residents with four or more children. Japan, which had a long history of social security prior to 1950, recently extended its health insurance and pension insurance systems so that all residents can obtain medical care and are insured against old age, invalidity and death of the breadwinner. By legislative measures it has encouraged the voluntary participation in unemployment insurance of employees in small firms, who are not compulsorily insured, and it has extended protection against employment injuries to fishermen.

The preoccupation with social security of other Asian countries that are not highly indusrialized is comparatively recent, arising out of the pressing need for economic security among the large number of workers who have left their villages, thus losing to a large extent the protection of traditional forms of mutual aid, have crowded into the cities, and for the first time have become entirely dependent upon a money wage, which ceases if they fall sick or become incapacitated and which does not allow them a sufficient margin to make provision for emergencies or for their old age. The difficulties of introducing comprehensive social security schemes encountered in Latin American countries exist in Asa to an even greater degree. Therefore their gradual application by region, industry, size of establishment and contingencies covered is the generally accepted policy, followed, for example, in Burma, China (Taiwan), India, Indonesia, Iran and the Philippines. When the Indian Employees' State Insurance Scheme was implemented in 1952, it covered employees whose earnings did not exceed a prescribed amount in factories employing twenty or more workers in specified industries in two cities: 128,000 persons were insured. The scheme has since been extended on a geographical and industrial basis and in 1961 it covered 1,674,000 persons. In some regions it now provides medical care for dependants of the insured persons; over half a million family units are eligible. Since 1950 India, Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, Iraq and Singapore have introduced provident fund schemes.

The labour insurance regulations in China (mainland) were introduced in 1951 and amended in 1953 for workers in factories and mining enterprises throughout the country. Under these regulations benefits are provided in cases of injury, disablement and sickness; there are likewise death benefits for workers and staff members and their lineal dependants, old-age pensions, and maternity benefits. All expenses of these benefits are borne in full by the management or owners of enterprises. The administration of labour insurance is laid upon the trade union organizations. During the last decade, free medical services were extended to government functionaries and personnel in people's organizations and schools. In 1958, 13,780,000 workers and other employees were covered by labour insurance, compared with 3,300,000 in 1952 and 600,000 in 1949. In 1958, 6,880,000 workers and other employees were entitled to free medical services, as against 4,000,000 in 1952.

In Africa, since 1950, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia have established social insurance schemes for employees in industry and commerce covering a number of contingencies. In 1959 the United Arab Republic enacted social security legislation covering employment injuries, old age, invalidity and death of the breadwinner.

In African countries south of the Sahara, extensive

migratory movements, urbanization, the continual weakening of the traditional bonds of solidarity and the impact of a money economy have given rise to new needs for social security measures either, as in other developing countries, to replace the old forms of mutual aid that have disappeared, or to alleviate the economic difficulties of these groups created by new and extended needs. African countries show a variety of arrangements for the provision of health services and the maintenance of income in various contingencies. These arrangements are based in part on government services, for example, in the field of health; and in part on the individual liability of the employers for medical care and the payment of wages during incapacity due to sickness. In some countries, for example, Gabon, Dahomey, Senegal and Upper Volta, responsibility for the payment of employment injury benefits has been transferred from the employers to equalization funds administered according to principles of social insurance. The introduction of family allowance schemes in certain African countries, and particularly those of French-speaking Africa, undoubtedly reflects the influence of the legislation of the former metropolitan countries and the living and working conditions of African workers when the large agricultural, mining and industrial undertakings were established.

Several African countries have quite recently adopted, in principle, rather extensive social security schemes. The Congo (Leopoldville) in 1961 issued a Legislative Decree establishing a new social security scheme covering all classes of employees, irrespective of race or nationality, except civil servants who are otherwise protected, in the contingencies arising out of employment injuries, and in the long-term contingencies, old age, invalidity and death of the breadwinner, and also providing family allowances. In 1961, Guinea promulgated a social security code applying to all wage earners and providing for family allowances, maternity and employment injury, sickness, disability, old-age and survivors' benefits.

Pension legislation was enacted in 1960 in the Ivory Coast and in 1961 in Upper Volta. Nigeria recently set up a compulsory savings scheme, which will operate through a national provident fund, and in principle applies to all employees. It will constitute the first step that can reasonably be taken towards social security in old age. Some degree of old-age protection is afforded in certain African countries by means of contractual industrial schemes set up as the result of collective bargaining. Such a scheme, created in 1958 on an inter-country basis in the French Federation of West Africa, is still operating for various industries, commerce and transport in Dahomey, Niger, Senegal and Togo.

Structure and organization

The majority of the existing or planned social security schemes are based on principles of compulsory social insurance, although medical care, old-age pensions and family allowances are provided in a number of countries as a public service for all, not linked to payment of contributions. Only a few countries use social assistance (public aid to needy cases) as the principal means of providing social security, but some of those having social security schemes use it to supplement in individual cases the benefits provided by social insurance. Recent reforms in existing social insurance schemes, for example in Austria, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany and, as regards cash benefits, the eastern European countries, have not altered their social insurance character. A few new social assistance programmes and the Canadian universal old-age pensions scheme have been set up since 1950, but the great majority of the new schemes, such as those of Burma, the Congo (Leopoldville), Cyprus, Guinea, India, Israel, Libya, Nicaragua and the Philippines, apply the social insurance approach.

A few countries in Asia and Africa have set up compulsory savings schemes, whereby the workers covered and their employers must contribute regularly in order to build up a capital sum for each worker, which is payable under specified conditions, notably on retirement, or to the survivors should the member die. Iraq is using this compulsory savings approach as a first step towards the introduction of a social insurance scheme, and in several countries consideration is being given to the transformation of provident funds into social insurance schemes, which will relate the benefit to the duration of the contingency rather than provide a lump sum.

The number of industrial and occupational pension and savings schemes and, notably in North America, of medical and hospital insurance schemes, already considerable in 1950, has continued to grow. These schemes, which have a contractual rather than a statutory basis and are often the result of collective bargaining, are subject to a certain degree of government control under income tax, insurance or other national legislation. They play a considerable role in supplementing the statutory social security protection available. Under many of these schemes the provisions concerning acquired rights and their transfer have been liberalized, so that the mobility of workers is less frequently hampered by the possible loss of pension rights.

The reforms of existing social security systems have tended towards the co-ordination of protection in various contingencies or, where there are separate schemes for different categories of the gainfully occupied population, towards the unification of the benefit provisions.

The administration of social insurance schemes is generally vested in autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions, subject to varying degrees of government supervision. However, where practically the whole population is included in the scheme, its administration may be entrusted directly to the Government, as in the United Kingdom. After social security reforms of the early 1950's in the eastern European countries, the Government has administered pensions insurance, with the administration of sickness insurance benefits and certain welfare services entrusted to the trade unions, and the provision of medical care the responsibility of a national health service. Later, Bulgaria transferred the administration of all cash benefits to trade unions, and Poland entrusted the administration of all cash benefits to an autonomous institution.

Usually the insured persons and their employers are represented in the organs of the autonomous and semi-autonomous institutions. In the older schemes, the role of the smaller self-governing insurance bodies, whose existence reflects the influence of the mutual benefit movement, is decreasing in importance, since Governments are extending the scope of their regulations.

Finance

Social security systems usually derive their resources from one or more of the following sources: contributions from the insured persons and employers, contributions or subsidies from the State or other public authorities, and earmarked income or other taxes. The cost of employment injury benefits is nearly always borne by the employers. Otherwise the sources of revenue for different benefits often vary widely and they may vary within one system or country. In the highly industrialized countries where all gainfully occupied persons or all residents are covered by a social insurance scheme, the distinction between the contribution of an insured person based on insurable earnings and a social security income tax subject to a ceiling, such as is levied in Canada for old-age pensions, is somewhat blurred. But even where all gainfully occupied persons are covered by a social security scheme, it is frequently considered desirable for psychological reasons to maintain the link between insurance contributions and the right to benefit. In many of the schemes of countries in western Europe, tripartite financing by the insured person, his employer and the State is prevalent, although in others and in the United States there is no contribution from the public authorities. In the eastern European countries, the insured persons' contributions have disappeared and the benefits are financed by the employers and by the State through the national budget. Countries that have introduced schemes for restricted categories and relatively small numbers of employed persons (who tend to be regularly employed, better established workers) have had to consider whether and to what extent it is equitable to use public funds to subsidize schemes for such very limited sectors of the population. New schemes in Burma, Cyprus, India and Israel, like most of those in Latin America, are (usually with exceptions as regards the employment injury branch) financed on a tripartite basis. The State does not, however, participate in the cost of social insurance in the new schemes of Libya, Morocco or Tunisia. In the African countries formerly under French administration, the employers, through equalization funds, pay for the family allowances provided for employed persons on a collective basis.

A recent ILO study on the cost of social security during the period 1949-1957 [1] shows that, of the twenty-eight countries for which data were available (mostly industrialized countries), in twenty-six the receipts, total expenditure and expenditure on benefits of social security schemes increased more rapidly than the national income over the period 1950 to 1957 inclusive. The increases may be attributed to the extension of the scope of the social security schemes, both as regards the contingencies covered and the persons protected, and to the liberalization of their benefit provisions. The social security receipts and expenditures increased only slightly more rapidly than the national income in New Zealand and were relatively stable in terms of the national income in the United Kingdom, countries which had comprehensive social security schemes in 1950.

[1] International Labour Organisation, *The Cost of Social Security, 1949-1957* (Geneva, 1961). See also *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.4), p. 15.

Medical care

Under the medical care provisions of the older social security systems in the countries of western Europe, the patient may usually choose his doctor from among those under contract with the social security institution or administration. The doctor is remunerated by a fee for each patient on his list or by a fee for each service rendered. Some of these schemes also have their own medical institutions where special services are provided. In the countries of eastern Europe, the national health administrations maintain hospitals and other medical establishments and provide care by salaried doctors for the persons eligible for medical benefits.

In the developing countries, where medical personnel and facilities are limited and unevenly distributed, the direct provision of care by full or part-time salaried doctors from polyclinics and hospitals operated by the social insurance institutions is found to be a rational and effective way of providing benefits. As a general rule, such a system is followed by the schemes of the Latin American countries and by those of Burma, Iran and, to some extent, India, The Libyan social insurance institution has arranged with the public health service to provide care for insured persons. Many countries give medical assistance to any needy resident, and the developing countries do so to the extent permitted by their limited medical and financial resources. In the newly independent countries of Africa south of the Sahara, such health personnel as is available has been enlisted for the public health services, which attach great importance to the provision of preventive care.

Over the years, the range of medical benefits provided by social security schemes has increased and the conditions for benefit have been liberalized. There is no qualifying period for medical care under national health services and in a number of insurance schemes, including the new schemes of Burma, India, Turkey, and the voluntary scheme in Indonesia, only insured status is required. Some of the older schemes are abolishing previous limits in the duration of medical care, and the new Canadian hospital insurance scheme provides hospital care for as long as necessary. In the schemes recently introduced in the developing countries, however, it is usual to fix a maximum period of eight, thirteen or twenty-six weeks per case of sickness or within a prescribed period, at least until there has been sufficient experience to indicate that the scheme could bear the cost of more liberal provisions.

Considerable concern has been shown in regard to the rising cost of medical benefits. A study published by the International Labour Office in 1959,[2] however, " does not bear out the commonly held belief that there is a general tendency for all medical costs to rise — or it rather indicates that they have not risen any faster than national income or reference wages, although hospital costs show a certain tendency to outstrip the rest ". The International Social Security Association is systematically collecting data on the cost and volume of benefits in cash and kind.

[2] *The Cost of Medical Care,* Geneva, 1959.

Cash benefits

Under most medical security schemes, the cash benefits provided in the *short-term contingencies* — sickness, maternity, unemployment and temporary incapacity due to an employment injury — are related to immediately previous earnings, subject to minimum and maximum limits on the amount reckoned; in a few schemes, the benefit rates are uniform, at least for persons with similar family responsibilities. Where uniform amounts are payable, the rates have been raised from time to time to take account of changing economic conditions. Where benefits are related to earnings or wages, they automatically rise with increases in wages, and only the maximum benefits payable or the ceilings on the earnings reckoned in computing the benefits need to be adjusted.

The *long-term contingencies* covered by social security schemes include old age, invalidity, death of the breadwinner and, except for invalidity or death due to an employment injury, they are frequently covered by a single pension scheme, with pension formulae for each embodying the same general principles. Among the three contingencies old age has attracted most attention, particularly in the countries of western, central and northern Europe, North America and Oceania, whose populations are relatively aged. Most pensions are in some way related in amount to the pensioner's previous wages or earnings and to the length of his working career. Between 1959 and 1961, Sweden, Finland and the United Kingdom, which provide flat-rate pensions intended to guarantee to all a subsistence income, introduced pension supplements related to past earnings.

In order to maintain the purchasing power of pensions during periods of rising living costs and possibly to enable pensioners to share in higher levels of living, adjustments in the rates are needed from time to time. A number of countries, including Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Israel, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden, now have provisions in their legislation for automatic or semi-automatic adjustment of pensions currently being paid to changes in a wage or price index; the majority of these countries introduced such provisions within the period under review. Other countries, including Cuba, Ecuador, Greece, Nicaragua, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, that have accepted the principle of the systematic adjustment of pensions to changing economic conditions, require the competent authority to keep the operation of pension funds and the adequacy of the pensions paid under review. The United Kingdom legislation, for example, requires a quinquennial review and report to Parliament on the rates and amounts of benefits in relation to the circumstances of the insured persons, but in fact the basic rates have been revised four times since the national insurance scheme came into effect in 1948. Still other countries make adjustments on a purely *ad hoc* basis in the light of rising living costs and standards.

The cost of the upward adjustment of pensions is met in various ways according to the financial structure of the scheme, and entails considerations of a highly technical nature. Wage-related contributions produce increased resources as wages rise, and adjustments in flat-rate benefits are frequently accompanied by corresponding adjustments in the contribution rate.

The economic burden of maintaining old persons who are not in gainful activity has caused some concern, particularly in the highly industrialized countries where the proportion of old persons in the population is great, and much consideration has been given to the terms of national pension schemes that affect the age of retirement and thus the dependency burden of the economically active population. Those responsible for social security policy and planning must evaluate the effect on the labour market, and thus on the national economy, of the pensionable age, the qualifying conditions for pensions, particularly those that entail withdrawal from gainful activity or income tests, and any incentives to continued employment that are included in the pension formula. Countries with full employment tend to provide pensions from a prescribed age, whether or not the claimant is gainfully occupied, so as to encourage older people to remain in the active labour force and thus to increase national production. On the other hand, in some developing countries, the right to pension is made conditional on abstention from gainful or insurable employment or activity, since, where the possibilities of employment are limited, it is not considered reasonable that one person should benefit simultaneously from remunerative employment and from a pension whose cost is in part borne collectively.

The protection afforded in the long-term contingency arising out of an *employment injury* has been greatly improved by the provision in the new employment-injury insurance schemes for pensions payable throughout the contingency, rather than lump-sum grants previously awarded under schemes based on the individual liability of the employer.

Some sixty countries have *family allowance* schemes, and within recent years the rates of benefit have been raised in a number of the older schemes. Like many of the European schemes, those of the newly independent countries of Africa usually provide allowances at flat rates. Morocco and Tunisia limit the number of children in respect of whom an allowance is payable.

Equality of treatment of nationals and non-nationals in social security

The comprehensive social security protection of non-nationals, especially of migrant workers, and the payment of social security benefits abroad have given rise to a number of problems. In national legislation and practice there is still considerable inequality of treatment between nationals and non-nationals, particularly as regards non-contributory allowances and unemployment and family benefits. The national legislation that provides social security benefits for non-nationals often makes entitlement conditional on reciprocity, or on a residence requirement. Workers employed alternately or successively in their own and other countries may not be able to acquire or maintain pension rights, unless there are arrangements to permit the totalization of periods of insurance in different countries; and they may not be able to draw the pensions for which they have qualified unless pensions are payable abroad.

In the last decade, there has been a marked development in arrangements to ensure equality of treatment in social security and the payment of benefits abroad, and there is now a considerable body of international law on this subject. It is based upon a network of bilateral and multilateral reciprocal agreements and upon International Labour Conventions.

Almost 200 bilateral agreements on social security, concluded between 1950 and 1960, inclusive, are known to the ILO; the vast majority of these are agreements between countries in Europe. The bilateral agreements usually provide that the nationals of one contracting country shall be covered by the social security legislation of the other contracting country and receive equal treatment with the nationals of the latter. In recent years, there has been considerable co-ordination of national social security legislation at the regional level. In 1952 the American States members of the International Labour Organisation adopted a resolution concerning the protection of social security rights of migrant workers and proposing that these should be ensured by means of a special agreement between the American countries. Among the instruments coordinating the national social security legislation of certain European countries, mention should be made of the agreement of 27 July 1950 (revised in 1961) concerning the social security of Rhine boatmen, the European interim agreements concerning social security concluded in 1953 by the States members of the Council of Europe, and the European Convention on social security concerning workers engaged in international transport, which came into effect on 1 May 1960. In 1957, the States members of the European Coal and Steel Community signed a European Convention on social security for migrant workers, the provisions of which, with certain modifications, were repeated in regulations of the Council of the European Economic Community which came into force on 1 January 1959.

Equality of treatment of nationals and non-nationals in the field of social insurance is a principle endorsed by the International Labour Organisation since its inception. Before the war, the International Labour Conference had adopted a number of conventions which dealt *inter alia* with equality of treatment in several branches of social insurance and the establishment of international rules for the maintenance of migrants' pension rights. The Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention, 1952, dealt with this complex problem only in the most general terms. The International Labour Organisation has recently found the time opportune for framing an international instrument or instruments to deal fully with all aspects of the problem, and accordingly the subject was placed on the agenda of the International Labour Conference in 1961 for a first discussion. After further discussion in June 1962, the Conference adopted a Convention (No. 118) concerning Equality of Treatment of Nationals and Non-Nationals in Social Security. The aim of this new convention is to assure social security protection to all workers employed in a foreign country, subject to reciprocity. This objective applies to every branch of social security for which the country concerned has accepted the obligations of the convention. Other provisions cover the payment of benefits abroad, the maintenance of acquired rights and family allowances.

Chapter X

SOCIAL SERVICES AND SOCIAL DEFENCE

SOCIAL SERVICES: TEN YEARS OF SOCIAL SERVICE DEVELOPMENT [1]

During the past ten years, organized social service has expanded remarkably in all parts of the world. This expansion has varied in form and degree from country to country, but the trend has been nearly universal. There is also evidence today of a common pattern of development, in spite of the lack of a common world-wide understanding of the precise functions and limits of social service as an organized activity of society. Each new social service project has tended to appear as a particular undertaking to meet particular needs in a particular setting. Only through their evolution in a wide range of settings have the common attributes of these projects become more readily apparent. This has been facilitated by the greatly increased exchange of information, experience, and appraisal in recent years.

A landmark in the effort to identify the common elements was reached in 1959, when a group of social service experts from eight countries with sharply differentiated programmes and problems reached agreement upon the following definition of the social service function:

> "... social service is defined as an organized activity that aims at helping towards a mutual adjustment of individuals and their social environment. This objective is achieved through the use of techniques and methods which are designed to enable individuals, groups, and communities to meet their needs and solve their problems of adjustment to a changing pattern of society, and through co-operative action to improve economic and social conditions." [2]

This definition emphasizes that social service is concerned with that area of human need in which social relationships are basic, whether among individuals or between individuals and their social institutions.[3] "Adjustment" is seen as a two-way process in the sense that, while individuals must make certain kinds of adjustment to the society in which they live, the social structure must also adapt to their changing needs and aspirations. Social service is concerned with both kinds of adaptation, easing the way for people who need help and assisting the community or Government to develop or adapt programmes and policies that will prevent hardship and meet their requirements better. It is a guardian of the individual and the family living in a complex society in which historical movements and mass organizations, however useful to people at large, may well miss the special needs of particular individuals or groups of people. Through its knowledge of these particular needs, social service can not only extend immediate help but also contribute to the better adaptation of social institutions, laws, programmes and planning, for the best use of common resources to meet these needs.

If social services are to play an essential role in the social structure rather than serve as a kind of philanthropic frosting on its surface, they must inevitably change their form and scope as the society itself changes. They may themselves influence or facilitate these changes, but are in turn affected by them. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the social service activity of a new nation, just beginning to move beyond tribal political organization and a subsistence economy, bears little relationship to the massive and complex network of social services and benefits necessary to the functioning of a highly industrialized society. The role may be the same, but the programmes can only be compared in terms of a broad spectrum of social development.

In a relatively simple, localized, self-sufficient society, the family and tribal pattern of relationship and responsibility functions to meet the recognized social needs of its members. Not only the parents but the larger family group assume responsibility for the rearing of children. Such a society makes some kind of provision within the limits of its resources for its aged, its widows and orphans, its disabled. It often makes rather elaborate provisions for the induction of young people into full adult responsibility, including marriage, and for giving social recognition to the other major landmarks in the life cycle. It protects its members to the best of its capacity and knowledge against common danger and disaster. Because such a society is governed largely by long-established custom, everyone knows his rights and obligations. As long as it remains self-contained, the society is relatively stable and static and its pattern is only subject to change under outside influence or major disaster. Although the function of priest or tribal leader may involve some of the same forms of social support and facilitation, organized social services have little place in this kind of society unless

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[1] The discussion in the following pages seeks to give a broad picture of the current process of development of the social services on a world-wide basis, and to this end attempts to characterize the different stages of development of these services. While the analysis is, to a large extent, based on information from individual countries, an effort has not been made to use particular countries as examples of developmental stages.

[2] *The Development of National Social Service Programmes* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 60.IV.1).

[3] Absence of a commonly accepted terminology has proved a major problem in this field. In United Nations practice, increasingly followed elsewhere, the term "social welfare" is generally applied to a broad range of socially sponsored activities and programmes directed toward community and individual well-being; the term "social service" is used to indicate a more limited specific functional area within this broad grouping; and the term "social work" refers to the profession primarily concerned with social service functions.

they come from the outside in the form of missionary or other philanthropic activity.

The extended family or tribal system, as described above, is still the basic reliance of people in many parts of the world, but it is increasingly being breached by the on-rushing tides of social, economic and political change. This has been particularly true in the period since the end of the Second World War. The forces of change are, amongst other things, breaking down geographical and cultural isolation; introducing dependence on wage employment and the market-place instead of production for family consumption; narrowing the responsibility of the family, and reducing the authority of the family head and his control over production and consumption by its members; separating family members physically through rural-urban migration; disrupting the traditional relationships between generations and between sexes; grouping and re-structuring local political forces within a national framework. These changes have created needs and problems that cannot be met by the traditional resources of family custom. It is at this point that social services begin to appear, not necessarily to displace the social functions of existing institutions, but to assist and supplement them. Social services at this initial stage are typically sporadic, unstable, selective and embryonic. But this makes them no less important as the institutional forerunners of more substantial measures to come and as tokens of social intention at a time when aspirations far outrun capacity.

The formative stage of social service development

In this period of transition, the family and other traditional sources of mutual aid continue to function in meeting social needs, even though faced with new difficulties. Most children, aged and disabled are still cared for through a shared family responsibility, and other long-established customary patterns of group relationship persist even though weakened by change. It is interesting to note that, in Africa, for example, the obligations of one member towards others in a tribal group are frequently carried over into the new setting by those who have migrated into cities, even undergoing in some instances an institutional adaptation in the form of tribal mutual aid associations. Traditional religious institutions such as the Buddhist *wat* and Moslem *wakf* have been adapted to some degree to meet new social problems.

But the very pressures and aspirations that created these changes with their attendant social problems are also equally operative in stimulating the authorities to seek new institutional measures for their solution.

Organized social service plays a much more important role in nations undergoing social and economic transition than the scope of coverage of its benefits would seem to suggest. The very fact that it exists at all testifies to an institutional change which is important in itself, and which has great potential for the future. It is doubtless for this reason that most of the new nations of Africa and Asia have included in their governmental machinery a Ministry of Social Welfare or other similar administrative body, as a token of their intention to expand their efforts for human betterment in this field as rapidly as their resources will permit. Other countries have likewise included in their newly adopted constitutions declarations concerning the rights of individuals to certain kinds of social benefits which they hope some day to be able to assure to all.

The limitations of the social service programmes are dictated by the absolute poverty of resources in money, personnel and institutional structure. A country trying to pull itself by its own bootstraps out of a bare subsistence level of economic production has little if any surplus funds, and that little is sought for the economic investment to break the impasse. Personnel and institutional limitations are also formidable at this stage, and can only be breached by improvisation. Fellowships for foreign study and observation have helped to supplement these limited resources and technical assistance from outside has helped to supplement limited local experience. The lack of administrative structure is also a major handicap. Because institutional structure is intangible, its importance as a national asset is not as widely understood as such visible symbols of development as factories, dams, roads and housing projects. But social services are essentially institutional in character, and cannot precede their own administrative machinery. Moreover, this machinery must be able to reach out beyond the ministry headquarters, the capital city, and the other major centres. In countries now blanketed with a network of government agencies, welfare offices, schools, clinics, and specialized institutions of all kinds, it is difficult to visualize the administrative problem of getting any sort of social services into villages where there is little transportation, no telephone, no school, no doctor, only the most primitive housing and few if any literate people. The fact that it has been so often accomplished by new countries, if only on a token scale at the onset, is itself remarkable.

The potential scope of social service activity in such countries is affected by the complete or relative absence of other specialized services. Fine distinctions of functional specialization have little meaning in places where there are few if any services of any kind. It is for this reason that, so often, workers sent into relatively untouched villages — whatever their original designation and sponsorship — in fact quickly become " multi-purpose workers " teaching the first principles of hygiene and child care, administering simple remedies, advising on farming and housekeeping practices, conducting literacy classes, stimulating co-operative activity and undertaking a variety of tasks performed by more specialized workers in a more highly developed community setting. But even the more specialized services in such countries do not always fall readily into simple classifications. Hospitals, clinics, schools, and other special projects are often launched on a philanthropic basis by welfare or religious organizations. Frequently, such projects will combine several services within a single grouping: for example, a children's clinic with a feeding station; a maternity hospital with an adoption service; an orphanage with a boarding-school. The characteristic tendency of social service organizations, both governmental and voluntary, to pioneer in developing for a limited group services and benefits which are subsequently extended under other auspices to a broader cross-section of the population is especially prominent at this stage, when the disparity between need and resources places so many restraints on broad social action.

The actual emphasis in early social service undertakings varies considerably from country to country. Many new programmes, especially those directed towards rural community development, spring from the urgencies of the immediate situation. In other instances, however, the pattern is influenced by the outside culture to which the countries have been most directly exposed. Countries formerly under British influence, for example, rely heavily on voluntary agencies — often with government subsidy — for child care and related services. Direct government services for families and children in these countries are often tied to the courts and performed by probation officers. In countries with a French background of influence, social service is often associated with the work of health clinics and visiting nurses. In Latin American countries, where the Hispanic tradition is still strong, heavy reliance is placed upon the philanthropic activities of the Roman Catholic Church. More recently, some countries have been influenced by United States concepts of multiple programmes with co-operative planning, while others have adopted Soviet and East European patterns of youth organization and social services tied to employing enterprises.

Certain elements are, however, sufficiently common to warrant generalization. In the first place, it is clear that the magnitude of the challenge places responsibility for planning, initiating, and supporting social services on the Government itself, however much it may welcome and even support ancillary voluntary effort. Secondly, the practical necessity for drastic selectivity among possible projects and beneficiaries is an inescapable fact at this early stage, which is likewise often a period of trial and error in which not all the projects attempted can be expected to take root and grow.

In the selection of projects, high priority is usually given to the needs of children requiring special care, for whom the philanthropic impulse is widely compelling. Among such children are those who have been cast adrift by reason of the death of their parents or social disruption; wandering or delinquent children coming to the attention of law enforcement bodies; severely handicapped children such as the blind or deaf; and a selected group of children for whom a better standard of care is sought than can yet be provided for the mass. Most commonly, care is at first provided for such children in residential institutions, where they often receive a higher standard of physical care and educational opportunity than is generally available in the community. The very hopelessness of quickly raising the standards for all children in their local environments is a reason why these initial efforts (for certain categories of children) are so largely concentrated in self-contained institutions. Most community child welfare services tend to come with a later stage of development, although a combined approach to the health and welfare needs of children and the education of their mothers is not uncommon.

Persons with severe handicaps, such as the blind, also make a basic appeal to the philanthropic impulse. Not only are there more of such persons in countries where disabling diseases are still largely unchecked, but the traditions of many religions place a high value on giving help to them. Alms-giving as a means of acquiring virtue can create a social problem in the modern city if it is not translated into the institutional terms of organized social service. Thus, many countries have sought to help such people and curb the spread of mendicancy by simultaneously providing them with institutional care and enacting laws directed against begging. In most cases, the standards of care offer only limited facilities for rehabilitation, although the exceptions are notable.

In addition to these programmes of direct help for certain individuals, most countries now in this transitional period feel a strong need to begin programmes directed toward *groups* of people on whom the processes of social change are making heavy demands. Already mentioned is the urgent need to extend interest and aid to the villages where the bulk of the population still live, through various kinds of community development and extension programmes.

Some newly emergent countries, especially those in Africa, have also devoted substantial effort to reaching women and young people through organized group programmes. Changes in the role of women seem to go hand in hand with social development. The shift to a different pattern of social organization requires a major adaptation of women in their roles as mothers, wives, producers and members of the community. Many countries, therefore, make special efforts to help this process of adaptation through women's organizations, women's institutes, women's activities within community development programmes, adult education, agricultural extension services, and various programmes related to child health, welfare, and nutrition. The emancipation of women in turn influences the development of social services themselves, since it is often through the efforts of individual women leaders and women's organizations that the social service programmes receive their strongest impetus.

Young people likewise are severely affected by the break in the cultural tradition at the very time when their enthusiastic participation in building a new society is most needed. Socially sponsored youth programmes seek to give them a new focus and a new social base. Boys whose fathers found their sense of manhood and participation in adult society through various kinds of initiation rites and supportive customs may well feel deprived and lost with the disappearance of these rites and customs, unless some substitute fills the vacuum in their lives. Youth movements, youth clubs, dramatic athletic contests, and other new forms of self-expression help to serve this purpose. Girls, too, are faced with difficult problems of adjustment, and often receive a lower priority in the allocation of limited educational resources. Girls' clubs offer them a new form of group activity, practical education and a testing ground for their new independent status. Some countries have organized work projects whereby young people, displaced from their village background but not yet absorbed into wage employment, may learn productive skills and contribute to the building of their country. Special camp programmes and regional contests of various kinds also help to create a widening sense of national identification.

While the above types of social service seem to have priority in countries at the first stage of social development, other types are also found here and there. The typical pattern of initiating limited projects virtually on a demonstration basis makes such variations logical.

In many ways, these are equivalent to pilot projects. Few such societies can afford to underpin individual family income through a broad system of public assistance, but they may none the less provide some supplementary or emergency assistance in particular cases. This is especially true when surplus foods or other forms of direct aid are available from abroad. Special efforts may be made to muster emergency aid in time of such disasters as flood or drought, or to aid the victims of social upheaval. But the basic fact remains that countries in which poverty is endemic can usually afford little more than social service programmes that are either extremely restricted or predicated on the principle of stimulating self-help.

The stage of limited programme development

An analysis of social service trends in terms of stages of development is helpful in reducing their countless diversities to a semblance of order, but its limitations in classifying countries must also be recognized. Countries adapt to changing needs in a continuing pattern, in which old institutions are modified and new ones are built upon or added to the old, rarely or only slowly displacing them altogether. This is especially true of social service, whose function is supportive and catalytic with respect to a variety of other social relationships and institutions rather than clearly delimited in terms of particular types of benefits.

It does appear, however, that many of the less developed countries have moved during the last decade or so from an initial stage of token and experimental activity into one in which they undertake to rationalize, solidify and project social service programmes within whatever area of responsibility they think important. At this point, they have gained some experience from the scattered activity of their formative period; have built up a body of personnel which has benefited from that experience and often also from foreign training and observation; have made some progress in coping with their initial social dislocations; have usually achieved greater stability in their government machinery as a whole, including the creation of mechanisms for over-all planning and the allocation of resources; and are in a good position to make use of technical assistance from abroad in advancing their social service programmes.

This is the time when countries begin to develop a real social service "policy", in the sense of a continuing plan of action directed towards desired ends. These ends may either form part of an over-all developmental plan, or may be formulated separately by a government welfare agency or a co-ordinating body which includes both government and voluntary welfare representation. This is also the time when real social service institutions begin to take root in the forms of laws that fix the required patterns of social responsibility, programmes that provide a particular type of benefit or service, or agencies to fulfil particular functions (or a combination of all three in the sense that a law may create a programme and the agency to administer it).

In most developing countries, this is a crucial period which may well set the pattern of institutional growth for many years to come. How will functions be divided between the Government and voluntary organizations? How will they be shared as between the central, provincial and local levels of responsibility? How will they be financed: by current taxes, by voluntary contributions, as a charge on production, or as part of a special development budget? How will limited resources be allocated so as to secure the maximum return? Should they be concentrated on a few priority programmes or should a small beginning be made on a wide variety of fronts? Should the highest priority be given to stimulation of self-help, to child welfare measures that will strengthen the younger generation, to organizations for major groups in the population, such as women and young people; or should help be concentrated on the particular families and individuals whose need is greatest?

Many seeming contradictions in this period of social service development can only be explained by recognizing that its achievements are primarily institutional, that they cannot be measured solely in terms of their direct impact on people, as would be true in the later stages of social advance. It is perhaps for this reason that, despite the frequent lip-service paid to the need for priority concentration in this developmental period, actual experience seems to point in the direction of greater diversification. The place of particular programmes within the machinery of government — for example, programmes for village development which have already begun and have taken on a co-ordinating role — is sometimes debated, with subsequent shifts in their location. Knowledge of the variety of forms taken by social service programmes in other countries encourages a desire to try these new forms, even if only on a small scale, and adapt them to the needs at home. Moreover, experience with the limitations of early undifferentiated approaches to certain kinds of need creates an inevitable pressure toward solutions more specifically geared to particular problems.

For example, in child welfare the limitations of all-purpose residential institutions are better understood: their relatively high cost per child and the social deprivation suffered by children removed from their own families and the mainstream of the cultural environment in which they must spend their lives. Consequently emphasis often shifts to programmes that either assist mothers to rear their children at home or provide substitute home care when that is impossible. In the first category are programmes for the day care of children of working mothers, developed either by community agencies or the employing enterprise; supplementary food distribution; school lunch programmes; and general child welfare services. In the second category are programmes for foster care placement an organized adoption, often supported by new legislation to improve traditional adoption practices and protect the welfare of the children concerned. At the same time, institutional care tends to be adapted to the needs of children with special problems that cannot be readily met in their own homes: the mentally retarded, children with various types of physical disability, and the emotionally disturbed. Institutional care for older children, including those referred to by the courts as delinquents or vagrants, moves more in the direction of vocational training and rehabilitation.

Similarly, institutions and programmes in behalf of the extremely disabled tend to introduce more constructive rehabilitative practices. These include not only better

diagnostic, restorative and therapeutic services, but also attempt to motivate the disabled towards independent living and self-support. Many countries at this stage begin the manufacture of simple prosthetic appliances as an aid to the handicapped, and in others the operation of sheltered workshops helps them towards self-support. Rehabilitation programmes often have a high priority in countries where war has left an especially heavy incidence of disability, but are also generally welcomed as a constructive investment in reducing the toll of long-term dependency.

During this stage, schools of social work are usually organized or extended. The availability of a group of social-work teachers, students, and graduates in turn gives new impetus to the initiation of varied social service programmes and the introduction of social service into new settings. This is often encouraged by the school itself, in order to give its students varied field-work experience, but it is also stimulated by professional workers in other fields, who have seen the value of social workers in supportive roles in other countries. This is especially true with respect to the use of medical social workers in hospitals and community health agencies, the employment of social workers in the schools, and their services for courts both in making social investigations and serving as probation officers (social workers are often used in order to help differentiate juvenile and family problems from other litigation in the courts).

The high concentration and visibility of acute social problems in cities undergoing heavy in-migration also creates strong pressures for the creation of new urban social programmes, especially on a neighbourhood basis. In some countries, these have taken the form of community centre buildings where a variety of social and related services are located: for example, mothers' clubs, day care centres, youth programmes, clinics and literacy classes. In other countries they more clearly resemble the rural community development programmes, seeking to stimulate the latent capacity of neighbourhood residents for self-help and self-organization.

Most countries in this stage of development are still not in a position to give families substantial relief or assistance in the care or support of their own non-producing members. Services as such are far less costly to an economy in which manpower is the major asset, in spite of the cost of training and supporting specialized personnel, than programmes in which direct economic benefits are extended on a social basis to a substantial group of people. It is for this reason that social service development in these earlier periods places its major emphasis on service, and makes very limited provision for financial assistance. It is virtually impossible for countries living close to the margin of their resources to finance public assistance programmes of wide applicability for the aged, widowed and disabled, or to provide income supplements for large families or others with special needs. The shared pot of rice, gruel, or stew, the place at the family hearth — however meagre — still remains the principal form of material aid in these situations. As mentioned above, however, some countries have been able, in spite of poverty, to undertake programmes of food distribution through the availability of surplus food from abroad, and limited emergency relief is often mobilized in cases of disaster or unusually extreme impoverishment. Likewise, in some countries group shelter has been provided for a few of the homeless aged, but such care is the exception rather than the rule in cultures which still emphasize the obligations of family responsibility.

As the variety of social services and auspices has expanded, the need for co-ordination, consultation and joint planning is reflected in the increasing number of national and local welfare councils on which all interested agencies are represented. National conferences of social work for the exchange of ideas and experience have also expanded, and many additional countries have begun sending delegations to the biennial sessions of the International Conference of Social Work. In countries where the Government extends subsidies or other benefits to voluntary agencies, these are more frequently predicated on the meeting of minimum standards, and the practice of enforcing such standards on all agencies through regulation and licensing also becomes more common.

Moves towards social entitlement and inclusiveness

A survey of social service development in the past ten years suggests that the later stages of such development are in the direction of basic programmes built around concepts of legal entitlement and inclusiveness of coverage. The goal is to assure a minimum and dependable level of help in any given situation: i.e., to all children, to all the impoverished or isolated old people, to all the disabled, to all those disoriented by change, to all villages, to all communities, and — in fact — to all who need help. Any narrower statement of the goal would be unacceptable in appearing to sanction discriminatory selection among persons in the same situation of need. However necessary such a selection may have been as a concession to the practical realities of a period of impoverishment, it can be accepted only as a temporary accommodation.

Moreover, the social conditions and problems of countries reaching a more advanced stage of economic specialization and industrialization are such that they require this broader degree of social responsibility, if the society as a whole is to function effectively. A larger proportion of the population depend on employment and market conditions which they do not control, and thus become more vulnerable to outside circumstances affecting their own ability to meet their social needs and obligations. The complexities of this mutual interdependence are so great that there are more possibilities for particular individuals or groups to become disoriented in their social adaptations. The very diversity of social measures itself creates a greater need for programme co-ordination and assistance to individuals in securing a needed form of aid. All these factors intensify the need for a broader programme of social services and related social benefits than is either possible or quite so necessary in a less highly organized society.

No country, however, can afford to move into programmes of broad social entitlement until its economic resources have reached a point where a substantial amount can be made available for social expenditure. And even then, it is generally not possible to apply the two principles of legal entitlement and inclusiveness of coverage simultaneously. In the typical situation, the principle of legal entitlement to certain social benefits must first

be reserved for selected categories of people or situations where the nature of the need or circumstances would seem to warrant such a priority. It is only at a later stage that the total resources of a country, including its institutional structure, are sufficiently developed to permit the extension of these benefits on a broader basis of coverage and entitlement. However, these two forms of social service development overlap in such a variety of ways that the distinction, while highly important for understanding the role of the social services, is difficult to apply in every case.

Selective entitlement to social benefits

In countries where social resources are still inadequate to meet fully any particular type of social need, difficult choices must constantly be made between individuals and localities with equally valid claims, in terms of their need for the benefit or service provided. There is, therefore, a constant demand, as the total scope of such programmes expands, for objective criteria of entitlement by which such choices can be rationalized, and for incorporation of these criteria into laws and administrative policies that will reduce the need for *ad hoc* decisions. This has usually been done in three different ways. The first is to specify the particular type of need that will be considered the basis for entitlement; as, for example, that of a child lacking any source of adult care and support. Most of the more socially advanced countries have followed this principle in enacting child welfare laws which assure support and protection to all such children, through a combination of court action, social service provisions and legal obligation on parents or near relatives. A second method, often combined with the first, limits entitlement not only by social situation but also by ecenomic circumstances. This method, often characterized by its use of the so-called " means test ", is the typical pattern of public assistance in which economic aid is extended to persons in certain designated situations, as, for example, to widows with small children, provided that their own economic resources fall below certain maximum limits. The " means test " is also applied as a method of selective entitlement to a wide variety of other social benefits, such as hospital and health care, subsidized housing, day care and other special provisions for children. The third method is to reduce the extent of social need by making provisions for its prevention. This is the role of contributory social insurance, under which certain predictable needs are anticipated through pooled compulsory savings, protecting the covered group against a common risk, such as unemployment, loss of earnings in old age or disability. Direct public services for particular groups, services required of certain classes of employers, and tax concessions for persons in specified situations are also methods of preventing need by selective entitlement.

The common characteristic of social programmes in countries at this stage is, therefore, the factor of selective entitlement, which may be extremely restrictive or become increasingly inclusive. Selective entitlement is particularly important in reconciling social advance with economic reality, in the period when countries begin to shift the major burden of support for non-producers from the individual family to a broader social base. The older system of familial and voluntary responsibility places virtually the whole burden of relieving indigency on the poor themselves. As a higher level of national income is achieved, this compounding of misery — however inescapable in an impoverished society — is less likely to be considered tolerable. On the other hand, no other form of social service is as costly as one that involves the assumption of responsibility for maintenance. For this reason, in developing countries, public assistance is almost inevitably limited in the beginning to a relatively small group of people and given at an economic level that is considerably below the prevailing level of living for the population as a whole. Despite these limitations, however, any public assistance programme which underpins a minimum level of living for a particular group of people must be considered a major landmark in the total span of social service development. Not only is the principle of a minimum social guarantee of basic significance, but the institutional mechanism thus established can be and typically has been expanded to cover a wider range of need more adequately as resources permit.

Selective measures for the prevention of need may, in this period, be extremely limited, but in their potential for expansion lies the promise of the future. Nowhere is this potential more clearly demonstrated than in the social insurances, a great social invention of the late nineteenth century which has increasingly demonstrated its effectiveness as a method of preventing dependency and need. In its early stages, social insurance coverage is typically highly selective, protecting workers in only a few limited fields of employment, such as the civil service or the more advanced industries. Its methods and administration differ radically from those of social service proper, but the two are closely related in terms of social policy. Some countries combine social service and social insurance in a Ministry of Social Welfare, while others have placed social insurance administration within a Ministry of Labour. Whatever the administrative pattern, however, their interaction in terms both of general policy and impact on individual welfare becomes increasingly marked with advancing economic and social development.

In this stage of social development there are many other programmes which, directly or indirectly, and however limited and selective in coverage, reduce the actual or potential scope of social welfare needs. These include both preventive and remedial health programmes which reduce the dependency and maladjustments attendant on ill health; programmes for the training and placement of workers in better jobs; subsidized programmes for better housing and neighbourhood development; projects for opening up new areas and for the resettlement of people in these and other areas of better opportunity. All of these, while largely outside the central focus of social service administrative responsibility, affect the general development of social policy and, in any case, may often require the facilitating services of social workers.

The role of social service in countries with comprehensive programmes of social benefits

In the more highly industrialized countries, social welfare has evolved in the direction of broad programmes of social benefits increasingly available to all on a comprehensive rather than a selective basis. This has been,

for the most part, a gradual evolution, with the principle of selectivity often continuing to some degree to limit the range of benefits and beneficiaries. But there is a definite shift from primary emphasis on limitation of social responsibility through selectivity to emphasis on individual entitlement. Factors inherent in the logic of development, as well as changes in social philosophy and expanding resources, contribute to this shift in emphasis. As the coverage of selective programmes broadens, many pressures, including those of acceptability to the general public and simplicity of administration, operate in the direction of universality. From country to country, however, these pressures are modified by differences of opinion as to the appropriate division of scope for private and social expenditure, with resulting variations in the kinds and combinations of benefits and degrees of entitlement.[4]

Among the benefits provided in different countries on a basis of virtually universal entitlement are the following: cash payments in old-age retirement or periods of disability; cash benefits and relocation help in times of unemployment; cash payments and other benefits for widows, orphans and unmarried mothers; marriage and maternity benefits; family allowances, tax concessions and other privileges for large families or for all children; hospital, clinic and other health services, both remedial and preventive; institutional care for children, the disabled, and the aged with special needs; subsidized recreational and vacation programmes; youth programmes; day care and other special services for children; and many others. These benefits may be provided either as a direct public service supported by taxes; as a part of a general programme of contributory social insurance; as a required part of the obligation, of employment enterprises and a direct charge on their cost of production; through tax concessions and exemptions; or by some combination of these methods.

The degree of responsibility for these programmes assigned to social welfare agencies differs from country to country, but the specific focus of social service programmes (as defined in this discussion) is clearly modified by their existence. To the extent that these programmes are successful in anticipating and meeting the social needs described above, the pressure on social service resources is thus reduced. But experience to date has indicated that, however much the emphasis in social service programmes may be shifted by these changes, their supportive and catalytic activities on behalf of individuals and social relationships continue to grow. In fact, the very variety and relative impersonality of these broadly-based institutions for social aid, together with the growing complexity of the economic and social structure of which they form a part, actually create a greater need for certain individualizing functions of social service and new challenges for its role in social adaptation.

In this type of setting, social services (however located organizationally) are being constantly adapted to perform the following kinds of functions:

Assistance in meeting those social needs in which the knowledgeable help of another person is essential: for example, substitute care for children for whom it is not available in their own homes; protective care and other services for the socially isolated aged; support and guidance for the socially maladapted in a wide variety of situations.

Assisting people to find their way to the particular general or specialized programme that can help them.

Continuing to provide assistance in cash, direct benefits, or service on an individualized basis to people whose particular needs are not fully met by the mass programmes.

Mobilizing emergency aid and services in time of disaster.

Organizing neighbourhood or group services that require broad citizen participation and do not lend themselves to generalized administration: for example, neighbourhood clubs and services to the homebound.

Pioneering in new areas of service as new or changing social needs emerge.

Helping to guide the growth of general social policy and the adaptation of other social programmes through first-hand knowledge of actual individual, family, and community needs.

General trends of social service development

The preceding sections have attempted to show that social service during the past ten years has moved through a spectrum of change, with substantial developments that are not always comparable, since the stage of development determines differences in method, scope and emphasis of function. Failure to recognize these essential differences can cause confusion on the part of those who attempt to apply the standards of highly advanced programmes to the problems and realities of countries still struggling to achieve such advances. It can also prove discouraging to the latter if they do not measure their own progress against historical perspective.

While philanthropic activity has a long-standing place in human history, organized social service as it is known today is only about a century old, even in those countries which have now achieved the most complete network of social benefits. In most countries, the period since 1950 covered by this report has been a time either of the first introduction of social services or of their consolidation into an over-all programme. It is not surprising, therefore, that it is only in this period that such services have ceased to be considered simply as isolated phenomena providing particular benefits in a specific social setting.

During the period under review, many factors have contributed to a widening exchange of knowledge, experience and technical information in the field of social service. In many areas, the Second World War left in its wake staggering social and economic dislocations that compelled new measures of social aid, and international assistance helped to apply these measures and thereby widen the horizons of social service. The subsequent development of international technical assistance programmes at once speeded the processes of cultural exchange and imposed the necessity for a clearer common ground of understanding on which technical assistance could be based. This growth of communication has been aided by many inter-

[4] Social benefits of universal or wide-spread availability are more often identified under the general designation of "social security" than of "social service" and, as such, are discussed more fully in the chapter devoted to social security.

national undertakings, such as seminars, workshops, institutes, exchanges of personnel and surveys. Other consultations have helped to clarify the relationship of social service to such closely related fields as health, nutrition and social security. Discussions have also been held between social service practitioners and social scientists to consider the interrelationship between social science findings and social service activity. The potential contribution of the social sciences to social service is only beginning to be explored.

On the administrative side, a trend towards structural unity through the creation of special ministries or other government units for social service policy and programme administration may be noted. Most countries tend to use the more inclusive concept of social welfare or social affairs as the focus for ministerial or departmental organization, sometimes grouping this with a related field such as health, social security, labour or community development.

The Ministry of Social Welfare usually has administrative responsibility for all social service functions which are not intrinsically subordinate to some other major purpose (as, for example, in the courts). But this is by no means the only pattern. Some countries have associated family counselling services with their health programmes. In others, assistance to the needy is considered an aspect of social security, while child welfare services may be handled on a largely local basis as, for example, in the Scandinavian countries. The most notable exception, however, to the functional administration of social services is the administrative pattern followed in the USSR and, to a considerable degree, in the other countries of eastern Europe. In this pattern, all social service functions are considered ancillary to some other primary concern: thus, family counselling and services for young children are provided by health agencies; those for older children and young people, by the educational agencies; those for workers, by their employing enterprises and trade unions; those for farm families, by the farm co-operatives; and others by the Ministry of Social Security, housing units, and other agencies reaching particular groups of people. Thus the trend toward functional unity is modified by interesting variations.

Closely related to this trend in terms of administrative structure is the growth in most parts of the world of a body of personnel with specialized training for the performance of social service functions. The development of such a professional specialty, commonly known as social work, is still relatively new, having followed closely on the development of social service as an organized social activity. The profession of social work is, therefore, still engaged in the process necessary to every new profession of seeking out the precise boundaries of its competence and the desirable requirements for attaining such competence. There have been many special difficulties attendant on this process. Since organized social service sprang from a tradition of personal philanthropic responsibility, which it has by no means fully replaced, it is not always easy to make a clear distinction between what people do as individuals to help each other and what they do through organized instrumentalities with professional paid staff. Even organized social services of certain kinds, like those of the religious organizations and the Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies, rely heavily on the freely contributed services of volunteers for their manpower. Voluntary women's organizations have played a major role in initiating the social service programmes of developing countries, and the important voluntary services of countries like Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States still depend to a considerable degree on the leadership and work of citizen volunteers.

Two forces, however, have tended in most parts of the world to bring about growing reliance on the profession of social work. One is the increasing institutionalization of social service programmes. The other is the ever greater complexity of social relationships and of the problems that have to be dealt with.

An increase in number and spread of special institutions for the training of social workers is one of the conspicuous developments of the past ten years. These schools differ widely in the level and emphasis of the education they offer, ranging all the way from the highly advanced social-work doctoral programmes of some universities in industrialized countries to training of essentially secondary-school level in many of the countries where general educational levels are still low. They also differ considerably in the particular jobs for which they train: some training programmes are aimed primarily at the positions of leadership and supervision, while others train students to take over the practitioners' jobs in social service programmes. Many countries in the very earliest development stage are launching their social service efforts by creating schools of social work to train the leaders for the programmes they are projecting. Often, in these cases, it is the school itself which must start new programmes in order to provide practical field experience for its students.

More typically, however, the personnel requirements of already expanding programmes far outrun the supply of trained social workers, and the possibility of securing such a supply in the foreseeable future. It is, therefore, necessary to assign many functions to auxiliary workers or to social workers whose training is considerably below a professional standard. Many countries have established special short-term courses for such workers, especially for those who are trained either for some limited task in a social service setting or for more generalized functions at a village level. This necessity for social service programmes to rely heavily on non-professional workers has sometimes confused the relationship of their work to the profession.

Another wide-spread trend is seen in the extension of the governmental role and the greater reliance placed on the instrumentalities of law and government rather than voluntary effort, religious prescriptions, or custom, in meeting social needs. This applies both to law as the authority for social service programme development and law as a means of establishing and maintaining minimum standards of social responsibility on the part of individuals, voluntary agencies and employing enterprises. Among the areas of individual relationships increasingly governed by law in a number of developing countries are those relating to marriage, divorce, support for children and other dependants, adoption and personal liability in various circumstances. Many such questions had hitherto been governed solely by local custom. Countries in which social relationships had been exclusively within the jurisdiction

of religious bodies have likewise moved to incorporate provisions in these matters in the legal system. Law has also been used more frequently to regulate such questions of social relationship as the treatment of children, the minimum age and conditions for the employment of children, compulsory school attendance, begging and the giving of alms, family desertion, protection of women and minimum standards of employment. All such actions have a bearing on the scope and operation of social service programmes.

There is much variation among countries, even those at the same stage of general economic an social development, in the degree to which social service functions are decentralized to provincial or local units of government, and in the extent to which voluntary programmes are encouraged and financed by the Government. In countries like the United States, which place heavy emphasis on the interaction of pluralistic social institutions, voluntary social welfare programmes are encouraged; but their only governmental aid comes in the form of tax concessions to their supporters and the purchase of service on behalf of specific individuals. In the United Kingdom and countries where British influence has been felt, some measure of public subsidy for voluntary welfare agencies is the general rule. In countries with a planned economy, the line between governmental and non-governmental bodies is not easily drawn, and this is also true in countries where a single religious body performs many welfare functions.

Many pressures operate towards a stronger role for government and, more specifically, for the central Government as the policy-making and financing body in the social service field. Financing is often the major determining factor here, when the national Government alone has an adequate financial base to launch even experimental or selective programmes and to carry them forward to the broader base required in a period of more advanced development. In countries with more advanced programmes, the interdependencies and complexities of the society usually require national policy leadership, even when the administration of actual programmes is local.

At the same time, efforts are being made to offset this centralizing trend by programmes directed to stimulation of local initiative, wide-spread citizen participation, and self-help activities of various kinds. The most extensive and best known of these have, of course, been those devoted to rural development. More recently there has appeared a parallel effort to stimulate the sam kind of popular initiative and concern for common social problems through urban development projects. Some of these have been primarily focused on community centres located in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of social problems, thus creating a physical centre for various social services and efforts for neighbourhood improvement. Others have placed their primary stress on community or neighbourhood organization and the participation of people in a wide variety of projects for community betterment, or the provision of services pertaining to the every-day life of the person or family. Still others, especially in the more highly developed areas, have stressed neighbourhood co-ordination of existing programmes and have sought to create a more direct access for their beneficiaries to the centres of management and policy control.

Virtually all countries, whatever their political structure or degree of development, are today seeking means of securing the participation of citizens in solving social problems. This is a major challenge to the capacities of social service, and one in which all countries can benefit by comparisons of varied experience and experimentation. In addition to the neighbourhood approach already mentioned, some see the answer in the efforts of groups of people drawn into association by a common problem, and they cite as an example the successful experience in curbing alcoholism through the mutual support of erstwhile alcoholics, or the progress made by parents in securing specialized help for children with special prob lems, such as the mentally retarded. Some see the answer in a wider provision of social services through such organizations or associations as trade unions and religious bodies. Others favour diversification and decentralization of administration, with greater reliance on local citizen boards and councils. But, whatever the approach, it is significant that the very pressures that are moving all countries toward the provision of basic social guarantees by the Government are also stimulating efforts to activate community co-operation and the wider participation of people in the solution of their own problems.

Social services and levels of living

In order to understand the full range of social service involvement in advancing levels of living, the concept of "levels of living" must be interpreted to include a component of social relationships. This component is not as generally recognized as the material aspects of levels of living, and can best be explained through examples of its absence. A child, for instance, requires food, shelter and physical care, but he also requires the warm and continuing attention of adults personally dedicated to his welfare. An old person may be adequately provided with income and the necessities of life, but still be lonely, isolated and cut off from the mainstream of social life. The process by which young people move from childhood to full membership in adult society may fail to enlist their enthusiasm, with resultant rebellion or withdrawal into a degree of social isolation which none would consider a satisfactory "level of living". Even in the most affluent society with a wide range of social benefits, it is possible for persons or even whole groups of persons to be passed by as minorities in the general forward movement. In fact, the more affluent the total society in terms of material standards, the more intolerable these social deprivations become.

Social services are basically concerned with social relationships, but social relationship is also the framework of economic support for all children and the large numbers of adults who must depend on the earnings of others. In this way, social services are directly concerned with the economic aspects of living levels. This is especially true in societies which have neither the economic resources nor the institutional structure to support social programmes that assure income and basic services to the entire population. Such countries may then rely heavily on social services to assist their efforts for a better level of living in a number of the ways indicated in the preceding pages.

Social defence

Introduction

Among the major problems and trends — both positive and negative—in the field of social defence during the past decade are: continued lack of adequate criminal statistics; need for more precise definition of the concept of "juvenile delinquency"; greater concern about crime and juvenile delinquency in less developed countries undergoing rapid urbanization; more emphasis in government policy on prevention of crime, and especially of juvenile delinquency; growing pressure to incorporate preventive policies in comprehensive social development plans and programmes; more frequent use of evaluative research; increasing reliance on probation and other non-institutional measures, and on re-educational measures within institutions; and growing attention to prison architecture in relation to the new approaches in the philosophy of treatment. The following analysis is devoted to a consideration of these trends.

Extent and characteristics of crime and juvenile delinquency

It would be difficult to state with certainty whether, as is often claimed, there has been a significant increase in crime and juvenile delinquency during the last decade or so.[5] All statistical data on crime and juvenile delinquency, and especially data involving comparisons in place or time, need to be treated with the utmost caution. With respect to any one country, the information available is often incomplete, and statistics, when they do exist, may not have been collected in the same manner over a period of years. They do not always cover the same age groups or the same offences, and legal definitions may sometimes have changed in the period under consideration.[6]

New legislation or the modification of existing legislation, as well as new campaigns against crime with a stepped-up policy of arrests, may greatly affect the statistics. Moreover, there is always a large but variable number of undetected or unreported offences, the so-called "dark number", and this adds to the impossibility of obtaining a completely realistic picture of the crime problem. Many other factors, such as population increases, economic and social changes, migration and political unrest, may affect the conclusions to be drawn.[7]

If the above cautions are kept in mind, various kinds of information, both quantitative and qualitative, can nevertheless be drawn upon to reach a limited number of conclusions about recent trends in crime and delinquency.

In economically developed countries, the problem of crime and juvenile delinquency has been a cause for concern for many years. The methods of prevention and treatment are still, for the most part, tentative, haphazard and unsystematic and, in many of these countries, concern about crime and juvenile delinquency has been increasing in recent years, whether because of the increase in its actual extent[8] or because of growing sensibility to the problem and alarm among the citizens and among public officials and specialists in the social defence field about its current manifestations. The problem continues to exist despite the higher standards of living in these countries, the increasing availability of social, psychological, psychiatric and medical services, the extension of educational opportunities, and the direct, specialized services provided to help offenders and those in danger of becoming offenders.

Property offences remain foremost among delinquent acts committed by juveniles. While it would seem that, in the less developed countries, property offences are committed largely for economic reasons, the motives for many property offences in some countries with a high standard of living must sometimes be sought elsewhere. Thus car theft, in particular, frequently for short usage only ("joy-riding"), has occurred increasingly in many highly developed countries.

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5 For an illustration of the caution with which criminal statistics in general should be approached, see Barbara Wootton, *Social Science and Social Pathology* (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1959), pp. 21-32.

6 With respect to juvenile delinquency, for example, a clear picture of the problem over space and time requires a definition of the term "juvenile delinquency". There has been a tendency in many countries to include under this term small irregularities and maladjusted behaviour, which do not constitute criminal offences, thus unnecessarily stigmatizing certain children as delinquents, as well as inflating the total picture of delinquency. A reversal of this trend and a more realistic approach to the problem is suggested by a recommendation adopted by the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held in 1960, namely (*a*) that the meaning of the term *juvenile delinquency* should be restricted as far as possible to violations of the criminal law, and (*b*) that ... specific offences ... [involving] small irregularities or maladjusted behaviour of minors, but for which adults would not be prosecuted, should not be created. *Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders*, London, 8-19 August 1960 (United Nations publication, Sales No: 61.IV.3.), p. 61. There have also been two opposing tendencies with respect to the upper age limit for juvenile offenders. A number of countries have raised this limit to 18 or even higher, while others are reconsidering this position because experience has shown that it covers persons who should be classified as adults There has, moreover, been a tendency to establish another category, that of the young adult offender for whom special measures may be provided. These variations and shifts in definition naturally affect the statistics on juvenile delinquency.

7 Thorsten Sellin, writing about crime and delinquency in the United States of America, says: "... the statistical picture of criminality must remain on a very elementary level until public authorities become conscious of the need for more sophisticated data. The social cost of criminality, not to mention its financial burden, certainly is large enough to call for an accounting that yields information of sufficiently detailed character to provide a better basis for preventive action and repressive measures." (Thorsten Sellin, "Crime and Delinquency in the United States: An Over-All View", *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, vol. 339, January 1962, p. 23.)

8 A report on juvenile delinquency, prepared for the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, listed the following countries and regions as reporting increasing delinquency: Africa, the Americas, Australia, Austria, Eastern Germany, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, New Zealand, Sweden, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States. Countries reporting decreasing delinquency were Belgium, Canada, Italy and Switzerland. United Nations, *New forms of juvenile delinquency: their origin, prevention and treatment*, by Wolf Middendorff (A/CONF.17/6), pp. 5-17. In a recent report on juvenile crime in Japan, it is reported that "Japanese juvenile crime embarked on a steady climb upward in 1955. Noticeable jumps occurred in the years 1957 and 1958." Hideo Fujiki, "Recent Trends of Juvenile Crime in Japan", *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, vol. 53, No. 2, June 1962, p. 219.

Attention in some countries has been drawn to juveniles from "middle-class" backgrounds who commit delinquent acts, in spite of (or perhaps partly because of) a life of security and lack of risk. Excessive drinking, drug addiction, vandalism, violence without apparent motive, and even mass rioting by spontaneously formed groups of juveniles, as well as delinquency by organized gangs, have been widely reported during the last decade in various parts of the world.

A phenomenon occupying much public attention during the 1950's and having certain connexions with delinquency has been the wide-spread appearance of groups of adolescents variously identified as, for example "bodgies" and "widgies" in Australia, "Teddy boys" in England, *blousons noirs* in France, *Halbstarke* in the Federal Republic of Germany, "mambo boys and girls" in Japan, "hooligans" in Poland and the USSR, and *gamberros* in Spain; a common external denominator of the adolescents seems to be some distinctive form of dress. Occasionally these groups are organized in gangs or, less formally, in subcultures or "contracultures".[9]

Juvenile delinquency and other youth problems are often associated with accelerated socio-economic changes, such as rapid urbanization. Although they affect adults as well, changes and related conflicts and ambiguities in institutions, values, and systems of authority, including changes in the family system, seem to have particular consequences for youth. Even in countries that report a decrease in crime,[10] there has been concern about the problem, and efforts directed toward the prevention of crime have been intensified. With respect to the USSR, for example, it is stated:

> "With the country now in the period of extensive construction of a communist society, the task of preventing, sharply reducing and finally eliminating crime... has assumed great national and political importance. The measures adopted by the Party and government in recent years have helped in the solution of this important problem, resulting in a decline in crime. However, the final eradication of crime is a long process which can be considerably accelerated by systematic study of the state of crime and its causes, and on this basis working out and implementing the most effective measures for the prevention and steady reduction of every kind of crime." [11]

The countries where crime is reported to be on the increase include: the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. The following table gives reported statistics on crime trends in the United States of America for five serious offences, for the period 1950-1960:

CRIME RATE OF CITIES, 1950 AND 1960
(per 100,000 population)

Offence	*1950*[a]	*1960*[b]
Murder and non-negligent manslaughter	5.1	4.6
Robbery	50.0	61.4
Aggravated assault	73.4	87.6
Burglary	356.4	558.1
Automobile theft	153.4	346.5

[a] From *Uniform Crime Reports*, vol. 21 (1950), No. 2, table 31. 2,297 cities; total population 69,643,614.

[b] *Ibid.*, 1960, table 6. 3,366 cities; total population 96,678,066.

Homicide, the most serious of the categories listed, showed a decline between 1950 and 1960, but all other categories showed an increase.

In economically less developed areas, during the past decade there has also been increasing concern about crime and juvenile delinquency.[12] Indeed, "It is generally recognized that prominent among the social characteristics identified with a transition to a modern type of economy accompanied by social change are to be found the phenomena of crime and delinquency." [13] This occurs in connexion with, and perhaps because of, the social disorganization which often accompanies rapid social change. An example is the case of boys who leave their native villages for the cities, where they have little or no supervision in the absence of their parents or with the presence only of the father, who may be living in circumstances wholly unsuitable for family upbringing. Although in many less developed areas (or parts of such areas), the problem of crime and juvenile delinquency still does not appear to have become a social problem of major public concern, persons interested in these phenomena consider that adequate preventive measures suitable to the country concerned must be applied quickly, and that policies and programmes should be fitted into the framework of the broad economic and social planning of the country.

Prevention

The last ten years have seen an intensified emphasis on the prevention of crime, and particularly of juvenile delinquency. Which of the measures considered to be preventive are truly successful remains largely in the realm of speculation for the present, since many programmes are planned and executed in an unsystematic way without evaluation and control. Direct preventive poli-

[9] J. M. Yinger, "Contraculture and Subculture", American Sociological Review, 1960, vol. 25, No. 5, pp. 625-635.

[10] Some countries report a decrease in crime, but an increase in juvenile delinquency. In a recent report, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Denmark, reported that "there had been no essential increase in criminality in Denmark during the last 8-10 years. A certain increase had been observed in juvenile delinquency, however." *Nordisk Kriminalistisk Arsbok 1960*, Introduction (in English), p. XIV. The same is true of Japan, where the number of adult arrests has either remained at the same level or decreased. H. Fujiki, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

[11] V. N. Roshchin and M. P. Lachin, "Characteristics of Criminals", *The Soviet Review, A Journal of Translations*, vol. 2, No. 1, January 1961, p. 3. This article originally appeared in *Sovetskove Cosudarstvo i Pravo*, 1960, No. 7, under the title "Concerning the Study of Crime".

[12] See, for example, United Nations, the *Prevention of Types of Criminality Resulting from Social Changes and Accompanying Economic Development in Less-Developed Countries*. Reports prepared by J. J. Panakal and A. M. Khalifa (A/CONF.17/3).

[13] United Nations, *Prevention of Types of Criminality Resulting from Social Changes and Accompanying Economic Development in Less-Developed Countries*. Report prepared by the Secretariat for the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, London, 1960 (A/CONF.17/4), p. 3.

cies for adults are still predominantly designed to prevent recidivism by previously convicted offenders; with respect to juveniles, however, particular attention has been given in recent years to the prevention of delinquent acts by juveniles not known to have committed such acts before.

Most countries approach crime and juvenile delinquency prevention by using indirect measures. For example, general measures aimed at the improvement of the welfare of society as a whole are regarded in many countries as prevention. Moreover, general or indirect measures for juveniles include child welfare programmes; censorship of the press and also of films, and radio; all-day schools; recreational and leisure-time activities; programmes either to prevent, or to prepare for, migration of young people to the city; parent education; school mental-health services; and vocational guidance and training. However, there is no clearly discernible pattern of data that would permit the isolation of one or several of these measures as effective instruments for the prevention of crime. Such programmes are fully justified in their own right, but claims made for their role in the prevention of delinquency remain, for the most part, unsubstantiated; it may be self-deceptive to believe that with such measures an adequately effective and broad programme for the prevention of deliquency has been evolved.[14] Direct measures, designed to reach young people who show a specific tendency to delinquent behaviour, include special schools or special classes, youth gang projects and special police; these must also be evaluated before claims can be made for their effectiveness. In a recent unpublished survey on the effectiveness of programmes for the prevention of juvenile delinquency, it was found that, while no country covered in the survey had developed a system of preventive action based on a comprehensive, co-ordinated and sustained research plan, central organizations in the field now exist in many countries either in the form of official government departments or officially sponsored centres or commissions. Thus increasing research co-ordination and the adoption of stricter research standards may be expected.

In both less developed and developed countries, there is an urgent need for systematic research on preventive policies and programmes.

Treatment

The tendency to approach the problems of crime and delinquency from a social rather than a legal point of view, and to stress the reintegration of the offender into society, began to emerge among penologists and criminologists long before the Second World War, and is now gradually being translated into practice, replacing the punitive or purely custodial methods of the past.

The methods at present considered most conducive to the rehabilitation of the offender have one feature in common: they try to strengthen the offender's bonds with the community rather than to sever them. They aim, whenever possible, at avoiding imprisonment by the maximum use of probation; at replacing short-term imprisonment by penalties; at vocational training and training for productive occupation through prison labour; at the use of open institutions; at easing the transition from a long term of imprisonment to normal life, by pre-release treatment and by parole; at the use of group therapy and related methods, as well as individual psychiatric treatment for offenders who need such help; and at the adaptation of the design and construction of correctional institutions to these positive treatment functions.

These methods are unevenly applied in different countries, and there is often considerable inconsistency in their use within the same country. Laws designed to ensure the use of progressive methods frequently remain inoperative; moreover, the need for these methods varies from one situation to another. In some instances, the public clings to deeply entrenched attitudes with regard to punishment, and opposes methods it considers too lenient. The main difficulty, however, and one that holds true both in highly developed and in developing countries, is acute shortage of funds and trained personnel.

Detention pending trial

Detention pending trial[15] is one field in which theory and practice are at variance for the reasons outlined above.

In theory, there is general agreement that persons awaiting trial should be detained in prison only in exceptional cases, and that persons held in this manner should benefit from a special regime, since they must be presumed to be innocent until they are proved guilty. The latter principle has been embodied in the "Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners"[16] adopted by the Economic and Social Council on 31 July 1957. In practice, almost everywhere prisoners awaiting trial still receive very little attention, and frequently encounter worse conditions than sentenced prisoners. In a number of countries, the law specifies that persons held pending trial must be kept in a place other than in a prison for sentenced offenders. Ordinarily, however, such persons are detained together with offenders sentenced to short terms of imprisonment.

While the laws of many countries allow for credit of the period of detention against the prison sentence which may eventually be passed, not all laws do so; in fact, an offender may be deprived of freedom for a period of time considerably longer than his actual sentence. A study recently conducted in the United Kingdom on the time spent awaiting trial indicated, *inter alia*, another paradoxical situation, which may also exist elsewhere; the study noted that the proportion of custody cases ending in acquittal was small, but that a substantial proportion of custody cases ending in conviction did not in fact result in prison sentences.[17] While, in some cases, the pre-trial detention

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14 See "Report of the European Seminar on the Evaluation of Methods used in the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency", Rome, Italy, 14-23 October 1962.

15 Detention pending trial is not considered treatment in the strict sense, but is included here because elements of treatment are involved.

16 Reproduced from the Report on the *First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 56.IV.4).

17 United Kingdom, Home Office, Research Unit, *Time spent awaiting trial* (London, H.M.S.O., 1960), p. 16.

of persons who are not imprisoned after conviction may be necessary, it is paradoxical that detention in prison pending trial is so widely used in cases of offences that by court judgement are later deemed not to call for a sentence of imprisonment.

The undesirable effects of holding juveniles pending trial in houses of detention or prisons, and sometimes with adult adult criminals, are obvious. Nevertheless, it is by no means uncommon in practice for minors to be imprisoned pending trial. A study prepared by the International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation indicates that legislation in various countries attempts to protect juveniles from being subjected to the pre-trial system for adults, and to make available to the responsible children's court or administrative body various substitute measures, so as to limit detention of juveniles to cases of absolute necessity.[18] Some of these laws are, however, not fully enforced.

Probation [19]

The more extensive use of probation and the general improvement of its procedures since the Second World War are outstanding features of present-day criminal policy, and exemplify the trend to provide non-punitive treatment for the offender outside the institution.

Many countries, however, report a great lack of qualified probation personnel, so that the value of this measure is seriously jeopardized. In the United States of America, where the probation technique has been used for a long time, a report of the National Probation and Parole Association (now known as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency) indicates that only 3 per cent of the probation officers working with juveniles handle fifty cases or less, which is considered an adequate workload, while 34 per cent carry between 150 and 299, and 13 per cent carry 300 or more.[20]

Short-term imprisonment

Persons sentenced to short-term imprisonment, which in some countries is considered to be for a period usually not exceeding thirty days and in others a period of less than six months or less than a year, constitute a very high percentage of the prison population, sometimes as much as 80 per cent of the total. Such imprisonment may expose the offender to harmful influence by long-term, more serious offenders; it allows little or no opportunity for constructive training; at the same time, it represents a great administrative and financial problem. While short-term imprisonment cannot be totally abolished, many countries are seeking to reduce the frequency of its use by employing substitute penalties which do not involve the deprivation of liberty. Among the arguments for using fines are that they constitute a source of revenue for the State rather than an expense, they do not impose the stigma connected with imprisonment, and they can be adjusted to the offence more easily than other penalties.[21] Inequities arise, however, if the rates of fines cannot be adjusted to the capacity to pay, so that the poor offender is much more heavily penalized than the well-to-do offender. To remedy this, Sweden, in 1931, introduced "day-fines" based on the offender's daily wage or other source of income. Several other countries have adopted a similar system.

Other methods used by some countries and recommended by penologists as possible alternatives for short-term imprisonment are restitution for damage caused, and work or services rendered without deprivation of freedom. The latter was recommended, for example, by an Inquiry Committee in the State of Uttar Pradesh in India: the Committee suggested that, to provide means earning, offenders might be employed on public works while continuing to live with their families, thus rendering a service to the community without cost to the State.[22]

Prison labour

Prison labour has been variously regarded as the prisoner's punishment, his duty, his right, and part of his treatment; the view that has been developing gradually since 1950 is that prison labour should be regarded as a normal activity of the prisoner.[23] The point of view now most widely advocated is that all sentenced prisoners should be required to work, if they are fit to do so. This procedure will enable prisoners to receive vocational training, to form better working habits and not to suffer the psychological disadvantages of prolonged idleness. Proper safeguards should be established to avoid the exploitation of prison labour, and the same provisions for safety, health, accident protection, working hours and social security should be made for prisoners as for free workers. Equitable remuneration for work is advocated, so as to stimulate the prisoners' interest in the work and enable them to indemnify their victims, help their families, who have often become a public burden, and set some money aside for their own use. Eventually, when rates of remuneration

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18 International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, *The treatment of untried prisoners* (Nivelles, Belgique, Imprimerie administrative, 1961), pp. 1-8. (Prepared for the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 5-15 December 1961.)

19 See United Nations, *The Selection of Offenders for Probation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.4). *Probation and Related Measures* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 51.IV.2); *Practical results and financial aspects of adult probation in selected countries* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.14).

20 United States of America, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, Children's Bureau, *Survey of Probation Officers, 1959* (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 7.

21 United Nations, *Short-term Imprisonment*, General Report prepared by the Secretariat for the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, London, 1960 (A/CONF.17/5), p. 96 and p. 105.

22 *Ibid.*, para. 398.

23 See the "Standard Mimimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners", *opu. cit.*, Rules 71 to 76. See also the discussions of prison labour at the 1955 Congress; *Prison Labour* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 55.IV.7); the discussions of the European Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 1954 and 1958. The United Nations Seminars for Asia and the Far East (Tokyo, 1957) and for the Arab countries (Copenhagen, 1959); the discussions and conclusions and recommendations on the integration of prison labour with the national economy, including the remuneration of prisoners, of the *Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders*, London, 1960, *op. cit.*, and the two basic reports on this subject presented to the Congress (A/CONF.17/1 and A/CONF.17/2).

equal to those of free workers are achieved—provided the prisoners' output is the same as that of free workers — prisoners should repay part of the cost of their maintenance in the institution and pay any taxes for which they might be liable.

In practice, prison labour presents numerous problems: owing to limited resources, the prison administration can frequently provide neither adequate vocational training nor more than token remuneration; usually little or no work is provided for short-term prisoners, who form the larger part of each country's prison population; prisoners are often used for maintenance work only, because nothing else is available or because they are unskilled; even when there is work, there is often not enough to keep all prisoners occupied full-time at the rate at which free workers must produce; prisoners' work is often of poor quality and limited in output; when well-organized, constructive prison industries exist, public opinion and organized employers' or workers' groups frequently exert pressure not to allow the products of prison industries to compete on the market. Reports from many countries indicate that, with the exception of a few experiments, progress in this field is very slow and must be considered unsatisfactory.

Open institutions

Opportunities for the diversification of work and for production which can be usefully integrated with the national economy are more readily available in open institutions; in addition, such institutions permit the prisoner to live under conditions as close to normal as possible, thus creating an environment much more conducive to treatment than the closed security institution. Moreover, open institutions reduce the cost to the State of maintaining correctional institutions. There is a continuing trend to make more use of such institutions in all parts of the world. This has been treated in some detail in the 1959 *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development*.[24]

Pre-release treatment and parole[25]

Prisoners used to be returned to normal life with little more than a suit of clothes and fare money. Special pre-release programmes, now increasingly used in various countries, include special information sessions on such matters as parole conditions and employment opportunities; greater freedom inside the institution; group and individual counselling; transfer from a closed to an open institution or to a pre-release camp; pre-release leave, so that the offender may be interviewed by potential employers or may re-establish contact with his family; and leave for work, which allows the offender to be employed in the community provided he returns at night to the institution or the pre-release hostel. Parole or conditional release, whether or not a condition of supervision or any other condition is attached to it, is used more and more widely to reduce the length of the sentence, and to facilitate the transition of the offender from the highly controlled life of the correctional institution to the freedom of community living. During the period of after-care, he may be given such material aid as clothing, transportation to place of residence, subsistence money, help in obtaining necessary documents, shelter and assistance with employment problems. Non-material aid given may include counselling, group therapy and special treatment for alcoholic and psychopathic offenders.[26]

Group therapy and related methods

The widening application of group therapy to criminals and delinquents — or potential criminals and delinquents — is one of the more novel developments of the last decade. It is based on the premise that "criminality is social in nature and therefore can be modified in individual cases only if the [offender's] relations with social groups are modified.[27] The technique of group therapy has been defined as consisting of "processes, occurring in formally organized, protected groups and calculated to attain rapid ameliorations in personality and behaviour of individual members through specified and controlled group interactions".[28] It has been used increasingly in a number of countries during the last few years, not only within institutions but also in the treatment of adult and juvenile offenders outside prison. Most extensive use of it has been made in Canada and the United States, where a substantial proportion of correctional institutions now employ it. It has also been used on an experimental basis in Australia (State of Victoria), Denmark, Finland, Israel, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.[29]

In some instances, group therapy of offenders with their families has been introduced experimentally. This form of group therapy has been found of particular value in the treatment of offenders who feel socially alienated because of their offence and conviction.[30]

The experiments to date point to the efficacy of using groups composed of participants serving medium-length sentences who accept treatment, are on not too different intellectual or cultural levels and, often, suffer from particular disorders (e.g., alcoholism, drug addicition or sexual abnormality). Participants are brought together for a minimum of three to six months in one or two weekly

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24 See *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.2), pp. 112-113.

25 See *Pre-release treatment and after-care as well as assistance to dependants of prisoners*. Report by B. Paludan-Müller (A/CONF. 17/8) and *Pre-release treatment and after-care as well as assistance to dependants of prisoners*. Report by the Secretariat (A/CONF. 17/9), prepared for the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, London, 1960.

26 *Ibid.*

27 D. R. Cressey, "Contradictory theories of correctional group therapy programmes", *Federal Probation*, vol. 18, 1954, p. 20-26.

28 R J. Corsini, *Methods of Group Psychotherapy* (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957), p. 5. The objectives of group psychotherapy have ben formulated as: socialization, taking the role of others, mutual support, permissiveness, identification with the group, group attachment and loyalty, and reorientation of attitudes. M. B. Clinard, *Sociology of Deviant Behavior* (New York, Rinehart, 1957), p. 551.

29 International Society of Criminology, "Group therapy for offenders". Paper submitted to the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 5-15 December 1961, annex B.

30 Wolff Feldman, "Forsog med familebehandling i gruppeform", *Nordisk Tiddskrift for Kriminalvidenskab*, vol. 28, No. 1, 1960, pp. 27-44.

sessions employing verbal, occupational and/or dramatic techniques, and led by one or two therapists (psychiatrists, psychologists or case workers with requisite training acting under the supervision of a clinical team).[31] There is, however, further need for broad empirical observation, experimentation and systematic validation of results. It is also necessary to consider carefully the problem of the separation of therapy from the juridical process, and the provision of safeguards for the preservation of the secrecy of statements made during the meetings.

The technique of "group counselling", used in California since 1954, has recently been introduced in other countries, such as Sweden and the United Kingdom. This less intensive type of group work can be applied on a large scale, and permits the use of non-specialized personnel; it is aimed at preventing undesirable social and psychological changes in the prisoners, at increasing mutual understanding between staff and inmates, and at facilitating the re-educational process. Supervision by specialists remains necessary, however, as does specialized treatment for more severely disturbed offenders.

In line with increased awareness of the need for a comprehensive approach to the problem of treating offenders, there has been a growing tendency to use group therapy and allied techniques as part of combined and integrated programmes. It is believed that, "by increasing the participants' self-knowledge and by giving them an opportunity for enotional release, group therapy contributes materially to the success of the other methods of treatment".[32]

Tranquillizing drugs

The introduction of the tranquillizing drugs on the general psychiatric scene has led to experimentation with their use in correctional treatment. Further advance in this field will depend upon experimentation with and validation of the use of psychopharmacological agents in general psychiatric practice. As emphasized by the Commissioner of Mental Hygiene of the State of New York, the use of drugs in the correctional setting requires careful psychiatric examination and follow-up, particularly because of possible side effects. Dispensation by rote of these drugs by non-psychiatric personnel is strictly contra-indicated. Individualization of treatment must be emphasized, as well as the need to use drug therapy in conjunction with some psychotherapy and vocational rehabilitation measures, to which they render the offender more accessible within the framework of a total co-ordinated programme.[33]

The design and construction of institutions for adult and juvenile offenders

Until quite recently, proposals for adaptation of the design and construction of prisons and other institutions for adult and juvenile offenders to positive treatment methods had little practical application. Basically, such institutions should strike a balance between two aims: the re-education of the offender and the protection of the public. Protection of the public, however, has hitherto been the overriding consideration, and the assumption has been that every offender is dangerous and must be isolated at all costs. Today, it is generally conceded that only a limited percentage of offenders are dangerous enough to the public to warrant detention in a costly, maximum security institution, and that the large majority of prisoners can be confined in medium or minimum security institutions at considerably less expense.

Most institutions now in use were built before the principle was accepted that the offender should receive positive treatment, and that a variety of services, including medical, psychiatric, educational, vocational, recreational and social services, should be provided for this purpose. Moreover, such institutions were built at a time when prison populations were considerably smaller.[34]

The construction of correctional institutions must be adapted to the nature of the specialized services that can be provided. For instance, in a number of the less developed countries, it would be difficult to find personnel for a prison psychiatric service. Institutions for juvenile offenders should have the character of a school rather than of a prison. Certain types of offenders, such as drug addicts, require special institutions.[35]

Size is one point on which theory and practice differ as far as the construction of institutions is concerned. Rule 63 (3) of the "Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners" states that "the number of prisoners in closed institutions should not be so large that the individualization of the treatment is hindered". In some countries it is considered that the population of such institutions should not exceed five hundred. In spite of this, information on recent prison construction and on plans for the near future indicate that, although progress has been made in building small, adaptable and comparatively low-cost institutions, mammoth maximum security insti-

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31 United Nations Consultative Group on "the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 5-15 December 1961", Report (ST/SOA/SD/CG.1), pp. 48-57. See also International Penal and Penitentiary Foundation, international colloquium on "New psychological methods for the treatment of prisoners", Brussels, 26-31 March 1962. Conclusions.

32 Clas Amilon, "The youth prison in Sweden", *Canadian Journal of Corrections*, vol. 4, No. 1, January 1962, p. 13.

33 Paul Hoch, "Implications of drug therapy for correctional administrators", *Correction* (Albany, N. Y.), vol. 25, No. 7-8, July-August 1960, pp. 4-7.

34 United Kingdom, Home Office, *Report of the Commissioner of Prisons for the year 1960* (Command Papers 1967, London, 1961), p. 5.

"... training is... gravely hampered by the physical condition of many of the existing buildings and the lack of the specialist facilities which modern technique requires. To have to work in prisons which are virtually unchanged since they were built in the nineteenth century or earlier, when the whole emphasis was on security and deterrence, does not invite from either the staff or the prisoners the response to modern methods of constructive training which is necessary if they are to succeed. It is no more possible to train prisoners in these obsolete conditions than it would be to provide a twentieth century system of education in antiquated schools or to carry out modern hospital treatment in the unimproved buildings of the pre-Victorian era." Statement to Parliament by the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom. *Penal practice in a changing society*. Aspects of future development (England and Wales) (Command Paper 645, London 1959), p. 21.

35 A more detailed discussion of the design, construction, size and site of institutions may be found in "Planning and construction of institutions for the treatment of juvenile delinquents and adult offenders". Note by the Secretariat, prepared for the United Nations Consultative Group on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Geneva, 5-15 December 1961.

tutions are still being built, so that certain superannuated methods will be perpetuated for some time.[36]

Training and research

Training and basic research in social defence have become all the more important as a result of recent penal and penitentiary reforms and the emergence in many countries of a new parajudicial personnel, including psychologists, social workers and educators, in addition to the traditional assistance provided by medico-legal experts and psychiatrists.

In response to needs in economically less developed regions, the United Nations has planned, in co-operation with host Governments, regional institutes to train personnel and carry out research in this field. Each institute may also provide consultative and advisory services to Governments or institutions in the region, and will serve both as a clearing house and a documentation centre for the collection of data and the dissemination of information and training materials. The first of such institutes, for Asia and the Far East, established under an agreement with the Government of Japan, was opened in Fuchu in 1962. Since 1952, special United Nations seminars in the field of social defence have been held for certain regions (Asia and the Far East, Arab States, Latin America) [37] and on special topics.[38]

At the national level, a survey conducted in 1960 of the teaching of criminology in European countries and in the United States revealed that such instruction is still neglected, both at the undergraduate and post-graduate levels.[39] In recent years, however, there has been a trend towards the establishment, in a number of countries, of institutes combining the teaching of criminology, the criminological sciences, the allied sciences, and occasionally, criminal law. While a number of "institutes" in the field have been in existence for some time, mainly on the continent of Europe and in Latin America, they have for the most part been attached to university faculties of law, reflecting the old conception of criminology as a subsidiary and accessory science to criminal law.[40] In order to promote an integrated inter-disciplinary approach to teaching and research in the social defence field, recently established institutes tend to a high degree of centralization and co-ordination in their teaching and research. Some of these institutes have been set up at leading universities, as, for example, the Cambridge Institute of Criminology and the Institute of Criminology of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In other countries, such institutes have been established as governmental or autonomous semi-governmental bodies as, for example, the Training and Research Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Justice and the National Centre for Social and Criminological Research in the United Arab Republic. Most countries have also established special facilities for the in-service training of personnel.

The prominent place given to research in the recently established institutes of criminology and other training centres attests to the spirit of inquiry and experiment in which the penal system is being developed in many parts of the world today, and to the importance attached to research in the development of effective programmes for the prevention of crime and delinquency. In some countries, this has resulted in the setting up of a special facility for research in a government department, or in financial appropriations for specific research projects conducted outside the Government. Work has centred on three main areas of inquiry: causation of criminal and delinquent acts, and on possible preventive methods; the different manifestations of crime and delinquency; and the efficacy of different methods of treating the offender.

With regard to the causation of delinquency, what appears to be necessary is perhaps not so much an expansion of research as a new approach in research. Research into the etiology of delinquent behaviour has been the most fascinating, most plentiful, and yet, in a sense, the most unfruitful of endeavours. Many hundreds of studies, some of them carried out with a high degree of scientific sophistication, have been done on the causes of delinquent and criminal behaviour but no theory satisfactorily explains causation. Inter-disciplinary research in which the constitutional, psychological and social situational factors are recognized for their part in motivating human behaviour would appear to be much more promising, and would seem to warrant more support.[41] Internationally oriented cross-cultural research on the etiology of delinquency would also appear to hold considerable promise, as a means of ascertaining the effects of the different

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36 Information on recently built and projected institutions may be found in the special number on prison architecture, *British Journal of Criminology*, vol. 1, No. 4, April 1961, and in the issue devoted to the design and construction of institutions for adult and juvenile offenders of the *International Review of Criminal Policy*, No. 17-18, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.5.

37 *Asia and the Far East Seminar on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Rangoon, 25 October - 6 November 1954* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 55.IV.14); *Second Asia and the Far East Seminar on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Tokyo, 25 November - 7 December 1957* (United Nations ST/TAA/SER.C/34); *Latin American Seminar on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Rio de Janeiro, 6-19 April 1953* (United Nations publications, Sales No.: 54.IV.3); *Middle East Seminar on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Cairo, 5-17 December 1953* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.17); *Second United Nations Seminar for the Arab States on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Copenhagen, 23 September - 16 October 1959* (United Nations, ST/TAO/SER.C/42).

38 *European Seminar on Probation, London, 20-30 October 1952* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.13); *European Exchange Plan Seminar on the Institutional Treatment of Juvenile Offenders, Vienna, 27 September - 9 October 1954* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 55.IV.13); Seminar on the Evaluation of Methods used in the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, Rome, 14-23 October 1962.

39 Leon Radzinowicz, "Criminological and Penological Research". Lecture delivered at the Second United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, London, 8-19 August 1960. For a summary of the lecture, see the Report of the Congress (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.3, pp. 54-55).

40 For survey of such institutes as well as the teaching of criminology in the faculties proper and in institutions connected with scientific research of professional training courses, see United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, *The University Teaching of Social Sciences, Criminology*, Paris, 1957.

41 European Seminar on the Evaluation of Methods used in the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency, Rome, 14-23 October 1962. Note by the United Nations Secretariat, p. 10.

constellations of factors that may be associated with delinquency and of factors present in one environment but not in another.

A number of research projects in recent years have attempted to identify potential delinquents, so that preventive programmes may be provided for them; other research projects have followed up known delinquents in an attempt to determine potential recidivism. Prediction tables have been elaborated, particularly in Japan, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. These tables elicited great interest as well as considerable controversy among specialists. Critics contend that they do not sufficiently define juvenile delinquency, that they would stigmatize juveniles who may never become delinquent, and that they have not been sufficiently validated. It can be stated, however, that such tables do highlight conditions harmful to all children, may identify groups from which future delinquents are likely to come, and constitute an interesting research field for modern criminology.

Many research projects have been criticized for overemphasis on an isolated factor favoured by a particular discipline, for generalizations from one type of society to another, and for insufficient validation of conclusions. Such criticisms extend to research on prevention and treatment, in both the adult and the juvenile fields.

A number of major efforts are now being made in the belief that research on causation is a prerequisite for the elaboration of successful programmes of delinquency prevention. In New York City, for example, a new project, the Mobilization for Youth "research action" project, includes provision for basic research on substantive issues pertinent to the definition, distribution, origins and content of juvenile delinquency. This project views the development of delinquency as a consequence of pressures arising from a lack of integration of the cultural and social structures of the project area, and is notable for its use of a built-in research design to evaluate the impact of the service programme.[42]

Research on the manifestations of crime has dealt with various types of offences, such as robbery,[43] murder [44] and sex offences.[45]

From the correctional point of view, the pressing problem is still the evaluation, by research methods, of the efficacy of different types of treatment, under different conditions, on different types of offenders. A comparative study conducted in London by University College, in collaboration with the Home Office and the Prison Commission, on the treatment of young adult offenders in Borstals, detention centres and prisons is one of the first systematic attempts to study simultaneously three different types of treatment, as applied to offenders whose psychological characteristics and social background have been thoroughly observed. Studies on the effects of imprisonment, particularly "short-term imprisonment", have been carried out in a number of countries, notably by the Training and Research Institute of the Japanese Ministry of Justice. Similar studies on the effects of probation, parole and other forms of treatment have also been undertaken, most frequently as operational research projects designed to provide the responsible authorities with a quantitative basis for decisions.

On the continent of Europe, empirical investigations have, for the most part, been lacking but, during the past ten years, systematic research has been carried out in the Scandinavian countries. The Copenhagen Institute of Criminal Science was established in 1957 in the Faculty of Law and Criminal Science of the University of Copenhagen for the purpose of carrying out research in criminology, criminal policy and penal law; assisting students and young graduates who are interested in such studies; and promoting research through co-operation with official agencies, institutions and individuals. It collaborates with the other similar research institutes which have been set up in Stockholm, Aarhus (Denmark), Oslo and Helsinki. Another pioneering effort is the work being done by the state-supported *Centre d'études de la délinquance juvénile* in Belgium. Research studies in other countries are gradually being initiated at, for example, the Ljubljana Institute of Criminology in Yugoslavia and, with a clinical orientation, at the Rebibbia Centre in Italy.

The experience of the last ten years points to the need of making basic data available on research projects being carried out both nationally and internationally, in order to permit the best use to be made of findings.[46]

The general picture of practice and research in social defence reflects uneven progress, and a variety of trends, efforts, research procedures and experimentation. Much that is now being done may prove fruitful in the coming years. The application and extension of modern social defence techniques to developing countries is a logical aim; however, great caution should be exercised, in order to minimize errors arising from the application of practices that may be out of harmony with local and specific socio-cultural conditions.

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42 Mobilization for Youth, Inc., *A Proposal for the Prevention and Control of Delinquency by Expanding Opportunities* (New York, 1961).

43 F. H. McClintock and Evelyn Gibson, *Robbery in London: an Enquiry by the Cambridge Institute of Criminology*. London, Macmillan, 1961 (Cambridge Studies in Criminology, edited by L. Radzinowicz, vol. XIV).

44 Paul Bohannan, *ed. African Homicide and Suicide* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1960).

45 Cambridge University, Department of Criminal Science, *Sexual Offences* (London, Macmillan), 1957.

46 Some noteworthy efforts for the wider dissemination of the findings of such projects have already been made. The recently established Research and Information Centre of the National Council on Crime and Delinquency in the United States of America has started a clearing house of this nature, and the first catalogue of projects on an international basis was issued in 1962. (See *Current Projects in the Prevention, Control and Treatment of Crime and Delinquency*. (A specialized international abstracting service of studies and research in the field was started in 1961): "Excerpta Criminologica", published in Amsterdam by the Excerpta Criminologica Foundation.

Chapter XI

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

INTRODUCTION [1]

Trends in Latin America over the past decade can be set forth in two apparently contradictory pictures. On the one hand, *per capita* incomes have risen and important gains have been made in education and public health; a few of the larger countries within the region may have entered a stage of sustained economic and social growth; the term "under-developed" is now less appropriate than "unevenly developed". Political leaders and social scientists in the region are closer than ever before to a consensus on the broad policy prerequisites for sustained development. The meetings of regional agencies have evolved an increasingly detailed and consistent set of principles for action, and many of the countries have strengthened their technical capacity to plan for development. Agrarian reform; diversified industrialization; reduction of extreme inequalities in income; channeling of a larger share of income into productive investment; curbing of inflation; expansion and redirection of education; social measures to enable the alienated and impoverished lower classes to function as responsible citizens, producers, and consumers, are now accepted as essential elements of a co-ordinated national policy by sectors of opinion that once either disregarded them or seized on one or two of them as panaceas. The trends towards comprehensiveness of programming and towards closer policy relationships between economic development and human welfare received a remarkable regional endorsement in the Charter of the Alliance for Progress, adopted by the Punta del Este meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council in August 1961. The same meeting received assurances of external funds on an unprecedented scale to support comprehensive programming over the entire decade ending in 1970.

On the other hand, a high degree of social tension, a combined feeling of urgency and frustration, pervades the region. Since the mid-1950's, most of the countries have seen an ominous falling off in the rate of increase of income. In spite of the apparent consensus on broad policies there are long delays in the translation of these policies into practical programmes, bitter arguments over details, and an evident lack of confidence among classes, political groups and regional interests in each other's good faith and capacities. Accusations are heard from different quarters that reforms are being circumvented by the drafting of unenforceable laws or the limitation of action to pilot projects, that they are being distorted to serve vested interests, or that they are being used as pretexts for violent subversion of the social order.

Below the apparent agreement on the nature of the social problems of Latin America — many of which are obvious even to the casual observer — there are also wide areas of disagreement about the basic facts. Are the levels of living of specific classes and occupational groups rising or are they deteriorating? Although statistical information has improved considerably in recent years, it gives only ambiguous answers to many such questions, and different sectors of opinion can select figures that support wildly discordant preconceptions.

The older élites in the Latin American countries are being challenged or shouldered aside by much larger urban strata (the so-called "rise of the middle classes"), and the masses of the population are simultaneously transforming or abandoning their traditional ways of life, becoming aggressively conscious of the gap between their "social rights" and their place in society, joining political movements, trade unions and peasant leagues, sometimes erupting in seemingly aimless outbursts of violence. The broad outlines of this process are well known but intensive sociological field research to find out what the different groups make of the changes to which they are subjected, what they hope for and how they relate themselves to national life, is only beginning. Some observers fear that present trends indicate failure to evolve patterns of living and class relationships that will be compatible with rapid economic growth in a democratic political framework, and point to the relative economic stagnation and political stalemates of some Latin American countries formerly the most dynamic of the region as illustrations of the dangers ahead. The occupational roles that must be filled in the course of development — ranging from the governmental policy-maker and private entrepreneur to the factory worker and small farmer — are also beginning to be scrutinized in relation to the social structure. It is generally agreed that up to the present candidates for many of the key roles are insufficient in numbers and deficient both in formal training and in motivations.

To sum up, Latin America has progressed both materially and in its ability to co-ordinate regional action; but this progress is simultaneously stimulated and threatened by the rapidity of social change and the failure of social relationships to adapt themselves to such change.

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[1] Social conditions in Latin America have been discussed in two previous reports in this series. See chapter X of the *Preliminary Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 52.IV.11 and chapter VII of the 1957 *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publications, Sales No.: 57.IV.3). The present chapter attempts to distinguish the most important regional trends and prospects, but leaves the presentation of detailed social statistics and descriptions of social programmes to the 1961 *Economic and Social Survey of Latin America,* to be published by the Organization of American States and the Economic Commission for Latin America.

Population trends

The population of Latin America is now growing by about 2.9 per cent annually, according to the most recent estimates. This rate, which has been rising over a long period and is higher than that of any other major region, is expected to exceed 3 per cent during the coming decade. From about 200 millions at present the population should reach 300 millions before 1975 and 600 millions by the year 2000. The countries of Middle America and the Caribbean are growing faster than the regional average, several of them having rates around 3.5 per cent. Only two countries, Argentina and Uruguay, have annual rates of increase below 2 per cent. The rapid growth of population and the lack of any prospect that such growth will slacken in the foreseeable future underlie the desperate urgency of present demands for economic development. The demographic situation has been analysed, future trends forecast and the economic and social implications discussed in a series of United Nations studies.[2] The present chapter will limit itself to a brief recapitulation.

The region as a whole does not face any immediate threat of over-population, in the sense that some of the Asian countries feel themselves threatened. Latin America has about one-seventh of the land area of the world and only one-fourteenth of the population. While much of the land is not cultivable, all except two or three of the smallest countries have ample unused land that could be brought under cultivation. Most of the countries look on the prospect of populations much larger than the present as a challenge but not as a burden.

Their "population problems" derive from the age structure associated with very high rates of increase and from the heavy investment requirements if the growing population is to be productively employed and enjoy rising income levels.

The national populations are extremely youthful, with the high average ratio of 84 dependants (persons under 15 and over 65 years of age) to 100 persons between 15 and 64, the conventionally defined "working age". Such a dependency ratio means that both the family and the State must assume very heavy burdens if the youth are to attend school long enough to receive the kind of education called for in a modern society; in practice, most of the youth enter the labour market at an undesirably early age because they must contribute to the family income. Moreover, owing to the nature of the population trends, the number of children annually reaching school age, the numbers of youth looking for their first jobs, and the numbers of families seeking homes increase even more rapidly than the total population, so that the numbers of places in schools, of jobs, and of dwelling units must rise by more than 3 per cent each year simply to keep present deficiencies from growing.

Between 1945 and 1955 Latin America as a whole maintained an annual rate of growth of *per capita* income of 2.7 per cent; since then the rate has slipped to 1 per cent, while food production is barely keeping up with the population increase. The Economic Commission for Latin America estimates that if the higher rate of economic growth is to be regained while population growth continues at a rate even higher than the present, the region by 1975 must expand its industrial production by 400 per cent and its agricultural production by 120 per cent. It must find jobs for a labour force increasing by 35 million and only 5 million of the new jobs can be expected from agriculture.

This forecast implies a continuing large-scale movement of population out of the older agricultural regions that cannot use more labour productively, and a need for heavy investments not only in sources of employment elsewhere but also in urban housing and services. Up to the present, the countries have not found means to channel international migration according to any conception of desirable geographical distribution. The urban population is growing at a rate of about 5 per cent annually, and the larger cities are growing at even higher rates. The metropolitan areas of some of the national capitals have doubled in population during the past decade, while the gap between their resources and the investments that would be required to provide an adequate physical setting for all of their people has become ever wider. In the majority of countries, even the very high rates of urbanization have not been sufficient to reduce the population on the land. The latter continues to grow, although slowly, and only a few of its excess workers find their way to new agricultural lands.

One finds in all of the Latin American countries a large lower stratum in the population that has not benefited from economic progress up to the present and is suffering from multiple deficiencies; lack of employment at wages permitting a tolerable level of living; lack of education and of skills and working habits that might help it obtain such employment; levels of housing, sanitation, and diet that reduce working capacity; unstable family life contributing to and fostered by the other deficiencies. The more rapid the population growth and the accompanying redistribution of population, the greater the probability that this stratum will persist and grow in numbers despite industrialization, rising *per capita* incomes, and improving conditions for the remainder of the people. Such groups, both urban and rural, have persisted even in countries at the highest levels of development, and the increasing efficiency of industry and agriculture, with a stationary or declining demand for unskilled labour, decreases their opportunities for steady employment.[3]

[2] The most recent information may be found in "The Demographic Situation in Latin America", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. VI, No. 2, October 1961, and in "A Demographic Analysis of the Educational Situation in Latin America" (UNESCO/ED/CEDES/8-ST/ECLA/CONF.10/L.8-PAU/SEC/8). Since 1957, a regional Centre for Demographic Training and Research, set up at Santiago under the joint auspices of the United Nations, the Government of Chile, and the Population Council, Inc., has promoted and conducted regional demographic studies. Information from the most recent round of national censuses indicates that the rate of population growth is rising even higher than demographers had previously forecast.

[3] The implications of present trends in population growth and geographic distribution are to be discussed in a study now being prepared by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America. This study will emphasize that the rate of urbanization to be expected and the accompanying difficulty of absorbing the marginal population into productive work increase very sharply and ominously the higher the rate of population growth. Projections

Up to the present, none of the Latin American countries have even considered the adoption of a policy aimed at slowing down the rate of population increase, with the partial exception of Puerto Rico, and it is unlikely that such policies could in the foreseeable future command either governmental or popular support. The continuation of high rates of increase is therefore taken for granted in development plans; an eventual slackening of population growth as a result of urbanization and changes in family life may be expected, but even this is only a remote possibility at present.

Policies for the redistribution of population, or rather for a diversion of part of the flow of internal migrants away from the big cities to smaller towns and to vacant land, have received more attention, but in practice have not progressed beyond the stage of pilot projects; some of these policies will be discussed later.

The changing social structure and problems of social integration [4]

Social scientists have made several attempts to construct typologies of Latin American countries, using various combinations of statistical indicators of *per capita* income and its rate of growth, levels of consumption, diffusion of educational and other social services, size of the middle strata in the populations, degree and rate of urbanization, etc., in order to assess the balance (or lack thereof) in their socio-economic growth or the degree of integration of their national societies.[5]

The inadequacies of the statistics and the unevenness of distribution within countries of many of the factors measured through the indicators are such that a complex typology can at present be little more than a risky experiment, and even if these problems could be solved, the countries would not fit neatly into groups. They do reveal some interesting affinities, however, if one considers the statistical groupings in the *light of broader,* less quantifiable information on present trends.

Three countries with annual *per capita* incomes between US $550 and US $325 [6] (Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) are also predominantly urban, have large middle strata and rank well above the remainder of the region according to most indicators of consumption and social services. In these countries, however, *per capita* incomes and levels of living have remained stationary or declined since 1945. A fourth country, Cuba, falls into a very similar pattern according to pre-1960 statistical indicators, but in Cuba revolutionary change has deprived these statistics of more than historical interest.

In one country, Venezuela, a *per capita* income estimated at US $1,000 in 1955-59 is far above that of any other country in the region and far out of line with indicators showing relatively small middle strata in the population and levels of living well below those of the four countries mentioned above. Venezuela, with its economy concentrated on oil exports, has long been the most obvious example of unbalanced growth in Latin America. Since 1959, a higher proportion of the oil income has been utilized for educational and other social services, but at the same time *per capita* income has ceased to grow, and social tensions have become increasingly acute.

Three large countries (Brazil, Mexico and Colombia) stand near the Latin American average according to *per capita* income (US $250-300 in 1955-59) and most other indicators; the first two show high rates of growth of income, the third a moderate rate. These (with Venezuela and Peru) are the countries in which the national averages conceal the widest ranges of local situations, with some areas and some occupational groups prosperous and dynamic, others impoverished and static. Two of the smallest countries, Costa Rica and Panama, are also in the middle range or somewhat above it in *per capita* income. In their cases the statistics can be assumed to reflect a more generalized middle position.

The other ten republics (Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru) fall below the ten already listed according to most indicators (their 1955-59 *per capita* incomes ranged between US $200 and US $75), and show a number of resemblances among themselves if compared with the countries above them. First, with the exception of Peru, they are much smaller in population; they include nine out of the twelve countries in the region with fewer than five million people, and total less than 15 per cent of the regional population. Second, their populations are much more rural; they include nine out of the eleven countries in which the urban population in 1960 was estimated at less than 40 per cent. Third, they include all four of the countries (Bolivia, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Peru) in which a majority of the rural population is Indian, separated from the rest of the population by linguistic and cultural barriers. Fourth, they rank below the other countries in the relative size of their upper and middle strata, assessed by occupational criteria. In rates of growth of *per capita* income, they show no uniformity; one of them, Nicaragua, had one of the highest

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which start by assuming that one-third of the urban population belongs to the marginal groups, that the rural population will continue to grow at a fixed low rate, and that urban remunerative employment will increase by 5 per cent annually, indicate that with a 2 per cent rate of national population growth the marginal population would be completely absorbed into remunerative employment within twenty years, while with a 3.5 per cent rate of population growth it would rise from one-third to half of the urban population.

[4] The following pages lean heavily upon "El desarrollo económico de América Latina: Consideraciones Sociológicas", by José Medina Echavarría (to be published by UNESCO in *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America,* II).

[5] See, for example, Roger Veckemans and J. L. Segundo, "Synthesis of a Socio-Economic Typology of the Latin American countries" in *Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America,* I (UNESCO, Paris, 1962); T. Pompeu Accioly Borges, "Graus de desenvolvimento na America Latina", in *Desenvolvimento e conjuntura* (Rio de Janeiro), vol. V, No. 2, February 1961; Gino Germani and Kalman Silvert, "Politics, Social Structure and Military Intervention in Latin America", in *Archives européennes de sociologie* (Paris), vol. II, No. 1, 1961; and Pedro C. M. Teichert, "Analysis of Real Growth and Wealth in the Latin American Republics" in *Journal of Inter-American Studies* (Gainesville, Fla.), vol. I, No. 2, April 1959. See also chapter III of the 1961 *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.14).

[6] 1955-59 average in terms of 1950 dollars. Estimates made by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for Latin America; see "Situación demográfica, ecónomica, social y educativa de América Latine" (UNESCO/ED/CEDES/4-ST/ECLA/CONF.10/L.4-PAU/SEC/4).

rates in the region between 1945 and 1958, while two others, Bolivia and Haiti, have increased little if at all. In these countries, however, to an even greater extent than in most of the larger countries, the rates of income growth depend on the market for a few export products and it must be emphasized that such reported rates of growth may have little immediate relevance to the lot of the masses of the population.

The above groupings cannot be correlated with the degree of social tension now visible in the different countries, but it can be assumed that the origins and forms of tensions differ considerably in the first group of countries, where a process of development that aroused high hopes in the past has slowed down or become paralysed; in the large countries in the middle group plus Venezuela, where the uneveness of growth has meant a widening gap between different sectors of the population,[7] and in the last group.

Studies of social structure and social mobility in the Latin American countries have made some progress during the past decade, and are beginning to move from the analysis of occupation and educational statistics to field research using sampling methods. The conceptual and practical problems that arise cannot be discussed here. The authors of these studies are asking anxiously whether the traditional nearly static two-class society, now obviously disrupted, is really going to be replaced, as might be hoped from the history of countries now economically advanced, by a society with a continuum of many social strata, with considerable movement from one to another, with a widely diffused sense of participation in national affairs, and with a generalized expectation of continuing socio-economic change.[8] They point to the existence of similar social groups and problems of transition throughout Latin America, although the relative importance of the different groups and their adjustment to their present roles are widely divergent in the different countries.

The traditional landowning and mercantile upper class no longer enjoys unchallenged power anywhere in Latin America, although its members hold many leading positions, and family ties and family rivalries within the upper class are still of considerable importance. While individuals from this class may be found in a wide range of occupations and as spokesmen for all kinds of political and social doctrines, the class as a whole is inevitably on the defensive, under attack for opposing land tenure reforms and more equitable tax systems, accused of transferring much of its wealth abroad as insurance against upheavals and inflation. Traditional upper class values and ways of life are also blamed for influencing the rising middle groups to avoid the roles most needed for economic development and to prefer luxury consumption to saving.[9]

The degree of truth in the widely accepted stereotype of a reactionary, selfish, frightened upper class cannot be assessed here, but the prevalence of accusations along these lines — some of them coming from irreproachably moderate sectors of opinion — is one indication of the lack of social consensus, the exceptional degree of mutual distrust between groups that endangers healthy growth in the region. Although in recent years important new elements have entered the upper classes, through the avenues of industry, politics or professional eminence, in general the newer elements have not replaced the older groups as a cohesive and widely accepted leadership in political life, economy and culture.

Among the newer elements, the industrial entrepreneurs have received most attention for their strategic developmental role. It is well known that a few Latin American cities (São Paulo and Medellin are usually mentioned) have produced dynamic entrepreneurial groups that have not appeared in other cities offering apparently similar opportunities. It is also well known that a high proportion of the entrepreneurs in Latin America as a whole (although not in Medellin) are of recent immigrant origin. Some recent studies have sought in family upbringing and in the psychological make-up encouraged by the local societies the explanation for the appearance of entrepreneurial drive in certain groups rather than in other.[10] It may be, however, that the real problem in Latin America is not the failure of entrepreneurial talent to appear and to respond to real opportunities, but its diversion from industrial production by the larger rewards and greater degree of security offered by non-productive or mainly speculative enterprises such as urban real estate dealings.

Recent analyses of Latin American society single out the "emerging" or "rising" middle groups as the strategic elements in socio-economic change. Definitions of the groups in question differ; some writers treat them as a class; others prefer terms such as "middle sectors", "middle strata" or "middle mass" in order to underline their heterogeneity or to avoid a misleading implication of common traits and class consciousness. The middle classes (using the word loosely, as no more inadequate than the alternative terms) range from entrepreneurs and professionals, among whom the distinction between

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7 A leading Brazilian economist asserts that economic development has as yet brought "no benefit whatever to three-quarters of the population of the country. Its main characteristic has been an increasing social and geographical concentration of income": Celso Furtado, "Reflexiones sobre la prerrevolución brasileña", *El Trimestre Económico* (Mexico), July-September 1962, p. 373.

8 Germani and Silvert, *op. cit.*, Medina Echavarría, *op. cit.*, and Gino Germani "Estrategia para Estimular la Movilidad Social" (UNESCO/SS/SAED: LA/B4-ST/ECLA/CONF.6/LB-4) discuss these questions and contain references to earlier studies. *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York, Council of Foreign Relations, 1960) contains particularly informative discussions of the changing social structures of Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico and Peru from the viewpoint of anthropologists. Sample surveys concerning social mobility have recently been carried out in four Latin American capitals under the auspices of the Centro Latino-Americano de Pesquisas em Ciências Sociais, Rio de Janeiro; the *Boletim* of the *Centro* (vol. IV, No. 4, November 1961) reports some preliminary findings. The *Centro* together with the Pan American Union sponsored a seminar on social structure, stratification and mobility in June 1962.

9 The latter criticism was made in a recent study of inflation in Mexico, a country in which the traditional upper class lost most of its power years ago. See Barry N. Siegel, *Inflación y desarrollo: Las experiencias de México* (Mexico, Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, 1960), pp. 139-146.

10 Professor Everett E. Hagen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has made a comparative study of community leaders in Medellin and in the relatively unprogressive city of Popayan, using psychological tests. See chapter on "The Transition to Economic Growth in Colombia" in his book on the *Theory of Social Change* (Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1962).

" middle " and " upper " rests on family ties and wealth, to small shopkeepers and the lower grades of public and private employees. They include some of the most conservative (and even parasitic) groups in society as well as the most innovative (or even disruptive). They have in common education at least to completion of the primary course and a high valuation on education for their children, incomes well above the subsistence level, a striving for higher status combined with a well-defined fear of loss of status, and a consciousness of opportunities to participate in national political and cultural life. The overwhelming majority of them live in the cities; in only a few countries can one find an appreciable number of farmers or other rural inhabitants who can be considered part of the middle classes in terms of education, income and civic consciousness.

The more restrictive definitions limit the middle classes to persons whose occupations do not require manual labour, and the low prestige accorded to such labour is certainly an important element in status distinctions. However, the relatively skilled and stable workers in manufacturing, mineral production, power, transport and communications as well as the better-off self-employed artisans are in fact in a middle position in the Latin American social structure. Some groups of organized workers have attained incomes well above the average for the characteristically lower-middle-class occupations, setting them far apart from the lower class that is described below, and technological change has opened wide opportunities for new occupations requiring a combination of manual skill and commercial initiative — particularly garage operators, owner-drivers of trucks and buses and repairers of electrical appliances. These groups no doubt differ widely from other middle groups in their social origins and political coloration but they have many aspirations and anxieties in common.

There are discrepant estimates for the size of the middle groups; but it is safe to say, however, that these groups, including the better-off workers and artisans, range from a majority of the population in Argentina and Uruguay to less than a tenth in some of the smaller Central American, Caribbean and Andean countries.

The experience of several countries indicates that the presence of large middle groups does not guarantee sustained economic growth or attainment of a satisfactory degree of consensus on national goals. Some analysts blame the difficulties of these countries on the failure of the middle groups, after a promising beginning, to continue to offer dynamic leadership and fill the roles of producer and investor. Whatever the case, it is clear that once opportunities in the occupations associated with such growth dwindle, the self-protective efforts of the middle groups may help to frustrate the recovery of economic health: pressure for expansion of public employment becomes more irresistible, private workers and employees strive for inviolable job security, professionals and business men seek legislative safeguads against competition. Such pressures are notorious in all of the countries that have large middle groups and lagging economic growth. Elsewhere, and particularly in Brazil and Mexico, shifts in the composition of the middle groups are responding to healthier stimuli, and managers and technicians are rising in relative strength. Throughout Latin America, however, the heritage of social relationships has left a typical dependence on sponsorship (whether by relatives, friends, or a political party) rather than on open competition for advancement. This background, combined with the primary importance of public employment among the opportunities open to middle-class youth, has contributed to a pervasive reliance on government action for the solution of all problems that inhibits the innovating spirit otherwise to be expected of rising middle classes.

At best, the middle classes are undergoing various stresses that make their future behaviour hard to predict. Their material aspirations have been rising faster than their incomes or levels of living. Some important groups, such as the schoolteachers, have shared hardly at all in the gains in national *per capita* incomes. In most countries, the lower-middle groups and even the better-paid workers are barely able to afford the consumer goods that they have come to think of as essential to a " decent " way of life, and the widening appetite for television sets and other costly manufactured products indicates that this strain on their incomes will be even greater in the future. Indebtedness is widespread; and any lingering propensity to save money is likely to have been killed by experience with inflation. For the middle classes as for the lower, regular investment in lottery tickets has become a sort of substitute for saving. The middle classes find it hard to obtain housing meeting their standards of decency, and many of them are struggling to meet the high costs of buying and building on a plot of land in the chaotic suburban expansion characteristic of the larger cities. The burden of educating their children beyond the primary level is very heavy, and the resulting opportunities for upward movement in occupation and income are likely to be disappointing. While the middle groups are the main beneficiaries of the social security systems, the benefits they receive are often meagre in relation to costs. The degree of satisfaction with present levels of living is therefore low. It is significant that groups falling within the narrower definitions of the middle classes, such as bank employees and schoolteachers, have been among the most frequent and militant participants in strikes in recent years.

Other sources of insecurity, harder to assess, lie in changes in personal relationships and in beliefs concerning the social order. Increases in the freedom enjoyed by women and adolescents, probably more rapid than the changes experienced by the middle classes of other regions, have not yet led to generally accepted new codes of behaviour and family life.

The middle classes, including the better-off workers and artisans, belong to the " modern " world. The " lower classes ", which make up a majority of the population of the region, are becoming ever more inextricably involved with the modern world, but as yet have derived few advantages from this involvement. The forms taken by their struggles to participate more fully in national life may well determine the lines of regional development during the next few years.

The rural population remains the largest element within the lower classes in almost all of the countries. Its problems are discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter, and need not be mentioned here. The urban

lower class — to repeat a well-worn generalization — has transferred many of the characteristic features of rural poverty to the cities, particularly to the peripheral shantytowns in which, according to one estimate, four and a half million families in the region now dwell. In the cities, no clear-cut dividing line can be drawn between this lower class and the lower-middle strata of employees, workers, artisans and small shopkeepers. The last two occupational groups, in particular, include many persons at the extreme of poverty and under-employment as well as others who are prospering. The urban housing shortages mean that relatively well-off families are usually found in the same slum neighbourhoods and shantytowns as the indisputably " lower class " unskilled and casual labourers.

The material aspects of the plight of the urban lower classes have been often described, but we have little evidence on the ways in which they are adjusting to urban society. Observers in some localities report apathetic misery and little or no upward mobility. Other local groups are reported to be striving desperately to better their lot through education, acquisition of skills, and self-help organization. Among many of them, occupational preferences, family life, and residence seem to be equally unstable; the men may try to relieve their burdens by shifting from job to job, by deserting their families or by moving to another town. They are less likely to be active members of formal organizations of any kind than are the groups above them in the social scale. Many of them are frequent cinema-goers, and have radios in their homes; in the largest cities a few of them have even managed to acquire television sets. Newspapers and other periodicals appealing to the semi-literate have grown in numbers and in circulation. We know very little, however, of the nature of the influence exerted by these media on the masses of the urban (let alone the rural) population, or what these groups make of the diverse political and social appeals directed to them, mainly by would-be spokesmen from the better-educated middle classes. Observers point to a continuing rejection of impersonal urban institutions and work relationships, a yearning for person-to-person guidance and aid replacing that once expected from the *patrón*, the paternalistic landowner. Il is well known that a few leaders in different countries offering personal magnetism, sympathy and simple solutions to their problems have had remarkable success in drawing large previously alienated sectors of the population into active participation in national life, while at the same time fostering among them expectations and hostilities that can hardly be reconciled with present developmental needs.

From the beginning of Latin America's independent history the more foresighted national leaders relied heavily on education to bring forth a productive citizenry capable of working republican institutions. The appearance of a dynamic educator as president, minister or university rector has initiated a major new stage in the growth of many of the republics. Present preoccupations with the role of the school systems in promoting economic development and assisting in social integration have only given a new urgency to the long-continued struggle to universalize education. The majority of the countries now consider universal primary education attainable within the next decade, and their secondary and higher enrolments are, if below their real needs, quantitatively impressive.

The growth of the school systems within a social structure such as that discussed above has, however, given them certain characteristics that clash with the new demands made upon them. The school systems at present are simultaneously conservative and revolutionary, in self-contradictory ways, promoting at the same time social inertia and social disruption. They are also extremely wasteful, in terms of the thousands of pupils who drop out year by year, all the way from the elementary schools through the universities, without deriving advantage from their incomplete courses. At the same time, the schools have become associated with an over-emphasis on formal qualifications at all levels of employment, often confirmed by legislation, so that the possession of a certificate or degree is more valued than the education attested by the degree. The severest criticism of these defects is heard from Latin American statesmen and educators; they are agreed that the quantitative expansion of the schools envisaged for the coming decade must be accompanied by carefully planned reforms of the school systems and by a clearer conception of the purposes of education.[11]

The difficulties go back to the dual origin of the school systems. One system, much the older, was organized from the top downwards. The universities qualified members of an élite to practice a limited number of learned professions; more important, they granted the *status symbols* of membership in the élite. To a large extent, the universities organized their own secondary and even primary schools to prepare youth for entrance. The other system, of negligible importance before the mid-nineteenth century, consisted of elementary schools intended to generalize literacy and of a limited number of vocational schools. The dividing lines between the two systems have become blurred and they have influenced each other in many ways, without fusing into a single system with coherent purposes.

The free public elementary schools acquired curricula crammed with subjects unrelated to the backgrounds of the children, taugh mainly by memorization and repetition; their holding power was naturally limited. Even today, practically all rural children and the great majority of children from the urban lower classes drop out of school before completing a six-year primary course. The educational authorities are only beginning to face understandingly the formidable problem of devising methods of primary education that will help children from these classes (including Indian children unable to speak the official language) towards a lasting sense of identification with the national society and towards motivations compatible with present developmental goals, while imparting the techniques that will enable these children to progress further up the educational or occupational ladder.

Secondary education has until recently concentrated almost entirely on preparation for the universities. To

11 Both the achievement and the shortcomings of the school systems are discussed exhaustively in the background papers prepared for the Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development held in Santiago in March 1962, and in the reports submitted to the Conference by national ministries of education. The frank criticisms of the present schools to be found in the latter reports are particularly interesting.

a large extent, it has been left to fee-charging private schools receiving state subsidies. One of the most significant trends of recent years, however, has been the overwhelming of this limited system by the educational demands of the urban middle classes and, to some extent, of the better-off workers. In many places the demand has been met by diluting the standards and shortening the classroom hours in the schools, with little change in their curricula. Many of the students are unable to complete the course (usually of six years) and are left frustrated and resentful, with an education occupationally worthless. At the same time, some of the cities have seen a mushroom growth of private commercial and other vocational courses, usually without much official control over their standards, and presumably drawing their enrolment from somewhat lower strata of the population. Present plans call for diversification of the secondary schools and for an educational content at once more applicable vocationally and more contributory to social integration. The change most commonly envisaged is to split the six-year course into self-contained two-year periods, with the first two years offering a general introduction to vocational and university-preparatory courses of differing lengths.

Meanwhile the rising tide of youth with secondary school certificates is pressing upon the universities. Some of the latter have resisted the pressure, frustrating thousands of youth unable to find a place in them, while others, by admitting all applicants who have completed the secondary course, have acquired enrolments so inflated as to preclude any supervision of students and to limit the educational process to huge lecture classes. New universities are springing up in provincial towns, usually very short of both funds and qualified professors. The structures of the universities have become extremely unwieldy, as new courses, research institutes and extramural activities have been added piecemeal to the semi-autonomous faculties preparing students for the traditional professions. The larger universities in the national capitals, while for the most part legally autonomous, are extremely influential forces in the political leadership of the countries, and their inevitable involvement in ideological contests complicates their attempts at self-adaptation to the new demands on them. Their students are well known to be among the most dynamic and insecure elements in the Latin American societies; their organized pressures on the universities sometimes contribute to reforms, sometimes to a partial paralysis of the educational process. The intensity of student protests in secondary schools as well as universities is often out of proportion to their immediate occasions, but unfortunately there have been practically no intensive explorations of the social and psychological roots of their unrest. Most of the students come from the urban middle classes, and it is likely that they are torn, consciously or unconsciously, between a natural desire to safeguard the special privileges they hope to derive from their education (often acquired with painful sacrifices) in a highly stratified and class-conscious society, and a more generous urge to struggle for a really democratic social order.[12]

12 See Roberto Munizaga Aguirre, "La Universidad Latinoamericana" (UNESCO/ED/CEDES/21-A—ST/ECLA/CONF.10/L 21-A—PAU/SEC/21-A) and Rudolph P. Atcon, "The Latin American University", *Die Deutsche Universitätszeitung*, Frankfurt a.M., February 1962, for differing interpretations of the present needs of higher education in Latin America. Social scientists have pointed to the present lack of information concerning the motivations of the youth, including the students, as one of the most important gaps in present knowledge of the Latin American social situation, but their recommendations for research have not yet been acted upon. See Medina Echavarría. "Final digression on youth", *op. cit.*

Rural trends and programmes

The rural policy problems now coming to the fore in Latin America are not new; many of them have been debated since the Mexican Constitution of 1917 first declared the rights of peasants and rural workers to own land. Up to the past decade, however, the urban bias of Latin American culture, reliance on industrialization as the key to development, and the political power of groups determined to maintain the rural *status quo* combined to insure that rural reform proposals had only a slight and intermittent influence on national policies. In fact, various social critics have detected a tacit understanding by which urban middle-class leaders have secured the tolerance of the landed interests for advance social measures by limiting their application to the cities, or even by discriminatory restrictions of the rights of the rural population, as in the case of laws favouring unionization of urban workers but prohibiting agricultural unions. For several reasons, this neglect is disappearing:

(1) Economic policy-makers, alarmed at the slackening of the regional rate of economic growth, the persistent inflationary pressures and balance-of-payments crises, have become convinced that the low rate of growth of agricultural production — in particularly of foods for domestic consumption — and the inability of the rural population to contribute to the market for domestic industry are incompatible with their economic goals. At the same time, they have begun to take into account the impact on productivity of deficient food consumption, and to include targets for higher *per capita* consumption in their development plans.[13]

(2) The contradiction between the present situation of the rural population and national ideals of democracy and social justice has become more obvious as the isolation of this population has decreased. The rising rate of natural increase of the rural populations indicates that the traditional tenure systems and methods of production cannot be continued without a deterioration in their already intolerable levels of living; their accelerating movement into the big cities makes their poverty more conspicuous and alarming to the better-off groups.

13 For example, Chile's recent ten-year development programme singles out insufficient food production, with the accompanying rise in food imports and negligible purchasing power of the rural population, as being among the main obstacles to development. This programme presents standards for minimum *per capita* consumption of staple foods, compares them with actual consumption, and sets targets for 1970. Bolivia's ten-year plan envisages an increase in daily caloric intake from 1,800 at present to 2,400 in 1971 and an increase in protein consumption from 52 gr. to 65 gr. National and regional nutrition institutes, active in some countries for a number of years, are gradually building up a body of data making it possible to take the dietary situation and needs into account in programming. The FAO Freedom-from-Hunger Campaign has also exerted an important influence in bringing these questions to the attention of the programming agencies.

(3) The rural population is beginning to organize and show capabilities for effective political action. This is true even among the Indians. The nearly spontaneous movement of the Bolivian Indian peasants following the 1952 revolution, which dictated the sweeping character of the Bolivian land reform, is the most striking example. More recently the Cuban peasants have been effectively mobilized in support of a revolutionary programme. Venezuela has had an important organized peasant movement since 1959. In Brazil and Chile, peasant organizations held their first national congresses in 1961; the congress in Brazil was attended by 1,500 delegates and 3,000 observers from local peasant leagues and rural workers' unions. Such movements have not yet been objectively studied, some of them are torn by leadership struggles linked with national party politics, and the extent to which the rural population is actively involved in them cannot be determined, but most observers agree that there is an explosive unrest in large parts of the countryside. Forcible seizures of land, rural terrorism directed against landowners and against peasant leaders reported from many areas, suggest that if present opportunities for planned and peaceful agrarian reforms are not seized, the land will be redistributed under pressure of violence in the countryside.

While the objective of raising agricultural productivity and the objective of redistributing land in a manner acceptable to the rural population are logically quite compatible, it appears that under the conditions prevailing in much of Latin America land reform can be expected to cause a short-term decrease in agricultural productivity. Even if this is true, the reforms cannot be postponed or evaded; they are an essential step in the incorporation of the rural population into national life as full citizens.[14]

Up to the present, three Latin American countries have carried through agrarian reforms that have changed the ways of life of the majority of their rural people: Mexico in a process that has continued for nearly forty years and is still evolving, Bolivia since 1953, and Cuba since 1959. A fourth country, Venezuela, is in the midst of a reform that is intended to be as far-reaching as its predecessors. A fifth, Guatemala, embarked upon an ambitious agrarian reform programme in 1952; this was for the most part abandoned after the revolution of 1954, but has had an impact on the rural population that cannot yet be assessed. Colombia enacted a comprehensive agrarian reform law in 1961; Chile, Honduras and Peru did so in 1962; at least four countries (Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Panama) have draft laws in various stages of preparation or discussion by their legislative bodies. Most of the Latin American countries already have laws of more limited scope providing for distribution of public lands and, in some cases, for expropriation of unused private lands. Many of them have created commissions or institutes of agrarian reform, usually as semi-autonomous public bodies. These range in attributes from the powerful Instituto de Reforma Agraria (INRA) of Cuba, which manages plantations, markets crops, and has assumed other functions (such as retail sales to rural workers) that permit it wide intervention in the economy, to bodies that limit themselves to the drafting of legislation. The newer legislation is generally both comprehensive and complicated; this stems both from the efforts of special interests to protect themselves and from the aspiration to take full advantage of the lessons of earlier reforms and deal with the rural problem in an integrated way. One experienced observer comments: "The preoccupation with 'legalism' and with legislative details is striking. Land reform laws are invariably long, complicated and detailed. This makes their implementation very difficult. Only a fraction of the laws have actually been carried out .... In addition, the many detailed provisions are not only hard to implement but are equally hard to change if they prove unworkable. The tendency to complicated laws resulted frequently in a veritable jungle of previous legislation which must be cleared away."[15] The progress of the draft laws through the legislative bodies is often very slow. President João Goulart of Brazil recently declared in urging Congress to pass an agrarian reform law, that more than 200 draft laws had been presented to Congress since the creation of the Comissão Nacional de Política Agrária in 1951 without overcoming the resistance of those interested in preserving the old Brazilian rural structure.[16]

Both the reforms that are now in progress and the draft laws envisage some combination of the following policies:

(1) Colonization of vacant lands is usually one of the first practical measures to be undertaken — often long before it is presented as one element in agrarian reform. The over-crowding of many of the older agricultural areas under existing conditions of tenure and production techniques and the availability of huge areas of empty land make colonization an essential part of rural policy in most Latin America countries, but colonization schemes are over-emphasized by some sectors of opinion, and looked on with suspicion by others because they do not involve interference with present tenure arrangements and are not resisted by large landowners. It is probable that in most Latin American countries, the opening of new lands will have more immediate importance as a means of increasing agricultural production than as a means of meeting the land hunger of the rural workers. The opening of new lands for commercial farming requires very heavy investment in roads, clearing of forests, building of houses and schools, and provision of health services to combat tropical plagues. It also requires experimentation and instruction in new agricultural techniques. The men best fitted to pioneer in such areas are those with experience of commercial farming, and with capital to meet at least part of their needs until the farm becomes productive. Countries such as Brazil and Venezuela have in the past followed this reasoning by trying to secure for colonization projects immigrants from Europe or Japan rather than local cultivators. For the same reason some of the reform projects envisage

14 These conclusions were endorsed by a group of experts meeting in Mexico in December 1960 under the sponsorship of UNESCO, The Economic Commission for Latin America, and the Pan American Union. See appendix I *to Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America.*

15 Thomas F. Carroll, "The Land Reform Issue in Latin America", in *Latin American Issues: Eessays and Comments,* New York, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.

16 Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos, *Boletín Quincenal,* Mexico, 25 November 1961.

optional compensation in vacant land for landowners whose holdings are expropriated since, it is hoped, they will have capital and initiative to exploit such land.

Mexico during the past decade has been more successful than any other Latin American country in expanding its cultivated area, largely through irrigation; this has enabled the country to attain the region's most outstanding rate of production increase but has done practically nothing to relieve the situation of the small cultivators in the densely populated areas.

Most of the national agrarian reform policies now envisage the planned resettlement of small cultivators, under supervision and with fairly elaborate agricultural and social services. The few experiments that have been made, however, indicate that such colonies are slow to succeed and expensive in relation to the populations involved. In Colombia, according to a recent estimate, it would be unrealistic to expect more than 15,000 to 20,000 families to move to the *llanos,* the lowland areas of colonization, within the next five years; this would not compensate for population increase in the densely settled rural areas. In Chile, a colonization programme in operation since 1955 resulted in the settlement of 76 new landowners by 1961, all on relatively extensive holdings in the extreme south of the country; the programme envisaged the granting of smaller family farms, but as yet only 56 of these have been "contemplated".[17] In Ecuador, the one colonization project started since the creation of an Instituto de la Colonización in 1957, at Santo Domingo de los Colorados in the lowlands, had settled only 17 families on small 15-hectare farms and 37 on larger holdings by 1961. This pilot project is now being reorganized "so as to end a policy of totally directed colonization, which up to the present has not given favourable results, either economic or social, because of high costs and excessive paternalism towards the settlers".[18] Venezuela's land settlement programmes prior to the present agrarian reform have also been criticized as excessively expensive and paternalistic: "The model villages created were designed for a level of living which far exceeded that prevailing in surrounding areas.... Everything was being done for the settlers, and in many cases they were even given prolonged cash subsidies."[19]

Small-scale colonization projects in other countries have encountered the same difficulty; a commendable eagerness to make sure that the colonists adapt to new ways of life without hardship has made the projects both too expensive to be duplicated on a large scale and too parternalistic to help the colonists complete the transition into self-supporting farmers.

While organized resettlement of small cultivators is thus still at the stage of pilot projects, a great deal of spontaneous resettlement is going on without any cognizance, help or control from official agencies. This movement has been on a much smaller scale than the cityward migration, and only guesses can be made as to the numbers involved, but it affects some of the rural groups reputed to be most conservative. Andean Indians are moving down the eastern slopes of the mountains into the sub-tropical river valleys. About 5,000 familes are believed to have settled in the Tambopata Valley of Peru over the past 30 years, and the Government expects a flood of migrants with completion of a road into the area around 1963; 40,000 to 50,000 Indians are believed to have moved spontaneously into the Bolivian lowlands over the past 15 years. Meanwhile, Brazilian, Colombian, and Central American peasants have been drifting into new areas of settlement. Such migration often precedes the construction of roads but rises rapidly as the roads are extended. The partial conquest of malaria, which previously made some of the valleys most uninhabitable, has removed one of the most important barriers to resettlement.

Such a movement has both promising and ominous aspects. On the one hand it goes far to disprove opinions formerly advanced to the effect that highland peasants could not adapt themselves to tropical settlement for both physical and psychological reasons. On the other hand, it threatens an extension of the *minifundio* patterns since the settlers clear only the small plots they can cultivate with hand implements, have only limited access to markets, and live so thinly scattered that it will be hard to bring schools and health services to them. At the same time, it means an enormous waste of forest resources through slash-and-burn cultivation, and much of the land now being cleared may eventually be left eroded and worthless. In Brazil, where penetration of the interior has not been deterred by abrupt changes in altitude and climate, this process has gone on for a long time, leaving a "hollow frontier"; that is, much of the land near the coast has been exhausted and abandoned, and urban food supplies come from newly cleared areas hundreds of kilometres distant from the coastal cities.[20] Another unfortunate aspect of the penetration of parts of the interior of South America is the continuing displacement of previously isolated Indian tribes by the new settlers, usually without any effective intervention from the distant national authorities.[21]

The countries may find the provision of guidance and assistance to spontaneous resettlement more effective than the more formal colonization projects on which they have concentrated. The Government of Peru, with the assistance of the Andean Indian Programme, has begun to provide services for the Tambopata settlers, and is receiving aid from the United Nations Special Fund in a pre-colonization survey intended to guide the expected

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17 Reply of the Government of Chile to United Nations questionnaire circulated in connexion with the preparation of the 1962 Report on *Progress in Land Reform* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.2).

18 Reply of the Government of Ecuador to United Nations questionnaire in land reform.

19 Thomas F. Carroll, *op. cit.,* based on evaluation made by the Ministerio de Agricultura y Cria in co-operation with the Instituto Agrario Nacional (*La colonización agraria en Venezuela 1930-1957,* Caracas, 1959).

20 See Kempton E. Webb, "Problems of Food Supply in Brazil", *Journal of Inter-American Studies,* vol. III, No. 2, April 1961.

21 Darcy Ribeiro, "The Social Integration of Indian Populations in Brazil", *International Labour Review,* Geneva, April and May 1962. This authority estimates that about 87 Brazilian tribes have become extinct during the past 50 years and forecasts that if the present lack of effective protection is not remedied another 57 out of the present 143 tribes will disappear by the end of this century.

flow of migrants into the valleys near Tambopata. This survey is to be co-ordinated with pre-colonization surveys in Bolivia and Ecuador; these will be the first large-scale attempts to study the experiences and needs of spontaneous settlers as a guide to action. In Brazil, the Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE), the agency responsible for development of the depressed states of the north-east, envisages an assisted movement of 20,000 families a year from the chronically drought-stricken zone to the empty and more humid lands of Maranhão and norther Goiaz, already the scene of considerable spontaneous migration and of a few formal colonization projects.

The unaided migrants are, at least in the beginning, squatters on public land or on private holdings that have not been exploited by their owners. Most of the countries have legal provisions by which such squatters can obtain titles to their plots, but this is usually a procedure too complicated and expensive for the scattered subsistence cultivators, especially as land titles are likely to be confused and reliable maps lacking. Where rising land values are expected from new road construction the situation is further complicated by the efforts of speculators, who are better able than the settlers to cope with legal procedures, to acquire large tracts for resale. Statistics for a few countries indicate rather small numbers of title grants to squatters: in Chile, 1,500 between 1957 and 1960, in Colombia, 2,600 since the beginning of the colonization programme.

(2) The reform of tenure in the older agricultural regions is the most controversial aspect of rural policy, and its unanimous endorsement by the Latin American Governments in the Punta del Este Charter sums up one of the most remarkable changes in recent years. As indicated above, the reasons for this change have been mixed, and the practical results vary widely.

The high degree of concentration of landholdings in Latin America, probably exceeding that in any other major region, is well known and illustrative statistics can be found in a number of sources. The following table summarizes the situation around 1950 for the region.[22]

Size of farms (hectares)	*Percentage of farms*	*Percentage of land area*
0-20	72.6	3.7
20-100	18.0	8.4
100-1,000	7.9	23.0
Over 1,000	1.5	64.9
Total	100.0	100.0

In general, the very small holdings (*minifundios*) are intensively cultivated, but can hardly afford their owners subsistence, let alone a surplus for the market. The cultivators' primitive techniques and their inability to give their land fertilizer or adequate rest from cropping mean inevitable soil depletion and declining ability of the *minifundio* lands to support even their present population. The very large holdings (*latifundios*) are not intensively cultivated and include large areas of land held idle for speculative purposes. The reform policies envisage a combined attack on the two extremes. The *latifundios* are to be induced or compelled to give up part of their land and to farm the remainder more efficiently, while the *minifundio* cultivators are to receive holdings large enough to enable them to function as efficient family farmers. The two problems that arise immediately are the financing of land expropriation and the transformation of subsistence cultivators into true farmers.

Land in most of the countries is over-valued in relation to the income that is derived from it, partly because of the traditional prestige of land ownership, partly because of its usefulness as a hedge against inflation. Government purchase of land voluntarily offered for sale is thus not practicable, and laws authorizing this method of acquiring land for distribution have been ineffective; where such sales have been made the landowners have simply unloaded their poorest land. In Chile, the law authorizing land purchases prior to passage of the 1962 agrarian reform law prohibited payment at a rate exceeding the taxable value of the land by more than 10 per cent, while market value commonly exceeds assessed value by two to five times.[23] The few countries that have carried out large-scale reforms through expropriation (Mexico, Bolivia, Cuba) have all adopted systems of compensation unacceptable to the landowners and enforceable only after the latter had lost all influence over government policy. These systems usually involve compensation in long-term bonds rather than in cash and at the low tax valuation of the land rather than the high market value. In several countries the constitutions require cash compensation; Brazil and Chile are now proposing constitutional amendments permitting compensation in bonds.

A more indirect method of changing the tenure system has been attractive in theory but ineffective in practice. A few countries, Colombia in particular, have provided for graduated land taxes with higher rates for idle or underutilized land. It was hoped that such taxes would force the landowners either to sell part of their land or bring the whole into production. In practice, the Governments have lacked basic data and administrative machinery for enforcement of such laws. " The powerful landowning groups seem to be unwilling to submit to a graduated land tax which is of sufficient magnitude to mobilize the labour market and improve the tenure distribution. By the time the balance of power has shifted away from them it is too late for such evolutionary and gradual measures and the pendulum invariably swings over to expropriation and confiscation." [24]

In the case of the traditional large estates there is no question that a transfer to family farming can increase production. The modern plantations producing export crops such as bananas and sugar present quite different problems. Here, operation of very large units, with ample capital and able to use heavy machinery efficiently, may be more productive than any alternative system. The main objections to the plantation system have derived from the plantations' extensive powers over their workers, the

22 Thomas F. Carroll, *op. cit.*

23 Reply of the Government of Chile to United Nations questionnaire on land reform.

24 Thomas F. Carroll, *op. cit.*

heavy seasonal unemployment associated with the system, and the concentration of production on one crop, to the neglect of food production.

In Cuba, where agriculture prior to the land reform was dominated by large modern plantations, the need to maintain the productive efficiency of these enterprises was one reason for the conversion of the greater part of the land expropriated into "people's farms" managed by the Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria and worked by wage labour, or into co-operatives.[25] In Puerto Rico also, sugar-cane land expropriated under a law prohibiting holdings in excess of 500 hectares is operated by a public corporation, the Puerto Rican Land Authority, and is worked by unionized wage labour.

Elsewhere, unionization, minimum wage laws, and the extension of social security are bringing some plantation workers a status roughly equivalent to that of urban industrial workers, although agricultural workers are commonly excluded from the pro-union provisions of national labour legislation. A recent study of the sugar plantations of north-east Brazil concludes that the typical modern technically efficient *usina* now incorporates eight to twelve formerly separate old-style plantations, with at least 6,000 hectares of land serving a central refinery, with 4,000-6,000 workers living within its borders, and with its own schools and other community services. At the same time the freedom of action of the management has become narrowly circumscribed by government regulation of production and marketing, and by labour laws and union organization.[26] Banana plantation labour in most countries is now unionized, and in some of the Central American countries the banana workers constitute the strongest element in the trade union movement. The growth of responsible unions of plantation workers and their acceptance by the employers, trends that have appeared within the past decade, may prove an acceptable alternative to breaking up of the plantations, although this is not yet clear. A difficult process of three-sided bargaining is involved: plantation owners, workers and Government must agree on a wider range of issues than usually appear in urban collective bargaining, and in the typical situation of mutual distrust such bargaining is likely to break down in violence. (The situation in company-owned mining towns in the region is quite similar.)

The plantation system, moreover, depends largely on seasonal labour, although mechanization is reducing the need for it. The permanent labour force enjoying full benefits of job security, housing, etc. may amount to less than half the labour force at peak seasons; many of the workers are employed only 80 to 100 days in the year. An adequate year-round livelihood for such workers cannot be found within the plantation system.

In most of Latin America the dwarf holding (*minifundio*) has long co-existed with and supported the *latifundio*. The small cultivators with one or two hectares of poor hillside land have formed a convenient reserve of seasonal labour for the large estates occupying the fertile valleys, and even for distant mines and tropical plantations. The position of these cultivators has naturally tended to deteriorate as their holdings have been divided into even smaller plots through inheritance, as erosion and overcropping have ruined fertility, and as the large estates have continually encroached on them through such devices as monopolization of water for irrigation.[27] In many areas, also, seasonal work opportunities have declined with modernization of the estates. In Chile, *minifundio* owners are reported to have turned to petty trade, particularly the selling of alcoholic beverages to estate workers.[28]

In the present reform policies, the elimination of *minifundios* is regarded as just as important and difficult as the breaking up of *latifundios*. Fragmented holdings need to be consolidated, a good deal of eroded land needs to be retired from cultivation altogether, and some cultivators must find land or employment at long distances from their traditional homes. Most of the reform laws set standards, varying with type of land, for minimum size of economic holdings. The Cuban law sets a basic minimum of 26.8 hectares of non-irrigated productive land distant from urban centres. The Chilean law prohibits the sub-division of farm lands below a size considered the minimum for efficient production (15 hectares of irrigated land, 50 hectares of other land) without special approval by the Ministry of Agriculture, and provides for expropriation of *minifundios* and their consolidation into economic units, with the owners who are squeezed out to receive preference in distributions of other land; the Peruvian draft law has a similar provision.

On this point, however, national policies are ambivalent. Immediate social and political pressures conflict with the requirements of raising productivity, and there is a well-known danger that in practice the land reforms might increase the prevalence of *minifundios*. This has already occurred in the Mexican and Bolivian reforms, and is threatened in Venezuela. In Chile and Peru the legal provisions for compulsory consolidation of dwarf holdings have given rise to natural fears that the reforms will be used to take from the poor the little land they have, and will be hard to enforce. Even in Cuba, nothing has been done to consolidate existing holdings that are smaller than the legal minimum. The example of Haiti, the only Latin American country in which small peasant holdings

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25 Reply of the Government of Cuba to United Nations questionnaire on land reform. Out of the first 400,000 *caballerias* of land expropriated (about two-thirds of the total area expected to be affected by the tenure reform; on *caballeria* equals 13.42 hectares) about half has been organized into people's farms; 75,000 *caballerias* have been distributed in small holdings to 30,741 families; the remaining area has apparently been granted to co-operatives. More recent policy statements indicate that the co-operatives are to be converted into people's farms, but that medium-sized farms (15-30 *caballerias*) are to be left under private management.

26 W. W. Hutchinson, "The Transformation of Brazilian Plantation Society", *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, vol. III, No. 2, April 1961.

27 At the extreme, the average Indian family holding on the Peruvian side of Lake Titicaca has been estimated at about half a hectare; such a holding is split up into as many as 15 or 20 widely separated plots (Alfred Metraux, "The Social and Economic Structure of the Indian Communities of the Andean Region", *International Labour Review, Geneva*, March 1959).

28 Oscar Dominguez Correa, *La Tierra es la Esperanza*, Santiago, Instituto de Educación Rural, 1961.

have been the dominant form of tenure since the beginning of the country's independent history, shows the extreme poverty and deterioration of land that can come about when such tenure prevails under conditions of high population density and without the technical and educational prerequisites for transition to efficient farming.

In the first place, the most urgent demands for land distribution come from the most densely populated rural areas, in which there is not enough land to give each family a plot of economic size. In the second place, most of the beneficiaries, with their lack of capital and primitive techniques, cannot cultivate more than a subsistence holding. In Venezuela, a study of small cultivators concluded that " the majority of the *conuqueros* who possess from five to twenty hectares of land... are not using all the land they have to its full capacity... More commonly than is thought, the limiting factor is not the size of the unit, but the technical knowledge of the cultivator and the lack of facilities for working the land." [29] For these two reasons, the Venezuelan Government, in the early stages of its reform, is deliberately distributing holdings smaller than it considers ideal, and smaller than the holdings that have been granted to European immigrant farmers. The same thing happened in practice in Bolivia in the rather disorderly land division that occured in 1953. In Mexico, while present policy considers ten hectares the minimum for satisfactory *ejidal* holding, the 1950 census showed that 42 per cent of the 1,500,000 *ejidatarios* had parcels of less than four hectares. It is generally agreed that the correction of this deficiency in the reforms will require long-term programmes of technical assistance to the beneficiaries combined with the opening up of new areas, but that tenure reforms cannot be postponed until such prerequisites can be met.

For another reason, some of the land reform programmes contain separate provisions for the granting of very small holdings. The reforms commonly assume that large holdings requiring wage labour will continue to operate, as long as they are productively efficient and do not monopolize unused land. Ownership of a house and garden would give the rural worker some protection against the power associated with such large holdings, and a better opportunity for stable family life. The Chilean law mentioned above exempts " *huertos familiares* " from the general prohibition of *minifundios* and provides for small land allocations of this type. Such a policy was also present in the Mexican reform. Home ownership for rural workers is clearly a desirable objective, but careful planning and supplementary measures such as enforcement of minimum wage laws will be needed if the very small holdings are not to perpetuate the present relationship between *latifundios* and *minifundios*, in which the former can pay wages below subsistence level because the workers grow most of their own food.

In the tenure system most widely found in Latin America up to the present, the majority of rural workers lived on the estates and received part of their remuneration in kind — mainly through permission to cultivate a plot of land for subsistence and occupy a hut. As stated above, *minifundio* cultivators on the fringes of the estate often furnish supplementary labour at planting and harvest time. The number of workers solely dependent on cash wages has been growing, in part because of changes in production methods, in part because population increase has produced an excess unable to find a place either on the *minifundios* or within the states. In many areas the landowners have begun to abandon the old system for reasons of efficiency, or to forestall claims by the resident workers to ownership of their plots of land in case of a tenure reform. In parts of Guatemala, for example, the collapse of the policies of land reform and unionization of rural workers initiated prior to 1954 was followed by a shift to " speculative farming ", with a new readiness to change crops from year to year to meet expected market demands. One consequence has been " the growth of new relationships with labour and new attitudes towards property. The ownership of vast areas of land may no longer be desirable; it may be more profitable to rent land for a single year to raise a quick crop, and then forget about it. In this new situation, labour has no permanent attachment to the *hacienda* and its owner, and very likely, cannot count on a predictable amount of seasonal work ".[30] Such a change not only makes the rural worker's subsistence more precarious and his family life more unstable, since he cannot even count on a shack to live in, but also breaks the old paternalistic tie with the employer, which formerly gave a certain amount of psychological security.

The landless worker is found also in the few areas in which small farms predominate, and here he may be even worse off, since the small farmers need only occasional help, most of which they can obtain from their neighbours. A recent study of rural life in Costa Rica finds that the landless workers make up a distinct group at the bottom of the rural social scale. The working capacity of the men in this group is lowered by malnutrition and apathy; they are the last to be hired by local farmers for seasonal work. The cultivators with very small holdings in the same neighbourhoods are both more productive at such work and show more initiative at finding supplementary income outside farming (in particular, by illicit distilling). The landless workers are excluded from most community activities; because of their inability to contribute dependably to the support of a wife and children their family life is more unstable than that of other groups in the community. Most of them are descended from several generations of workers in the same plight.[31]

Even in the Mexican *ejido* communities, groups are found that did not share in the distribution of land, and are without rights in the community. These men ironically known as *libres* (free), " sometimes are allowed to work by the day in the peak of the season. Generally, they attempt to 'hire out' to the remaining private properties,

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29 G. W. Hill, J. A. Silva Michelena, and Ruth O. de Hill, *Vida Rural en Venezuela*, Caracas, July 1958.

30 Richard N. Adams, " Social Change in Guatemala and U.S. Policy ", *Social Change in Latin America Today*, New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1960.

31 Victor Goldkind, " Sociocultural Contrasts in Rural and Urban Settlement Types in Costa Rica ", *Rural Sociology*, Lexington, Ky., December 1961.

to find occasional work in neighbouring *ejidos,* or to get jobs in one of the urban areas and commute ".[32]

A good many of the landless workers can be expected to meet the needs of economic development by shifting into non-agricultural occupations. Unfortunately, as the Costa Rican example suggests, there is likely to be a residue that is low in initiative, poorly adapted to either urban or rural labour, unlikely to be absorbed even by a rapid increase in urban employment opportunities, and unqualified to receive an allocation of land under any reform system that takes potential productivity into account. This problem has been mentioned above in relation to population trends; the special social techniques needed to deal with it are only beginning to be experimented with in the Latin American setting. Brazil and some other countries are now planning to extend social security to all rural wage workers; but contributory social security schemes have many shortcomings even among the urban workers. Rural casual labourers can hardly be expected to contribute enough towards their own social security even to meet the administrative costs of collecting their contributions and the Governments cannot at present meet the costs of effective social security for them.[33]

The present rural policies envisage a social and political as well as an economic transformation in the countryside. The often-described rural passivity and neglect are no longer general, but in most of Latin America there are no satisfactory recognized channels through which the rural population can express its demands, through which tenure reforms can be adapted to local needs and desires, and through which the local population can join forces with the national agencies to make effective the services that are needed to complement tenure reforms.

The smallest political sub-division in most of the countries is the *municipio,* comprising an administrative centre and a surrounding rural area, which may be quite large and contain a number of hamlets. The *municipio*'s powers of self-government are usually limited and rather ineffectively exercised, but whatever powers it has and whatever governmental services trickle down from the national or state capital, are in practice monopolized by the municipal centre. This centre, however small and poor, thinks of itself as urban and superior to the rural hinterland.

Most of the small cities, towns and villages that are municipal centres are poorly integrated with the countryside economically as well as politically and socially. Their functions as marketing centres for rural produce and suppliers of goods and services to the rural people are carried out lethargically and at high cost. They provide few jobs for the surplus rural workers, and the more ambitious among their youth continually leave for wider opportunities.

The surrounding rural people sometimes have their own traditional leaders and forms of organization, but these have been partly channels for transmission of orders from above, enforcement of army conscription and collection of taxes, and partly systems for the performance of traditional religious ceremonials. Some sectors of opinion have invested a good deal of hope in the adaptation of the traditional rural groupings to new needs, but there is little evidence that this is happening on an important scale. More commonly, rural community organization is very weak or non-existent; the families live either on scattered holdings or in tiny settlements with few organized functions; in Venezuela the average rural population nucleus (excluding the *municipio* capitals) has only 13 houses and 73 people.[34] Community cohesion, both in the municipal centres and in the rural hamlets, is commonly further weakened by family or neighbourhood feuds, often hereditary but now increasingly complicated by the rival appeals of national political parties.

This weakness or absence of rural community organization and the traditional tendency to disregard rural opinions introduce a serious danger that land reform and other rural programmes, whatever their stated principles, will continue to be managed from the top and distorted to serve the interests of groups that can reach the ear of authority — whether the autorities in the national capitals, the politicized national leadership of peasant organizations, or the lowest echelon of government officials and the judges of land courts operating in the municipal capitals. Ideals of local self-government are not lacking in Latin America, and many advisers have persistently urged its strengthening. In Brazil, according to a leading authority on administration, local governments constitutionally and theoretically enjoy a degree of autonomy perhaps unsurpassed in any other country in the world.[35] Such autonomy, however, cannot make the working of land reform more flexible as long as it is at the disposal of a clique of landowners and officials in the municipal administrative centre.

A considerable number of local rural projects intended to stimulate community initiative and thus raise levels of living can be found throughout Latin America. Some of them, particularly in Mexico, have long histories, and here and there rural communities have attained a high level of co-operative action without such external stimuli. It is common to find in a single country similar projects operated in different localities by Ministries of Health, Education, and Agriculture, by publicly-financed autonomous agencies, and by voluntary agencies. In recent years, the intergovernmental agencies as well as bilateral mutual assistance arrangements have entered the scene, both through their promotion of community development and fundamental education techniques, and through the Andean Indian Programme. None of these programmes has as yet been given the resources to operate on a national scale, though many of them are envisaged as pilot projects leading to such national programmes. Commonly

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32 Clarence Senior, *Land Reform and Democracy* (Gainesville, University of Florida Press, 1958), p. 180.

33 These problems are discussed in detail in a recent International Labour Office document prepared for the Sixth Meeting of the Inter-American Conference on Social Security: *Social Security in Agriculture* (Mexico, 1960).

34 G. W. Hill, *op. cit.*

35 Diego Lordello de Mello, in comments submitted to the United Nations Working Group on Administrative Aspects of Decentralization for National Development, Geneva, 16-27 October 1961.

there is insufficient co-ordination or even awareness of each other's experiences among the projects sponsored by different agencies. Most of the projects of this type have been directed to groups of small cultivators; they have not been able to influence the workers settled on the large estates or the landless labourers with their minimal opportunities for community organization. Few of them have been integrated into the prevailing structure of local government; they have had some success in making the services located in the municipal centres more accessible to the rural people, but rarely have built up easy working relationships with the municipal authorities. A few recent national laws granting limited functions of self-government to rural communities that organize themselves and apply for recognition may be traced to their influence.[36]

The imminence of large-scale land reform has given these projects new meaning, and should enormously increase the ability of the rural communities to benefit from them. Up to the present, many of them have found the limited ability of *minifundio* cultivators dominated by neighbouring *latifundios* to improve their living conditions by their own efforts a frustrating situation. The present land reform policies generally envisage co-operation with the existing community development projects, both at the national level and locally, the use of personnel trained in them in the planning and execution of the reform, and the organization of the land reform in such a way as to stimulate community organization and initiative.

The system of land allocation can itself be made a powerful influence in this direction. In Mexico's pioneering land reform, particularly during the most active period of distribution of land during the 1930's, high hopes were placed on the system of distribution to *ejidos* (organized local groups that petitioned the Government for land) as an avenue to wider collective social action, even to a new social order. For the most part, these hopes were not realized, but similar aims reappeared in the Bolivian reform.[37] In both instances, the State was unable to supply technical aid and credits on a scale meeting the needs of the new landholders and, as stated above, many of the new landholdings were too small to give the recipients scope for a prosperous community organization. In Cuba, popular participation in the reform has been sought through national mass organization of rural workers and through administrative councils elected by the workers on people's farms and co-operatives rather than through community organization among recipients of individual landholdings, but in Venezuela the Agrarian Reform Act of 5 March 1961 returns to the ideal of collective action by recipients of land, and this is also present in the draft laws of some other countries.

Under the Venezuelan Act land is to be distributed to more than 400,000 small cultivators and rural workers — practically the whole of the rural population needing land — during the present decade. The Act provides for allocation of land either to individual petitioners or to groups, but gives more attention to the latter method. Members of rural population groups are to elect temporary committees to represent them during the processing of the request; after the group is granted land, it is to meet in a General Assembly, organize into an Agrarian Centre, and elect annually an Administrative Committee of the Centre. The Administrative Committee, which may be advised by a Technical Director appointed by the National Agrarian Institute, is to maintain liaison with the Institute; make plans for production, credit and marketing; and co-operate with the Institute in developing technical assistance, health and educational programmes. Such a system, beginning with the encouragement of joint action among the families who seek land and continuing as a channel for common action and relations with official agencies, will, if successful, create a new type of rural community among rural people with only a weak tradition of community organization.

Reforms of land tenure and community organization imply simultaneous improvements in rural education, health practices and housing, in the organization of production and marketing, and in the supply of credit.

The Latin American countries, like many in other regions, have long relied heavily on the school as the main stimulus to change in the countryside. The geographical distribution of schools has gradually widened and rural enrolment increased, so that today the rural teacher is often the only public servant (aside from the policeman) who actually lives in the rural areas and has a continuing contact with rural people. The typical shortcomings of the rural schools, however, have not been overcome. The educational level of their teachers remains very low: "... the rural teacher in Brazil (a woman) who can scarcely read and write and who has had no adequate pedagogic training, earning a minute salary."[38] The typical school curriculum, specified to the pettiest details in national regulations, is quite unrelated to the capacity

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[36] Such projects in Latin America have been reported on through a series of study tours and working groups sponsored by the United Nations. See, in particular, "Programas de desarrollo de la comunidad rural en el Brasil, el Ecuador y Peru: Informe presentado por los participantes en una gira de estudio de las Naciones Unidas, mayo y junio de 1959" (ST/SOA/SER.O/ST/TAO/SER.D/34); and working papers of sessions of the Regional Inter-Agency Working Group on Community Development in Mexico, Central America, Panama and the Caribbean Region.

[37] The *ejido* policy has for several years been a subject of controversy among Mexican economists and rural specialists. It is clear that the *ejidos* have not contributed very much to the raising of rural levels of living, and that medium-sized private holdings are a more dynamic element in the rural economy, with a continuing disposition to encroach on *ejido* lands despite official protection of the latter. Their defenders point out that the *ejidos* have enabled their members to enjoy a larger measure of human rights and that they have mitigated the effects of rural underemployment when the State could not afford investments to meet this problem. For differing assessments of the system, see Victor Alba, "The Mexican Economy: State Action and Private Initiative", the *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, November 1959; Jacques Chonchol, "La Agricultura Mexicana", *Cuadernos Latino-Americanos de Economia Humana*, vol. 1, No. 4, 1959, pp. 35-48; and Marco Antonio Duran, "El Desarrollo de la Agricultura Mexicana", *Journal of Inter-American Studies*, vol. III, No. 1, January 1961. Present national policy calls for the strengthening of democratic leadership in the *ejidos* through the enforcement of laws requiring periodic election of their authorities, and for the provision of more adequate social and technical services (Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonización. *Memoria de Labores 1960-1961*, Mexico, 1961).

[38] J. Roberto Moreira, *Educação e Desenvolvimento no Brazil* (Rio de Janeiro, Centro Latino-Americano de Pesquisas em Ciências Sociais, Publicação No. 12, 1960), p. 185.

of the teacher, the time the children will spend in school, or the rural environment. Most rural children pass through only one or two grades of schooling, not enough to secure functional literacy; in fact, most of the rural schools do not offer a complete primary course, fixed at six grades in the majority of countries. Teachers working under such conditions have sometimes been called upon in national programmes to organize adult literacy classes, promote better community health habits, and even provide agricultural advice; the results have naturally been limited.

Programmes of research and experimental pilot projects seeking methods by which the rural teacher can meet the heavy responsibilities placed on him are now found throughout Latin America. Rural normal schools and arrangements for in-service training of rural teachers have been created. Several countries have introduced nuclear school systems, in which a central team of specialists, including a social worker and public health worker, aids several teachers in scattered one-room schools, and the children have an opportunity to complete their primary education at a central school. Educators are also pointing to the practicability of complete primary courses in one-teacher schools, on condition that the regulations are made more flexible and the teachers given adequate guidance. In most countries, the new methods have as yet benefited only a handful of rural children; the difficult next step is to find (and pay) enough dedicated teachers and supporting specialists to move out of the pilot project stage.

The programmes for land reform and community development have brought both a new urgency and new opportunities to rural education. Previously the schools were working in an apathetic or even hostile environment. The rural workers and *minifundio* cultivators did not see enough to be gained from education to motivate them to dispense with the labour of their children for more than a year or so, and the landowners were either uninterested or suspicious of the potential influence of literacy on their labour force. Consequently the rural school was more likely to be stultified by its environment than to change it; instances have been cited of rural groups remaining 100 per cent illiterate after a school had been functioning for several years among them.

Observers agree that this indifference to education disappears wherever the rural population envisages land reform as a possibility. Education is then seen as a means of defence against exploitation. It is no accident that the first Latin American country to make important progress in new techniques of rural education was Mexico, and that the most rapid increases in rural school enrolment in the past few years have been in Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela.

The prospect of continuing movement of youth from farms to cities strengthens the rural demand for education but complicates the task of reforming its content. The school should not encourage the children to reject rural life, as it is often accused of doing, but a schooling narrowly adapted to rural needs will only perpetuate the present handicap placed on rural youth who must compete for urban jobs and adapt themselves to urban ways of life.

The need is not only to raise the general educational level of the rural population but also to enable qualified rural youth to reach the higher rungs of the educational ladder, and to do this in such a way that an adequate proportion will return to provide leadership and technical guidance to the rural masses. Up to the present, rural youth have been almost entirely excluded from secondary and higher education by the incompleteness of the primary courses offered in rural schools; the exceptions have naturally entered urban occupations. Agricultural education at the secondary level has been offered only on a very small scale, and the few institutions of this type have been sparsely attended; such education was incompatible with the social structure in the countryside. The larger landowners were not interested in such an education for their children and the rest of the rural population either could not qualify to enter or saw no advantage in doing so. The Federal Government of Brazil created a system of agricultural secondary schools in 1940; by 1958 they had a capacity of 20,000 students but an enrolment of only 5,000. An inquiry conducted in five of them indicated that the students were looking forward to jobs as government agricultural technicians or as managers of large estates; they did not envisage using their training as farmers.[39]

Agricultural education at the university level naturally shows similar weaknesses.[40] While government agricultural agencies have devoted considerable effort to the creation of faculties and institutions, enrolment in them averages only 57 per cent of capacity, while most other branches of higher education are overcrowded. In 13 countries in 1958, enrolment in agricultural courses ranged between 6.0 per cent and 0.4 per cent of total higher enrolment, for an unweighted average of 3.1 per cent. A large majority of these students come from the urban middle classes and try to find work in the cities after graduation, especially in the central offices of government agricultural agencies. Meanwhile, the region is equally short of qualified agricultural extension workers and of the detailed information on local soil types, plants, insect pests and many other matters needed for a sound agricultural policy. These deficiencies, in countries of remarkable topographic and climatic diversity, are bound to cause unnecessary waste and disillusionment once large-scale resettlement is undertaken. Such questions of technical information fall outside the scope of this chapter, but their importance cannot be over-estimated. The numerous agricultural specialists needed for the present rural plans can be obtained — and persuaded to go where they are most needed only — if the educational opportunities of rural youth at the primary and secondary level are greatly improved.

The inter-connected rural deficiencies in education, economic opportunities, and institutions for collective action have limited the effectiveness of a number of other rural programmes that are receiving a new impetus from the imminence of agrarian reform.

Several Governments have promoted rural co-operatives over a number of years. The inefficiency of the present urban marketing systems and the hardships worked on

39 Roberto Moreira, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

40 See Alvaro Chaparro, *Un Estudio de la educación agrícola universitaria en América Latina*, Food and Agriculture Organization, Agricultural Studies, No. 48, Rome, 1961.

the small cultivator by his inability to hold his crop off the market to wait for a favourable price indicate their potential value. Successful co-operatives, however, imply competent and dedicated advisers, local officers with some education, and a certain amount of mutual trust and disposition to co-operate. The lack of these prerequisites in much of Latin America has prevented rural co-operatives from attaining a mass membership. In Mexico, where co-operatives have been promoted over a longer period than elsewhere, a recent survey indicates that fewer than half of the more than 10,000 farm co-operatives set up have survived, and that many of these are in poor shape.[41]

Farm credit institutions in most of Latin America have served only the larger landowners. Even the few public credit institutions specifically designed to meet the needs of smaller farmers have not been able to reach the *minifundio* cultivators. The Mexican Banco de Crédito Ejidal, for example, set up to assist the beneficiaries of land reform, after many years of operation by 1959 extended credit to only about a quarter of the *ejidos* — the more prosperous among them.[42] In fact, even if funds were ample and the administrative difficulties of lending money to persons with minute and precarious cash incomes, who are also illiterate and remote from the lending agencies, could be overcome, the small cultivators are more likely to use credits for non-economic purposes than to increase their production.

The supervised credit system initiated in Brazil in 1949 and since extended on an experimental basis, usually with the support of funds from abroad, to a number of other countries, is designed to overcome these difficulties. Under this system, credit is supplied to selected cultivators who agree to follow a production plan. The beneficiaries receive assistance in improvement of home life as well as in agricultural practices and marketing. The costs of such a method, in terms of trained supervisory personnel, are too high for it to be applied to very large numbers of farmers, and its proponents rely partly on the demonstration effect. That is, it is hoped that the success of the first beneficiaries will stimulate their neighbours to imitate them, and that gradually it will be possible to extend loans with less supervision. The method is still in process of evolution and experiment, as its promoters attempt to broaden its influence at lower costs per beneficiary. Some programmes combine more limited supervision by technicians with the organization of local committees of cultivators to administer funds, decide on loan applications, and see that the loans are used for their stated purpose. In Brazil in 1959 the local affiliates of the Associacão Brasileira de Credito e Assistencia rural (ABCAR) had 170 local offices with more than 500 technicians, each technician attending about thirty families. A recent report by the ECLA/FAO Joint Agricultural Division comments: "By its very nature, 'supervised credit' is costly. But as the importance of its educational and formative aspects is appreciable, the educational costs of credit should be set apart, so that they are imputed not to the loan, but to special items in the national budget or to international funds that might be earmarked for this purpose." [43]

Urban trends and programmes

Some proponents of rural social reforms see such reforms primarily as a means of keeping the people on the land. Ominous as many aspects of urbanization in the region may be, however, it would not make sense either economically or socially to aim at immobilizing the growing numbers of underemployed peasants on subsistence holdings, even with the meagre improvements in living conditions that could be attained by self-help on these holdings. In Mexico alone "it is probable that two million peasants could leave agriculture without decreasing either the volume of production or its rate of growth, while permitting those who would remain in the countryside to raise their employment and income levels".[44] Some of the present surplus farm labour can be absorbed into new agricultural areas, but the greater part of the rural population increase can be expected to continue to move out of agriculture, into the towns and cities. This does not mean that the mushroom growth of the national capitals need be accepted as inevitable; the problem is to vitalize and to improve the holding power of the smaller urban centres, without falling into an artificial and over-expensive propping-up of regional economies.

The present chapter has little to add to the discussions of the rapid growth of cities in Latin America presented in the 1957 *Report on the World Social Situation* and the report of the 1959 Seminar on Urbanization in Latin America. The prospect of large-scale external aid for urban programmes suggests that the countries will be able to cope with the social consequences more adequately than in the past, but there is little agreement on the share of resources that should be devoted to the urban infrastructure and urban social services, and little progress towards a healthier distribution of the urban population in cities and towns of varying sizes.

Recent studies confirm earlier warnings that industrialization is not absorbing a satisfactory part of the growth in the urban labour force. The surplus labour continues to take refuge in service occupations of low productivity. This continuing trend is reported even from Mexico, with its relatively high rate of economic growth.[45] In

41 Marco Antonio Duran, *op. cit.*

42 Ramón Fernández y Fernández and Ricardo Acosta, *Política Agrícola Ensayo sobre Normas para México*, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961, p. 126.

43 "An Agricultural Policy to expedite the Economic Development of Latin America", *Economic Bulletin for Latin America*, vol. VI, No. 2. The experience of the Brazilian supervised credit agencies is summed up in Associação Brasileira de Credito e Assistencia Rural, *Reformulação da Politica de Aplicação de Credito Rural em Articulação com a Extensao Rural. Conclusões e Recomendações da I Reunião Nacional de Especialistas em Credito dos Servicos de Extensão Rural e Representantes de Entidades Financiadoras*, Rio de Janeiro, 1960.

44 Edmundo Flores, *Tratado de Economia Agrícola* (Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1961), p. 367.

45 According to a recent analysis, the Mexican economy up to 1955 absorbed the increase in the labour force "as it will continue to absorb many more millions in future years — in semi-subsistence agriculture, trade, domestic and personal service, and other types of marginal employment... much of the increase in the so-called service and white-collar industries in Mexico and elsewhere simply reflects the fact that the population of working age has increased more rapidly than have the job opportunities in industries producing physical goods". (A. J. Jaffe, *People, Jobs, and Economic Development: a Case History of Puerto Rico Supplemented by Recent Mexican Experience*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1959.)

countries where such growth has lagged, the failure of industry to utilize more labour is naturally more pronounced.

The hindrances to industrial expansion stemming from the present characteristics of the urban labour force have been often described. The common pattern continues to juxtapose a shortage of qualified foremen and skilled workers with an excess of persons seeking employment who are not only unskilled but practically debarred from acquiring skills by low education levels, poor physical condition and lack of steady work habits. Even if the educational reforms and other social programmes that are now envisaged throughout the region result in a better qualified labour force, it appears that industry will face a continuing dilemma between increase of efficiency with only slow increases in employment and increases in employment with only slow increases in productivity.

The absorption of surplus labour into the service occupations has kept visible unemployment in most of the Latin American cities at a fairly low level. In some instances, however, the anti-inflationary readjustments of economic policy that have appeared since 1957 have brought about a decline in employment in industry and construction, sometimes accompanied by a reduction in public employment, which could not be absorbed in this way. In Venezuela the President's Message to Congress of March 1962 estimated unemployment at about 280,000 or 12 per cent of the labour force. More than a third of these unemployed were in the metropolitan area of Caracas. Under such circumstances the highest unemployment rates are usually found among construction workers, since the first consequence of an austerity policy is likely to be a collapse in the building boom that has occurred in the larger cities during periods of inflationary economic growth. In Santiago in December 1960, while 7 per cent of the labour force was unemployed, unemployment in construction reached 20 per cent.[46]

The actual composition of employment within the services sector, the economic productivity of the activities carried on within this sector, and the experiences of the workers in it remain very little known. The frequent shifts from one type of job to another and the numbers of persons pursuing more than one occupation at the same time indicate that not only sample surveys but also intensive case histories of single families may be needed to obtain a clear picture of the situation.[47] The large employment in petty trade, home industries, etc., is not solely or simply a result of the inability of industry proper to absorb the available labour. A good many workers undoubtedly prefer the freedom from industrial discipline, the ability to fix one's own hours and rhythm of work associated with the former occupations; a kind of embryonic and undisciplined entrepreneurial spirit may also enter in. A study of factory workers in São Paulo indicated a common aspiration among them to set up small businesses; many of these workers after several years of factory work became intentionally inefficient so as to provoke the management to discharge them and give them the legally fixed severance pay as capital for such businesses.[48]

Hardly any of the major cities have as yet made substantial progress in eradicating the peripheral shantytowns or in improving their housing conditions. The number of persons living in shantytowns has probably increased, although the exhaustion of waste areas open to such settlement and police action to prevent the appearance of new shantytowns have meant that increased overcrowding within them has been more common than expansion of their area. A few cities have experienced new instances of organized occupation of land by large groups of families under political leadership. Low-cost housing projects have, as in the past, done something to alleviate overcrowding among the lower middle classes and better paid workers, but very little for the populations of the shantytowns. In some cases, inflation has brought windfall benefits to the minorities who have managed to receive new housing, by wiping out the value of their fixed rentals or amortization payments. In Chile, according to an official source, housing financed through social security funds has permitted " many employees to enjoy dwelling completely out of range of their real capacities to pay. This is basically a subsidy which the mass of employed persons has paid to a relatively few lucky one ".[49]

While recent observers find some evidence of improvement in other aspects of living conditions among the urban working classes, particularly in the range of durable consumers' goods they possess, it is generally agreed that their housing, on the average, is becoming worse.

In Venezuela, a country previously able to afford more low-cost housing construction than any of its neighbours, the results of the policy followed up to 1959 — construction of huge apartment blocks for rental to low-income families — have not been encouraging. It has proved nearly impossible to collect rents from the occupants; the expected funds for further construction have thus dried up; new shantytowns have appeared around Caracas; and the apartment houses have become fortresses of the most aggressively discontented part of the city population, including many unemployed.

The urban housing situation offers some hopeful aspects. In the first place, pilot projects have provided considerable experience in the adaptation of self-help housing methods to urban conditions, and housing agencies now envisage a considerable expansion of such projects as one method of spreading their resources to meet the needs of families who cannot afford amortization payments for the types of housing provided up to the present. In Mexico City, a large-scale programme has been envisaged that would offer the many thousands of families who have housed themselves in *colonias proletarias* the alternatives of improving their present dwellings or of demolishing them and building better houses on the same sites, using

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46 Instituto de Economía, Universidad de Chile, *Ocupación y Desocupación, Gran Santiago — Iquique — Antofagasta — La Serena — Coquimbo — Concepción, Diciembre de 1960,* Santiago, 1961.

47 See for example the recent studies by Oscar Lewis reported in *Five Families* (Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1959), and *The Family of Sanchez* (New York, Random House, 1961.)

48 Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes, " Aspects of the Adjustment of Rural Migrants to Urban-Industrial Conditions in São Paulo, Brazil ", *Urbanization in Latin America,* Paris, UNESCO, 1961.

49 Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (CORFO), *Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Económico 1961-1970,* Santiago 1961, p. 108.

materials supplied by central workshops at costs they can afford. Up to the present, however, shortages of funds and questions relating to division of responsibilities among public agencies have delayed action on this promising initiative.

In the second place, the Inter-American Development Bank now offers to the countries housing loans that are to be linked to the adoption of long-range programmes relating construction targets to housing deficits; in practice, a number of loans have preceded the adoption of programmes. The first programmes along these lines that have been announced do not promise any reduction in the numbers of families now living in sub-standard housing. At best, they are expected to keep the deficits from growing. In Colombia, estimates made by the ECLA secretariat indicated a quantitative urban housing deficit for 1961 of 272,000 dwelling units, with a need for construction of 369,000 new units during the period 1961-65 in order to regain even the unsatisfactory relationship of housing supply to urban population existing at the time of the 1951 census. The Colombian development plan, however, envisages only 226,100 new urban units during this period, half of them to be built by the principal public housing agency, the Instituto de Crédito Territorial. In Chile, a need for 448,000 new urban units during the period 1961-70 has been forecast if the housing levels of 1952 are to be regained. The Chilean ten-year plan calls for construction approximately matching this figure.

Neither the employment nor the housing problems of the big cities can be solved within their own boundaries. The potential scale of migration to them is so great that any increase in jobs or in dwellings is likely to be overwhelmed. In fact, a major housing programme, unless it depended mainly on self-help techniques, would increase the demand for unskilled construction labour and thus the attractiveness of the city to migrants. If present trends continue, the Federal District of Mexico and adjoining localities within the metropolitan area will have 15 million people by 1985 and will account for 60 per cent of national industrial production. Other national capitals may grow in similar proportions. The problems of physical organization of such super-cities — provision of water, transport, sewerage, food supplies — will be formidable at best. Most of the countries now favour some degree of industrial decentralization, and several have called in advisers on regional planning. The main factor promoting a limited amount of decentralization at present is the growth of steel industries whose location depends on sources of ore and power rather than on proximity to the concentrated urban market of the capital. Broader plans for decentralization, however, are still on paper.[50] The forces making for concentration of manufacturing (of consumer goods in particular) in the vicinity of the capital cities — closeness to the richest market, to financial institutions, to official agencies, to a large and varied labour reserve, to the ways of living preferred by the managerial class — are very powerful.

The past decade has been a period of rising consumer prices in almost all countries, of rapid inflation in a few. The wage earners have in general lost ground in the struggle to maintain their share of the national income, but through most of the period the impact of inflation on them has been mitigated by policies keeping down the prices of basic foodstuffs (by permitting imports at favourable exchange rates), freezing rents, and freezing transport fares. In more recent years a partial abandonment of such measures, as part of the process of freeing the economies from excessive controls, has led to hardships and some violent protests.

At the same time, some of the Governments have encouraged consumer resistance to price increases, either by publicity (denouncing shops that have raised prices and disseminating names of shops selling at approved prices) as in Chile, or by direct sales to the consumer, as in Mexico. In the latter country an official agency, the Compañía Nacional de Subsistencias Populares (CONASUPO) has the double function of stimulating food production through purchases from small farmers at guaranteed prices and of raising urban consumption levels (CONASUPO represents a reorganization and expansion of an earlier agency with similar functions). A subsidiary of CONASUPO sells food and clothing directly to the public from trucks touring the low-income parts of the Federal District, at prices half or less those in retail shops. CONASUPO has also announced the organization of an administrative council representing all government organizations and decentralized institutions, state as well as national, concerned with improving the standard of living of the poor.[51]

The distribution system for foods and other consumer goods in Latin American cities commonly involves a high mark-up between producer and consumer, and a great deal of waste and deterioration of food along the way. High profits by middlemen are only a part of the reason. The crops of the small cultivator are often bought by village shopkeepers or truck owner-drivers who operate on a small scale, and eventually sold to the consumer by petty shopkeepers or market-women in the cities who must sell at a high mark-up because their turnover is so small. The proliferation of small shops with low turnover is one of the most obvious characteristics of the poorer quarters of Latin American cities. They meet the needs of consumers who are living from hand to mouth, by selling goods in very small quantities and sometimes by extending credit. At the same time they constitute one of the ways in which under-employment is disguised. These small shopkeepers now face difficulties, on the one hand from official action to protect the consumer and, on the other, from the rapidly spreading competition of super-markets and chain stores, organized along United States lines and sometimes by subsidiaries of United States companies. Protest strikes and demonstrations by small shopkeepers are reported here and there and it seems likely that an inevitable improvement in efficiency of the distributive system will sharpen the problem of unemployment and

50 A systematic survey of the implications and prerequisites of decentralization in Mexico has been made by a United Nations adviser. See Paul Lamartine Yates, *El Desarrollo Regional de México*, Mexico City, Banco de México, S. A., Investigaciones Industriales, 1961.

51 The mixture of agricultural price support and urban social assistance functions has been severely criticized. See Ramón Fernández y Fernández and Ricardo Acosta, *op. cit.*, pp. 200-246.

reduce the range of alternatives now open to the city-dweller of the poorer classes.

Integration of social and economic development

Regional endorsement of an agreement such as the Charter of the Alliance for Progress, adopted at the Punta del Este meeting by representatives of nineteen out of the twenty Latin American republics together with the United States, would hardly have been conceivable ten years ago. It reflects a gradual growth of insight into the problems involved in programming, a disillusionment with one-sided solutions, and a fear that the uneven and intermittent economic growth that has been secured up to the present, impressive though it has been in parts of the region, may be violently interrupted because of failure to satisfy the needs of the majority of the people. In this approach to a consensus of informed opinion on the prerequisites for sustained development, the influence of international organizations, in particular the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, has been felt in many ways: primarily through studies throwing light on the realities of the region and testing economic theories against these realities, and through the provision of a common background of experience for the increasing number of policy makers who have served both at the regional and the national level.

The Charter of the Alliance specifies that "progress" shall be evaluated not only through the economic yardstick of *per capita* national income but also through such social yardsticks as infant mortality rates, literacy rates, and *per capita* calorie intake. It sets forth the economic target of a 2.5 per cent annual increase in national income *per capita* together with some quite specific social targets to be reached by 1970: a minimum of six years of primary education for every school-age child, and a five-year increase in life expectancy. Other social targets are presented in more general terms: the national income is to be more equitably distributed; unjust systems of land tenure are to be reformed; productive and well-paid jobs are to be provided for the workers now unemployed; the deficit of housing for low-income families is to be reduced; secondary, vocational and higher education is to be modernized and expanded. Regional meetings of specialists are envisaged to prepare more specific social targets and timetables. The Latin American countries agreed to implant or strengthen systems for the preparation, execution and periodic revision of national economic and social development programmes compatible with the terms of the Charter. They were to submit such long-term programmes within eighteen months after the meeting if possible. The Charter envisages both a mobilization of internal resources for development through fiscal reforms and other measures, and the provision of at least US$20,000 million from sources outside the region during the decade ending in 1970.

The programming goals and techniques that are now winning general acceptance in Latin America have evolved through several decades of trial and error. State intervention and regulation of the economy increased sharply during the 1930s as a reaction to be catastrophic slump in exports that accompanied the world economic depression. Policies of stimulating industrialization through public investment directed by autonomous public corporations appeared a little later. By the late 1940s national "development plans" began to be published. During this period, however, state intervention responded to contradictory pressures and motives. The plans did not in general rest on any clear conception of priorities, available resources, or the inter-relations of different programmes. Even plans that purported to be comprehensive usually consisted of uncoördinated projects. This was particularly true of their social elements, which were often limited to construction of school buildings, hospitals, and housing. The ideal of planning continually conflicted with a tendency to seek protection or freedom of action for specific projects by allocating them to semi-autonomous public bodies with resources not subject to central budgetary control. The result was sometimes an excessively complicated administrative structure and a jungle of regulations not responding to any unified policy. In Argentina, in particular, it is now generally agreed that governmental insistence on "planning" in the period up to 1953 coincided with a disregard of the increasingly serious structural maladjustments in the Argentine economy and the decline of productivity in most sectors. The quality of public administration deteriorated while state intervention in the economy increased, "resulting in the bureaucratic perversion of important aspects of the economic system".[52]

Over the past decade administrators and economists have subjected pseudo-planning and over-regulation to continual searching criticism. Since 1955, economic difficulties and the evident shortcomings of earlier policies have caused the majority of Latin American Governments to move in the direction of "austerity", involving a curbing of public expenditure and an elimination of controls. As the Punta del Este decisions indicate, however, this trend has not led to a rejection of long-term planning and large-scale public investment. Rather, the prerequisites and implications of effective planning are now better known, and it is agreed that such planning calls for administrative simplification and decentralization rather than the reverse.

It is also agreed that planning is a continuing process, requiring adequate information, clearly formulated principles and techniques and a permanent technical staff. The attempts to meet these prerequisites have taken several forms. In some countries the autonomous bodies handling public investments in industry have created their own research and planning divisions, as the Chilean Corporación de Fomento has done. In others, the Central Bank has done so. In Mexico, responsibility for planning has been assigned to the secretariat of the Presidency. The organizational form that has appeared most widely, however, is the autonomous advisory planning agency staffed by technicians, reporting directly to the President or to a permanent planning committee of ministers concerned with economic and social questions. Some of these advisory bodies now have nearly a decade of experience.

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[52] Raul Prebisch in *Economic Growth: Rationale, Problems, Cases*, Proceedings of the Conference on Economic Development sponsored by the Department of Economics and the Institute of Latin American Studies at the University of Texas in 1958, Austin, University of Texas Press, 1960.

International co-operation has strengthened the national planning bodies and encouraged them to widen their interests. Teams of experts from the International Bank, the Economic Commission for Latin America, and other intergovernmental bodies have studied the national economies, usually in co-operation with local planning personnel; advisers from the same sources have assisted in the creation of planning bodies and have worked within them. Advisory groups set up by ECLA in Bolivia and Colombia, some years before the Punta del Este meeting, assisted in preparation of the two ten-year plans which became the first long-term development programmes submitted under the terms of the Alliance for Progress, and similar groups are now being organized in other countries under the joint auspices of ECLA, OAS, and the Inter-American Development Bank. More than 1,000 persons have participated either in short courses on the techniques of development planning offered by ECLA experts in the individual countries or in more intensive courses held since 1952 at ECLA headquarters in Santiago.

One important sequel to the Punta del Este meeting has been the expansion of regional training through the creation of a Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning, to be financed by the United Nations Special Fund and the Inter-American Development Bank. This institute took over in July 1962 the intensive courses previously offered by ECLA. It is expected that the number of annual participants will rise to at least eighty and and possibly to one hundred within two or three years. While the courses up to the creation of the institute concentrated on over-all development programming and on economic questions, in the second half of 1962 special three-month courses on educational planning and health planning were undertaken, and a course on the sociology of development was for the first time included in the general curriculum.

Such an institution promises an unprecedented cross-fertilization of thinking on planning problems, both regionally and between specialists in different economic and social fields. A series of regional meetings dealing with broad policy problems has already made important progress in this direction. The 1959 Santiago seminar on urbanization in Latin America brought together administrators, economists, sociologists, and experts on housing and city planning. The Mexico City Expert Working Group Meeting on the Social Aspects of Economic Development in Latin America also brought together specialists from different disciplines to reach joint recommendations and proposals for future lines of research. The March 1962 Santiago Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development helped economists and educators to develop a framework of ideas on the relationships between their fields and also produced detailed plans for progress toward the educational goals set forth in the Punta del Este Charter.

An Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development, jointly sponsored by FAO, ECLA, the Organization of American States, and the United States Agency for International Development, is now undertaking a regional programme of studies that is to begin with national programmes worked out in collaboration with Governments. The latter programmes are to give priority to projects implying improvement of the living conditions of the lowest-income groups; measures for improvement of rural education, housing, sanitation and nutrition are expected to be included, as well as measures for improvement of systems of production and marketing, agricultural extension, and credit. In its final phase the programme is to seek a co-ordinated agricultural policy for the whole of Latin America in line with the hoped-for regional economic integration.

A few of the Latin American countries have created agencies for the development of specific regions, either because these regions offer exceptional promise for large-scale investment, as with the various river basin development commissions of Mexico and the Cauca Valley Corporation of Colombia, or because they are lagging conspicuously behind the rest of the country, as with the north-east of Brazil. The terms of reference of such agencies are generally in part social, but their budgets have up to the present been too limited to permit them to embark on important social programmes; such programmes are left in the main to the national agencies responsible for them throughout the country, with some help from the regional agencies in construction of buildings. The Superintendencia de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste (SUDENE), however, in 1962 received approval from the Congress of Brazil for a large-scale rural resettlement and industrialization programme, and has been given joint responsibility with the United States Agency for International Development (AID) for the spending of more than US$200 million in the first two years of a five-year plan conprising social as well as economic projects. At the same time, SUDENE is to control an emergency work-relief programme to alleviate the destitution resulting from the latest of the droughts with which the Brazilian north-east has been plagued. Such regional agencies can be expected to gain in importance and in the scope of their social activities; in view of their partial autonomy, co-ordination of their activities with those of national agencies and with national plans is likely to be difficult.

It might be over-optimistic to conclude that the ability to programme effectively has kept pace with the growing urgency of the need to do so. In the early stages of the Alliance for Progress, grants are being made for short-term projects — in particular for urban housing — where deficiencies are particularly conspicuous, before it is possible to determine the place of such projects in comprehensive plans. Inadequacies of information have not been overcome; the basic field research needed for an appreciation of social trends is progressing only slowly. The gradual improvements in coverage and accuracy of decennial censuses visible around 1950 has been followed by some faltering in 1960-1961; several countries have postponed their censuses owing to economic or political difficulties. The obstacles to planning inherent in the social structure, in the public administration, and in political instability are formidable, and the temptation to overcome them by extreme political solutions is ever present. The extent to which the policy-makers can summon up a "will to plan", an acceptance of the sacrifices implied by planning, and a feeling of common interest in different strata of society remains to be seen.

Chapter XII

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Regional problems and social forces

The region discussed in the following pages is hard to delimit. Since its central area is a historic cross-roads and source of cultural diffusion, it is natural that the adjoining countries should exhibit many forms of transition between the traits identified with the "Middle East" and those of southern Europe, central and southern Asia and tropical Africa. This chapter deals with the countries of Arab culture of south-west Asia and the lower Nile valley and also, to the extent that they share in the broader problems of the region, with Cyprus, Israel and Turkey.

The region occupies a middle position not only geographically but also in levels of development — and in the administrative, educational and financial prerequisites for continued development — between the countries of Europe and those of the greater part of Africa and Asia. *Per capita* incomes rise above $US400 per year in only one or two of the countries, but fall below $US100 in very few. The Governments generally play a strong role in economic and social life, with a substantial proportion, sometimes as much as one-third, of national income passing through public channels; an appreciable part of national incomes throughout the region is at present diverted to military expenditure. In most of the countries, internal savings account for the greater part of the capital formation which is promoting economic growth; some countries finance their development from the resources derived from foreign corporate exploitation of their oil, while for the others extensive external aid plays a crucial role. Their arable lands are to a considerable extent covered by cadastral surveys, so that they are administratively able to undertake orderly land reforms; at the same time rural discontent has to date not taken the form of organized protest movements; the several Governments that have undertaken land reform have not had to take precipitate action, but have been able to plan their reforms and execute them in a well-thought-out manner. The renewal of their educational traditions at both the elementary and higher levels has enabled countries of the Middle East to provide much of the professional and most of the administrative talent they require, without as yet obviating the need for considerable external technical assistance. Nearly two-thirds of the children now go to school, although over two-thirds of the adults are still illiterate.

Nearly 99 per cent of the people get their living from about one-fifth of the area, the rest being desert. The precarious agriculture of the region has to support a population which has almost doubled in the last thirty years. Annual rates of increase have risen to 3 per cent in a few countries, and the population of the region as a whole is growing faster than that of any other major region except Latin America.[1] This rate can be expected to rise still higher if, as is probable, deaths among pre-school-age children, which account for more than half of all deaths in most of the region, are reduced. The implications of present and projected population increase for national efforts to raise *per capita* incomes, together with a particularly acute shortage of arable land, has induced one country, the United Arab Republic, to accept the principle of family planning, but this policy shift has been too recent to have had measurable results.

The proportion of the population within the age groups conventionally considered those of "dependency" is naturally high, the relatively small numbers of the aged being offset by the large numbers of youth. In practice, however, the dividing line between the population of working age and the dependent children and old people is not sharply drawn, since society does not rigorously insist on either school attendance or old-age retirement. Thus the United Arab Republic's sample survey of Egypt's[2] labour force in 1957 indicated that the age-group 6-19, which contained 30 per cent of the population, had over 20 per cent of the actual labour force, while the age-group 65 and above, which contained 4 per cent of the population, accounted for 3 per cent of the labour force.

It is generally agreed that under present conditions of production there is not enough work in the region for all who are capable of it. The effective labour force has been estimated at only 30 per cent of the population, whereas a comparison with other regions, taking into account differing age structures, would lead one to expect nearly 40 per cent. The difference would seem to be accounted for mainly by the slight participation of women in directly remunerative work (and by a general underestimate of their participation in family economic activities). Within this relatively small active population, varying numbers of persons able and willing to work are known to be unemployed: 150,000 (33 per cent) permanently so in Jordan, according to recent estimates accepted by the Development Board, and 275,000 (4 per cent)

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[1] See tables 1 and 3 in chapter II for estimated rates within the region.

[2] In this chapter, the term "Egypt" is used when the conditions or developments referred to relate to the period before the union of that country with Syria in 1958, or to the Egyptian region of the United Arab Republic between that year and the secession of Syria in 1961. By extension, the term "Egypt" is also used when the reference is to situations that originated during the periods just mentioned, but are still continuing. The term "United Arab Republic" is used both when the reference is to that political entity between 1958 and 1961, and to Egypt alone since the Syrian secession.

in Egypt on the day of the sample labour survey of 1957. Underemployment is believed to be widespread in view of the long dead seasons in the agricultural cycle and the excessive numbers in various " tertiary " occupations. Estimates made by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and others would suggest that the percentage of the labour force that is underemployed may be around one-fifth in the Arab countries of south-west Asia, less in Turkey and somewhat more in Egypt. In much of this region, however, the long hours and hard work that are the lot of most of its people result only in very low production and sometimes, in a year of drought or flood, in practically no production at all.

Agriculture claims nearly three-quarters of the labour force but yields only about two-fifths of the national product in Iraq, Syria and Turkey; three-fifths of the labour force and three-tenths of the national product in the United Arab Republic; one-half and one-sixth in Lebanon. Income *per capita* in agriculture is thus only one-half or less of income *per capita* in the economy of the region as a whole. Jordan, in which half the labour force is in agriculture and receives half the product, is the only known exception. In any case, the national product from agriculture is subject to wide fluctuations from year to year, owing to the unreliable weather.

On the other hand, in the " tertiary " sector, comprising commerce, communications, transport, utilities and services, one-tenth of the labour force accounts for two-fifths of the national product in Turkey, one-sixth for two-fifths in the United Arab Republic. *Per capita* income in this sector thus reaches the somewhat high ratio of twice the *per capita* income of the economy as a whole, in spite of heavy underemployment in some parts of it. This sector is also the fastest growing, but in a few countries it is matched by manufacturing and the extraction of oil: the share of agriculture in the labour force fell by 7 per cent, while that of services rose by 9 per cent in Egypt in ten years (1947-57) and similar trends are to be found elsewhere. Much contemporary planning is aimed at diverting investment from the agricultural sector to the production of commodities in agriculture and industry.

The proportion of economically active population in the secondary sector (industry) is much the same throughout the region, but the content of this sector and the income it produces vary greatly, depending on the stage of economic development reached by the particular country. Industry, consisting mainly of handicrafts, may represent one-tenth of the economically active population and one-tenth of national product, as in Jordan. Where it is a combination of handicrafts and oil extraction and refining, it may occupy less than one-tenth of the active population (1 per cent in oil itself), but provide three-tenths of the income, as in Iraq; well over half, as in Saudi Arabia; or a still greater proportion, as in the smaller oil-producing countries. Where handicrafts are being supplemented by larger-scale manufacturing, industry may still occupy only one-tenth of the population, but produce one-sixth of the national income, as in Syria, or one-fifth, as in the United Arab Republic.

National efforts to maintain a high level of investment for the purpose of rapidly expanding *per capita* income have met with several difficulties. The inequalities in available funds between the oil-producing countries and the others are well known; Iraq could invest more than 20 per cent of its national income during the 1950s, while in Egypt the most careful and austere planning has been needed to assure investment of about 12 per cent. Political instability in much of the region has been a factor inhibiting domestic investment; it has also promoted capital flight — large sums have been sent abroad. Moreover, the region is dependent, like other developing regions, on forces outside its control, such as world market prices and foreign aid, so that annual rates of growth have fluctuated widely.

Several of the countries passed through years in the 1950s when increase in production fell short of increase in population; in general, however, for the decade as a whole, increased output greatly outstripped population growth.

Much of the investment has not taken the most economically productive forms. In the United Arab Republic, for example, between 1952 and 1954, following land reform, funds previously directed to investment in agricultural land, which it was hoped would help finance industry, went into construction of apartment houses in Cairo and other cities. Such Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti capital as is invested in other Arab countries is believed to find its way mainly into urban land speculation and construction, either directly or by serving as a basis for bank credit.

Rises in *per capita* income have not necessarily meant that the average level of living has risen to a corresponding degree. The structure of the society, the economy and the state in much of the region may prevent that from happening. Income and the power to control its uses are quite unevenly distributed — though, with one or two outstanding exceptions, no more so than in other less developed regions. In Lebanon, where the distribution of income is believed to be less uneven than in most of the other countries, it is estimated that 60 per cent of national income goes to 18 per cent of families, while 50 per cent of families receive only 18 per cent; in other words, a *per capita* income of $US333 (LL.1,000) hides a median income of $US166 (LL.500) per person. In countries where the *per capita* income is only half as high, the distribution is usually more uneven. In Egypt, for example, where the *per capita* income in 1958 was around $120, it was estimated that 52 per cent of the national income accrued to just under 10 per cent of the population.[3] In Syria, where *per capita* income is about $US150 (LS.500), a large share of the value of the crop went to non-farming landlords who owned two-thirds of the arable land before 1958, while profits of the larger industrial establishments amounted to two-and-one-half times their wage-bill in 1956; FAO has commented that " The institutional structure of the Syrian economy... undoubtedly aided the process of economic expansion. On the other hand, these very factors were responsible for inhibiting a balanced growth and for denying to the mass

[3] Groupe d'études de l'Institut d'étude du développement économique et social de l'Université de Paris, " Pression démographique et stratification sociale ", *Tiers Monde*, Paris, July-September 1960 and April-June 1961.

of the people an equitable distribution of the benefits of growth."[4] In the countries that have resorted to public controls and planning of investments, the need for further investment is judged so pressing that the greater part of increases in national income is channelled into investment rather than into immediate improvements in consumption; at the same time, the concentration of such investments in the industrial sector, in which only a small percentage of the population works and in which it may cost $10,000 or more to create one job, limits their immediate impact on levels of living, however much this policy may be justified in the long run.

The pattern of income distribution means that, although the region may perhaps have enough calories to feed its inhabitants, a significant fraction of both the urban and the rural population are unable to afford a nutritionally adequate subsistence diet (which in one "poverty line" study proved to cost about $0.15 per person per day or $50 per year). A recent planning survey, taking into account other subsistence needs besides food, has estimated that approximately one Lebanese in ten has less than $80 per year and may therefore be regarded as destitute (*miséreux*).

The people of this region are not only challenged by a grave economic and demographic situation, but are also passing through a series of major political changes. Nationalism in the Middle East, with its mingling of peoples and numerous minority groups, has developed many distinctive characteristics.

There have been wast dislocations of population. The population movements of the past fifteen years have equalled in scope those which this region underwent during the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, although the casualties have not reached the genocidal proportions which the League of Nations had to face during the Armenian and Greek migrations of forty years ago. Between 1946 and 1960 one half million Jews from Europe and the Americas and an equal number from Africa and Asia have sought new homes in Israel; over 150,000 Turks from Bulgaria migrated to Turkey in 1950-1951. A million Palestinians are now assisted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). Nor can this chapter be regarded as closed so long as present causes of latent hostilities are not removed.

The political insecurity to which this region has long been heir has thus been continued in a new form into the present age, encouraging in business circles a spirit of speculation which is, in any case, common in less developed areas; this speculative spirit seeks quick profit rather than long-term investment, endeavours to keep capital liquid, and scatters resources geographically, preferring commerce to industry and the family firm to the corporate enterprise.

During the past fifteen years, however, many new forces have emerged, including new "technocratic" élites and specialists in mass organization and communication. One of the most important of these has been the military officer corps. The officers have been drawn mainly from classes other than the large landowners and business men. They have intervened in politics, claiming to represent the ideals and needs of the people more broadly than monarchies or than parliaments that reflect the current concentration of economic power and influence. In a region of family enterprises, the army has often been the only large-scale organization: its general staff has taken a professional pride in planning ahead, and keeping abreast of technical change. The intervention of the army in politics has, however, introduced the struggle between competing social interests and ideologies into the officer corps itself.

Although the military has exceptional power in the region, theirs is not the only kind of professional expertise to enjoy increasing influence. A new prestige has come to professionals such as doctors, engineers and technicians, who have the skills required for economic and social development and whose organizations have legal authority to discipline their members; also to the higher civil servants who administer expanding public services. Men with enough social influence to secure election to parliament are therefore no longer the principal source from which policy-making personnel can be drawn. New political parties have arisen, based on sensitivity to unfulfilled popular aspirations for economic and social progress.

In the growing cities, popular opinion has become more articulate and organized. To some extent, a new public of regularly employed clerical and manual workers has been organized by trade unions; the number in whose name the unions speak often greatly exceeds that of their dues-paying members; and they have aimed more at governmental intervention than at direct negotiation with employers or at direct provision of welfare services themselves. At the same time, the population has been widely exposed to audio-visual mass communications media that transcend state boundaries, and especially to a passionate radio discussion of public issues, thanks to the international diffusion of Arabic, as well as to a dramatic film portrayal of standards of living prevalent in more developed countries. The current "mobilization" of the masses has been effected with extremely modest means: radio receivers average one in every ten families in the Arab East (Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria), and one in five in Turkey, and copies of daily newspapers one in five in the United Arab Republic, and (except in Lebanon) less in the other Arab countries.

The conjuncture of all these new forces has been accompanied by a questioning of established parliamentary and constitutional forms and of prevailing doctrines of economic liberalism; by widespread malaise and dissatisfaction; by a conviction that the satisfaction of the private interests of minorities should be subordinated to the general interest; and by a growing belief that there are considerable areas of policy in which it may be desirable to substitute governmental planning for private decision-taking. In particular, the experience of the past fifteen years and the impact of contemporary economic thinking have led gradually to a concentration of attention upon two aspects of national income as subjects for governmental planning. One is the determination of the amount and direction of investment. The other — and

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4 Food and Agriculture Organization, "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: United Arab Republic (Syrian Region)" (Rome, 1959, 59/8/6040), p. I-4.

this is essentially the field of social policy — is the distribution of consuming power, in order to lessen inequalities by facilitating access to land ownership, social security, and health and educational services, as well as by reforming the tax structure.

The past ten or fifteen years have thus represented a critical turning-point in this region. A mission to Syria of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), reporting in 1955, summed up the contemporary crisis in that country, and by extension in much of the region, in the following terms:

> "The Syrian economy has now probably reached a stage in its development at which the government must undertake a more important promotional role. It is unlikely that in the future private enterprise will be able to maintain, unaided, the fast rate of expansion.... In the future, therefore, the aim should be not simply to raise production and national income, but to ensure that all elements in the population share equitably in the benefits of economic development." [5]

An FAO study on integrated development of Mediterranean agriculture and forestry in relation to economic growth has indicated that more than fourteen million new jobs would have to be created in the Near East and North Africa in the twenty years from 1956-75. Assuming that the investment needed to create each new job would average over $5,000, then the total investment required would be of the order of more than $70,000 million and would rise from $1,700 million in 1956 to $5,500 million in 1975.[6]

A report submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly in 1959 indicated that four countries of the Arab East alone would need to invest $7,800 million in the ten years 1960-70 in order to absorb their growing labour force at a low cost of $3,300 per job, and that this figure would have to be raised to $9,500 million if the Palestinian refugees also were to find work.[7]

The policies that call for investment planning are a matter not only of dimensions, but also of direction. Where agriculture offers little or no opportunity for effective employment of a larger labour force — and this is the case in most countries in the region — the increasing population will have to be drawn into industry and services. FAO has therefore envisaged four times as much investment in non-rural sectors as in agriculture, so that effective employment in the non-rural sectors may exceed that in agriculture by 1975.[8] On Turkey's potential development during the years 1956-75 FAO has reported that:

> "It is... a fact that Turkish agriculture does not require one single worker more than it has at present in order to provide a population of 40 million with its food supply.... The inevitable conclusion has been reached that Turkey will only be highly productive by 1975 if, as far as possible, the entire increased labour force is employed in non-agricultural work. ...an almost unachievable programme of industrialization." [9]

The Government of Lebanon has been similarly advised by its planning consultants. The region is thus faced with what is both a threat and a challenge, the more serious because such little industrialization as it has thus far undergone has added to its productivity rather than to its ability to provide employment for its rising population; and instability, government policies and other factors have tended to lessen the inclination of private capital to invest in the expansion of domestic industry, thereby leading to increased governmental assumption of responsibility.

Social programmes and policies

Apart from the considerations reviewed above, the evidence concerning changes in living conditions in this region is largely confined to knowledge of the expansion of services provided by the community for its members. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the rise in *per capita* income that has occurred in most of the countries has benefited the population at large (even though not to a degree commensurate with the rise), both through the expansion of collective services and through an increase in individual spending-power, as is shown by the appreciable increase in *per capita* purchases of several articles of mass consumption, such as sugar, textiles, shoes and glassware.

During the 1950's the region in general made remarkable advances in education and more limited advances in public health and social insurance and gained experience in low-cost housing; but a number of countries made expensive mistakes in physical planning and reached a turning-point in fiscal policy, and engaged in various programmes focused specifically on either rural or urban problems.

Education

Elementary education has now reached more than half the children in the region, although not in all the countries. The enrolment figures have in many instances doubled over each of the past two decades, thus far outpacing the rise in population. Where this has not happened, the reason has been either that the big rise occurred earlier and has now slackened off, as in Turkey, or that it did not begin until the late fifties and is still proceeding.[10] The burden of providing universal primary education in the average Middle Eastern country is half again as great as in the average west European country, in view of the size of the school-age groups in relation to the total population; the relative cost is in fact much

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5 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Syria* (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 23 and 26.

6 Food and Agriculture Organization, *FAO Mediterranean Development Project, The Integrated Development of Mediterranean Agriculture and Forestry in Relation to Economic Growth* (Rome, 1959), pp. 104 and 116.

7 *Official Records of the General Assembly, Fourteenth Session, Annexes,* agenda item 27 (A/4121).

8 "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: United Arab Republic (Syrian Region)", p. 103.

9 FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: Turkey" (FAO, Rome, 1959, 59/8/6251), paras. 549-553.

10 For recent information on enrolment in individual countries see UNESCO, General Conference, eleventh session, "Report on the Educational Needs of the Arab Countries" (UNESCO, 11 C/PRG/2, item 17.112, 12 August 1960).

heavier because the newness of the educational systems means a disproportionate need for capital investment in school-buildings and for teacher-training. Thus, although several of the countries spend a higher proportion of their national incomes on education than do some west European countries, only two or three of the smallest and least typical have reached universal enrolment, and elsewhere the majority of children who do begin school drop out before completing a six-year primary course.

Two major obstacles to universal primary school are the past low valuation placed on schooling for girls among the Moslem majority and the difficulty of penetrating the more remote rural areas. The tradition of Koranic schools has been largely responsible for the high value attached to schooling among the people but, although a small girl might be permitted to attend these schools for a year or two, education did not have the same potential importance for her as for a boy. It is remarkable how rapidly the practice of sending girls to school has spread; while boys still outnumber girls two to one in primary schools and by three to one in the secondary schools, enrolment of girls has been rising much more rapidly than that of boys. In the rural areas, schools reach the villages that are headquarters for administrative units, and thus cater to the more accessible part of the rural population long before they spread to any great extent among the outlying villages.

The Middle Eastern countries have, for the most part, been spared the mistake of over-concentration on elementary education which would have left them without trained leadership. The region has a long tradition of higher education and of secondary education for the minority expecting to proceed to the higher institutions, as well as of elementary Koranic education for wider groups. What is new is that the Governments have taken over from religious institutions the main responsibility for the support of education on all levels and for the setting of standards, with completion of each level certified through state examinations.

During the past decade post-primary enrolment has tripled, and vocational and teacher-training institutions have been considerably expanded. In regard to teacher-training, the United Arab Republic reached a point at which it could afford to raise admission standards from six to nine years of previous schooling, cut back the output (from 9,000 graduates in 1958 to 3,600 in 1960) and provide 3,000 teachers to other Arab countries. Nevertheless, the pressures have been strong for more academic secondary education, giving access to the universities and traditionally attractive occupations, and have meant that part of the expansion of secondary schooling has been in directions hardly reconcilable with sound educational planning. At the same time, the post-primary as well as primary schools continue to rely heavily on dictation and memorization aimed at the passing of examinations. Middle Eastern educators agree that this weakness can be overcome only by training teachers capable of freer methods stimulating intellectual appraisal and analysis among their pupils. Several programmes have relied on schoolteachers for the promotion of adult education in the villages, but in the past the teachers have not had the qualities needed to do so effectively.

An impressive number of new universities have been established and university enrolment has expanded significantly. The United Arab Republic and Turkish state universities are now among the world's largest. The professional faculties of the universities have been developed very unevenly. The relative attractiveness of law is partly an indication of the predominantly individualistic character of society and the role played within it by conflicts of private interest over limited sources of wealth, but is also partly a survival from the epoch when legal training was considered the proper preparation for a public official. In some Middle Eastern countries lawyers have been produced in greater numbers — in relation to population size — thar in the most educationally advanced European countries. On the other hand, faculties of science have provided only a fraction of the personnel needed for teaching science at the secondary and teacher-training levels, and for the scientific research at all levels of which the region stands in need, while the faculties of engineering have not removed the need for extensive contracting of engineering services from outside the region, and angronomists and veterinarians have been produced in dangerously small numbers, except in the United Arab Republic and Israel. The problem of providing appropriate training for potential policy-making civil servants has not been solved. In short, the roles played by the state universities reflect the limited extent to which state planning has grappled with manpower problems in relation to long-term needs, largely perhaps because planning in this region has not yet extended to the perspective of ten to fifteen years needed for the planning of higher education.

Social security

Social insurance has reached this region since the Second World War.[11] The great reforms that occurred in Europe were soon projected into Cyprus, Turkey and, later, Israel, each with its own distinctive characteristics.

Meanwhile, other countries made interim arrangements. Lebanon and Syria threw into the individual employer the liability for separation indemnities, family allowances, and compensation for work injuries, thus obviating almost all need for public administration of the law. Iraq, again, created a provident fund in which each worker has his own account and from which he can draw small sums to meet pressing emergencies, and the remainder — either in a lump sum or in periodic payments — in the event of death, old age or invalidity; this was envisaged as providing necessary experience prior to introducing social insurance. Both approaches made provisions for lump sums which would permit the recipient, on giving up work as an employee, to set up in business for himself; for this remained a region where the self-employed outnumbered the employed, with a corresponding preference for capital sums over pensions.

Starting in the 1930's, Egypt initiated various schemes of insurance against work accidents and occupational

[11] International Labour Organisation, Regional Conference for the Near and Middle East, Teheran 1950, Report III, *Social Security;* ILO Seminar on Social Security, Prague, 1959, Papers and Report.

diseases, and in 1955, after deciding to wind up an unworkable non-contributory assistance scheme started a few years previously, it introduced social insurance that has gradually been extended until in June 1962 it covered about 1 million persons employed in commercial and industrial establishments of all sizes. Here — as also in Syria and Turkey — financing of old-age pensions on an actuarial basis has meant that there are extremely few beneficiaries during the early years, while the Government finds the insurance reserves a useful new source of forced domestic saving, especially since contributions amount to more than 20 per cent of wages.

In Israel, however, where a mandatory old-age insurance scheme covering the whole population (except housewives) was enacted in 1953, the high maximum entrance age and the very short qualifying period required for the receipt of benefits have resulted in a rather large redistributory effect, beginning shortly after the system was inaugurated.[12] The national insurance scheme in Israel was preceded by voluntary insurance schemes which it replaced to a certain degree.[13]

In most of the region the needy continue to depend for relief on the religious obligation of charity, which remains generally binding. A United Nations-Arab League seminar ten years ago discussed with approval the possibility of channelling this obligation into modern forms of mutual aid,[14] but most of the countries have found no alternative to continued tolerance of begging.

Health

The major health problems of the Middle East continue to be the infectious and parasitic diseases characteristic of predominantly youthful and rural populations with low incomes, poor communications, low standards of environmental sanitation and limited access to modern health services. Bilharziasis has spread with irrigation. Trachoma remains endemic, as do dysenteries and enteric fevers. Worm infestation is wide-spread. Tuberculosis is reported by the World Health Organization (WHO) to be gaining ground in densely populated rural areas; and methods of control demonstrated at Damascus and in Tunisia have not been generalized, through lack of the necessary health services. In many agricultural areas, almost every inhabitant is the carrier of several preventible diseases. Forms of preventive medicine other than mass inoculation and mass spraying seem to await the organization of an appropriately staffed health service network, capable of identifying and treating the carriers of preventive disease and raising the sanitary standards of the population. Progress has been significant during the past decade in the training of physicians, nurses, sanitarians and other para-medical personnel needed for health work. The increase in availability of health personnel has not, however, as yet made a very marked impact on the prevalence of endemic diseases, with the exception of malaria, which has already been eradicated in a few of the smaller countries, and which is expected to disappear by 1965 from Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria.

The health services in many areas have undoubtedly been hampered by the importation of practices and organizational forms not suited to local conditions. For example, a seminar on maternal and child health in the Eastern Mediterranean region, sponsored by the WHO Regional Office, has said of infant welfare centres established for purposes of health education:

> "Unfortunately this pattern of separate preventive and curative work has been copied in other parts of the world where practically no general practitioner services or hospital treatment for children exist. In such circumstances this separation is undesirable and impracticable. To spend valuable time and personnel encouraging and advising with respect to 'well babies', while refusing attention to the sick, is a denial of all ethics — human and medical. It is incomprehensible to the community and can only result in misunderstanding and waste." [15]

Social aspects of fiscal policy

The Governments of this region, as of others, have used fiscal policies as a way of encouraging social and economic change along certain lines rather than others. From the 1920's to the 1950's, the effects of fiscal policies — which were not necessarily the effects aimed at by the Governments concerned — favoured the concentration of wealth and income, the expansion of the cultivated area regardless of long-term consequences, and the expansion of the tertiary sector. Attempts were also made to encourage long-term productive investment in agriculture and industry by exempting equipment and raw materials from customs duties, granting rebates on income and other taxes to new enterprises, offering cheap credit and other means; but the effect of such measures, although appreciable, fell short of expectations.

More recently, a policy of controlling spending power has been effected, principally through changes in the pattern of direct taxation, associated with the reduction or abolition of the traditional land or crop tax, and the comcomitant or subsequent introduction of more progressive income taxes.

Fiscal practices have favoured two categories of influential income-recipients. The one is the landholder: income derived from the land has been subject to low tax rates or, in Iraq, Jordan and Syria, to tax immunity, rather than to rebates that would encourage investment in increased productivity. The other privileged category has consisted of self-employed persons in commercial and service occupations, in so far as administrative procedures have not been adequate to prevent tax evasion; in one country, non-reporting of income has been estimated at 75 per cent in private business and 90 per cent in the

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12 Dr. G. Lotan, *Social Insurance in Israel* (Jerusalem, National Insurance Institute, 1960), p. 8.

13 *Ibid.*, p. 27.

14 *Third United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for the Arab States in the Middle East* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 54.IV.9), pp. 33-36.

15 *Report of the Seminar on Maternal and Child Health in the Eastern Mediterranean Region, Cairo, Egypt, 25 November-7 December 1957* (WHO, Regional Office for the Eastern Mediterranean Region, Alexandria, 1958), p. 42.

liberal professions.[16] Income tax has therefore fallen mainly on employed persons, including public servants and corporate business, much of which is foreign. Taxes on inheritance have also been generally low, thus making wealth an hereditary privilege.

Meanwhile indirect taxes have continued to fall on such necessities as salt, matches and, in some countries, building material and local agricultural produce, thus being largely regressive. At the same time they have fallen on a widening range of conventional necessities and amenities, such as many imported goods and various means of public and private communication and transport, thus becoming progressive to the small middle sector of the population that achieves some degree of relative comfort without, however, transferring to public use any significant part of the spending-power of the wealthy few.

Fiscal privilege thus helped produce the situation against which the revolts of the last fifteen years have taken place. Agrarian reform in some countries (see below) has put a limit to large holdings. Nationalization of commodity marketing in the United Arab Republic has also constituted a drastic reaction from previous under-taxation of the tertiary sector, significant parts of which were largely in non-Egyptian hands.

Fiscal policy has not yet been systematically used in the regions as an effective tool of integrated economic and social development planning, although this is beginning to be considered, as in Lebanon, chiefly as a liberal alternative to the more direct forms of state economic action adopted in the United Arab Republic and some other countries in the region.

Social development planning

The kind of economic liberalism pursued in countries of this region ten years ago did not preclude the gradual building up of social programmes. Education and other social services were slowly extended, and constituted the principal way in which a broad middle section of the population benefited from such expansion as may have occurred in national income. Most countries of this region have now adopted a policy of governmental development planning which, to a greater or lesser extent, combines social policy with economic policy or provides the opportunity for such combinations. The actual extent to which over-all planning has been done varies considerably among the countries. Some of the plans, such as those in the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Turkey, are of a comprehensive type covering the various economic and social sectors and setting up specific targets or objectives in each field. In other cases, the plans thus far amount to little more than a collection of projects, mainly for investment in infrastructure, or cover only certain economic sectors. In some countries, the planning machinery exists mainly on paper and, where it has been more fully put into effect, it is largely staffed by economic planners. Social development planning as such, with the exception in some cases of education and health, is only beginning in most countries in the region. Social planning tends to be seen as a task separate from over-all development planning, and social projects are frequently added to development plans because of pressure by the ministry concerned, rather than as a result of a careful study of the requirements for investments in human resources in relation to the plan as a whole.

The 1950's have represented a transitional phase in which Governments, after gaining experience in the planning of piecemeal programmes, have moved in the direction of planning development in its entirety. National development plans are being constructed according to what have now become standard economic models. Thus, the United Arab Republic aims at a 40 per cent, and Jordan and Syria at a 50 per cent, increase of gross domestic product in five years, and Iraq at doubling its non-oil income. Turkey envisages an annual growth rate of 7 per cent (i.e., in the aggregate, 100 per cent in ten years) by investing 14 per cent of gross domestic product plus external aid. All plans having social objectives aim at a more equitable spread of increased income, even while meeting the first pressing need for savings. They also aim at increased work opportunities as well as increased production. It must be noted, however, that the growth-rate sought in production and, therefore, the investment rate required tend to be higher than those regarded by some observers as feasible, that they depend on considerable external and private investment (25 per cent and 35 per cent respectively in Syria, 50 per cent and 35 per cent in Jordan) and that the investment rates are indeed so high as to make difficult an increase in private consumption in the near future, although an appreciable increase is envisaged in the plans.

The chief social effect of the plans must be sought in the provision of jobs and the expansion of development-connected social programmes; in the reduction of great wealth by expropriation and taxation; and in the growth of social insurance funds, production and marketing co-operatives, and various forms of local community action.[17]

Planning has greatly stimulated both social and economic research, particularly statistical research. In some countries there was already a foundation on which to build, especially where, as in Egypt, there was a well-established tradition of state administration, but research had now to provide the new information needed everywhere for planning. Emphasis was placed on national accounts and labour-force statistics, while demography acquired a new practical importance. Nevertheless, the Middle East remains a region in which the exact knowledge needed for accurate planning is particularly scarce. Most social research has up to the present been carried out or commissioned by government agencies. The region is particularly weak in independent social or sociological surveys, although some universities have begun to undertake them.

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16 B. Higgins, *Commerce du Levant* (Beyrouth), 15 February 1961.

17 For details on planning trends in the region see *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1959-1961, Supplement to World Economic Survey 1961* (United Nations publication, Sales No: 62.II.C.2); *Report of the Conference on the Social Aspects of Development Planning in the Arab States* (ST/TAO/SER.C/55; ST/SOA/SER.T/2); and United Nations "Planning for Balanced Social and Economic Development in the United Arab Republic" (to be issued later).

RURAL SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

The rural population constitutes between one-half and four-fifths of the total population of countries of this region. Concerning its social conditions, information is particularly scanty and special studies are scarce. It is difficult to know the extent of general improvement during the past decade in rural cash incomes, diet or housing, although there are some indications of changing patterns of consumption — purchases of plastic articles, sewing-machines, hurricane lamps, clothing, etc., which may be offset by a decline in hoarding.

Incomes are undoubtedly very low. As noted above, *per capita* income among the agricultural population is much lower than in the economy at large. Among the rural working population alone, without counting rent- or share-receiving landlords, the FAO Mediterranean studies have suggested $28 *per capita* in Iraq [18] and $80 to $90 in Syria.[19] As regards family incomes, for a typical crop-sharing family in Iraq the IBRD mission estimated annual cash income at $28-55, and commented: "Life is not far above the subsistence level and must often be below it." [20] A recent survey of the East Jordan valley by the Government's statistical office suggests that the annual income of farm families averaged $375 before paying rent and $125 afterwards. A study published by the Economic Research Institute at Beirut suggests $133 as median family income in villages in the Bigaa, and $95 as median indebtedness. The average income of an Egyptian family working a one-hectare farm is estimated at $140. Daily wages of farm labourers in the more favoured parts of the Arab East fluctuate around $1, and most labourers are employed only part of the year;[21] since the combination of winter rains and summer drought permits agricultural work during only half the year, except in the irrigable river valleys, rural underemployment has always alternated seasonally with overwork. Rainfall is capricious: in Jordan and Syria, the 1958/59 wheat crop was only one-third that of the previous year; in some countries, nearly half the sheep have died in years when the rains have failed, and in 1961 a particularly severe drought in eastern Anatolia forced Turkey to introduce large emergency shipments of wheat from the United States.

The dimensions of agricultural production in this region are not accurately known, but are certainly subject to wide year-to-year fluctuations. According to FAO, estimates, *per capita* food production for the region as a whole has increased somewhat over pre-war figures. Crop production, however, has apparently declined *per capita* in the United Arab Republic; elsewhere it has definitely increased *per capita* in Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Turkey, but in the last-named only at the long-term cost of cultivating steppe pasture lands, with danger of serious erosion. Meanwhile the region has become a net importer of grain, with quite heavy dependence on grain imports in a number of the countries. Livestock production has simultaneously declined *per capita* in nearly all countries of the region, compared with pre-war production.

In many areas, demographic pressure on limited land resources has enabled landlords and middlemen to increase rents to levels that represent a higher rate of return than that prevailing in more developed countries. An extreme instance is found in the East Jordan Valley, where rents are now estimated to be two-and-a-half times as high a fraction of farm income as before the influx of refugees.

The low rural incomes of this region are also attributable to low output per worker. FAO has therefore proposed programmes of heavy investment to raise the output per man-unit effectively employed in agriculture by one-third in twenty years (1956-75). The possibility of success of so costly yet modest a programme depends, however, on a considerable array of changes needed for making a more effective use of capital, labour and natural resources.

Indebtedness has become wide-spread with the monetization of the economy, but constitutes a different problem according to whether the debtor is a labourer, a small cultivator, or a medium or large landowner. The principal security that a labourer can offer is his ability, and that of his family, to work to pay off a debt; and this tends to bind him to the employer who gives him an advance on his wages. The principal security that a small cultivator can offer is his share of the crop; and during the hungry months on the eve of harvest, when prices for supplies are highest, he may have to sell his crop in advance to a trader at a discount on the low post-harvest price. His problem of seasonal credit has been met by institutional marketing in certain localities where he can keep an account with a marketing institution, such as an Egyptian agrarian reform co-operative, or the Turkish grain-marketing corporation, or where there are village credit co-operatives, as in one-quarter of the villages of Jordan. His problem of medium-term credit has been approached through "supervised credit", which has now been made available in nearly all Egyptian villages, and is being introduced in Jordan by collaboration between the agricultural and co-operative services. Only a landowner can borrow on the security of real estate, at a low cost, from a bank, and government agricultural banks in Syria, Turkey and formerly in Egypt have helped to finance the development of large enterprises (some of which have been slow in honouring their debts to public institutions). Small landowners, however, have been able to make little use of bank credit, partly because they have less possibility of using tractors and pumps bought on credit, but partly also because they have been protected by law against borrowing on the security of their homesteads; thus a land reclamation holding cannot be mortgaged in Iraq without ministerial consent. Governmental, co-operative and other institutional credit has therefore accounted for only part — in pre-1958 Syria about perhaps one-half — of agricultural credit, and has proved

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18 "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: Iraq" (Rome, 1959, 59/8/6039), chap. II, p. 27.

19 "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: United Arab Republic (Syrian Region)", chap. II, p. 32.

20 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Iraq* (Baltimore, 1952), p. 133.

21 According to information available to the International Labour Office, the minimum wage of Egyptian agricultural workers was 18 piastres ($0.50) a day in 1959, and the average number of days worked was 150 to 220 per year, depending on weather and province (ILO, *Labour Survey of North Africa*, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 60, Geneva, 1960), p. 70.

useful mainly to landowners. In spite of the prevalence of rural indebtedness, institutional agricultural credit remains small in relation to output, and is one of the prerequisites for higher farm-family income. Some observers have come to feel that the traditional systems of non-institutional credit, provided mainly by merchants and large landowners, deserve a more sympathetic assessment than they have received in the past, and that in any case such credit will continue to be important for years to come. They point out that rural people (and even city workers) continue to patronize private money-lenders even where credit from state-managed co-operatives has become available. The reason is that the high interest is seldom collected in full but represents a sort of give-and-take between lender and borrower in which the lender often acts as a lifetime adviser, capitalist associate, and source of aid in emergencies. Evidence is insufficient to determine whether this picture or that of the grasping usurer is more representative.

According to FAO estimates, the average country-dweller gets 75 per cent of his calories from cereals in Turkey, and 70 per cent in the United Arab Republic; and in some localities dependence on cereals is considerably above the average. In oases and river valleys, and on coastal plains and windward mountain slopes, cereals have long been supplemented with fruits and vegetables, the production of which has been greatly increased by irrigation in recent years. These crops, however, have been grown largely for income from the urban and foreign market, rather than for improvement of the low-income producer's diet; serious dietary deficiencies have been found among mothers and children, even in some of the most productive and most intensively cultivated areas. On the wheat farms of the steppes and inland plains, diet supplementation has been most uncommon, so that a technical revolution substituting intensive for extensive, and mixed for one- or two-crop farming, and developing horticulture and livestock as well as agriculture, has to be considered for the sake of the people's nutrition as well as for the conservation of the soil and as a corollary of the break-up of the larger landed properties.

The three principal types of dwelling in the rural parts of the Middle East are the goat-hair tent of the nomad, the stone house of the fruit-growing villager of the hill country and the mud hut of the cultivator of the plains. The tent has not been the subject of public programmes for its improvement, nor has the stone house, except in earthquake-stricken areas such as Lebanon. The hut of the cultivator, by far the most numerous in the region, has been the subject of a few experimental projects but no national programme. The hut as such has been well described in a recent Jordanian official survey:

> "The favoured building material has been mud brick.... It is material which is well suited to the needs of the people. The earth which is used can often be obtained free and is usually available near the building site. It is easy to work and construction is refreshingly free of complications, care being needed only to ensure that the walls are reasonably vertical. The final product, with a roof of rushes and reeds supported by poles, is a house which need not be unpleasant and is well insulated from the sun in summertime. If in winter the foundations are sometimes eroded by floods, they can usually be repaired at little cost. There is no sign that the house is not durable.... In short, it is a house which offers adequate shelter and can be erected quickly and at little cost. If need be, it can be abandoned with little regret." [22]

The cultivator's housing thus costs him little or nothing. Often, however, he is insecure in his tenure, for his house may be neither owned nor rented, but occupied with permission of the landowner, which may be withdrawn any time. What matters, moreover, is not only the house and its tenure, but also access to a safe water supply, an orchard of a few trees, a garden where the housewife can supplement the field crops, accommodation for livestock, and a source of inexpensive domestic fuel that will allow the cow dung to be used to manure the garden.

The basically insanitary character of the villages of the cultivators has been singled out as the most important obstacle to health in the rural Middle East. After five years of experimentation at Qalyub (the United Arab Republic), a Rockfeller Foundation team reported:

> "Under the present situation in the villages, it was possible to improve sanitation only through installation of water supplies and latrines. Such installations in a village, without parallel improvement in housing, social and economic status, do not appear to have a marked effect upon the death rate in infants and therefore presumably little or no effect on the rate of dysenteries in infants.
>
> "Fly control will prevent the spread of acute eye diseases and will lower the dysentery and the infant mortality rates. However, it has been shown that fly control by insecticides cannot be maintained for a period of over two years. Basic fly control through improvement in handling manure and control of other breeding areas cannot be achieved under the present conditions of housing and of handling animals and manure for the fields.
>
> "Overcrowding and poor ventilation and lighting are probably major factors in the spread of tuberculosis and no real improvement can be made in the present villages.
>
> "It would appear that the only possibility of improvement must be that of rebuilding villages along sanitary lines, with arrangements for separating the animals from the living quarters of the villagers. Such a process will be costly and must necessarily be a long-term programme extending over many decades and co-ordinated with educational, economic and social improvements." [23]

Such social security as a countryman in this region enjoys comes from his membership in an extended family. In most villages, each conjugal family is a separate household; but each set of paternally related households forms a single great family, whose head represents it in the village council of elders, and whose members help one another — sometimes even to get an education and to migrate (the migrant sending back remittances). Only

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22 Jordan, Department of Statistics, *The East Jordan Valley, a social and economic survey* (Amman, 1961), p. 114.

23 J. W. Weir *et. al.*, "Evolution of health and sanitation in Egyptian villages", *Egyptian Public Health Association Journal* (Cairo, 1952), No. 27, p. 55.

in Cyprus and Israel are all rural families covered by modern forms of social security. In the absence of newer ways of spreading risks and providing against old age and infirmity, the countryman has had no alternative but to beget sons and cling to his relatives.

Agrarian reform

The principle of private ownership of rural land outside the built-up area of the village has prevailed in the Middle East only within the past century, replacing the earlier conception of the State as owner. During the period of European rule and the first generation of independence after the Ottoman Empire, holdings were registered largely by the *zaïm*, the locally influential men who traditionally acted as intermediaries between the cultivators and the Government. Ownership became increasingly concentrated and increasingly identified with political influence. In half the countries, this concentration of land-ownership was the most important factor in the power structure in 1950; by 1960 it had lost much of its importance. Change has been facilitated by the fact that the landowners have not been a hereditary aristocracy or gentry with long-recognized ownership rights, but at the same time has been retarded by rural dependence on the intermediary role of the *zaïm*.

The change began in Egypt as one of the first acts following the revolution of 1952. A maximum of 80 hectares was set to the size of a person's property plus some additions on behalf of close family members. Any excess that had not been disposed of by a certain date was expropriated with compensation (seventy times annual land tax, and about half the prevailing market price); a High Committee (later a Ministry) of Agrarian Reform thus became responsible for distributing 175,000 hectares or 7 per cent of the cultivated area of Egypt. The distribution was effected by selling lots to 160,000 cultivators, who did not already own two hectares and who were ready to accept certain conditions in order to obtain ownership, such as a prohibition on subdividing their new property among their heirs, and an obligation to join a management co-operative. This "supervised co-operative" proved to be the cardinal innovation of Egyptian land reform: it permitted many small properties to be operated as one large unit, whereas previously some big properties had operated as many small units; it thus maintained productivity at at least as high a level as before the reform and in some instances raised it. It also gave each land-reform village a new communal organ, the co-operative, which was able not only to manage production and marketing, but also to retail household supplies and provide many common non-economic services. It has to be added that the Egyptian reformers had certain advantages that were lacking in other countries: every inch of cultivated land was already meticulously surveyed and recorded as well as valued for tax purposes, and there was a supply of university-trained agronomists.

In the United Arab Republic's "second revolution" of 1961, the maximum for individual ownership was reduced to 40 hectares. The Ministry of Agrarian Reform had also by now been called upon to manage or distribute small areas expropriated from foreigners, large areas of state domain, and larger areas belonging to endowed foundations, amounting to another 120,000 hectares. On the half of the cultivated land that continued to be leased, an effort was made to erect legal barriers to the pressure of owners on tenants. Leases were therefore made legally enforceable only in so far as they were in writing, gave three years' security of tenure, limited rent to seven times the annual land tax and, from 1961, applied to an area not exceeding 20 hectares. Circumvention of these prescriptions was made a penal offence. It is estimated that cultivators of land rented from large and small owners were thus saved about one-third of the rent they had previously paid. Land-tenure reform has coincided with other processes to bring a great diminution in the size of the average holding in Egyptian agriculture. The prohibition of perpetual family trusts, and a feeling that there was more security in urban than in rural real estate, have also contributed to the break-up of family estates. The combined effect of these various processes is seen in the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY SIZE OF HOLDINGS, UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC (EGYPT), 1952, 1959 AND 1961

Size of holding (hectares)	*Percentage of total cultivated land*		
	1952	*1959*	*1961*[a]
0-1.9	35.5	57.8	50.7
2-79	44.7	36.3	49.3
80 up	19.8	5.9	—

[a] Anticipated results of 1961 reform.

SOURCE: ILO, Labour Survey in North Africa and National Bank of Egypt, *Economic Bulletin* No. 3, 1961.

The revolutions of 1958 saw the extension of land-tenure reform to Syria and Iraq. In Syria, the same maximum was established as in Egypt in the case of irrigated land, and a new maximum of 300 hectares for rain-fed land, plus allowances for family members. Owing to the slowing down of cadastral surveys about 1940, there was at first great uncertainty as to the area to be covered by these reforms, which proved eventually to be about 1,500,000 hectares or 30 per cent of the cultivated area, expropriated from about 3,200 owners who still retained an equal area within the legal maxima.

Numerous other problems which had not been encountered in Egypt arose in Syria. Uncertainty as to the distinction between irrigated and rain-fed land led to the contesting of many expropriations before the agrarian reform courts, resulting in delays in making final distributions and inability to do more than lease land provisionally to former tenants. By June 1961, while 670,000 hectares covering 678 villages had been expropriated, only 148,000 had been distributed to 14,000 families. The elimination of the landlord class has raised certain problems of credit and marketing for which previous Syrian experience offered no immediate solution. An effort has been made to replace the managerial function of landlords by co-operatives. In any case, the mere fact of no longer having to pay rent to landlords has substantially increased the income of beneficiary families.

In Iraq, the maxima adopted were more generous to the landlord than in Syria. The irrigated maximum was set in 1958 at 250 hectares, so as to permit private high-

lift pumping, and the rain-fed maximum at 500 hectares. On this basis, the Government expropriated 1,360,000 hectares (or one-eighth of the area cultivated from time to time) from about 4,000 owners, who still retained an equal area within the legal maxima for individual holdings. Iraq was fortunate in having its own agricultural and veterinary colleges; but it had no service with the requisite experience for organizing co-operation and credit in the way that was needed, and the rough land survey made thirty years earlier when land rights were settled required extensive supplementing. In four years (1958-1962) some 686,000 hectares were distributed to about 60,000 families, mainly out of expropriated land, but partly by rounding this out from state domain.

Integrated field services

The co-ordinated extension of social programmes into rural areas became the essence of the only other rural programme of comparably large dimensions — that of the United Arab Republic for covering the country with "combined units". A separate budget for capital investment permitted the construction and staffing of 250 such units by 1957. They brought the field personnel of the Ministries of Health and Social Affairs, as well as of Education, into closer contact with the villagers. On the other hand, they posed serious administrative problems concerning the relationships between the three ministries involved, between these and other ministries such as those of agriculture and agrarian reform which were not represented in the units, between the "combined units" and Cairo, and between the "combined units" and the local population. They were not focused on specific problems, such as adding to the effectiveness of agrarian reform. Local people were not asked to make any contribution towards the construction or operation of the combined units, thus departing from the principle previously applied of inviting them to take primary responsibility for village improvement associations and centres. These problems were met in 1960 by creating new administrative zones, each representing the radius of action of a combined unit, somewhat widely interpreted; putting each zone under an administrator with his own budget; associating with him a committee of local political leaders; and empowering him to co-ordinate the field agents of all ministries, including those in the combined unit. Various steps were also taken to link the units more closely with the village councils. In Israel, in the Negev region, the programme of establishing cantonal centres with facilities for tractor service, intermediate schooling, health and social services, and local government and administration, has been expanded to cover newly settled areas. Each such centre services a number of surrounding rural communities with their own kindergartens and elementary schools.

Land reclamation

It is at some peril that man has extended the area of cultivation from time to time, and especially since mechanization enabled him to "mine" the less productive rain-scarce steppe. In Syria, FAO has recommended "the return to grazing of some 200,000 hectares of dry steppe land which has been brought under cultivation but is submarginal for farming";[24] and the Syrian development plan for 1960/65, going even further, proposed to withdraw from cultivation 365,000 hectares of land with a rainfall of less than 250 millimetres. In Turkey, FAO reported that "plowing of the poor steppe pasture has far exceeded safe limits"; that the area under the plow is 50 per cent greater than can be plowed without danger of serious erosion; that the livestock population of what remains of the steppe pastures has been increased by 50 per cent in the past twenty years; and that food production has been imperilled.[25]

Under some circumstances, careful irrigation and drainage have made it possible for growing populations to eke out a livelihood for a time in once desert areas. In the Nile valley, perennial irrigation has had this effect during the past century; during the 1950's productivity per hectare was even further increased. Such success, however, has been both precarious and exceptional. "An unsound system of irrigation, especially of intensive summer irrigation, represents a deadly threat to the productivity of the soil", FAO has reported.[26] With reference to Iraq, FAO further stated that:

> "The Haigh Commission (1949) estimated that about 60 per cent of the irrigated areas have been affected by salt, and the IBRD Mission that 20 to 30 per cent of the land under irrigation has been abandoned owing to salt, and that yields on the rest of the land have declined by 20 to 50 per cent. According to the FAO soils expert, salinity now affects as much as 70 to 85 per cent of the irrigated area."[27]

Action to ensure that new land is brought into cultivation and ruined land reclaimed in ways to keep it permanently productive is likely to be for long one of the most important contributions of government to development in the Middle East. Land reclamation presents the opportunity to involve the cultivators in a new development programme and to create new forms of community life where the resistance of an established institutional structure would be absent. In fact, this opportunity has been realized only to a very small extent. Land reclamation projects have been conducted under centralized administration, and have been lacking in social research, in planning and in disposition toward innovation. The traditional forms of community life have therefore been reproduced in most of the new settlements. In various instances, no provision has been made to group settlers in organized village communities, to set them up with capital by hiring them collectively to lay down drainage, to make sure that they were agriculturists, or to limit the land to what a family could till. Reclamation projects have been carried out in a large number of countries of the region, but they have been conceived and executed primarily as engineering projects, with inadequate attention to various social problems.

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24 "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: United Arab Republic (Syrian Region)", chap. I, p. 15.

25 *Ibid.*, "Turkey", paras. 8-257.

26 *FAO Mediterranean Development Project, The Integrated Development of Mediterranean Agriculture and Forestry in relation to Economic Growth*, p. 128.

27 "FAO Mediterranean Development Project — Country Report: Iraq", chap. 3, para. 37.

Rural administration

The United Arab Republic reorganized local administration in 1960, re-dividing Egypt into twenty-five rural and urban *muhâfazahs* (prefectures), each under a *muhâfiz* (prefect) equal in rank to the under-secretary in charge of a ministry and entrusted with considerable powers of decision. These *muhâfazahs* were in turn subdivided into 350 newly created cantonal entities, each covering the zone served or to be served by a combined unit, in the hope of effecting the co-ordinated planning and operation of all field services. At each level appointive councils were also created, bringing together officials and leading local members of the National Union.

Meanwhile, the Arab countries of south-west Asia continue to live under the Ottoman local administration laws of one hundred years ago, as amended after the First World War. In Iraq, the *liwas* (departments) have received considerable grants-in-aid which have enabled the *mutasarrifs* (prefects), in consultation with their general councils, to extend education and other services. In Jordan, after about one-third of the customary village councils had been supplemented by informal community development committees, the Ministry of the Interior through its sub-prefects promoted the election and incorporation of statutory village councils, while the Ministry of Social Affairs through *liwa* agents has promoted village credit co-operatives and the Ministry of Agriculture through *liwa* teams, *qada* supervisors and village agents has promoted agricultural improvement committees.

The nomads of the arid zone

The southern frontier across Saharan Africa and Arab Asia is a truly arid zone, where man was able to survive only by maintaining flocks of camels, goats and sheep, which he accompanied on their yearly migrations. In the great demographic change of recent generations, the ratio of nomadic to sedentary population has been drastically reduced. In Iraq, in 1905 more than one person in six was a nomad; in 1957, only one in twenty-five, although the number of nomads remained constant at 250,000. The pastoralists' extensive grazing-grounds carried less than one person per square kilometre. Any increase that might occur in the nomadic population had perfoce to join the sedentary population. Much of the increase in the sedentary population of Iraq and Arabia and part of that of Syria and Jordan has come from this source. Sedentarization of nomads has also been necessitated by the fact that the area under grain has greatly increased, through either irrigation or abuse of the soil, leaving less land for nomadic pastoralism and thus obliging the nomad to overgraze his desert steppe or to come to terms with the encroaching sedentary culture.

The nomad has reacted in various ways. The tribal sheikh may have become a landlord and the tribesmen his tenants, as in much of Iraq. He may have hired tractors and grown winter wheat on his tribe's summer pasturage, as in eastern Jordan. He may have rented the tribal grazing-grounds to a tractor-dealing merchant, as in Syria. He may have overgrazed in summer in areas where water can be trucked out from a city or taken from an artesian well. The tribe may have broken into splinter groups, each settling in a separate locality. A group that has settled may have given up the camels no longer needed to transport its tents, but continued to practise transhumance with its goats or sheep. Wage-labour has offered several thousands of jobs, as the oil industry, mining and public works have spread into the desert. Military service has offered tens of thousands of jobs, from the frontier guards of the United Arab Republic to the Arab Legion of Jordan. The Saudi dynasty has settled its Wahhabi warriors in artificial cases.

These changes have not been purely spontaneous. They have been accompanied by the rise of modern states with modern weapons. The grazing-grounds of the " Fertile Crescent " and the Kurdish steppes were partitioned with state boundaries after the First World War, and those of the Negev since the Second World War. The airplane and the automobile have ended both the razzia and the caravan. Territorial administration has replaced tribal authority, as country after country has been mapped out into departments, cantons and communes. Government policies have concentrated upon sedentarization. The domination of the camel nomads over the southern frontier of this region, and often also over the sedentary population of the oases and mountain villages, lasted three thousand years; but it has decisively come to an end in the present century. The past ten years have been only a culminating point in this process.

The nomads of this region still number one or two million, according to the way in which the term is defined or the extent to which they have compromised with the sedentary life. The problem still remains, not only of what they become, but also of what becomes of their land, and therefore of what they become in relation to it. Thus far, little or nothing has been done to convert the arid zone into cattle range, with the marginal rain-fed grainlands growing fodder where now they lie fallow one year in two or three, and with a veterinary service, abattoirs and refrigerating plants, and the transformation of the bedouin from pastoralists to cattle-raisers. Irrigation and urbanization offer limited possibilities for further sedentarization, but the reports of international and regional organizations have begun to point the way toward a policy of efficient cattle-raising as one major solution to the problem of the nomads. This must be viewed in the context of the dangers of over-extension of certain forms of agriculture mentioned above, the decline in *per capita* livestock production, the protein inadequacy of the region, and the growing regional demand for meat as income rises.

URBAN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

While the Middle East remains predominantly rural, the cities have been growing in population two or three times more rapidly than the rural areas and, as in other regions in process of development, a very large part of the urban growth has been accounted for by migration from rural villages into the larger centres. The principal regional metropolis, Cairo, grew from 1.0 million in 1927 to 2.0 million in 1947 and 3.3 million in 1960. The most recent census showed that 35 per cent of its population was born outside the Cairo governate. Between 1955 and 1960, Istanbul grew from 1.27 million to 1.72 million, while the population of the surrounding villages fell

somewhat, indicating that their people were moving into the city.

The cities are primarily service centres, offering to underemployed young people from the country-side a chance of odd jobs or year-round work in occupations ranging from construction to commerce, together with opportunities for medical care, schooling and entertainment. Industries are growing up around the cities but, except in Turkey, only a few towns, and these not among the largest, are of industrial origin or have become essentially industrialized. The fact that total factory employment in the region, including Turkey, Israel and Cyprus, is still below 1 million shows that factors other than industrialization (including agricultural over-population, lack of services and amenities, and boredom in the country-side) are still predominant in the urbanization of the Middle East. The tendency of migrants to the cities to reproduce rural ways of life in their one-family-to-a-room huts or shanties, their indifference to the requirements of urban sanitation and their predominant illiteracy are too well known to need elaboration here.

Many newcomers seek a measure of mutual support by forming voluntary associations composed of persons from the same home-province or village. In Cairo, for example, nearly 150 such associations of Egyptians have been discovered, besides others of Sudanese and other foreigners.

The formation of urban neighbourhood groups, however, would seem to be generally less spontaneous in the Middle East than in certain other regions, except perhaps by way of male frequentation of a neighbourhood mosque or café. Here and there a city-wide voluntary movement has attempted to penetrate each quarter,[28] as with the effort ten years ago to have citizens of each quarter of Alexandria explore the quarter's needs for adolescent recreation, or the recent "social movement" at Beirut that has attempted to make medical service and legal aid accessible within each neighbourhood to persons unable to pay for them. One special aspect of the neighbourhood problem is undoubtedly the need for migrants to acquire certain urban standards of behaviour, co-operate with municipal services, and obey regulations. It is not clear to what extent this attitude of civic co-operation at the block or neighbourhood level is being fostered. There is some evidence that the attention given by municipal governments to the problems of the poorer neighbourhoods (where migrants congregate) has increased, together with the number of officials in contact with the people, but there is the problem that rather authoritarian attitudes on the part of some officials reinforce a prevailing passivity and lack of interest in neighbourhood co-operation on the part of the populace concerned.

Employment for wages also constitutes a new link between the newcomer and the urban society. The trade unions of this region do not operate many welfare or provident services of direct benefit to their members, and seldom have the funds or property that this would imply. Business concerns with a "paternalist" tradition have sometimes taken some interest in the problems of their employees outside working hours, helping them for example to find necessary schooling, apprenticeship or medical treatment for members of their families. A favourite undertaking of benevolent associations is the training of young persons to enable them to earn a better living. The contribution which Governments might make by technical education, especially if co-ordinated with the needs of management, is widely recognized; but it reaches sizeable numbers of people as yet only in Cairo and Kuwait.

Land use in the growing cities is determined largely by speculation. One striking aspect of the opening up of new quarters by speculative building has been that for the first time Muslims and Christians have become neighbours, and mosques and churches have been built in the same neighbourhood, whereas the older quarters were always distinguished by religious homogeneity. Religious foundations, both Islamic *Waqfs* and Christian religious orders, have taken their place among the great land speculators of the cities. It has been estimated, for example, that one-third of downtown Beirut is in their hands. Land prices currently cited per square metre are at the rate of several hundred United States dollars in downtown Cairo or in the bazaars of Damascus, and even several thousand on one of the central squares of Beirut. In Beirut, it has been found that during the 1950's some 97 per cent of municipal outlay on improvements was accounted for by the cost of compensation for expropriations and 3 per cent by actual public works, and that total investment in the development of the city amounted to $200 million, of which $6 million was municipal and all the rest private.

A kind of land speculation is often engaged in not only by lawful owners but also by squatters and those who organize them. A group of families will occupy an unused urban site; its owner will go to court in order to get an order for its evacuation; by then its inhabitants will be well organized under a leader who collects from them an extralegal rent, limits the illicit tapping of electric power and water lines and sells them the current and water, and acts as their intermediary in dealing with public authorities. The administration will often decline to execute a court order for evacuation, on grounds of humanity and public order. Thus the owner has no recourse but to the council of state or other administrative tribunal, if such should happen to exist and to give promise of a sympathetic hearing. Under such circumstances, there is little effective legal barrier to the creation of shantytowns, both in vacant lots inside the cities and on vacant land outside. Those that disfigure Beirut are now forty years old. The leaders who have appeared in the shantytowns are sometimes regarded as no more than gangsters and exploiters. They respond, however, to a real demand deriving from the squatters' fear of eviction and their need for an experienced intermediary between themselves and authority. Some North African cities have found that such leaders, if recognized, can be induced to co-operate in the organization of self-help methods of community improvement.

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28 It has long been habitual in this region to break down a city into small quarters, each with its own *mukhtar* or *mugaddim*, responsible for getting to know its people, registering their births and deaths, and generally acting as middleman between the government and the people. In some countries a quarter has its elected council. In some it can have its own common property, as a *section de commune*.

Physical planning has advanced in the sense that most Governments now have an "urbanism" office. However, there are few examples of actually implemented plans for a regional market area, facilitating the joint development of a rural zone and its urban centre. Here and there, as in Damascus, a good city plan has provided a frame for ordered growth and, while not preventing speculation, has kept it within bounds; or the occasion of a disaster has been seized for planned reconstruction, as at Port Said. Additional examples of effective city planning are provided by Amman and Tel Aviv. Elsewhere city planning has done little more than facilitate land speculation and traffic in and out of the capital; or it has been regarded as a luxury until unplanned sprawl created almost insoluble problems. The results of bad planning and no planning have now become so obvious that they have begun to be frankly discussed in informed circles in the Middle East.

National Governments have helped the cities to carry out in new ways their traditional role of service centres. It is in cities that public hospitals are chiefly located, public dispensaries first opened, schools developed in greatest number and variety, and amenities of many kinds provided, from metropolitan stadia to neighbourhood playgrounds. The associated service personnel (doctors, teachers, etc.) concentrate in the cities. The provision of these services and amenities naturally augments immigration from the rural areas where such services are lacking.

Cities require a high capital investment in physical infrastructure, including street improvement, water supply, waste disposal, electric power, passenger transit and markets. These costs can be heightened for geographical reasons, as when water is not available locally, or a city like Amman is built on a number of hills separated by valleys. The required capital is not easily available for this type of investment. Thus, IBRD missions have pointed out that Baghdad had no sewage-disposal system, while many small Iraqi towns had neither a water supply nor electricity (1952); that water was taken from the river and peddled from carts in the city streets of the headquarters town of the Syrian Jazirah (1955); that only one-fifth of urban dwellings had piped water, and that business enterprises had to provide their own power plants in Jordanian cities (1957). Since its creation the International Development Association (IDA) has been able to help Governments meet this kind of need as, for example, by a long-term' low-interest loan to Jordan on behalf of the municipality of Amman, so that the public water supply will no longer run dry on the hottest days of summer. In many other cities the problems depicted so recently by Bank missions are already being solved. For example, Jiddah, Mecca, Medina and Riyadh are now installing sewage-disposal systems.

As indicated above, the housing problem has been dominated by the mass migration of rural people to urban areas, bringing with them their ability to construct a one-room house quickly and cheaply, in ways that have harmonized neither with the traditions of the many-storeyed stone-built *medina* nor with the standards of the modern city of reinforced-concrete apartment houses. Razing these shantytowns or *bidonvilles* and substituting publicly provided low-cost housing has proved impractical, because the improved accommodation is within the means of only a minority of lesser officials, public utility workers, and such other clerical or manual workers as earn a regular income. On the other hand, Morocco and Tunisia in similar circumstances have found that, when a slum is razed, a family can itself rebuild its core accommodation along approved lines with government-provided material, and then add to it at its leisure, just as Lebanon found that rural victims of earthquakes preferred to receive cement, sand and reinforcing iron to reconstruct their own houses and even refused to occupy those built for them by the public authority.

Although public low-cost housing has reached more than token proportions, government unwillingness to spend scarce capital on projects judged not to be directly productive keeps such housing down to a scale unrelated to the size of the housing shortage. In Cairo, after considerable experience with smaller projects in the 1950's, the current Five-Year Plan provides $130 million for 20,000 units, over half of which will have more than one room; the number of households will probably increase by over 100,000 during the same period. In Iraq, 8,500 houses were built by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1950-60, and 10,000 are now managed by the Ministry of Housing, for sale to regularly-paid government servants and other employed persons capable of paying for them over a term of years. In Kuwait and Riyadh, large-scale housing programmes are being implemented, leading to the disappearance of the greater part of the old towns.

Most Governments have not tried to use the building capacities of the urban populations themselves, owing perhaps to lack of the necessary technical and supervisory personnel; and cheap credit has not been used as a key to low-cost housing in these lands of high interest rates. Meanwhile, most countries have permitted or encouraged speculation in what are, by local standards, luxury apartments, which sometimes stand empty while overcrowding mounts in the slums. Construction in most growing cities has failed to meet the rising expectations of more than a small section of the population. "In terms of value," the IBRD mission to Syria reported in 1955, "probably over 80 per cent of the new housing has been of the western or European type, which is too costly for the vast majority of the people."[29] Land values have thus been pushed so high that compensation has become a deterrent to expropriation for public use. The biggest public housing programme in the region is UNRWA's substitution of 100,000 huts for 30,000 tents in its camps for 400,000 of the Palestinian refugees. Baghdad has made a start in self-help housing by giving 25,000 free lots and all necessary common facilities to mud-hut dwellers willing to rebuild at their own cost in "Thawrah (Revolution) City".

Industrialization, although limited, has posed some special problems. The oil industry, operating in places not already inhabited, has had little alternative but to provide accommodation and amenities for the different categories of its employees. In Iraq its example has been followed by port authorities, railways and banks, as well

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29 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *The Economic Development of Syria*, p. 163.

as by local administrations and municipalities. In general, however, the promoter of a new industry has a choice of location. If he chooses to locate in a rural area where land and labour costs are lower, he may have to practise company-town paternalism, as in Turkey and at Mahalla in the Nile Delta, where it was reckoned in 1952 that the fringe benefits provided were equal to 20 per cent of wages. In Iraq, it is assumed that the following will happen: industrialists are obliged by law to provide housing; and the development budget includes loans to them for this purpose, which is believed to add about 50 per cent to their capital outlay. Alternatively, industry can locate near existing housing, schools and other services and facilities, so as to benefit from these "external economies". This is the choice that has been made by the Government of the United Arab Republic in its industrialization plans, which have therefore done more to add to the opportunities and problems of existing metropolitan areas than to stimulate the growth of secondary cities.

A policy of deliberate decentralization of urban growth, with creation of cities intermediate between the metropolitan centres and the villages, as objectives that are desirable in themselves, has not been pursued in this region, with certain exceptions, as in Turkey and Israel, and the Iraqui decision to locate bilaterally financed state industrial enterprises in provincial headquarters towns. If secondary agglomerations have been created, it has been in obdience to a specific geographic imperative and to meet a specific economic need, as with a new oil-town or a new sea-port. Nevertheless, many provincial headquarters towns and other administrative centres have been equipped with secondary schools, hospitals and other facilities, as well as with piped water, electric power and improved transportation. Changes of this kind ought to add to the attractive power of these smaller centres of urban life and help to balance urban development.

Chapter XIII

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA [1]

INTRODUCTION

From the standpoint of social progress,[2] the last decade in Asia was, in general, a period of considerable effort but of sometimes limited or less than expected results. Only some of the smaller or less populated countries, as well as Japan — which has become famous as the exception to Asian generalizations — showed clear-cut and incontestable gains in personal consumption.[3] In the other countries, however, by the end of the decade there was reason to believe that many of the efforts of the past ten years would bear fruit in the current and ensuing decades.

In most countries of Asia, there were instances of improvement in specific sectors, including important improvements in the levels of public health and education. Even in sectors advancing in averages or percentages, however, a challenge for much of the area arose from the fact that, in terms of absolute numbers, there were at the end of the decade more human beings unable to read and write or to enjoy a healthy diet and dwelling than ever before.

Many millions at the end of the decade remained mal- and under-nourished.[4] The region was still vulnerable to epidemics and afflicted by droughts. In spite of quantitative expansion, the quality of education and of training deteriorated in some cases, owing to the rapidity of the expansion. The problem of unemployment of educated youth in some parts of the region, already serious at the beginning of the decade, was further magnified. Attempts at family planning, systematically pursued only in the second half of the decade, did not, except in Japan, have any appreciable influence on the birth rate in the short period in which it was tried. The peasant in some of the more populated countries remained as poor and underemployed as before, and programmes of village industries, designed to provide additional employment opportunities, ran into some difficulties. A major failure of a number of Asian countries during the latter half of the decade, from both an economic and a social point of view, seemed to be their inability to increase food production rapidly enough. Although an elaborate body of land reform legislation was devised, it remained largely unfulfilled except in Japan, China (mainland) and China (Taiwan). The programmes of community development fell short of the high expectations placed in them, and the movement of rural communes in mainland China had to be substantially reoriented in the face of initial failures in food production and rural development. The large and uncontrolled movement of peasants to already overcrowded cities aggravated urban problems; attempts to decentralize industrial development, principally through industrial estates and regional planning, did not often succeed in reaching the core of the problem. The experiments of urban community development in South Asia and of urban communes in mainland China were either too limited in scope or uncertain in direction. The housing problem, especially in urban areas, was worse at the end of the decade. Social investments were generally unrelated to economic needs and resources, and planning for "balanced economic and social development" remained an ideal rather than an accomplished fact.

On the positive side again, there was a growing desire among the Asian masses for higher levels of living and a conviction that through improved educational opportunities and other efforts this was a goal that could be realized in the not-too-distant future. If social progress at the end of the decade left much to be desired, this must be viewed in the context of mass poverty in Asia, the limited resources and the pressures of rapid population growth on the limited resources in areas already heavily populated; viewed in this context, the programmes of the last decade did indeed have an impact.

OVER-ALL SOCIAL TRENDS AND PROGRAMMES

Population

As far as population is concerned, a distinction can be made between the problems of mainland China, India, Japan and Pakistan, which already have large populations and relatively little possibility of expanding the area of cultivation, so that even a moderate increase cannot be productively absorbed in agriculture, and most of the South-East Asian countries, which actually have higher

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[1] This chapter reviews salient social trends and programmes in Asia during the period of approximately the last decade. For the purposes of this chapter, Asia is defined as consisting of the countries of the "ECAFE region", including mainland China. The designations employed and the presentation of material in this report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. In view of the incompleteness and inconsistency of data from mainland China, the conclusions presented in this chapter with respect to developments in mainland China are necessarily tentative, and are subject to the same limitations and qualifications noted in previous United Nations reports, in particular the annual economic surveys published by ECAFE. The chapter necessarily concentrates attention on the bigger and more populous countries, in view of the greater availability of information with respect to these countries. The Asian republics of the USSR are not included.

[2] Social progress is viewed here as consisting of the whole range of the components of levels of living, including personal consumption.

[3] This was the case also in the indicators of economic progress. See *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1961* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.F.1.).

[4] Malnutrition refers to the quality and composition of different elements in the diet, whereas undernutrition is measured by the total quantity of food taken.

rates of population increase than the big countries, but in which the main problems for the present are uneven geographical distribution and high dependency ratios. In the former group, public leaders are generally agreed that population pressure is one of the chief problems.[5] It is widely believed that during the past decade the increase in *per capita* income has been small, mainly because of the mounting population coupled with slow economic growth. Indications are that the already large population will increase even faster in the future, since birth rates have not generally declined, whereas death rates have been falling remarkably.

The proportion of young persons (under 15 years of age) has steadily increased, and Asia's population at the end of the decade was predominantly a young one.[6] As a consequence of this, and of a tendency in some countries to prolong the period of formal education, the proportion of economically active population (in the working age) has probably been declining. Asian population is even more predominantly rural than that of other low-income regions, except Africa. Finally, population pressure in Asia is aggravated by its uneven distribution between and within various countries, being concentrated primarily in the old agricultural areas in river valleys, plains and coastal regions.

Health

Spectacular achievements in health and the resultant decline in mortality have been the principal factors in the unprecedented increase of population. This impressive record of achievement must, however, be balanced against the fact that health levels in Asia are still among the lowest in the world. There is still a substantial shortage of trained medical manpower at all levels. The quality of medical education offered in the region suffers from inadequately prepared teachers, ill-equipped medical schools and laboratories, and outmoded medical curricula.[7] The concentration of available medical facilities in urban areas and the reluctance of doctors to serve in villages continue to be major limiting factors in rural health. In spite of considerable efforts, the problems of rural water supply and urban sewage have assumed even larger proportions. To these difficulties must be added the traditional adherence of large groups of the rural populations to animistic beliefs and their general distrust of modern medicine, and the disputable medical competence of traditional medical personnel such as "herb doctors", as well as the problems arising from the shortage of financial resources available for health and the inadequacy of administrative machinery for health at the state and local levels.

There have been, as, for example, in mainland China, significant achievements in the field of rural health,[8] efforts to train and improve the status of traditional medical personnel as one means of overcoming the shortage of modern medical personnel, and campaigns to enlist popular participation in health and hygiene improvement.[9] But major difficulties remain, and the dependence of health conditions on the success of crops has meant that successive agricultural failures in recent years have increased the incidence of diseases connected with mal- and under-nutrition.

Advance in health in Asia has also been limited by the generally poor levels in other social sectors, particularly housing and education. In the final analysis, however, the low health levels are directly related to the low levels of economic development.

Nutrition

One of the chief factors limiting progress in health and welfare has been the poor quality and quantity of the diet for much of the region. Evidence indicates that *per capita* net availability of food grains, for a population that subsists mainly on cereals and pulses, is far below accepted minimum requirements. If many millions of Asians are undernourished, the proportion of those suffering from malnutrition is very much higher.[10] In the predominantly rice-eating countries of the region, protein deficiencies are common and other nutriments essential for a balanced diet are inadequate. In spite of this, Governments in the area have not generally been able to deal with the problems connected with the production, marketing and distribution of animal proteins, vegetables, grain legumes, fruit and other protective foods, and considerations of these needs have largely been left out of attempts at agricultural development planning.

Within the generally poor nutritional state of the region, there are significant country-to-country, and even more striking within-country variations.[11] The large and populous countries, such as India, Indonesia and Pakistan, are worse off than some of the smaller countries. Mainland China is reported to be in a somewhat better position than the Indian sub-continent, but evem there extensive food shortages are reported because of crop failures.

Education

Education in Asia during the last decade presents a mixed picture. A marked expansion of education has occurred, unprecedented in Asian history, with almost a doubling of school enrolment at all levels within ten

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5 Mainland China has been a major exception to this rule, but present indications are that the Government takes a serious view of the population pressure problem.

6 Forty per cent of the population of mainland China is believed to be under 15 years of age, and this proportion is probably applicable to Asia as a whole.

7 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Education, *Report of the Commission on National Education*, Karachi, 1960.

8 In the opinion of some observers, this has been the outstanding achievement of the rural communes in mainland China. (see Richard Hughes, *The Chinese Communes*, London, The Bodley Head, 1961.)

9 A well-known example is the campaign against the "four plagues" — flies, mosquitoes, rats and sparrows ("National Health Campaign", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 21 January 1958).

10 Sukhatme estimates that about half of Asia's population suffers from malnutrition. (See P. V. Sukhatme, "The World's Hunger and Future Needs in Food Supplies", *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Series A (General), vol. 124, 1961, part 4.

11 Japan, Burma, Thailand, the Federation of Malaya and China (Taiwan) are among the better-fed countries in the region. Only in these countries, and perhaps in Ceylon, has the nutritional picture significantly improved in the last ten years.

years.[12] There is now a clearer understanding of, and general agreement with respect to, priorities within education.[13] Particularly significant quantitative progress has been made in primary education, and the goal of universal, compulsory and free primary education is now generally accepted and vigorously pursued.

The rapid expansion has, however, brought problems in its wake. The quality of education has in many instances deteriorated. The basic structure and form of most Asian educational systems still remain unsuited to the requirements of contemporary development, and tend more to stimulate a mass desire for consumption than to provide means for satisfying it. Wide urban-rural, sex and other differences in educational opportunities continue to exist. The hopes placed in the new stimulus given to technical and vocational education have not generally been realized, and the persisting shortage of middle-level technical personnel has impeded industrial growth.[14] Finally, educational expenditures have by and large not been systematically and effectively related to the broader picture of employment opportunities and economic development, and such efforts towards educational planning as have been made are limited by the inadequacy of the financial and other resources set aside for education,[15] the lack of accurate scientific data and educational statistics, crude administrative arrangements for relating educational investment to over-all development, and the lack of sufficient numbers of people trained in the relatively new discipline of educational planning.[16]

The large proportion — often as much as 75 per cent in rural areas — of drop-outs, and an equally large proportion of failures in examinations by those who remain in schools, have been major sources of wastage of the limited educational resources available. The lack of school buildings and other educational equipment as well as of textbooks — complicated further by the multiplicity of languages in the countries of the region — has also contributed to the poor quality of education in the rapidly expanding and new schools of the last decade. Most important, however, the vast expansion of enrolment in a relatively short time has inevitably produced an acute shortage of teachers, especially for technical subjects, thereby making it necessary to use untrained or under-trained teachers, who are usually, especially in the villages, offered subsistence-level salaries and accorded a low standing in the community. The village teacher's low morale and his inadequate training are, undoubtedly, responsible for the dubious value of much of the primary education given in the rural areas of some countries.

The basic failure of education in much of Asia during the past decade has arisen from the traditional stress on general literacy at the bottom and higher education at the top, geared to training civil servants and office workers. The content and character of Asian systems of education, often transplanted from the West without adequate adaptation, is usually overloaded with literary subjects and stresses mental ability rather than technical competence, particularly at the secondary level, which is generally marked by outmoded curricula; higher education is dominated by such subjects as law, humanities and economics, while science, agronomy and engineering are generally neglected. In short, in spite of ten years of effort to change the situation, Asian education is still incapable of producing the types and numbers of skilled workers as well as of industrial leaders and scientific pioneers that are required for rapid development. This is particularly true, for example, in India and Pakistan. It is much less true of mainland China, which has radically altered its educational system (see below), and of Japan.

Popular Asian attitudes toward technical education (except in Japan and mainland China) have made it difficult to attract adequate and suitable personnel to these fields, but this has by no means been the only difficulty. Experience in the last ten years has shown that the high hopes placed on training within industry and other part-time training have not been realized; efforts in this direction were considerably frustrated both by the apparent failure of industry to respond to the new requirements and by the frequent inability of Governments to provide decisive initiative. However, the attempts to improve technical training[17] through the establishment of widely scattered industrial training institutes, the initiation of apprenticeship schemes on a national scale, the new provisions for evening classes for industrial workers, improved facilities for training craft instructors, and the establishment of industrial estates in conjunction with technical training institutions (so as to provide a ready means of practical training for students)[18] will all undoubtedly have a profound effect on the course of technical education in the present decade.

Trends in education in mainland China during the past decade are sufficiently unique to merit separate consideration. There has been a very rapid expansion at all levels, although a decline in quality as in the rest of

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12 Between 1951 and 1958, school enrolment as a percentage of total population increased markedly in every country, with the exception of the Philippines (a country with a long history of substantial educational investments), where it remained more or less constant. (See table in *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1961*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.F.1.) In China (Taiwan), over 95 per cent of children of school age were attending school in 1960-1961.

13 A recent regional education meeting sponsored by UNESCO concluded that priority should be given to a scientific and technical, primary and adult education, in that order. (See the Report of the Regional Symposium on Over-all Educational Planning, New Delhi, 29 January-22 February 1962.)

14 The most critical shortages have appeared at the level of the supervisor and foreman, the skilled operator and technician, rather than at that of the executive or engineer, although current manpower planning necessarily continues to stress requirements at the top levels. The need for planning with reference to intermediate-level personnel is, however, gradually gaining recognition.

15 The Third Five-Year Plan of India (1960-1965), for example, allocates more to heavy industry than to all the social services (including education) combined.

16 There is general agreement in the region, however, as reflected in the meeting of Asian Ministers of Education held in Tokyo, in 1962, that educational planning needs to be co-ordinated and integrated with over-all development plans.

17 See International Labour Office, "Vocational Training in Asian Countries", Advisory Committee, Eleventh Session, Geneva, November 1961 (AAC/XI/D.8/8).

18 India plans to set up five industrial estates near universities and another five contiguous with rural institutes. (See *Establishment of Industrial Estates in Under-developed Countries*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 60.II.B.4.)

Asia; but, unlike the situation in other Asian countries, education in mainland China has been characterized during the last ten years by far-reaching attempts to introduce mass education through the integration of education and production and through part-time schooling, by a quite successful effort to push technical education, a marked emphasis on specialization, a stress on pre-primary education, and a tendency to experiment on a big scale in educational policy. The policy of combining education with productive labour, which became the hallmark of education in mainland China following the announcement of the "great leap forward" in 1958, had the twin objectives of having students work and workers study. Physical labour and production were made part of every student's curriculum, but peasants and workers, in turn, were also required to attend literacy courses and in general to improve their productive capabilities by attending spare-time educational institutions. As a consequence of this policy, the latter part of the decade under review saw a mushrooming of on-the-job training courses sponsored by a great variety of institutions and enterprises, including mines and industrial plants, although it is reported that the adult spare-time courses have generally not been adequately supervised by government education departments, and much waste has apparently resulted from the fact that employees have seldom been given enough time for proper study. The economic goals proclaimed by mainland China have necessarily implied a decided emphasis on specialization at all levels, but particularly the secondary level. Liberal arts courses, which dominated earlier Chinese education, have been substantially curtailed. Higher education curricula have stressed engineering, medicine and science rather than law, social science, finance and economics; and a series of specialized institutes have been created.

Unemployment of the educated

A widespread problem in Asia (with mainland China as a major exception), which has its source at least partially in the educational system, is that of unemployment among educated youth. It is generally agreed that this problem has been considerably magnified in the last ten years and is now assuming quite alarming proportions. In its broadest sense, of course, it is the problem of youth employment itself, and is therefore necessarily a large-scale problem in a region where young persons constitute an unusually high proportion of total population.

It is associated with the kind of education received, the negative attitudes of educated Asian youth towards manual work,[19] their desire to seek high-prestige positions in the already overstaffed sectors of administration, government and public service,[20] and their inability as well as their unwillingness to pursue technical and professional occupations. Other factors responsible for the growing numbers of educated young unemployed in Asia are the low overall rate of economic development, the rudimentary state of manpower planning, the rapid population growth, the migration of educated rural youth to urban centres,[21] and the relative geographical immobility of educated urban youth. In India alone, it is estimated, there were about one million educated young persons without jobs at the close of the last decade. The cumulative result of these factors has been not only that educated youth in some countries are, in ever-increasing numbers, unable to find jobs, but also that they are becoming increasingly undisciplined, bitter and frustrated. The coexistence of severe shortages of technical personnel in certain sectors with an over-supply of personnel who are educated but without technically relevant skills has therefore been a major impediment to Asian development during the last decade.

Governments in the area have not been insensitive to the magnitude of the problem, and, indeed, quite a wide variety of measures have been initiated in response to the public attention given to it.[22] Efforts have been made to modify primary and secondary school curricula so as to develop specific skills as well as greater respect for the dignity of manual labour. Compulsory national service schemes for youth, similar to measures already adopted in mainland China,[23] are under consideration in some countries, such as India and Pakistan.[24] Other measures have included the establishment of work-cum-orientation centres for educated unemployed (as in India), employment exchanges, apprenticeship schemes, and vocational guidance centres for educated youth. It appears, however, that the measures adopted thus far have been on too small a scale to cope with the dimensions of the problem.

Family planning

After some hesitation and initial controversy, several Asian Governments became convinced by the end of the last decade that one solution to problems of unemployment and the slow pace of economic and social development was the exercise of some control over the exceptional rate of population increase. (In recent years, moreover, the results of census enumerations in most Asian countries revealed that the actual population far exceeded the expectation.) Accordingly, a number of Asian countries

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19 Anthropological studies indicate, moreover, that traditional Asian cultures value intellectual ability more than technical proficiency, and manual work is regarded as the destiny of the lowly. It appears that modern educational systems have strengthened rather than modified these values.

20 See International Labour Office, "Problems of Youth on the Threshold of Employment", paper prepared for the Eleventh Session of the ILO Asian Advisory Committee, Geneva, November 1961 (AAC/XI/D.4/2).

21 See the final report of the Eleventh Session of the ILO Asian Advisory Committee, Geneva, 6-10 November 1961 (GB 150/10/22).

22 In the view of some writers, the problem of unemployment among educated youth has, because of the articulateness of this group, attracted more general notice and discussion than other forms of unemployment. A number of government panels and study groups have studied and reported on the problem. (See, for example, the *Outline Report* of the Study Group on Educated Unemployed, which was established by the Planning Commission in India in 1956.)

23 Mainland China has for some time been carrying out a systematic programme of periods of productive service by teachers and students in rural areas. (See "Higher Institutions Transfer Personnel to Rural Areas for Physical Labour", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 25 October 1957; also "Graduates Sent to Rural Areas", *Hsin Hua Jih Pao*, Nanking, 5 September 1957.)

24 The Pakistan Planning Commission has recommended the establishment of a National Development Corps. (See Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, *The Development and Utilization of Manpower*, Karachi, 1960.)

have launched programmes of "family planning". It is widely felt in these countries that science and technology, which have already been successfully harnessed to control the death rate, should be mobilized and also applied to the birth rate.[25a]

In the latter part of the decade under review, and particularly after 1957, a systematic and extensive programme was initiated in India: it included, among other things, establishment of a network of family planning clinics in both urban and rural areas; assistance to state governments in setting up mobile family planning clinics or sterilization units in districts; strengthening of the staffs of medical schools; creation of centres for training doctors and other professionals in the required techniques; plans for the free distribution of contraceptives on a large scale, in medical and health centres in towns as well as villages (irrespective of income); a variety of studies to determine the effectiveness of various methods and the response of different socio-economic groups in the population; and preliminary attempts in some states, such as Madras, to organize mass sterilization, and the offer of bonuses for this purpose. The three Five-Year Plans of the country have been made successively higher allocations[25b] for family planning through clinics, hospitals, dispensaries, maternity homes, maternity and child health centres, health centres of state governments, local bodies and voluntary organizations. In addition to the measures already adopted, a recent Health Survey and Planning Committee[26] appointed by the Government has recommended greater stress on the national manufacture of contraceptives, certain legislative and administrative measures including legalized abortion and formal sex education in schools. The available evidence does not indicate that the family planning programme in India has as yet had an appreciable effect on the national birth rate.

Pakistan has encountered some socio-religious obstacles to its family planning programme. The Government has, however, pursued the programme vigorously and given emphasis to its health value so as not to arouse religious hostility. Like India, Pakistan is one of the first countries in the world to include a specific appropriation for family planning in its five-year plan. The programme is still, however, largely experimental and aims chiefly at mass propaganda, stressing the desirability of family planning, emphasizing its compatibility with the Islamic religion and making information on birth control methods widely available. Evidence indicates that thus far the main impact of the programme, and its chief support, have been among the educated upper and middle-class urban dwellers.

Mainland China has in the course of the last decade twice reversed its official attitude towards family planning. An official policy of rejection of birth control, up to approximately the middle of the decade, gave way, under the impact of increasing concern with problems of surplus manpower and rural exodus, to an intensive but short-lived birth control campaign, from about 1955 to 1958. Following the "great leap forward" movement in 1958, until the end of the decade, birth control was again out of favour and denounced as Malthusianism. The latest reports indicate, however, that in the 1961-1962 period, birth control has again become state policy, a decision possibly motivated by the food shortages resulting from successive crop failures in recent years.

Mainland China has emphasized that family planning is undertaken for health reasons, and to provide favourable conditions for bringing up children. The family planning campaign has ranged from (in earlier years) raising the marriage age and systematically discouraging early marriages, raising the domestic production of contraceptives and lowering their price to (in recent years) provision of specific instruction on birth control methods on a wide scale and making abortion and sterilization services available upon request. A vigorous propaganda campaign has been waged, covering both the significance and the techniques of birth control and using a vast array of mass media resources — radio, press, films, pamphlets, medical slides, billboards, mass meetings, lectures, factory bulletin boards, exhibitions, cartoon strip booklets and even traditional singers in the streets. Available evidence is not sufficient to assess the effect on the trend of the birth rate in mainland China.

Japan alone among Asian countries has definitely met with great success in its birth control programme. At first accepted only by salaried groups in the cities, birth control had, by the end of the decade, become widely prevalent also in villages and in all socio-economic groups. The remarkable experience of Japan in family planning — bringing the birth rate down approximately 50 per cent in ten years — was, however, facilitated by circumstances which are not duplicated in other Asian countries; e.g., a large urban majority, nearly universal literacy, a relatively high level of living, and availability of broad-based purchasing power for contraceptives. The high priority accorded to family planning by the Government and the high rate of abortion have also been important factors in the results achieved. Surveys indicate a widespread willingness in many parts of Asia to engage in family planning, but there is little knowledge and still less actual practice of modern methods for making this effective.[27]

Different explanations are offered for the apparent failure to date of attempts of Asian Governments, except Japan, to reduce the national birth rates appreciably through family planning programmes. According to one

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25a M. C. Balfour, "Family Planning in Asia", *Population Studies*, London, vol. 15, No. 2, November 1961, pp. 102-110. In this article Balfour discusses the recent development in family planning in Asian countries from Japan to Pakistan, with particular reference to Ceylon, China (Taiwan), Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.

25b The Second Five-Year Plan (1955-1960) allocated seven times as much for family planning as the First Five-Year Plan (1950-1955), while the allocation in the Third Five-Year Plan (1960-1965) was five times ($52 million) as much as in the second plan.

26 Government of India, Ministry of Health, *Report of the Health Survey and Planning Committee* (August 1959-October 1961), New Delhi, 1961.

27 A survey conducted by Chandrasekhar in Madras — a state where family planning has been more successful than elsewhere — showed that nearly three-quarters of the married couples interviewed wanted to limit their family's size; however, family planning was "desired but not widely practised" (S. Chandrasekhar, "One Answer to India's 'Explosion'", *Population Review*, vol. 5, No. 2, July 1961, p. 94).

view, it is yet too early to assess the potential effects of these programmes. Another view is that any effort to promote birth control is foredoomed to failure in the circumstances of deep poverty, ignorance and cultural inertia now prevailing throughout most of Asia. According to this view, a major transformation of the economic and social structure must first be brought about in order to create conditions that would be favourable to the spread of the small-family ideal and the practice of effective birth control. Still another view is that the measures taken by the Governments for the purpose of promoting birth control have not been adequate, not sufficiently vigorous and imaginative and adapted on the basis of research to Asian conditions, and not well enough organized and financed to achieve the desired effects.

Rural development problems and policies

The problem of rural development

The evidence suggests that, in most rural areas of Asia, where some of the lowest *per capita* incomes in the world are to be found, there has been little improvement in personal income and consumption during the last decade. While official statistics indicate that there was an over-all modest increase in average *per capita* income in the decade under review, most of this increase apparently occurred in urban areas; rural *per capita* incomes in many countries remained generally constant, or may even have declined.[28] The characteristic features of the Asian countryside are still, as they were a decade ago, tremendous pressure of population on limited land, concentration of land ownership,[29] limited employment opportunities and considerable under-employment, widely prevalent usury and indebtedness, and low productivity. In some countries producing export commodities, important segments of the agricultural population have remained highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market.

The lack of substantial improvement in the life of Asian peasants has led to general agrarian dissatisfaction, but the unrest has remained largely latent or unconstructive, and the villager's desire for change has not been sufficiently crystallized to provide an effective motivation for development. Within this context, Asian Governments have, in general, adopted a wide range of far-reaching measures designed to introduce dynamism into a somewhat static setting, but the solutions offered have, in many cases, been only partial. Progress in agricultural production in relation to population growth has remained slow and uncertain in some countries, and the people themselves have often not matched, or responded to, official efforts (as in the failure to utilize irrigation schemes effectively). The basic features of the social structure and land tenure have remained unaltered for much of the region; and the programmes of rural industrialization have generally fallen short of expectations.

Rural employment

In a number of Asian countries, for nearly half the year, during the dry season, the farming population of many villages remains largely idle. Moreover, a large proportion of the adult male population in rural areas is not engaged in productive occupations or is only intermittently employed.[30]

The causes of wide-spread unemployment and underemployment in Asian villages include not only such basic factors as the high rate of population growth in an already crowded countryside, without sufficient economic growth in country or city to absorb the surplus, but also more specific causes, such as the disappearance of old rural industries and artisan crafts under the impact of factory competition; large population displacements; the continued use of outmoded agricultural techniques; excessive dependence on the vagaries of climate; and the strong preference of the Asian peasant for agricultural occupations, his reluctance to give up land (which, in his eyes, alone provides security), and his tendency to look upon other occupations as supplements to farming.

Measures adopted or contemplated by Asian Governments have included expansion of the total cultivated area and of irrigated land; stimulation of small-scale and local village industries; the use of more intensive methods of farming (tried with particular success in Japan and China: Taiwan); industrial decentralization and the dispersion of industries away from urban centres; development of the rural infrastructure (e.g., water development and control, extension of power supply, and building up of common facilities); and efforts to improve the social components of the rural infrastructure through such programmes as better rural education and provision of vocational training facilities.[31] The development plans of the region, which in almost all cases list increased employment as one of their chief objectives, have tended to place primary reliance on the capacity of agriculture itself to absorb additional manpower, although considerable emphasis is also given to road development, public works and other large-scale rural projects involving the

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28 For example, statistics published by the state government of Uttar Pradesh in India indicate that, in the ten years between 1949-50 and 1958-59, rural *per capita* income (in terms of 1948-1949 prices) remained more or less stationary, about $US40; this was also the conclusion of a study by Baljit Singh in the same area (See Baljit Singh, *Next Step in Village India*, London, Asia Publishing House, 1961, p. 38). A recent restudy of certain Bengali villages after an interval of twenty-five years concludes that conditions have remained unchanged and that "the incidence of poverty has not been lessened" (Hashim Amir Ali, *et al., Then and Now: A Study of Socio-economic Structure and Change in Some Villages Near Visvabharati University, Bengal*, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960).

29 There are, however, significant differences between the various countries and between regions within a particular country. This does not apply to China and Japan or to large parts of the peripheral countries of South-East Asia, especially after land reforms.

30 Mainland China has at times acknowledged, and at other times denied, the existence of the problem of surplus manpower in rural areas. It is generally agreed, however, that the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment is as acute there as in the other under-developed countries of Asia. In fact, this problem aroused considerable official concern in mainland China in the middle of the last decade, and a survey undertaken in that period revealed that surplus manpower in rural co-operatives amounted to more than one-quarter of the total population.

31 International Labour Office, "Promotion of Rural Employment in Asia", ILO Asian Advisory Committee, Eleventh Session, Geneva, 1961 (AAC/XI/D.9/3).

use of the vast reserves of unskilled or semi-skilled surplus labour in rural areas.

The measures adopted have, of course, not been directed solely towards creating employment; they are measures for rural development as a whole, for halting the urban migration trend and for ensuring balanced urban-rural development. It appears, however, that the type of large-scale industrialization around which so much of the developmental effort has centred cannot be counted on to absorb surplus rural manpower to a sufficient extent, at least in its present dimensions. Moreover, there is little hope in the immediate future of a substantial increase in jobs in other urban sectors, such as banking, insurance, transport and trade. The situation is complicated by the fact that there is no consensus regarding the effects of certain basic developmental measures on employment; for example, the question of the effects of the mechanization of agriculture in the Asian environment is still in the stage of discussion and debate. Even if all the liberal provisions and estimates for the creation of additional employment that are contained in various Asian development plans were to be completely fulfilled, the problem of rural unemployment and underemployment in most countries of the region will not be solved [32] unless the efforts to control population growth prove more successful than they have in the past.

Rural industries

During the last decade in Asia, much hope has been placed in the promotion of small industries, and in rural industrialization in general, as important means of generating additional employment in rural areas. The allocations for small-scale and rural industries show a continuously upward trend.[33] Training programmes in connexion with small industries, especially in rural areas, have received particularly high priority. Subsidies of various kinds, both direct and indirect (e.g., assuring the purchase of products of village industries for the armed forces), have been given to stimulate the growth of small industries. Through intensive research on new production techniques or by improving traditional ones, it has been possible in some instances for small village industries to turn out products which have strategic importance or which cannot be produced under large-scale factory conditions.[34]

A decade of experience with small industries suggests, however, that, while they have made a substantial contribution to the improvement of rural levels of living, they have not yet proved successful as a principal means of eradicating unemployment and underemployment. Although the main reasons for this are perhaps social, a number of other factors have also been responsible. These include deficiencies in capital, techniques, equipment, and managerial and entrepreneurial skills; a tendency to implement small-industry projects as isolated schemes without sufficient regard for their relationship to the specific situation, potentialities and needs of the locality; the dominating position of middlemen and merchants; neglect of the marketing aspects; the failure to deal with the basic problem of the credit standing of small industrial undertakings; and, finally, the failure of large-scale production itself to provide the necessary backing (e.g., failure, in spite of great strides in this direction, to make electricity and power universally available in villages).

Some observers have questioned the wisdom of the policies pursued. Cottage industries have in many cases been heavily subsidized and protected for cultural and nationalistic reasons, even when their effect on employment and rural development has been dubious. It is argued that much of what village industries produce could be produced more economically and efficiently by factories. Large sums have been allocated for small industries. The penalties imposed upon factory production in order to protect village industries have also impeded development of the former. Factories are prohibited from producing certain categories of goods in some cases, or prevented from expanding in others; and special taxes are often imposed in order to protect village products. The process of economic modernization through mass production in factories is thus considered to be impeded, so that the advantages for current employment of the village industries must be viewed in conjunction with the disadvantages of a slower rate of growth of over-all production and the implications for future employment.

Japan, however, has shown that village industries can be quite successful and consistent with rapid over-all growth. A long period of successive improvements in production, organization and marketing has enabled Japan to attain remarkable success in small industrial undertakings. Moreover, small-scale and large-scale production have become fully integrated in a vast industrial process; in many instances, small village industries produce single parts for the large assembly plants in urban areas. Conditions which have contributed to successful small-scale industry in Japan are, however, largely absent elsewhere in Asia at present — a high level of education and skills in villages, an extensive network of rural transport and communication, and availability of electricity and power throughout the rural areas. Japan's experience shows, moreover, that western models and methods of production cannot be transplanted without adaptation. The ultimate success of small industries in Asia's hundreds of thousands of villages may require very considerable governmental assistance — in research, pilot trials, training specialist and managerial personnel, and providing loans and subsidies; the policy question, in the opinion of some Asians, is whether the results would warrant such large-scale investments, when considered in the framework of alternative investments.

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[32] In Ceylon, the implementation of the Ten-Year Plan (1958-1968) would still leave one-half of those currently unemployed without jobs; in India, it is estimated that eight million new jobs were created in the second half of the last decade (1956-1961), but that the working population increased by ten million in the same period; the employment targets set in the current Japanese and Pakistani plans are also regarded as ambitious but inadequate. (See International Labour Office, *Employment Objectives in Economic Development, Report of a meeting of experts, Studies and Reports, New Series, No. 62,* Geneva, 1961.)

[33] International Labour Office, "Modernization and Revitalization of Small-Scale and Rural Industries", paper prepared for the ILO Asian Advisory Committee, Eleventh Session, Geneva, 1961 (AAC/XI/D.6/1).

[34] In India, for example, research has made it possible for village industries to produce high-grade paper; since local factories do not turn out paper of high quality, this has resulted in the saving of considerable amounts of foreign exchange.

Agriculture and food production

The core of the rural development problem is to be found in agriculture, and Asian Governments, by the end of the last decade, appeared to be concentrating increasingly on this problem, which has important implications for industrialization, foreign exchange — a crucial matter in the current developmental situation — and the levels of living of the masses. Several Asian countries are directly dependent on exports of agricultural products for their foreign exchange earnings, while others are pursuing policies aimed at food self-sufficiency so as to save precious foreign exchange.

Nevertheless, indications are that food and agricultural production in the decade under review has not increased satisfactorily. Some of the smaller or less populous countries, such as China (Taiwan), the Federation of Malaya and Thailand, have come up to or surpassed pre-war productivity in most agricultural products, but this has been offset to some extent on a regional basic by lack of similar advance in the large and populous countries. In mainland China, for example, which is still a predominantly agricultural country, it is generally agreed that failure in agriculture has been the big stumbling block to development in the last part of the last decade; good crops have been harvested only in certain years, while severe crop failures have occurred several times, and during the last three years in succession. While over-all food production for the region as a whole increased on the average by about 3 per cent *per annum* over the last decade, *per capita* food production showed on average an increase of only 1 per cent, owing to population growth. *Per capita* food production for the region has therefore not yet completely regained the pre-war level. Moreover, the advances in food production have come mainly in grain (particularly rice and wheat), sugar and oilseeds, whole milk and meat production have shown little improvement.[35]

The failure of the larger countries of Asia to increase agricultural production substantially during the last decade is reflected in the fact that in neither the number of acres under cultivation nor in the yields per acre have the increases been substantial. The area under cultivation has not expanded significantly because of shortage of arable land, slowness of progress in irrigation and resettlement schemes (which are costly)[36] and in some cases flight of peasants from the land for security reasons. Unsatisfactory progress in increasing yields per acre can be attributed to a variety of causes: the failure to extend, improve or maintain irrigation; the already existing intensity of cultivation in densely populated areas, where the introduction of machinery may supplant hand labour but not supplement it; ineffectiveness of efforts for agricultural education and extension; resistance of peasants to the introduction of new crops or improved techniques of cultivation; and failure to carry out successfully basic institutional reforms, in land tensure, credit and marketing.

Agricultural development planning has been impeded by lack of data and lack of funds, as well as lack of co-operation on the part of tradition-bound peasants living on the edge of subsistence and disinclined towards risk and innovation. The generally low priority given to the agricultural sector in some of the development plans of the region has also tended to obstruct progress in agricultural development planning. There has been criticism in some countries that agricultural development policies thus far have been concerned chiefly with specific technical improvements — crop rotation, better seeds, better drainage, etc. — but not enough with over-all organizational and institutional changes in the rural sector. It is argued that the basic overhauling of the agrarian institutional framework has been largely neglected in many places; that the entire organization of farming and the question of farmers' incentives, which are linked structurally to the size of holdings and tenurial systems, are as important as technological schemes to increase production. Institutional as opposed to technological reconstruction of agriculture (and therefore also of rural society) has thus become a subject of debate among Asian policy-makers. The view that both kinds of measures are required is increasingly reflected in current governmental thinking and policies, although questions of priority and emphasis remain.

Land reform

In order to deal with the major agrarian problems of the region, which are absentee landlordism and tenancy, a variety of land reform measures of varying scope and effectiveness have been carried out during the past decade in practically all countries of the region.[37] The chief programmes have been: measures for the elimination of intermediaries (undertaken with some success in India and Pakistan); measures for converting tenants into owners, and other tenancy reforms (undertaken with particular success in China (Taiwan), and with some measure of success in Ceylon, the Federation of Malaya, India, Pakistan, the Philippines and the Republic of Viet-Nam); the establishment of ceilings on land holdings in order to meet part of the problem of landlessness or near-landlessness (notably in India and Pakistan); measures for the redistribution of land (successful in Japan and China (Taiwan)) but tried also in Burma, Pakistan, the Phillipines and the Republic of Viet-Nam; attempts to consolidate fragmented holdings and the imposition of various limitations on subdivision and fragmentation (particularly in India and Pakistan); measures to simplify tenurial systems; restrictions on sub-letting and sharecropping (especially in India); and provisions for co-operative farming (particularly in mainland China and India).

The land reform programmes of Japan and mainland China have attracted particular attention owing to their speed in execution and their comprehensiveness. In

35 Sixth FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East (Kuala Lumpur, Malaya, 15 to 29 September 1962).

36 The cost of clearing new lands for cultivation and the problems of resettlement have proved formidable in Asian countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines and the Republic of Viet-Nam, where the problem is not so much over-all scarcity of land as maldistribution of the agrarian population on the land.

37 See *Progress in Land Reform, Third Report*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.2.

Japan, the Owner Farmer Establishment Law came into force at the beginning of the decade under review, and within three years almost all the land had been transferred to owner farmers. In mainland China, the whole process of agrarian reform, taken in its broadest sense, has passed through three stages. The first stage established the principle of peasant proprietorship with the passing of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1950. The second stage was the establishment of co-operatives, with the pooling of land and other principal means of agricultural production. The third stage consisted in the amalgamation of co-operatives into communes. These changes, constituting a vast agrarian revolution in the country with the largest population in the world, were carried out within a period of ten years (corresponding almost exactly to the decade under review here), with each of the phases lasting about three years. For Asia as a whole, progress in land reform has been halting. Results have been uneven or inconsistent (as in the various Indian states); implementation of legislation has proved difficult (as in the Philippines and India); and administrative bottlenecks have appeared (as in Indonesia), owing to the absence of the appropriate organizational infrastructure. Many of the land reform measures have not really benefited the landless workers, whose numbers continue to grow; the upper-middle peasantry continues to carry out "family cultivation" through sub-tenants and permanently hired labour and without itself contributing any manual labour; the socio-economic structure of farming and land distribution patterns remain basically unaltered; ownership of land continues to be concentrated in a few hands; holdings (units of cultivation) are still inefficient and uneconomical in size; the problem of multiplicity of tenure systems involving various subtle distinctions has not been dealt with; the conversion of tenants into owners (accomplished to a limited extent) has not been accompanied by much redistribution of land; the application to individual cultivators of floors (minimum limits) and ceilings (maximum limits) exists in theory only; and the relationship of institutional to technological changes has not been adequately appreciated. Even the official opinion of the results accomplished is far from optimistic; the report of India's central Food and Agriculture Ministry for 1957-1958 conceded that, while progress in legislation had been very good, the actual implementation of reforms gave little cause for satisfaction. It appears to be the general consensus that a decade of land reform in Asia, in spite of considerable progress in some countries, has not yet fully achieved its major objective, which is to give the peasant the incentive to make improvements on his land and increase his productivity.

The effects of land reform on rural income are in general difficult to measure. In Japan, land reform, combined with a vigorous programme of rural industrialization, which makes it possible for farmers to supplement farm income with non-farm income, has led to steady increases in rural incomes; these have brought about not only higher levels of living in the villages, but also increased investment in farm capital goods; it is difficult, however, to isolate the share of land reform in this progress. In India and Pakistan, studies are inconclusive, but it appears that farm incomes may have increased somewhat as a result of the abolition of intermediary rights. In China (Taiwan), where land reform has made possible more prolonged and intensive employment on the land, farm incomes have undoubtedly increased. However, in other countries and for Asia in general, there is no evidence of a direct causal connexion between land reform and higher income. The effects of land reform on productivity and employment are equally unclear, although in some instances they appear quite favourable.

The problem of integration in the formulation and execution of land reform programmes in some countries deserves special mention. In India, for example, land reform is the responsibility of, among others, the central ministries of food and agriculture, irrigation and power, and co-operation and community development, as well as the state departments of revenue, settlement, agriculture, irrigation, etc. In theory, the central government lays down the broad policy and is supposed to ensure a common approach in legislation, as well as to detect gaps in implementation, through a Central Committee for Land Reform located in the Planning Commission, but the states are responsible for working out the legislation and for all phases of implementation. Moreover, separate administrative staffs are responsible for carrying out the tenancy reforms, the census of holdings, settlement, the consolidation of holdings, reclamation, the fixing of ceilings, etc.

Land reform programmes have usually been undertaken independently of community development programmes. In India and Pakistan there has been practically no attempt to relate the two. In Japan, land reform was carried out without the support of a formal community development programme, although its success was due largely to the prominent role played by representatives of local land committees. In the Philippines, the limited scope of land reform and its separation from community development have been a major deterrent to the success of the latter. In China (Taiwan), however, where community development type local activities such as farmers' associations have played a very important part in the success of land reform, the two programmes have reinforced each other.

Co-operatives

In some Asian countries, co-operatives in one farm or another have been a central element in rural development policies, but there is a lack of agreement on the effects that they have had on agricultural production and employment during the last decade. An official report in India has concluded that co-operatives have facilitated the introduction of improved farming techniques and have, by using labour-intensive methods, extended employment opportunities.[38] In China (Taiwan), farmers' associations have played an important role in facilitating the recovery of the high pre-war levels of productivity. In mainland China, the most intensive period of establishment of co-operatives in the middle of the last decade coincided with a substantial increase in the output of grains and in agricultural productivity in general.[39] Japan,

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38 Government of India, *Report of the Working Group on Co-operative Farming*, December 1959.

39 *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1958* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.II.F.1).

however, achieved dramatic increases in agricultural productivity in the same period without a co-operative movement of any kind.

In India, the first and second Five-Year Plans (1950-1955 and 1955-1960) made elaborate provisions for state governments to experiment in various methods and techniques of co-operative farming and to develop phased programmes for their adoption; a number of state governments have taken little concrete action, however, and targets established in the plans have invariably remained underfulfilled. Difficulties in establishing effective co-operatives have been encountered in other parts of Asia.

One difficulty has been that co-operative village management has often not succeeded in establishing itself outside the influence of the vested interests in village communities and the traditional power groups (which have also obstructed the implementation of land reform legislation). Another factor has been that the extension of co-operation to fields other than credit has not proved easy; villagers have shown eagerness to adopt arrangements that would provide an alternative to, and reduce their dependence on, the ubiquitous money-lender, but they have failed to show the same enthusiasm for other forms of co-operation, such as marketing.[40] The result has inevitably been a major set-back to the principle of the multi-purpose co-operative, which Governments have attempted to make the foundation of co-operative policies in the agricultural sector. Various other factors have impeded the effective development of co-operatives in some countries of Asia, such as the indifference and sometimes hostility of administrators at the central, state and district levels, who do not believe in co-operative farming (and other related programmes, such as decentralization, land redistribution and community projects); the absence of the general preconditions (such as a flexible administrative organization responsive to changing needs) necessary for the success of co-operatives, and the tendency to push these programmes too fast before the preconditions were satisfied; frequent reversals and shifts in policy; and, finally, the failure in Asia generally to integrate co-operatives, supervised credit and agricultural extension into a combined approach to rural development.

Rural community development

The major rural development programme in much of Asia during the last decade, symbolizing Asia's desire to bring quick progress to the underemployed and poor rural populations, has, however, not been land reform or co-operatives, but rather "community development" — organized self-help at the local level stimulated and assisted from without. Asia is the first major region to have carried out extensive programmes of community development. By the end of the decade under review, as many as sixteen Asian countries had community development programmes of varying range and emphasis. In some of these countries, such as Ceylon, China (Taiwan) and India, the programme had already covered more than one-half of all villages and a corresponding proportion of the rural population; however, in others, such as Indonesia, although ambitious and comprehensive programmes were formulated, they could not be adequately implemented, owing, among other things, to a shortage of technical and organizational staff and of other resources. In spite of the extensive coverage and the wide publicity accorded to the subject, however, it was generally felt by the end of the decade that community development in some Asian countries had not attained all the diverse goals that had been set for it or had lagged in relation to the increasing expectations of the rural masses.[41] Currently, therefore, political leaders, planners, administrators and professional workers in Asia are seeking ways to make the programmes more effective, and the most recent trends in the programme must be regarded in this light. These new trends include: (*a*) increasing identification of community development with local government; (*b*) increasing emphasis on the economic goals of community development in addition to its civic, welfare and social aims — on its role in fostering viable rural industries, its relation to land reform and co-operatives, its relation to agricultural production and economic development in general, and, finally, on long-range programmes with a wide range of social and economic objectives and a diversity of means for achieving them; (*c*) growing concern with problems involved in relating community development to national development planning (for example, problems of administrative machinery, allocations to a separate community development agency as against supporting technical service departments, assessment of non-monetary contribution through self-help, and relating local desires to national plans and *vice versa*); (*d*) more attention to evaluation with respect both to specific targets and to more general assessment; (*e*) increasing appreciation of the need to expand training facilities; and (*f*) recognition of the critical role of youth and of women in community development.

Among the trends noted above, one of the most clear-cut and far-reaching is the new emphasis on the use of local authorities for the administration of the technical services involved in community development. Ten years' experience of community development in Asia has shown clearly that its success is dependent upon increasing decentralization of administrative, financial and technical responsibilities.[42] This is already reflected in the current community and rural development policies of a number of Asian countries — for example, India, Indonesia, Japan Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The new systems of decentralization envisaged will, however, require changes and innovations in existing administrative structures, personnel administration (e.g., the possibility of evolving a unified local government service or an integrated central-local career civil service), financial administration, and the relations between technical ministries and local authorities.[43]

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40 Government of India, Planning Commission, Programme Evaluation Organization, *Evaluation Report on Working of Community Projects and NES-Blocks* (New Delhi), vol. I, April 1957, p. 38.

41 See, for example, the report of the 1959 United Nations Mission to evaluate Community Development in India (TAO/TND/31/Rev.1).

42 *Report of the Asian Conference on Community Development*, First Session, Bangkok, 4-6 September 1961 (United Nations, E/CN.11/569).

43 See *Decentralization for National and Local Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.II.H.2).

Although, as indicated above, Asian community development programmes have in more recent years begun to stress economic objectives, there was, over the last decade as a whole, in some countries a relative neglect of such matters as rural industries, marketing, storage, local irrigation, developing supplementary forms of production, helping farmers improve agricultural techniques, etc. The contribution of community development in Asia to improved production techniques, particularly to farming techniques, has in some cases been a matter of considerable effort, but only modest results (owing principally to the lack of technical departmental support to front-line community development workers). It is probable, however, that community development programmes have contributed substantially — although this is hard to measure — to greater future productivity through their considerable emphasis on human investment, particularly in improved health and education. Community development programmes have also contributed significantly to the civic and political education of rural masses, their increased capacity to solve their own problems, and the forging of a two-way link between the Government and the people.

In some Asian countries, community development programmes, especially in the early part of the last decade, suffered from administrative confusion. The relation of community development personnel to existing authorities and to the technical services of government has been a problem. The district administration (often served by district officers trained in the old civil service tradition) has emerged as a weak link in the administrative chain[44] and the community development programme in some instances has been implemented through administrative procedures and practices that are contrary to the very philosophy and spirit of the movement. Training programmes have been inadequate, particularly for village level workers and development block officers, who are often hastily recruited from other branches of the civil service. Failure of various categories of specialists to work together as a team and conflicts between administrative and specialist personnel have been frequent. The problem sometimes appears to centre around the village-level worker, whose effectiveness, in the absence of administrative power, depends largely upon the force of his personality and the example he sets. He does not always command respect from the villagers, and the wide range of demands placed on him has also tended to reduce his effectiveness. In other instances (e.g., Pakistan), village-level workers selected from outside the civil service have shown themselves to be a very dynamic factor in rural development, but their effectiveness has often been impaired by lack of adequate support from other development departments.

A criticism which has also been levelled at the programme as it has been carried out during the last decade in some countries is that community development, in spite of being a method devised mainly for the integrated rural development of the entire community, has not yet succeeded fully in approaching the problem of rural development as an organic whole, taking into account simultaneously the problems of developing local industries, strengthening local governments, introducing co-operative farming arrangements designed to make small-scale farming an efficient operation, and effecting basic social structural changes through land reform. Community development obviously needs to be associated with the two other basic institutional changes under way in Asian rural society — land tenure reforms and the rejuvenation of local government organs. Rural housing, which is a problem of vast dimensions in Asia's villages,[45] has not been brought into the main stream of community development, even though it offers special possibilities for self-help and other community methods.

In certain cases, the benefits of community development programmes may have gone primarily to rural élites, to upper castes and classes, or to other vested interests, who are usually the only literate group in the village and who have necessarily been used as agents in the implementation of the programme, with consequent bolstering of their power. In other cases the benefits to the village have been primarily the satisfaction of village pride, as in the construction of an impressive but unnecessarily expensive school building, while less obvious and less dramatic but deeply essential changes have not been made.

In the opinion of many experts, an important obstacle to development planning in Asia during the last decade has been the failure to get people involved in development at the local level — the development programmes have been too much a matter of planning activity at the top. There are some exceptions to this statement, but it appears that only a small amount of voluntary labour has thus far been contributed to community development projects in spite of the wide-spread prevalence of rural underemployment.[46] Asian leaders feel, however, that with the emergence of a new type of local leader trained in the dynamics of community action, with the gradual disappearance of the dominance of rural traditionalism, and with wider and better appreciation among government officials and all categories of expert personnel of the meaning and importance of community development, the programme will eventually succeed in building stronger motivation at the village level.

The acknowledged difficulties of community development in Asia are not so much an argument against the central principle of the programme as an indication of

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44 See Carl C. Taylor, *A Critical Analysis of India's Community Development Programme*, New Delhi, The Community Projects Administration, Government of India, 1956. This is, however, less true in more recent years. In Pakistan, for example, the younger group of district officers have proved themselves to be very keen proponents of community development processes.

45 In the rural areas of India, for example, 50 million houses need to be improved or entirely rebuilt (see country paper submitted by India to the 1960 ECAFE Working Party on Housing and Building Materials).

46 A recent United Nations study estimates that only one or two days *per annum* of voluntary labour are contributed to community development projects; the only exception is the Republic of Viet-Nam, where the substantial labour contributed is not thought to be voluntary. (See *Community Development and Economic Development*, Part I, A Study of the Contribution of Rural Community Development Programmes to National Economic Development in Asia and the Far East, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 60.II.F.6.)

the magnitude and scope of the Asian rural development problem. Nor has community development been tried long enough for its results to become really manifest; concerted efforts over a much longer period are necessary. Finally, the mere fact that a programme of these dimensions has been actually established — through the creation of a wide variety of community development organizations and structures — is in itself an accomplishment of no mean importance.[47]

One question now being asked is whether undue reliance had been placed on the spontaneous co-operation of villagers, and whether the reluctance to use compulsion of any kind had not prevented fuller use being made of the greatest resource available in Asia's villages — the vast surplus of manpower. Some observers contend that, historically, no country has in the past succeeded in mobilizing surplus rural labour on a mass scale except through public works schemes involving at least some degree or form of compulsion.[48]

Rural communes

The system of rural communes in mainland China, inaugurated in 1958, has attracted considerable attention as an alternative approach to the problem of rural development. This system, which is one of the largest and most far-reaching social changes in modern history, is striving towards the total mobilization of rural manpower for productive purposes. The communes differ in two respects from the agricultural producers' co-operatives which they have replaced: they are larger and have greater (although not complete) collective ownership of the principal means of production; and they have a greater diversity of functions. The commune, formed by merging several co-operatives into a single organizational unit, was made responsible for the development of agriculture, industry, trade, culture, health, education and military affairs. Government administration, production management and all aspects of economic and social life in rural areas were thus combined into one entity.

Apart from ideological and political considerations, one of the main purposes of the rural communes was to bolster the food supply. This problem was attacked in two ways: first, by attempting to increase production through mobilization of manpower and more effective farming, and second, by measures to regulate aggregate consumption, particularly through common mess-halls (designed, among other things, to control the amounts and types of food consumed and to prevent wastage). There is wide-spread disagreement on the affect of communes in increasing food production.

While the main role of the rural communes is considered to be the improvement of agriculture in mainland China, substantial efforts have also been made to stimulate rural industrialization under the aegis of the communes. The commune industries have concentrated mainly on the development of products suited to particular localities on the basis of readily available local raw materials. In line with the recent policy of giving priority to agriculture, commune industries have been designed chiefly to serve agriculture directly.

Steel production involving little expense has been undertaken through the experimental revival of simple traditional production techniques requiring practically no skill or training; but the experience of small scale iron smelting plants, as well as of other types of commune-run enterprises, has shown that the poor quality of the products turned out is the chief problem. Moreover, the demands of agriculture itself, in the face of recent decline in food production, has been a major limiting factor to the development of rural commune industries; recent decrees call for diversion of 80 to 90 per cent of all rural manpower to agriculture, discontinuation of non-essential commune industries, and periodic suspension of industrial enterprises (e.g., in peak agricultural seasons) so as to reduce the number of personnel engaged in rural industry by about 50 per cent.

Apart from the communes' role in health and education (treated elsewhere in this chapter), their principal social goal has been the rapid and fundamental transformation of the traditional Chinese family and social structure. The transfer[49] of an estimated one hundred million women in the rural areas of mainland China from household and family responsibilities to economically productive occupations and to communal social services within a period of a year or two must certainly be regarded as an unprecedented social change. A variety of institutions — nurseries and kindergartens, homes for the aged, and various social service "stations" for household needs — have been created to perform functions previously carried out within individual private households. The drafting of women away from household work to productive work[50] on this scale may, in the opinion of various observers, have improved the financial situation of families and promoted the financial independence and self-reliance of women, but its adverse effects on normal family life are believed to be considerable.

Four years' experience in the operation of rural communes in mainland China suggests that the following are among the main problems that have arisen: inadequacy on the part of managers of communes, who in many instances are not only untrained but were also, until recently, illiterate and were called upon suddenly to assume responsibility for the operation of organizations that are in many respects more complex than big businesses; frequent conflicts between economic plans of the central Government and the desires of local communes; overstaffing at all levels of the administrative organs of the commune system, inefficient and wasteful use of

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[47] See Report of the Seminar on the Planning and Administration of National Community Development Programmes, Bangkok, 1961 (ST/SOA/SER.T/3).

[48] *Some Aspects of Economic Growth of Under-developed Areas*, three lectures by Professor T. Balogh, New Delhi, National Council of Applied Economic Research, 1961 (see especially Lecture II on "The Problem of Agricultural Backwardness", pp. 31-32).

[49] Referred to in official announcements from mainland China as the liberation of women from household drudgery.

[50] Not all women leaving homes were, however, directed into "productive" occupations; the great majority were employed in community services such as nurseries and mess-halls, with the result that they continued to perform somewhat the same functions they had performed previously, with the difference that they were now working in an impersonal setting rather than in and for their own families.

available manpower; the authoritarian attitude displayed by local cadres and their failure to evoke popular enthusiasm; the general lack of incentives for peasants;[51] and the general dissatisfaction of peasant communities, including persistent demands for more democratic management, more free time, a differential reward based on different productive capacities, and more freedom of choice in food, clothing, etc.

As these difficulties in the operation of communes in mainland China have become apparent, certain measures have been introduced in the system to ease the situation. The major changes introduced during 1960 and 1961 were: (*a*) shift of emphasis from the large unwieldy commune to the smaller units (production brigades and production teams) and growing independence and importance of the latter as the basic production unit — in other words, the revival of the nucleus of the old producers' co-operatives and the conversion of communes into a kind of loose federation of agricultural co-operatives; (*b*) the restoration of incentives and local initiative by, for example, the reduction of payment in kind; the granting of permission for individual families to retain more of their own produce and for commune members to engage in spare-time production of vegetables on small plots of land around their houses, as well as permission to engage privately in handicraft production for personal needs (not requiring contribution to the commune); the granting of special status and greater scope for individual effort to the abler and more experienced farmers; the awarding of special prizes for extra efforts, and the granting of various "small freedoms" (e.g., ownership of huts, restoration of village stores, etc.); (*c*) a reduced rate of capital construction; (*d*) measures to retain all excess manpower in rural areas and other measures to ban the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry; and (*e*) limitations on the non-agricultural activities of the commune, especially commune industry.

It should be noted that conditions differ widely in the 26,000 different rural communes reported to be in existence (with an average membership of 5,000 households each and embracing almost the entire rural population); also, as indicated above, the institution of the commune itself is being continually changed and adapted in both concept and practice. With these limitations, observers appear generally agreed that rural communes in mainland China have had considerable success in public health; in water conservation, flood control, irrigation and river valley projects; in building up the amount of agricultural capital and equipment available to peasants through intensive application of manual labour; and, finally, in road construction and other forms of capital development requiring mass mobilization of rural manpower. As a technique for mobilizing the vast reserves of surplus labour and increasing government control over the rural sector, communes have been singularly effective. In agricultural production as a whole, however, and even more in the operation of rural industries, the communes do not appear to have been equally successful. Their emphasis on mass labour, rather than on skilled and specialized labour, has made their contribution to the development of efficiency and productivity essential to industrial and economic growth in rural areas of doubtful value.

[51] It is argued by some, however, that the loss of output through reduced incentives is made up for, at least in part, by the technical advantages inherent in larger units.

URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS AND POLICIES

Causes and characteristics of Asian urbanization

The urban development problem in Asia is really an extension of the rural problem. In the decade under review, as indeed in the preceding decades, Asian urbanization was the result chiefly of "push" factors — of large-scale migration from rural areas to turban centres.[52] This migration from country to city is in turn the result of conditions in rural areas that are now well known, although they vary from country to country: low levels of rural living and the drabness of village life; heavy pressure of population on land; limited agricultural resources, and consequent chronic food shortages; poor employment opportunities and patterns of seasonal unemployment and underemployment in agriculture; unresolved problems of the agrarian structure and, also, dissatisfaction of peasants with the implementation of land reform and collectivization measures; and, finally, problems of physical insecurity and law and order.

In certain Asian countries, however, the so-called "pull" factors have been more important — the real or imagined attractions of city life, the lure of urban existence to which rural populations have been exposed especially through relatives in cities, expectations of higher income and improved living standards in urban areas, better recreational opportunities and higher standards of medical care in cities, and the desire on the part of rural students to obtain higher education (usually available only in cities).[53]

A somewhat special kind of "pull" factor has been that of expanding industrialization in traditional urban centres. At least in the first half of the decade under review, the industrial policies of Asian Governments tended to accentuate rather than relieve urbanization problems.[54] Governments and private enterprises have been inclined to emphasize the intensive utilization of available installed industrial capacity and the expansion of existing industrial plants rather than the creation of new ones elsewhere. The result has been industrial expansion in already crowded urban centres and the further migration of potential labour from the countryside to the cities (in numbers surpassing employment opportunities). Thus, a paradoxical situation has arisen, with, on the one hand, inadequate industrial employment in the established

[52] Some of these causes of Asian urbanization were discussed at the Joint UN/UNESCO Seminar on Urbanization in Asia and the Far East, held in August 1956 at Bangkok; for a summary of the report of the Seminar, see 1957 *Report on the World Social Situation* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 57.IV.3).

[53] It is, of course, not always possible to draw a clear distinction between the "push" factor of low levels of living in villages and the "pull" factor of expectation of a higher level of living in the city.

[54] See paper prepared by the ECAFE secretariat entitled "Problems of Industrial Location", *Housing, Building and Planning Bulletin*, Nos. 12 and 13, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.7.

cities for the growing stream of rural migrants, and, on the other hand, a continuing industrial expansion in these cities, which has only tended further to stimulate the flow of rural migrants.[55] So vast are the reservoirs of unused manpower in Asia that limited improvement in employment opportunities attracts a multiple of the number absorbed, with consequent social problems. The already congested centres have been growing fastest, according to recent census data.

Some of the important characteristics of Asian urbanization should be noted at this point. Asian cities are still primarily centres of government and trade rather than of industry. Urbanization has been taking place more rapidly than economic growth, industrialization and non-agricultural employment. Most Asian countries (notable exceptions being India, Pakistan, mainland China and Japan) have one dominant metropolis, which is several times larger than the next biggest city and which serves as the centre of administrative personnel, financial organization and commerce. The cities contain densely settled heterogeneous populations with significant cultural differences. There is usually a sharp contrast and division between city and country, with the city or important parts of it being quite modern while the countryside is traditional; the dominant city in fact often appears alien to the indigenous culture. At the same time, the Asian city, or important parts of it, in other instances appears as a cluster of villages without a distinctive urban milieu. Rapid rural-urban migration means to a large extent conversion of rural underemployment into urban unemployment. Practically all Asian cities present a vast range of social problems — unemployment and underemployment; very bad housing and, for some of the population, none at all; congestion; marginal self-employment; shortage of electric power; prostitution; delinquency, crime and vagrancy; poor local transport; and increasing demands for health, welfare and educational services — which are beyond the administrative and financial means not only of the cities but often of the countries themselves.

Urban policies

By the end of the decade under review, all Asian countries had become acutely aware of the gravity of the urbanization problem and had initiated a series of direct or indirect measures to cope with it. In addition to research and surveys to assess the dimensions of the problems, the following major types of measures bearing on the subject have been undertaken: (1) programmes of rural development in the broadest sense of the term; (2) efforts to induce rural migrants, either through compulsion or through persuasion, to return to their villages of origin; (3) administrative measures to ensure an integrated approach to problems of urban development at both the local and the national level; (4) development of low-cost housing estates and of satellite towns and "new towns" on the outskirts of congested urban centres; (5) decentralization of industry through industrial estates, etc.; (6) regional planning; (7) colonization and resettlement programmes, including river valley development projects; and (8) use of the urban community development approach in certain south Asian countries and of urban communes in mainland China.

Rural development as an aspect of urban policy

Asian Governments have generally taken the view that the solution to the urban problem must, in large part, be found in the rural setting from which migrants to urban areas are drawn. In this sense, all measures for rural development have the dual purpose of promoting rural development as such, and of controlling the rate of urbanization. In some instances, the second objective is clearly articulated, while in others it is not, but in all cases the effect on urbanization is presumed to be indirect. In some instances, however, rural development may have actually increased migration to cities by raising levels of education and levels of aspiration.

Return of rural migrants

Among the most direct and immediate measures adopted by some Asian countries to halt over-urbanization has been the attempt to dissuade rural migrants from going to urban centres, or to organize their return to villages. Both the economic and the social costs of maintaining surplus labour are much greater in the cities than in the countryside. Mainland China, in particular, has carried out over the period of the decade a systematic and intensive campaign designed to "round up" and return rural migrants to their villages and reverse or halt "the blind movement of peasants to towns". A great variety of measures, some of them drastic, have been employed, including, for example, the transfer of "surplus population of cities" to the countryside and to "hilly areas" to engage in agriculture, forestry and other projects requiring the mass application of labour; [56] requirements of prompt registration by peasants and rural migrants upon entering cities;[57] instructions to agricultural producers' co-operatives to welcome returning migrants back to villages and to facilitate their readjustment to rural life through the provision of food and housing and other assistance;[58] the application of the policy of "return straight home" to "inflowing" peasants in order to avoid costs of transhipment;[59] instructions to urban workers not to flaunt the attractions of urban life during their periodic visits to villages; "ideological education" in villages to help the rural population to understand the importance and significance of agricultural production;[60]

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55 In mainland China, for example, the lack of sufficient industrial employment opportunities in cities has been a major problem of urbanization, but the increase in non-agricultural employment in the wake of the "Big Leap Forward" in 1958, far from solving the problem, only led to an unprecedented increase in the flow of rural migrants to cities.

56 United Nations, "Population Growth and Problems of Employment in the ECAFE Region", *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, vol. XII, No. 2, September 1961.

57 "Chungking Conscientiously Solves Problems of Blind Influx of Peasants into City", *New China News Agency*, Chungking, 2 May 1953.

58 "200,000 People in Shansi Cities Return to Countryside", Taiwan, *Shansi Jih Pao*, 26 December 1957.

59 "Joint Directive of Chinese Communist Party Central Committee and State Council on Prevention of Blind Exodus of Rural Population", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 18 December 1957.

60 *Ibid.*

revision of various subsidies and social service provisions in cities which had tended to encourage rural-urban migration (e.g., subsidized housing for workers, payment of one-half of the medical expenses of workers' dependants, the issuance of food and clothing ration coupons, etc.);[61] the granting by civil affairs departments in cities of travel and subsistence allowances to enable peasants to return to their villages.[62]

Administrative measures

A major obstacle to urban development in Asia countries has been the inadequacy of municipal governments, in terms of both technical staff and financial resources, in dealing with the broad range of urbanization problems.[63] There has been a tendency in recent years, therefore, for national or state Governments to intervene directly by providing city governments with technical and financial assistance or by creating within national Governments various departmental units which are responsible for housing, reconstruction, industry and social development in urban areas. However, by the end of the decade under review, the problem of an integrated approach to the whole complex of problems of urban development had not yet been satisfactorily resolved. Often the traditional public works departments, in the absence of an integrated administrative agency, have tended to take over a wide range of urban development functions and to deal with the new problems of urbanization, for which they are ill prepared.

Housing

The problem of urban housing is, in many aspects, the core of Asian urbanization problems. It is generally agreed that the urban housing situation in Asia has deteriorated in the ten years under review in all countries with the exception of Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore and, perhaps, Thailand and Ceylon.[64] The growing housing shortage is the result, on the one hand, of the backlog of previous needs and the extensive repair and replacement required in over-age slum dwellings, and, on the other hand, of population increase in urban areas combined with rising incomes, which have created pressures for new and better housing. It is estimated that from one-quarter to one-half of all city dwellers in Asia were, at the end of the last decade, living in slums or other makeshift arrangements,[65] a fact that has a direct effect on the entire level of living in urban areas, and especially on urban health and the productive capacity of the urban population. Squatter settlements on publicly owned land have been started on the outskirts of a large number of Asian cities by migrants for whom there is no housing. In some countries, the political strength of "squatters" has made their eviction difficult.

In spite of the steadily deteriorating housing conditions in urban areas, Governments in the region were unable to make available the resources needed to remedy the situation, since housing had already become a major competitor for over-all resources, and especially for critical construction materials that were also needed for transport, industry, schools and hospitals, irrigation and power. In the opinion of some Asian leaders, housing was already claiming a share of resources that was excessive in relation to other equally important and not less urgent needs. Consequently, some countries, such as India, have accorded a low priority to housing and have exercised control by rationing building materials and by other means.

Within the limitations imposed by the general dearth of resources, Asian Governments have sought to improve housing conditions by various means, the most important of which have been the following:

(1) Direct public housing and slum clearance: In most countries of the region, Governments have either directly undertaken housing programmes for low-income and other specific groups through their public works departments or else have financed municipal building, and in several countries specific allocations in development plans have been made for this purpose. A number of Asian cities have also established Improvement Trusts for urban development and slum clearance; it is believed, however, that many of these have turned into estate development agencies for middle-class housing and have actually undertaken little or no slum clearance.

(2) Financial and related forms of assistance: A number of Asian countries have made available loans, subsidies and grants or a combination of these to local and state governments, housing boards, housing co-operatives and individuals for the construction of housing for specified groups (such as industrial workers or low and middle income groups) or for the development of land for housing and the provision of community facilities.

(3) Aided self-help: One form of government assistance has been the provision of land and building sites to low-income groups or to squatters, either completely free of charge or at a nominal cost, with the stipulation that the groups which are endowed with the land should mobilize their own working power and construct houses through aided self-help. The aided self-help principle implies that low-income families should build houses largely by their own labour, but with government assistance for those items that they themselves are unable to provide (e.g., certain materials, site, etc.). It appears, however, that while aided self-help in housing has had considerable success in rural areas, its results have generally been disappointing in the cities; according to some observers, the alternative principle of "instalment building" (by which the Government provides the "core" of the house, and urban dwellers make periodic additions as and when resources permit), which has been tried in some Asian countries (e.g., India, Pakistan and Hong Kong), has been more successful than self-help or its variations.

(4) Establishment of satellite towns: Most Asian countries have responded to problems of urban congestion by

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61 Sun Kuang, "Urban Population Must be Controlled", *Jen Min Jih Pao*, Peking, 27 December 1957.

62 "GAC Directive on Dissuasion of Peasants from Blind Influx into Cities", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 17 April 1953.

63 Lloyd Rodwin, "Current Development in Regional Planning", *Housing, Building and Planning Bulletin*, Nos. 12 and 13.

64 Paper submitted by the ECAFE secretariat to the 1962 Inter-Agency Meeting on Urbanization, Paris, June. Not enough is known, however, about the urban housing situation in mainland China to warrant this generalization with respect to that country.

65 In India, for example, one-fifth of the population of Delhi and Ahmedabad, one-quarter of the population of Calcutta and over one-fifth of the population of Kanpur are reported to be housed in slums or to lack "housing" altogether.

attempts to set up housing developments and " satellite towns " on the outskirts of large cities. In mainland China, the establishment on the fringes of large urban centres of low-cost housing estates, which are intended to be self-contained communities with their own schools, hospitals and playgrounds, has been an important means of coping with the problems of rapid urbanization. In Pakistan, satellite towns for refugees have been constructed near Karachi and some other large cities, and in some instances developed land has been made available to private builders.[66] Singapore is, however, probably the outstanding example in Asia of a vigorous programme of satellite towns undertaken to relieve congestion in the central part of the city.

(5) Industrial workers' housing and new towns: In mainland China, the State, which is responsible for the operation of industry, undertakes the provision of housing for industrial workers,[67] while in other Asian countries, where the State may or may not have a dominant role in the industrial sector, Governments have attempted to induce employers to build houses for their labourers through, for example, the granting of subsidies for this purpose, or through relevant legislation. In many instances, employers themselves have taken the initiative to transform what at first were mere labour camps near sources of raw materials into " company towns ", providing acceptable housing and other amenities for their workers.

(6) Improvement of the building industry: Some Asian countries have attempted to improve the housing situation by using direct measures to extend the capacity of the building and building-materials industries. The measures adopted have included, among others, efforts to increase local production of building materials; establishment of cement factories; increased emphasis on labour-intensive and traditional house construction methods requiring little capital and offering possibilities of substituting labour for capital; and organization of apprenticeship schemes in the building trades.

(7) Building research and experimentation: Some Asian countries, notably the Federation of Malaya, India, Indonesia and the Philippines, have sought, primarily under government sponsorship, to effect savings in building costs and thereby to maximize housing with the limited resources available, through research on architectural and engineering design, on the preservation and utilization of various building materials such as timber and bamboo, and on alternative methods and types of construction. During the period under review, two regional centres for building research — one in India (primarily for the arid tropical zone) and the other in Indonesia (primarily for the humid tropical zone) — were established with United Nations assistance.

Industrial decentralization

Asian countries have placed considerable reliance, particularly during the latter part of the past decade, on policies of industrial decentralization as a means of controlling urbanization, promoting balanced urban-rural development, and stimulating industrialization of rural areas, particularly through small-scale industry. Governments have recently taken steps to discourage the further development of large industries in over-crowded city areas, through specific governmental regulation of the location of public as well as private industrial units, and through the creation around cities of zones earmarked for industry. In Pakistan, for example, an area of 22,000 acres in the Trans-Lyari region north-west of Karachi has been under development as an industrial colony. In India, the state governments of Maharashtra and West Bengal have taken measures for further industrial expansion outside their two big metropolitan centres; the government of Maharashtra has developed 3,000 acres of land at Atale, outside the city of Bombay, while the West Bengal government has developed Durgapur as a township for heavy industries about one hundred miles from Calcutta. The approach adopted by the Indian Government to deal with problems of rapid urbanization has been that of developing " centres of growth " in smaller towns and in rural areas, which would link the economy of rural areas with that of the neighbouring large urban centres.[68] Mainland China and Mongolia have, for several years, also actively pursued a policy of transfer of population from old urban centres to new towns (e.g., in the sparsely populated north-west province of Shansi in mainland China) which are expected to develop into dynamic points of industrial growth in what are relatively under-developed regions,[69] and thereby also ease the urbanization problems of the traditional metropolitan areas. A number of " industrial cities " are reported to have sprung up in the interior of mainland China during the past ten years as a consequence of this policy.[70]

The " industrial estates " approach has been used by a number of countries of the region as a means of ensuring dispersal of new industries, moving old industries from insanitary city slum areas to locations permitting better living conditions, and developing small industries in rural areas. Industrial estates seek to attain not only economic objectives, such as increased productivity, but also social objectives, such as protecting the health of the worker, as well as relieving further congestion and overcrowding in cities. In most instances, industrial estates have offered developed sites in the vicinity of large urban centres (with provision for water and electricity supply, factory premises, etc.) to production units of small-scale industry. India, which initiated the policy of industrial estates early in 1955, had established one hundred such estates by the end of the decade.[71] The great majority of industrial estates have been established under official sponsorship of one kind or another (central or local), and the

66 Rapid urbanization in Asian cities has led to scarcity of building land and rapidly rising land values.

67 See, for example, " Housing for Anshan Steel Workers ", *New China News Agency, Anshan*, 14 January 1958.

68 See the Third Five-Year Plan (1960-1965) of India.

69 The personnel selected to go to the new towns were carefully chosen from among residents of old urban centres in mainland China.

70 See, for example, " Construction of Cities Along Szechwan-Sikang, Sikang-Tsinghai and Sikang-Tibet Highways ", *New China News Agency*, Chungking, 27 December 1953; " Great Achievement in City Construction in China ", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 16 May 1956; and " Building Construction Grows in Cities ", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 24 November 1956.

71 The creation of a much larger number of estates is contemplated for the period of the Third Five-Year Plan.

role of co-operatives or associations of private entrepreneurs in these undertakings has so far been minimal.[72]

While the programme of industrial estates has reached a fairly advanced stage in some Asian countries, it is only in the initial planning stages in others. Moreover, the scope of the different programmes varies from single experimental projects to large networks, and from developed sites or very small estates to full-fledged industrial townships. In countries with relatively advanced programmes, industrial estates have already become quite prominent in certain small industries (e.g., in producing single components of bicycles). By the end of the decade under review, it was not clear whether industrial estates would turn out to be effective nuclei for the industrialization of rural areas. A number of questions still remained to be settled, including those concerned with technical processes in small undertakings; optimum size of estates; integration of the various authorities and agencies operating in the small-industry field; marketing of products of industrial estates; and development of transport and power facilities in remote areas where industrial estates are sometimes located.

Regional planning and development

Closely related to policies of industrial location is the regional planning approach, which Asian countries have used with increasing frequency. The development plans of India, Japan, mainland China and Pakistan have accorded high priority to regional development, as a means of reducing regional disparities and promoting rational and balanced development of different geographical areas.[73]

Several Asian countries have attempted to solve problems of urban congestion and at the same time to promote simultaneous social and economic development in rural areas through various schemes of resettlement, land reclamation, and multi-purpose or integrated river basin development projects.

In Pakistan, the Thal Project in the Punjab is an outstanding example of the development of a hitherto unsettled area in order to relieve population pressure in areas now inhabited and to meet problems of displaced and homeless persons. The Thal Colonization Project, supervised by the Thal Development Authority, has established new towns, factories, schools and hospitals, with provision for agriculture and medium-size and small industries, in order to absorb the influx of refugees in the wake of political partition. In the Philippines, the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation addressed itself more directly to problems of urban housing and urban congestion by undertaking programmes of resettlement for families living in the slums of the big cities or in other congested areas. Large numbers of families in Manila have been encouraged to return to farms and to resettle in Mindanao, where land is relatively abundant. Families moving to Mindanao resettlement areas have been assisted by the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration in a variety of ways, in order to enable them to make a fresh start. Such assistance has, for example, included provision of essential tools and small loans and technical assistance with respect to house-building and cultivation.

In Indonesia, the programme of "transmigration" — the transfer of population from one region to another — has been intensified during the last decade, and has been increasingly used as a major instrument of government policy to relieve the heavy population pressure in the urban and rural areas of Java. The Government has attempted, through its Department of Transmigration in the Ministry of Social Affairs, to establish communities in the sparsely populated islands of Indonesia which duplicate as far as possible the cultural conditions of Javanese communities. Settlers have been provided with various incentives, including assistance in agricultural as well as small undertakings, to deal with seasonal unemployment. The First Five-Year Plan of Indonesia provided for both "organized transmigration" (with government help) and "spontaneous transmigration" (by the people themselves, using self-help), with particular stress on the latter. Several research studies on various aspects of transmigration have also been carried out.[74]

Mainland China has carried out an intensive and large-scale programme of land reclamation and of transferring people to the sparsely settled frontier provinces, both as a means of rilieving population pressure in densely settled areas and of increasing agricultural production through bringing additional acreage under cultivation.[75] Although the intention was to settle people on land which had not previously been used, it appears that much of the reclaimed land is located in established agricultural regions consisting mainly of poor-quality land which was previously abandoned.

Several spectacular large-scale river basin development projects, undertaken in Asian countries during the past ten years,[76] have opened up large areas for settlement. These projects appear to have been more useful as a means of providing fuller employment and higher levels of living for existing populations in the regions than as a means of permanently absorbing new peasant populations

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72 See Report of the United Nations Seminar on Industrial Estates in the ECAFE Region, Madras, November 1961 (E/CN.11/1 and NR/35).

73 *Report of a Group of Experts on Formulating Industrial Development Programmes in the ECAFE Region* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.II.F.7).

74 Soefaat, "Transmigration Problems in Indonesia", *Housing, Building and Planning*, Nos. 12-13.

75 See, for example, "China's Aims in Land Reclamation", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 30 January 1958; "First Batches of Young Volunteer Reclamation Teams Organized by Youths of 16 Provinces", *New China News Agency*, Peking, 23 December 1955; "Large Group of People Leave Shanghai to Join Construction Work", *New China News Agency*, Shanghai, 1 April 1956; "Canton to Resettle 8,000 People This Year", *Wen Hui Pao*, Hong Kong, 30 April 1956; "10,000 Building Workers Transferred from Shanghai to Sian", *Daily Worker*, Peking, 8 August 1956; "Help Resettlers in Their Production and Home Building Effort" (editorial), *Kuang Ming Jih Pao*, Peking, 10 October 1956; "Over 79,000 People Resettled in Kansu Province", *New China News Agency*, Lanchow, 31 October 1956; and "Achievements in Socialist Transformation: Figures and Facts", *Shih Shih Shou Tsie* (Current Events), No. 18, 25 September 1956.

76 Some outstanding examples are: the Lower Mekong (in four south-west Asian countries); the Damodar in India; the Gal Oya in Ceylon; the Kitakami in Japan; and Huai and Yellow River Projects in mainland China.

migrating from elsewhere. They have, however, provided employment for large numbers of unskilled workers drawn from the rural areas where the projects are located and, as in mainland China, to huge numbers of mass labour recruited from a wider area.

Although the river basin projects are usually styled "multi-purpose", they have often been limited to irrigation, flood control, power production and other more purely economic objectives; their potentialities for social change, for controlling urbanization and for promoting balanced urban-rural growth have not yet been fully realized.

Urban community development

Asian urban agglomerations, which, as noted previously, are in many instances no more than clusters of easily identifiable communities, offer special possibilities for the application of the principles and techniques of community development. Accordingly, a number of Asian countries, notably India, Pakistan and the Republic of Viet-Nam, have, during the past decade, adopted the "urban community development" approach as one technique for dealing with problems of rapid urbanization. By the end of the decade under review, outstanding examples of urban community development programmes in Asia were those in the cities of Dacca, Delhi, and Saigon; some of the programmes (e.g., that in Dacca) were inspired by the central rather than the municipal administrations, while others (e.g., the Delhi programme) were initiated by municipal governments with the help of non-governmental organizations.

The urban community development programme of Pakistan is the most elaborate in Asia. The main trends in the programme have been: (1) steady expansion between 1958, when the programme was initiated, and 1960: it advanced with increasing financial allocations from a pilot demonstration stage to a movement of national scope;[77] (2) institutionalization and identification with local government: urban community development in Pakistan has been fully integrated into the administrative system at all levels, with provision for official as well as non-official participation. Urban community development has been made the responsibility of existing departments at all levels of government, instead of being entrusted to a new separate department. The acceptance by the government at all levels of the method as a valid approach is in fact considered to be a major factor in the success of the programme; (3) emphasis on training: particular attention has been given to on-the-job training of "*mahalla* multi-purpose workers" who, in the final analysis, are responsible for encouraging, leading and co-ordinating development efforts in urban communities.

Except in Pakistan, however, the urban community development approach, by the end of the last decade, was still in an experimental stage in Asia. Moreover, its role and its usefulness as a solution to a wide range of urban problems have yet to be established. It has given promise of being an effective instrument in creating a sense of community, in organizing urban population groups to help themselves, in disseminating various skills and trades, in helping marginal urban groups to be assimilated in the larger urban community, in mobilizing underemployed urban manpower, and in helping to create a changed outlook in communities. It has not shown promise, however, in attaining economic goals, which has led some observers to conclude that urban community development is a quite different concept from rural community development and cannot be assigned similar production goals or material targets.[78] The most important achievements of the programme thus far have been social — improved health, adult literacy, and social welfare measures such as maternal and child welfare, women's centres, boys' and girls' clubs, etc.; the economic aspect of the programme has been confined to the provision of assistance in production-cum-training programmes in home industries as a means of enabling urban housewives to supplement family income.

Urban communes

Quite different in conception from the urban community development approach is the system of urban communes tried in mainland China. Inaugurated on an experimental basis in 1958, in conjunction with the rural communes, the full-scale organization of urban communes really did not get under way until 1960; by the middle of 1960, there were reported to be 1,000 urban people's communes having a total membership of 52 million persons. The main functions of the urban communes, according to official statements, were: to foster neighbourhood industry; to promote suburban farming; to provide public welfare services (e.g., child care, care of the aged, and welfare of other groups requiring government relief); and to operate community dining rooms. The main advantages hoped for were the conservation and control of food grains through the establishment of mess-halls, the control of savings and expenditures through savings banks, the mobilization of underemployed urban manpower (and womanpower) for labour-intensive undertakings, the provision of additional employment opportunities in urban areas, and the reduction of differences between urban and rural levels of living.[79] The operation of "street" industries has been an important function of urban communes in mainland China. The purpose of urban commune-operated industries has been to serve as "handmaidens" to the larger state-run industries, to produce small consumer goods for local consumption (with the ultimate end of making urban communities self-supporting), to relieve the burden on the transport system of meeting local needs locally as far as possible, and to produce agricultural machinery and tools for rural communes.[80] Since the major role of urban commune industries has been to serve as a subsidiary for larger industries by processing

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77 Salah El Abd, "*Urban Community Development in East Pakistan* (United Nations, TAO/PAK/26).

78 *Community Development in Urban Areas* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.IV.6).

79 The reduction of differences in levels of living between urban and rural areas is sought through standardized consumption in community mess-halls as well as through exchange visits between urban and rural communes; it appears, however, that thus far this objective has not been attained.

80 In some instances, urban communes have also sent out tool repairing teams to the rural areas.

materials for the latter and in general by being geared to their needs, these industries have necessarily been made to depend for their products mainly on the use of scrap materials from big factories and other waste materials and discarded articles in cities, using as much as possible locally available female labour. The urban communes, as a new form of municipal organization, are reported to have encountered various difficulties although it appears that the gradualness with which they have been introduced (in contrast to the sudden introduction of rural communes), as well as the principle of voluntary membership, has helped to ease some of these difficulties. The official philosophy appears to have been not to rush the introduction of urban communes, and the approach to them has been fluid and piecemeal. Their usefulness in dealing with problems of urbanization is still open to question. Although urban communes are gradually tending to take over some of the functions of municipal governments, they are not yet autonomous administrative and economic units; they have clearly been in the process of constant change during their short history, and the form they will ultimately take is not possible to predict at this time.

Chapter XIV

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

Introduction

The decade 1950-1960, and particularly the latter half of it, has been the most important period of this century for African self-determination. One after another, colonial territories gained their independence with great rapidity and joined the family of nations. In 1954 it was estimated that 450,000 square miles with 18 million people, not including South Africa, had become independent, but by 1961 this had increased to 9 million square miles with 90 million people.

Social change over this period has been no less far-reaching. Progress has been substantial but uneven. Through the efforts of African Governments and the aid of international organizations, diseases are being defeated and educational and training facilities made available to ever greater numbers. But conditions of health and sanitation are poor, and in only a few countries does the literacy rate exceed 20 per cent. One of the major problems has been how to transform the economies of African countries and provide adequate social services in tradition-bound rural societies under conditions of mass poverty and accelerated population growth. Various obstacles have been encountered and certain incompatibilities of social and economic goals discovered. Consequently, there has been a more searching examination of the prerequisites of development and of the problems of priorities, balance, integration and timing of action. The lack of balance has adversely affected attempts to raise the material levels of living. On the one hand, public health measures and disease control and the removal of the worst extremes of undernourishment are enabling more children to survive infancy and most adults to live longer. But, on the other hand, it is proving more expensive and more difficult to educate the children and to find employment and social amenities for the adults.

Income is, in general, very low. Recent estimates indicate an average annual *per capita* income of about $100 for Africa as a whole.[1] FAO has given the following classification of countries in tropical Africa according to their approximate level of *per capita* national income: Ghana, Central African Federation and Senegal, $151-200; Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon and the Ivory Coast, $101-150; Congo (Leopoldville), Dahomey, Guinea, Kenya, Nigeria and Sudan $71-100; Central African Republic, Sierra Leone, Mali, Niger, Tanganyika, Chad, Gambia and Uganda, $51-70; and Ethiopia and Upper Volta $50 or less.[2] In many countries, real income has been static or declining in recent years. For example, the annual rates of growth of real gross domestic product were: 6.1 in Congo (Leopoldville) in 1950 but —0.8 in 1958; 5.33 in Morocco in 1951 but —1.4 in 1958; 4.0 in Tunisia in 1950 but 0.8 in 1958.[3]

There are big differences in income between African groups, let alone between Africans and non-Africans, and these differences would seem to be widening. The ratio of the average non-African to the average African income was about 30 to 1 in Kenya in 1957, 40 to 1 in the Central African Federation in 1956, and 70 to 1 in the former Belgian Congo in 1957. In a number of occupations, especially those requiring advanced education and training, Africans who have taken over from expatriates in some newly independent countries have received the same salaries and allowances that the expatriates received, far above the average indigenous income.[4]

Social structure and social trends

Family and kinship groupings, lineage, clan, tribe and other traditional affiliations are still important features in the ordering of social life in Africa. With social and spatial mobility, these ties and the obligations related to them are being modified in varying degrees, and new social categories and forms are emerging, similar in many respects to those of western societies. Within the wide range of social change in Africa, certain features stand out prominently. First, there is the changing emphasis from the importance of the group to that of the individual; second, the changing character of the family; third, the change in the character of leadership; and, lastly, the adjustments and conflicts in the areas of race and ethnic relations.

The first problem was formulated as follows by Mr. Julius Nyerere, President of Tanganyika:[5]

> "In traditional African society, the question of the limits of responsibility as between the individual and the society in which he lives was not being clearly defined.... The African would not think of himself apart from that community in which he lives.... He saw no

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1 *Economic Survey of Africa since 1950,* United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.II.K.1; International Labour Organisation, "Methods and Principles of Wage Regulation" (Geneva, 1962, AF.A.C./11/2), p. 4; also *Yearbook of National Account Statistics,* United Nations publication, Sales No.: 62.XVII.2.

2 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, *FAO Africa Survey, Report on the Possibilities of African Rural Development in relation to Economic and Social Growth* (Rome, 1962), tables 1-3.

3 *Yearbook of National Accounts Statistics,* United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.XVII.4.

4 W. Arthur Lewis, "Education and Economic Development", *Social and Economic Studies* (Kingston, Jamaica, University College of the West Indies), vol. 10.

5 *Symposium on Africa* (Wellesley, Mass., Wellesley College, 1961), pp. 157-158.

struggle between his own interests and those of his community to him was an extension of his family.... Our problem is just this: how to get the benefits of European society, benefits which have been brought about by an organization of society based on an exaggerated idea of the rights of the individual and yet retain the African's own structure of society in which the individual is a member of a kind of fellowship."

This trend is reinforced by western-orientated religious and educational systems which have stressed the value and central place of the individual. Christian teaching and marriage rules have, for instance, insisted on a form of marriage which emphasizes the bond between individuals and not between families.

Some observers tend to stress the disintegration of the extended family in Africa, especially under urban conditions, but recent research indicates that, although kinship structures are unlikely to persist in their traditional forms in towns where many of their functions are being taken over by other groups, nevertheless kinship groupings still play an important role. Various social obligations to kinsfolk in town and in country are maintained, especially through visits, gifts and money. New immigrants are also assisted by their kin group to adapt themselves to urban life. The indications are, however, that the nuclear family system is gaining ground in urban areas. A study made in Dakar, for example, showed that 41 per cent of the households surveyed were composed of small nuclear families. In some areas inter-ethnic marriages are becoming more frequent. For instance, in Livingstone 40 per cent and in the Copperbelt 59 per cent of the marriages were inter-ethnic, while in Leopoldville the percentage is even higher.[6]

Like the family, the wider social groupings have also shown marked effects of change. One result of political independence has been to put authority in the hands of younger and at the same time more educated men. The leadership arising from this authority is based mainly on western education and political experience, which at times is also given a traditional flavour. Under the stimulus of western-induced change, new groupings are emerging, which are developing a common social identity and economic self-interest. The processes of change, however, have not proceeded far or deep enough as yet in most areas to produce a restructuring of African society along the lines of a western class system. Primary differentiation in the cities and towns, as well as on the plantations and in the mines, is still largely related to educational background, training, skills, salary and wage considerations, professional services rendered to the community and related criteria.[7]

There is extreme fluidity of the new socio-economic groups, especially in the towns. New factors of differentiation and social stratification are being introduced without robbing the older ones entirely of their effectiveness. On the basis of income, occupation and education, the main socio-economic groups may be classified at three or more levels, which tend to overlap to a great extent. On an occupational basis, the "upper" stratum would include political leaders, managerial, administrative and professional personnel; an intermediate stratum, composed of sub-professional and technical personnel and school-teachers; and a third group, of skilled or semi-skilled and clerical workers. Opportunities for training are steadily increasing the number of skilled and semi-skilled workers, whose levels of earning tend to place them above the growing number of unskilled wage earners, to say nothing of the subsistence farmers. The gap between the earnings of these different groups is usually very wide, and the gulf is often considerably wider between any category of wage or salary earner and the mass of the population, who live on a subsistence basis.

One of the most crucial factors in emergent Africa during the period under review has been the tensions and conflicts arising out of relationships between racial and ethnic groups, particularly in areas with settled European minorities. In Algeria and Angola there has been open racial conflict on a military scale to resolve political issues. In Kenya the problem of land was a factor in the Mau Mau revolt. In South Africa and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, although tensions remain acute, restrictive measures and the threat of force have maintained an uneasy peace.

In South Africa, the announced policy of the Government is the separate development of different racial groups in separate regions, envisaging, for Europeans and Africans, the ultimate creation of separate self-governing or independent states within South Africa. In addition to these separate regions, the Government has also demarcated separate group areas which are concentrated in urban districts where Africans as well as over three-quarters of the European and Asian population and almost two-thirds of the coloured population live.[8] Between 1950, when the programme was initiated, and 1962, over 500 group areas were already defined.[9] While in many cases the area defined for a particular racial group has corresponded to existing residential segregation, the programme has involved large-scale movements of population, primarily of non-Europeans, affecting homes and land ownership, businesses and professional practices, as well as related agencies and social institutions.

Despite the complexity and diversity of African social and cultural systems, and the political divisions brought about by tribal and colonial factors, there now exists on that continent a new consciousness of unity. There is also a variety, tenacity and vitality in African cultural systems which have cushioned the impact of outside influences. This resilience should not be forgotten in any attempt to assess change on the African continent. It is manifested when African leaders today speak about the "Africanness of Africa", expressed in such terms as Pan-Africanism, and in efforts to reconstruct African history

6 These examples are taken from WP.22 prepared for the Workshop on Extension of Family and Child Welfare Services within Community Development Programmes held at Accra (Ghana) Nov.-Dec. 1960.

7 William Lewis, *New Forces in Africa* (Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1962), pp. 114-121. See also below, section IV, Urban Trends and Programmes, for further discussion of these points.

8 Group Areas Proceedings and Government Notices, Reports of South African Institute of Race Relations also give practical details.

9 *Hansard*, South Africa, 2 February 1962, vol. 510 (printed for Government Printer by Cape Times Limited, Cape Town).

and attempts to encourage and demonstrate African art. To understand African social life and the African transformation, these points must be born in mind.

Population trends

Africa has reached a stage in her demographic evolution marked by an upward trend in population growth, and the indications are that an even sharper rise may be expected. The social and economic implications of this growth are of far-reaching significance for African development programmes.

Although African censuses are often rather rudimentary, it is possible to determine certain fundamental trends in population growth since the Second World War. These are: the rapid rate of urban growth; the marked difference between urban and rural rates of increase; the fairly high over-all rate of natural increase for the continent as a whole; and the somewhat high masculinity ratio found in the large urban centres, especially in the mining and industrial towns.

It is estimated that the annual rate of population growth for Africa as a whole during 1956-60 was about 2.2 per cent, varying from about 2.5 per cent for the United Arab Republic and higher for West Africa, to as low as 1.5 per cent for Cameroun, Gambia and Angola. The over-all increase between 1950 and 1960 was estimated at 23 per cent, and it is estimated that between 1960 and 1970 it will be greater.[10]

The indications are that the average crude birth rate in most African countries is about 47 per 1,000.[11] The figures available suggest a somewhat higher level of fertility for West Africa and a lower level for Southern and East Africa, with North Africa falling between. For North Africa, estimates of crude birth rate vary from middle to upper forties. The Sudan has an even higher rate of 52.[12] Estimates based on Household Sample Surveys of twelve West African countries suggest an even higher fertility rate, with an average crude birth rate of 50 and more per thousand. Guinea was estimated at 62, while Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Togo and the Ivory Coast were between 55 and 60. Another important feature of fertility in Africa is the difference in levels between indigenous and non-indigenous populations. Persons of European and Asiatic origin have rates of the order of 25-30 per thousand, which compares with the level for Europe. Trends in the fertility of African populations will affect social and economic development directly in terms of requirements for investments in education, in health programmes and in agricultural and industrial growth. High fertility, for example, entails rapid increases in the child population, requiring larger sums invested for educational purposes.

Information on conditions of mortality in Africa is even more scanty than is the case with fertility. In general, the crude death rate among the indigenous African populations is high, averaging 25 and ranging from approximately 20 to 40 per thousand, while expectation of life at birth ranges between 20 and 40 years. The crude death rates are higher in the rural areas than in the urban centres, except in Senegal and the Central African Republic, and the crude birth rates are similarly higher in the rural areas, except in Senegal and the Congo (Leopoldville).

The African population is relatively youthful. An analysis of the age composition of the population of twenty-three selected African countries shows that the present age structure is not expected to alter significantly as a result of population growth, so that the three age categories, under 15, 15-59 and 60 and older, would constitute approximately 40 per cent, 55 per cent and 5 per cent respectively of the population. There is a high ratio of dependants (the young plus the aged) to producers.

Another problem area is migration. The general pattern of migratory labour has often been described.[13] In Central and Southern Africa, countries such as Nyasaland, Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi and the High Commission territories form reservoirs of labour for other countries. Estimates show that some 40 per cent of the adult male population of these areas may be away from their tribal areas, and in some areas the proportion may be as high as 75 per cent. The movement is mainly southward to the Rhodesias and the Republic of South Africa, while in East Africa it has been directed especially towards Uganda and Tanganyika. Within each country, there is also the national movement from the reserves, or areas of traditional agriculture, to other centres of economic opportunities, such as towns, plantations or mining industries. In the Congo (Leopoldville), the main movement has been from the rural areas to the mines and industries of Katanga and the industrial city of Leopoldville. In West Africa, the majority of migrant workers move from the savannah zone to the mines, plantations and cash-crop farming areas and towns of the peripheral coastal regions. Here the most important areas of emigration have been the Upper Volta and, to a lesser extent, Niger, Mali, Guinea, Gambia and Mauretania; while Ghana, the Ivory Coast and, to a lesser extent, Senegal constitute the receiving countries. In some countries, however, measures are being taken either to control the flow by bilateral agreements or to attempt to check the flow by development measures at home.

The exodus from the countryside and the rapid growth of towns all over Africa pose some of the most acute economic and social problems for Governments in both their rural and their urban development programmes. In the rural areas, the absence of large numbers of young adult males (who, rather than females, tend to emigrate) has resulted, in many areas, in the deterioration of agriculture and the lowering of output. Even where agricultural output has been maintained, it is generally recognized that, in the absence of a large proportion of the adult male popu-

10 *The Future Growth of World Population* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 58.XIII.2), p. 69.

11 Most of the new data summarized in this section have been obtained from the fertility study to be published in *Population Bulletin of the United Nations*, No. 7, under the title "The Situation and Recent Trends of Fertility in the World", and from Economic Commission for Africa *Seminar on Population Problems in Africa*, 29 October-10 November 1961, Cairo, United Arab Republic (United Nations, E/CN/ASPP/L.6-E/CN.9/CONF.3/L.6).

12 United Nations, *Population Growth and Manpower in the Sudan*. A joint study by the United Nations and the Government of the Sudan (in preparation).

13 See International Labour Organisation, *African Labour Survey*, Studies and Reports, New series, No. 48, Geneva, 1958.

lation, the rate of improvement in farming methods is considerably slower than it could have been. A recent study, for example, indicates that, while women provide the main form of labour in subsistence farming in Nyasaland, they are little interested in agricultural improvement.[14]

The absence of a large number of migrant workers and the permanent exodus of some of the most progressive and vigorous males also tends to have an inhibiting effect on changes in land tenure and utilization. Thus a high level of out-migration over a long period may be related to a stagnant rural economy and the existing system tends to perpetuate itself, making it difficult in the rural areas to introduce such changes as are needed to increase productivity. Moreover the return of migrants after seasonal migration, or owing to urban unemployment, may cause pressure to be put on the available land,[15] making it increasingly difficult in some areas for the tribal economy to re-absorb the returning migrant.[16]

It is not desirable socially and psychologically for male migrants to live apart from their immediate families for extended periods of time, up to two years or more, in cities, plantations and mining compounds, thus disrupting normal family life. A survey carried out recently in a farming village in the Sudan,[17] in which as many as 38 per cent of the husbands of married female residents were living outside the area, indicated that a high percentage of females (21 per cent of females as compared with 7 per cent of males) were suffering from mental illness, and suggested that the absence of husbands might be a factor involved.

Although the level of urbanization is still very low in Africa compared with other regions of the world, the rate of urban growth has been considerable. For twenty-eight cities south of the Sahara, the growth rate was about 4 per cent per annum during 1931-1948, increasing to 5 per cent per annum from 1948-1960, with regional variations for Central and West Africa (excluding Nigeria, where towns of over 20,000 grew from 6.7 to 9 per cent of the total population between 1931 and 1953). In view of migration from rural areas, the rate of population growth for African town is substantially higher than their recorded rate of natural increase. It is estimated that, in 1960, only about 6 per cent of the population of Africa south of the Sahara lived in towns of 20,000 or more inhabitants although this average covers wide differences between countries. The average varies from 30.7 per cent for South Africa to less than 2 per cent in Mali and Tanganyika. It also covers wide differences in the pattern of urbanization, varying from the concentration of the urban population in single large centres, as in Senegal, where 50 per cent of the urban population is concentrated in Dakar, to a more diffused urban growth, as in Ghana and Nigeria. The urbanization trend has been more marked for cities of over 100,000[18] inhabitants.

Health

During recent years, the use of new drugs, the development of health centres, education in preventive measures and the launching, with international support, of campaigns against various forms of disease have brought marked health improvements in Africa. These improvements are reflected in the decrease in the mortality rate and the rapid growth of population in recent years. But, despite these gains, general health conditions are still very poor. Average life expectancy is exceedingly low and the mortality rate still very high.

In North Africa, for instance, epidemic diseases such as smallpox, typhus, cholera and plague are still threats. Trachoma still affects a very high proportion of the population, but malaria, formerly prevalent throughout the area, is lessening. Typhoid and dysentery are also prevalent, but schemes for the improvement of water supplies are being carried out. In the United Arab Republic, about three-quarters of the rural population may still be suffering from bilharziasis and two-fifths from hook-worm. Throughout Africa veneral disease is increasing, while malaria, tuberculosis, worm infections and blindness are decreasing but remain widespread. Moreover, the health services are grossly inadequate to cope with the situation, with only one doctor per 100,000 inhabitants in countries such as Niger, Upper Volta and Ethiopia.[19] Everywhere, however, programmes for health improvement have been drawn up and in a number of countries implementation is proceeding as fast as personnel can be trained. A problem that deserves more attention than is being given to it in Africa at the present time is mental health, although a few countries have made a modest start in this field.

The planning of long-term programmes for health improvement is becoming more and more a feature of government policy. Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia and the United Arab Republic are implementing long-term plans[20] and it seems probable that other countries will follow.

Food production and consumption[21]

African consumption surveys show that the calorie intake is often only just sufficient for the population as a whole, while supplies may be inadequate in drier areas in certain seasons. According to a recent survey of fourteen African countries, the supply of total calories derived from starchy foods and cereals varies from 71 to 91 per

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14 Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, *Report on an Economic Survey of Nyasaland*, 1958-59, Salisbury.

15 E. Colson, "Migration in Africa, Trends and Possibilities" in *Population in Africa*, Report of a Seminar held at Boston University, Frank Lounier and Mark Earp (Ed.), Boston University Press, 1960.

16 Tom Roper, "Labour Migration in Africa", *Journal of African Administration* (London), vol. XI, No. 3, April 1959.

17 T. A. Baasher, "Survey of Mental Illness in Wadi Halfa", *World Mental Health* (London), vol. 13, No. 4, November 1961, pp. 181-185.

18 Rates computed on the basis of data given in *Demographic Yearbook 1960* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.XIII.1), table 10; table 2 "Demographic Factors and Trends" (United Nations, SEM/URB/AF.4), pp. 31-34.

19 World Health Organization, *Annual Epidemiological and Vital Statistics*, 1959 (Geneva, 1962), table 29, pp. 651-653.

20 *International Survey of Programmes of Social Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 59.IV.2), p. 11.

21 See also chapter on "Food and Nutrition", in particular table 5, in *FAO Africa Survey*.

cent.[22] The indications are that, while calorie supplies appear fairly adequate except in certain areas for some groups of children, there are qualitative defects, particularly the low consumption of animal protein. In Uganda, surveys carried out in 1956 in the rural areas indicated the widespread existence of protein malnutrition and vitamin deficiencies.[23] Similarly, a joint WHO/FAO survey in Basutoland showed that malnutrition was widespread in that territory.[24] The lack of variety and particularly the low consumption of meat, milk, fruit and vegetables are emphasized in all these reports.

Surveys carried out in the savannah areas, where there is only one cereal crop, reflect seasonal deficiencies in calorie consumption, and deficiencies in vitamins A and C during the long dry season when leaves, fresh vegetables and fruit become scarce. In the forest zones, there is evidence of occasional calorie deficiency where cash crops have pushed out food crops. The starchy staples consumed in the forest zones are low in vegetable protein, although this may be offset by the purchase of meat and fish. In areas where production for the market is combined with subsistence food crops, food purchases become an important factor. Studies made over the past ten years indicate that, in the cocoa belt of Nigeria, for example, the farmers purchased from 50 to 70 per cent of their food requirements, while the farmers of the coffee and cocoa belt of the Ivory Coast purchased some 30 per cent.[25]

The differences between the different economic groups as regards food consumption are brought out clearly in a recent survey on workers' budgets in Salisbury, Southern Rhodesia. The survey distinguishes between families and single workers who received regular rations of food from their employers on the one hand, and families and single workers who provided their own food on the other; the general level of daily calorie intake in unrationed families was only about one-half that of the rationed.[26] In Ghana, it was found, on the basis of data obtained in the urban budget surveys,[27] that the expenditure for bread rose significantly with income, and that also as income rose the dry manioc products were increasingly supplanted in the diet by other staples such as plantains and yams. Ultimately, with a rise in income, the demand for starchy staples is likely to decline and the demand for fish and meat, fats and oils, fresh fruit and vegetables to increase.

Storage methods in most African rural areas are still primitive, resulting in heavy seasonal losses in farm yields.[28] To enable rural production to meet the increasing demands from urban centres, not only should measures be taken to stimulate increased productivity per farmer, but also to make use of practicable but inexpensive storage devices to preserve what has been produced for a more even distribution of supplies throughout the year. Urban consumers will also be relieved of the financial hardship of the high off-season food prices.

The levels of nutritional health in a community may be affected not only by the available food supply but also by cultural factors. The methods used in the preparation and cooking of food, the avoidance of certain foods during pregnancy or early infancy, and various food taboos are all important in determining the benefits a community derives from their diet. Research and education are essential in this field, as well as in food production and storage. FAO, WHO and UNICEF, in co-operation with Governments, have been undertaking research and education in nutrition, through nutrition surveys, education of mothers in child care and feeding, supplementary feeding programmes, school gardens, training of professional nutrition workers, fellowships, seminars and other means. In a number of cases, schemes for improvement in nutrition are linked with health programmes.

Education and training

Education is now a major political and budgetary factor shaping government policy in Africa; it is considered to have far-reaching importance for development and progress, so that today a comparatively high proportion of the national incomes of African countries is being devoted to educational programmes. Undoubtedly, over the last decade, and particularly during the latter half of it, the achievements in education in most of Africa have been impressive. There have been marked increases in the enrolment of pupils[29] and students and a large flow of students to institutions overseas, for training. National Governments have given priority to education, and extensive assistance has been provided by international agencies, national Governments under bilateral programmes, religious bodies, private foundations, universities and other outside sources. However, the proportion of school-age children receiving even primary education is still very low, and the illiteracy rate among the indigenous population exceedingly high. Funds are inadequate, particularly in view of the pressing need for teachers and the capital costs of accommodation and other facilities. The rapid growth in school enrolment and the acute shortage of teachers have sometimes had the effect of lowering educational standards.

An educational problem of far-reaching importance to African development is the difficulty of finding a role in the economic and social system of African societies

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22 The findings of selected dietary surveys in African countries are given in *FAO Africa Survey*, p. 24. At the fourth Inter-African Conference on Food and Nutrition held in Douala in 1961 reference was made to nearly 100 food consumption surveys covering urban centres, savannah zone, forest zone, high altitude areas and special groups. Food consumption sample surveys have now been carried out in a number of African towns. See particularly Thomas T. Poleman, *The Food Economies of Urban Middle Africa, the Case of Ghana* (Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Studies in Tropical Development).

23 Uganda Medical Department, *Annual Report*, 1956 (Entebbe, Government Printer, 1958), pp. 9-11.

24 *Activities of the World Health Organization in the Non-Self-Governing Territories*. Report prepared by WHO (A/AC.35/L.322).

25 Food and Agriculture Organization, *Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics*, vol. VIII, January 1959, p. 6.

26 Central African Statistical Office, *First report on urban African budget survey in Salisbury*, 1957-58, Salisbury, 1958.

27 T. J. Poleman, *op. cit.*

28 See *FAO Africa Survey*, p. 27.

29 During the last decade, according to data reported to UNESCO, primary enrolment as a proportion of the corresponding age group doubled in fourteen of the thirty countries reporting; six of nine reporting countries doubled their secondary enrolment; and nine of thirteen reporting countries doubled their tertiary education (see *Compendium of Social Statistics*, United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.XVII.3, tables 5.4 and 5.5).

for the rapidly growing number of school leavers, especially those from elementary schools. The increase in educational facilities and enrolment in primary schools has resulted in the influx of large numbers of youngsters into the unskilled labour market. This increasingly large segment of the population, which tends to be educated away from the traditional system, has often found great difficulty in establishing a place within the society. Many of the young people with some elementary education drift into the towns, hoping for some kind of white-collar employment which they do not find, and end up as misfits or as members of groups that are part of neither the old nor the new society, and often tend toward delinquency. The problem for policy-makers is to provide the type of education and training schemes that will equip these youths to make the maximum and most effective contribution to economic growth, and to accommodate themselves to a changing society.

A UNESCO survey carried out in 1962 reported a rapid expansion in secondary-school attendances in some African countries, although the base has been so small that doubling or trebling the number of students going to secondary school may affect only a small number out of the total school-age population. There has also been rapid expansion in the enrolment figures of the universities and in the number of African students studying overseas. For instance, Nigeria had about 2,000 students studying overseas in 1960.[30] The pace of establishing institutions of higher learning in former territories quickened with independence and the need for places in the universities outstripped by a considerable margin the estimates made by colonial administrators. The problem of this rapid expansion has been one of money, manpower and equipment, and the cost per student of running these universities is far higher than in European countries. Most of the staff are expatriates who must be attracted to these positions with offers of high salaries. Moreover, since these new universities also maintain a modern establishment for services and accommodation for students as well as for academic, administrative and maintenance staff, often requiring imported items and expensive arrangements in the given locality, the total cost of maintaining them is very great.[31]

The merits and demerits for African society of a western type of educational system have been discussed often enough, especially the fact that a western system constitutes but a part of the total process of social and cultural learning, and neglects much of the African environment and the development of African personality. The trend in the independent African States, excluding South Africa, is to achieve a synthesis between the African and western values, to adapt European schooling to the facts of African life and to shape the curricula accordingly for African needs. These aims are stressed by educators as well as by political leaders.[32]

A high proportion of the politicians, including some prime ministers, were former schoolteachers; in some States, as many as one-third of the members of the Government. This fact adds stimulus to the educational development. Now that African leaders are responsible for their country's development policy, there is an interesting new emphasis on the need to develop manual skills appropriate to the requirements of the African environment, as part of the Governments' educational policy. African leaders [33] are now stressing the urgency for technical training, and there is a rapid growth of technical and trade institutes in the various countries. But the lower prestige given to technical training, compared with the high status of the academic professions, is hampering recruitment for technical and trade schools, so that the tendency is for vacancies to exist in these institutions while teacher-training colleges and universities are unable to find accommodation for all their applicants.[34]

The problem of separate facilities for the main racial groups has been acute in the British territories in East and Central Africa, as well as in South Africa. However, in British East and Central Africa, in greater or lesser degree, progress has been made towards solving racial questions in the educational sphere through changes in government policy and in the educational programmes for development based on a policy of integration.

Racial separation in primary schools in South Africa was extended in 1953 by the institution of a programme of Bantu education for African children on a tribal basis, and the introduction of the respective indigenous languages as the media of instruction through the eighth school year. A similar operation has been instituted for European children, whose primary education is required to be in their home language, whether Afrikaans or English — regardless of the familiarity of the children concerned with the language. School facilities, however, are available for all European children, for whom education is compulsory, and increasing facilities have brought education within reach of almost all the children in the other racial groups. By 1959, racial and ethnic separation in educational institutions was extended to university level. Three separate university colleges have been established on a tribal basis for Africans, one by conversion of a university college formerly open to all non-Europeans; separate university colleges for coloured and Indians were later established.

The education figures for most countries of Africa show that, with the exception of the non-African minority groups, education of girls lags far behind that of boys; only a very small proportion receive any formal schooling at all. The explanation usually goes deep into customary beliefs and attitudes. Yet the contribution of educated and trained women is indispensable for rapid economic and social growth. A number of African Governments

30 *Investment in Education,* Report of the Commission on Post Certificate and Higher Education in Nigeria (Lagos, Federal Ministry of Education, 1960), p. 113.

31 W. Arthur Lewis, "Education and Social Development", *Social and Economic Studies,* vol. 10 (Kingston, Jamaica, University of the West Indies).

32 Melville Herskovits, *The Human Factor in Changing Africa* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), pp. 217-258.

33 Deliberation at the conference of Heads of African Universities held in Khartoum in 1960 under the auspices of ECA.

34 In the Belgian Congo before independence, technical schools were well patronized by Africans but other forms of higher education were not open to them. Congo belge, Ministère des Colonies, *La réforme de l'enseignement au Congo belge, Mission pédagogique Coulon-Deheyn-Renson, Conseil supérieur de l'enseignement* (Brussels, publication No. 1, 1954), p. 95.

endorse the policy of education for women and, in most African countries, women exercise the franchise together with men. In some Governments there is at least a token representation of women. Change in the social and educational status of women is, however, being accelerated most rapidly in certain countries, especially in those where a mass literacy campaign is in progress.

If the danger of regression to illiteracy is to be avoided, there is an evident need to reinforce educational efforts by providing school-leavers and the many adults becoming literate continuing opportunities for self-education. Public libraries can help to meet this need but the library system in most of Africa has not yet been developed to any significant extent.[35]

The use of radio in educational broadcasting for schools is a new development in Africa and has great possibilities. Television, which has been more recently introduced by a few countries, might in the future also be used as an important educational medium. African Governments are interested in the use of radio for school instruction, particularly as it might help in the solution of the teacher shortage problem. But there are technical and financial, as well as social difficulties in using this medium extensively in African schools. There is considerable interest today in the possibility of using other new developments in education, such as programmed learning and teaching machines and other teaching aids, to speed up the educational process in Africa. Research on educational methods for Africa may prove of considerable importance.

African countries are experiencing an acute shortage of trained manpower. To cite two cases: Tanganyika attained independence in December 1961, but in July of that year Tanganyikans were able to fill only 616 of the 4,887 senior posts in the civil service. At the end of 1958, there had been only 181 Africans in senior posts. It has been estimated that, in 1960, there were 350 Africans in the senior grades of managerial, administrative and professional categories in Nigeria, but that by 1970 the country would require 2,100.[36]

The demand for skilled labour and technically qualified supervisors has also increased far beyond supply. Political pressures demanding Africanization of employment, the increase in the number of undertakings requiring skilled labour and the excessive cost of hiring European personnel have all contributed to this trend. As a result, there has been a considerable expansion not only of technical education but also of apprenticeship schemes and accelerated training courses with a wide range of on-the-job training schemes. Large industrial or commercial undertakings in West Africa have also established their own vocational schools, adapting their training programmes to meet their specific needs. In the Rhodesias, Senegal and Uganda, the Governments have established training schools jointly with large, local, private enterprises. Emergency science training schools conducting two-year courses for selected clerical officers have recently been established in Nigeria and in the Sudan. Institutes of administration and management have also been established in Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya and the United Arab Republic. For health workers and social workers, more emphasis is being placed on on-the-spot training, and UNICEF has been operating a number of schemes for this purpose in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika.

African education is severely handicapped by the shortage of qualified teachers. Recruitment abroad and accelerated training programmes at home have helped, but the problem becomes more acute with the rapidly increasing number of pupils and students seeking admission to schools and colleges each year. The efficiency of a high proportion of teachers, too, is severely impaired by lack of training. In Nigeria, it was found in 1960 that only 10 per cent of all teachers in schools and training colleges met required standards.[37] In Niger, in 1957, one-third of the secondary-school teachers were "pupil teachers", and only 7.7 per cent of the teaching staff in primary and secondary schools had had six years of secondary education and one year of teacher training. The picture is virtually the same in most countries. However, throughout Africa, Governments, with international aid, have planned and are implementing greatly expanded teacher-training programmes.

Rural trends and programmes

The policies and programmes of African Governments during the last few years are giving more attention than before to rural development. Although African peoples are predominantly rural, and their economy is based primarily on agriculture, the emphasis placed on rural development does not seem to be sufficiently strong in some countries. In the current development plans of most African Governments, the importance attached to the agricultural sector varies enormously. Only six out of seventeen countries intend to devote one-third of their planned public expenditure to direct investment in agriculture, and more than one-half intend to devote less than one-fifth. The general emphasis and methods adopted are similar for most countries, the aim being to increase agricultural production without much basic change in the existing institutional framework.[38]

Over most of Africa, agriculture is often difficult and uneconomical because of a number of enrironmental, technical and social factors. These include: limited amount of rainfall in many areas; shortage of water supplies; poor and inadequate communications; relative poverty of soils; and human and animal diseases. There is not only a scarcity of technical services but also resistance to innovation, owing to cultural factors. Agricultural productivity is limited by such customs as communal systems of land tenure, traditional methods of exploiting the land, attitudes towards keeping and selling of cattle and fragmentation of holdings. Added to these are the pressures of overpopulation in a few areas and the more serious problem of the drift away from the land in many others.

Surveys covering the ten-year period 1946-56 show

35 UNESCO is, however, active in providing assistance in this field.

36 *Investment in Education*, p. 53.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

38 See *FAO African Survey: Report on the Possibilities of African Rural Development in Relation to Economic and Social Growth*, p. 71.

that, in general, the volume of agricultural production in Africa increased faster than the population over the period. While production for export increased faster than production for domestic consumption, there appears to have been in that period a slow but steady rise in per capita consumption as well. Agricultural imports have also increased sharply. But per capita food production decreased slightly after 1958/59 and declined sharply in 1961/62. Since there has been an increase in agricultural exports since 1958-59, the inference is that subsistence agriculture has fared the worst. The latest information [39] indicates that the total volume of agricultural exports has increased by over 60 per cent compared with the 1948-52 average but, owing to the continued decline in prices over the past seven years, earnings have increased by only 30 per cent. In 1961, agricultural export earnings were about 8 per cent lower than the peak level reached in 1958. Increased agricultural output and expert earnings are necessary, if economic development is to take place without a drastic lowering of the levels of living of a growing population. In many countries, the export of agricultural products is both a major industry and a major source of revenue to the Government. Increased output is essential in order to increase the reserves available for investment. The involvement of the rural population in the national development efforts is also important, if the gap between the urban sector of the economy and the traditional rural areas is not to become so great as to form a major impediment to further economic growth and social development. Moreover, the demand for agricultural products is likely to increase rapidly as a result of population growth, the high rate of rural-urban migration and rising incomes.

The programmes of African Governments have taken such forms as schemes: (*a*) to settle large groups of farmers; (*b*) to consolidate fragmentary land holdings; (*c*) to redistribute land on a more equitable basis; (*d*) to irrigate large areas of land; and (*e*) to help with loans or bonuses to encourage and improve methods and increase production. In a few cases, Governments have encouraged large corporations to set up plantations. Various extension schemes to guide farmers in adopting improved techniques and co-operatives for the marketing of products have also been introduced.

Trends in agricultural organization

A principal feature of agricultural development policies has been the establishment of farm settlement schemes. In Kenya, for example, population and political pressures have led to new settlement schemes, while in Northern Rhodesia, soil exhaustion and overcrowding, as well as the Kariba hydro-electric project, have necessitated a number of resettlement schemes. In Nigeria, farm settlement schemes have recently been adopted, partly to find employment opportunities for young school leavers and partly to create a new generation of farmers skilled in modern farming techniques.[40] In the Congo (Leopoldville), as well as in French-speaking West Africa, government-sponsored *paysannats indigènes* have played an important role in raising agricultural productivity within the framework of the traditional system. Within the traditional system, land was consolidated and allocated for longer periods, while methods of cultivation and of crop and land rotations were supervised by specialists. By the late 1950s, nearly 150,000 farmers had been settled in the Central Province of the Congo (Leopoldville).

There have been other approaches to agricultural programmes. In Ghana, the main emphasis in the 1962 programme was in establishing state farms. Former agricultural stations have been transformed into state farms, and "pilot farms" have also been set up.[41] In East and Central Africa, from about 1956, the planning of land use on a comprehensive regional basis has been facilitated by the availability of aerial photographs and by a number of fact-finding surveys. In the United Arab Republic, vigorous action has been taken to improve agriculture. The Gezira Agricultural Scheme in the Sudan is often cited as an example of a successful large-scale co-operative enterprise between Government and people. Some countries are experimenting with similar agricultural schemes including large-scale irrigation projects, under a partnership arrangement involving either the Government or a public company and tenant farmers. Ghana's Volta scheme and the United Arab Republic's Aswan project will bring many thousands of acres of arable land under cultivation by peasant farmers under well-organized settlement schemes. Other countries have more modest schemes at the planning stage.

In North Africa, one target towards which Governments have directed their rural development programmes has been the settlement of nomads and semi-nomads.[42] Two sedentarization processes are operative; the "spontaneous" and the "induced". Several of these Governments have launched a number of schemes to settle their nomadic groups, aimed principally at establishing semi-sedentary communities and replacing animal husbandry by agriculture through increasing the area of cultivated land and developing the available water resources.

Large-scale farming by European settlers represents a major sector of economic activity in parts of East and Central Africa. Recent trends towards political independence and non-racial land development in Kenya and Southern Rhodesia [43] and uncertainties about political developments are already exerting an inhibiting influence on further expansion of this type of farming.

In South Africa, the Government's policy of the residential separation of the races has affected its agricultural programme for Africans and Europeans. The bulk of South African farm products come from the 100,000 European-owned farms, covering an area of about 100 million *morgen*.[44] The European farmers employ

39 Second FAO Regional Conference for Africa, Tunis, 1962 (ARC 62/3).

40 *Western Nigeria Development Plan, 1962-68* (Sessional Paper No. 8, 1962), p. 19. Also *Eastern Nigeria Development Plan, 1962-68* (Official Document No. 8, 1962), p. 23.

41 "Ghana's Farm Revolution", *West Africa* (London), issue No. 2374, 1 december 1962, p. 1319.

42 International Labour Organisation, *Panel of Consultants on Indigenous and Tribal Populations* (PCITP/1962/1/4, Geneva, 1962), p. 59.

43 See Economic Commission for Africa, "Economic and Social Consequences of Racial Discriminatory Practices" (United Nations, E/CN.14/132), pp. 49-54.

44 One morgen = 2.12 acres.

about 800,000 non-European farm workers on a permanent basis and some 700,000 seasonal and casual workers, both men and women. In rural areas outside the Bantu areas, the number of Africans is to be limited to those needed for farm labour. Between 300 and 400 African-owned farm lands[45] in the European rural areas are gradually being purchased or expropriated by the Government, and the Africans concerned given alternate land purchase rights in the Bantu areas.[46]

A recent UNESCO seminar emphasized that African Governments are well advised to treat as a matter of urgency the deterioration of the soil and landscape of the continent. There is the problem in some regions of the loss of soil fertility through over-cropping, resulting mainly from population pressure, the shift to cash crops, and the lack of techniques and adequate means of restoring fertility. As a consequence, yields are no longer sufficient to meet even the subsistence needs of an increasing population. These conditions are, for example, found in Sokoto Province of Northern Nigeria, in Chad and in the Bantu reserves in South Africa. The intensive cultivation of individual crops has also led to serious deterioration of the soil, as in Senegal, where the groundnut-growing area simply shifts further east as another area of land becomes exhausted. In the Mossi area of Upper Volta, it is estimated that erosion is responsible for a loss of 2,000 tons of soil per square kilometre each year. In Tanganyika and Kenya, recurrent drought and overgrazing have destroyed millions of acres of land through erosion. Serious erosion has also taken place in Basutoland. Governments are becoming increasingly aware of these problems, and in some cases effective measures have been taken to improve conditions.

In some countries, agricultural development is impeded by traditional systems of land tenure and utilization. Increasing population pressure and the extension of cultivation have resulted in more land being brought into use, reduction of fallow land, fragmentation of holdings and overgrazing. The general scramble for land in some places —and often its misuse—has led to deterioration both in yield and in social values, as friction and litigation arise in the community.

The customary systems of land holding in Africa are passing through a transitional stage and a gradual process of individualization can be observed in many areas. In most West African countries, individual land tenure systems, resulting from the commercialization of agriculture, have developed further in the coastal regions, which are more exposed to urban and export markets, than in the interior regions, where traditional land tenure systems are still common. In the Sudan, it is only in the Riverain and Gezira areas in the northern part of the country that individual ownership of land is to be found. Individualization, however, has at times given rise to indebtedness and loss of land through unwise economic transactions. In varying degrees, however, measures are being taken to control the disposal of land as, for instance, in Tanganyika, where the Government has announced its intention to convert all freehold land tenure, which it considers an alien tenure, into long-term leaseholds.

In North Africa, the most radical reforms have been carried out in the United Arab Republic. These have been approached in four different ways: (1) The Land Reform Act of 1952 set a ceiling to holdings, arranged for the distribution of the land in excess of these ceilings and introduced comprehensive tenancy regulations and the fixing of wages for agricultural labourers; (2) The Land Reform Law of 1961 lowered the ceiling of holdings; (3) State-owned land was reclaimed and distributed; (4) Land use was consolidated and a uniform system of crop rotation outside the areas affected by land reform legislation adopted.[47]

Where land has been apportioned on a racially discriminatory basis, agricultural development for Africans tends to be hampered, although in some countries government policies during the decade have attempted to ameliorate this situation. In the Republic of South Africa, if the target under the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 is reached, the area of land available to Africans will equal 13 per cent of the extent of the country. Thus about 70 per cent of the population holds less than 15 per cent of South Africa's total land area. In Southern Rhodesia, where there are twelve times as many Africans as Europeans, the total area assigned to Africans under the Land Apportionment Act of 1941 was 50,701 square miles as opposed to 75,910 miles for Europeans. In Kenya, until the enactment in 1960 of non-racial land policy legislation, the land held by, or available for, non-Africans was 13,400 square miles and largely superior in quality. But racial restrictions on ownership and occupation of land are now prohibited and Divisional and Regional Land Control Boards have been set up.

Extension schemes, co-operatives and community development

Most African Ministries or Departments of Agriculture are aware of the need for providing advisory services and for strengthening the efficiency of extension work, but they are unable to train or recruit personnel fast enough for their purpose. New extension methods are being tried out at the village level, using audio-visual aids, literature prepared in the vernacular, radio programmes, documentary films and agricultural shows, with varying degrees of success. Compared with some other world regions, rural indebtedness has not been a major problem in most African countries. But the lack of security on which to raise credit, in view of the traditional type of land tenure system and the generally low level of education and technology, makes it difficult for farmers to secure and utilize credit successfully. However, considerable advance is being made in the supply of credit through co-operatives. The main function of the co-operative movement in Africa[48] has been to organize

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45 Figures from different sources vary, but all are higher than 300 and less than 400.

46 See Union of South Africa, *Summary of Report of the Commission for the Socio-Economic Development of the Bantu Areas Within the Union of South Africa* (Pretoria, Government Printer), p. 46.

47 *Progress in Land Reform* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 63.IV.2), p. 71.

48 See United Nations, "The Co-operative Movement in Africa" (E/CN.14/133).

associations for processing and marketing agricultural produce, and to provide the credit in money and kind necessary for agricultural production. In English-speaking countries, voluntary marketing co-operatives of African producers were encouraged between the two wars, and this movement has since gained considerable impetus. Co-operatives in the French-speaking countries, on the other hand, had their origin in officially-sponsored *sociétés indigènes de prévoyance*, which was originally started to provide stores of grains in case of bad harvests. In recent years, attempts have been made to transform them into peasant co-operatives.

The co-operative movement at the moment is much favoured by African Governments and is strongly supported by most African leaders, so that co-operatives, particularly marketing societies, have rapidly increased in number. The potential for co-operatives in Africa will no doubt be further developed.

The relationship between community development programmes and agricultural co-operatives is complex, and has taken different forms in most African countries. In East Africa, there is little connexion between the two programmes. But in the United Arab Republic and in the Gezira project in the Sudan, where supervised agriculture and organized co-operatives have been introduced with changes in land tenure, it has been found necessary at the same time to organize community development programmes. In the French-speaking countries, where co-operatives based on the peasant group are part of government rural development programmes, community development workers are usually an integral part of these programmes. A new approach is being made in some areas towards meeting the problems of rural education and towards making the peasants aware of the possibilities of development and self-help. In the Senegal plan, for example, provision was made in 1960 for the establishment of *centres d'expansion rurale* to co-ordinate the level of the *arrondissement*, the activities of the technical departments and local officials concerned with agricultural extension work, education, health, etc.

In East and West Africa, community development based largely on self-help has undertaken such improvement schemes as the construction of roads, water points, wells, dams, schools, post-offices and clinics. Rural development is organized in Senegal through the Regional Centres for Aid to Development, in Mali through the Mutual Rural Development Association, and in the Ivory Coast through the independent *centres de coordination et de coopération agricole*. Agricultural extension work and credit arrangements are also an integral part of the schemes.

The approach to community development through adult literacy classes is becoming fairly widespread in Africa, and is particularly developed in Tanganyika and Ghana. The classes help to break down some traditional barriers by bringing different age and sex groups together. The schemes also achieves the co-operation of traditional, voluntary and government organizations. Governments are using these adult classes to put across programmes of health and hygiene as well as agricultural extension schemes. Educational work among women has been an important feature of community development work in these countries and has often been undertaken through women's clubs. In Uganda, for instance, the extensive network of these clubs provides a meeting ground for women living in scattered villages.

The most important contribution of community development lies in the stimulation of new attitudes, reflected in the role of the *animateur* in French-speaking countries. In Senegal, for example, the *animateur* is the key figure in stimulating the rural community to participate in forming co-operatives, in undertaking group projects to raise its own productivity and levels of living with the aid of government technical services.

Many of the schemes reviewed are still in their infancy. The next ten years are likely to be a period of great experimentation in different combinations of individual and collective enterprises. Much as been said about the impediments to rural development but, on the whole, Africa is without many of the long-standing problems of feudal land-holding, rural debt and over-all rural overpopulation which beset other regions.

Urban trends and programmes

Much attention has been given, in recent years, to the rapid rate of urban growth in Africa. The effects of rapid urban growth have not all been bad. Since the Second World War, African towns have contributed disproportionately to the national life of the new States. The sharpest breaks with the past are manifested in the towns which have been the foci of most African political movements. Urban centres are the headquarters of the newspapers, radio stations and other media of mass communication which have influenced change in Africa.

The most marked feature of the new towns is the poverty of the African urban masses. The urban worker is often far less privileged than is realized by those who set out to seek a better life in the towns. An outstanding characteristic of the urban labour problem is the huge disparity in wages between Africans and non-Africans and, more recently, within the African community itself, between a very small political and social élite and the mass of Africans. To most Africans, the cost of maintaining themselves in towns is rising considerably. Food is expensive and rent-profiteering is common, particularly in slum property. As zoning laws have often removed Africans far from their places of employment, the cost of transportation is not infrequently a heavy additional burden. If it is difficult for the majority of Africans to make ends meet even for the absolute essentials, the urge to purchase some small luxuries is very great, with the result that many Africans find it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory allocation of priorities of needs and wants.

Employment situation

Reliable information for detailed analysis of the employment situation in the urban areas of Africa is very scanty. According to a recent estimate, the proportion of Africans working for wages in Africa south of the Sahara rose from some 8 per cent of the economically active population in 1938 to 17 per cent by 1955.[49] But this average covered

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49 International Labour Organisation, *Report of the Director-General* to the First African Regional Conference, 1960 (ILO, Geneva), p. 27.

wide differences between countries, ranging from 40 to 50 per cent in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland to less than 10 per cent for most of West Africa in 1955.[50] Since 1955, total wage employment has continued to increase in most — though not all — countries under the impact of planned development programmes, although at varying rates for different countries and for different sectors.

A comparison of available employment figures with those for the rate of growth of urban population in some countries suggests that rural-urban migration is continuing faster than employment opportunities, and that the employment market in urban areas has become overcrowded. Although urban labour supply exceeds demand, there is in all African countries a shortage of skilled manpower and high-grade personnel, a shortage that has become acute owing to the changes in the economic, social and political life of the continent during the last decade.

Domestic service and self-employment still offer employment opportunities to a number of urban dwellers. In 1956, 20 per cent of the Africans in wage employment in Brazzaville were in domestic service. In some towns, petty trading, craftwork and the service industry have offered independent job opportunities, and some Governments, like that of Nigeria,[51] are encouraging this trend by offering assistance in development programmes to these areas of activity.

A feature in the employment situation is the increasing number of African women working in towns. They range from a minority working in education, social and medical services, or office jobs, to a large number of market women in Accra in Ghana, and in Lagos and Onitsha in Nigeria. Except in West Africa, South Africa and Mozambique, no female wage-earning labour force of any significance has developed.

In parts of Central and East Africa, considerable unemployment in the major urban areas has been caused by economic recessions, resulting partly from political uncertainty and partly from fluctuations in the demand for primary products, especially in the mining industry. Unemployment has also been a major problem in some of the smaller West African countries. In other parts of West Africa, such as Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, where employment opportunities are increasing more rapidly, the problem is chiefly a shortage of skilled workers.

In some areas, there is a high labour turnover which is related to the close link between the rural and urban economy and to the lack of economic and social incentives to permanent settlement in towns. In Tripoli, for example, it has been impossible to recruit the full complement of dock workers, during the sowing or harvesting seasons in the rural areas. In Nairobi, in 1953, 48 per cent of the African workers were found to have been in their actual job for less than a year, 80 per cent for not more than two years and only 3 per cent for over ten years. In Mombasa, the corresponding proportions were 40 per cent, 69 per cent and 7 per cent respectively. But the situation seems to be improving recently, as was shown from a study of conditions in the Congo (Leopoldville), the Rhodesias, Equatorial Africa, Angola, Mozambique, the Republic of South Africa and Nigeria in 1961.[52] But improvements in labour turnover and absenteeism have been attributed mainly to the increase of urban labour supply far above job opportunities.

Recent trends in the Africanization policy of the public services and, to a lesser extent, the corporations, as well as some big firms, have increased the number of jobs available to Africans. But opportunities for employment of unskilled workers are limited and the situation tends to worsen.

Wage differentials are very marked in Africa. For the Congo (Leopoldville) an ILO mission estimated that wage-earners' living standards were nearly twice as high as those of farmers in the traditional sector. But in a later ILO study,[53] the suggestion is made that, although average individual earnings of wage labour in towns are considerably higher than those of rural workers, the advantage is offset by the fact that the urban worker can only draw on the resources of the subsistence economy to a very slight extent while, as mentioned earlier, he may be burdened in the town by the support of his family as well as by contributions to needy relations elsewhere. A comparison of the ratios of wages between a skilled and an unskilled job in four industries showed that manual skill differentials tend to be much larger in Africa than in more developed countries, but that the differences have narrowed in recent years. This trend might be caused by a number of factors, chief among which are government efforts in the field of minimum-wage legislation and collective bargaining. But wide differentials continue to exist between manual and non-manual or clerical jobs, owing to an overvaluation of clerical as compared with manual work.

Although African countries have not yet set for themselves any full-employment target, they are increasingly concerned with the problem of employment stabilization in urban areas. Among the measures adopted are: provision of adequate housing; restraining the flow of migrants to the towns, particularly by means of rural development and settlement schemes; and regulation of employment conditions and wage levels. Attempts are also being made to steer migrants towards secondary urban centres and away from centres with large pockets of unemployment. Regional economic development programmes have been included in national development plans in Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic. The objective is to improve the social environment and economic conditions of the areas from which people migrate of the cities.

Programmes for repatriating unemployed urban migrants to villages exist in some countries but, judging from experiences in Leopoldville in 1958, they have not

50 International Labour Organisation, "Methods and Principles of Wage Regulations", paper prepared for the African Advisory Committee at its Second Session at Tananarive, Geneva, April 1962.

51 *Western Nigeria Development Plan, 1962-68.*

52 "Human Factors of Productivity — Absenteeism and Labour Turnover", working paper for the Sixth inter-African Labour Conference held at Abidjan, 17-26 April 1961, under the auspices of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa South of the Sahara, Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara.

53 International Labour Organisation, "Employment and training problems connected with urbanization in Africa", SEM/URB/AF/CONF.7.

been too successful. In Cameroun, the Congo (Leopoldville), Gambia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, compulsory registration of urban workers through labour exchanges has been attempted but without much success. Instead, Governments such as those of Cameroun, Congo (Brazzaville), Dahomey and Ghana, have formulated measures for the voluntary mobilization of unemployed urban youths for work on rural construction projects or public works schemes, so as to give them useful training while they are in paid employment.

Governments are taking an active interest in wage regulation as a labour-stabilizing device. In the English-speaking countries where the Government is a large employer of labour, its sets the wage standards for the private sector to follow. This may take the form of minimum-wage legislation obligatory on public and semi-public employers alike. Encouragement is also given to efforts to make collective wage agreements, and some Governments have established machinery for compulsory arbitration or conciliation. In the French-speaking countries, wage levels are based on the previous French administrative system of a *minimum vital,* i.e., the minimum requirements. However, since independence, increasing reliance is being placed on the system of voluntary collective agreements. In South Africa, collective bargaining does not apply to African workers, while negociated agreements by industrial councils for non-African workers may be legally binding. Most North African Governments actively promote collective bargaining and operate arbitration and conciliation machinery.

Some African Governments hope to redress the lack of balance between rural and urban living standards by giving attention to planning and development on a regional scale. Guinea, for instance, is co-ordinating the efforts of both private and government enterprises in developing her bauxite industry, in siting of the aluminium factory in relation to hydroelectric power and in establishing her rice industry. Mali is also using a similar development approach. The Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara has given continued guidance in discussion of development problems in Africa and recommendations for long-term planning. At the African Labour Conference, held at Abidjan in 1961, a resolution was adopted stressing the need to integrate large industrial projects with community development plans.[54]

But, as one observer has stated, the stabilization of the African labour force is by itself not the key to the reduction of economic pressures as the source of many urban problems. A settled labour force, for instance, makes demands on the limited amenities which are provided. Social security arrangements are very much needed and social welfare services are seriously inadequate.[55]

Housing

If present trends continue, African cities will double in population about every fifteen years — the fastest rate of urban growth in the world. Some cities, like Lagos, have doubled in size in the last ten years. Slums and other sub-standard housing and a lack of proper sanitation are characteristic of many of these overcrowded towns and cities. Most Governments, however, are assuming some degree of responsibility for the provision of more urban housing, but are finding the responsibility difficult and burdensome. The tendency, therefore, has been to stimulate schemes of aided self help, together with the construction of a certain amount of public housing to meet the needs of different types of low-income or unemployed families.

Housing for higher and middle income non-African groups is generally adequate. The shortage is in accommodation for the low-income, indigenous population, as well as for the non-indigenous minorities, such as artisans with lower incomes.[56] Mining companies, railway companies and other large corporations, as well as plantations, provide housing for most of their employees. But some of these organizations do not provide housing for the families of their African male employees. This accounts in part for the high turnover of workers and the emergence of a number of associated social problems. The system whereby Governments provided housing for expatriate staff has been taken over by most of the new African Governments for accommodating their African civil servants. The system is expensive for Governments and, in some cases, gives an unfair economic and social advantage to the civil servant by providing him with highly subsidized housing.

Until recently, attempts to improve the housing situation have been directed through the creation of semi-independent housing boards, but in the last few years there has been a trend towards assumption by Governments of greater responsibility in the planning, execution and financing of housing as part of a general social and economic development plan. Allocations for housing, including low-cost housing on a self-help basis, in current development plans have risen to higher relative and absolute magnitudes than in their earlier plans.

Various types of project have been undertaken by municipalities, regional governments and national governments. Efforts at public construction of housing for rental by low income families have encountered a number of difficulties: families have not been able to pay even the low rents asked without taking in lodgers; even heavily subsidized housing schemes solve only a small part of the housing problem; and they are frequently planned without sufficient awareness of the social and psychological needs of those concerned. Consequently, some Gouvernments are now trying other and cheaper methods of house building, such as the leasing of serviced plots to individuals on which to build their own houses on a self-help basis. Self-help projects have been applied successfully in some areas, often supported by government loan schemes [57] as, for example, in Ghana, where family self-help housing

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54 Scientific Council for Africa South of the Sahara, *Meeting of Specialists on Urbanization — and its Social Aspects,* publication No. 75 (Abidjan, August 1961), p. 27.

55 Peter C. W. Gutkind, "The African Urban Milieu: A Force in Rapid Change", *Civilizations* (Brussels), vol. XII, No. 2, 1962, p. 177.

56 *Special Study on Social Advancement in Non-Self-Governing Territories* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 61.VI.1), p. 17.

57 See report of the Workshop on Low-cost Housing and Related Community Facilities, held in Tunisia in October 1961 (United Nations, E/CN.14/SWC.D/4).

schemes are supplemented with government loans for a permanent roof.

In North Africa, while there are some fine modern blocks of flats and individual dwellings with adequate amenities, the general picture is an unhappy one. The rapid growth of towns, industrialization and the exodus from the countryside have led to extreme overcrowding in the older parts of the towns and the growth of shanty districts in the suburbs. To cite one example, the Government of Morocco faces the formidable task of housing three-quarters of a million people. New housing plans and policies have been adopted in most of the North African countries within the last decade. A problem of many housing programmes in Africa generally has been that they have not always been considered in relation to the development policy of the country as a whole or of the particular region. The long-term economic implications of the schemes as well as the human factors have too often been neglected. As noted above, however, some Governments, in their latest development plans, have taken measures to include housing as part of a more comprehensive development plan.

There is a need for surveys of housing problems as well as for pilot projects at this pioneering stage of development. Institutional arrangements for savings and low-interest loans need to be made to assist Africans who receive regular incomes to build low-cost housing. Housing standards suited to current social and economic conditions should be established and developed, instead of those based on the type of housing formerly provided for expatriates. Local materials should be developed and used to reduce building costs and at the same time to stimulate local industry.

Town planning

The sprawling and widespread extension of African towns is due not only to geographical factors but also to the lack or inadequacy of planning. Land speculation in urban centres leads to the development of suburban districts and the spread of shanty-towns, which have considerably strained such public services as public transportation, water, electricity supply and sanitation. African towns often have to cope with unpleasant conditions imposed by a tropical environment, and some towns are not suitably situated. Moreover, in multi-racial towns, the African areas are not infrequently in low-lying sites and are heavily congested. Unless some rational authority is imposed on the gradual expansion of towns, a tightly knotted urban centre tends to develop, from which, like a spider's web, residential and commercial development spreads out and grows until it engulfs outlying settlements. Attempts are, however, being made by some African Governments to replan towns. Abidjan, for instance, now has an over-all plan which includes slum clearance and redevelopment and the creation of new pilot neighbourhoods. An over-all town plan for Bamako, Mali, has also been drawn up, and the development of one-quarter of the town is being carried out as an experiment.[58] In English-speaking East and Central Africa, efforts are being made to create greater uniformity in sanitation and building standards. Zoning laws and town-planning schemes are being designed on grounds other than race and wealth.[59] In North Africa, local government authorities, as in Cairo and Casablanca, have taken measures to improve public utilities and to cope with other problems of urban expansion.[60] Most African Governments have powers covering a whole range of new measures designed to locate and promote industrial development by granting special privileges. But, although Governments' policies as expressed in development plans show that they intend to ensure balanced development, very little has actually been done to prevent industrial concentration. Governments are so anxious to promote industrialization that many would hesitate to use their powers in a restrictive manner.[61]

The social problems of rapid urbanization are intensified in Africa by administrative difficulties. Even where municipal authorities have adequate legal powers to enforce land use within the city, they often do not use these powers, for various reasons. Because of the urban sprawl, a great deal of the urban area falls outside their jurisdiction. In most instances, too, the systems used by metropolitan powers for administering African towns were not successful and have not been sufficiently adjusted by the new Governments to suit present needs. However, attempts are being made to bring about some improvements. Morocco, for example, has a master plan for her large towns; central authorities vested with special powers have been established.

Social welfare and social security

Although most African towns have grown as a result of migration from rural areas, social forces engendered in the towns tend to promote similar behaviour on the part of people of different origin.[62] Consequently, while the urban migrant still moves along kinship channels in his attempt to establish himself, and to find housing and initial means of support, yet as an urban worker with a modern political approach, he often finds his tribal affiliation less important to him than his role as townsman, miner, artisan or unskilled labourer.[63] But this trend may be more marked in some regions than in others. The policies of Governments and companies are being adapted to this change. Now, instead of working with tribal-centred groups, they tend to support groups based on the new industrial, political and social "class" order[64] evident in African urban areas. However, in matters of interpersonal relations between Africans, such as the struggle for leadership, and certain forms of mutual aid, tribalism still plays a part. It is not unusual to find as many as forty different tribes competing with one another in some urban areas for housing, amenities, jobs and services. Many social problems inevitably arise through close contact, different living standards and varied cultural back-

58 *Meeting of Specialists on Urbanization*, p. 27.

59 P. C. W. Gutkind, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

60 United Nations, *Report of the Urbanization Survey Mission in the Mediterranean Region* (ST/TAO/SER.C/51-ST/SOA/SER.T/1), p. 13.

61 *Ibid.*, p. 19.

62 *Meeting of Specialists on Urbanization and its Social Aspects*, p. 20.

63 M. Gluckman, "Tribalism in Modern British Central Africa", *Cahiers d'études africaines*, No. 1, January 1960, p. 56.

64 A. W. Southall, *Social Change in Modern Africa* (Oxford University, Oxford Press, 1961), pp. 126-144.

grounds. Disputes are also frequent and, because the range of customary law is great, the administration of justice becomes complex.

Urban social welfare services have been particularly directed towards meeting the more urgent problems of urban life under African conditions, such as programmes concerned with women's education, homeless children, idle youths, migrant labour and occupational training. The education of women has been given increased attention in many African countries through women's voluntary clubs and other organizations. In French-speaking towns, in the *Centres sociaux* emphasis is on the education of women in child-care and hygiene, family health, dressmaking and housekeeping. In most English-speaking countries, community centres have special programmes for women, giving courses in home economics and mothercraft. Voluntary organizations provide services for women as well as for old people and children in need of care. In national development plans, more provision is being made for the development of youth camps, sports facilities, remand homes and probation services. In the Congo (Leopoldville), Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mali and Senegal, youth programmes emphasize self-reliance as well as training for a trade and in citizenship. Part of the training and "induction" facilities for migrant workers is also given through youth centres.

In spite of the increasing involvement of African Governments in providing welfare services for their citizens, a major responsibility for organizing and financing various aspects of welfare services continues to rest on voluntary organizations. The present trend is for closer co-operation between public and private bodies, with varying degrees of control and financial assistance by central or local government authority. At the planning level, a few African countries have established a national body responsible for the development of co-ordinated plans and policies in relation to education, housing, health and social services. In the United Arab Republic, for example, a permanent public Social Welfare Board has been established, covering all the major divisions of the social sector.

Social security in the traditional African context has been a family or kinship obligation, with the urban worker contributing financial aid to his rural kinsfolk, and the latter receiving him in his old age. However, for many urban workers, this pattern no longer holds. To the need for social security schemes has been added the need to stabilize the labour market by extending the social policies of Governments to cover workers. Consequently, during the last few years, many African countries have been studying or have adopted social security schemes.

Where such schemes already exist, there has been expansion in scope and coverage. In the United Arab Republic, benefits have been extended to cover an additional two million workers in both public and private undertakings. In some multi-racial societies, such as Kenya (where large employers, both public and private, have established contributory and non-contributory schemes for retirement benefits), coverage has been extended to include certain categories of African workers, while in others, different provisions are made for Africans and non-Africans. In Angola and Mozambique, the benefits are restricted to a small category of Africans—the *assimilados*. In South Africa, certain categories of African workers are deliberately excluded on technical grounds, while those included in the scheme are at a disadvantage on grounds of racial discrimination.[65]

Finally, urbanization forms an integral part of modern, industrial, cultural and economic change, and neither the social problems arising from rapid urban growth nor the policies evolved to deal with them can be separated in practice from the whole range of administrative, demographic and economic problems of over-all national development.

Planning and integration of social and economic programmes

The analyses of the prevailing social and economic conditions and trends in Africa in the preceding sections of this chapter show how complex and interrelated are the development problems facing emergent African countries. Traditional social structure, population changes, political organizations and cultural factors have influenced economic development and change, and have themselves been influenced by economic change. But the process of interaction has not been without conflicts and restraints, resulting in major problems which tend to retard the pace of socio-economic change.

These problems of flight from the land, of rapid urbanization and population growth, of food production and agricultural modernization, of urban unemployment and rural underemployment, of balanced development between geographical areas and development sectors are examples of socio-economic development problems facing African countries, which they are determined to overcome in order to achieve a higher standard of life. It is to this end that, since the Second World War, many countries have adopted social and economic development "plans". The adoption of social development programmes, in particular, as integral parts of national development plans stems from a desire to achieve specified socio-economic objectives and changes in the social condition of the people. Basic to such declared objectives in the plans is the common desire to improve the living conditions of the people through the pursuit of a policy of social equality and opportunity and the elimination of poverty, illiteracy and disease.

Economic development planning in Africa began in the early years of the post-war period. For about a decade, these plans were in effect no more than government departmental programmes with limited range and scope, and lacked any real co-ordination between the different sectors, while major development problems were largely treated in isolation. During the last decade, however, countries increasingly came to adopt comprehensive social and economic development programmes in an attempt to mobilize available human and material resources for the realization of declared national objectives. In these programmes, the various problems came to be seen more and more in their interrelatedness.

In the first half of the last decade, most African countries launching development programmes geared their public investment priorities[66] to the development of

[65] See E/CN.14/132, *op. cit.*, pp. 149-165.

(66) In this section impressions and substance have been derived from the published development plans of a number of African countries.

roads and railways, needed for the promotion of commerce and for opening up rural areas to facilitate communication. This was followed closely by investment in social service facilities and in public administration. During the second half of the decade, however, for many countries, there was a priority reappraisal in favour of education and health services, but *with infrastructure, other social overhead and public administration still predominating*. With the adoption of new development plans extending to the sixties, a marked shift of emphasis was observed, away from social overhead expenditure in favour of directly productive investments in agriculture, industry and public utilities. Most countries then found that, as demand grew for the supply of social service facilities the means for providing them became relatively more scarce and other demands for the available resources became more pressing. Consequently, the new priority allocation for social services came to depend both upon the claims and needs of the productive sectors of the economy and upon the availability of funds.

The share of public funds going to the social sector varied from country to country during this period. In general, the relative allocation devoted to social services for most countries grew towards peak levels during the second half of the decade. The table below shows the comparative allocation of planned capital expenditure from public funds in sixteen different countries for the various development sectors. Ten countries, the Congo (Brazzaville), Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tanganyika and Upper Volta, have in their current plans allocated over 20 per cent of planned capital outlay to the social sectors of their respective countries. In the case of the Congo (Brazzaville), Morocco and Senegal, the allocations to the social sector have been inflated by the substantial planned investments on housing and town and country development. In other countries, the allocation has been in the range of 15-16 per cent. But this is not the whole story. While capital expenditure in social service facilities is heavy only in the initial stages, the maintenance of existing and new social services involves substantial recurrent expenditure, which for some countries or regional governments accounts for 33 to 40 per cent or more of public annual budget expenditure.[67] In terms of both capital and recurrent outlays, expenditure on social services would appear to have accounted for a substantial share of national development resources during the decade. A marked feature of this public commitment is for the level of such expenditure to be maintained in spite of the growing demands of other sectors.

Furthermore, the table shows the priority ranking in financial terms in the various countries over a period of time for the different divisions of the social sector. For example, housing and town and country planning would currently appear to be relatively more important than health and education together or than human resources development, for the Congo (Brazzaville), Morocco and the United Arab Republic and nearly so for Senegal. For a number of countries, about 5 per cent of planned capital outlay was allocated to health programmes, while the allocation for education differs considerably in the various countries. Within a given division of the social sector, national priorities vary widely, but the trend in most countries is towards increased expenditure in technical and secondary education, while in the field of public health much weight is given to preventive measures.

A second major trend in government programming in most African countries during the decade has been the growing acceptance and application of the concept of comprehensive development planning but, owing to the lack of trained personnel and planning machinery, some countries have not been able to carry out comprehensive planning on a national scale. However, in the field of rural problems and programmes, techniques for the integrated approach have been well developed in some countries, while in others they are being experimented on and adapted to local conditions. But, for the more complex urban programmes, much remains to be done in the application of the principle of integration. Departmental rivalry and jealousy have too often retarded the effectiveness of development. There is therefore a need for more effective co-ordination of efforts and programmes at the local, regional and central levels and through the various national planning and executive agencies, committees or councils in order to avoid waste and to achieve balanced progress. The result, for countries that have taken this lead, has been the better co-ordination or integration of regional development programmes within national plans, as in the cases of Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia.

A comparison between the earlier and current development plans in the various countries adopting them confirms certain trends. In the plans of most countries, there is a close relationship between agricultural and industrial production programmes on the one hand and training schemes and education programmes on the other, between urban and rural programmes on the one hand and national and regional development programmes on the other. Furthermore, while in most of the French-speaking countries comprehensive development planning embraces both private and public sectors and engages the interests of all shades of national opinion, including representatives of employers' and employees' organizations, by contrast, in the process of plan formulation in most English-speaking countries programme co-ordination has been confined to the public sector in both the proposal and the execution stage.

There have been attempts in recent years in a number of African countries to modify and strengthen their planning machinery. Remarkable results have been achieved of late in countries such as Morocco, Senegal and Tunisia, where planning organizations have efficient secretariats and statistical departments or institutes, and have achieved a high level of programme integration at the planning level.[68] Further experience and research will be required in most countries of the region to achieve the optimal balance of investments in the economic and social sectors of development.

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67 Data is not available for an analysis of combined capital and recurrent expenditure in a number of countries. For examples see *Eastern Nigeria Development Plan*, pp. 3 and 12 and *Western Nigeria Development Plan*, p. 48.

68 See United Nations, Working Papers for the Meeting on Comprehensive Planning, Addis Ababa, 15-20 October 1962, especially E/CN.14/CP/6; E/CN.14/CP/11; E/CN.14/CP/10; E/CN.14/CP/12; E/CN.14/CP/8 and E/CN.14/ESD/6.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES : SECTORAL ALLOCATION OF PLANNED CAPITAL EXPENDITURE FROM PUBLIC FUNDS FOR SELECTED AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Country	*Plan period*	*Capital allocation in million US $*	*Percentage distribution*									*Total social services*
			Agriculture	*Industry*	*Electricity*	*Transport and communi-cations*	*Education*	*Health*	*Housing, town and country planning*	*Other social services*	*Other projects*	
Cameroun	1961-65	116.9	38.3	0.3	—	35.9	10.6	4.8	..	2.6	7.5	18.0
Congo (Brazzaville)	1961-63	67.9	13.7	—	—	33.3	8.2	4.5	30.4	2.2	7.7	45.3
Ghana	1959-64	980.1	7.1	7.2	31.1	15.1	7.9	5.3	4.9	2.2	19.2	20.3
Guinea	1960-63	157.6	26.0	22.5	0.8	24.1	9.8	4.3	1.5	0.4	10.4	16.2
Ivory Coast	1958-62	109.6	32.9	2.6	1.8	30.3	11.7	4.3	0.9	6.7	0.8	31.6
Kenya	1960-63	76.8	38.6	1.0	—	14.8	8.3	2.4	4.2	0.5	30.2	15.4
Malagasy Republic	1959-62	121.3	38.5	1.1	0.7	35.8	6.8	8.2	3.7	3.5	1.7	22.2
Morocco	1960-64	1,314.9	31.0	28.3	11.3	8.3	5.0	1.2	18.0	2.5[e]	4.4	26.7
Nigeria	1962-68	1,892.2	13.5	33.9	15.1	25.6	10.3	2.5	6.2	1.1	11.8	20.2
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland	1959-63	214.9	2.0	—	40.4	32.4	6.8	5.2	..	..	13.2	12.0[f]
Senegal	1961-64	203.3	19.0	7.0	—	33.5	12.3	5.3	17.2	—	5.7	34.8
Sudan	1961-70	818.5	32.3	8.9	1.4	20.0	13.0	3.0	—	7.7	13.7	23.7
Tanganyika	1961-64	67.0	25.0[b]	4.0	7.5	18.3	13.8	4.0	8.7	0.6	18.1	27.1
Uganda	1961-66	129.5[a]	8.3	15.1[c]	10.4	23.3	7.1	4.1	3.2	1.0	27.5	15.4
United Arab Republic	1960-65	3,902.7	23.5	25.5	8.2	16.1	2.9	0.6	10.3	1.6	11.3	15.3
Upper Volta	1963-68	165.4	36.0	11.6	7.3[d]	11.2	8.0	2.2	7.5	4.3	11.9	22.0

SOURCE: Compiled by the Economic Commission for Africa.
[a] Capital account as far as known.
[b] Including water development and irrigation.
[c] UDC projects including agricultural projects.
[d] Including power.
[e] Including rural planning.
[f] Education and health services only.