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SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE:
SPECIAL PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Gambia

Report of the Secretary-General

1. In its resolution 36/220 of 17 December 1981, the General Assembly expressed deep concern about the extensive destruction of life and property that was inflicted on the Gambia as the result of recent events. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General, *inter alia*, to organize a special emergency assistance programme of financial, technical and material assistance to the Gambia to enable it to meet its urgent needs for rehabilitation and reconstruction.
2. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General arranged for an inter-agency mission to visit the Gambia in March 1982, where preliminary consultations were held with the Government.
3. Subsequent to the visit, the Government of the Gambia provided the mission with detailed information on the additional measures necessary to deal with basic social and economic conditions. In July 1982, the mission held concluding discussions with the Government.
4. The mission's report, which is annexed hereto, describes the salient features of the Gambia's economy. It also describes the economic and social impact of the events of 30 July 1981 and provides details of three projects formulated by the Government in the light of these events. These are recommended by the mission for international assistance.

* A/37/150.

5. In paragraph 5 of resolution 36/220, the General Assembly invited a number of specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system to bring to the attention of their governing bodies the special needs of the Gambia and to report the decisions of those bodies to the Secretary-General by 15 July 1982. Their replies will be reproduced in a report of the Secretary-General covering the Gambia and other countries for which the Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to organize special economic assistance programmes.

ANNEX

Report of the mission to the Gambia
 (18-22 March and 19-24 July 1982)

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. An inter-agency mission led by the Under-Secretary-General and Co-ordinator of the Special Economic Assistance Programmes visited the Gambia from 18 to 22 March 1982. Preliminary discussions were held with representatives of the Government of the Gambia concerning the assistance which the country needs for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of those sectors of the economy that were damaged as a direct consequence of a rebellion on 30 July 1981.
2. During discussions, the Government stated that the events of 30 July 1981 had underscored the urgent need to advance the implementation of a number of social and economic projects envisaged in the Gambia's second National Development Plan and designed to overcome unsatisfactory conditions in a number of areas. The Government wished, in particular, to implement projects and programmes in the areas of food production, youth employment and communications and to do so within a framework of integrated rural development. Through such projects, it is hoped to improve the quality of life in the rural areas, raise income levels by developing productive activities and thereby reducing the drift of the rural population to urban areas. The training of young people and the creation of opportunities for their employment and participation in community development is to be given special attention. The Government also stated that it had assigned priority to improving the broadcasting system and the internal telecommunications network.
3. Subsequent to the mission's visit, the Government provided additional information. This included details of the damage or losses sustained by various sectors of the economy, including physical damage to the infrastructure and revenue losses resulting from the disruption of economic activity following the attempted coup. The Government also indicated the amount of the resources which it had found necessary to divert from planned development in order to meet extraordinary expenditures which were incurred as a result of the rebellion. In addition, the Government provided detailed information concerning three priority projects which it wished to implement to meet urgent needs of the population.
4. Concluding discussions between the mission and the Government of the Gambia took place in Banjul between 19 and 24 July 1982.
5. The mission wishes to place on record its appreciation of the full co-operation it received from the Government of the Gambia in providing information necessary for the mission's work. The mission also acknowledges with appreciation the assistance it received from the Resident Representative and Deputy Resident Representative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Banjul.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Physical characteristics

6. The Gambia, located on the coast of West Africa, consists of a narrow, low-lying strip of land along both banks of the Gambia River, extending inland for about 480 kilometres and covering a total area of 10,368 square kilometres. It forms an enclave in the Republic of Senegal.

7. The climate is characterized by a long dry season from October to May and a short four-month rainy season beginning in June. Average annual rainfall is about 1,000 mm but year-to-year variations are large, ranging from 800 mm to 1,700 mm.

B. Population

8. The population at mid-1982 is estimated at about 635,000 and is predominantly rural. Although the urban population is small, it is growing at a fast rate - 4.2 per cent per year as compared with the national average of 2.6 per cent. About 20 per cent of the population now live in the capital, Banjul, or in the surrounding urban area. Children below the age of 15 account for 41 per cent of the total population.

9. Overall population density is high, averaging 90 per square kilometre. The resulting intensive land use has caused a serious degradation of agricultural soils.

C. Government

10. The Gambia acceded to independence on 18 February 1965. On 24 April 1970, the country became a republic with Sir Dawda Jawara as President. President Jawara continues to hold the office of President, having been re-elected in 1972, in 1977 and in May 1982. The Government of the Gambia has shown itself firmly committed to parliamentary democracy and has maintained genuine individual freedom.

11. On 17 December 1981, the President of the Gambia and the Head of State of Senegal signed a pact of confederation between the two countries, which was ratified on 29 December 1981 by the respective legislatures and became effective on 1 February 1982. The Confederation under the name of Senegambia, provides for the gradual economic and political integration of the two countries, integration of the armed forces, co-ordination in the field of communications and establishment of joint institutions. With regard to planning and development, the President of the Gambia stated that confederation "will mean harmonization of our development plans, co-ordination of development strategies, policies and programmes and undertaking joint regional projects". (Foreword to the second Five-Year Plan, 1981/82-1985/86.)

D. Economic setting

12. The economy is predominantly agrarian, with agriculture providing a livelihood for about 80 per cent of the population and accounting for 40 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Moreover, the economy is very narrowly based, with a high dependency on ground-nuts. Ground-nuts are the principal source of cash income for farmers and production and processing account for over 90 per cent of total export value. Indeed, the value of ground-nuts marketed is the single most important factor of income growth in the Gambia and the principal determinant of fiscal, monetary and balance-of-payments developments in that country. Cotton is the other main cash crop but it represents only a small proportion of agricultural production.

13. The most important food crops in the Gambia are millet, sorghum and rice, the basic staple of the population. However, owing to competition with ground-nuts, local food production covers only 70 per cent of the country's food requirements; about 35,000 tonnes of cereals, mainly rice, are imported annually.

14. Livestock and the fisheries (both commercial and artisanal) are important economic activities, but their potential is not yet being fully exploited. There are good forest resources but these are being depleted by the present practices of forest exploitation for wood consumption.

15. The modern sector, although small, is relatively active: transit trade to Senegal and other neighbouring countries is a source of revenue for the country in general and also for the Government budget; tourism, which has become increasingly important over the past decade now provides direct employment to about 2,200 persons and is the second largest employer in the modern sector after the Government. About 25 per cent of the salaried labour force is employed by the Government, primarily in construction, education and public health.

16. Industrial activity is very limited: two ground-nut-oil mills, a soft-drink factory and a shoe factory, all located in Banjul, form the bulk of manufacturing production.

17. Disparity of income levels between urban and rural population is great: income per capita of the urban population, estimated at \$550 annually, is about four times higher than that of the rural population. The country is classified by the United Nations as a least developed country.

18. The economy is vulnerable to several factors entirely beyond the Government's control, such as the vagaries of the weather, world prices of ground-nuts, and the economic slowdown in the Gambia's main tourist markets. Moreover, variations in agricultural production directly affect two other sectors of the economy: manufacturing, which mainly consists of oil milling, and commerce.

E. Currency

19. The national unit of currency is the dalasi (D) which is linked to the pound sterling at the rate of D 4 to £1.00. Estimates of project costs provided in the present report have been converted to United States dollars at the rate of D 2 to \$US 1.00.

III. ECONOMY AND FINANCE

A. Output and income

20. In the years immediately following independence, the economy of the Gambia benefited from the generally favourable world prices obtained for its ground-nut production, although income growth varied considerably from year to year, reflecting

variations in ground-nut prices. In the period 1973/74-1978/79, however, the economy virtually stagnated, registering an annual average growth rate of only 1 per cent.

21. In 1979-1981, the Gambia's economic and financial situation deteriorated sharply. As a result of the drought which occurred in these years, agricultural output fell drastically, seriously affecting agrarian incomes, government revenue and export earnings. The output of ground-nuts, which had been between 130,000 and 140,000 tonnes during the early 1970s, fell to 65,000 tonnes in 1979/80 and 45,000 tonnes in 1980/81. Furthermore, the international prices of ground-nuts were depressed. This, combined with rapid global inflation, resulted in serious deterioration in the Gambia's terms of trade.

B. Tourism

22. Tourism, whose importance to the Gambian economy had been increasing during the 1970s, also contracted in the years 1979-1981. This was due largely to adverse economic conditions in Western Europe - the Gambia's main tourist market. As compared with 1978/79, chartered tourist arrivals were lower in 1979/80 and 1980/81 by 8 per cent and 21 per cent, respectively.

C. Rural-urban migration

23. The fall in rural and urban incomes and the rising cost of living have given rise to acute economic hardship for the people of the Gambia, especially those in the urban areas.

24. Rapid rural-urban migration has been a feature of the Gambian economy since the late 1960s. The migration, principally of rural youth to the national capital, Banjul, and the surrounding urban area, was induced largely by the growth of employment opportunities in trade, tourism and other non-agricultural sectors of the economy, including public administration. It had continued during the period of the First Five-Year Plan (1975/76-1980/81), despite the Government's efforts to reduce it through programmes of agricultural development, expansion and improvement of rural infrastructures and social services to improve the quality of rural life, and development of alternative "growth centres" in the provinces. By 1979, almost one fifth of the Gambia's total population was located in the capital and its peri-urban area. In addition, the capital attracted considerable numbers from neighbouring countries, partly because of the limited economic opportunities afforded for their skills in their own countries.

25. The crop failures and reductions in rural incomes in 1979-1981 accelerated the rural exodus of young people to urban areas, especially to Banjul.

D. Government finances

26. Declining revenues and rising costs have caused the Gambian Government serious budgetary difficulties. Traditionally, government financial policy had been conservative, aimed at generating savings on the recurrent budget with which to finance counterpart costs of donor-assisted development projects. In recent years, however, it has not been possible to generate such savings. As a result, a large part of the counterpart funding has had to be borrowed.

Table 1. Government finances, 1979/80 to 1981/82
 (Millions of dalasis)

	1979/80 Outcome	1980/81 Outcome	1981/82 Estimate
Recurrent expenditure <u>a/</u>	87.7	88.9	126.0
Development expenditure	73.7	69.8	90.6
Expenditure	161.4	148.7	216.6
Extrabudgetary lending, net	-5.4	-	-
Expenditure and lending	156.0	148.7	216.6
Current revenue	93.2	82.6	136.9
Grants	22.0	24.1	69.2
Revenue and grants	115.2	106.7	206.1
Over-all balance	-40.8	-42.0	-10.5
Amortization of government debt	0.6	0.4	2.2
Financing requirement (-)	-41.4	-42.4	-12.7
Borrowing for Development Fund	40.9	50.4	50.8
Short-term and other financing	0.5	-	-

a/ Excluding amortization and transfers to the Development Fund.

E. Balance of payments

27. The combination of low ground-nut production, fall-off in tourism and depressed terms of trade culminated in large balance-of-payments deficits in the early months of 1981 (see table 2). The Government was obliged to approach the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for balance-of-payments support.

Table 2. Balance of payments, 1979/80 and 1980/81
 (Millions of dalasis)

	1979/80	1980/81
Exports of goods and services	196.1	162.4
Merchandise exports, f.o.b.	150.9	113.9
Ground-nut products	55.6	30.9
Other domestic exports	9.2	10.0
Re-exports and adjustments	86.1	73.0
Services	45.2	48.5
Travel	32.2	35.0
Imports of goods and services	-336.1	-315.2
Merchandise imports, f.o.b.	-265.8	-245.9
Services	-70.3	-69.3
Freight and insurance	-41.5	-39.4
Technical assistance services	-15.0	-16.5
Balance of trade f.o.b.	-114.9	-132.0
Balance of goods and services	-140.0	-152.8
Net interest, transfers, grants	+34.2	+47.1
Balance on current account	-105.8	-105.7
Long term capital, net	+70.0	+91.2
Basic balance	-35.8	-14.5

F. International Monetary Fund assistance

28. By mid-1981, the Gambian authorities had begun to address the situation within the framework of a medium-term programme negotiated with IMF, which aimed at diversifying and restructuring the economy and reducing internal and external imbalances. However, in view of the possible reorganization of the Gambia's financial and monetary institutions consequent upon the formation of the Senegambian Confederation, a one-year standby agreement was approved by IMF in January 1982 in place of a medium-term arrangement. Under the signed agreement, the Fund approved a standby credit of SDR 16.9 million (about \$US 19.5 million).

IV. THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT, 1981/82-1985/86

29. The Gambia's second Five-Year Plan aims to continue the development process within the over-all framework of the goals and objectives identified in the first Plan. This includes the diversification of the economy and increasing self-reliance through development of the country's own natural, human and material resources. Rural development, reduction of the urban-rural disparity in incomes and stemming of the rural migration to urban centres, which were important objectives of the first Plan, are to be given even more attention in the second Plan.

30. TESITO or self-help is a central philosophy of the Gambia's development efforts. In the foreword to the second Five-Year Plan, the President stated: "External conditions will undoubtedly affect our economic progress, and external assistance will facilitate our tasks. But the success of our plans depends upon ourselves, our united and dedicated efforts".

31. The second Five-Year Plan envisages expenditure of D 475 million (about \$238 million) at constant 1980/81 prices over the period 1981/82-1985/86. This compares with planned expenditures of D 350 million for the first Five-Year Plan period. As compared with the first Plan, the second Plan allocates a larger share of resources to the directly productive sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture. Industry and public utilities have also been allocated larger shares of the total outlay (see table 3).

32. The Government has already initiated contacts with a number of donors concerning the financing of a broad spectrum of the projects included in the second Plan.

V. THE EVENTS OF 30 JULY 1981

33. From its accession to independence in 1965, the Gambia had enjoyed an uninterrupted period of democratic government, characterized by respect for individual freedom and a climate of political stability. No army was maintained, and the security forces consisted only of the police and a para-military unit, called the Field Force, comprising about 500 men.

Table 3. Sectoral distribution of development expenditures under the Gambia's first and second Five-Year Plans

	First Plan	Second Plan (projected)
	(Percentage)	
Agriculture	16.4	27.6
Industry	1.7	6.2
Public utilities	12.0	14.2
Transport and communications	44.3	30.3
Tourism, trade and finance	4.7	1.5
Education, youth, sports and culture	9.2	7.8
Health, labour and social welfare	2.2	3.2
Housing and community development	3.4	4.4
General public services	6.1	4.8
Total	<u>100.0</u>	<u>100.0</u>

A. The rebellion

34. Against a background of reduced rural and urban incomes, declining employment opportunities, and urban population pressures and stresses, riots broke out in the Gambia on 30 July 1981. The area most affected was the capital city, Banjul, but other areas of the country also experienced outbursts of violence. The disturbances lasted for eight days, but the effects on the Gambian economy can be expected to be of long duration.

35. Although the core of the disturbances was political in nature, the Government attributes the looting and rioting that occurred to dissatisfaction and restiveness among unemployed youth.

36. At the request of the Government, troops from Senegal assisted Gambian forces in the restoration of order. The riots and fighting resulted in considerable loss of life and injuries, as well as damage to public and private property. Figures from the principal hospital in the capital city indicate that 160 persons died and 655 were wounded. In addition, considerable numbers received attention in various clinics and health centres in the area of Banjul, while the number of persons who died or were wounded in the villages is not known.

B. Economic costs of the disturbances*

1. Immediate

37. In addition to the social cost of loss of life and injury, considerable material damage was sustained in both the public and private sectors. Damage to public assets during the disturbances was assessed at D 3.03 million (about \$1.5 million). Losses due to the looting and ransacking of business premises is estimated at D 42 million (about \$20 million). Although losses suffered by households are difficult to assess, claims for property loss amounting to D 985,000 (\$462,000) were submitted to a National Reconstruction Committee appointed by the Government immediately after the disturbances.

38. Furthermore, economic activity was disrupted, virtually ceasing for about two weeks (from 30 July to 9 August) and returning slowly to normal only after another six to eight weeks. Agricultural operations were affected, both in the villages in the vicinity of the capital and further afield.

2. Medium-term

(a) Trade

39. The Government estimated that the adverse effects of the disturbances on the wholesale trade of the Gambia, including the important re-export trade would be felt for a year or more. Wholesalers and importers were placed in a difficult position because of the problem they faced in rebuilding stocks lost in the rioting and looting. Foreign exchange constraints and the lack of credit facilities were the principal obstacles. Moreover, some firms which lost heavily during the disturbances were reluctant to replace stocks. The mission was informed that two factors inhibited the return of confidence to the trading community: one was the Government's inability to adhere to its earlier assurances of paying partial compensation, amounting to about \$6 million, to business firms that had suffered losses due to the disturbances; the second factor was the uncertainty about the Government's policy towards re-export trade under the Confederation.

(b) Tourism

40. The adverse publicity of the July disturbances led to large-scale cancellation of charter tourist bookings to the Gambia for the 1981/82 season. Although the Government embarked on a promotional campaign to reassure potential tourists of the country's return to normalcy, these efforts could repair only a small part of the damage during the course of that season. Charter tourist arrivals in 1981/82 are estimated at 28 per cent below the level of the previous year, instead of the 12 per cent increase that had been projected earlier. Although the projected recovery in tourism may have been delayed by the persistence of the economic

* In this section, conversions are made at the July 1981 rate of D 2.13 to \$US 1.00.

recession in Western Europe, the further decline experienced in 1981/82 was attributed by the Government primarily to the cancellation of bookings in the main tourist markets.

Table 4. Level of tourist activity, 1980/81 and 1981/82

	<u>1980/81</u> (actual)	<u>1981/82</u> (projected)	<u>1981/82</u> (estimated actual)	<u>1981/82</u> <u>estimated changes</u> <u>as compared with:</u>	
				<u>1980/81</u> (actual)	<u>1981/82</u> (projected)
		(units)		(percentage)	
Air charter tourists	19,209	21,478	13,756	-28.4	-36.0
Bed-nights spent in hotels, all visitors	287,259	298,000	214,330	-25.4	-28.1

41. The Government has estimated that in the 1981/82 season, as compared with 1980/81, turnover in the hotel sector, covering hotels, restaurants, taxi services, domestic travel activities, handicrafts and other tourist services, was reduced by 25.4 per cent; value added by the industry declined by an estimated 30 per cent; net foreign earnings from tourism are estimated to have been 25 per cent less.

42. The Government fears that the events of July 1981 will continue to have adverse effects on the country's tourist industry for some years to come. Furthermore, the tight security and law enforcement measures (curfew, police patrols, military presence) which the Government was obliged to undertake in the wake of the riots do not favour the climate for tourism. The Government recognizes the need to allocate additional funds for tourist promotion overseas to counter these influences.

3. Impact on Government revenue and expenditure

43. The disturbances which broke out on 30 July 1981 resulted both in loss of revenue to the Government and an increase in expenditures and their adverse effects on the economy may continue for some time to come.

(a) Revenue

44. Import duties and taxes normally constitute about two thirds of the Gambia's total tax revenue. As a result of reduced imports following the riots, revenue from import duties and taxes fell appreciably. Moreover, because of losses

suffered by the principal commercial firms, receipts from company income tax were less than usual. Normally, this source of revenue constitutes 9 per cent of fiscal receipts in the Gambia.

(b) Increase in expenditures

(i) Immediate

45. The rebellion made it necessary for the Government to incur extraordinary expenditures estimated at about \$6.5 million. These do not include expenditures for food and medical relief (for details, see appendix, table 1). This total includes expenses incurred for the repair of buildings and installations and repair or replacement of vehicles damaged during the outbreaks of violence. Also included are other expenses incidental to the restoration of normal functioning of the economy. These expenditures, together with outlays made to enable certain ongoing projects to be completed, were financed from cash grants totalling \$13.8 million received from various donors (for details, see appendix, table 2).

(ii) Medium- to long-term

46. The Government estimates that the medium- to long-term expenditures necessitated by the events of July 1981 will be seen to be considerable when the final figures are compiled.

47. One immediate measure adopted by the Government following the disturbances was to expand and add to projects included in the second Five-Year Plan, raising its total cost from D 425 million to D 475 million. The expected expansion of Government outlays in the medium-to-long term fall into two categories: national security; and reconstruction and development.

(c) National security

48. After the events of July 1981, the Government of the Gambia deemed it necessary to strengthen and reorganize the country's security forces. Furthermore, it was decided by the Governments of the Gambia and Senegal that their security forces should be integrated. The Gambian contingent of the combined armed forces is to be larger than its former Field Force while its police force also is to be significantly strengthened.

49. These developments will entail large capital and recurrent expenditures, for personnel, purchase of vehicles, arms and other equipment, supplies, buildings and other infrastructures. The amount of the additional expenditures is yet to be determined. However, of the additional D 50 million which was allocated for the implementation of the second Five-Year Plan, D 20 million represents a provisional allocation for national security infrastructures. The Government believes that actual expenditures in this area will exceed this amount substantially.

50. Moreover, additional institutional expenditures related to national security were incurred, including the establishment of a Ministry of the Interior in September 1981.

(d) Reconstruction and development

51. Following the rebellion, the Government decided to amend the second Five-Year Plan, expanding some projects, giving higher priority to others, and adding new projects to meet the needs highlighted by the events.

52. The Government stated that offers of external assistance for financing additional expenditures have not yet been received. Unless such assistance becomes available, the resources for the reconstruction and development programmes will have to be found by reducing expenditures on other projects included in the Plan. The Government could not increase its own development expenditures without undesirable effects on the budget and the balance of payments. In the circumstances, external assistance is sought to enable the Government to implement three priority projects designed to meet urgent aspects of the situation. These are described in section VI of the present report.

4. Budgetary impact of the additional expenditures

53. The Government stated that the expected substantial increases in both capital and recurrent expenditures as a result of the disturbances will constitute a severe strain on its limited financial resources. The budgetary pressures are especially severe because of the adverse trend in Government revenues. As was noted in section III, the budgetary situation has made it necessary for the Government to borrow a large part of the funding required to meet counterpart costs of donor-assisted projects. Until the Gambia's financial situation improves, it would therefore be helpful if donors would consider waiving the requirement for counterpart funding. Donors might also wish to consider financing, in whole or in part, for an initial period, the recurrent costs to projects which they are funding, until the projects become fully operational or self-supporting.

C. Relief and rehabilitation measures

54. Immediately after the disturbances, the Government appointed a National Reconstruction Committee, consisting of senior ministers and top-level civil servants, to co-ordinate and oversee all arrangements for relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. It also appointed a Commissioner for External Aid to administer all assistance for relief and rehabilitation received in response to an appeal from the President of the Gambia and another for recovery of looted property and its restoration to the rightful owners.

55. Relief assistance in the form of cash, food, drugs, medical and surgical supplies and medical personnel, was received from many countries, international agencies, including organizations of the United Nations system, and non-governmental organizations, notably the International British Red Cross. The timely response from the international community greatly assisted the Government in its efforts to meet the most urgent needs of the affected population, and to initiate programmes of rehabilitation and reconstruction.

1. Food distribution and aid

56. The food supplies of the majority of the urban population, which depends upon purchases from day to day, had been disrupted during the disturbances; in addition, food stocks had been looted. It became necessary to distribute free food, mainly rice, among the needy sections of the population. The Commissioner for External Aid, in close co-operation with the Ministry for Local Government and Lands, the sole agency responsible for food distribution, formulated the logistics and administration of the distribution. A total of 1,063 tonnes of rice and 212 tonnes of sorghum was distributed among 220,892 people. An additional 41 tonnes of rice was allocated for the feeding of detainees and others in public institutions.

57. Although estimates of food required for the emergency had been based on the population of Banjul, Koto St. Mary and the Western Division, food distribution had to be extended also to the provinces. The disturbances occurred just before the harvest and exacerbated the already serious food situation in the rural areas. A total of 1,915 tonnes of rice and 474 tonnes of sorghum was distributed in the rural areas during this period, bringing the total distribution to over 3,000 tonnes of rice and 686 tonnes of sorghum.

58. Rice, sorghum and wheat flour were the principal food aid items received, with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), France, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States of America as the principal donors. The quantities pledged and received till the end of December 1981 were as follows:

	<u>Pledged</u>	<u>Received</u>
	(tonnes)	
Rice	8,659	1,210 (of which 580 were bought locally)
Sorghum	200	200
Flour	700	700

2. Medical aid

59. Medical services at the Royal Victoria Hospital, the main hospital in the capital, and at various clinics and health centres in the area were under intense pressure during the disturbances, and for some time thereafter, because of the large number of dead and wounded. The timely provision of external assistance, which included drugs, medical and surgical supplies and medical personnel, did much to alleviate local shortages and the pressure on local medical personnel.

3. Rehabilitation

60. Efforts were focused on repairs of vehicles, equipment and installations, buildings, etc., so as to restore normal functioning as quickly as possible. This required considerable expenditure in the repair and replacement of damaged equipment. Details of the expenditures and commitments are given in the appendix, table 1. The rehabilitation, which was financed in part from the \$13.8 million received in cash grants (see appendix, table 2) was substantially completed by the end of the year, and in many cases much earlier.

VI. RECOMMENDED PROGRAMME OF ASSISTANCE

61. The Government is seeking external assistance in the amount of \$7.8 million to enable it to implement three projects which were formulated after the events of July 1981 and which are addressed to particularly urgent needs of the people. The projects are in three areas of critical importance to the country, namely, food production, communications and the training and employment of young people. The three projects are:

	<u>External financing required</u> (US dollars)
1. Rice irrigation development	4,887,800
2. Rehabilitation of Radio Gambia	1,333,600
3. National Youth Programme	<u>1,598,000</u>
Total	<u>7,819,400</u>

Project 1: Rice irrigation development (\$4,887,800)

62. A priority objective of the Government is to make the country self-sufficient in food production. At present, local food production covers only about 70 per cent of the Gambia's needs. One of the staple foods consumed in the country is rice. Unfortunately, local production has not kept pace with demand and about 35,000 tonnes of milled rice have to be imported into the Gambia each year at a cost of about \$12.6 million ('B' broken rice, c.i.f.). Reduction of rice imports would release scarce foreign exchange for the financing of imports essential for the country's development.

63. The production of all rain-fed crops in the Gambia is greatly affected by seasonal and annual variations in rainfall; in recent years drought has had particularly adverse effects. With a view to insuring against production losses in drought years, improving productivity in rice cultivation and increasing output, thereby improving nutritional levels in the rural areas, raising farmers' incomes

and also conserving foreign exchange, the Government, with external assistance, embarked in the late 1960s on a programme of rice cultivation using pump irrigation. About 3,000 hectares are now under pump irrigation, while about 21,000 hectares are cultivated by traditional rain or flood irrigation methods. These traditional methods of cultivation are entirely dependent on the vagaries of the weather; in a year of poor rainfall, yields can be halved. According to a sample survey of the 1981/82 rice harvest conducted by the Gambian Ministry of Agriculture, the yield of paddy rice from swamp lands and rain-fed upland areas averaged, respectively, about 1.2 tonnes and 1.1 tonnes per hectare per year while the average yield from pump-irrigated areas was about 5.3 tonnes.

64. Eventually, the Government would like to exploit the full potential of a further 24,000 hectares not yet developed. Consideration has been given to the construction of a salt-water barrage across the river Gambia to stop the advance of saline intrusions upriver, especially during periods of low flows at the end of the long eight-month dry season. This would create an upstream reservoir sufficient for 24,000 hectares of dry-season irrigation.

65. As an immediate, priority project, however, the Government wishes to consolidate and reorganize the existing 3,000 hectares of pump-irrigated rice lands in the MacCarthy Island and Upper River divisions with a view to increasing their productivity, increasing the returns to the farmers and reducing the costs currently being borne by the Government for pump installations and other equipment as well as for maintenance and servicing. About 3,000 farmers are, at present, engaged in these developments.

66. A number of shortcomings in the existing developments have been identified by the Government. Principal among these are: the uneconomical, small size of most developments, mostly in the range of 5 to 10 hectares; poor field layout, with many fields being inadequately watered and, because of their small size, difficult to level and cultivate; poor irrigation facilities, unsuitable pumps, poor maintenance and unreliable operation; poor irrigation systems with under-designed, leaking canals; absence of flood control or drainage; poor land preparation; and lack of control over quantity of water abstracted.

67. The Government therefore wishes to carry out a programme of improvement which would encompass: (a) consolidation and water control; (b) training; (c) improved techniques; and (d) drainage.

(a) Consolidation and water control

68. The Government proposes to consolidate, wherever possible, existing small units lying adjacent to each other into single units and to provide them with single, larger irrigation pumps together with improved canal layout, drainage and flood protection. Of the existing 3,000 hectares under irrigation, it is estimated that about 1,500 could be reorganized into larger units in the range of 10 to 40 hectares. The number of pumps required would be reduced by 40 per cent and very substantial savings in pump running costs would be effected.

69. The Government pointed out that the majority of the main canals in the irrigated areas were not lined during the development stage. Initially, the reason for this was to allow for soil compaction. According to a study conducted in 1981, only about 8,000 metres out of 51,230 metres of long main canals in the MacCarthy Island and Upper River divisions were lined with cement. As a result, a primary problem confronting the irrigation projects is the excessive loss of water through seepage in the main canals. This, together with poor drainage and inadequate protection against floods, has had severely adverse effects on the irrigation schemes, such as the imposition of extra burden on the pumps, the removal of more water from the river than is necessary, the use of additional fuel and, in some instances, insufficient water supplies to farmers. The redesigning and lining of existing major canals is therefore an urgent requirement. The Government envisages that consolidation and upgrading of the 1,500 hectares including re-designing and lining of canals, can be completed within five years.

(b) Training

70. There is an urgent need for the training of irrigation staff, in particular, irrigation engineers and mechanics. The Government requires the services of an expatriate, experienced Chief Irrigation Engineer for a period of five years. In addition to field work, one of his primary duties will be to train Gambian nationals in various aspects of irrigation engineering and management.

(c) Improved techniques

71. The Government wishes to introduce irrigation techniques better suited to the needs of the country than those which exist at present. On consolidated, larger developments, for example, it wishes to use four-wheel tractors to replace pedestrian tractors in land preparation.

(d) Improved drainage

72. During the wet season, a number of existing developments cannot be cultivated by pump-irrigation methods because of flooding from the river or run-off from adjacent high land. Measures to protect the irrigated areas from these hazards, the Government believes, would encourage farmers to use the irrigation facilities to double-crop the land. The Government therefore wishes to undertake progressive drainage and flood protection work during the five-year programme. The work requires suitable earthmoving equipment, to be operated under the direction of the Chief Irrigation Engineer and his staff.

73. In procuring the equipment required to implement this project, the Government will endeavour to attain a certain degree of standardization in the interest of economy, servicing of equipment, replacement of parts, use of tools, etc.

74. The Government recognizes that security of land tenure is an important consideration in providing individual farmers with the incentive to maintain and improve their holdings. At present, farmers work land allocated to them by the district authorities or on which they have leasehold. The further question of water use and possible legislation is under study by the Government.

75. The Government's programme to rehabilitate and consolidate existing rice developments is to receive funding assistance in the amount of \$1.16 million from the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF). Under an approved agreement, UNCDF will provide equipment and accessories, including pedal threshing-machines, power tillers, tractors, small irrigation pumps and two 250 KVA generators.

76. In order to implement fully its proposed five-year programme of rehabilitation and consolidation of irrigated rice developments, the Government is seeking additional external assistance amounting to \$4,887,800, as follows:

	<u>Estimated costs</u> (US dollars)
(i) <u>Construction and equipment</u>	
Canal construction, redesigning and lining	2,812,500
Equipment <u>a/</u>	1,199,800
Pumps	(240,000)
Two mobile workshops	(60,000)
Vehicles and other equipment	<u>(899,800)</u>
Subtotal	4,012,300
(ii) <u>Personnel</u>	
Expatriate staff	450,000
Local staff	163,000
Seconded staff	<u>262,500</u>
Subtotal	875,500
Total cost of project	<u><u>4,887,800</u></u>

a/ Details are provided in table 3 of the appendix to this report.

77. The Government estimates that implementation of this project would increase yields of paddy rice from the present 5.3 tonnes per hectare per year on average to approximately 7.3 tonnes. The increment in rice production for the 3,000 hectares under irrigation would therefore be about 6,000 tonnes per year. Costed at \$300 per tonne, this would represent additional return to the value of about \$1.8 million per year.

78. The proposed project would be carried out under the direction of the Gambian Ministry of Agriculture. Detailed documentation on the project is available from the Ministry. A list of items of equipment required to implement the project with specifications and estimated costs, is provided in table 3 of the appendix to the present report.

Project 2: Rehabilitation of Radio Gambia (\$1,333,600)

79. Since the Gambia has neither a daily newspaper nor a television station, Radio Gambia is the main instrument of mass communication and citizen education in the Gambia. It is used by the Government to keep the population informed on its policies and programmes, and as an instrument to mobilize the population and encourage its active participation in the development process. On the educational side, Radio Gambia serves to complement the efforts of the extension services of the Ministries of Agriculture, Health and Community Development. It also plays a vital role in school and adult education, and family welfare education. Through the dissemination of local language programmes, it contributes to the preservation and promotion of the indigenous cultures of the Gambian people. All of these functions make broadcasting in the Gambia a vital component of successful project implementation in the rural areas. Moreover, it is the major means of communication between the centre and the rural areas.

80. When the rebellion occurred, the Government had been on the point of increasing the scope of Radio Gambia by introducing a second channel. During the disturbances, the broadcasting transmitter and studios were attacked and damaged. Moreover, the events underscored the inadequacy of existing equipment.

81. The broadcasting system is now at the point where many of its requirements require to be met urgently if satisfactory operation is to be achieved. Unless these requirements are met soon, the system risks a complete breakdown.

82. Under the proposed project, which will be implemented by the Ministry of Information and Tourism, assistance would be provided to Radio Gambia studios near Bakau and the transmitter station at Bonto.

83. As a one-year project, the total estimated cost is \$1,809,240. Of this sum, the Gambia Government will provide \$79,830 for personnel salaries and \$395,810 for operational and maintenance costs. External assistance is sought to meet the remaining \$1,333,600, as follows:

	<u>Estimated cost</u> (US dollars)
Broadcast equipment: Spares for the studios and Bonto Transmitter Station	773,500
New studio requirement in Banjul	75,000
Reuters News Agency receiving system	7,000
Bonto power supplies	50,000
Lighting and fencing	100,000
Transport	25,000
Technical assistance:	
(a) Studio transmitter engineer)	
(b) Electrical mechanical engineer)	125,000
Training (technical):	
(a) Fellowship	128,100
(b) Training equipment to support in-service training effort	50,000
Total	<u>1,333,600</u>

Project 3: National Youth Programme (\$1,598,000 plus technical assistance)

84. The training and employment of young people in the Gambia is one of the Gambia's most pressing needs. Young people in the age group 15 to 24 years constitute about one fifth of the total population. The group, numbering about 115,000 at present has a growth rate of 3 per cent per annum, which has serious employment implications.

85. General unemployment and under-employment is a major problem in the Gambia. The work force is expanding faster than the economy's capacity to employ. Moreover, with about four fifths of the population deriving their livelihood from agriculture, many of the workers become unemployed in the off-season.

86. In addressing the problem, the Government has reviewed the country's education system. A systematic restructuring and reorientation of the primary school curriculum is being carried out to make it more relevant to national needs and appropriate for the young people for whom it is intended. Nevertheless, the

effects will not be felt immediately and, in the meantime, the Government faces a problem of considerable dimension with regard to the country's young people. At the end of the 1980/81 school year, there were 2,000 primary-school leavers who could neither be admitted to secondary schools nor have the opportunity to repeat primary courses. By 1990/91, this number is expected to treble, even assuming significant expansion of secondary education. At the secondary level, there were 1,000 school leavers in 1980/81 who could not be absorbed either in post-secondary school institutions or in any kind of middle-level formal sector occupation. The situation is compounded by the influx into the urban centres of large numbers of educated youths in search of employment. There is also a significant but undetermined number of under-employed, illiterate youths with little or no schooling.

87. The Government is concerned by the fact that many of the educated and partially educated school leavers have little or no chance of obtaining gainful employment. This has contributed to the frustration and discontentment among the country's youth. This situation manifested itself during the disturbances when the majority of casualties were found to be young people.

88. In the light of the tragic and destructive events of July 1981, the Government sees an urgent need for a comprehensive youth programme. This would aim both at equipping young people with the training and skills that will enable them subsequently to engage in economic activity and at providing them with opportunities for gainful employment.

89. Initially, the proposed programme will be established as a pilot project and will be primarily directed to large farming communities. The Government believes that if rural unemployment and under-employment can be reduced and rural incomes increased, this, together with other measures designed to make rural areas more attractive, could help to arrest the rural-urban drift of young people, with all its undesirable effects.

90. The project will be diverse in scope and multi-disciplinary in nature, involving a wide range of Government ministries and departments. The Ministry of Education, Youth, Sports and Culture will be responsible for the execution of the project. The following Ministries, however, will also participate: Agriculture, Health, Information, Economic Planning, and Industrial Development. The departments of Community Development, Public Works and Co-operatives and Marketing, and the Non-Formal Education Service Unit will also have a role.

91. Rural development centres for youth training and employment would be established in each of four divisions of the country, namely, the Upper River Division, the MacCarthy Island Division, the North Bank Division and the Lower River Division. The specific sites of the centres are to be determined on the basis of surveys to be carried out in the four divisions.

92. Participation in the programme will be completely voluntary. Unemployed school drop-outs and "push-outs", together with under-employed, unschooled youths will be recruited. Initially, each centre will have an intake of 100 participants, with the numbers being increased as experience is gained. The duration of the programme will be 18 months.

93. Activities in the centres would be based on the main economic activity of the region in which they are located. Typical activities would include the following: basic, simple methods in practical agricultural/farming methods; general education, including functional literacy and numeracy, as necessary; vocational training in village crafts; first aid and elements of civil defence; work on such projects as village improvements, road construction, conservation of resources, bush clearance, irrigation and land drainage. The centres would aim at becoming economically self-sufficient, and it is hoped that many of those who complete their training can become self-employed.
94. To the fullest extent possible, the youths will participate in community development. They will be employed on field work for a few days at a time, during which period they will be accommodated in small tents.
95. One of the project's aims is to settle participants in productive work. They will be assisted in setting up model farms for the cultivation of vegetable gardens, raising of poultry, etc. Such activities are important because they provide employment during the crop off-season periods. They will be assisted in the purchase of equipment, and collection centres for the marketing of their produce will be established within easy reach.
96. Each centre is to be equipped with residential facilities (workshops, dormitories, assembly and dining halls, reading room and kitchen). Construction of the buildings would utilize local materials as far as possible. Until the buildings are completed, participants would occupy tents, 10 tents being required for each centre. A number of small tents will also be required for field work. The project also provides for beds, mattresses, uniforms and work outfits. Each centre would be provided with a lorry, pick-up truck and jeep.
97. Technical assistance will be essential for the project. The Government seeks the support of relevant international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and FAO, both for assistance in drawing up details of the project and for advice in its implementation.
98. One technical expert will be required to co-ordinate the programme and to train local counterparts for each of the centres. The Government intends to use also specialized local personnel for teaching and training and possibly expertise from other African or developing countries with relevant experience.
99. The Government would also welcome voluntary technical assistance both from multilateral agencies such as the United Nations Volunteers programme and bilateral voluntary agencies.
100. Provision is made for food for the centres for 18 months only. After this period, it is hoped that participants will have developed farms large and productive enough to make them self-sufficient in food. In costing the project, the food has been estimated at D 5 per day for each participant for 548 days, a total of D 1,096,000 (\$548,000). However, the Government intends to submit a request to WFP for assistance under its food-for-work on community development programmes.

101. The capital cost of the proposed project, based on constructing and equipping four centres is \$1,598,000 (excluding the cost of technical assistance), as follows:

	<u>Estimated cost</u> (US dollars)
Construction	600,000
Vehicles	172,000
Lorries (4)	(120,000)
Pick-up trucks (4)	(28,000)
Jeeps (4)	(24,000)
Tools and equipment	200,000
Tents (40)	12,000
Small field tents	6,000
Beds and mattresses (400)	40,000
Uniforms and work outfits (400)	20,000
Food (for 18 months)	548,000
Total	<u>1,598,000</u>

102. If the project proves successful, the Government intends to extend the programme nationwide. The Government hopes that this programme, together with other complementary measures in the economic and social fields will increase the attractiveness of rural areas and help to arrest the rural-urban drift. Expansion of the programme will also require international assistance.

103. Further information concerning the project may be obtained from the Gambian Ministry of Education, Youth, Sports and Culture (Department of Youth).

VII. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

104. The Gambia's economy, being a narrowly-based, agrarian one, is extremely vulnerable to external factors beyond the Government's control, such as the vagaries of weather and world market prices for its principal export, ground-nuts. Its young tourist industry is strongly affected by economic conditions in its main markets, mainly countries in Western Europe.

105. In two successive crop years - 1979/80 and 1980/81 - the Gambia's output of ground-nuts was drastically reduced as the result of drought: the 1980/81 crop, at 45,000 tonnes, was about one third of the output in the early 1970s. In addition, international prices of ground-nuts were depressed. Furthermore, economic recession in Western Europe appreciably reduced the country's earnings from tourism. In consequence, rural and urban incomes, government revenue and export earnings declined substantially.

106. With the population growing at an annual average rate of 2.6 per cent, economic stagnation and decline has resulted in a serious and worsening unemployment situation. Unfavourable socio-economic conditions in the rural areas, where four fifths of the population draw their livelihood, have led to an increasing drift of the population to the urban areas, particularly the young people. The trend has exacerbated the problems of the urban centres and added to the prevailing stresses.

107. On 30 July 1981, riots occurred in the Gambia, causing considerable loss of life and property. The area most affected was the capital city, Banjul, but other areas of the country also experienced outbursts of violence. Although the core of disturbances was political in nature, the Government attributes the looting and violence that occurred to dissatisfaction and restiveness among unemployed youth.

108. The immediate economic losses incurred included \$1.5 million in damage to public assets, damage to business property amounting to about \$20 million and damage to households amounting to about \$0.5 million. Furthermore, agricultural production was disrupted.

109. In the medium term, the depletion of the country's stocks, difficult and costly to replace, is expected to depress wholesale and import activity for a year or more.

110. The tourist industry, already adversely affected by economic recession in Western Europe, suffered considerable cancellation of bookings following the disturbances. The Government fears that, despite its expenditure on tourist promotion, the industry will feel the adverse effects of the July 1981 rebellion for some time to come.

111. The disruption of economic activity and the reduced volume of imports resulted in immediate loss of revenue to the Government, primarily in the form of import duties and company tax. At the same time, the Government immediately incurred additional expenditures as a result of the disturbances, amounting to \$6.5 million, excluding outlays for food and medical relief (see appendix I, table 1). These expenditures, together with outlays made to enable certain ongoing projects to be completed, were financed from cash grants totalling \$13.8 million received from various donors (see appendix I, table 2).

112. Following the disturbances, the Government decided to expand its programmes in two areas: (a) national security and (b) reconstruction and development. The Government estimates that both the capital and recurrent costs of these additional

projects will be considerable and will constitute a serious drain on the country's limited resources. Donors are invited to consider waiving the requirement for counterpart funding, until the Gambia's financial situation improves. It would also be most helpful to the Gambia if donors would be prepared to meet, in whole or in part, the recurrent costs of assisted projects until the projects become fully operational or self-supporting.

113. Three priority projects have been formulated by the Government in the light of the events of July 1981 with a view to strengthening the thrust of the Government's rural development programme, by increasing food production, improving communications, especially between the capital and the rural areas, and creating opportunities for young people for training and employment while also participating in community development. The Government is seeking external assistance in the amount of \$7,819,400 to implement these projects: \$4,887,800 for rice irrigation development, \$1,333,600 for the rehabilitation of Radio Gambia and \$1,598,000 for a National Youth Programme.

APPENDIX

Table 1

Expenditures and commitments from the Emergency Fund
 (Dahsis)

	Amount
<u>(i) Summary of expenditure from the Emergency Fund up to 31 December 1981 a/</u>	
President's Office	2 452 181.43
Inspector General of Police	720 486.60
Ministry of Justice	643 911.95
Commissioner for External Aid	2 333 686.63
Ministry of Water Resources	2 950.00
Ministry of Information and Tourism	474 371.88
Ministry of Health, Labour, and Social Welfare	15 887.00
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources	10 000.00
Gambia Utilities Corporation	1 003 976.49
	<u>7 657 397.98</u>
<u>(ii) Emergency Fund's outstanding commitments</u>	
<u>Department</u>	
1. <u>Education Department</u>	
Furniture - fittings	56 299.00
2. <u>Gambia Utilities Corporation</u>	
500 KVA transformer	173 700.00
3. <u>Post and Telecommunications</u>	
Telecommunications equipment for Brikama Exchange 3 off charges types of power supply systems	15 786.00
4. <u>Livestock Marketing Board</u>	
2 insulated vans	210 000.00
5. <u>Gambia College (School of Nursing)</u>	
Furniture and fittings for 60 classrooms	50 000.00
6. <u>Public Works Department</u>	
Vehicles Rehabilitation works	290 800.00
7. <u>Police</u>	
Transport Radio network	757 440.00 350 000.00
8. All other departments, transport	2 992 760.00
9. Contingency	200 000.00
Total	<u>5 096 785.00</u>

a/ Expenditure of D 4,177,500 from the Emergency Fund to the Development Estimates to facilitate the completion of specific ongoing projects was also approved.

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Table 2

Cash grants received in response to an appeal made by the
President of the Gambia in August 1981

(United States dollars)

Donor	Amount
Australia	10 000
China	64 000
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	3 250
Iraq	500 000
Ivory Coast	150 000
Kuwait	1 000 000
Oman	50 000
Qatar	2 000 000
Saudi Arabia	10 000 000
African/American Labour Centre	1 000
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions	1 000
Total	<u>13 779 250</u>

Table 3
Equipment required for rehabilitation and consolidation
of irrigated rice development (Project 1)
(United States dollars)

Quantity	Item	Estimated total cost
<u>(a) Transportation</u>		
1	Seven-seater estate car (Peugeot 504)	12 500
2	Land Rover 10-seater station wagon	37 500
2	Land Rover 1.w.b. box body pick-up	25 000
12	98 cc motor cycle	15 000
		90 000
<u>(b) Workshops</u>		
2	Mobile workshop	60 000
<u>(c) Engineering plant and equipment</u>		
2	22 RB 3/4 YD dragline excavator	261 250
2	Sets timber dragline mats	2 500
3	4 x 4 7-tonne tipping truck	187 500
1	Electric-driven slab-making machine	6 250
1	Digger loader	100 000
1	Trailer low-loader	25 000
2	Pedestrian vibrating roller	2 500
4	Half-yard dumper	20 000
2	2" portable pump, self-priming	2 500
2	Poker vibrator	2 500
2	Monkey grubber (Tarpen winch)	1 250
1	5-tonne chain block and sheer-legs	620
2	Half-bag concrete mixer	2 500
2	1,000-litre water dower trailer	2 500
	Small tools and equipment	5 000
		621 870
<u>(d) Survey equipment</u>		
1	Automatic surveyor's level with horizontal scale	3 125
1	Dumpy level	1 875
4	Staff	625
80	Ranging rod	625
2	Steel tape, 30 metres	160
4	Linen tape, 30 metres	160
2	Surveyor's umbrella	160
		6 730
<u>(e) Pumps</u>		
24	12" axial flow pump	240 000
<u>(f) Initial land preparation equipment</u>		
4	100 hp 4-wheel-drive agricultural tractor	110 700
4	Disc harrow	7 500
4	Rotavator	12 500
2	Mouldboard plough, reversable	12 500
1	Land plane	15 500
1	Bund former	1 875
1	Ditcher	3 125
		163 700
<u>(g) Drawing office equipment</u>		
		8 750
<u>(h) Office equipment</u>		
		8 750
	Grand Total	1 199 800

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