



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 17TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. CARASALES (Argentina)
(Vice-Chairman)

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Organization of work

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The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 138 and 139 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. YONDON (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): In our earlier statement the Mongolian delegation commented on some of the most important aspects of the problem of how to halt the nuclear arms race. Today our delegation is addressing the Committee to express its views on matters relating to nuclear disarmament and also on other agenda items of this Committee.

The second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament confirmed once again that the problem of averting a nuclear war remained the most vital and urgent task facing us today. That special session also confirmed the urgent need for States to make efforts in that direction. We note with satisfaction that the current session, in response to the appeal made at the special session, is now considering new proposals made by the Soviet Union relating to the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and a proposal on intensifying efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy.

In this connection the Mongolian delegation wishes to note the constructive approach taken by many delegations to the problems of halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament. This is something that can be seen from the proposals made by India, Mexico and other countries on averting the threat of nuclear war. Our delegation supported the Indian proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and also the Indian proposal to set up, within the Committee on Disarmament, a working group to draft the text of such a convention. However, because of the negative position taken by the United States and other Western countries, the Committee was unable to take the appropriate decision.

(Mr. Yondon, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation considers that the time has long since come for us to seek a practical solution to the problem of halting the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament in all its aspects. That goal would be significantly promoted by the proposal of the Soviet Union on the drafting, adoption and phased implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. It would be advisable for the Committee on Disarmament to set up a special ad hoc working group as quickly as possible and, as a first step to beginning multilateral talks, get down to drafting a phased programme for nuclear disarmament in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Act.

We feel that great importance should be attached to halting the development of new systems of nuclear weapons, and also to not deploying nuclear weapons on the territory of those countries where no such weapons exist at present. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 36/92 K, the Committee on Disarmament should, in the very near future, resolve positively this question of setting up a working group for negotiations on concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of the nuclear neutron weapon.

This matter of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of those countries which to date have none makes this task of achieving an appropriate international agreement even more acutely urgent. A ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly help to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear States and create favourable pre-conditions for establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. We fully support the efforts of the non-aligned States to effect the swift convening of an international conference on the Indian Ocean.

An integral element of the curbing of the nuclear-weapons arms race, particularly qualitatively, is a full and comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Since our delegation commented in detail on this issue in our earlier statement, I would now confine myself to a general evaluation of the consideration of this item in the Committee on Disarmament at its last session.

(Mr. Yondon, Mongolia)

The socialist countries, including Mongolia, on several occasions pointed to the fact - and I wish to repeat this once again - that the approach taken by the individual nuclear Powers in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this question of a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests gave rise to serious misgivings. Particularly noteworthy were their attempts to use the Committee on Disarmament as a cover-up for reluctance and unwillingness to move towards the conclusion of a treaty on a complete nuclear-weapon test ban. Until those nuclear Powers show the necessary political will and a willingness to hold real negotiations, and until they agree to the eventual conclusion of a treaty on a complete and comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban, our fears will remain justified.

Like the majority of members of the Committee on Disarmament, we continue to advocate constructive talks and a review and expansion of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. The problem of restricting and eliminating chemical weapons is becoming increasingly acute. This is to be explained primarily by the new dangerous developments in the chemical weapons arms race resulting from the production by the current United States Administration of new forms of this barbarous weapon and its attempts to deploy it in other peoples' territories. This requires urgent and firm measures so that an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the complete destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons can be drafted without delay.

The socialist countries attach particular importance to ensuring that the future convention will take full account of new developments in the area of chemical weapons and of all aspects relating to the prohibition of binary or other multi-component types of chemical weaponry. We share the view expressed here that some progress was made during the drafting of individual elements of the convention in the Ad Hoc Working Group on chemical weapons. However, in order to strengthen this positive shift it is essential to achieve further political agreements on fundamental aspects of the Convention. In our view, this would be promoted by the document proposed by the Soviet Union on the fundamental provisions of the convention, which constructively takes account of the views and comments of the various parties and countries.

(Mr. Yondon, Mongolia)

Nowadays, action to expand the arms race to outer space is becoming increasingly dangerous. In order to avert this dangerous trend the Soviet Union proposed at the last session of the General Assembly the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. It also proposed a draft agreement on this.

In its resolution 36/99 the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations with a view to achieving agreement on the text of such a treaty. Unfortunately, obstructionism on the part of the United States has prevented us from starting such negotiations and from setting up an ad hoc working group, although I would note that there is fairly general agreement in the Committee on the need for such negotiations.

(Mr. Yondon, Mongolia)

The representatives of several countries say, presumably in connection with the establishment of the working group and therefore the terms of its mandate, that no account has been taken of the prohibition of anti-satellite systems. In this connection the question that naturally arises is, why would the United States not want to agree to the proposal of the Soviet Union to resume bilateral talks on such systems?

We think that the current session of the General Assembly should produce recommendations for intensifying the work of the Committee on preparing an international treaty, including the establishment of an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations on the substance with a view to the adoption of effective steps to prevent the expansion of the arms race to outer space. We feel it should also call on the Soviet Union and the United States to resume bilateral negotiations on the question of anti-satellite systems. Our delegation, in conjunction with other delegations, has sponsored a draft resolution distributed in the Committee as document A/C.1/37/L.8.

The broad range of problems related to halting the arms race and to the adoption of effective measures to achieve disarmament include one of significant importance, that is, the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. These talks, which deal with the basic global strategic situation, can be successful only if they are based on a strict compliance with the principles of equality and equal security. From that point of view, in our opinion the proposals made by the Soviet Union during the Soviet-United States talks take this fundamental principle fully into account and offer an opportunity for a genuine quest for effective agreement on a radical reduction of strategic arms and also of nuclear arsenals in the medium range.

(Mr. Yondon, Mongolia)

Recently, the anti-war movement among the world's public has become increasingly active, involving ever broader sections of the population in various parts of the world. That demonstrates that the peoples of the world are becoming deeply aware of the threat of nuclear war and firmly resolve to struggle to avert it.

At its second special session devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly launched the World Disarmament Campaign, which was supported by the overwhelming majority of States. We have noted with satisfaction that an important part of that Campaign is Disarmament Week, which has now become one of the largest regular events for mobilizing world opinion in support of disarmament. The special session of the General Assembly again advocated the celebration of Disarmament Week to promote the aims of disarmament. Pursuant to the decision of the special session, the Mongolian delegation intends to submit its views in the form of a draft resolution.

The socialist countries have always put forward constructive initiatives and they continue to do so in the sincere desire to achieve concrete agreements on all matters relating to the halting of the arms race and achieving disarmament. One of the most recent examples is the document prepared a few days ago in Moscow following the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The position of those States on many of the most important problems is set out in that document and it convincingly demonstrates the willingness of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to work, exclusively through negotiations, towards a settlement of European and international problems that have built up and their desire to achieve progress in the limitation and reduction of arms, particularly nuclear arms, and to avert the threat of war. As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, the Mongolian People's Republic in future will continue to promote in every way possible that extremely important objective.

Mr. LIANG Yufan (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Allow me, Sir, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, to extend to you our warm congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. I am confident that, under your guidance, this Committee will make progress in its work. The Chinese delegation assures you of its full co-operation. I should also like to take this opportunity to congratulate Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico, and to request the Swedish delegation kindly to convey our congratulations to Mrs. Alva Myrdal, both of whom have had the honour of winning the Nobel Peace Prize for their untiring efforts over the long years to promote peace and disarmament.

People had placed hopes on the recent second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. But that session not only failed to produce a comprehensive programme on disarmament, but also failed to make substantive progress on any disarmament issues. Many delegations have expressed regret and dissatisfaction with this result during the general debate at the plenary as well as in their statements before this Committee. The Chinese delegation shares their feelings.

The failure of the second special session on disarmament is by no means an isolated event. Just like all the other recent frustrated disarmament efforts, it is the result of the policies pursued by the super-Powers. Backed by their ever more powerful military strength, the two super-Powers have been vying with each other for world supremacy. As a consequence, the international situation has been increasingly destabilized, the danger of a new world war has been growing and confidence between States, which is indispensable to the disarmament efforts, has been undermined. Contrary to the goals of disarmament, the super-Powers have long since been engaged in a frenzied arms race, which has brought into their possession huge nuclear and conventional arsenals. Far exceeding any legitimate needs for their own defence and security, these arsenals have become the means of their expansionism and hegemonism. They have been stepping up their respective global strategic deployments for aggressive purposes, maintaining and strengthening overt or covert military bases at key strategic locations all over the world, installing various types of weapons, and stationing large numbers of troops abroad - all these are for the dual purpose of securing their vested interests and further

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enlarging their spheres of influence whenever the opportunity arises. Furthermore, they have time and again abetted and supported regional wars of aggression. One of the super-Powers which talks loudest about disarmament is still invading and occupying another country. It should also be pointed out that even in the few months since the second special session on disarmament, the super-Powers have not shown any restraint, but have stepped up their actions which undermine the disarmament efforts. No sooner had one of them undertaken "not to be the first to use nuclear weapons" than it staged a comprehensive nuclear war exercise to flaunt its nuclear attack capabilities and stepped up deployments of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The other super-Power has not slackened its efforts to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons, and is making plans for protracted nuclear warfare. In the meantime, each of the super-Powers, in order to emerge victorious in a nuclear war on earth, is vigorously extending the arms race into outer space.

The reality tells us that disarmament can make no headway whatsoever unless determined struggles are waged against the hegemonistic policies of the super-Powers. The super-Powers must bear special responsibilities for both nuclear and conventional disarmament - this is a foregone conclusion that many small and medium-sized countries have drawn from the history and reality of the two super-Powers' arms race and contention for hegemony since the end of the Second World War. Just as some representatives have pointed out in their statements at the current session: "The two major nuclear Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, have the main responsibility for constraining the nuclear arms race"; "while all States should make efforts to create progress in this field the nuclear-weapon States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals must bear the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and should take the first step in nuclear disarmament. An important contribution by these States would be agreement upon substantial balanced and verifiable reductions of nuclear weapons"; "the super-Powers, which bear a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace", should "redouble their efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament". Other representatives have stressed the importance of mobilizing world public opinion against the accumulation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the super-Powers.

Pursuing an independent foreign policy, China firmly opposes hegemonism and upholds world peace. China is opposed both to a global war or a nuclear war, for which the super-Powers are making preparations, and to any conventional war of aggression started or supported by them. China has consistently stood for genuine disarmament and against the arms race between the super-Powers, maintaining that they should take the lead in substantially cutting back their nuclear and conventional arsenals. To facilitate the progress of disarmament, the Chinese Government submitted at the second special session on disarmament a proposal on the essential measures for an immediate halt to the arms race and disarmament, a proposal which comprises five sections, namely: objective, principle, measures, verification and negotiation.

We would like once more to give a resumé here of the essential points of our proposal. The measures contained therein are as follows. First, all nuclear States should reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. Pending this, the nuclear States should each undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones

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and not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other at any time or in any circumstances. Secondly, the Soviet Union and the United States should cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of any kind of nuclear weapons and reduce by 50 per cent their existing nuclear arsenals, including all types of intercontinental, medium-range and other tactical nuclear weapons, as well as their means of delivery. Thereafter, all nuclear States should undertake to cease all nuclear tests, stop the qualitative improvement and manufacture of their nuclear weapons and reduce their respective nuclear weapons and means of delivery according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed upon. Thirdly, all States should solemnly undertake not to use conventional forces to commit armed intervention or aggression against or military occupation of any other States. As a first step towards conventional disarmament, all foreign occupation troops must be withdrawn without delay. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and the United States should proceed to reduce substantially their heavy and new-type conventional weapons and equipments, especially those for offensive purposes. After this, the other militarily significant States should join them in reducing their respective conventional armaments according to a reasonable proportion and procedure to be agreed upon. Fourthly, chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction should be prohibited.

The first point of the above Chinese proposal has taken into account the strong desire of the people all over the world to prevent nuclear war. We believe that so long as nuclear-weapon States do not harbour the intention to commit aggression and expansion it should not be difficult for them not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. If the nuclear States genuinely comply with this undertaking, it should greatly help to reduce the menace of a nuclear war. Eighteen years ago, when exploding its first atomic bomb, China already assumed these obligations unilaterally. It is noted that at the recent second special session on disarmament, the Soviet Union committed itself not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This was certainly a change from the Soviet refusal to do so hitherto. However, people cannot fail to note also that the Soviet Union undertook this obligation only after it had built up a vast nuclear arsenal and gained a preponderance in conventional arms. Furthermore, the Soviet statement

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did not contain an undertaking on not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones. Instead, it indicated that the Soviet commitment was conditional upon "how the other nuclear Powers act", which cannot but give rise to the suspicion that the Soviet Union may suddenly withdraw its promise whenever it thinks opportune. On the other hand, one also notes that the United States still refuses to assume the same obligation, insisting on its doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

The second point of the Chinese proposal is based upon the consideration that simply calling for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons without stipulating a step-by-step reduction until their complete elimination is not enough to halt the arms race and realize genuine nuclear disarmament. As everybody knows, only the Soviet Union and the United States possess the largest nuclear arsenals and only they are capable of launching a nuclear war; therefore, it is only reasonable and fair that they should be the first to make substantial reductions in the process of nuclear disarmament. However, under the pretext of "equal security", the super-Powers want all the nuclear-weapon States to assume equal responsibility. That is merely a subterfuge to cover up their reluctance to carry out disarmament. The nuclear arsenals already in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States constitute a serious threat to world peace and security. Even if they cut their nuclear arsenals by 50 per cent respectively, each of them will still possess far more nuclear weapons than any of the other nuclear-weapon States. We are pleased that some other countries have put forward ideas identical or similar to ours. Regrettably, the Soviet Union only talks about a "freeze", and not substantial reductions; and although the United States has put forth some suggestions for reduction it has an eye to only a few specific types of nuclear weapons. The proposals from each of them, in the final analysis, are designed to weaken the other side while sustaining and reinforcing those spheres where it has already got the upper hand itself.

Our proposal links the nuclear-test ban closely to the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. As pointed out in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament,

"The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind." (resolution A/S-10/2, para.51)

Proceeding from a desire to check the nuclear-arms race and to prevent nuclear-weapon proliferation, a great number of peace-loving countries wish to impose a ban on all nuclear-weapon tests as soon as possible. We fully understand this desire. In our view, nevertheless, as one aspect of the whole process of nuclear disarmament, a nuclear-test ban can have certain effects in diminishing the threat of nuclear war only when it is combined with other measures of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved by a mere test ban without halting the improvement and production of nuclear weapons, or without a substantial cut-back of the same. Today when nuclear weaponry has already developed to a point where the emphasis is on improving target accuracy and advanced-warning abilities, a test ban alone can hardly check the arms race. The history of the past 19 years since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty testifies to this point convincingly; during this period the super-Powers have conducted many more nuclear tests and the nuclear weapons in their possession have improved, both quantitatively and qualitatively. It is true that the super-Powers did once unilaterally declare a "moratorium" on testing, but that only proved to be a hiatus before a new round of tests and in no way affected the production, development and deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons. Now we see one of them put forward a "new proposal" for a test ban; its motivation cannot but arouse suspicion.

Our proposal also embodies the principle that nuclear disarmament should be carried out in conjunction with conventional disarmament. Undoubtedly, as nuclear weapons have immense destructive power, nuclear disarmament deserves to be given the highest priority. But the super-Powers must not be allowed to divert people's attention from conventional disarmament with empty talk about nuclear disarmament. So we must attach due importance to conventional disarmament. Reduction of conventional arms should go side by side with nuclear disarmament.

The super-Powers have relied on their far superior conventional arms, both in quantity and in quality, to carry out military intervention, invasion or occupation of other countries. For this reason, people are justified in demanding that the super-Powers should bear a special responsibility for conventional disarmament entailing a substantial reduction of their conventional arsenals. It would be ironical if in discussing conventional disarmament we did not touch upon wars of aggression perpetrated or supported by the super-Powers with conventional weapons. History shows that conventional wars have never ceased since the end of the Second World War and have even been on the increase, and that more often than not such wars have taken place with super-Power involvement or backing. Also, considering that a nuclear war might result from the escalation of a conventional war between the super-Powers, if one only calls for nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war while overlooking conventional disarmament and losing vigilance against conventional war, a loophole might still be left for the outbreak of a nuclear war. We are glad to note that the United Nations has already called the first meeting of governmental experts for the study of conventional disarmament, which we hope will produce useful recommendations and propositions.

The fourth point in the Chinese proposal proceeds from the urgent and immediate need for the prohibition of chemical weapons. Although there is the 1925 Geneva Protocol on this question, chemical weapons are to date a real and persistent threat. In recent years there have been frequent reports about the use of chemical or toxic weapons. The arsenals of the two super-Powers contain large stockpiles of chemical weapons which are constantly being updated or replenished while those of higher toxicity and which are more convenient to use are being developed. We are of the view that the United Nations should undertake serious and closer investigations of the reported use of chemical weapons in order to establish the facts. The proposed convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons should provide, in clear-cut terms, for the prohibition of the use of such weapons and for strict and effective verification measures.

The above-mentioned proposals of the Chinese Government have been submitted out of a sincere desire to promote genuine disarmament. China has time and again solemnly pledged that it will under no circumstances seek hegemony. China belongs to the third world; it will never join in the arms race and in rivalry

(Mr. Liang Yufan, China)

between the super-Powers. The call for the Soviet Union and the United States to take the lead in making substantial reductions of their armaments is legitimate and reasonable and is in keeping with the needs of our times. The fact that we call on the super-Powers to take the lead in disarmament does not mean that we intend to be exempted from the exercise. We have made it quite clear in our proposals that as soon as they have stopped the testing, qualitative improvement and manufacture of nuclear weapons and reduced their nuclear arsenals by half, we shall be willing to undertake corresponding obligations.

In the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the struggle to oppose hegemonism and preserve world peace is a lofty and arduous task. There are bound to be obstacles, even set-backs, in the process of disarmament. But we are not disheartened or pessimistic. We are convinced that world peace can be preserved provided the peace-loving nations of the world unite and, by adhering to the correct principles of disarmament and giving full play to all agencies and conferences within the United Nations system, intensify their struggle to oppose the super-Power policies of aggression, expansion and arms race and thwart their strategic plans.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): In its first statement in this debate, on 22 October 1982, the Bulgarian delegation dwelt upon the questions of the deterioration of the international situation, the ongoing arms race and the increased danger of a global nuclear conflict, which have dominated the debate so far. It emphasized in this connection the urgency of taking concrete steps for forthright change and reversal of the present extremely dangerous trend of aggravation of the international situation. More specifically, my delegation underscored the supreme importance and urgency of steps such as the historical decision of the Soviet Union, which has undertaken the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, and its proposals submitted at this session for a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and for a safe development of nuclear energy.

In this statement I would like to touch on other disarmament issues and to express some of my delegation's considerations prompted by the debate so far.

As is known, the hopes of mankind in connection with the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and the adoption of resolute measures for curbing the arms race and proceeding to genuine disarmament were not fulfilled. It is also well known that the socialist and the non-aligned countries did their best to bring that session to fruition, and that if, notwithstanding all their efforts, the desired results have not been achieved, there is only one explanation, namely, the lack of political will and readiness on the part of the United States and some of its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to put an end to the senseless arms race and to start along the road of gradual disarmament. What is more, at the second special session on disarmament we heard the representative of a State which is a permanent member of the Security Council make a statement to the effect that the international community and the United Nations had made a mistake by setting their hopes on disarmament as a way of averting the horrors of war and achieving lasting peace. Several days ago, the representative of the United States elaborated on this theory by stating in this Committee that:

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

"Those fallacies and illusions are all associated with the view... that peace is threatened primarily by an 'arms race' and that peace can be attained by arms-control agreements, even though Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter is allowed to wither away. This familiar error puts the cart before the horse." (A/C.1/37/PV.13, p. 13)

The figurative use of this phrase about the cart and the horse, which has been frequently mentioned in the disarmament talks, implies that we are confronted with a dilemma: either disarmament first and then ensuring respect for the principles of the Charter or, first, respect for the Charter and then disarmament. At the same time advantage has been taken of the justifiable concern of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, expressed in his annual report, at the seriousness of the international situation and at the fact that the Security Council:

"all too often finds itself unable to take decisive action to resolve international conflicts," (A/37/1, p. 3)

as well as of his proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of the Security Council in order to present them as an alternative to efforts in the field of disarmament. In other words, we must first establish a sound system of international security and ensure compliance with the Charter by all Member States, and then we shall proceed to solving the disarmament problems.

Other Western delegations have added new touches to this approach, which we can define as a "non-disarmament approach," among them confidence-building among States, openness about defence policies and military information, setting up institutions for international control and so on, all this in the context of creating preconditions for taking measures in the field of disarmament.

Naturally the question arises as to whether the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which is based on the premise that the:

"ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency" (S-10/2, para. 1)

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

and that:

"Measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority," (Ibid., para. 20).

is simply a fallacy and an illusion. The answer of my delegation to that question is a categorical "No".

First, as is known, only three months ago the second special session on disarmament unanimously adopted a document, which is among the few but extremely important results of the session, which states, inter alia:

"The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action." (A/S-12/32, para. 62)

It is obvious that the "non-disarmament approach" and the new priorities that have been offered are strikingly at variance with the Concluding Document of the second special session on disarmament. That is why we cannot help but express our anxiety and ask whether those States whose representatives speak of "fallacies" and "mistakes" still continue to adhere to the Concluding Document.

Secondly, the dilemma with which we are now faced is nothing new. The question of disarmament first and then security - or vice-versa - had been amply discussed in the League of Nations. It was a fallacious dilemma then, as it is now. Paragraph 54 of the Final Document gives an answer to this question:

"Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned." (S-10/2, para. 54)

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

It is obvious that the two tasks are not contradictory. As indicated in the memorandum submitted by the Soviet Union to the second special session on disarmament, every initiative aimed at strengthening international security in our age should include the following three basic components, first, in the military field measures for halting the arms race; secondly, in the political and legal field settlement of international conflicts and crises through negotiations and strengthening of the principles of non-use of force and, thirdly, in the moral field refraining from any war propaganda.

Thirdly, the socialist countries have always been in favour of strengthening the international legal guarantees for the security of States. It is well known that for several years now the question of enhancing the effectiveness of the principle of non-use of force in international relations has remained on the agenda and is still not resolved. It is also known that it is in fact the Soviet Union which has proposed the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force, which would be indeed a "recommitment" to the principle inscribed in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter. Oddly enough, however, the delegations of the United States and other NATO countries, which in the First Committee declare their support for strengthening the principle of non-use of force, are doing everything possible to impede the consideration of that same question in the Sixth Committee. It is also strange to hear some representatives in the First Committee speak of the need for the legally binding decisions of the Security Council to be implemented, whereas their countries are always in opposition when measures are proposed in the Security Council for enforcing resolutions that have been unanimously adopted with regard to the Israeli aggression against Lebanon or the imposition of sanctions against South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter.

Fourthly, the problem of verification of concluded agreements has again been artificially inflated and divorced from the concrete agreements.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The question of verification is discussed broadly and generally without taking into account precisely what kind of disarmament measure is meant. Quite absurdly, the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, unilaterally assumed by the Soviet Union, is being dismissed by some on the grounds that it is not verifiable. The history of disarmament talks shows that the question of verification always comes up and assumes inflated proportions when a new round of the arms race is in the offing. It always becomes the standard of those who are not interested in business-like negotiations. And since it is not easy to explain to the public why the existing system of verification is after all not an impediment to the functioning of the disarmament agreements already in force, the efforts are now focused on producing evidence of violations of those agreements. Such is the case with the alleged use of chemical weapons in South-East Asia and Afghanistan. Although no evidence of such alleged use has been produced, the initiators of this slanderous campaign are promising us ever more sensational disclosures every year. It is evident that they are more interested in making noise, in raising a hue and cry and in stirring suspicions in order to undermine the prestige of the agreements in force and in creating a smokescreen for the realization of their chemical-weapon programme.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The question of verification is completely clear to anyone who is familiar with paragraph 92 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. It is self-evident that all parties to a given agreement are equally interested in the existence of an adequate method of verification that would reassure them that all its provisions will be unswervingly fulfilled by all. But it is also clear that there can be no verification without disarmament, that the scope and form of verification should be commensurate with the scope and form of the concrete obligations established by the given agreement on arms limitation and disarmament, and that the implementation of verification should in no way infringe on the sovereign rights of States or allow interference in their internal affairs.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria wholeheartedly supports the view of the overwhelming majority of Member States that today the most urgent and immediate task is to avert the danger of nuclear war. Among the measures and urgent actions that should be taken if this danger is to be thwarted, it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. This very approach is the core of the programme for nuclear disarmament proposed by the Soviet Union, and supported by all the socialist countries, in its memorandum to the second special session on disarmament.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria also supports the concept of mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and ultimate destruction.

The Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe can make a crucial contribution to the success of efforts to eliminate the nuclear threat and to achieve the final goal of nuclear disarmament. At the same time, we share the concern of many that the American side does not seem to be making any sincere effort to reach an agreement. Against the background of its policy in this field, we have more and more facts which arouse suspicion that the United States is trying to use the negotiations not as an instrument for hammering out agreements but, rather, as an instrument for pacifying the

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public in its own country and as a cover for its nuclear build-up. Needless to say, these negotiations will be successful only if both parties strive to achieve mutually acceptable and specific agreements, based on the strict observance of the principles of equality and equal security.

The Bulgarian delegation has repeatedly stated its position that the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is essential for curbing the arms race and strengthening international security. The most serious threat is posed by the growing ambitions and aspirations of some reactionary and aggressive régimes to acquire nuclear weapons in regions of the world permanently fraught with tension and the danger of war. As has been pointed out with good reason, the appearance of nuclear weapons, even in one country, could trigger a chain reaction of nuclear proliferation. This could have grave and unpredictable consequences for the military and strategic equilibrium and the prospects for nuclear disarmament. That is why the constant strengthening of the non-proliferation régime should be a permanent objective of the international community. An important and constructive step forward and a gesture of goodwill in this direction, in our opinion, is the readiness of the Soviet Union to place under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) a part of its peaceful nuclear facilities.

In this connection, I should like to point out the growing significance of the task of strengthening the entire system of international agreements in the field of disarmament, including their universalization. The need for this question to be constantly under consideration has been duly reflected in resolution 36/92 H on the status of multilateral disarmament agreements, adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

I should like to dwell briefly on the well-justified demands of non-nuclear-weapon States for the strengthening of the guarantees for their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As is known, my delegation has been following this question with marked interest. We regret the fact that the Working Group of the Disarmament Committee which has been considering this question failed to make headway at the last session and complete the tasks entrusted to it. This is, of course, a reminder of the necessity

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to intensify efforts in the search for a solution to this problem. We continue to be of the opinion that this could be achieved most effectively through the preparation of a relevant international convention.

The present international situation underlines in particular the need for formulating an international agreement prohibiting the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of countries where there are no such weapons at present. Refraining from further development of nuclear weapons on the territories of other countries would contribute to averting the nuclear threat, to strengthening the non-proliferation régime, and to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

The view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world is conducive to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the strengthening of the security of States is gaining momentum. The experience gained from the conclusion of the Tlatelolco Treaty is reassuring in terms of the practicality of the idea of establishing such zones in other parts of the world, including northern Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Balkan Peninsula.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria is particularly interested, for understandable reasons, in turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Well known is the proposal to this effect made last year by Todor Zhivkov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of Bulgaria, as well as the idea of holding a summit meeting of the leaders of the Balkan countries to discuss this problem.

Although a partial measure, turning the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone would be of extremely great and topical significance. In our view, there are a number of objective factors and conditions which favour the realization of this idea. Among them we can point to a steady trend of growing confidence, understanding and good-neighbourliness in relations among the Balkan States. A system of bilateral co-operation has been developed and is functioning in the political, economic and cultural

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

fields. As has been shown in practice, differences in the socio-political system are not an impediment to peaceful coexistence and co-operation among States, given the presence of good will and readiness on their part. Their belonging to different military and political alliances need not a priori be an obstacle to State participation in nuclear-weapon-free zones. The contention that the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Balkans would upset the balance of forces on subregional and regional levels - that is, in the Balkans and in Europe - is totally devoid of logic. The initiative of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is not at variance with the popular idea of establishing zones of peace and co-operation in the Balkans, in the Mediterranean and in other parts of the world, which enjoys the full support of my country. Bulgaria will continue to devote its time and energies to that end.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of all States and their destruction is of the utmost importance.

Now we have reached, and this has not been disputed, an important crossroads. The world is on the verge of a chemical-arms race that will vitally affect the whole prospect for the prohibition of those weapons.

As to the nature of that threat, let me just say that the latest advances in science and technology represent an incomparably more serious danger and pose incomparably greater difficulties in the determination of the scope of the prohibition as well as in the process of verification than unitary chemical weapons do. I have in mind, of course, weapons of binary or multicomponent charges, or "C" weapons.

We believe that a convention on chemical weapons must ban binary as well as other multicomponent weapons. Such provisions are and will remain a keystone in preventing a qualitatively new stage in the chemical-arms race.

And indeed, what kind of a convention would that be if the new modern chemical weapons that are being developed by at least one Western State will not be prohibited?

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the Soviet Union submitted a new constructive and flexible document entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction". In the Committee on Disarmament my country has already expressed its full support for that new major initiative the aim of which is to achieve the speediest possible prohibition of chemical weapons and, as far as possible, to remove the obstacles hindering the adoption of the convention. We share the view that during the negotiations States must refrain from actions that might affect or prejudice them.

It is high time, however, that we concentrated our efforts on the finalization of that convention within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament. We are determined to do all we can to assist in that process.

To conclude I should like to express the firm determination of the People's Republic of Bulgaria to work, sparing no efforts, for the strengthening of world peace and security. This determination has found due reflection in the communique of the meeting of foreign ministers of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty which states that those States:

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"will continue to exert efforts for checking the process of aggravation of international tensions, for removing the threat of war and for achieving progress in the limitation and reduction of weapons, especially of nuclear weapons".

Mr. RACZ (Hungary): In my statement today I should like to deal with questions related to the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and, briefly, with the question of radiological weapons.

The Hungarian delegation has paid particular attention to the subject of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction ever since it was taken up by the General Assembly on the initiative of the Soviet Union in 1975 and by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the following year. That attention has been manifested by the fact that it has been a sponsor of all the relevant draft resolutions submitted to the General Assembly. The Hungarian delegation submitted working papers on this issue in 1978 and in 1982 in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the Committee on Disarmament respectively, and it was the Hungarian delegation which initiated last year and again this year the holding of informal meetings in the Committee on Disarmament on this important and urgent problem.

The continued dedication of the Hungarian delegation is motivated by the profound desire, which I hope is generally shared here, that the new results and discoveries of the ongoing scientific and technological revolution should be used only for peaceful purposes for the benefit of mankind. Unfortunately, the accelerating progress of science and technology harbours not only possible benefits towards solving many problems of mankind but, if misused, also a grave danger of triggering a qualitatively new round in the arms race.

Military-technical magazines and other publications have for about a decade been carrying reports and studies on new methods of mass annihilation that might be employed to create some hitherto unheard-of weapons. Certain new types of weapons of mass destruction exist only in principle, but others could already be in the phase of development. Without going into detail, on the basis of the publications I have mentioned I should like to touch upon some characteristics of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Racz, Hungary)

One of the distinctive features of the new non-nuclear-types of weapons of mass destruction is their highly discriminatory effect. Such weapons are capable of disturbing certain basic functions of the human body, doing harm to people of certain ethnic origin. Such weapons are highly controllable in terms of their effect or manner of action. They can, for example, influence human psychic conditions or reproductive capabilities. Because of their very discriminatory action, the use of such weapons could go unnoticed for a long time. This could lead to a transformation in the nature of combat action and may open up possibilities for hidden warfare.

It was the Soviet delegation that in 1975 proposed in the General Assembly the conclusion of an international agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and submitted a draft international agreement. Since then, the General Assembly and the Geneva Committee on Disarmament have been dealing with this problem. In 1978 the first special session on disarmament paid marked attention to this issue. The Final Document firmly expressed that:

"effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review". (resolution S-10/2, para. 77)

The delegations of the socialist countries in Geneva have made great efforts to facilitate the elaboration of an agreement on the issue, but because of the position taken by some Western countries no real progress has been achieved in this field. Those delegations prevented the Committee on Disarmament from establishing a group of qualified governmental experts in order to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and to draft possible agreements on specific types of new weapons of mass destruction. The informal meetings held on the issue, at the initiative of the Hungarian delegation and with the participation of experts in 1981 and this year, proved to be useful but could not change the general situation.

(Mr. Racz, Hungary)

In resolution 36/89 adopted last year, the General Assembly broadened the general approach and, at the same time, enlarged our possibilities and duties in the context of this question. That resolution, while maintaining the aim of elaborating a draft comprehensive agreement and possible agreements on specific types of weapons with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily-significant States to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new weapons of mass destruction, as a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement. Such declarations would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council.

The world community has on numerous occasions firmly condemned the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Now this session of the General Assembly gives those States which are capable of developing and manufacturing them the opportunity to come forward with their solemn declarations, committing themselves never to create any new weapons of mass destruction. No doubt, such declarations as provided for in paragraph 3 of resolution 36/89 would have a significant moral and political value and would create better possibilities for progress in this important field. The Hungarian delegation, together with a large number of other delegations, is eagerly looking forward to hearing statements of position to be made by the delegations concerned.

The Hungarian delegation expresses the hope that the Committee will give due attention to this important question and that the resolution to be adopted on this issue will pave the way for the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Consequently it is ready to participate actively in the elaboration and adoption of such a draft resolution.

Now I turn to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons, which has been before the Committee on Disarmament and the General Assembly since 1979. During those three years the question, on which an agreement initially seemed relatively easy to reach, has become more and more complicated.

(Mr. Racz, Hungary)

The main reason for this trend of development lies in the different approaches to priority and to the manner of solution concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons and the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities. Some delegations have repeatedly advocated priority for the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities, while unjustifiably playing down the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. This situation has led to a deadlock; thus the respective working group could hold but three meetings during the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1982.

Nobody could deny the importance of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack. The new Soviet proposal on the "Intensification of efforts to remove the threat of nuclear war and ensure the safe development of nuclear energy" clearly demonstrates the significance which the USSR attaches to this problem in the general context of limiting and removing the danger of a nuclear war. Operative paragraph 2 of the relevant draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation:

"Declares that the deliberate destruction of peaceful nuclear installations even by means of conventional weapons is essentially equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, that is to say, to actions of a kind which the United Nations has already described as the gravest crime against humanity". (A/C.1/37/L.7)

My delegation considers it as a very important step in the right direction and consequently fully supports it.

The Hungarian delegation continues to hold the view that both questions are timely and important and that both should be solved separately. This is the way to ensure progress in the solution of both questions. Hungary, which presided over the Working Group in two consecutive years, in 1980 and 1981, and thus has a special interest in this field, is ready to do its best for the early conclusion of a radiological-weapon treaty and for rapid progress in the solution of the other problem.

In conclusion, I should like to express the hope of my delegation that the resolution to be adopted on these problems will be conducive to real progress and will give new momentum to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): May I first of all, on behalf of the Pakistan delegation and on my own behalf, convey to Ambassador Ghebo of Ghana our warm felicitations on his unanimous election as Chairman of the First Committee. During the two weeks that the First Committee has been in session, we have seen ample evidence, if evidence were required, of his diplomatic experience which covers many fields, and of his skill which has been demonstrated in many other forums. We are confident that under his guidance the First Committee will be able to complete its work in the best possible manner. We offer to him and to the other officers of the Committee our good wishes and our pledge of full co-operation.

I wish to take this opportunity to extend our heartiest congratulations to Ambassador Garcia Robles and, through the Swedish delegation here, to Mrs. Alva Myrdal, on the award of this year's Nobel Peace Prize to them. Their devotion to the cause of disarmament is well known. We owe them a debt of gratitude for their untiring and selfless service to the cause of world peace.

We have listened with great attention to the statements made in this Committee during the course of the last two weeks. Each one of those statements has underlined the sombre state of affairs now obtaining in the world and the perils we face with the new round of the arms race between the big Powers.

It should by now be a self-evident truth that world peace and security cannot be assured through the accumulation of arms. This accumulation has, in our experience, aggravated rather than eased international tensions. It has sharpened confrontation. Common sense, therefore, demands that our search for peace and security be pursued through disarmament.

Pakistan fully shares the sense of dismay felt by the international community at the failure of the second special session devoted to disarmament. It is obvious that heightened international tensions prevented substantive agreements on issues of vital importance in the field of disarmament. We believe, however, that a concerted effort must be made to emerge from this vicious circle of international tensions spawning a new arms race which, in turn, exacerbates international tensions.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Fearful of the lengthening shadow of the nuclear threat, nations and peoples all over the world had hoped for the adoption of concrete measures by the second special session to alleviate the impending threat of a nuclear war which may today occur not only by design. Sadly, these hopes continue to be dashed by the unrelenting adherence of the major nuclear Powers to their own narrowly conceived strategic doctrines. Any use of nuclear weapons, whether or not limited in scale, would inevitably escalate into a world-wide nuclear war. It is our common duty therefore to adopt with mutual consent, concrete measures aimed at the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

We welcome the non-first-use declaration made by the Soviet Union. If other nuclear-weapon States were to follow the examples set by the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, the world would come closer to the realization of the important goal of the prevention of nuclear war.

The complex of issues related to the question of nuclear disarmament can best be addressed in a multilateral context. The security of non-nuclear-weapon States in a nuclear exchange, even when they are non-belligerents, would be equally threatened. They must therefore be associated with the process of negotiations leading to reductions and the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Pakistan delegation believes that a comprehensive nuclear test ban is the first essential step on the long and difficult road to nuclear disarmament. The non-participation of two nuclear Powers in the multilateral negotiations on this subject in Geneva, even when they were, at best, preliminary in nature, and were held under a highly restricted and therefore unsatisfactory mandate, is indicative of the complexities of the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban. However, we continue to hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to move quickly to hold meaningful negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty if real progress on this vital and important item is sincerely intended.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

It is an unfortunate fact, but one which must be recognized, that the security perceptions and strategic doctrines of the major Powers preclude the realization of an early resolution of the global disarmament issues. However, we cannot allow our efforts to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be diverted. My delegation continues to believe that the comprehensive programme for disarmament should be both a programme of work and a commitment to act. Our ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament can best be achieved under a comprehensive programme in a step-by-step process which clearly establishes the linkages between the various stages and different kinds of disarmament negotiations. My delegation is in no doubt that the primary responsibility for progress towards general and complete disarmament, and for initiating this process, would have to be assumed by those Powers with the largest military arsenals. And in our pursuit of this objective, the most urgent task with the highest priority is to bring the nuclear menace under control.

Pakistan has welcomed the ongoing talks between the Soviet Union and the United States for the limitation and reduction of strategic and intermediate nuclear forces in their respective arsenals. Important proposals in this context have been made by the two sides themselves and by many others. Given the dangers confronting our world, it would be tragic if concern with fractional advantages of one side or the other in specific weapons systems or disputes regarding statistics were to prevent an early agreement on this central aspect of the nuclear arms race. It is perhaps invidious to repeat that there are already national nuclear-weapon inventories sufficient to annihilate our civilization several times over.

While there cannot and should not be any let-up in our global efforts, the regional approach can be an effective complement to global measures and an important constituent in the step-by-step approach to general and complete disarmament. Pakistan's initiative for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and for the agreed reduction of conventional armed forces are principally designed to bring security and stability to our region. A determined implementation of regional disarmament measures will in our view gradually strengthen the various links in a comprehensive global programme.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Equally, interim arrangements, particularly in the absence of meaningful progress on nuclear disarmament, can play an important role in allaying the legitimate concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States as regards threats to their security. I refer to the question of concluding effective arrangements to safeguard the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is a matter of deep regret that in the negotiations in Geneva it has not been possible to reach agreement on the modest and reasonable call by the first special session to that effect. It is the inalienable right of the non-nuclear-weapon States to refuse to become victims of a nuclear war which they have persistently sought to prevent. Pakistan, along with other non-aligned and neutral States, calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to review their policies and present revised positions on the question at an early date. We look forward to a positive response from the nuclear-weapon States at this session.

With regard to the ongoing negotiations in Geneva on the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is encouraging to note that some progress has been registered. However, reports that the major Powers are at the same time proceeding to augment their chemical-weapon arsenals detract from the credibility of their commitment to conclude a comprehensive chemical-weapon ban. The General Assembly should call upon the big Powers to display political courage at the highest level and strive for the conclusion of the convention in a short, preferably fixed, period of time.

The lack of success so far in beginning negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the militarization of outer space is yet another issue which causes concern. It would be in the interests of all not to allow the arms race to extend into outer space and to declare it in the first instance as the common heritage of mankind.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

We cannot remain insensitive to the reality of the international situation which the Secretary-General in his report has very aptly described as "international anarchy" (A/37/1, p. 3). A case in point is the military intervention in Afghanistan three years ago, whose impact on regional stability, and in global terms on East-West relations, needs no elaboration. Small and medium-sized countries like Pakistan have a vital stake in the establishment of a world order based on the Charter of the United Nations. In the words of my Foreign Minister during his address to the General Assembly on 4 October 1982,

"The strength of the United Nations, which is indispensable to world peace, is also a measure of our determination to achieve a just and civilized world order and to prevent a universal holocaust."

(A/37/PV.16, pp. 28-30)

A climate of mutual trust combined with the necessary political will is a basic prerequisite for any disarmament measures in the present-day world. While mutual disputes and tensions exist between States, it is difficult to believe that they will agree to any far-reaching restraints in arms accumulation. It is therefore necessary to create the right political climate and strengthen mutual trust. The principles of the United Nations Charter - respect for the security and territorial integrity of States and non-interference in their internal affairs - provide a firm and durable basis for bringing that about.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The armaments race has consumed colossal financial and other resources. Such resources ought to be directed, on grounds of enlightened self-interest, to the ending of world poverty. Disarmament and development essentially have the same relationship as disarmament and security. Disarmament, development, security form the triad on which the world must construct a new international order. While we urge upon the East and the West to find a viable basis to achieve effective disarmament, we also call for the forging of a new consensus between the North and the South which should attempt equally to bridge both the economic and the security gap between them. A common historical cause lies behind these disparities and only a composite solution will prevent the catastrophe which might result from a lack of understanding on the part of the privileged and the prosperous towards the under-privileged and the poor.

I have in my statement indicated the general views of the Pakistan delegation on the agenda items pertaining to disarmament which are before us. We hope to make further observations on specific issues later.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus): We are approaching the end of Disarmament Week. In this Committee we have heard many valid statements by representatives of Member States and some very important ones. The sum total of our activities in this Committee should be towards creating the conditions necessary for proceeding effectively towards disarmament, because we all know that we have made very few, if any, steps towards that goal. Recent developments have shown not only that the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament failed but also that the climate of world affairs has so deteriorated that manifest and dire consequences have resulted from the ineffectiveness of Security Council decisions, as was pointed out very clearly by the Secretary-General in his recent report on the work of the Organization.

This manifest ineffectiveness of the Security Council is in direct contravention of the basic provisions of the Charter. I shall not take time to go into the factors that have created this condition of violating the Charter with impunity, even contemptuously, as we have witnessed in recent times. This Committee must do something towards effectively remedying this evil, which lies at the root not only of the present disorder, insecurity and terrorism in the world which we have witnessed in Lebanon and in other situations, but also of our

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

ineffectiveness in proceeding towards disarmament. Disarmament is a symbolic world, as I said before, containing all the aspects of international security and not merely the reduction of armaments and collateral measures, which should be attended to in order to render it possible that negotiations on the actual reduction or regulation of armaments may be practically achievable.

We have had too many years of repeating here, and in the General Assembly, the same generalities in statements, the same indifference towards pointing out what is wrong and providing and expressing the means of putting it right. It is not enough to speak about the difficulties, the troubles and the evils of the present situation, resulting from the lack of disarmament and from the disagreement between the major Powers. We know that they are in disagreement, and they are in disagreement because there is no trust and confidence between them and because the one side thinks the other wants to dominate the world.

We have a duty here to harmonize the relations and actions of nations and we can only do that by insisting that the Charter be complied with. Once we have created this state of international security through the Charter, the order which will result from compliance with the relevant Articles of the Charter - we all know them and I shall not repeat them here - the decisions of the Security Council will become effective and we shall have order.

Within that order, confidence in the United Nations as an instrument of international peace and security will be created and from that order we shall have a greater climate of confidence between Member States, which would find security, particularly the smallest States, which would therefore not waste their means of development on armaments but would see to their development; and the major Powers, in that climate, would be able to have better understanding and co-operation between themselves on matters relating to international peace, security and survival.

It is therefore our purpose here to promote that understanding, to see first that we have the necessary primary objective which would promote a strategy of peace, so that we may proceed effectively towards disarmament. That can be achieved, as I have already said, by complying with the Charter.

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

In this sense we would like to see draft resolutions relating to the effectiveness of Security Council decisions, the need for which has become obvious, and to supporting the Secretary-General in his activities and his energy in bringing this matter to the Security Council at a high level, so that we may see actual results during the present session.

We hope that this Disarmament Week will prove effective in this respect.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): Before I adjourn the meeting I should like to make one or two points.

Representatives will recall that at the meeting on 21 October the Chairman of this Committee drew the attention of representatives to a document entitled Medium-Term Plan of the United Nations. Its budgetary implications will be considered in a few days by the Fifth Committee. The document has been distributed to all delegations in document A/37/6 and as far as this Committee is concerned the Introduction of this document and chapter I have been distributed. The Chairman has said that delegations, if they deemed it appropriate, would be given an opportunity to make comments on this document. In view of the fact that the Fifth Committee will be considering the item shortly, it is my intention, after we shall have completed the speakers' list for this afternoon, to give delegations that wish to do so a chance to comment on this Medium-Term Plan.

Secondly, I should like to remind representatives that as already decided, the list of speakers for the general debate in this Committee on disarmament items will be closed at 6.00 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.