

UNITED NATIONS



SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RECORDS

THIRTY-SEVENTH YEAR

2373rd MEETING: 4 JUNE 1982
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2373rd MEETING

Held in New York on Friday, 4 June 1982, at 4 p.m.

President: Mr. Luc de La BARRE de NANTEUIL
(France).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2373)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. Question concerning the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas):

Letter dated 31 May 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15145)

The meeting was called to order at 5.45 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Question concerning the situation in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas):

Letter dated 31 May 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Panama to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/15145)

1. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): In accordance with decisions taken at the previous meetings on this item [2371st and 2372nd meetings], I invite the representative of Argentina to take a place at the Council table; I invite the representatives of Brazil and Honduras to take the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Ros (Argentina) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Corrêa da Costa (Brazil) and Mr. Lobo (Honduras) took the places reserved for them at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): Members of the Council have received copies of two letters dated 4 June from the representative of Argen-

tina to the President of the Council. These two letters will be issued as documents S/15159 and S/15160.

3. I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document S/15156/Rev.2, submitted by Panama and Spain.

4. Before doing so, I shall call on those representatives who wish to make statements before the voting.

5. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): The situation facing the Council this afternoon is straightforward. If Argentina had not invaded the Falkland Islands at the beginning of April, there would be no crisis and we would not be meeting today. If Argentina had obeyed the mandatory demand in Council resolution 502 (1982) immediately to withdraw all its forces from the Falkland Islands, the crisis would have passed and we would not be meeting today.

6. But Argentina did invade the islands and defied the mandatory demand of the Council to withdraw. In these circumstances, it would have been perfectly legitimate for my Government to have taken the attitude that the only course open to us was the inherent right of self-defence, contained in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. But we did not. Over many rounds of intensive negotiations, we did everything in our power to bring about compliance with the resolution by peaceful means. We showed flexibility. As the world will know from published documents, we went as far as we could on 17 May to achieve the peaceful implementation of the resolution without compromising important principles which I have set out many times before the Council. Our final proposals were comprehensively rejected by the Government of Argentina. My Government then, naturally and rightly, took them off the table. We then turned, under resolution 505 (1982), to try to find acceptable conditions for a cease-fire, accompanied by the total withdrawal of Argentine forces, as demanded by resolution 502 (1982). Again our efforts were unsuccessful. The Government of Argentina insisted on pre-conditions. These were fully set out by the representative of Argentina in the Council on 2 June [2371st meeting]. As I said at the time, acceptance of those pre-conditions would have led us back into the morass of procrastination and evasion which my Government has experienced on the part of the Government of Argentina over the last two months of the most intensive negotiation.

7. At the beginning of the present debate, I circulated informally to delegations language which we could have supported as appropriate to bring about an immediate cease-fire, linked inseparably to the immediate and total withdrawal of all Argentine forces from the Falkland Islands. I drew attention to these elements in my statement to the Council on 2 June [*ibid.*].

8. The draft resolution before the Council today in no way meets these criteria. There is no direct and inseparable link between the cease-fire and immediate Argentine withdrawal within a fixed time-limit. The wording of the draft resolution, without any shadow of doubt, would enable Argentina to reopen the endless process of negotiation, thus leaving Argentine armed forces in illegal occupation of parts of the islands.

9. This is totally unacceptable to my Government and my delegation will vote against the draft resolution in document S/15156/Rev.2.

10. Mr. IRUMBA (Uganda): Mr. President, I should like, at the outset, to congratulate you most warmly on your assumption of the high office of the presidency of the Council. The month of May was a trying period for the Council and for international peace. Considering current international crises, the month of June promises to be equally trying. We are confident that, given your wisdom, your experience as a diplomat and your political skill, you will conduct the deliberations of the Council successfully. My delegation is happy to see you, a representative of France, a country with which my own country shares cordial and fruitful relations, presiding over the business of the Council.

11. I should also like to pay a very special tribute to Mr. Ling Qing, of the People's Republic of China, for the skilful and dedicated manner in which he performed his duties as President of the Council last month. It was a pleasure for my delegation to work under his guidance.

12. On 3 April and 24 May [2350th and 2364th meetings], my delegation made known its position regarding the dispute between the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom over the Malvinas Islands. Uganda is unequivocally committed to the principles of non-alignment and is an active member of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries. Our position regarding this issue is consonant with the position of the Movement contained in the Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, held at Lima in 1975;¹ that position has been affirmed at subsequent ministerial and summit meetings.

13. With regard to the substance of the matter, the non-aligned countries, without prejudice to the general principle of self-determination, have recognized, in the special and particular case of the Malvinas Islands, the just claim of Argentina. The Movement

has equally advocated a peaceful solution of the dispute and urged the two parties to continue active negotiations. As we have stated before, Uganda fully subscribes to both aspects of the position of the non-aligned countries.

14. My delegation voted in favour of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) because of our well-known position against the use of force in international relations. The use of force or the mechanism of war is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations, which enjoins Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

15. I wish to express my delegation's gratitude to the Secretary-General for his untiring efforts to find a peaceful solution to the present conflict. To judge from his report of 21 May [2360th meeting], substantial progress had been made towards narrowing the differences between the two parties before the breakdown of the negotiations. This in part motivated the Council to give a further formal mandate to the Secretary-General to continue his peace efforts. In his report to the Council at the beginning of this debate [2371st meeting], the Secretary-General stated:

"It is my considered judgement that the positions of the two parties do not offer the possibility of developing at this time terms for a cease-fire which would be mutually acceptable. In accordance with the mandate given to me by resolution 505 (1982), I shall, nevertheless, maintain close contact with the parties if an opportunity can be found in which the exercise of my good offices can contribute to bringing this tragic crisis to an end." [S/15151.]

16. It is sad that little progress has been achieved since the adoption of resolution 505 (1982). On the contrary, the war has continued, resulting in heavy casualties on both sides. We regret that lives have been lost and property damaged. As we stated on 24 May, it is our firm conviction that there is no alternative to negotiations. Only through the mechanism of negotiations can a settlement emerge, one which will preserve the national honour and prestige of each party to the conflict. Even at this late hour, we still appeal to both parties to cease all hostilities and to resume negotiations.

17. The Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, has the primary role in the maintenance of international peace and security. What, then, should the Council do to fulfil its obligations in the present circumstances? The Council cannot remain indifferent while a war in which a great deal of blood is being spilt and which continues to claim many lives still rages on. Equally, my delegation believes, the Council has a duty to see to it that its resolutions are implemented.

18. My delegation, in its attitude concerning the draft resolution in document S/15156/Rev.2, will be guided

by the desire to bring about a cease-fire and to end the suffering and loss of life. Equally, it will be guided by the necessity for the Council to ensure the implementation of its resolutions—in this particular instance, the implementation of resolution 502 (1982) in its entirety.

19. We believe that the draft resolution addresses itself to these concerns. The preambular paragraph reaffirms the resolutions of the Council on this subject. Furthermore, paragraph 1 calls for a cease-fire to take place simultaneously with the implementation of resolution 502 (1982). Uganda will therefore vote in favour of the draft resolution.

20. Mr. NISIBORI (Japan): Japan will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us, with the understanding that Argentina will withdraw its military forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) within a reasonable period of time.

21. My Government is profoundly distressed at the prospect of further bloodshed in the conflict over the islands and therefore implores Argentina to comply in good faith with the appeal of the Council to withdraw its forces.

22. Japan earnestly hopes that, with the withdrawal of the Argentine forces from the islands and the resultant termination of the lamentable use of force in the region, Argentina's traditional ties of deep friendship with other countries will be strengthened in the future.

23. Mr. DORR (Ireland): As I am speaking formally in the Council for the first time since your assumption of the presidency, Sir, I should like to offer you my best wishes for the month ahead, my congratulations and my promise of our support. I should like also to offer my congratulations and my thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Ling Qing, of China, for the skilful, patient, calm and wise way in which he directed our proceedings during the previous month.

24. In the two months since this issue first came to the attention of the Council, we have seen an old dispute escalate to a conflict, a conflict to a war. We fear now to see a war, which is so far limited, become an even greater tragedy, which could lead to greater bitterness and mistrust and sow the seeds of continuing conflict.

25. Since the problem first came to the Council on 1 April, Ireland has tried consistently and constantly to assert certain basic principles. I would identify five points which form our attitude and which guide our approach to the present draft resolution.

26. First, we are aware that the question of sovereignty over the islands has been in dispute and that it has been subject to negotiation for some time. We have expressed no position on the merits of that dispute.

27. Secondly, we considered it wrong of Argentina to try to resolve that dispute in its favour through the use of force. That action was rightly rejected by the Council in resolution 502 (1982) of 3 April. Ireland voted for that resolution; we continue to support it strongly, and we believe that it must be implemented.

28. Thirdly, we know from the past how a dispute escalates to a conflict, a conflict to a war, and a war to a level which may escape all calculation. We dare not risk this in our time. We believe it vital, therefore, in any such case that the deadly process be halted. This must be done at the earliest possible stage because it becomes more difficult at each successive stage.

29. Fourthly, we believe that this process, though dangerous, is not wholly inexorable or inevitable. It can be stopped, and it can be stopped without any betrayal of principle if full and adequate use is made, and made on a continuing basis, of those methods and procedures which were evolved over a generation by the international community and are now embodied in a particular way in the United Nations.

30. Fifthly, if, on the other hand, this process which I have described is not halted in any particular case, then the dangers are great. Indeed, in the present international situation it is no exaggeration to say that they could become incalculable.

31. This has been our approach throughout as the conflict has grown and developed. I have summarized it several times in the Council by saying that someone must shout "Stop!" At the same time, I have always emphasized strongly Ireland's continuing support for resolution 502 (1982), which we see as an assertion of the rule of law and not of force in international relations.

32. We began trying to say "Stop!" on 1 April, when we joined in a call by the Council to both parties not to use force [2345th meeting, para. 74]. We continued on 2 and 3 April in statements in the Council [2349th and 2350th meetings] and in our vote for resolution 502 (1982), which called for an end to the fighting, Argentine withdrawal and a negotiated settlement.

33. In early May, when other peace efforts seemed to be at an end, we called for a meeting of the Council [S/15037]. We activated our request on 21 May [2360th meeting], and on 25 May [2366th meeting] we introduced a draft resolution in the hope that that could bring an end to the fighting and a return to negotiation. That proposal in its original version envisaged three steps in bringing the conflict to an end and getting negotiations back on the rails.

34. The first vital step, we felt, had to be taken by the parties. In our original draft resolution [S/15106], therefore, we asked that they suspend hostilities for

the short period of 72 hours. While hostilities were thus suspended, we envisaged that the Secretary-General could take a second step by working out with both sides the practical details for a lasting cease-fire, including possible United Nations observers.

35. At a third stage, of course, we wanted the Secretary-General to resume his mediation efforts on the larger issues with a new mandate from the Council.

36. In subsequent discussion with other members of the Council, and in order to gain the widest possible support, we modified this proposal. We removed the request to the parties to take the first step by suspending hostilities for a short period. Ireland, together with five non-aligned members of the Council, then sponsored the modified version of our initial draft resolution, which was adopted as resolution 505 (1982). We were aware that it placed a heavy burden on the shoulders of the Secretary-General precisely because we were no longer asking the parties to facilitate his efforts by taking the first step. In the event, the Secretary-General carried out his mandate with all his customary skill and dedication. We nevertheless learned to our regret from his report [S/15151] that the positions of the two parties did not make it possible to work out a cease-fire.

37. And so the conflict continued. It has now reached a stage where we may be within hours of a major pitched battle between the opposing sides for possession of the main town on the islands. There has already been much loss of life in this war. There is now a serious and imminent danger that this loss of life will greatly increase. Reports say that the land forces confronting each other number about 7,000 on each side—a total of 14,000, which is more than eight times the total population of the islands.

38. Must a war which has already cost a great deal in human life culminate in this major battle, which threatens even greater bloodshed? For us the answer is no, as it has been all along at every stage in the escalation process. Even now we want to stay "Stop!" The dispute should not have become a conflict through the initial use of force. The conflict should not have become a war. The war must not now become an even greater tragedy.

39. But does a call for an end to the fighting mean abandoning the principles which we upheld so strongly in early April and which are now embodied in resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982), for which we voted? My delegation is sure that the answer is no. What Ireland wants is both an end to the fighting and the full implementation of all of the provisions of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982).

40. That is the background against which we approach the present draft resolution.

41. My delegation, in discussions, had been considering a slightly different approach: a resolution which

would reaffirm resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982), spelling out one by one the provisions of resolution 502 (1982), calling the urgent attention of the parties to their obligation under the Charter and requiring them to implement those provisions fully and without delay. We would, of course, also have requested the Secretary-General to maintain his mission of good offices under resolution 505 (1982), and we would have asked both Governments to signify within a short time period their acceptance of the provisions of that resolution.

42. In the event, Ireland did not press those ideas, since Panama and Spain, as co-sponsors of the draft resolution now before us, accepted certain amendments. We are pleased that they did so, and in our view these amendments clearly link the full implementation of resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982) to the cease-fire which the Council calls for. For this reason, we feel it right and necessary to vote in favour of the present draft resolution.

43. Once again we say "Stop!" We say this as we have said it all along, while insisting on full commitment to the principles which we have upheld and for which we have already voted in the Council. We know well that there are difficulties. We know that there is mistrust on both sides. And we do not wish to be simplistic in our approach. But the negotiations so skilfully carried out by the Secretary-General, which are endorsed in resolution 505 (1982), offer hope. Through them the principles we support can be upheld and grievances can be addressed. Continuation of the war until this climatic battle takes place can bring only tragic loss and lasting bitterness.

44. We will vote in favour of this draft resolution because we want to say "Stop!" one last time. "Stop before it is too late."

45. Mr. NGUAYILA MBELA KALANDA (Zaire) (*interpretation from French*): It is with great satisfaction, Sir, that my delegation congratulates you, a representative of France, a country which has such friendly relations with Zaire, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June.

46. The delegation of Zaire wishes to take this opportunity to pay a well-deserved tribute to Mr. Ling Qing, of the People's Republic of China, who presided so competently and so skilfully over the work of the Council during May.

47. From the beginning of the crisis in the South Atlantic which has brought into conflict the United Kingdom and the Argentine Republic, two countries which maintain friendly relations with Zaire, we have supported all efforts to reach a negotiated solution of the conflict. Within this framework, Zaire wholeheartedly supported the two resolutions adopted by the Council—resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982).

48. It is in this context that, pursuing the same goal, Zaire supports the draft resolution presented by Panama and Spain in document S/15156/Rev.2, in order to put an end to the bloodshed and because it calls on the two parties to implement resolutions 502 (1982) and 505 (1982).

49. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): The Council will now vote on the draft resolution contained in document S/15156/Rev.2.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, Ireland, Japan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zaire

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: France, Guyana, Jordan, Togo

The result of the vote was 9 in favour, 2 against and 4 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, the negative votes being those of permanent members of the Council.

50. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now call on those representatives who have asked to be allowed to make statements following the voting.

51. Mr. KARRAN (Guyana): First of all, I should like to extend to you, Sir, my sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of June. You have assumed the presidency at a time when there is every evidence of a busy time ahead, but your demonstrated skill, experience and wisdom give us the assurance that you will guide the work of the Council impartially and effectively in this most difficult period.

52. I should like also to pay a tribute to your predecessor, the representative of the People's Republic of China, for the very calm and efficient manner in which he conducted the business of the Council during the month of May.

53. My delegation listened with great interest to the interim report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Council on 2 June [2371st meeting] and to his account of his efforts to find an agreed formula for a cease-fire. To him we pay a well-deserved tribute for his untiring efforts in the cause of international peace and security. None of us can doubt the difficult nature of the task assigned to the Secretary-General by the Council, but he has demonstrated his ability to pursue resolutely a course in search of peace and with a view to ending hostilities in the region of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). We are indeed indebted to him for his most commendable efforts and for his outstanding patience and devotion in his search for a

negotiated solution consistent with Council resolution 502 (1982). My delegation supports him fully in his continued efforts to bring an end to the current hostilities.

54. When the Council met on 3 April [2350th meeting] to consider the situation in the South Atlantic, it was in the context of a specific act of aggression committed by a State Member of the United Nations, an act that was contrary to fundamental principles of its Charter and of the international rule of law. That act was the invasion by Argentina of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas). The Council adopted, as will be recalled, resolution 502 (1982), the purpose of which was to express in unequivocal terms condemnation of the use of force in the settlement of disputes and at the same time to elevate pacific settlement procedures.

55. Guyana has already expressed its regret that Argentina has not fulfilled the terms of that mandatory resolution of the Council. Specifically, Argentina has not shown a disposition to withdraw its armed forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas), as required by paragraph 2 of resolution 502 (1982). In effect, Argentina's non-fulfilment of one of the fundamental terms of the resolution is both the cause and consequence of the current level of armed hostility in the South Atlantic.

56. Guyana profoundly regrets the mounting loss of lives and the material damage that have followed the escalating level of violence. Guyana believes that this tragic waste was clearly avoidable. Guyana believes in the transcendent virtue of peaceful, negotiated settlement of disputes and situations of conflict. Guyana deeply abhors the resort to the use of force. That is why Guyana supported resolution 502 (1982). That is why we supported resolution 505 (1982).

57. Guyana, in principle and as a logical consequence of its position, supports the call for a negotiated solution. In the specific case before us, however, my delegation would have preferred to see an explicit link between the putting into place of a cease-fire and a clear statement of intent from Argentina regarding its readiness to implement the requirement contained in resolution 502 (1982) to withdraw its armed forces from the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas) within a clearly defined time-frame.

58. The draft resolution contained in document S/15156/Rev.2 does not do that.

59. It must not be seen at any stage that the Council is condoning the use of force for the settlement of disputes. It was for that reason that my delegation was forced to abstain on the draft resolution on which we have just voted.

60. Mr. de PINIÉS (Spain) (*interpretation from Spanish*): We have been discussing the situation of the Malvinas Islands for more than two months and during

that time two resolutions, 502 (1982) and 505 (1982), have been adopted with the purpose of fulfilling the responsibility of the Council, striving to establish peace and avoid any worsening of the conflict.

61. In resolution 505 (1982), a formal mandate was given to the Secretary-General so that negotiations that had been undertaken almost from the beginning of the conflict could proceed in order to achieve implementation of resolution 502 (1982) and put an end to the hostilities.

62. When, in his interim report to the Council submitted on 2 June [2371st meeting], the Secretary-General said that the positions of the two parties did not offer the possibility for a cease-fire as a prior condition for the settlement of the conflict, the Council again shouldered its responsibility, and, with a view to avoiding the continuance of the hostilities with the attendant tragic loss of life, my delegation, together with the delegation of Panama, submitted a draft resolution which, in successive stages, has been amended to arrive at a wording that would be compatible with the points of view of the largest number of Council members.

63. Despite those endeavours and the continued tokens of goodwill and flexibility shown by the sponsors in adapting the content of this draft to meet the desires of the parties, the draft resolution submitted has not been adopted. That should not be regarded as a failure on the part of the countries that supported this highly balanced text, which only requested a cease-fire and reaffirmed previously adopted resolutions and the mandate of the Secretary-General contained in resolution 505 (1982). I would say, however, that it represents a failure of peace.

64. Those of us who have striven to the best of our abilities to avoid an even more tragic outcome and an irreparable loss of life have, I feel, met our responsibilities. I believe the failure is rather that of those who have prevented the draft resolution from being adopted.

65. One can only hope that the appeal for moderation and agreement implicit in that draft resolution, even though it has not been adopted, will not fall on deaf ears and that its spirit will be taken into consideration, even by those who did not support it.

66. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): The decision taken by the Council today is, I think we all understand, a terribly important one: it marks one more failure in a series of failed efforts to mediate a conflict that is more than 200 years old, one more failed attempt to substitute reason for force, negotiation for violence, words for bombs and bullets.

67. Today's decision, then, marks one more step in a process of escalation whose end is not yet in sight. Phase one of this most recent conflict ended with the

Argentine occupation of the Falklands. Phase two may well end with British reoccupation of the Falklands. Where will phase three end?

68. Affirmed in the vote of the majority today is the will to negotiation and to peace. Affirmed in the veto of my Government, to which I will return in a moment, is the principle that force should not be allowed to triumph.

69. One of my sons handed me this morning a poem of another man who disapproves of Argentina's forceful act against the Malvinas Islands. In some lines in "An English Poem", the great Argentine writer Borges wrote:

"I offer you my ancestors, my dead men, the ghosts that living men have honoured in marble, my father's father killed on the frontier of Buenos Aires, two bullets through his lungs, bearded and dead, wrapped by his soldiers in the hide of a cow; my mother's grandfather, just 24, heading a charge of 300 into Peru, now ghosts on vanished horses."

70. The friends of Argentina, of the Americas and of world peace hope that Argentina will have few such offerings from this war and from the post-war period. We hope—all of us here, I believe—that co-operation can be restored, friendships mended, urgent tasks recommenced, of building in the New World a truly new world.

71. My Government has worked hard for mediation and settlement of this dispute. We have been rent by the clash of values, loyalties and friends. That clash continued down through the registration of the vote on this issue. I am told that it is impossible for a Government to change a vote once it is cast, but I have been requested by my Government to record the fact that were it possible to change our vote we should like to change it from a veto—a "no", that is—to an abstention.

72. Mr. KAM (Panama) (*interpretation from Spanish*): I must, of course, begin by expressing my delegation's deepest appreciation—and I am sure that I am also echoing the sentiments of the delegation of Spain—to the delegations of China, Ireland, Japan, Poland, Uganda, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Zaire—countries which supported our draft resolution. I wish that to be stated clearly in the verbatim record.

73. Mr. President, both you and the members of the Council are witness to the fact that exactly four days ago my country called for an urgent meeting of the Council to continue our consideration of the serious issue of the Malvinas. In our letter [S/15145], we pointed out that it was a matter of great urgency, in view of the intensification of the conflict and the growing number of lives being lost as a result. None the less, despite the urgency we attached to the

matter, the Council could not meet until last Wednesday afternoon. On that day, 2 June, and together, I repeat, with Spain, we submitted a draft resolution, intending to have it voted upon immediately.

74. The fact that it was not voted on immediately was due to the sincere desire of both Spain and Panama to enable the Council to adopt a resolution that would be a first step towards peace.

75. For two days both delegations showed a sincere, constructive spirit of compromise in an attempt to arrive at a text acceptable to the greatest possible number of Council members. Thus, we cannot be accused of being inflexible or of acting unilaterally because, although my delegation was the only one to vote against resolution 502 (1982), we agreed, out of respect for Council decisions, to a specific reference to that resolution, reaffirming it and requesting the parties to implement it in its entirety.

76. In spite of all our efforts, which, I repeat, were and still are motivated by a real desire to see a first step made towards peace in that war-torn area, this afternoon we have witnessed an act which is, to say the least, unusual. Because of a joint veto—one of which, that of the United States, was later corrected—we were, unfortunately, not successful with our initiative, which was supported by a number of countries and upon which many peoples had placed their hopes. And if our proposal did not succeed, it was because of the use of the veto by the United Kingdom.

77. When we requested an urgent meeting of the Council, we did so with the explicit request that the Council should carry out the responsibilities and functions conferred upon it by the Charter and that it should act without delay. We were trying to create a new opportunity for the Council to be able to demonstrate its effectiveness. We were trying to enable the Council "to save face", if I may use that expression. But, because of the British veto, the Council has been incapacitated.

78. There is not now the slightest doubt as to just who is responsible for bringing the Council to such a pass. It is not the third-world countries, but some permanent members who are making a systematic and obstinate use of their right of veto.

79. None the less, what has happened here this afternoon has been a useful lesson. We have no doubt now as to who here are really for peace and who are for a continuation of the war.

80. As the representative of Spain so rightly said, what happened here was not a failure for those of us who sponsored the draft resolution or voted for it. Underlying any apparent failure there is a lesson. Underlying any apparent failure there is a victory, and our victory has been to show world opinion that

there are nine countries here honestly concerned about a settlement of this dispute, honestly concerned about peace.

81. Regardless of the final outcome of this Malvinas episode, my delegation feels that it will have resulted in an important credit balance for Argentina and for Latin America. Among other things, we will have on the credit side the knowledge of who are our friends and who are not. This episode will have shown that Latin America is able to unite, that Latin America can demonstrate its solidarity and that friendship is tried and tested in difficult times like these. On the credit side, this episode will have contributed to our having in future a different kind of Latin America, above all, a Latin America with a deeper and renewed anti-colonial and anti-imperialist awareness. And let us not be told here that to speak of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism is a cliché, because events are demonstrating to us that colonialism and imperialism still exist.

82. We wish to state that the fact that this evening the Council was not able to adopt this draft resolution calling for a cease-fire does not in any way mean that the Council consents to England's continued aggression and punitive action, even extending to massacre, against the Argentine soldiers, who are also defending principles, principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and, of course, the dignity of the whole of Latin America.

83. In closing, I wish to state that my delegation intends to ask for further consultations in the Council in order to continue our consideration of this item, because we continue to believe that peace is still possible, despite this intransigence; that peace is still possible, despite attempts at domination. We are still confident that something can be done to avoid the spilling of blood in the Malvinas and, of course, to avoid any further deterioration in inter-American relations.

84. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I shall now make a statement as the representative of FRANCE.

85. First of all, I should like to say clearly that, of course, France in this matter has but one concern, but one aim: that hostilities should cease as early as possible, in respect for law.

86. In this spirit, France has always advocated the undertaking of negotiations on the basis of and in accordance with all the provisions of Council resolution 502 (1982).

87. Today we had before us a draft resolution submitted in document S/15156/Rev.2. The only question we had to ask ourselves, in view of the great responsibilities of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, was, to my mind, the following: was the adoption of such a text by the Council

likely to contribute to a settlement of the conflict; was it likely to contribute to an effective cessation of hostilities?

88. This text embodied positive elements which were not insignificant, since it clearly linked the cease-fire to the acceptance of resolution 502 (1982) in its entirety—in other words, to the immediate withdrawal of all the Argentine troops from the Malouines, as we say in French, and to the search for a diplomatic solution to the conflict in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. Furthermore, in making reference to resolution 505 (1982), it confirmed the mission of good offices entrusted to the Secretary-General.

89. However, it was impossible for us to disregard one major fact: resolution 502 (1982) was adopted on 3 April, more than two months ago. Despite this long interval, no start has been made on its implementation, nor has there been any sign of such a start being made. It is therefore understandable that one of the parties to the conflict felt it essential to obtain certain safeguards against the prolongation of such a situation.

90. France considers that negotiations on the draft resolution should have continued in order to arrive at a consensus on the effective implementation of resolution 502 (1982) and, within the framework of that resolution, at a genuine cessation of hostilities.

91. Without such a consensus, which would have made it possible to move towards a peaceful and honourable outcome, the French delegation, which has spared no effort to attain that aim, was constrained to abstain from voting on a text which should have been and could have been further improved in order to gain the agreement of all.

92. I now resume my function as PRESIDENT.

93. I call on the representative of Argentina.

94. Mr. ROS (Argentina) (*interpretation from Spanish*): Under the draft resolution submitted by Panama and Spain, the Council would have assumed its minimal responsibility, under the Charter of the United Nations, for maintaining international peace and security. In other words, it would have called for a cease-fire in order to save lives and to stop a war so that the United Nations could effectively serve the cause of peace.

95. The United Kingdom, a permanent member and a party to the dispute, used its veto to prevent that

from happening and the Council from assuming its obligations. Let it be clear to the international community and to history that the United Kingdom, by its veto, is solely responsible for all the deaths, whether they be Argentine or British, that will henceforth be caused in the Malvinas Islands dispute. Let it also be clear that the machinery provided in the Charter for the proper maintenance of international peace and security is only ineffective when a Power with the right of veto uses it to serve its own colonial ends, as in the present case.

96. Today it is the Malvinas; yesterday it was Namibia; tomorrow it may be any other corner of the world where the hopes of peoples to free themselves from colonial domination will be dashed. It is most unfortunate that the United Nations must remain frustrated and unable to act in such tragic situations.

97. I cannot end this brief statement without expressing my appreciation to the delegation of Spain, the mother country so ably represented by Mr. de Piniés, and to Panama, our sister republic in Latin America, for submitting the draft resolution which has just been voted upon. I thank Mr. de Piniés and Mr. Kam for their strenuous efforts in favour of peace throughout these lengthy and arduous Council proceedings.

98. I also thank those delegations in the Council which, showing a deep sense of responsibility, voted in favour of the draft resolution.

99. The PRESIDENT (*interpretation from French*): I now call on the representative of the United Kingdom, who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

100. Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom): The representative of Argentina has laid the blame on my country for any further loss of life. As I said at the outset of my statement in explanation of vote this afternoon, the responsibility for the crisis lay in the Argentine invasion. The responsibility for any further loss of life lies in the refusal of Argentina to withdraw from the islands, as demanded by resolution 502 (1982).

The meeting rose at 6.55 p.m.

NOTE

¹ A/10217 and Corr.1, annex, para. 87.

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