

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FOURTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 September 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. Garcia Robles

(Mexico)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY
Miss S. BOYD

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUIEROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV
Mr. SOTIROV
Mr. DEYANOV
Mr. PRAHOV

Burma: U MAUNG HIAUNG GYI
U TIB KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. Yu MENCJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. L. STAVINCHA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. W. BASSIN

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDLER
Mr. G. THEDELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KONIVES
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. HARYOMATRAM
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. DAMANIK
Mr. HEDAYAT

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRIYA

Italy:

Mr. H. ALESSI
Mr. G. OLIVA
Mr. L. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. T. TAKAKASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSILANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. P. CANNOCK

Poland: Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS
Mr. B. SUJKA

Romania: Mr. T. MELIESCANU
Mr. T. PANAIT
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mrs. G. JONANG
Miss H. OLSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN
Mr. A.T. LUGATCHOV
Mr. V.L. GAI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. H.D. BUSBY
Mr. H. WINSTON
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Austria:

Mr. H. BOHM
Mr. W. LANG

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I declare open the 184th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee today begins consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements about any other question related to the work of the Committee.

Since this is the Committee's first meeting this month, I should like to say a few preliminary words in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee for September.

Barely four months ago the Committee on Disarmament drafted and transmitted to the General Assembly a special report for the purposes of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which included, in addition to a summary of the principal background elements, the usual information on the work of the Committee carried out during the first part of its 1982 session.

This will obviously be of great help to us in the task we now have to accomplish, since the new material we have to prepare will cover no more than about six weeks. This will allow us, I hope, to give adequate treatment to the important and complex questions we must cover in the report; including agenda items 1 (nuclear test ban), 2 (cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament), 4 (chemical weapons), 5 (new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons) and 7 (prevention of an arms race in outer space), as well as the subjects of ways and means of increasing the effectiveness of the Committee and a possible enlargement of its membership. We shall also have to mention, if only very concisely, what was agreed on with respect to the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, security assurances and radiological weapons.

To help it in its task, the Committee will have the results of the very valuable preparatory work done under the guidance of Ambassador Gatere Maina, its Chairman during the month of August which has just ended. I am sure I am correctly interpreting the feelings of all members of this negotiating body in expressing to Ambassador Maina our great appreciation and gratitude for the very efficient way in which he carried out his important task. I should like in addition to express my personal gratitude for his very kind words about me at the last meeting over which he presided, on Tuesday.

Lastly, it is a pleasure to state that the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Berasategui, and all their efficient colleagues in the secretariat, both visible and invisible, have once again made the valuable contribution to our work to which we are accustomed.

Even though, for the reasons I have given, the work we have to do in the next two weeks may seem less onerous than has been the case in previous years, we must not forget that next week will contain an extra two days' holidays when we shall not be able to work, which means that, taking 16 September as the closing date for our 1982 session, we have only nine working days left, including today.

I trust that members of the Committee will be aware of the responsibility which this situation places on all of us and will be ready, as they have always done in the past, to give their valuable and determined co-operation towards the successful conclusion of our efforts.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mongolia, Hungary, Cuba, Japan, the United States of America and Austria.

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since I am the first person to take the floor in the Committee in September, I have the honour of initiating the round of congratulations that will undoubtedly be expressed to welcome you as the new Chairman of this Committee. I need hardly tell you how happy Ambassador de la Gorce would have been, had he been present, to offer you himself a warm and friendly greeting. I should like, for my part, to assure you that my delegation is looking forward to working this month under the chairmanship of the representative of a friendly country, a distinguished Ambassador whom we all consider our doyen because of his experience, whom we also consider the living memory of the Committee on Disarmament, always ready to quote texts from every possible date in the Committee's history and even, sometimes, what I would call its prehistory, when disarmament matters were dealt with by other bodies. I would also like to ask my distinguished colleague, Mr. Nanjira, kindly to convey to Ambassador Maina my delegation's thanks for the way in which he performed his difficult task as Chairman during the first month of our summer session.

My statement today will be on the subject of the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

In an earlier statement, on 20 April last, the French delegation stressed how important it felt it to be that the Committee should proceed, in accordance with resolution 36/97 C, to a thorough examination of the problems involved in the prevention of the deployment in outer space of weapons which might, in the not too distant future, have profoundly destabilizing effects.

At that time, like other delegations, we emphasized that what was needed first was agreement, in relation to outer space, on the meaning of certain terms, such as the word "weapons", which are often used ambiguously, as well as an exchange of views to determine priorities for our discussions.

The very interesting statements we heard at the plenary meeting devoted to this item on our agenda revealed not only, as might have been expected, that positions on this subject differ greatly, but also that this is an important problem which should be considered more thoroughly at the Committee's next session. France, as it indicated on 20 April last, is in favour of the establishment of a working group provided it has a structured agenda which will enable it to consider the various aspects of the problem methodically. France would also be in favour of a meeting of experts at the beginning of our next session, in the same way as was done so successfully in the case of chemical weapons.

Of the important aspects of the matter that were brought up during the discussion, I would like to draw particular attention to the following four points:

Recognition of our Committee's special responsibility in the attempt to achieve a multilateral consensus on the problems of the extension of the arms race to outer space;

The inadequacy of existing legal instruments, in view of current and foreseeable developments in technology;

The uncertainty surrounding the idea of the immunity of space objects; and

The constraints resulting from the long-standing and now irreversible use of outer space for both civilian and military purposes.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

Recognition of the role of the Committee on Disarmament

In addition to the two competing resolutions, 36/99 and 36/97 C -- France was one of the sponsors of the latter -- which were adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, we now have, as several speakers have noted, the consensus reached at the United Nations Conference, UNISPACE '82. It is to be hoped that this will have put an end to a potentially harmful situation which would have led to a regrettable duplication of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and that of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

We hope that we can interpret the settlement of this conflict of competence as recognition of the complexity of the space element and its growing importance in the consideration of matters relating to the balance of forces and international security. This recognition should lead to acceptance of its corollary, namely, the fact that questions concerning the arms race in outer space now no longer concern the two major space Powers only, even if those Powers clearly have a particular and direct responsibility in this regard because of their existing or potential military capabilities.

It is true that the importance attaching to the work of our Committee is also connected with the inadequacy of the existing legal instruments in view of the foreseeable developments in technology.

Contrary to a widely held opinion, technological developments in the next 10 or 20 years are fairly easy to foresee: space programmes respond as much to the internal logic determined by the extent of the technical and financial investments put into them as to political promptings.

For more than a quarter of a century, outer space has been seen essentially in terms of support for military means of observation and communication. The parallel with the early days of aviation is, moreover, quite remarkable in this respect.

Even if new laser-weapon or directed-energy systems are at present still far from being technologically feasible or economically viable, it seems likely that the idea of the orbital platform, either manned or automatic, capable of use for both civilian and military purposes, will become a reality. Both the orbital rendezvous techniques practised by the Soviet Union for some years and the capacities of the United States space shuttle point in this direction.

In other words, the essential problem up to now has been (and it still is) that of the immunity of the space segment of land-based weapons systems from possible pre-emptive enemy attacks. Although it is true that the space segment is specifically designed for a particular purpose (for example, data transmission, analysis of the environment in which land-based troop movements are taking place, the detection of positions), it is functionally indissociable from a land-based network of communications and control systems. Furthermore, it has no purpose except as part of a complex military organization.

The moment outer space can itself become the scene of specific military activities, whether these are directed against other space objects (such as enemy satellites) or against land-based activities (the trajectories of ballistic weapons, for example), the problem of the arms race in outer space takes on an entirely new dimension.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

In view of these possibilities, therefore, one of the most important aspects of our discussions ought to be to consider which of the three roles that it is possible to assign to outer space is to be chosen:

(1) That of a demilitarized "sanctuary", after the manner of Antarctica, the sea-bed and the moon;

(2) That of a "support area" for civilian and military land-based activities, to be used in accordance with its specific characteristics and advantages;

(3) That of a specific new "battlefield" in which space-based systems would attempt to destroy or cripple one another, in all likelihood as a prelude to -- the most optimistic among us say as a substitute for -- confrontation on earth.

The first idea -- that of making outer space a sanctuary or totally demilitarizing it -- is obviously no longer possible. It is therefore unrealistic to try to revert to it.

The second idea -- outer space as a support area for a mixture of civilian and military activities -- is the one which prevails today and ought, therefore, in our view, to be considered as a basic element in our work.

The third idea -- outer space as a staging ground for specific confrontations -- is one technological possibility. It remains to be seen whether it is desirable.

It may be argued that, all in all, it is preferable to transfer to outer space a rivalry that may cause untold damage to the surface of the earth; that it would be possible, there, to reduce dependence vis-à-vis nuclear ballistic missiles; and that competition between defensive weapons systems (ABMs based on orbital platforms) in outer space would, all in all, be preferable to the present situation in which the balance between offensive weapons must constantly be re-established as one side or the other becomes more or less vulnerable.

Although theoretically attractive, these arguments take no account of the facts. First, even if such space technologies become operational, it is unlikely that they would be reliable enough to justify less dependence on land-based systems: ABMs stationed in outer space would in all likelihood constitute only a first line of defence.

Secondly, it is doubtful whether, in such a situation of competition for the military domination of outer space, one of the Superpowers would tolerate the superiority of the other for any length of time. In that context, therefore, the very vulnerability of systems stationed in outer space would be a great inducement to the launching of preventive attacks.

It is thus not enough to say that weapons systems in outer space would not threaten the earth and that in any event the prospects for such systems are too distant and problematical to justify their consideration at the present time. The international community should adopt a consistent approach to the question of the arms race in outer space.

In the French delegation's view, this means that the international community should set itself the following two objectives:

Not to allow outer space to become the point of departure for acts of aggression; and

To protect space vehicles and, in particular, ensure the immunity of satellites.

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

The first objective, which, as we have seen, relates to technologies of the future, can be achieved only if the second, which involves tons of equipment now in orbit over our heads, is attained.

Hence the importance which we, like many other delegations, attach to assuring the immunity of satellites.

In this connection, it must be noted that the existing legal instruments are entirely inadequate and fail to meet the needs of the present situation.

A number of these legal instruments have been referred to during our discussions, for example:

The 1963 Treaty on the partial suspension of nuclear weapon tests, in the atmosphere and, as it states, "beyond its limits, including outer space";

The 1972 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, article V, paragraph 1, of which refers to the deployment of space-based ABMs and article XII, paragraph 2, of which refers to the principle of non-interference with national means of verification;

The SALT I agreement, which also provides for non-interference with "national means of verification", including satellites, according to the formal declaration made by President Carter on 1 October 1978 -- a declaration for which there is no Soviet counterpart;

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Use of Outer Space.

Other agreements and international conventions relating to outer space, such as the Agreement on the Return and Rescue of Astronauts, the Convention on Damage Caused by Space Objects, the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and the Convention on Registration of Space Objects are, for our purposes, only of minor interest.

It may be noted that:

First, the 1967 outer space Treaty offers only a partial solution to the problems of the arms race in outer space. Article IV, paragraph 1, of the Treaty in fact restricts, as military activities in outer space, only the placing in orbit of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction.

The Treaty thus authorizes other military uses of outer space. This is clear, moreover, both from the statements made at the time by the Soviet representative and from the positions adopted by the United States.

We can go even further: from our point of view, the Treaty is of symbolic value only because the use of nuclear weapons in orbit is of doubtful military effectiveness, for the reason given on Tuesday by Mr. Arthur Clarke, speaking on behalf of the delegation of Sri Lanka, when he said that, in trying by that means to cripple or destroy its enemy's satellites, a country might well destroy its own.

Secondly, uncertainty about the immunity of satellites extends, according to some interpretations, even to those satellites whose positive role in the verification of international agreements is nevertheless provided for as "national means of verification".

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

Articles I and III of the 1967 outer space Treaty do, of course, state that outer space shall be used in accordance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Article III also refers to the maintenance of international peace and security.

The question of the immunity of military observation satellites, including their use in application of Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter, is therefore closely bound up with recognition of the international lawfulness of the role they play.

The above-mentioned declaration by President Carter in 1978 establishes a link between military observation satellites and national means of verification, whose lawful use is recognized in the international instruments in force.

With regard to the Soviet Union, the situation is formally less clear, and it is essential for us to know the position of the Soviet delegation on the following three points:

Does the international protection of "national technical means of verification" specifically include satellites? It would seem obvious that it should, but it would be useful if it were clearly recognized.

Is such immunity subject to restrictive interpretations concerning the extent of acceptable verifications, or is any observation capability automatically considered lawful? and lastly,

Does the non-interference clause embodied in Soviet-American bilateral agreements apply to third countries and international organizations?

An answer to these questions might not be necessary if the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union on 11 August 1981 did not appear precisely to leave the door open for all possibilities. As the French and Italian delegations noted in earlier statements, the juxtaposition of article 1 of the draft text, which prohibits the stationing of weapons in outer space, although the term "weapons" is not -- and in our view cannot -- be defined, and article 3 thereof, which, on the other hand, legitimizes the destruction of satellites that might appear to any of the signatories to be designed for a purpose contrary to article 1, is extremely disturbing.

Article 3 not only in effect authorizes States to take the law into their own hands in outer space on the basis of their suspicions, thus creating mistrust and insecurity for all, but also legitimizes the deployment of such anti-satellite systems. In order to be used against possible violators, such systems would, of course, have to be tested, deployed and ready for use.

The wording of article 2 also gives rise to all kinds of questions: when, in the unilateral and subjective judgement of one of the parties, a satellite or space platform is considered as not being used "in strict accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and mutual understanding", is it to be concluded that it is legitimate to interfere with its functioning?

This question is a valid one in view of another proposal submitted by the Soviet Union on 10 August 1972 in connection with television satellites. The proposal provided that a State was entitled to use "the means available to it, not only in its territory, but also in outer space or situated outside its national jurisdiction" against programmes which it considered "unlawful".

Articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Soviet draft treaty which, as indicated above, presuppose the possession of anti-satellite systems for use by what might be called

(Mr. de Beausse, France)

self-appointed space sheriffs, thus limit the self-defence capability of space objects since "target" satellites are prohibited from disturbing the functioning or changing the flight trajectory of "hunter" satellites.

The difficulties we at once encounter as soon as we try to make an artificial distinction between satellites for military purposes and satellites for civilian purposes or to use terms as ambiguous as that of "weapons", should persuade us to contemplate a variety of measures rather than a global treaty. Such measures might include:

The use of language corresponding to the facts. Everyone knows that national means of verification include satellites. Why not say so?

The immunity of satellites. As a result of bilateral agreements, satellites benefit from some measure of protection. Why should such immunity not be specified, increased and extended beyond bilateral arrangements relating to non-interference with "national means of verification" to all existing satellites, if they are equipped only with passive means of defence?

The consideration of weapons systems as a whole and not of their space segments only. Why not recognize the fact that, as regards a weapons system of which only part is in orbit, it is the system as a whole that must be restricted, as in fact was done in the bilateral ABM Treaty. It should be recognized that the central problem is still that of the arms race, and its increasing use of outer space, and not that of the "militarization of outer space".

The adoption of measures designed to build confidence in the immunity of systems whose stabilizing value arises principally from their availability in times of crisis, for example, notification of the characteristics of space objects and the adoption of "co-operative" measures in order to remove any suspicions that might be aroused by certain actions on the part of a space object belonging to another State.

Recognition of the merit of a human presence in outer space because of the capacity for initiative and judgement that is thus introduced into the conduct of space missions. In this connection, the a priori suspicion implicit in the specific reference, in article 1, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft treaty, to reusable manned space vehicles, i.e. to the United States space shuttle, is unacceptable.

The giving of higher priority to the consideration of ways of promoting international co-operation with a view to using earth observation systems for the verification of arms limitation agreements and for crisis control. Mr. Arthur Clarke rightly recalled, at our last meeting, the proposal for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, originally made by France, which has been supported by a large part of the international community and forms the subject of a very useful report by the Secretary-General.

This is not the place to repeat the reasons why we think that the development of technology inevitably raises the question of the internationalization of space observation and, consequently, that of the benefits which the international community may derive from it, especially in the matter of disarmament. It is, however, clear that the gradual establishment of such co-operation would, in many ways, be the best response the international community could offer to the real concern of peoples at the prospect of the extension of the arms race to outer space.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, Ambassador Issraelyan, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, first of all allow me, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to welcome you to that office, eminent Mexican diplomat and statesman as you are, and known throughout the world as a champion of the cessation of the arms race and one who has done much for the attainment of that goal. I wish you success in your tasks and promise you the co-operation of the Soviet delegation. We should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Maina of Kenya who successfully guided the work of the Committee during August.

The Soviet delegation would like today to express its views on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and also to touch on questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Soviet Union attaches exceptionally great importance to the prevention of an arms race in outer space in view of the general interest in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. As Mr. Brezhnev, the head of the Soviet State, said in his message to the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

"Co-operation in outer space should unite people and develop an awareness of the fact that we all live on the same planet and that peace and prosperity on earth depend on all of us.

"The Soviet Union consistently declares that outer space should remain an arena of peaceful co-operation, that the infinite expanses of outer space should remain free from weapons of any type. The attainment of this great humanitarian objective by joint efforts is not only feasible but is also a vital need for the sake of the future of all mankind."

At the request of the Soviet delegation, Mr. Brezhnev's message has been distributed as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

As you know, during the 1960s and 1970s, through the efforts of our country and of other States, international treaties and agreements were drafted and concluded which closed off a number of possibilities for the appearance of weapons in outer space and these have already been recalled by delegations in their statements. However, the restrictions thus existing are not complete, for an effective international legal barrier has not yet been created for the prevention of the stationing in outer space of those types of weapons which do not fall within the definition of weapons of mass destruction. There thus remains a danger -- a danger which has recently increased -- of the militarization of outer space.

The Soviet Union believes that we should not allow this to happen. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of the other States of the world are evincing an equally serious concern on this score. This is shown in particular by the decision adopted at the recently concluded United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which urged the competent bodies of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament to give due attention and attach the highest importance to the serious concern of the international community at the extension of the arms race to outer space.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

I would recall that at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union introduced a proposal aimed at preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. The proposal concerned the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The submission of the text of a draft treaty occasioned a broad discussion both in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament. The adoption by the General Assembly of two resolutions aimed ultimately at the prevention of an arms race in outer space also contributed to this end.

The main question which has arisen in the course of discussion -- and this has again been shown today by the statement of the French delegation -- is that of the determination of the basic content of possible negotiations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament on the subject of item 7 of its agenda. Both at the Committee's spring session and during the current session, including the Committee's last meeting, on 31 August, many delegations again affirmed that the only urgent aspect of this matter is the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

Allow me, gentlemen, to consider this point in greater detail.

There is no doubt that the question of anti-satellite systems is part of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. This is obvious and no one denies it. However, to confine the prohibition to anti-satellite systems means not only not looking ahead to tomorrow but also not seeing those dangerous trends which are before our eyes even today. What constitutes a threat to international peace and security is not only -- indeed, not so much weapons for attacking space objects as weapons for carrying out attacks on earth from space. Since the latter are capable of keeping the entire planet under their aim, they are infinitely more dangerous. I should like to draw attention to the fact that in his statement today the representative of France said that we should not allow space to become the departure point for acts of aggression. We agree with that. Consequently, to begin solving the problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space with the prohibition of anti-satellite systems would be equivalent to trying to achieve similar aims, let us say in the sphere of military aircraft, by prohibiting anti-aircraft defence facilities.

There is also the fact that one and the same means of conducting activities in space can be used for carrying either useful or dangerous payloads. For example, a satellite may in one instance be collecting meteorological data and in another it may be equipped with homing missiles, representing a threat both to space and to earth. Other delegations in their speeches have referred to the versatility of satellites, including speakers at the Committee's last meeting, on 31 August. The make-up of the means used for conducting space activities is a matter of general knowledge. It includes land-based equipment, launching devices, controls, and so on.

Thus if we are thinking of prohibiting anti-satellite systems, then we at once have to answer the question: what are we going to prohibit? If that is to include everything that helps put into space devices for the destruction or damaging of space objects, then practically all space activity might find itself threatened

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

with prohibition. This makes no sense, and in any case is hardly practicable. We therefore consider that the subject of the negotiations should be what really constitutes a threat when it is placed in space, namely, any kind of weapon.

In practice this could include space-object interceptors, based on the most diverse principles, for attacks on individual artificial earth satellites or for eliminating the space systems of an opponent, anti-missile weapons for attacks on intercontinental ballistic missiles and weapons for the destruction of air, sea or land targets from outer spaces.

What I have said applies also to reusable space vehicles. They can, of course, be used for peaceful purposes, but at the same time they can be used to carry a variety of weapons. It is for this reason that they are mentioned in paragraph 1 of article 1 of the Soviet draft treaty.

As regards laser weapons, some delegations have doubted the possibility of their appearance in space at least in the foreseeable future, regarding the whole of this problem as being rather in the realm of fantasy. But such views are in flagrant contradiction with the facts. From the statement, for example, of Mr. J. Millburn, the United States Assistant Deputy Secretary of Defense for research and development of advanced technology, it appears in particular that given the provision of the requisite financial means, the construction in the United States of military facilities for space laser weapons is possible even during the present decade. What fantasy is there in that, gentlemen?

We entirely agree with the argument put forward by the representative of Sri Lanka in his statement on 31 August, and indeed by many other speakers, that it is easier to prevent the appearance of new types of weapons than to eliminate those that already exist.

We therefore consider that the best way of dealing with this problem is to prohibit the placing and stationing in space of dangerous loads consisting of either specially designed or adapted devices and means for acting on objects in order to destroy or damage them, wherever these target objects may be, in outer space, in the air space or on earth.

We have been asked, both at the spring session and at this session, how we would define the expression "weapons of any kind". Obviously, the search for a generally acceptable formulation should proceed roughly along the lines indicated above.

As regards the scope of the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, our draft treaty prohibits this for any purpose, including testing, development and use. These questions were, as you know, raised at the Committee's spring session by a number of delegations, including those of Italy, the Netherlands and India.

The Soviet delegation would like once more to draw attention to the fact that the Soviet draft, as it is easy to see, does not ignore the problem of anti-satellite systems. Both the Soviet draft treaty and the draft mandate for a working group submitted by the Mongolian delegation at the spring part of our session allow for the possibility of the consideration of the question of anti-satellite systems in the

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context of other measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and also take into account other comments made during this session, in particular by the delegations of India, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.,

The Soviet delegation acknowledges the technical complexity of space problems, to which the representative of the United States referred in his statement at our plenary meeting of 10 August. In our view, however, this fact does not argue in favour of putting off the discussion of the question for ever but rather in favour of supporting the Mongolian delegation's proposal for the setting up of a working group on this subject before the end of the Committee's present session.

It must be said that statements made at the Committee's plenary meeting on 31 August, as also today's statement by the representative of France, show that material for negotiations exists.

We appeal to the United States delegation to reconsider its approach and we firmly urge the establishment of an ad hoc working group which would permit the Committee to begin serious negotiations on this exceptionally important problem with the participation of experts.

In conclusion, we should like to stress that one of the most important tasks of the Committee is to do everything in its power to help prevent the possibility of space becoming a source of military danger for States, which will inevitably happen if weapons of any kind are installed in outer space. We, for our part, are ready to engage in honest, equal and business-like negotiations with the aim of achieving constructive agreements on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In connection with the questions put by many delegations, and in particular those contained in document CD/508, concerning certain elements in the Soviet basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, the delegation of the USSR would like to offer certain comments on a number of these questions which appear to us to present a broad interest.

As regards other questions that have been put, we intend to answer them in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

First of all, I should like to make a comment of a general nature. As you know, the Soviet Union submitted for consideration by the international community a draft text on basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons -- which means what it says, basic provisions and not a precise text of the entire convention. This, of course, was done deliberately. For it seems to us that in order to draft such an important and complex international convention we must first of all agree on its basic provisions, the "skeleton" of the convention, as it were, to which we can then add with less expenditure of effort the "muscles" of appendices, lists, quotas, protocols, etc.

Let us now look at the questions.

We were asked why we had included a special provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

Well, of course, it was not by chance that we included in the draft basic provisions a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States and on the removal of such weapons from those territories and their

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

subsequent destruction. There were very good reasons for this. The inclusion of this provision is based on reality, namely, the practice of certain States, which have stationed stocks of chemical weapons outside the boundaries of their national territory. For example, according to numerous press reports, there has been a good deal of political tension recently about the location of stores of American chemical weapons on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. This fact is clear evidence of the merit of including in the draft convention a provision on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States.

An obligation in this sense ought, in our view, to enter into force simultaneously with ratification of the convention and continue for the entire period of its validity. Naturally, the withdrawal of chemical weapons from the territories of other States will demand a certain amount of time, depending on the quantity of the stocks so stationed. We would propose reaching agreement on such periods of time. How is the fulfilment of this obligation to be verified? Such verification can be carried out through national technical means, and also upon request.

There is another and not unimportant aspect: our proposal aims at preventing the deployment of binary weapons in parts, for example, by the members of military blocs as part of a "division of labour", so to speak, between them. For example, stocks of one component of a binary weapon could be stationed on the territory of one State and stocks of the second component on that of another. Such a possibility must, of course, be reckoned with, and that is what we are trying to do.

Another of the questions put to us concerns substances produced for permitted purposes which, it is proposed, should be included in a list of chemicals presenting a particular danger from the point of view of their possible diversion to use for purposes of chemical weapons. Preparing and agreeing on such a list will, frankly, be very difficult in particular because this question directly affects both the chemical industry and the use of chemicals for military purposes not connected with chemical weapons. An illustrative list of certain substances -- as has been suggested -- will not solve this problem. I should like to take this opportunity to appeal to delegations to take an active part, at the appropriate stage, in efforts to find a concrete answer to this undoubtedly important question, with the help of their technical experts.

Considerable interest was expressed in the section of the draft basic provisions devoted to verification.

On the question of verification of the destruction of stocks, in particular, we assume that in addition to national verification, inspections, etc., a number of international procedures will be implied also. One of these might be when an additional exchange of information is necessary between interested States concerning the factual state of affairs. Another procedure might be the conduct of on-site inspections upon request if an exchange of information has not provided a satisfactory solution. Another, and independent -- and I would repeat, independent -- measure envisaged is that of systematic international verification of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialised facilities -- for example, on the basis of an agreed quota.

Questions were put to us about certain particular aspects of this form of inspection. But it would surely be better for the participants in the negotiations to reach an agreement in principle that during the period of the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons or their diversion to permitted purposes there should be provision for the possibility of the conduct of systematic international on-site inspections

(Mr. Isaevyan, USSR)

of the destruction of stocks at converted or specialized facilities. If such a provision for inclusion in the convention were agreed on in principle, which unfortunately is not the case at present, that would constitute a great step forward and we could then consider methods of implementing this agreement -- and I repeat, agreement. Such an agreement does not yet exist.

The same applies to verification that the permitted production of super-toxic lethal chemicals at specialized facilities **does** not exceed the upper limit of one tonne. We propose that such a facility should operate under national verification with a very strict registration of amount of initial products consumed and chemicals produced, that its location should be restricted and that provision should be made for the carrying out of international on-site inspections (for example, on the basis of an agreed quota) to verify the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes at such a facility. But it may be asked, have we reached agreement in principle on this question too. I think not, although there would not seem to be any obvious insuperable obstacles to our doing this.

We are also in agreement with those delegations which, judging by their questions, are concerned about how verification can be conducted with respect to the possible production of the precursors of super-toxic substances and of binary weapons, at commercial enterprises. As for arguments that binary weapons and their production can be dealt with in the same way as other types of chemical weapons, we do not find them very convincing. Such arguments do not eliminate the problem of verifying that precursors for binary weapons are not being produced, in particular at commercial enterprises.

I should also like to stress one other point. Whatever types of activity we may consider and whatever obligations under the Convention may be involved in practice, according to the Soviet draft basic provisions international verification in the form of on-site inspection upon request would in general be applicable. We were asked about the procedure for carrying out this form of verification. In this connection I should like to point out that such a procedure has been worked out in detail in the course of negotiations on other international agreements and treaties and the experience gained in the course of those negotiations, in particular the Soviet-Anglo-American negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, could obviously be applied also to the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

I should like to take the opportunity to make a few brief comments on the course of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the Committee. There is no doubt that the Ad Hoc Working Group under the experienced guidance of Ambassador Sujka has done a great deal of useful work: mutual understanding has widened on many important aspects of the convention, differences of views have in many instances been reduced or minimized, and possible agreed formulations are even beginning to emerge. At the same time, however, in the Soviet delegation's view, there have appeared certain undesirable tendencies diverting us from the speediest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. These tendencies are evident in the fact that, instead of consolidating the basic provisions of the future convention, on which consensus is in sight, some delegations have been trying to divert the discussion to secondary and at times purely technical matters. And the number of these matters is constantly growing.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Some seem to regard the Committee as a place providing courses for the improvement of skills, and force the Committee to investigate technological methods which they have not tried out themselves, not to speak of the fact that other delegations have serious doubts about these methods.

Of course no one denies the possibility of using technical progress and the achievements of science for ensuring the effective fulfilment of international agreements, but we must not put the cart before the horse and substitute academic discussions of various kinds for political readiness. If we follow this course, with our frankly rather slow tempo of negotiations, we shall never catch up with technical progress. The existing technical procedures will be replaced by new ones; those new ones will be replaced by even newer ones, and so on. We are opposed to the conversion of the Committee into a scientific and technical society. We believe that agreement on key aspects of a chemical weapons convention such as the scope of the prohibition, declarations, confidence-building measures, verification and other aspects of the future convention should be consolidated and not made artificially dependent on the solution of particular issues.

Not long ago, during one of her visits abroad, the Prime Minister of India recalled an old Indian tradition, namely, to find something about which agreement can be reached, even if it is only something very small; that is a starting point, and you must then try to enlarge the area of agreement. That is an old and wise Indian tradition.

Those are the comments the Soviet delegation wished to make about the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Erdembileg, the representative of Mongolia, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, warmly to welcome you to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of September. We know you well as one of the outstanding diplomats of Mexico and a great specialist with a wealth of experience and knowledge in the sphere of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. This gives us every confidence that the Committee will successfully complete the work of its 1982 session. Allow me sincerely to wish you every success in your responsible task and to assure you that the Mongolian delegation will co-operate closely with you in dealing with the matters that are on the Committee's agenda for this session.

The Mongolian delegation would also like to express its gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for his contribution to the work of the Committee during the month of August.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

tjh The Mongolian delegation would like to speak today about item 7 of the agenda, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

A number of statements have been made on this question since the Committee first added this new item to its agenda at its spring session this year. My delegation has been following the course of the discussion with the greatest interest. It has also expressed its views on the subject both here in the Committee and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that the Committee has on the whole reacted positively to the two resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly at its last session.

At the last session, the delegation of Mongolia introduced resolution 36/99 in the First Committee on behalf of its sponsors.

Both during the spring part and during the present part of this session the Mongolian delegation, like many other delegations, has repeatedly advocated the orderly and structured consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this subject to begin concrete negotiations for the adoption of effective measures towards the elaboration of an international treaty in this connection.

As I have already reminded the Committee more than once, the Mongolian delegation formally submitted the working paper in document CD/272 which proposes a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group on this question.

As you know, an exchange of views on this question was held in formal meetings. The Committee has been discussing item 7 of its agenda this week at its plenary meetings. During the discussions both at informal and at plenary meetings it has unfortunately become clear that certain delegations intend to maintain the absence of consensus on the question of the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this matter. I will say frankly that we do not quite understand this obstructionism.

We believe that the time has come for concrete negotiations on this important and urgent question in an ad hoc working group. We know perfectly well that a very small number of States are playing the principal part in the exploration and use of outer space. Nevertheless, in view of the extremely dangerous consequences of an arms race in outer space for the peace and security of all, the Committee is obliged to take a vital interest in the consideration of this question and the urgent drafting of an international legal instrument on the subject. The overwhelming majority of the world's States demand this.

This was confirmed in particular at the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which recently ended in Vienna. The Conference urged the competent bodies of the United Nations and in particular the General Assembly and also the Committee on Disarmament, in considering measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, to give appropriate attention and high priority to the serious concern of the international community at the extension of the arms race to outer space.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

We are all fairly familiar with the fact that outer space is not always and everywhere a peaceful sphere and frequently shows signs of becoming a new arena for the arms race. This is illustrated by the alarming reports in the world's press which have become more frequent of late. I am referring in particular to the numerous projects for the production of a whole range of space weapons designed for the launching of attacks on objects in space, in the atmosphere and on the earth's surface.

There are particularly far-reaching plans in connection with the possible military uses of the reusable space vehicles being constructed in the United States under the "shuttle" programme. According to press reports the Pentagon specialists are considering plans for the establishment of military bases in space with the help of these vehicles, the location in space of mines for attacks on the artificial earth satellites of an opponent and the creation of large-scale systems of space-based anti-missile defence. The possibilities are being examined of the use of space shuttles as vehicles for various types of weapons. Other very important plans for the militarization of outer space are connected with their use. Major-General J. Welch, deputy head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff for research and development said recently: "Our activities continue to expand at a substantial rate and the shuttle with its potential for the delivery of heavier and more sophisticated payloads plays the part of catalyst in this."

The distinguishing feature of the new plans is the fact that the space shuttle is to play the role of the basic element in them without which the systems to be established cannot function. These systems include, for example, large platforms with laser weapons and also small-sized air and space vehicles for the carrying out of short-term operations in outer space and in the atmosphere.

One of the largest programmes to which the Pentagon is at present attaching primary importance is the programme for the development of laser weapons. Their purpose is to be the destruction of any objects, on earth, at sea, in the air and in outer space. Work on the construction of the basic element of this weapon is being carried out within the framework of the so-called triad of space-based laser weapons which, in the view of the periodical Foreign Policy, may soon bring a combat system for space into being. It is planned to test the elements of the triad in space in 1984-1985.

The American press has also published reports about the construction in the United States of anti-satellite systems based on small-sized interceptors. It is to reach its target with the help of a small missile launched from an F-15 fighter aircraft. According to the plans, flight tests of the mini-interceptor in space will begin during the first half of 1983 and it will be supplied to the armed forces in the mid-1980s.

But the United States is not merely developing space weapons; it is also creating the necessary conditions for their use. It is known that from 1 September of this year the area of space surrounding the earth will for the Pentagon become a new potential theatre of military operations. From then on,

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

a special space command will begin functioning in the United States armed forces. According to reports in the western press, the head of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff said with respect to the establishment of this command: "Research and development in the sphere of space weapons will soon make it possible for us to carry out military operations in space."

The implementation of such plans and programmes could undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences. It is therefore urgent and important to prevent an arms race in outer space in time.

Mongolia, like many other States, fully supported the Soviet Union's proposal for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The Mongolian delegation is one of those delegations which are in favour of a comprehensive solution, that is, as proposed in article 1, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty submitted by the USSR, which states that States parties undertake not to place in orbit around the earth objects carrying weapons of any kind, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner, including on reusable manned space vehicles of an existing type or of other types which States parties may develop in the future. In addition, we are not opposed to the treaty containing a provision concerning the prohibition of the use of anti-satellite systems.

The discussion in the Committee of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has also revealed a different approach, a pragmatic and gradual one, as its advocates have put it. According to this approach, the prohibition would be confined to anti-satellite systems, the wide variety of weapons and systems not coming within the category of anti-satellite systems thus being left outside the prohibition. Furthermore, it seems that the very expression, anti-satellite systems, is being used in a very ambiguous way, probably because the advocates of this approach have not put forward a clear definition of what they mean by anti-satellite systems.

The Mongolian delegation firmly believes that the main aim should be the solution of the problem as a whole, that is, the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space, and that the question of anti-satellite systems should be dealt with in the general context of measures aimed at the achievement of this goal.

In conclusion, the Mongolian delegation would like to suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, and through you to the members of the Committee, that after item 7 has been considered at plenary meetings, consultations should continue with a view to agreeing on a mandate before the end of this session and adopting a decision on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Hungary, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): I can say without any exaggeration, Mr. Chairman, that I feel happy to be among the first to greet you on the day when you assume the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. I wish you could feel and openly say in the near future: "Well, this is the kind of negotiating forum I have been battling for". In the meantime, we count on your vast experience and diplomatic skill which, I am convinced, will help us get the maximum out of the present situation.

May I also express my appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, for the contribution which he made to our work as Chairman for the month of July. At the same time, I wish to bid farewell to those colleagues who have left the Committee in the short two weeks since I took the floor last time -- Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria. On behalf of my delegation, I wish them well in their new assignments.

Finally, it is a pleasure to welcome in our midst the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock, and to offer him the friendship and co-operation of the Hungarian delegation.

Today I wish to set out my delegation's views on a few questions relating to agenda item 7 -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

This year the world is celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the launching of the first man-made object into outer space, the pioneer flight of the first Soviet Sputnik. That event 25 years ago opened for man the gate of the space age, the exploration and use of outer space.

The peaceful use of that new, endless area has already brought enormous benefits for mankind. Nobody can, and I believe nobody really wants to, deny or underrate the significance of the peaceful use of outer space in numerous fields such as meteorology, navigation, telecommunication, the remote sensing of natural resources, etc. Taking into account the rapid progress of science and technology, a rich flow of further results -- many of them perhaps not even thought of now -- may be expected in the near future, which can serve for the benefit of mankind as a whole. That actually was the general desire expressed vividly by the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held only recently in Vienna.

It is very unfortunate that the dawn of the space age was very soon clouded by the sombre possibilities of using outer space also for hostile purposes. When that threat was realized, initiatives were quickly taken in order to avoid such a development. The first important step in that direction was the adoption of the outer space Treaty, signed in 1967, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space, codifying at the same time the fundamental principles concerning man's activities in the cosmic environment. The peaceful activity of States and their co-operation to that end, were further regulated by the conclusion of a set of international instruments. My delegation is proud to note in this respect that Hungarian representatives in the various bodies of the United Nations outer space Committee have contributed to no small extent to the drafting of those instruments.

The growing danger of the outbreak of an arms race in outer space, and the urgent necessity to avoid it, is clearly reflected in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. In paragraph 80 it says the following:

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

"In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."

A step of outstanding significance was taken last year at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The Soviet Union -- taking into account various events showing that outer space may be getting involved more and more in hostile activities, thus becoming an arena for the arms race, and guided by the sincere desire to put an end to such a course of development -- submitted a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. The Hungarian delegation welcomed that new initiative, and we continue to consider it a very important and timely action in the proper direction. In our view, the draft treaty is a good basis for the elaboration of the international instrument which our Committee is required to do.

At its last session the General Assembly adopted two resolutions to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. Resolution 36/99 -- referring to the draft treaty which I have just mentioned -- requests the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations in order to achieve agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The other one, resolution 36/97 C, also requests the Committee to conduct negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, making special reference to the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

That development, and more concretely the two resolutions, have charged our Committee with a new responsibility and additional tasks. The Committee in turn has decided to include in its agenda for 1982, a new item, item 7, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". During the first part of the session informal meetings were held, and now the item is on our programme of work for the second part of the 1982 session.

The Hungarian delegation is firmly convinced that the Committee on Disarmament took a great step forward when it embarked on the consideration of this item. This development will have to lead soon to serious negotiations and the earliest possible elaboration of the text of a treaty banning the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space. If the Committee wants to achieve that purpose -- and the trend of the discussion has so far indicated the existence of a strong will to do so -- serious negotiations must be started without delay, with the requisite political will, in order not to lose the momentum.

My delegation feels that the consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space has been useful. It has contributed to a better knowledge of the problems involved, and outlined the different approaches as to how our Committee should deal with this important and very timely issue.

Last Tuesday we had the opportunity to listen to the fascinating statement by Professor Clarke of Sri Lanka. My delegation also followed with great attention the statements made by Ambassador Alessi of Italy and Mr. Skinner of Canada. While admitting the seriousness and the high level of their statements, I have to express some degree of disappointment on the part of my delegation because of the one-sidedness of those interventions. Our distinguished colleagues spoke only of one aspect of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, namely, the prevention or the prohibition of anti-satellite systems.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

My delegation does not want to deny or belittle the importance and the timeliness of the solution of this problem. Nevertheless, we consider that this is only one of the many aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, and I know it is shared by many others, there are or there may be other weapons which could be used in or from outer space. It is really regrettable that no aspects other than the prohibition of anti-satellite systems were mentioned by our distinguished Italian and Canadian colleagues. The Hungarian delegation, like many others, feels that all aspects of the prevention of an arms race in outer space should be considered and, hopefully, solved by our Committee.

Although my delegation -- like the great majority around this table -- holds the view that the prevention of an arms race in outer space is basically a matter of political decision, I venture to make a few brief comments on some of the views expressed by certain delegations.

First of all, we cannot share the optimistic evaluation that the idea of laser-gun and particle-beam weapons can be translated into an operational capability only in the hazy distant future. Reading the expert study issued by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in 1973, entitled Outer Space - Battlefield of the Future? one can find the following conclusion:

"As far as space-borne lasers are concerned, these are in the development stage. For such systems, chemical lasers are more useful because of their compact size Advances in infra-red laser radars show that with such devices, an object in space can be tracked When such a device becomes available, it can be used to disable solar cells and optical sensors on board a satellite. In high energy lasers and charged-particle beams we may well be seeing the beginning of the next revolution in weapon technology."

Let me recall that the book from which I have quoted was published in 1973, just like the so-called "Occasional Paper 25" by the Stanley Foundation, entitled "Can Space Remain a Peaceful Environment?" which states the following: the United States military has proposed incorporating new types of space systems into existing operational commands, and using satellites for real-time battle management and war fighting. Space technology could free military forces from dependence on foreign bases and from the need for communication and monitoring facilities in other countries.

The study of the Stanley Foundation, whose conclusions I mention in an abbreviated form -- for brevity's sake -- but without changing their message, then goes on stating the following: the United States Air Force envisage both manned and unmanned space stations that would be used for targeting, damage assessment, and retargeting of strategic weapons, weapons guidance, and real-time battlefield command, control and communication functions.

These are only a few examples to prove the point that the problem of anti-satellite systems -- important as they may be -- is but one of the many aspects of the issue. My delegation cannot help coming to the conclusion that the extra weight given by certain delegations to this single item may perhaps serve some special interests.

In conclusion, let me say frankly that at the beginning of the summer session the Hungarian delegation expected a speedy solution of the establishment of a working group on item 7 of our agenda. Unfortunately, the position taken by some western countries

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

has not made it possible. Nevertheless, we continue to hold the view that a working group with a properly worded mandate, like the one suggested by the delegation of Mongolia in document CD/272, would be the best framework for dealing with this question.

However, I do not want to over-emphasize the importance of the establishment of a working group on outer space. I have ample reason not to do so. I am fully aware of the fact that the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament, the ENDC and the CCD, were able to elaborate disarmament agreements without working groups, while this Committee which has now established quite a few groups, still considered to be the best framework for negotiations, has so far been unable to elaborate a single draft treaty or convention on disarmament. But that only underscores my point: what is really needed are devotion, readiness and political will. And if and when they are given, we can easily find the way to elaborate and conclude disarmament measures, with or without working groups.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Solá Vila, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. SOLÁ VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, we are very happy to see you occupying the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament this month. Mexico and Cuba are two friendly countries which have set an example of co-operation. As the President of the Cuban Council of State, Fidel Castro, declared: "With Mexico, Cuba has a tradition of history and friendship as with no other country in Latin America. Our struggles have been closely linked with the struggles and the history of Mexico."

You, Ambassador García Robles, have dedicated your efforts and your life to the cause of disarmament and peace. You have never faltered in your efforts. Your motto seems to have been based on the words of Benito Juárez, one of the great patriots of the Americas, who said: "He who does not hope to win has already lost". Despite the enormous obstacles in our way, we cannot give up the fight for general and complete disarmament.

I also wish to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Maina, for the masterly way in which he guided our work during the month of August, and to wish him success in his new functions.

Allow me also to join in the words of welcome extended to Ambassador Peter Cannock of Peru, with whom we hope to continue to co-operate closely, and to express my appreciation for the work done by two other colleagues who are leaving us, Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria and Ambassador Marko Vrhunec of Yugoslavia.

The adoption of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is an item which the Committee on Disarmament has been considering as a matter of priority since its summer session in 1979.

It should be recalled that the only assurances those States had at the time were the ones offered unilaterally by some nuclear-weapon States; and, as was pointed out by the Group of 21, some of those assurances not only contained unacceptable limitations, conditions and exceptions that reflected their subjective approach, but were also based entirely on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, which has helped to bring the world to the brink of war.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

When the Committee on Disarmament decided to establish a working group to consider this important item, it stated that the Working Group's objective would be to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Since then, much has happened during the Committee's consideration of this item and many developments have occurred with respect to the possible use of nuclear weapons such that today the threat to the non-nuclear-weapon States posed by the possible use of such weapons is greater than it was in 1979.

In this connection, it must be borne in mind that the use of nuclear weapons would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike, as has been recognized on more than one occasion, even in this negotiating body.

At one point in its work, the Working Group dealing with this item seemed to be about to reach agreement that would lead to the adoption of an international instrument which would give effect to the assurances in question. It had begun to consider the so-called "common approach" and everything was going well until the policy of nuclear deterrence, still based on the possible use of nuclear weapons, again ruled out the possibility of reaching any kind of agreement.

Talk then turned even more insistently to the possibility of the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution containing assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, but it has so far been impossible to agree on wording that would satisfy all parties equally, primarily for the following two reasons: on the one hand, there are nuclear-weapon States which are not prepared to renounce the use of such weapons; and on the other hand, it is obvious that if the declarations made are to lead to an effective resolution, they must be identical in their content for otherwise, the countries which are seeking to ensure respect for their right to survival would find it difficult to take them seriously.

In any event, the adoption of a resolution by the Security Council would be only an interim step towards the assurances which we are demanding and it would have to be recognized that the ultimate objective is a legally binding international instrument.

In view of the situation in the Committee on Disarmament, the group of non-aligned and neutral countries, namely, the Group of 21, urged the nuclear-weapon States to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The reply to that request is known to all. One nuclear-weapon State, the Soviet Union, declared that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons, thus strengthening security assurances. It also proposed the adoption of a programme of nuclear disarmament whose implementation would undoubtedly produce gratifying results and be of benefit in the matter of negative guarantees.

Other nuclear-weapon States nevertheless reaffirmed their positions with regard to nuclear deterrence and the use of nuclear weapons, thus pursuing their cold-war policies and hampering the progress of the Committee's work on the priority items on its agenda.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

We have noted with alarm that some members of this Committee have suggested that we should forget the references to nuclear deterrence and the possible use of nuclear weapons, but how can such a thing be suggested when it is precisely the root cause of the deadlock reached in the discussion of any item in this Committee, which implicitly involves, in one way or another, prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons?

Reference was made at a recent plenary meeting to the so-called Baruch Plan which, it was claimed, was to place nuclear energy under United Nations control. Nothing is further from the truth; this is, moreover, a dangerous assertion because it distorts the facts and could lead us into unwitting errors.

The reason why I am dwelling on this matter is precisely because it is the basis for the positions of those who are opposed to nuclear disarmament, who are blocking the adoption of effective assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, who are hampering the establishment of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war and who are making it impossible, for example, to start concrete negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

At the first meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, held on 14 June 1946, Mr. Bernard Baruch proposed the creation of an international atomic development authority, whose functions would include, inter alia:

"1. Managerial control or ownership of all atomic energy activities potentially dangerous to world security.

2. Power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities".

As you can imagine, Mr. Baruch's proposal, which has come to be called the Baruch Plan, was found unacceptable because of the risks it involved precisely for the security of the world that it was supposed to protect.

It escapes no one's notice that all the components of the international atomic development authority -- laboratories, information, materials -- absolutely everything was to be in the hands of the United States itself, the country which had submitted the proposal. Everything **was** to be in the hands precisely of those who had been responsible for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear disasters -- in the hands of those who, in an act of aggression that was to be the first of the cold war, had not hesitated to wipe off the face of the earth hundreds of thousands of peaceful Japanese citizens.

But what has not been said in some of the statements we have heard is what came after the Baruch Plan.

At the second meeting of the Atomic Energy Commission, held on 19 June 1946, only five days after the submission of the United States proposal, the representative of the Soviet Union, Andrei Gromyko, submitted a draft convention prohibiting the production and use of atomic weapons and providing that within three months from its entry into force all atomic weapons were to be destroyed.

This was a counter-proposal to the Baruch Plan and one that left no room for doubt.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

There is no need to say here which countries objected to that proposal, for it is the same ones, using the same arguments, which are today opposing the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

I should merely like to point out, if you will allow me, that now, as 30 years ago, what lies behind this policy of rejecting anything to do with nuclear disarmament and the non-use of nuclear weapons is the policy of nuclear deterrence and of the possible use of nuclear weapons, which has contributed to the failure of the negotiations in all the bodies dealing with disarmament matters in recent decades.

It may be recalled that, as early as 1942, seven years before the establishment of NATO and four years before the submission of the famous Baruch Plan, Sir Winston Churchill declared, in the famous secret memorandum whose contents were later disclosed by Macmillan at the Conference of Strasbourg:

"I must admit that my attention is focused primarily on Europe, on the rebirth of European glory, on the continent that gave birth to modern nations and to civilization. It would be an immeasurable disaster if Russian barbarism were to obliterate the culture and the independence of the ancient European States."

Similarly, the United States general, General Groves, who had been appointed as director of the "Manhattan Project", which was the code name for the atomic bomb project, said:

"I consider it important to state, and I think it is a well-known fact, that, not more than two weeks after being placed in charge of the project, I did not have the slightest doubt that Russia was the enemy and that the project was designed with that in mind".

Furthermore, the 1943 Quebec Agreement, which formally established the atomic military alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom, contained a comprehensive strategy for the use of atomic weapons that clearly reveal the origins of nuclear deterrence and the policy of the use of nuclear weapons.

It cannot be claimed that anyone taking part in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament is unaware of the dangers this policy presents, since it is precisely this policy that has provoked the arms race and created the greatest obstacles to negotiations on the priority items on the agenda of this negotiating body.

We now have before us what could be a new Baruch Plan, but it is a genuine and straightforward plan. I am thinking of the establishment of a working group to negotiate on item 2 of our agenda, the adoption of concrete measures to prevent nuclear war, the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons and the initiation of negotiations for the implementation of a programme of nuclear disarmament. Why are these measures being rejected? Why are objections being expressed? Why are attempts being made to prevent the Committee on Disarmament at all costs from carrying out the task entrusted to it? The reply to these questions is the same, and is to be found in the earlier events to which I have referred.

This situation has considerably increased the danger to which all of mankind, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, is exposed because it is the policy of deterrence and of the possible use of nuclear weapons that is preventing the adoption of effective security assurances.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

This policy is also the cause of and the reason for all the apparent contradictions we have encountered in this Committee in recent years:

When it was agreed to broaden the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, a decision was taken to manufacture new chemical weapons systems; when it was agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, very serious obstacles were placed in the way of the formulation of what should be an effective ban and discussion of the scope of the ban desired by the majority of the countries represented here, was blocked; when reference was made to the need for nuclear disarmament, obstacles were placed in the way of the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament.

The same contradictions are revealed by the public announcement of certain dangerous decisions. How is it possible, for example, that there are plans for the deployment of the new IK intercontinental ballistic missiles when negotiations are being held in this city on the limitation and reduction of strategic weapons? How can it be that although the Minuteman missiles were said to be vulnerable, plans are now being made to place IK missiles in the very silos that were said to be vulnerable?

These apparent contradictions, both within and outside the Committee, can be explained by the policy of nuclear deterrence, by doctrines which regard nuclear war as admissible and by the decisions that have been taken with regard to a first nuclear strike.

This Committee cannot be unaware of this danger and cannot ignore its implications for the disarmament negotiations.

In 1979, in view of the danger represented by nuclear weapons and because they had inadequate security guarantees, the non-nuclear-weapon States demanded effective measures amounting to genuine guarantees. Now, with the acceleration of the nuclear arms race since that date and the reaffirmation by some high officials of the importance and validity of the doctrines I have referred to in this statement, and which have existed since the 1940s, it is more necessary than ever to demand the adoption of a legally binding international instrument which will give non-nuclear-weapon States genuine guarantees against the use of nuclear weapons.

In this connection, allow me to quote a passage from the Final Document of the Sixth Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries:

"The Conference declared that the most effective assurance of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons".

It is for this reason, and because we consider that no doctrine on the use of nuclear weapons can be justified, since, among other things, it hampers this Committee's work, that we have discussed these matters at such length.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Solá Vila, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is Ambassador Okawa, the representative of Japan, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, it is more than a pleasure, indeed it is an honour for me, to be able to present to you our respects and congratulations on your assumption of the Chair of this Committee for the month of September and until the beginning of next year's session. May I also express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Moina, for the smooth and efficient way in which he and the members of the Kenyan delegation guided us during the month of August. While much regretting the departure of Ambassador Moina, I would wish to add my best wishes for his future career after he returns to Nairobi.

With your indulgence, I now wish to make a statement under item 5 of our agenda, namely, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". Under our work programme, this item is to be discussed next week, but since the radiological weapons Working Group is meeting this afternoon, I wish to address the subject before this afternoon's meeting.

Japan is a small country, slightly smaller than the State of California in the United States. On this small expanse of land, Japan has at the moment 24 nuclear reactors, six nuclear fuel processing facilities and one facility for the reprocessing of spent fuel. It will, thus, be easily understood that the guaranteeing of the safety and security of those nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes is a matter of great concern to our country. We are consequently of the view that the prohibition of attacks against such facilities by means of some sort of international agreement would be of considerable significance in this respect. We are sure that this view is shared by the many countries which have such nuclear facilities on their territories.

It was against this background that the Prime Minister of Japan stated at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on 9 June of this year:

"It is a matter of great concern for countries of the world to be relieved from anxieties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It is important, in particular, to ensure and guarantee the security of nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, and Japan hopes that international efforts toward this end will be successful. My country, for its part, wishes to contribute positively to these efforts."

It was against the same background that my Government appreciated the initiative taken by Sweden in the context of a possible radiological weapons treaty. Japan recognizes the importance of achieving such a treaty and also the importance of prohibiting attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, and my delegation has been carefully following the deliberations on these two questions in this Committee.

In this connection, may I take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation to the two successive chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Kórnives of Hungary who struggled so hard for two years to accommodate the various views and advance the work on a radiological weapons treaty, and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany for the zeal and skill with which he has been trying to find a compromise solution to the difficulties that have been encountered. In the letter he addressed to the members of this Committee at the beginning of this summer session, Ambassador Wegener suggested that we look for linkage mechanisms between a radiological weapons treaty on the traditional model and the separate regulation of the intimately related subject-matter concerning nuclear facilities.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Apart from our inherent interest in seeing some sort of international agreement worked out to prohibit attacks against nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes, it is also by way of responding to Ambassador Wegener's appeal, if I may use that word, that my delegation has been instructed to present a working paper in which we propose a draft protocol on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in the form of an optional protocol to the eventual treaty on radiological weapons.

The working paper can be found in document CD/323, which I believe my distinguished colleagues have before them. There is a slight typographical error in the document and I would like to take this opportunity to point that out. In paragraph 9 on page 3 of document CD/323 it says that "Japan has no intention to exclude the possibility of attacks against nuclear facilities" and that is of course completely wrong. This should read, "Japan has no intention to exclude the possibility of dealing with the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities in an independent and separate treaty." I would request the secretariat to be good enough to issue a corrigendum in that respect.

Let me now try to explain in a few words why we have chosen the form of an optional protocol. We have seen the difficulty that has arisen around the proposal to include a prohibition clause in the radiological weapons treaty itself. We recognize that the two matters are closely related, and that in fact they have the common purpose of keeping to the minimum the damage that could be caused by contamination as a result of the dissemination of radio-active material. However, the one would seek to prohibit a weapon, the other an act -- the act of attacking a nuclear facility.

We therefore sought to find a way of negotiating an international agreement on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities while maintaining the relationship between such an agreement and the radiological weapons treaty. We felt that the solution was to deal with the issue of prohibition of attacks in a separate instrument, and not in the radiological weapons treaty itself, while at the same time giving parties to the treaty the option to become parties to the protocol, within the framework of the treaty, if they so wished.

We hope that the tabling of this working paper will be of some help in disengaging ourselves from the present impasse, and will thus contribute to accelerating the radiological weapons negotiations with a view to their early conclusion. At the same time, we hope that our proposal will help to get us launched into a constructive discussion on how to deal with our concern regarding attacks on nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes.

Finally, may I point out that the outline of the draft protocol annexed to our working paper is nothing more than a skeleton and that the many technical and legal points that have not even been addressed in our paper can best be taken up in the course of actual negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The next speaker on my list is the representative of the United States of America, Ambassador Fields, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation congratulates you on your assumption of the Chair in the final days of our session. We take special pride in seeing the distinguished son of our great neighbour to the south, Mexico, take up the reins of our Committee. We are confident that with your wise counsel and firm leadership the Committee will conclude its business with dispatch and adopt expeditiously a report on our summer session to the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly. I pledge, Sir, to you my delegation's full co-operation and extend my best wishes for fruitful progress in the Committee under your leadership. My delegation also wishes to extend to Ambassador Maina, through the delegation of Kenya, our admiration and appreciation for his able chairmanship of the Committee for most of its summer session. His balanced and sage direction of the Committee's affairs confirm our expectation and reflect great credit not only upon his own quality of leadership but upon his country's as well. We note with regret that he will also be leaving our ranks to return to Nairobi for a new assignment. His loss to us will be deeply felt for his cheerful personality, warm demeanour and effective contributions were sources of inspiration to us all. We wish him well in his new task and every happiness in the days ahead.

I would like to speak today on item 7 of our agenda, the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the large number of speakers at our previous meeting indicates, this question is one in which all delegations in the Committee, including my own, share a considerable interest.

During our spring session, I addressed the Committee on this agenda item during one of the two informal sessions devoted to this subject. Since that time interest has heightened and a number of delegations have urged the creation of a working group to deal with the issues. My delegation believes that the Committee should sharpen its focus by further discussion of this agenda item before considering whether to take such a step. I hope my statement today will serve to further that goal.

As a major space Power, the United States approaches the question of arms control and disarmament arrangements affecting outer space as an important and serious matter. This approach has shaped our policies and guided our actions in international forums. The United States attaches the greatest importance to the continued preservation of outer space for peaceful purposes, and to the prevention of activity there of an aggressive character. In its support of resolution 36/97 C at the United Nations General Assembly last fall, the United States joined in agreeing to "consider the question of negotiating further arms control measures in outer space ..." here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We are the beneficiaries of the efforts of our predecessors in the field of arms control and disarmament, who have endowed us with a number of agreements affecting outer space. These have already banned from outer space the most dangerous category of weapons -- weapons of mass destruction -- and have imposed other significant restrictions on weapons-related activities there.

The outer space Treaty of 1967 is the broadest and most far-reaching of these agreements. It prohibits the orbiting of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction. It forbids the installation of such weapons on any celestial body, including the moon, or their stationing in outer space in any other manner. This Treaty, moreover, also preserves the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes, and forbids "the establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies."

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Additionally, the outer space Treaty provides that its parties, "in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding", shall apply the principles and regulations of international law, including, most notably, the Charter of the United Nations, to their activities in outer space. This point is worth stressing. A consequence of the application of the United Nations Charter and international law to outer space is the recognition that outer space can have an important role to play in the maintenance of world peace and security. And indeed, in the view of my delegation, outer space has served this end very well, by providing a place for satellites devoted to a wide range of useful purposes, from communications to navigation, to the monitoring of arms control agreements, to the stabilizing function of providing early warning against the possibility of a nuclear attack.

In the view of my delegation, the arms control regime affecting outer space would be strengthened if States not already party to the outer space Treaty were to adhere to this agreement. Indeed, I regret to say, there are 11 members of this Committee who are not yet parties to this important Treaty.

The limited test ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits, inter alia, nuclear explosions in outer space. In addition to the direct arms control benefits this Treaty has provided, namely, the absence of nuclear explosions in outer space, the Treaty has also had another great benefit relating to the continued development of the peaceful applications of outer space. As Mr. Arthur C. Clarke pointed out on Tuesday, the many scores of satellites now performing a wide range of tasks would be placed in serious jeopardy were nuclear explosions to occur in outer space.

As with the outer space Treaty, the limited test ban treaty enjoys widespread, although not universal, adherence. One hundred and eleven countries are States parties to this important agreement. The adherence by additional States to this important agreement would serve to strengthen arms control arrangements for outer space.

The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, negotiated in our predecessor body, the CCD, and signed in 1977, also applies to outer space. This Convention has now entered into force for some 30 States, a much smaller number than for the outer space and the limited test ban treaties. Again, much wider adherence to an agreement which effectively forestalls manipulation of the environment, including outer space, for hostile purposes would serve to strengthen the outer space arms control structure.

It is possible to point to a number of other agreements that affect the regime of outer space, its use for peaceful purposes and the prevention of its misuse for aggressive purposes. I should only add to my discussion here today the 1972 bilateral Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union limiting anti-ballistic missile systems. In so far as this Treaty relates to the prohibition of weapons in outer space, the two parties have undertaken not to develop, test or deploy space-based anti-ballistic missile systems or their components.

A fair assessment of the body of international law applying to the environment of outer space which I have just described would be that nations can have some confidence that the most destabilizing developments which might have been foreseen in the past -- especially the orbiting or stationing of weapons of mass destruction in outer space -- have already been renounced by those parties to the outer space

(Mr. Fields, United States)

Treaty. When the provisions of this Treaty and the other agreements I have described are considered, the widespread notion that an arms race in outer space is an immediate threat is placed into a more realistic perspective. I must therefore confess to some amazement at the view of some who seem to dismiss -- or minimize -- these agreements as "totally insufficient".

It is also useful to examine the contribution which the use of outer space makes to the implementation of arms control agreements generally by providing a means whereby monitoring and verification can be carried out. It is abundantly clear that those arms control agreements which rely in part or in whole on national technical means of verification would probably otherwise have been impossible. At least, such agreements would have required intrusive verification measures, measures that no State wants to adopt lightly, especially if a better or more easily available alternative can be found. It is safe to say that given the reluctance of some States to agree to so-called "intrusive" means of verification, man's ability to make use of outer space for verification and monitoring purposes has in many cases made the difference between effective agreement and no agreement. It is interesting to note that a recent article on monitoring arms curbs in the 19 May issue of Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn pointed out that reconnaissance satellites "produced a real breakthrough in means of observing and monitoring arms limitation measures."

In addition to the specific arms control functions served by outer space, the great potential of outer space for peaceful purposes serves us in a great and ever-increasing variety of important ways. We are all aware of the just completed UNISPACE '82 conference, and of the many applications demonstrated and discussed in that forum. These show just how intimately connected with our daily lives the utilization of outer space for civil purposes has become. From the use of meteorological satellites to improve weather forecasting and warning of severe storms, to communications satellites which make possible the global transmission of live television coverage of both historical and recreational events, it is evident that outer space plays an important role in maintaining the structure of our international society. The United States has taken the lead over many years in making available to the world at large the technology and benefits from its space programme, which is dedicated to placing outer space in the service of peace, and to strengthening the bonds that link nations together.

We all recognize that outer space, and these satellites, have military value. There is no point in denying the simple fact that the use of outer space can and does serve important military functions such as early warning, communication and navigation. These functions can serve to strengthen international stability by strengthening the deterrent value of military forces and reducing the chances of strategic miscalculations. But as Professor Clarke, in his eloquent statement last Tuesday pointed out, "there are few of man's artifacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes: what matters is the intention".

And there is another simple fact which there is no point in denying. That is that the Soviet Union, for whatever purpose, has been actively engaged over a number of years in the development and testing of an operational anti-satellite weapon system. That system puts at risk the satellites of every nation. In light of this fact, my Government has concluded that it has had no prudent choice but to continue to pursue a programme of its own to develop a similar capability.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The United States is in full agreement that unrestrained competition in the development and deployment of weapons affecting outer space -- what we often call an arms race --- would not promote the larger goal of a more peaceful world. Indeed, it is for this reason that the United States supports discussion of this matter here in the Committee on Disarmament.

We continue to be willing to examine possible further measures to be added to the existing body of arms control agreements as they apply to the outer space environment. On 4 July of this year, President Reagan announced a national space policy for the civil, military and arms control uses of outer space. These policies are outlined in a document, copies of which my delegation would be happy to supply to other interested delegations. I would like, however, to quote the appropriate passage from this document as it relates to arms control:

"The United States will continue to study space arms control options. The United States will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapons systems, should those measures be compatible with United States national security."

There are two points in this passage which I think are worth special note. First, the United States believes that attention should be focused on measures applicable to specific types of weapon systems. Obviously, measures which are vaguely worded, and contain only imprecise generalities whose applicability would be open to question, are not useful, nor, I think would they be of interest to delegations here. Secondly, the United States believes that arms control measures subject to consideration should be equitable and verifiable. These two tests are valid standards to be applied against any potential arms control agreements.

It should also be mentioned that, as with other aspects of our work in arms control and disarmament, our consideration of further outer space arms control measures cannot proceed in a vacuum. The international climate has an important bearing on the prospects for co-operation on such measures. As with all arms control measures the real world must affect our judgement.

Finally, I believe I can confidently say that all of us here share a vision of mankind's future in space. As a boy, I recall being held in awe by the serialized exploits of "Buck Rogers" and "Flash Gordon", never dreaming that these were more than flights of fancy. Yet, in our lifetimes we have witnessed man's first tentative steps off our planet. We all remember the poignant comment of astronaut Neil Armstrong as he became the first man to set foot on the moon: "One small step for man, a giant step for mankind". It is not inconceivable that our grandchildren, or perhaps their children, will decisively break the bonds of earth and venture into a new age beyond our imagination. But only if the peace is kept can mankind reach out to that final frontier.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. The last speaker on my list is the representative of Austria, Mr. Lang, to whom I now give the floor.

Mr. LANG (Austria): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor at this very late hour during the first meeting of the Committee on Disarmament in the month of September, my delegation joins with pleasure previous speakers who have expressed their satisfaction to see you, Sir, as the presiding officer for the remainder of the 1982 session. That you, Sir, one of the most eminent personalities in the field of disarmament assume the leadership of this Committee, can certainly be qualified as an historic moment. We welcome you also as the representative of Mexico, a country with which Austria has entertained time and again cordial relations in spite of the enormous distance which separates us in terms of geography.

Looking at those highly political and sensitive questions, to which your distinguished predecessor referred a few days ago, one becomes aware that patience will be necessary, as well as wisdom, realism and a certain degree of flexibility on the part of all concerned. The Austrian delegation hopes that the decisions to be taken on those questions will take due account not only of the interests of the member States of the Committee on Disarmament but also of all countries having expressed a particular concern for questions of disarmament and arms control, a concern which stems in the case of Austria from its location in one of the most sensitive areas of our globe.

This delegation wishes also to pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Maina of Kenya, who guided this Committee so ably during the month of August and whose efforts were instrumental in overcoming feelings of disappointment and frustration which were harboured by many delegations as a consequence of the very limited results of the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

My delegation has listened with particular care and attention to those statements which were made on the item entitled, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". May I, with your kind permission, submit the following comments for consideration by the Committee, comments which come from a Government which has for many years shown special interest in questions of outer space, in particular the peaceful uses of outer space.

Mankind is confronted with the serious prospect of outer space being progressively drawn into an arms race.

More than 1700 military satellites have been launched during the last decade; military establishments on both sides increasingly rely on satellites, especially for strategic purposes. The wide and growing range of functions turn these satellites into valuable targets, thus creating strong incentives for developing anti-satellite capabilities. Other efforts potentially introducing weaponry into space are carried out in the field of ABM technology.

These developments have led to grave concerns as to the prospects for the peaceful uses of outer space which were vividly expressed last month in Vienna during the second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The president of the Conference, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Willibald Pahr, urged the participants to conclude agreements which should definitely ban all kinds of weapons in outer space.

In its final report the Conference expressed the view that the extension of an arms race into outer space is a matter of grave concern to the international community, is detrimental to humanity as a whole and should therefore be prevented. The Conference recommended that the competent organs of the United Nations, in particular the General Assembly and the Committee on Disarmament give appropriate attention and high priority to that concern when dealing with measures aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Knafl, Austria)

In 1978, the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had already requested measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. Last fall, the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly called upon the Committee on Disarmament to seek agreement on the text of an appropriate treaty to prevent the spreading of the arms race into outer space.

There is widespread agreement that the existing international instruments establishing the principle of exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes are insufficient to prevent the spreading of an arms race into space. Some of the deficiencies and loopholes in the most important of these instruments, the outer space Treaty, have come up as a consequence of technological evolution. Others were deliberately built in by the drafters because some of the few possessing certain capabilities in space technology, as well as the necessary financial resources, wished to keep their options open. Again, other deficiencies stem from the growing realization that the ever-increasing use of outer space by a few, especially for military purposes, may unduly limit peaceful uses by others.

As a starting point for strengthening the arms control regime for outer space, one should examine in detail the scope and true meaning of the relevant provisions of the outer space Treaty. As long as the principle of peaceful use for the benefit of mankind which underlies the entire outer space regime remains open to radically divergent interpretations, the danger of creeping militarization will stay with us. And indeed, as we know, some interpret peaceful use to exclude only activities or devices of an aggressive character, whereas others would have it cover all military activities.

Whilst vagueness of terminology may have been helpful in the past, such uncertainty cannot any more be tolerated. In view of the concrete ongoing efforts to experiment with and eventually use offensive devices in space, terminology must be clarified, and necessary new prohibitions should be clear and unequivocal.

Upon the basis of an agreed clarification of the present provisions, it will certainly prove indispensable to introduce new prohibitions concerning the use of outer space. Extension of the provisions of paragraph 2 of article IV of the outer space Treaty to outer space itself or an express prohibition of introducing offensive devices of any kind, even for mere testing purposes, might be considered as possible approaches to this problem.

The restraint that a strengthened regime for outer space would impose on those who, at present, have the capabilities actually to use outer space will eventually, upon careful consideration, be seen even by those few countries as a benefit. For if they do not accept restrictions now, they might be faced, tomorrow, with a situation in which the hardening of devices sent into space and the risk of losing space-based communication and other capabilities will add tremendously to their costs and, especially, raise the danger of destabilizing losses of installations basic to their system of deterrence. The history of arms control, well known to most assembled here, points to earlier miscalculations where, for the semblance of temporary advantages, limitations were turned down at a point in time when they would have been technically and politically feasible, whereas the arms developments that were left uncontrolled raised endless problems only a few years later.

Finally, no new substantive provisions will curb the arms race in outer space unless the countries concerned are able to agree on an effective machinery of implementation and verification. The credibility of any new obligations will depend on their reliability, on the degree of trust they can create among the countries concerned.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

In this context, I would like to state our conviction that sooner or later, verification from space and in space will have to be internationalized. At present only two countries dispose of a full state-of-the-art array of space capabilities. For the time being and for a long time to come, this situation makes reliance on national means of verification the least credible option. Last year's United Nations study on this subject has shown that an international satellite monitoring agency is an entirely feasible objective. This element should be taken into account when elaborating new arms control agreements concerning outer space.

As to the question of how to strengthen the outer space regime, my country had put some considerable hope in the American-Soviet talks on anti-satellite systems that were held approximately until the Vienna summit of 1979. We would see some advantages in a resumption of these talks.

At the same time this Committee, responding to relevant resolutions of the first special session on disarmament, the last General Assembly and UNISPACE II, should deepen its engagement in the question of preventing an arms race in outer space and set up a working group to this effect. Any move to accelerate the preparatory process leading towards the "take-off" of full-fledged negotiations is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of Austria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. As I said a few moments ago, the representative of Austria was the last speaker on my list. Does any other representative wish to speak? I shall give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, but in view of the lateness of the hour I hope that he intends to make a very short statement. Otherwise I would prefer it if he were to wait until our next meeting.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I apologize to you and to my colleagues for taking the floor at this very late hour and, of course, I shall be brief.

It is a matter of great satisfaction to see you in the Chair for the month of September. Your great accomplishments for the sake of disarmament are well known and give us confidence that under your leadership the Committee on Disarmament will wind up its present session in a satisfactory way. The leader of my delegation will no doubt later express our appreciation for your chairmanship in a more appropriate and ample way.

Upon the instructions of my Government I wish to place the following short statement on record.

It is our earnest conviction that no effort should be spared to prevent unrestrained competition in the development and deployment of weapons affecting outer space. We attach great importance to the responsible task confided to the Committee on Disarmament in this regard, which was reconfirmed by the concluding document of UNISPACE '82. Our concern is well known. During the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly the Netherlands, together with some like-minded States, took the initiative of introducing a draft resolution which led to resolution 36/97 C, accepted by an overwhelming majority. We welcomed afterwards the fact that, in conformity with this resolution, the Committee on Disarmament, at the beginning of its 1982 session decided to place a new item, item 7, on its agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". On 3 April 1982 the leader of

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

the Netherlands delegation had the pleasure of explaining our basic approach to this question in detail. We have followed the present debate in our plenary meetings with great interest. In our view, the contributions made by the delegations which have addressed agenda item 7 illustrate amply that consensus virtually exists as to the desirability of establishing meaningful measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. I feel therefore encouraged to reiterate the view expressed in this Committee by the leader of my delegation on 12 August 1982, to wit, that the text of resolution 35/97 C provides adequate language for elaborating an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group to be established under agenda item 7. We strongly urge the Committee on Disarmament to take such a course of action which would warrant that the 1983 agenda item 7 will be dealt with in an appropriate way.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement, for its brevity and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. We have now completed the list of speakers for this morning's meeting.

You will all have received the time-table which the secretariat has prepared for next week. As usual, it is merely indicative and can be amended later if necessary. After consulting the secretariat and bearing in mind the number of speakers inscribed for our meeting next Tuesday, 7 September, I intend, unless any delegation objects, to change the time given in that tentative time-table for the opening of Tuesday's meeting from 10.30 a.m. to 10 a.m. If there is no objection, I shall take it that you agree to this.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from Spanish): I should like to ask for your co-operation in that matter too. If we had begun this meeting promptly at the hour fixed, namely, 10 o'clock, it would now be 1 o'clock and all those who had engagements for lunch would have been able to keep them. It is therefore my intention to begin meetings, if not exactly at the hour fixed, no more than 10 minutes later, so that when we say 10 o'clock it means that the Chairman will open the meeting at 10.10 and if we say 10.30 I shall open it at 10.40. I am sure you will understand the reason for this and will co-operate with the Chairman in this matter.

I should also like to point out, at the request of the secretariat, that Thursday 9 and Friday 10 September are holidays for the United Nations and the Palais des Nations will be closed. As regards the date for the closure of this session, as I said at the beginning, for the time being I am taking 16 September as the tentative date for the termination of our work, but naturally it is for the Committee and not for myself to decide the actual date of closure.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 September, at 10 a.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.35 p.m.