

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDREDTH AND EIGHTY-THIRD PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 31 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. T. FINDLAY Miss S. BOYD
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. TELLALOV Mr. I. SOTIROV Mr. R. DEYANOV Mr. K. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYLW HLAING U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. TIAN JIN Mr. YU MENGJIA Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG Mr. SUO KAIMING
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. L. STAVINOH Mr. J. JIRUSEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Ms. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. B. D'ABOVILLE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES  
Mr. B. LE GARS

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N.S. SUTRESNA  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARM  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA  
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI  
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR  
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU  
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK  
Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. T. PANAIT  
Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. A.C. CLARKE

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mrs. G. JONÄNG

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN  
Mr. V.L. KOTJUKANSKY  
Mr. A.P. FILATKIN  
Mr. A.T. LOUGATCHEV

United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Ms. M. WINSTON  
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO  
Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIĆ

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA  
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERAATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 183rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee will devote this plenary meeting to item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". However, in conformity with the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work.

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen, this is the last plenary meeting of the Committee that I shall have the privilege and the honour to chair, as Kenya's chairmanship expires at midnight tonight. I would therefore like to make a few general observations as permitted by rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

The Committee has closely followed the work programme contained in document CD/304, which we adopted at the Committee's second plenary meeting on 5 August. Nevertheless, rule 30 of the rules of procedure has afforded delegates sufficient flexibility in handling various items at the time convenient to them. A general agreement emerged in the early days of the session that it would be more productive to discuss the items on a selective basis because of the early clear indication that progress would not be possible on some of the topics on the agenda. The Kenya delegation agreed to that selective approach to the programme because we were convinced that the limited success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament, several weeks before we assembled here for this summer session of the Committee, was still very fresh in our minds. I expressed the views of my Government on the outcome of the second special session when I assumed the chairmanship of this Committee on 3 August.

The issues before the Committee for negotiation are complex and require a lot of patience. Unless our efforts are backed by a firm political will and commitment on the part of all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant States, progress in the work of this Committee will continue to be very slow indeed. This was, I believe, the fundamental reason why most delegations assembled here have favoured and advanced the idea of shelving the work of the ad hoc working groups on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons and negative security assurances. The failure of these groups to make real progress in their work during the spring session of the Committee earlier this year and the outcome of the second special session have blunted the expectations and hopes vested in this Committee by the international community. My delegation therefore hopes that real progress will be made when these working groups resume their work in 1983.

We welcome the reappointment of Ambassador García Robles as Chairman of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which was re-established at the beginning of this session. I wish once more to congratulate him on that important reassignment and on his assumption of the Committee's chairmanship for the month of September as well as the inter-sessional period -- between now and next February -- when the Committee will convene here again at the beginning of its 1983 spring session.

(The Chairman)

I hope that the informal consultations which Ambassador García Robles and the chairman of the other working groups -- namely, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Wehner of the Federal Republic of Germany -- are going to conduct within their respective working groups between now and next February will go a long way in laying the ground for real progress in these groups when they meet next year.

Progress has been modest or lacking on the other items on our agenda, namely, chemical weapons, a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The formal and informal discussions held since we convened here have indicated that a serious impasse still reigns over the questions of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. It has proved difficult to agree on the procedural questions of establishing working groups to deal with these issues.

The Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has commenced its work on a negative note, with two of the nuclear-weapon States withholding their participation. I hope that the Working Group, under the able leadership of Ambassador Curt Lidgard, will overcome its difficulties and agree on a work programme for its future deliberations. I hope, too, that the Committee can agree at its current session on establishing a working group on outer space, with clear terms of reference. The question of the group's chairmanship could then be finalized at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has done some serious work since it convened here on 20 July. The "homework" groups have done very useful work, and I wish to commend Ambassador Sujka of Poland for the good leadership he has provided to the chemical weapons Working Group.

The questions of the expansion of the membership of the Committee and enhancing its effectiveness still remain to be dealt with. These questions are highly political and sensitive, but I believe it is possible to find an acceptable compromise on the membership issue. Obviously, a clear distinction exists between the two issues, and they should therefore be treated separately. Informal consultations held at the levels of groups and individual delegations could be continued. Patience on the part of the applicants will be necessary. All delegations appear to me to be in favour, in principle, of some expansion of the membership of the Committee. The divergences of opinion that exist concern the timing of and criteria for such expansion. The discussions on these should be pursued with some urgency, to enable the Committee to make firm recommendations to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

Of particular and general importance, however, is the question of improving the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee appears not to have made up its mind on what needs to be done. It would be advisable, in our view, to treat this question as a separate item on the Committee's agenda. A structured debate on the matter is essential, and the sooner it takes place the better.

Distinguished delegates, the tasks lying ahead of the Committee are thus enormous and challenging, and I wish again to express my full confidence in the leadership of the incoming Chairman, Ambassador García Robles, and reiterate my delegation's support for him. I would also like to take this opportunity to inform my colleagues in the Committee that I shall be returning to Kenya shortly, at the end of my tour of duty as Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations. My departure was delayed to enable me to undertake the duties

(The Chairman)

of Chairman of this Committee for this month. I shall therefore be returning to New York tomorrow, in order to prepare for my return to Nairobi. I wish to bid you farewell and to express my personal gratitude for the friendship and co-operation which you have extended to me in the past four years, during which I have had the privilege of working with you in this Committee.

In particular, I wish to thank all the delegations for the co-operation accorded to me during my chairmanship of this Committee. To my good friend of many years, and Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Rikhi Jaipal, I extend my thanks for the invaluable assistance and advice he has extended to me during the past month. My thanks also go to Mr. Berasategui and all the other members of the secretariat, the secretaries of the various working groups and their contact groups, the interpreters, the translators, the technicians, the Conference Room assistants and everybody else who has made a contribution in his or her own way toward the success of the work of the Committee. To them all I extend my sincere thanks.

Finally, let me assure you that Kenya will not relax her dedication to the cause of disarmament. We shall continue to stress the negotiating character of the Committee on Disarmament. We shall, to the best of our ability, continue to play an active and constructive role in the disarmament negotiations.

Before beginning with our regular business for this plenary meeting, may I recall that, as announced at previous meetings of the Committee, I intend to put before the Committee for adoption today the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events as contained in document CD/318, as well as the draft communication circulated in Working Paper No. 73.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Sri Lanka, Italy, Canada, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Algeria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Mexico and Zaire.

I give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, before beginning my statement today, may I express our appreciation of the businesslike manner in which you have led the Committee in this important period of our summer session. I am very sorry that you are leaving us tomorrow. We should like to wish you everything best in your future appointment which your Government will give you.

The great importance that the Committee on Disarmament attaches to the issue of a nuclear test ban was once again restated during the recent discussions. We are all fully aware of the firm determination of the overwhelming majority of States to put an end to all nuclear-weapon tests by all States for all time. A nuclear test-ban treaty is universally regarded as an effective means to curb the qualitative development and proliferation of nuclear weapons and gradually to reduce reliance on these weapons, thus contributing to the prevention of nuclear war.

The Bulgarian delegation welcomed the long-overdue decision of the Committee on Disarmament to set up an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda, "Nuclear test ban". We hope that under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden this Working Group will make progress towards preparing the grounds for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation will do its best to contribute to this end.



(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

I am tempted to say a few words about the circumstances in which the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its deliberations.

We fail to understand why, at our last plenary meeting, the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, reacted so harshly to the well-founded criticism addressed to the United States following its inconsistent approach to the issue of a nuclear test ban. Harsh words and general goodwill declarations do not have a persuasive power to deny facts. Let us see how the facts stand on the record of the Committee on Disarmament.

First. It was the United States delegation that once again confirmed at the beginning of our summer session that that country no longer considered a nuclear test ban as a priority issue but that it regarded the conclusion of a CTBT as an element in the full range of its arms control objectives, to be dealt with in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament. At the same time, however, it objected to starting negotiations on item 2 of our agenda. Can we reasonably consider as normal a procedure envisaging that the reduction of nuclear weapons should precede the halting of nuclear weapon tests? Together with the majority of delegates we have difficulties in understanding such an approach. We share the doubts expressed by the delegation of Sweden as to whether the lumping together of the CTB and "the broad range of nuclear issues" can be in full conformity with the legally binding commitments of the United States, assumed in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, where all States parties pledged to seek the achievement of "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time". How can the Ad hoc Working Group on item 1 seriously examine and negotiate verification issues relating to a nuclear test-ban treaty if the delegation, which has initiated its present mandate is guided by the belief that "the present time is not propitious for the negotiation of such a ban"?

Second. Many delegations, including my own, have repeatedly underlined the importance of the tripartite negotiations. The delegation of Bulgaria associated itself with those who welcomed the report of 30 July 1980, which stated: "The three negotiating parties have come far in their pursuit of a sound treaty and continue to believe that their trilateral negotiations offer the best way forward. They are determined to exert their best efforts and necessary will and persistence to bring the negotiations to an early and successful conclusion". Only two years after this encouraging statement was made, the present administration of the United States, having first unilaterally discontinued the tripartite negotiations, decided not to resume them any more. The United States Government went even further in undermining the present basis for completely outlawing nuclear-weapon testing and announced that it would not ratify the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It would be a pity if what has been achieved by the tripartite negotiations is to be lost.

Third. Not only have many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament, but the entire international community has been seriously worried by reported official statements that the United States is "going to need testing and perhaps even testing above the 150-kiloton level for a long time to come". The distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, convincingly pointed to the reasons why the United States administration may need to continue the testing of nuclear weapons. Upon reading the experts' testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee one cannot but arrive at the conclusion that whenever international efforts acquire a more positive momentum towards achieving a CTB, "the anti-ban forces in the USA immediately go to work" and destroy everything achieved.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

These are some facts which are known not only to delegations to the Committee on Disarmament but as I mentioned the whole world is aware of them. We therefore associate ourselves with those who have firmly stated that they are not prepared to tolerate a situation in which the Committee is being used to conceal from the public a policy of continued nuclear-weapon testing by the United States.

We all noted with regret the statement made at our last plenary meeting to the effect that whether popular or unpopular the United States position would continue to be determined mainly by the security interests of the United States. All States members of this Committee have their own security interests. This is, however, no reason for them to follow an approach that totally disregards the common interests of the international community of States and questions the very existence of the Committee on Disarmament.

In this regard, one cannot but recognize that the Soviet Union, which certainly has its own security concerns, is the only nuclear-weapon State ready to contribute to the achievement of the CTBT and to nuclear disarmament as a whole. Here, I cannot fail to register our regret and disappointment that the People's Republic of China and France have refused to participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

I wish to turn now to some of the issues discussed in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

First. As all of us know, the great majority of the delegations in the Committee on Disarmament accepted in a spirit of compromise a limited mandate with the hope that discussing and defining issues relating to verification and compliance would help us prepare for the actual drafting of a CTB treaty. However, one cannot but notice a clear-cut attempt to draw the Group into a kind of abstract exercise, which has nothing to do with the purposes of evolving common ground for negotiating a CTB treaty. And if the responsibility for the Working Group's inability to start right away its substantive work should be attributed, as suggested at the last meeting by the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, we have to point to those delegations which have persisted in their opposition to the Working Group's defining an understanding on the relationship of the verification examination to the scope and other related issues of the future CTB treaty. Referring to one or another working assumption just does not suffice if we are to carry out a political rather than an academic examination of the problem. I need not elaborate now on our ideas of the main elements of the future treaty, since this has already been eloquently done in the statements of the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.

Second. The Group is facilitated by the fact that the outlines of a realistic system of verification providing a satisfactory degree of assurance that clandestine tests will be detected have emerged for quite some time. The tripartite report referred to its basic components -- national technical means of verification, international exchange of seismic data, other provisions for consultations and co-operation, including on-site inspections on challenge,

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

procedures for complaints and possible additional arrangements between two or more parties to the treaty. A balanced combination of these elements may form the skeleton of a reliable system of verification. The discussion being carried out in the Working Group has strengthened the conviction of the majority of delegations that the present technical means of verification are sufficient to ensure compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Third. We highly appreciate the work done so far by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The Bulgarian delegation will continue to contribute to the efforts aimed at fulfilling the tasks assigned to the Group by the Committee on Disarmament. Here we should like to be very clear in respect of what the scientific experts are requested to do. We agree that following closely all new technical developments is an attractive goal for scientists. The seismic expert Group should, however, concentrate on the elaboration of an international seismic data exchange system serving strictly the purposes of a CTBT -- no more, no less. The basic elements of such a system, in our opinion, were already formulated in the consensus reports contained in documents CCD/558 and CD/43. At the same time we should like to underline that such a system can be of practical value only in the context of a clearly defined course of international action towards drafting a CTB treaty. The extent to which the international data exchange procedures might be developed and utilized by States parties to the treaty could be finally determined when and if, the scope, the potential parties, the duration and all other political and legal aspects of the future treaty are known.

I would like to touch briefly now on the question of the "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", that being the subject for our meeting today. We have only one plenary meeting for the discussion of this issue, but the series of informal meetings during the spring and the summer session have amply demonstrated the growing interest in the problem, as well as the urgent need to establish appropriate organizational structures for negotiations and the elaboration of agreements in this field.

When taking up the subject of the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space, we should first of all stress the fact that the cosmos is being turned more and more into a constant field of human activity that is of ever-growing importance to the over-all development of mankind. In the quarter of a century that has elapsed since the first Soviet "sputnik", a number of agreements regulating the exploration and the utilization of outer space have been elaborated, including a treaty banning the stationing of any kind of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space.

While including this item in our agenda and programme of work for 1982 we are aware of the responsibilities of the Committee on Disarmament for the elaboration of a universally acceptable international legal instrument designed to erect a solid barrier to the extension of the arms race to outer space. Such a course of action would be in full conformity with and would constitute a natural continuation of the existing agreements in this domain of international law.

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

It is in this light that we evaluate the merits of the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space which was introduced by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and circulated in this Committee as document CD/274. Article 3 of the draft stipulates: "Each State Party undertakes not to destroy, damage, disturb the normal functioning or change the flight trajectory of space objects of other States Parties, if such objects were placed in orbit in strict accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of this treaty".

Does this approach not cover the meaning of both relevant resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly? Is not it the right moment to start elaborating mutually acceptable measures regulating the conduct of States with a view to the latest developments and thus to prevent a new extremely dangerous and costly stage of the arms race in outer space? Or do we prefer to become helpless witnesses of the transformation of the Hollywood scenarios of "Star Wars" into a terrifying reality of our own civilization?

Our position on the creation of a subsidiary body on this item is well known. We note with satisfaction that practically all members of the Committee, with the notable exception of the leading western State, are in favour of purposeful discussions and negotiations on these issues. The draft mandate submitted by the delegation of Mongolia is a basis offering wide possibilities for various approaches to the matter. We believe that, bearing in mind the considerations presented by the delegations of Italy, Mexico, Sri Lanka and others in the course of the informal meetings, we should continue the consultations on a possible mandate for an ad hoc working group to be created before the end of the current session. This would mean that as early as next February we could proceed in a concrete manner with our discussion and negotiations, supported by national experts, as has been suggested by some delegations.

From 15 to 25 August, the Second International Assembly of Children, "Banner of Peace", took place in Sofia, uniting young representatives of 110 countries of the world, under the noble motto, "Unity, creativity, beauty!". Along with many events, a meeting of a youth and children's Parliament session was held. The appeal adopted stated, inter alia, the following: "Statesmen and public figures, remove forever the horrors of war! Protect the children -- the greatest wealth and hope of mankind!" To my Government and its delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, and we believe to many others, this appeal is a new impulse and a confirmation that we are on the right track. Only the road to disarmament, mutual understanding and peace can secure a happy future for the generations that follow us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement. Before giving the floor to the next speaker on my list, the representative of Sri Lanka, I wish to welcome him in the Committee. Mr. Arthur Clarke is an outstanding expert in questions relating to outer space. He has a remarkable background in that particular area, including academic and scientific activities which have made him well known as an authority in the field. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. CLARKE (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, it is both an honour and a responsibility to appear before you today, to discuss military activities in the last and greatest arena of human affairs. Although this meeting is concerned with the prevention of an arms race in outer space, prevention is only one aspect of the problem. As the mathematicians would say, it is necessary but not sufficient. I shall also discuss the positive uses of space technology for strengthening international security.

Before doing so, may I very briefly give my qualifications for addressing you. I became a member of the British Interplanetary Society in 1934, and was later its Chairman. In 1951 I presided over the first London meeting of the International Astronautical Federation and I have known most of the leading figures in the field. Only two months ago, I had the privilege of being hosted at "Star Village" by my friend Cosmonaut Alexei Leonov and his colleagues. I have written more than 30 books on space, and this month spoke at UNISPACE '82 as a member of the Sri Lanka delegation.

Back in 1945, as a Royal Air Force officer, I wrote the paper that outlined the principles of satellite communications. A few months later, my essay "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare" won first prize in a competition set by the Royal Air Force Quarterly. It has been a strange experience reading that paper again after almost 40 years, and I would like to quote the lines of Shelley with which the essay began:

"Cease! Drain not to its dregs the urn of bitter prophecy.  
The world is weary of the past,  
Oh, might it die or rest at last!"

Nevertheless, "bitter prophecy" is indeed what we are concerned with today. So first, I must request you -- if you have not already done so -- to read Jonathan Schell's book The Fate of the Earth, which is the most convincing account yet given of the realities of nuclear warfare. It should be required reading for every statesman.

And yet Carl Sagan has summed up the implications of this entire book in a single chilling sentence: "World War Two once a minute, for the length of a lazy summer afternoon."

One other reference: I hope that you can arrange to see the BBC's recent HORIZON science programme, "The Race to Ruin", which showed the first test of laser weapons on airborne targets and interviewed both American and Russian scientists on the possibilities of war in space.

This month at UNISPACE '82, there was some confusion as to precisely what is meant by the "militarization of space". There are very few of man's artefacts which cannot be equally well used for peaceful or warlike purposes; what matters is the intention. It is impossible to define a class of devices and say that "These must not be developed, because they can be employed offensively".

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Let me give an example: few things would seem more remote from military affairs than the geodetic satellites used to detect minute irregularities in the earth's gravitational field. At first sight, this would seem to be of interest only to scientists; nevertheless, these subtle variations are of vital concern to the designers of intercontinental missiles, because unless the earth's gravitational field is accurately mapped, it is impossible to target a missile with precision. Thus purely scientific satellites, by greatly increasing the accuracy of warheads, can have a major impact on strategy. Yet does anyone suggest that they be prohibited?

Even meteorological satellites, one of the most benign of all applications of space technology, because they have already saved thousands of lives, are of obvious military importance.

Similarly, communications satellites would play an absolutely vital role in military operations. Yet neither represents a direct threat to peace.

Just as military helicopters can be used for disaster relief work, so some military space systems can be positively benign. Indeed, we might not be alive today without the stabilizing influence of the reconnaissance satellites operated by both the United States and the USSR.

Let me remind you of a piece of recent history: in the early 1960s, there was a vigorous campaign in the United States claiming that the USSR was far in advance in the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The so-called "missile gap" was a major theme in the Kennedy-Nixon campaign, and millions of words were written urging that the United States start a crash programme to overcome the Soviet Union's "enormous" lead.

That missile gap was a total illusion -- destroyed when American reconnaissance satellites revealed the true extent of Soviet rocket deployment. President Johnson later remarked that reconnaissance satellites had saved the United States many times the cost of the space programme, by making it unnecessary to build the counter-force originally intended.

By a fantastic coincidence, just yesterday I discovered President Johnson's actual words, and I quote:

"We were doing things we didn't need to do; we were building things we didn't need to build; we were harbouring fears we didn't need to harbour." (My italics.)

However, in a sense, that information may have come too late. One can picture the feelings of the Soviet military planners when contemplating this American debate. They knew they did not have the weapons the United States claimed, so what was the purpose of the exercise? Were the Americans deliberately creating an excuse to rearm? That might have seemed the most plausible assumption -- but in fact, ignorance rather than malice was the explanation. In any event, the Soviet Union decided it must produce the missiles which, at that time, existed only in the imagination of the Americans. So the seeds of a space arms race were planted, almost a quarter of a century ago.

It is possible to play a numbers game with payloads and launching to prove almost anything. Statistics indicate that the Soviet Union has now launched about twice as many "military" payloads as the United States -- by 1981, roughly 860 against 420.

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Does this mean that the Soviet Union is twice as aggressive as the United States? Not at all, because the Soviet Union's reconnaissance satellites are planned to operate for only a few weeks whereas the much bigger American satellites remain in orbit for many months. So the quantity of American reconnaissance information is probably much greater than that of the Soviet Union, a point to which we will return later.

However, photographic or television reconnaissance is limited by cloud conditions; only radar can give all-weather coverage. And only the USSR has used radar satellites, powered by nuclear reactors to reconnoitre the movements of ships at sea, as was revealed when Kosmos 954 crashed in Canada in 1978.

Another area of confusion and controversy is that of Landsats or earth resources satellites, which give superb views of our planet, of enormous value to farmers, industrialists, city planners, fishermen -- in fact, anyone concerned with the use and abuse of Mother Earth. The United States has made its Landsat photographs, which have a ground resolution of roughly 80 metres, available to all nations. Not surprisingly, there has been some concern about the military information that these photographs inevitably contain. That concern will be increased now that Landsat D has started operations with a resolution of 30 metres; I was stunned by the beauty and definition of the first photographs when they were shown to us at UNISPACE a few weeks ago. The French SPOT satellite will have even better resolution (10 - 20 metres) and this is rapidly approaching the area of military importance, although it is nowhere near (perhaps by a factor of one hundred) the definition of the best reconnaissance satellites under favourable conditions.

There is a continuous spectrum between the abilities of the earth resources satellites and the reconnaissance satellites, and it is impossible to say that one is military and the other is not. What matters is, again, intention.

One may sum up the situation by saying that although these satellites may be annoying to some nations, they are not aggressive: and that is the essential factor.

More confusion has now been created by the American space shuttle, which has been heavily criticized in the Soviet Union. It is perfectly true that many of the shuttle's missions will be military -- yet it is as potentially neutral as any other vehicle.

The one new factor the shuttle does introduce is that, for the first time, it gives a space-faring power the ability to examine, and perhaps to retrieve, satellites belonging to somebody else, thus opening up prospects of "space piracy" -- as the Soviet Union has put it. However, one cannot help thinking that fears on this score have been greatly exaggerated. If you do not want anyone to capture your satellite, it is absurdly simple to boobytrap it and thus to destroy, with very little trouble, an extremely expensive rival space system.

From past experience, I would venture a prediction in this area. When only the United States possessed reconnaissance satellites, there was a great outcry in the Soviet Union about these "illegal spy devices". When the Soviet Union also possessed them, this cry was suddenly stilled. In the same way, when the Soviet shuttle is launched, perhaps we will hear no more talk of space piracy ...

The essential point is that all these systems -- communications, meteorological, geodetic, reconnaissance, and the shuttle itself -- though they represent some degree of militarization of space, are still, for the moment, defensive or even benign. Some countries may be upset by certain applications, but they can all live with them, accepting their benefits as well as their disadvantages. The new factor which has now entered the discussion is that of deliberately destructive space systems, i.e. weapons.

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

It seems to have been forgotten that the first weapons were introduced into space almost 20 years ago by the United States, which exploded several nuclear warheads above the atmosphere in tests of a possible anti-satellite system. This approach was abandoned when it led to the discovery -- only recently rediscovered, to the consternation of military planners -- that a few nuclear blasts in space could knock out all satellites, simply by the intensity of the radiation pulse.

The fact hovers ominously over all discussions of space weapons systems. A desperate country could blind and cripple all its enemy's satellites -- as well as everyone else's -- by a few large nuclear explosions above the atmosphere.

Such lack of discrimination has led to a search for precision weapons. Since as far back as 1968, the Soviet Union has made more than 20 tests of a non-nuclear anti-satellite destroyer, or ASAT, which hovers near its victim and explodes in a shower of fragments. In June 1982, it tested this satellite system for the first time in conjunction with large-scale ballistic missile launches from silos and submarines.

The interesting question arises -- why are the Russians so concerned with developing an ASAT system, with its obvious destabilizing implications? One can only assume that the Soviet Union, which is able to obtain a great amount of information about the United States military establishment by old-fashioned techniques (such as buying trade magazines on the news-stands), realizes that reconnaissance satellites are much more vital to the Americans than to itself.

Predictably, the United States has not been indifferent to this Russian lead. President Reagan has now announced the development of an ASAT system much more advanced than the Soviet satellite-killers; indeed, it introduces a new dimension into space warfare.

The American weapon is launched, not from the ground but from high-flying aircraft, thus jumping up out of the atmosphere to home on a satellite as it passes overhead. This makes it very inflexible and extremely difficult to intercept, as it could be launched from any point on the earth at very short notice.

Doubtless, scientists in the Soviet Union are attempting to find a counter to this system and so the insane escalation of weapons will continue -- unless something can be done to check it.

Neither the United States nor the USSR-ASAT systems will be operational for some years, so perhaps there is a last chance to prevent the introduction of offensive (as opposed to defensive) systems into space. The importance of halting this arms race before it gets truly under way will be emphasized when one realizes that these planned ASATs are only the primitive precursors of systems now being contemplated. For a horrifying description of the next phase of space warfare I refer you to the recently published "High Frontier" study directed by General Daniel O. Graham. This envisages building scores of orbital fortresses to intercept oncoming ICBMs before they could reach their targets. Such a system would cost not billions, but hundreds of billions of dollars and of course would only be a stepping stone to something even more expensive, which is the "Star Wars" just mentioned by the distinguished representative of Bulgaria.



(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

Which leads inevitably to the subject of laser and particle beam weapons. Now that the long-imagined "death ray" is technically possible, it has been seized upon as a solution to the problem of defence against nuclear missiles. A vigorous debate is in progress over the practicability of such systems and the consensus appears to be that although they are theoretically possible, it will be decades rather than years before they can become operational, except for relatively close-range purposes.

However, I am always suspicious of negative judgements, because I remember vividly the debate in the United States over the possibilities of long-range rockets in the late 1940s. Let me quote again the notorious pronouncement made by the chief American defence scientist, Dr. Vannevar Bush, in 1945:

"There has been a great deal said about a 3,000 mile high-angle rocket ... I don't think anyone in the world knows how to do such a thing, and I feel confident that it will not be done for a long period of time to come ... I think we can leave that out of our thinking. I wish the American public would leave that out of their thinking."

The American public did; but the Russians didn't.

If something is theoretically possible, and someone needs it badly enough, it will be achieved eventually, whatever the cost. And when one side develops a new system, the other will try to outdo it. The two Superpowers are both led by intelligent and responsible men, yet they sometimes appear like small boys standing in a pool of gasoline -- each trying to acquire more matches than the other, when a single one is more than sufficient.

It is no longer true that wars begin in the minds of men; they can now start in the circuits of computers. Yet the technologies which could destroy us can also be used for our salvation. From their very nature, space systems are uniquely adapted to provide global facilities, equally beneficial to all nations.

As you are well aware, in 1978 the French Government proposed the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency to help enforce peace treaties and to monitor military activities. This has been the subject of a detailed study by a United Nations Committee (see United Nations document A/AC.206/14 of 16 August 1981) conducted by Hubert Bortzmeyer. The conclusion is that such a system could well play a major role in the preservation of peace.

The operational and political difficulties are obviously very great, yet they are trivial when compared with the possible advantages. The expense -- one or two billion dollars -- is also hardly a valid objection. It has been estimated that its reconnaissance satellites saved the United States the best part of a trillion dollars. A global system might be an even better investment; and who can set a cash value on the price of peace?

However, the United States and the Soviet Union, anxious to preserve their joint monopoly of reconnaissance satellites, are strongly opposed to such a scheme. The British Government is also lukewarm, to say the least.

Nevertheless, we have seen that in matters of great, though lesser, importance, such as international communications, it is possible to have extremely effective co-operation between a hundred or more countries, even with violently opposing

(Mr. Clarke, Sri Lanka)

ideologies. Intelsat is a prime example, as on a smaller scale is Intersputnik, and in the near future Arabsat will establish its regional space system. There is no doubt that the resources exist in the Third World, independently of the space-faring powers, to establish an international monitoring system -- if the will exists.

I like the name PEACESAT, and although that has already been pre-empted by the Pacific Radio Network using the satellite ATS 1, I will use the term, with due acknowledgement, for the remainder of this talk.

Reactions at UNISPACE '82 and elsewhere suggest that the PEACESAT is an idea whose time has come. Those who are sceptical about its practicability should realize that most of its elements are present, at least in rudimentary form, in existing or planned systems. The French SPOT satellite, with a ground resolution of 10-20 metres, has already been mentioned. Whether the Superpowers wish it or not, the facilities of an embryo PEACESAT system will soon be available to all countries in the near future.

May I remind my Russian and American friends that it is wise to co-operate with the inevitable; and wiser still to exploit the inevitable.

PEACESATS could develop in a non-controversial manner out of what Howard Kurtz, their long-time advocate, has called the Global Information Co-operative.

This could be a consortium of agencies for weather, mapping, search and rescue, resources and pollution monitoring, disaster watch, information retrieval and, of course, communications. No one denies the need for these facilities. If they were provided globally, they would inevitably do much of the work of a PEACESAT system. The only extra element required would be the evaluation and intelligence teams needed to analyse the information obtained.

The organization, financing and operation of a PEACESAT system has been discussed in the United Nations report, to which I refer you. It is not a magic solution to all the problems of peace: there is no such thing. But at least it is worthy of serious consideration, as one way of escape from our present predicament -- all of us standing in that pool of gasoline, making our Mutual Assured Destruction ever more assured. To quote from General Graham of the High Frontier Project: "We should abandon this immoral and militarily bankrupt theory ... and move from Mutual Assured Destruction to Assured Survival ... Should the Soviet Union wish to join in this endeavour ... we would, of course, not object..."

I would like to end, as I began, with the conclusion of my 1946 essay, "The Rocket and the Future of Warfare".

"The only defence against the weapons of the future is to prevent them ever being used. In other words, the problem is political and not military at all. A country's armed forces can no longer defend it; the most they can promise is the destruction of the attacker ...

"Upon us, the heirs to all the past and the trustees of a future which our folly can slay before its birth, lies a responsibility no other age has ever known. If we fail in our generation, those who come after us may be too few to rebuild the world when the dust of the cities has descended, and the radiation of the rocks has died away."

Mr. ALESSI (Italy): Mr. Chairman, since I spoke last, other eminent members of this Committee have left. It is with regret that I note the departure of the distinguished representatives of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec, and Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey, and wish them well in their new assignments. At the same time, I would like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Cannock, who, I am certain, will give an appreciable contribution to the work of this Committee.

I would like to address today item 7 of our agenda, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". I am glad to note that the Committee has allocated formal plenary meetings for this item and that our discussions progress with the active participation of all delegations. In this regard, we have listened with attention to the very interesting contribution just made by the distinguished delegate of Sri Lanka, Mr. Clarke, who spoke with the knowledge, the eloquence and the frankness we would expect from an expert of his reputation.

The recently concluded United Nations Conference devoted to the peaceful uses of outer space (UNISPACE '82) should serve as a further inducement for us to advance with determination in our substantive examination. It is to the credit of the United Nations, in particular of the COPUOS, the motive force in international co-operation, that progress in space-science and technology is being achieved in an orderly manner and benefiting mankind as a whole. The Committee on Disarmament is called upon to complement that work from a different angle, that of arms control and disarmament proper. In carrying out this exploratory stage of our proceedings, we have to bear in mind the goal that this Committee, heeding the recommendations of the General Assembly, has set for itself. Our task is not just to deal in general with space-related weaponry, but to try to prevent an arms race in this new dimension of human activity. It is therefore essential to have a clear perception of the avenue or avenues whereby an arms race might be introduced into outer space. We regard the present stage of our work as mainly directed towards acquiring that perception which, in turn, would enable us to establish an order of priorities and to orient our future endeavours.

The view of my delegation in that regard is known: we believe that the development of physical and technical means to destroy or damage space objects or to interfere with their operation is the most immediately threatening problem confronting us. We believe that in this specific area the ingredients for a military competition are present: the importance of satellites as targets, the development of a panoply of physical and technical anti-satellite means which would give the holder a considerable strategic advantage, the difficulties of protecting satellites by making them less vulnerable etc., all these factors could set in motion ... in our view ... the reactive cycle which characterizes an arms race.

Besides anti-satellites systems, more exotic types of weapons have been mentioned in the course of our discussions, notably the "directed energy weapons". That old favourite of science-fiction writers, the laser gun, as well as particle-beam weapons have been mentioned as having a specific potential as space-related weapons. By this term of space-related weapons we mean weapons that are such by reason of the location of the weapon launcher or the location of the target. However, whether and when this potential can be translated into an operational capability remains a moot question.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

Though lasers represent a branch of electronic technology that has been in existence for over 20 years now, it appears that substantive difficulties remain to be overcome before the principle can be put to full fruition, including its military applications. The necessary requirement of cost-effectiveness makes that task incomparably harder.

These are the conclusions of various authoritative studies which have been made public so far, one of the most significant being that carried out by Richard L. Garwin, a scientist with an exceptional background in the more exotic frontiers of technology. A revealing article was recently published in the Reviews of modern physics which gave the results of a collaboration between American and Soviet researchers in the field of lasers. The authors stated, inter alia, that the achievement of certain extra progress which is now needed to proceed further in the application of that kind of technology "presents as difficult a challenge as any that Man has ever undertaken". They further stated: "We cannot truly say whether we are closer to the goal today than in the past, since it is not even possible to assert that the goal will ever be reached".

Nearly all the problems encountered in laser technology would affect particle-beam systems, in particular the hydrogen-atom beam, which is the only particle-beam useful in space. Moreover, particle-beams present certain difficulties peculiar to themselves.

A realistic assessment of where lie the real dangers confronting mankind in relation to outer space is essential to our work. We can all participate in evolving such an assessment, but only States possessing major space capabilities can make a definitive contribution. In this field perhaps more than in other fields of disarmament we depend on the contribution of those who have a full knowledge of the subject matter.

We appreciate the argument that we should aim for a comprehensive agreement capable of sealing off all possible avenues towards an arms race in space. It has been said here that it is easier to prohibit something before it comes into existence.

We believe, however, that, in this case, adopting such an approach from the beginning might well result in one of two things: either an ineffective agreement unable to stem the extension of the arms race to outer space or, more probably, the unnecessary delaying of more limited but urgently needed measures.

On balance, we continue to believe that the attention of this Committee should concentrate with absolute priority on those space-related weapons which are currently operational; our task would then be a true disarmament task, as we would strive to prohibit and eliminate systems which are in the arsenals and have been deployed.

Satellites can be destroyed or damaged at present by co-orbital intercept, by orbital intercept and by direct ascent from the ground.

In our statement of 30 March we undertook a preliminary effort in order to identify some of the issues relating to a ban on ASAT systems. We stated that foremost among those issues were the definitional questions of what constitutes an "anti-satellite system" and what constitutes an "anti-satellite activity".

Following on those considerations I would add that the answer to those questions would also depend on the kind of agreement we seek and on what we actually want to prohibit. Should we try to ban both weapons and activities? How effective would

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

be an agreement that confined the prohibition to attacks on or acts of interference with satellites, irrespective of the systems used to bring about such attacks or acts of interference?

We noted, for instance, that, in its reply to the Secretary-General's note regarding the second special session devoted to disarmament, Sweden mentioned as one of the possible options an agreement restricting or prohibiting activities characterized as interference with or attacks on space objects carried out both from space itself and from Earth.

With regard to ASAT weapons, a basic issue would appear to be that of the scope of the prohibition. It would be necessary to consider carefully which of the various stages -- development, testing, deployment, acquisition, use, etc. -- should be included in the scope.

Destruction of existing ASAT systems would also be a major issue to address.

The question of verification should be considered simultaneously since it would be relevant to a definition of the scope of the prohibition. In the case of ASAT systems, verification would be as important an issue as ever. Even a limited ASAT capability, retained or acquired in evasion of an international agreement, could be of significant military value. For this very reason the question of destroying existing ASAT systems and their component parts, and providing for verifiable dismantling procedures, could not be avoided in the course of discussions.

Outer space is still a medium mainly free from kill-mechanisms. Existing ASAT systems seem to be effective only against low altitude orbiting satellites. The full testing in space of operational ASAT weapons against high-altitude space objects might foreclose the possibility of arriving at an adequately verifiable ban on anti-satellite weapons. Such an eventuality can only be regarded with apprehension: an ASAT world is a more dangerous world. The human and material resources which are available should be used to promote our security and well-being. Satellites today perform a fundamental role in this respect, and the precious contributions that satellites have made to international co-operation and peace have been eloquently underlined by the speaker who preceded me.

We no longer live in an age when a world war would stem from the assassination of an archduke; it is the instability of the situation and not the instigating event which is likely to be responsible for such an eventuality and which must be avoided.

An effective and verifiable treaty banning ASAT systems would be an important contribution towards this objective.

Last week, an International Symposium on the prevention of nuclear war was held at Erice, a small town in Sicily, under the auspices of the Centre Majorana. Scientists and analysts of the highest reputation from many parts of the world took part in the deliberations. One of the issues evoked there, among many others, was that of the outstanding importance of certain types of satellites for that purpose. Providing adequate protection for satellites would also be a significant contribution in this respect. The opportunity before us is ripe but perishable. We should seize it without delay.

Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I concluded my statement without extending to you our warmest wishes for your future. The talents that once again you have displayed in providing such an able leadership to the Committee on Disarmament will undoubtedly be of great value in the new assignment that awaits you in Kenya.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, Mr. Skinner.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, first I would like to join other speakers who have congratulated you on the way in which you have conducted our meetings this month. I think we have, in spite of a number of enormous difficulties, actually achieved quite a lot and a good deal of the credit belongs to you. At the same time, I would like to say how sorry we are that you are leaving us -- as indeed are other speakers who have addressed the question of your departure -- we are sorry, but we wish you the very best. Before I begin my statement on outer space, I would like to say a word or two about why Canada may have some credentials to address this problem. One is the question of our land mass. Ever since there has been a consciousness about outer space, it has been critical to us, as a country, to be involved in the question because of the communications aspect that the curve of the earth presents to us as a country. Through satellites we are able to communicate with each other within our own country and for this reason we are perhaps one of the leading countries in space technology. Not only do we contribute to space technology but we have also been the recipients of it through the contributions of others, either directly, that is through co-operation with other State Powers, or indirectly, when we have received, of course, our Cosmos 954 which has been an interesting experience.

I would like now to address the question of outer space in some detail. In approaching the problems of arms control and outer space, we are taking up the first arms control issue of the twenty-first century. Mr. Arthur Clarke, in his statement a few minutes ago, has given us, I think, a pretty good idea of the dimensions of the problems. Even so, we are only beginning to gauge the immensity of the issues: we are less than 18 years from the year 2000 and the negotiations we undertake here could have an important effect on the manner in which we approach the next century.

Several important events have taken place between sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, I mean, in terms of outer space. The completion of the test phase of the United States space shuttle programme, culminating, as it did, almost 25 years ago after Sputnik I, portends certain commercial aspects of the application of space technology which could rival as a benchmark in the exploration of space of placing the first satellite in orbit. The appearance of a reusable space vehicle -- that is, the world's first true spaceship -- has implications, the dimensions of which are not always easy to grasp. On the Soviet side is the increasing internationalization of its space programme along with its technological perfection. While Columbia was completing its final test flight, a French space-man was orbiting the earth in a Soviet spaceship, thus creating what is a unique situation of having both astronauts and cosmonauts of three nations in orbit at one time. Truly, space is being internationalized in a real as well as a conceptual, that is, in a legal manner.

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, despite the disappointment many feel, may have had one positive benefit among others. It dispensed with illusion and stands as an object lesson of the necessity of working within the framework of what is possible. Already we see, at the summer session of this Committee, a renewed sense of realism, and this sense is as important for our deliberations in outer space as on any other issue which may appear before the Committee.

In this regard we should consider the effects of UNISPACE '62 recently concluded in Vienna. It is readily apparent that the mandate of the outer space Committee on peaceful use and the mandate of this Committee on arms control issues may be considered to have in some respects a mere mirror image aspect. I do not wish to deal at great length with the organizational aspects of arms control and disarmament; this is a matter which seems to be of endless fascination, not only to this Committee but elsewhere as well. We believe it would be better to move on to more substantive matters. Nevertheless, it is our view that the basic responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space has been placed upon this Committee by the General Assembly. We should therefore take up our work in an energetic fashion. It is equally clear that there is a background in the outer space Committee discussions which will be of immense value here in the Committee on Disarmament: for example, the 1967 outer space Treaty is a product of the outer space Committee. As we build upon the outer space Treaty and other aspects of space law in developing the arms control treaty, which we all hope for, we must ensure that the experiences of the outer space Committee as well as of the CD, the CCD and the ENDC are fully utilized. We do not think, at this stage, that it would be productive to prolong discussion about whether or not to set up a working group on outer space if these discussions actually inhibit the Committee from addressing the substantive issues.

On 18 June, before the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, Prime Minister Trudeau underscored the urgency of coming to grips with the development of new weaponry for use in outer space. He noted that 25 years ago, the first man-made satellite was launched. That event marked a leap in man's mastery of the natural environment. I have a note here on my paper, which is a term that Mr. Arthur Clarke used in this regard; he called it the last and greatest arena of human affairs.

Mr. Trudeau noted that 15 years ago it did not seem premature to close off the possibility that space might be used for other than peaceful purposes. He observed that today the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space is, in our view, patently inadequate.

The need, therefore, is clear and unequivocal.

(Mr. Skinner, Canada)

I have noted that the Committee on Disarmament has a considerable wealth of experience to draw upon. First and foremost is our negotiating experience based upon other issues, and a good amount of useful work can be undertaken in preparation for substantive negotiations. For example, an inventory of background material relevant to outer space is essential. There are a number of treaties, both multilateral and bilateral, which have served to attempt to reserve the "use of outer space for peaceful purposes". In addition to the 1967 outer space Treaty there is the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty, certain aspects of SALT I and SALT II, the ABM Treaty and multilateral treaties such as the 1979 moon Treaty, all of which have a certain significance in this regard. A compendium of relevant portions of these and other aspects of space law, drawn up in a fashion similar to that used by the experts in United Nations document A/AC.206/14 on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency would, in our view, be useful indeed.

There is a considerable scope, in these preliminary stages, for dealing with other essential and basic matters such as definitions, for it must be recognized at the outset that if we are to proceed in this Committee we must do so on the basis of a common and understood language.

For this reason, and in this regard, I wish to table in this Committee a working paper on arms control in outer space which presents the issue in what we have sought to make a balanced and non-controversial manner. This working paper has been prepared in order to put forward under one cover some of the considerations in developing an approach for this Committee. You will see now that it appears in document CD/320 which has just been distributed. Among other things, the paper presents the dangers in attempting to categorize space systems in a rigid manner -- that is, some systems might lend themselves to categorization, most, however, have characteristics which, depending upon the situation, can be either stabilizing or destabilizing. You will notice, incidentally, as you go through this paper in the fourth paragraph from the end of CD/320, there is a reference to a table which, you will note, does not appear in the document. The reason for this is because of what I have just said. After a long consideration it was decided that it would serve no useful purpose to try to categorize systems at this stage. Therefore, I would ask that a correction be issued to remove that paragraph.

In any event, I hope this working paper will be useful to members and will serve as a basic presentation of some of the issues, thereby contributing to a measure of common understanding.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for his kind words addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe.



Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure and personal satisfaction even at this late date that I seize the occasion to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship for the month of August, a responsibility which you have so ably discharged during a difficult month when the Committee had to reflect on the disappointing results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and at the same time plan its future programme. The particular pleasure and satisfaction that I express to you originate in the fact that our two neighbourly countries have enjoyed for a long time the best of relationships, going back to the time of the heroic struggle of your people against colonialism. This bond of friendship between our two countries has since been further strengthened by our common struggle against the forces which attempt to divide our regional and subregional unity. On a more personal note, as you are about to leave us to take up other appointments, may I express my warmest congratulations to you on a job well done and wish you continued success in your future assignment. My congratulations also go to Ambassador Okawa of Japan for the many significant contributions he has made not only during his term of office but throughout the years he has been associated with the Committee. Ambassadors Venkataswaran of India, Valdivieso of Peru and Yu Peiwen of China have left us, and Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia is about to leave us also. My delegation wishes all of them success in their new assignments. My delegation also welcomes to this Committee Ambassadors Dăcu of Romania and Cannock of Peru and looks forward to co-operating and working closely with them.

The Committee on Disarmament is meeting at a juncture when, after four years of negotiations under a reorganized machinery, the Committee has little to show by way of concrete results. The reasons, at least as far as the non-aligned members of this Committee are concerned, are given in their common assessment of the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and I hardly need to elaborate on them. Suffice it to recall here that the review has underlined a number of factors constituting major obstacles to the implementation of the programme of action for disarmament agreed upon at the first special session. These are the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, the concept of the so-called "limited nuclear war", the suspended negotiations between the two major nuclear-weapon States, the delay in ratification of the SALT II agreement, the refusal by some nuclear-weapon States to accord the highest priority to negotiations on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing in all environments and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons from their arsenals.

These obstructive attitudes clearly manifested themselves in official statements made during the second special session and the negotiating sessions. The present climate of international tension and confrontation coupled with instances of aggression, intimidation, political and economic coercion, directed particularly against developing countries, have aggravated the prevailing threat to world peace and international security. In such a fluid situation, the existence of nuclear weapons jeopardizes all the more the security interests of all States. The prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which threatens the whole of mankind, should have been a focal point for our deliberations and negotiations. For these reasons, negotiations should have been intensified with a view to halting the arms race and bringing about a gradual reduction of nuclear weapons until they are completely eliminated from the arsenals of war. But we know, regrettably, that this was not the case. In fact the reverse was the trend -- evading the main issues by exaggerating problems such as those connected with verification instead of showing political commitment to essential requirements for proceeding with substantive negotiations.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In the past decades efforts to increase and refine nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been intensified to such an extent that it is now possible to deliver nuclear weapons at distances of thousands of kilometres with such accuracy that no place in the world is safe.

The variety of nuclear arsenals is such that, it is now contemplated for increasing numbers of military personnel to exercise decisions on this most destructive weapon, thus risking nuclear war by deliberate design as supported by various reports suggesting methods of winning "a protracted nuclear war". Even if these reports are challenged, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, as a result of the escalation of international tension, local wars, etc., is not ruled out. It is for this reason that the people of the world attach the greatest importance and urgency to the halting of the nuclear arms race and to proceeding to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The nuclear arms race threatens the survival of mankind and its prevention is, as stated in the Final Document, "the most acute and urgent task of the present day". Viewed within such a global framework it is difficult to justify the policy of certain States which conceive their national security interests as the sole criterion to which all other States must conform, and defend nuclear weapons on grounds of security and national interest. This raises a fundamental question: whereas the inherent right of a State to protect its security is recognized, does that right extend to a point where the extinction of mankind becomes an acceptable risk? Such an attitude, certainly, is at variance with international norms governing inter-State behaviour. It further aggravates the already tense international climate and inspires mutual mistrust and thus weakens confidence-building efforts which could clear the way for more substantive disarmament measures.

It is undeniable that the arms race is a manifestation of attempts to use or threaten to use force against the territorial integrity of other States. Attempts such as interference in the internal affairs of other States, the perpetuation of colonial and neo-colonial domination, maintaining under various guises the present unjust and inequitable international economic relations, all of these fall under the same category of manifestation of behaviour contrary to enhancing international peace and security. National security interests are misconstrued when they are used as a means of destabilizing other countries and regions or simply for claiming them as part of that country's region of "vital interest" or when these countries and regions are used as demonstration grounds for exercising war games with unpredictable consequences for the countries of the region concerned. Such an aggressive policy has been recently witnessed in Lebanon, resulting in untold misery and suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian people and causing ruthless destruction of life and property which my delegation condemns.

The study entitled "Relationship between disarmament and international security" (A/36/597) by the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General, states that "stretching the demands of national security interests unreasonably far would present an obstacle to disarmament".

No subject matter has aroused greater concern since the Second World War than the question of nuclear weapons, and the unceasing efforts ever since to prohibit their use. For decades now Ethiopia's position has been that, pending general and complete disarmament, the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, must be

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

halted. It was in this spirit that Ethiopia took the initiative in submitting the proposal for the total prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. This proposal was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixteenth session in resolution 1653 (XVI), which declared the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons to be contrary to the United Nations Charter and a crime against humanity and civilization. The resolution in its operative paragraph (c) states:

"The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons is a war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war will be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons."

It is in this spirit that Ethiopia received with enthusiasm the declaration by the USSR during the second special session that the USSR will "not be the first to use nuclear weapons". We express the hope that this declaration, together with earlier Soviet and Chinese declarations, will induce other nuclear-weapon States to make equivalent declarations banning the first use of nuclear weapons.

Like many other countries, Ethiopia had entertained the hope that disarmament measures such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty would lead to more significant disarmament measures. But to our dismay, there has been a continued upward spiral of the qualitative and quantitative nuclear arms race.

To come back to the focal question of the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war, I would like to quote a passage from the study that I just referred to:

"As nuclear arsenals grow with a greater variety of weapons under the control or custody of an increasing number of military personnel, the danger of a nuclear war by inadvertence grows. A nuclear war could be unleashed as a result of human or mechanical failure, by accident, by miscalculation, as a result of ineffective command, control and communication procedures or capacities, the escalation of a local conventional war, as a result of blackmail or terrorism or through sheer madness".

Therefore an urgent task facing us at present is to remove the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war.

It is with this frame of mind that my delegation considered the positive proposal by the delegation of India to establish an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war. This proposal, supported for some time now by many delegations, receives our fullest endorsement.

My delegation is pleased that at long last the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has begun its difficult work. As the task of the Working Group is made all the more difficult by the limited nature of its mandate, we are assured nevertheless by the fact that it is chaired by the distinguished Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden and his very competent delegation. We regret, however, that China and France have decided not to participate in the NTB Working Group. It is the view of my delegation that a nuclear test ban could hardly be effective without the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States. We hope that the two States will seriously reconsider their positions and recognize the responsibility placed upon them by virtue of their nuclear status.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

At every opportunity that my delegation has had to refer to the comprehensive test ban treaty, it has always expressed its favour for the continuation of the trilateral negotiations on a CTBT. In this connection, the decision of the United States not to resume the trilateral negotiations is therefore regrettable and such a move would appear to dash the prospects of a meaningful progress on a nuclear test ban at present.

I would now like to say a few words regarding the question of verification. The Ethiopian delegation has no intention of underestimating nor downgrading the importance of an effective verification mechanism for a given disarmament measure. The importance and the necessity of verification for disarmament measures are widely recognized by all. Lately, however, the issue of verification has been used by a few delegations in the Committee in a disproportionate manner. We do not question at all the legitimate concerns expressed by those seeking adequate measures of verification to ensure compliance with any agreement to be concluded. We believe this concern is shared by all. However, to engage the Committee in discussing and negotiating on detailed procedures for verification without regard to the scope or the nature of each particular measure is to make negotiations contingent upon and hostage to the structures of the verification process. It would be appropriate, therefore, as expressed by the majority of the members of this Committee, rationally to address the issues of scope and its commensurate compliance procedures.

We express the hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will show progress corresponding to its current intensified work. In this context I would like to express the admiration of my delegation for the able and dynamic leadership that Ambassador Sujka has provided to the chemical weapons Working Group. The emphasis placed on working out a composite text on the various elements needs to be urgently reinforced by a new demonstration of a strong political input so as to generate meaningful progress. In this regard, the Ethiopian delegation would like to reiterate its satisfaction, already expressed at the second special session, at the initiative undertaken by the Soviet Union in submitting a draft document on the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention.

The provisions relating to international on-site inspections to verify the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles and to control the production of those chemicals permissible under a future convention are most notable. The Soviet draft, in our view, provides an impetus for serious negotiations on chemical weapons. We would appeal to and encourage those delegations which have addressed their legitimate inquiries to the Soviet delegation and sought clarifications on the Soviet provisions, to undertake likewise a corresponding bold initiative on this urgent and important subject.

Before concluding, let me touch very briefly upon the item inscribed on our agenda for today's plenary meeting, "prevention of an arms race in outer space", a subject with which we have to deal more fully in the future. The Ethiopian delegation believes that space technology should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Therefore, any military applications or any hostile use of space should be strictly prohibited by an international treaty or international agreements. Faced with rapid space technology and its frightening dimensions, our efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space will face greater difficulties the longer the realization of the objective of a demilitarized outer space is delayed by lack of a common approach. It is our earnest hope, therefore, that through the establishment of an ad hoc working group, concrete proposals can be pursued, developed and negotiated for a common approach to make outer space a lasting and peaceful heritage of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, His Excellency Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee takes up today item 7 -- the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Therefore, I would like to dwell upon this question in the first part of my statement. Afterwards, I am going to touch upon some aspects of the work of the NTB Working Group.

There is no doubt that nuclear disarmament, including particularly a comprehensive test ban, is the item of highest priority this Committee has to deal with. At the same time we cannot leave out of sight developments in other fields which -- if not prevented at an early stage -- could have serious destabilizing and dangerous consequences for international security and the maintenance of peace in the future. Recent events prove that the militarization of outer space is becoming a reality. It is no longer a question of science fiction. It is also no secret that certain military planners regard outer space as the "battlefield of the future". Their programmes of super-armament in outer space have become part and parcel of their concept aimed at achieving military superiority.

Taking into account these dangerous developments, my country favours the prohibition of the deployment of any kinds of weapons in outer space. An appropriate international agreement would effectively curb an arms race in outer space and promote the peaceful uses of this area.

We were very much satisfied that this basic position was adhered to by almost all delegations at the recently concluded Conference, UNISPACE II.

As far as this Committee is concerned, my delegation is led by the following approach:

Firstly, the ban should be a comprehensive one. It should prohibit the deployment of any kinds of weapons in outer space. Thus, the ban would include the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, but would not be limited to it. Focusing on anti-satellite weapons only would not exclude the extension of the arms race in outer space into other directions.

Secondly, following the request of the United Nations General Assembly contained in resolution 36/89, the Committee on Disarmament should embark on negotiations.

We regret that some States seem, up to now, not to be prepared to accept the negotiating role of the Committee concerning this item.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

But how long should we wait for real negotiations, not to speak about measures to curb the arms race in outer space? We have to take into account the fact that the United States some years ago broke off bilateral talks on the cessation of the arms race in outer space. Even more: as is well known, the United States only recently set up a military outer space command and is implementing a huge military programme in outer space.

Therefore, no efforts should be spared to start immediately negotiations on the prohibition of the arms race in outer space. The draft treaty tabled by the USSR last year represents an appropriate basis for real negotiations.

A Working Group should be set up on this subject. Where should all substantive problems be discussed and explored if not in the framework of such a body?

One cannot pronounce oneself in favour of the consideration of concrete measures against the arms race in outer space while at the same time rejecting the establishment of appropriate bodies to deal with all the proposals, draft treaties and documents which have been submitted on this subject. My delegation fully supports the draft mandate for such a Working Group proposed by the Mongolian People's Republic in document CD/272. The Committee should take action on this proposal and not confine itself to a non-committing academic exercise on the prevention of the arms race in outer space.

My delegation will support every initiative to this end.

In the course of this session, my delegation has already on several occasions explained its position concerning some basic as well as current problems with regard to a comprehensive test ban. Since the newly established NTB Working Group is now in an advanced stage of its work, allow me to make some further comments in this connection.

My country attaches great importance to the solution of the verification problems connected with a CTB. Appropriate verification measures should ensure compliance with the obligations of the treaty, enhance confidence in it, and thereby induce countries to adhere to it. At the same time, it stands to reason that issues concerning verification cannot be discussed and solved in a vacuum, but only in close connection with the basic question of the treaty -- the scope of the prohibition. Concrete verification measures are only to be agreed upon if it is known precisely what is to be prohibited and, thus, to be verified.

This relationship between scope and verification was clearly spelled out in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Concerning the work of this Group, my delegation, like the delegations of other socialist countries, proceeds from the understanding that issues relating to verification of compliance with a CTBT will be examined as applied to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, which would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution, acceptable

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

to all parties, of the problem of underground explosions for peaceful purposes, and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States. In close connection with such an understanding on the scope of a CTB, the socialist countries proposed a list of seven items relating to verification to be discussed in the NTB Working Group.

Unfortunately, it was not possible to agree at the beginning of the work of this Group on an outline of its programme of work based on a clear understanding on the scope of the prohibition.

An abstract discussion on verification questions, i.e., without relevance to a specific scope, could hardly lead to concrete conclusions with regard to CTB verification.

My delegation highly appreciates the efforts of the Chairman of the NTB Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, and his alternate, Mr. Hyltenius, to fulfil the mandate of this Group. The Working Group has so far had an interesting exchange of views on the scope of the prohibition as well as on basic questions of verification. We appreciate the contributions made in this regard by the delegations of the Soviet Union, India and Sweden, among others, as well as by the Chairman of the seismic experts Group, Mr. Ericsson.

At the same time, we cannot but express our concern at the tendency shown by some delegations to involve the Working Group in academic debates on verification questions having no other purpose than to make the Committee forget all the useful experience accumulated during more than 20 years of negotiations on CTB issues. Those Delegations even seem to neglect the results of the trilateral negotiations in which some of them participated. In those negotiations, a multilateral verification system for a CTBT was elaborated. It was a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation that the USSR only recently re-emphasized that it regards this verification system as adequate.

In the judgement of my delegation, the NTB Working Group seems to be now at a turning point: either, it might proceed from the assumption that all the technical means necessary for verifying compliance with a CTBT with a sufficient degree of certainty exist and it is now time to elaborate the political and legal framework or elements of such a verification system; or, it might go the other way round, and start a new detailed debate on highly technical issues, and study all pros and cons of the means of verification with the hope of obtaining in the distant future an idea of a possible verification system. This alternative is not new: both trends determined also the discussions held in the 1960s and 1970s in this Committee on a CTB.

But should we not take into account the experience gained in order to avoid the failures of the past?

(Mr. Harder, German Democratic Republic)

In the 1970s two main views were in the centre of debates on CTB verification.

The first view was that the verification problem could be resolved on the basis of national means, i.e. remote control, supplemented and improved upon by international co-operation and procedures. These two methods would complement each other. This opinion was expressed in 1971 by many non-aligned and neutral countries in working paper CCD/394. A similar position was held by the socialist countries. The second view was that seismic methods of detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions would not be capable of providing adequate national technical means of verifying a CTB. The conclusion was drawn that there was a continuing need for study and research into seismic methods of detection and identification of underground events. This view was held, inter alia, by the United Kingdom in document CCD/402. A similar position was taken by the United States delegation which declared, for example, in 1974: "For us, the most promising approach to achieving a CTB lies in continuing serious work on the technical issues that must be resolved, specifically those involved in the problem of verification" (CCD/PV.604).

It is, of course, important to clarify and solve technical problems connected with verification of a CTB. However, at some point a political decision should be taken. Otherwise, there would be a danger of converting negotiations into technical deliberations, and their purpose -- a CTBT -- would be buried under a heap of technical papers.

In view of the actual importance of this question, my delegation has discussed this "technical approach" already in detail in the NTB Working Group. It especially dwelt upon the questions of evasion techniques which in the 1970s were advanced by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom and which, in their view, could very much hamper the efficiency of seismic means.

Of course, such possibilities may theoretically, and even practically, not be excluded. But here again, should one not first of all take into account the political aspect of this matter? It is only too obvious that a would-be violator of a CTBT would have to weigh up the possible military advantages gained by cheating using the above-mentioned methods against the political disadvantages in the event of the violation being detected. Moreover, the Government concerned must take into account the capability of an international seismic network to detect the violation. Furthermore, would it then not be advisable to look for an appropriate political solution of this problem? This could be an obligation by each State party to a CTBT not to impede the national technical means of the other parties, including the prohibition of the use of concealment measures, inter alia, evasion techniques.

Another question which played an important role in the CTB discussions was the problem of on-site inspections. In scientific literature it is broadly emphasized that these inspections could only marginally add to the efficiency



(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

of a seismic network. This view was also broadly shared by many delegations in the discussions on CTB questions which have taken place in this Committee over the years. In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to document CCD/431 tabled in 1976 by the Swedish delegation. On the other hand, the United States delegation in particular stressed the importance of on-site inspection. It stated for example in 1976 that "adequate verification of a CTB continues to require some on-site inspection" (CCD/PV.704). However, that delegation never provided a clear answer to the question of what is meant by "adequate verification" and what special purpose on-site inspection would serve. In 1976, the USSR declared its support for the "verification by challenge" concept and included an appropriate provision in its draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests (CCD/523). Thus, one might have thought that United States concerns had been met. However, the course and the actual state of the trilateral negotiations, as well as the work of this Committee, provoke the question: what is given more importance in the position of the United States -- the search for "adequate verification", or the interest in continuing nuclear weapons tests to develop the new nuclear warheads necessary for the implementation of their new nuclear warfare doctrines?

When considering issues of CTB verification, we should not allow ourselves to be bogged down in a wealth of technical details and unreal questions. The overriding questions are political ones and we must find political answers to them, corroborated by certain technical methods, e.g., in the field of verification. Moreover, existing technical means already provide a sufficient capability for CTB verification. Therefore, I cannot but agree with the former representative of Canada to the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Pearson, who stated in 1973:

"The establishment of a fully-tested world data exchange system to which all of us can contribute could be one of the most effective methods available to the international community for setting up a comprehensive test ban regime. Let us be clear, however, that problems of verification are a matter of judgement, not of technical perfection". (CD/PV.4)

It would also be difficult not to agree with the conclusion contained in the already quoted Swedish working paper, CCD/431: "It would be impossible to create a verification system that would secure the timely detection of any violation of a treaty at any time". To look for such a "perfect" verification system could only indefinitely postpone the elaboration and conclusion of a CTBT. With all seriousness we should rather face the question: which danger is greater -- the threat caused by the absence of a CTBT, or the low risk posed by a not 100 per cent verification system? Given the present state of seismic art, no country could realistically expect to conceal clandestine tests except perhaps tests of small yield weapons of little military value.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Thus, my delegation shares the opinion expressed already in 1972 by the United Nations Secretary-General:

"While I recognize that differences of views still remain concerning the effectiveness of seismic methods of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests, experts of the highest standing believe that it is possible to identify all such explosions down to the level of a few kilotons. Even if a few such tests could be conducted clandestinely, it is most unlikely that a series of such tests could escape detection. Moreover, it may be questioned whether there are any important strategic reasons for continuing such tests or, indeed, whether there would be much military significance to tests of such small magnitude.

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification by seismic and other methods, and the possibilities provided by international procedures of verification such as consultation, inquiry and what has come to be known as 'verification by challenge' or 'inspection by invitation', it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban.

"In the light of all these considerations, I share the inescapable conclusion that the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests".

This view was also broadly shared among experts in the United States. In a statement made in 1976, the Arms Control Association said the following:

"The combination of improvement in seismic detection systems and satellite surveillance capabilities has led many arms control experts to conclude that a CTB could be adequately verified at the present time by national means. They stress that the verification question is not whether an extremely small nuclear test (a few kilotons) can go undetected, but rather whether the risk of not being able to detect such small tests would be of any military significance. Furthermore, the country contemplating such a violation of a CTB would also need to examine whether a weapon test of such a small yield would produce military benefits worth risking detection and the abrogation of the treaty".

Last but not least let me quote from a statement delivered in 1972 by the former United States representative to the CCD and this Committee, Ambassador Adrian Fisher, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

"We have solved many of the problems of discriminating between earthquakes and explosions; we can identify explosions down to yields of a few kilotons. There will always, no matter how much research we do, be some events of low yield that cannot be identified. This doesn't mean, however, that a comprehensive test ban is undesirable.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

"But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? ...

"If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that lack of a precise capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes will not stand in the way of our moving toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. We do not need to deploy a single new piece of equipment or await the development of still more data to be in a position to start negotiations.

"We should continue research in the means of seismic discrimination. It is likely to result in more reliable, more efficient and probably still more accurate means of discrimination, but it is not now the real obstacle to the comprehensive test ban treaty that I hope this administration will now decide seriously to pursue".

I think that these questions, touched upon by Ambassador Fisher in 1972, have not -- after 10 years -- lost their importance and topicality. On the contrary.

Let me summarize: in discussing verification questions relating to a CTB, we should carefully take into account the experience of the past. We cannot neglect the basic ideas which were already developed with regard to CTB verification. Efforts to start the whole exercise from the very beginning -- "from scratch" -- would not serve any practical purpose. They would rather lead to a new protracted verification debate.

In joining the consensus on the -- frankly speaking -- modest mandate of the NTB Working Group, it was the understanding of my delegation that this mandate could not be any long-term solution. The Committee should, rather, at the end of this session or at the beginning of the 1985 session, decide on a new, more forward-looking and action-orientated mandate.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement.

We have exhausted the time available for this morning's meeting, so I suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly.

The meeting was suspended at 1.15 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 103rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Algeria, Mr. Taffer.

Mr. TAFFAR (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to offer you the congratulations of the Algerian delegation on the way in which you have been presiding over our Committee, and to tell you how happy my delegation is to see the representative of an African country guiding our work during this month of August.

We should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa, who, with the skill with which we are all familiar, presided over the fortunes of the Committee at a crucial time in our work.

I should, lastly, like to take this opportunity to express the gratitude of Ambassador Salah-Bey to all those who have wished him every success in his new appointment.

Since this is the first time that my delegation is taking the floor at a plenary meeting, I beg you to allow it, in accordance with rule 31 of our rules of procedure, to refer to various matters which are of particular concern to us.

It was highly significant that at the very moment when the General Assembly, meeting in special session, was discussing problems of disarmament and security, the "Zionist entity", encouraged by complicity of all kinds, was launching a new and barbarous aggression against the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples with the clearly declared aim of liquidating the Palestinian people. This aggression, which amounted virtually to genocide, reminded us once again, if that was necessary, how pointless is our search for peace and security through general and complete disarmament so long as international relations are based on the exercise of force and domination.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure, as many delegations here have pointed out. There is no need, however, to look far for the causes of this setback. The outcome of that session nevertheless confirmed the elementary truth that it is the lack of political will on the part of certain powers that is the main stumbling-block to any substantial progress in the sphere of disarmament. True, the constant deterioration in the international climate is not conducive to the success of such gatherings, as many delegations around this table have rightly stressed. However, it must be recognized that this deterioration is caused and maintained by a system based on principles of domination and exploitation. But the root cause of the failure is undoubtedly the attitude of certain powers which conceive and apprehend problems of security only in terms of relations of strength and the balance of power, an approach which inevitably leads to an attempt to gain supremacy through a feverish arms race. It is this stumbling-block, the lack of political will, which prevents the Committee on Disarmament from undertaking real negotiations on the vitally important questions which are before it. As a result, the entire multilateral negotiating process on disarmament matters is at an impasse.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

The disappointment we rightly feel at the failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is all the greater when we remember the efforts made by the non-aligned countries and the flexibility they showed throughout that session. We were justified in hoping that in response to such an attitude the States which were blocking a consensus would make an effort to help reach a compromise. Unfortunately that was not the case.

This frustration ought not, however, to paralyse us. On the contrary, we must redouble our efforts to try to achieve concrete results on the questions that are before us. This is the only way of restoring a certain credibility to the multilateral negotiating machinery and in particular to the Committee on Disarmament whose responsibility has thereby become even more important.

While the General Assembly at its second special session failed in its principal objective, namely, the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, it at least had the merit of clearly reaffirming the validity of the Final Document of 1978 and States' commitment to respect the priorities established in the Programme of Action adopted by consensus at the first special session devoted to disarmament. On the strength of this reaffirmation, the Committee on Disarmament ought to continue to work on the basis of those objectives and priorities.

Having made these few remarks of a general nature, I should like now briefly to touch upon some of the items appearing on our agenda for this summer session.

My delegation shared the views of those delegations which proposed that three of the ad hoc working groups should be "put to sleep" for the period of this short summer session.

What, after all, could we expect from a resumption of the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament a few weeks after the second special session? A period for reflection in fact seems to us entirely necessary before the Working Group on this subject resumes its activities. Furthermore, this will give Ambassador García Robles time to hold consultations on ways and means of resuming the negotiations on sounder bases so that the Committee on Disarmament may be in a position to submit a draft programme of general and complete disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session, in accordance with the decision adopted at the second special session. We are, however, firmly convinced that such a programme, to have any real value, must include specific and concrete measures of disarmament, establish an order of priority in accordance with paragraph 45 of the Final Document, lay down at least a tentative time-table for the application of the measures enumerated and, lastly, contain a credible commitment on the part of all States to carry out all the elements of this programme.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is at an impasse because of fundamental differences of views on such important questions as the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verification of compliance with the treaty, peaceful uses and, finally, the prohibition of attacks upon nuclear installations. Given such divergences of view, it was undesirable for the Ad Hoc Working Group to meet regularly during this session. Here again, we hope that the consultations being held by Ambassador Wegener will bring about a sufficient reconciliation of these positions to permit the Group to emerge from its impasse.

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

As to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we consider that the key to the problem is in the hands of the nuclear-weapon Powers, for only a change of attitude on their part could give meaning to our work in this Group. We can, however, only express our pleasure at the solemn declaration of non-first-use of nuclear weapons made by the Soviet Union at the second special session. China also having given a similar undertaking, we hope that the other nuclear-weapon Powers will reconsider their positions and undertake at last to offer the non-nuclear-weapon States all the requisite assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We have also taken note of the change in France's position which appeared to be implicit in the statement made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at the second special session.

I should like now to offer some brief comments on the questions we are dealing with at this session.

My delegation is, of course, very pleased at the long-awaited establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. The choice of Ambassador Lidgard as Chairman of that Working Group is further cause for satisfaction. His appointment amounts in fact to a well-deserved tribute to his country, Sweden, which has always fought for the cessation of nuclear tests, but it is also a tribute to the exceptional qualities Ambassador Lidgard has shown whenever he has been asked to direct a working group.

As we all know, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has a limited mandate, the result of concessions made principally by the Group of 21, which saw the establishment of the Group with such a mandate as a first step towards the genuine negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, in accordance with paragraph 51 of the Final Document. We are, however, convinced that the question of verification cannot be dealt with in the abstract and that prior agreement on the sphere of application and the nature of the future treaty is necessary, if only as a working hypothesis. Furthermore, any attempt to isolate verification questions could well involve us in purely technical discussions or academic debates. We would have wished the Group to use the meetings allocated to it during this session to lay the groundwork for a solution to verification questions so that it would really be able to start the negotiation of a treaty prohibiting nuclear tests from the beginning of next year. Unfortunately, however, this appears not to be the case. We, for our part, are ready to agree to any verification system provided it is universal and non-discriminatory and allows all States access to all data.

The Algerian delegation has taken note of the decision of two nuclear-weapon States not to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We nevertheless hope that these two Powers will contribute to the Group's work by other means and in particular through the intermediary of the Chairman of the Working Group.

The Committee on Disarmament is still, as in the past, prevented from discussing the eminently priority question of the cessation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament. Once more, all the proposals put forward under this item of our agenda have been rejected for lack of a consensus. Does not that constitute a denial of the right of all States to participate in negotiations directly affecting their vital security interests, which is certainly true of nuclear disarmament questions?

(Mr. Taffar, Algeria)

We recognize, of course, that the nuclear-weapon States have a special responsibility in such negotiations. But this responsibility ceases to be exclusive as soon as the issues under discussion are such as to affect the security of all States.

The initiation of restricted negotiations, however important, cannot be used as an argument to justify the holding up of the multilateral process of negotiation. My delegation remains convinced of the need to set up an ad hoc working group to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document and to identify the basic questions to be dealt with in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We also support the Indian proposal for the establishment, under this item, of a working group to negotiate, as the first stage in the negotiating process on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. It is more urgent than ever today to adopt effective measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Another item on our agenda second only in importance to that of nuclear weapons is the question of chemical weapons. The negotiations on this subject are extremely promising, to judge by the progress made -- slow, it is true, but substantial -- and the intensity of work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the guidance of Ambassador Sujka. The Group has in fact embarked on the delicate and crucial stage of trying to reach a compromise on the questions which remain at issue.

The main tasks remaining before the Working Group are to find a balance acceptable to all parties between national means of verification and the international verification system and to reconcile the positions of delegations on the question of a clause prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. On the latter point it appears that the Working Group is near a compromise which, without prejudice to the Protocol of 1925, meets the requirements of delegations demanding the inclusion of such a provision. The solution of these two important questions will mean that an appreciable advance has been made towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons.

The question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is the item for discussion at our meeting today. No one is unaware of the importance of this subject in view of the threat of the extension of the arms race to outer space which is increasing day by day. The use of space technology for military purposes greatly increases the risk of outer space becoming the arena of rivalries and constituting a threat to peace, security and the peaceful use of space. Paragraph 80 of the Final Document of 1978 states that further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held to prevent an arms race in outer space.

In the consideration of this question, the importance and complexity of which no one can deny, a global approach should be adopted covering all types of armaments and all activities connected with the development, production, stockpiling and deployment and use in outer space of all types of weapons, while allowing the right of every State to engage in the exploration and the peaceful use of outer space. All negotiations on this question ought, moreover, to include a consideration of measures to promote international co-operation in the matter of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Toffar, Algeria)

The time has thus come to start negotiations towards the adoption of effective measures to prevent the extension of the arms race to outer space. To this end, my delegation supports the proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question, without prejudice to respect for the order of priority of the questions included in the Committee's agenda.

I should like, before I conclude, to say a few words about the Committee's working methods. My delegation still believes that the formula of ad hoc working groups constitutes the best approach for the consideration of the items that are before us. On the basis of this conviction, my delegation supports in principle any proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group which would help us to move forward along the road to disarmament, due respect being paid to the order of priorities set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Algerian delegation consequently deplores the misuse of the principle of consensus to block the establishment of ad hoc working groups on such urgent matters as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. TIMERBAEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the USSR would like to make a few brief comments in connection with the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events which has been put before the Committee for its consideration.

The Soviet delegation has no objection to the report and agrees to its being taken note of by the Committee.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to the distinguished Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ericsson, for the very useful clarifications he gave in connection with the Group's report and in answer to the questions of distinguished representatives.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the work of the Group of seismicological experts. The two reports submitted by the Group in documents CCD/558 of 1978 and CD/43 of 1979 form a good basis for the elaboration of an international seismic data exchange system in connection with a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, the drafting of which is one of the priority tasks of our committee.

The international exchange system proposed by the Group, including a global network of approximately 50 stations, communications channels and international centres, is designed to provide States parties to the future treaty with such information as will substantially increase the reliability of verification that nuclear weapon tests are not being carried out.

It is extremely important that such an international system should be easily accessible to all States parties to the future treaty and that every State party should have the right not only to provide data from the seismological stations designated by



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it for purposes of the international exchange, but also to receive all the seismological data made available through international exchange. This is particularly important for countries possessing a poor seismological network or no seismograph facilities at all.

It was agreed in the Group that for purposes of national verification it would be entirely sufficient to have a Level 1 parameters system which would reduce to the minimum the number of seismic events remaining unidentified after the process of identification at national centres. Such a system of parameters has been worked out by the Group of seismological experts and is suitable for the determination of the co-ordinates of epicentres, the origin time of events and their depth and magnitude.

It is envisaged that whenever the use of Level 1 parameters is not sufficient to clear up doubts about the nature of events, Level 2 data will be drawn upon for more thorough analysis, at the request of any party to the treaty.

Thus we, like many other delegations, recognize the expediency of using Level 2 data. They are in fact useful, but in practice they will be needed only in a small number of cases and only in a volume sufficient to permit identification of the nature of a given event.

The scientific Group's mandate, as Dr. Ericsson observed, is unlimited. This is perhaps also its shortcoming, for with such a mandate any State can, without restriction, present the outcome of its national investigations for discussion. All the same, however, the seismological experts must complete their work at some stage and sum up its results on the basis of the principle agreed on for the designing of the system as a means of facilitating national verification.

The representative of India rightly observed that the scientific Group ought not to go to the extreme where the better becomes the enemy of the good. We fully share this view.

The suggestions made recently by certain experts concerning an increased role for Level 2 data (as regards the volume of such data transmitted and the degree of processing) represent their national assessments, which are their prerogative. We are not trying to impose our views on this matter on any one but at the same time we see no justified technical need for departing from the principle already agreed on for the designing of the system. There already exists in the world today a sound technological base consisting of means available to many States for the receipt and exchange of seismological information. Furthermore, the Group's recommendations in that respect offer a sound basis for the establishment of a realistic seismological exchange system.

Of course we are in favour of further technological progress, but that is an endless process and the adoption of recommendations by the Group of Experts at the present stage of its work ought not, therefore, to be delayed. As regards the further improvement of the system, that was to be one of the tasks of the committee of experts proposed by the participants in the tripartite negotiations in

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document CD/130. The parties to the future treaty were to exchange technical information in that committee and to co-operate in promoting the effectiveness of the international exchange as a whole.

Dr. Ericsson, replying to questions on the work of the Group of Experts, said that the tempo of its activities had somewhat slowed down. One cannot but agree with this statement. The work of the Group was at its most successful at the time when the negotiations on a treaty were in progress. The lack of political will on the part of certain countries in favour of the conclusion of a treaty and the continuation of the negotiations naturally has a direct effect on the success of endeavours with respect to other aspects of this problem, including the purely scientific aspects. The work of the scientific Group is not taking place in a vacuum. It is likely to suffer further in the future from the effects of the political decisions of certain Governments. It is precisely for this reason that it is necessary to adopt a critical approach also to the inclination of certain countries to engage in an endless improvement of the system, at the same time rejecting what was only recently approved and demands immediate completion in the form of the third regular report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and, more important, its putting into practice through the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In conclusion, we wish to support the proposal of the distinguished representative of Japan that a letter should be sent to the World Meteorological Organization requesting that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be allowed to continue to use the WMO Global Telecommunications System on a regular basis for the transmission of seismic data for purposes of the detection and identification of seismic events.

And, last but not least, I should like, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to express our gratitude to you for the skilful and successful way in which you have been conducting the meetings of our Committee during the month of August, and to wish you all success in your future posts.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, Mr. Yu Mengjia.

Mr. YU MENGJIA (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today, I wish to make some preliminary remarks on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The rapid development of space science and technology has greatly raised man's ability to conquer the universe and utilize its potentialities. At present, space science and technology are being gradually and effectively applied to man's production activities and various aspects of man's life, thus constituting an important element in the acceleration of nations' economic development, the improvement of people's living conditions and the promotion of social progress.

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But the development of outer space science and technology has also raised questions causing us concern and apprehensions. The tendency to start an arms race in outer space between the Superpowers has become obvious. Credence is given by the Superpowers to the concept that "whoever controls the universe can control the earth". They have engaged themselves in active research on and the utilization of outer space and the development of outer space weapons. The Soviet Union started its development of anti-satellite weapons more than 10 years ago, and up to now, it has already conducted dozens of experiments. The United States is reportedly also taking effective measures to intensify its research activities and plans the deployment of anti-satellite weapons in outer space. Various indications point to the fact that the development of outer space weapons constitutes an integral part of the global strategy of the USSR and the United States. These two countries are competing with each other to extend the arms race to outer space, thus increasing the danger of war. This has already caused widespread anxiety among peace-loving people throughout the world. At the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space held recently in Vienna, numerous countries urged the Superpowers immediately to cease activities leading to an arms race in outer space and expressed the hope that the Committee on Disarmament would adopt effective measures to this end as soon as possible.

China has all along held that outer space is the common environment of mankind and that space technology represents a great achievement in the development of science and technology. All countries should explore and use outer space for peaceful purposes and refrain from turning it into a new arena of the arms race. We agree with the views of the majority of the member States that the Committee on Disarmament should establish a working group as soon as possible so as to adopt all practicable measures to prevent an arms race in outer space. As is known to all, at present there exists a huge gap between States in space science and technology, especially in regard to their military application, and only the United States and the Soviet Union have the necessary conditions for it. Therefore, in the prevention of an arms race in outer space, they have unshirkable special responsibilities.

With regard to the mandate of the proposed working group, we are of the view that it should be authorized to consider and negotiate on the issue of the complete prohibition of outer space weapons. The future legal instrument on the prohibition of an arms race in outer space should be comprehensive. It should ban all outer space weapons, including anti-satellite weapons, and it should not only prohibit the deployment of weapons in outer space but also the testing, production and use of any type of outer space weapons because the mere prohibition of the deployment of weapons in outer space would leave leeway for the testing and use of weapons in outer space and in consequence the complete prevention of an arms race in outer space would not be achieved. Some States have proposed that the question of the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons be discussed first. As a practical step, this proposal seems to deserve our exploration.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I shall wait until our next meeting, when I will have assumed the chairmanship of the Committee, to express to you my delegation's appreciation for the way in which you have conducted our discussions during the month of August.

I regret that I was not present at the Committee's 182nd meeting, last Thursday, when the distinguished representative of the United States referred at some length to the statement I made on Tuesday, 24 August. I was absent because I was in duty bound to attend the thirty-second Pugwash Conference that was being held in Warsaw, commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of that institution of which I have the honour to be a member.

However, although I was unable to hear Ambassador Fields personally, I have since read the statement he made here with the greatest interest, and I shall now answer it with the brevity it merits.

I hope that our distinguished colleague will forgive me for not imitating him in offering gratuitous interpretations of the motives for our respective statements. On the other hand, I would like to say that I share, to the point of making it my own, the view he expressed in the following terms:

"Rhetoric designed to mask rather than to illuminate the real issues we face does not serve any helpful purpose."

I shall therefore confine myself to pointing out that the "real issue" which I have dealt with in some detail in the three statements I have made, apart from this one, during the month of August, was that of the need for compliance with international agreements, since, as was stated on 17 June, during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the highest political level of the country which Ambassador Fields represents here, "agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept".

I discussed this basic problem in connection with two issues, that of a nuclear test ban -- the first item on our agenda -- which I referred to in the statements I made at the 175th meeting, on 3 August, and the 181st meeting, on 24 August, and that of the "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" -- the second item on our agenda -- to which I devoted my statement of 19 August, at the Committee's 180th meeting. I have nothing to add to what I said in those three statements. I have full confidence in the good judgement of the members of the Committee and the conclusions they may reach simply by comparing the content of those three statements with that of the statement to which I have been referring.

During my lengthy association with both deliberative and negotiating bodies concerned with disarmament, I have had fairly frequent occasion to disagree with the

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views of the nuclear Superpowers. From 1969 onwards, for example, my delegation carried on a nine-year struggle against the maintenance of what we called the "outmoded institution" of the co-chairmanship of the Superpowers. These efforts were rewarded with the introduction of the democratic system of chairmanship by rotation for the Committee on Disarmament in 1978. I also spent nearly 10 years stating publicly, both in New York and in Geneva, that the Soviet Union ought to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, as it finally did in 1978 and 1979 respectively. I venture to hope that the differences of opinion which now unfortunately exist between the Mexican delegation and that of the other Superpower may, in the not too distant future, be resolved in the way which, as is clearly shown in the verbatim records of this Committee and of the First Committee of the General Assembly, is desired by all the peoples of the earth and by almost all the States Members of the United Nations and of the Committee, namely, the elaboration and entry into force of a nuclear test-ban treaty which will translate into reality the goal set forth, almost 20 years ago, in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and reaffirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 -- both of which instruments are in force for the United States -- namely, "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".

Mrs. EKANGA KABEYA (Zaire) (translated from French): Allow me first of all, Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as acting *Chargé d'affaires*, to offer you my delegation's warm congratulations on your accession to the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of August.

We should also like to extend our congratulations and thanks to your eminent predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his dynamism and the tireless efforts he made to ensure the success of our work during his period of office.

I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome among us Ambassador Datcu of Romania and Ambassador Cannock of Peru, and to associate myself with all the expressions of regret and farewell which have been voiced upon the announcement of the departure of the distinguished representatives of India, Algeria, Peru and Yugoslavia, who have been called upon by their countries to fulfil important functions elsewhere. My delegation wishes them every success in the accomplishment of their new tasks.

Our session is taking place immediately after the convening of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the participants in which have told us over and over again, here in the Committee, that it did not achieve the results expected because of the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers and because of international tensions exacerbated by the invasion of Lebanon, the foreign intervention in Afghanistan and the competition in deterrence between the nuclear-weapon Powers. Ought we, at a time when international relations are characterized by the breakdown of *détente*, hegemonic rivalries between the major Powers and the nuclear arms race, to be content with this failure?

My delegation is firmly convinced that our Committee, the only multilateral negotiating body, absolutely must overcome all the obstacles and move forward

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towards the attainment of the objective set for it by the United Nations General Assembly, namely, the initiation of negotiations with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the "ultimate objective" of all efforts made in the sphere of disarmament.

Before explaining my delegation's views on some of the items on our agenda, I should like to quote a few paragraphs from a text in document A/S-12/AC.1/L.5/Add.1 of the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session which was prepared by the Chairman of Working Group I in New York and which fully reflects our concerns in the disarmament sphere.

These paragraphs read as follows:

"The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States ...

"Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies ... The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries.

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

It is clear from the foregoing that, faced by the danger of a possible nuclear confrontation all countries, whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, should combine their efforts to ensure peace and international security and more particularly to make possible the development of the poor countries through the release of the ever vaster resources which are being swallowed up in the arms race.

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With respect to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, dealing respectively with the subjects of a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my delegation would like to reaffirm here the position of the Executive Council of Zaire (the Government) which has always consisted, first, in requesting the nuclear-weapon States to assume their responsibilities in the matter of nuclear disarmament and, secondly, in giving the support of Zaire to the proposals of the Group of 21 for the setting up of two working groups, the first to negotiate on a test ban treaty and the second to consider the measures to be adopted to put a stop to the nuclear arms race.

My delegation naturally, therefore, welcomes the Committee's decision to allow the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban to begin its work during this session. Although the Group's mandate is limited for the time being we believe that it will be possible for the Group to discuss other proposals at a later date. In this connection we agree with Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium that we should adopt a political and legal approach to our work rather than plunging into pseudo-technicalities which would be of no use to us and would give rise to pointless discussions, for example, on the acceptable level of verification.

On behalf of my delegation I should like to congratulate Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden very warmly on his appointment as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and to assure him here and now of the co-operation of my delegation within its modest limits. At the same time we regret the decision of two nuclear-weapon Powers not to participate in the work of that Ad Hoc Working Group. We would urge and beg them to help the Working Group carry out its task.

I cannot fail to state the profound concern of my delegation at the introduction of nuclear weapons into southern Africa. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa with the complicity of certain Powers constitutes a very serious danger for the security of African States.

My delegation therefore wishes, as other African delegations have already done, to reaffirm in its turn the desire repeatedly expressed by our heads of State that Africa should be made a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Committee on Disarmament ought therefore to give this matter very serious consideration and to take appropriate measures in order to avert the disastrous consequences which could result from the introduction and accumulation of nuclear weapons in Africa.

We are happy to note that a nuclear-weapon Power recently undertook not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

My delegation also enthusiastically welcomes the proposal by India for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the prevention of nuclear war.

My delegation has always attached very great importance to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended in failure and was unable to meet the great expectations placed in it with respect to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament should in no way discourage us in our efforts to achieve this goal.

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My delegation hopes that in spite of that failure the Working Group, which will resume its activities only in 1983, under the distinguished guidance of its Chairman, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, will make good use of the respite which has been granted it to conduct varied and constructive consultations with a view to devising a comprehensive programme of disarmament acceptable to all. The same applies to the working groups on security assurances and radiological weapons, whose work has been suspended until the end of this year.

My delegation is very much interested in the consideration of measures for the prevention of an arms race in outer space, which is the common heritage of mankind and ought to be used by States solely for peaceful purposes. My delegation is ready to agree to any constructive proposal in this connection and fully supports the idea of the consideration of this subject during the present session in a working group set up for the purpose.

My delegation considers chemical weapons the most barbarous and murderous weapons of mass destruction and has always been in favour of their total elimination.

We reaffirm our support for General Assembly resolution 35/144B which urges the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, negotiations towards the adoption of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons.

We believe that a general and verifiable prohibition of the manufacture and stockpiling of chemical weapons of all types would constitute an important step towards general and complete disarmament.

My delegation would like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Sujka of Poland, the Chairman of the Ad hoc Working Group, for the noteworthy progress the Group is continuing to make under his efficient guidance.

We are glad to see that the proposal made at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament that meetings of ad hoc working groups should be concentrated in time for the sake of greater efficiency has been applied in the matter of chemical weapons.

Lastly, the subject of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is one of universal concern. Like very many other members of the Committee, we believe that in order to create conditions conducive to the disarmament process, all States without exception should comply strictly with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, refrain from any actions which might be prejudicial to the efforts being made in the disarmament sphere, adopt a constructive attitude towards the negotiations and manifest the political will to reach agreements.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Zaire for her statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?



(The Chairman)

As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I intend now to put to the Committee for adoption the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, as contained in document CD/318, as well as the draft communication circulated in Working Paper No. 73.

I suggest that we take up first the report of the seismic Group. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the schedule of work contained in paragraph 10 of document CD/318.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to Working Paper No. 73, containing a draft communication to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization in connection with the utilization of the Global Telecommunications System. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee accepts the text as drafted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have consulted with the incoming Chairman of the Committee and we agree to recommend to you to advance the time for the opening of the next plenary meeting to 10 o'clock sharp in view of the long list of speakers for that meeting.

If there is no objection, the next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 September, at 10 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.