

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 24 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA

(Kenya)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. R. GARCIA--MORITAN
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. T. FINDLAY Miss S. BOYD
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. TELLALOV Mr. SOTIROV Mr. DEYANOV Mr. PRAMOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U MAUNG MAUNG GYI U TIN KYAW HLAING U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG Mr. SUO KAIMING
<u>Cuba:</u>	~ Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. VEJVODA Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ Mr. J. JIRUŠEK
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. G. THIELICKE  
Mr. F. SAYATZ  
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. G. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. T. KAWAKITA

Kenya:

Mr. G. GATERE, MAINA  
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR

Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU

Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. P. CANNOCK

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. DATCU

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Mr. T. PANAIT

Mr. M.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Mrs. JONANG

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

Mr. V.L. GAI

Mr. V.L. KOTJUKANSKY

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mrs. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Ms. M. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VHRUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. O. GNOK

NON-MEMBER REPRESENTATIVES

Senegal:

Mr. A. SENE

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 181st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee starts today its consideration of item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

In connection with item 1 of the agenda, may I draw the attention of the Committee to document CD/518, entitled "Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events", which has been circulated today for consideration by the Committee. In addition to the statements that members might wish to make on the report, it is the practice of the Committee to make some time available for questions which members wish to address to the Chairman of the Group, Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. I will therefore invite Dr. Ericsson at the end of this plenary meeting to answer any questions addressed to him in connection with the progress report.

Before we start our business for this plenary meeting, I wish to note that we need to continue our consideration of proposals made under items 2 and 7 of the agenda of the Committee. Members will recall that we started our discussion on those proposals at our informal meeting on Thursday last. In accordance with the programme of work for the present week, we reserved this afternoon for an informal meeting. We should therefore continue our exchange of views this afternoon at an informal meeting. In connection with the time reserved for an informal meeting on Thursday afternoon, may I suggest that we devote that meeting to the question of the improved and effective functioning of the Committee. We will proceed accordingly, if there is no objection.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Yugoslavia, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mexico, Sweden, Japan, Australia and Senegal.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular pleasure to greet you, the representative of a non-aligned, friendly African country as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament and to assure you that my delegation will do its utmost to facilitate the difficult task that stands before you.

I would also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who had the particularly delicate and difficult task of concluding the session of the Committee on the eve of the second special session.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to greet the new representative of friendly and neighbouring Romania, Ambassador Datcu, whose experience will be important for the work of our Committee, and to wish much success in their future duties to our colleagues who have left us, Ambassadors Yu Peiwen of China, Valdivieso of Peru and Venkateswaran of India.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Our summer session is taking place under the direct impact of the unsuccessful conclusion of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many previous speakers have spoken about this, giving various assessments as to the causes of such a conclusion. We share the views of the great majority who have said that the failure of the special session must be placed in the perspective of the persistent deterioration in the international situation during the past four years. However, differences also exist with regard to the causes that have led to such a deterioration in the international situation, and there are even greater differences with respect to the way out of the present difficult situation.

The continuation of the arms race, which is irreconcilable with the goals and principles of the United Nations, is surely the main cause and consequence of such a state of affairs.

The theory and practice which aspire to present the appearance of new weapons as an imperative of national defence interests and a way to seek political and military balance, in reality represent an attempt to justify the arms race and as such are **unacceptable**, both from the standpoint of world peace and international co-operation as well as from the standpoint of the national security of any State. The arms race is inevitably the consequence of power politics, the exercise of pressure, interference in the internal affairs of countries and the expansion of spheres of interest. All this generates distrust, insecurity and instability, which lead to a constant deterioration in international relations and constitute the most concrete and most dangerous threat to peace and the security of countries and hinder socio-economic development in the world. Such a situation has unfortunately been going on for too long a time. Its harshest aspect is the increasingly frequent aggressions against non-aligned countries of which the most recent example in such a series of events is the genocide carried out against the unarmed civilian population of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples on the part of the exceptionally aggressive Israeli war machine. It is particularly disquieting that the Israeli aggression, which equals in its atrocities the one to which the populations of many countries were exposed during the Second World War, including the Israeli people themselves, is taking place without particular protest from many countries which otherwise follow very closely and with considerable publicity the violation of individual human rights in some countries.

We consider that the way out of the present situation must only be sought in the creation of a new system of international political and economic relations. As regards politics in particular, a change in the international behaviour of the big Powers must be sought, while they must bear the full responsibility in all this for the state of international relations as well as for their own concrete behaviour. Parallel to this, negotiations should be conducted on the settlement of the most urgent issues. The thesis that the precondition for disarmament negotiations is the improvement of the political climate and, in that connection, the resolving of political hotbeds of crisis and other problems in general, particularly in the relations between the big Powers, is not convincing. For us, it has only relative significance, all the more so since the arms race itself is the source and consequence of mistrust and crisis in relations. In other words, the overcoming of the present unfavourable international relations can only be achieved through parallel efforts in the political, military and economic spheres. Only political means can efficiently pave the way for disarmament, just as practical disarmament measures, as modest as they initially may be, can contribute substantively to the promotion of the political climate and to confidence in the success of the peaceful settlement of disputes.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

The existence of mutual confidence would, no doubt, lead to the strengthening of political will which, in turn, proceeding from the existence of global and approximate parity of power, could call for practical measures of military disengagement and the reduction of armed forces and armaments. When stressing that the requisite condition for peace, security and confidence in the world is the existence of a balance between the big military Powers, it is often overlooked that the process of the arms race only worsens even more the existing lack of balance between the big Powers and the rest of the world, especially to the detriment of the countries which do not belong to any alliances and primarily small countries. The interest of these countries, among which Yugoslavia also finds itself, is therefore geared towards a taking of measures as urgently as possible to reduce the level of armaments, in order to ensure the right of every State to security.

In such a situation the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, is the most appropriate forum which should make particular efforts to attenuate the unfavourable situation in the field of disarmament. We share the opinion of all those who have assessed the Committee as being capable of achieving if even an insignificant degree of success in its work. Of course, any success will depend both on reinforced efforts and even more on the resoluteness, i.e. the political will to achieve it. The programme of work we have adopted offers such possibilities, especially in connection with some priority issues on the agenda. I shall dwell very briefly on the work of some working groups and, in that respect, the problems that we must solve.

First, my delegation considers that one of the most mature issues is the ban on chemical weapons. In the course of a decade of the Committee's work on this issue, much has indeed been done to bring near the completion of the text of an international convention. Yugoslavia has always accorded the greatest attention to the prohibition of this type of weapons of mass destruction and will continue to give its contribution through the participation of its experts. So far, Yugoslavia has submitted several working papers relating to particular elements of the convention such as verification, the definition of chemical warfare agents, medical protection against nerve gas poisoning and in relation to the destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion of warfare agents and their means of production. We believe that the Ad Hoc Working Group can make further significant progress in this year's work and can embark next year upon the elaboration of the final draft of the convention.

Secondly, even after four years the Committee on Disarmament is still not conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament which is the first priority adopted by consensus on the part of all States at the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament and confirmed again at the second special session held in July this year. The many people who rightfully demonstrate in the streets of many cities, calling for the prevention of the nuclear threat, probably do not know that this Committee has never even started to negotiate about these weapons with which only a few States keep the entire world hostage. To be truthful, it is possible to deliver speeches on nuclear weapons in this Committee every day and occasionally obtain a response from some of the nuclear-weapon Powers as to why it is "unrealistic" to negotiate in the Committee and outside it as well. However, instead of negotiations, the utmost is being done to convince the rest of the world how imperative it is to halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons, as this can lead to an uncontrolled situation and possible use of nuclear weapons by "irresponsible" countries. At the same time, these very countries are reinforcing their own nuclear armament "in order to restore the disrupted balance", and the like, as if the present frightening situation in which one learns daily of new plans to win a protracted nuclear war were not enough.



(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

My delegation, which has persistently been asking that the Committee on Disarmament start negotiating on nuclear disarmament, deems positive the proposal of India to establish a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. This could be a significant contribution in the framework of the complex consideration of issues relating to the prohibition of use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament. The starting basis for the consideration of this issue in the Committee could be the existing agreement between the United States and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war signed in Washington on 22 June 1973.

In this connection, we assess as a positive contribution the declaration regarding the non-first-use of nuclear weapons made at the second special session on disarmament by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Such a statement was also made several years ago by the People's Republic of China and we hope that other nuclear-weapon Powers will also follow suit, which would be the best proof that they really want to prevent a nuclear holocaust in an efficient manner.

Thirdly, my delegation thinks that it is of outstanding importance that, after long-standing requests, the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has been created by the Committee. We would like to extend a particular greeting to its Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador Mr. Lidgard of Sweden, a long-standing and consistent champion of general and complete disarmament who we know will successfully lead this Group. Although this Group starts to work with a limited mandate that satisfies us only in part, we consider that the present mandate could still allow for the consideration of a programme of work which should not be too narrow and limiting in nature. A good basis for such consideration is contained both in the draft outline of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban submitted by its Chairman and that submitted by the distinguished Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic. What is important at this stage is to make as clear guidelines as possible, leading to the final goal, that of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. My delegation considers that such a treaty should prohibit all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all times by all States and should be based on a verification system that is non-discriminatory and universal in nature, which would guarantee equal access for all States and would attract universal adherence to the treaty.

It is with regret that my delegation learned that the delegations of the People's Republic of China and France will not take part in the work of this Group. We, like other non-aligned countries, have always maintained that all nuclear-weapon States must participate equitably in the entire work of this Committee and have sincerely welcomed this when it came as the result of the first special session. It is our conviction that all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, have responsibilities with regard to the consideration and contribution they ought to give in the area of nuclear disarmament. No one is better capable of giving proposals on the prohibition of particular types of weapons or can better understand the value of similar proposals by the other party than the one who possesses this type of weapons himself. It is difficult for non-nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the non-aligned countries, to participate fully in the efforts to progress towards nuclear disarmament if all the nuclear-weapon Powers do not make an active contribution to that effect, all the more so since participating in the work of the Group does not impose any unilateral binding obligations. My delegation expresses the hope that the delegations of the People's Republic of China and France will reconsider their decisions and take part in the Group's work as soon as possible.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

Fourthly, our Committee has before it the proposal for the creation of a working group on the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the prohibition of anti-satellite systems, based on two resolutions tabled at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly to the effect that it is imperative to take timely steps to prevent the possible taking of such actions. We have listened to the arguments presented by some States which consider that there is no room for the creation of this group before many uncertainties have first been elucidated, since only two States are so far capable of transferring the arms race into outer space and that many members of the working group would be incapable of understanding the technical aspect of the problem. Admitting to a certain extent the validity of these arguments, we think that we are primarily dealing with a political issue and the decision to adopt an international instrument that will prevent certain activities in outer space, without entering into complicated technical details at all.

Fifthly, for reasons that were cited in this Committee, my delegation accepts that the work of the working groups on negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament remain in abeyance until the end of this year. Nevertheless, we think that this short period of rest should be used not only for informal consultations but also to make the most solid preparations possible for the continuation of the work of these groups.

For anyone who participates in the work of this Committee and follows its activities for a longer period of time it becomes increasingly clear how complex the issues it faces are and how it is increasingly difficult for it to fulfil its voluminous programme of work. This gives rise to the need to periodically re-examine the organization of its work as well. The task with which the Committee is faced now is not easy in this respect, since it also encompasses the issue of a possible extension of its membership, on which there are differences of opinion in the Committee. In view of the fact that this is the single multilateral negotiating body whose importance is growing by the day, we consider that any premature solution could bring more harm than benefit. In order to ensure a broader and more thorough exchange of views, one that would also include other members of the United Nations, we think that consultations should be continued during the General Assembly as well and appropriate solutions be proposed only after solid preparations have taken place. I would like to point out that we view sympathetically the increased interest of States in actively participating in the work of the Committee. This is a positive sign that there are more and more countries that wish to take part in solving disarmament problems. We think first of all that the existing rules of procedure of the Committee should be adjusted in such a way as to accord all Members of the United Nations the automatic right to speak in the Committee and submit appropriate proposals.

As my leaving Geneva also brings my mandate as head of the Yugoslav delegation to the Committee on Disarmament to an end, permit me to express in conclusion some of my personal impressions.

When the Committee on Disarmament was created after the first special session, Yugoslavia, the non-aligned movement and many other countries as well as the world public as a whole, saw in it a new, big chance. The increasing threat to peace and security and the increasingly difficult problems of socio-economic development in the world inevitably call for the arrival at last of that historical turning point when the arms race will stop and a genuine process of disarmament will begin. No such reversal has been produced during the past four years. On the contrary, all hopes have been betrayed. The big Powers, the blocs and even the rest of the world have further strengthened and added

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

to their armaments. This is happening in a situation when the world has never wanted peace and needed co-operation more but has never been more divided and threatened; when differences between the rich, developed and poor, underdeveloped world in which millions of people are hungry every day have never been so great; when the world was never so interdependent and aware of the need for peace and development, while at the same time being so armed and directly threatened by the danger of total nuclear destruction. These dilemmas have no alternative. The world can only survive in peaceful coexistence that should proceed from general and complete disarmament and universal international co-operation for the development of all countries.

Although we all agree on this in theory, we do not, however, implement it in practice. I am deeply convinced that the solution for the way out of the present dangerous situation can only be found in the sustained support by all countries and on every occasion of the fundamental principles of peaceful coexistence, collective security and equitable co-operation which are embodied in the United Nations Charter and for which the non-aligned movement is wholeheartedly striving. It is only in the genuine realization of these principles that every country can find its place under the sun, ensure its security, freedom, independence, human rights and development. This is the only way to overcome relations based on power politics, domination and hegemony, to prevent the jeopardizing of independence by spheres of interest and interference in the internal affairs of particular countries which alone have the right to decide about the form and way of their life. Only through equitable international relations and the establishment of the New International Economic Order is it possible to build a world of confidence, peace and friendship between all peoples and States of the world.

Such a general political climate must also be maintained by the Committee on Disarmament in order that it may accomplish its important tasks. Without this, the Committee will continue to mark time, listen to calls being repeated and to rhetorical speeches, hold innumerable meetings with no results at a time when the world has an increasing number of problems, conflicts and weapons every day. Its work will continue to yield no results if we are not capable of creating conditions that will ensure that the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral negotiating body, becomes the true forum for negotiations on disarmament. The work of the Committee has always encouraged me because of the prevailing spirit of co-operation, tolerant discussion, equitable relations and a generally existing aspiration to progress and fulfil the task before us. I think that this spirit should today be preserved so that tomorrow, when common sense, confidence and political will finally prevail, these conditions will ensure genuine, productive and successful work by the Committee on Disarmament. I regret that I have not witnessed that "tomorrow"; however, I am deeply convinced of it. And not only because of the spirit that prevails here but also because we have no other alternative.

I can assure you that my country, continuing Tito's policy, will always do all that is in its power to support the Committee on Disarmament in continuing its work in this spirit and to fulfil the historical tasks for which it has been created.

I would like to thank all delegations for their active, constructive and friendly co-operation and the secretariat and particularly Ambassador Jaipal, for their highly professional work. I wish for all of you that you may arrive as soon as possible at that historical turning point from armament to disarmament, which is so eagerly awaited by the great majority of mankind and which would pave the way for a new era of freedom, prosperity and well-being for all.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

I am sure that all members of the Committee share my feelings in learning that Ambassador Vrhunec will be leaving us soon. He has contributed much to the work of the Committee with his outstanding diplomatic skill and his tact and wisdom. I wish him success in his new assignment where, I am sure, he will continue to serve his great country with distinction.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, His Excellency Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, our statement today will be devoted to the questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear tests.

It is not by chance that these questions are the first on the Committee's agenda. They are in truth the main, the central issues in international life.

Furthermore, there is every reason for saying that they are becoming more and more urgent and acute. This stems from the fact that the United States is intensifying, on a growing scale, its material and technical preparations in the nuclear sphere, as also the aggressiveness of its military and strategic concepts. A nuclear war is now viewed by the United States as possible and, in certain circumstances, expedient, and practical preparations for it are under way with the aim of winning a victory. Hence particular emphasis is placed on creating a first-strike potential, on reducing the striking distance, on efforts to move the nuclear menace created by such a policy as far away from United States territory as possible. All this leads to a sharp destabilization of the strategic situation in the world.

Following upon these doctrines, based on the admissibility and even acceptability of a nuclear conflict, we learned literally a few days ago that the Pentagon had completed a "strategic master plan" which is to provide the United States, according to the press, with "the capability of winning a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union".

I do not think that it is necessary to explain in detail to such a competent and qualified body as our Committee to what extent the calculations about winning a victory in a nuclear war are insane. The Soviet Union, like the overwhelming majority of States, bases its approach on the indisputable fact, decisive in the present international situation, that should a nuclear war begin it could mean the destruction of human civilization and perhaps an end to life itself on earth.

This view is also shared by the majority of military experts. It is shared in particular by such a high-ranking American military leader as General D. Jones, who has just retired as Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. He is reported to have warned that preparations for fighting either a limited or a protracted nuclear war would be throwing money into a "bottomless pit". "I see great difficulty", he said, "in keeping any kind" -- I would emphasize, any kind -- "of nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States from escalating."

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, Soviet leaders have repeatedly stressed that our military doctrine is purely defensive in character. This general defensive orientation of Soviet doctrine has been and still is reflected in the military-technical policy of our State. I should like to stress this fact.

Faithful to the principles of its nuclear policy, the Soviet Union has taken the unprecedented step of giving a unilateral pledge that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This pledge, which became effective at the moment when the message from the head of the Soviet State, Leonid Brezhnev, was read out from the rostrum of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, is our concrete contribution to the efforts of the international community to avert a nuclear war and to curb the nuclear arms race.

At the request of the Soviet delegation, the message from Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament has been circulated as an official document of the Committee.

We wish to stress that the Soviet unilateral pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons means in practice that the task of preventing a military conflict from developing into a nuclear one will be given even greater attention in the training of Soviet armed forces, and this task in all its complexity is becoming a permit part of our military activities. As was stated by Marshal D.F. Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union, this imposes an even stricter framework on troops and staff training and the determination of the weapons complement, and requires the organization of even more rigid control in order to rule out reliably the possibility of any unauthorized launching of nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic.

Attempts to belittle the importance of this Soviet action by labelling it "propagandistic", "declarative" and so on, are not likely to convince many people, and will certainly not be successful here in this Committee whose members are experts in disarmament matters. We are grateful to the distinguished representatives of fraternal socialist countries members of the Committee, as well as to the distinguished representatives of Pakistan, Brazil, Yugoslavia and other countries, who have praised the Soviet initiative.

The peoples of the world have the right to expect that the initiative of the Soviet Union will be followed by reciprocal steps on the part of the other nuclear-weapon States. If the other nuclear-weapon Powers also undertake an equally precise and clear obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether, which is what the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world demand.

Questions relating to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war should be considered by our Committee as a matter of priority, and we support the Indian proposal that negotiations should be undertaken on "appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war". We would recall that it was on the initiative of the Soviet Union that the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session adopted the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, which has won high moral and political recognition.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Parallel to urgent measures to avert the growing nuclear threat it is essential for the Committee to proceed to the elaboration of measures which would really bring the nuclear arms race to a halt and lead to nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet delegation would like at this point to stress primarily our positive attitude to the idea of a mutual freeze on nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and, finally, to their complete elimination. This has been declared from the rostrum of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is a global one, and we are in agreement with the great majority of delegations which have offered an analysis of this problem. While we attach great importance to the present negotiations between the USSR and the United States of America on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms and on the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe, and while we express the hope that these negotiations will lead to speedy and positive results, we would like at the same time to stress with the utmost firmness that the problem of nuclear disarmament should be considered in all its scope by the Committee and that the Committee as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating organ should concretely and productively contribute to the solution of this problem.

Nuclear war, if it should break out, will spare no one; it will affect every State on earth. That is why all States, including, certainly, the non-nuclear-weapon States, have not only the right but the duty before humanity to do everything in their power to help solve the problem of nuclear disarmament.

Striving, for its part, to contribute constructively to the achievement of this aim the Soviet Union, in its memorandum on "Averting the growing nuclear threat and curbing the arms race", submitted at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, advocated the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme, and proposed concrete parameters for this programme on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session.

It is our view that such a programme could include the following:

Cessation of the development of new systems of nuclear weapons;

Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the purpose of manufacturing various types of nuclear weapons;

Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear munitions and of their delivery vehicles;

Gradual reduction of accumulated stockpiles of nuclear weapons, including their delivery vehicles;

Total elimination of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear arms limitation and reduction should include all nuclear means, and primarily strategic armaments and medium-range weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As can be seen from our list of possible nuclear disarmament measures, one of the first stages of the programme could be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for the manufacture of various types of nuclear weapons -- something which very many other countries also have advocated. The Soviet Union is ready to examine this matter in the over-all context of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race.

It goes without saying that during the elaboration of nuclear disarmament measures it will be necessary to agree upon appropriate methods and forms of verification which would satisfy all parties concerned and promote the effective implementation of the agreements reached.

We would particularly stress that the resources released at each stage as a result of nuclear disarmament would be totally allocated to peaceful purposes, including the provision of assistance to developing countries, excluding, in other words, the reallocation of those resources to the production of what are known as conventional armaments.

The Soviet Union is prepared to take part in all this work. It is now the turn of the other nuclear-weapon Powers and in particular of the United States, to state their position.

The USSR memorandum has been circulated today at the request of our delegation as an official document of the Committee, and we hope that it will help us in our work.

The Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for the conduct of negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and we consider that it is extremely important for the Committee to set up immediately an ad hoc working group on this item.

That is the position of the Soviet Union on the questions of the prevention of nuclear war and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this connection I should like to say frankly that the statements made by certain delegations in the Committee cause us, to say the least, perplexity, for by putting the blame for the deadlock in the negotiations on these priority issues on the so-called "Superpowers", lumped together, they do not perceive, or do not want to perceive that the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States differ in principle. This applies in particular to the delegation which, on the one hand constantly reiterates its support for the positions of the developing countries and on the other hand, by its refusal to participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, has set itself up in opposition to the majority of the Committee. Such contradictions, whether deliberately or not, mislead public opinion and can only damage negotiations on disarmament. We appeal to these delegations to adopt a correct approach to the position of the USSR, in particular on the basis of the documents which have been distributed.

I should now like to speak about the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

Although the vital importance of this problem is widely admitted, in view of recent United States Administration decisions in this sphere which deny the primordial importance of this issue, I wish briefly to explain here the Soviet approach of principle to the problem of nuclear tests.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The complete and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is one of the most important problems in the general complex of measures aimed at averting the threat of nuclear war. Its solution would mean setting up a real obstacle in the way of the further improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types and systems of such weapons. It is known, too, that tests are used for verifying combat readiness and for increasing the efficiency of existing nuclear munitions. The cessation of further tests would impede this process and thus really contribute to a lowering of the military efficiency of nuclear weapons, which would lead to a decline in the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war and an increase in the stability of the strategic situation both on a regional and on a global scale.

We are glad that many delegations share this point of view. As the representative of the Netherlands rightly put it at the Committee's meeting on 17 August, "A comprehensive test ban would strengthen the security of all States, create conditions for a gradual de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and draw closer the goal of undiminished security at a progressively lower level of armaments. Moreover, a universal agreement to cease nuclear testing would enhance confidence between States".

Bearing all this in mind, we think that the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an important measure for the limitation of the nuclear arms race. It would, at the same time, strengthen the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime since it would deprive States seeking to possess nuclear weapons of the possibility of carrying out tests, which is an indispensable stage in the production of such weapons.

Acting in accordance with this approach, the Soviet Union has consistently made efforts -- and will continue to do so in the future no less persistently, in spite of the endless zigzags in the positions of the United States and certain other nuclear-weapon-Powers -- to secure the conclusion of a CTBT. That is our steadfast position. I believe that the consistency of our approach and our numerous constructive initiatives and proposals on this problem are obvious to everyone.

The President of the United States recently announced his decision not to resume the trilateral talks on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom which were broken off by the United States. At the same time the decision was taken not to ratify the Soviet-American treaties on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which were signed respectively in 1974 and 1976.

Obviously, there is no need to assess these decisions. World public opinion as well as many delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have already given a due assessment of them. In fact in the United States itself a number of political figures of high standing whom we all know well, former directors of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and heads of United States delegations at negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests, colleagues of ours such as William Forster, Gerald Smith, Paul Warnke, Ralph Earle, Adrian Fisher and Herbert York have stated their refusal to support the United States Administration's decision which, they have stressed, casts doubt upon the sincerity of the United States in the strategic arms reduction talks in Geneva and in other arms control negotiations".



(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Two other nuclear-weapon Powers, too, France and China, have made their "contribution" to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests, in announcing a few days ago, that they would not participate in the negotiations on this issue in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban has started its meetings in this -- to put it bluntly -- not very favourable situation.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we are ready, in spite of this situation, to participate constructively in the activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is of course in the first instance required to define, in relation to the subject under consideration, "issues relating to verification and compliance", as the Group's mandate states. Verification cannot be considered in a vacuum, abstractly. There should be a clear understanding that the issues relating to verification and compliance will be examined as applying to a treaty which would prohibit all test explosions of nuclear weapons in any environment, would be of unlimited duration, would provide for a solution acceptable to all parties of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and would include among its participants all nuclear-weapon States.

The future work of the Group will show how serious the other nuclear-weapon States are in their approach to its work. Even now, in view of the recent decision of the United States Administration on the subject of nuclear weapon tests, a question arises, and we put it to the Committee: will not the United States try to use our Committee and the negotiations being started in it on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests as a screen to deceive world public opinion while at the same time speeding up such tests?

The Soviet delegation would like to state very clearly that we have no intention of tolerating a situation in which the Committee on Disarmament is used for such improper purposes.

Those were the comments the Soviet delegation wished to make on the two first items on our agenda. These observations were prompted by the Soviet Union's basic policy which aims at the prevention of nuclear war, the cessation of the further sophistication of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they are completely eliminated. The outstanding importance of these items is especially evident now, when the international situation in the Middle East has suffered a new and serious deterioration. In this region Israel, encouraged by a nuclear-weapon Power -- the United States -- is carrying out a policy of genocide against the Lebanese people and against the Arab people of Palestine. This aggression has caused profound indignation on the part of the Soviet people and of all people of goodwill. We decisively condemn the aggressive actions of Israel and its protectors, which are a threat to world peace. Particular alarm is caused by reports that the Israeli militarists are using on a large scale barbarous phosphorus shells against the peaceful inhabitants of Lebanon. This is a matter relating directly to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament, and we believe that it should not ignore these facts.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement.

May I note the presence among us for the first time of the new representative of Peru, Ambassador Peter Cannock, who is replacing our esteemed former colleague, Ambassador Valdivieso. Ambassador Cannock joins us after having served lately in a position of high responsibility in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as a member of the Cabinet of the Foreign Minister dealing with special questions. His diplomatic experience will be a welcome addition to this Committee. I welcome him and I wish him, on my own behalf and that of the Committee, a very successful mission in Geneva.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, with reference to the announcement by the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec, of his imminent departure, I should like to say that I fully share the feelings you expressed, both as regards the outstanding contribution our colleague has made to the work of this Committee ever since its initiation and as regards the well-deserved success we are sure will be his in his new assignment. I also fully endorse the warm words of welcome you addressed to Ambassador Peter Cannock who is with us today for the first time.

In resolution 36/84 adopted on 9 December last year, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all States members of the Committee on Disarmament to bear in mind that "the consensus rule should not be used in such a manner as to prevent the establishment of subsidiary bodies for the effective discharge of the functions of the Committee", and also to support the creation of "an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests". We hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group which the Committee set up on 21 April of this year in connection with item 1 of its agenda entitled, as we all know, "Nuclear test ban", will keep very much in mind in the discharge of its functions the objective set by the General Assembly in the resolution to which I have just referred, for that objective alone is fully in keeping with the commitments entered into in the 1963 and 1968 Treaties to which reference is so often made in our discussions.

My delegation considers that it would be pointless once again to review here the background to this question, which stretches back over more than a quarter of a century: it was in 1954 that Nehru for the first time raised the question of ending nuclear-weapon tests. The preamble to resolution 36/84, which I mentioned at the outset and which is included in the annexes to the Secretary-General's letter reproduced in document CD/231 of 2 February 1982, contains a summary, no less significant for being condensed, of the salient aspects of that background. Furthermore, the position of my delegation, which has on countless occasions considered this item both in Geneva and in New York, essentially coincides, as I have said a number of times but will repeat once more today, with the views expressed by the United Nations Secretary-General in 1972, when he stated before the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement ...

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification ... it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban ...

"The potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

Bearing the foregoing in mind, I believe that the best I can do in this statement -- and what I shall do in the remainder of it -- is to quote from some testimony, chosen from among the enormous number of statements which have been made by prominent persons in the United States, the only nuclear Superpower which has for some time been showing clear signs of unwillingness to abide by the undertaking unequivocally set forth in the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty. The testimony which I shall read out dates from the same period as the views of the Secretary-General which I have just recalled, and is taken from the United States Senate official records of the hearings of the relevant Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign relations Committee in 1971 and 1972.

The first testimony which I shall quote is that of Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, as it was the first in the hearings. He said the following:

"It is indeed good to hear that Senator Edmund Muskie, as Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization, will be holding hearings on the underground test question -- the first since 1963.

"At that time, as Science Advisor to President Kennedy, I participated in the decisions leading up to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. Important as a first arms control measure, this treaty was nevertheless a compromise made necessary by the inability of the Soviet Union and the United States to reach agreement on the number and mode of on-site inspections required to monitor an underground test ban. Actually, there was no technical reason why we should not have concluded a comprehensive test ban treaty at that time. We now know that only political considerations on both sides prevented reconciliation of the minor differences that existed at the time.

"Today, the feasibility of an underground test ban is even greater. It was recently announced that a scientists' panel at a test detection conference of the Advanced Research Project Agency of the Defense Department concluded that progress in seismology now makes it possible to distinguish all but the smallest tests from earthquakes. A test ban agreement without on-site inspection, therefore acceptable to the Soviet Union and practical to implement, would now appear possible.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"It is increasingly recognized, moreover, that there is no longer real reason for these underground explosions -- if there ever was -- since the ABM warhead for which the tests are chiefly designed may already have been made obsolete by changes in United States policy ...

"At the same time, progress in test detection techniques make serious East-West talks on an underground test ban a priority. Already, public pressure for this treaty seems to have increased the credibility of our position at the SALT talks. I hope these hearings will serve to stimulate a new United States initiative toward this imperative measure of arms control. We desperately need to bring the arms race under control. We need to concentrate our hopes, energies, and resources more on constructive things and less on fear-motivated, hopeless weapon systems such as the ABM. Here is an opportunity for our nation to exercise judgement, restraint, and leadership through a modest but important step toward a more rational world."

That is the end of what I want to quote from the statement by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

The second testimony from which I should like to quote, which is dated 14 July 1971, is that of Ambassador James J. Wadsworth, who was for several years the alternate representative of his country to the United Nations in New York, and from 1958 to 1960 none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva. I have selected from that testimony the paragraphs which I shall now read out, because they appear to me to be of particular interest for this multilateral negotiating body:

"Speaking both on behalf of a distinguished group of citizens who have organized the Task Force for The Nuclear Test Ban, and from my own experience as Chief of the United States Delegation to the Conference on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in Geneva from 1958 to 1960, I fervently hope that these hearings will at long last put us back on the road to a comprehensive East-West test ban and thus signal the end of the nuclear arms race.

"There is increasing evidence that the security of the nation will not be strengthened through further development of nuclear weapons. Underground testing, therefore, may and should become obsolete.

"However, it is hardly necessary to warn that severe opposition must be expected -- and not chiefly from the Russians ...

"I can testify that President Eisenhower was dedicated to the goal of a ban on all nuclear tests. Several times during my years at Geneva, it seemed the test ban agreement with the Russians could be concluded. Each time, however, obstacles arose which even the President, with all the power of his office, could not overcome. I believe the following brief analysis of the tactics used by the opposition could serve to alert us to the hurdles we should be prepared to surmount, as once more a test ban agreement is in sight.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"Naturally, since the United States insisted on the need for on-site inspection, the Soviet resistance to inspection presented a continuing difficulty in the negotiations. Nevertheless, from the beginning of the discussions at the Geneva Conference of Experts in 1958, United States scientists said they were impressed with the sincerity of the Soviet delegation ...

"In my view, our difficulties in reaching a test ban arose in part from within, not from without. The principal opposition originated from that complex of defence establishment agencies, including the Atomic Energy Commission, which are responsible for the United States weapons programme. It was clear that the military elements of the executive branch were thoroughly opposed to the treaty ...

"In August 1958, the Conference of Experts at Geneva, including both the Western and the Soviet delegation, completed their 'technical' report. The American technical delegation believed that for the first time they had obtained Soviet agreement to the principle of international inspection and to a control system which would make a test ban feasible. At that point, our anti-ban forces immediately went to work. AEC scientists produced 'new data' on high-altitude tests, decoupling, and the 'big hole' theory. Eventually, their exaggerations were proved invalid. Nevertheless, their delaying tactics succeeded. Our East-West agreement was postponed and a new conference convened to consider the revised data ...

"By March 1960, it appeared once more that the talks to devise an effective detection system had been successfully concluded. The two Western leaders, Prime Minister Macmillan and President Eisenhower, had agreed to join the Russians in a treaty banning tests in the atmosphere, underwater and in outer space, policed by the system of 180 control posts devised at Geneva. Clandestine underground tests down to the level of 4.75 seismic magnitude would be detected through a system of seismic instruments and a quota of on-site inspections. There would be a joint moratorium on all small tests below this 'threshold', since they could not be easily identified. Moreover, the two leaders did not believe clandestine tests of this size could produce results which could have a major effect on either nation's strategic posture. A joint research project to discover detection methods for these small tests would be initiated.

"Only the final details of the agreement remained to be worked out at the 'summit' meeting planned for May 1960 in Paris. Since I knew at first hand the strength of the opposition to the test ban, I was concerned that plans for the 'summit' should go forward without interruption ...

"After all the delays ..., however, it appeared all efforts to delay the agreement would fail, and as the date for the 'summit' approached, there was widespread expectation that a test ban would be concluded. Just two weeks before the 'summit', you will recall, an American U2 spy plane was shot down by Soviet rockets. In the resulting confusion of mutual suspicions and recriminations, hostility replaced the pre-summit détente. Khrushchev left Paris after one meeting, denouncing President Eisenhower, the summit collapsed and the treaty was postponed again.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The central mystery, which the hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could not solve, remained. Why were the provocative U2 flights continued at a sensitive period when the capture of the plan could rupture chances of a détente? ...

"As far as our Joint Chiefs were concerned, the issue of effective inspection was a smokescreen. Continuation of an aggressive underground test programme was, for them, a prerequisite. Ultimately, they prevailed.

"It is on the basis of this personal experience that I believe the public must have all the facts if we are to end the arms race. I am reassured that the Congress is conducting these hearings. Despite the record of the past, by being alert to the tactics of those who oppose a nuclear test ban, I believe that their opposition can be overcome.

"Inaccurate evidence will no longer be acceptable as a basis for decision. The true reasons for the objections will be recognized. The evaluation that American weaponry is already sufficient for defence, that a test ban can be agreed without endangering American security, and that the risks involved are now acceptable, is of overriding public interest".

That is the end of my quotation from the statement made at the hearings before the United States Senate by Ambassador James Wadsworth who, as I said at the beginning, was none other than head of the United States delegation to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests held in Geneva.

To conclude these quotations, I am going to read some paragraphs chosen from the statement made by someone whom, I am sure, many of my distinguished colleagues will well remember for, apart from playing a prominent part in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the 1960s, he was head of the United States delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1977 and 1978 and to this Committee in 1979 and 1980. I am referring to Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher who, in May 1972, said the following:

"My testimony is directed primarily to the political significance of a comprehensive test ban. I do not believe, however, that we are dealing with a situation in which we have to rely on political assets to overcome military liabilities because I am persuaded, on the basis of expert testimony, that from the point of view of weapons development, a test ban is, on balance, advantageous to the United States. The experts with whom I have consulted, and whom you have heard, have made it clear that, even allowing for the possibility of some cheating in relation to small underground tests, the relative position of the United States to the USSR would be more favourable under a comprehensive test ban, monitored solely by national means, than it would be under the present circumstances which permit testing through a much wider range of yields.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The political advantages of a comprehensive test ban are considerable. As this committee is aware, the United States in the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by President Kennedy, pledged itself to continue negotiations to ban all nuclear weapons test explosions. This commitment was reaffirmed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, negotiated under President Johnson and ratified by President Nixon. Thus, three administrations have undertaken this commitment.

"It is clear to me that other countries of the world take this commitment of ours quite seriously. In the particular context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty I have grave doubts that it will have any success in persuading certain potential powers to seriously consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty as long as we are conducting an extensive series of underground tests ...

"We have heard a good deal about verification and doubtless will hear more. But let's put things in proper perspective: verification of a comprehensive test ban has always been only a part of the problem. The main question which existed in 1958 and exists today, 14 years later, is really this one: do we want to continue testing nuclear weapons? Is our over-all security better with a comprehensive test ban even though there is some risk of a few small clandestine tests, or without a ban, which allows the Russians to test at all yields, encourages additional nations to acquire nuclear weapons and continues indefinitely the arms race? If we decide that it is in our best interest to ban tests, I do believe that our present capability to distinguish earthquakes from explosions at very low magnitudes should be satisfactory to permit us to move toward a comprehensive test ban treaty ...".

That is what Ambassador Fisher said in 1972 at the Senate hearings.

The Ad Hoc Working Group which has just been set up will undoubtedly be able to find in the testimony that I have just reviewed a rich source of inspiration, which will help it to carry out its work in such a way as to ensure that it is in keeping with the aims which have been pursued in vain by all the peoples of the world since the middle of this century. Those statements may also help members of the Group to have a clear understanding of the need to ensure that the question of verification is not used as a "smoke-screen", as it was put in one of those statements, and also of the need for the United Nations General Assembly and world public opinion to be fully informed of developments on this issue to which, quite rightly, for so long now "the highest priority" has been attached among the various nuclear disarmament issues.

Mr. HYLTEINIUS (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to introduce today document CD/318, containing the fourteenth progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Ad Hoc Group met from 9 to 19 August 1982, under the chairmanship of Dr. Ulf Ericsson of Sweden. Experts from twenty countries took part in the session.

The Ad Hoc Group considered the draft chapters for its third formal report on a global system for a seismic data exchange, designed to assist States to monitor a nuclear test ban.

The Group considered a number of national investigations on seismographic stations and networks, and the extraction of data from the stations, on the world-wide transmission of such data through the WMO Global Telecommunication System, on the transmission and use of whole records (so-called Level 2 data), and on the tasks of international data centres designed to assist participating States in analysing all the data seismologically.

As before, the Ad Hoc Group enjoyed excellent co-operation with the WMO and plans further experimental transmission over the WMO network. In order to obtain full efficiency in such a transmission, the WMO has advised the Ad Hoc Group that arrangements could be made to send the Ad Hoc Group's transmissions on a regular basis. I understand that this advice is essentially an offer of even further co-operation, and I think that use should be made of this generous offer. I also understand that the distinguished representative of Japan will speak on the substance of this matter today.

In preparing its progress report in March this year the Ad Hoc Group had difficulties in finding a way to report on national investigations on the exchange and use of so-called Level 2 data (i.e. of whole records). Recent advances in computer and telecommunication equipment have made it possible to exchange, without much effort, many more Level 2 data than was foreseen in the two formal reports submitted by the Ad Hoc Group in 1978 and 1979. In addition, recent advances in scientific understanding have made it possible to exploit Level 2 data also in the analysis foreseen for international data centres, thereby significantly increasing the quality of their calculations. These were initially foreseen to be made only on the basis of Level 1 data (i.e. bulletin-like extracts from the records). This latter result, based on national investigations in Sweden and elsewhere, is still under debate in the Ad Hoc Group with respect to the manner of reporting on it. I am confident that a constructive outcome of this issue will be found in due course.

The other matter -- how to report on modern possibilities for the exchange of Level 2 data has, however, been resolved -- a good omen for the third formal report of the Ad Hoc Group, expected to be submitted next year.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has told me that he is very satisfied with the clear and business-like manner in which the quite difficult matters concerning Level 2 data have recently been discussed in the Group.



(Mr. Hyltenius, Sweden)

The Ad Hoc Group proposes that its next meeting be held from 7 to 18 February 1983.

With these words, Mr. Chairman, I formally propose that the Committee takes note of the progress report contained in document CD/318.

Finally, I want to say that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, is prepared to report in more detail and to answer questions, if any, in the same manner as has been customary in the past.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement.

As I noted at the beginning of this plenary meeting, the progress report by the Ad Hoc Group has been circulated for consideration by the Committee. Before I give the floor to the following speaker on my list, may I inform the Committee that the delegation of Japan has submitted document CD/319, which has been circulated today and deals with one of the questions contained in that report. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan, His Excellency Ambassador Okawa.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, we have once again received a progress report from the chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. My delegation wishes to thank Mr. Hyltenius, the distinguished delegate of Sweden, for introducing this report and, of course, Dr. Ericsson, the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group for its preparation.

My delegation has followed with interest the progress of work in the five study groups established within the Ad Hoc Group two years ago. A Japanese expert is one of the co-convenors of the third study group dealing with the "format and procedures for the exchange of Level 1 data through WMO/GTS". We have been encouraged by the two trial exchanges of Level 1 seismic data which took place in 1980 and 1981 through the GTS of the WMO. We note the statement in the new progress report that the Ad Hoc Group sees the need for additional tests in order to obtain further experience. My delegation would like to know how many such additional tests are going to be needed before the global system of seismic data transmission on the WMO/GTS can be consolidated.

I have taken note of a sentence in the new report which says that the Ad Hoc Group "noted the advice of the WMO that significant improvements in transmission could be expected only if the Ad Hoc Group were to use the GTS on a regular basis". This sentence appears towards the bottom of page 2 of the progress report.

In this connection, it should be pointed out that the trial exchanges over the GTS that I have just referred to were conducted only under provisional arrangements with the WMO. I drew the attention of the Committee to this fact in my intervention of 16 March 1982 when I suggested that the Committee on Disarmament should formally request the WMO to co-operate in the global transmission of seismic data by authorizing the use of its GTS for that purpose. As the distinguished Chairman has just announced, my delegation has tabled today a Committee document setting forth the background to the Ad Hoc Group's relationship with the WMO and explaining why this relationship needs to be formalized.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

With regard to the exchange of Level 2 data, I referred in March to the considerable progress achieved in recent years in the technology for data exchange of this sort and said that efforts should be made to apply such new technology to the exchange of Level 2 data. We welcome the progress reported from the Ad Hoc Group in this regard. Last week, the Norwegian delegation demonstrated a prototype system for seismic data exchange initiated by the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) and we are grateful to the Norwegian experts for showing us how wave-form or Level 2 data can be rapidly transmitted under their system. We also thank them for their document CD/310. We hope that consensus may be achieved in the Ad Hoc Group on the application of agreed procedures for analysing Level 2 data in the context of the envisaged global exchange.

The new progress report once again refers to the third report of the Ad Hoc Group, the completion of which seems to be postponed from year to year. Again we are told that the Ad Hoc Group will need to conduct additional work before submitting a full, complete report in compliance with its present mandate.

It should be recalled that the Ad Hoc Group was set up by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 22 July 1976. In the ensuing six years we have been provided with two valuable reports which are contained in documents CD/558 of 9 March 1978 and CD/43 of 25 July 1979. While looking forward with anticipation to receiving the third report of the Ad Hoc Group, my delegation, as a member of this Committee, would like to know how the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group sees the prospects of his Group's work in the future. In my layman's mind, I cannot quite grasp the extent of the work that remains to be done and how much longer it is going to take; and whether the Ad Hoc Group's work is not being overtaken by the yearly progress in technology, and whether this does not mean that the Ad Hoc Group will need to be in permanent session simply to catch up with such technological progress. I simply hope that at each stage in the Ad Hoc Group's labours the results can be put to practical application without seeking further sophistication; and that additional technological advances can be taken up and incorporated into the exercise as they become available.

While hoping that Dr. Ericsson and the distinguished experts of his group will forgive me for these rather probing remarks, I do wish to reiterate my delegation's deep appreciation to them for the most valuable work they have been conducting over the years.

Before concluding this speech, I would like to say how pleased we are to learn of the arrival of our new colleague from Peru and my delegation wishes to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Cannock. I must also say how sorry we are that ambassador Venkateswaran of India and Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria are no longer amongst us and that Ambassador Vrhunec of Yugoslavia is also about to leave us. On behalf of my delegation I wish to pay high tribute to these distinguished colleagues of ours for their contributions to the work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Japan for his statement. Document CD/319 suggests that a request be addressed to the Secretary-General of the World Meteorological Organization by the Chairman of the Committee, so that the necessary arrangements might be made to enable the Ad Hoc Group to continue to utilize the Global Telecommunication System on a regular basis for the transmission of seismic data in order to detect and identify seismic events. On the basis of the request contained in document CD/319, I intend to put before the Committee for consideration and decision, at our plenary meeting next Thursday, a draft communication to the Secretary-General of WMO. I now give the floor to the next speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Australia, Mr. Steele.

Mr. STEELE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, the Australian delegation welcomes the progress report on the fourteenth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and considers that the Committee on Disarmament should take note of this useful document, CD/318. It is more evident than ever that international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events are of direct importance to our work. Now that the Committee on Disarmament has established an Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, this relevance will become apparent to all. The Chairman of that Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard, and his adviser, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, have already emphasized this. Dr. Ericsson, as Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts, continues to oversee an activity deserving of our fullest support; he himself similarly earns our appreciation.

I would like to draw the Committee's attention to a number of important points in document CD/318, but before doing so I wish to remind the Committee of the consideration it gave to the previous progress report, as recorded in CD/PV.164 of 18 March. Differences of opinion, not reflected in that progress report, were aired in our March debate over the issue of how far the Group of Scientific Experts was able to apply to its work, within the terms of its mandate, many startling related technological advances, including those being demonstrated in national experiments.. Those differences of view to some extent remain but they are being frankly acknowledged and addressed, and compromises sought. Proof of this can be found in document CD/318 itself, which was put together without great difficulty. Although paragraph 7 of that document concludes by noting certain matters not yet resolved, it is clear that the issue in question will be thoroughly considered in future and the results of this consideration will be brought to the Committee's attention.

National investigations are a fundamental aspect of the Group's further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system envisaged for use in international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. At the fourteenth session Norway put on a display of hardware, impressively flexible and low in cost, which could form the basis of an international data centre. Norway has shown how Level 2 data (i.e. detailed records of wave forms) can be readily transmitted and has invited participation in an experimental multilateral exchange of such data by, for instance, telephone-linked computers. This experiment deserves support.

Other valuable work relating to the use of Level 2 data at International Data Centres has been done by Sweden and the United States. This remains controversial or at least unresolved. Nevertheless, if vastly more information can

(Mr. Steele, Australia)

now be used by data centres than was envisaged when the expert Group's mandate was first framed, it is time for that mandate to cope with such a development: this may or may not in itself require formal revision.

The Ambassador of Japan has today pointed out to the Committee that there is a need to formalize the exchange of Level 1 data over the World Meteorological Organization's Global Telecommunications System, for example by a request from the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament to the Secretary-General of WMO. In this connection he has taken this initiative and tabled document CD/319. Australia is co-convenor with Japan of study group 3 considering data exchange over the WMO/GTS and strongly urges that steps be taken to follow this proposal through. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts itself in paragraph 7 of document CD/318 notes the benefits of a more regular basis to the Ad Hoc Group's relationship with the WMO/GTS. It sees "the need for additional experiments using the WMO/GTS to test other aspects of the possible international exchange of data". We can therefore anticipate some large-scale experimentation in 1983 of data exchange over this system. The urgency of the matter is apparent.

The concluding paragraph of document CD/318 envisages that the Ad Hoc Group's third report will be submitted during the 1983 session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation welcomes this first specific indication of a date for the report and hopes that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will have no difficulty in adhering to it. There is no doubt that the Committee as a whole would greatly benefit from a detailed account next year of the work of the Ad Hoc Group.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement.

I would now like to invite members to address questions to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ericsson.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Japan has, I think, put some very interesting and probing questions to Dr. Ericsson, and I think that the Committee would benefit by hearing his response to those questions.

Dr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): There were four questions put to me by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan. The first question relates to the experiments which the Group of Scientific Experts has been performing on the WMO network and the question is: "My delegation would like to know how many such additional tests are going to be needed before the global system of seismic data transmission on the WMO/GTS can be consolidated."

I take it that a final consolidation of what the data exchange system should be, in detail, would have to wait for thorough experience on the WMO lines on a regular basis. The WMO world-wide network is a patchwork of national parts; each country operates the part on its own territory, from neighbour to neighbour. This makes the

(Dr. Ericsson, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

reaction time of that system to changes rather long. We have, in the past, asked for permission to transmit on these lines some three months before the actual test and that has proved to be insufficient to obtain a complete, positive reaction from the whole system. If ever we obtain a regular transmission situation then we would obtain full operation in regard to our needs in, let us say, 6 to 9 months and that would then be, I would not say final, but a very major step towards a final understanding of how the system would work.

Here, and also in response to the second question, I would like to say that the Group of Scientific Experts now meets twice a year and produces its results at a certain pace. So far, that pace has been faster than that of the nuclear test ban so there is, all the time, ample room for improvement while waiting for political developments. The second specific question of Ambassador Okawa was: "My delegation would like to know how the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group sees the prospects of his Group's work in the future", and he went on to add questions about the extent of the work that remains to be done and how much longer it is going to take, and whether the Ad Hoc Group is not being overtaken by the yearly progress in technology. As I said, so far, we think that we have been faster than the test ban. If we sit and wait, then there will be a gap. Science does not develop very quickly; technology however, does, especially in the aspects of telecommunications, where development is very rapid. There we have simply been overtaken, since 1978, by the progress of technology and this is why we have devoted some years of effort to finding out how we could best accommodate these new developments. The matter of Level 2 data, of how to deal with complete records, is first of all an important and difficult technical question. It is also a question of whether participants are in a position to exploit these possibilities. It is a very rapid development and it is understandable that these developments proceed at a different speed in different places on this globe. The positions of participants, therefore, to take advantage of these developments right now, say today, are very different indeed. On the other hand, it is quite clear that this kind of new technology, in due course, will penetrate, I would say, all countries. This then makes it necessary that the system of global data exchange which the Group of Scientific Experts is exploring, describing and investigating, should contain a feature of renewal, a feature of taking into account the new significant developments in science and technology. Again, this is an important aspect of any system which we might propose to you, and it is certainly our responsibility to see to it that some suitable feature of renewal is included also. This is why we have taken our time in preparing a third report, because it is this very question which is before us in this discussion on what we call in jargon Level 2 data. I hope that this is a sufficient answer to the questions posed by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan.

The CHAIRMAN: We have exhausted the time available to us this morning and I propose that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m. when Dr. Ericsson will answer a few more questions and we shall proceed to hear the last speaker on my list. Upon the adjournment of the plenary meeting we shall move to the informal meeting that the Committee is to hold today on proposals tabled under items 2 and 7 of the agenda.

If there is no objection, I will suspend this plenary meeting now.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 181st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

May I invite those members of the Committee who wish to address questions to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ericsson, to do so.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, through you, I would like to thank Dr. Ericsson for the clarifications he gave, particularly in response to the very pertinent questions which were raised by the distinguished Ambassador of Japan, but I must confess that my delegation was a little distressed by a couple of remarks that were made by Dr. Ericsson during his statement. He seems to suggest that in fact the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is maintaining a very, shall I say, commendable progress in its work but that the political negotiations on a nuclear test ban seemed to be going very slowly, and he appeared to suggest that in fact the delay had been on the political conclusion of a nuclear test ban and that therefore, in the intervening period, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts would continue to take into account the latest developments in science and technology. Somehow I got the impression that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts was in no hurry because negotiations in the political sphere on a nuclear test ban were in any case not going to be concluded for some time. This is really something which my delegation is a little worried about because this I think involves us in one of those "chicken or the egg" arguments. Is it that the political negotiations on a nuclear test ban are being delayed because the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is unable to arrive at any definitive conclusions on the setting up of a global seismic monitoring network, or is it that the global seismic monitoring network can in fact be elaborated some time in the distant future because in any case the negotiations on a nuclear test ban do not seem to be leading anywhere? As far as my delegation is concerned, there is a very close relationship between political negotiations on a nuclear test ban and the kind of work which is being carried out by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, and we have always been given to understand that the political negotiation of a nuclear test ban would be considerably facilitated by the early conclusion of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. We are in fact now being told that this is somehow a parallel exercise which may not have very much to do with the political negotiation of a nuclear test ban. For my delegation, the very rationale of such a group, the Group of Scientific Experts, is that it serves the interests of the early conclusion of a treaty on a nuclear test ban. It has no other rationale for its existence, and if my delegation becomes convinced that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is somehow conducting an exercise in a vacuum -- conducting an exercise which has very little to do with negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban -- then I must say that my delegation would have to review its whole attitude towards the further functioning of this Group of Experts. This is for us a very serious matter and therefore I would like the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to perhaps clarify this point. I do not think that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts can operate on the assumption that its work is quite open in this way and that it can continue to take into account every technical or scientific advance which is being made, as long as there is no prospect for a nuclear test ban, or we shall then come to political negotiations on a nuclear test ban in which our colleagues will ask us: how can we have a nuclear test ban treaty when problems of verification have not been resolved? This is not the kind of

(Mr. Saran, India)

situation that we would like to face and we would be very glad if the Chairman of the Group of Scientific Experts can give us an explanation as to what is the assumption on which his Group is operating. As far as we understand it, there is a certain assumption of a global seismic monitoring network which was drawn up, I think, when the Group itself was established, and I think that in document CCD/558 there are very clearly laid out terms of reference stating the objective of the Group of Experts. How far away is the Group of Experts from achieving that objective? That is a very simple question to which a very simple answer can be given, and I think we should not enter into this argument that if there is no nuclear test ban in sight then the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts can take all the time in the world to do its work.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Well, I would like to thank the distinguished representative of India for his significant question. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts is now operating on a mandate which was given to it in 1979 and which is contained in document CD/46. It says that the Committee on Disarmament decides that the Ad Hoc Group should continue its work on such measures which might be established in the future for the international exchange of seismological data, and it goes on to say that this work should include, inter alia, further elaboration of detailed instructions for an experimental test which is foreseen as further development of the scientific and technical aspect of the global system as well as co-operation in the review and analysis of national investigations, which have also essentially proved to be directed towards new aspects and improvements in scientific understanding and technological possibilities. We are, therefore, certainly now in a phase where we attempt to improve the system which we described and proposed to the Committee in our reports CCD/558 and CD/43 and our mandate is formally open-ended in that respect. Certainly, the work of the Group of Scientific Experts is organized in such a way that we meet twice a year here in Geneva, and between these times a number of experts undertake to communicate with their colleagues and put together the results of investigations, drafting chapters towards the report. If a nuclear test ban were to enter into a stage of foreseen implementation, then certainly the Group of Scientific Experts could step up its work; I see no difficulty in that. The Group has already in the past recommended the measures to be taken for a global data exchange system, in the reports I mentioned. However, the material in those reports is in a few respects -- certainly not in every respect, but in a few respects -- now outdated by the surprisingly fast developments in technology as well as some developments in science. It therefore stands to reason that we should try to include these new results in a forthcoming report. This is now being done at the pace which I just described, but if a politically-generated demand for a very fast result were to arise, then I am quite sure that those States which supply the experts to co-operate in this Scientific Group could instruct them to devote much more of their time than they do now to this task. Perhaps I should say that a few delegations do have experts who devote themselves full-time to this work. Other countries do not supply scientists to that extent. These scientists participate only part-time in these investigations. This, I think, describes the situation which, to my understanding, would in no way hinder, from the verification point of view, and as far as the tasks of the Ad Hoc Group are concerned, the conclusion of a nuclear test ban.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, before asking some questions, I would like to join other members in expressing admiration and gratitude to Dr. Ericsson for the work he has been conducting on our behalf for so many years, as well as for the clarity and precision with which he answers our questions on such occasions. In fact, I have two questions.

Firstly, now that the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban is established and at work, some delegations have addressed the issue of what should be the formal relationship between the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and the NTB Working Group, and various suggestions have been made. Obviously, the essential point for all is that the Group of Scientific Experts should be able, when requested, to give advice on technical matters and that a correlation in substance should be achieved. Dr. Ericsson, did this question come up during your recent meeting and what ideas on the relationship -- an optimum relationship -- would you and your colleagues have at hand?

Secondly, when replying to Ambassador Okawa this morning, you pointed out the rapid technological developments in the Level 2 data domain and you stressed the immense potential that these new developments have. But you also pointed out that the capability of countries to draw the full benefits from Level 2 data would vary according to their own development. Now, Dr. Ericsson, we know that both during the spring session and during this session, the way in which Level 2 developments were to be reflected in the report caused considerable controversy and it is quite noticeable that in contrast to the original report text proposed, a number of amendments were moved by one particular country group, tending to downgrade the importance of Level 2 data, or rather even to discard it. We all know that your Group had a difficult time arriving at the consensus text which we now see. My question is the following, Dr. Ericsson: What is the impression of yourself and your colleagues, as experts, of the reason for the obvious reluctance to treat the Level 2 data for what they are worth? Would you think that it is due to a less advanced technical structure in the country group which has made these amendments, or is it rather due to an instinctive reluctance to use the potential of Level 2 data because it offers such immense potential for an advanced international verification system in this domain?

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Your first question was on the relationship between the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban and the Group of Scientific Experts. The main relationship, certainly the one that the Group of Scientific Experts has set up, is to deliver consensus reports on the specific matter of data exchange to assist countries in monitoring a nuclear test ban. This does not cover the whole field of verification of a nuclear test ban, but is only part of it. As I said a while ago, the circumstances in the last few years have brought forth a certain mode of operations, a certain pace of delivering results and that job is still there. If, as envisaged, we are able to provide the Committee on Disarmament with a third report recommending a number of improvements in the system as seen originally, then I hope that we do a good job, contributing at least one element of the verification complex for a nuclear test ban. The pace of work is rather slow, so if you think that the Group as a whole might respond to questions from this body or its Working Group, then the question of how -- if I am extremely formal -- could be put before the Group only in February, because that is



(Mr. Ericsson, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

when it meets, so it is not, from that point of view, extremely practical. On the other hand, the existence and the activities of the Group, have, I think, generated a set of experts who know the test ban verification question rather well by now. There are some 20 to 25 national experts in this field in the Group and I think that, at present at least, the optimal way of using that expertise would be if delegations here, or their Governments, simply exploit the potential of their own experts. That, to me, under present circumstances, would be the best way of using that potential. That was in answer to your first question. In your second question, you asked, essentially, why we have this difficulty with the Level 2 data. There are several reasons for that, and it has been to me, personally, of much concern to understand, because the difficulty is obviously very great, and in my present understanding there are several elements. There are two elements which I mentioned earlier today. First of all, some of these developments are simply new, quite startling, and it takes some time even for a scientist -- a technologist -- to get acquainted with the possibility. Secondly, the access to these technological possibilities, which exist in principle, is rather different in different countries. It is very much a question of national organization, how they are or could be made available. And these methods are, quite apart from our work here, simply not settled in all countries. In a few countries like Norway, this technology happens to be very readily available. This is also the case in my own country. Other countries have not yet decided on how to do it and this generates a genuine difficulty in our work. We are a Group which should give a consensus report on questions on which a consensus is really very hard to find. Secondly, and that was a result which we obtained during our present session, it turned out that States participating with experts in the Group of Scientific Experts have rather different views on how they intend to exploit the data exchange, and this was made very clear during the present session. That, to me, is an explanation of why it was very difficult in the recent past to obtain agreement on how these possibilities would be exploited when such a data exchange system would operate under a nuclear test ban. It turned out for some countries simply to be a political matter. That is something which we must respect and we have to wait until political decisions, if any, are taken so that the discussion can go forward. Whether this will be the case or not, I cannot know. I notice, however, this year, and this was reflected, I think, in a statement by Mr. Hyltenius of Sweden this morning, that the discussion of these rather delicate and difficult matters was very business-like and to-the-point in the Group of Scientific Experts and that gave me very much satisfaction. I also think that there is some hope that we will be able to resolve these matters, in due course, in a constructive way.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I have read the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts, and listened with great interest to Dr. Ericsson's responses to questions put to him. The United States participants during this 14th meeting of the Ad Hoc Group have reported to me that, as always, Dr. Ericsson's patient and firm hand in guiding the work of the Group has been an element essential to its progress. My delegation therefore offers him our congratulations. We have also been pleased to see Dr. Ericsson serving as an adviser to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, and are confident that his participation will reinforce the work of both groups.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

My delegation believes that the Committee should take note of the Ad Hoc Group's progress report. It is encouraging to me that so many States have participated, and that a number of significant contributions have been submitted reporting on the work being carried out in the various study groups. The valuable participation of the World Meteorological Organization has also been reflected by the presence of a representative of that body during the course of the meeting. Would it not, Dr. Ericsson, facilitate the work of the Ad Hoc Group if more States, especially those represented in this Committee, were to participate in the Group? It seems to my delegation that greater participation would not only broaden the geographical coverage, but expand the scientific expertise, thereby enhancing the over-all effectiveness of the Ad Hoc Group. We would value your views on this matter, Sir.

Members of this Committee will recall that last March I expressed concern that the Group was having some difficulty in preparing its third report to the Committee because of disagreement as to what is permitted under its mandate. At the same time, I noted that there was no notable disagreement among experts with regard to matters of a purely scientific nature. Consequently, my delegation notes with pleasure that this progress report contains a more complete description of recent developments in seismic and data-transfer technologies. These have been made available to the Group from a number of national contributions. Unfortunately, the experts have, as yet, not reached agreement concerning the relevance of these developments for the important functions of the international data centres envisaged under a world-wide system of exchanging seismic data.

My delegation continues to believe that our mandate to the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, wherein it directs "further development of the scientific and technical aspects of the global system", intends that advances in relevant fields of science and technology should be fully taken into account in order to ensure that the international exchange of seismic data might be as efficient and productive as possible. This is a view which I believe is shared by most delegations present here. Do you share this view, Dr. Ericsson?

I might add at this point that, at this session, the Committee has benefited from an impressive demonstration of the rapid transmission of large quantities of seismic data over long distances. Thanks to the Norwegian Government, which significantly contributes to the work of the Ad Hoc Group, an inexpensive portable data terminal was set up here in the Palais des Nations and data were exchanged over international telephone circuits, including satellite links. These data included actual seismograms, referred to by the Ad Hoc Group as Level 2 data, from both the United States and Norway. The information was displayed on a television monitor to a number of delegates and simultaneously stored in a mini-computer. There can be no question that we can share waveform data on a wide scale. Do you not agree, Sir?

It is of vital importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament that these advances be fully reported to us in the anticipated third report of the Ad Hoc Group. The report should include, if necessary, a description of those points on which consensus agreement among the experts was not possible.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

The Committee will, I think, have to give further thought to the future activities of this Ad Hoc Group. Some delegations have already begun to address this question both here and in the Working Group dealing with nuclear test ban verification and compliance issues. The third report of the Ad Hoc Group will provide a basis for bringing these considerations into focus, if this has not already been achieved before its publication.

In conclusion, let me say again that my delegation welcomes the progress report of the Ad Hoc Group, and we look forward to continuing our support of the Group's further work.

We would appreciate Dr. Ericsson's answers to the questions I have put. Let me thank Dr. Ericsson for his answers to the questions put to him by other delegates, and also thank him in advance for his answers to my questions.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts): Well, the first question of Ambassador Fields was: would it not facilitate the work of the Ad Hoc Group if more States, especially those represented in this Committee, were to participate in the Group? The question was put in the context of co-operation with WMO, but I take it that it is more general. Certainly, from the physical point of view, increased geographical coverage, especially of the southern hemisphere, is quite important, so the Group of Scientific Experts would really welcome more participating countries from that part of our globe. Increased participation from members of the Committee on Disarmament and other States would certainly expand the scientific expertise available for our discussions. Here I would like to remind you that ever since the beginning, a number of States not members of the Committee have sent experts to these talks, and in the Group of Scientific Experts they are on a perfectly equal footing with everyone else. Norway is one example of such a country which is, as you know contributing. There is also a third aspect of participation. In my opinion what we are doing in this scientific Group is on the borderline between applied science and the political considerations which go into a test ban. So, from that point of view, increased participation, especially from the States in the Committee on Disarmament, would be a welcome addition to our understanding of where the political limitations to our scientific experiments are. This then, is really an affirmative answer to the distinguished Ambassador of the United States.

The second question Ambassador Fields asked me was whether I shared the view that advances in the relevant fields of science and technology should be fully taken into account in our recommendations. The answer is, yes, of course; but there again, the insertion of such advances is very difficult, because it is not only science that we are engaged in, it is science limited by or conditioned by political purposes and conditions, as I said in response to the question of the distinguished Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The third question was whether I agreed with the statement: there can be no question that we can share waveform data on a wide scale. Certainly there is no question that this is, in principle possible; the technology is known and understood, and is being made more and more available. Here I would like to give a clarification on this Level 2 discussion. As far as the exchange of Level 2 data is concerned, the Group of Scientific Experts has been able to reach an understanding on how to report. This understanding came in the recent session, and therefore remains to be implemented in our report.

Finally, Ambassador Fields said that the third report should also include, if necessary, a description of those points on which consensus agreement among the experts was not possible. In the present progress report, there is a formulation which points

(Mr. Ericsson, Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts)

out that there are significant areas of discussion or investigation on which a consensus has not yet been reached and this, I think, points to the possibility that if necessary, similar statements could be expected in the third report. I hope not; I hope that everything will be complete and without such reservations, but I now see the possibility that with regard to certain items, such reservation could be made in the report. This concludes my response to the questions of Ambassador Fields.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, through you I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Ericsson for the clarifications he has given to some of the questions I raised. I must confess that what he has stated, in fact, has confirmed some of the suspicions that we had to begin with. From what Dr. Ericsson has stated, it would appear that progress on the elaboration of a global seismic monitoring system has been held up precisely because of the lack of political will on the part of certain States -- that if there was a genuine desire on the part of these States to conclude a treaty on a nuclear test ban, the work of the Group would be brought to a conclusion with a greater sense of urgency.

The second comment I would like to make concerns the incorporation of recent technical and scientific advances in the work of the Group of Experts. It would appear from what Dr. Ericsson has said that technical advances in this field in fact make the results achieved obsolete at a rather rapid pace and it would appear to us that this creates a situation where the better may become the enemy of the good. As far as we are concerned, all that we require is a system which is adequate for our purposes, that is, adequate to verify compliance with a treaty on a nuclear test ban. I think that the Group of Experts, if they are to operate within clearly defined limits, must have a rather good idea of what the Committee on Disarmament considers adequate, because if we do not have this kind of clearly defined limit, the work of the Group will become open-ended in character and I must say that my delegation does not agree that the mandate of the Group in fact gives this kind of an open-ended character to its work. If this is the kind of interpretation which is given to the mandate of the Group, then this Group would in fact not be one which is elaborating international co-operative measures for the detection and identification of seismic events, but rather a Group which is keeping a watching brief on scientific and technical developments in the seismic field, and if the latter is what it is doing, then my delegation sincerely and very seriously would doubt the value of such a Group to our negotiations on a nuclear test ban.

The CHAIRMAN: I suggest that, after further consideration of the progress report at the next plenary meeting, we adopt the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts at our plenary meeting on Tuesday, 31 August, i.e. in a week's time.

In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 130th plenary meeting, I will now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Senegal, His Excellency Ambassador Sene. Before doing so, I wish to extend to him a warm welcome in the Committee as the representative of a brother African country. His vast diplomatic experience in several important posts as well as his distinguished political career, during which he held several cabinet positions, will undoubtedly contribute substantially to our work. You have the floor, Sir.

Mr. SENE (Senegal) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to congratulate you warmly on your accession to the chairmanship of this august Committee. It gives me personally a great and legitimate satisfaction and you can imagine what a source of pride it is for an African like myself to see a worthy son of our continent, a citizen of a country that is a friend of my own, directing the work of this unique multilateral negotiating body on disarmament. In this connection, the heavy task that is yours today is significant in more than one respect. It is a sign of the growing awareness in the international community of the need to associate all States, large and small, in the deliberations and negotiations on disarmament. And my delegation cannot but see it also as a very promising sign of a genuine disarmament process, undertaken and pursued with the support of all the Members of the United Nations.

I should also like to congratulate the distinguished representative of Japan who preceded you in the Chair. I am certain that, like him, you will acquit yourself brilliantly in the tremendous task you have inherited.

Lastly, I should like to thank all my fellow Ambassadors, members of the Committee and their delegations, who have graciously agreed to my country's participation in the work of this body. You may be sure that we shall do our best to deserve this mark of confidence in us.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament is being held just after the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the results of which were disappointing in more ways than one. The comprehensive programme of disarmament, the adoption of which ought to have been the logical sequel to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, has been sent back to the Committee on Disarmament with perhaps even more "square brackets" than it had before it was considered by the General Assembly. This is proof of a serious failure. A failure which should not be taken too lightly, lest we lose sight of the adverse consequences that might ensue if vigorous steps are not taken to give new impetus to the negotiations on disarmament.

One of the causes to which the failure of the second special session on disarmament is usually attributed is without any doubt the deterioration in the relations between the great Powers and the increased resort to force in international relations.

This evaluation is not without foundation, since the arms race, as a number of speakers here have said, is the symptom of a disease -- a disease of our time. It is the expression of conflicts, political tensions, power struggles, and also of the economic inequalities and violations of human rights in the world. For, as was so often recalled during the second special session, disarmament measures cannot take place in a political vacuum. In fact, it would be unduly optimistic to expect great progress in disarmament when armed aggression, intervention, occupation, racism, colonialism and economic exploitation still prevail in international relations. Moreover, one lesson which can be drawn from the disappointing result of the second special session is the need to examine ways and means of strengthening international security while disarmament measures are in progress. It seems to my delegation that it is essential for us to review our approach to this subject. It is because détente between the great Powers is in a state of crisis that, for example, the North-South dialogue is today blocked. Similarly, given the frequency of armed aggression and of wars by proxy in the third world, disarmament negotiations

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

must inevitably suffer the negative repercussions of this situation. It is therefore urgently necessary for the members of the international community, and particularly the great Powers, to make greater efforts to strengthen the system of collective security envisaged in the Charter of the United Nations and actively to promote the establishment of the New International Economic Order.

In this connection, my delegation believes that the approach of establishing a link between disarmament, security and development should become part of the disarmament negotiating process.

Senegal has always adopted this approach, and ever since it became independent has worked tirelessly to try to help improve the international climate so that peace, security, co-operation and economic progress for all peoples should become the rule.

Taking as its inspiration the values of our black African civilization, such as dialogue and tolerance, Senegal has joined in the efforts of the international community to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes, in particular by taking part in several peace-keeping operations and by working with neighbouring countries to promote a climate of confidence, mutual understanding and regional co-operation.

For we believe that the disarmament process would be greatly facilitated if, simultaneously with the global negotiations which take place here, the States of a particular subregion or region tried to overcome their differences in order to work together for the sake of the economic and social progress of their peoples. That is why we have tried, through a subregional and regional approach, to contribute to the relaxation of tension in the western part of Africa to which we belong, and the creation of an atmosphere of trust and peace conducive to the consolidation of our young States' independence and their economic progress.

At the same time, the adoption of a regional approach to arms limitation matters has not made us lose sight of the essentially global character of disarmament problems. On the contrary, we are convinced that both approaches must be pursued with equal vigour if we hope one day to eliminate the nuclear danger.

The reason why, in our evaluation of the results of the second special session, we have emphasized the link between disarmament, security and development, is that we hope thereby to contribute to the adoption of an approach which will make it possible to give a new impetus to the disarmament negotiations and to reaffirm the importance of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. In our view, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was held at a truly unfavourable time, although the delegations present made huge efforts to bring it to a successful conclusion.

There is no doubt that the recrudescence of tensions between the Superpowers prevented any real progress in this direction. Today, it is more important than ever, after the failure of the Second Review conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1980, and after the second special session devoted to disarmament, to dispel the impression that the principal nuclear Powers have no intention of fulfilling the commitments they undertook vis-à-vis the international community to enter into serious negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

For the degree to which existing arms limitation treaties and undertakings are fulfilled will be decisive as regards the conclusion and signature of new agreements. By carrying out their own obligations, the Superpowers would be in a better position to persuade the other nuclear-weapon Powers to join in the disarmament process and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Thus, the session of the Committee on Disarmament is taking place at a crucial moment in the disarmament process. Now more than ever, the great Powers must demonstrate their determination to fulfil the undertakings they gave at the first special session and to co-operate actively in the conduct of the negotiations envisaged.

The sphere in which the Superpowers can best show that what happened in New York last July was purely accidental is that of nuclear disarmament.

For since the adoption of the Final Document nuclear arsenals have grown much larger and the arms race has continued unabated.

The arms race has resulted today in a fantastic accumulation of weapons, with a constant increase in their terrifying destructive power. This last aspect is by far the most important. The qualitative arms race pursued by the great Powers is the real motive force of the arms race itself. It is based on the use of technical progress to manufacture ever more deadly weapons, as is stressed in the United Nations report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, in the following words: "The six main military spenders not only account for three fourths of world military spending, but for practically all military research and development and for practically all exports of weapons and military equipment. All significant developments in armaments originate here and spread from here to the rest of the world, with greater or lesser time lags." Starting from a nucleus of a few great Powers, the arms race is spreading to all regions and all natural environments.

Because it is inadequate for the requirements of our time, the arms race can only have negative consequences. On the one hand, contrary to what is claimed, it increases insecurity in the world, thus constantly endangering international peace and security, and, on the other hand, it causes an immense waste of resources at the very time when mankind is faced with vital development problems.

Clearly, the existence of the thousands of nuclear warheads possessed by the Soviet Union and the United States creates a permanent risk of nuclear war for the world, the more so as these warheads have the explosive power of 1.3 million Hiroshima-type bombs and can destroy the world several times over.

At the present time, this massive accumulation of weapons is the fragile basis of the so-called "balance of terror" that has safeguarded the nuclear peace of the postwar period. It is not difficult to show how precarious this peace nevertheless is. Furthermore, it is no secret to anyone that the thousands of missiles so light-heartedly deployed by the Superpowers could easily be subject to a technical failure that could lead to a nuclear war by accident. And that is no mere speculation. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute there have been 125 nuclear accidents in the last 30 years, that is, one every few months. Thus, the fate of mankind seems to be hanging by a very thin thread, at the mercy of the slightest technical failure.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Moreover, the balance of terror, which has, when all is said and done, so far prevented the outbreak of armed conflict between the great Powers, is in the process of being destabilized by the dynamics of the arms race and the appearance of a new doctrine, that of the partial or limited use of nuclear weapons. The restraint apparent up to now as regards the use of nuclear weapons was connected with the certainty of mutual destruction.

Nuclear war was indeed unthinkable so long as a potential aggressor knew for certain that the adversary, even if he was struck first, could always strike back and destroy the main industrial centres and cities of the aggressor State. But that certainty is in the process of disappearing today because the latest advances in the matter of the precision of delivery vehicles gives them an accuracy of within 10 metres, thus making possible the annihilation of the enemy's strike-back capability by destroying the silos containing ballistic missiles. These prospects thus make a preventive nuclear war -- I will not say likely, but certainly possible. We do not want it, but the probability exists.

However, the accuracy of delivery vehicles is not the only element contributing to an increase in the probability of nuclear war. There is also, alas, the emergence of new doctrines regarding limited nuclear warfare. Thus, some news reports indicate that one Superpower is seriously contemplating making preparations for a protracted nuclear war. Certainly, if such reports turn out to be true, this could drastically lower the threshold for the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. In addition, a danger of nuclear war may also arise through the acquisition of nuclear technology by isolated colonialist, racist regimes.

For who can guarantee that the regime of Pretoria, which is endeavouring to acquire nuclear weapons, will have any scruples about using them or threatening to use them one day? That regime's obstinacy in maintaining its odious system of apartheid in itself suggests that the possession of atomic weapons might encourage it to try to freeze the situation in southern Africa. It is true that it would merely be deceiving itself since no new ~~weapon can~~ stop the course of history. However, the international community should be vigilant in this regard. If the racists of Pretoria were to be allowed to possess atomic weapons, the result would be an unprecedented threat to the strategic heart of an entire region which in fact only wants to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The African countries voiced their anxiety in this respect at the first and second special sessions of the General Assembly. In the Final Document of the first special session, the General Assembly requested the Security Council to take effective steps to prevent South Africa from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons. We hope that the Security Council will make every effort necessary to prevent that dangerous possibility from occurring, in particular by prohibiting any collaboration in the nuclear field that would enable South Africa to acquire the ultimate weapon.

It is these risks of nuclear conflict that I have mentioned that make the adoption of effective measures to prevent nuclear war so urgent. In this connection, my delegation supports the Indian proposal for the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war. In fact, several important proposals have been made recently by the nuclear-weapon States. My delegation has



(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

noted with interest the proposals of the Soviet Union and China on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Of course, such unilateral declarations are not enough to resolve the problem. We hope, however, that these proposals will be studied carefully by the other nuclear-weapon Powers so as to permit the adoption of specific recommendations on the limitation or prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Undoubtedly, nuclear weapons are the gravest threat to the survival of mankind. And yet, despite a decade of negotiations between the Superpowers, there has been no real progress in the matter of arms reduction. It is vital, therefore, given the growing risks of nuclear catastrophe, that negotiations should be started on the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the progressive reduction of stockpiles of such weapons. This is why my delegation supports the proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

This is not to say that we do not appreciate at their true worth the negotiations being carried on at Geneva by the United States and the Soviet Union. At the same time, we believe that nuclear disarmament cannot be the exclusive province of the nuclear-weapon States. For in fact, a multilateral negotiating process in which non-nuclear-weapon States participate will still be necessary, given the universality of the nuclear peril which threatens the whole planet and the entire human race.

My country, as a signatory of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, would also like to stress here that the nuclear-weapon States have still not provided adequate assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States which could be the victims of a nuclear threat or attack. Security Council resolution 255 of 19 June 1968 is clearly unsatisfactory in that in it the permanent members of the Council undertook no obligations other than those already contained in the Charter, nor did they provide for any special procedure. For we know that the effectiveness of a security assurance is a function of its capacity to prevent aggression rather than to remedy it. My country believes that the Committee on Disarmament should continue to study the problem of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States at a time when the risks of the proliferation of nuclear weapons are greater than ever. In this connection, my delegation has taken careful note of the declaration by France on the subject. This is a positive step towards the adoption of measures providing adequate negative assurances by all the nuclear-weapon Powers.

However, the only effective assurance against the use of nuclear weapons is their prohibition and destruction. In the meantime, effective steps must also be taken to halt and reverse the arms race. In this regard, my delegation believes that the time has perhaps come to begin to implement paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

The conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, which would end the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems, has been under consideration for nearly a quarter of a century.

The reasons for such delay defy all common sense when we know, on the one hand, that the continuation of nuclear tests does not enhance the security of the Superpowers, and on the other, that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement, as Mr. Ericsson said a few minutes ago.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

It is, moreover, difficult to understand how, 20 years after their undertaking to ensure the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, the three depositaries of the partial test-ban treaty are still in the negotiating stage. After several years of trilateral discussions these Powers, despite their undertakings, adjourned their talks sine die. It is greatly to the credit, therefore, of the other members of the Committee on Disarmament that they should have proposed the setting up of an Ad Hoc Working Group whose limited mandate should not impede the consideration, at the appropriate time, of matters such as the scope of the treaty. Verification is, of course, an important matter but it should not make us forget that the essence of the problem is primarily political.

As the report prepared in pursuance of General Assembly decision 34/422 states, verification of compliance with a complete prohibition of nuclear tests no longer seems to be an obstacle. It is necessary, therefore, in my delegation's opinion, that the question of verification, the importance of which is recognized, should not be used as a pretext for failing to fulfil certain commitments solemnly undertaken before the international community. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty has this kind of priority and it would be politically dangerous to delay it any longer.

Of course, it would have been desirable for all the nuclear-weapon States to take part in the work of the Working Group. The international community knows where the responsibility lies for the delay in the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. We hope, however, that as progress is made in the drafting of the treaty, all the nuclear-weapon States will find it possible to take part in the work of the Working Group.

Another major problem on our agenda for this session which has drawn our particular attention is the following. It is the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction which, according to paragraph 75 of the Final Document, is one of the most urgent measures of disarmament.

It is, to this end, essential that the negotiations which have been going on for so long should culminate in tangible results. My delegation has noted in this connection that the Ad Hoc Working Group set up by the Committee has received new proposals which have given new impetus to the negotiations. We hope that a satisfactory solution will soon be found to the problems relating to the inclusion of a clause prohibiting the use of chemical weapons and verification of the prohibition of use.

Undoubtedly, we cannot but be sensitive to the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, for they have been used during the last two decades against peoples struggling for their national liberation in Africa and Asia.

The draft convention should therefore be sufficiently wide in scope to take account of the main problems raised by chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

In paragraph 80, the Final Document states that in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.

The risks of the militarization of outer space have become greater with the appearance of anti-satellite systems. Given the important role that satellites can play in international co-operation in such fields as communications, meteorology and navigation, it is essential for steps to be taken to prevent outer space from becoming an area of military confrontation.

Here again, the lack of any results from the bilateral discussions between the Soviet Union and the United States has left the matter in the lap of the Committee.

The proposal to set up a working group on outer space seems to us a sound one, since such a group could help the Committee in its consideration of the question of the negotiation of effective agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

I cannot end my statement without referring to the question of the colossal resources that are swallowed up in the arms race and the negative consequences of this for development, particularly that of the most needy countries.

This question is not on the programme of work for the Committee's 1982 summer session but it is undoubtedly on its agenda.

Indeed, the volume of the resources devoted to armaments presents a sorry contrast to the amount spent to meet the world's urgent needs.

A few figures will give a better illustration of this waste. In 1982 world military expenditures, according to the SIPRI Yearbook, totalled \$600-650 billion. This figure is equal to three-quarters of the aggregate income of all the poorest peoples of the earth.

Since the end of the Second World War, the arms race has absorbed more than \$6,000 billion, the equivalent of the aggregate gross national product of the entire world in 1975. These fabulous financial resources are being swallowed up in a vain quest for security at a time when 570 million people are suffering from malnutrition, 2.8 billion people have no safe drinking water and 1 billion human beings are without proper medical care. The absurdity and the tragedy of the wastage caused by the arms race is all the more evident when we remember that the World Health Organization spent \$83 million over a period of 10 years to eradicate smallpox from the world. That sum, according to the United Nations' report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, would not be enough to buy a single strategic bomber.

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

Taking our analysis further, we note that the wastage of resources is not confined to financial resources. A considerable proportion of skilled manpower is diverted into largely unproductive activities. Military research absorbs about 40 per cent of research and development funds throughout the world and employs some 400,000 engineers and scientific and technical specialists. Nor is the environment spared: new military techniques, such as saturation bombing and incendiary and chemical weapons, when they have been used, have done irreparable damage to the ecology. Moreover, the arms sector is responsible for an exorbitant share of the consumption of non-renewable resources. A single example will illustrate my thesis: world consumption of liquid hydrocarbons for military purposes is about 700-750 million barrels a year, or twice the annual consumption of the whole of Africa. This wastage is largely accounted for by a fairly small number of countries. In 1977, the military expenditures of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries represented 71 per cent of world expenditures, while those of the Third World were 14 per cent. Although it is true that the military expenditures of the latter group are unfortunately tending to rise, thus diverting precious resources from economic development, the expenditures of the NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries have nevertheless not declined.

The effects of the arms race on international trade, development assistance and the transfer of technology are still more negative. In fact, the strategic considerations underlying the thinking of the military Powers lead to restrictions and discriminations in international trade. Thus raw materials, advanced technologies and goods of prime importance are called strategic products and ipso facto subject to restrictions. Such practices are obviously incompatible with the establishment of a New International Economic Order based on freedom of access for all countries without discrimination to capital, raw materials and technology markets.

Another field in which the negative effects of the arms race are felt is that of development. The development assistance of the military powers has been hampered by strategic and political considerations and so has been inadequate. The amount of money devoted to development assistance is only one fourteenth of world military expenditure and has remained static for years. The target of 0.7 per cent of GNP laid down in the Development Strategy is far from having been attained. Yet a contribution of a mere 5 per cent of their military expenditures would have meant a rise in the development assistance of the market-economy countries from its present level of 0.32 per cent to the target figure of 0.7 per cent.

These considerations have been presented in detail in the United Nations report on disarmament and development. The report shows, inter alia, that the continuation of the arms race can lead only to a cycle of confrontation, to

(Mr. Sene, Senegal)

declining prospects for mutually advantageous co-operation and to a contraction of the development possibilities of all nations. On the other hand, policies aimed at promoting development would expand the basis of détente and would place the North-South dialogue in a more promising and more appropriate framework. The benefits would thus inevitably be both political and economic.

In conclusion I should like to say a few words about increasing the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. We believe that the Committee in its present form is more democratic than the one that existed before 1978. Nevertheless, the fundamental question remains the same. Are the Superpowers ready to allow all countries, large or small, to participate in the disarmament negotiations in accordance with paragraph 26 of the Final Document? As long as they do not change their attitude on this point, the struggle for democratization must go on. The Committee on Disarmament will only be able to play its proper role if the principle of the democratization of the disarmament process is recognized and applied by all. Since disarmament is a political process, it must be approached from the political angle, and we must not yield to the temptation to believe that if we place the primary emphasis on questions of a technical nature, we shall succeed in solving the fundamental political problems that exist.

We consider that it is on the basis of the right claimed by the non-nuclear-weapon States to express their views on the disarmament negotiations, as the representatives of Sweden and India have already argued, that the question of enlarging the Committee should be considered, taking into account the real points on which the Committee's effectiveness is blocked.

In conformity with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, General Assembly resolution 36/97 J and paragraphs 55 and 62 of the Concluding Document of the second special session of the General Assembly, the proposals for a limited expansion of the membership of the Committee have received wide support.

We therefore hope that the Committee will be able to make an appropriate recommendation in this connection, taking into account, of course, the principle of a fair geographical distribution.

In the past, the participation of members of the non-aligned movement in the disarmament negotiations has made possible the emergence of a new spirit, a softening of the attitude of confrontation inherent in the bloc system, and above all it has inspired continued devotion to the cause of disarmament. This moderating influence of the non-aligned and neutral countries should continue to be exerted through their increased participation in the disarmament negotiations.

The vision of a world freed from war has haunted mankind from earliest times and goes back to the dawn of creation. Today, this vision is the goal of our debates and activities in this Committee, where we seek, through negotiation and dialogue, to find a way of assuaging present confrontations in order to ensure the future survival of the human race. My country, for its part, undertakes to mobilize all its inventive capacities in an effort to make a small contribution to this joint endeavour, which is the essential condition for the survival of mankind and his continued presence in the future both on earth and in the universe, amid the prodigious discoveries of science and technology which have been achieved over the centuries through the genius of man and have enriched the cultural and universal heritage of the human race.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Senegal for his statement, and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I have a small technical matter to raise, putting a question through you to the secretariat. My query relates to documents CD/314 and CD/315 which were distributed today, 13 narrowly typed pages. As is readily visible and as was explained to us by the speaker introducing these documents, they are verbatim extracts from the extensive speech of that same delegation at the second special session. Now it struck me that we all have these texts before us; we all have them on file; they are at our fingertips if we want to read them. And the question has also struck me what advantage is being sought by distributing them again, as I am told there are close to 1,000 copies in various languages. I am asking the question because we are in a period of particular budgetary stringency of the United Nations and the delegation which has circulated these papers is most adamant in insisting on the zero growth of our budget. It is not, of course, the slightest intention of mine to contest the right of any delegation to circulate the papers it wishes to circulate, but I would like to have personal clarification from the secretariat, a small calculation, of the eventual cost if all 40 delegations here were to redistribute our speeches at the second special session here in the Committee. In order to show that I do not want to make any controversial matter out of this, I would be perfectly happy if the reply is given privately to my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and I would encourage the secretariat to take up the last suggestion. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Peru.

Mr. CANNOCK (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first occasion on which I am formally participating in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, allow me first of all to say what a pleasure it is for the delegation of Peru to see you, the distinguished representative of a country to which my country feels very close, guiding our work during the month of August. I have learned that during the part of this summer session that has already gone by, my colleagues have been able to appreciate the competent and constructive way in which you have been presiding over the Committee's work, and that you have been seen as a most worthy successor to Ambassador Okawa, whose merits are well known to the Peruvian delegation.

I should like first, in my statement, Mr. Chairman, to express my gratitude to you for your kind words of welcome, which were echoed by many of my new colleagues, whom I would also like to thank. I was already aware that the Committee on Disarmament was an unusual forum within the family of international bodies, and I am glad to have been able to begin to appreciate that for myself today, feeling as I do the climate of personal cordiality in which it carries out its work. I have not the slightest doubt that such an atmosphere is the most favourable framework possible for a group of persons trying to find formulas for reconciling a series of diverging interests.

(Mr. Cannock, Peru)

For my part, I have every intention of carrying out my functions as head of the Peruvian delegation to this Committee in a way which is in keeping both with the high intellectual level of its members and with the competence of my predecessor, Ambassador Felipe Valdivieso, on whose behalf I wish to express thanks for the kind words of members of the Committee upon his recent departure. I shall endeavour to ensure that Peru's contribution to the cause of general and complete disarmament continues to be one both of action and of principle, in accordance with a tradition of its foreign policy which is based on defence of the law and censure of arrogance.

On the other hand, I am aware that the Committee is passing through a difficult period, in which its very identity has been called into question, both within the Committee itself and outside it. The glaring lack of positive results from the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has only helped to foster such questioning, and a situation seems to be emerging in which not only do we not know exactly what we are but also we do not know what we wish to be.

What is really at stake behind these uncertainties is the negotiating capacity of the Committee, which we all recognize as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", but which during these four long years has not managed to bring a single topic of negotiation to a successful conclusion, and has not even been able to start negotiations on the issues with the highest priority that are within its purview.

It is not surprising, although it is disturbing, that there continue to be obstacles to the setting up of working groups on priority, important topics; nor is it surprising that there are other items which are included in our agenda but have not even been introduced into the discussion, such as "disarmament and development" or "conventional disarmament". In this context, it is likewise not very surprising that three of the working groups set up by the Committee have decided not to work during the present session, or that today negotiations worthy of the name are under way on only one issue.

In these circumstances, my country's participation in the Committee will be directed primarily towards defending the Committee's negotiating power, in other words its essence, and to actively promoting conditions which will make it possible for effective negotiations to be held on major issues within the Committee.

We are happy to know that our efforts will take place in this atmosphere of personal warmth to which I have referred, which distinguishes the Committee's work and offers, I believe, the most favourable background for encouraging future negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Cannock for his statement and for the kind remarks he addressed to the Chair.

Before I adjourn the plenary meeting, may I recall that the Committee will hold an informal meeting in five minutes' time to continue its consideration of proposals submitted under items 2 and 7 of the agenda.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 26 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.