

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 17 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA

(Kenya)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. TAFFAR

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN

Australia: Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. TELLALOV
Mr. SOTIROV
Mr. DEYANOV
Mr. MIKHAYLOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U TIN KYAW HLAING
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. LI WEIMING
Mr. SUO KAIMING
Mr. YU ZHONGZHON

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. d'ABOVILLE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. G. THIELICKE
Mr. F. SAYATZ
Mr. R. TRAPP

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAH

Indonesia:

Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:

Mr. J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. T. KAWAKITA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE MAINA
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J.M. KIBOI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. VAN DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
Mr. A.U. ABUBAKAR
Mr. A.A. ADEPOJU
Miss I.E.C. UKEJE

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Sweden: Mr. C-M. NYLTENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. S. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.F. PRIACHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Ms M. WINSTON

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. J.A. ZARRAGA .

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mrs. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERESATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 179th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 2 of its agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". However, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Nigeria, Italy, the Netherlands, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, China, Australia and Norway.

First of all, allow me to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to the representative of Norway, Ambassador Vaernø, a diplomat of wide experience and for a long time associated with disarmament matters. Ambassador Vaernø has been since 1977 special adviser on disarmament matters to the Foreign Ministry of Norway and since 1978 Director-General of the Ministry's Department of Policy Planning and Research. He was the leader of the Norwegian delegations to both the first and the second special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and Chairman of the 1980 Review Conference of the Convention banning biological weapons. Ambassador Vaernø is also Chairman of the Foreign Ministry's Advisory Council on Disarmament and Arms Control.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Nigeria, His Excellency Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation to see you -- the representative of a brotherly non-aligned African country -- presiding over the meetings of this Committee for the month of August. From the competent way you have conducted the Committee's affairs, you have demonstrated your wealth of experience and diplomatic skill, and I pledge the co-operation and support of my delegation in the accomplishment of your difficult task. My good friend and colleague, Ambassador Okawa, also deserves our gratitude for a job well done during the spring session. My hearty words of welcome go to our new colleague, Ambassador Datcu of Romania, and I look forward to working closely with him. We say farewell to our versatile and amiable friend, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who leaves Geneva finally at the end of this week.

Sixteen years ago, I had the honour of sitting in this hallowed chamber representing my country in the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee. My feeling then was that the arms race was a symptom of an underlying disease and that if we could cure that disease the symptom would go away. All good physicians, I know, make a distinction between a disease and its symptoms, and in general their prescriptions aim at curing the disease and not the symptoms.

After the unqualified failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, I am more convinced by this line of reasoning regarding the arms race and disarmament negotiations than I was sixteen years ago. If I may paraphrase the words of my distinguished Chinese colleague, to catch a fish you don't climb a tree; you go to the river.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

Depending upon one's angle of vision, the failure of the second special session can be attributed to many factors. To my mind some of these factors are:

- (i) First, the sense of unrealism which has provided the basis of some of the theoretical abstractions that have evolved in this Committee; and
- (ii) Secondly, the lack of political will on the part of the big military powers represented in this body. In this connection I wish to recall that a distinguished member of this Committee reminded us during the spring session that political will is not manufactured here in Geneva. It is brought from home. In other words, what can be achieved in Geneva depends largely on the assessment of the international situation by our respective Governments and the security requirements called for by such assessment.

I wonder if one can talk seriously about disarmament without attempting to answer the question, what are the causes of the arms race or why are nations, on the whole, unwilling to disarm? Some of the statements that have been made in this hall since the beginning of the spring session seem to point at the correct answers. The distinguished representative of China, Minister Tian Jin, has already advised us against looking for a fish on top of a tree. Mrs. Inga Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation, in her statement on 3 August, gave reasons why we fared better at the first special session than at the second. She acknowledged the fact that the first special session took place "at a time when international relations, and relations between the two Superpowers in particular, were infinitely better than now." Still on the same point, Ambassador Louis Fields of the United States said on 10 August that "the CD has failed to produce a single treaty. This is attributed to various causes. But in the view of my delegation the real lesson of the second special session is that this negotiating body cannot confine itself to a narrow view of the world. If it does, it is in danger of becoming irrelevant to its true objective." To my mind, this is a profound statement not only because of the graphic way it has been put, but also because of the relevance of the message it contains.

It can be shown that most agreements in the area of disarmament negotiations have taken place during periods of an agreeable international climate. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 and the Salt agreements which were signed in the era of détente are examples of progress in disarmament negotiations made under a favourable international climate.

If it is possible to establish a relationship between success in disarmament negotiations and a favourable international climate, will it not be worth our while to make serious efforts at improving the international climate while at the same time working hard on disarmament negotiations? I am not going to suggest that a working group be set up here or elsewhere within the United Nations system to monitor the observance of the United Nations Charter by member States with particular reference to Article 2, paragraph 4. If such a group were set up, its work would have a catalytic effect not only on the programme of disarmament but on disarmament negotiations generally.

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Today we are all witnesses to the ever-increasing arms race by the Superpowers and other nuclear-weapon States, a sad reflection of the disorder and lawlessness in international affairs. This race, and the competitiveness it breeds, have had their spill-over effects in other regions of the world, especially the third world where, as we all know, all the wars since 1945 have taken place. This has brought untold hardship to millions of people in the third world and hindered, in no small measure, the process of economic development.

My delegation is convinced that the time is overdue for this Committee to devote some informal meetings to discussions on the close relationship between disarmament and development, and we hope that at its 1983 session the Committee on Disarmament will allocate time for this important agenda item.

Permit me now to comment briefly on the Committee's work programme for this session. My delegation agrees that the short period available to us this session compels us to be selective and deal only with matters of the utmost urgency and priority on our agenda. We therefore support the immediate convening of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We are of the view that the limited mandate, with all its pitfalls, should not close the door to further proposals and initiatives that would make more realistic the present sketchy terms of reference. My delegation welcomes the unanimous election of Ambassador Curt Lidgard as the Chairman of the Working Group. While regretting the decision of two nuclear-weapon States not to participate in the work of the Working Group, I believe that their action reflects the degree of uncertainty in the international climate. My delegation is of the opinion that the failure of the nuclear-weapon States to abide by the provisions of Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has created a situation of nuclear apartheid which does not help in solving the nuclear problem.

My delegation regrets that the credibility and effectiveness of this Committee continue to be jeopardized owing to its failure to embark upon multilateral negotiations on the urgent and priority question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The spontaneous enthusiasm that "peace movements" have so far manifested has demonstrated the world-wide conviction of the unacceptability of the nuclear-weapon option.

We fully agree with a nuclear freeze option, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes, and a halt to the further manufacture of nuclear weapons.

We again request that the Group of 21's proposals contained in document CD/180 be tabled immediately before the Committee for a decision. My delegation agrees with the Indian delegation that there is enough material in the replies of all States, and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to the Secretary-General's Note in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B, for this Committee to devote time to discuss measures on how to prevent a nuclear war. We also support the Indian proposal for the setting up of a working group on the prevention of nuclear war.

While welcoming the Geneva bilateral talks on intermediate-range nuclear and strategic arms, we hope that in future the scope will be broad enough to cover all weapon systems. We also join the call that this forum should not turn into a

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secret cult with a deliberate news black-out. Indeed, this Committee and the entire international community have the right to be informed of the state of the negotiations.

The prevention of the arms race in outer space is another key issue on the Committee's agenda. We see its urgency in the over-all process of nuclear disarmament. The increased militarization of outer space manifests a more dangerous trend in the arms race, and my delegation stands firm in the conviction that outer space constitutes a common heritage of mankind to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. While we favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the subject, it is our view that the scope of the convention must be comprehensive enough to cover anti-satellite weapon systems.

The fact that at its second special session the General Assembly was not able to agree on a comprehensive programme of disarmament is both disappointing and frustrating, but my delegation is not discouraged. We still believe that a CPD with specific and concrete international measures of disarmament and a clear-cut order of priorities, to be implemented within a given time-span, provides hope for the achievement of general and complete disarmament. While agreeing that the Working Group should be kept in abeyance during the remaining part of the 1982 session to allow for reflections and informal consultations under the able leadership of Ambassador García Robles, we hope that this period of meditation will not be a pretext for dilatory tactics on the part of those delegations that want to see the programme permanently put away. My delegation maintains the same attitude with regard to the ad hoc working groups on negative security assurances and radiological weapons. The "cooling off" period should also provide sufficient time for rethinking especially among the nuclear-weapon States, whose political input has remained elusive in the course of negotiations. The informal consultations could perhaps succeed in providing compromise solutions to the problems.

My delegation welcomed the Committee's decision to concentrate negotiations during this summer session on chemical weapons. We believe that these weapons, next only to nuclear weapons, constitute the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction. However, we are under no illusion about the hard bargaining necessary to achieve even modest success in this area, having regard to the fixed positions of the two major blocs. My delegation will, as usual, continue to co-operate actively with Ambassador Sujka of Poland, whom we are happy to see guiding the work of the ad hoc Working Group.

My delegation was one of those that listened with rapt attention to Ambassador Fields of the United States when he set forth, a few months ago, his country's approach to the achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons. On that occasion, we were informed that the United States intended to modernize its chemical weapons warfare capability because a potential adversary had not joined the United States in reducing its own chemical warfare

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capability and had also greatly increased its own chemical warfare capability, thus threatening the security of the United States, and as if this were not enough, this adversary had doubts as to whether it was complying with the Biological Weapons Convention. At that time, my delegation joined the delegation of Sweden in saying that the United States modernization programme would only start an irrational chemical weapons race that would further complicate the work of the chemical weapons Working Group. We still hold this view.

My delegation again listened with interest to the United States intervention on 12 August 1982, and we agreed with the view expressed that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention should be truly effective in order to ensure a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons.

We have stated on a number of occasions our position on the verification provisions of a future chemical weapons convention, and we would like to say once more that a chemical weapons convention should provide for a combination of national and international means of verification which should complement and supplement each other. Strict reliance on national verification measures in our view is not realistic and cannot generate international confidence in a chemical weapons convention. On the issue of verification, there are fundamental differences of approach and only by narrowing the differences can any real progress be made in elaborating a convention. My delegation therefore welcomes the USSR draft general provisions which obviously is a basis for further concrete work. At this juncture, we would only like to stress that we feel that the future chemical weapons convention must ensure the destruction of chemical warfare agents, munitions and devices, as well as the destruction and dismantling of chemical weapons means of production. While we have generally agreed that this should be completed within ten years after the convention has entered into force, we would support a mechanism to conclude this earlier, in order to ensure wider and quick adherence to the convention, which would enhance international confidence and contribute to the disarmament process. While the verification provisions are still a major hurdle to be crossed, the problem of the scope of the convention still deserves some attention. While my delegation noted the views expressed by the Soviet Union, we continue to hold the view that there is no legal difficulty in including a provision relating to use, since such a provision will strengthen the 1925 Protocol by adding measures of verification to it, and since even if a ban on the production of chemical weapons is immediate, the weapons will still be retained in the period between the coming into force of the convention and the time-frame for total destruction. All the same, only a significant change in the political will of certain States will ensure the required progress on this question. The important element for my delegation is that there should be an effective provision in the convention recalling the provisions of the Geneva Protocol that chemical weapons should not be used and for an effective mechanism for verification of the use of chemical weapons.

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The failure of this organ to record any significant progress since its inception continues to be a matter of paramount concern. Perhaps it is relevant now to take a second look at this machinery and see whether there exist any other ways by which the effectiveness of this multilateral negotiating body could be enhanced. Although we have no illusion in retaining the principle that there is no substitute for frankness and goodwill, our experience has shown that some of our organizational procedures need to be reviewed periodically for the Committee to be action-oriented.

The rule of consensus, and the way this has been used in the Committee to obstruct even straightforward issues like matters of procedure, clearly comes to mind. Rules are made for man and not man for rules. My delegation holds the view that this body is competent to review such rules as are found to be restrictive and obstructive rather than helpful.

Other proposals have been tabled concerning, for example, giving the ad hoc working groups a free hand to determine their working procedures, the possibility of the Committee's working for a longer period, and changing the name to raise the status of this negotiating body. All these are useful proposals that this Committee could examine and make appropriate recommendations on to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session.

The issue of expansion, however, needs a careful and objective consideration if the purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of the Committee. My delegation, while agreeing in principle that ample opportunity should be given to all States Members of the United Nations to participate as observers in the work of the Committee, nevertheless believes that the present number is adequate for the purposes of negotiation. This does not mean that we are opposed to a limited expansion of membership which must take into account geographical spread in addition to the positive contribution of non-members to disarmament efforts. It is only in this way that a balanced representation of the international community can be ensured.

These are specific issues, necessary preconditions for progress. We cannot afford to spend precious time in this beautiful chamber like Emperor Nero "fiddling while Rome burns". Mankind is witnessing trying times, unprecedented in history with the danger of nuclear catastrophe staring us in the face. I hope this Committee will be equal to the challenge!

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Italy, His Excellency Ambassador Alessi.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the Italian delegation would like first to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee and to wish you every success in your work. The competent way in which you are guiding our work is yet another reflection of your great qualities as a diplomat and the worthy representative of a country with which Italy maintains fruitful relations.

My delegation would like to thank the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, for the exemplary manner in which he accomplished his task during a particularly difficult period in the work of our Committee.

I should also like to take this opportunity to offer a warm welcome to the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcu, and to express my delegation's regret at the departure of an eminent member of this Committee, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India. Allow me also, Mr. Chairman, to associate myself with the words of welcome you addressed to Ambassador Vaernø of Norway.

As this session of the Committee is a short one, I feel that it would be more useful if I were to confine my remarks to a brief statement of my delegation's views on certain questions more directly related to our current work, namely, a nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, established as a result of very difficult negotiations, has finally begun its work under the dynamic and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard. The first meetings of this Group have taken place in a positive atmosphere, which makes us optimistic about the possibility of making a start, at this session, on the implementation of its mandate. We feel that the attitude of the United States delegation is particularly encouraging, and will allow the Group greater latitude in its work. Although the absence of two delegations is obviously regrettable, it should not, for the time being, prevent important and useful work from being done in the Working Group, which at present constitutes the only international forum dealing with the subject of a nuclear test ban.

Furthermore we are convinced that, in considering the problems connected with the verification of compliance with a nuclear test ban, the new Ad Hoc Working Group will not fail to take advantage of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Some degree of co-ordination between these two bodies would certainly be useful, and the question of a possible broadening of the mandate of the Group of Experts, which has been suggested by several delegations, should be given consideration.

It is in the matter of chemical weapons that the Committee most nearly fulfils its institutional role as a multilateral negotiating body. Our great appreciation goes to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group, Ambassador Sujka. We endorse the objective of completing, by the end of this session, the elaboration of a document which can next year serve as the basis for the drafting of the text of a convention. The discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group clearly shows that the success of our efforts depends essentially on agreement on an adequate system of verification. In this connection, we would like to express our appreciation to the delegations of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Netherlands which have made very useful

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new contributions in this area during this session. For the same reason, we share the interest aroused by the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The comments to which they have given rise and the replies awaited thereon could be of considerable assistance in our efforts.

On a specific point, that of the use of chemical weapons, I should like briefly to recall our position, which has already been explained in the Working Group: it is that a solution to the question of the use of chemical weapons should be sought within the framework of an adequate procedure for dealing with complaints. To this end, the future convention should include a clause expressly endowing the consultative committee with competence to investigate any complaint concerning the use of chemical weapons, and this, independently of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the validity of which should be explicitly reaffirmed. Such a clause should be based on recognition of the fact that any use of chemical weapons would necessarily imply the violation of one or more of the obligations included in the field of application of the Convention.

It is, however, essential that a rapid investigation into the use of chemical weapons should be possible. For this reason, provision should be made for the fairly automatic initiation of an investigation after the receipt of a documented complaint. The consultative committee's competence in this sphere should apply not only to cases of the use of chemical weapons by a State party to the convention, but also to cases of their use with the assistance of a State party. Last year, my delegation proposed a formula which is included among the comments on Element XIII, covering these two possibilities: we have noted that several delegations have expressed similar views this year; we therefore hope that our proposal can form the basis of a compromise to resolve this delicate issue.

I am pleased to note that the Committee seems determined henceforward to give the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space all the attention it deserves; some reservations expressed last spring appear to have been overcome. Proposals have been made for the establishment of a working group on this item of our agenda. We are in principle in favour of doing this. The real problem, however, is not whether or not to set up a subsidiary body, but how to proceed in this matter. It would be essential for the group to have an appropriate mandate, both because of the technical complexity of the subject and because we have no experience of negotiations on weapons control and disarmament in this area.

Without a mandate which provides a specific goal for our discussions, they are likely to prove aimless. My delegation has constantly drawn the Committee's attention to the urgent need to consider, as a matter of priority, questions concerning an effective and verifiable prohibition of anti-satellite systems. That in itself would be a sufficiently ambitious task. Although opinions in the Committee differ on this subject, we have noted with satisfaction some change in the way of thinking of certain delegations.

On the points to which I have referred, as well as on others which will be considered by the Committee, we should bear in mind the lessons of the second special session on disarmament. While it produced very little in the way of

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concrete results, that session will nevertheless have taught us certain things. The negotiations on the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the main objective of the session, are proof of this. Although it did not prove possible to reach an agreement, these negotiations provided the international community with a unique occasion for a thorough consideration of all matters relating to disarmament and their interdependence. Thus the discussions will have led to a better understanding of the problems and respective positions, and this in itself is a worthwhile result.

My delegation is still very much in favour of the continuation of efforts towards the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The negotiations that have taken place so far have shown that there are basically two types of problem: problems relating to the structure of the programme and problems relating to its formulation. This is particularly true with regard to nuclear weapons. When we resume these efforts, we ought to try first to resolve the structural problems.

At a time when all mankind is in doubt about its destiny and we are powerless to prevent the multiplication of bloody conflicts and violations of the fundamental rules that should govern the life of the international community, it is our duty to ask ourselves what contribution the Committee on Disarmament can make to the cause of peace.

The General Assembly, at its second special session on disarmament, rightly devoted special attention to the prevention of nuclear war. The delegation of India recently put before the Committee a proposal in this connection. However, precisely because we are living in the nuclear age, our efforts ought to be directed towards the prevention of war in all its forms. We all live in fear that conflicts which begin with the use of conventional weapons may, by accident, error or miscalculation, reach the nuclear threshold. That is why respect for the Charter of the United Nations and for international law are crucial to the success of disarmament; similarly, conventional disarmament is a fundamental aspect of all efforts aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear war. This is in part because of the growing sophistication and lethality of conventional weapons and the increasingly frequent use of such weapons in various regions of the world.

In my delegation's view, these considerations should form the basis of any contribution which the Committee on Disarmament may decide to make to the cause of preventing a nuclear conflict.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Netherlands, His Excellency Ambassador Van Dongen.

Mr. Van Dongen (Netherlands): For many years, the Netherlands has stressed over and over again the need for a vigorous pursuit of nuclear arms control and disarmament. Within this context no one will deny the close relationship that exists between the two aspects of nuclear arms control, i.e. between nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the maintenance of a non-discriminating and credible non-proliferation regime by the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other hand. As we have stated before: "unrestrained vertical proliferation could increase the danger of a widening proliferation in a horizontal sense".

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

My Government therefore attaches the utmost importance to the bilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament currently taking place in Geneva between the United States and the USSR which indeed, in conformity with paragraph 48 of the Final Document, bear a special responsibility in this matter, being the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the most important nuclear arsenals.

This does not mean that one should now rely solely on these negotiations and forego other approaches towards nuclear disarmament.

The Netherlands has consistently held that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty is long overdue. During two decades, a CTB has been a priority item on the international disarmament agenda. But even so, nuclear testing continues.

A complete and verifiable prohibition of tests of nuclear explosive devices in all environments and for all time will hamper considerably the development of new nuclear weapons, either by nuclear-weapon States or by non-nuclear-weapon States. A comprehensive test ban would strengthen the security of all States, create conditions for a gradual de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and draw closer the goal of undiminished security at a progressively lower level of armaments. Moreover, a universal agreement to cease nuclear testing would enhance confidence between States.

Consequently, it is a matter of serious regret to the Netherlands Government that under the present circumstances the trilateral negotiations will not be resumed.

We also regret that not all nuclear-weapon States will participate in the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda.

We are fully aware of the argument advanced by China and by France, that is that the envisaged CTB treaty would tend to freeze the situation in favour of the two nuclear-weapon States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals. We do not contest it, but we should like to point out that this argument applies even more pointedly to the non-nuclear-weapon States possessing the industrial and scientific capability of providing themselves with a nuclear armoury. The danger of nuclear weapons is such that we have difficulty in accepting the thesis that for some States, further testing to enhance their nuclear capability remains necessary before a halt can be considered. Moreover, we are convinced that a successful outcome of the above-mentioned bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR -- which we ardently hope for -- might help other nuclear-weapon States to overcome their reservations as to the test ban under negotiation here.

Even if the parameters of the ban under consideration here do not fully meet the national requirements of all States, all of them would be served by the establishment of an adequate integrated international monitoring system which would verify compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty. That is exactly what we are going to try our hand at this summer and we would therefore welcome the active participation of both China and France.

The appeal I made just now should not be conceived as indicating that we are entirely satisfied with the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group as it stands. We do attach the greatest importance to adequate verification as is well known, but we do not consider verification to be an aim in itself.

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

Paragraph 31 of the Final Document states that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Verification requirements can vary substantially, depending on the decision whether the envisaged ban is going to prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments or only nuclear weapons testing. We should, we believe, aim at a combination of two items: first, a good definition of scope -- in the view of the Netherlands Government this would mean that the envisaged ban would also apply to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions -- and secondly, an adequate and reasonable system of verification. In this context I may perhaps repeat what my predecessor had to say on 2 April 1981: "We should not overreach ourselves when dealing with each of the separate elements of the draft convention. We should not become prisoners of perfection."

For a sensible discussion of verification, the question of scope will have to be addressed. In this respect we endorse what the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, had to say at the 175th meeting of the Committee, on 3 August 1982: "The Working Group now established should be utilized to the full to investigate all relevant aspects of a CTBT."

The subject of verification in the nuclear field transcends, of course, the mere test ban. Eventually, however far away this may seem, it will come into play when a halt in the production of nuclear warheads and the destruction of stockpiles are being considered. Compared to the intrusive verification measures needed for these purposes, those necessary for an effective and adequately verifiable test ban are in all likelihood modest in scope.

There would be a less direct, but in the end probably effective way of halting the production of nuclear weapons, i.e. by the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This idea, first proposed by the late President Eisenhower, has always been attractive to the Netherlands, primarily because a cut-off is one of the few nuclear arms control measures for which an international verification system has already been worked out in principle: I refer, of course to the IAEA safeguards.

But let me now turn to the tools presently available to handle the subject in hand.

It is a matter of satisfaction to the Netherlands delegation that thanks to your good guidance, Mr. Chairman, the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 of the Committee's agenda has started smoothly on its course of action. We are happy to see our distinguished and respected colleague Ambassador Kurt Lidgard of Sweden chairing it. We trust that under his dynamic leadership the Ad Hoc Working Group will accomplish whatever its present limited mandate allows for. We also welcome the announced participation of Dr. Ulf Ericsson as a special adviser.

(Mr. Van Dongen, Netherlands)

The present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group requests it to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress towards a nuclear test ban. Before the conclusion of the 1982 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group has to report to the Committee on the progress of its work. Thereafter the Committee on Disarmament will take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard.

It is clear that we have to act with some speed to carry out this mandate in time. We would therefore suggest that the Ad Hoc Working Group be accorded as many meetings as it needs, irrespective of meetings of other ad hoc working groups.

Netherlands working document CD/312 which I have already briefly presented in the Working Group and which I take pleasure in introducing now to the Committee, contains a draft programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group's activities.

The first part contains some general observations indicating our approach to agenda item 1. We believe that the paramount importance of a nuclear test ban lies in its effective contribution towards stopping both vertical and horizontal proliferation. A nuclear test ban would thus be an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament.

The test ban to be agreed upon should be comprehensive and of worldwide application. Given this scope, the Ad Hoc Working Group established under item 1 should certainly draw on the reports of the trilateral negotiations, but should not take these negotiations as the only basis of its work. With respect to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, we contest that they can be distinguished from non-peaceful ones. They should be covered by the test ban, but we might eventually be willing to consider dealing with them in a separate protocol.

The establishment of an international monitoring system should be envisaged. If it is to be comprehensive, it should be an integrated monitoring system, comprising both atmospheric and seismic detection methods.

The second part of our working document contains an outline of a draft programme of work for the Ad Hoc Working Group. We suggest that the Working Group would start with the consideration of institutional aspects of an integrated international monitoring system.

We have found no justification for any departure from the division into three main topics to be considered under this item as defined in document CD/95 submitted on 22 April 1980 by Australia. The Working Group could usefully draw on the illustrative list of subjects contained in that paper.

(Mr. Van. Dongen, Netherlands)

A second activity of the Ad Hoc Working Group would be the elaboration of the technical prerequisites for the establishment of an integrated international monitoring system by acting upon the work performed under its traditional mandate by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events and the integration of atmospheric detection methods into the envisaged monitoring system.

Provisions relating to compliance with the test ban are identified as a third item on the programme of work as we see it.

The final item on the draft programme is the obvious category of final clauses to a comprehensive test ban. If, and I admit that it is a big if, a programme of work as outlined could be completed, conditions would be ripe for the conclusion of a multilateral CTBT.

It follows from the outlined programme of work that the Ad Hoc Working Group would be in need of expert advice. The work of the seismic experts would have to continue and an advisory body on atmospheric detection methods could probably not be dispensed with.

In the third and last part of our working document we suggest that this aspect be adequately dealt with by an enlargement of the mandate of the presently functioning Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to include advice on atmospheric detection methods. The name of the new body would have to be readapted accordingly. To avoid unnecessary loss of time, this new Ad Hoc Group of Experts should be established as a subsidiary organ of the Ad Hoc Working Group and report to that body. It would, of course be master of its own procedures; it might decide e.g. to establish two or more subsidiary bodies, one consisting of seismologists, thus not disrupting the present fruitful co-operation in the seismic group.

I may perhaps add one specific remark about the co-operation of the seismologists. So far the expert Group has not been able to absorb all relevant technological advances made in the recent past. In our view, particular attention should be given to setting up procedures which would ensure that all stations in a global network would be equipped with modern digital recording devices and that computers with adequate capacity for handling the seismometer recordings should be installed and linked to an international communication system.

This concludes my presentation of our working document, CD/312. But before leaving the floor, I should like to underline once again that my Government considers a comprehensive test ban to be a key element of the process to bring nuclear armaments under control and will, therefore, continue to contribute towards its realization.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today this Committee takes up item 2 of our agenda -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I would like to address this subject in the first part of my statement. Afterwards I should like to dwell upon some questions concerning the newly established Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

In view of recent developments, especially the adoption of long-term plans for the intensification of the nuclear arms race by one nuclear-weapon State, steps by the Committee on Disarmament to come to grips with item 2 are more necessary than ever before. The need for urgent measures to curb the nuclear arms race has again been underlined by reports about new efforts undertaken by the United States to justify a nuclear war and to make such a war winnable.

The International Herald Tribune of 16 August published on its page one an article stating that "on the orders of the Reagan administration, the Pentagon has completed a strategic master plan to give the United States the capability of winning a protracted nuclear war with the Soviet Union". According to this press report the plan is to supersede the ill-famed Presidential Directive 59 approved by the former administration. The plan is said to have much more of a fighting stance and is more detailed in its advocacy of nuclear warfare than that directive and other relevant United States documents. The report quotes an article published in 1980, one of the authors of which was recently appointed as an adviser to the United States Government. The authors specified that 20 million United States fatalities would represent a "compatible level" in a nuclear war. But no conclusion was drawn with regard to possible fatalities in the region of my country in the case of a protracted nuclear war, in Central Europe, where there is a great concentration of people and where in one country the biggest density of nuclear weapons in the world exists. Who could dispute that the casualties in this region, in the case of a protracted nuclear war would be significantly higher? Thus, in the light of the growing danger of a nuclear war, nuclear disarmament should play a central role in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee must give this question the priority it deserves. It is a matter of satisfaction that this view was expressed at the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament and in our recent debates here by the overwhelming majority of States.

My delegation continues to favour the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2. This would be a clear and encouraging indication that this Committee will live up to its responsibilities. Unfortunately, now as before, such a step is being blocked by some nuclear-weapon States.

It was with great interest that my delegation on 10 August listened to the statement made by the distinguished representative of the United States in which he declared: "We believe that negotiating meaningful measures of nuclear disarmament is the most urgent task before us". But unfortunately no conclusion was drawn concerning the role of the Committee on Disarmament in this regard. My delegation would be very much interested to know if the United States delegation, in view of the above-mentioned opinion, is ready to review its position and agree to the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2. On 5 August we noticed with pleasure that the People's Republic of China expressed its support for the establishment of such a working group.

(Mr. Harder, German Democratic Republic)

During our previous deliberations the argument was advanced that a working group on item 2 was not necessary in view of the ongoing bilateral negotiations. These negotiations, of course, are very important and we wish them success. It is our hope that meaningful results can be achieved on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security.

But bilateral and multilateral negotiations by no means exclude each other. As was stated in document CD/4 tabled by the socialist group in 1979, the preparation and conduct of the negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them should not be to the detriment of bilateral negotiations, nor should they impede the achievement of bilateral agreement.

The aim of multilateral negotiations on item 2 should be the development of a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament. This could support negotiations in other forums. In recent years a body of proposals was assembled which could be taken up in a more organized and systematic manner in an ad hoc working group. In this regard we have in mind inter alia:

The proposals made by the Soviet Union at the second special session on disarmament on the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme;

Proposals on a mutual freeze on nuclear weapons submitted at the second special session by India, Mexico, Sweden and Ireland;

The Canadian "Strategy of suffocation" as well as the proposal by Australia and Canada on the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes (CD/90).

This is only an illustrative list. Working documents CD/171 and CD/293, prepared by the secretariat, show that there is enough material to be processed and transformed into a nuclear disarmament programme by an ad hoc working group on item 2.

Closely connected with item 2 is the question of the prevention of a nuclear war. Although the General Assembly underlined in its report on its second special session that the prevention of nuclear war remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day, it was not possible at that session to come to an agreement on urgent measures in this regard. Some delegations were only virtually ready in the last hours of the second special session to agree to set up a subsidiary organ to deal with this matter.

We deem it is now time for this Committee to continue the work started at the second special session. My delegation, therefore supports the proposal made by the Indian delegation on 12 August for the establishment of a working group to undertake negotiations on appropriate and practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. Such a group should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives. In this connection, the obligation by nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons is of particular importance.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Recent events again underline the urgent need to proceed to negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

According to press reports the United States is now preparing the production of a third type of neutron warhead. It was reported that a large part of the 23,000 nuclear warheads which the United States envisages producing in the next 10 years are to be neutron ones. There are more and more signs which prove our concern, many times expressed in the Committee on Disarmament, that the introduction of neutron weapons into military arsenals would lower the nuclear threshold. This is inter alia confirmed by the fact that leading military figures in the United States are thinking of "some form of delegated clearance" to use tactical nuclear weapons in Central Europe. A recent American study pointed out that 5-20 neutron nuclear warheads could be used to destroy one tank division of the other side. Here, again, military planners seem to look upon this weapon as if it was a special kind of conventional arms, thereby fully disregarding the devastating results the use of such nuclear weapons would have in Central Europe and in other parts of the globe. Not to speak about the world-wide implications connected with the role of neutron weapons as a trigger to an all-out nuclear war. In the view of the military planners mentioned above the neutron weapon is the ideal weapon for the so-called integrated battlefield or "conventional-nuclear-chemical-biological-electronic battlefield". Taking into account all these developments, my delegation would like to reaffirm the proposal of the group of socialist countries that the Committee on Disarmament should create the necessary organizational conditions to negotiate on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons. The best framework for such negotiations would be the establishment of an appropriate working group.

Having discussed questions connected with item 2, I would like to associate myself with the proposal that you, Mr. Chairman, should go ahead with your consultations to develop a common approach on the Committee's future course of action concerning item 2. We hope that you will soon be in a position to report to the Committee on those consultations so that we may take the appropriate decision. In the view of my delegation the holding of some informal meetings on item 2 would not be sufficient.

The approach outlined above would be a real means to support "the Committee on Disarmament as an institution", as Ambassador Sadleir of Australia put it on 5 August. I hasten to add "as an institution for negotiations", since mere discussions, technical debates or even "educational exercises" would not suffice.

This also fully applies to the activities of the Ad hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban which had its first meeting last week. With regard to the work of this Group my delegation would like to stress the following:

Firstly, in its work, the Group should proceed from the principle that the scope of prohibition of a given disarmament agreement determines its modalities of verification. This principle was reaffirmed in paragraph 31 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. Therefore, my delegation agrees with the view expressed on 10 August by the distinguished Ambassador of Pakistan that, "the first issue relating to verification is the scope of the test ban". Only on the basis of a clear understanding on the scope of a CTBT can the Working Group proceed to the discussion and definition of questions of verification. In the view of my delegation the scope of such a treaty should be the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests by all States for all time to come.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Secondly, the discussion and definition of verification issues should take place in a practical and rational manner, having in mind that it is the aim of this Committee to elaborate a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The Group should therefore concentrate its work on the main political and legal questions of verification connected with such a treaty but not hold academic discussions on verification in abstracto. At this session, which is actually the first phase of its work, the Group should take up all relevant proposals and define the issues which would constitute the basis of a verification system. Next year, on the basis of a new mandate, the Group could then proceed to the actual drafting of the treaty as a whole.

Thirdly, my delegation will resist all attempts to convert the Ad Hoc Working Group into another technical group. In our view, the Group is not the right place to discuss the administrative, financial and legal aspects of a so-called international seismic monitoring system. These undoubtedly important questions can be solved when there is an agreement on the basic provisions of a CTBT. Then an appropriate body for these highly organizational and technical issues may be set up. To go the other way round would mean to put the cart before the horse. What can be discussed in this regard if we do not know what will be the scope of the treaty and which countries will take part in it and provide data for the international exchange? Moreover if, owing to the position of some countries the treaty is concluded only in the distant future, technology will have further developed and today's technical and organizational considerations may be obsolete.

Fourthly, there should be a clear understanding that a perfect, foolproof verification system is not and will not be possible. Here as in other cases one should not look for the wishful verification system but for the system which is attainable and will provide sufficient assurance that clandestine tests will be detected. Existing technical means of verification, an international exchange of seismic data as well as some procedures of international co-operation, including verification by challenge, make the likelihood of the detection of such tests very high. It is the considered view of my country that the threat caused by the absence of a complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests far outweighs the low risk posed by a not-foolproof verification system.

Before concluding my statement I cannot but express again the concern of my delegation on the position of France and the People's Republic of China towards the NTB Working Group. It is our hope that they will reconsider their position and take an active part in this Group. It was also with deep regret that my delegation on 10 August in the plenary and on 13 August in the Working Group heard the reaffirmation of the United States position that a CTB was only an "ultimate goal" and that the present time was "not propitious" for negotiations on it.

Moreover, on 6 August, the anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, a responsible figure of the United States Administration declared that the United States will continue to test nuclear bombs and may increase the size of weapons tested.

In view of this, one may ask what purpose the NTB Working Group will serve. In this regard we share the doubts expressed by the Swedish delegation on 3 August concerning the attitude of the nuclear-weapon State mentioned above.

Time and again we have stressed that verification discussions should be related to the practical needs of disarmament agreements but should not become a cover for the lack of political will to agree on certain measures of arms limitation and disarmament. It would be a bad service to this Committee and the cause of disarmament if the Group just established is intended by one side to be used to this end.

As far as my delegation is concerned, we are prepared to play an active part in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban on the basis of the above-mentioned considerations.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time at a formal plenary meeting, I wish first of all to associate myself with the congratulations that have been expressed on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for this unusually difficult month of the session. I take this opportunity also to express my delegation's appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Okawa of Japan, for his very valuable contribution to our work in the crucial month which preceded the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Anybody who has been around this Committee for a long enough time, has to get accustomed to the fact that as time passes one good colleague after the other disappears from our midst. This month we are sad to note the absence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson of Sweden, Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China and Ambassador Valdivieso of Peru, to whom tribute is to be paid for their work in the Committee. This expression of sorrow, however, is suppressed by the feeling of pleasure in welcoming among us our old friend, Ambassador Ion Datoa of Romania, whom I wish success in this new job.

In conformity with our programme of work, and fully in accord with the priorities, long established and only recently reconfirmed, I wish today to deal, first and foremost, with questions related to the first two items on our agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and a nuclear test ban. These are, in fact, the questions that were in the focus of attention all through the second special session, which ended only a few weeks ago.

The special session was taking place in particularly difficult and disquieting international circumstances, in a period which had been considered and also proved to be unfavourable to efforts aimed at curbing the arms race and promoting genuine disarmament. Nevertheless, the delegation of Hungary, like those of the great majority of the member States, went to the special session fully determined to do everything possible to contribute to the removal of the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, the halting of the arms race, especially in its nuclear aspects, and the promotion of concrete measures of disarmament.

The special session, though unable to arrive at specific conclusions and recommendations, has clearly expressed "its profound preoccupation over the danger of war, in particular nuclear war", and declared unambiguously that the prevention of a nuclear disaster "remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

The peoples of countries like mine, which have suffered the horrors and devastations of two world wars, which are living in the shadow of unprecedented accumulations of weapons of mass destruction, have fully recognized that if they want to survive, if they want to live in peace and security, nuclear war must be prevented and the nuclear arms race must be brought to an end.

It was against this background that the Hungarian delegation, together with those of the overwhelming majority of member States, approached the fundamental issues of the special session. It was against this background that the representatives of non-governmental organizations and a world-wide movement of public opinion gave an unprecedented support to the efforts of those delegations. It was against this background that they all welcomed the solemn commitment of the Soviet Union concerning the non-first-use of nuclear weapons, and urged the other nuclear-weapon States to assume similar obligations, that is, to live up to the special responsibility they must bear for the future of mankind.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation is fully convinced that the undertaking of such an obligation by all the nuclear-weapon powers would reduce to a large extent the danger of a nuclear war, would strengthen confidence among those powers, as well as the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in them, and would in fact be equivalent to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons. Such a turn of events would create the necessary atmosphere for further steps towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons.

A great number of statements delivered during the first four meetings of this session have convinced my delegation that the majority around this table are ready and willing to start meaningful negotiations on questions of top priority like the prevention of nuclear war, as well as various aspects of nuclear disarmament. We welcome that sign of readiness, and are all set to engage actively in such negotiations. At this point I wish to express the satisfaction of my delegation with the working paper presented by the delegation of India at the previous meeting -- document CD/309 -- concerning a draft mandate for an ad hoc working group to be established under item 2 of our agenda. Having been advocating the establishment of such a working group for many a year, the Hungarian delegation welcomes this new initiative. Together with several other members of the Committee my delegation is requesting you, Mr. Chairman, to start immediately urgent consultations on that proposal. Informal meetings of the Committee on the same subject could be convened without much further delay.

The world community of nations, including of course the peoples of our own countries, have shown indignation at the lack of any tangible results in the previous years of disarmament negotiations. Criticism is mounting, expectation is growing, and the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament as a whole and that of its members is greater now than ever before. At the special session certain delegations obstinately defied the wish and determination of the great majority, even the popular masses of their own countries, and stubbornly blocked every effort aimed at reaching agreement on the most burning questions. Now the pressure is upon this Committee, and that pressure is clearly mounting. If we want to avoid world-wide criticism and condemnation for failure to live up to our task, we must start concrete negotiations on the priority questions of our agenda. One of the priority items, as I have just tried to indicate, is the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. The other such question, in fact the very first item on the agenda, is a nuclear test ban.

The complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests is a task of particular urgency. This is a problem the solution of which is long overdue. The head of the Hungarian delegation in his statement at the special session gave evidence of a certain measure of optimism, and a large amount of expectation, when he said the following:

"It is heartening to note in this respect the decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament last April in Geneva to have a working group start consideration on these items soon. We shall do our best to ensure that the working group contributes to the earliest possible cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests." (A/S-12/PV.9, p.31)

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation welcomes the decision taken by the Committee at the last meeting, and congratulates Ambassador Curt Lidgard of Sweden, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1. We can assure him of our full support and co-operation.

In April my delegation acted in a spirit of co-operation and compromise when it joined the consensus on a mandate for that Working Group. We considered and continue to consider the compromise formula as a basis on which concrete work towards the negotiation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests can and must be started. We fully endorse the interpretation of the provision of that mandate given by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic in his statement on 21 April, and the Hungarian delegation will participate in the activities of the Working Group in conformity with that interpretation. My delegation fully shares the views expressed in connection with the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban by my colleague from the German Democratic Republic who preceded me.

In the context of agenda item 1, the Hungarian delegation feels it necessary to express its regret and resentment concerning the attitudes of China and France with respect to their non-participation in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. We certainly hope that their negative posture will not last long.

The alarming news reports concerning the United States position on nuclear-weapon testing, and the United States Administration's open refusal to resume the trilateral talks on a comprehensive test ban, have come as a slap in the face to all those who are eager to start negotiations on that top priority issue. The prospect that the United States may even increase the size of the weapons tested, as indicated recently by one of the high officials in Washington, is a valid reason for concern and anxiety not only to members of this Committee but also to the whole of mankind.

The Hungarian delegation, therefore, is eagerly awaiting a detailed and unambiguous statement from the delegation of the United States, clarifying the intentions of its Government on that very important subject.

There is yet another item which I want to deal with today. During the spring session of the Committee the Hungarian delegation welcomed the adoption of a new mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, allowing it to accelerate the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. We deem it essential, as we emphasized also at the special session, that renewed efforts should be made towards the early elaboration and conclusion of such a convention. We must keep in mind that certain decisions concerning the manufacture and deployment in Western Europe of a new type of chemical weapons, binary weapons, are likely to initiate a new surge in the arms race. It is, therefore, especially justified and urgent to demand the active contribution of all member States to the work that has been under way since 20 July in the Working Group under the able and energetic chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

The best example of such an active contribution is the "Basic provisions" of a chemical weapons convention submitted by the Soviet Union at the special session, and tabled also here as document CD/294. That document, having received overwhelming support from delegations, is capable of giving a major impulse to accelerated and serious negotiations on a draft convention, given similar will also from other sides.

The Hungarian delegation is of the view that the Working Group has made substantial progress in its deliberations -- and here one must not forget to mention the useful activity of the experts on chemical weapons -- at least enough for the elaboration of a composite draft text of a convention. Containing already agreed provisions as well as alternative texts for provisions where agreement may not be reached within the short time now at our disposal, the composite text would make it possible not only for us but also for the General Assembly at its forthcoming session to assess the progress achieved, and would then serve as a useful basis for our negotiations next year.

I cannot conclude this statement without giving strong expression to the deep concern and rightful indignation of my Government and of public opinion in Hungary over the brutal Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the Palestinian people and the peoples of the whole region. We have strongly condemned that genocidal attack and the imperialistic motives behind it, and continue to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanon and other occupied territories.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind remarks that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to dwell upon the question of banning chemical weapons. This question has all along had its important place in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, and has attracted particularly the attention of the people. This is because, on the one hand, the people of the world are abhorrent of such inhuman weapons, and on the other hand, the threat of chemical war is growing unabated. One Superpower, faced with charges of its use of chemical weapons, is refusing any international investigation, while the other Superpower, in disregard of opposition at home and abroad, is engaged in the renewal of its chemical arsenal with binary chemical weapons. The side which has gained an edge in chemical warfare capacity tries to preserve it, while the losing side attempts to recover its lost superiority. Thus, the two sides are vying with each other in expanding their respective chemical armaments. These facts and also what has transpired in some of the local conflicts since the Second World War serve to remind us that we must not relax our vigilance against the grave consequences of the possible use of chemical weapons. The Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility to eliminate this horrible threat and to reach agreement as soon as possible on the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons.

We have scored some progress after several years' efforts. The devotion and ability of the successive chairmen of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the goodwill and co-operative spirit displayed by many representatives as well as the efforts made by the experts -- all these have made it possible for us to enter into a new stage of elaborating provisions of a future convention. In this regard, document CD/CW/WP.33 submitted at the end of the spring session is of help in our further negotiations.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Now I would like to offer some observations on the following questions:

1. On the scope of the prohibition:

We have maintained all along that the use of chemical weapons should be included in the scope of the prohibition in a future convention, and we have repeatedly reiterated our position both at plenary meetings and at meetings of the Working Group. Together with four other delegations, we put forward at the spring session an alternative text on this issue. In the discussions since 20 July, the importance of this question has gained more attention. Here I would like to express our thanks to the Romanian representative for his useful work as co-ordinator of the consultation group on the question of "scope of prohibition". He has provided us with a list of possible solutions on this question which will facilitate our further discussions.

2. On declaration:

Declaration is one of the key elements in a future convention. A declaration should include detailed and accurate items and contents in its provisions; otherwise, the effectiveness of the convention could not be ensured. In this connection, I would like to point out that in annex II of document CD/CW/WP.33, it is laid down that the contents of declarations should include the capacity and location of chemical weapons production facilities. We consider this very necessary. We are also of the view that the production facilities for chemical weapons referred to here should comprise both factories set up solely for producing chemical weapons as well as specialized facilities affiliated to other chemical industry enterprises (such as a chemical weapons workshop set up within a civilian chemical industry enterprise).

The delegation of the Soviet Union put forward recently the "basic provisions" of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We shall study them further. The Soviet paper contains provisions relating to declarations and confidence-building measures. According to those provisions, a country might postpone its declaration to the international community of the location of chemical weapons production facilities till seven years after it becomes a party to the convention. We feel that it is rather difficult to understand such a prolonged postponement. It is our view that the adherence of a State to a convention means that it is willing to undertake the obligations laid down in the convention; consequently, the location of production facilities to be dismantled should not be kept secret for such a long time. Otherwise, it would run counter to the purpose of the confidence-building measures.

3. On verification:

Verification is another key element in a future convention. Strict and effective verification would serve as an important guarantee that the convention may not become a mere scrap of paper. In this regard, suffice it to refer to the historical lessons of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. It is precisely because the Protocol lacks the necessary verification provisions that over the past 50 odd years since the signing of the Protocol it has not been possible to conduct any fair international investigations into complaints about the use of chemical weapons, including complaints and reports on chemical warfare in Afghanistan and south-east Asia in recent years. This state of affairs cannot but jeopardize the authoritativeness of the Protocol.

Therefore, we hold that emphasis should be put on international verification and, in particular, necessary on-site inspection. In fact, many States have advanced constructive proposals. Document CD/CW/WP.33 also embodies a number of very good provisions. However, there are also evident shortcomings, i.e. no on-site investigation is provided for in regard to complaints or reports on the use of chemical weapons. We deem it indispensable to include such a provision, if we are to attempt to elaborate a credible convention for the international community.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

We have noted that the Soviet Union, in submitting the "basic provisions", has accepted the principle of on-site inspection. In the "basic provisions", reference has been made to the possibility of carrying out on-site inspection in two kinds of situation. Some representatives have made comments in this regard. As I mentioned earlier, we will study the Soviet proposal further. However, I would like to offer a preliminary observation. We feel that to ensure the effectiveness of the convention, more necessary on-site inspections are required, such as on-site inspection on the dismantling of production facilities and on allegations of the use of chemical weapons, etc.

Since the start of the summer session, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has adopted some flexible approaches, setting up a number of informal consultation groups to engage in intensive consultations on some major issues of a future convention. We welcome this useful attempt. We also hope that consultation will be conducted on the basis of the results already achieved, which are reflected in document CD/CW/WP.33.

During the Second World War, the Chinese people also suffered from the harm of chemical weapons. In order to eliminate forever the danger of chemical war, the Chinese delegation sincerely hopes that a convention on the complete prohibition and total destruction of chemical weapons can be concluded as soon as possible. To this end, we pledge to make efforts together with other delegations.

Mr. STEBBE (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today to react to the announcement by the delegations of France and China that they will not participate in the work of the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban.

Australia has for many years stressed the priority in disarmament negotiations of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty, and has consistently played an active role in international forums on this question. We have always held that such a ban should be genuinely comprehensive and should prohibit all nuclear tests in all environments for all time. A comprehensive test ban must, by definition, be capable of attracting universal adherence. It goes without saying that the prospects for this would be vastly better if all those States involved in nuclear testing participated in work on the treaty from the outset. While it is true that the Working Group established by this Committee is not, for the time being, empowered to begin negotiations on a CTB, it does have the opportunity to make an invaluable contribution to that end. Indeed, the fact that the Working Group does not have a negotiating mandate is all the more reason why no delegation should abstain from participation.

Australia can feel only regret and disappointment that two of the nuclear-weapon States have seen fit not to join in this endeavour. The Australian public has long been concerned at continued nuclear testing, particularly in our region. It will not be an easy task for the Australian Government to explain why two States, both having excellent relations with Australia, have declined to join in discussions aimed ultimately at a halt to such testing. Australia hopes that France and China will reconsider their positions and at an early date take up their rightful place in the nuclear test ban Working Group.

Australia similarly hopes that the negotiations between the other three nuclear-weapon States may be resumed at the earliest possible date.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement. In accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at its 157th plenary meeting, I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Norway, His Excellency Ambassador Vaernø.

Mr. VAERNØ (Norway): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for your kind introductory welcome and also to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. In view of the close co-operation between Kenya and Norway, it is a great pleasure for me to address the Committee while you are in the Chair. Personally, I should also like to recall our close collaboration at previous conferences to which you always made important contributions.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament must necessarily take on added significance, convening as it is just after the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Like other governments, the Norwegian Government shares the disappointment felt as the second special session failed to adopt more substantive and far-reaching documents. It did not achieve what we had hoped for. On the other hand the second special session was not held in vain. A balanced analysis will have to take into account a number of considerations.

First, the second special session provided yet another opportunity for all Members of the United Nations to address themselves to the global issues of arms control and disarmament in a detailed and thorough-going manner. The management of armaments in our contemporary world is certainly a question which deserves the attention of this world body in a way which only a special session can provide.

Secondly, the second special session did carry out a review of the implementation of the decisions, or the lack thereof, of the first special session. Whereas no unanimous conclusion was reached in this respect, the session did reaffirm the Final Document of the first special session. It must be emphasized that the commitments undertaken at that time are still valid, including the Programme of Action.

Thirdly, it should be recognized that during the second special session, a number of ideas and proposals were put forward. To the extent that these contributions will facilitate negotiations toward balanced and verifiable agreements, the session will indeed have been valuable.

We should not, however, underrate the problems which might arise from the possibility that large sectors of public opinion, disappointed and disillusioned by the lack of tangible results from the second special session might increasingly come to distrust and turn away from all multilateral disarmament negotiations. The limited achievements of the special session have underlined the vital role of the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. In this perspective the restoration of public confidence in the whole process of multilateral disarmament negotiations is also at stake. Here it seems to us that multilateral negotiations in the sense of producing militarily significant agreements are becoming more important than ever. It is urgent that this process now be speeded up. It is in this spirit that my delegation today intends to table two working papers, which we hope might constitute a modest contribution to this process.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Important follow-up work remains to be done both by the Committee on Disarmament and by the General Assembly as a result of the second special session. To the extent possible, we intend to take an active part in this follow-up process.

We still attach importance to the comprehensive programme of disarmament and are pleased to see that the Ad Hoc working group on a CPD has been re-established under the chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles. Norway intends to participate in the CPD Working Group when it resumes its work in 1983.

In addition to the follow-up of Nordic proposals in the fields of disarmament and development and on non-proliferation policies, Norway would like to see a number of issues in the institutional field acted upon both by this Committee and by the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. I draw the attention of members of the Committee to our own proposals regarding the Committee on Disarmament, UNIDIR, and the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. As regards the Committee on Disarmament, it is the hope of my Government that the Committee will be able to present a unanimous recommendation to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session concerning the expansion of the Committee's membership, consistent with the need to enhance its effectiveness. My delegation was pleased to note that suggestions in this respect received wide support during the second special session.

The theme of this morning's meeting -- the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament -- is a priority item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament.

It is certainly of importance to the Committee that the bilateral talks begun in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union on intermediate and strategic nuclear weapons should lead to results which can facilitate nuclear disarmament. As regards the other priority item, the comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Norwegian Government welcomed the decision taken at the close of the first part of the 1982 Session of the Committee on Disarmament to establish an Ad Hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban. We are pleased that Ambassador Lidgard, the distinguished representative of Sweden, has been elected Chairman of this important Working Group.

Since its establishment in 1976, Norway has participated in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. The Norwegian participants are scientists at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR). A Norwegian scientist from NORSAR is scientific secretary of the Ad Hoc Group. Another Norwegian scientist is co-convenor of the study group on format and procedures for the exchange of level 2 data.

During the past 10 years, Norwegian scientists have conducted extensive studies and completed large-scale research projects relevant to the problem of the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Experts from many countries have participated in the research activities at NORSAR. This has resulted in improved methods for distinguishing the signals of explosions from those of earthquakes. NORSAR also publishes a monthly seismic bulletin, which is distributed in more than 20 countries.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Under the able chairmanship of Dr. Ericsson of Sweden, the Group has proposed the establishment of a global seismological network to assist in the verification of a potential CTBT. The Ad Hoc Group is pursuing its work by elaborating in detail how such a global system should be operated. A problem of particular importance in this regard is how to achieve rapid, reliable exchange of the large volumes of seismic data which would be accumulated. In the years that have gone by since the Ad Hoc Group first proposed the global system (in 1978 in document CCD/558), there have been rapid technological advances with respect to computer and data communication technology. This has opened up new possibilities to improve the effectiveness of the global data exchange, and Norway considers it important that the work of the Ad Hoc Group take advantage of this new situation.

As a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Group, a low-cost computer system has been developed for the purpose of rapid international exchange of seismic data. The system would be suitable as a prototype which could be further developed for future installation at any station in the global seismic network.

In this connection I have the honour to introduce the Norwegian working paper contained in document CD/310 on a prototype system for the international exchange of seismological data under a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Such a prototype has been developed by scientists at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR) as a result of a research project which was initiated in 1980 under the sponsorship of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This afternoon a demonstration of how such a system functions will be staged by representatives of NORSAR.

It is our hope that this national contribution will prove to be of value to the further studies of the seismic expert Group and the negotiations in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban, which in its first phase will focus on verification.

As we have pointed out before, the Norwegian Government is prepared to make NORSAR available as a monitoring station within a global seismic verification system. With this in mind, Norway will continue to take an active part in the seismic expert Group. We shall also participate in the Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban as an observer.

According to the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and several resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its regular sessions, the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Norway welcomed the decision taken at the beginning of this year's session on a revised mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Based on document CD/CW/WP.33 and under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka, the negotiations are now entering a new phase, aimed at reaching compromises on the main outstanding questions. In this regard, Norway has with interest studied the proposals concerning verification contained in the basic provisions of a chemical weapons convention which were introduced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union during the second special session.

The Norwegian Government is of the opinion that a ban on chemical weapons is one of the most important issues on the international agenda for disarmament.

(Mr. Vaernø, Norway)

Today, I have the pleasure to introduce document CD/311, which is a Norwegian working paper on verification of a chemical weapons convention. The working paper is based on a research programme on sampling and analysis of chemical warfare agents under winter conditions. This research programme, which is also sponsored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was initiated in 1981 as a Norwegian contribution to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The working paper contains a summary of the research report. The full report is annexed to the English version of the working paper.

This working paper describes the results of field experiments of sampling and analysis of supertoxic nerve and mustard agents under winter conditions. Field experiments have been undertaken in order to avoid the artificial conditions of a laboratory set-up. The samples were left outside in the prevailing weather conditions of changing temperature, wind and relative humidity, which are hard to simulate in a laboratory exercise.

Within the framework of the research programme we have studied the various factors determining the loss of chemical agents, in order to evaluate the probability of making a negative or positive conclusion. We have also investigated the penetration and diffusion of the chemical agents in snow, problems of the utmost importance for sampling procedures. In addition, we have looked into the problem of transporting samples from the field to an internationally recognized laboratory. The field experiments showed that identification of chemical agents can be made by analysis of snow samples taken as long as two weeks, and in some cases even more than four weeks, after possible use. Verification of nerve agents such as Vx and Soman can be achieved over a longer period than is the case for Sarin and Tabun.

In the last part of the working paper we have made some concluding remarks concerning the consultative committee to be established within the framework of the convention.

The committee should be authorized to conduct on-site inspections in order to fulfil its responsibilities. In our view, the committee should establish a pool of well-qualified international experts from whom a multilateral team of experts could be selected in each case.

As soon as possible after its establishment, the committee should adopt verification procedures flexible enough to take account of any new scientific achievement. In elaborating the procedures for on-site inspection it is necessary to take into account the time element.

In the second phase of the Norwegian research programme which will take part during the winter of 1983, we intend to study problems related to storage of samples until they can be analysed by an internationally recognized laboratory. We shall also investigate the behaviour of other agents such as irritants and precursors. Efforts will also be devoted to the possibility of using the decomposition products of chemical agents under winter conditions as additional evidence of identification, since this may significantly extend the possibility for drawing firm conclusions for a long period after possible use.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Norway for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegate wish to take the floor?

As the Committee is aware, several proposals have been advanced in connection with item 2 of our agenda. In our timetable for the present week, we left open the possibility of holding an informal meeting next Thursday, 19 August, in the afternoon. We have already had one comprehensive informal consultation on all these matters. It now remains for us to hold an informal meeting in this chamber, in conformity with our established practice. I suggest that we hold an informal meeting on 19 August at 3.30 p.m. to consider these proposals, i.e. those in documents CD/180, tabled by the Group of 21, CD/259, submitted by the German Democratic Republic, CD/219, tabled by a group of socialist countries, and CD/309, tabled by India. There may be some others too. We could also continue our exchange of views on document CD/272 submitted by Mongolia under item 7 of the agenda, i.e. the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

If there is no other suggestion, we will proceed accordingly.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to inform the Committee that I have requested the Secretariat to circulate in the delegations' boxes a communication received from the Chargé d'Affaires of Senegal requesting participation in the work of the Committee under rules 33 and 35 of the rules of procedure. I intend to put before the Committee a draft decision concerning that request at our plenary meeting next Thursday.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 19 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.