

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 3 August 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C. Gatere Maina

(Kenya)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. R. GARCIA-MORITAN  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUNG  
Mr. SUO KAIMING

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. L. STAVINOMA  
Mr. A. CIMA  
Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMLVES  
Mr. C. GYORFFY  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. T. TOTH

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. N. WISNOEMOERTI  
Mr. T. DAMANIK  
Mr. F. QASIM  
Mr. A. BARRIN

Iran:

Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. KWAKITA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. C. GATERE M. INI  
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J.M. KIBOI  
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. VAN DONGEN  
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAJ

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. I. DUTCOU  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. M. BICHIR

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALLIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. R.M. TIMMERBAYER  
Mr. V.V. LOSHCININE  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. V.F. PRLACHIN  
Mr. V.L. GALI

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M.D. BUSBY  
Ms. M. WINSTON  
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Ms. E. EKANGA KIBEYA  
Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 175th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished delegates, let me first of all express my sincere gratitude to Ambassador Yoshio Okawa of Japan who, in accordance with rule 9 of this Committee's rules of procedure, has handed over to me the Chairmanship of the Committee. Ambassador Okawa has done an outstanding job since he assumed the Chairmanship of the Committee last April. The issues on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were still as complex and unresolved as they had been four or even more years earlier. But you did your best, Mr. Ambassador, and we owe you a debt of gratitude for the guidance and leadership you have provided to the Committee during this period.

I wish also to thank Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and his staff, for the valuable services they have provided to the Committee since we last met here three months ago.

Distinguished delegates, since this is the first meeting of the Committee on Disarmament since the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament ended, we cannot avoid looking back to it and drawing some conclusions. The session had two fundamental issues to deal with. It had to review the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session devoted to disarmament, and to consider, if possible, adopting a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Most regrettably, neither of these issues was at all successfully resolved. The same can be said of three other main items on its agenda, which were: the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, enhancing the effectiveness of machinery in the field of disarmament and measures to mobilize world public opinion in favour of disarmament.

Since the session was not able to complete its work on these issues, it decided to refer them back to this Committee and to the regular sessions of the General Assembly. This development imposes a heavy burden on the Committee during this short session and I believe for a few sessions to come.

My delegation was disappointed by the outcome of the twelfth special session as, I am sure, were many others, but we were encouraged by the determination of the session not to destroy the work done in disarmament so far. The act of referring back the unresolved issues to the Committee on Disarmament and to future sessions of the General Assembly, was a mark of faith and trust in this institution. It provides a challenge to this Committee, to you distinguished delegates and to the Governments which you represent. This is the way my delegation views the developments in the special session.

We recognized before the special session started that the circumstances in which it was held were inopportune. The political climate and the tensions in the world could only contribute negatively to the deliberations on issues of disarmament. Disarmament is not a science that can be developed in isolation from the issues

(The Chairman)

affecting nations from day to day. It is directly related to the perceptions of security of each State and the arrangements made to maintain international peace and security. If the arrangements made cannot be seen to provide security, if there is any doubt whether the machinery created to underpin security can work when the need arises, then negotiations in the field of disarmament must necessarily remain extremely difficult. This interrelationship between international peace and security and disarmament was recognized by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament and expressed in paragraph 13 of the Final Document, which reads as follows:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means".

My delegation hopes that these interrelationships will be borne in mind at all times and that serious work will be done to implement and strengthen the machinery provided in the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Uppermost in our thoughts as we start this summer session of the Committee are the ongoing conflicts in different parts of the world. While these do not fall directly in our field of work, nevertheless they do affect our deliberations and negotiations and therefore everything that can be done to bring them to an end should be done. The prevention of the frequent occurrence of local wars would go a long way to reducing tensions and thus contribute to improving the climate in which we negotiate in this Committee.

The recent outcome of the second special session devoted to disarmament necessitates a strong reaffirmation of the Final Document of the first special session and total commitment to it by all States. It also underscores the negotiating character of this Committee, which should be utilized fully by all its member States. Problems of scope and verification of compliance with agreements on disarmament issues are undoubtedly at the heart of the absence of political will.

Ways should be sought of enhancing the effectiveness of this Committee as a negotiating body on disarmament matters. Our agenda is full. There are the problems of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and the prevention of an arms race in outer space, among others, which the current session of the Committee has to tackle. We will need to work harder and faster.

Distinguished delegates, I have briefly outlined some of the fundamental problems which the General Assembly failed to resolve at its second special session

(The Chairman)

and which I believe the Committee should seriously negotiate during its current session. A draft programme of work for the plenary meetings of the Committee will be circulated to all delegations this afternoon. I hope that we can adopt it at the next meeting of the Committee, on 5 August, so that we can get started on our work without delay. This is going to be a relatively short session of the Committee on Disarmament and we should, therefore, take advantage of every hour available to us.

As for the establishment or re-establishment of ad hoc working groups and the organization of their work, I have initiated informal consultations and we shall discuss them this afternoon.

My delegation is entirely at your service and stands ready to help in every way possible to achieve progress in our work.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to the new representative of Romania, Ambassador Datcou, who joins the Committee for the first time today as leader of his delegation. Ambassador Datcou is a very experienced diplomat who served recently as head of delegation to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and, before that, as Permanent Representative of his country in New York. He was previously Permanent Representative to the United Nations Office at Geneva and also head of his country's delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I am sure that we can count on his vast experience in the complex tasks before the Committee. I would also like to welcome once again the presence among us of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, leader of the Swedish delegation, who will address the Committee today.

I would also like to recognize the presence among us today of the 1982 disarmament Fellows. I am informed that the Geneva part of the Fellowship Programme began on 12 July and will end on 30 August. The disarmament Fellows will be attending our plenary meetings during the course of their stay in Geneva. On behalf of the Committee, I extend a warm welcome to them and wish them all the best in their studies.

May I draw the attention of delegations to document CD/300 entitled "Letter dated 3 August 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament in connection with the concluding document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament" which has been circulated today by the secretariat.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mexico, Canada, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, India, Sweden, Brazil and the Federal Republic of Germany.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the distinguished representative of Mexico, His Excellency Ambassador García Robles.



Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin by expressing the sincere satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament during this first month of our 1982 summer session. All those who like myself have had the good fortune to see you working not only here in the Committee on Disarmament but also at the General Assembly in New York know that the guidance of the Committee's work is in very good hands. As regards myself personally, since, as we all know, it is the custom for the incoming Chairman to consult the outgoing Chairman before assuming his office, I believe that I could not have found a better predecessor to consult at the end of this month. I should also like to express -- or rather to repeat -- my congratulations to Ambassador Okawa, the distinguished representative of Japan. We all know how well he discharged his tasks here during the last month of the spring session. But those of us who were present at the recent special session of the General Assembly can also bear witness to the outstanding way in which he acted there as Chairman of the Committee. Lastly, I should like very sincerely to endorse your words of welcome here to Ambassador Datcou. He has only just joined us here but for a number of us, as you yourself said, he is an old friend from New York, where he was for a number of years his country's permanent representative. It is, of course, a great pleasure to me to see among us here once again my distinguished colleague and friend, Mrs. Thorsson, and I am glad to know, also, that the disarmament Fellows are with us again here this summer.

At the beginning of the first session of this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", on Wednesday, 24 January 1979, I made the following statement concerning the Final Document which set down the results of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in the spring of 1978, and which, as you know established the Committee on Disarmament:

"Never before had the United Nations succeeded in adopting, and still less by consensus -- including France and China -- such a comprehensive document which emphatically proclaimed a series of conclusions or provisions -- whose accuracy or compulsory nature, depending on the case, it will in future be impossible to call in question -- such as those defined in the emphatic statements that the increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it; that the existing nuclear arsenals and the continuing arms race pose a threat to the very survival of mankind; that there is a close relationship between disarmament and development, and that any resources that may be released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used to bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries; that in accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament and that therefore Member States must keep the United Nations duly informed of all steps, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, taken outside its aegis."

The results of the second special session devoted to disarmament which has just been held at United Nations Headquarters were very different. The General Assembly, in fact, failed lamentably in what had, from the beginning, rightly been considered to be its fundamental purpose: approval of a comprehensive programme of disarmament which would faithfully reflect the requirements embodied in paragraph 109 of the Final Document.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This failure was not, of course, due to any lack of organization, industry or determination. At its second meeting, held on 14 June, the Ad Hoc Committee of the twelfth special session established an open-ended working group responsible for the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The group -- Working Group I, which I had the honour of presiding over -- immediately set up four drafting groups, also open-ended, to try to reach agreement on the text of the various chapters of the programme, on the basis of the draft text, the fruit of two years' work, which had been transmitted to the General Assembly by the Committee on Disarmament.

It would be out of place here to give a detailed account of the uninterrupted efforts that were made for rather more than three weeks in the bodies I have mentioned and in various additional informal consultations in an attempt to achieve the objective sought. Suffice it to recall, briefly, that the chapters on "Objectives" and "Priorities" were almost completed, that very considerable progress was made with respect to the chapter concerning "Principles" and also, although to a lesser extent, on the chapter to be called "Machinery and procedures" and an additional chapter, containing material drawn from the preceding chapter in the Geneva draft, on the subject of "Verification".

In addition, at its fourth meeting, Working Group I had before it a draft "Introduction" which I had felt it appropriate to prepare, in my capacity as Chairman of the Group, and which -- although there was insufficient time for it to receive proper consideration -- did not give rise to any objection either.

On the other hand, the part of the programme concerned with "Disarmament measures", and more particularly the measures contained in the section entitled "Nuclear Weapons", proved to be an insurmountable barrier to the achievement of a consensus. I do not want in this respect either to go deeply into the various elements that came into play in producing the sorry outcome we are facing. I shall simply repeat what I said at the closing meeting of the special session of the General Assembly, on 10 July, when I expressed my firm conviction that the members of the group known as the "Group of 21" -- of which Mexico is a member and which, as you know, includes all the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament which are not attached to either of the two major military alliances -- could certainly have a quiet conscience, for, as I said at the time -- and I gave a number of concrete and irrefutable examples -- it is very unlikely that there was ever an occasion in the history of multilateral disarmament negotiations, when one of the parties made so many important concessions as were made by the Group of 21 during the short period of the negotiations that took place during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I cannot but mention also the surprise felt not only by myself but also by many other representatives of third world countries when the delegation of one Superpower, after declaring in the general debate that "we need deeds not words" and that "we should not confuse the signing of agreements with the solving of problems", because "agreements genuinely reinforce peace only when they are kept" shortly thereafter adopted an attitude in flagrant contradiction with those statements, which had been made on 17 June at the highest level. In fact, it was probably the question of the action to be taken with respect to the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests which constituted the decisive element in the General Assembly's failure as regards the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The attitude that was adopted was, we believe, in clear contradiction with the obligation assumed in the partial test-ban treaty nearly 20 years ago, the preamble of which expresses a determination to "achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", an undertaking which was to be expressly reiterated five years later in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which is undoubtedly also reflected in article VI of that Treaty. Furthermore, it should also be borne in mind that the same Superpower approved -- and not by participating in a consensus, which may sometimes mean mere passive acceptance, but by the positive and unequivocal act of a vote in favour -- the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of three separate resolutions in three successive years (resolutions 32/78 of 12 December 1977, 33/60 of 14 December 1978 and 34/73 of 11 December 1979) urging the three States which had been conducting negotiations -- that is, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union -- first, to "expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible" and secondly, to transmit the results immediately thereafter to the Committee on Disarmament, at the same time the General Assembly requested this Committee to initiate negotiations on the treaty in question "with the utmost urgency"; "as a matter of the highest priority" or "immediately" -- whichever expression you like to pick from the three resolutions in which they are severally used.

Naturally, it is the sovereign right of each State to decide on the principles of its foreign policy. However, it is also its inescapable duty towards the international community to let it know what to expect as regards the application of those principles. We were told during the debate at the recent special session of the General Assembly, in the words of Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, that only tyrants' promises "are in deep contrast to their performances". If what that country wants is the limitless acceleration of the nuclear arms race, then it should say so frankly. The World Disarmament Campaign for which Mexico had the privilege of taking the initiative two years ago, and which the General Assembly solemnly launched at its opening meeting recently, has the specific purpose of providing reliable information to the peoples of the world -- those peoples both of Europe and the United States who have been demonstrating in their millions to express their desire for peace and disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament.

As the General Assembly so rightly stated at its special session of 1978, if nuclear weapons constitute a threat to the very survival of mankind, it is obvious that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations". It is only natural, then, that those States which wish to be genuine spokesmen for their peoples should consider it not only an obvious right but also their imperative duty to analyse coldly and objectively the reasons why, after a quarter of a century of discussions in the United Nations and the various disarmament negotiating bodies, it has still not so far been possible to agree on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests once and for all. For the purposes of such an analysis, I believe that it would be very useful to consider certain recent opinions and facts of particular relevance, which I shall now mention.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

In a book which appeared in the bookshops while the General Assembly was meeting recently, entitled "Nuclear Illusion and Reality", Lord Solly Zuckerman, undoubtedly one of the best authorities on the subject, wrote as follows:

"In July 1959 [a year that fell within the period of voluntary moratorium, 1958-1961], Harold Macmillan wrote that: 'The Americans ... seem now to be turning against a comprehensive agreement (to include underground tests). This, if true, is tragic.' Later he noted: 'The real reason is that the Atomic Commission and the Pentagon are very keen to go on indefinitely with experiments (large and small) so as to keep refining upon and perfecting the art of nuclear weapons.' ...."

Amplifying the above remarks by Macmillan which he quotes in his book, Lord Zuckerman adds some comments of his own, as follows:

"One reason why the Americans were so keen on continuing to test nuclear warheads was that by the time there was talk about test-bans, they had already embarked on a vigorous programme to develop ballistic missiles. The Russians, not surprisingly, responded by intensifying theirs. This added another dimension to the arms race, as did the dream of devising anti-ballistic missile systems. ....

"In 1964, a year after the Partial Test-Ban Treaty was signed, York and Wiesner, who were associated with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy at the centre of the debate, published the article to which I have already referred, and in which they stated that in assuring national security further tests of nuclear weapons were unnecessary."

I should like to repeat that last statement to make sure that members have heard it: York and Wiesner declared that no further tests of nuclear weapons were necessary to ensure national security. Lord Zuckerman goes on to say:

"As they saw it, the increase in military power which might follow from further testing and from the elaboration of more nuclear weapons was bound, in both the East and the West, to bring about a decrease in national security. In the considered professional judgment of these two men -- and they had all the facts at their disposal -- a continuation of the nuclear arms race provided no escape from this curious paradox."

That was the situation in the second half of the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s, and things do not seem to have changed much, as can be seen from an editorial that appeared in the New York Times a mere 10 days ago, on 23 July. For that article, which bears the vivid title, "Nuclear Sand in the Eye", contains the following statements, among others:

"The Administration has avoided test-ban negotiations for 18 months; it clearly has no interest in the total treaty. That is too bad for Soviet-American relations and for the cause of non-proliferation. Without great military risk to either power, a total ban would do much to help discourage other nations from pursuing nuclear weapons."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff invariably insist that testing is essential for weapons development and for confidence in the reliability of old warheads. Their opposition is reinforced by America's weapons laboratories, which fear for the future of their work if denied the right to test. But there are good answers to these concerns that the Administration does not even bother to debate. It sides with the Chiefs and uses old scare stories about inadequate verification to confuse Congress and the public ..."

This article in the New York Times continues:

"So there would be no insuperable obstacle to monitoring compliance. The Soviet Union has gone further than ever before in agreeing to American-controlled monitoring boxes where Washington wants them and to the idea of on-site inspection on challenge...."

"A comprehensive ban would hamper improvements in warhead design, an American emphasis, and explosive power, a Soviet emphasis. It would also gradually erode confidence in the reliability of warheads on the shelf. But that is important only for a pre-emptive first-strike. American strategists who feel vulnerable to such a strike would actually gain security from a total ban."

That is the end of a quotation from an editorial which appeared in the New York Times 10 days ago, on 23 July.

At its second special session on disarmament the General Assembly, after expressing its regret that it had been unable to adopt a comprehensive programme of disarmament, said that it saw grounds for encouragement in the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, their solemn undertaking with respect to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in the matter of disarmament negotiations agreed upon in its programme of action. Shortly thereafter in those same conclusions, the General Assembly stated the following:

"Member States have affirmed their determination to continue to work for the urgent conclusion of negotiations on and the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which shall encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail, and in which a new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. To this end, the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is hereby referred back to the Committee on Disarmament, together with the views expressed and the progress achieved on the subject at the special session. The Committee on Disarmament is requested to submit a revised draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

We believe that the General Assembly was right not to contemplate any action by the Committee on Disarmament during the current year. For we are convinced that the fate of the comprehensive programme will depend primarily, not on the Committee, but on the "political will" of a few of its members and ultimately, it might perhaps even be said, on that of a single one of them which is very probably still not prepared to take the necessary decisions, if the Programme -- as many delegations, including our own, consider essential -- is not to imply any retreat, however small, with respect to the Final Document of 1978.

We hope that during the next six weeks, which will constitute the whole of what is called the summer session of the Committee on Disarmament, it will be possible to establish exactly what the present situation is in this matter and how it may possibly develop in the near future. It should be borne in mind that the Ad Hoc Working Group on item 1 of our agenda, "Nuclear test ban", will be beginning its work for the first time. My delegation's position with regard to the question of "verification", which is given priority in that Group's mandate is well known. Basically it coincides with that expressed by none other than the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1972 when he declared to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"I believe that all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement ..."

"When one takes into account the existing means of verification ... it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban ..."

"The potential risks of continuing underground nuclear weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests."

That is what the Secretary-General of the United Nations said here in 1972, and as we all know, he expressly repeated that statement in 1980 in his introduction to the report of the experts.

It is thus clear that acceptance of that mandate meant a tremendous concession on our part and we were only able to make that concession, as I said in my statement on 21 April last, at the 173rd meeting of the Committee, because, as is stated in its mandate, the working group "will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session," and also because, as is again stated in that mandate, "the Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

We hope that the Superpower whose future attitude on this question will, as I said earlier, in our view, be decisive for the fate of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, will be able in turn to show the necessary flexibility so that it can adopt a position on the substance of the matter that is consonant with the obligations assumed in the Treaties of 1963 and 1968 to which I have referred and the position endorsed with its affirmative vote in the three General Assembly resolutions which I have also expressly mentioned.

Only thus will the Committee be able -- and let us hope that this will come to pass -- to transmit to the General Assembly next year, at its thirty-eighth regular session, a revised draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which will justify the convening of a third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mexico for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Canada, His Excellency Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I should like to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. It is good to see you in the Chair. Many delegations have worked with you in New York and here in Geneva on disarmament matters and I want to take the occasion also to thank Ambassador Okawa for his great efforts as Chairman in April when he attempted to prepare the Committee in order that it would maximize its contribution to the second special session. Much is expected of the Committee during this period. Much responsibility, therefore, lies with you. It is always a pleasure to see a fellow representative of the Commonwealth in the Chair. We aim to contribute to your success. At the same time, I should like to welcome Mr. Bensmail to the secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament. He brings with him experience which will stand the Committee in good stead.

Just before it adjourned last spring, I referred in a plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament to its unique responsibility -- to negotiate. At its regular sessions the General Assembly does not negotiate, nor indeed was this the function of its second special session on disarmament.

Despite a number of shortcomings, the second special session has reaffirmed the critical role of the Committee on Disarmament in the multilateral process of negotiating arms control and disarmament agreements. Indeed, the second special session reaffirmed, in a number of ways, the confidence of the international community in this Organization. Should we not therefore look quickly to the future? Should we not build especially upon areas where substantial progress has already been made?

In planning our work for this short summer session we need to husband our resources carefully. In our view, the Committee should focus its main attention on three substantive areas -- chemical weapons, a comprehensive test ban and outer space.

Issues such as negative security assurances, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament should, in our view, be given less concentrated treatment. In the cases of negative security assurances and radiological weapons, discussions during our spring session suggest that while these matters need to be kept under review in the Committee, further consultations outside the Committee amongst individual delegations might yield the most profitable results.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

The General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament charged the Committee on Disarmament to proceed with further work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Experience at the second special session, and indeed that within the Committee last spring, suggest that there might be benefit now in a "cooling off" period. Instead of immediately resuming our efforts to reach a mutually satisfactory comprehensive programme of disarmament, the time may be ripe for reflection, for reformulation of national positions, so that we may, when the time is right, move ahead.

I should now like briefly to refer to problems related to our work on a chemical weapons convention, the comprehensive test ban Working Group, and the item on outer space.

With respect to chemical weapons, I should like to recall the words of my Prime Minister at the second special session: "Given the complexity and characteristics of many modern weapons systems, national technical means may not be adequate for verifying arms control and disarmament agreements. Consequently, the international community should address itself to verification as one of the most significant factors in disarmament negotiations in the 1980s". Nowhere is this observation more apt than in our efforts to achieve a chemical weapons convention. Under previous Chairmen of the chemical weapons Working Group, Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard, much was accomplished: Ambassador Sujka has already added his particular contribution to this progress. We have now come to the point where it is clear that the success of our efforts will depend upon the degree to which there is agreement on adequate measures of verification. This, I repeat, is now the fundamental issue before the Committee.

We have noted with great interest the Soviet proposals concerning verification of a chemical weapons convention announced by Foreign Minister Gromyko at the General Assembly's second special session. We look forward to exploring these proposals in detail during this session of the Committee on Disarmament. We want particularly to explore those provisions relating to "on-site verification on an agreed basis". In line with our objectives in achieving further progress towards a chemical weapons convention, Canadian expertise will be provided for a period longer than in the past for technical discussions on verification matters.

We are pleased that the Working Group on a comprehensive test ban will commence work at this session. We believe it to be in the interest of this Committee as a whole that it should begin substantive consideration of the items under its mandate as soon as possible. We recognize, however, that given the shortness of this session, an in-depth examination of many of the issues may have to await our 1983 session. In the meantime, the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts will meet from 9 to 20 August; the creation of the comprehensive test ban Working Group



(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

adds to the seismic experts Group a dimension of additional importance. I should like to recall that Canada has played an active role for the past six years in the development of international seismic data exchange, which has been the primary responsibility of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. In the forthcoming months, Canada will be able to join those countries which have been exchanging data on a provisional basis. In this way we shall be one further participant in the definitive data exchange from the outset. We believe that such an exchange can -- and should -- be implemented in advance of the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The threat of an arms race in outer space has concerned the international community for some time. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly has acknowledged the Committee on Disarmament's responsibility to deal with this subject. As a beginning, we believe that the Committee should attempt to define the dimensions of this problem. To this end, it is our intention to participate actively in the consideration by the Committee at this summer session of the issues relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

I have singled out the foregoing items as the important ones for treatment by the Committee in this short summer session. There are indeed other items on our agenda. Short though our time may be, we should take up one of the most significant of these remaining items, that relating to the organization and the membership of the Committee on Disarmament. The effective functioning of this body is at stake. We agree with those who have argued that a review of our work methods is necessary. We should seek to reach accord on the resolution of these matters, not only in the interests of the Committee on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating body, but also in the interests of resolving the substantive tasks we have before us.

I think that in this Committee it is neither proper nor productive to dwell on the shortcomings of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I said at the outset today that we should be forward-looking. The best way this committee can reaffirm its commitment to the arms control and disarmament process, and to justify the trust the international community has placed in it is through the realization of concrete and practical steps. There indeed are opportunities before us. Let us seize them.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):  
Mr. Chairman, the USSR delegation is glad to welcome you, the representative of Kenya, to the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. We would like to wish you all success. You can be sure that the Soviet delegation will support your efforts to promote the implementation by the Committee of the tasks it is charged with.

I should like, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to express our gratitude to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who so successfully carried out the tasks of Chairman of the Committee not only during the month of April but also subsequently, during the particularly responsible period of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We wish to welcome Comrade Datcu, the Ambassador of Romania, to the Committee and we look forward to a continuation of our traditional co-operation and friendship with the Romanian delegation.

The Committee on Disarmament resumes the work of its 1982 session at an important time. Last month the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament completed its work. During that session the will of the international community for peace, the determination of peoples to restrain the demon of war and to secure the realization of the life-long aspirations of mankind for a world without arms, for a world without wars, were expressed more clearly than ever before.

Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, in his message to the second special session noted that "if we are to single out what is the most important, the most urgent, what now worries people in all corners of the globe, what preoccupies the minds of statesmen and public figures in many countries of the world, it is the concern for halting the endless build-up of ever more destructive types of weapons, achieving a breakthrough towards the improvement of international relations and averting a nuclear disaster".

Does not the powerful movement for peace and disarmament which has lately attained such strength in all countries of the world bear witness to this? Owing to the vigorous actions of the peace-loving forces the second special session proved to be an important landmark in the efforts of peoples to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and to curb the arms race.

The question of preventing nuclear war was the principal, the central issue at the session from the beginning to the end of the work of this representative international forum. In the document it adopted at the session the General Assembly, expressing its profound concern over the threat of nuclear war and stressing that the removal of that threat is "the most acute and urgent task of the present day", urged all States to consider as soon as possible "relevant proposals", designed to avoid nuclear war "thus ensuring that the survival of mankind is not endangered".

This means in the first instance the proposal that all nuclear-weapon States assume the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet Union has unilaterally assumed this obligation. If the other nuclear-weapon States follow our example, then the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war will actually be reduced to naught since this would be tantamount in practice to a ban on the use of nuclear weapons altogether.

The head of the Soviet State in his message also expressed a positive attitude to the idea of a mutual freeze of nuclear arsenals as a first step towards their reduction and eventually their complete elimination.

It is our opinion that the Committee on Disarmament should pay special attention to these urgent issues which are of deep concern to the international public.

At its second special session on disarmament the United Nations General Assembly in its decision unanimously reaffirmed the validity of the Final Document of its first special session and the obligation of its member States to respect in negotiations on disarmament the priorities agreed on in the Programme of Action.

This, distinguished delegates, places before the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum responsible for working out concrete international agreements to restrain the arms race, tasks of vital importance. It can justifiably be said that the responsibility laid on our Committee by the international community through the United Nations General Assembly was never so great as it is today. We should convert into practical measures the impulse given by the General Assembly to the solution of concrete problems of arms limitation and disarmament. It is all the more imperative as the international public rightly expresses its serious concern over the fact that for more than five years now the Committee on Disarmament has made no progress and in fact has been merely marking time.

It is not our intention now to investigate the reasons for the lack of progress in the Committee's work. We have often spoken about this ourselves, and we have frequently heard many of the representatives sitting at this table also speak about the reasons for the stagnation in our work. This very morning the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico dwelt on them at some length. Progress in the Committee has been blocked for a long time now, and the main reason is that certain States still do not have the political will to undertake real measures of arms limitation and disarmament under effective international control.

This cannot go on for a long time. The Committee on Disarmament will fail in its duties as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body and it will suffer the same grievous fate as befell other disarmament bodies which existed in the past if it does not achieve decisive progress in its work.

In accordance with the priorities specified by the General Assembly we should give our attention first and foremost to the problems of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It has long been a matter of urgency to set up an ad hoc working group on item 2 of the Committee's agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". At the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the Soviet Union in its memorandum, "To avert the growing nuclear threat and to curb the arms race" proposed the elaboration, adoption and stage-by-stage implementation of a nuclear disarmament programme. The major parameters of such a programme are set

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

forth in the memorandum. Moreover, in compliance with the wishes expressed by many States we agreed that one of the first stages of the programme would be the cessation of the production of fissionable materials used for the production of various types of nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union is ready to consider this problem in the whole context of the limitation and cessation of the nuclear arms race.

The complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is a very urgent problem. Before the recess the Committee set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this item, and we hope that this Group will proceed without delay to work on the problem that was indicated in plain terms by practically all representatives when they agreed on the mandate for this Group -- the problem of drafting a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

In view of recent press reports concerning the adoption by the United States Administration of some new decision on the question of nuclear tests, it is important to us -- and obviously to all those present in this room -- that the United States delegation should clarify that country's intentions and indicate whether it is ready to draft such a treaty or not. Clearly, this will greatly influence the attitude of the States members of the Committee to the activities of the above-mentioned Working Group.

In accordance with our decision taken earlier, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons resumed its work before the start of the plenary meetings of the Committee itself. This proves that the Committee is perfectly aware of the primary significance of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction.

The Soviet Union is strongly in favour of the speediest possible solution of this major problem. True to the humane purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the Soviet Union has never used chemical weapons anywhere and has never transferred them to anyone. Motivated by the desire to achieve a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons, the Soviet Union submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session a text entitled "Basic provisions of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction".

Our draft, which has been distributed as an official document of the Committee, contains quite a number of new elements, inter alia on the question of verification of compliance with future conventions, and we express our deep satisfaction at the fact that both at the second special session and during the work of our Working Group on Chemical Weapons many delegations gave a positive appraisal of the provisions of the Soviet draft. The representative of Canada has referred to our proposals at this morning's meeting.

The Soviet delegation is convinced that there now exist all the objective conditions necessary for a decisive advance towards the solution of the question of the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. We therefore consider that the Committee should prepare by the end of its current session a composite draft text of a future convention containing both agreed provisions -- we hope there will be many of them -- and those on which we have not been able to reach agreement during this stage of our work on the draft of a convention.

The problem of the prevention of an arms race in outer space is not less important, and it, too, has already been referred to today. Unfortunately events are developing in such a way that outer space is becoming more and more an arena for the arms race. It is for this reason that we ought without delay to start drafting

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an appropriate international treaty. The Soviet Union's concrete proposals on that question -- a draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space -- has been submitted for consideration to the Committee on Disarmament. We consider that the Committee should set up an ad hoc working group to draft the treaty, as well as to consider other proposals directed at preventing an arms race in outer space.

Together with the delegations of other socialist countries the Soviet delegation has more than once put before the Committee concrete proposals for the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Our proposals in this respect have concerned both the problem as a whole, and individual specific aspects of the possible production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

To dispute the urgency of this problem would be to show inexcusable negligence since we are witnessing the continuous creation of ever newer types of weapons of mass annihilation. Thus the cruel neutron weapon has become a reality. The same might happen also in the case of radiological weapons. We call on the delegations of all the countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament to show a realistic understanding of these problems and to intensify their efforts towards the drafting of appropriate international agreements on the prohibition of these types of weapons of mass destruction.

I should also like to recall that at the second special session on disarmament the Soviet Union spoke in favour of the renunciation of the use of new discoveries and scientific and technical achievements for military purposes. This is a major and sweeping problem which it will of course not be easy to resolve. But it is a problem that exists and it is high time to start thinking jointly of ways to solve it.

I should like now to come to the question of the organization of the work of the Committee's summer session. First of all I will say that for reasons you all know, this session will probably be the shortest one for many years, a fact which in no way reflects on the responsibility and the importance of the tasks which are now before the Committee. It is precisely for this reason that we should organize the work of the session particularly efficiently, that is not wasting a day or even an hour on unnecessary procedural and organizational discussions.

The most important question for us to settle immediately is that of the resumption and effective organization of the work of the ad hoc working groups. In accordance with the priorities reaffirmed by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the greatest attention should be given to the working groups on the prohibition of chemical weapons and nuclear weapon tests. We are in favour of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the skilful and experienced guidance of Ambassador Sujka, continuing its activities both in August and in September, and perhaps in the succeeding months of the present year. The Working Group on the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests should obviously begin its work next week. We hope that organizational questions not yet resolved will be settled through consultations in the next few days.

We would urge that consultations should be held under the guidance of the Chairman of the Committee regarding the setting up at the summer session of a working group on item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

We also feel that there is no justification for delaying the solution of the question of creating a working group on item 7 of the agenda, "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". We believe that this working group should begin its work during the current session of the Committee. Here, too, we are ready for constructive consultations with delegations with a view to finding a mutually acceptable mandate and resolving other organizational problems.

As to the resumption of the activities of the other working groups -- those on the prohibition of radiological weapons, on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, in view of the limited time and the work done over a number of years, during which marked divergences at times appeared, we ought now to decide on the form and frequency of the negotiations in the framework of these working groups. We are prepared to show flexibility in this matter and to meet other delegations half-way. At the same time we shall oppose any unnecessary reiteration of positions well known to all since that would be a pure waste of the time of which we have so little.

There is one more question to which we ought all to give some thought. The General Assembly at its second special session resolutely reaffirmed the priorities established in the Final Document of the first special session. That was the consensus view of all the countries represented in this Committee. Those priority questions include such urgent matters as the drafting of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons and a number of other international agreements designed to curb the arms race and especially the nuclear arms race. In this connection, in our view, the need has arisen to establish time-limits for the conclusion of our work on those agreements. We attach great importance to this question and we express the hope that other delegations, too, influenced by the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, will regard this idea positively.

The Soviet delegation has come to the second part of the 1982 session determined to negotiate constructively on the whole spectrum of items on the agenda of the Committee and in conformity with the mandate received by the Committee from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly. On all the items on the Committee's agenda, our delegation has concrete proposals to make, aimed at the speediest possible achievement of mutually acceptable agreements.

In conclusion, I would like to express confidence that all delegations represented in the Committee on Disarmament will make due efforts to fulfil to the utmost the instructions given to the Committee by the United Nations General Assembly -- by the whole international community -- and make a concrete, really tangible contribution to the solution of the problems of removing the threat of nuclear war and curbing the arms race.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of India, His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Indian delegation, I would like to welcome you, the representative of friendly and non-aligned Kenya, as Chairman of the Committee for the month of August. We meet today for the first time since the conclusion of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament. The total failure of that session to achieve any tangible result whatsoever adds a sense of urgency and importance to our work here as the only multilateral negotiating body. We hope, Mr. Chairman, that under your wise and experienced leadership we shall be able to dispel some of the gloom and pessimism that has descended over the international scene as a result of the failure of the second special session.

I would also like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of our delegation to Ambassador Okawa of Japan who, as Chairman of this Committee since April, not only presided over the crucial phase of the preparation of our report to the General Assembly at its second special session, but also successfully steered us to a consensus on the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. In addition, I have great pleasure in extending a warm welcome to Ambassador Datcu of Romania, a country with which India has cordial and fruitful relations. His experience and knowledge will be valuable to the Committee in its work.

The failure of the second special session last month to produce even the most modest results has been a great setback to the cause of disarmament. What is especially regrettable is the fact that the report of the session failed miserably to do justice to the depth of concern and anxiety which oppresses the people of the world at the growing danger of nuclear war. If one had to identify the single most important cause for the failure of the session to adopt even a single measure towards preventing the possible outbreak of a nuclear war, it is the patent fact that for the most powerful nations the illusion of political and military pre-eminence which is associated with the accumulation of armaments proved more important than the special responsibility they bear towards the international community to ensure world peace and security.

India, as you know, dissociated itself from the chapter on conclusions contained in the report of the session. We did so because we share the view expressed by a large number of non-governmental organizations and popular movements that survival is not a matter of consensus. At a time when popular disquiet and anxiety over the dangers of a catastrophic nuclear war have reached overwhelming proportions, the session could not offer even one modest measure to restore hope. The credibility of the multilateral process is now in danger of being entirely vitiated, unless we in the Committee on Disarmament can bring a new sense of purpose and urgency to our negotiating task, particularly on the priority items of our agenda. We may rightly be disappointed at the failure of the second special session but we should not allow that to discourage us in our efforts.

The summer session of the Committee this year will barely cover six to seven weeks. It is necessary, therefore, to be carefully selective in our approach and to focus attention on the most important priority areas. We are glad to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which has been meeting since 20 July under the energetic leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland, has at last come to grips with the crucial process of reconciling divergent positions through an exploration of various promising compromise options. This phase of the Group's work is perhaps the most crucial and at the same time the most difficult. It requires intensive

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work and imaginative diplomacy. It is, therefore, both appropriate and essential for delegations to give the Ad Hoc Working Group the maximum scope for advancing its work and bringing a chemical weapons convention closer to realization.

Needless to say, the newly created Ad Hoc Working Group on a nuclear test ban will also be a priority area of concern. It is nearly 20 years since the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded, with a commitment among the parties to negotiate a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons as early as possible. There is justifiable impatience in the international community over the continuing delay in concluding a treaty on a nuclear test ban. We cannot, therefore, afford to lose any time. We trust that within the time available to us this year, the Working Group will be able to complete its limited mandate and clearly identify the choices available to us with respect to the verification of a nuclear test ban. In this connection, the Committee on Disarmament can benefit from a detailed and negotiation-oriented report from the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts. On the basis of the conclusions reached as a result of our work this year, we should be able to get down to the real business of drafting the text of a treaty on a nuclear test-ban early next year.

A third area of major concern to all is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. This subject is closely linked to the question of nuclear disarmament, including the prevention of nuclear war. A thorough consideration of this item is, therefore, essential, particularly in view of recent developments in space technology, many of which have far-reaching and significant military implications. Our delegation is prepared to be flexible as to the manner in which we deal with this problem. We could, for example, set up an ad hoc working group on outer space, which would in the first instance determine the scope of the problem and the precise area that negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament would cover. We could also explore the implications of several recent developments in space technology for the field of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament as well as for the prevention of nuclear war. The negotiation of an agreement to ban the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons would be a good starting point, in the view of my delegation, although it must be clearly understood that this again should be immediately followed by other far-reaching measures that would cover the development, testing and deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

The Committee on Disarmament would be rendering a real service if it were to recommend to the General Assembly that pending the negotiation of concrete measures in this field it should adopt a resolution declaring outer space the common heritage of mankind to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

I commenced my statement by saying that the special session proved to be an unmitigated failure, especially because it was unable to produce even one modest measure for the prevention of nuclear war, the prospect of which hangs over our own as well as succeeding generations. What the special session failed to achieve



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the Committee on Disarmament must now try to redeem. There are, of course, differences amongst us over the concrete issues which should be the subject of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. I believe, however, that we are all united in our common determination to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. Several countries, including all the nuclear-weapon States, have now submitted their views on the question of the prevention of nuclear war to the United Nations Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981 entitled, "Prevention of nuclear war". These replies contain some valuable ideas and suggestions on the question, which is universally recognized as of the highest importance. For example, the reply of the United States, contained in document No. A/S-12/11/Add.4 states that "there is no objective of greater importance than the prevention of nuclear war". The leaders of the Soviet Union have similarly repeatedly stressed the urgency of taking measures to avert a nuclear catastrophe. Other States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, have all recognized the need to adopt concrete and effective measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of a nuclear war. It has also been recognized that both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States have a role to play in this regard. It is for this reason that in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which was negotiated inconclusively at the second special session, the following measure under the section "Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons", figures without brackets:

"In this regard, the respective roles of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified".

The Committee on Disarmament has a clear responsibility to undertake urgent negotiations on measures for the prevention of nuclear war, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Since a nuclear war would affect both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the prevention of nuclear war is also quite clearly a multilateral concern of immediate relevance. I would, therefore, urge that under item 2 of our agenda, the Committee on Disarmament should immediately set up an ad hoc working group to negotiate, as a first step, practical measures for the prevention of nuclear war. The working group could take as a basis for its work all the replies received by the Secretary-General in response to resolution 36/81 B, as well as the discussions on this subject at the second special session itself, where various initiatives and proposals were put forward by States in this regard. The working group could also identify the respective roles of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard, as indicated in the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. If by the end of the summer session the Committee on Disarmament is able to come up with just a few concrete and practical recommendations on this issue, which has generated such deep anxiety and profound concern amongst peoples all over the world, it would have amply justified its existence and restored its credibility with the international community.

I would accordingly request you, Mr. Chairman, to put this proposal for an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament before the Committee, so that an early decision may be taken and we could get down to work forthwith.

These, then, are the areas on which we ought to be focusing our attention during the limited time available to us during the rest of our 1982 session. What about other items on our agenda?

It is a matter of deep regret to us that despite the spirit of compromise and flexibility displayed by the non-aligned countries, a credible and meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament proved beyond our reach at the second special session. I do not wish to dwell here on the factors responsible for this failure,

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of which you are all aware. It must be stated, however, that a comprehensive programme of disarmament without specific and concrete measures of disarmament, a clear-cut order of priorities, at least an indicative time-frame for its implementation and a credible commitment thereto on the part of States, would be meaningless. These minimum requirements of a credible comprehensive programme of disarmament are based in fact on the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, which was adopted by consensus. We cannot, therefore, agree to any retreat from that document. If there are those who wish to deviate from positions they themselves subscribed to only a few years ago, they must bear the full responsibility for their actions. In any event, it seems evident to us, in the light of our experience at the second special session, that no useful purpose would be served by another immediate round of negotiations designed to remove brackets from the text that has now come back to us from New York. We need to reflect over the approach we have so far adopted on this whole issue and perhaps be prepared to explore a new basis for reaching a consensus. Our own view is that instead of attempting to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose nature and status is as of now ambiguous, we should instead return to the original aim of negotiating a treaty on general and complete disarmament. In her message to the General Assembly at its second special session, the Prime Minister of India stated:

"Disarmament negotiations must once again revert to the task of achieving a treaty on general and complete disarmament within an agreed time-frame, as was discussed between the United States and the USSR in the Agreed Principles and Draft Treaties of the early 1960s. Although the problems involved have become far more complex, the basic approach and the principles then formulated could still provide a basis for meaningful negotiations".

Only a treaty on general and complete disarmament would be able to resolve questions relating to the measures to be implemented, the nature of the obligations to be undertaken by States and the time-frame within which the goal of general and complete disarmament would have to be achieved. It would also resolve the problem of effective international verification and control to ensure compliance with the obligations assumed by States for achieving disarmament.

I would like to recall here that paragraph 38 of the Final Document explicitly calls for negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The paragraph states:

"Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

On the above basis, our concrete suggestion is that the Committee on Disarmament should start work on such a treaty and report the results achieved to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-eighth session.

During the spring session, it was obvious that the working groups on negative security guarantees and radiological weapons respectively had clearly reached an impasse in their negotiations. In the limited time available to us during this session, we would prefer that instead of convening regular meetings of those working groups, their respective Chairmen should conduct informal consultations, especially with the delegations most directly concerned, in order to explore options that may point the way to compromise solutions. It has been our experience that in a situation of deadlock, meetings of a group merely result in a restatement of positions and sometimes even a hardening of positions. It would be best to avoid such a development.

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Before concluding my statement, I would like, with your permission, to introduce document No. CD/295, dated 23 July 1982, containing the text of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which was submitted by India at the second special session. The draft convention is an attempt to provide a concrete and practical basis for the long-standing proposal by non-aligned countries calling for a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament. I need not go into the rationale for the conclusion of such a convention, which will be self-evident. Both in Geneva and in New York, our delegation has made several interventions in justification of such a measure, and delegations present here are quite familiar with the arguments advanced in this regard. It had been our hope that in response to the widespread and rising wave of anxiety and concern over the growing danger of a possible nuclear holocaust, the General Assembly at its second special session would have agreed to an immediate prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, this did not prove to be possible. We trust that delegations represented in the Committee on Disarmament will now give serious consideration to the draft India has submitted and provide their reactions to its contents. Since it is put forward as a draft, we would, of course, be willing to consider any sensible amendments or modifications to it. Let me make it clear that our motivation in introducing this draft convention is to serve the cause of the prevention of nuclear war, the cause of human survival, and no other purpose. Those who disagree with our proposal should therefore at least be willing to engage in a meaningful debate on the issues involved and not attempt to reject it out of hand as some delegations sought to do at the second special session. We remain ready at all times to answer questions and to dispel any doubts that delegations may have on the text of the draft.

India has consistently tried to work actively and responsibly to further the cause of disarmament. It is not merely idealism that impels us to work for disarmament. In the age of nuclear weapons, disarmament has become, for India as a nation and for us all here as members of the world family, a practical matter for ensuring our survival. We all have our particular national interests to serve. But we should also be acutely conscious of the fact that in today's interdependent world, no nation can escape the common destiny imposed upon us by the very existence of nuclear weapons. As the Prime Minister of India asked in her message to the second special session: "In a war, the dominant thought is to win. Can we do less for peace?".

The delegation of India pledges to you, Mr. Chairman, that it will never be found wanting in the quest for peace and security through disarmament, a peace that is now more than ever before a categorical imperative in drawing the world back from the brink of nuclear disaster, before it is too late.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is pleased to welcome you to the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament during the current month of August. You may count, Sir, on the full co-operation of the Brazilian delegation for the discharging of your responsibilities. I am confident that during your Chairmanship this Committee will achieve substantive progress in its endeavours.

Once again this single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament meets in Geneva to resume its work. This time, however, delegations are still pondering the dismal results of the second special session devoted to disarmament, which, as we are acutely aware, did not reach any agreement on the substantive questions placed before it. International public opinion watched the proceedings in New York with keen interest, and will certainly have derived the logical conclusions from the failure of the second special session to meet the expectations it had raised. No amount of pious expressions of regret will disguise the stark fact that the second special session did not accomplish its task because the commitments to the Final Document of 1978 and to the implementation of its Programme of Action have been systematically ignored in the policies of the nuclear-weapon Powers during the four years since the first special session and in the day-to-day proceedings of the second session itself.

During the preparatory stages of the special session, the delegation of Brazil repeatedly warned against the growing trend toward the dilution of the principles and priorities inscribed in the Final Document. Upon the adoption of the report of the third session of the Preparatory Committee, last October, I had occasion to express our misgivings over the opportuneness and the utility of holding a special session on disarmament if no adequate preparation were undertaken with regard to the substantive questions that should be addressed. I stated then that "some delegations raised difficulties as to the acceptance of language previously agreed upon by consensus", and that "such a disavowal of commitments accepted only four years ago is viewed by my delegation as a disturbing practice". I ended those remarks by saying that if substantive aspects were not seriously discussed in preparation for the second special session, its chances for success "will become so dim that it would be legitimate to ask ourselves whether it should take place at all".

The second special session did take place, however, and can claim as its only substantive achievement the adoption of a document that contains the "unanimous" and "categorical" reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session, as well as a renewed pledge by all Member States to respect the priorities agreed on therein.

Upon the adoption of the report of the second special session, my delegation stated its understanding that such a reaffirmation amounts to a renewed commitment for the immediate start of multilateral negotiations on such priority matters as the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing and measures of nuclear disarmament. The current session of the Committee on Disarmament is the appropriate occasion to ascertain whether or not member States are prepared to live up to their renewed undertaking to honour their commitments. As I have just said, the failure of the second special session can be ascribed to the trend to backtracking from such commitments. The contradiction between the stated policies of some nuclear-weapon

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Powers and those commitments is even more disturbing. Nevertheless, such commitments were formally reaffirmed at the close of the special session. Accordingly, the credibility and usefulness of the multilateral machinery for disarmament, including this Committee, depend on the course of action that such Powers will choose to follow. Governments around the world, as well as international public opinion, will watch closely the attitudes and positions of those Powers during this summer session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Allow me now to turn to the immediate questions of organization that are before us, and which my delegation hopes can be quickly disposed of so that the Committee can dedicate the larger part of this short session to the substantive work assigned to it.

We ended our last session with four working groups, namely, those on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and chemical weapons. The latter has already resumed its work on 20 July, and should continue to the end of the Committee's 1982 session. As for the comprehensive programme of disarmament, the second special session decided that this Committee would continue its efforts to achieve a draft that could be submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-eighth regular session. After the experience of the detailed but inconclusive discussion on the comprehensive programme both in Geneva and in New York, and taking into account the forthcoming thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly, my delegation believes that all of us could benefit from a period of reflection on the options open to us with regard to the programme. Accordingly, the Committee might decide that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should start its work some time next January, a few weeks ahead of the scheduled date for the Committee's 1983 session.

As regards the working groups on radiological weapons and on negative security assurances, the special report of the Committee adopted last April clearly showed that the difficulties that lie in the path of agreement are not likely to be resolved in the deliberations of this Committee for the time being. Progress on negative assurances depends ultimately on progress in the security perceptions of the nuclear-weapon Powers and on their understanding of the manner in which their present policies affect the vital security interests of non-nuclear-weapon nations. At the second special session the Governments of the USSR and France made important unilateral statements on matters that have a bearing on the question of negative security assurances. Both statements represent, in our view, an evolution with regard to their previous stand. The other nuclear-weapon Powers should examine thoroughly those two statements with a view to evolving their own positions on the matter, so as to provide adequate ground for multilateral progress.

As for radiological weapons, the low priority of the issue and the nature of the controversy over the scope of the proposed treaty would make it advisable for this Committee not to spend the scarce time available on the fruitless kind of exercise engaged in during the spring session.

At the same time, the Committee is now confronted with the need to speed up action on the top priority issue on its agenda, namely a nuclear test ban, on which

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a working group was created at the close of the spring session. In order to discharge its responsibilities, the Committee should start by taking the remaining procedural steps so as to enable the Working Group to begin its substantive task without undue delay.

Proposals have also been made since the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly for the establishment of a working group on the demilitarization of outer space. At the last session of the Committee, my delegation expressed its doubts on the opportuneness of dealing with such question in the absence of agreement on the priority items of our agenda. The establishment of the Working Group on a comprehensive test ban and the renewal of the commitment to respect the priorities of the Final Document, however, seem to open up prospects for adequate multilateral treatment of the nuclear test ban as well as of questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. If such assumptions prove correct, my delegation would not object to the establishment of a working group on outer space, with an agreed negotiating mandate.

To sum up, my delegation proposes the suspension, for the time being, of the activities of the working groups on negative security assurances and on radiological weapons. The Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament would resume its proceedings in early January next year. During the current session, the plenary of the Committee would, either formally, or informally, devote special attention to the discussion of item 2 of its agenda, with a view to achieving agreement on the modalities of its substantive treatment. The proposal by the Group of 21 for the establishment of a working group on nuclear disarmament is still on the table, as well as the suggestions advanced on the further development of the points contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Together with the discussion of those issues by the Committee, there would be three working groups holding regular activities: the working groups on chemical weapons and on a nuclear test ban, both already established, and the new working group on outer space, whose mandate will have to be defined before it can actually start substantive work.

My delegation is convinced that a decision on those lines would ensure the best possible utilization of the short time available to us. We would hope that, in consultation with delegations, the Chair will be very soon in a position to make final proposals on the organization of our work for this second part of the 1982 session.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Brazil for his statement. I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, my delegation extends a warm welcome to you as the incoming Chairman. Your long, distinguished service both in East Africa and as your country's representative abroad have continuously strengthened your reputation as an immensely experienced and skilled international administrator and negotiator. You project the fine qualities of moderation, fairness and efficiency which your country Kenya has brought to the development of Africa in the international community at large and which, we are now assured, it will continue also to bring to bear in the future.

I would like to express gratitude to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Okawa, to whom we are very indebted indeed for his excellent guidance at a particularly difficult time. We gladly join in welcoming the distinguished new delegate of Romania, Ambassador Datcou.

The brevity of our summer session should cause us to curtail our general debate to a minimum. Accordingly, I will attempt to be very brief, and to dispense also with the more general political reflections which we have all found useful for setting the stage for our work on other occasions.

I would, however, devote a brief retrospective comment to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament which ended in New York on 11 July, and which thus immediately preceded our session. No doubt, the session has yielded unsatisfactory results in many areas, notwithstanding the hard work, heavy investment of time and collective goodwill that went into its preparation and marked its early stages. The outcome has been a disappointment for many, and the Federal Government is among those which share that regret, the more so since it deployed considerable effort to ensure a higher level of achievement at the conference. But my Government sees no reason to be discouraged by this development. It rather places the emphasis on the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session, on the ensured continuity of the world-wide disarmament debate, and on the maintenance of the principle of consensus. In its view, the special session has thus confirmed the most important principles which will enable us to continue to give a positive response to the challenge of disarmament which faces the international community. All of us are aware of the complexity and multiplicity of the problems before us: perhaps, then, we should admit that, forgetful of that complexity, we assigned to the special session (with its relatively short opportunity for negotiation) too comprehensive a task -- that we set our sights too high.

But there are a good many useful and positive elements in the "Conclusions" of the second special session and we should also not forget that, parallel to the session, the two major Powers agreed to embark on a momentous disarmament negotiation in the strategic nuclear field and the fact that the first meeting of the START talks took place during the session itself provides encouragement and impetus for the future.

The Federal German Government is determined -- in the spirit of Chancellor Schmidt's speech of 14 June before the United Nations -- to continue to work vigorously for the objectives of disarmament and to make contributions that are as concrete as possible.

In this shortened session period, also, we are called upon to deal with concrete problems in the most rational and economic manner. Since all topics on our agenda are up for detailed discussion in plenary, I do not wish to give views now on them all. I would like to single out only those where my delegation sees particular potential for progress during this session, and where it places particular priorities.

(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The chemical weapons group has got off to an early and promising start. It will easily become the one work unit which will accumulate the maximum number of meetings by the end of our session. This is perfectly in keeping with my delegation's intentions. A comprehensive chemical weapons ban is highest on our priority list, and my delegation notes with encouragement the new vistas that have opened up for the Committee's work in this domain on the basis of declarations made during the second special session, mainly by the Soviet delegation. These vistas have to be explored with care, and have to be measured against the requirements which many countries have established in the course of previous sessions, specifically in the verification field. While my delegation generally welcomes the thrust of the new Soviet proposals, we feel that there may still be considerable deficiencies, mainly as regards the scope of regular obligatory on-site inspections, and there is a need also to incorporate in the future chemical weapons convention a full-fledged contractual obligation on the part of all States to submit to on-site inspections if a breach of the convention is alleged and a formal demand for such inspection is put forward. In order to obtain a clearer view of the meaning of the Soviet proposals, my delegation has submitted, in the form of a working paper, a number of detailed questions. We are looking forward to replies from the Soviet side, and express gratitude in advance. The chemical weapons Working Group has commenced its work with considerable momentum and speed, and this momentum should be maintained.

In the view of my delegation it is imperative that the Working Group on nuclear testing should get off to a rapid start under dynamic leadership, and that the potential of the mandate of the Group which the Committee agreed upon in late April be fully utilized with the aid of a well-structured work plan and a maximum of technical and political expertise. My delegation is particularly interested in seeing the work of this Group going ahead on the basis of realism, taking into account the preparedness and ability of all participating countries to move forward at this time. This would also imply that the Working Group does not disdain the principle of graduality and brings in its harvest, limited as it may appear to some, at a time when the fruits are ripe -- hoping for new seasons to yield additional and perhaps more delicious fruits.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is back on our list of agenda items. My delegation has attempted to make the fullest possible contribution to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, both prior to and during the special session. We are therefore particularly saddened that progress in New York was not more substantial. Yet the thorough discussion of all parts of the comprehensive programme during the special session brought intermediate results that should not be underestimated, and has certainly brought a better understanding of what the programme must and can achieve. There is perhaps little point in devoting a major part of this session to further formal negotiations on the comprehensive programme, but all delegations must now carefully analyse the results of the negotiations of June and July and, on that basis, perhaps in the framework of informal exchanges, give thought to how and when a new series of negotiations should be initiated, taking into account our 1983 deadline for that venture. During the final stages of the special session my delegation had occasion to suggest that we may also wish to rethink the methodology and structure of the comprehensive programme.

As the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I am fully aware of the difficulties that lie in the way of a successful resumption and conclusion of negotiations in that Group. At this juncture, it appears important that all delegations should gain a very clear view of the options that offer themselves to negotiators. I have written to all heads of delegations in that sense, and would hope shortly to embark on some informal consultations on the basis of reactions to that letter, before new formal meetings of the Working Group, if any, are called.



(Mr. Wegener, Federal Republic of Germany)

The Committee is to report to the thirty-seventh regular session of the General Assembly on its membership structure, and must deal with a number of thoughtful recommendations as to the restructuring of its work. My delegation would wish to see informal plenary meetings commence at an early point to deal with these important subjects. A more rational working structure, instituting a better economy of its time, is urgent. My delegation is eager to concur with any useful suggestions that would be weighed in this context.

The recommendation made in the course of the second special session that the Committee should hold an extended uninterrupted annual session appeals to my delegation, and has obvious practical merit. However, the personal link between multilateral disarmament meetings in Geneva and New York must not be cut. In our view, the future work schedule of the Committee should be such that Geneva delegations could continue to make their full contribution to the proceedings of the General Assembly's First Committee, and also, if perhaps to a lesser extent, to the work of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

We are generally in favour of a limited enlargement of the Committee's membership with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of the Committee and we would urge that, quite independently of and before tossing around the names of certain candidates, the principle and percentage of such enlargement should be decided upon without delay on the basis of firm, objective criteria. Among these, the contribution individual countries can bring to our Committee on the basis of their prior earnest work is of particular significance.

My delegation is eager for the Committee to embark on its concrete work as early as possible, and promises you, Mr. Chairman, its full co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words that he has addressed to the Chair.

We have now exhausted the time available to use for this morning's meeting. If there is no objection, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting and resume it this afternoon. We would then listen to the last speaker inscribed on my list, and immediately afterwards I would convene an informal meeting of the Committee to consider some organizational work. If there is no objection, we will proceed accordingly. Before I adjourn the meeting, I would like to announce, on behalf of Mr. Skinner of Canada who co-ordinates one of the contact groups of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, that this contact group will meet this afternoon immediately after the plenary meeting of the Committee in conference Room I. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting was suspended at 1.05 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 175th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. As agreed this morning, the Committee will now listen to the remaining speaker inscribed for today's plenary meeting.

I now give the floor to the distinguished representative of Sweden, Mrs. Inga Thorsson.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): First of all, it is my very great pleasure to congratulate you on advancing to the important office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of August. The Swedish delegation will, of course, give you its full support in the execution of your office which you will do with the skill and distinction that we have been accustomed to expect from you.

I would also like to thank you for your kind words of welcome to me this morning.

Warm thanks go also from my delegation to the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, for the excellency with which he carried out his heavy duties as Chairman of the Committee, not only during the month of April, but also behind the stage of the second special session on disarmament. I want, furthermore, to welcome the new Romanian representative, Ambassador Datcu, my old friend of many years from the General Assembly's First Committee.

Likewise the Swedish delegation is very pleased to see this year's disarmament Fellows with us in this Chamber, and we want to welcome them here.

We have come together again -- we, the club of 40 nations -- committed, through the votes of our countries over the years in the United Nations General Assembly, to carry out successful multilateral disarmament negotiations. Have we come together more happy, more satisfied with the state of things than when we adjourned at the end of April?

Between that date and today lies the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Anyone pledged to the cause of disarmament would, I believe, be prepared to agree with my judgement, that we are not more happy than three months ago. The remaining impression today is that those Governments which are genuinely committed to disarmament, as the cause of this generation of mankind -- and the Swedish Government belongs to those -- will have, following the five weeks in New York, to redouble their efforts, with the aim of achieving a decisive breakthrough in the fairly immediate future in disarmament talks. Otherwise the end result will only be one. And let us admit that difficulties exist, obstacles exist, even adversaries of disarmament exist to make results infinitely hard to achieve. We experienced all of it during the five memorable weeks that we spent at the second special session in June and July. What should our judgement be on the events that have passed since the Committee adjourned in late April?

The weeks in New York were weeks of agony and anguish. And at the end, on Saturday, 10 July, we listened to an impressive list of speakers wishing to give their final views on why so much went wrong during these weeks.

There is indeed very much to be said in negative terms about the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. But I do feel it of importance to emphasize that most of what happened and what did not happen could have been foreseen in advance. Let us remember that the first special session, four years ago, needed six weeks of work, under severe strain and almost to the point of collapse, to achieve the ultimate

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adoption of a Final Document that has, with full justification, been called of historic importance. This happened at a time when international relations, and relations between the two Superpowers in particular, were infinitely better than now. The second special session was faced with the task of managing, in a period of five weeks, to deal successfully with two main issues, of such magnitude and containing such controversial elements, debated and negotiated over for years, that an unbelievable amount of trust, confidence and goodwill would have been required to cope with it. We all know that under prevailing circumstances this was simply not so. The task before the second special session was comparable to a request by the United Nations that the two Superpowers should change their basic strategic concepts overnight.

Thus, the necessary prerequisites for reaching beyond the 1978 Final Document simply did not exist. But, in my judgement, four things were achieved at the second special session.

First, the session did adopt, by consensus, a concluding document, containing as its final part 10 paragraphs of political conclusions.

Secondly, it adopted guidelines for the World Disarmament Campaign, which was solemnly launched at the opening meeting of the session.

Thirdly, it acted as a catalyst for one of the most impressive manifestations of free popular movements ever witnessed, not only in New York but wherever opinion can be freely expressed.

Fourthly, it assured the continuous consideration of the items on its agenda by transmitting them to the forthcoming regular General Assembly session and, if necessary, to subsequent sessions. No proposals are finally killed.

Let me say a few more words on some of these achievements.

The concluding document is not a bad document. On the contrary it is, under the circumstances, a very good one. It states the history of the past four years in clear political terms. It contains, furthermore, a number of political statements adopted by consensus on issues which up to the very last moment were heavily contended by the major military Powers. What is even more important, considering indications that some of these Powers were wavering in their dedication to the 1978 Final Document, is the unequivocal and unanimous reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of this document, as well as their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations established in its Programme of Action.

Most unfortunately, I shall have to return, in very sad terms, to this particular point in a few minutes. This is due to something which became abundantly clear during the five weeks of the second special session but which indeed is not a new phenomenon. I shall dwell briefly on this matter as it is, beyond doubt, the main reason behind our failures so far in multilateral disarmament negotiations. As anyone could guess, what I am aiming at is the attitude of the Superpowers towards these negotiations, the Powers which have, through their policies of negligence and obstruction, blocked progress for years, the Powers which prefer secret bilateral talks behind closed doors, denying this multilateral body the right and the possibility to negotiate the highest priority items on its agenda, the Powers which disregard politically, although not legally, binding United Nations resolutions, on which they themselves have voted in favour, the Powers which through their behaviour display their arrogance towards the world around them.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

What has happened-- and not happened-- so far in the field of disarmament negotiations in the nuclear age is to me evidence of the lack of insight, and imagination, of these Powers. As a small piece of evidence, I shall quote one sentence from the letter which President Reagan sent to General Rowny, the Chairman of the United States delegation to the START talks which opened on 29 June here at Geneva:

"As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the USSR are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace."

I want to say in all sincerity that, judging those Powers by their performance so far, which is one of an accelerating nuclear arms race, the majority of the peoples of this earth entertain grave distrust in these self-appointed "trustees for humanity". We have the right to be equal partners, for two reasons:

1. The nuclear-weapon States have shown that they are unable to free themselves from a situation characterized by a morally and politically insoluble dilemma.
2. All States, be they nuclear or non-nuclear, militarily aligned, neutral or non-aligned, share the common fate of a possible nuclear holocaust.

Against the background of what we have witnessed over the years and, most recently, at the second special session, of obstructionist Superpower policies, I could not believe my ears when I heard the United States delegate on the last day of the session say:

"The United States is proud of its record in disarmament."

Nor could I but disagree with the USSR Ambassador to the United Nations when, on the same occasion, he spoke of the constructive approach of the delegations of the socialist countries and further stated that their positions accord with the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of the States and peoples of the world. It is, of course, deeds, and not words, that count when the performances of the Superpowers are assessed. And the deeds of the USSR speak against the words of the USSR at the United Nations.

One glaring example of the intransigence of the Superpowers, in this particular case especially of the United States, assisted by the United Kingdom, is of course the behaviour before, during and after the second special session, regarding the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, justly considered the key issue of nuclear disarmament and thus the highest priority item on our agenda. This key issue has, as we all know, a tragic history. So far, all efforts to get genuine negotiations started have been in vain. At the second special session also, the resistance continued, blocking attempts to have texts adopted which were watered down to a bare minimum. Disparaging remarks made on that occasion about the usefulness of a CTBT on the part of the resistant States might make us wonder about the seriousness of their recent agreement to initiate CTB discussions in a working group of this Committee.

It will, of course, again be recalled that, at the second special session, even these States joined the consensus decision to adopt the concluding document which, in its paragraph 62, states the following:

"The General Assembly was encouraged by the unanimous and categorical reaffirmation by all Member States of the validity of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session as well as their solemn commitment to it and their pledge to respect the priorities in disarmament negotiations as agreed to in its Programme of Action."

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However, two weeks ago, 10 days after their support of this consensus document at the United Nations, the Reagan Administration decided, 19 years after the adoption of the partial test-ban Treaty, not to resume the trilateral CTB negotiations. This is grave news. Not that we particularly need the tripartite talks, which were, anyhow, only preparatory to multilateral negotiations in this body on our highest priority item. But the sense of the United States decision seems to be to postpone into the distant future any serious consideration of a CTBT.

Perhaps we should not be surprised, as we were given advance notice, for example in the memorable speech on 9 February by Dr. Eugene Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, in this very chamber. He then stated that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue, and that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". But he went on to say something more stunning, and I quote him again:

"Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues."

How can the lumping together of the CTB and "the broad range of nuclear issues" be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of the United States to a CTBT, in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, where parties pledged to seek the achievement of the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time", a pledge which was confirmed in the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968?

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, that were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs. From its recent action, however, must we draw the conclusion that the United States does not want a CTBT, that through continuing nuclear testing it aims at continuing the murderous nuclear arms race? But is the United States now prepared to face a situation where it will be accused of violation of legally binding international commitments freely entered into? When these commitments were made in 1963, through the ratification of the partial test-ban Treaty by a Senate vote of 80 to 19, the late Senate Republican leader Everett M. Dirksen said:

"I should not like to have written on my tombstone: 'He knew what happened at Hiroshima, but he did not take a first step.'"

The next step seems to be in the distant future. What will be written on the tombstones of those responsible for this deplorable fact?

Of course, there are also practical political considerations to be made by the United States, relating to its glaring refusal to accept full scope multilateral negotiations on a CTBT. This Superpower should be aware of the rapidly mounting, and fierce, opposition among non-nuclear-weapon States against the obstruction by the nuclear-weapon States of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. What will happen at the third NPT Review Conference in 1985, three years from now, if by that time we do not have a multilaterally negotiated CTBT? Will the United States take the risk of the collapse of the NPT, the only barrier, however deficient, that the international community possesses against horizontal nuclear-weapon proliferation?

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

No, we should not have been surprised at President Reagan's decision two weeks ago. We had been given early warnings. But we are deeply sorry and shocked that it was taken after the second special session, after the reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document of the first special session. However, following this new act of disdainful disregard of consensus decisions at the United Nations, the United States is providing cheap ammunition to its main adversary. It does make action on the international stage unnecessarily easy for that Power.

Let me state emphatically, that, in accordance with Sweden's persistent policy, for us a CTBT retains its full importance both as a means to slow or stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a demonstration of the possible interest of the nuclear Powers to finally initiate an era of mutual nuclear restraint.

It also remains our view that the goal is, and must be, to achieve a complete test ban of unlimited duration. Although we support what must be called a moratorium in this context, i.e. a test ban of limited duration, we consider it only an instrument to promote the negotiation of a permanent CTBT under strict international verification. In this context, let me stress that Sweden does not believe in internationalizing a Threshold Test-Ban Treaty of the kind concluded in 1974 but not yet ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union. Such a Treaty could not restrain a feared horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms and is of little concern to developed nuclear Powers which could legitimize-- probably for a long time-- their intense continued development of nuclear weapons within the generous threshold allowed. It would amount to another smokescreen for unlimited testing. I say this with some emphasis as I understand the latest move of President Reagan to be to look for changes in that Treaty in order to further strengthen protection against violation of its limits. This would only serve the purpose of showing some zeal in the search for some measures of arms control while in reality there would be none.

The Working Group now established should be utilized to the full to investigate all relevant aspects of a CTBT. The Committee on Disarmament should bear in mind that the task of the seismic expert Group in important respects would assist and underpin the activities of the Working Group. In this context, let me also stress the desirability of allowing the expert Group to consider and report also on the most modern data acquisition and analysis methods available and of enlarging its possibilities for looking into further ways of verifying a test ban, such as through the detection and measurement of airborne radioactivity.

As the work of the CTBT Working Group unfolds, Sweden intends to reintroduce at an appropriate moment relevant parts of its 1977 draft CTB treaty text, together with new parts which take into account developments since then and the comments made in the Working Group, so as to again provide the Committee with a complete and contemporary draft CTBT text.

The brevity of this session of the Committee on Disarmament will probably only allow for limited progress on the other high priority item of chemical weapons, on which a lot of useful work has been performed during the last two years. In so far as there was a need for new political signals, we have noted with considerable interest the outline of a draft convention presented to the General Assembly at its second special session by the Soviet Union. As it seems to contain or reflect a number of features discussed by this Committee, it would be our hope that it represents a genuine will to negotiate difficult issues and is not intended merely to politically counter certain dispositions in the chemical weapons field by the other Superpower. We are looking forward to discussing these questions in greater detail in the chemical weapons Working Group.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The chemical weapons field appears to my delegation to be one area of negotiation where there is still hope for agreement, however complicated the substance. This opportunity must be used to the full by the Committee and its Working Group. Needless to say, it will take the active co-operation of the Superpowers not only in the Committee but also through a resumption of their bilateral negotiations. We for our part are prepared to make every effort to contribute to a solution of outstanding problems. We would not be opposed, inter alia, to continuing work beyond the scheduled working period of the Committee, if this appears desirable to achieve decisive progress.

This leads me on to a few words on the procedures and activities of the Committee on Disarmament, which has been reaffirmed as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Sweden does not believe that we should allow a discussion on this matter to develop into a great procedural debate, which would deprive the Committee of much of its precious negotiating time. On the other hand it would be futile to deny that certain improvements and changes could be brought about through informal consultations. At this point let me make the following brief comments.

We have some doubts about making this body a permanent around-the-year negotiating forum. Even the present work-load of the Committee strains the capacity of a developed and technically advanced country like my own. A further extension of working schedules and programmes would be likely to overextend smaller delegations and would only favour those large States or groups of States whose sincere disarmament interest there is sometimes reason to doubt.

But there is, as I said, room for improving the efficiency of our work. Thus, the use of plenary meetings for making repeated general statements could be questioned. Much stricter priorities should be set for the time allocated to working groups. Whereas it would seem highly advisable to provide additional meetings for the negotiations on chemical weapons and the CTBT and perhaps also for outer space, we should somewhat limit time allotted to some other working groups, not because the issues that they are dealing with are in themselves of secondary importance but because they are unlikely to yield results unless a change of wills and minds occurs. This could in due course be ascertained through informal consultations.

Let me also recall Sweden's firm view, which we share with many other members of the Group of 21, that the consensus rule of the Committee should not any longer be allowed to be misused in procedural matters, such as in blocking the setting up of working groups requested by a large majority of Committee members.

Much has been said and much will have to be said about the imperative need for a change of wills and minds, first and foremost in the leading military Powers. We have waited for that change a long time. Quite a number of us have recently gained new hope, not because of any signs of such a change, but because of the appearance of a new and, hopefully, significant political force, the sharply awakening public awareness of the tremendous risks that this and coming generations run, if we allow the leaders of the world to continue their present course. For a growing number of people, for a swiftly growing number of people, the issue has changed from being one of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival. It is a matter of rapidly increasing awareness of what a nuclear weapon actually is. For the first time since 1962, when Herman Kahn published his well-known book, people are thinking about the unthinkable. One of the reasons: they have suddenly understood that they will have to do so, because military and political leaders, by talking about "controlled nuclear counter-attacks", "protracted conflict periods", have made the

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

unthinkable thinkable, i.e. by the logic of nuclear doctrines, nuclear weapons are becoming usable. And people understand that this trend will have to be stopped for the sake of survival.

The forceful and broadly based popular peace movements in West Europe and North America are what George Kennan recently called the most striking phenomena of the early 1980s, having already had an influence of events. They were very much present during the second special session, and their activities during these weeks were more impressive than anyone could have expected. No one who participated, as I did, in the 12 June orderly, peaceful and gay mass demonstration of 800,000 people for disarmament and peace, will ever forget what role individual concerned citizens are able to play, and will continue to play in the struggle for fairness, decency and peaceful relations among nations. What has, by some, been called the dismal failure of the second special session must never be allowed to overshadow the compelling need for all people of good will to form an international disarmament constituency, to join forces for the achievement of a safe and peaceful world and the betterment of human conditions everywhere.

To relieve mankind of present dangers of extinction is the task of this generation of men and women. A few weeks ago I listened to a moving testimony to this compelling task by a well-known American Roman Catholic priest, the Reverend Theodore Hesburgh. He said:

"I experienced something almost like a religious conversion. For thirty years I have been deeply engaged in trying to create a better world, in the face of extreme poverty in Asia, Africa and Latin America, working to alleviate world hunger, to oppose the denial of human rights at home and abroad, working against tropical diseases afflicting hundreds of millions of humans, against illiteracy and for education -- and suddenly it dawned on me -- if we do not eliminate the nuclear threat, all of these other problems will be irrelevant, for there will be no more humans on earth to have problems."

When the same consciousness is awakened around the world, there will be no political leader, in any leading military Power, who can withstand it. Disarmament will be the idea whose time has come.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sweden for her statement and for the kind words that she has addressed to the Chair.

That completes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Before I adjourn this plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee, I would like to inform members that the secretariat has circulated today CD/INF.1/Rev.7 entitled "Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation". The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 5 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The plenary stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.