

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 25 March 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario Alessi

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI
Mr. MAACHI
Mr. A. TAFFAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mrs. S. FREEMAN
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss DE CLERQ

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. B. GRINBERG
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV
Mr. N. MIHAILOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U THAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. LI WEIMIN

Cuba:

Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA
Mr. J.L. GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA
Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. El-S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. GESBERT
Miss L. GHAZERIAN
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. H. KAULFUSS
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. HOLLAI
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA

Mr. B. MAUNA

Mr. I. DAMANIK

Mr. A. BAHRI

Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M. MAHALLATI

Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI

Mr. B. CABRAS

Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Mr. R. DI CARLO

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA

Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Mr. K. TANAKA

Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES

Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI

Mr. S.M. RAHALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. A.J.J. OOMS

Nigeria:

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. U.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. H. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. ZAWALONKA
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJMAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. H.S. DOGARU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.A. EDVOKOUSHIN
Mr. M.I. IPPOLITOV
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. A.P. KOUTEPOV
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United Kingdom:

Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Ms. S.F. BURK
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC
Mr. V. VOJVODIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA
Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA
Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 166th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 4 of its agenda: "Chemical weapons". However, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

I should like to welcome today to the meeting of the Committee two distinguished visitors, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the representative of Hungary.

His Excellency Ambassador Ruth has already made statements before our Committee several times in the past. As you know, he is the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. He has been very active in matters of disarmament, not only in this Committee but also in New York, where he has attended the regular sessions of the General Assembly.

His Excellency Mr. Imre Hollai, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, is also an experienced diplomat who has already twice served in his present post. From 1974 to 1980 he was the permanent representative of his country to the United Nations in New York. As a specialist in multilateral diplomacy, he has participated in a number of international conferences, some of them on disarmament.

I know that members of the Committee will listen with great interest to the statements our two visitors are going to make to us and that their presence here is greatly appreciated.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, the United States, Mongolia, Bulgaria, the Soviet Union, Kenya, Argentina and China. A further member of the Committee has expressed a wish to speak today and I hope that I shall be able to give him the floor. However, since we already have nine speakers on the list for this morning, he has kindly agreed to speak only if we have sufficient time when the above list of speakers is exhausted.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Federal Government Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control, His Excellency Ambassador Ruth.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, it is a very great honour for me to address the Committee on Disarmament again. The last time I had this privilege was on 6 August 1981. On that occasion I explained my Government's position on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (CD/205) jointly submitted by Australia, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. At the same time I was able to obtain a personal impression of the great sense of responsibility, the dedication to serious negotiation and the expertise which characterize the Committee's work. In my address I warned against either euphoria or resignation and stated that I was particularly encouraged by the negotiations within the working groups for chemical and radiological weapons. I note with satisfaction that the work on a convention banning chemical and radiological weapons has been intensified.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament has entered a decisive phase. We shall continue to participate constructively in the work of the Committee aimed at presenting a product to the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly that is capable of gaining the support of all sides.

As we all know, the prospects for tangible success of the Committee's efforts depend to a large extent on whether there is an improvement in the international climate, especially between East and West. Unfortunately there has been a deplorable reverse trend: since 13 December 1981 a dark shadow has been lying over the relations between East and West as the consequence of an event that runs counter to the objectives and results of the CSCE process in Europe. Several delegations, including my own, have stressed this in the general debate at the beginning of this session.

Realistic and concrete arms control continues to be an urgent task of international security policy. It is therefore gratifying that the Committee has been able to agree on an effective programme of work, that a new extended mandate has been formulated for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that progress has been made towards the establishment of a new working group on the subject of nuclear testing with a focus on problems of verification of the observance of a comprehensive test ban.

My Government, which has attached great importance to the Committee's work in the field of a chemical weapons ban from the very outset, is ready to make its contribution so that success can be achieved. With this in mind my delegation is submitting a new working paper on the question of verifying compliance with a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and stipulating the destruction of existing stocks and production plants. We do so knowing that a large measure of agreement has already been achieved on the convention's scope and on definitions. Unfortunately this positive development has until now not been accompanied by corresponding progress in resolving the crucial issue of verification.

The position of my Government is clear:

The Federal Republic of Germany is a contracting party to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, to which it adheres without reservations. Furthermore, in 1954 it became the only country until now to commit itself -- vis-à-vis its allies -- not to produce nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. When signing the Bacteriological Weapons Convention in 1972 my Government declared that "in the sphere of chemical weapons, it will neither develop nor acquire nor stockpile under its own control any of the warfare agents which it has already undertaken not to manufacture". My country also agreed, in connection with its commitment, to international verification of the non-production of chemical weapons. The experience gained from this practical verification was presented at an international workshop held in March 1979 and was then recorded in document CD/37.

In view of these circumstances my country felt justified to make energetic efforts to promote the conclusion of a comprehensive and -- at the same time -- verifiable chemical weapons convention. Our parliament, the German Bundestag, unanimously supports these efforts. In a decision unanimously adopted on 3 December 1981 it called upon the Committee on Disarmament to make even greater efforts than hitherto for the conclusion of a chemical weapons convention, which it deems indispensable and of which effective international verification must be an integral part.

(Dr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

I know that we are all agreed on the following points:

Chemical weapons are regarded by the international public as being especially obnoxious and are a particularly great threat to the civilian population.

The danger that these weapons might be employed in a military confrontation despite the Geneva Protocol banning their use cannot be precluded as long as they exist.

This danger must be averted, and indeed it can be averted. This requires an agreement which stipulates the destruction of all existing chemical weapons subject to adequate verification and ensures that no State may in future develop, produce or stockpile chemical weapons.

The observance of such an agreement must be reliably safeguarded. This is the only way of ensuring that the horrors of chemical warfare are completely banned and forever from the world.

Our experience with regard to the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons reinforces our conviction that, although these problems are even more multifaceted and complex than those connected with other arms control agreements, practicable solutions that are universally acceptable can none the less be found. Let me outline some of the elements of a necessary verification arrangement.

(a) A chemical weapons convention cannot be monitored by national technical means alone. By looking at a chemical factory from the outside one cannot see what is going on inside.

(b) On-site inspections by teams of international experts must therefore be a firm component of a verification régime.

(c) A reliable verification régime has two main functions: it must enable situations requiring clarification to be examined impartially, and it must ensure the observance and implementation of the convention by means of regular and non-discriminatory international measures according to a fixed procedure.

(d) The legitimate interest in keeping chemical production and research methods secret must be fully protected.

There are, in my view, favourable prospects for progress towards a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. Only recently the President of the United States stated unequivocally that his country regards the conclusion of a comprehensive and verifiable chemical weapons convention as a high priority of its arms control policy and that it would welcome such an achievement by 1984 since it would then no longer need to resume the production of chemical weapons discontinued by the United States in 1969 and introduce modernized chemical weapons. The Committee's working group on chemical weapons has for the first time been given a comprehensive mandate for the drafting of a convention. The discussions in this group have been speeded up and intensified. The future work of the Committee can build on the substantive progress already achieved. International opinion has been made sensitive to the subject of chemical weapons not least by reports that such weapons may have been used in crisis areas in South Asia. Thus the conditions exist for a successful outcome which would free mankind from a nightmare.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

The working paper submitted today by my delegation is intended to be a constructive contribution offering practicable solutions to the one problem still causing the greatest difficulty: that of adequate verification.

The authors of the paper have been guided by the following objectives: we propose a verification régime which, in our view, is both effective and acceptable. It recognizes that expenditure and the manpower requirements must be kept within reasonable limits.

The paper envisages regular checks for monitoring both the destruction of existing chemical weapons stocks and production facilities and the undertaking not to manufacture chemical weapons. In addition, the paper calls for inspection on challenge, that is the possibility of special checks in the event of founded suspicions. Neither of these two procedures is sufficient on its own; a dependable verification régime must include both of them.

The paper does not overlook the fact that a verification régime could be more elaborate. We do not exclude the possibility of defining additional confidence-building measures in the field of chemical weapons, which could have a particular psychological and political impact. The paper does not contain any specific suggestions in this field as it is designed to outline the elements of a verification régime that we consider indispensable for any ban on chemical weapons.

Let me add a few words on the regular checks described in the paper. We feel that we have not proposed any unreasonable measures. To verify that the commitment not to manufacture chemical weapons is being honoured, we consider it sufficient to ensure random on-site inspections of chemical plants producing organo-phosphorous substances. The paper recommends that lots be cast to select the plants for inspection. In our view, the very possibility of the lot falling upon a potential violator serves to ensure a large measure of confidence that the convention is being complied with.

Specific rules are suggested for verifying the destruction of chemical weapons stocks and production facilities. They provide for obligatory inspections before and after the period during which destruction is to be effected; during the period itself jointly agreed forms of monitoring with technical aids, such as flowmeters, and random on-site inspections are to be carried out.

As you will notice, we do not suggest the inclusion of regular checks to monitor the production of dual-purpose agents. In this respect the scope of the convention goes beyond that of this proposed verification régime. This seems to us to be a justified limitation. In our view, comprehensive verification would be very difficult to carry out from a technical point of view in this particular field. Furthermore and above all, the agents concerned are of less military importance. The regular checks suggested by the paper therefore concentrate on supertoxic agents. In this context the actual design of a production facility will give an indication of whether the convention is being violated.

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In this connection the paper also suggests a method for verifying the non-production of binary weapons. This involves the taking of samples, which are analysed at the inspection site itself. The analysis involves a summary procedure which proves the non-production of the key precursors of binary weapons but does not disclose the complete actual composition of the sample. When I speak of binaries I mean a composition containing a key precursor as one of the two or more components. Only this key precursor is a phosphorus-organic compound which is essential for a binary weapon. It is this key precursor which must be subject to verification. It is thus not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification. In this context I should like to add that the term "binary", as used in the paper, includes weapons made up of two or more active substances..

Let me stress that the proposed procedure is intended to rule out the possibility of any abuse. My country's chemical industry, which faces lively competition on both national and international markets, strongly supports the proposals made here and is willing to share the experience it has gained with any interested party.

I invite all delegations to the Committee to take a close look at our paper and to incorporate it in their own considerations. In the interest of increased international co-operation and trust, long-standing reservations should now be re-considered. Clearly defined on-site inspections should be recognized as a suitable means of verification in the field of chemical weapons. This would also create favourable conditions for other disarmament and arms control efforts. Reliable verification is not to the advantage or disadvantage of any individual party: rather, it serves the interests of everyone concerned and enhances world-wide confidence in arms control agreements and the realistic expectation of achieving co-operative measures designed to ensure compliance with negotiated results.

Ever since the Geneva Protocol was drawn up in 1925, this city has been the scene of many successful international endeavours for disarmament and arms control. At present it hosts not only the Committee on Disarmament but also another negotiating forum of crucial importance for security and stability in Europe and worldwide. I refer, of course, to the American-Soviet negotiations on the reduction and limitation of intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which, after the agreed two-month recess, will be resumed on 20 May with a new round. My Government is naturally following these talks with the greatest interest and is participating actively in the consultations of the North Atlantic Alliance on this subject. In our view, the bilateral American-Soviet INF negotiations and the Committee's multilateral efforts to achieve a comprehensive chemical weapons convention have something in common: they both aim at a zero-level outcome, in other words, the INF negotiations at the elimination of all land-based long-range nuclear missiles, and the efforts of this Committee at the elimination of all chemical weapons, thus making a contribution to achieve outcomes at the lowest possible level. My country hopes that such substantive results will be achieved in both cases. We will support every effort to move towards constructive and concrete results to facilitate the negotiations and bring them to a successful conclusion.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I should now like to give the floor to the representative of Hungary His Excellency the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Imre Hollai.

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): Allow me first of all to thank you for the very kind words of welcome you have extended to me, Mr. Chairman, and also to associate myself with the sincere congratulations that the head of the Hungarian delegation has already expressed on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of March. It is a privilege for me to address the Committee on Disarmament today and to present the views of my Government on some of the very important issues presently occupying the attention of the peoples and their representatives. It is also a source of great personal pleasure to see so many familiar faces around this table. I am happy to have had the opportunity to work with many of you in previous years, and look forward to co-operating with all of you on forthcoming occasions.

There is not a single person in Hungary who would disagree with the resolution of the Twelfth Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party which states that "In our epoch it is decisive for mankind to maintain peace and to prevent the outbreak of a new world war". That national unity is the most solid basis of my Government's foreign policy, the priority objective of which it is to contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security, the easing of tension and the elimination of the danger of war.

With a view to achieving that priority objective the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has always done and continues to do its best to promote every effort aimed at halting and reversing the arms race, reducing arms and armed forces, and arriving at genuine and effective measures of disarmament. As a proof of our profound commitment to arms limitation and disarmament, I may mention that Hungary is a party to all international agreements in force in those fields, and actively contributed to the elaboration of many of them. The representatives of my country spare no efforts to be engaged actively and constructively at all fora where such issues are deliberated or negotiated.

The Hungarian People's Republic has always devoted particular attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. We are convinced that today when the international situation is marked by the aggravation of the confrontation between the forces of war and peace, when militaristic circles attempt to disrupt the existing parity of forces and openly strive for military superiority, today the responsibility of this Committee -- the single international forum to negotiate global issues of arms limitation and disarmament -- is greater than ever before. Consequently, the responsibility of the States members of this body has similarly increased. Now that all nuclear weapon States and most of the militarily significant countries are represented here in a well-balanced negotiating body, the Committee has no one else to blame for its shortcomings but itself or some of its members.

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In the process of preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the States members of the Committee on Disarmament must face the frustrating problem: should each of them share equally the blame for not having utilized fully the last three years? In an alarmed world where public opinion will judge the Committee by the extent to which it has succeeded in halting the arms race and achieving substantial cuts in the enormous burden of the armaments programmes, the answer is clear. Clear as the balance sheet of the majority of the member States which have from year to year come forward with concrete proposals, draft treaties, working papers on substance, as well as real measures of arms limitation taken unilaterally in order to set an example and pave the way to equitable agreements.

In a world where the accumulation of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, poses a permanent threat to the very survival of mankind and civilization, when all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament, the duty of States to negotiate in good faith is a primary obligation. It is an obligation that has been unanimously undertaken in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Therefore, any State unwilling to fulfil its obligation takes upon itself a heavy responsibility.

The Hungarian People's Republic, like other socialist States, is pursuing a consistent foreign policy aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. Together with the other States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, Hungary has repeatedly reaffirmed its readiness to negotiate and conclude agreements on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of weapons of any kind on a just and reciprocal basis. As stated recently in the Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty States towards the end of last year, that readiness "applies not only to nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction but also to conventional armaments. It also applies to the numerical reduction of the armed forces of States."

Representatives of my Government have stated on numerous occasions that for the Hungarian People's Republic the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the elimination of the threat of a thermo-nuclear catastrophe and nuclear disarmament are questions of the highest priority. We continue to maintain that within the complex of nuclear disarmament measures the complete and general prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests must be treated with the greatest urgency. In this context, my Government has welcomed the constructive step taken by the Soviet Union when it expressed its readiness to accept for a definite, initial period such a prohibition on a trilateral basis. We are deeply convinced that a comprehensive test ban would have unprecedented catalytic effects upon the whole range of nuclear disarmament problems.

For the socialist countries, co-sponsors of the comprehensive proposal in document CD/4, the most attractive and most expedient solution is to prepare and start negotiations on the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, and on the gradual reduction of their stockpiles until the

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complete elimination of such weapons. There are several measures, however, which might be conducive to a comprehensive approach. The first one would be the further strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, and in the same scope, the adoption of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

The adoption of such an agreement, we are firmly convinced, would be an important measure in itself, and in addition it could serve as a precursor to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The socialist States have for long been advocating that idea, and my country supported every effort aimed at creating such zones in various parts of Europe, like the North of the continent, the Balkans, as well as the central part of the European continent in which we are particularly interested. We are also in favour of creating a zone of peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean region. The Hungarian Government is of the view that such zones would be instrumental in lessening tension and strengthening confidence even beyond their geographical boundaries.

The Final Document of the first special session on disarmament clearly recognized the special responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon powers in the field of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet Union has always lived up to that responsibility. Even after the United States had unilaterally broken off bilateral negotiations, the Soviet side continued to manifest a constructive attitude, and on numerous occasions called for the speedy resumption of their talks, in particular those on strategic arms limitation. The Hungarian Government is strongly urging the prompt renewal of those negotiations with a view to achieving a significant limitation and reduction of strategic arms. We are convinced that such a turn of events would have a beneficial influence on the international atmosphere as a whole, and would promote arms limitation and disarmament negotiations also in other frameworks.

There is a close relationship between the global aspects of the SALT process and the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The Hungarian Government welcomed the opening of negotiations on this complex subject between the Soviet Union and the United States, and expressed its full support for the lofty objective and constructive proposal of the Soviet party. We are in favour of a solution which would provide for the total elimination of all medium-range nuclear weapons targeted on our continent, ultimately making Europe totally free of all nuclear weapons. Last week the Soviet Union has again demonstrated its consequent and resolute stand in this respect when it decided to introduce a unilateral moratorium and offered a reduction of a certain number of medium-range missiles later this year. The international community of States would have expected similar goodwill and reciprocal readiness at the negotiating table from the other party. However, the hasty refusal by official circles in the United States only revealed an alarming lack of readiness to give thorough consideration to the important proposals aimed at solving one of the most difficult problems of our days.

The Hungarian People's Republic, just like any of the non-nuclear-weapon States, has a legitimate concern for its security, as well as for the security of all the peoples of the world. We are convinced that the best solution to

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remove the threat of a nuclear war would be the earliest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons, or at least to outlaw the first use of such weapons as the gravest crime against humanity. Partial measures, however, could also contribute to the strengthening of the security of States.

In this context, I wish to emphasize that my Government attaches great importance to strengthening the guarantees of security of non-nuclear-weapon States. Our point of departure is that States -- like my own country -- which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons under a valid international legal instrument, and whose territories are free of nuclear weapons of other States, have an inherent right to unconditional guarantees that they will never, under any circumstances, be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We continue to be advocates of a solution within the framework of an international convention. However, we support the proposal to have, as a first step, declarations by the nuclear-weapon powers to that effect, identical in substance and confirmed by the Security Council of the United Nations.

The Hungarian people was deeply shocked and alarmed when in August last year the United States Government announced the commencement of the large-scale production of neutron warheads. Even the thought of a possible use of that weapon is profoundly deplorable, and generates a strong feeling of indignation all over the world, but particularly in Europe where it is intended to be deployed. My Government is resolutely urging the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations without delay on a convention to prohibit in a comprehensive manner that adominable weapon.

The amount of time I have devoted to questions concerning the complex of nuclear disarmament, just like the great emphasis that the Hungarian delegation has always laid on all such issues, is clearly indicative of the urgency and priority which the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to those problems. This fact, however, does not detract from our will and readiness to pursue meaningful negotiations on all the other items on the Committee's agenda.

The Hungarian delegation has, indeed for a long time, been one of the proponents of urgent measures, the conclusion of international agreements aimed at the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of such weapons; the prohibition of radiological weapons; and the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The people of my country, like peoples in the whole of Europe, are deeply worried by recent measures taken in the United States on the production and deployment of binary weapons. All States, in particular the European States, should raise and firmly reject the sinister plans aimed at flooding this continent with new waves of nuclear, neutron and chemical weapons. This Committee should accelerate its efforts aimed at preventing a new and very

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dangerous spiral of the chemical arms race. Urgent steps should be taken to prevent the production and deployment of new types of chemical weapons, in particular binary weapons, as well as the deployment of chemical weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present.

The Hungarian delegation has been deeply involved in efforts to elaborate a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, and it will continue to be engaged in further negotiations to that end.

Only a week ago our delegation submitted a proposal in this Committee concerning various steps aimed at preventing a qualitatively new round of the technological arms race, and to achieve a comprehensive prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. We suggested also to give serious consideration to appropriate formulations, by which all States, especially the permanent members of the Security Council and other militarily significant States would make solemn declarations, identical in substance, condemning any further efforts to develop, manufacture and deploy new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. My Government is hopeful that our initiative is carefully considered and will be given positive response.

Before concluding this review of my Government's position on some of the major problems of arms limitation and disarmament, I wish to mention that we fully support the proposal made by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly for the earliest possible conclusion of an international treaty aimed at preventing outer space from becoming a new arena of the arms race. We hope that all the members of the Committee realize the great danger that would face mankind if another sphere of vital interest to all States got involved in the arms race.

In conclusion I wish to reaffirm the great importance which the Hungarian People's Republic attaches to the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. With that in mind, our delegations here in the Committee and its subsidiary bodies, and in the Preparatory Committee in New York, are co-operating in the preparations in order to ensure the realization of all the sound anticipations. We expect the special session to become a forum of action-oriented decisions. We shall do everything to help preserve and further develop the results achieved at the first special session. We want to contribute to the maintenance of the principles embodied in the Final Document, and to be instrumental in the preparation and adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The Hungarian delegation has been actively engaged, and continues to do so, in the drafting of that programme. Our position of principle is well known to everyone, and our constructive proposals are well received and appreciated. Therefore, I can limit myself now to stating only a few basic considerations of my Government.

In the introductory part of this statement I have made it clear that the Hungarian People's Republic is ready and willing to negotiate and conclude agreements on the limitation, reduction or prohibition of weapons of any kind on a just and reciprocal basis. This commitment has been declared on various occasions, most recently in the Declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee, held in Warsaw in May 1980. That document was signed by the highest political personalities of the member States, and discussed and ratified by the relevant political and legislative organs. I should like to mention that the Declaration contains a detailed description of the commitment, which -- as a matter of fact -- was reaffirmed and further developed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty countries at their last meeting held at Bucharest in December 1981.

The Hungarian People's Republic is determined to continue negotiations in full harmony with the principles and priorities adopted by consensus at the first special session, and embodied in the Final Document. We are further determined to negotiate on all measures in a comprehensive manner, on a rational sequence of interrelated actions to be taken over established periods of time. We support the inclusion in the comprehensive programme of disarmament of appropriate provisions on the holding of periodic reviews in order to ascertain the realization of commitments and the achievement of the projected measures. Such reviews should give further impetus to the continuation of the disarmament process, and should lead in due time to the convening of the first world disarmament conference. In our opinion, such world conferences could mark the fulfilment of the objectives of each major phase of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which -- we sincerely hope -- will lead in the not too distant future to general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): We are indeed privileged today to have two distinguished guests participating in our plenary session. Their presence confirms the importance which their respective Governments attach to our Committee. My delegation takes great pleasure in joining you, Mr. Chairman, in extending to their Excellencies Ambassador Friedrich Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Imre Hollai of Hungary to our meeting, and in expressing to them our appreciation for their presence in the Committee. I also wish to note with some regret the departure of our distinguished colleague and friend, His Excellency Ambassador Mircea Malitza, the able representative of Romania to this body. My feelings, I must confess, are mixed because, while I shall, as indeed shall we all, miss his congenial and skilful work in our Committee, I must say that our sense of loss here in Geneva is a selfish one because he takes up his post in Washington, and there he will become the diplomatic representative of Romania to the United States. I wish him well in his new responsibility and know that he will make a significant contribution to Romanian/United States relations.

The achievement of a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons is a goal which ranks near the top of the Committee's agenda. It is a goal to which my Government attaches great importance.

In his statement to the Committee on 9 February, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Eugene Rostow, outlined the position of the United States with respect to a chemical weapons prohibition. Today, during one of the two plenary sessions devoted specifically to the subject of chemical weapons, I would like to set forth the United States approach in greater detail.

The United States views the effective prohibition of chemical weapons as a means for increasing our own security and the security of our friends and allies, as well as the security of neutral/non-aligned States. We are seeking to eliminate a real threat by removing real weapons from existing arsenals of potential adversaries. The United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect. They are particularly effective against military forces and civilians in small countries who do not have the means to protect themselves. We are convinced that even as we sit in this room these weapons are being used in current conflicts in remote areas of the world -- in Afghanistan, Laos and Kampuchea. We must stop the use of chemical weapons and achieve the goal we seek -- a complete and verifiable ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons for all time.

Ensuring that a chemical weapons ban increases security and that, so far as is possible, it does not harm legitimate chemical activities is a heavy responsibility. It is a highly complex and difficult task to strike the proper balance. Toxic chemicals are ubiquitous in modern societies. Today all societies depend heavily on toxic chemicals used as drugs, pesticides and chemical intermediates, to name but a few examples. It is my Government's view that the simple approach used in the past for biological weapons and environmental warfare cannot serve as a model for dealing with the much more complex problems surrounding a ban on chemical weapons.

The Committee on Disarmament and its predecessors have already been working on a chemical weapons ban for over a decade. In view of the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved, it should not be surprising that reaching agreement has proved difficult. Yet we should not lose sight of the fact that considerable useful work has been accomplished.

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Unfortunately, progress has been very uneven. Far greater progress has been made in defining the scope of a prohibition than in working out arrangements to ensure universal confidence that all parties are complying with their obligations. It is clear that lack of agreement on issues in the area of verification and compliance constitutes the key obstacle to successful completion of the Committee's work.

In this context, I would like to discuss briefly certain events outside the Committee which form an important part of the background for the Committee's discussions of a chemical weapons ban, and which have a great influence on the attitude of my Government. A proper understanding of these events is essential if members are to understand the United States position on this subject.

First, as is well known, the United States has concluded that it cannot any longer postpone steps to modernize its deterrent chemical weapons stockpile. More than a decade ago we shut down all of our chemical weapons production facilities. We have not produced any chemical weapons since that time and have in fact destroyed large quantities of such weapons. We had hoped for reciprocal behaviour on the part of the Soviet Union, and believed that progress toward a chemical weapons ban would obviate the need for future production by eliminating the threat our chemical warfare capabilities were designed to meet. Unfortunately, however, the threat not only remains, but is greater than ever. We must take prompt steps to deal with it -- to do otherwise would be irresponsible. We would greatly prefer an adequately verifiable treaty, we will continue to work actively for it, but until such an agreement is achieved, it is clear from Soviet actions that we must maintain military capabilities in the chemical weapons field. This approach is consistent with that taken by my Government in other areas where negotiations are under way. Sadly, my Government has concluded that no other approach is likely to produce positive results. I shall not belabour this point. For the information of other distinguished delegates, my delegation is submitting today a working paper entitled, The United States programme to deter chemical warfare, which explains in greater detail the several steps we are taking and the reasons behind them. The objective of the United States chemical programme as has been clearly stated, is to maintain the safest, smallest level of chemical munitions which will provide an effective deterrent to a chemical attack by an aggressor. It is not, as some would have you believe, to gain a superiority in these weapons, or even to match the sizeable Soviet capability. I would note in particular that over 70 per cent of our planned expenditures are related to protection against chemical attack.

Allegations have been made in this Committee that the United States is not negotiating in good faith, and that we are deliberately creating obstacles to an agreement by modernizing our chemical warfare capabilities. That is sheer nonsense. United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government. I would also like to make clear that if we are successful in achieving such a ban, we would be willing, indeed eager, to terminate our binary weapons programme promptly.

In addition, some delegations would have others believe that production of binary chemical weapons will make adequate verification of a chemical weapons ban considerably more difficult or perhaps even impossible. This, too, is nonsense. The fact is that all manufacturing processes for chemical warfare agents, whether for conventional, binary, or other multi-component weapons, present the same basic verification problems. Our planned binary systems will produce standard nerve agents which have been discussed extensively in this Committee. They will use the

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same key precursors used to produce nerve agents by conventional methods. A binary production facility will still contain special devices for handling toxic chemicals. These will not be as extensive as in a conventional nerve agent plant, but this difference will have no real impact on verification. National technical means are not adequate even for dealing with conventional chemical warfare agent plants. As with facilities which produce conventional chemical weapons, an on-site visit to the production facility itself could determine without great difficulty what was being produced and for what purpose. Also, as with conventional chemical weapons, there are precursors involved which are "single-purpose"; that is, they have no commercial application. Such key precursors will have to be dealt with in a future convention, regardless of the type of chemical warfare agent production process in which they may be used.

There is a second series of events which has much more serious implications for the work of the Committee -- events which have created grave concerns that existing arms control constraints on chemical and biological weapons are being violated.

The United States now has good reason to question Soviet compliance with the biological and toxin weapons Convention -- an arms control treaty negotiated in this Committee's predecessor body. We have compelling evidence of a highly unusual outbreak of anthrax, linked to a heavily-secured military installation, in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk in the spring of 1979. We have repeatedly, on a bilateral basis, asked the Soviet Union to provide information which would allay our concerns. The response of the Soviet Government -- that this outbreak was due to natural causes -- is frankly not consistent with the information available to us.

In addition to the Sverdlovsk outbreak, the United States and other countries have evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Soviet and Soviet-assisted forces in contravention of international law. Lethal toxins, whose possession for hostile purposes is prohibited by the biological and toxin weapons Convention, have been found in samples from areas of reported chemical weapons attacks in Laos and Kampuchea.

My Government has just completed an exhaustive review of all the information currently available on the reports that chemical weapons are being used in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan. We have concluded that lethal and other chemical weapons are being used in all three countries and that a member of this Committee, the Soviet Union, is directly involved. We will make available to all delegations a copy of the document which outlines our conclusions and the information on which they are based.

This accumulation of evidence, from many different sources, raises a number of serious issues regarding existing and future arms control agreements, particularly in the area of chemical weapons. The need for improved international verification procedures and mechanisms for dealing with compliance issues has been clearly demonstrated. The repeated refusal of the Soviet Union to co-operate

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in resolving these outstanding issues, which are of great concern to the United States and others, casts a pall over our collective efforts to attain a chemical weapons ban.

These developments have reinforced my Government's determination to ensure that the verification and compliance arrangements of a future chemical weapons convention are truly effective.

The importance which my Government attaches to verification is well known. This is not an abstract negotiating position. It is a fundamental security consideration. We believe that a capability to retaliate in kind to a chemical attack is essential for the purpose of helping to deter such an attack. If we are to accept an obligation under a convention to relinquish such a capability, the provisions of the convention must provide an adequate level of confidence that potential adversaries are also relinquishing their chemical weapons capabilities. Let me be frank. We will not accept a convention that cannot be adequately verified and thus cannot be relied upon to eliminate the threat which chemical weapons pose to the security of the United States and others. I cannot conceive that my Government would enter into a convention if serious doubts on this remained.

There is general agreement that a verification system for a chemical weapons convention should be based on a combination of national and international means which would complement and supplement each other. However, fundamental differences exist. Some delegations want to rely almost totally on national technical means and national measures of implementation. Many others, including my own, believe that only international measures, including systematic international on-site verification, can provide the basis for adequate verification. We are convinced that for the foreseeable future, national technical means will be inadequate. Furthermore, national implementation arrangements will not help assure others that national Governments are in compliance. There can be no substitute for co-operative international verification measures, including appropriate provisions for systematic on-site monitoring, agreed in advance in the convention.

Discussions of general approaches to verification have amply demonstrated that these fundamental differences exist in the Committee. One would think that in such a situation, an intensive effort would be made to isolate, and focus on, the problem areas. That is the approach favoured by my delegation and many others. But a number of delegations apparently want to avoid tackling these difficult questions. We do not see how such an approach can lead anywhere. Ignoring problems will not make them less real or less important and certainly does not facilitate their resolution. Meaningful progress toward a chemical weapons convention will depend upon progress in resolving basic verification issues. In my delegation's view, it is not productive to try to draft the text of provisions in other areas when there is not even the basis for a common approach on the verification provisions.

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The time has come to move beyond a general discussion of broad approaches to verification. The Committee should now focus on specific verification tasks, one by one, and devote as much time as may be necessary to achieving agreement. The list of tasks outlined in the Canadian working paper, document CD/167, would provide a good starting point for drawing up a list of issues to be addressed. There clearly will not be any simple formula which can be applied in all cases. Because of the variety of verification tasks, a chemical weapons verification system will need to include a variety of measures tailored to suit particular situations.

Finding solutions to the many remaining problems will require active co-operation among all members of the Committee, applying their collective imagination and expertise. It is in this spirit that my delegation has sponsored two briefings on the concept of remote continual verification. In the near future we will submit a concrete proposal to the Committee for a detailed evaluation of this technique as a possible component of a chemical weapons verification system.

The active involvement of technical experts will be needed for understanding both the technical dimensions of the tasks and the technical possibilities for accomplishing them. In this regard, my delegation believes that the principal work of experts in the area of toxicity determination has been completed. The most important need now is for expert advice in the area of verification. We would agree that as a first step, experts be asked to outline this summer possible procedures for monitoring destruction of declared chemical weapons stockpiles and to address several other specific verification-related topics contained in the draft report of the consultations held on 15-19 March.

There is one final point that I want to ensure that everyone understands. My delegation pledges its full co-operation in the Committee's efforts to achieve a chemical weapons ban. We are ready and willing to sit down with others to try to find specific solutions to the many specific problems which have to be resolved if a chemical weapons convention is to be achieved. In this regard, some have suggested that one of the most effective ways to achieve rapid progress would be for the United States to resume bilateral negotiations with the USSR. Let me clearly state the United States position on this matter. The possibility of resuming bilateral negotiations remains open; pending a demonstration by the Soviet Union of genuine readiness to negotiate effective verification and compliance arrangements, and to comply with their obligations under existing agreements. There should be no misunderstanding on this point. The ball is squarely in the Soviet court.

We have been seeking an effective ban on chemical weapons for many years. We have no illusions that solutions will be found quickly. But the longer we wait to grapple with the real problems in the area of verification and compliance, the longer it will take. We should not lose any more time.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation to extend to you our sincere greetings on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee and our wishes for the successful completion of your responsible task.

I should like to take this opportunity to express our delegation's thanks to Ambassador Mahallati of Iran for his efforts as the Chairman for the month of February in organizing the present session of the Committee.

I take particular pleasure in welcoming the new representative of Czechoslovakia, my good friend and colleague Ambassador Milos Vejvoda, and assuring him of my continuing close and business-like co-operation.

Before embarking on a more detailed statement of the Mongolian delegation's position on item 4 of the agenda, I should like to make a few more brief remarks on the highest-priority issue of nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, was and is in favour of an early start being made on genuine negotiations in this Committee on items 1 and 2 of its agenda, and the immediate establishment of ad hoc working groups with appropriate mandates. It is perfectly natural that the main theme in the statements of many delegations in this forum should be a just demand for the starting of negotiations on the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Almost all are in favour of such negotiations being no longer postponed.

At earlier plenary meetings we listened with great attention to the statements made by a number of delegations from the Group of 21, including the delegations of India, Sri Lanka and Brazil, and also to the statements of Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, and Ambassador Sujka, the distinguished representative of Poland, all of which statements touched upon a number of important aspects of a question relating to item 1 of the agenda — more precisely, that of the setting up of an ad hoc working group.

We believe that the mandates for the ad hoc working groups adopted by the Committee on Disarmament should be such as to permit the conduct of negotiations on the substance of the issues concerned, that is, the elaboration of the relevant multilateral treaties and agreements.

In this connection we fully endorse the suggestions made by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic in document CD/259. We consider that precisely such an approach would serve as a basis for further concrete actions to be undertaken by members of the Committee. It is important that those actions should lead to results.

In the present difficult international situation questions of the elaboration and adoption of effective measures in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and nuclear disarmament are becoming most urgent and acute. The attainment of positive solutions to these highest-priority problems is the goal of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in their constructive efforts and

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initiatives aimed at the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe. In this context I should like to stress the importance of the new Soviet proposal concerning a key issue in the matter of the prevention of the growing threat of a nuclear missile war.

The Soviet Union's new peaceful initiatives, put forward a few days ago by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, L.I. Brezhnev, at the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR, have been received with full support in the Mongolian People's Republic. The Soviet Union's decision unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in the European part of the USSR, the quantitative and qualitative freezing of such weapons already deployed there and the halting of the replacement of old missiles by newer ones, as well as a number of other concrete proposals advanced by the Soviet Union, are permeated with a sincere concern to avert the threat of war and a desire to reduce the level of military confrontation and to achieve mutually acceptable agreements in the Soviet-United States negotiations on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union has thereby demonstrated once again its goodwill and its readiness to strive for the positive solution of vitally important problems in the interests of strengthening peace and stability, not only in Europe but in the world as a whole.

Allow me now to make some observations on behalf of the Mongolian delegation with respect to item 4 of the agenda, which the Committee has begun considering this week.

The many years' efforts of the Committee on Disarmament aimed at the elaboration and approval of a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction are meeting with serious new difficulties. We are convinced that the prohibition of chemical weapons is today one of the most urgent tasks, brooking no further delay, in the sphere of real disarmament. The majority of the world's States are of the same view, namely, that mankind must be spared the horrors of chemical warfare and saved from that most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction.

However, a diametrically opposite position has been taken on this important issue by the Washington Administration, which has adopted a multi-billion-dollar programme for the "chemical rearmament of the United States", the essence of which consists, basically, in commissioning a new generation of chemical weapons and ultimately stationing them on the territories of other States. The decision of the United States to step up the production of charges containing a new and even more lethal nerve-gas mixture, the so-called binary charges, is creating a situation fraught with the most dangerous consequences.

The addition of binary weapons to the military arsenal of the United States of America and its NATO allies represents first and foremost a threat of the use of this most dangerous type of weapon of mass destruction in densely-populated parts of Europe. Thus attempts are being made not only to transform Europe into an arena for some kind of "limited nuclear war" but also to regard that continent as the most suitable theatre for a future war with the use of chemical weapons.

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At the same time, the authors of that very programme of "chemical rearmament of the United States of America" are continuing in every way possible to inspire reports of "instances of the use of Soviet chemical and toxin weapons" and to involve the United Nations in a so-called "investigation of the matter". In the statement just made here in the Committee by the representative of the United States there was again an attempt to make allegations not in accordance with the facts. Members of the Committee on Disarmament are well aware that such ploys have failed to produce any result whatsoever.

It is not surprising that such slanders and distortions of the facts are being resorted to by those who for many decades ignored the 1925 Geneva Protocol and, in the early 1970s, made use of chemical weapons, or rather waged real chemical warfare against the peoples of Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea. Such inventions are resorted to by those who are waging an undeclared war against Afghanistan. They gladly supply chemical weapons to terrorist bands sent into the country from abroad, who then use them against the peaceful Afghan population.

All these actions are being undertaken by certain circles to justify their practical steps towards the implementation of the plan for "chemical rearmament" and, in particular, the large-scale production of a new generation of chemical weapons — binary weapons.

These actions are being undertaken also in order to justify the Reagan administration's plans, which were confirmed by the United States Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger in his interview on "The Voice of America", to consider reviewing international treaties and agreements prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

The modernization and the unprecedented increase in the production of war gases is inevitably leading to a new and dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and is creating a situation in which everything positive that has been achieved towards the reaching of agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons and further efforts in that direction could be reduced to naught. In other words, the whole matter of the emergence of binary weapons will severely complicate the negotiations on the elaboration and conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons.

At the last plenary meeting, Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, very rightly said that the emergence of the problem of binary weapons inevitably creates certain difficulties in solving a wide range of questions relating to the future convention — questions relating, in particular, to the scope of the prohibition, transfer, the declaration of stocks and their destruction, and issues directly connected with the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Taking these circumstances into consideration, the delegations of the socialist countries, including Mongolia, have submitted working paper CD/258 drawing attention to certain important aspects most directly related to the negotiations at present taking place in the Committee. I do not wish to dwell in detail on that document, as its contents are already known to all members of the Committee, and it should form the subject of careful consideration.

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We are convinced that a review of the decision, i.e. the renunciation of the wide-scale production and deployment of a new generation of chemical weapons, would contribute towards the early achievement of generally acceptable agreements in the important disarmament sphere of the complete elimination of chemical weapons.

The Mongolian People's Republic, together with other peace-loving States, is resolutely opposed to the production and deployment of binary weapons.

In that connection I wish to point out once more that at the last session of the General Assembly Mongolia was a joint sponsor of resolution 36/96 F, which was supported by the votes of 157 delegations, only the United States delegation voting against. Proceeding from its consistent policy aimed at preventing war and strengthening universal peace and security, the Mongolian People's Republic considers it urgently necessary to intensify multilateral efforts to curb the chemical arms race even further and to undertake practical steps towards the attainment of agreement in that area of genuine disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament can do a great deal in that respect, first and foremost by successfully completing the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The Mongolian delegation notes with satisfaction the active continuation of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group under the capable and enterprising chairmanship of Ambassador B. Sujka of Poland. We hope that on the basis of the broader mandate adopted at this session of the Committee, the Working Group will achieve even more substantial progress towards the earliest possible elaboration of an appropriate international instrument.

While it has the floor, the Mongolian delegation would like to deal in detail with one of the issues relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As members of the Committee know, the agreed position of the group of socialist countries set forth in document CD/245 has evoked considerable interest on the part of a number of delegations, and especially among the representatives of the Group of 21. The sponsors of that document have been requested to provide additional explanations on some of the points contained in it, and a number of questions were raised in that connection.

The Czechoslovak delegation has made several statements here on behalf of the group of socialist countries, giving a detailed explanation and exposition of our agreed position. The Mongolian delegation will not, therefore, repeat what has already been said, but would like to answer some questions asked by the distinguished representative of India at an earlier plenary meeting of the Committee.

Those questions relate to the initiative of the Mongolian People's Republic concerning the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. That proposal was formulated in document A/36/27 (p. 100) and also in document CD/245 (p. 8).

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To the question: "How would such a convention be different from the responsibilities already undertaken by States of all regions under the United Nations Charter?", I should like to give the following answer.

The principle of non-use of force is, of course, proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations as one of the fundamental principles governing international relations. Article 2 (4) of the Charter provides: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Here, the principle in question is given as a ruler of conduct for States and for the Organization itself in its activities.

I do not think anyone will dispute the already existing practice of giving more precise form to the rules and principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations in special documents, both declaratory and contractual in nature. That is the natural process of their deeper elaboration and confirmation, taking into account new realities and objective requirements in international relations. In that connection, mention may be made of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights and, last not least, to the 1972 declaration on the renunciation of the use of force in international relations and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

I wish to stress that the Final Act of the 1975 Helsinki Conference represented a major contribution towards the development and strengthening of the principle of the non-use of force in international relations. Mention should also be made of the Bandung Declaration, known to us all.

Furthermore, in implementation and development of important provisions of the United Nations Charter, a whole system of international treaties and agreements has already been worked out and concluded with respect to the halting of the arms race and disarmament.

It seems obvious that the future convention will not be a simple repetition of what is already set forth in the Charter of the United Nations but will contain specific practical measures for the development and implementation of the Charter provision concerning the prohibition of the use of force under the conditions of a specific region, where the need for the conclusion of such an agreement is vital and perhaps more urgent than in any other region of the world.

Here I should like to draw your attention to a passage in the message addressed by our President, Yu. Tsedenbal, to the Heads of State and Government of the countries of Asia and the Pacific in connection with the convention we are

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proposing: "The proposed convention would also, naturally, develop and strengthen the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and a number of United Nations resolutions on questions relating to the renunciation of the use of force, with respect to the specific situation in the region."

And there is one other important consideration to which I should like to draw the attention of Committee members. The proposed convention should contain provisions identifying ways of implementing the principle the observance of which it seeks to achieve. For example, another passage in the above-mentioned message from our President reads: "An important place should be occupied by provisions providing for active steps by States parties on such cardinal issues for the strengthening of peace and security as measures relating to the reduction of military confrontation, the curbing of the arms race and disarmament."

Thus the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean will represent a significant contribution towards the implementation of a most important provision of the Charter of the United Nations, which, unfortunately, is often violated, especially on the Asian continent.

Article 52 of the Charter envisages the possibility of the conclusion of regional arrangements on matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. The conclusion of the proposed convention could become a concrete step towards the implementation of that important provision of the Charter.

To the question: "Is the convention being proposed a multilateral convention limited to the States of the region of Asia and the Pacific or is a series of bilateral treaties envisaged?", I wish to reply as follows:

The Mongolian People's Republic is proposing the conclusion of a multilateral convention covering the countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore, we consider it desirable that all the States that are permanent members of the Security Council, which bear a special responsibility as regards the maintenance of international peace and security, should participate in the elaboration and signing of such a convention. At the same time, we in no way belittle the value of bilateral agreements on the non-use of force between countries of the region. Such agreements would obviously help to create the conditions for the implementation of measures on a multilateral basis.

We see bilateral treaties and agreements on peaceful mutual relations and co-operation between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean as important components in the elaboration and adoption of a multilateral instrument of a regional nature. Incidentally, it would be appropriate in this context to recall recent reports concerning the initiation of negotiations between India and Pakistan on the question of the conclusion between them of a non-aggression treaty or peace treaty — what matters here is not the name of the document but its purpose and contents. If a treaty is concluded which really meets the genuine interests of

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the peace and tranquility of the peoples of both countries and of the southern Asian sub-continent as a whole, then, in my view, the idea of collective security is beginning to gain ground in that most important part of the Asian continent and there are prospects of a further deepening of that process in future. And that is very important.

Lastly, in reply to the question: "How would breaches of the convention be dealt with and what would be the relationship of such a security system to the collective security framework already provided for under the United Nations Charter?", I would make the following points:

As we understand it, in the event of a breach of the convention's provisions, the parties to it could, in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, employ such means as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration or other peaceful means of their own choice.

No provision of the proposed convention should affect the rights and obligations of States under the United Nations Charter, including the provisions relating to collective security measures.

Questions relating to the implementation of the convention's provisions could be examined at periodic conferences for the review of the operation of the convention or through the creation of some form of machinery which might be provided for in the convention. Examples in that respect may be found in the activities of certain organizations set up on a regional basis.

It goes without saying that, in the event of the occurrence of a situation representing a threat to international peace and security, emergency measures could undoubtedly be taken in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that the very essence of the Mongolian proposal consists in the search for a path that could lead towards meeting the long-term interests of States in that largest and most populous of the world's continents. Such a search calls for a great deal of time and for persistent concerted efforts by countries and peoples.

The important thing, in our view, is the need for a political dialogue to strengthen confidence and a broad mutual understanding. As we have already said, the Head of our State, Yu. Tsedenbal, last year addressed a message on this subject to the Heads of State and Government of almost all the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Most of the States in that region received the Mongolian proposal with great attention and expressed their support. Due attention and importance are being given to this matter at various conferences of international organizations and other bodies.

Thus, I believe a good start has been made towards achieving a constructive dialogue. It is important that this process should be strengthened further so that a sound basis may be laid for further successful progress in the common cause.

The Mongolian People's Republic is fully resolved to continue making efforts, together with other States, towards the attainment of the noble common goal.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Bulgaria, His Excellency Ambassador Grinberg.

Mr. GRINBERG (Bulgaria): My delegation has already had an opportunity to extend its congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee, as well as to welcome the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and the Netherlands in this Committee. Let me now express our satisfaction in connection with today's participation in our deliberations of two distinguished guests, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic, Mr. Imre Hollai as well as Ambassador Dr. Friedrich Ruth, the Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. Lastly, I would like to state how much we regret that the head of the Romanian delegation, and our very good friend, Ambassador Mircea Malitza, is leaving this Committee in order to take up another important post. We have always appreciated his important contribution to our work and enjoyed his close co-operation and his contribution to the development of our common endeavours in this Committee.

Today I would like to present certain considerations of the Bulgarian delegation on item 4 of our agenda, "Chemical weapons". Instead of describing the importance of our negotiations in this field, let me give a brief quotation from a manual on chemical weapons: "After only a brief exposure to nerve gas, victims bleed profusely from the nose and mouth, go into severe convulsions and die within minutes or after days of agony." To this the manual adds that the lethal doses are measured in milligrams. While discussing this issue, therefore, we should not forget that the military arsenals of today may contain several hundred thousand tons of chemical warfare agents.

I think we need such a reminder in order to grasp the true dimensions of our task.

Paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the United Nations General Assembly's first special session on disarmament proclaimed that "The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament", and that the conclusion of a convention to this end "is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations". Very soon this Committee will have to report on the results of its efforts to halt and reverse the arms race in this important area.

Looking back over the years of deliberations, we would like to underline first of all the fundamental role that was played by the bilateral USSR-United States talks in the period 1976-1980. It is to be regretted that these talks have been unilaterally discontinued, because they could still have served a very useful purpose.

Turning now to the multilateral negotiations, I would like to note with satisfaction that during the sessions of the Committee in 1980 and 1981 very useful work on the elaboration of the elements of a future convention was done under the leadership of Ambassadors Okawa and Lidgard. This year's session has been marked by the resumption of the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an extended mandate, under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Sujka of Poland. Our delegation welcomes the business-like atmosphere that prevails in the Working Group. A number of statements and documents presented by different delegations will no doubt contribute to the formulation of the elements of the future convention. Finally, let me also mention that for the last three years we have been assisted in our work by technical experts from more than 20 countries, including Bulgaria, and I wish to avail myself of this opportunity to express to them our acknowledgement.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

We are all aware that in spite of the progress achieved so far, a lot of problems still remain to be resolved, including those of definitions, the scope of the prohibition, declarations concerning and the destruction of existing stocks of chemical weapons, verification of the implementation of the convention etc. It is essential, at this stage, that all delegations take a balanced approach towards the whole complex of questions, without artificially upgrading some at the expense of other, equally important questions.

It is heartening to note that there is an increasing awareness of the necessity of such an approach. Even in the statements made on the complex and delicate subjects of control and verification, it has often been possible to discern signs of a growing realization that the "concept of distrust" would lead us nowhere. For our part, we fully share the position of the Soviet delegation, as presented by Ambassador Issraelyan in his important statement of 31 March 1981: "No matter how much we expand and complicate the verification system, no matter how comprehensive we strive to render it, we shall never reach the point at which we can be sure that no uncertainties have been left concerning some important aspect or other of the activities of States, related to the observance of all the provisions of a convention banning chemical weapons."

Having said this, however, I would like to stress most emphatically that our position regarding the possibility of devising an effective system of verification over the implementation of the future convention is a positive and optimistic one. In this respect my delegation has been encouraged by the initial exchange of views in the Working Group, which revealed that even though some important questions have yet to be resolved, there are a considerable number of converging points on questions of both principle and detail.

We could hardly make an attempt at assessing the present state of the negotiations on banning chemical weapons without taking into account the recent decision of the United States Administration to proceed to the production and deployment of what are known as binary and multi-component chemical weapons.

To condition the American people to accept these unpopular measures and in order to justify themselves before world public opinion, in the course of the last several years, the United States has been waging an unprecedented, large-scale defamation campaign against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, affirming the alleged use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan and south-east Asia. Today the United States representative, Ambassador Fields, thought fit to repeat these slanderous accusations in his statement. We can only regret that those who are responsible for this campaign have not yet abandoned their tactics which can only result in poisoning the atmosphere and making our work even more difficult than it actually is.

The fact is sufficiently worrisome in itself, that at a time of greatly increased tensions and an escalating arms race in many fields, a new, particularly deadly weapon is being added to the long list of horrible means of mass destruction, threatening the survival of mankind. But on top of this, as has been rightly pointed out by many delegations, we have to bear in mind that should these new weapons, based on the latest technological achievements and on qualitatively new principles, actually be produced and deployed, the current negotiations on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons would be greatly complicated. This is the opinion of the overwhelming majority of the international community as reflected in General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, which in its operative paragraph 5 "Calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons". It is indeed regrettable that the United States cast the only negative vote on this important resolution.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

We cannot fail to voice our anxiety and to deplore the fact that the new multi-billion-dollar programme for the production of binary weapons will open up a new channel in the arms race. But as Europeans we have additional reasons for concern because hardly anyone could doubt that these weapons are to be deployed in densely populated areas of the world, and above all in Europe. That is why my delegation strongly supports the idea of the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territory of countries where such weapons are not stationed at present. We have also proposed that each State party to the convention should recall to its national territory, not later than six months after its adherence, all chemical weapons stationed under its jurisdiction on the territory of other States.

Following an objective preliminary analysis of the implications resulting from the emergence of binary weapons, the delegations of a group of socialist countries presented to the Committee document CD/258, in which they have put forward their views on a number of issues related to those weapons. Apart from this, the Bulgarian delegation submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a questionnaire on the same subject. At this point I would like to refer in general terms to two major problems that the emergence of binary chemical weapons poses for all of us. The first one relates to the scope of the prohibition in the future convention, the second to its control and verification provisions.

1. In the considered opinion of our experts, binary weapons will further complicate the already difficult distinction between commercial chemicals and those which can be used for chemical weapons. This applies especially to organo-phosphorus compounds in the production of pesticides.

2. In the area of control and verification, binary weapons will multiply the difficulties in the evaluation of the declared stocks of chemical weapons, the control over non-production of chemical weapons, the non-possession of chemical weapons, etc.

In stating the above we are fully aware that these views are not shared by some delegations. Only two days ago the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, questioned whether by their nature alone binary weapons made problems of verification more difficult. Today we heard similar views from the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields. To prove his point Ambassador Summerhayes maintained that the components of binary weapons were chemically highly reactive and, because of storage problems, essential binary precursors would not be stored in large amounts for civilian use. Hence, the problem of verification of such precursors would be similar to, if not less difficult than those of the verification of other lethal agents.

The arguments adduced by the United Kingdom delegation failed to remove our concern regarding the negative implications of binary weapons for our efforts.

As is well known, the civilian chemical industry uses for permitted purposes many substances which are highly reactive. Their storing in large amounts does cause some technical difficulties but these problems are not insurmountable. Thus, on the one hand, it would not be impossible to store highly reactive substances as precursors of binary weapons, and, on the other, the presence of such substances in a given country could not in itself constitute a basis for suspicions of non-compliance unless they are known to be components of binary weapons.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

But, could there be a guarantee that the States parties to the future convention will be fully informed of developments in the field of the production of binary or multi-component chemical weapons? How are they going to overcome the dangers resulting from a possible lack of knowledge or from an overdose of suspicion? These are real and not imaginary problems.

I hope the question I have raised will not be interpreted as an expression of pessimism. Our purpose is only to contribute to the better understanding of the problems posed by the introduction of the new generation of chemical weapons and, through this, to their solution. We sincerely believe that, should there be a political will, this Committee will be in a position to accomplish successfully its difficult tasks.

I would like to turn now briefly to item 1 of our agenda. We have already addressed the nuclear test-ban issue on previous occasions and our position is clear. We are in favour of setting up an ad hoc working group to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. With this in view we gave our full support to the proposal for a mandate for such a working group made by the delegation of the German Democratic Republic (document CD/259).

As is known, there were some new developments in this area recently. A statement was made by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, to the effect that the United States would be in a position to join a consensus to establish "a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement".

In view of some previous statements which made clear that the United States no longer considered the negotiation of a CTBT an immediate task to be accorded the highest priority, many delegations met Ambassador Fields' announcement with mixed feelings and many questions. These reservations were fully justified because a discussion of an issue of such complexity as verification in a vacuum, and without any reference to a clearly defined objective, could hardly serve any useful purpose.

Now, as is known, in spite of these legitimate doubts, a drafting group was set up under your chairmanship to try to formulate a mandate for a working group which would make it possible for this Committee to start a process of genuine multilateral efforts which should culminate in the conclusion of a CTBT. My delegation is participating in the drafting group, proceeding from the belief that should there be goodwill on all sides its task would be successfully accomplished. In our view to achieve this the mandate of the future working group should be based on the following premises: (1) it should allow for a consideration of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests in all its aspects, and (2) the aim of this discussion should be the subsequent early conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation has asked for the floor today in order, in accordance with the Committee's programme of work, to state our position on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. However, before I pass on to this subject, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union on the key problems of the prevention of the ever-increasing danger of a world nuclear-missile war which were put forward by President L. Brezhnev on 16 March of this year.

Especially significant are those proposals which are designed to facilitate the achievement of an agreement on a large-scale reduction of the nuclear weapons of the two sides in Europe, based upon the principle of equality and equal security. The decision of the Soviet leadership unilaterally to introduce a moratorium on the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe serves these goals. Moreover, the Soviet Union intends already this year, if there is no new aggravation of the international situation, to reduce, on its own initiative, a certain proportion of its medium-range missiles.

In response to the request made to us by a number of representatives in the Committee, the Soviet delegation is distributing a part of the statement of L. Brezhnev at the **seventeenth** congress of trade unions of the USSR as a document of the Committee on Disarmament.

For a number of reasons we attach particular importance to our statement today. It concerns the prohibition of chemical weapons i.e. the problem of one of the most dangerous and barbarous types of weapons of mass destruction, the solution of which is awaited impatiently by all mankind and which is rightly listed among the priority issues confronting our Committee.

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to chemical weapons is clear and unequivocal: the Soviet Union was one of the initiators of the proposal for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and it has done and is continuing to do everything in its power in any forum and within any organizational framework where such efforts are made, for the speediest possible elimination of this type of weapon from the arsenals of States.

At the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and subsequently, the Soviet Union drew the attention of the world community to the fact that the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons were inadmissibly slow. That was not a mere statement of fact but rather an expression of concern for the speeding up of the negotiations. The effective conduct of negotiations and their successful conclusion are needed particularly now in the light of recent events, when an entirely new situation is emerging or has already emerged in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. If no decisive steps are taken today to eliminate chemical weapons, tomorrow it may be too late.

In this connection the most serious factor, leading directly towards a dangerous spiralling of the chemical arms race and thus undermining the very basis of the negotiations on the prohibition of this type of weapon, is the United States decision regarding the further expansion and the modernization of its chemical arsenal. The five-year programme amounting to \$10 billion includes the mass production of binary chemical munitions and the development of new methods for the use of chemical weapons. In spite of the fact that present United States stocks of chemical weapons

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include about three million shells, tens of thousands of aircraft bombs, hundreds of thousands of mines and high explosive bombs, it is planned to increase the quantity of **chemical** charges up to five million units and to replace the types growing obsolete by new ones, and mainly by binary munitions.

The United States decision on chemical rearmament is part of an over-all scheme which includes the initiation of the production of neutron weapons, the plans for the stationing of new American nuclear missiles in western Europe and the general NATO decisions on the expansion of military preparations. According to the latest United States military doctrines, the European region is the most probable arena for the use of chemical weapons. The United States deputy Under-Secretary of Defense, speaking in Congress, stated that it was necessary to equip the United States armed forces with the newest types of chemical weapons in order "to have the possibility of conducting large-scale chemical warfare in Europe against the Warsaw Treaty countries".

We sometimes hear it said, including today in the Committee on Disarmament, that the production and deployment by the United States of new varieties of chemical weapons, and especially binary weapons, are essential in order to guarantee the security of the United States and also its allies, and because the United States is "lagging behind" the USSR in the sphere of chemical weapons, because of the "Soviet threat", and so on. Gentlemen, how often can the same pretexts be used, particularly when they have over and over again been flatly refuted, even by some leading American figures?

The world has already witnessed American discomfiture over the alleged United States lag in the sphere of nuclear weapons and bomber aircraft in the 1950s and over the "United States missile lag" in the early 1960s. Later it turned out for example that the Soviet "missile threat" had been overestimated by some 15-20 times, but by then the United States had already embarked on the mass production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, thus laying the foundation for a renewal of the arms race. The United States is now trying to convince us of its "backwardness" in the sphere of chemical weapons. The United States is obviously using these fables to try to persuade American taxpayers to finance its gigantic military programmes.

It is claimed that what is involved is a normal modernization of chemical weapons. In reality, the development of the production of binary weapons introduces a new generation of chemicals into the range of warfare agents.

The other side of the coin consists in the fact that the production of binary chemical weapons will considerably complicate the search for mutually acceptable solutions at the current negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The work of the Committee at the present session has already confirmed this. Many delegations, both in the Ad Hoc Working Group and at plenary meetings, have pointed out the additional difficulties arising in connection with the emergence of binary weapons.

In this connection we would like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to working paper CD/258, "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons", submitted by a group of socialist countries. The sponsors of the paper, without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of the negative consequences of embarking on the production of binary chemical weapons, mention a number of important points of direct relevance to the negotiations in progress in the Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The delegation of Bulgaria put forward a number of specific questions which have arisen in connection with the

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decision on the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. It seems to us that the answers to these questions are of interest to all members of the Committee. The Yugoslav delegation submitted an interesting document on binary weapons in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We agree with the statement of the United Kingdom Ambassador that it is necessary to give careful consideration to the matter of binary chemical weapons before reaching any conclusion. One can also agree with his words that "binary weapons will need to be dealt with in a chemical weapons convention because, in common with all other types of chemical weapons, their production and stockpiling will be prohibited".

At the same time we can in no way share his opinion that the problems of control as regards binary weapons and as regards chemical weapons with ordinary unitary munitions differ very little from each other, since allegedly the components of binary weapons, designed by their nature to be highly reactive, are related to toxic chemicals also by their aggressiveness with respect to the material of the munition's case. There is no need to be an expert in order to understand that there is a serious inaccuracy here. From unclassified literature it may be learned that there is no correlation between a chemical's toxicity and its activity with respect to the material of the casing. Thus the high reactive capability of these chemicals is of no assistance in the matter of control.

As regards the additional difficulties which arise in connection with the emergence of binary chemical weapons, they include, for example, the ensuring of compliance by States parties with the commitment not to transfer chemical weapons, since the separation of chemicals for commercial purposes from chemicals for weapons purposes will become an almost insoluble problem. Difficulties will arise also in connection with the declaration by States of their stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production of such weapons, because it will be necessary to specify the **chemicals** for commercial purposes which may be produced for binary weapons.

To illustrate this problem let us take the following example. As components for the synthesis of warfare agents in the binary charges being elaborated and developed in the United States, isopropanol and polysulfide are being used, i.e. common chemical products. Consequently, in order to produce binary munitions the Pentagon has no special need to establish new branches of industry. The other components of the binary synthesis --- the chemicals "DF" and "QL" -- are somewhat more complicated in their composition, but they, too, without any particular difficulty can be absorbed into the technological processes for the production of organophosphorus pesticides production. In addition, the cases of binary munitions are virtually the same in structure and shape as those of other special munitions (smoke, signal, propaganda, etc.) and they could be produced by factories producing ordinary munitions.

It is quite probable that even at factories producing the separate components of binary systems as well as cases for binary munitions, it will be impossible to determine the real purpose of the products. Thus even if the representatives of an international verification body are admitted to such a plant, they are unlikely to be able to detect anything relating to binary weapons. The conditions will therefore exist for the secret stockpiling and storage of chemicals for purposes of binary weapons -- for the production of chemical weapons within the framework of commercial production. We shall, of course, study document CD/265, introduced today by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, but all that we have said shows that there is no justification for the conclusion contained in the statement of Ambassador Ruth that "it is not true that binary production techniques cannot be subjected to reasonable and effective verification".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The idea of binary weapons allows the possibility of selecting the pairs of components among a wide range of chemicals, which would lead to the emergence of ever new varieties and modifications of chemical agents with the most diversified spectrum of effects. This fact means that the establishment of a list of potential chemical agents to be prohibited would become meaningless. How, then, is it possible to dismiss as "nonsense", as the representative of the United States did today, the concern of a large number of States, including a number of Western countries, at the appearance of binary weapons?

We are saying all this now, not in order to give a political assessment of the actions connected with the production of binary weapons. That has already been done, at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, in resolution 36/96 B, which contains an appeal to States to refrain from the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons. As you know, of the 157 States Members of the United Nations, only one voted against this resolution -- the United States of America. Here in the Committee on Disarmament we are concerned, first and foremost, about the fate of the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and about the **effectiveness** of **any agreements** that might be reached at those negotiations.

The same resolution contains an appeal to States to refrain from stationing chemical weapons in those countries where there are no such weapons at present. This appeal, which in particular was also adopted on the initiative of the Soviet Union, is designed to increase the effectiveness of a future agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

It is important, in our view, that while efforts are being directed towards the elaboration of a convention and also during the first years of its implementation, when stocks of chemical weapons are to be destroyed, no actions should be allowed which could lead to a proliferation of chemical weapons on the globe, and in particular to their stationing on the territories of other States. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, the Soviet delegation has already submitted a draft for a provision of the convention on the non-stationing of chemical weapons, either directly or indirectly, on the territories of other States during the period of implementation of the commitment on their destruction or conversion to non-hostile purposes. It would be a good idea also if we were to consider together how to solve the question of the non-stationing of chemical weapons also during the period before the convention enters into force.

I should like now to touch upon questions of verification. We have repeatedly stated, and we reaffirm it again, that we, no less than others, are concerned that the commitments under the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons should be strictly observed. We do not therefore altogether understand the United States representative's excessive emphasis of the importance of verification questions. Whom was he actually trying to convince? -- himself?

The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to express in the Committee on Disarmament the substance of our views regarding the verification of compliance with a prohibition on chemical weapons. In order not to repeat myself I will refer to our statement of 31 March 1981. Briefly, our view is that control should be based on national methods of verification, supplemented by international procedures; it should not be accompanied by "total verifications", which are tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of States and are detrimental to peaceful industry. Control should in all respects and at all times be commensurate with the real requirements of the convention and ensure the fulfilment of each of the undertakings provided for in it.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The representative of the United States attempted in his statement to present the position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in a distorted light. He asserted that they rule out international forms of verification. This, like many other things in the statement of the United States delegation, is not in accordance with the facts. I repeat: we are in favour of a combination of different types of control measures. At the same time it is clear from the statement of the representative of the United States that the latter recognizes nothing other than systematic intrusive international verification. That, to be precise, is the true situation.

How then can we solve this difficult problem, taking into account all these requirements, which are undoubtedly fair in themselves, and on a basis acceptable to all States parties to the future convention? Past experience suggests that the time has come to change somewhat the methods used for the examination and elaboration of provisions on verification.

It seems to us that we could stop discussing in general terms whether preference should be given to national or to international means of verification, whether international on-site inspection should be carried out on a voluntary basis or not, whether such verification should be conducted when necessary, upon demand, by request, according to lots, on a systematic, regular, periodical basis, etc., etc., and pass on to a consideration of verification problems in a more specific way.

We have in mind the following. Clearly under the convention, the States parties will assume a very specific range of obligations. To a large extent these have already been defined. Thus, there is the possibility of considering concretely, for each of these obligations, what forms and types of control would be necessary and to what degree.

For example, States will be obliged to destroy within established periods of time their stocks of chemical weapons. There could be endless discussions, with no common view emerging, as to whether, in connection with this obligation, there should or should not be international inspections at the site of the destruction, whether samples should be taken at the same time, and if so of what kind, how often and by whom, etc. In order to start making some headway, we could proceed differently. We could think carefully about the series of measures necessary in order reliably and effectively to guarantee the destruction of stocks, beginning with those that are the most natural and easy for States to carry out, and passing on if necessary to the more complicated and difficult ones. In other words, whenever a common opinion emerges to the effect that national verification measures may be insufficient, appropriate international procedures could be discussed according to the same principle -- that is, proceeding from the relatively simpler to the more complicated measures.

In proposing that we should proceed in this way we are taking into account the extreme difficulty of devising a verification system which, while ensuring the requisite control over compliance with the convention, at the same time meets the need to respect the legitimate security interests of the States parties.

All more complicated and difficult verification measures should be used only in cases where the control measure more acceptable to the State cannot give the desired result i.e. provide the assurance that the convention is being implemented.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This approach takes into account also the important fact that the control measures will be supplemented by various kinds of declarations, the exchange of information and other measures giving States the assurance of compliance with the convention.

Allow me to refer to the words of the representative of Japan, Ambassador Okawa, concerning questions of control in connection with a nuclear weapons test ban. In particular he said: "The quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all." Ambassador Okawa further said that the adequacy of any verification system is probably in the last resort a question of political assessment.

Distinguished delegates, we must endeavour to find a mutually acceptable solution to this problem. It is completely out of place to put forward preliminary conditions, as was done today, in an almost threatening manner, like an ultimatum: either the Committee accepts unconditionally the principles of verification for a convention prohibiting chemical weapons that please the United States, or that country will not become a party to the future convention. That is not the language of negotiation. It will lead nowhere. It merely compromises those who resort to it.

I should like to make one general observation. With every new development in the consideration of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the Working Group shows a quite natural and lawful tendency to go deeper into the technical points and details. This reflects the progress in its work. At the same time, we would like to warn against too great a passion for discussing various, sometimes strictly scientific and even abstract problems which will merely deflect us from the immediate and priority task of the earliest possible elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of the development and production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons.

The Soviet delegation would like to express its satisfaction at the way in which the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has been organized and is proceeding this year. Precisely in accordance with the new mandate, intensive work is being done on individual provisions of the future convention, and comments and working papers are being put forward which contain at times some interesting approaches. We are especially pleased to note all this since the Chairman of the Group is our friend Ambassador B. Sujko.

Notwithstanding all the difficulties mentioned in our statement today, we are optimistic as regards the possibility of achieving progress in the field of chemical disarmament. At the same time we naturally understand that a great deal of work still remains to be done in order to make this progress real. We call upon other delegations to co-operate constructively in this important matter.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In recent years the United States and some of its allies have often tried to envenom the political atmosphere in many international bodies, including the Committee on Disarmament, with baseless slander directed at socialist States. One of the favourite forms of this slander has been references to some kind of involvement of the Soviet Union in alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We have repeatedly stated that the Soviet Union has nowhere and never violated any international agreements including those in the fields of arms limitation and disarmament. Nevertheless the slander continues, as was shown by the statement of the United States delegation at today's meeting. This is done in order to justify before public opinion, including that of their own country, the new spirals in the chemical arms race. The false and fabricated character of this statement is shown among other things by the fact that the initiators of the slander, while shedding crocodile tears over alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol slyly, and of course intentionally, pass over in silence the terrible consequences of their own actions in south-east Asia. The representative of the United States did not say that the crimes of the American soldiery in this region of the world are still having their effects even today. It is true that the United States representative recognized that "the United States is very conscious that chemical weapons have been used on the battlefield in the past with devastating effect", but he did not dare to admit that the United States itself has made extensive use of chemical weapons, that no State in the world in the whole history of mankind has used chemical weapons on such a scale as the United States. And again, he did not say that the consequences of the crimes of American militarists in south-east Asia are continuing today.

Recently a delegation of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR visited Viet Nam, where it examined the conclusions of the studies of the consequences of chemical warfare in that country. Here are some of them. The mass utilization by the United States armed forces of chemical weapons against Viet Nam during the period 1961-1971 caused profound changes in the ecology of the country, greatly undermined the economy and inflicted irreparable damage on the health of the population of Viet Nam. More than 100,000 tons of various chemical agents were used against the people of Viet Nam, including 96,000 tons of phytotoxins and more than 7,000 tons of war gases. Toxic chemical agents were spread over 44 per cent of the tropical forests and jungles and 40 per cent of the cultivated areas of South Viet Nam. In their attacks on large tracts of forests and cultivated lands, the United States armed forces used chemical agents in huge quantities -- from 10 to 100 kg per hectare. In recent times, to the many thousands of victims of chemical weapons during the period of the war there have been added the victims of those weapons' so-called long-term consequences. These are people suffering from nervous disorders, skin diseases and more serious illness such as, for example, cancer of the liver. The women of Viet Nam give birth to deformed babies; they are subject to abnormal pregnancies and miscarriages.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Most anomalies observed now in Viet Nam, especially during child-birth, are the result of disorders of the genetic structures caused by dioxine. It should be noted that the nature of the changes in the genetic structures observed in Viet Nam in those of the population who suffered the effects of the "orange mixture" are similar to the changes in the chromosome structures observed in the citizens of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who suffered the horror of atomic bombing. Thus at the present time it can be affirmed that as a result of the use by the United States of various types of weapons of mass destruction, there are on our planet two sets of people with disorders of the genetic structures: they are among the inhabitants of Japan and Viet Nam.

It is becoming more and more clear that Americans themselves are among the victims of the chemical warfare carried out by the United States in Viet Nam. The ecological delayed-action bomb which they laid in Viet Nam has transformed itself into a boomerang destroying the very Americans who participated in the war in Viet Nam. Those who carried out chemical attacks are now suffering in the same way as their former adversaries and victims. Thousands of veterans victims of chemical weapons are registered now in the United States.

Those who are now doing their utmost to prove what cannot be proved, namely, that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have allegedly used chemical weapons wish to pass over the above-mentioned crimes in silence.

The representatives of the Soviet Union, including those at the highest level, in different international bodies have resolutely repudiated this lie. We would like to point out that many eminent scientists and experts, including some in the United States, have found a complete incompatibility of the above-mentioned fabrications with the scientific, medical and technical data. Substantially the same conclusion was reached also by the group of experts who, as is clear both from the document they submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly and from press reports, were unable during their official visit to Asia to find any evidence of the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons. Even the most zealous instigators of the anti-Soviet campaign are compelled to recognize the absence of any facts on this score.

Allow me, for example, to quote the note verbale of 14 September 1981 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General: "American experts have studied and evaluated the symptoms described in these reports in order to determine what poisonous substance or substances could have had such effects. They came to the conclusion that none of the known classical chemical warfare agents, either alone or in combination with other substances, could have caused the symptoms that were described or have led, as was reported, to such rapid death." The matter could have been closed there. The soap-bubble burst, but the State Department decided to continue the campaign it had begun.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Nothing is changed and nothing can be changed in this regard by a new opus of the State Department. It is high time for the United States to stop inventing fables about Soviet-made chemical weapons. The insinuations of the Western press and officials about a "Soviet chemical threat" will not become true by being repeated many times. Neither the Western press, nor those who give it biased disinformation have or can have any objective data about the use of Soviet-made chemical weapons because no such facts exist in nature.

Two words about the Soviet-American negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union's position regarding the bilateral negotiations between the USSR and the United States has been repeatedly stated by President Brezhnev. We are prepared to resume the talks that have been broken off, but we are not begging for them. We can make headway either with or without negotiations with the United States. But we cannot permit a distortion of the facts.

Typical of such distortion in the statement of the United States representative was the attempt to create the impression that some kind of deadlock had occurred in the Soviet-American negotiations over the question of control. There was no such deadlock in those talks, as is evident in particular from the Soviet-American report to the Committee on Disarmament of 7 July 1980. That report (CD/112) states in particular: "The United States and the Soviet Union wish to inform the member States of the Committee on Disarmament of their earnest intention to continue their persistent efforts to find mutually acceptable solutions to the extremely complex unresolved issues relating to a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, with a view to completing successfully the bilateral United States-Soviet negotiations and presenting a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament at the earliest possible time."

How is it possible to talk about a deadlock when in fact the date was given for the next round of talks-- January 1981. The United States unilaterally broke off those negotiations in the same way as it broke off many other negotiations with the Soviet Union on arms limitation questions. They decided to do this, not because of any difficulties which had arisen on one question or another in the course of the negotiations, but in accordance with the general anti-Soviet policy adopted in the matter of armaments by the Government of the United States. That is true on this matter also.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as is shown among other things by their actions in the Committee, are actively participating in the efforts aimed at the cessation of the production of chemical weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons, and they believe that this type of weapon of mass destruction should once and for all be eliminated from military arsenals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. The last three speakers on the list of speakers for today, namely, the representatives of Kenya, Argentina and China, have very kindly, in view of the lateness of the hour, agreed to defer their statements to the next plenary meeting of the Committee, on Tuesday, 30 March. I should like to thank them on behalf of the Committee for the understanding they have shown and to assure them that their names will appear at the head of the list of speakers for the meeting on 30 March. Are there any other comments? Ambassador Herder has asked for the floor.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of the German Democratic Republic highly appreciates your efforts to promote an early agreement on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 1 of our agenda.

In recent days, my delegation, the delegation of the People's Republic of Poland as well as other delegations addressed pertinent questions to the United States delegation in order to clarify some problems connected with the United States proposal on this subject made on 11 March. We are very much interested in having clear answers to all those questions because this would provide my Government with the necessary information to determine our further approach to the elaboration of the above-mentioned draft mandate.

After having had a look at the list of today's speakers and having noticed that the United States representative was on the list, I had expected, frankly speaking, an answer from him to the many questions which were addressed to his delegation in connection with our efforts to agree on a mandate for a CTBT working group. I hoped that after several attempts made by my delegation and other delegations to get some explanations from the United States delegation, that delegation would at least respect the wishes expressed by members of the Committee and show a constructive approach to the items inscribed in our agenda. What happened was just the opposite.

It was with deep regret that my delegation today listened to a fairly undisguised statement on the necessity of a new spiral in the chemical arms race. Obviously, the country concerned needs not only nuclear-weapon tests for a "credible deterrence" but also a "chemical weapons deterrence". Thus, we may ask ourselves if the Committee on Disarmament, shortly before the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, should be transformed into a Committee for advertising and justifying different kinds of doctrines on deterrence and on the need to develop and deploy corresponding sophisticated weapons. As far as binary weapons, verification of compliance with a chemical weapons convention, and the "alleged use of chemical weapons" are concerned, my delegation explained its position on 23 March. There is no need to repeat our arguments.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, we repeat our request to the above-mentioned delegation to respond to our questions, since a failure to do so could complicate, even delay an understanding on a draft mandate for a CTB working group.

Mr. NOIRFALISSE (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I did not wish to raise a point of order out of respect for Ambassador Herder whose rank is higher than mine, but since three distinguished representatives, those of Kenya, Argentina and China, have withdrawn their names from the list of speakers, I think we ought to abide by your decision and close the meeting now.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Belgium. I understood that the statement made by the representative of the German Democratic Republic was in exercise of his right of reply, and it was for that reason that I gave him the floor.

I should like now briefly to mention another subject. I should like to remind members of the Committee that, in accordance with the provisions of the regulations applying to the United Nations Office at Geneva, Friday, 9 April and Monday, 12 April, will be official holidays. The Committee will not, therefore, be able to hold any meetings on those two days. The Chairman is well aware that we shall certainly have a great deal of work to do during the last two weeks of the first part of our session, and I shall therefore consult the chairmen of the working groups to find out their needs as regards additional meetings, particularly during the month of April. As I said at our plenary meeting last Thursday, we shall perhaps in the future be obliged to hold simultaneous meetings. In drawing up the timetable for the coming weeks, the Chairman will endeavour to reduce the number of such meetings to the minimum necessary to enable the Committee to complete its tasks.

The secretariat has distributed to you today, at my request, an informal document containing a timetable for the meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, it is purely indicative and can be modified later, if necessary, according to the requirements of our work.

If there are no objections, I shall take it that the Committee agrees to this timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): May I remind you that the Committee is to hold an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. to consider methods for the review of its composition. At the same time I should like to put before the Committee the question of deciding on the date of closure of our session, with a view to our having, if possible, an exchange of views on this subject and reaching an agreement. Immediately afterwards, there will be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 30 March, at 10 a.m.

The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.