

53. Mr. VAN BOVEN (Director, Division of Human Rights) said that many of the activities planned for the first half of the Decade had not been carried out because of a lack of resources. However, the Conference held at Geneva in 1978 had given a new impetus to the Decade and had complemented the Programme originally adopted in 1973.

54. Several members of the Council had correctly pointed out the need for adopting measures, especially of an informational and educational nature, to combat the roots of prejudice, racism and racial discrimination. Since the Council was at an important stage of planning for the rest of the Decade, it was important to plan not only a Conference but also a number of other substantive activities, with regard to which the report of the Secretary-General contained suggestions and ideas (see E/1979/15). The Secretariat services responsible for the Decade, in particular the Division of Human Rights, must be able to make adequate plans for the execution of the programme of activities, but since the Decade was the responsibility not only of the Secretariat but also of the United Nations system in general and the non-governmental organizations, activities between those bodies should also be planned and co-ordinated. For that reason, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly should decide as quickly as possible on the activities they planned to undertake, so that the necessary planning, preparation and co-ordination of those activities could be ensured.

55. With regard to the financial implications of that programme, he said that the General Assembly and the Council would give priority to the activities connected

with the Decade but that those activities could be carried out only if sufficient resources were provided. With present resources it would be very difficult or impossible to carry out all of those activities. Therefore, in accordance with paragraph 28 of document E/1979/15, if the Council and the General Assembly approved the programme of activities, the Secretary-General would request additional resources from the General Assembly, which would allocate the necessary credits at its thirty-fourth session.

56. In reply to the question raised by the representative of Argentina (7th meeting, para. 4) concerning the legal basis for the studies of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities mentioned in the programme of activities for 1979, contained in paragraph 27 of document E/1979/15 (a study on discriminatory treatment of members of ethnic groups in arrest, trial and detention and another study on the role of private group action in combating racism and racial discrimination), he referred to the report of the Sub-Commission on its thirtieth session (E/CN.4/1261), and in particular to paragraph 75 of that report, containing recommendations made by a working group of the Sub-Commission which had been accepted and approved by the Commission on Human Rights in its resolution 8 (XXXIV). The study on the role of private group action in combating racism and racial discrimination was also mentioned in the original Programme for the Decade, contained in the annex to General Assembly resolution 3057 (XXVIII), which was the basic resolution for the Decade.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.

10th meeting

Monday, 30 April 1979, at 11.05 a.m.

President: Mr. Hugo SCHELTEMA (Netherlands).

E/1979/SR.10

AGENDA ITEM 13

Multilateral emergency assistance (E/1979/29, E/1979/L.27)

1. Mr. BERKOL (United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator), after reminding the Council of General Assembly resolution 33/21, said that the intractable nature of the problem under discussion could be gauged from the fact that the current session marked the beginning of the sixth successive year in which the Secretary-General had reported on the progress of assistance to Ethiopia. The occasional notes of cautious optimism sounded in the reports had been followed by new set-backs caused either by conflict and the consequent displacement of people, or by crop failure resulting from recurrent drought or excessive rainfall and flooding. The action taken had sometimes seemed to be no more than a short-term palliative. For the past three years, attention had repeatedly been drawn to the fact that Ethiopia's difficulties were likely to persist until a planned and concerted effort was made to remove the root causes. A humanitarian response was needed to meet a humanitarian need. People could not be left to suffer when the reason for their condition was beyond their control. Un-

less the humanitarian need was met, it was questionable whether the development programme could proceed.

2. On the recommendation of the multi-donor mission of June 1978, the results of which had been described in the Secretary-General's latest official report on assistance to the drought-stricken areas of Ethiopia (A/33/195), the Director-General of FAO had made two appeals for assistance to the international community, and he himself had appealed for non-food items. Against the target figures of 200,000 tons of cereals and 17,000 tons of complementary foods, 78,000 tons of emergency grain had reached Ethiopia by the end of December 1978. By the end of March 1979, a further total of 201,655 tons, including 10,000 tons from Australia, 6,000 tons from the Netherlands, 14,600 tons from the United Kingdom, 42,350 tons from the United States, 9,705 tons from the European Economic Community, 40,000 tons from the World Food Programme and 1,000 tons from the Mennonites, had either reached Ethiopia or had been pledged. Complementary foods received or pledged by March 1979 had totalled 17,476 tons, including 4,000 tons from Belgium through UNICEF, 2,523 tons from the United States, 4,800 metric tons from the European Economic Community, 3,500 tons from UNICEF and 2,653 tons from Catholic Relief Services and other voluntary agencies.

3. The response of the international community to the appeal for logistic and technical assistance at the ports, and for inland transport, had been extremely encouraging. Pledges had been made in cash or in kind for 163 trucks and 124 trailers, most of which had arrived in Ethiopia. The Government had provided a suitable site for the workshops, administrative offices and vehicle park and had given the equivalent of \$250,000 to cover initial operating costs. The project was funded through a government trust fund and supported by UNDP and the ILO: UNDP was financing the employment of four experts and two volunteers for the repair and servicing of the vehicles and the training of staff.

4. The Government of the Netherlands had undertaken to provide grain-handling equipment at the port of Assab, at a cost of approximately \$2 million, which should materially reduce the turn-round time of ships in the port.

5. In the spring of 1978, UNHCR had begun its humanitarian assistance programme for victims of the Ogaden conflict. Projects costing a total of \$US 4.4 million had since been established for food, resettlement and reconstruction assistance for displaced persons in the provinces of Hararghe, Bale and Sidamo. The distribution of assistance had been supervised locally by the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission. The programme, which was continuing within the limits of an allocation of \$US 5,075,000, had initially been established on the basis of a target population of 30,000 families, totaling approximately 150,000 persons. The number of persons displaced by the Ogaden conflict had, however, been considerably larger, those requiring assistance in 200 settlement sites in the highlands of Bale alone having numbered 550,000, according to government sources.

6. The UNHCR Regional Liaison Office at Addis Ababa had recommended additional projects costing a total of \$US 2 million, to benefit some 20,000 newly arrived families from the afflicted areas.

7. The United States Agency for International Development had approved commitments of 29,600 tons of wheat and 3,730 tons of corn-soya-milk for rehabilitation projects in Bale and Sidamo. Funds equivalent to the cost of 12,750 tons of wheat would also be raised for the procurement of necessary food supplies.

8. The new assistance projects were mainly designed to meet supplementary requirements for the construction of communal facilities, such as water supplies and health posts, and to provide basic resettlement assistance, including the provision of blankets, clothing, domestic utensils and seeds.

9. No detailed assessment of the 1978 harvest was yet available, and accurate data for some areas were unlikely to be forthcoming. Although in 1978 rains had generally been below normal, the deficits had been critical only in a few areas, where the harvest had been adversely affected. While better than that of the previous year, the 1978 harvest as a whole would be appreciably smaller than the 1976 crop because of the lower-than-average rainfall and the shortage of fertilizers and seed. Prevailing conditions had also encouraged the spread of ergot and of locusts and other crop pests. Farmers in the war-devastated areas had been short not only of seed and fertilizers but also of draught oxen and tools.

10. Desert locusts had infested northern Ethiopia and the Ogaden region of southern Ethiopia. The swarms, which had clustered in the highlands, had been difficult to control because of the difficult terrain and bad weather. The Desert Locust Control Organization for

Eastern Africa (DLCO-EA) had given a warning that the outbreak, which had been the most serious for 16 years, could easily develop into a major plague. The locust attacks had been brought under control by DLCO-EA teams in October 1978, but the FAO Committee had pointed out that the campaign would have to continue throughout 1979 and 1980.

11. The true situation with regard to food would not be known until the results of the crop survey by the Ministry of Agriculture, due in May 1979, were available. According to current estimates, between 250,000 and 300,000 tons of grain would have to be imported in 1979, 55 per cent of it for commercial use and 45 per cent for food aid. No accurate information was available from a number of areas, including Eritrea and parts of Tigre. In Eritrea, where events were thought to have affected the main cropping season, there would be massive food requirements for the forthcoming 18 months.

12. The Government of Ethiopia was reopening the settlement schemes along the Wabe Shebelle region in the Ogaden, where 30,000 settlers had been rehabilitated before the war, and was also planning to resettle 250,000 people from western Wollo in other parts of the country. The heads of 22,000 families had already been moved to prepare living accommodation for the remaining family members. The World Food Programme was proposing that the soil conservation and reforestation projects should be amalgamated into a single project for the rehabilitation of forests and of grazing and agricultural land. There were various other projects connected with the rehabilitation of disaster victims in Ethiopia.

13. By government action, and with the assistance of the international community, a repetition of the tragic events brought about by the 1973/1974 drought had been averted in 1978. The situation was, however, still unsettled, and further international assistance would be required.

14. Mr. OLCESE (Deputy Assistant Administrator, UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa) said that the drought conditions that had first become apparent in Ethiopia in 1971 had continued to affect the well-being of the Ethiopian people. Inadequate rainfall had resulted in poor harvests in the early years of the crisis and, with depleted grain reserves in rural areas, famine had become prevalent as early as 1972. The worst affected areas had been the Wollo and Tigre provinces in the north-east, which, in 1971, had had an estimated total population of 4.2 million.

15. The situation had become so serious that the Ethiopian Government had had to launch an emergency food aid operation in 1973. Although 126,000 tons of relief grain had been distributed to some 1.2 million people in Ethiopia—80 per cent of it in Wollo and Tigre—by the end of 1974, 100,000 to 150,000 people were estimated to have died from hunger and malnutrition. With the exception of 6,500 tons of grain purchased by the Government from surplus areas in Ethiopia, all the food had come from donors among the international community.

16. It had been realized from the outset that the effects of the drought had been exacerbated by ecological degradation in the highlands, brought about by increased human and animal populations and inappropriate land-use practices. The related catastrophe in the nomadic lowlands of the Ogaden in 1975 was therefore not altogether surprising. There had been a number of favourable years during which the livestock population in the

Hararghe, Bale and Sidamo provinces had gradually been built up beyond the long-term capacity of the rangelands, contributing to extensive over-grazing. With the failure of the autumn rains in 1974 and the irregularity of the spring rains in 1975, about 80 per cent of the cattle population of the area had died of starvation.

17. A large-scale irrigation project along the Wabe Shebelle river in the Gode area of Hararghe province, started by the Government in 1976, had offered good prospects of helping the drought-stricken nomads of the area to become cash-crop farmers, and had attracted an estimated 30,000 volunteers. At the same time, a number of small irrigation schemes had been financed by non-governmental organizations to assist the Rerebare (the indigenous river population), and by the end of 1976 there had been grain surpluses along the Wabe Shebelle.

18. Hopes of increased food production and of amelioration of the living conditions of the afflicted people had, however, been short-lived. The 1977-1978 Ogaden conflict had resulted in the destruction of the Wabe Shebelle settlements and the dispersion of the population, and had also affected food production in other parts of the Ogaden. For example, in the Jijiga plains, which had traditionally produced a considerable sorghum surplus, most farmers had been unable to resume their normal activities after the war.

19. The international community had generally responded favourably and generously to Ethiopia's appeal for food aid and for activities designed to lessen the effects of the drought and to relieve the resultant food shortage. Continued assistance was being received from bilateral, multilateral and voluntary agencies and other donors in terms of food, cash, equipment and technical expertise. Among the United Nations agencies which had contributed were the World Food Programme, UNHCR, UNDR0, UNICEF and FAO.

20. Describing the role played by UNDP in the mobilization and provision of assistance, he said that, in December 1977, the Administrator had approved project ETH/77/025, which was a three-year project for logistic and food aid transport, at a total cost to UNDP of \$702,000. The project, which had become operational in 1978, was designed to improve the nation-wide distribution of food aid and other non-commercial supplies to stricken areas, to facilitate the transport of fertilizer and export crops and to strengthen the major state transport organization. Under the project, executed by ILO, the office of the UNDP Resident Representative in Ethiopia had been responsible for co-ordinating the delivery, storage and maintenance of vehicles, food, equipment and other supplies from bilateral, multilateral and non-governmental donors. By the end of 1978, donations in cash and kind for the purchase of emergency transport vehicles and equipment had totalled \$9.69 million. The vehicles included 93 Volvo FLO trucks, 50 12-ton Mercedes trucks, 124 Farid trailers and 20 5-ton four-wheel-drive Mercedes trucks.

21. Among the projects approved in 1978 for financing from the country's indicative planning figure had been project ETH/78/003 (Assistance to land-use planning), to help the Government to implement a programme of conservation and effective use of the soil, vegetation and water resources, at a cost of \$2 million; project ETH/78/004 (Institute of agricultural research), which was a new phase of assistance to the establishment and strengthening of an active and viable agricultural research institute with a view to developing and deploying improved techniques in crop husbandry and

production, at a cost of \$4.7 million; and ETH/78/013 (Development of irrigated agriculture), which was designed to assist in the development of national capabilities for the optimum utilization of water resources in irrigated agriculture, at a cost of \$1 million. The three projects were designed to create the necessary conditions for increased agricultural production and for the readier availability of food supplies even in times of crisis.

22. The Government had also decided to pursue the rehabilitation of the Wabe Shebelle settlements which had been destroyed in the Ogaden conflict. A first and necessary step in that direction was the reconstruction of the Gode bridge, which had provided the only access to the settlements. UNDP assistance had been requested to finance such reconstruction, and project ETH/79/002, financed from the Special Measures Fund for the Least Developed Countries, had been approved for the purpose in February 1979, at a total cost of \$243,000. Reconstruction of the bridge was scheduled to be completed by the end of April 1979, and the Government was expected to approach UNDP for limited assistance in the rehabilitation of the settlement themselves.

23. While the return to normal rainfall patterns should lead to increased agricultural activity, there was another threat to domestic food production. Together with Kenya, Somalia and the Sudan, Ethiopia lay in the western zone of a desert-locust-prone belt extending from India through the Arabian peninsula to the Horn of Africa. The Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa had been created to facilitate the control of desert-locust swarms in the East African countries. There had been no threat of infestation for a number of years, but in 1978 swarms of desert locusts had swept through Ethiopia, destroying crops and vegetation. Emergency assistance to help the Desert Locust Control Organization for Eastern Africa to curb the spread of the locusts had become necessary. In July 1978, UNDP had approved the expenditure of \$150,000 to help to provide supplies of sprays and mobile equipment.

24. The locust crisis was still serious, only 11 of the 15 large swarms observed in the country having so far been controlled, and the others having escaped to cause damage to crops and other vegetation. More effective control was currently being planned. UNDP had contributed \$345,000 for the immediate, one-year emergency operation and would also be responsible for administering an allocation of \$1 million made by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Fund for the purpose. That plan was to be followed by a two-year mid-term control operation, for which the Administrator intended to ask the Governing Council of UNDP to allocate \$2 million from the reserve for the period 1980-1981.

25. It could thus be seen that UNDP was doing its best to give practical short-term and long-term assistance to the drought-stricken areas of Ethiopia to the limit of available resources. Between December 1977 and February 1979, assistance totalling \$9,140,000 had been approved for the six projects he had mentioned. UNDP realized that formidable problems remained to be solved in order to meet short-term and long-term food requirements; further assistance was likely to be requested, if only for helping to rehabilitate the Wabe Shebelle settlements.

26. Mr. ADUGNA (Observer for Ethiopia) said that the problem before the Council was not new, but had increased in magnitude and intensity. Despite the tremendous effort made by the Ethiopian Government and

the international community, the catastrophic effects of the drought still remained unchecked. The problem was becoming disturbingly critical in various regions of the country. According to a recent survey carried out by the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission within the framework of its early warning system, it was estimated that well over 3 million people urgently required food assistance for the following 12 months. About 2.5 million of them were victims of drought, while over a million were victims of aggression in the southern and south-eastern parts of the country.

27. In addition to the drought which had ravaged the country for almost seven years, the desert-locust plague which continued to threaten East Africa and the Middle East had affected the well-being of a sizeable part of the Ethiopian population. His Government wished to emphasize the need for further urgent contributions to enable effective control measures to be implemented. The gravity of the problems was compounded by a serious shortage of transportation. The drought situation had persisted since 1973. He had alerted the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to the threat of famine in Ethiopia.

28. In view of Ethiopia's limited capacity to cope with such vast problems, he had invited the Director-General of FAO to send a multi-donor mission to assess the situation. The mission had established that the country needed about 200,000 tons of cereals and 17,000 tons of high-protein food over and above what was already available to it through international aid and domestic production. Despite appeals by Ethiopia and by the Director-General of FAO, the international community's assistance had fallen far short of the needs.

29. Speed was essential if lives were to be saved. The situation was still deteriorating, despite the efforts made by the Provisional Military Administrative Council ever since it had begun to administer the country. The Government was well aware that the problem of natural disaster did not end with the provision of temporary relief to the victims and that only through economic development could a country develop its capability to handle calamities. It had therefore recently launched a campaign for a green revolution and had mobilized human, financial and material resources to revive the national economy by attacking the root causes of poverty. In his address to the nation on the approval of the short-term development plan of the National Revolutionary Development Campaign in February 1979, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam had said that the most urgent task was to save Ethiopians from the scourge of hunger and to change the conditions that had impoverished Ethiopians for centuries. So far, the relief and rehabilitation operation had focused attention on life-saving emergency schemes which did not provide lasting solutions to the recurrent problem. For that reason, famine had persisted in four regions of the country, threatening the lives of over 2 million people. It was primarily to save more people from the recurrence of famine by rehabilitating its natural environment, developing virgin lands and increasing the productivity of existing cultivated land that the Government had launched the National Revolutionary Development Campaign. Among other things, it envisaged the resettlement in fertile parts of the country of some 250,000 people from the seriously affected areas exposed to frequent natural disasters. It had prepared detailed, specific projects for the agricultural rehabilitation of various regions and had drawn them to the attention of a number of donor Governments. Some had already been started, and he wished to acknowledge the assistance of the Office for

Special Relief Operations of FAO. Further assistance was, however, still required.

30. In conclusion, he expressed his country's deep gratitude to the United Nations agencies and various Governments and voluntary organizations for their invaluable support during its years of hardship.

31. Mr. CHABALA (Zambia) said that it was evident from the reports given by preceding speakers and from relevant documentation before the Council that the drought situation in Ethiopia remained grave and had been compounded by a number of developments, in particular the growing shortage of food and the logistical constraints which continued to hamper the distribution of relief grain to the drought-stricken areas. Despite the generous assistance afforded to the Government of Ethiopia by Member States and the international community, unless substantial further international assistance was made available soon, the prospects for meaningful relief were, at best, limited.

32. The gravity of the emergency caused by the drought and the scale of the remedial efforts required could prove burdensome for many a nation, particularly a developing country with limited resources such as Ethiopia. The ecological factors which had given rise to the emergency were completely beyond Ethiopia's control. The fundamental causes could be eliminated only by effective, concerted international assistance. Any viable long-term development, and Ethiopia's very survival, would depend on the extent and pace at which the current emergency was resolved. The Government of Ethiopia continued to demonstrate its firm determination to mitigate the effects of the drought and had launched the green revolution campaign, which would bring about fundamental changes in the country's economy. The success of the large-scale programmes and measures undertaken or planned depended on a number of imponderable factors and, in particular, on the level of international assistance and the pace of its disbursement in the affected areas. Consequently, the task demanded international solidarity on an unprecedented scale.

33. His delegation wished to express its sincere appreciation to all Member States and to all organizations within and outside the United Nations system which had provided assistance to the Government of Ethiopia and trusted that all those in a position to do so would respond generously and expeditiously to fresh appeals for additional assistance.

34. In conclusion, he introduced draft resolution E/1979/L.27 on assistance to drought-stricken areas of Ethiopia on behalf of the sponsors, to which should be added Jamaica and Rwanda. The draft resolution was self-explanatory, but he wished to draw special attention to the eighth preambular paragraph and to operative paragraph 3. Operative paragraph 4, stating that the Council decided to keep the matter under review, had been included because the problems caused by the emergency had not been resolved and assistance fell far short of what was needed. Since the draft resolution was not controversial, he hoped that the Council would adopt it without delay in order to stress the urgency of the problem.

35. Mr. MAKEYEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that his delegation supported the draft resolution. The Soviet Union had always sympathized with the problems of assistance to developing countries suffering from natural disasters and usually provided such assistance on a bilateral basis, in order that it might be most effective. It was giving considerable assistance

to Ethiopia in view of its enormous needs. In September 1978, it had signed an agreement concerning economic and technical assistance to Ethiopia which covered industrial development, transport, training and other matters. It had made available some 90 million roubles, had provided training for over 2,000 Ethiopians in the Soviet Union and in Ethiopia and had sent over 200 Soviet specialists to Ethiopia, as well as providing humanitarian and military assistance. The Soviet Red Cross had provided food and medicines, a medical assistance team had been sent to the drought-stricken areas and a major hospital had been built by the Soviet Union and staffed by Soviet personnel. A recently-signed protocol to the economic and technical assistance agreement provided for the development of important agricultural and other projects.

36. With regard to the Secretary-General's report on assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon (E/1979/29), his delegation had voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 33/146 because it attached great importance to the rehabilitation of that country, which had been a victim of Zionist imperialist aggression. It considered, however, that the fundamental responsibility for making good the damage inflicted on Lebanon lay with those who had committed that aggression. The Soviet Red Cross had given assistance to the refugees in Lebanon; in particular, providing medicines and food for children. His delegation considered that the Secretariat was able to discharge the tasks covered in that resolution without additional budgetary resources. It did not object, however, to taking note of the report of the Secretary-General.

37. Mr. WEIBGEN (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) spoke about the over-all situation in Ethiopia with regard to food and the continuing threat posed to that country, among others, by the desert locust. In 1978, the Director-General of FAO had issued two appeals for assistance with food supplies for Ethiopia, to which the international response had so far been satisfactory; the World Food Programme had, for its part, made available 50,000 tons of cereals. However, further voluntary contributions were required since a substantial amount of food aid for 1979 still remained unpledged. Under those circumstances, food security stocks were particularly important. A recent FAO food security mission to Ethiopia had recommended the establishment of about 60,000 tons of stocks, for which the assistance of the international community was again required. With regard to agricultural rehabilitation, a start had been made on government-prepared projects in Bale and Sidamo provinces, but further funding was required for their full implementation. FAO had already contributed, through the Office for Special Relief Operations, to those projects to which it attached great importance.

38. The Director-General of FAO had recently convened another meeting to discuss measures to be taken against what had been described as the dreadful plague of the desert locust. In 1978, control measures in India, Pakistan, the Arabian Peninsula, the Sudan and Somalia had been successful, largely due to the speedy response to an appeal by the Director-General of FAO which had brought in contributions amounting to \$4.5 million. In addition, over \$1.5 million had been released immediately for preventive action from the FAO technical co-operation programme and its Working Capital Fund. Nevertheless, large-scale breeding continued in countries around the Red Sea, in Ethiopia and to some extent in the Iran-Pakistan area, and it had been confirmed at the recent FAO meeting that swarms on a

greater scale than in 1978, when they had caused grain losses in Ethiopia, Somalia and the Sudan, were expected in the region over the following months. In response to the Director-General's appeal for intensified efforts to control desert locusts, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries had made a contribution to UNDP of \$1 million for immediate action and Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands had also contributed substantial amounts. He urged all those in a position to do so to follow their example.

39. Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic) said that, as one of the sponsors of the text adopted as General Assembly resolution 33/21, his country was in favour of its resolute implementation. The measures already taken had helped to relieve the situation, but the reports stressed the need for continued assistance. He wished to assure the Ethiopian people of the sympathy and solidarity of the German Democratic Republic. Socialist Ethiopia was making a heroic struggle to overcome the heritage from the past and to defend its revolutionary achievements. The social and economic changes it had initiated so far and the campaign to strengthen the national economy would also doubtless gradually improve the country's capability to cope with the forces of nature.

40. The German Democratic Republic was rendering substantial solidarity assistance to the people of Ethiopia through bilateral measures and direct agreements. Goods worth over 30 million marks, including consignments of many essential supplies, had been sent to Ethiopia over the previous two years in addition to aid consignments from social organizations such as the Federation of Free German Trade Unions and the Red Cross of the German Democratic Republic. His country proposed to continue such assistance to socialist Ethiopia and, acting on that principle, it had become a sponsor of the draft resolution under consideration (E/1979/L.27).

41. Mr. STEPHANIDES (Cyprus) said that his delegation fully supported the draft resolution as a mark of his country's commitment to the noble principle of collective assistance to disaster-stricken areas, from which Cyprus had also benefited in the past.

42. Mr. KHAN (Pakistan) said that his delegation fully supported the draft resolution and asked to be added to the list of sponsors. It was evident from the reports which the Council had heard that the situation in Ethiopia deserved the continued attention and increased assistance of the international community. His Government contributed to the United Nations fund for disaster relief to the extent of its ability.

43. The PRESIDENT inquired whether the Council was prepared to adopt the draft resolution (E/1979/L.27) forthwith as the Zambian representative had suggested.

44. Mr. DONNELLY (United Kingdom) said that, as a donor to Ethiopia, his Government should be made aware of the fresh information, including the Secretary-General's report, which had been made available for the first time at the current meeting, before taking a decision on the draft resolution which had also just been submitted.

45. Mr. METELITS (United States of America) supported the comment of the United Kingdom representative.

46. The PRESIDENT pointed out that, under the rules of procedure, unless the Council decided otherwise, at least 24 hours must be allowed for consideration of proposals. As two delegations had asked for an op-

portunity to study the draft resolution under discussion, he took it that the Council wished to postpone a final decision on it.

It was so decided.

47. The PRESIDENT said he took it that the Council wished similarly to postpone its final decision on the Secretary-General's report on assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon (E/1979/29). However, the Council had concluded its discussion of agenda item 13.

AGENDA ITEM 15

Medium-term plan for 1980-1983 (E/1979/AC.1/L.1)

48. The PRESIDENT reminded the Council that the *Ad Hoc* Sessional Committee to consider agenda item 15 had held only one meeting, as it had been advised that the French text of the medium-term plan could not be made available before the end of the Council's current session. The Council had before it a draft resolution on the medium-term plan (E/1979/AC.1/L.1), which had been submitted by the Tunisian delegation on behalf of the Group of 77. He suggested that the Council should discuss how it wished to deal with the matter.

49. Mrs. DERRÉ (France) said that her delegation could not agree to the medium-term plan being discussed at the Council's current session. The final draft had not yet appeared in French and her Government had consequently been unable to adopt a position on it. Her delegation would not oppose an exchange of views on planning and planning methods in general, which might prove useful to the following session of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, but it could agree to a discussion of specific chapters only if the French text was available. Consequently, although her delegation had no objection in principle to the draft resolution submitted by the Tunisian delegation, it could not agree to a discussion on chapter 13, to which the draft resolution referred, until that chapter was available in French.

50. Mr. LAHLOU (Morocco) said that if the medium-term plan had not been changed since the Council's preceding session, his delegation was prepared to discuss it on the basis of the text which it had received at that time and transmitted to the Moroccan Government. He understood that there would be no further report on the plan from the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination, since that Committee had decided not to consider the subject again.

51. Mrs. DERRÉ (France) said that the plan had been modified since the Council's preceding session.

52. Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary), speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the *Ad Hoc* Sessional Committee, suggested that the Committee might meet on one or two occasions to express its views on the draft resolution submitted by Tunisia, which was largely of a procedural nature.

53. Mrs. DERRÉ (France) inquired which chapters of the medium-term plan could be provided speedily in all working languages, including French. The Committee for Programme and Co-ordination had had a complete

French text of the original draft. If there were only minor changes to chapter 13, it should be possible to produce the final text very rapidly, in order to make discussion of that chapter possible, if that was particularly desired.

54. Mr. SEVAN (Secretary of the *Ad Hoc* Sessional Committee) said that work was currently proceeding on volume I of the plan, which did not include chapter 13. However, if that specific chapter was urgently required to enable the *Ad Hoc* Sessional Committee to meet, he would so inform the Administration and it could be made available.

55. The PRESIDENT suggested that the *Ad Hoc* Sessional Committee should meet at the earliest opportunity to hear a further report from the Secretariat on the situation.

It was so decided.

AGENDA ITEM 1

Adoption of the agenda and other organizational matters (*continued*)* (E/1979/30, E/1979/L.26)

56. The PRESIDENT drew the Council's attention to the note by the Secretariat (E/1979/L.26) transmitting the recommendation of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination that it should hold a resumed nineteenth session in September to examine the proposed programme budget for the biennium 1980-1981.

57. Mr. MULLER (Secretary of the Council) said that the financial services had not yet informed him of the financial implications, if any, of the proposal to hold a resumed nineteenth session of the Committee.

58. Mr. MAKEYEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the note by the Secretariat did not reflect the decision which had been taken at the Council's organizational session. The resumed session of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination had been decided upon because the Secretariat had not prepared the programme budget in time for the May session. However, it had also been decided that the Committee's May session should conclude its work one week early or in any case not later than 26 May. The Committee should abide by that arrangement to give a good example and, in that case, the resumed session in September would not entail any financial implications.

59. Mr. MULLER (Secretary of the Council) said that he fully shared the Soviet representative's opinion. The whole programme had been dislocated by the events which had occurred at the end of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: since the translation services had been unable to make good the arrears of work, his section maintained that no financial implications should be involved in rearranging the Committee's session. However, he had received no positive response on the subject and for that reason he had been obliged to make his previous statement.

60. The PRESIDENT suggested that further consideration of the item be deferred.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

*Resumed from the 8th meeting.