

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVENTH PLenary MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 23 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mohammad Jafar Mahallati

(Iran)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.H. SADLER  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Miss R. de CLERCQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POICHEV  
Mr. K. PRANOV

Burma: U HAUNG NAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CHA

Egypt: Mr. E.S.A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. H.N. FAHIY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREIT  
Mr. F. YOMAHIES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE  
Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HENDER  
Mr. H. THIEDLICHE  
Mr. J. MOEMERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN  
Mr. M. KLINGLER

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOLIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. HARYOMATARAN  
Mr. B. SILANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. H. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KOBOI

Mexico: Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. V.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. T. STROJMAS

Romania:

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. J. LUNDIN  
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. Y. NAZARKIN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. V.H. GANJA  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. GUIDERSEN  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. LEONARD  
Mr. F. CORDEN

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. N. VRHUNEC  
Mr. N. IINHAILOVIC

Zaire:

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

(The Chairman)

The second request is from Finland, dated 18 November 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 50. 2/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The third request is from Norway, dated 20 November 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 51. 3/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The fourth request is from Austria, dated 18 December 1981, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 52. 4/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

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2/ "In response to the request of Finland (CD/247) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Finland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Finland".

3/ "In response to the request of Norway (CD/248) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Norway is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Norway".

4/ "In response to the request of Austria (CD/249) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Austria is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Austria".

(The Chairman)

The fifth request is from Turkey, dated 15 January 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 53. 5/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The sixth request is from Spain, dated 30 January 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 54. 6/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

The seventh request is from Tunisia, dated 2 February 1982, and the corresponding draft decision is in Working Paper No. 55. 7/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted.

It was so decided.

We have concluded our consideration of requests for participation of non-member States. In conformity with its programme of work, the Committee considers today item 1 of its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". In accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of India, Czechoslovakia, Japan, the United Kingdom and Australia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

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5/ "In response to the request of Turkey (CD/250) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Turkey to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Turkey is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Turkey".

6/ "In response to the request of Spain (CD/251) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Groups established for the 1982 session".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Spain is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Spain".

7/ "In response to the request of Tunisia (CD/252) and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1982 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee".

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1982 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Tunisia is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Tunisia".

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all join you in offering the warm congratulations of my delegation to Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Sujka of Poland and Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany on their appointment as Chairmen of the various Ad Libit Working Groups that have been re-established for the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. We have every hope that, under their skilful guidance, the Working Groups will achieve significant and concrete results.

On 2 February 1962, the alternative representative of the Delegation of Czechoslovakia introduced before this Committee the agreed position of a group of socialist countries on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In my statement today, which is in conformity with rule 50 of the Rules of Procedure, I would like to offer our initial comments on some aspects of this agreed position and seek certain clarifications with a view to achieving a further convergence in our respective approaches.

My delegation has been gratified to note that, in several aspects, the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 largely coincide with the agreed positions of a group of socialist countries. We have also noted with satisfaction that the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, in his statement on 16 February, expressed complete agreement with the views put forward by the head of my delegation, Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaran, on the question of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Several of the clarifications we seek, therefore, would in effect be aimed at confirming our points of convergence and identifying any significant divergences that we need to work upon in the future.

It has been stated by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia that the comprehensive programme of disarmament "should be an agreed complex of measures aimed at the cessation of the arms race and the implementation, by stages, of genuine disarmament within the framework of established time-limits". We agree with this view. However, we find that, in detailing the various measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament, no attempt has been made to indicate the stages within which these measures would be implemented. The interrelationship among the various measures as well as the sequence in which their implementation is envisaged can only become clear and manifest through the use of a framework of stages. We would be grateful, therefore, if the Czechoslovak delegation could clarify to us whether the four-stage approach adopted in document CD/225 is acceptable. If this approach is acceptable, then it would be most useful for us to have some idea as to how the various measures of arms limitation and disarmament envisaged by a group of socialist countries are to be ordered among the various stages. Until this information is available, it would be difficult for us to identify the common ground between us except in rather broad conceptual terms.

The distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia has listed the various measures "in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, the implementation of which would lead towards the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament". However, while these measures have been categorized under certain broad headings, no logical sequence has been followed in their ordering. For example, in what kind of sequence are the measures listed in paragraphs (a) to (i) under "Nuclear weapons" to be implemented? Which among these measures belong to stage I, which to stage II and so on?



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The other difficulty we encounter in going through the list of measures lies in the mingling together of concrete and specific measures with those which are extremely broad and general in character. Thus, a broad-range measure encompassing the entire process of nuclear disarmament is included in paragraph (b) under "Nuclear weapons", together with a very specific measure such as the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (paragraph (e)). Similarly, a specific measure such as "the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space" has been lumped together with a non-specific and indeterminate category entitled "Further measures to prevent the conversion of outer space into a sphere of military confrontation".

The Group of 21 has tried to put forward as many concrete and specific measures as it could identify under each broad weapon category. Such measures are, for obvious reasons, more specific in character for the first stage, becoming more general for subsequent stages. The agreed position put forward by a group of socialist countries does not give us any clue as to how the every concrete and precise measures envisaged by it are to be related to the broad and general categories included in the programme. A related question here would be whether these socialist countries share the view expressed by the co-sponsors of document CD/205 that the specific agreements to be negotiated cannot be predetermined and must be left to be worked out among the parties involved in the negotiations themselves. Such an approach would point to adopting telegraphic and general formulations in the listing of measures in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the other side is the approach adopted by the Group of 21, which calls for specific and concrete measures, whose objectives, if not results, are predetermined by mutual agreement. To us, it appears that the socialist countries on whose behalf the Czechoslovak statement was made have adopted a bit of both approaches. We would be grateful if this point could be clarified.

We have all agreed that the ultimate goal of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In our view, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should therefore encompass measures for the cessation and reversal of the arms race in all its aspects, the reduction of armaments and armed forces and their final and complete elimination. However, the list of measures contained in the statement of the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia does not give us a clear picture of the final stages of the process of achieving general and complete disarmament under effective international control. In several cases, measures included under the various separate headings are, in this sense, incomplete. For example, under the heading "Armed forces and conventional weapons", we have one measure calling for the freezing of the armed forces and conventional weapons of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and their allies, coupled with another measure entitled "The reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons". We do not have in the list an indication of when and how the complete elimination of armed forces and conventional armaments would be achieved. Similarly, under "The reduction of military expenditures", provision is made for a reduction in the military budgets of militarily significant States, as also for a freeze on military budgets in general. No indication is given as to how other States will reduce their military expenditures and how a total abolition of military appropriations would be achieved. In fact, if one were to go merely by the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia, the complete elimination of military appropriations would not appear to be an objective of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Let me hasten to add that the list of measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament cannot possibly be exhaustive. However, since the programme is to be a self-contained one, it must include measures, even

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if indicative, for all the various stages of the process of achieving general and complete disarmament. Our colleagues from the socialist delegations could perhaps shed some more light on how they envisage measures required for the final stages of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Before turning to the measures themselves, I would like to comment briefly on some of the principles for the comprehensive programme of disarmament outlined by the representative of Czechoslovakia. One such principle he has mentioned is that of "equality and equal security". We would like to know how this principle would be applied in practice in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In particular, we would like to draw attention to the fact that a vast imbalance exists between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other. This imbalance is constantly increasing. How would the principle of equality and equal security be applied to such a situation?

Another principle mentioned in the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia concerns the process of nuclear disarmament. It has been stated that at all stages of the process of nuclear disarmament, "the existing balance in the sphere of nuclear power must remain the same with a constant reduction of its level". Does this imply that the existing status quo would have to be maintained as among the five nuclear-weapon States? At what point would the nuclear arsenals of all the nuclear-weapon States be eliminated?

We have carefully studied the list of measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament as envisaged by a group of socialist countries. It is with satisfaction that we have noted a coincidence with respect to several of these measures. However, I would like to single out some of the items contained in the list which need further discussion and clarification.

Under the category entitled "Nuclear weapons", reference is made to the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. However, a complete prohibition on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which is broader and more universal in scope, has been omitted. This is despite the fact that the socialist countries, on whose behalf the statement by the representative of Czechoslovakia was made, all voted in favour of General Assembly resolution 36/92 I, entitled "Non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war". We would be grateful if it could be explained to us why this important measure was excluded.

Still under the category "Nuclear weapons", it has been stated that "as a first step, the possible stages of nuclear disarmament with their approximate contents could be discussed, and in particular the content of the first stage". However, for my delegation, the various stages of nuclear disarmament have already been clearly spelt out in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. What we need to do now as part of the negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament is to elaborate these stages of nuclear disarmament.

The position of my Government concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is well known. We could not, therefore, accept the measure outlined in paragraph (f) under the heading "Nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Saran, India)

Let me now turn to the section entitled "The prevention of the proliferation of the arms race in new spaces explored by man" in the statement of the representative of Czechoslovakia. Under this section, one of the measures listed is "the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space". At the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, my delegation stated that any treaty for the prevention of an arms race in outer space must cover the development, testing and deployment of weapons of any kind in outer space.

Under the section with the heading "Regional measures", reference has been made to "the renunciation of the expansion of the existing military and political groupings and of the creation of new ones". As far as military alliances are concerned, India, as a non-aligned country, has consistently called for the dissolution of all such military blocs. We cannot, therefore, accept a mere freeze in the existing situation. Secondly, it is not clear why political groupings should also be the object of renunciation if they do not have military connotations. For example, would the non-aligned movement have to freeze its existing membership and at some point dissolve itself? What about other political bodies of a regional character? We would be grateful if it could be clarified to us in what sense the term "political grouping" has been used.

Under the same heading, provision is made for the "limitation and lowering of the level of military presence and military activity" in the Atlantic Ocean, in the Pacific, in the Mediterranean Sea and in the region of the Persian Gulf and "the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activity in the Indian Ocean". Such formulations make no differentiation between foreign military presence and military activity in these regions and the entirely legitimate military presence and activity of the States belonging to the region. Of course, in the final stage of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, all military activity in all regions would cease. However, when we speak of partial and regional measures, it is necessary to highlight the logical sequence of measures which would lead to disarmament on a truly global scale. In such a logical sequence, the establishment of a Zone of Peace, for example, in the Indian Ocean in terms of the Declaration adopted in 1971 by the United Nations is obviously a first and necessary step. Peace and security in the Indian Ocean are now threatened by the rapidly increasing military presence of outside Powers and the scramble for military bases in the Indian Ocean area. The removal of foreign military presence and the cessation of foreign military activity in the Indian Ocean cannot be put on a par and sought to be achieved together

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with the cessation of military activity by the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean. Yet, this is precisely the impression that may be created by the formulation used in the statement by the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia. We would be grateful if we could have a more detailed explanation of the sequence of steps in which measures under paragraphs (f) and (h) would be implemented and the responsibilities of littoral and hinterland States and extra-regional States at each stage.

As a State belonging to Asia, my delegation is naturally interested in the measure included in this section in paragraph (j) entitled "The conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force in the relations between the States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean". We would be grateful for further details on the proposed convention. It may be explained to us how such a convention would be different from the responsibilities already undertaken by States of all regions under the United Nations Charter. We would also like to know whether what is being proposed here is a multilateral convention limited to the States of the region of Asia and the Pacific or whether a series of bilateral treaties is envisaged. How would breaches of the convention be dealt with and what would be the relationship of such a security system to the collective security framework already provided for under the United Nations Charter?

Under "Collateral and other measures", provision has been made for a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Is not adherence to the United Nations Charter itself a commitment by all States to the non-use of force in relations amongst them? What purpose would be served by a separate treaty on the non-use of force?

These are some of the comments that I wanted to make on the positions advanced by a group of socialist countries concerning the comprehensive programme of disarmament. These comments have been made in the spirit of seeking further areas of convergence with our socialist colleagues on issues relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament. We believe that it is only through a process of debate, a process of questioning, that we can arrive at better mutual understanding of our respective positions. It is our conviction that, in the replies and clarifications that we are certain will be provided to our questions, we shall be able to discover opportunities to broaden the already considerable area of agreement that exists between us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of Czechoslovakia, Minister Strucka, who will introduce the working paper contained in document CD/245.

Mr. STRUCKA (Czechoslovakia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement at the plenary meeting of the Committee on the occasion of the opening of its current session on 2 February (CD/PV.150), the Czechoslovak delegation had the honour, as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries on the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, to present the agreed position of the delegations of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on the question of the content of the CPD.

We note with satisfaction that our statement has aroused serious interest among delegations and is proving useful in the consideration of the question of elaborating a CPD, both at plenary meetings of the Committee and in those of the Working Group on this question and the three contact groups concerned.

This was also shown in today's statement by the distinguished representative of India. We shall, of course, study Ambassador Saran's statement with the proper attention and in due course furnish an additional explanation. As regards certain points touched upon by the representative of India, the delegations of the socialist countries have already given some explanation in the CPD Working Group and in the contact groups. We shall continue to adopt a constructive approach in the search for a compromise solution to the problem of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In view of the interest shown in the agreed position of the socialist countries on the question of a CPD and in order to facilitate acquaintance with it, we decided to set forth that position in the form of an official document of the Committee. Accordingly, on 19 February, the Czechoslovak delegation, on behalf of the aforementioned socialist countries, transmitted to the Committee secretariat the text of a working paper, which has already been circulated among delegations under the symbol CD/245.

The said working paper submitted by the group of socialist countries reproduces all the main points of our statement of 2 February. To facilitate its use, we have divided it into the following sections: general provisions; objectives of the programme; principles; specific measures; disarmament and other global problems; time-limits and procedures for the implementation of the programme; monitoring of arms limitation and disarmament; mechanisms and procedures, and participation of world public opinion in efforts to achieve disarmament.

On the basis of the formulations contained in our intervention of 2 February and in document CD/245, the co-sponsors of that document have already begun practical work. In particular, having regard to the fact that in many cases our proposals coincided with points contained in documents issued by the Group of 21, we decided to adopt those documents as a basis for our work, adding to them those of our proposals which were absent from the Group of 21's documents. Thus we proposed additions to the proposals put forward by the Group of 21 on the subjects of the objectives, priorities and principles of the CPD. We shall continue to employ this -- in our view constructive -- method of work also in the future.

(Mr. Strucka, Czechoslovakia)

Working paper CD/245 reflects the constant readiness of the socialist-countries to make a substantial contribution to the elaboration of a meaningful draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, which the Committee may submit as a concrete achievement for consideration at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We are convinced that the implementation of the provisions in document CD/245 would represent a constructive contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the group of socialist countries, to assure the Committee, once again, that we shall continue to play a fundamental and active role in the elaboration of a CPD. We shall adopt a constructive approach to the proposals of all countries, and above all those of the Group of 21, whose position coincides largely with our own.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I cannot help expressing my delegation's disappointment that, as we begin our substantive work at this 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons seems still to be eluding our efforts and receding even more into the future. Six months have passed since I made my last appeal in this Committee for a comprehensive test ban; approximately a year and a half has passed since the trilateral negotiations were suspended; and 19 years have passed since the partial test-ban Treaty was concluded with the promise that the three nuclear-weapon States would be continuing to seek a comprehensive ban.

On 9 December last year, the United Nations General Assembly again adopted two resolutions on nuclear testing; both of them reiterated the Assembly's grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated; and both of them reaffirmed the Assembly's conviction that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority. The view of the overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations cannot be misunderstood or ignored. And my Government associates itself with this majority view on nuclear testing.

The Japanese Government has on many occasions made representations to the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States against the nuclear tests they have been conducting over the years. These representations spring from the fundamental position that Japan continues to be opposed to nuclear test explosions of any kind -- undertaken by any State. And that is why my Government has also spoken out several times in favour of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of a CTB.

The achievement of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has always been regarded by my Government as the one measure of the highest priority in the whole field of arms control and disarmament. While welcoming the trilateral negotiations on a CTB, we have stressed the need for such a treaty to be achieved through truly multilateral negotiations in this Committee.

I am under standing instructions from my Government to reiterate our appeal for the commencement of multilateral negotiations in this Committee to achieve a comprehensive test ban at the earliest possible date. In this connection, I continue to hope that a consensus can be reached to set up a working group or other subsidiary body of the Committee to deal with this question in the most effective and concentrated manner. My delegation repeats its willingness to put forward a draft mandate for such a working group at the appropriate moment. As I stated in this room on 6 August last year, "The mere setting up of a CTB working group would be a very meagre achievement indeed, but if the Committee on Disarmament were able to report even that achievement to the special session next year, it would be of some significance".

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will be reconvening from the beginning of March to continue its important work of setting up an international system for the exchange of seismic data to help in detecting underground nuclear tests. My delegation looks forward to hearing the Ad Hoc Group's evaluation of the second trial exchange which was conducted in November last year, especially since more countries than at the first trial participated this time, including several socialist States. We understand that it would be possible to detect underground tests down to a yield of about 10 kilotons with a reasonable degree of accuracy if the detonation took place in hard rock, provided there is an appropriately deployed network of seismic stations. The detection threshold would be higher if the explosion were detonated in alluvium, for instance. We are told that such a network would render it possible to distinguish between earthquakes and nuclear explosions of a relatively low yield. If that were the case, surely it would be worthwhile to endeavour to achieve a ban on underground tests of a yield above, say, 10 kilotons. This would certainly be a welcome one step forward in the direction of a comprehensive ban of all underground tests.

There are apparently various ways of evading detection of an underground nuclear explosion by an international network of seismic stations. The experts will no doubt continue to seek ways of closing these loopholes. The effective functioning of a reliable verification system is of fundamental importance to any disarmament or arms control measure. However, the quest for absolute perfection in the verification mechanism, an infallible verification method, may result in no agreement at all. A reasonable balance has to be struck between the value of having a positive if not complete disarmament agreement, on the one hand, and the risk that certain violations may be theoretically possible in spite of the verification mechanism that has been agreed upon, on the other. Perhaps the adequacy of any verification system is ultimately a matter of political judgement and mutual trust.

While my Government refuses to abandon the hope that a truly comprehensive ban on all nuclear explosions of any kind and by any State is an attainable objective, it also feels that, in the state of affairs where we are, even limited additional restrictions on nuclear-weapon testing would have the effect of at least slowing down the further development of new types of weapons or hindering the further sophistication of existing ones. And above all the political impact of such a step on international efforts devoted to the cause of disarmament would be undeniable. The very first step in the direction of nuclear disarmament would have been taken and this would give much-needed new hope and encouragement to those engaged in the disarmament process.

As a representative of a non-nuclear-weapon State, I can merely express the hope that the nuclear-weapon States bear in mind the pledges they made in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968 "to seek

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to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end."

If an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been allowed to conduct such useful work over the years, why can we not have an ad hoc group of administrative experts, for instance, to work out the necessary administrative arrangements for the proposed seismic data exchange? As Ambassador McPhail, the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, pointed out last week, the idea was originally proposed by the Australian delegation two years ago. My delegation has been in favour of that proposal. The Committee or a suitable subsidiary body should begin discussing the financial, legal and administrative aspects of the envisaged international seismic data exchange. These details should be worked out before the entry into force of the CTB treaty so that the data exchange can begin operating together with the treaty and not from an unspecified date after the treaty has entered into force.

Much has been said about the importance of a CTB in the context of maintaining the non-proliferation régime and I will simply recall the unhappy outcome of the 1980 NPT Review Conference and remind member States that the next Review Conference in 1985 could turn out to be crucial to the NPT régime.

My delegation understands that the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests of 1974, and the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes of 1976 are under consideration by the signatories for ratification. I wish to reiterate my Government's view that the entry into force of these two instruments would constitute an important step towards the achievement of a CTB. May I also express my delegation's hope that the trilateral CTB negotiations can be reopened at the earliest possible date.

My delegation listened with interest the other day to the idea put forward by Mme Thorsson, the distinguished Under-Secretary of State of Sweden, in connection with the international surveillance of airborne radioactivity as a means of monitoring nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We look forward to receiving the working paper that Mme Thorsson promised us. We would also be interested in hearing the reactions of other delegations.

Allow me to conclude my statement by citing the following paragraph from the message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations read out to us by our distinguished Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, on 4 February: "Another important issue is the long-awaited conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. This would provide a major impetus for further progress towards the limitation and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. It would also be of significance in strengthening the non-proliferation régime." It is precisely such a "major impetus" that we are all seeking, especially as we move forward to the second special session.



The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, who will introduce the working paper contained in document CD/244.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, as you have just said, I have asked for the floor this morning to introduce document CD/244, which we have entitled "Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention". We have put this document forward as a contribution under item 4 of our Committee's agenda. We tabled this new working paper to be available at the time when the Committee had just taken the decision to give a revised mandate to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We look forward to the resumption of the Group's work later this week under the leadership of Ambassador Sujka of Poland and we hope that our paper, which we have also asked should be circulated as a working document under the symbol CD/CW/WP.26, will be considered in detail in that forum as soon as possible. We understand that all language versions will be available this evening.

I will not take up much of the Committee's time now in describing the substance of the working paper, but I think it is useful to do so very briefly. As I made clear in my opening statement on 11 February, my Government has had a long-standing commitment to the achievement of a comprehensive, effective and adequately verifiable ban on chemical weapons. We believe that verification is the central problem to be faced in drawing up a CW convention and that the Working Group will need to ensure that adequate attention is devoted to this key issue if we are to make progress. This is the reason why my delegation has concentrated on verification and compliance in the paper I have introduced; we are nevertheless very much aware that other important issues such as the definition of the scope of the convention will also need to be resolved and we hope that it will prove possible to work in tandem on these issues.

Perhaps I should now make a few explanatory remarks about document CD/244 which other delegations might find helpful in further considering our proposals.

The paper is set out in two sections: the first describes in the form of a memorandum the United Kingdom's view on the way in which a chemical weapons convention should be verified; the second sets out, in the form of draft elements, the type of provisions which a convention would need to include in order to fulfil the requirements set out in the first section of the paper. We will of course be happy to elaborate further upon the reasoning behind our proposals; the first section of document CD/244 gives a preliminary explanation of the provisions which are set out as what we have called draft elements.

In looking at the substance of document CD/244, delegations may find it helpful to know that we approach the verification of a chemical weapons convention from two directions: first, the verification of the destruction of stockpiles and, secondly, the verification of the non-production of chemical weapons, which we have called "monitoring of compliance". We have divided verification into these two separate categories because the different activities to be verified will need different monitoring techniques. Moreover, for the vast majority of countries which, of course, do not possess any stock of chemical weapons, only the second category of verification measures, that is, those relating to the monitoring of non-production, would come into force.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

As our working paper makes clear, the verification of both these aspects of a ban on chemical weapons will require a combination of national and international measures. National measures of verification may in time be of increasing value in monitoring the non-production of chemical weapons.

Mr. SADLER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, may I, in this intervention, address myself to item 1 of the Committee's agenda, namely, the nuclear test ban. My remarks will to some extent amplify what I said briefly on this item in my general statement on 11 February. There should be no doubt that Australia deeply shares the widespread regret at the failure to make progress towards a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The deadlock we have reached on the matter is a matter of priority for the Committee on Disarmament, for our Governments and the peoples they represent. Our task as negotiators and as diplomats is to find a way of resolving the problem. Clearly new ideas are called for. Several new ideas which deserve seriously to be looked at were made on 18 February by Ambassador McPhail of Canada.

All members of this body are committed to the aim of a nuclear-test ban. What we have all had in mind is one treaty which prohibits test explosions of nuclear weapons in all environments, with related provisions covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It is an aim which, as we have found, does not easily translate into negotiation. The tripartite report of July 1980 said this was because many of the issues are novel, sensitive and intricate, and because national security concerns are directly concerned. The question then arises: are we likely to make progress by continuing to urge that a CTB be tackled all in one go and all at once? My delegation, as committed as any in this room to a CTB treaty at the earliest possible date, is willing to consider alternatives to the all-or-nothing approach if such alternatives hold a serious prospect of leading to real, substantial progress.

The international climate, as those who have addressed the Committee this session acknowledge, is not encouraging. It does not seem to favour sweeping agreements, no matter how urgent the need for them. On the other hand lesser agreements ought to be within reach. Agreements on chemical weapons, radiological weapons, negative security assurances and, I even venture to suggest, on a comprehensive programme of disarmament are feasible, but only, it seems, on a step-by-step basis. There are many precedents for agreements of this sort which have had distinct value even when they have not gone the whole way -- the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and, of course, the partial test-ban Treaty. Certainly they all leave gaps of one kind or another.

The concept of gaps is particularly relevant. The Treaties I have just mentioned, imperfect as they might be, do raise important barriers to the unrestricted testing of nuclear weapons. There are large gaps between each of them, but why, in the absence of any more encouraging prospect, should we not do our best to create further barriers? Clearly if the Tlatelolco principle, to take only one example, were extended, it would cut down the geographic area over which testing takes place. If extended everywhere, it would have the same effect as a CTB treaty. Similarly, one could consider a lowering of the permitted yield of nuclear tests, perhaps in a succession of treaties, until the zero target is reached: this again would achieve a CTB treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

The attraction I find in the Canadian statement of 18 February is that it offers a coherent approach to a CTB based on the closing of gaps. Ambassador McPhail drew attention, for example, to the possibilities existing in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. These Treaties could also conceivably lend themselves to extension.

If for a moment we forego the all-in-one approach to a CTB, many thoughts are provoked. Might existing Treaties — whether bilateral or multilateral — be extended to those nuclear-weapon States which are not yet parties to them? Might the bilateral treaties be developed into multilateral ones? The Threshold Test Ban Treaty prohibits explosions above 150 kilotons, but, if the public debate is a guide to national security concerns, then a threshold which is one order of magnitude lower could be quite quickly achievable. The verification provisions of the TTBT and the PNET, providing for a wide measure of detailed data exchange and direct co-operation between the parties, might be of great relevance in a wider context.

What would we be doing if we had been in a position to establish a working group on a CTB? My guess is that we would not be attempting to draft, not at an early stage anyway, on novel, sensitive and intricate issues. More likely we would, as in the Chemical Weapons Working Group, be drawing heavily on existing international instruments and the results of negotiations in restricted forums and, in general, following a step-by-step approach.

I have referred to barriers and gaps: it might be more explicit if I referred instead to the bricks necessary to make a wall. We have an opportunity to add more bricks with the aim of steadily building a total and complete barrier to nuclear tests. Australia in the past has suggested that we tackle the legal and administrative aspects of an international seismic data exchange. Other proposals have been made. An expanded scope for the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts has been suggested. I submit that, if we can devise a way to relate each of these ideas, brick-by-brick to our final objective, the eventual wall, we will not attract negative reactions from those who, for one reason or another, shy at building a wall in one stroke and from those who, on the other hand, consider that one brick is too insignificant — indeed too distracting — an impediment to be worthwhile putting in place. Apart from the fact that the process of building can go on in different places at the same time, there is the practical need to get the lower ones cemented in place before adding higher ones. Here I am thinking again of the Australian proposal made in document CD/95.

Canada has proposed the establishment of a group of political experts, under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament, to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations. My delegation feels this proposal has some merit, in the difficult circumstances in which we find ourselves on a CTB. The same group could discuss all the points I have made today and give the Committee an indication of whether new approaches may help it to tackle its priority agenda item.

I stress, in closing, that I commend for further study the ideas that Canada has put forward. I do so as a means of keeping movement towards a CTB alive in a climate which, in the absence of a step-by-step approach, is in danger of leading

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

to the CTB being shelved for a quite unacceptable period of time. In other words, I am attracted to the idea of maintaining, in the words of the Canadian Ambassador "some movement in the negotiating process to avoid risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing". In saying this I also stress that the need which I see to have a closer look at what Canada suggests should not in any way be taken as replacing or diluting the ultimate and central aim that the Australian Government has, namely, that of developing a CTB.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any delegation wish to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 25 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.