

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 6 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio Okawa

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. M. IMTI Mr. M. BELKERID Mr. A. TAFFAR
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARSALES Miss H. NASCIMBENE Mr. V. ESPECHE GIL
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. D.H. SADLEIR
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. A. ONKELINX Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE Miss DE CLERQ
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA E SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUANTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. B. GRINBERG
<u>Burma:</u>	U THAN TUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. G.R. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. TIAN JIN Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. J. STRUCKA Mr. A. CIMA
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. I.A. HASSAN Mr. M.N. FAHY
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Mr. M. VILLETTE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BAHRIN

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILIG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.H. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAÏBI

Netherlands: Mr. F. von DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENIAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. D. RUSSIN
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIYAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
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Mr. M.D. BUSBY
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. HISKEL
Miss M.E. HOINKES
Mr. J. MARTIN

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. HAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRITUNEC
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on
Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the 169th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee continues today its consideration of item 6 on its Agenda, entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament". As usual, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so, in conformity with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Mongolia, the United States of America, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Sri Lanka, Romania and Brazil. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Mongolia, His Excellency Ambassador Erdembileg.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, in its statement today the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic would like to express some views on item 5 of the Committee's agenda, entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons".

But before doing so, I should like, on behalf of my delegation, sincerely to congratulate you in connection with your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April.

My delegation places great hopes in the successful outcome of the Committee's deliberations under your wise guidance in this important and responsible period covering the completion of the work of the first part of the Committee's 1982 session and the submission of the special report to the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Permit me to take this opportunity to express once again my delegation's gratitude to the representative of Italy for the work done by him in discharging the functions of Chairman for the month of March.

Today, the Committee on Disarmament, in accordance with its programme of work, is completing consideration of agenda item 6. The Mongolian delegation has briefly expressed its views on this item in its previous statements.

As is known, General Assembly resolution 36/92 F requested the Committee on Disarmament to complete, during the first part of its session in 1982, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to submit it in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

In this connection, I should like to point out that, notwithstanding the considerable efforts made by the Committee in the contact groups and in the course of consultations between interested delegations and apart from certain results, there still remain unresolved problems and a number of difficulties in the way of agreement on the text of the programme.

However, we have not yet lost hope that the Committee will prove able to make the most efficient use of the time remaining and move ahead with the execution of the task before it.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Mongolia's position on the question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction has been stated in this Committee on several occasions. We, like many others, continue to hold the view that the simplest and most reliable means of resolving this problem is the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement that would erect a firm barrier to the emergence of any new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. At the same time, meeting the position of the western partners in the negotiations in the Committee half way, we do not preclude the possibility of concluding agreements on individual types of such weapons.

In this context, radiological weapons could already have been declared illegal. When the joint Soviet-United States proposal on the prohibition of radiological weapons was introduced in the Committee, many delegations expected, with fully justified hope, that, on the basis of this proposal, agreement would be reached in the Committee on Disarmament on this type of weapon of mass destruction in the near future.

But facts remain facts and it can only be regretted that the negotiations have moved in the direction of the complication of the problem. We consider the first requirement to be to reach agreement on the question of prohibiting radiological weapons themselves without linking it to other, unrelated questions.

With regard to the problem of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, I should like to refer to General Assembly resolution 36/89, which "calls upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States, to make declarations, identical in substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons", that "would be approved thereafter by a decision of the Security Council".

In this connection, the Mongolian delegation supports the proposal of the delegation of the Hungarian People's Republic for the holding, during the second part of the 1982 session, of informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of governmental experts to consider the question of the aforementioned declarations and other issues, relating to the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

In our opinion, such an approach would enable the Committee to make progress in this matter.

I should like to say a few words about the question of the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.

The concern felt by world public opinion about the threat of this most inhuman and barbaric type of weapon was fully reflected for the first time in resolution 36/92 K, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

In this resolution, it is stressed that the introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon in the military arsenals of States escalates the nuclear arms race and significantly lowers the threshold to nuclear war, thereby increasing the danger of such a war.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Further on in the resolution the General Assembly recognizes the inhumane effects of this weapon and requests the Committee on Disarmament to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear-neutron weapons.

Thus, the General Assembly has clearly and unambiguously defined its attitude to neutron weapons.

However, it is to be regretted that, because of the obstructionist attitude of some delegations, there has been no decision by consensus within the Committee on Disarmament concerning this recommendation from the United Nations General Assembly.

Nevertheless, the Mongolian delegation, together with other socialist countries, continues to believe it essential that, in accordance with the above-mentioned recommendation of the General Assembly, the Committee should start concrete negotiations on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon and set up an ad hoc working group for this purpose. In this connection, I should like to point out once again that as long ago as March 1978 the group of socialist countries submitted for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

We consider that, in order to prevent a new neutron spiral in the arms race and a further increase in the danger of war, the Committee on Disarmament must heed the call of world public opinion.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States of America, His Excellency Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Although you have asked that the customary tribute paid to incoming Chairmen should be dispensed with, in your case I must demur, for I would be remiss if I did not express the pleasure and satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you, my dear friend and colleague, in this Chair. We have important work before us this month and we are confident that your experience, skill and dedication, so ably demonstrated during your tenure as the representative from Japan to this Committee, will lead us to a successful conclusion during this critical period in our 1982 session. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's admiration and appreciation to our Chairman for the month of March, my good friend the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Alessi, who has given unsparingly of his time and considerable talents to the work of our Committee during his chairmanship.

Today I would like to speak on agenda item 6, dealing with a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

For the past three sessions, the Committee has pursued efforts to achieve the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control through a Working Group dedicated to the development of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. This work has been carried out under the able and dedicated leadership

(Mr. Fields, United States)

of Ambassador Adeniji, the representative of Nigeria, in 1980 and our distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, in 1981 and 1982. This task -- inspired by the desires of all people to live in a world of genuine and lasting peace -- has not always been easy, due to the fundamental nature and complexity of the issues involved. We have, despite these difficulties, accomplished important and useful work. However, our task is still far from complete, and significant work remains to be done, both here in the Committee and at the second special session of the General Assembly, where the results of our work will be submitted to the scrutiny of an anxious world community. Although my delegation will undoubtedly have more to say about the programme when we refer to the procedure for forwarding the results of the Working Group's efforts to the second special session, I would like briefly to outline its views on certain aspects of the work done to date.

In saying that difficult questions remain, I do not want my colleagues to think that I am a prophet of doom. The resolution of the remaining problems is not beyond our reach. It is, however, important that we understand fully not only what the issues and the problems are, but the underlying rationale for the positions of various concerned delegations.

The United States approaches the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament within the framework of its over-all national security policy -- a policy based on enduring principles aimed both at achieving and at maintaining peace. An essential element of our policy, as reiterated by Secretary Haig on 14 July 1981, is the search for sound arms control agreements.

My Government is committed to this search and this commitment was reaffirmed by President Reagan in his press conference on 31 March, in which he said:

"I have and I will continue to seek realistic arms control agreements on nuclear and conventional forces. I want an agreement on strategic nuclear weapons that reduces the risk of war, lowers the level of armaments and enhances global security. We can accept no less".

In calling upon the Soviet Union to join us in pursuing the goal of peace, President Reagan said:

"I invite the Soviet Union to join with us now, to substantially reduce nuclear weapons and make an important breakthrough for lasting peace on earth".

The importance which our President attaches to arms control issues was highlighted yesterday by his decision to address the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this connection, he expressed both the hope that President Brezhnev would also attend and his desire that the two should meet at that time to discuss issues related to disarmament, so important to all of us. In his announcement, he said:

"The whole idea ... of arms reduction, arms control, is one of the most important things that is facing us, and I hope that we'll (Presidents Reagan and Brezhnev) be able to address the conference".

(Mr. Fields, United States)

These statements by President Reagan make it clear that there can be no question about my country's commitment to the search for an enduring peace and its strong desire to begin the process of reducing nuclear weapons as a major contribution towards this goal.

I would like to point out that President Reagan spoke of "realistic arms control agreements". It is with this sense of realism and commitment to the arms control process that my delegation has approached our negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I cannot over-emphasize the attachment of my delegation to a workable and realistic programme. Regrettably, past attempts by serious and dedicated men and women to create and maintain peace have not always been marked by great success. The fundamental causes of war and international tension have not been eradicated despite our best efforts. For us to achieve success, our endeavours must take full account of the interaction between the causes of tension and the accretion of armaments. Agreements to limit and reduce arms must be carefully negotiated to protect and enhance the security of all the parties involved and to ensure that such agreements do not create instabilities which increase the risk of the very conflicts they are designed to lessen. The obligations they create must be precise and compliance with them must be verifiable. The process of negotiation is necessarily a consensual one. The technical and political complexity of these issues, the fundamental nature of the interests involved and the impossibility of foreseeing with precision relevant future developments make it unrealistic to predict a rigid sequence or arbitrary time-tables for the conclusion of particular agreements. Distrust and suspicion are obstacles to disarmament; thus, collateral measures to promote openness, or "transparency", and enhance the building of confidence are vital to the process. Moreover, progress in disarmament must go hand in hand with the strengthening of international procedures and institutions for peace-keeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes. For these reasons, we believe that, to be successful, progress must be made by discrete steps and through specific agreements.

While experience and practice have shown that success in disarmament can only be achieved through a realistic step-by-step approach, we have none the less supported, and continue to support, the broad approach to disarmament adopted by this Committee in the negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation has participated actively in this work, in the belief that such a programme can provide both a broad guide to action towards disarmament and a means of measuring progress. It is our belief -- one shared by many in this Committee -- that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide the necessary framework for action towards disarmament. It should not dictate specific actions to States, but should, rather, serve as a guide or plan for use by States in the development of the specific actions to be undertaken by them. It should identify measures that require negotiation and the principles to guide those negotiations and suggest priorities to be observed. It should

(Mr. Fields, United States)

also indicate procedures for ensuring adequate and effective verification and compliance with the measures to be negotiated by States, as well as the appropriate mechanisms for review and appraisal.

The content of the comprehensive programme of disarmament must reflect realistic, as well as effective, balanced, verifiable and appropriately interrelated approaches which take fully into account the existing security needs of all States, the international atmosphere and political realities. The concept of the integration of measures and the negotiations on them is extremely important. Negotiations can be pursued on different measures at the same time and several measures may be discussed in one set of negotiations. This concept reflects my Government's policy towards arms control and disarmament negotiations.

The United States is at present engaged in a variety of arms control and disarmament negotiations. In Vienna, we are involved in negotiating the reduction of arms and armed forces in Europe. Here in Geneva, we are negotiating bilaterally with the USSR on intermediate-range nuclear forces. We have discussed the expansion of confidence-building measures in Europe in the context of the Madrid Review Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe. In this Committee, we have been pursuing negotiations on a radiological weapons convention and the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention. On all of these issues, our desire is to achieve agreements as soon as possible. However, these efforts, and others to be commenced, involve complex and difficult issues, on which it is not possible to reach agreement overnight. My delegation therefore believes, as do others, that it is unrealistic to include deadlines or even indicative time-frames for the initiation or conclusion of specific negotiations on measures contained within the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The establishment of such time-frames without regard to unpredictable future international developments is illogical. The concept of urgency can be more realistically reflected by agreeing on the need to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control in as short a time as possible and by setting in motion a process of periodic reviews to give impetus to the implementation of the programme. Such a dynamic process would take the best advantage of progress reached in negotiations on the measures outlined, the state of negotiations in progress and the international atmosphere and political realities.

As to the nature of the programme, my delegation does not view the comprehensive programme as a substitute for the negotiation of specific agreements which will move the world towards general and complete disarmament. The binding legal commitments which will further this process can only be entered into as a result of successful negotiations on effective, balanced and verifiable agreements. We earnestly seek the conclusion of such agreements. What is required now is the political will not only to subscribe to, but also to undertake to implement the programme. This is best done not in words, but in deeds -- and, specifically, through the activities of States to create the kind of trust which enables true progress towards disarmament.

(Mr. Fields, United States)

I would like to turn now to the question of measures for inclusion in the programme. My delegation has always held the view that, if the programme is to serve effectively as a road map to disarmament, the measures included in it should indicate the subjects upon which negotiations should take place, as well as the general issues to be discussed in these negotiations. The measures should thus not be too specific and should not be phrased in such a way as to prejudice the outcome of such negotiations. It is, after all, the primary responsibility of the States undertaking such negotiations to determine the specific contents of the negotiations, as well as the manner in which specific measures will be discussed.

My Government also has had some difficulty with the placement of specific measures in a series of stages or phases within which the negotiation of measures are to be implemented. The negotiating process is a continuing one which does not lend itself to the conclusion of a particular package of measures at any specific time. We do agree that measures to be negotiated can be identified in a logical sequence and we have worked in the Working Group on this basis. It also seems logical to us that measures can be grouped according to the steps that are initially required by the present situation, intermediate steps and steps to bring about general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Through this approach, some progress has been made in the Working Group's Contact Group on measures. Some headway has also been made in an informal contact group which is hard at work in attempting to reconcile the different texts submitted concerning specific measures.

We have made progress in our negotiations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament both in the Working Group proper and in our informal contact groups. Under the respective chairmanships of the Ambassadors of France, Brazil and the German Democratic Republic, we have developed negotiating texts, albeit in some cases highly bracketed ones, on objectives, priorities and principles of a CPD. We have also, as I have already noted, made some progress on the identification and elaboration of measures for inclusion in the programme. Furthermore, I think we all agree on the need for a periodic review of the comprehensive programme of disarmament and my delegation does not foresee great difficulty in working out the specifics for such a review. We believe that at the end of this session we will have a negotiating document, however bracketed, however informal, that delegations can refer to their Governments for intense review before we turn again to the task of the final shaping of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we must strive to negotiate a comprehensive programme which will command the necessary consensus. We must avoid inequitable or unbalanced formulae which, in their impact, are destabilizing and would jeopardize peace. Our programme must responsibly take account of the longing of the peoples of the world for the establishment of a framework for disarmament which will lead to lasting peace. It is a noble effort, and I pledge the co-operation of my delegation in that effort.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Fields for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, His Excellency Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): I take the floor this morning for the purpose of introducing the joint technical report contained in document CD/270 and submitted by Indonesia and the Netherlands concerning the destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at a site near Bandung, the capital city of the Province of West Java, Indonesia.

It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation that, at this juncture in the Committee's work, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands are in a position to submit this report to the Committee with a view to sharing with all other member States the experience of co-operation gained by our two countries in a field related to a subject — that of chemical weapons — which is under consideration by the Committee. We sincerely hope that the report will contribute, in one way or another, to the progress of the work being done by the Committee in this respect.

As you may have noticed from the document, the destruction of this dangerous agent took place three years ago in my country. The report is being submitted at a time when the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, is elaborating provisions of the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons relating, in particular, to their destruction and verification. The crux of this prohibition, in the view of my delegation, is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents.

I believe it appropriate to stress that the existence of this mustard agent in Indonesia was an inheritance from the then Government of the Netherlands East Indies, under whose authority this chemical weapon was intended for use in retaliation in the event that chemical weapons were used by the enemy during the Second World War, which was extending to the region. As it turned out, chemical weapons were not used there during that war.

As you are aware, Indonesia underwent physical struggle prior to the proclamation of its independence in 1945 and in the years thereafter. Under such circumstances, it was inevitable that the Indonesian authorities should have been completely unaware of the presence of the mustard agent in the country. This also seems to have been the case in the Netherlands.

It was fortunate for the two countries that, in 1975, a Dutch national who had been involved in the dismantling of the plant around 1949 was conscientious enough to bring the matter to the attention of the Netherlands Government, which in turn informed the Government of Indonesia.

The two main considerations that motivated the decision of the Indonesian Government to dispose of this dangerous agent as soon as possible were:

1. The realization of the serious consequences its prolonged existence might have for the population living in the vicinity and for the environment, especially after the subsequent discovery of a corroded tank;

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

2. Strict adherence to the 1925 Geneva Protocol by Indonesia, a party which did not make any reservations. Indonesia therefore considered that the countries party to this Protocol are obliged to destroy on their own initiative dangerous chemical agents existing in their respective countries or in the territories under their jurisdiction.

For this destruction, the Indonesian Government requested the Netherlands Government, the authority responsible for the existence of this agent in Indonesia, to provide technical assistance; for its part, Indonesia provided logistics and security for the whole operation.

The ensuing co-operation between the Governments of the Netherlands and Indonesia in the destruction of this dangerous agent was indeed exemplary and reflected the prevailing excellent and amicable relations between the two countries.

When the Indonesian-Netherlands joint operation came to an end, it turned out that there were still about 2,000 litres of mustard agent at the site. Indonesia took upon itself to destroy them by the hydrolysis method.

It is not my intention to dwell on the technical aspects of this operation, which was called "Obong". However, some of its highlights of a non-technical character are perhaps worth mentioning.

Indonesia, a country which does not possess or manufacture chemical weapons, gained invaluable experience from the destruction operation.

Despite 40 years of storage in the underground shelter, the agent was still potent mustard. This may serve as a reminder that, even after being stored for such a long period of time, the agent still possesses its full destructive capacity. Such agents are at present probably still in the possession of a number of countries.

In a future convention, the need for on-site inspection during destruction is essential to ensure that the destruction of the agent is really carried out in terms of its declared type, quantity and location, thus eliminating possible doubts about the sincerity of the parties concerned.

The destruction of such a quantity of mustard agent using relatively simple equipment in a relatively short period of time might become an element for determining the time-limit for the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons of the same category, having due regard for local conditions.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

For a developing country like Indonesia, such destruction requires technical assistance and expertise from developed countries; this might also be considered as an element of the future convention.

Lastly I wish to submit that the case of Indonesia might also be applicable to other countries which have similar historical backgrounds. In this connection, may I avail myself of this opportunity to express once again the appreciation and gratitude of the Government of Indonesia to the Netherlands Government for the assistance and co-operation extended during the operation.

While I have the floor, may I be permitted to touch briefly on two aspects of the item on chemical weapons to which my delegation attaches great importance.

Many members of the Committee have voiced concern about recent developments with regard to the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, namely, binary weapons, which they consider might impede the Committee's work on the banning of chemical weapons.

The emergence of these new weapons will undoubtedly add a new dimension to the chemical arms race.

My delegation does not at all question the right of any State to develop and adopt a policy which it conceives would best serve its defence or security interests. But if States have committed themselves to achieving a particular goal in a negotiating forum, it is only logical to expect from them that they will not take action or develop policies which, by their very nature, contravene that same goal, lest the credibility of their pronouncements be diminished, if not undermined. Apparently, what appears to be logic for countries like Indonesia does not appear to be so for others. But, my delegation submits, two wrongs do not make a right.

My delegation has taken note of the statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields, on 25 March 1981, in which he gave an assurance that "the United States commitment to the goal of a complete and verifiable ban on chemical weapons has been reaffirmed by the highest authority of our Government". Ambassador Fields further stated that "if we are successful in achieving such ban, we would be willing indeed to terminate our binary programme promptly".

My delegation interprets this assurance as having a dual message. On the one hand, it asks the Committee to work speedily on the prohibition of chemical weapons and, on the other, the United States will strive for the achievement of the goal of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

It is the sincere hope of my delegation that this pledge will become a reality in the not too distant future.

There have been some objections, raised in this Committee, to the need to include a ban on use in the future convention since the topic was already covered by the 1925 Geneva Protocol. Logically speaking, as the use of chemical weapons has already been prohibited in the Geneva 1925 Protocol, existing stocks should have been destroyed and there should be no point in developing new types of such weapons. The contrary has, regrettably, proven to be true.

This situation, as my delegation sees it, has been mainly due to the following:

Firstly, the reservations made by a number of countries, including the most powerful ones, to the 1925 Protocol on the eventuality of non-compliance with its provisions by an enemy State, have brought about a situation under which chemical weapons continue to be of potential use;

Secondly, the limitative scope of use in the Geneva Protocol, which does not cover other forms of armed hostilities short of war; and

Thirdly, the absence of compliance machinery in the 1925 Protocol has rendered more probable the potential, or even actual, use of chemical weapons.

The continued existence of chemical weapons in the arsenal of States and the reported intention of manufacturing a new type of such weapons only reinforce my delegation's conviction that the ban on the use of chemical weapons in the form which **appears** in the 1925 Protocol should be strengthened; hence the need to reaffirm the prohibition of the use of such weapons in the comprehensive chemical weapons convention that we are now elaborating.

The importance of the need to include the element of use in the future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons has been further underlined in the Canadian paper contained in document CD/167, in the light of new developments regarding the problems of dual-purpose agents and binary compounds.

Furthermore, the distinguished representative of Australia, Ambassador David Sadleir, spoke very eloquently and in a comprehensive manner on the question of use in the statement he made on 1 April 1982. I have nothing to add to that statement. It suffices for me to recall that Indonesia, together with Australia, Argentina, China and Pakistan, has submitted a proposal for alternative wording for the scope of prohibition of the future chemical weapons convention.

Mr. van DONGEN (Netherlands): This is the first time that I take the floor to make a formal statement in plenary session of the Committee on Disarmament and it gives me great satisfaction to be able to do so under your chairmanship. In the short time that has elapsed since my arrival at Geneva, I have already learnt the value of your knowledge and your judgement, and when I therefore congratulate you on taking the Chair of our Committee, enlightened self-interest makes me congratulate myself as well that my first formal steps in the field of disarmament can be made under your guidance. Belated thanks are due to your distinguished predecessors, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran and Ambassador Alessi of Italy, and to the several colleagues who both formally and informally welcomed me to this body. Before going into the substance of my statement, I particularly wish to put on record, my respect for the work done here by my valued friend and predecessor, Ambassador Richard Fein. It is both a privilege and a challenge to follow in his footsteps in the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. Chairman, invoking rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure, I wish, like the distinguished representative of Indonesia before me, to introduce the joint working paper CD/270. After the intervention of my distinguished colleague, its subject-matter needs little introduction.

The Netherlands delegation has two good reasons for welcoming the opportunity to speak today, the first being the fact that, jointly with Indonesia, we can report on something that was actually done and not merely talked about in the disarmament sphere, the second that we can report on a joint effort made by the two countries concerned in an atmosphere of harmony and mutual trust.

Operation "Obong" can be regarded as an implementation "avant la lettre" of a possible chemical weapons treaty. Such a treaty remains of immediate priority for our two delegations and I am happy to note that one may conclude from the active negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons that this appears to be the case for all delegations and that keen interest has been displayed by a number of observers.

An essential element of any C/W treaty is the destruction of existing stockpiles of chemical weapons and chemical warfare agents under adequate international verification.

To generate maximum confidence in a C/W treaty, countries should declare all their stocks and if possible start destroying them before the treaty enters into force. This, of course, you realize, would be the optimal scenario. In reality, it is probably too much to expect that all countries will declare their operational stocks before the treaty enters into force, while destruction of operational stocks is likely to start only after the treaty has come into force.

At the same time, there are no reasons why obsolete stocks should not be declared and destroyed as of now. We know that several countries are in the process of destroying old stockpiles of chemical weapons or have already done so, recognizing the importance of removing extremely toxic materials from the environment. Publicizing such activities may help to build confidence and help other countries in the search for suitable methods of destroying their stocks.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

The destruction of chemical weapons and agents is often far from simple. Their extreme toxicity and, thus, the risks involved for the persons working at the destruction site require high safety standards. Transportation of old stockpiles can be dangerous and therefore undesirable. The possibility of adverse environmental effects must also be taken into account. As a result, the entire destruction operation is likely to be costly and time-consuming.

Between the two World Wars, a number of countries produced or possessed mustard agents. After the Second World War, several of them decided to destroy their old mustard stocks. Different destruction methods were designed. These were either highly complex --- in part because of the requirement for large quantities of water and/or decontaminants --- or entailed the risk of an unacceptable environmental impact.

Examples of the former are the hydrolysis method and the method used by the United States Chemical Agent and Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS); open-pit burning and ocean dumping are examples of the latter. All methods have their advantages and their disadvantages.

Today, the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands present to you a report on their joint operation to destroy a considerable amount of mustard agents. This technical report is contained in document CD/270. The operation described was, of course, adapted to the prevailing specific conditions, but, we are confident, that it also demonstrates that the destruction of mustard agents is a viable fairly simple and cost effective operation that can be carried out without endangering public health or the environment.

My distinguished colleague from Indonesia has already given you the sum of the historical background and I shall try to keep this part of my intervention as brief as possible. The stockpile at the site on the island of Java originally was intended as a deterrent against possible chemical warfare in the region. But as it turned out, chemical weapons were not used in the war that broke out. After the war, the plant that had been in operation to produce this stockpile was dismantled. But the mustard agent itself, stored in sealed tanks in underground shelters, was not destroyed. And only a few people were in possession of all the facts; in particular, neither the Indonesian nor the Netherlands authorities were aware of the existence of a stock of mustard agent. And only in the second half of the seventies was attention drawn to the matter by one of the persons who had been involved in dismantling the plant.

The Indonesian and Netherlands Governments then decided to eliminate the dangerous substance and they agreed that the Netherlands Government would provide technical assistance, including technical experts, and the Indonesian Government would be charged with providing logistics and guaranteeing security during the operation. The Prins Maurits Laboratory TNO in the Netherlands was charged with the provision of the technical assistance.

A fact-finding mission in April 1973 revealed the presence, on a site adjacent to an artillery range and in close proximity to an inhabited area, of five steel tanks of 10 cubic metres each in as many underground stone shelters half-filled with water. One of the tanks had corroded to such an extent that the contents had apparently leaked out. Yet no mustard agent could be detected in relation to that tank although decomposition products were present. The other four tanks were found to contain mustard agent, to an estimated total of 55,000 litres.

(Mr. van Dongen, Netherlands)

The presence of such a large amount of mustard agent in close proximity to populated areas and the possibility that the tanks could leak were, of course, of great concern to the Indonesian Government. Consequently, it was decided that the agent should be disposed of as quickly as possible.

Several methods of destruction were considered, taking into account that on-site destruction was necessary since transport of the agent over large distances was evidently too risky. This latter factor limited the available options, in view of restrictions on energy, on water and on material supplies. The methods I mentioned earlier --- hydrolysis, the CAMDS and TAMDS methods, open-pit burning or ocean dumping --- were therefore rejected. Other methods were also rejected, mainly because they presented disposal problems.

In the end, the decision was made to use a method of controlled incineration. A specially-designed incinerator was built in the Netherlands and shipped to Indonesia. After the Indonesian ABC Defence Corps had made the necessary preparations on the site, the construction and the testing phase started. This phase lasted for about a month. The actual incineration of the mustard agent took place in June 1979. A total quantity of 32,000 litres of mustard agent was destroyed. You will find in the working document a detailed description of the incineration method, as well as of the difficulties encountered in the destruction of part of the stock.

What lessons can be drawn from this operation and the history behind it? The first is that the destruction of considerable quantities of mustard agent under the conditions described can be safely carried out in a reasonably short period of time and with relatively simple equipment.

The second, no less important, is the demonstration of the value of co-operation. We have here a tangible example of a joint, practical effort to help build the basis for a treaty banning chemical weapons altogether.

The third lesson concerns verification. During the destruction operation, due attention was given to a possible verification mechanism. Supposing for a moment that the Obong operation had taken place under a chemical weapons convention, the question of a required type of verification would then, of course, have arisen. And our reply would have been that, with the technology now available, only on-site inspection on a regular basis would have provided adequate proof that the chemical warfare agent had indeed been effectively and totally destroyed. Theoretically, possibilities of remote observation and control exist, but they are still a long way from becoming operational. Much research and development will be required before the feasibility of such a system can be established. For the foreseeable future, only on-site inspection during the destruction will provide adequate verification for the destruction of stockpiles, as in Operation Obong.

These are some preliminary observations as an introduction to document CD/270 jointly circulated by the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands. Our two delegations intend to arrange for a presentation of a more technical nature in this Committee later in the year.

It goes without saying, and in this I am sure that I can speak for my Indonesian colleague, that both our delegations are prepared to answer any question that may arise concerning this operation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sri Lanka, His Excellency Ambassador Jayakoddy.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, T.S. Eliot, perhaps with poetic licence, described April as the "cruellest month". Let me hasten to say that my delegation does not think that the month of April needs to be the cruellest month either for you or for the other distinguished representatives in this Committee. It can become a hard and punishing month in which the Committee endeavours to complete its work, hopefully with a measure of success.

Your long and distinguished record of work in this Committee and the intense commitment to disarmament of your country, its Government and its people are greatly appreciated by distinguished representatives here. It is therefore an honour and privilege for my delegation to welcome you as Chairman, wish you success and, at the same time, pledge to you our fullest co-operation and assistance. We are confident that you will, with your infinite patience, great competence and unfailing courtesy, help to bring the Committee to a successful conclusion of its current session.

We were privileged to have the distinguished Ambassador of Italy to guide us through the Ides of March. The last month was a difficult one for all of us. It called for quiet diplomacy, tenacity and skilled persuasiveness to steer the Committee towards important decision-making. Ambassador Alessi demonstrated all these qualities in ample measure, thus helping the Committee to make several strides towards accomplishing the tasks before it. My delegation would like to express its sincere thanks to Ambassador Alessi for his invaluable contribution during the month of March.

I wish to make a few observations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which is on our agenda for today. We have all accepted that a comprehensive programme of disarmament could become the centre-piece of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I do not wish to anticipate what kind of centre-piece it will be, but my delegation hopes that it will not be a disappointment to those who hope for something significant and substantial. The Committee owes a very large debt of gratitude to distinguished Ambassador García Robles for his indefatigable chairmanship of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. He has, with great pains, unswerving determination and single-minded commitment, tried to move the negotiations forward. What has been achieved up to now in the Ad Hoc Working Group is modest, but there is still time and an even greater desire for more accomplishment. We hope that, by the end of this session, we shall have something worthwhile to place before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation has no illusions about what the eventual adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament could mean. We do not think that the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament by the Committee and its adoption by the special session will trigger an avalanche of instant disarmament that will make us turn our military weapons into ploughshares. Nor will it, by itself, end the nuclear arms race or reliance on deterrence and counter-force strategies to ensure national security. Our expectations are more limited. A comprehensive programme of disarmament will, in our view, be a starting point that reflects a common will and

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

commitment to initiate a balanced, comprehensive and realistic process that encompasses genuine and effective measures of disarmament being negotiated and implemented. It will, in our view, signify that we accept a framework of positive, affirmative action towards general and complete disarmament, taking into account the various interrelationships between security, military preparedness and the desire to create an international order in which war is not used any longer as an extension of politics and diplomacy. It is in this light and based on such a hope that my delegation views the formulation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and its eventual adoption and implementation.

I would like to touch on two matters that will be referred to in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The first refers to the establishment of zones of peace. I have in mind here, specifically, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. As the distinguished representatives on this Committee well know, my country has, since 1972, been active in promoting the concept of the Indian Ocean being declared a zone of peace. Sri Lanka's unswerving commitment to this proposal and our uninterrupted pursuit of this goal are based on the deep conviction that its realization can eliminate a serious threat to the peace and security of the entire Indian Ocean region. The militarization of the ocean that has been under way over the last decade has resulted in an escalation of tension and has given rise to great concern that the Indian Ocean could become a nuclear battle ground. This is an eventuality that we wish to avoid by taking all effective measures before it is too late.

Keeping this in view, my delegation has, in the course of negotiations on the CPD, emphasized the importance of formulating the measure dealing with the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace with accuracy and clarity and of attaching the necessary high priority to it in the process of implementation. We feel that failure to recognize the full significance of this measure, or a postponement of its implementation to a far-distant date, will contribute to a further aggravation of tension and the widening of nuclear conflict areas in the world. We therefore hope that the measure and timing of its implementation will be reflected appropriately in the CPD by consensus and without reservations.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the machinery and procedure envisaged in the CPD to promote the disarmament process, to review continuously the progress of implementation and to hold special review sessions. These are vital functions to assist and ensure that the CPD is being implemented and to identify problems or set-backs that may be experienced. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that progress in implementation will be influenced by a wide variety of factors and interrelationships in different degrees. Adjustment, readjustment and the need for changes of pace, taking account of developments, particularly in the fields of science and technology, will have to be considered on a systematic basis if realism is to prevail.

These requirements help to underline the need for a more comprehensive review of institutional arrangements relating to disarmament within the United Nations system. This question has already been recognized and we have the report of a Group of Experts

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

on institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. The report will come before the second special session. It is necessary to refer in this connection to the proposals made at the first special session regarding institutional arrangements relating to the disarmament process and the role of the United Nations in this field. Paragraph 125 of the Final Document has listed all of them. They include the proposal for a world disarmament authority made by the President of Sri Lanka, His Excellency J.R. Jayewardene. Subsequently other proposals were made in the General Assembly.

All these proposals, in our view, merit serious consideration by this Committee, as well as action by the second special session and future sessions of the General Assembly. It is our view that the process of refining and revitalizing the United Nations disarmament machinery has not ended. We feel that the proposals that have been made contain very useful elements which can be refined and elaborated further before being given an institutional character. They could then enhance considerably the central role of the United Nations in promoting disarmament and stimulating more accelerated negotiations.

Even a cursory study of the activities of member States in the United Nations General Assembly in recent years on disarmament issues clearly illustrates the quantum leap that has taken place in their interest in disarmament. Equally significant is the fact that the issues have increased not only in number, but also in complexity and pervasiveness. The adoption of a CPD will make its own impact on existing disarmament machinery and institutional arrangements. If we are fortunate enough to witness the adoption and implementation of a CPD, we can surely hope to see at least a marginal increase in the further commitment of States to the acceleration of disarmament and a bigger increase in the determination of people all over the world to pursue the goal of disarmament.

In the light of these conditions, it is the view of my Government that it is neither premature nor utopian seriously to consider the need to bring existing disarmament machinery and institutions fully into line with the current needs of disarmament and, to some extent, even to foreshadow future developments.

My delegation considers, therefore, that any reference in the CPD to the question of machinery and procedure should serve a wider purpose, namely, to contribute to the examination of all existing institutional machinery within the United Nations system related to disarmament with a view to fashioning the most effective arrangements which will fully respond to current conditions and needs and effectively serve the new needs that hopefully will emerge in this second Disarmament Decade. My delegation hopes that this will become the shared interest of all delegations in this Committee and at the second special session.

Finally, my delegation welcomes the statement that was made this morning by the distinguished Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Fields, to the effect that the distinguished President of his country, Mr. Reagan, will address the second special session. We hope other distinguished leaders, too, will participate in this session to make it the success it deserves to be.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jayakoddy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Mr. Noleşcanu.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all associate my delegation with the congratulations and the warm welcome extended to you on the occasion of your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April.

Your qualities as a diplomat, negotiator and colleague are well known to the Committee and stand as evidence that our work during this difficult month will take place in the best possible conditions for the positive conclusion we all desire. I should like to assure you that you will have my delegation's full support in the discharge of your important responsibilities.

I should like to take this opportunity of warmly extending to Ambassador Mario Alessi of Italy my delegation's most sincere thanks for the efficiency, courtesy and friendship which characterized his chairmanship.

In its statement today, the Romanian delegation would like to refer to the agenda item relating to the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Since the initiation of negotiations on this subject within the Committee, the Romanian delegation has had several opportunities to express its views on the importance of the elaboration of such a document in the context of the second special session devoted to disarmament, as well as its standpoint with regard to the Programme's structure, content and general approach. We have supported the initiatives aimed at securing the achievement of that objective and, in particular, the proposals of the neutral and non-aligned countries of the Group of 21. At this stage in our work, I shall therefore confine myself to making a few observations.

An analysis of the stage reached in our negotiations on this subject does not give us cause for much optimism. Despite the intensification of efforts and the negotiations that have been going on under the able chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, the Romanian delegation considers that we are still far from having a broadly acceptable draft document for submission to the special session. This leads us to believe that, in the days to come, we shall be forced to take a decision of principle concerning the way in which we should present to the special session the results of the efforts we have made in the Committee.

It must be acknowledged that the task of drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament is certainly a complicated one. It involves nothing less than re-establishing general and complete disarmament as the foremost task of disarmament negotiations and, to that end, formulating a coherent set of measures that will lead to the achievement of that objective. This amounts to saying that the task has been to prepare, on the basis of the existing documents and, primarily, the Programme of Action of the first special session devoted to disarmament, a genuine disarmament strategy for the years to come.

Secondly, it must also be recognized that, since the beginning of our negotiations, there has been a difference of approach, and that, despite the negotiations, it has not vanished. On the contrary, we would rather be inclined to say that these differences of approach have been reflected throughout our discussions and have left their mark on

(Mr. Meleşcanu, Romania)

specific issues relating to the programme, especially the legal force, the phases of application and the terms for the implementation of the measures. It is quite obvious that, in these circumstances, it has been difficult to arrive at concrete, generally acceptable formulations for the substance of the draft programme.

The proposal by the Chairman of the Working Group to set up a drafting body to try to find possible ways of reaching an agreement represents, without any doubt, one of our last chances to equip ourselves to submit a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament to the special session. The Romanian delegation supports this initiative and, for its part, is ready to make a constructive contribution to these activities. At the same time, we should like to point out that this exercise should take place within the limits set by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and those deriving from the practical value which we should like to impart to the programme.

With regard to our mandate, the Final Document of the first special session states that the Committee on Disarmament should elaborate a "comprehensive programme of disarmament".

My delegation considers that the following consequences may be drawn from the contents of paragraph 109 of the Final Document:

We are supposed to elaborate a programme and, therefore, an instrument in which the time element must be present. Even if it is a question of indicative time-frames, as many delegations have emphasized, the time element is, in our opinion, an essential feature of the programme.

Secondly, we have been asked to elaborate a comprehensive programme. For us, this means that the document will contain a comprehensive set of measures designed to lead from the present situation to general and complete disarmament. We should like to stress that this concept implies at the same time the existence of several phases of implementation, for the process in question is a long-term one that cannot conceivably be completed all at once.

Thirdly, the special session instructed us to elaborate a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I should like to stress the word "disarmament", as it is an important indication. What the General Assembly has in mind is the elaboration not merely of some arms control measures, but of a genuine programme of disarmament having as its objective the halting of the arms race and the initiation of a real process of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament.

In addition to these limits which stem from the mandate given to the Committee on Disarmament by the special session of the United Nations General Assembly, there are also practical considerations which must be taken into account.

If the comprehensive programme of disarmament is to be of any practical use, it should not be a carbon copy either of the Programme of Action adopted by the first special session devoted to disarmament or of the Programme of the Second United Nations Disarmament Decade.

(Mr. Meleşcanu, Romania)

As my delegation has repeatedly emphasized, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be a genuine practical instrument for the mobilization of the political will of all States in favour of disarmament. Consequently, it is unimaginable that it should be given no more binding force than that of a mere resolution, even one adopted by consensus. My delegation supports any initiative designed to make the programme as binding as possible, in order to make it a real practical instrument for starting the disarmament process, beginning with nuclear disarmament.

We are convinced that the time has come for all delegations, including our own, to show goodwill and a spirit of compromise so that we may finalize the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament. My statement today is intended to assure you of the Romanian delegation's desire to contribute to the achievement of solutions which are as widely acceptable as possible. Nevertheless, it should be stressed, as we have already done, that there are, stemming from our very terms of reference, as well as from the considerations of practical usefulness that we must bear in mind with regard to this important document, limits to every spirit of mutual understanding.

It is in this spirit that my delegation is prepared to co-operate, both now and in the future, in the elaboration of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Brazil, His Excellency Ambassador de Souza e Silva.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, it is, for my delegation, a source of special satisfaction to see you in the Chair of our Committee, not only because of your personal qualities of diplomatic skill and statesmanship, but also because of the very close and co-operative ties that prevail in the relations between our countries. The same I could say of your distinguished predecessor, and of the relations between Italy and Brazil. To Ambassador Alessi I should like to pay a warm tribute for the highly praiseworthy manner with which he discharged his functions last month.

The first part of the 1962 session of the Committee on Disarmament started and is about to end under the shadow of heightened confrontation between the two major military alliances and particularly between the Superpowers. Both sides utilized this chamber, a negotiating forum, for rhetoric or propaganda, blaming each other for the armaments race and misconduct in international relations. Since their mutual relations are based on hostility and mistrust, the accumulation and improvement of weapons of mass destruction is seen as a viable answer to their security problems. They have also made it clear, by implication, that the individual security of nations outside their immediate system of alliances has but little impact on their over-all strategic policies. Accordingly, they do not seem to assign to multilateral fora anything more than a marginal role. This situation has, of course, a direct bearing on the ability of this Committee to fulfil its mandate.

In assessing the first half of the 1962 session, one striking feature immediately comes to the forefront: the unwillingness of the nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies to accept even an initial engagement, let alone a clear commitment, seriously to undertake multilateral negotiations on any measure of nuclear disarmament. This has been especially apparent during the protracted activities of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, but let us briefly examine the current status of the work on each of the items of our agenda.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

I will not make comments on item 1 (Nuclear test ban), on which procedural negotiations are being held. My delegation and several others have been actively participating in these negotiations on the formulation of a mandate and it is our hope that all delegations will show enough flexibility and spirit of understanding to allow those efforts to come to a successful end, so that the Committee may at long last deal with the substantive aspects of the question.

Of the remaining six substantive items, only one has been the subject of concrete multilateral efforts to elaborate a convention banning a certain category of weapons of mass destruction. The laborious process of providing the Working Group on Chemical Weapons with a negotiating mandate for the performance of such a task bespeaks the reluctance of some major Powers to enable the Committee to discharge its functions. Work on the "elaboration" of a chemical weapons convention has been plagued by dispute over accusations of the past and present use of such weapons. Moreover, one side openly embraces the debatable theory that, by increasing the sophistication of its chemical arsenals, it will provide an "incentive" for the other side to come to terms at the negotiating table. Its opponent refuses even to consider including the prohibition of the use of such weapons in the scope of the convention and does not seem prepared to ascribe a meaningful role to international means of verification in the mechanism aimed at ensuring compliance with its provisions. By the time the new generation of chemical weapons starts to be deployed, the other Superpower will probably claim that it, too, must procure the same kind of weapons with which to face the new threat coming from the potential adversary. In such a climate, prospects for the early conclusion of a convention seem very slim.

In the field of radiological weapons, a different situation reflects the same realities. Here, the two Superpowers, having agreed in happier times on a draft treaty to ban a kind of weapon the precise definition of which they themselves seem at pains to supply, have asked the Committee to sanction their agreement as fast as possible, so that this body can at least present the United Nations with one specific text. Some delegations, however, not convinced either of the timeliness or the usefulness of the initiative, sought to inject some substance in that draft. Their substantive proposals, which dealt mainly with the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities, with the link between radiological non-armament and nuclear disarmament and with the effective promotion of the peaceful uses of radioactive material, all met with fierce objection from the proponents of the original draft treaty. A meaningful instrument on radiological weapons will remain a distant possibility as long as the Superpowers insist on dealing with this question according only to their own strategic perceptions.

But it is in the chapter on negative security assurances that the confrontation between the Superpowers and, for that matter, among all nuclear-weapon Powers, has had a definite paralysing effect on the procedures of this Committee. Their declarations on security are solely aimed at each other, while the right to security of the rest of the world has been utterly disregarded.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, also subject to the same distortions, has continued to elude this Committee. In the painstaking process of putting together the various chapters of the draft programme, the nuclear-weapon Powers have clearly avoided undertaking any definite commitment to nuclear disarmament. The vagueness of their own proposals and their inability to accept even the slightest

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

indication of the timing for the implementation of the various phases of the programme cast serious doubts on the possibility that the second special session will adopt any effective such document by consensus. In the absence of a negotiated compromise, the last resort might only be to utilize the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly for the adoption of the programme.

The consideration of the new item introduced this year in the agenda of the Committee, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, again reflects the confrontational aspect of the relationship between the two Superpowers, already evident in the formulation of the two resolutions adopted by the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly on the matter. Each resolution seeks to prohibit the development of specific space activities in which each side perceives the other as holding a technological edge. Brazil cautioned the First Committee last year about the possibility that the introduction in our agenda of an item on outer space might prove detrimental to the pursuit of efforts towards a structured treatment of item 2 (Nuclear disarmament) in the Committee. It seems now clear that our fears were not ill-founded. Last year, this Committee held an interesting, albeit inconclusive and oddly secretive, debate on item 2 of its agenda. During this first half of the 1982 session, however, the treatment of this priority item has gone no further than its mention in statements in plenary. My delegation, for one, views this development with the utmost concern, since the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have been assigned the highest priority by the United Nations. We would again urge the Committee to devote adequate time to item 2 of its agenda at the forthcoming second part of the 1982 session.

In a word, the ability of the international community to negotiate effectively in the field of disarmament has so far been the most conspicuous casualty of the heightened climate of hostility and confrontation between the Superpowers.

This rather grim assessment of the results of the first part of our 1982 session points to the urgent need to take serious stock of the current situation in the field of disarmament. This Committee was created, four years ago, upon the trust of the community of nations that the fundamental tenets of the Final Document would be observed in good faith in the pursuit of a common goal. These fundamental tenets stand clearly above the natural fluctuations of the changing relationship among nations and should not be questioned at the whim of such changes. Yet, in this short span, some members have openly questioned their validity and refuse, by word and deed, to live by the commitments they solemnly undertook in May 1978. Arguments to the effect that the realities of the world situation now justify a different attitude are misleading inasmuch as reality is also a consequence of the very actions and perceptions of nations, particularly the most heavily armed. The assessment of reality, moreover, should not be restricted to the state of the relationship of the Superpowers and their allies; it encompasses the aspirations and the security needs of the vast majority of nations as well. It is thus for all nations together, particularly those that bear the greatest responsibility for disarmament, to reinforce the commitments formally undertaken, rather than detracting from them by narrowly seeking individual security at the expense of the security of others. The special responsibility for disarmament does not mean exclusive responsibility for negotiations; it makes the nuclear-weapon Powers accountable before mankind and does not confer upon them any special privilege.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

The second special session devoted to disarmament offers a chance for such serious stock-taking and for a political understanding of great significance for the future of mankind, an understanding that would have its conceptual basis in the Final Document and would find its operative expression in a meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. The most powerful States on earth, however, now seem to have second thoughts about the conceptual basis provided for in the Final Document, which ought to be incorporated in the comprehensive programme. Until they realize that there is no alternative to disarmament, mankind should not be condemned to watch helplessly as the threat of nuclear war looms larger ahead. The special session offers a framework for achieving political definitions and finding pathways for action on the most pressing issue of the prevention of nuclear war.

Nuclear war cannot be prevented by heightened confrontation or simply by increasing the odds of destruction against a potential adversary. There must be instead a strong political commitment to act now, through appropriately binding agreements, to ensure that nuclear war no longer remains a contingency in the strategic planning of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Such a bold step forward would be even more effective in a disarmament perspective and must thus be predicated upon a genuine will actively to seek nuclear disarmament. Will, in political matters, derives from the conviction of one's legitimate interest and perceived needs. It seems, however, hardly possible to assert that there is any legitimate interest or need to pursue the course of nuclear armament when such a course is seen as a threat by the very populations whose security it was originally designed to protect.

The Superpowers have in the past concluded partial agreements between themselves with a view to preventing the possibility of a nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, such as the establishment of hot lines, limited exchanges of information and the like. While those agreements are certainly useful, they lack the disarmament perspective which is demanded by the community of nations. Such agreements were designed to minimize or offset the involuntary use of nuclear force, which is voluntarily kept in a constant state of preparedness for a strike. They seek to bolster reliance on and acceptability of nuclear force and not gradually to phase out existing nuclear arsenals. Prevention of nuclear war in an operative sense should aim at a much more ambitious goal. It must look beyond the narrow perspective of parochial security interests towards genuine security for all nations.

All nations of the world, including the peoples of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies, wherever they can be freely heard, demand explicit reassurances that will allay the growing fear of extinction. Resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus at the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, can supply the basis for the achievement of such a political commitment, which is of profound significance for the community of nations as a whole. Let the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament be remembered as the historic occasion when the nuclear-weapon Powers finally decided to use their might for the benefit of mankind and not for its annihilation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Today, document CD/271, entitled "Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification" and sponsored by the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia, was circulated in this conference room. In this official document, reference is made to a demonstration system which has been deployed since 1930 in certain countries, inter alia in Germany. Since there is no Germany, neither in the United Nations, nor in the Committee on Disarmament, nor elsewhere, I wonder which country is meant. To my knowledge, the German Democratic Republic has not joined this system. Perhaps the authors had in mind the Federal Republic of Germany? I would therefore like to ask the authors of this document, through you, Mr. Chairman, to correct this part of the document and to use the names of countries in accordance with generally-recognized international practice. This is not only a matter of mutual respect, but also necessary to avoid any misunderstanding and possible misinterpretation. I am particularly grateful in this connection to the Russian translators, who, obviously on their own initiative, have made the necessary correction in the Russian version of this document.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Herder for his statement. Before I give the floor to the next speaker who has asked for it, may I ask the authors of this document if they would like to say anything?

Mrs. HOINKES (United States of America). On behalf of the United States and, I am sure, the co-sponsors as well, may I express our apologies for this oversight. I am sure that it will be remedied, with due haste.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): I have a small announcement. In June 1980, the Canadian delegation tabled in the Committee on Disarmament a compendium, a rather large document, dealing with arms control verification proposals. This document surveyed a number of proposals -- I think well over several hundred -- which had been put to the Committee and its predecessor bodies and which emanated from some very ambitious and energetic people in Ottawa. They have now updated that original compendium and it is my honour to submit it to you, with the request that it be circulated to members of the Committee for their interest, enjoyment and amusement.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Skinner. Are there any other delegations which would like to take the floor? That does not seem to be the case.

Distinguished delegates, the Secretariat has circulated today at my request Working Paper No. 59, dated 2 April, as well as a communication received from the Permanent Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations Office at Geneva. Copies of that communication were also placed in the delegations' boxes last Friday. The last decision follows the pattern of previous decisions adopted by the Committee in connection with requests from non-members of the Committee wishing to participate in its work. Before we adjourn this plenary meeting, I suggest that we suspend it briefly to consider Working Paper No. 59. We could then resume the plenary meeting and take the relevant decision if consensus exists? I see no objection to this suggestion. The plenary meeting is therefore suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 12.10 p.m. and resumed at 12.25 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The one hundred and sixty-ninth plenary meeting is resumed. I invite the Committee to take a decision on Working Paper No. 59. 1/ If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Before adjourning this plenary meeting, may I remind members that the Committee will hold this afternoon at 3 p.m. an informal meeting to consider the following questions: (a) the draft report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; (b) the closing date for the first part of the Committee's 1982 session; and (c) modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee.

I now give the floor to the representative of India, Mr. Saran.

Mr. SARAN (India): In the programme of work that you had circulated, there appears to be a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons also scheduled at 3 p.m. I had indicated in the Working Group the problems that could arise, particularly for small delegations like my own, from the holding of concurrent meetings, both of which will be considering very important questions. To my mind, it would be advisable for the Ad Hoc Group on Radiological Weapons to convene after the informal meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Saran; I was just about to address that question. The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons has asked for the floor to make an announcement.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Indeed the distinguished Indian colleague's concerns can be met easily because the Working Group, at its last formal session, did take a decision to make contact with the Secretariat to arrange for a meeting this afternoon subsequent to, rather than concurrent with, the informal meeting of the Committee and I expect that the Radiological Weapons Working Group will resume its work immediately upon conclusion of your informal meeting. In this context, I am happy to note that arrangements have been made with the interpreters to stay after 6 o'clock. However, the meeting time will be so limited as not to endanger the success of certain social functions that are likely to take place later in the day.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): As we have half an hour at our disposal, I would suggest that, to save time, we open the informal meeting to start consideration of this afternoon's programme now.

1/ In response to the request of Tunisia [CD/252 and CD/276] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Tunisia to participate during 1982 in the meetings of the ad hoc working groups on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapons States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. SARAN (India): My thanks are due to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. May I request similar consideration from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, who I see has also scheduled a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group simultaneously with the informal meeting tomorrow?

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Saran. Perhaps we should give Ambassador Sujka time to consider that request.

Meanwhile, I would like to seek your comments or reactions to the practical suggestion that emanates from Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. The proposal is that, since we have roughly another 30 minutes, the Committee might reconvene in an informal meeting and start the discussion that was supposed to take place from 3 o'clock this afternoon.

Mr. AKINSANYA (Nigeria): My delegation would not have any problem with the proposal of Ambassador Lidgard, but I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that it looks forward to hearing about progress made in your ongoing consultations on item 1.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Mr. Akinsanya; I will bear that point in mind. Does silence mean that the Committee is in favour of Ambassador Lidgard's proposal?

Mr. DON NANJIRA (Kenya): Of course, silence could mean agreement or disagreement, depending on how you look at it. However, I think most delegations were prepared to tackle this question this afternoon, and, usually, when a meeting ends earlier, there is the hope that we are going to leave earlier, to prepare for the next meeting. However, if the Committee decides to take up this matter now, it would mean that we would continue with it this afternoon. If the decision is to start the informal meeting now perhaps we could start with sub-item (b).

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Nanjira for his very useful suggestion. I would propose then, if there is no objection, that after we conclude the formal meeting of the Committee in a few minutes' time, we convene an informal meeting to discuss sub-item (b), which is the closing date of the first half of the 1982 session. Will that be agreeable to the Committee? Thank you very much, we will act accordingly.

Now I would like to invite Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to respond to the question put to him by Mr. Saran of India.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): I would like to respond in a most positive way to this requirement but I am afraid that it will be impossible. If the Chairman of the Working Groups are asked to present the reports of the subsidiary bodies to be included in the report of the Committee, to the plenary meeting on Thursday, 8 April, my Group would need prolonged discussion on the second reading of the draft which was prepared yesterday. It was discussed for the first time yesterday and it is scheduled to discuss it tomorrow afternoon, together with two other also rather complicated

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

issues, deriving from the programme of work of the Working Group for the spring session. This is why we have even discussed the possibility, or rather the necessity, of having a night session of the Working Group tomorrow. If the plenary meeting of the Committee does not consider the reports of subsidiary bodies on this critical 8 April, we can certainly agree with the suggestion to convene the meeting of the Working Group after the informal meeting of the Committee tomorrow at 3 o'clock. But it depends on the programme of the meetings and the issues to be discussed during the plenary meetings of the Committee. It is totally in your hands Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons was, I admit, more or less along the lines that I anticipated. I will recall that, when we adopted the timetable for this week, I referred to the need for simultaneous meetings in some cases, in view of the shortness of the time available to us before the end of the session. So I feel that we should try, after all, to hold simultaneous meetings, although it may cause some inconvenience to certain delegations. I do not think we have any alternative, but I would be willing to listen to the views of others. My inclination would be to have the meeting of the Ad Hoc Group on Chemical Weapons tomorrow afternoon while the informal meeting is in session.

Mr. SARIN (India): I realize that we have a rather full agenda in front of us, and that, in certain cases, it might be necessary to have simultaneous meetings, but so far we have avoided holding concurrently important meetings, such as the informal meeting to consider extremely crucial issues, and meetings of negotiating bodies. Of course, if it is the decision of the Committee to hold a meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group simultaneously with the informal meeting of the Committee, I would not object, but I would only like to make it clear that my delegation might find it necessary, when the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons comes before the plenary, to suggest rather drastic amendments if they do not correspond to our positions. My delegation would certainly not like to face the plenary of the meeting with such a situation, but we have certain important interests in the negotiations which are taking place in the Ad Hoc Working Group and we would certainly like to see a reflection of our views in the report. Informal consultations have been held along with other meetings which we have not been able to attend. Decisions which are taken in these informal consultations are not binding on our delegation, so I would like to make it clear that, while we have no objection to such simultaneous meetings being held, I would like to reserve the position of my delegation concerning any report which may be submitted to the plenary.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his statement and for his understanding and the point that he has just made will certainly be borne in mind by the Chairman in the scheduling of future meetings. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 8 April, at 10 a.m. I would wish to remind the members of the Committee that the time for the opening of the Committee on Thursday is 10 a.m. and not 10.30 a.m. Immediately after adjourning this meeting I will convene an informal meeting of the Committee to discuss the closing date. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.