

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 1 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio Okawa

(Japan)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIBENE  
Mr. V. ESPECHE GIL

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE

Belgium: Miss de CLERQ  
Miss G. VAN DEN BERGH

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. L. GOTZEV  
Mr. B. GRINBERG  
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. G.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA  
Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA  
Mr. J.L. GARCIA HERNANDEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE  
Miss L. GHAZERIAN  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN  
Mrs. L. PURI

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. B. MAUNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. S.O. BOLD  
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI  
Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. G. ANDERSSON  
Mr. S. ERICSON  
Mrs. G. JONANG  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J.I. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT  
Mr. H.E. SWIFT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Miss S.F. BURKE  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Miss M.E. HOINKES

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 168th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Distinguished members of the Committee, before we start the programme of work for this plenary meeting, I would like to make a brief statement on the occasion of assuming the chairmanship of the Committee.

Today we enter the third and last month of the spring session of this Committee and, in the remaining few weeks at our disposal, in addition to our normal work as the disarmament negotiating body, we have to prepare our report to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the results of our negotiating efforts over the past three years.

It is hoped that the second special session will produce concrete results or at least provide new and badly needed impetus for progress in the field of arms control and disarmament. In my own country, the expectations of our citizens are mounting daily and hardly a single day passes without the large daily newspapers carrying some article or editorial concerning the special session or disarmament in general; and I imagine this is also the case in many other countries. I could add that our activities in this Committee are also followed with considerable interest in Japan.

At such a moment, I feel particularly honoured to be given this opportunity of serving in the chair of this respected international forum. I assume this task with humility and a sense of great responsibility. I pledge to you all that I will do my best to fulfil my duty.

Fortunately, my two competent predecessors for this year, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran and Ambassador Alessi of Italy, have completed most of the ground work for this session and I am extremely grateful and indebted to them. I wish to pay them a tribute for the painstaking efforts and the most effective leadership they provided for us during the months of February and March. My task is therefore, with your guidance and co-operation, to try and wind up the work of our spring session in a reasonably presentable manner.

In this connection, I would like to express my respects to Ambassador Jainal and to Mr. Berasategui and to the other members of the Secretariat he so ably leads and say how much I shall be depending on them to support and assist me in my task.

Our main and immediate preoccupation is, of course, the completion of a meaningful and appropriate report for presentation to the second special session. At the same time, I trust my distinguished colleagues will agree with me when I say that we should not allow the second special session to make us lose sight of our long-range objectives and responsibilities as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Let us remember that, after the second special session, we must return to this room in the summer to resume our work and try to make real progress in substantive disarmament negotiations.

Before concluding these brief remarks, I may perhaps be permitted to mention a few practical considerations which I think will be relevant in view of the very limited time we have available to us this month. Firstly, I shall endeavour, to the extent possible, with your understanding and co-operation, to maintain punctuality in

(The Chairman)

the opening and closing of our meetings. Secondly, I shall seek your collaboration to keep interventions in the Committee and in informal meetings, as well as in informal consultations, as concise and to the point as possible. Thirdly, I wish to remind you of my suggestion last year that we could perhaps do with a little less formality in our proceedings, although I certainly do not wish to deprive my predecessor of the praise he so rightly deserves.

I count on your understanding, your co-operation and your support to enable me to steer our spring session to a successful conclusion.

The Committee continues today its consideration of item 6 of its agenda, entitled "comprehensive programme of disarmament". In any case, members wishing to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Sweden, Argentina, Cuba, Australia, Morocco, China and Indonesia.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Sweden, His Excellency Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, after your thoughtful remarks, it is my pleasant duty as the first speaker to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee for the month of April.

I do not think that I am going against your appeal for less formality because it is not formality when I express to you a few words concerning the sincere appreciation my delegation feels in seeing you in the chair for this difficult month of April, when we are supposed to conclude our work and make a meaningful summary of it in order to give the special session a good basis for its assessment of our achievements.

You, perhaps more than most of us here, are personally involved in and devoted to these matters. Not only that, you are also exceptionally experienced and skilled in leading international negotiations. It is therefore with great confidence that we look forward to your leadership during the month of April.

To your distinguished predecessor, I also would like to say a couple of words, namely, to express our appreciation of the way in which he led our work in the month of March. He did so with great calm, steadfastness and, of course, all the diplomatic skill that one can expect from an Italian diplomat and I think that it is with deep satisfaction that he can look back at his achievements of the past month.

I am going to speak today on item 7 of the agenda, the issue of preventing an arms race in outer space.

The peaceful uses of outer space are now, 25 years after the start of the space age, manifold and bring great benefits in areas such as communications, navigation, meteorology and remote sensing of the earth. It is no doubt of great importance further to advance the peaceful uses of this environment. Simultaneously, however,

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

military applications are rapidly assuming increasing importance. In fact, the vast majority of satellites launched so far have had a military mission. It is thus estimated that about 75 per cent of all satellites orbited since the start of the space era in 1957 have been launched for military purposes. Although it is true that a considerable portion of military satellites have a rather limited lifetime, they nevertheless illustrate the fact that outer space is being heavily militarized. Other factors of a qualitative nature give added reason for concern that outer space may become a future battlefield if nothing is done to prevent such a development.

We live in times of rapid progress in science and technology. What is science fiction today may well become reality tomorrow. This is true not least in the field of military technology and perhaps particularly so as far as the exploitation of outer space is concerned. Only a couple of decades ago, the military exploitation of outer space appeared as a fantasy to most people. Outer space has now become the main arena for the technological arms race. It is of capital importance to prevent this new domain from continuing to invite further costly investments in terms of human talent and material resources in a futile race for superiority and bargaining chips. The recent discussions regarding anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) and ballistic missile defence (BMD) provide examples of conceivable developments which would presumably be enormously costly and also destabilizing.

Awareness of the threatening evolution as far as outer space is concerned is certainly not new. Several attempts have been made to bring this matter to the attention of this Committee. I have in mind particularly the thoughtful contributions made by Italy and the Netherlands and, of course, the two resolutions adopted by the General Assembly last autumn, where the Soviet Union, as well as the western countries I just mentioned, played an important role in promoting multilateral negotiations on this issue.

It is a fact, well-known to all of us here, that disarmament negotiations are often outstripped by the pace of developments in military technology, which make warfare possible in environments which have so far been spared from militarization. This is a matter of great concern to my Government and no doubt to many other Governments represented in this Committee.

Efforts have already been made in this respect. One example is the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in outer space and reserves the use of the moon and other celestial bodies exclusively for peaceful purposes. Its provisions are, however, not sufficient to prevent a general arms race in outer space. Further efforts must be made in this regard.

This matter is now before the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation welcomes the fact that these important and, in some respects, urgent questions will be dealt with in the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. We consider that, after the initial exploratory talks taking place during the first part of this year's session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee should be established with an appropriate mandate in the summer of 1982.

The two Superpowers play a predominant role in the military and civilian exploitation of outer space. It is therefore a welcome development that they have already held bilateral talks on the problem of avoiding an arms race in this environment. It is regrettable that these talks have been suspended. In the view of my delegation, it is highly desirable that they should be resumed as soon as possible.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

However, outer space is a common province of mankind and its use or abuse is therefore a matter that concerns all countries. Even if the Superpowers have a clear technological lead, an increasing number of other countries will gradually be in a position to make use of outer space. It is also for this reason natural that the prohibition of an arms race in this domain should become the subject of multilateral negotiations.

It should be noted in this connection that satellites can make a very useful contribution in the disarmament field by providing the means for non-intrusive verification and surveillance. It is a well-known fact that surveillance by satellites has been tacitly accepted as a means of verification in the SALT context. Similar ideas are the basis for the timely and valuable French initiative on the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency. This initiative is all the more valuable and forward-looking in that it envisages a multilateral body which would play a crucial role in international verification, since it is unlikely that the verification techniques which are available to a small fraction of the countries of the world would achieve universal acceptance.

Our immediate concern, however, is, in accordance with the wording of item 7 of our agenda, how an arms race in outer space should be prevented. For a number of reasons, it is extremely difficult to define at the outset in exact terms the scope of limitations and prohibitions one should aim at in order to achieve an effective prohibition that would prevent undesirable developments without hampering legitimate activities in outer space. One problem is that some space systems have both military and civilian applications. Another is that some military systems may primarily have stabilizing effects and others may have destabilizing effects.

A fundamental question will be to consider whether efforts should concentrate on banning or limiting various weapons systems in space or on banning or restricting certain activities or actions which would constitute interference with or an attack against space objects. Perhaps a combination of both approaches is called for.

It seems appropriate initially to determine the extent to which existing provisions in treaties such as the 1968 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty and its subsequent Protocol need to be completed in order to cover existing and expected developments in outer space warfare.

As a matter of principle, it must be agreed at an early stage whether a prohibition should cover all military satellites or concentrate on those space systems which are primarily and increasingly integral parts of terrestrial warfare systems.

Another matter of principal importance is the extent to which it would be possible and desirable to limit research on and the development, testing and production of military space systems.

A third issue which must be dealt with initially is whether one should aim at a comprehensive convention or apply a step-by-step approach. If the latter alternative is chosen, it would seem appropriate to establish a list of priorities according to which the most threatening developments would be subject to negotiations first. It is, for example, quite conceivable that the problem of anti-satellite warfare should be addressed at a very early stage. This question also comprises complicated problems of definition, as so pertinently illustrated by the distinguished representative of Italy last Tuesday.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

It would seem to my delegation that, primarily, all devices that have the purpose of hampering the stabilizing uses of outer space should be prohibited. Verification through technical means must not be interfered with. At the same time one must also be aware of the problem of asymmetry which may arise in military conflicts between space Powers and other countries as far as space communications for military purposes are concerned. A considerable number of existing satellites are designed to give early warning of attacks. If they were to be eliminated, the adversary might well react in an unpredictable way. Such destabilizing undertakings should, in the view of my delegation, be prohibited.

It is Sweden's view that outer space itself, as is already the case for the moon and other celestial bodies, should be reserved for exclusively peaceful purposes. However, it is a well-known fact that military uses of outer space are frequent and far-reaching. It therefore becomes a matter of paramount importance to prevent such activities from having a hampering effect on existing and future civilian and peaceful uses of outer space.

It is obvious that the monitoring of military activities in outer space and the verification of compliance with future limitations and prohibitions will entail a number of difficult political and technical problems. My delegation attaches great importance to this matter and wishes to stress the need to strive for multilateral solutions to these problems.

General knowledge of what is going on in terms of current and potential military developments is particularly limited as far as outer space is concerned. Here, as in other areas of the global arms race, excessive secrecy is one of the main driving forces behind the race. If the leading space Powers are really interested in reaching agreements with prospects of universal adherence, they should be forthcoming in providing information and answering the questions which will no doubt be put to them in this Committee. My delegation therefore urges them not only to resume their bilateral talks on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, but also to give a comprehensive report to the Committee on the issues and problems of substance they are faced with in these talks. This will enable the Committee on Disarmament to address the issues and to make progress in parallel with the bilateral efforts by the leading military Powers.

There can be no doubt that the space Powers and, especially, the leading among them bear special responsibility for preventing an arms race in outer space. Developments in the field of space technology are such as to widen the gap between the leading powers and most members of the world community. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that the present oligopoly will last forever. The sooner this is realized and accepted, the better the prospects for progress in the forthcoming negotiations, for the benefit of us all.

It is not too late to avoid a fruitless arms race in outer space, which would waste enormous resources and make our planet still more insecure. But time is a crucial factor in disarmament negotiations. The longer we wait, the more difficult it will be to tackle the many complex problems we shall face.

**The CHAIRMAN:** I thank Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, His Excellency Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out in your opening remarks, last year, during the Committee's informal consideration of ways of improving its functioning, you and I were among those most strongly in favour of doing away with what had become a ceremony of congratulations extended to the new Chairman by all members of the Committee and of having that pleasant task performed by one representative only. However, as you have said, the fact is that it is very difficult to give up a practice which indeed simply reflects the truth. It is for that reason that I take great pleasure in expressing satisfaction at having you preside over our deliberations during the current month of April and in wishing you every success, which will also represent a success for all of us, since the last month of a session usually involves a great deal of work and the need for exceptional efforts to bring our three months of work to a satisfactory conclusion. For this, you can count on the Argentine delegation's firm and steadfast support.

At the same time, I wish to extend to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Alessi of Italy, my delegation's sincere congratulations on the very efficient manner in which he guided the Committee's deliberations during the past month; the quality of his leadership was reflected not only in our formal and informal meetings, but also in all the work done outside this room; we have not all had an opportunity to know and, in particular, to realize how many consultations he had to engage in while presiding over the work of the Drafting Group, whose task was and is of particular importance. He did all this very well, with the distinction that is customary for Italian diplomats. It is therefore with genuine pleasure that I extend to him my delegation's warmest congratulations.

Today I shall refer to agenda item 3: "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question for more than three years, in pursuance of the provision of paragraph 59 of the Final Document, which I shall not read out since it is so well-known. I wish to point out, however, that the appeal made in this paragraph by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a transitional measure, pending the achievement of the fundamental objective contained in paragraph 56, which states that "The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons".

The Argentine Republic has expressed the view -- which it continues to hold -- that the "most effective guarantee" -- to use the words of the Final Document -- and perhaps the only guarantee of survival, in the true sense of the term "guarantee", that a State can have is the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

There is no need to repeat that this basic objective is now farther beyond our reach than ever.

The Committee on Disarmament has nevertheless set up an Ad Hoc Working Group on this issue for three consecutive years and has done so once again in 1982. The Group has done valuable work in identifying problems, clarifying positions, suggesting common formulas and seeking procedures that might serve as a substitute for a binding international convention, an instrument which, as everyone agrees, is as desirable as a goal as it is impossible to achieve, at least at the present time.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in its resolution 36/95, reaffirmed the urgent need to reach agreement on this matter and appealed "to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character."

The meetings held by the Ad Hoc Working Group in 1982 show that the positions of the States which should provide the guarantees — the nuclear-weapon States — have not undergone any change. For some time now, they have had what might be called crystallized by them approaches based on their strategic perceptions and on their respective unilateral declarations, which are all different and all contain conditions, requirements and escape clauses that so reduce their value as to make them meaningless as guarantees on which non-nuclear-weapon States can rely for their security.

In view of the rigidity of these positions and the comprehensive exploratory work done by the Working Group, it seems evident, in my delegation's opinion, that the next steps should be taken in the area of the political will of the nuclear States and that there is no longer any point in continuing sine die with theoretical debates confined almost entirely to the repetition of viewpoints that have already been expressed and discussed. There are also other items on our agenda that have not yet been discussed in depth and that perhaps offer better prospects of success.

It therefore seems logical to ask whether the time has not come to discontinue, for the time being, and I stress the words "for the time being", the efforts which the Committee has been making with regard to so-called "negative guarantees" and to say so frankly to the second special session of the General Assembly, as suggested in the statement made on 16 March 1982 by the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan. Perhaps the General Assembly can give fresh impetus to these discussions and the nuclear-weapon States can take advantage of this opportunity to announce new policies that are more in line with the desires of the non-nuclear-weapon States, which will be the beneficiaries of such guarantees and must regard them as satisfactory in order for this exercise to have some meaning.

The Argentine Republic continues to believe that the only measure which will justify this effort is a legally binding international instrument, without any conditions or limitations as to scope, which will protect all non-nuclear-weapon States and include an undertaking to work effectively for nuclear disarmament that will lead to the genuine and real guarantee, namely, the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

The experience of the Ad Hoc Working Group shows that this objective is still far beyond our reach, and all the alternatives proposed or mentioned (resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, identical unilateral declarations, etc.) do nothing more than restrict the importance of or nullify something that is in itself of no great value.

So long as nuclear weapons remain available for use, a convention on so-called "guarantees" will be nothing more than a palliative that will leave a great many questions unanswered. Can a declaration of intent really be verified? Can one be sure

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

that a nuclear State which considers its national security to be seriously threatened will not use every means at its disposal to defend itself? Will not the effects of a nuclear war also be felt in the territory of a State which is supposedly protected by a "guarantee", even though the State under attack is a different country which is not protected by the guarantee, but with which it shares a common border?

These and other questions which many of us are asking ourselves should not, however, hamper the search for means of enhancing — even if only to a small extent — the security of States which form part of a world in which a nuclear disaster seems increasingly possible.

It is to be hoped that the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the body through which the international community will express and put forward its views on this matter, which is, to an ever-increasing and more intensive degree, uppermost in the minds of peoples, will succeed in bringing about a resumption of the negotiations on item 3 of our agenda. This is yet another challenge the nuclear Powers face and, on this issue, as well as on others, a great deal depends on how much imagination and flexibility they show in trying to respond to the legitimate concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In fact, all issues which involve nuclear weapons are interconnected, and it can be said that the security of all States, or at least that of the non-nuclear-weapon States, will be enhanced if measures are taken to prevent a nuclear war.

It is perhaps not irrelevant to point out in this connection that resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus at the recent session of the General Assembly, urges, in its paragraph 1, "all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General ... (for consideration at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament) their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war".

To the best of my delegation's knowledge, no nuclear-weapon Power has responded to this appeal by the General Assembly, although the time-limit set in resolution 36/81 B, 30 April 1982, is very close.

The process is, however, already under way. On the basis of the provision of operative paragraph 2 of the same resolution, the Government of India submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, on 8 February 1982, its comments and proposals with regard to the prevention of nuclear war and I am sure that those proposals will receive careful consideration at the next Assembly.

My delegation considers, as it has already stated on other occasions, that the prevention of nuclear war continues to be a question of the highest priority and that, if the Final Document expressed that view four years ago, this urgency is, if possible, even greater today because the time that has passed since then has made the threat even more immediate.

It is therefore logical and inevitable that the second special session of the General Assembly should give careful attention to this issue and that, in order for this examination to lead to results which are concrete and feasible as well as positive, it will be essential and indispensable for proposals and practical suggestions to be made by all States concerned and, primarily, by the Powers which possess the means of unleashing a nuclear war.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

It is therefore to be hoped that the objective which prompted the adoption of resolution 36/81 B will actually be achieved. If it is, an important contribution will have been made to the work of an international meeting which is now the focus of our attention, namely, the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Carasales for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Cuba, His Excellency Ambassador Solá Vila.

Mr. SOLÁ VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): First, Ambassador Okawa, I would like to express my delegation's most sincere congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April; we are certain that, under your able guidance, demonstrated yet again when you were the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, this negotiating body will conclude its spring session for the year successfully. Allow me also to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, for the efficient way in which he conducted our work during the month of March.

The Ad Hoc Working Group established by this Committee to negotiate a convention banning chemical weapons is one of those that has, in our opinion, accomplished worthwhile work. Efforts to that end have been encouraged by the international community for many years and this negotiating body, in particular, has devoted a considerable proportion of its time to the subject.

Although, at the beginning of the Committee's work, the Working Group had a limited mandate which did not satisfy all delegations, this year at last its mandate has been broadened and the Group is, technically at least, fully in a position to complete its work successfully within a short time.

However, the hopes which many delegations placed in the work of this Group seem to be evaporating in the face of what is undoubtedly the beginning of a new escalation of the arms race: the decision to start manufacturing binary chemical weapons.

In his statement to the tenth World Trade Union Congress held recently in Havana, Fidel Castro, the President of the Councils of State and Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, said: "In present conditions, the improvement of any kind of weapon sets off a chain reaction that necessarily leads to the further development of weapons systems and makes the previous means of warfare obsolete, so that they are swiftly abandoned. Every day the cost of such systems rises and every day the period during which they will be effective is reduced. This is the absurd and irrational logic of the spiralling arms race".

The manufacture of this new generation of chemical weapons adds a further link to the disastrous chain which started with the decision to postpone ratification of the SALT II Agreement and continued with the decision to deploy new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and, more recently, the decision to start manufacturing nuclear neutron weapons.

It has been rightly said that the production of binary weapons makes the negotiations to ban chemical weapons far more complex, since it has a negative effect both on the determination of toxicity and on aspects relating to verification.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

In referring to the complexity of this latter question, document CD/167, submitted by the Canadian delegation just over one year ago on 26 March 1981, points out that the situation could become even more tense if the United States decided to renew its binary weapon capacity; unfortunately, that prophecy has been fulfilled.

The arguments used to justify production of this new generation of chemical weapons are based on the theory of deterrence and are therefore unacceptable to my delegation.

Speaking in this Committee on 25 March last, the representative of the United States said that an effective ban on chemical weapons was a way of increasing its own security, as well as that of its allies and the non-aligned and neutral countries. As the representative of a non-aligned country, I have to state in this respect that such an objective cannot be achieved by accelerating the chemical weapons race. Far from protecting the security of States, binary chemical weapons merely increase the dangers involved by placing substances that have traditionally been used for peaceful purposes in the category of chemical warfare agents.

Similarly and as a result of the foregoing, document CD/264 contains various arguments which do not bear close scrutiny.

These arguments, which are also based on the policy of deterrence and dramatize an imagined danger which does not in fact exist, are intended to give the impression that the objective sought is the strengthening of defence, when in fact it is to force negotiation from positions of strength.

It is now easier to understand the reason behind the false and tendentious allegations made about the use of chemical weapons in various regions. It is now more obvious that the idea was to condition public opinion in order to eliminate as far as possible any opposition to this new escalation of the chemical arms race.

The production of this new generation of chemical weapons is a serious obstacle to the work of this Committee and, in particular, to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the scope of the ban, toxicity criteria, transfers, declarations of stockpiles and production facilities and verification measures.

In order to give an idea of the foregoing, suffice it to say that the number of neuro-toxic substances which may be used as components of binary mixtures will not only tend to increase, but it will also be impossible to discount the development of substances with other toxic effects.

With regard to toxicity criteria, the Committee has already been informed of the existence of opposing criteria. It has been stated, rightly in our view, that the toxicity of binary substances cannot be determined either by their precursors or by the final products.

In the first case, binary substances would be classified in a lower category; in the second, the role of the by-products of the final reaction might well be unknown.

(Mr. Solá Vila, Cuba)

With regard to transfers, it should be noted that the danger of the proliferation of chemical weapons is growing: the purpose of certain transactions will be very difficult to determine since it is practically impossible to draw a distinction between chemical substances for commercial use and those for use as weapons.

Consequently, it will also be extremely difficult to demonstrate that violations have occurred.

It is worth noting that the declaration of chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities will become more difficult because chemical substances produced for commercial purposes may also be used to manufacture binary weapons. It should also be pointed out that this affects the developing countries which do not have chemical weapons and which will have to provide data on their economies that may deliberately be used to hinder their development.

Lastly, I would like to make some brief comments on verification measures. The development of binary chemical weapons has undoubtedly created a new situation and the methods of control which we have discussed for so many years do not appear to be able to guarantee with any certainty that a particular country has or does not have binary weapons.

The existence of chemical substances which can serve a dual purpose and be used both in civilian and in military industry detracts from the effectiveness of the so-called in situ inspections supported so strongly by some delegations. It can also be said that this situation lends itself to concealment of the funds which States allocate to chemical weapons and thus also affects the declarations we referred to earlier.

In view of the foregoing, it is essential to recognize the importance of a national system of verification and control under which States would, because their prestige was at stake, take all the necessary steps to guarantee strict compliance with an international agreement on the subject.

A national system of verification as a basis for the control of any agreement assumes considerable significance in terms of international verification measures, since the direct participation of States in the control of agreements to which they are parties would prevent doubts and suspicions concerning the implementation of such agreements and guarantee that the collection of the data needed for effective control would not be hampered.

In conclusion, we must recognize once again the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which were in progress on this subject outside the Committee, but which have now been unilaterally and unjustifiably interrupted. The resumption of those negotiations would undoubtedly help to solve many of the problems that arise in connection with the prohibition of chemical weapons and, in particular, with the work which this Committee is called upon to do in that field.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Morocco, His Excellency Ambassador Skalli.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, you will understand that I feel bound to say how pleased we in the Moroccan delegation are to see you presiding over our work for the month of April.

Your devotion to the cause of disarmament and your humanity are only part of the explanation for the conscientiousness and enthusiasm you display in bringing to the work of our Committee the invaluable contribution of your country, a great friend of my own.

These qualities, together with your great courtesy and perceptiveness, which are a reflection of the great civilization to which you belong, have made of you a man whose views and opinions are received here with respect and keen appreciation.

We are convinced that, under your chairmanship, the momentum created by your predecessor, the very distinguished representative of Italy, Mr. Alessi, will be sustained and continued.

I should like to devote my statement today to a problem to which my country attaches the utmost importance, namely, that of the security guarantees to be granted to non-nuclear-weapon States.

As you are aware, this is a problem that has been of concern to all non-nuclear-weapon States for nearly two decades. Serious efforts have been made in a number of international forums, such as the 1968 Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, and during the elaboration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The purpose of those efforts, it should be noted, was and still is to free the non-nuclear-weapon States from the fear of the use or threat of use against them of nuclear weapons. These countries want to obtain from the nuclear-weapon States a binding legal commitment that they will never use and never threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State that undertakes not to acquire such weapons.

These efforts have led to the results of which we are all aware: Security Council resolution 255 (1968), General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII) and the five unilateral declarations made by the five nuclear Powers.

Morocco, which, jointly with other non-nuclear-weapon States, has undertaken by virtue of its accession to the NPT not to acquire nuclear weapons in any way whatever, endeavoured at the Conference at which that Treaty was reviewed to obtain guarantees of the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Thus, at the first Review Conference held in 1975, the Moroccan delegation called for the adoption by the Conference of an international instrument relating to security guarantees that would form an integral part of the NPT.

We do not intend to dwell on the results to which those endeavours gave rise. They are well-known to all of us.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

At the special session in 1978 which it devoted to disarmament, the General Assembly gave fresh impetus to the efforts made in that area. For instance, in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of that session, the General Assembly, having taken note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, urged them to pursue efforts to conclude effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. My country, which considers that the results achieved, including the unilateral declarations, are inadequate, welcomed the adoption of paragraph 59 with satisfaction. It likewise welcomes the manner in which the Committee of Disarmament is dealing with the problem. It is worth recalling that, as far back as 1979, the Committee appointed, for this purpose, an Ad Hoc Working Group, which, until this session, had the benefit of the competence of the distinguished representatives of Egypt and Italy, who presided over it, as it now has the benefit of the experience and skill of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan.

Although we cannot underestimate the obstacles that stand in the way of a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character, we must pursue our efforts to achieve that goal.

The Committee's discussions have made it possible:

- (1) To identify some elements of the commitments not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States; and
- (2) To carry out a detailed and comparative analysis of the possible alternatives to a common approach or formula.

The discussions during the four sessions of the Group have provided a detailed view of the propositions before us. We are now faced with two approaches: on the one hand, an approach that provides for assurances to be granted without any condition, qualification or limitation and, on the other, an approach which requires certain criteria to be met in order to determine which non-nuclear-weapon States would be covered by the guarantees.

My delegation, which represents a country that has entered into a binding commitment, is unable to accept some of the conditions proposed by some nuclear Powers. In particular, it is unable to agree that non-nuclear-weapon States, such as Morocco, should be required to enter into additional commitments.

We cannot agree that States such as Morocco, which are Parties to the NPT, must wait for a nuclear-weapon free zone to be created in their region before claiming the benefit of security guarantees. My country is sparing no effort to establish nuclear-free zones in Africa and the Middle East. However, the efforts that have been made in the past two decades with a view to denuclearising the African continent have, unfortunately, been unsuccessful because of South Africa's totally negative attitude. The efforts to denuclearise the Middle East are also being deliberately obstructed by Israel. If these facts are borne in mind, one cannot but understand our attitude towards such a proposition.

Morocco can also not agree that the granting of assurances to a State Party to the NPT should depend on its accession to an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

As to the form of the international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Moroccan delegation has already stated on several occasions that it is in favour of concluding an international convention on the matter.

We are also pleased to note that, in principle, there is no opposition to such an approach.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Skalli for his statement and for his very kind words. I now give the floor to the representative of Australia, His Excellency Ambassador Sadleir.

Mr. SADLEIR (Australia): Mr. Chairman, it is with particular pleasure that, on behalf of my delegation, I congratulate you, the representative of a State with which Australia not only has strong regional ties, but a special treaty relationship, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee.

May I also express my appreciation to your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador of Italy, Mr. Alessi, on the efficient and sensitive manner in which he presided over us. That the Committee has been able, in difficult international times, to make recognizable progress on several important fronts is in no small way due to his personal efforts.

I turn now to two items on our agenda, namely, the issues of chemical weapons and of radiological weapons.

We, as the Committee on Disarmament, can take some satisfaction from the sense of priorities and timing that led us to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons; a Working Group which has, moreover, the mandate of elaborating an agreement to prohibit such weapons.

In one context or another, the attention of the international public is being drawn, increasingly, to these peculiarly sinister and grotesque tools of war. International concern at their very existence grows steadily. The topic is an emotional one, as it has been ever since the first horrific use of chemical weapons almost 70 years ago. Emotion is not a good basis for reasoned debate or substantive negotiation, but it lends impetus and urgency to the search for a convention designed to eliminate these weapons.

There are already important areas of consensus on the means of achieving and shaping such a convention. There is consensus, for example, on the need for such a convention. There is consensus on the aptness of this Committee as a body in which to negotiate a convention banning chemical weapons. There is consensus on the fact that chemical weapons are of considerable military value. That point is nowhere disputed in the publicity currently being given to these weapons. Indeed, it is partly their very efficiency, notably against civilians and the inadequately protected, which makes resort to them tempting and the need for a ban on them urgent.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

If chemicals of one sort or another are being used in the conflicts now taking place in too many parts of this earth, then there can be no doubt that those chemicals are taking a very severe toll. If, already, there is deployment on a large scale on one or both sides of the European military theatre, then that is because the use of chemical weapons in certain military contingencies offers a decisive advantage, even when those who constitute the target have some protection. If there is to be an increase in CW capabilities, for example through the development of binary weapons, this is because that increase in capabilities may serve to deter. I do not intend, here, to give an assessment of the various public reports that have appeared on these matters. But I will come back to them in describing the task before the Committee.

Two major issues remain to be resolved in our efforts to prohibit chemical weapons. Those are the issues of scope and verification. The issue of scope, including the important question whether or not there should be a ban on use, is a contentious one. Once again there is, however, consensus on some fundamental points. One of these is the sanctity of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, even though it does not do so in a comprehensive way. The Protocol is far from perfect, for it suffers from ambiguity, as well as a lack of comprehensiveness. Nevertheless, the Protocol of 1925 does have great merit: it is already in place, it is already part of the machinery of constraint and a great many States are parties to it. The Protocol will need to be referred to in the new convention towards which we are working, since whatever the scope of the new instrument, it will build on the achievement of 1925. What our convention should do is link itself, perhaps in its preamble, to the Protocol. In doing so, it should reinforce the Protocol. This reinforcement would then be mutual. The determination of the international community to make chemical weapons impossible would be unequivocal.

Some delegations have in the past expressed concern that a new convention could have the effect of weakening the 1925 Protocol. I do not think they need worry. When a treaty builds on an earlier one, the legal force of that earlier treaty cannot be weakened. Nor is there ambiguity of commitment. A party to one, but not to the other remains bound by the commitment it has made. If bound to both, the commitment is equally clear. In practice, it seems highly probable that all States parties to the 1925 Protocol will also move to adhere to the new convention.

Another fundamental point under the heading of scope on which there is consensus concerns the definition of the criterion of purpose. There is general agreement that some highly toxic chemicals will be permitted for production, stockpiling, retention, transfer and so on. Such chemicals will, for example, include pharmaceuticals. The essential criterion distinguishing permissible chemicals from those to be prohibited is the ends to which these chemicals are to be put. The definition of the general-purpose criterion is, and must be, the corner-stone of the treaty at which we aim: all other definitions refer back to it. In the definition of categories -- supertoxic lethal chemicals, lethal chemicals and other harmful chemicals -- the criterion of purpose will determine what is and what is not to be banned.

The criterion of purpose as applied to chemical warfare agents refers to the purpose for which they are made. They are produced for use in armed conflict in order to confer military advantage. Thus, the criterion of purpose refers, in fact,

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to the specific activity of gaining a military advantage, namely, the use of chemicals in war. In other words, the general-purpose criterion already refers to the use of chemicals in armed conflicts. It seems logical therefore to ban the use, as well as the production, stockpiling and so on, of toxic chemicals.

A ban on use is also logical from another point of view. The clauses of a CW convention aimed at determining whether or not the convention is being honoured are likely to be applied only when there are reports, suggestions or news that chemical weapons are being used. You may think that a pessimistic statement, what in the jargon of our times might be termed a "worst-case scenario", but it is for all that a realistic statement. Consequently, it seems to my delegation logical that provision must be made in a convention for a ban on use to be investigated and verified on its own merits. We should not make the problems of verification more difficult by introducing artificial constraints that permit verification only of less central and more oblique violations, such as unlawful production or stockpiling.

Even in the best case, use is pertinent: if our efforts are successful, that will be evident only by the fact that chemical weapons are not used. Whether or not there is unlawful production, stockpiling or transfer, there will be little real concern among States or on the part of world public opinion so long as there are no suggestions of use.

Recent reports of use in various conflicts bear directly on our task, both with regard to the scope of a future convention and with regard to its verification provisions. The United Nations is looking into these reports, but under considerable handicaps, not the least of them being the absence of agreed mechanisms. This is, in part, why the United Nations investigation has been extremely slow. The procedures for collecting and assessing material relevant to the United Nations team's enquiry are undetermined. The lesson to be drawn is that the convention we seek must provide for eventualities of this sort: it must ban use and it must establish machinery for complaints and for verification. Many sound ideas have been advanced on these aspects. Those ideas include proposals to link the new convention to existing instruments. In the Ad Hoc Working Group, detailed proposals have been put forward for establishing a consultative committee. One suggestion, which has not been made in this Committee before, but should not be ignored altogether, is for agreed, designated neutral States to make available a small corps which would specialize in verification techniques and could quickly investigate cases referred to it by the consultative committee. I mention these ideas to show not only that our work is urgent but that we should not have closed minds on the range of options open to us in tackling it.

Since the Committee on Disarmament first began work on this agenda item, it has benefited from the help of experts. Delegations have been able to draw on technical advice and feed it into the Working Group. This has helped in regular sessions of the Working Group and in separate exercises structured around specific problems such as

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the determination of toxicity. It is time, in the view of the Australian delegation, to develop this important aspect of our work. It is time that technical advice should be available when a political need for it has been determined. Conversely, technical advice can help to shape that political need and, indeed, ensure that the need is a real one or well-based or intelligently framed. My delegation considers that on aspects such as verification, it would greatly assist the Working Group to know what technologies are available and how they might be applied to our task. We have consistently supported, for example, the work done in this area by Finland and believe that this work will prove valuable. It is for this reason that we consider that the technology described as remote continual verification -- or Recover -- should be further examined. It is why we believe that the CW specialists should be convened here again in August to explore technical aspects of a future convention, as recommended in Working Paper No. 30.

We have heard a great deal about binary weapons at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation regrets any new development of chemical weapons, for whatever reason. We would be happy to see the shelving of any new development, including that of binary weapons. But some fundamental points need to be faced squarely. First, binary weapons are no more or no less than the sum of their parts: the known sum of known parts. For the purposes of our convention, as has been urgently argued by Yugoslavia in document CD/266, the parts can be called precursors, or more precisely "key precursors" and subjected to the same procedures as the chemicals which go to make up a chemical weapon of a non-binary type. The binary process -- involving chemical reaction during use -- would therefore be treated under the convention in the same way as the process of producing chemical weapons by a chemical reaction at a chemical plant. Secondly, are the most vocal opponents of this development in favour of a ban on binaries? If so what arrangements do they have in mind in practical terms for verifying such a ban? In my delegation's view, verifying a ban on binaries is no different from verifying a ban on other chemical weapons and it should, of course, involve on-site inspection. Finally, the clock cannot be stopped, let alone turned back. Assuming there was a ban on binaries, and an effective, verifiable one at that, we would still have to cope with the potential for binaries. We would still, in attempting to draw up a chemical weapons convention, have to acknowledge the possibility that a weapon could be constructed by mixing two chemical agents in flight. In other words, the issue of binaries is with us come what may: the problem is a technical one and it should have nothing to do with politics.

My last remarks on this item relate to the activity of the Working Group, under its dedicated Chairman, Ambassador Sujka of Poland. My delegation was pleased to see the mandate of the Working Group expanded. We were pleased that its new terms of reference permit specific wording to be tabled in the form of alternative elements of a draft CW convention. It is pleased too at the response of delegations to this development. It considers that a positive report on its

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current work can be made by the Working Group, through the device of an agreed Chairman's statement, to the second special session on disarmament. It considers that, at the resumed summer session, the Working Group will be able to go a stage further and seek to rationalize the various new alternative elements. Together with the elements and comments that constituted last year's report of the Working Group, under the distinguished chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. Such rationalization should mean that, by the end of the year, much of the work of elaborating a convention on chemical weapons will have been done. Many technical details will remain to be worked out. It may be that the questions of scope and of linkage with other instruments will not have been fully resolved by then. Nonetheless, we shall have taken a decisive step forward, a step which does much to meet earnest international hopes for real progress towards proscribing chemical weapons.

I now turn to the subject of radiological weapons, on which the Australian delegation has not spoken substantively in plenary for some time. That is because, in our view, more was to be gained by concentrating our efforts in the Working Group on resolving outstanding questions. For two reasons, we judge that the time has now come to speak out on some aspects of the Working Group's tasks. We note first that, building on the strong foundations laid last year by the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary, Mr. Komives, and under the driving leadership of this year's Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Wegener, there is a real chance of progress in the work on what is defined as the traditional subject-matter of negotiations on radiological weapons. Secondly, the Working Group has begun serious study of how to ban attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

On the text covering the traditional material, Australia last year sought to help define what constitutes a radiological weapon. This year, we have put forward in the Working Group four different definitions. In so doing, we hoped not so much to conceive a definition that would meet the stringent technical requirements that are needed, but to prompt creative thinking on the problem. In that respect, we believe we have succeeded. We earnestly hope that, once a technically sound definition has been achieved, political objections yet unvoiced will not impede its ultimate inclusion in a treaty. Many grey cells and much sweat have gone into the effort to devise a definition that can in no way be interpreted as legalizing the use of nuclear weapons. Discouragement and much disappointment would undoubtedly follow if doubts yet unexpressed on this way of proceeding were to negate it.

As to the other articles of the projected *RM* convention, we have been greatly encouraged by the workmanlike attitude of those taking part in the Working Group and firmly endorse the Chairman's view that we should try, before the second special session, to come as close as possible to an agreed treaty.

(Mr. Sadleir, Australia)

Frankly, my delegation has always seen a convention on radiological weapons as a marginal disarmament measure. Nonetheless, we have also regarded it as worth persisting in as a further step on the path to disarmament. Agreement, even near agreement, on the draft of a convention is, moreover, something which can only encourage us in our work and help ensure a successful special session. We need, in any event, quickly to despatch this particular monster so that we can attack with greater confidence the larger monsters that crowd our agenda.

As to the projected ban on attacks against civilian nuclear facilities, Australia still has under review how this might best be achieved. One thing, however, is clear: there is little to be gained from linking it in such a way to negotiations on the traditional material that neither is advanced. The banning of attacks on civilian nuclear installations will be, as even the first of our meetings has shown, a task of great complexity. It requires and deserves the full attention of a Working Group free from other preoccupations. It has, for example, been argued that so fierce are the consequences of the hostile dispersal of radioactive material from nuclear facilities that attacks on the whole range of installations involved in any way with such material should be prohibited. While this may sound like a good idea, it raises immense problems not only of verification, identification and marking of the facilities to be protected, but also of adequately delimiting perimeters and sanctuaries. Many countries are, moreover, so peppered with facilities which use or handle radioactive material for a wide variety of purposes, that an effort to ban attacks on all of them immediately runs up against insurmountable practical problems.

Thus, the Committee will need to look carefully at the problem of definition, especially at the lower, less dangerous, end of the spectrum, which includes such installations as spent fuel storage facilities, nuclear research establishments, factories working with irradiated material and radioactive material being transported between facilities. Australia, as a country with facilities at this lower end of the spectrum, is concerned to see a full exchange of views on all the options open to the Working Group in developing a definition of the kinds of facilities and installations to be protected by the projected ban. Accordingly, we would welcome any technical information and expertise that delegations can bring to the discussions. I do not want to finish this statement without stressing that my delegation brings an open mind to the matters encompassed by a ban on attacks against civilian nuclear installations and looks forward both to learning from and to co-operating with all delegations on this journey into relatively uncharted waters.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of China, His Excellency Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all, please allow me warmly to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. We believe that, with your diplomatic skill and rich experience, you will be able to guide our Committee to the completion of its arduous task in the last month of the spring session. I would also like to express our appreciation to Ambassador M. Alessi of Italy, who so excellently accomplished extensive work during the last month.

I would now like to express our views on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is a task entrusted to the Committee by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This is a reflection of the urgent desire of the people of the world that such a programme should help halt the arms race and promote disarmament. Since the Working Group on a CPD resumed its work last January under the skilled and experienced chairmanship of Ambassador García Robles, many meetings have been held and a great deal of work has been done. During this period of time, representatives of member States have held serious and intensive discussions and frequent consultations on the elements of the programme. As a result, they have further clarified their respective positions and views and gradually arrived at various degrees of convergence on some of the issues and achieved some progress. In this connection, I wish to express our appreciation of the active role played by the Group of 21. However, we cannot fail to note that, on the conceptual issues relating to the stages, nature and time-frame of the programme, the measures to be included in the programme and the procedures for the review of the implementation of the programme, differences still exist among various sides and agreement still eludes us. Greater efforts therefore still have to be made in this regard.

In our view, if a comprehensive programme of disarmament is really to accelerate the process of disarmament, we should, as stated by representatives of some States, make a step forward from the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The programme should encompass specific measures to be implemented by stages rather than merely listing various measures. For the promotion of the disarmament process, the measures of the initial stage are the most crucial. Measures for this stage should be as specific as possible. Their formulation should proceed in the light of the escalation of the arms race and the growing danger of war and it should reflect the principle that the States with the largest arsenals should be the first to reduce armaments so that the implementation of those measures may curb the arms race and reduce the danger of war. With regard to the question of how many stages should be included in the programme, various sides generally think that there should be at least three stages: the first, intermediate and final stages, with the intermediate stage being sub-divided into two or three stages if necessary. We view this approach as feasible.

With regard to the question of time-frames, views remain widely divergent. We are of the opinion that there should be an indicative time-frame for each stage. This would give us a sense of urgency in the implementation of the measures. If there is no time-frame at all or if States do not undertake to implement relevant measures within a time-frame, then the programme will lose much of its practical significance.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

Apart from an indicative time-frame, it is also necessary to define an appropriate review mechanism and procedures. Periodic reviews will not only promote the implementation of the programme, but also facilitate the adjustment of measures for the next stages. Therefore, reviews may generally be carried out at the end of each stage without excluding the possibility of also conducting mid-stage ones, should the necessity for them arise. We subscribe to the view that the United Nations should play the central role in reviewing the implementation of the programme. We believe that, if the negotiating parties genuinely wish to promote disarmament by elaborating the Programme, then once it has been worked out after serious negotiations, they should naturally undertake the obligation and responsibility of implementing it conscientiously.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is drawing closer with each passing day, yet the text of the various elements of the programme, especially the most substantive part on "measures", still contains many brackets. This situation cannot but arouse general concern. As some representatives have pointed out, the achievement of results in negotiations depends on the will to negotiate. We would like to emphasize that the fulfilment of the task of elaborating the programme depends mainly on whether or not the Superpowers that possess the largest arsenals have the will to cease their arms race and to carry out disarmament. Though they cannot overtly oppose the provision of principle that they have special responsibility for disarmament, the Superpowers, in discussions and negotiations on specific disarmament measures, have frequently placed in brackets the reasonable proposals of the non-aligned and neutral States that they take concrete disarmament actions. This constitutes the main obstacle to substantive progress in negotiations.

In the course of the meetings, we have deeply felt the effects of the general international situation on the disarmament negotiations. The intensified Superpower rivalry in various parts of the world, their accelerated arms race and the continued aggression and occupation of sovereign States by hegemonists have jeopardized confidence and understanding among States and have seriously affected the atmosphere of the disarmament negotiations. This has naturally added to the difficulties involved in the elaboration of the programme. Therefore, in order successfully to elaborate and, subsequently, implement the programme, it is of key importance that the Superpowers should change their positions and honour their professed desire for disarmament with concrete actions.

Finally, I wish to state that the Chinese delegation will continue to exchange views with other delegations and work together with them for the completion of the elaboration of the programme.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sutresna.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, permit me, at the outset, to express on behalf of my delegation our sincere congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of April. Your accession to the chair during the last month of the Committee's first session of 1982 augurs well for the completion of the Committee's work, in view of what the Committee is expected to contribute to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I say this because we are all aware that you have long been deeply involved in this multilateral disarmament negotiating body. This factor, against the background of the past, yet unique experience of the country which you so ably represent, has given

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

my delegation added confidence that you will be able to guide our work to a successful conclusion. My delegation pledges its support and co-operation to you in the accomplishment of your task.

I shall be remiss if I do not also say, on this occasion, how much my delegation appreciates the contribution made by your predecessor, the distinguished representative of Italy, Ambassador Mario Alessi, during his term of office as Chairman of the Committee for the month of March. The skill, tactfulness and firmness he displayed in presiding over our work during that period enabled the Committee to reach the stage at which it finds itself today.

My brief intervention this morning will be devoted to item 6 of the agenda namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and, in particular, the question of the nature of the CPD.

My delegation attaches considerable importance to the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In my delegation's view, it will determine and reflect the degree of our commitment to the implementation of the CPD in future. The embodiment of the CPD in a legally binding instrument would constitute the greatest assurance of its credibility and worthiness and crown the long, hard and laborious work that has gone into its elaboration.

My delegation realizes that some delegations in the Committee have raised objection to this idea. They have argued, for example, that the success of any negotiations would depend on various factors and that, in pursuing disarmament efforts States cannot be legally bound. While it is true that we cannot treat disarmament negotiations in isolation, it is equally true that relations among States at any given moment are the result of the behaviour of the States concerned and, as such, lie within the domain of their respective responsibility. Linkage theory can, and must, work both ways. Thus, external factors may influence the disarmament negotiations, but especially if progress is achieved, the disarmament negotiations can also help to shape relations among States.

My delegation also suspects that there is some apprehension that, once the CPD is embodied in a legally binding instrument, it will eventually serve as another platform for blaming one State or group of States in the case of failure to arrive at successful results. If this failure occurs, the blame will be on all of us without exception. Needless to say, the Final Document constitutes a vivid reminder to all of us that we have to proceed to disarmament or face annihilation. It is therefore difficult to understand that this noble aim of disarmament should be put aside simply because of the perceptions and security interests of a few States.

The distortion of the noble aim of disarmament has, to some extent, also been caused by those who expressed doubts about the assumption on which the state of affairs referred to in paragraph 11 of the Final Document was based; and who went even further, saying that paragraph 11 was an exaggeration. My delegation is aware that some military strategists have advocated the view that a nuclear war could be winnable. Another suggestion based on this false premise was that, as they are already used to the existing situation, they argued that there is no point in changing it and that there is no other way than to accept it as a reality. The only remark that my delegation can offer, at least for the purpose of this brief intervention, is: are we going to continue to live under constant fear as a result of the so-called balance of terror or deterrence policy? My delegation submits that to live without fear is one of the fundamental rights of mankind.

In conclusion, the experience I believe we all gained from the first special session devoted to disarmament is that political commitment alone is not enough to ensure the implementation of the Final Document.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

I am not at all suggesting that the embodiment of the CPD in a legally binding instrument will automatically ensure its strict and faithful implementation. However, my delegation believes that we will at least have the assurance that the obligations contained therein will be carried out in good faith.

The Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a CPD, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, requested us, during the last meeting of the Contact Group, to find an acceptable solution to the two different approaches to the nature of the CPD and to choose between a legally binding instrument and a simple recommendation of the General Assembly.

I am not claiming that, by this brief intervention, my delegation has adequately responded to such a request. I must admit, however, that my delegation continues to hold the view that the CPD should be legally binding. As to its appropriate form as a legal instrument, my delegation has an open mind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sturesna for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

The secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As announced by my predecessor, there will be no activities in the United Nations Office at Geneva on Friday, 9 April. Therefore, in order to maintain the frequency of weekly meetings, we have had to provide for simultaneous meetings. Of course, this is not a new development, since we have already been holding simultaneous meetings for some weeks. The only difference is that we can now count on full conference services for the meetings shown in the informal paper. As usual, the timetable is merely indicative and we can adjust it as we proceed. It seems to me, however, that the arrangements contained in the informal paper are the minimum required to allow the Committee to discharge the tasks facing it before the end of the first part of the present session.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the timetable.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been asked by Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to transmit to you the following message:

"The Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons invites delegations to open-ended informal consultations on the format of the report, on Monday, 5 April 1982, at 10.30 a.m. in Room I."

I will now adjourn the plenary meeting.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 6 April at 10 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.