

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SIXTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Thursday, 18 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m. and 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI (Iran)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Mr. V. BEAUGE  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T.C. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX  
Miss R. de CLERCQ  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U NGWE WIN  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. YANG MINGLIANG  
Mrs WANG ZHIYUN

Cuba: Mr. P. HÚÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. EL SAYED A.R. EL REEDY  
Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSI

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. de REAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HEEDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI  
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMLJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI  
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy: Mr. M. LESSI  
Mr. B. CALBRIS  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA  
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KOBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI  
Mr. M. HALFLOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO  
Mr. J. BENAVIDES  
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY  
Mr. S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON  
Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mrs. J. LINK  
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. H. BUSBY  
Ms. S. BURKE  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. GUNLERSEN  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R. SCOTT  
Mr. J. LEONARD

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BILBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA  
Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In the Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the one hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Canada, Egypt, Peru, Yugoslavia, Ethiopia and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Canada, Ambassador McPhail.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Let me, at the outset, welcome those new representatives who have joined the Committee and congratulate you, Sir, as you take the Chair in this opening month of our session. Not only do I want to pledge to you the traditional support of my delegation, but also to express the kind of sympathy that has to go with every Chairman who experiences the first month of the Committee's session. Having been through that myself, I know that the sympathy is needed and you have it.

Let me pay a tribute, as well, to your predecessor, who had to experience the final month of the Committee's session last year, as this too is the kind of onerous task that deserves not only commendation, but sympathy and he indeed has deserved and received all of that from us.

I want for just a moment to pay a tribute to our former Italian colleague. I do so, not least because within this room he displayed humanity, humour and friendship, and I can think of no international conference context, with the complexities with which we deal, in which those qualities are more important. I think he had them and displayed them, and I think we would do well to remember him and draw our inspiration in difficult moments from the example he set for us.

Today I wish to consider the activities of the Committee on Disarmament in the period leading up to the focus of our efforts in this first part of our work this year; the second special session on disarmament. I would accordingly like to present our estimation of where the Committee on Disarmament might best apply its efforts, given present circumstances both within this Committee — and outside it.

For a number of reasons 1982 is an extraordinary year. But in the twentieth century, each year seems extraordinary offering both opportunities and risks. This year, the time available to seize the opportunities open to us is especially short. Equally, the life of this body has been short — only four years, since it was established by the first special session and it may be too soon to make lasting judgements. Nevertheless, the second special session will, on behalf of the world community, assess the efficacy of this body and its ability to make progress on those critical issues entrusted to it. Our thoughts about the outcome of that assessment should surely be sober.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

International security and the Committee on Disarmament:

There is inevitably an international atmosphere within which we must conduct our business. Progress — or lack of it — by the Committee on Disarmament, equally inevitably, is a reflection of the world outside these chambers. No procedural manoeuvre, however timely, no drafting, however skillful, can erase the hard fact that the Committee on Disarmament can go no further than the realities of international life permit.

Present international conditions are an object lesson that international security and stability cannot be taken for granted. One focus of great international concern — Afghanistan — has now been joined by another — Poland. Many of us have drawn the same conclusions from both, however different local circumstances may seem. Surely it is incontestable that events in Poland eloquently — and tragically — underline the interdependence and interconnectedness of the world community. Surely events in that country, which some may claim are a purely internal affair, have had a profound and negative effect on immediate prospects for the construction of a new East/West atmosphere of confidence. Our deliberations — and our chances of making progress — are accordingly affected.

Prospects for stability and security in Europe, but in other areas of the world as well, have effects far beyond their region itself. Prime Minister Trudeau, like others, has recently pointed to the fact that economic problems and international disputes have increased in both number and complexity. Political and economic instability is painfully evident across the entire spectrum of international relations and, indeed, the problems of East/West and North/South relations, energy, nuclear proliferation, the environment, refugees and sporadic outbursts of violence and war all form a complex of cause and effect.

Yet despite the present international atmosphere, is it not in the mutual interest of all for every effort to be made, for every avenue to be explored, in pursuit of the goals the Committee on Disarmament has set itself. Expectations must necessarily be limited by the realities the international situation imposes upon us. We do not believe that ignoring these realities makes any easier the resolution of the problems they represent. Appeals to "political will" will not help. But let us get on with the job. We are for real negotiation, not confrontation.

How then to assess the prospect for success of this session of the Committee on Disarmament? Should we take encouragement from the results of the last General Assembly? Many resolutions were passed, but no resolution dealing with any substantive topic relevant to the concerns of this Committee was endorsed by the Assembly by consensus. This is not progress. Likewise the appearance of those resolutions whose purposes serve the interests of the sponsors more than those of the international community as a whole cannot be construed as progress. It is, in addition, a debatable blessing that other resolutions should have been passed by the Assembly looking for organizational solutions to substantive problems, thus turning such problems over to the Committee on Disarmament particularly at a time when this body already has a surfeit of work.

These are facts. It is only on the basis of a greater recognition of these facts and a willingness to deal with them that we will be able to contribute to the success we all hope for at the second special session on disarmament. Can we not build on that consensus reached in 1978 rather than destroy it by inadvertence — or by design? Should we not be governed by the considerations that lead to that consensus and strive to achieve the highest level of agreement on ways to move ahead?

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

Last spring, I noted that, in our opinion, it would be wise for the Committee to make an objective assessment of the direction in which we were moving and why precisely because we were leading towards the next special session devoted to disarmament. While it is true that the Committee on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body and therefore possesses unique authority, its authority, we repeat once more, ultimately depends upon the results it produces. This year we face a shortened session, yet this year, even more is expected of the Committee: and, let us face it, more hope is invested in it than in the past. These, then, are the international and internal atmospherics affecting the tasks with which the Committee is charged in the period up to the second special session. I now would like to turn briefly to these tasks:

Those who participated in the efforts of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons have reason to be satisfied. A number of the most complex areas in the elaboration of an eventual chemical weapons treaty were identified and set down. Complex problems remain, some substantive and some technical, particularly in the field of verifying the terms of an eventual treaty; and some, of course, of a more political nature.

It is a matter of great regret to us that the traditional resolution on chemical weapons jointly co-sponsored by Canada, Poland, the Byelorussian SSR and Japan was not adopted by consensus at the last General Assembly. The lack of consensus on this resolution could mean that the way is open for a prolonged debate on procedural matters, should some in this Committee so choose. Such a debate in our view would, we fear, sacrifice substance to form. We are confident, however, that such a debate can be avoided and indeed we hope and expect that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be adopted in this Committee by consensus.

Many expect that the comprehensive programme of disarmament will be a "centrepiece" of the second special session on disarmament. There are few areas where the consensus-building procedure of finding the lowest common denominator of agreement and raising it to the highest is more important than during our efforts to develop a comprehensive programme that can be accepted by all. This process will require patience and flexibility, for only through compromise is consensus possible. Great problems remain and consensus is by no means certain. We are encouraged however, that it does appear there is a gathering consensus on the holding of review conferences. This is only a beginning, but a good beginning.

We continue to believe that a treaty on radiological weapons has the advantage of closing off a weapons option and the prospects for its development. We do not exaggerate the importance of such a treaty, but we do think it would be a positive step. This said, if at all possible — and we think it is possible — the conclusion of the text of such a treaty by the time of the second special session would represent the first concrete evidence of the Committee on Disarmament's ability to produce an agreement. It is for this symbolic reason that we consider the conclusion of a text more important than it would otherwise be. There are still a number of proposals which could be incorporated into the text of a treaty on radiological weapons, particularly one put forward by Sweden on the safeguarding from attack of civilian nuclear facilities. It is surely not beyond the skill of this negotiating forum to find a technique for addressing seriously this question in parallel with the work already undertaken on the treaty.



(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

In our judgement, all aspects of the question of negative security assurances have now been explored, often in exhaustive detail. The time has therefore come to reach the highest common denominator of agreement on this matter. In the present circumstances, for reasons well known to this Committee, no "common formula" is likely to be agreed. We therefore support the proposal that, as an interim solution, means be explored for the Security Council to announce, in a suitably-worded resolution, the summation of each individual nuclear-weapon State's negative security assurances. Such a move by the Security Council would, we believe, be particularly appropriate during the second special session.

The debate on nuclear matters within the Committee — we cannot yet call it a negotiation — will resume. We were encouraged at the last session by some aspects of this debate: it contributed to greater understanding of the complex issues posed by the existence of nuclear weapons, a requisite, we believe, before we can talk meaningfully about nuclear disarmament. In respect of conventional weapons, we must understand why they exist before advocating disarmament which will meet specific conditions, as it must. We hope, however, that this debate will evolve into more of a dialogue engaging nuclear and non-nuclear Powers alike for the practical and constructive ends, and not abstract ones, we all seek. In the meantime, we welcome a continuation of the process begun last year. Let us continue to give priority to the substantive over the procedural or abstract.

In that context, we continue to believe that it is productive for the Committee on Disarmament to give due weight to the question of setting up a working group on a CTB; but let us not give it undue weight. In the present context, this is essentially a procedural matter, although of great symbolic importance to many. Our substantive interest should be the eventual conclusion of a test ban treaty; it is not the setting up of a working group as such. We would be advised to focus our efforts on areas where progress is possible. I wish now to put forward some considerations on where we might best apply our endeavours.

The realization of a verifiable multilateral comprehensive test ban treaty, to end all nuclear testing in all environments for all time, continues to be a fundamental Canadian objective. It is one of the four interrelated nuclear arms control measures of the "strategy of suffocation" proposed by my Prime Minister at the first special session in 1978. The concept of the strategy was reaffirmed in the Canadian House of Commons last June.

The subject of a nuclear test ban has been part of the United Nations agenda since 1954. Since 1963, when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed, the negotiating body in Geneva has annually been requested by the United Nations General Assembly to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban treaty. The United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR conducted negotiations from July 1977 to November 1980, when they were recessed. The consensus necessary for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty as requested by the United Nations General Assembly, continues to elude us.

For the past two years or so, our principal concern has been that the Committee on Disarmament should assume some substantive role in the elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty — that this negotiating body do some useful and constructive work, at an early date, without prejudicing the accomplishments of the trilateral negotiations. Canada has called for the resumption of these trilateral negotiations. A year ago, in this Committee, Canada announced its "readiness to contribute to the definition of the Committee's substantive role". We have publicly

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

stated that we were in favour of the establishment of an ad hoc working group with an appropriate mandate. Canada co-sponsored resolutions at the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly calling for the establishment of a working group, although, as stated in our intervention on 16 July last year, "our objective is the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty and not the establishment of a working group per se; and our support for a working group rests on our belief that it could assist in this direction: that is to say, the working group should be viewed as a means to an end and not the end itself ... let us not permit debates on this issue to become bogged down in symbolism to the detriment of the actual matter at hand".

The question of setting up a working group on a comprehensive test ban is essentially a procedural matter, but we would support the establishment of a political experts group under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament to discuss matters which were not at issue in the trilateral negotiations from 1977 to 1980. They could include the financial, legal and administrative aspects of an international seismic data exchange as proposed in the Committee on Disarmament in April 1980 by Australia. The mandate for such a group would of course have to be agreed in consultation with the trilateral negotiating States.

Canada is not convinced that nuclear weapon testing must go on forever or at its current disturbing pace. Restrictions on the number and yield of tests should be possible, as well as on geographic locations of testing sites. To existing nuclear testing agreements could be added further agreements which would move towards the objective of an eventual comprehensive test ban treaty. There is a need to generate some movement in the negotiating process. There is a need to avoid the risks inherent in a continued freeze in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. A number of arms control treaties were realized as a result of the precedents created in working out the partial test-ban treaty of 1963. They include the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions of 1976. It has been argued by some that the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions would be undesirable and could be counterproductive. We do not agree. Fully implemented, these two Treaties, with international co-operation, could be utilized and built upon to move towards a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and on the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions would bring into force limitations on yield, albeit at a high level. It would also bring into force the exchange of technical data about testing programmes and the limiting of testing to specific designated sites, as provided for in the Protocol to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. It would also bring into force the provisions of the Protocol of the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions dealing with technical arrangements for monitoring and exchanging information.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

A very useful further step would be the resumption of the trilateral negotiations for the specific purpose of negotiating a second-stage agreement which would further restrict the numbers and yields of tests and the location of testing sites. Such an agreement could be for specific reductions or, even better, for sets of reductions over time.

With such a process in motion, it would seem possible to envisage a greater role for the Committee on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events by involving it in aspects of the exchange of information which would be occurring with the two Treaties earlier mentioned. At some stage in the not too distant future, the implementation of the international seismic data exchange (ISDE) would also appear to be useful.

The implementation of this international verification measure in connection with an interim agreement implies that such an agreement, once reached in trilateral negotiations, would, in certain respects at least, lead to the Committee on Disarmament's involvement.

Canada would hope that in such a process the other nuclear-weapon States, France and China, would join and would sign the partial test-ban Treaty.

The confidence which a veritable second-stage agreement would build should, in turn, bring within the realm of possibility whatever further agreements on limitations and reductions may be required to move towards a permanent comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The above ideas are being contributed in an effort to help focus the Committee's efforts on what seems to us to be possible — some positive and constructive movement in the negotiating process on nuclear testing. My delegation will be glad to work towards this end, the ultimate objective of which is the achievement of an important goal of the international community — a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

In my closing remarks I wish to consider the relationship between the Committee and the second special session. We believe that it is in the interests of the Committee to bring to the second special session the greatest possible number of tasks for which it has been charged fully completed. Some have argued that those items not readily lending themselves to resolution in the Committee should be left to the special session itself. We should not have any illusion that matters unresolved in this negotiating forum can be any more readily dealt with at special session, whose functions and purpose are fundamentally different. We trust — and it is indeed our goal — that the Committee's contribution to the second special session on disarmament should be the greatest possible; its contribution should not be a burden, as indeed it might be should the Committee fall short of its goals. The Committee on Disarmament is, in a real sense, on trial and will be judged by the results it produces at this session. Let us therefore proceed with this firmly in mind.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Egypt, Ambassador El Reedy.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, you opened this meeting in the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. We join with you in praying that God will help this meeting to contribute towards the achievement of a better world. We also take this opportunity to congratulate you on your direction of our work and to convey our best wishes to our brothers, the people of Iran, to whom our own people are linked by indissoluble bonds. We also wish to express our sincere appreciation to Ambassador Sani, our previous Chairman, for his wise and effective direction of the work of this Committee.

On behalf of my delegation, I would like to express our sorrow and condolences to the Italian delegation on the death of our dear colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo.

I also welcome all our new colleagues representing Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nigeria and the United States of America.

As we begin a new round of work, it is only natural to pause for a while to take stock of the situation regarding the arms race, the halting of which is the *raison d'être* of our deliberations here. It is regrettable to note that, in spite of extensive discussions and numerous resolutions, the production of weapons of mass destruction has continued unabated; indeed it has gained further momentum and, thanks to the astonishing advances of science and technology, these weapons have increased in destructiveness. This state of affairs has given rise to the emergence of a new category of regular statistics, commonly known as over-kill statistics, directed at calculating the number of times the present arsenals can destroy mankind. In short, the present and potential destructiveness of existing arsenals and the expenditures towards further production are beyond imagination.

In this unreal atmosphere which prevails over the almost year-round discussions of disarmament issues, in which our discussions constitute an important element, we cannot but wonder at the gap between words and deeds, between promises and their fulfilment!

In the interval since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, which outlined an international disarmament strategy and rationalized the disarmament machinery by establishing a body for deliberations and another, namely, the Committee on Disarmament, for negotiations, not a single real achievement has been made in the field of disarmament. Indeed, we are practically today at an impasse.

If we add to this the worsening economic situation in the third world, and the absence of progress in the establishment of a new and equitable international economic order, then the continued waste of huge human and material resources on the production of more instruments of war and annihilation draws a picture which indeed calls for pondering on the sombre road taken by humanity.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

We as a developing country have responded to the calls addressed to us. Suffice it to note that a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which consist of developing countries not party to any military alliance, have adhered to the non-proliferation Treaty, which by the same token commits the nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and to halt nuclear-weapon testing. But unfortunately this commitment has so far remained totally unfulfilled.

Moreover, in this Committee, my delegation, together with the group of non-aligned countries, has done its best and has submitted a number of proposals to advance our work. Yet we are unable to discern any tangible result during the four-year interval between the first and the second special sessions of the General Assembly. The greatest evidence of this is that in spite of our persistence and in spite of successive General Assembly resolutions, we have been unable even to establish the appropriate machinery for dealing with items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

It is axiomatic to say that there is a relationship between the international climate conducive to disarmament negotiations and international behaviour, the world having recently witnessed increasing violations of the rules of international law and international legality. The continued oppression of the brotherly people of Afghanistan is dire evidence of this. We would also add that there has been an increasing resort to the policy of force and the violation of the sovereignty of national independence of countries, as well as attempts to annex territories by force. Such violations undeniably affect the international climate and heighten the feelings of suspicion, mistrust and insecurity. In this context, we believe the Superpowers have a responsibility to see to it that their behaviour is in accordance with the norms of international law and the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. They also have a major responsibility for the strengthening of the international machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, the deterrence of aggression and ensuring respect for the principles of the Charter.

In the light of these considerations, it may be necessary for the General Assembly, at its second special session, to examine the relationship between disarmament and all that relates to international behaviour, international security, the activation of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and guaranteeing respect for the principles of the Charter and the implementation of resolutions of the United Nations.

But at the same time disarmament issues have become so important and urgent that the continuation of negotiations is imperative, and we do not believe that they should come to a halt under any pre-text or circumstance -- for no one can deny that the accumulation and development of nuclear weapons constitutes the deadliest and most immediate danger to the survival of mankind as a whole.

Therefore, my delegation welcomes the opening in Geneva on 30 November last of negotiations between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe and believes that

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

it is an important and positive development. In spite of the worsening international situation, these negotiations have started, and we wish them all success. We share the desire of the two sides to achieve security in Europe under which the European peoples can live in an atmosphere free from the threat of the use of nuclear weapons on their territories.

Egypt is especially interested in these negotiations since the strengthening of European security would obviously have a positive impact on the security of our region and on our efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and Africa.

At the same time we strongly urge the two sides to reach agreement on an early commencement of the negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. This will no doubt enhance the glimmer of hope discernible in this climate, otherwise saturated with pessimism.

I wish now to make a few comments on the state of our work in the Committee. We cannot but start by reiterating our position of principle to the effect that this Committee has to discharge its responsibilities with respect to items 1 and 2, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which have been on its agenda from its first session. Egypt at almost the very same time last year, on the occasion of its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, clearly stated that in taking this step and accepting the obligations arising out of its adherence to the Treaty, it hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would also meet their obligations. In this connection the statement of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued on that occasion and which was distributed as a document of the Committee on Disarmament read as follows:

"Egypt wishes to express its strong dissatisfaction at the nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two Superpowers because of their failure to take effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament."

The statement went on to say:

"Moreover, in spite of the fact that more than 17 years have elapsed since the conclusion of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, the nuclear-weapon States are alleging that various difficulties still stand in the way of a permanent ban on all nuclear-weapon tests, when there is only need for a political will to achieve that end."

On the basis of this clear statement we once again urge the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil the obligations they undertook. I would add that we believe that we also have a right to be enlightened about the fate of the trilateral negotiations, which we had hoped would have assisted this Committee in fulfilling its primary responsibility. In the same vein, we resolutely continue to call for the establishment of two ad hoc working groups on these agenda items to enable the Committee to discharge its mandate with regard to the most crucial and dangerous disarmament issues.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

Turning now to the item on chemical weapons, on which a good measure of progress has been made in reaching agreement on specific elements and detailed formulations for incorporation in a treaty on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, we believe that the early conclusions of such a treaty has become an imperative and urgent matter in view of all the developments presaging a stepping up of the production of chemical weapons, a situation which would create additional difficulties if a speedy conclusion of the treaty is not forthcoming. Today we are at a critical turning point. Consequently, this Committee should gear all its efforts towards the finalization of a treaty on chemical weapons, taking advantage of the progress made last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group under the leadership of Ambassador Lidgard.

Only a few months lie ahead of us before the beginning of the second special session of the General Assembly. We are therefore working under the pressure of time to finalize consideration of certain issues before this deadline. Foremost among them is the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which hopefully will be finally agreed and formulated before the end of this session in April. The Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject has made considerable progress in exploring the various elements to be included in the programme. What remains is to reach agreement on some of the key issues, in particular those relating to "measures", the nature of the programme, and the time-frame for its implementation.

In addition to the CPD, which we hope will be finalized by the end of our current session, should we not also endeavour to finalize agreement on some other matters under consideration in order to submit the results to the second special session?

In this regard, one of the most important aspects is to reach agreement on a clear and categorical commitment whereby the nuclear-weapon States undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the first special session, the nuclear-weapon States issued their unilateral declarations. However, it is now generally recognized that these declarations are not sufficient and do not offer sufficient assurances. If we can, in this Committee, on the basis of the discussions which took place in the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group, the plenary Committee itself and the General Assembly, reach an agreement whereby the nuclear-weapon States commit themselves, clearly and unequivocally, to renouncing the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States, then we will be able to claim a first significant achievement. Moreover, such a development will answer the legitimate demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the majority of which have voluntarily renounced the nuclear option within a treaty framework and have subjected their nuclear installations to international inspection and verification procedures.

In addition, we believe that we have to pursue efforts to conclude a treaty prohibiting the production and use of radiological weapons. Although such a convention is not an urgent priority on the disarmament agenda, its conclusion, in our view, would be a contribution to our efforts to prevent the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. My delegation considers it essential

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

legally to prohibit attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. This question has acquired added significance as a result of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi peaceful nuclear reactor last summer. We hope that a solution can be found to this question and that the nuclear-weapon States and other States members of nuclear alliances will understand this just and reasonable demand of the non-nuclear-weapon States -- a legitimate demand which has been further substantiated by events.

For more than 20 years, specifically in the wake of the launching of the first space satellites, Egypt has, together with the group of non-aligned countries, been in the forefront of nations calling for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Although my delegation believes that the best way to handle this question is to establish a legal rule or international legislation prohibiting the use of outer space for other than peaceful purposes, the logic thus being the remittance of the issue to the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, in response to the preference shown by many delegations for considering the subject in the Committee on Disarmament, we have agreed to its inclusion in our agenda. We would, however, like to emphasize two points:

First, the objective of our endeavours would be to reserve outer space for peaceful uses and to safeguard against its militarization. Consequently, we have to avoid the risk of finding ourselves being dragged into an exercise that may lead to the legitimization of some military uses of outer space.

Secondly, the consideration of this item should not be at the expense of the priority items on our agenda, particularly the questions of a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

In this connection it might be useful if the secretariat, at the proper time, could prepare a compilation of the relevant background material, including the various proposals made which may be of help to us in the consideration of this question.

The second special session of the General Assembly will be for us, as responsible members of the community of nations, an occasion to assess and evaluate the efforts being made to halt the arms race and achieve general and complete disarmament. In this regard, our Committee has a special responsibility, through its evaluation, to help the General Assembly to be fully aware of the implications of the ever-deteriorating situation. This would help the second special session to chart a road which could make our planet a more secure and brighter world.



The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the words you addressed to the Chair and the kind reference you made to the people of my country. I now give the floor to the representative of Peru, Ambassador Valdivieso.

Mr. VALDIVIESO (Peru) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to express my delegation's pleasure at seeing you assume the chairmanship of our Committee. During the fulfilment of this important and delicate task, you can count on our full, although surely modest, co-operation. I would also like to express, through you, our deep appreciation for the successful work of your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia.

I would like to pay a tribute to the memory of our very distinguished friend and colleague, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo, who, as head of the Permanent Mission of Italy, represented his country with dignity, competence and decorum which earned him our respect and consideration. Our sincere condolences go to the Mission of Italy.

My delegation also welcomes the new representatives of Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United States of America, to whom we offer our co-operation.

We are meeting at a time when certain international events are causing deep concern among large sectors of world public opinion, which is alarmed by what some regard, not without reason, as a plain and simple return to the so-called cold war, that is, to a relationship between the Superpowers based on confrontation and uncontrolled competition.

In any event, it must be recognized that the international system is in the process of becoming increasingly unstable as a result of the crisis of confidence that seems to be developing between the worlds known as East and West.

For anyone who reads the international press, it is no secret that most of the current international tension and crises have gained momentum as a result of the change that has taken place in strategic perceptions at the level of the Superpowers.

For example, the apocalyptic hypothesis of Mutual Assured Destruction, whose initials make up the English word "MAD" in suggestive symbolism, is being replaced by the hypothesis of a "limited nuclear war" or a war whose effects can be controlled. At the same time, hurried efforts are being made to establish a force that will be permanently ready and capable of intervening in any part of the globe; and the old and creaking regional "mutual defence" alliances forged as a result of the cold war are being revived.

Such fundamental changes in strategic perceptions at the global level have serious repercussions not only on relations between East and West, but also on the South, i.e., on the developing countries as a whole.

Not only is the possibility of a nuclear war now accepted -- making the classical concept of deterrence obsolete -- but plans are being made in function of that possibility; and, in international relations, everything depends on the absolute predominance of the East-West crisis.

There is no time now for the North-South dialogue; nor place for international codes of conduct to govern the functioning of the existing international system. There is no need to codify the international law of the sea and no need for new orders, whatever their subject-matter. The concept of international co-operation for development is being redefined, with private and bilateral agreements prevailing over public and multilateral agreements. Action to combat underdevelopment, that is, the hunger, poverty, illness, marginality and denial of basic human rights suffered by two out of every three people on the planet, is no longer a priority for the international community.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

The priority issue now is "security", as defined by the North. It means more military expenditures and fewer social programmes everywhere, in times, moreover, of widespread recession.

Our countries cannot afford such a reversal of priorities; and we do not understand the distinction between the concepts of "security" and "development" because, as far as we are concerned, they are exactly the same. Our countries' present insecurity is a result of the underdevelopment of our societies. Accordingly, the achievement of our security requirements necessarily implies the achievement of our development, which is nothing less than being able to give our citizens standards of living compatible with the human dignity proclaimed in a solemn Universal Declaration.

This is our concept of security: we are now losing a war which is older and more destructive than any in this century and which kills thousands of our children, men, women and elderly people everyday.

We all tremble at the thought of how unbearable the neutron bomb is, but I wonder how many of us tremble with the same fear at the thought of the intangible bombs of hunger and illness, which are so harmless to things and so deadly to human beings and which, because of our failure to act, have constantly been dropped on every corner of the underdeveloped world ever since its history became part of that of the West as a result of the colonial phenomenon.

No, Mr. Chairman, we do not agree with the new strategic definitions. They put us on the second level or simply ignore us. They deprive us of our national identities and place our future in the hands of others, however friendly they may be.

It is painful, though not irrelevant, to see how the process of disarmament is affected by such developments.

The fact of the matter -- if indeed it lies in the statements of high Government officials and in specific military budget and sales figures -- is that there has been an escalation of the arms race and it has not been limited to the Superpowers or indeed to any of the Powers; it has, rather, spread to the developing world.

Developing countries such as mine have other, specific reasons for this concern, which is, in our case, overshadowed by the prospects for the North-South dialogue in which we, as a developing country, believe that we can better project our national interests in the international arena.

We are aware that some States question the very idea of this other way of looking at the international system. The issue is, however, not one of labels or words, but, rather, in our view, one of proving and stating one of the basic facts of the present world order, namely, the co-existence of developed and developing States in a structure of interrelations that places the latter, sometimes involuntarily, at the mercy of the former.

When one of the big ones sneezes, many of the little ones catch cold. This is the most common effect of so-called "interdependence", which few seem to remember, and it shows just how vulnerable and dependent the weaker countries really are.

One of the clearest examples of the asymmetrical relationship between the two groups of States is to be found in the field of security and armaments policy.

Contrary to what some people think, the third world countries do have direct and vital interests in the process that guides and defines relations between the political-economic-military blocs, whose strategic and security perceptions directly affect us, as shown by the escalation of the arms race and the international crises that have broken out in the developing world.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

As a rule, the largest concentrations of arsenals in developing countries and, consequently, the most violent wars that the world has known since the end of the Second World War have taken place in areas that were trapped in the clutches of East-West rivalry and tension.

Not even during the best of times of détente, whose absence today seems so tragic to us, did any significant change take place in this dynamic or, in other words, in the historically verifiable fact that the rivalry between the two blocs, with their mutual deterrent power, naturally tends to affect the peripheral regions of the third world, which thus become an impotent theatre sacrificed to foreign confrontations.

The Superpowers' definitions of their "vital interests", "strategic concerns" or similar concepts are based on the assumption that the natural setting for such definitions is the world as a whole.

The most important consequence of the way in which the Superpowers see themselves and international reality and which characterizes the positions they have adopted is the unequal distribution of security at the world level and, therefore, an order which is as unjust and out of proportion as that which characterizes the other structural levels of relations between weaker and stronger countries.

The latter, which are in an absolute minority in the community of nations and have a minority share of the world's population, nevertheless have a near-monopoly on security, while the former are condemned to live in constant insecurity because their right to define their own ideas of security is not respected.

This is the result of the fact that the security of the peripheral countries is almost always defined in terms of the strategic — and the economic, political and ideological — interests of the blocs which compete for universal supremacy and, as far as ideological-political models and international leadership are concerned, are held up to the developing world as the only two alternatives.

In accordance with our approach to international relations, our interests focus on the need to establish a new international security order which will guarantee the legitimate rights of the developing countries to develop in genuine independence and to follow the path of non-alignment vis-à-vis the East-West crisis, which is neither inevitable nor desirable.

It is understandable that we should be deeply concerned about the breakdown of the dialogue and the crisis of mutual confidence between the Superpowers because we know that, if events continue on their present course, the developing countries will have to pay for most of the damage.

We as Latin Americans are particularly concerned about the fact that Central America is well on its way to becoming a new critical trouble spot because of persistent attempts to subordinate its complex problems to the inadequate logic of the East-West dialectic and because of public speculation about the possibility of direct foreign intervention in the area.

(Mr. Valdivieso, Peru)

The peoples of this sister region, heirs to a common history, should not have to endure interference in their efforts to find solutions to the specific, age-old problems of achieving economic development, social justice and institutional growth and stability in a truly democratic and pluralistic climate in which human rights are fully respected.

We are, as stated on numerous occasions by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, therefore opposed to any foreign interference in the affairs of this region.

And we are therefore also concerned about the noticeable increase in the flow of weapons to this area and about the introduction into Latin America of the highly sophisticated military equipment from which it has so far been spared.

Imports of modern high-technology weapons create problems and difficulties for all developing countries not only because it is scandalous to use valuable resources, which should be spent on social programmes and development, to purchase very expensive arms, but also because such imports increase the recipients' capacity for violence and make them technologically dependent on their suppliers and such dependence can be used to create political and strategic alignments.

This brings us to the relationship between disarmament and development, an aspect of the disarmament problem that is of the greatest importance to the developing countries.

According to the report of the international group of experts, a select group of eminent persons which was presided over by Mrs. Thorsson, whose presence we welcome, and was requested by the United Nations to explore the nature of that relationship, the links between disarmament and development include the following significant facts:

In the last 30 years, nearly 6 per cent of the world's available resources have been consumed every year by the arms race.

Since the end of the Second World War, the nuclear Powers have manufactured more than 40,000 nuclear warheads with a combined explosive capacity 1 million times greater than that of the bomb which, in one of the darkest chapters in mankind's history, was dropped on Hiroshima in 1945.

If we could recycle the materials used to build and station only 200 land-based intercontinental missiles, we would have close to 10,000 t of aluminium, 2,500 t of chromium, 150 t of titanium, 24 t of beryllium, 890,000 t of steel and 2.4 million t of cement.

More than 50 million people, including almost 20 per cent of the world's engineers and scientists, are employed directly or indirectly in the production of military goods and services.

More than half a million skilled experts are involved, at a cost of \$35 billion per year, in military research and development programmes on new deadly technologies.

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About 6 per cent of annual oil output is used for military purposes and to produce weapons systems which use more copper, nickel and platinum every year than all the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America consume for other purposes.

In the developing countries, more money is spent on tanks, aircraft, missiles and artillery than on public health or education.

There are more people in military uniform in the world than there are teachers and more research is carried out and capital invested for military purposes than for research on new energy sources, health care, pollution control and agriculture.

The modernization of a small air-to-air missile costs more than the \$100 million spent in 10 years by the World Health Organization to eradicate smallpox.

From various points of view, disarmament and development are the two inseparable sides of the same coin. And since both are basic to problems that affect the international community as a whole — and not only a few States, however powerful they may be — the United Nations, the most universal forum, has been recognized as the legitimate principal protagonist and rightful initiator of the process of disarmament.

Speaking on behalf of a small country which believes in international law, which supports respectful dialogue among States, pluralism and the subordination of individual interests to the greater good and which is therefore opposed to the use or threat of use of force and to arrogance and contempt for the rights of others, we strongly reaffirm our unswerving belief in the irreplaceable role of the United Nations and in the great respect due to its most democratic and representative organ, the General Assembly, whose will we see as the repository of the highest moral authority.

Various speakers who have taken the floor before me have noted that this session of our Committee is of particular importance in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is imperative that the second special session should not fail, for if it does, there will be no way of halting the worsening of the international situation or the acceleration of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.

And if it is essential for the second special session devoted to disarmament not to fail, it is just as obvious that, in the work it will carry out between now and April, our Committee must achieve positive tangible results. In a very real sense, the destinies of both meetings are inextricably linked. We thus have a very heavy responsibility on our shoulders.

If we are to achieve positive results in our work in order to enable the second special session to make a substantial contribution to the process of

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disarmament, there will have to be a radical departure from some of the trends which have emerged in the Committee in the last few years and have prevented it from fulfilling its mandate.

In this connection, there is no doubt that the primary obstacle to be overcome is the nuclear Powers' proven lack of political will to conclude specific, binding agreements designed to halt the current arms race and reverse it through a mutually agreed process of arms limitations.

It is this lack of political will — demonstrated, moreover, by the specific actions of States outside this body — which has virtually brought the negotiations in the four established Ad Hoc Working Groups to a stand-still and has delayed the establishment of working groups to speed up the work on items 1 and 2 of our traditional agenda, to which the General Assembly has repeatedly given the highest priority.

This is not a simple procedural matter. As we all know, there are no instructions which say that the only way of holding negotiations on specific questions of disarmament is to establish ad hoc working groups, but we also know that, in practice, ad hoc working groups are the only negotiating bodies we have. In the best of cases, plenary meetings are useful for broad exchanges of views on specific issues, but that is all. They are usually used more for a general and open debate on all the items on the agenda and even to air questions which basically have nothing to do with the agenda items.

Custom, which is more powerful than is usually believed, particularly in the United Nations, has thus created a de facto situation in which matters not dealt with in an ad hoc working group are "frozen", so to speak, as far as their effective handling is concerned.

Opposition to the establishment of ad hoc working groups to negotiate specific agreements on items 1 and 2 of the agenda is therefore tantamount to opposition to multilateral negotiations on these questions. This is, in our view, unacceptable, whatever the justification offered — not only because of the repeated mandates of the General Assembly, but also because of the intrinsic importance for the process of disarmament of the immediate prohibition of all nuclear tests and the achievement of agreements on the halting of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race.

We are also of the opinion that the ad hoc working groups that are already dealing in the negotiating process with items 3, 4 and 5 of the draft agenda must be authorized to resume their work as soon as possible. As they carry out their task, we hope that they will be able to remove the obstacles hampering the achievement of specific agreements. In this connection, we were encouraged to hear that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, presided over with such diligence and success by Ambassador Lidgard, will be broadened.

I also wish to repeat the fact that we consider it truly shameful that the nuclear Powers consistently refuse to grant the non-nuclear-weapon States formal and binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For

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us, this is a matter of principle because we consider it morally intolerable for the nuclear Powers to take such great care not to offer such guarantees in a formal manner; their refusal is like a sword of Damocles holding the developing countries hostage to the nuclear Powers and their disputes.

The nuclear Powers seem to have known what they were about when they coined the term "negative security guarantees" because they are in fact the ones which are claiming that the non-nuclear countries should grant them a negative guarantee of credibility that is conceptually different from the positive, genuine and binding guarantees we are asking of the nuclear Powers.

The elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, which will be the centre-piece of the political process to be set in motion at the second special session next June, is without a doubt the Committee's most important immediate responsibility at this session.

Fortunately, the wisdom and patience with which our very distinguished friend, Ambassador Alfonso García Robles of Mexico, has guided the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has made it possible for its work to progress with a dynamism that is remarkable in this Committee.

That does not, however, alter the fact that the different interest groups still disagree on matters of substance. We hope that the fruitful exchanges of views that have taken place until now will have convinced all of us that the task at hand is not one of elaborating yet another document which is open to any interpretation whatever, contains no time-frame and depends on the goodwill of States.

Now is the time for us to be lucid enough to elaborate a comprehensive programme which is clear, contains time-frames -- even if they are only indicative -- and is able to generate effective agreements that will lead to specific disarmament measures.

This will, however, be possible if the nuclear Powers and, in particular, the Superpowers do not translate into action the desire they have proclaimed for international peace and moral commitment to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter, which, as Mr. Eugene Rostow, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, reminded us a few days ago, prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State.

As long as there is no such change in the conduct of the States which have a monopoly on force at the international level, we will still be able to say that the disarmament effort is a Utopian and quixotic activity, but it is none the less one from which we who can say that our sling is that of David will not flinch.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Vrhunec.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you, the representative of the friendly non-aligned country of Iran, my congratulations on assuming the chairmanship of the Committee for this month and to assure you of the full co-operation of my delegation in carrying out your difficult task.

I would also like to pay a tribute to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia for a very well and efficiently done job as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament during the closing month of its last session and the opening phase of the current session. I also extend a very warm welcome to the many new colleagues who have joined us for the new session of the Committee. May I also take this opportunity to pay a tribute to our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, and wish him the best in his new and important responsibilities in the Hague.

It is with great sorrow that the delegation of Yugoslavia has learned of the passing away of our colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo. Expressing our sincere condolences to the distinguished representative of Italy, we ask him to transmit our sympathy to Ambassador Montezemolo's family.

This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament has started its work under the shadow of highly exacerbated international relations. The situation which we are facing today in international relations is extremely unfavourable and gives ground to the greatest concern.

In evaluating such a situation, we proceed from the fact that the existence of blocs and the pursuit of a policy from a position of strength on the part of the Great Powers inevitably leads to a policy of domination and hegemony. This, in turn, gives impetus to the increasingly accelerating arms race which leads to a confrontation of a global nature and the spreading of spheres of interest to which are subjected all developments in the world and all areas of international life. Although resistance to such a policy is constantly growing, it continues to be pursued to the detriment of peace, security and co-operation and causes insecurity and instability, which lead to a general aggravation of international relations. All this goes against the vital interests of the whole of mankind; constant pressure is placed on the national independence and security of particular countries, especially the non-aligned and developing countries, thus greatly hindering possibilities for economic development and jeopardizing world peace.

As a European, non-aligned and socialist developing country, Yugoslavia gives particular attention to developments in international relations. It strives to make a maximum contribution to the overcoming of bloc divisions and the attenuation of bloc confrontations by strengthening those elements in international relations that can ensure the reinforcement of peaceful coexistence among States, respect for the freedom of man and independence, as well as the prevention of interference in internal affairs of particular countries and the improvement of broad and equitable international co-operation.

Striving for the consequent implementation of the United Nations Charter and the authentic principles of the movement of non-alignment, Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries are aware that only along these lines is it possible to ensure



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the creation of universal détente and a democratic system of international political and economic relations that will, inter alia, make it possible to halt the arms race and open the process of general and complete disarmament. In keeping with such policy, the highest political organ of Yugoslavia, the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, continuing the political traditions of President Tito, devoted a separate session in January this year to the consideration of current questions in the area of disarmament in the light of the efforts being made to solve this vital problem and ensure peace and stability in the world.

Proceeding from the assessment that the present serious aggravation of the international situation has to a great extent been caused by the constantly increasing arms race, the session of the Presidency stressed, inter alia, the necessity to renew and intensify the activity of the entire mechanism of the United Nations for negotiations on disarmament and underlined the importance of the need to activate negotiations on conventional armament in Vienna, as well as the negotiations on strategic and theatre nuclear weapons. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to reach an agreement at the CSCE Meeting in Madrid on convening a conference on disarmament in Europe. In view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Presidency discussed the preparations for this session and the co-operation of the non-aligned countries, as well as the contribution that the session should make to the halting of the arms race and the opening of the process of genuine disarmament.

Similarly, when recently delivering his report on the foreign policy activity of Yugoslavia before the Federal Assembly, the Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Josip Vrhovec, accorded considerable attention to questions relating to problems of disarmament and international security. In his assessment of these problems, he said that they are "one of the most sensitive areas of international life which has a strong bearing on the global situation in the world. Here, we once again find ourselves in a critical stage, perhaps the most uncertain one since the world has emerged from the cold war. We can freely say that the feat of strength which is going on between the existing military giants shakes our planet and causes the most profound uneasiness not only in many Governments but also in the broadest strata of the population. Peoples are expressing their exasperation because of the continuation of this race in an increasingly direct manner and are asking the Governments of their countries to halt it".

"Nevertheless", -- he went on to say -- "the race continues while equilibrium is established and disturbed at a constantly higher level, which in fact is nothing other than an increase in the danger for the outbreak of the third, i.e. nuclear, world war".

The arms race, which is becoming a universal phenomenon, especially in present conditions of enhanced interdependence and interrelatedness of the world, has manifold negative effects. The consequences are particularly grave for the economic and social development of particular countries, as well as for the deforming of the structure of the world economy. The arms race not only absorbs huge human, natural and material resources, but also contributes to the deepening of the general crisis of the world economy and over-all international economic relations, entailing grave political and social consequences. This affects the developing countries particularly hard and many of them are in a very difficult position. The competition in armaments is directly transmitted to the developing countries in all parts of the world. They have great difficulties in bearing the costs for armaments which they

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are compelled to spend in order to protect their independence and territorial integrity. This leads to a slowing down or postponement of the settlement of the urgent problems of their economic and social development, while the world economy is sinking into a deeper crisis. All this has a concomitant effect on increasing the general policy of instability in the world because questions of economic and political emancipation are essential components of peace and security in the world.

The many negative effects of the arms race are manifested in all other areas of international life. Many countries, as the protagonists of the arms race, forget that they jeopardize man's basic right, that is, the right to life.

Attempts are often made to justify the policy of armament by various doctrines "on the balance of power and security", "the balance of fear", deterrence, the need for suppressing or inflicting the "first, second" or similar nuclear strikes and the like. Quasi-theories are launched on the possibilities of a limited and local nuclear war, thus enhancing the production of corresponding new weapons of mass destruction. Claims are made that completely stable international relations or an ideal military balance or complete confidence must first be established, etc., and only then is it possible to come down to disarmament. Often, one's own exercising of pressure and interference are justified by some lofty goals or hidden intentions of others that should be forestalled and then these same acts committed by others are condemned and they are made responsible for the deterioration of relations and the arms race. We do not accept the arguments of any doctrine which boils down to the absurdity of the arms race and which cannot but end in destruction. For those, especially the Great Powers, which spread such doctrines, it would be better if they were to change their policy. Mutual accusation for various acts which serve to justify armament should be abandoned and political will should be shown in action.

There is no need to try to convince anyone that, for any race, and for the arms race as well, at least two competitors are required. Unfortunately, the present arms race involves a much greater number of participants. As concerns the responsibilities of countries, they are very clearly stipulated in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, as are the priorities concerning disarmament. Any assurances of one's own desire to reduce tensions in the world and negotiate about the reduction in armaments and towards disarmament sound very unconvincing if they are simultaneously accompanied by the publication of data in the daily press regarding the production of new lethal weapons of mass destruction or an astounding increase in military budgets.

For all the above reasons, the Yugoslav delegation cannot agree with the position of those who are saying that it is not possible to initiate the process of disarmament while the unfavourable and exacerbated international situation still lasts. We are of the opposite opinion. It is precisely in aggravated international circumstances that greater political will should be shown to make even greater efforts to halt the arms race and make use of all the possibilities, such as this Committee of ours, to move towards concrete results. They, in turn, will undoubtedly have a positive influence on the global state of international relations. There is no alternative to the process of disarmament in this respect.

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What can we expect this year from the work of this session of our Committee, the first part of which was rightly assessed as very important by many preceding speakers, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

It is evident that we are not working in a vacuum and that the general state of international relations is also reflected in the work of this Committee. We consider, however, that, despite the deterioration of the international situation and precisely because of it, the work of the Committee should be approached constructively, responsibly and efficiently. Any other approach would be harmful and would be conducive to negative, grave consequences. This is why we must not allow the Committee to become a venue for bloc rivalry and mutual accusations for the sins committed on the world scene, as this will render its work impossible. We should not reconcile ourselves to this state of affairs. Instead, negotiations should be approached as a means of achieving concrete results, which have been negligible thus far. The current international situation requires resolute efforts to contain the arms race and open a broad process of disarmament. After all, that is the main task of this Committee. Although there is very little time left until the second special session, we think that this Committee can play a significant role in the realization of some results that would considerably improve the record of its work and contribute to the success of the second special session. We are convinced that this Committee has sufficient strength and accumulated experience to carry out these tasks. It is only necessary to show political will and make a conscientious effort to overcome the difference of views which would be amply rewarded by lasting political benefits for all peoples of the world. All the efforts of my country and the countries of the Group of 21 are directed toward this end. The multilateral importance of the Committee on Disarmament and the advantages it offers should be used to the full, especially since the efforts invested so far have not yielded results that would give rise to a historical turning point from armament to disarmament.

The task of greatest priority for the Committee on Disarmament, on the basis of the consensus reached in the Final Document of the first special session, is to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. Three and a half years after the first special session, the Committee has still not begun to negotiate on nuclear weapons, which, as we have all agreed, pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. Some nuclear Powers persistently oppose the conduct of such negotiations in the Committee and the creation of an ad hoc working group for negotiations on which we continue to insist.

The case is similar with respect to the negotiations on a CTBT as well. The conclusion of such an agreement would represent an important aspect of the halting of the nuclear arms race and a first step towards nuclear weapons reduction. Solemn declarations and numerous resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly urging the conclusion of such an agreement and a series of requests made by the Group of 21 and some other members of the Committee for the creation of an ad hoc working group for this purpose encounter the persistent refusal of some nuclear Powers. Those who, through their refusal, contribute in the most direct manner to the continuation of the nuclear arms race are assuming the greatest responsibility. The minimum that can be asked of the Committee is the creation, at the beginning of the session, of working groups for nuclear disarmament and a CTBT and the opening of the negotiating process which has been awaited for so long.

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The second question with regard to which further progress can be made in comparison with last year is the resumption of the work of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and the setting of its new mandate, which would enable the commencement of concrete negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention. The urgent initiation of negotiations on a convention is all the more necessary in order to eliminate in the most concrete manner the threat of the use of these weapons and threats to produce new types of the most lethal binary chemical weapons stockpiles. Any postponement of the initiation of this work provides an additional track for the arms race, whose consequences are difficult to perceive and control.

My delegation also considers that the work of the working groups on the ban of radiological weapons and on negative security assurances should be resumed as soon as possible.

We believe that, by the second special session on disarmament, the conclusion of a convention on the ban of radiological weapons can be achieved. The questions that remain to be solved do not represent insurmountable difficulties. The Yugoslav delegation is prepared, in a spirit of consensus, to contribute to the successful conclusion of the work of this group.

As regards negative security assurances, my delegation has always considered that this right should unconditionally and automatically refer to all non-nuclear-weapon States which have renounced these weapons and do not have them on their territories. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will be able to submit an acceptable formula on negative security assurances before the second special session.

The success of the second special session is also most directly linked to the elaboration, by the Committee, of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Working Group headed by the distinguished Ambassador from Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, has done a considerable share of the work. There still remains, however, much to be done and time is running short. The difficulties that the Ad Hoc Working Group encounters in its work are not to be underestimated, but they are not of such a nature that they cannot be overcome through patient work and mutual understanding of the positions of particular delegations, all the more so since the majority of delegations has the same or very similar views to those contained in document CD/223 submitted by the Group of 21. The framework for the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is contained in many paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session and, in particular, paragraph 9, which, inter alia, specifies "that a comprehensive disarmament programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control"; paragraph 50, which speaks of "a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames"; and paragraph 109, which specifies that the "Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament

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encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality" and that "the comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ... a continuing review of the implementation of the programme".

The Group of 21 has therefore initiated in its working paper CD/223 the elaboration of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which contains a detailed programme of disarmament measures to be implemented in stages and within the corresponding time-frames, which have been set in a flexible manner as they are of an indicative nature. The review mechanism which the Working Group has not considered yet in greater detail should represent an important link for the establishment and implementation of disarmament measures.

The Committee should not fail to submit the draft of the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the second special session on disarmament. It is not necessary that it be perfect in all its parts, but it should be detailed enough to be able to be easily improved on at the session itself and for a decision to be made on its adoption.

Our spring session will take place in an atmosphere of preparation for the second special session on disarmament, which should, as stipulated in paragraph 128 of the Final Document of the first special session, "not be the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament".

The Committee on Disarmament can make its best contribution to that session if it achieves two results. First, to succeed in submitting a concerted proposal for a CPD. Second, to reach an agreement on some areas of disarmament which are on the Committee's agenda. By doing both of these things, we would create that constructive atmosphere which will indeed be needed for that universal gathering of members of the world community. It should trace new, comprehensive and concrete roads in order that we can finally and in effect embark upon the road to the systematic realization of those objectives for which an enormous majority of countries has opted innumerable times throughout the entire post-war period. This would be a definite break-through in halting the arms race and opening the process of general and complete disarmament. We have the full support of the entire world public for the achievement of this goal and it is something we owe to future generations. It is only by achieving this goal that mankind can avoid its own destruction and embark upon new roads of co-operation for development and the prosperity of all countries and people on earth.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, I wish to offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the current month and pledge to you my delegation's full co-operation in your heavy responsibilities. To your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, we are grateful for his able guidance during the Committee's work at the end of its 1981 session. I also wish to greet and welcome our new colleagues who have joined us this year. My delegation would like to associate itself with the other speakers in expressing condolences to the delegation of Italy on the passing away of Ambassador Vittorio Cordero di Montezemolo.

My statement today will be of a general nature. Having listened with great interest to the statements made by various representatives in the plenary, we may draw two general conclusions from the statements of the majority of delegations. First, that the Committee is beginning its 1982 session at a time when the international situation is very disturbing. Secondly, that increasing concern about the questions of the arms race and disarmament is being expressed with intensity by peoples all over the world. Hence, growing world public interest is being generated in the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is unavoidable, therefore, that our negotiations will, to some degree, be conducted with this awareness in mind. Whether these reflections impede or induce our task, the performance of the Committee at this session will have significant bearing on the forthcoming special session on disarmament.

It is not the intention of my delegation to discuss international events which have their own fora outside this Committee. However, we do not negotiate in this Committee in an insulated capsule. There are certain developments that have a bearing on items on our agenda and which may be taken up with full validity. On the other hand, there are political situations which should be confined to other bodies, since their discussion here would in no way promote our negotiations. It is on this basis that my delegation examines international events in this Committee.

In many of the meetings on disarmament and related topics going back to many years, a number of references are made describing the then prevailing international situation as being critical, tense, dangerous or even grave. Indeed, there have been many world crises, including aggressions and conflicts, many of which have led to wars. But recently there is a new doctrine which makes the international situation far more dangerous, with the increased possibility of nuclear catastrophe. I am referring to the concept of a limited nuclear war and the feasibility of conducting such a war. For example, the modernization of artillery pieces which would be capable of firing nuclear shells. The possibility of a limited nuclear war enunciated by the leader of one of the major nuclear-weapon States is a cause of grave concern. Ethiopia joins the multitude of nations and international public opinion in rejecting such an irresponsible attitude, which constitutes an unprecedented threat to the survival of mankind.

The foreign policy of Ethiopia is guided by the well-known principles of the non-aligned nations: respect for peace, justice and equality, national independence, national unity and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. These principles are also the cornerstone of the Charters of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity. Guided by these principles, my country views with great apprehension the recent arms build up and the unprecedented increase in the military budget of a major nuclear Power to the detriment of national and international socio-economic goals. It is equally disturbing for us, as a member of the Committee on Disarmament, to hear statements by high officials of this same Power rejecting the very basis of the principle of

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

respect for the equal rights of all nations and questioning our own working procedure in the Committee, namely, the principle of consensus. Within such a frame of mind, my delegation therefore fully understands if some members of the Committee showed displeasure and indignation at the propaganda directed against them and at the lack of respect shown for the sovereignty of the States that they represent or for actions taken by them with their own national sovereignty.

Turning briefly to the situation in our region, we view with particular concern the militarization and continued deterioration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean. The policy of the United States to secure military bases and facilities for its expanding Rapid Deployment Forces as well as war games and exercise conducted recently by it in the region gives grounds for deep concern. As Ethiopia attaches great importance to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, it regrets the failure to convene the Conference on the Indian Ocean at Colombo last year, as requested by the General Assembly in resolution 34/80 B.

I shall refer to another situation which my Government continues to be deeply concerned with, namely, the implications of South Africa's nuclear capability for the peace and security of Africa. Those Western States which assist South Africa with its nuclear programme and provide its nuclear material continue to turn a blind eye there to this regional concern of ours, yet call for the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. When we consider the nuclear item, my delegation shall highlight and focus on this particular threat.

However, enough has been said about the existence or non-existence of linkages between the present international political climate and disarmament negotiations. Our attention should focus on the danger of nuclear war posed by the existence of tens of thousands of nuclear warheads whose destructive capacity is millions of times greater than the atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima in 1945. It is a fact that the chances of using these weapons are rapidly increasing due to tense relations, particularly between the major nuclear-weapon States. Therefore, we cannot deny the urgency of concentrating seriously on our substantive negotiating work. This urgency is particularly evident in the fact that the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly adopted over 50 resolutions on disarmament and in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Without prejudging the outcome of the second special session or the performance of the Committee between now and the next few months, my delegation is of the view that the Committee on Disarmament should reactivate the three ad hoc working groups set up last year, so that they may continue their work while we continue to explore ways and means of reaching consensus on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, namely on a CTB and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Useful suggestions have already been submitted as late as last Tuesday, for instance by the German Democratic Republic, indicating the mandates and duration of the new ad hoc working groups.

With the current international background and the growing risk of a nuclear war, the Ethiopian delegation welcomes, therefore, the recent commencement of talks on medium-range nuclear missiles between the Soviet Union and the United States. We express the hope that, with the beginning of the Geneva talks, a period of renewed disarmament efforts will be encouraged and that the SALT process will likewise resume.

My delegation is pleased also that under your leadership, consultations have led to a consensus on the inclusion of the item concerning outer space. In view of the great speed with which space research and technology is progressing, it is high time that we should be concerned at the growing dangers of the military use of outer space, while other United Nations bodies consider concomittantly the legal aspects

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and the question of the peaceful uses of outer space, for herein lies an unlimited chance for mankind to direct its universal knowledge to benefit all countries of the world in the solution of their economic and social problems, particularly in the field of communications and the exploitation of natural resources. In the Committee on Disarmament, our immediate task is to negotiate measures of preventing the nuclear arms race from being extended into outer space, for the use of satellites for early warning system against nuclear attack and other uses of outer space suggest the likelihood of space war in the future. This concern, however, should not detract the Committee from pursuing its priority items.

In the light of the growing interest displayed by States and concerned people all over the world in the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament, the work in the ad hoc working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament in its preparation of a draft comprehensive programme will most naturally command special attention in the Committee's work. In this connection, it is indeed good fortune that the working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament has the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, to steer its work with his characteristic comprehensive and skilful approach.

The views of my delegation on the number of issues pertaining to the CPD are reflected in the position of the Group of 21 as contained in its working papers CD/223, CD/229 and CD/230. Based on the provisions of the Final Document, these working papers, which have been the object of extensive examination by various delegations, provide a realistic and effective approach for ensuring a meaningful disarmament draft programme for the second special session.

On the question of nuclear weapons, the objective of some delegations to equate nuclear weapons with conventional weapons would be difficult for my delegation to accept. Also, attempts to question the priority accorded to the question of nuclear disarmament in disarmament measures would equally be difficult to accept.

With respect to the items on our agenda, I would like to reiterate that my delegation would like to see the ad hoc working groups established last year continue their work without delay. On the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which are items of the highest priority, we wish to reiterate our view and emphasize the urgent need to set up ad hoc working groups. It is unfortunate to note that, in view of the statement made on the nuclear question by the distinguished representative of the United States at the plenary meeting on 9 February, it may prove difficult to attain this particular objective at the present time. However, with respect to chemical weapons, we should be able to make more progress under the revised mandate of the working group. In this connection, we regard published reports of the decision by the United States to build a facility to produce chemical weapons, as well as the allocation of increased funds for chemical weapons production, as regrettable, as it will inevitably intensify the chemical arms race. We are fearful that, in view of this disturbing trend, the complexity of chemical weapons negotiations will only increase over time. Therefore, the urgent need to achieve rapid progress on a chemical weapons convention is self-evident.

In conclusion, I would like to take cognizance of the report of the Secretary-General on the study of the relationship between disarmament and development, which we received with great interest. Under the chairmanship of Madame Thorsson of Sweden, to whom my delegation wish to express appreciation for the valuable contribution made, the study will not only provide a useful basis for the examination of the socio-economic consequences of the arms race, but will also hold the key to potential resources for the development objectives of the developing countries.



The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation would like to express its views on the first item on the agenda, "Nuclear test ban".

It is not by chance that the Committee on Disarmament is starting its work with a consideration of the question of a nuclear-weapons test ban, because this priority issue is indeed extremely important and urgent and its practical solution would meet the vital interests of all mankind.

The question of a nuclear-weapons test ban is one of the most acute amid the complex of problems relating to nuclear disarmament. The conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests would place an obstacle in the path of the improvement and further proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the solution of this problem is further delayed, the accelerated development and production of new and even more destructive types of such weapons will continue.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have actively and consistently advocated and continue to advocate the complete and general cessation of nuclear weapons tests by all States in all spheres for all time; they are in favour of the speediest possible solution of this important and urgent problem.

For a number of years we have urged that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active role in bringing about the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests. We have supported the proposal of the group of neutral and non-aligned countries for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to carry out negotiations in this regard. In his statement on 15 February the representative of the German Democratic Republic proposed a wording for the mandate of such a working group. We share the approach of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic.

Despite persistent efforts for many years by a large group of countries, and dozens of General Assembly resolutions on this question, multilateral negotiations in the Committee have still not been started owing to the position of the United States and the United Kingdom, which have blocked the establishment of an ad hoc working group and the commencement of negotiations on this item in the Committee.

As you know, at the end of the 1970s trilateral negotiations were conducted on the question of a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. From the very beginning the Soviet Union sought to ensure the success of the negotiations and to this end took important steps to meet its Western partners, introducing detailed proposals on various topics. These negotiations have been broken off by the United States and we can say nothing about their further destiny.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the same time, taking into account the great interest of the members of the Committee on Disarmament in this urgent matter, the Soviet delegation would like to inform the members of the Committee of the Soviet Union's position on some aspects of the question of the elaboration and conclusion of a treaty on a complete and general nuclear-weapons test ban.

We believe that the treaty should contain a commitment on the part of each party to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any test explosions of nuclear weapons in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in any sphere, as well as to refrain from the instigation or encouragement of or any participation in the conduct of nuclear weapons test explosions anywhere else.

We believe that the treaty should be supplemented by a protocol on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty and would take into account the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Under the protocol, the parties to the treaty would institute a moratorium on peaceful nuclear explosions and refrain from providing any inducement or encouragement to, granting permission for or taking any part in the carrying out of such explosions until an appropriate procedure for conducting them has been elaborated.

We support the idea that after the treaty enters into force the parties to it should continue without delay to examine the question of a procedure for the carrying out of peaceful nuclear explosions. Such a procedure could be embodied in a special agreement or special agreements and be brought into force through appropriate amendment of the protocol mentioned above.

We believe that in order to ensure that the treaty was without prejudice to any arms limitation agreements concluded earlier, it ought not to touch upon commitments compatible with it that have been undertaken by the parties under other international agreements. In our opinion the treaty should provide a procedure for its amendment and should contain a provision concerning withdrawal from it on grounds of higher national interests.

Recognizing the great importance of questions of verification of compliance with the treaty, we believe that the parties to the treaty should use the available national technical means of verification, as well as the possibility of the international exchange of seismic data. In the elaboration of such measures a leading role could be played and is being played by the Committee on Disarmament, under whose aegis a group of seismology experts has been working successfully for a number of years past.

Other means of co-operation could also be examined; in particular, the exchange of additional seismic data. This would be connected with the establishment and use by the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom of high-quality national seismology stations with agreed features.

This position was, of course, stated during the trilateral negotiations and it is reflected in the progress report on those negotiations which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It can be affirmed that the greater part of the work of elaborating the treaty was done. There remained only two or three questions to be agreed on for the successful completion of the negotiations..

However, the adoption by the West of a policy of intensifying military preparations resulted in the negotiations on this extremely important matter being broken off, and the United States now declares that the entire problem of a nuclear-weapons test ban is not pressing.

The Soviet Union is in favour of the resumption of the trilateral negotiations without delay and is ready to do everything in its power for their successful conclusion. At the same time, as we have stressed many times, the Soviet Union has always supported and continues to support the idea that the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament should be fully used for the successful conduct of multilateral negotiations aimed at putting a stop to nuclear weapons tests in all spheres and by all those who carry them out.

We are also prepared to support the proposals for the submission by the Committee of a report to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament on the situation as regards the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests.

In conclusion, we would like to stress here in the Committee that the Soviet Union would agree to the treaty's entering into force even if initially not all five nuclear-weapon Powers participated in it, but only three -- the USSR, the United States of America and the United Kingdom. In other words we reaffirm our readiness for the treaty to be signed initially by three nuclear-weapon Powers -- the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom -- and that we should not wait for the adherence to it of China and France. In that case the treaty would enter into force for a definite, agreed period of time and would remain permanently in force if the other nuclear-weapon Powers signed the treaty before the expiration of the fixed time.

Before concluding this statement, the Soviet delegation would like to dwell briefly upon another question, which has been raised several times here in the Committee. This is the matter of Soviet-American negotiations on nuclear arms limitation in Europe. In the course of the general debate the majority of delegations have welcomed these negotiations. The reason for this is obvious. The very fact of the commencement of these negotiations was received with satisfaction everywhere in the world and particularly in the European countries where the negotiations have given rise to hopes for the reduction of tension, the deepening of détente and confidence between peoples and the removal from Europe -- and indeed from the whole world -- of the threat of nuclear catastrophe.

At the same time, the manifestly tendentious and biased evaluations of the progress of the negotiations given in a number of statements by representatives of the Western countries have not failed to attract attention. For example,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the United States representative said on 9 February that President Reagan's proposal for the abolition of all intermediate-range land-based nuclear missiles, wherever located, was being considered at the negotiations. The United Kingdom representative said in his statement of 11 February that "achievement of the zero-level for land-based medium-range missiles on both sides would be a major contribution to international stability and therefore to progress in other areas of arms control endeavour".

The so-called "zero option" and the draft treaty based on it, which was submitted by the United States delegation on 4 February, is also widely propogandized as a "constructive" basis for the achievement of an agreement by the mass media of the Western countries.

In this connection allow me once more to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev of representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament, which has been issued as an official Committee document (CD/240), as well as to the article entitled "A new spiral in the arms race: to be or not to be?", both of which contain an analysis of the situation at the above-mentioned negotiations. The article was published in the newspaper Pravda on 10 February of this year and has also been circulated as a press-release of the USSR Mission in Geneva.

The article quotes the words of L.I. Brezhnev that the state of affairs at the negotiations "cannot but cause a certain watchfulness". The reason for this is the reluctance which is becoming increasingly evident on the part of the American side to seek solutions that would meet the principle of equality and equal security. The substance of the "zero option" proposed by the American side and propogandized in the Committee is that the Soviet Union should unilaterally liquidate all its medium-range missiles. As a result, "the number of NATO's medium-range nuclear-weapons would be in no way reduced, while the number of such weapons in the European part of the USSR would be reduced by more than half", and "NATO would gain more than a double advantage as regards the number of medium-range nuclear-weapon delivery vehicles and triple as regards the number of nuclear warheads".

As for the Soviet Union, it is prepared to agree on a genuine "zero option" -- one that would mean, not unilateral disarmament by one side but the total renunciation by both sides of all types of medium-range nuclear weapons aimed at targets in Europe, and more than that -- the renunciation of both medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons.

The article sets forth in detail the USSR position on all these questions and the proposals put forward by the Soviet side with a view to the speediest possible achievement of agreement.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes my list of speakers for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

As you know, we need to take decisions on the agenda and the programme of work for the first part of the 1982 session, as well as on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, radiological weapons and chemical weapons. I understand that the consultations held in connection with the mandate of the ad hoc working group on chemical weapons have been concluded and that we may be able to deal with this matter today.

I intend to suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it at 3.30 p.m. On that occasion, we will take decisions on those questions.

Immediately afterwards, we will hold an informal meeting to continue our consideration of pending matters.

The plenary meeting is suspended.

The meeting was suspended at 1.20 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God the Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, the one hundred and fifty-sixth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The representative of Zaire has asked for the floor and I give it to him.

Mr. BAGBENI (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, in taking the floor for the first time at this session, my delegation joins others in congratulating you on your brilliant election to the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of February 1982.

Your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia, had the honour of closing the work of our 1981 session and his positive contribution to the Committee's work deserves our gratitude.

My delegation would like to express its most sincere condolences to the Italian delegation for the untimely death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

It welcomes the new colleagues to the Committee and much appreciates the presence of Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the Head of the Swedish delegation, in the Committee. Her comparative study of the relationship between disarmament and development is a very positive contribution to our Committee's work.

The current session is, in our view, particularly important because it is called upon to assess four years of work in the field of disarmament and to submit a full report on its activities to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is to be held in June 1982 in New York.

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

There is no denying the fact that the Committee on Disarmament will be held largely responsible for the success or failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- all the more so because the current membership of the Committee on Disarmament is significant in several respects. The Committee includes all the nuclear-weapon Powers and those which aspire to become nuclear-weapon States.

The nuclear-weapon Powers which are members of the Committee on Disarmament are also all permanent members of the Security Council and use their right to the veto to express their disapproval of positions which run counter to their interests. Under Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations, they are also responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments, in order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

However, in order to carry out the mission entrusted to them in the Charter of the United Nations, which they signed voluntarily, the restoration of an appropriate climate for the re-establishment of confidence and understanding and even détente and co-operation, requires all States to abandon the illusive race for supremacy and their hegemonistic aims.

Making such statements before those who are primarily responsible for maintaining international peace and security at a time when international relations are characterized by a breakdown of détente, the resumption of the cold war and hegemonistic rivalry between the great Powers, which are ever in pursuit of zones of influence, bases and raw materials, not to mention the arms race and, in particular, the nuclear arms race, is not unrealistic, because it is on the basis of political will alone that they have adopted attitudes designed to create a general climate of uncertainty and distrust which exacerbates the potential threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The nuclear holocaust is no longer a topic of theoretical speculation; it has become a credible hypothesis as a result of the proliferation and reduction in size of atomic weapons, whose use is seriously envisaged in the event of conflict.

The advent of tactical atomic weapons, such as the medium-range theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, is entirely compatible with the concept of the use of atomic weapons in military strategy and renders the theories of deterrence and the maintenance of international peace and security through the balance of terror null and void.

The attention focused by the international community on the very concept of general and complete disarmament should encourage States to achieve their legitimate political, economic, social and cultural objectives without resorting to war or to a spirit of war and confrontation.

Is it necessary to mortgage the future of nations, peoples, generations and even mankind itself through the excessive accumulation of sophisticated weapons, of which mankind could easily lose control?

(Mr. Bagbeni, Zaire)

Mankind is currently living in a time when any promise or deed of destruction is possible because the potential annihilation of mankind has become an end in itself. In the past, war opposed adversaries who fought for a specific cause and, when the war ended, there was a winner and a loser, but with the weapons the world has today, it is possible and even certain that there will be no winners or losers because the world itself will be destroyed and, therefore, everyone will lose.

Commitment to the process of general and complete disarmament and, in particular, nuclear disarmament implies acceptance of the notion of control, especially effective international control. The nuclear-weapon States will therefore be called upon to allow the body responsible for control and verification to carry out its mission. Frontiers and installations must be open to it.

South Africa's acquisition of nuclear weapons with the complicity of certain Powers is a very serious threat to the security of the African States. It is contrary to the frequently voiced desire of our Heads of State to make the African continent a denuclearized zone. My delegation believes that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament should adopt measures to that end.

My delegation will have an opportunity to express its position on the various items on the agenda of the current session, but it would like to state at this juncture that, in its view, the substantive negotiations taking place in the ad hoc working groups should be continued, as should the working group on a comprehensive programme of disarmament so competently presided over by Ambassador Robles of Mexico. The ad hoc working groups on radiological weapons, chemical weapons and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be re-established and the mandate of the group on chemical weapons should be broadened.

My delegation also fully supports the idea of creating two further ad hoc working groups, one to negotiate a nuclear-test ban treaty and the other to consider measures to halt the nuclear arms race with a view to promoting nuclear disarmament. The resolutions of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, for example, resolutions 36/84 and 36/85, should be taken into account by our Committee so that their implementation is guaranteed, particularly since the latest session of the General Assembly considered the first two items on our agenda to be matters of the highest priority.

My delegation is pleased to note that agenda item 7 will be considered separately from the other agenda items.

My country, Zaire, has always advocated the peaceful settlement of conflicts and disputes. It will continue to make its voice, that of a non-aligned country, heard in our Committee's discussions so that peace, the essential condition for progress and the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, may be achieved.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

I would like now to take up the questions of the agenda and programme of work, as well as the re-establishment of subsidiary bodies.

In accordance with rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee, "the provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption".

The Committee has today before it Working Paper No. 47/Rev.2, which is submitted in conformity with rule 29. Before the Committee takes a decision on Working Paper No. 47/Rev.2, I wish to make the following statement:

"In connexion with the adoption of the agenda for 1982 and the programme of work for the first part of the session, it is understood that the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present can be considered under item 2 of the agenda, as was done last year.

Taking into account the views expressed, the Committee will decide to hold informal meetings at an appropriate time to consider item 7 of the agenda during the first part of the session. The further treatment of this item during the second part of the session will be decided in the light of the situation then prevailing. In considering this item the recommendations contained in General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99 will be duly taken into account."

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts Working Paper No. 47/Rcv.2.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation has no objection to the statement you have just made on the agenda and programme of work. It is the understanding of the Brazilian delegation that the further activity of the Committee during the 1982 session will be decided on the basis of the priorities established for its work.

The CHAIRMAN: Since there is no objection, it so decided.

It was so decided.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) (translated from Russian): The group of socialist countries, anxious to see the Committee get down to considering substantive issues at the earliest possible moment, does not object to the adoption by consensus of the Committee's agenda for 1982 in the form proposed by the Chairman in his working paper. However, it regrets that, owing to the negative stand taken by the delegations of the United States and its close allies in NATO, it has not been possible to include in that agenda the important item on the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon.



(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

As you know, as long ago as on 9 March 1978 the socialist countries of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559).

Considering the importance and urgency of this question, the group of socialist countries in the summer of 1981 called for the earliest possible start of negotiations, with a view to elaborating such a convention and establishing an appropriate working group within the framework of the Committee. However, such establishment was blocked at that time by the United States delegation.

The extreme urgency of this question has been repeatedly stressed by numerous delegations both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly. In resolution 36/92 K, adopted at its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly requested the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons without delay in an appropriate organizational framework, and to submit a report on this question to the General Assembly at its thirty-seventh session. The serious concern evoked by the emergency of the neutron weapon is also expressed in the communiqué issued by the Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegations of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, held on 25 and 28 September 1981. The resolution adopted at the beginning of 1982 by the Council of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) also calls upon interested parties to avert the danger inherent in the production of neutron weapons.

The group of socialist countries considers that the refusal to include in the agenda an item on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons runs counter to the view of the majority of States, as expressed, in particular, in United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/92 K.

The socialist countries, for their part, are resolved to continue to raise this question when the relevant agenda items are considered by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like now to draw the attention of the Committee to Working Paper No. 48 containing a draft decision on the establishment of ad hoc working groups on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, radiological weapons and chemical weapons.

I put for decision of the Committee the draft contained in Working Paper No. 48. If there are no comments, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): As one of the delegations which has participated in the consultations preceding this decision, I want to express our sincere satisfaction that we have now taken this important step in the history of our negotiations on chemical weapons. The language of the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons could, of course, have been further improved, but still I would like to express our appreciation, not least to the two States which participated in bilateral negotiations on the subject, namely, for accepting this broad mandate and thereby whole-heartedly agreeing to participate with restraints in these very important and difficult negotiations.

I sincerely hope that the earliest date referred to at the end of the paragraph dealing with the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will mean a date in the not too distant future.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I wish to state for the record, on behalf of my delegation, that the Yugoslav delegation understands that the mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons means that it covers all chemical weapons. I say so for the reason that all chemical weapons have been mentioned in the resolutions adopted in the United Nations, as well as in paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session.

The CHAIRMAN: The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing a time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee during the coming week. The time-table is of course tentative, since there are a number of questions that need to be settled if we wish fully to utilize the time available to us. Provision is made for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to meet on Tuesday afternoon instead of Monday afternoon, at the request of the Chairman of that Working Group. We will continue to hold informal meetings to deal with those matters still pending and we have left open dates for meetings of the three Ad Hoc Working Groups established by the Committee today, since we still need to take decisions concerning the chairmanship of those bodies. In any case, as soon as consensus is reached on this matter, I would like to be so informed.

As agreed by the Committee, we will hold an informal meeting five minutes after the adjournment of this plenary meeting to continue our consideration of requests for participation by non-members.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 23 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.15 p.m.