

TABULATION OF PROPOSALS CONCERNING NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT
MADE BETWEEN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS
AND THE CONVENING OF THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

Prepared by the Secretariat

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 116th plenary meeting on 19 March 1981, the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, in his statement concerning the further activities of the Committee on agenda items 1 and 2 relating to nuclear disarmament questions, requested the Secretariat to prepare a tabulation of all proposals on nuclear disarmament submitted since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, held in 1978, to be complemented subsequently by a similar tabulation of nuclear disarmament proposals submitted between the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 and the holding of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978.

2. In accordance with the first part of that request, the Secretariat, on 31 March 1981 prepared the first tabulation (CD/171), covering the period since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The present tabulation, covering the period between 1945 and 1978, has been prepared in accordance with the second part of the Chairman's request and includes proposals submitted to: (a) the General Assembly; (b) the Atomic Energy Commission; (c) the Disarmament Commission; (d) the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament; (e) the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee; (f) the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; and (g) the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Also included are the recommendations contained in the resolutions of the General Assembly transmitted to the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee and to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; other relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly; and other relevant proposals: (i) proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests (1958); (ii) proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack and for the preparation of a report thereon to Governments (1958); (iii) proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests (1958-1962); (iv) proposals submitted at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (1968).

3. Like the first tabulation, the present one includes references to the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons because, although that question constitutes a separate item on the Committee's agenda, in many cases it has direct relevance to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.

II. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY */

Third session, 1948

4. Draft resolution on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, submitted by the USSR on 17 November 1948 (A/723)

The draft resolution recommended that, as a first step in the reduction of armaments and armed forces, the permanent members of the Security Council reduce by one-third, during one year, all land, naval and air forces; that atomic weapons be prohibited as weapons of aggression but not of defence; and that an international control body be established within the framework of the Security Council for the supervision of and control over the implementation of the measures for the reduction of armaments and armed forces, as well as those for the prohibition of atomic weapons.

Ninth Session, 1955

5. Proposal submitted by the USSR in December 1955 (A/C.1/L.140)

The proposal, submitted as an amendment to a draft resolution subsequently adopted as General Assembly resolution 913 (X), setting up the Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, called on nuclear-weapon States to continue their efforts towards reaching agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

Eleventh Session, 1957

6. Memorandum submitted by the United States on 12 January 1957 (A/C.1/783)

It was proposed, inter alia, that after a cut-off on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, nuclear test explosions should be limited and ultimately prohibited, and that arrangements should be worked out for advance notice and registration and limited international observation of such tests.

7. Draft resolution on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, submitted by the USSR on 14 January 1957 (A/C.1/L.160)

The draft resolution called upon States conducting atomic and hydrogen weapons tests to discontinue them forthwith.

*/ Documents that contained proposals, including draft resolutions, that were subsequently adopted as or reflected in General Assembly resolutions are not included in this section. Also, documents that were submitted to more than one organ are included only under one organ, generally under the organ to which the contents of the documents more directly related.

8. Memorandum on partial measures in the field of disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 20 September 1957 (A/C.1/793)

The memorandum proposed, inter alia, reduction of armed forces, reduction of armaments and military budgets, prohibition of atomic weapons and discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing, prohibition of the transfer of these weapons to other States and the establishment of aerial photography zones in Europe and the Far East.

9. Draft resolution submitted by Japan on 23 September 1957 (A/C.1/L.174)

By the draft resolution the General Assembly would call upon the States concerned to suspend all nuclear-weapon test explosions, once they had agreed in principle on the need for a verification system.

10. Draft resolution introduced by India on 1 November 1957 (A/C.1/L.176 and Rev.1,2,4)

By the proposal, a commission of experts would supervise and ensure the effectiveness of a suspension of tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Twelfth Session, 1958

11. Draft resolution introduced by the USSR on 9 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.203)

By the proposal the General Assembly would call upon all States carrying out nuclear weapon tests to stop such tests immediately and enter into negotiations to conclude an appropriate agreement.

12. Draft resolution introduced by Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Morocco, Nepal, the United Arab Republic and Yemen on 15 October 1958 (A/C.1/L.204, Rev.1 and Add.1 and 2)

By the proposal, the General Assembly would, inter alia, call for the immediate discontinuance of nuclear weapon testing until agreement was reached by the States concerned on control arrangements, and would request the parties to the tripartite Geneva Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests to report to the General Assembly on the agreement reached.

Thirteenth Session, 1959

13. Declaration on general and complete disarmament submitted by the USSR on 19 September 1959 (A/4219)

The declaration contained the text of a three-stage programme which provided for: first stage - reduction of armed forces and armaments to agreed levels; second stage - completion of the disbandment of the armed forces and elimination of foreign military bases; third stage - destruction of all types of nuclear weapons and missiles, as well as air force equipment; prohibition of the production, possession and storage of means of chemical and bacteriological warfare and their destruction. An international control organ would be established to verify the implementation of the disarmament measures. At the end of the disarmament process, States would retain only strictly limited and agreed contingents of police (militia) equipped with light firearms.

The USSR also submitted a plan for partial measures, proposing the establishment of a control and inspection zone in Europe; establishment of an atom-free zone in Central Europe; abolition of foreign military bases; and conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Member States of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty.

Fifteenth Session, 1961

14. Agreed statement of principles, submitted jointly by the USSR and the United States on 20 September 1961 (A/4879)

As a result of an exchange of views on questions relating to disarmament and the resumption of negotiations, the USSR and the United States agreed on and recommended a number of principles as a basis for future disarmament negotiations, as follows: (a) the final goal would be general and complete disarmament; (b) the programme would ensure that States would have at their disposal only such non-nuclear armaments and forces as necessary to maintain internal order and a United Nations peace force; (c) there would be provision for the disbanding of armed forces, the elimination of military institutions, the discontinuance of military expenditures, etc. (d) the disarmament programme should be implemented by stages; (e) all measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that no State or group of States could at any time gain military advantage; (f) international control; (g) measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace should be agreed; and (h) all States should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date.

By its resolution 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the joint USSR/USA statement of agreed principles and recommended that negotiations on general and complete disarmament should be based on those principles

15. Memorandum on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 26 September 1961 (A/4892)

The memorandum contained proposals on freezing military budgets, prohibition of nuclear weapons; prohibition of war propaganda; non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and decrease of danger of surprise attack.

Nineteenth Session, 1964

16. Programme for peace and international co-operation (chapter VII) adopted at the second non-aligned summit conference, Cairo, 5-10 October 1964 (A/5763)

The programme suggested various measures of disarmament including: general and complete disarmament; peaceful use of atomic energy; prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests; establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; prevention of dissemination of nuclear weapons; abolition of all nuclear weapons; convening of a world disarmament conference.

Twentieth Session, 1965

17. Draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, submitted by the USSR on 24 September 1965 (A/5976)

The draft treaty would prohibit nuclear Powers from transferring nuclear weapons directly or indirectly into the ownership or disposal of States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons or from granting the aforesaid States or groups of States the right to participate in the ownership, control or use of nuclear weapons; prohibit such Powers from giving nuclear weapons and control over them and over their location to units or to individual members of the armed forces of States not possessing nuclear weapons; and require States not possessing nuclear weapons to undertake not to create, manufacture or prepare to manufacture nuclear weapons either independently or jointly with other States.

Thirtieth Session, 1975

18. Memorandum on the problem of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and establishment of lasting peace, submitted by Romania on 30 October 1975 (A/C.1/1066)

Romania called for a number of measures including cessation of the arms race through the immediate freezing and reduction of military budgets, with the highest priority overall being assigned to nuclear disarmament. It provided for undertakings to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons; banning introduction of new nuclear weapons into the territory of other States; cessation of development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and delivery means, and reduction and liquidation of stockpiles and a total ban; creation of nuclear-free zones; certain partial measures of disarmament and disengagement including withdrawal of foreign based troops, and the dismantling of foreign bases; conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament; enhancing the United Nations role and convening a special session of the Assembly on disarmament; banning war propaganda; and the wider informing of the public on the arms race and its consequences.

Thirty-First Session, 1976

19. Political declaration (chapter XVII), adopted at the fifth non-aligned summit conference, Colombo, 16-19 August 1976, submitted by Sri Lanka on 8 September 1976 (A/31/197)

The Declaration stressed the conviction of the Conference that universal peace and security could be assured only by general and complete disarmament in particular, nuclear disarmament, under effective international control and that essential measures to that end should include the complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests pending the conclusion of a test ban treaty, renunciation of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons as well as chemical, bacteriological and other weapons of mass destruction and the elimination of arsenals of all such weapons. The Conference declared that the arms race was inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the New International Economic Order. It reiterated the urgent need for convening of a World Disarmament Conference, and recommended in the meantime, the holding of a Special Session of the General Assembly.

20. Memorandum on questions of ending the arms race and disarmament, submitted by the USSR on 28 September 1976 (A/31/232)

The memorandum contained proposals which were considered as the main areas for co-ordinated action: (a) cessation of the nuclear arms race and reduction and subsequent elimination of nuclear weapons; (b) prohibition of nuclear weapon tests; (c) consolidation of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; (d) prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons; (e) prohibition of the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction; (f) reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments; (g) creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions; (h) reduction of military budgets; and negotiations on halting the arms race and on disarmament, particularly in a universal forum such as a world disarmament conference.

Thirty-second Session, 1977

21. Draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, submitted by the USSR in November 1977 (A/32/242, annex 11)

The draft resolution specified a variety of measures to be taken by all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, for the purpose of reducing, as far as possible, the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war. The proposal urged that those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet done so should conclude agreements with other nuclear-weapon States concerning measures to diminish and avert the danger of nuclear war and to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons and that those nuclear-weapon States which had concluded such agreements with each other should improve and develop such measures. It also called for negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the withdrawal of ships carrying nuclear weapons from certain areas of the world's oceans and on other possible measures to limit the nuclear arms race in those areas.

III. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION */

22. Proposal for the creation of an International Atomic Development Authority submitted by the United States on 14 June 1946 (AEC/1/1)

An International Atomic Development Authority would be created and entrusted with all phases of the development and use of atomic energy and with power to control, inspect and license all atomic activities. Once a system of control was effectively operating, further production of atomic weapons would cease and existing stocks of atomic weapons would be destroyed. The Authority would be in possession of full information as to the production of atomic energy.

23. Draft international convention to prohibit the production and employment of weapons based on the use of atomic energy for the purpose of mass destruction submitted by the USSR on 19 June 1946 (AEC/2/2)

The draft convention provided for obligations: (a) not to use atomic weapons in any circumstances whatsoever; (b) to prohibit the production and storage of weapons based on the use of atomic energy; (c) to destroy within three months of its entry into force all stocks of atomic weapons. Penalties for violation were to be provided by domestic legislation and the conversion should be followed by other measures to control observance of it. The need and possibilities of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes were stressed.

*/ The General Assembly by resolution 1(I) of 24 January 1946, established an Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which was dissolved on 11 January 1952, by Assembly Resolution 502 (VI).

IV. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE DISARMAMENT COMMISSION */

24. Draft plan of work submitted by the United States on 14 March 1952 (DC/3)

Under the draft plan, the Commission would, inter alia, examine such specific questions as: plans for the progressive and continuing disclosures of all armed forces, including atomic armaments; effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy; elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction; methods of verification, in particular through international inspection, to ensure the adequacy and accuracy of information disclosed; the establishment of an international control organ or organs; the elaboration of effective safeguards; procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

25. Draft plan of work submitted by the USSR on 19 March 1952 (DC/4/Rev.1)

The plan put emphasis on: (a) prohibition of atomic weapons - prohibition and control would be put into effect simultaneously; reduction by the permanent members of the Security Council of the armaments and armed forces by one-third within a year; and information on armaments and armed forces - including atomic weapons and military bases in foreign territories; (b) prohibition of the use of bacteriological weapons; (c) a draft convention on prohibition of atomic weapons and use of those existing only for civilian purposes; and (d) establishment of an international control organ within the framework of the Security Council.

26. Draft plan of work submitted by France on 26 March 1952 (DC/5)

The plan contained the following items: disclosure and verification of all armed forces and armaments, including atomic; regulation of all armaments and armed forces including the elimination of weapons of mass destruction; procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme. The questions of disclosure and regulation were to be studied concurrently in the first stage of the Commission's work.

27. Programme of work adopted by the Disarmament Commission on 28 March 1952 (DC/6)

Consideration of nuclear disarmament-related issues was envisaged under the following headings listed on the programme:

- A. Disclosure and verification of all armaments, including atomic armaments and of all armed forces.

*/ The General Assembly, by its resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952, established the Disarmament Commission which was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation, limitation and balanced reduction of all armaments and armed forces, for the elimination of all mass destruction weapons and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy.

- B. Regulation of all armaments and armed forces, including:
1. Elimination of atomic weapons and control of atomic energy
 2. Elimination of weapons of mass destruction
 3. Limitation and balanced reduction of all other armaments and armed forces.

C. Procedure and time-table for giving effect to the disarmament programme.

28. Proposal concerning essential principles for a disarmament programme, submitted by the United States on 24 April 1952 (DC/C.1/1)

The proposal set out essential principles of a disarmament programme including the goal and how it would be achieved through international agreements which would provide for safeguards to ensure compliance.

29. Tripartite working paper setting forth proposals for fixing numerical limitation of all armed forces, submitted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (DC/10)

The proposal suggested that there should be fixed numerical ceilings for China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. A ceiling between 1 million and 1.5 million was suggested for the Soviet Union, the United States and China, while a ceiling between 700,000 and 800,000 was suggested for the United Kingdom and France. The proposal called for agreed maximum ceilings for all other States having substantial armed forces and envisaged reduction in armed forces.

The proposal was supplemented with a new tripartite paper submitted on 12 August 1952 (DC/12).

30. "Letter dated 8 April 1954 from the Permanent Representative of India to the Secretary-General enclosing extracts from statement made by the Prime Minister of India in the House of the People on 2 April 1954 on the subject of the hydrogen bomb" (DC/44)

In his statement, Prime Minister Nehru of India, among other things, proposed that pending progress towards some solution, full or partial, in respect of the prohibition and elimination of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, the following measures should be taken:

- (a) "standstill" agreement on nuclear-weapon tests;
- (b) full publicity by the nuclear-weapon States and by the United Nations on the destructive power and known and probable effects of nuclear weapons;
- (c) immediate and continuing consideration, within the Disarmament Commission, of the "standstill" proposal on nuclear-weapon tests, pending decisions on prohibitions and control;
- (d) active involvement by States and peoples, in particular those not directly involved with nuclear-weapon production, in a world-wide public opinion campaign against such weapons.

31. "Communication dated 19 April 1954 to the Secretary-General from the Permanent Observer of Japan to the United Nations transmitting a letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan dated 15 April 1954 enclosing a resolution passed by the House of Councillors on 5 April 1954" (DC/50)

By the resolution, entitled "Resolution on international control of atomic energy and prohibition of atomic weapons", the House of Councillors decided to request the United Nations to take immediately appropriate measures to realize the establishment of an effective international control of atomic energy, the prohibition of atomic weapons and the prevention of damages by experiments of atomic weapons, and to achieve the peaceful utilization of atomic energy.

32. Draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 14 May 1954 (DC/SC.1/1)

By the operative paragraphs, the Disarmament Commission would, *inter alia*, declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other types of mass destruction weapons and direct the Security Council to take immediate measures towards an international agreement guaranteeing the establishment of strict international control over the implementation of that prohibition.

33. Working paper on methods of implementing and enforcing disarmament programmes - the establishment of international control organs with appropriate rights, powers and functions, submitted by the United States on 25 May 1954 (DC/SC.1/5)

The proposal called for the establishment of a United Nations Disarmament and Atomic Development Authority and detailed its organization, responsibilities and financing and relationships to other United Nations organs and to individual States.

34. Statement by the Government of the USSR on the speech delivered by United States President Eisenhower on 8 December 1953, submitted by the USSR on 8 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/8)

In its statement, the USSR, *inter alia*, accepted a proposal contained in United States President Eisenhower's speech that the two countries hold talks on atomic weapons. The USSR suggested that those talks should examine the USSR's proposal for an agreement by which signatories to it would assume a solemn and unconditional obligation not to employ atomic, hydrogen or other mass destruction weapons.

35. Proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/9)

The proposal consisted of a text entitled "Basic provisions of a draft international convention for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction, for a substantial reduction in armaments and armed forces, and for the establishment of international control over the observance of the convention".

36. Memorandum submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10)

The memorandum contained a proposal for immediate acceptance of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons except for defence. The draft treaty should include: the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons of mass destruction of every type; major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; establishment of a control organ. The treaty should be approved by a

World Disarmament Conference. The treaty would detail phases through which the disarmament programme should be carried out: first phase - over-all military manpower and military expenditure should be limited to 31 December 1953 levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear and other prohibited weapons should cease; third phase - the second half of the agreed reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

37. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 25 February 1955 (DC/SC.1/12/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the Security Council or the General Assembly would, among other things, propose to all nuclear-weapon States to destroy completely their stockpiles of nuclear weapons and use atomic materials solely for peaceful purposes.

38. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/14)

By the draft resolution, the sub-committee of the Disarmament Commission would submit to the General Assembly for consideration a proposal to convene in 1955 a world conference on the general reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, to be attended by States Members as well as non-members of the United Nations.

39. Draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1)

The draft resolution outlined the provisions which should be provided for in a disarmament treaty including: (a) total prohibition of use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and conversion of existing stocks to peaceful purposes; (b) major reductions in all armed forces and conventional armaments; (c) a control organ to guarantee compliance. The disarmament programme would be carried out as follows: first phase - over-all military manpower and expenditure should be limited to agreed levels; second phase - one-half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the manufacture of all kinds of nuclear weapons should cease; third phase - second half of the agreed reductions of conventional armaments and armed forces should take effect and on completion of it, the total prohibition and elimination of nuclear and all other prohibited weapons should be carried out.

40. "Declaration of the Delegations of Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States", submitted on 11 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/16)

The Declaration contained the views of the sponsors on the USSR draft resolution contained in DC/SC.1/12/Rev.1, above. They observed, *inter alia*, that the draft resolution did not provide for a halt to the production of atomic and hydrogen weapons and for the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons.

41. Draft resolution submitted by the USSR on 19 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/19/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the General Assembly would, *inter alia*, instruct the Disarmament Commission to prepare and submit for confirmation by the Security Council a draft international convention or treaty providing for the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other mass destruction weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States, a substantial reduction in armaments and implementation of those decisions on the basis of the joint French/United Kingdom proposals of 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10; see above).

42. Memorandum on the reduction of armed forces, submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 29 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/20)

France and the United Kingdom stated that they were prepared to reduce their armed forces to a ceiling of 650,000 provided that those of the other three permanent members of the Security Council would be fixed at a figure of between 1 million and 1.5 million, other States would have considerably lower ceilings, and no State would be entitled to increase its armed forces except in special cases.

In another memorandum of 19 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/24) it was agreed that the reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments should be better co-ordinated with the abolition of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, amendments to the draft resolution of 8 March 1955 (DC/SC.1/15/Rev.1, above) were proposed.

43. Proposal on nuclear disarmament, submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 18 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/23)

The proposal provided, in general, for the destruction and prohibition of use and manufacture of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons and for the conversion to peaceful uses of all stocks of fissile materials possessed by States. The proposal considered that these measures should be fitted in with reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in such a way that no country's security would be endangered in the process.

44. Joint draft resolution on the principles of control, submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 21 April 1955 (DC/SC.1/25)

The draft provided, among other things, for the establishment of an international control organ with rights, powers and functions adequate to guarantee the effective observance of reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments and the prohibition of the manufacture and use of nuclear weapons.

45. Proposal concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons submitted by the USSR on 10 May 1955 (DC/SC.1/26/Rev.2)

The proposal called for a declaration by the General Assembly in which was included a comprehensive and detailed two-stage disarmament programme. In the first stage the permanent members of the Security Council would reduce their armed forces and armaments by 50 per cent of the difference between the specific ceilings proposed by France and the United Kingdom. Simultaneously the draft envisaged as one of the first measures, discontinuance of atomic and hydrogen weapon tests, prohibition of the use of atomic weapons, and elimination of some of the military bases in the territories of other States. During the second stage, the second half of the reductions would be carried out. When 75 per cent of the total reduction had been completed a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would come into force. These weapons would be destroyed simultaneously with the last 25 per cent of the reduction of armed forces. The States should reduce their armaments and armed forces to the levels strictly necessary for maintenance of internal security and the fulfilment of the obligations under the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

Concerning control, it was anticipated, in the first stage, creation of an international control organ which would be allowed to install control posts on a basis of reciprocity, at major ports, at railway junctions, on main highways and at airfields in the territories of all States concerned. The functions of the control organ would be extended in the second stage and would include inspection on a permanent basis.

46. Memorandum of the United States, submitted on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/28)

The memorandum contained a statement on disarmament by the President of the United States on 21 July 1955 at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. In his statement, the President of the United States, among other things stated his Government's readiness to enter into a sound and reliable agreement to reduce armaments. In this connection, he stressed the view that priority attention in disarmament efforts should be paid to the subject of an adequate inspection and reporting system. He therefore suggested a study of the subject to include a step-by-step testing of inspection and reporting methods.

47. "Proposal submitted by Mr. N.A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, at the meeting of the Heads of Government for the four great Powers held on 21 July 1955" submitted to the Disarmament Commission by the USSR on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/29/Rev.1)

The proposal was in the nature of a draft decision by the four Heads of Governments on questions relating to the reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons. By the proposal, the four leaders would, inter alia, agree that complete prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons shall enter into force when conventional armaments and armed forces had been reduced to the extent of 75 per cent of the agreed reductions, and that pending the conclusion of an international convention on the reduction of armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, the four States would assume the obligation not to be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons against any country.

48. Memorandum of the United Kingdom, submitted on 29 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/30)

The memorandum contained a proposal by the United Kingdom at the Geneva meetings of the Heads of Government of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States, on 21 July 1955. The United Kingdom proposed that consideration be given to the establishment of a system of joint inspection of the forces confronting each other in Europe. The United Kingdom thought that the project would provide an opportunity for the practical test on a limited scale of international inspection of forces and would provide valuable experience and lessons for use over a wider field in the future.

49. Proposal concerning aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints, submitted by the United States on 30 August 1955 (DC/SC.1/31)

Under the proposed plan, the United States and the Soviet Union were to exchange information about the strength, command structure and disposition of personnel, units and equipment of all major land, sea and air forces, as well as a complete list of military plants, facilities and installations, with their positions. Verification of information was to be accompanied by ground observers as well as unrestricted, but monitored, aerial reconnaissance.

50. Working paper containing proposals concerning the structure of an international disarmament organization, submitted by France on 2 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/32)

The proposed organization would include a Control Administration section to ensure compliance with disarmament agreements.

51. Working paper containing proposals concerning the powers of the Control Administration, submitted by France on 2 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/33)

Elaborated on the functions of the Control Administration provided for in DC/SC.1/32, above. Functions were envisaged largely in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces.

52. Memorandum concerning the control organ, submitted by the United Kingdom on 13 September 1955 (DC/SC.1/34)

The work of the control organ would mainly be in the field of conventional armaments and armed forces but would also include the adequate attention being paid to developments relating to nuclear installations and reactors.

53. Working paper containing a proposal concerning the objects which should be subject to control, submitted by France on 6 October 1955 (DC/SC.1/35)

Amended parts of document DC/SC.1/33, above, with the amended version providing for an expanded role for the proposed Control Administration in the nuclear field.

54. "Memorandum supplementing outline plan for the implementation of the 21 July 1955 presidential proposal at Geneva regarding disarmament", submitted by the United States on 7 October 1955 (DC/SC.1/36)

Elaborated on DC/SC.1/28, above, on the subject of an inspection and control system in a disarmament programme.

55. Working paper containing a proposed synthesis submitted by France and the United Kingdom on 19 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/38)

This was a revised edition of the plan of 11 June 1954 (DC/SC.1/10, above). The new plan provided for: significant conventional reduction to be carried out in the first stage; limitation of nuclear tests at the beginning of the second stage and total prohibition at the beginning of the third; prohibition of manufacture of nuclear weapons - the cut-off at the beginning of the third stage - and the link between the achievement of political settlements and the achievement of disarmament.

56. Proposal for an agreement on the reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces, submitted by the USSR on 27 March 1956 (DC/SC.1/41)

The proposal contained three different partial disarmament approaches:
(a) limitation and reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to the specific levels of 1 million to 1.5 million men for the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and 650,000 for France and the United Kingdom, within two years, with an international control organ to be established and to be in position to carry out inspections before reductions commenced; (b) a European zone of limitation and inspection of armaments; (c) discontinuance of tests of thermonuclear weapons, independently of disarmament; (d) banning of atomic weapons on German soil; and (e) a 15 per cent reduction of military budgets.

57. "Draft working paper for the first phase of a comprehensive agreement for disarmament", submitted by the United States on 3 April 1956 (DC/SC.1/42)

Among the objectives of the first phase would be: decrease the nuclear threat over the world; provide against surprise attack; prevent a future arms race of either a conventional or nuclear nature. In implementing those objectives specific measures would, among others, provide for all signatory States possessing

nuclear weapons to begin to make agreed regular reciprocal and equitable transfers of their fissionable materials to exclusively peaceful uses; the testing of nuclear weapons to be limited and monitored in an agreed manner under the control of an Armaments Regulations Council.

58. "Working paper on control", submitted by France and United Kingdom on 3 May 1956 (DC/SC.1/44)

The proposed international disarmament organization would, in stage II of a disarmament programme, control, among other military-related activities and facilities, nuclear test explosions. In stage III, and for as long as the treaty on a disarmament programme remained in effect, control would also extend to establishments that produced nuclear materials, establishments that used nuclear materials and stocks of nuclear material of weapons grade not made up into weapons.

59. "Declaration", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and United States on 4 May 1956 (DC/SC.1/46)

In the Declaration the four delegations reaffirmed their determination to seek agreement on a disarmament programme which should take effect without delay and should include measures, under effective international control, to end competition in armed forces and armaments of all kinds.

60. "Draft declaration", submitted by the USSR on 3 July 1956 (DC/88)

By the draft declaration, Member States of the United Nations would, inter alia, assume a solemn obligation to refrain in their international relations from the use or threat of use of force and the use of atomic or hydrogen weapons.

61. Draft resolution submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 3 July 1956 (DC/87)

By the draft resolution, the Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission would continue to search for agreement guided by certain principles including: proceeding by stages, with each dependent on satisfactory completion of the previous stage; effective international control; and, under safeguards, cessation of build-up of nuclear weapons. The production of fissionable materials would be devoted to peaceful uses. Amendments to the draft were subsequently submitted by Australia on 10 July 1956 (DC/90) and by the four original sponsors plus Australia on 10 July 1956 (DC/91).

62. Draft resolution submitted by Yugoslavia on 10 July 1956 (DC/92)

The draft resolution urged the members of the Sub-Committee to reach agreement on general disarmament; to seek an early agreement on and implementation of such initial disarmament measures as were feasible, more particularly, a reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces as well as of military expenditure; the cessation of experimental explosions of nuclear weapons.

63. "Note verbale dated 25 July 1956 from the representative of India to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/98)

The note verbale contained a memorandum setting out proposals of the Government of India for consideration by the Disarmament Commission. The proposals included the following related to nuclear weapons: (1) cessation of all explosions of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons; (2) prohibition of the further use of fissionable materials for weapons purposes; (3) prohibition of the transfer of fissionable materials from civilian to military stocks; (4) an agreement by those States most

advanced in the production of weapons of mass destruction to dismantle in public a limited number of atomic and hydrogen bombs and to make available for peaceful purposes the fissionable material contained in these weapons.

64. "Letter dated 18 March 1957 from the representative of Japan to the Secretary-General transmitting a resolution of the House of Councillors of Japan on the prohibition of atom and hydrogen bombs, together with a letter from the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan" (DC/109)

In his letter, the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, in addition to transmitting the resolution adopted by the House of Councillors of Japan on 15 March 1957, also reproduced the texts of two earlier resolutions adopted by the House of Councillors on 5 April 1954 and 9 February 1956, both of which called for the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons. The 15 March 1957 resolution also called for such prohibition and inter alia called upon the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to suspend all atomic and hydrogen bomb tests. (See also DC/50, above).

65. "Proposal on the reduction of armaments and armed forces and the prohibition of atomic and hydrogen weapons", submitted by the USSR on 18 March 1957 (DC/SC.1/49)

The proposal, among other things, provided for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes. It also provided for the establishment of an effective international control organ to ensure compliance with the provisions of agreed measures.

66. "Note verbale dated 9 April 1957 from the Ambassador of Japan in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/51)

The note verbale contained proposals by the Government of Japan towards prohibiting nuclear test explosions. The proposals provided, inter alia, for the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation or a Nuclear Test Explosion Control Committee which could be newly established, to study whether it was possible to detect all nuclear test explosions and should it conclude that such detection was possible, all nuclear test explosions would be prohibited upon the recommendation of the General Assembly or Security Council. Should the Committee conclude that such detection was impossible by means of existing detection systems and methods, a new international detection machinery shall be set up by the Committee, methods of detection shall be improved and strengthened and steps shall be taken to make such detection possible.

67. "Note verbale dated 24 June 1957 from the Ambassador of Yugoslavia in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/52/Add.1)

The note verbale contained a "Declaration" dated 18 June 1957, of the People's Assembly of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia calling for an end to the tests of nuclear weapons and for their prohibition.

It suggested, as a minimum, an agreement to suspend such tests temporarily for a given period, to be supplemented by declarations by the States concerned not to conduct further tests, even after the expiry of the agreed period, unless another State should resume tests.

68. "Letter dated 26 April from the Chargé d'Affaires of Norway in London to the Secretary-General" (DC/SC.1/54)

Enclosed with the letter was a memorandum by the Government of Norway concerning the proposal for a system for registering nuclear test explosions.

69. Proposals on the implementation of partial disarmament measures, submitted by the USSR on 30 April 1957 (DC/SC.1/55)

The proposals envisaged: acceptance of the proposal to reduce the armed forces of the United States, the Soviet Union and China to 2.5 million men and of France and the United Kingdom to 750,000 men each, as a first step towards further reductions in the armed forces respectively to 1 - 1.5 million men and 650,000 men; reduction of the military budgets during the first period by 15 per cent; creation of an appropriate international control organ under the Security Council; establishment of control posts on the territory of States; renouncement of the use of atomic and hydrogen weapons; discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests; liquidation of foreign bases; aerial inspection within certain areas in Europe and the Far East; ending of war propaganda.

70. "Memorandum on nuclear test explosions", submitted by the United Kingdom on 6 May 1957 (DC/SC.1/56)

The memorandum contained proposals on the registration, limitation and cessation of nuclear explosions.

71. "Memorandum on radio-active fall-out", submitted by the United States on 8 May 1957 (DC/SC.1/57)

The memorandum contained the text of a speech on radio-active fall-out delivered on 26 April 1957 by the Commissioner of the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

72. "Joint statement on the temporary suspension of nuclear test explosions", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States on 2 July 1957 (DC/SC.1/59)

The statement, *inter alia*, noted USSR's acceptance of the principle of setting up inspection posts with appropriate scientific facilities for the purposes of control and detection of nuclear testing. The statement pointed out that such acceptance brought within the realm of possibility a temporary suspension of nuclear testing as part of an agreement for a first step in disarmament. The temporary agreement, the statement emphasized, would be subject to precise agreement on its duration and timing, on the installation and location of the necessary controls, including inspection posts, and on its relationship to other provisions of a first stage disarmament agreement.

73. "Proposal on the cessation of atomic and hydrogen weapons tests", submitted by the USSR on 14 June 1957 (DC/SC.1/60)

The proposal, *inter alia*, suggested the establishment, on the basis of reciprocity, of control posts in the territory of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States and in the Pacific Ocean area for the purpose of supervising the fulfilment by States of their obligation to cease atomic and hydrogen weapons tests.

74. "Working paper on systems of inspection to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack", submitted by Canada, France, United Kingdom and the United States on 2 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/62/Rev.1)

According to the paper, upon the entry into force of a first-stage disarmament agreement, the parties concerned would co-operate in the establishment and maintenance of systems of inspection in order to safeguard against the possibility of surprise attack. The paper then described in detail what would be envisaged.

75. Working paper containing proposals for partial measures of disarmament, submitted by Canada, France, the United Kingdom and the United States on 29 August 1957 (DC/SC.1/66)

The working paper contained proposals on limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments; military expenditures; non-use of nuclear weapons except in self defence; control of fissionable material; nuclear weapons testing, control of objects entering outer space, and safeguards against the possibility of surprise attack. Part of the proposal, which was intended as a package proposal, would be the setting-up of an international control organization.

76. "Note verbale dated 29 August 1961 from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement by the Government of the United States of America concerning the Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/189) */

The statement, inter alia, reviewed the United States Government's position on a nuclear test ban in general and on the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests, in particular. The statement stressed the importance and value of international inspection and control to ensure compliance with any agreement to discontinue nuclear-weapon tests and it appealed to the USSR to reconsider its position favouring national rather than international means of control.

77. "Letter dated 12 September 1961 from the Permanent Representatives of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, Cyprus, Federation of Malaya, Ghana, India, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General" (DC/190)

The letter contained a statement **/ on disarmament agreed by Commonwealth Prime Ministers on 17 March 1961. In their statement, the Commonwealth leaders, inter alia, said the aim must be to achieve total world-wide disarmament, subject to effective inspection and control. They stated that the elimination of nuclear and conventional armaments must be so phased that at no stage would any country or group of countries obtain a significant military advantage. They stressed that every effort should be made to secure agreement for the permanent banning of nuclear-weapon tests by all nations and for arrangements to verify observance of such an agreement. They saw an agreement banning nuclear tests as urgent since otherwise additional countries might become nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they held, an agreement on nuclear tests, apart from its direct advantages, would provide an additional impetus for agreement on other disarmament measures.

78. "Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting the text of a note concerning the resumption of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests delivered by the Government of the United Kingdom to the Government of the USSR" (DC/193)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

*/ Circulated also as an annex to document A/4853.

**/. The text of the statement was also circulated as an annex to General Assembly document A/4863.

79. "Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the representative of the United States of America to the President of the General Assembly, transmitting the text of a note concerning the resumption of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests delivered by the Government of the United States of America to the Government of the USSR" (DC/194)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

80. "Letter dated 14 December 1961 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting the verbatim records and documents of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for the period 28 November to 7 December 1961" (DC/195 and Add.1)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

81. "Letter dated 19 February 1962 from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting the verbatim records and documents of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests for the period 8 December 1961 to 29 January 1962" (DC/195 and Add.2)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

82. "Letter dated 19 December 1961 from the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a joint report on the situation in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1649 (XVI)" (DC/196)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

83. "Letter dated 20 February 1962 from the representatives of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a supplementary joint report on the situation in the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests" (DC/196/Add.1)

See "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

84. "Letter dated 20 December 1961 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a statement dated 13 December 1961 by the Soviet Government on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", (DC/197)

In its statement, the Government of the USSR, among other things, regretted that its proposal presented on 28 November 1961 at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests ^{*/}, had not met with the approval of Western nuclear-weapon States. It reaffirmed the proposal and saw it as creating every

^{*/} GEN/DNT/122. See also "Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

possibility for a speedy agreement on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The proposal, among other things, provided for a ban on nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, with the exercise of mutual control through national means of detection. In relation to underground tests, the proposal provided that a moratorium on such tests be established pending an agreement on a system for controlling underground explosions as part of an international system for controlling the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament. In its statement the USSR stressed that it would be forced, because of continued testing by Western States, to conduct nuclear-weapon tests in order to ensure its defence but that at the same time it would continue to make every effort to achieve an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests.

85. "Letter dated 2 January 1962 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a communication from the Soviet Government on the situation with regard to the question of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/198)

The communication of the Government of the USSR consisted of a detailed review of its position and an assessment, from its viewpoint, of developments at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests. In the communication, the Government of the USSR once more reaffirmed its position and proposals on the issue (see also document DC/197, above).

86. "Letter from the Secretary-General to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, transmitting a report on the inquiry conducted in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI)". submitted on 2 April 1962 (DC/201 and Add.1 to 3 and DC/204 and Add.1)

General Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI) of 4 December 1961, requested the Secretary-General to make an inquiry into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country. In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General on 2 January 1962, requested Member States to give their views with regard to the aforementioned conditions. Those views were reproduced as addenda to the Secretary-General's report as results of his inquiry, in accordance with Assembly resolution 1664 (XVI).

87. "Letter dated 3 April 1962 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Secretary-General, transmitting a statement by the Soviet Government on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/202)

In his statement, the Government of the USSR, among other things, asserted that Western nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United Kingdom and the United States, had not only continued but had in fact intensified their nuclear-weapon tests. The USSR, the statement continued, wanted a ban on such tests and as such was prepared to continue discussions at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests and also within the framework of an agreement on general and complete disarmament in the course of deliberations in the ENDC.

88. "Letter dated 28 April 1965 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/213 and Add.1 and 2)

Addendum 1 of the letter consisted of the text of a "draft treaty proposed by the USSR on general and complete disarmament under strict international control" */ and addendum 2 consisted of a memorandum **/ by the USSR on measures for the reduction of international tension and limitation of the arms race. Among the disarmament obligations provided for in the draft treaty were the prohibition and destruction of all stockpiles and the cessation of the production of all kinds of weapons of mass destruction including atomic, hydrogen, chemical, biological and radiological weapons. An international disarmament organization to implement control over disarmament was also provided for in the draft treaty.

89. "Letter dated 29 April 1965 from the representative of the United States of America to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/214 and Add.1)

The letter included a "Memorandum of the United States of America on measures to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn down the arms race, and reduce international tension". The memorandum set forth the positions the United States took at the ENDC during 1964. These positions were derived largely from proposals contained in a message to the Committee from United States President Johnson on 21 January 1964. The full text of the message was also included in the memorandum, as were statements by various United States officials elaborating on certain of its aspects. Also included in the memorandum was an amended text of the document previously submitted to the ENDC on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30, see above) by the United States entitled "Outline of basic provisions of a treaty on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world".

90. "Letter dated 3 May 1965 from the representative of Yugoslavia to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission" (DC/216)

The letter included a "Memorandum of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on necessary immediate measures in the field of disarmament".

The measures proposed by Yugoslavia for immediate implementation included the following: (a) the obligation not to use nuclear weapons; (b) the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests without exception; (c) the prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, with an agreement to begin solving the problem of demuclearization of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. Yugoslavia considered, inter alia, that the problems of control, as far as the aforementioned proposals were concerned, should not constitute an insurmountable difficulty.

*/ Revised text of the draft treaty originally submitted to the ENDC on 15 March 1962, incorporating additions and amendments issued since that date.

**/ General Assembly document A/5827 of 7 December 1964.

91. Draft resolution submitted by the United States on 1 June 1965 (DC/200/Rev.1)

By the draft resolution, the Disarmament Commission, inter alia, would urge the ENDC, inter alia, to resume negotiations as a matter of priority on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban treaty; conclude as soon as possible an agreement to halt all production of fissionable material for weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use sizeable, agreed quantities of such material; explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles which would open the path to early reductions in such vehicles.

92. Resolution adopted at the 102nd meeting of the Disarmament Commission on 15 June 1965 (DC/225)

By the operative part of the resolution, the Disarmament Commission, inter alia, reaffirmed the General Assembly's call upon all States to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and recommended that the ENDC should, among other things, consider as a matter of priority the question of extending the scope of the Partial Test Ban Treaty to cover underground nuclear-weapon tests.

V. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE TEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (TNCD)

93. "A plan for general and comprehensive disarmament in a free and peaceful world" submitted by Canada, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States on 16 March 1960 (TNCD/3)

The proposal called for a three-stage plan. In the first stage, it provided for the establishment of an International Disarmament Organization for carrying out studies and furnishing data designed to facilitate enforcement, as well as for initial arms reductions. Second-stage measures included a ban on placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space; an agreement to stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes; measures to prevent surprise attacks, including the establishment of an effective verification system; and further reductions in armed forces. In the final stage, maximum reductions were to be carried out, and an international law enforcement capability to preserve world peace was to be established. The ultimate goal was general and complete disarmament, with inspection and control under the international disarmament organization, particularly the prohibition of production of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction.

94. "Basic principles of general and complete disarmament", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and USSR on 8 April 1960 (TNCD/4)

According to the document, general and complete disarmament included, among other things, the disbanding of all armed forces, liquidation of all armaments, cessation of all kinds of military production, prohibition of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile weapons, cessation of their production and destruction of their stockpiles, and establishment of an international control organ. The process would proceed by stages with a fixed time-table.

95. Proposal concerning principles and conditions for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, submitted by Canada, France, Italy, United Kingdom and United States on 26 April 1960 (TNCD/5)

Among other things, the document declared that the disarmament process and any agreement finally reached must fulfil certain conditions, inter alia, the following: (a) disarmament must be carried out by stages, each stage to be completed as rapidly as possible although no fixed time-table could be laid down in advance for the process as a whole; (b) nuclear and conventional measures must be balanced so that no country or group of countries would obtain, at any stage, a significant military advantage and so that equal security for all would be maintained.

The proposal concluded that the final goal of a programme of general and complete disarmament under effective international control must be to achieve the reduction and limitation of all types of forces and weapons to the levels required by each State for its own internal security and fulfilment of its obligations under the United Nations Charter and the elimination of all weapons surplus to those required for these purposes. The programme must also provide for the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the final elimination of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

96. "Basic clauses on a treaty on general and complete disarmament", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on 7 June 1960 (TNCD/6/Rev.1)

The basic provisions of the draft treaty were: in the first stage (18 months) all means of delivery of nuclear weapons would be destroyed and their manufacture prohibited, all foreign military bases would be eliminated and all troops would be

withdrawn from foreign territories, all rockets launched for peaceful purposes would be subject to inspection, and dissemination of nuclear weapons would be prohibited. In the second stage, there would be a complete prohibition of nuclear, chemical, biological and other weapons of mass destruction, and reduction of armed forces to fixed levels. The third stage would complete the process of general and complete disarmament. An international control organization would verify the implementation of the provisions of the treaty by stages and without hindrance. Measures for preserving peace and security would be carried out under the United Nations Charter with the Security Council having contingents of militia at its disposal.

97. "Programme for general and complete disarmament under effective international control" submitted by the United States on 27 June 1960 (TNCD/7)

The paper outlined the goal and the controlling principles by which general and complete disarmament could be achieved and briefly described a three-stage programme. The first stage would include prohibition of placing in orbit vehicles carrying weapons of mass destruction; taking measures to guard against surprise attack; initial reductions in armed forces and armaments; and cessation of production of fissionable material. The second stage would include further reduction of armed forces; reduction of all weapons including atomic; and creation of an international peace force within the United Nations. The third stage would complete force reductions to levels required for maintaining internal order and for the international peace force. An international disarmament organization would verify that each stage was initiated simultaneously and upon completion of the necessary preparatory studies.

The proposal was further elaborated by a declaration on 25 September 1961 (A/4891) and also issued as ENDC/6 on 19 March 1962.

VI. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE

1962 Session

98. "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", a draft submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 19 June 1962 (ENDC/2)

The draft treaty set forth measures which would lead within a short time to elimination of the military machinery of States. The disarmament process would take place in three stages within a fixed, short period of time (five years). The reduction of armed forces and armaments would proceed to agreed levels parallel to the reduction in the production of conventional armaments. The total elimination of all foreign military bases would take place in the first stage. The complete elimination of vehicles for delivering nuclear weapons and the cessation of the production of such vehicles as well as the obligation not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear States was also envisaged in the first stage. The total elimination of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes and the discontinuance of their production would take place during the second stage. All types of chemical, biological and radiological weapons would be eliminated from the arsenals of States and destroyed. At the third stage, all armed forces would be fully disbanded and the elimination of the military machinery of States would be completed. The draft provided for strict international control over what was being reduced, destroyed or converted to peaceful uses, as well as over the cessation of arms production. Contingents without nuclear weapons would be made available to the Security Council, under article 43 of the Charter. An international disarmament organization within the framework of the United Nations Charter would establish procedures for the settlement of international disputes.

The draft treaty was later amended and revised as follows: 16 July 1962 (ENDC/2/Add.1), 22 September 1962 (A/C.1/867 or ENDC/2/Rev.1) and 4 February 1964 (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1).

99. "Draft Treaty on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 21 March 1962 (ENDC/9)

The draft treaty was originally submitted to the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests, as documents GEN/DNT/110 dated 18 April 1961, and addenda 1 to 3 thereto, and was also issued earlier as document A/4772 and addendum 1 thereto. See also "Proposals submitted to the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", below.

100. "Statement by the Soviet Government, dated 27 November 1961, in connection with the resumption of negotiations on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and text of a draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermonuclear weapon tests", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 22 March 1962 (ENDC/11)

The draft agreement was issued earlier as document GEN/DNT/122, on 11 December 1961. See DC/197 (Proposals submitted to the Disarmament Commission), above.

101. "Memorandum of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of 26 September 1961, on measures to ease international tension, strengthen confidence among States and contribute to general and complete disarmament", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 24 March 1962 (ENDC/14)

The memorandum contained proposals for (a) freezing of the military budgets of States, (b) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons, (c) prohibition of war propaganda, (d) conclusion of a non-aggression pact between NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries, (e) withdrawal of troops from foreign territory, (f) measures to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, (g) establishment of nuclear-free zones, and (h) steps to decrease the danger of surprise attack. Also issued as document A/4892, above.

102. "Letter, dated 27 March 1962, from the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, transmitting a Memorandum from the Government of the German Democratic Republic", submitted by Czechoslovakia on 27 March 1962 (ENDC/16)

The memorandum contained a proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe, including the region of northern Europe.

103. "Joint Memorandum", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and United Arab Republic, on 16 April 1962 (ENDC/28)

The joint memorandum expressed deep concern about the lack of agreement on banning nuclear weapon tests and proposed the establishment of an International Commission, a verification system for continuous observation and effective control on a purely scientific and non-political basis.

104. "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted by the United States on 18 April 1962 (ENDC/30)

The plan outlined a disarmament process which would take place in three stages. Beginning with a freeze, disarmament was to be gradual as confidence developed; ultimately, the military establishment would be eliminated. The first two stages were to be of three years each, and the third would be completed within an agreed period of time, as promptly as possible. Armed forces and all major armaments, nuclear as well as conventional, would be gradually reduced. The draft provided in the first stage for the nuclear-weapon States to halt production of fissionable materials for weapons; not to transfer control of nuclear weapons or information on their production to non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to transfer, for peaceful uses, agreed quantities of such material. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles and nuclear weapons would be reduced by an agreed percentage during the second stage and their production would halt and nuclear weapons would be reduced in the light of the steps taken in stages I and II. The plan envisaged a system of inspection and control to verify the disarmament process and, in addition, to verify remaining quantities of armaments and forces. It also proposed measures to keep and reinforce peace during and after the disarmament process. A United Nations peace observation corps and peace force would be established. The question of whether the peace force should be equipped with nuclear weapons was to be left open for future decision. The international disarmament organization would be placed within the framework of the United Nations and its administrator would consult with the Secretary-General, providing that the decisions would be taken by the organization's control council. Parties would refrain from use of force of any type contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, and would settle disputes in accordance with Charter procedures. The draft treaty was later amended as follows: 6 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.1); 8 August 1962 (ENDC/30/Add.2); 10 December 1962 (ENDC/69); 14 August 1963 (ENDC/30/Add.3 and ENDC/109).

105. "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58)

The draft treaty set forth provisions, inter alia, regarding the obligation to discontinue nuclear weapon testing; the establishment of the International Scientific Commission including its functions, role, organization of the verification system and on-site inspection; and the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

106. "Draft Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, Outer Space, and Underwater", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 27 August 1962 (ENDC/59)

The draft treaty was a contribution towards the realization of what eventually became the partial test ban treaty.

107. "Working paper on reduction of the risk of war through accident, miscalculation, or failure of communication", submitted by the United States on 12 December 1962 (ENDC/70)

The paper proposed various measures to prevent accidental war, in particular a nuclear war, including, among others, advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres, setting up observation posts, exchange of military missions, communications on military emergencies.

1963 Session

108. "Declaration on renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons", a draft proposal submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 12 February 1963 (ENDC/75)

The draft set forth several measures as a step towards more extensive disarmament measures. It urged the dismantling of bases in foreign territory for nuclear submarines; the withdrawal from foreign ports of aircraft carriers having nuclear weapons on board; the dismantling of strategic nuclear weapon systems in foreign territory; and the withdrawal of strategic nuclear bombers from foreign bases.

109. "Memorandum of position concerning the cessation of nuclear weapon tests", submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States on 1 April 1963 (ENDC/78)

The memorandum proposed arrangements for on-site inspections and for automatic seismic stations on territory under the jurisdiction or control of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States.

110. "Outline draft treaty prohibiting the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons", submitted by Mexico on 21 June 1963 (ENDC/98)

The draft treaty set forth provisions for prohibition of the placing in orbit and the stationing in outer space of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. It called for peaceful use of outer space and of the celestial bodies.

111. "Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States on 30 July 1963 (ENDC/100/Rev.1)

The document contained the agreed text of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater (Partial Test-Ban Treaty);

1964 Session

112. "Measures for slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension", submitted by the USSR on 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123)

The memorandum contained proposals on withdrawal of troops from foreign territories, reductions of armed forces, reduction of military budgets, non-aggression pact between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear non-proliferation, measures to prevent surprise attack, elimination of bomber aircraft, and prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

113. "Working paper on inspection of a fissionable material cut-off", submitted by the United States on 25 June 1964 (ENDC/134)

The proposal outlined the requirements for inspection of nuclear power under a cut-off of fissionable material production for use in weapons. IAEA safeguards were envisaged.

114. "Working Document on Nuclear Delivery Vehicles", submitted by Nigeria on 14 July 1964 (ENDC/136)

It was proposed that an agreed quantity of nuclear delivery vehicles should be set at the initial stage, with the goal of a total elimination of all such systems at the end of the disarmament process.

115. "Memoranda containing a brief résumé of the suggestions and proposals made by each delegation on measures of disarmament and collateral measures discussed during 1964 in the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 14 September 1964 (ENDC/144)

The paper contained memoranda which reflected views, positions, suggestions and proposals of each delegation on disarmament issues, particularly the question of nuclear disarmament.

1965 Session

116. "Draft treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons", submitted by the United States on 17 August 1965 (ENDC/152)

The draft treaty was a contribution towards the realization of what eventually became the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The draft was subsequently amended on 21 March 1966 (ENDC/152/Add.1) and on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/192).

117. "Draft of unilateral non-acquisition declaration", submitted by Italy on 14 September 1965 (ENDC/157)

The draft set the form for a unilateral renunciation of nuclear weapons by the non-nuclear-weapon States, with a view to facilitating international agreements to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to halt the nuclear arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals, leading to general and complete disarmament.

118. "Joint memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 15 September 1965 (ENDC/159 ^{e/})

The joint memorandum reiterated an appeal to the States concerned to suspend forthwith nuclear weapon tests in all environments, and called for the discontinuance of underground tests and the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

1966 Session

119. "Letter, dated 24 September 1965, from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/5976)", submitted by the USSR on 27 January 1966 (ENDC/164)

The letter contained a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, proposed by the USSR. The draft was subsequently amended on 24 August 1967 (ENDC/193).

120. "Working paper on transfer of fissionable material obtained by the destruction of nuclear weapons", submitted by the United States on 8 March 1966 (ENDC/172)

The paper suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union should each agree to transfer to peaceful uses highly enriched uranium and plutonium obtained from nuclear weapons destroyed for that purpose. The materials obtained through the destruction process would be transferred under IAEA safeguards and the weapons themselves would be disassembled under appropriate observation arrangements.

121. "Working paper on an inspection method for verifying the status of shutdown plutonium production reactors", submitted by the United States on 14 April 1966 (ENDC/174)

The paper set forth technical aspects of one possible method of determining that reactors for the production of plutonium that had been shut down in compliance with an arms control or disarmament agreement had remained so between visits of inspectors.

This paper was reinforced by a description of a monitoring system for the shut down of nuclear reactors, submitted by the United States on 11 August 1966 (ENDC/176).

122. "Joint Memorandum on a comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 17 August 1966 (ENDC/177)

The joint memorandum urged the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and offered various ideas and suggestions with a view to facilitating an agreement on the banning of underground nuclear tests.

^{e/} See also ENDC/177, below.

123. "Joint Memorandum on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons", submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic on 19 August 1966 (ENDC/178)

The joint memorandum presented five principles in connection with the negotiation of a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It also contained some elaborations of the sponsors' views and positions on each of the five principles as the basis for negotiating such a treaty.

124. "Memorandum concerning an approach to the realization of United Nations resolutions on banning of nuclear weapons, denuclearization of Africa and a world conference on disarmament", submitted by Ethiopia on 22 August 1966 (ENDC/180)

The memorandum presented views on nuclear disarmament and called for an international agreement for the security of denuclearized regions which were ready for collective security under the principles and auspices of the United Nations. It proposed seven criteria as a basis for negotiating such an agreement, particularly the question of the denuclearization of Africa.

125. "Working paper on determination of the location of seismic events", submitted by the United States on 23 August 1966 (ENDC/182)

The paper presented technical aspects of the determination of the location of seismic events as references for the verification systems of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.

1967 Session

126. "Memorandum on the control of an underground test-ban treaty", submitted by Sweden on 19 July 1967 (ENDC/191)

The memorandum presented a scientific background in connection with the problems of an underground test-ban control. It described the Swedish investigations on the question of how to use seismological methods of identification to distinguish underground explosions from earthquakes for the purpose of verifying an underground test-ban treaty.

127. "Working Paper: Proposal concerning the transfer of fissile material", submitted by Italy on 30 November 1967 (ENDC/205)

The paper contained a proposal from the speech delivered at the Conference of the ENDC on 1 August by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy.

1968 Session

128. "Draft resolution of the Security Council on security assurances", submitted by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States on 7 March 1968 (ENDC/222)

The draft resolution dealt with certain assurances for the non-nuclear-weapon States in connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It was later considered at the Security Council and was adopted as Security Council resolution S/RES/255(1968) on 19 June 1968.

129. "Report to the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission", submitted by the Co-Chairmen of the ENDC, the USSR and the United States on 14 March 1968 (ENDC/225)

The report contained, inter alia, the final text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as various views, additions and amendments proposed by delegations during the course of deliberations, particularly those of the non-aligned countries, were incorporated. The General Assembly, on 12 June 1968, adopted resolution 2373 (XXII) in which it commended the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; requested the Depositary Governments to open the Treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date; and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

130. "Memorandum by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament", submitted by the USSR on 16 July 1968 (ENDC/227)

In view of the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the memorandum contained proposals on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, stopping manufacture and destroying stockpiles of nuclear weapons, limitation and reduction of means of delivery of strategic weapons, limitations on nuclear-weapon-laden bomber flights and navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines, ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests, prohibition of use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, elimination of foreign military bases, measures for regional disarmament, and peaceful uses of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

131. "Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 August 1968 (ENDC/232)

The paper presented proposals regarding the problem of on-site inspection in connection with the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In particular, it called for the establishment of an international committee with the mandate to carry out on-site inspection.

132. "Working paper on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Italy on 23 August 1968 (ENDC/234)

The paper suggested that the regulation of underground explosions for peaceful purposes should temporarily be separated from that of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes. It proposed certain provisional measures concerning the conduct of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, pending an over-all agreement for the cessation of all experiments for military purposes.

The paper was later amended with additions contained in document ENDC/250.

1969 Session

133. "Draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof", submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 18 March 1969 (ENDC/240)

The draft treaty was the initial text proposed by the Soviet Union. It was later amended and revised, paving the way to the USSR-USA joint draft Treaty on Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof; contained in document CCD/269, below.

134. "Establishment of nuclear-free zones: Working document" submitted by Mexico on 24 March 1969 (ENDC/241).

The paper described the development of the proposals for nuclear-free zones in Africa and Latin America. It also gave a summarized analysis of the Treaty of Tlatelolco including the nature of its additional protocols. In its final part, it suggested certain conclusions bearing relevant significance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions in the future.

135. "Working paper with suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests" submitted by Sweden on 1 April 1969 (ENDC/242)

The paper contained a draft treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, including the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The draft treaty was later amended in CCD/348 on 2 September 1971.

136. "Working paper on the comprehensive test-ban treaty" submitted by Nigeria on 15 May 1969 (ENDC/246)

Supplementing working paper ENDC/232 submitted by the United Kingdom (see above) concerning the question of on-site inspection for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, this paper recommended that the proposed international committee in charge of such on-site inspection should be composed, exclusively, of non-aligned countries that had signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty and possessed the technological know-how to cope with the implications of such inspections.

137. "Draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor" submitted by the United States on 22 May 1969 (ENDC/249)

The draft treaty was the initial text proposed by the United States. It was later amended and revised, paving the way to the USSR-USA joint draft treaty on the sea-bed, as contained in document CCD/269, below.

138. "Revised working paper on requests to Governments for information about exchange of seismological data" submitted by Canada on 18 August 1969 (ENDC/251/Rev.1)

The paper contained a draft request of the United Nations Secretary-General to the governments of individual States concerning the provision of certain information in the context of the creation of a world-wide exchange of seismological data which would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

VII. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

1969 Session

139. "Draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof" jointly submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States on 30 October 1969 (CCD/269/Rev.1)

The joint draft was subsequently revised and amended during the course of deliberations, as contained in documents CCD/269/Rev.2 on 23 April 1970 and CCD/269/Rev.3 on 1 September 1970.

1970 Session

140. "Working paper on verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty" submitted by the United Kingdom on 26 July 1970 (CCD/296)

The paper described technical aspects of developments in seismic methods for monitoring underground explosions.

141. "Working paper on the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof (CCD/269/Rev.2)" submitted by Burma, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia on 30 July 1970 (CCD/297)

The paper contained amendments to the USSR-United States joint draft text of a Sea-bed treaty (CCD/269/Rev.2).

142. "Working paper introducing seismic data from Rulison" submitted by the United States on 4 August 1970 (CCD/298)

The paper introduced a technical report which presented a comprehensive resume of seismic data from RULISON, including travel times and amplitudes of the principal phases and the associated body- and surface-wave magnitudes.

143. "Working paper on seismological capabilities in detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada on 10 August 1970 (CCD/305)

The paper described technical aspects of seismology with the view to contributing to a verification system for a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

1971 Session

144. "Working paper concerning seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by the Netherlands on 18 March 1971 (CCD/323)

The paper set forth a summary of existing data in two figures regarding seismic detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

145. "Working paper on the seismological detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada on 29 June 1971 (CCD/327 and Add.1)

The paper outlined the results of a scientific study of Eurasian earthquakes and underground explosions made using seismic records from the currently deployed Eurasian standard seismograph stations.

146. "Working paper on seismological verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests" submitted by Sweden on 29 June 1971 (CCD/329)

The paper summarized six scientific reports made from 1960 to 1971 as well as some unreported results of efforts at the Research Institute of National Defence in Sweden with a view to contributing to the solution of remaining problems with seismological verification of a ban on underground test explosions of nuclear weapons.

147. "Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Stephan Lukasik, Director of the US Advanced Research Projects Agency, regarding research on seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions, presented at Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971" submitted by the United States on 30 June 1971 (CCD/330)

The paper reviewed the status of the research directed towards improving detection capability and location accuracy, the development of discrimination criteria, and the installation of appropriate instrumentation to provide the necessary seismic data to support the discrimination research. The research programme was further elaborated in document CCD/330.

148. "Working paper on the problem of underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Italy on 1 July 1971 (CCD/331)

The paper underlined the importance of the establishment of an effective international seismological data exchange system with a view to detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests, and made a number of suggestions in this regard.

149. "Working paper on possible progress towards the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" submitted by Canada on 22 July 1971 (CCD/336)

The paper recommended certain transitorial or confidence-building measures, pending the achievement of a total test ban, so as to reduce underground testing.

150. "Working paper suggesting some provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests" submitted by Pakistan on 12 August 1971 (CCD/340)

The paper suggested separate provisions to be applied to nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in connection with the conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions. It was proposed that non-nuclear-weapon States must not conduct any kind of nuclear explosions whatsoever including peaceful nuclear explosions, but that they might obtain the benefit of peaceful explosions conducted for them or on their behalf by the nuclear-weapon States in accordance with the provisions of an international agreement to be negotiated. It also proposed that the definition of a nuclear-weapon State should be that of a State which had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

151. "Working paper on some basic facts relating to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol II" submitted by Mexico on 19 August 1971 (CCD/342)

The paper presented some basic facts and elements contained in the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Additional Protocol II which had direct relevance to the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world, as well as certain implications to the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

152. "Working paper containing remarks of Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro, the Japan Meteorological Agency, concerning the usefulness of the employment of Ocean-bottom seismographs and a universally acceptable means of determining the magnitude of seismic events, presented at the Informal Meeting on 30 June 1971" submitted by Japan on 24 August 1971 (CCD/345)

The paper reviewed technical aspects of the employment of ocean-bottom seismographs and means of determining the magnitude of seismic events as well as their contribution to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions.

153. "Working paper on the seismicity of the USA, the USSR and China" submitted by the Netherlands on 7 September 1971 (CCD/349)

The paper presented a study based on a computer analysis of the epicenters of events in the years 1961-1970 inclusive, as provided by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. It set forth a comprehensive set of earthquake data for the whole world during that period.

154. "Joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty" submitted by Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia on 30 September 1971 (CCD/354)

The memorandum urged early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty in light of the intensified efforts devoted to examining the technical aspects of a verification system.

1972 Session

155. "Working paper on seismic yields of underground explosions - estimating yields of underground explosions from amplitudes of seismic signals" submitted by the United Kingdom on 25 April 1972 (CCD/363/Rev.1)

The paper discussed the technical aspects of the relationship between the seismic magnitude scales and explosion yields. It also demonstrated some of the difficulties in arriving at a consistent relationship, and hence in relating the detection and identification threshold, expressed as magnitudes, of a given recording system to explosion yields.

156. "Working paper on measures to improve tripartite co-operation among Canada, Japan and Sweden in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means" submitted by Canada, Japan and Sweden, on 20 July 1972 (CCD/376)

The paper described agreement of measures to improve tripartite co-operation in order to strengthen exchanges, not only of seismological data but also of over-all scientific information in the field of seismic discrimination.

157. "Working paper on an experiment in international co-operation: short-period seismological discrimination of shallow earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions" submitted by Canada and Sweden on 27 July 1972 (CCD/300)

The paper examined experiments conducted by Canada and Sweden regarding the power of seismological discriminants which depended only on short-period seismic observations as well as its implications for further studies.

158. "Working paper on seismic data handling and analysis for a comprehensive test ban" submitted by the United Kingdom on 22 August 1972 (CCD/336)

The paper described the technical aspects of handling seismic data by using computer systems at recording stations, as experienced by the United Kingdom, for a comprehensive test ban.

159. "A review of current progress and problems in seismic verification", submitted by the United States on 24 August 1972 (CCD/300)

The paper elaborated upon document CCD/330, above, which reported on ongoing United States research into seismic verification of an underground test ban. The present paper reviewed the progress towards attaining the research objective outlined in document CCD/330 and discussed certain residual problems preventing seismic verification down to low magnitudes. It also outlined some directions that were then being pursued in seismic instrumentation, seismic systems and deployments to assist in the solution of these problems.

1973 Session

160. "Letter dated 20 February 1973 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament", submitted by Mexico (CCD/394)

The letter reproduced the text of General Assembly document A/C.1/1026 containing a letter from the Chairman of the delegation of Mexico to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly addressed to the Secretary-General. That letter had requested the circulation, as Assembly documents, of the texts of the three bilateral USSR/United States instruments referred to as the SALT I accords, signed in Moscow on 26 May 1972.

161. Memorandum submitted to the CCD on 14 March 1973 by Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Sweden and Yugoslavia (CCD/396)

The memorandum considered, inter alia, that there was no justification for the stagnation of the Committee's work and the current absence of effective negotiations, especially on the priority items of a comprehensive test ban and ~~the prohibition of~~ chemical weapons. It considered further that the current phase of the Committee's negotiations should concentrate on "the most important questions related to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and not on less pressing matters".

162. "Working paper with points to be considered by experts on the verification of ban on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Sweden on 24 April 1973 (CCD/397)

Suggested a number of points for consideration by experts on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions. Among the points listed were the following:

- (1) methods and present capabilities for verification;
- (2) verification aspects of proposed treaty structures; and
- (3) technical and organizational matters to be settled in connection with a ban on underground nuclear explosions.

163. "Working paper presenting the ways in which verification has been dealt with in various arms control and disarmament treaties and proposals", submitted by Sweden on 24 April 1973 (CCD/398)

The working paper updated an earlier paper on the same subject, also by Sweden (CCD/287, see above).

164. "Working paper on problems in determining the body wave magnitude", submitted by Japan on 24 April 1973 (CCD/399)

The paper constituted a contribution to the on-going technical discussion of possible uses of seismic technology in the verification of a CTB. (See also documents CCD/306, 327, 363 and 380, above).

165. "Working paper on a review of the United Kingdom seismological research and development programme", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 June 1973 (CCD/401)

The paper reviewed the United Kingdom's seismological research and development programme and explained the underlying themes which determined the emphasis of that programme. The paper was submitted in connection with the consideration of the seismological aspects of a CTB.

166. "Working paper on the estimation of depth of seismic events", submitted by the United Kingdom on 20 June 1973 (CCD/402)

The paper examined the technical question of the estimation of seismic events within the context of the question of the monitoring of a CTB. In this connection, it describes two examples of the use of a spiking filter technique for the estimation of the depth of seismic events and considered that the technique's principal contribution to the seismological issues of a CTB was to increase the confidence with which doubtful seismic events were categorized.

167. "A program of research related to problems in seismic verification", submitted by the United States of America on 5 July 1973 (CCD/404)

The paper provided a detailed treatment of certain problems in seismic verification dealt with in an earlier paper, also by the United States (CCD/388, see above), indicated current ideas on approaching those problems and outlined the programme of research being undertaken by the United States to help solve those problems.

168. "Working paper reviewing Swedish scientific work on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions", submitted by Sweden on 10 July 1973 (CCD/405)

The paper was submitted as a contribution to the CCD's informal meetings of experts on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions. In general, it reviewed recent Swedish scientific work in this field. The main portion of the paper consisted of brief discussions on some of the subject matters listed in document CCD/397 (see above), also submitted by Sweden.

169. "The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means", submitted by Canada on 10 July 1973 (CCD/406)

Reviewed the recent scientific research and developments aimed at clarifying the technical factors involved in the consideration of the seismological verification of a CTB.

170. "Comments on CCD/399, concerning magnitude determinations", submitted by the United States of America on 10 July 1973 (CCD/407)

The paper contained reactions to certain points raised in document CCD/399, submitted by Japan (see above).

171. "Working paper on comparison between earthquakes and underground explosions observed at the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory", submitted by Japan on 10 July 1973 (CCD/408)

Pointed out certain preliminary investigations on the nature of seismic waves from underground explosions and earthquakes recorded by the Matsushiro Seismological Observatory of the Japan Meteorological Agency.

172. "Some observations on detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions - prospects of international co-operation", submitted by Italy on 10 July 1973 (CCD/409)

Considered that expanded research and international collaboration could contribute to reducing, if not eliminating, uncertainties relating to the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Saw the problem as having two basically inseparable aspects: (1) Discrimination of events, especially those of low magnitude, and (2) Refinement of recording techniques with a view to obtaining for any given event a generally recognized value.

173. "Letter dated 16 July 1973 from the Permanent Representative of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Norway on seismic research at the Norwegian Seismic Array (NOSAR)" (CCD/411)

The working paper presented the following two facets of the research undertaken at the data centre for the Norwegian Seismic Array (NOSAR): (1) Research into methods for detecting small seismic events; and (2) Seismic verification research.

174. "Working paper containing a compilation of statements made on the stagnation of the Committee's work, the absence of effective negotiations, and other related matters, at the formal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament held from 20 February to 16 August 1973 (535th to 622nd meetings)", submitted by Mexico on 23 August 1973 (CCD/415)

An illustrative compilation, prepared by the delegation of Mexico, of views expressed at the CCD's 1973 session on the question of the absence of effective negotiations in the Committee, especially on the priority issues of a CTB and a chemical weapons ban (see also CCE/396, above).

175. "Some observations on the verification of a ban on underground nuclear test explosions", submitted by the Netherlands on 23 August 1973 (CCD/416)

The paper, among other things, held that recent research and studies on the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions appeared increasingly to lead to common findings. In its conclusions, the paper: (1) felt that obligatory on-site inspections would not enhance the identification possibilities significantly; (2) indicated that realistic possibilities of evading an underground test ban seemed to exist for test yields of up to about 10 kilotons, and (3) stated that an intensified international exchange of those seismic data used for the identification of events was needed on a routine basis.

176. "Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States" submitted by Pakistan on 11 July 1974 (CCD/428)

The document contained the text of a resolution adopted at the Fifth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, from 21 to 25 June 1974. That resolution, among other things, called upon all nuclear-weapon States to give solemn assurances in the nature of an obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear-weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

177. "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests", jointly submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union on 16 July 1974 (CCD/431)

The document contained the text of the United States/USSR bilateral treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions together with the protocol to the treaty, signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974. The document also contained the text of the protocol to the 1972 United States/USSR treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, and a joint United States/USSR statement on environmental warfare. The ABM Protocol and the joint statement on environmental warfare were also signed in Moscow on 3 July 1974.

The threshold test ban treaty, among other things, prohibited the parties from carrying out any underground nuclear-weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons and provided for national technical means of verification, supplemented by the reciprocal exchange of relevant data, for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the provisions of the treaty.

The ABM Protocol reduced the number of anti-ballistic missile sites allowed each side from two to one.

178. "Underground nuclear test activities in the United States and the Soviet Union from 1969 to 1973" submitted by Sweden on 1 August 1974. (CCD/438)

The purpose of the paper was to report on recent underground nuclear weapon tests in the United States and the Soviet Union and to discuss the estimated yields of those tests in relation to the threshold of 150 kilotons agreed upon in the threshold test ban treaty (see CCD/431, above). The paper explained that its data regarding the numbers of tests and their estimated yields came from official announcements of some of those tests and from detection by seismological means.

179. "Letter dated 6 August 1974 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD/439)

The letter requested that the contents of United Nations General Assembly document A/9293 of 8 November 1973 be reproduced as a CCD document. That document contained a joint USSR/United States letter of 6 November 1973 to the Secretary-General transmitting the texts of the Agreement between those two States on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Washington, D.C., on 22 June 1973, and requesting that those texts be circulated as an official General Assembly document.

180. "Working paper on a development in discriminating between seismic sources", submitted by the United Kingdom on 13 August 1974 (CCD/440)

The working paper reported on the progress made in research initiated by the United Kingdom on seismogram modelling and on improving methods of depth estimation, in a continuing scientific study of the possible use of seismological means for the technical verification of a CTB.

181. "Working paper on the identification of seismic events in the USSR using seismological data from observatories in Japan and Sweden", submitted jointly by Japan and Sweden on 13 August 1974 (CCD/441)

The paper presented results of a joint Japanese-Swedish study of multistation mb (Ms) discrimination, carried out within the framework of an agreement between the two countries on co-operation in the field of detection seismology (see CCD/376, above). The goal of the discrimination exercise was to identify whether a detected seismic event was an underground nuclear explosion or an earthquake. The ultimate objective of improved seismic detection and discrimination, within the context of the CCD's work, would be to assist in CTB verification.

182. "Working paper on the accuracy of locating seismic events", submitted by Japan on 13 August 1974 (CCD/442)

A technical paper dealing with the question of the accurate detection and discrimination of underground nuclear explosions. The contents of the paper were related to the continuing examination of the subject of using seismic means to verify a nuclear test ban agreement.

1975 session

183. "Joint Anglo-Soviet Declaration on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons", submitted jointly by the USSR and the United Kingdom on 12 March 1975 (CCD/448)

Text of a joint Declaration signed in Moscow on 17 February 1975 by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the Declaration both sides, inter alia, stressed the need for nuclear non-proliferation and pledged efforts towards limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests with a view to their ultimate discontinuance.

184. "Steps to be taken within a Disarmament Programme", submitted by Romania on 13 March 1975 (CCD/449)

Among the measures proposed by the Twelfth Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in November 1974 for inclusion in an international programme were the following: prohibition of the use of nuclear and mass destruction weapons; nuclear-weapon States should halt production of such weapons and destroy existing stockpiles of the weapons; nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established; negotiations for general disarmament and, in particular nuclear disarmament, should be conducted on a democratic basis with the participation of all States concerned.

185. Working paper containing views of a Japanese expert on the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE), submitted by Japan on 7 July 1975 (CCD/454)

Against the background of efforts within the CCD towards adopting a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, the paper sought to differentiate between such tests and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and examined the implications of the latter for nuclear disarmament efforts. The paper stressed the complexity of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, noting in this connection that while such explosions should not be used to mask nuclear weapons tests they should not be banned completely either so long as they possessed peaceful economic feasibilities.

186. "Letter dated 24 June 1975 from the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects", (CCD/455)

The letter indicated that the IAEA had continued its studies on peaceful nuclear explosions and enclosed with the letter were certain documents describing and summarizing that Agency's activities in that field.

187. "Working paper on arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNEs)", submitted by the United States on 10 July 1975 (CCD/456)

The paper, among other things, examined how peaceful nuclear explosions could be accommodated under a comprehensive test ban. It considered that further discussions on CTB verification could provide a better understanding of how such accommodation might be achieved.

188. "Working paper reporting the summary proceedings of an informal scientific conference held 14-19 April 1975 to promote Canadian-Japanese-Swedish co-operation in the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological means", submitted jointly by Canada, Japan and Sweden on 14 July 1975 (CCD/457).

The title of the working paper adequately reflected the nature of its contents which reported on an informal trilateral seismological conference which brought together scientists from three countries active in multilateral technical efforts to study the use of seismological means for CTB verification.

189. "Working paper on safeguards against the employment of multiple explosions to simulate earthquakes", submitted by the United Kingdom on 24 July 1975 (CCD/459)

The paper described research on how safeguards could be employed to prevent the technical simulation of earthquakes to mask a nuclear-weapon test and examined the implications of such research for the CTB.

190. "Strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States", submitted by Pakistan on 29 July 1975 (CCD/462)

Contained the text of a resolution adopted by the Sixth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, from 12 to 15 July 1975. The resolution, among other things, urged nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which were not protected by treaty guarantees from a nuclear-weapon State against nuclear threat or attack.

191. "Letter dated 6 August 1975 from the Leader of the delegation of Mexico to the Acting Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament" (CCD/464)

The letter requested the reproduction as a CCD document of the texts of two draft resolutions, with accompanying annexes, submitted by certain non-nuclear States to the first Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, proposing agreement on two additional protocols to the Treaty; those drafts were not adopted at the Review Conference. The leader of the delegation of Mexico considered the texts of the drafts as relevant for the CCD's discussions on CTB and on nuclear disarmament in general.

192. "Letter dated 13 August 1975 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Qualified Governmental Experts for the Study of the Question of Nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its Aspects to the Co-chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament", (CCD/467)

With that letter, the chairman of the ad hoc group of experts studying the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones transmitted the study to the CCD, under whose auspices the study had been carried out. In its comprehensive treatment of the question, the study examined such topics as: the historical background of military denuclearization by areas; the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones; responsibilities of States within the zone and of other States; verification and control; nuclear-weapon-free zones and international law; and peaceful nuclear energy.

193. Comments on the informal meetings of PNE experts by Ambassador H. Hisibori of Japan on 18 July 1975 (CCD/463/Rev.1)

In his observations, Ambassador Hisibori, among other things, stressed that the subject of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) was complex. Each PNE project, he said, should be given careful international scrutiny in order to prevent its use to disguise nuclear-weapon testing. He thought that from the experts' statements on the subject, it was clear that indigenous PNEs by non-nuclear-weapon States was not feasible. He stressed that his observation was not an a priori political conclusion but the product of technical evidence as presented by the experts.

194. "Working paper containing a draft definition of the concept of a 'nuclear-weapon-free zone' and a draft definition of the principal obligations of nuclear-weapon States in respect of such zones", submitted by Mexico on 20 August 1975 (CCD/470)

The paper set out a definition of the term "nuclear-weapon-free zone" and outlined the obligations of nuclear-weapon States towards such zones. Those obligations, the paper stated, would be embodied in a binding international instrument.

195. Informal meetings on the question of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the CTB, note being taken of operative paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 3257 (XXIX) - Comments made by Ambassador Mishra of India on 18 July 1975 (CCD/474)

Ambassador Mishra of India, *inter alia*, asserted that only by considering the question of a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing would it be possible to arrive at satisfactory arrangements in regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, whether they were conducted by nuclear-weapon States or non-nuclear-weapon States outside the framework of the NPT.

1976 session

196. "The test ban issue", submitted by Sweden on 26 March 1976 (CCD/481)

The paper described the background and current status of the test ban issue, outlined the political requirements and technical possibilities for monitoring nuclear explosions and described possible international co-operative measures for monitoring a CTB.

197. "Working paper on co-operative international measures to monitor a CTB", submitted by Sweden on 26 March 1976 (CCD/482)

The paper discussed possible international co-operative measures to facilitate the global monitoring of a CTB. In this context, it outlined a possible international system consisting of a network of selected seismological stations, a communications network and an international data centre. (See also CCD/481, above).

198. "Letter dated 8 April 1976 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of Norway to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper on some new results in seismic discrimination" (CCD/484)

The paper, describing some new results of continuing technical research on seismic discrimination, was submitted in connection with the CCD's technical discussions, with the participation of experts, on the question of a CTB.

199. "Working paper on the United Kingdom's contribution to research on seismological problems relating to underground nuclear tests", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/436)

A progress report on seismological research in the United Kingdom into the problems of detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests. The paper was contributed in connection with the CCD's technical discussions on a CTB.

200. "Working paper on the processing and communication of seismic data to provide for national means of verifying a test ban", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/437 and Corr.1)

The paper, inter alia, reported on technical experiments in the United Kingdom on the processing and communication of seismic data as well as on the communications links on which the United Kingdom based its national capacity to verify a test ban by seismological means alone.

201. "Working paper on the recording and processing of P waves to provide seismograms suitable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions", submitted by the United Kingdom on 12 April 1976 (CCD/438)

The paper dealt with the technical aspects of a CTB and in this connection explained why broad band seismograms should be more reliable for discriminating between earthquakes and underground explosions than narrow band seismograms, and suggested how to obtain broad band seismograms from narrow band recordings on short seismograms.

202. "Working paper on the estimation of focal depth by pP and sP phases", submitted by Japan on 13 April 1976 (CCD/439)

A technical examination of the problem of focal depth determination, a relevant process in identifying underground nuclear explosions.

203. "The verification of a comprehensive test ban by seismological means", submitted by Canada on 20 April 1976 (CCD/490)

A progress report on seismological research and development undertaken by Canadian scientists. The report, among other things, summarized developments at the Yellowknife seismological array and described the contribution that medium aperture arrays could make to future international co-operative CTB monitoring procedures. The paper also discussed the problem of evasive detonation which it referred to as probably the most significant obstacle to significantly reducing the threshold of seismological discrimination between earthquakes and underground explosions.

204. "Current status of research in seismic verification", submitted by the United States on 20 April 1976 (CCD/491)

The paper reviewed current research problems in seismic verification, the status of the data resources and systems being developed to address those problems and the progress made towards their evaluation and solution.

205. "Text of a statement by Mr. Fakley at an informal meeting of the CCD on Tuesday, 20 April 1976", submitted by the United Kingdom on 21 April 1976 (CCD/492)

In his statement, Mr. Fakley, inter alia, identified the issues of verification and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) as the two main difficulties standing in the way of the successful negotiation of a CTB. He elaborated on that view and concluded that as of then seismic means were not capable of providing adequate national technical means of verifying a CTB and that further examination of the role of PNEs in a CTB was required.

206. "Working paper containing statement by Dr. Shigeji Suyehiro at the informal meetings with participation of experts on a comprehensive test ban on 20 April 1976", submitted by Japan on 26 April 1976 (CCD/493)

The statement, among other things, gave a general explanation of seismological means of verification in an effort to clarify certain technical aspects of a CTB. In this connection, he suggested the undertaking of a test run of a seismological verification system as a way, inter alia, of demonstrating its operative capability.

207. "Text of statement of the Government of Japan on the occasion of the depositing of its instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 3 June 1976", submitted by Japan on 3 June 1976 (CCD/494)

In the statement, the Government of Japan, inter alia, reaffirmed its policy of foresaking nuclear armaments and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to abolish their nuclear weapons. It also urged nuclear-weapon States to take concrete steps towards the realization of a CTB and hoped that they would make further effective efforts to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

208. "Terms of reference for a group of scientific governmental experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events" submitted by Sweden on 24 June 1976 (CCD/495)

Under the terms of reference proposed by Sweden, the expert group, whose establishment Sweden had proposed on 22 April 1976, */ in carrying out the investigation would, inter alia, specify the characteristics of an international monitoring system and estimate its detection and identification capability.

(The CCD, on 22 July 1976, decided to establish the expert group under its auspices. **/)

*/ See CCD/PV.704.

**/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-first session, Supplement No. 27 (A/31/27), para.66.

209. "Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes" (CCD/496 and Corr.1)

The text of the bilateral United States/USSR Treaty and its accompanying protocol, signed on 28 May 1976, was submitted to the CCD jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union on 23 June 1976. Also included was the text of an Agreed Statement by both countries relative to the Treaty. The Treaty, inter alia, limited each side's individual peaceful nuclear explosions to a maximum yield of 150 kilotons and aggregate or group explosions occurring at the same time to a maximum yield of 1,500 kilotons. The Treaty also provided for national technical means of verification supplemented by the reciprocal exchange of relevant information and access to sites of explosions.

210. "Letter dated 20 July 1976 from Mr. Leif Blomqvist of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a working paper by the Government of Finland on Finnish capabilities of seismological detection of underground nuclear explosions" (CCD/509)

The paper represented a contribution by the Government of Finland to the CCD's technical discussions on a CTB, in particular the question of the possible use of seismological means to verify a CTB.

211. "First progress report to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events" submitted on 6 August 1976 (CCD/513)

The report, among other things, indicated that the Group had agreed on the following provisional Table of Contents for its Final Report: 1. Summary; 2. Introduction; 3. Data and procedures to be used for detection and location of seismic events and for obtaining identification parameters; 4. Selection of seismographic stations for a global network; 5. Data exchange between selected stations and data centres; 6. Data centres for detection and location of seismic events and for reduction of identification parameters; 7. Estimated cost to establish and operate the specified monitoring system; 8. Estimated capability of the specified monitoring system; and 9. Proposal for experimental exercises. */

1977 session

212. "Draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted by the Soviet Union on 22 February 1977 (CCD/523)

The draft treaty provided, inter alia, for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests anywhere in all environments and for verification by national technical means combined with certain flexible procedures including the international exchange of seismic data and the possibility of on-site inspection. The draft treaty also stipulated that its provisions would not apply to underground peaceful nuclear explosions.

*/ The CCD, on 2 September 1976, took note of the report and approved, in principle, the proposed time schedule for the work of the Ad Hoc Group, subject to review in the light of its work.

213. "Working paper on location capability of a multi-array stations capability", submitted by Japan on 24 February 1977 (CCD/524)

A technical study related to possible seismological verification of a CTB.

214. "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions in all environments", submitted by Sweden on 1 March and 5 July 1977 (CCD/526 and Rev.1)

The draft treaty provided, in principle, for a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon tests, but suggested possible transitional arrangements for the two major nuclear-weapon States and special arrangements for the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions. Compliance with the treaty was based principally on co-operation in the international exchange of seismological data and verification was envisaged to include the assistance of a consultative committee and the possible involvement of the United Nations Security Council.

215. "Letter dated 20 July 1977 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i. of the Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the views of the Government of New Zealand on a comprehensive test ban treaty" (CCD/536)

New Zealand identified as the three main areas of difficulty facing CTB negotiations, the problem of universal adherence to an agreement by all nuclear-weapon States, the problems of adequate verification and the question whether or not to permit peaceful nuclear explosions under a CTB. New Zealand proceeded to discuss each of those problems in detail and concluded, among other things, that the advantages of a CTB heavily outweighed the risks involved in each of those three problem areas.

216. "Working paper on focal depth resolvability of a multi-array stations system", submitted by Japan on 3 August 1977 (CCD/540)

A technical paper dealing with possible seismological verification of a CTB.

217. "Working paper containing a preliminary draft comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Mexico on 23 and 25 August 1977 (CCD/545 and Corr.1)

Under section III entitled "Components and Stages of the programme", the preliminary draft stated, inter alia, that efforts should urgently be intensified to reach agreement on a CTB, the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and further measures in the field of disarmament, in particular those aimed at achieving quantitative and qualitative strategic nuclear arms reductions with a view to their eventual elimination. Under sub-section B of Section III, the preliminary draft listed a number of measures the implementation of which required the political will of the two principal nuclear-weapon States. Among those measures were the following: a moratorium on the cessation of the testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear weapons; a ban on flight-testing of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and the assignment of existing stocks to civilian uses; a freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons; a solution to the problem of the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

1978 session

218. "Working paper on the question of the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Italy on 31 January 1978 (CCD/543)

The paper listed nuclear weapons as one of the main elements that should be included in a comprehensive programme for disarmament and suggested action on the following specific measures in the field of nuclear disarmament: (a) Conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CTB); (b) Limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery systems; (c) Cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; (d) Strengthening of the non-proliferation régime; (e) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

219. "Working paper on the comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, USSR on 21 February 1978 (CCD/552)

The paper regarded cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as one of the principal areas of disarmament efforts and urged appropriate action on the following specific measures in this respect: measures to avert the danger of nuclear war; complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; consolidation of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons; establishment of nuclear-free zones and zones of peace.

220. "Working paper on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Romania on 21 February 1978 (CCD/553)

Under the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, which was listed as one of the elements for a comprehensive disarmament programme, the working paper listed the following specific measures:

(a) solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons;

(b) solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States at any time and under any circumstances;

(c) prohibition of the deployment of new nuclear weapons on the territory of other States; total prohibition of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof;

(d) withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of other States;

(e) cessation of the development and testing of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery (including the comprehensive test ban of nuclear weapons);

(f) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; conversion of existing materials to peaceful purposes and transfer of a quota of such materials to be used by all States in the framework of broad international co-operation;

(g) setting up of nuclear weapon-free zones and zones of peace and co-operation in various regions of the world accompanied by effective guarantees by nuclear-weapon States to observe their status;

(h) reduction and complete destruction of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their means of delivery;

(i) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

221. "Suggestions for inclusion in a comprehensive programme of disarmament", submitted by Nigeria on 24 February 1973 (CCD/555)

The paper listed nuclear disarmament as one of the elements for the comprehensive programme and stated in this connection that utmost priority should be given to the cessation of the nuclear arms race through the following specific measures:

(a) urgent conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty;

(b) a ban on the further development and testing of means of delivery of nuclear weapons;

(c) measures to achieve significant qualitative limitations on and substantial reductions in strategic nuclear weapons systems and the ultimate elimination of such weapons;

(d) establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions and complete prohibition of the introduction of nuclear weapons into areas where they did not already exist;

(e) cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes and submission of all nuclear programmes of all countries to IAEA safeguards;

(f) promotion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in all countries;

(g) encouragement of universal adherence to the NPT;

(h) complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

222. "Letter dated 9 March 1973 from the Chairman of the Ad Hoc group of scientific experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events to the Co-chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the final report of the Ad Hoc group" (CCD/558 and Add.1)

The report, among other things, reviewed earlier studies relevant to the detection and identification of seismic events; discussed procedures for extracting and reporting data from individual stations in a global co-operative seismic network; dealt with the selection of seismograph stations for a global network; discussed the estimated capability of the specified global system; examined the question of data exchange between selected stations and data centres; considered the subject of international centres for the collection, processing and exchange of seismic data; examined the question of equipment and estimated costs of establishing and operating the specified system; and proposed the carrying out of an experimental exercise in order, inter alia, to test the over-all functioning of the proposed system.

223. "Draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, USSR, on 10 March 1978 (CCD/559)

By the draft Convention each State Party would undertake not to produce, stockpile, deploy anywhere or use nuclear neutron weapons. Verification would mainly be by national technical means although consultations and co-operation within the framework of the United Nations might also be envisaged in connection with the verification problem.

VIII. PROPOSALS SUBMITTED TO THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR
THE FIRST SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT ^{2/}

224. "Working document submitted by the non-aligned countries containing the draft declaration, programme of action and machinery for implementation" (A/AC.187/55/Add.1 and Corr. 1-2). Submitted to the CCD by Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Peru, Yugoslavia and Zaire (CCD/550 and Corr.1)

In their suggestions for a "Programme of Action" the sponsors of the document listed nuclear weapons at the top of their order of priorities for disarmament negotiations and proposed the following specific measures in this field:

- (a) Prohibition of the use and, as a first step, renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons against States which had no such weapons on their territories.
- (b) Renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons.
- (c) The reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery leading to their complete elimination.
- (d) The immediate conclusion of a treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests.
- (e) The immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes.
- (f) Other urgent steps:
 - cessation of research and development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;
 - freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
 - prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems.

The sponsors stated in the document that the two leading nuclear-weapon States bore a "particular" responsibility with regard to the realization of the above measures, while the other nuclear-weapon States, as well as other militarily significant States should contribute towards the attainment of those objectives. They also proposed the following additional measures in the field of nuclear disarmament:

- (1) Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world on the basis of arrangements among States of such regions. Respect by nuclear-weapon States of these zones and the statutes thereof by means of legally binding international instruments that included the obligation to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States included in such zones.

^{2/}This section includes relevant proposals for a programme of action that had been submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session and were subsequently also submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

- (ii) The status of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace should be respected by all States, particularly nuclear-weapon States and the major maritime users. In addition it would be desirable to create zones of peace in the region of the Mediterranean, among others.
- (iii) The formulation of an international convention on the non-use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, pending their final elimination.

225. "Working paper submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament: Programme of Action on disarmament", submitted by Pakistan (A/AC.187/92; CCD/556)

According to Pakistan, the General Assembly would adopt the following specific measures on nuclear disarmament in its Programme of Action:

Prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

(1) An international agreement or another form of binding international instrument should be adopted, under which the nuclear-weapon States would commit themselves not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers.

(2) Nuclear-weapon States should undertake, in a binding legal form, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which comprise nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace and not to introduce nuclear weapons in such zones.

(3) Following the adoption of the above measures, negotiations should be initiated among the nuclear-weapon States for an agreement on the total prohibition of the use or threat of use of all nuclear weapons, strategic or tactical, under any circumstances.

Reductions and elimination of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and prohibition of their qualitative development

(1) The negotiations between the United States, USSR and the United Kingdom on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should be finalized as early as possible so as to enable the CCD to consider and adopt the treaty in the shortest possible time.

(2) The two major nuclear-weapon States should conclude the second agreement on strategic arms limitations to provide for meaningful reductions in their deployment of nuclear weapons and to halt the development and refinement of new kinds of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

(3) Those same States should conclude a third agreement to implement substantial reductions in their deployments of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This agreement should also prohibit all research into development and refinement of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

(4) An international agreement should be reached on measures to prevent the diversion of the results of scientific research and development (R and D) to war-like purposes.

(5) The two major nuclear-weapon States and their allies should initiate, within the negotiations for mutual force reductions in Europe, consideration of an agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate tactical nuclear weapons in co-ordinated phases.

(6) Negotiations should be initiated among all the nuclear-weapon States for a general agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons

(1) Immediate steps should be taken to ensure that nuclear facilities not presently subject to IAEA safeguards were brought under international inspection and control.

(2) International safeguards should be applied by the IAEA to supplies of nuclear equipment, materials, technology and facilities on a universal and non-discriminatory basis.

Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

(1) The nuclear-weapon States which had not ratified Protocols I and II of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America should do so without delay.

(2) All States and parties in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia and the South Pacific should take steps to implement the objective of denuclearizing their respective regions.

(3) In the meantime, no action should be taken which would retard the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

(4) All States and parties in those regions should accept the application of IAEA safeguards over their nuclear facilities on a non-discriminatory basis.

(5) The United Nations should continue to encourage measures to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions.

Creation of zones of peace in the Indian Ocean and other regions

(1) The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean should reach agreement on measures, such as a commitment to settle outstanding disputes by peaceful means, the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the maintenance of a reasonable military balance among themselves, in order to promote conditions of security within the Indian Ocean region.

(2) The great Powers should, for their part, agree at an early date to eliminate altogether their presence and rivalry from the region.

(3) Consultations regarding all aspects of the proposal to create a peace zone in the Indian Ocean should take place in the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean with the participation of all the States concerned and lead to the early convening of the Conference on the Indian Ocean.

(4) Efforts should be made to encourage the creation of zones of peace in other regions, such as the Mediterranean.

226. "Elements for inclusion in the programme of action of the United Nations Special Session on disarmament and in its documents relating to the machinery for disarmament negotiations" submitted by Sweden (A/AC.187/95; CCD/534)

Sweden suggested that in its "Programme of Action" the General Assembly should, with regard to nuclear disarmament:

- make an appropriate reference to the draft treaty on a comprehensive test ban;
- consider as a general guideline for further action that the nuclear-weapon States, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, bore the main responsibility for nuclear disarmament;
- conclude that negotiations should urgently be undertaken on the following measures aiming at the eventual total elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States:
 - (a) Freezing of the qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weapons and delivery systems;
 - (b) Cessation of the research and development of new types and new systems of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and guidance;
 - (c) Cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and of fissionable material for weapon purposes;
 - (d) Balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of their delivery systems;
 - (e) Prevention of proliferation of such weapons and systems.

The Assembly should also, according to Sweden:

- request the CCD to continue with the highest priority its work in the field of nuclear disarmament;
- underline the importance that the United Nations be kept fully informed on all ongoing bilateral and multilateral negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament;
- expect substantial results in the area of nuclear disarmament to be reported to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

227. "Draft programme of action for the United Nations special session on disarmament", submitted by Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom (A/AC.187/96). Submitted to CCD by Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (CCD/549 and Corr.1)

Under section II of their draft programme entitled "Immediate measures of arms control and disarmament", the sponsors proposed that in the nuclear field, in which they said the nuclear-weapon States had a "particular" responsibility, the first goal should be the prevention of both horizontal and vertical proliferation through the following specific measures:

- the halting and reversal of the nuclear arms race in its quantitative and qualitative dimensions: especially by a second Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, to be followed urgently by further strategic arms negotiations with the objective of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons;
- the earliest conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments, which should be adhered to as soon as possible by all States, particularly all nuclear-weapon States and should contain verification provisions giving maximum confidence that no party would conduct clandestine tests;
- further measures to develop an international consensus on the strengthening and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation régime, based primarily on adherence of all States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and on the system of safeguards of the IAEA;
- the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones suitable to specific conditions in the regions concerned through agreement between all the States in the region and with effective co-operation from nuclear-weapon States.

The second goal, the sponsors suggested, was the provision of assurances, as appropriate, by nuclear-weapon States designed to increase the confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their own security from nuclear attack.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION DISARMAMENT
COMMITTEE (ENDC) BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Twentieth session of the General Assembly, 1965

228. Resolution 2032 (XX)

By its operative paragraphs, the resolution urged the suspension of all nuclear-weapon tests; called upon all countries to respect the provisions of the Partial Test Ban Treaty; and requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its work on a CTB and on arrangements to ban effectively all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments taking into account the improved possibilities for international co-operation in the field of seismic detection, and to report to the General Assembly.

229. Resolution 2033 (XX)

By its preambular part, the resolution, inter alia, recognized that the denuclearization of Africa would be a practical step towards the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and of the objectives of the United Nations. By its operative paragraphs the resolution, inter alia, endorsed the declaration on the denuclearization of Africa issued in 1964 by the Heads of State and Government of African countries; called upon all States to respect and abide by the aforementioned declaration; called upon all States to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons on the African continent; called upon States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, using or deploying nuclear weapons on the African continent and from acquiring such weapons or taking any action which would compel African States to take similar actions; urged States possessing nuclear weapons and capability not to transfer such weapons, scientific data or technological assistance to the national control of any State in any form which may be used to assist such States in the manufacture or use of nuclear weapons in Africa; expressed the hope that African States would initiate studies, as they deemed appropriate, with a view to implementing the denuclearization of Africa and take the necessary measures through the Organization of African Unity to achieve that end; and requested the Secretary-General to extend to the Organization of African Unity such facilities and assistance as may be requested in order to achieve the aims of the present resolution.

Twenty-first session of the General Assembly, 1966

230. Resolution 2153A (XXI)

By operative paragraph A, the General Assembly requested the ENDC to consider urgently the proposal that the nuclear-weapon States should give an assurance that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States without nuclear weapons on their territories, and any other proposals that had been made or may be made for the solution of the problem.

231. Resolution 2162A (XXI)

The resolution requested the Secretary-General to prepare a concise report on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and on the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons.

(In accordance with this resolution the Secretary-General, with the assistance of a group of consultant experts, prepared a report entitled "Effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons and the security and economic implications for States of the acquisition and further development of these weapons", ^{*/} which the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly's twenty-second session.)

232. Resolution 2162C (XXI)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly requested the ENDC to pursue new efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as on collateral measures, and in particular on an international treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and on the completion of the test ban treaty so as to cover underground nuclear weapon tests.

233. Resolution 2163 (XXI)

The General Assembly, among other things, recalled the joint memorandum on a comprehensive test ban treaty submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic and annexed to the report of the ENDC, ^{**/} and in particular the concrete suggestions contained therein;

Recognized the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests; and in the operative paragraphs of the resolution: urged all States which had not done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty;

Called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments;

Expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and

Requested the ENDC to elaborate without any further delay a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

^{*/} Document A/6853 (Sales No. E.68.IX.1)

^{**/} Document ENDC/17, see above.

234. Resolution 2169 (XXI)

The General Assembly, inter alia, believed that the signing of a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons would greatly facilitate negotiations on general and complete disarmament and contribute to the search for a solution of the urgent problem of nuclear disarmament; believed further that the widest possible attendance at a conference for the purpose of signing such a convention was of vital importance for the effective and universal observance of its provisions; and in the operative paragraph of the resolution, requested that a future world disarmament conference give serious consideration to the question of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.

Twenty-second session of the General Assembly, 1967

235. Resolution 2286 (XXII)

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed with satisfaction the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, called upon all States to give full co-operation to ensure that the régime laid down in the Treaty enjoyed universal observance, referred to the contemplated signatures of Additional Protocol I of the Treaty and invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty.

The recommendations for the signature and ratification of Additional Protocols I and II were also reflected in the following resolutions: 2456 B (XXII); 2666 (XXV); 2830 (XXVI); 2935 (XXVII); 3079 (XXVIII); 3258 (XXIX); 3262 (XXIX); 3467 (XXX); 3473 (XXX); 31/67 and 32/76.

236. Resolution 2289 (XXII)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly expressed its conviction that it was essential to continue urgently the examination of the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and of the conclusion of an appropriate international convention on the subject. By operative paragraph 2 it urged all States to examine in the light of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly in resolution 1653 (XVI) the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the draft convention on the question proposed by the USSR^{2/} and such other proposals as may be made on the subject and to undertake negotiations concerning the conclusion of an appropriate convention through the convening of an international conference, by the ENDC, or directly between States.

237. Resolution 2343 (XXII)

By its operative paragraphs the resolution urged all States which have not yet done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear-weapon tests in all environments; expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data; and requested the ENDC to take up as a matter of urgency the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.

^{2/} See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second session, Annexes agenda item 96, document A/5834.

Twenty-third session of the General Assembly, 1968

238. Resolution 2455 (XXIII)

Substance of the operative paragraphs similar to that of General Assembly resolution 2343 (XXII), above.

239. Resolution 2456D (XXIII)

The resolution noted the recommendation contained in resolution D of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States; */ considered that, pursuant to the agreement reached in July 1968 by the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter into bilateral discussions on the limitation of both offensive and strategic nuclear-weapon delivery systems and anti-ballistic missile systems, such discussions could lead to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and relaxation of tensions and urged the Governments of the USSR and the United States to enter at an early date into the aforementioned discussions.

*/ See "Proposals submitted at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States", below.

X. RECOMMENDATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RESOLUTIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
TRANSMITTED TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (CCD)
BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly, 1969

240. Resolution 2602 A (XXIV)

By the operative paragraph of the resolution the General Assembly appealed to the Governments of the USSR and the United States to agree, as an urgent preliminary measure, on a moratorium on further testing and deployment of new offensive and defensive strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

241. Resolution 2604 (XXIV)

The contents of operative paragraphs 1 and 2 were the same as those of resolution 2343 (XXII), above. Operative paragraph 3 requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account the proposals already made in the Committee as to the contents of such a treaty, as well as the views expressed on the subject at the General Assembly's twenty-fourth session, and to submit a special report to the Assembly on the results of the Committee's deliberations.

Twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, 1970

242. Resolution 2627 (XXV)

Paragraph 5 of the resolution which was entitled "Declaration on the Occasion of the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations", stated the following:

"On the threshold of the Disarmament Decade, we welcome the important international agreements which have already been achieved in the limitation of armaments, especially nuclear arms. Conscious of the long and difficult search for ways to halt and reverse the arms race and of the grave threat to international peace posed by the continuing development of sophisticated weapons, we look forward to the early conclusion of further agreements of this kind and to moving forward from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and disarmament everywhere, particularly in the nuclear field, with the participation of all nuclear Powers. We call upon all Governments to renew their determination to make concrete progress towards the elimination of the arms race and the achievement of the final goal - general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

243. Resolution 2661 A (XXV)

The General Assembly, among other things, believed that the possibilities for rapid success in bilateral USSR/United States negotiations on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems would increase if steps were taken by the nuclear-weapon States to halt the development of new nuclear weapons and urged the Governments of the nuclear-weapon States to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems. The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 2932 B (XXVII), 3184 A (XXVIII), 3484 C (XXX), 31/189A and 32/87G.

244. Resolution 2661 B (XXV)

The General Assembly, by the resolution, noted that all States had the inalienable right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination; said it was aware of the development of new techniques for uranium enrichment; considered that these new techniques may contribute to the promotion of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; considered also that material produced by these new techniques may be diverted for weapons purposes unless subject to effective safeguards; noted that the IAEA was engaged in the study of safeguards under the NPT; and in operative paragraphs requested the IAEA to pay attention also to the safeguards required with respect to new techniques for uranium enrichment.

245. Resolution 2661 C (XXV)

By operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly urged the CCD to make more intensive efforts to bring about a faster pace towards the achievement of disarmament measures and by operative paragraph 3 recommended to the Committee to take into account in its further work and its negotiations General Assembly document A/8191 and Corr.1 as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future.

Document A/8191 contained a "Comprehensive programme of disarmament" proposed jointly by Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Under Section III of the document entitled "Elements and phrases of the programme", sub-section B dealing with "Other measures of disarmament", called for persistent scrutiny and negotiation to be given to the following specific measures of nuclear disarmament:

- (i) A moratorium or, cessation of testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems;
- (ii) The cessation of production of fissionable material for military purposes and the transfer of existing stocks to civilian uses;
- (iii) A freeze or limitation on the deployment of all types of nuclear weapons;
- (iv) The conclusion of regional agreements for the establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones;
- (v) A solution of the problem concerning the prohibition of the use of, or the threat to use, nuclear weapons.

246. Resolution 2663 A (XXV)

By operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly urged Governments to consider and, wherever possible, to implement methods of improving their capability to contribute high-quality seismic data with assured international availability, taking into account the suggestions contained in the documents annexed to the report of the CCD,*/ and invited those Governments in a position to do so to consider lending their assistance in the improvement of world-wide international availability of seismic data for the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. By operative paragraph 3 the Assembly invited Members of the CCD to co-operate in further study of this issue.

*/ A/8059.

247. Resolution 2663 B (XXV)

By operative paragraph 3 the General Assembly requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the proposals already made in the Committee as well as the views expressed at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of its deliberations.

248. Resolution 2734 (XXV)

Paragraph 20 of the resolution which was entitled "Declaration on the strengthening of international security", urged all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to make urgent and concerted efforts within the framework of the Disarmament Decade and through other means for the cessation and reversal of the nuclear and conventional arms race at an early date, the elimination of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, as well as ensure that the benefits of the technology of the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall be available to all States, to the maximum extent possible without discrimination.

Twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, 1971

249. Resolution 2825 A (XXVI)

By operative paragraph 2 the General Assembly requested the IAEA to include in its annual report to the Assembly full information on the progress of its work on the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT, including safeguards on nuclear material in uranium enrichment plants using both existing and new techniques.

250. Resolution 2828 A (XXVI)

By the preambular part, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its conviction that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB. By the operative paragraph, the Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests and urged nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973.

251. Resolution 2828 B (XXVI)

By the preambular paragraphs the General Assembly, among other things, took into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests were conducted and recognized that sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction already existed in the arsenals of certain States to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable. By the operative paragraphs the Assembly appealed to the nuclear States to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere; urged all the nuclear States to reach agreement without delay on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests; and reassured the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to oppose nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and requested the nuclear States not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.

252. Resolution 2828 C (XXVI)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, stressed anew the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States; urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty; called upon all Governments that had been conducting nuclear weapon tests, particularly those of parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments by all States; urged Governments to take all possible measures to develop further, and to use more effectively, existing capabilities for the seismological identification of underground nuclear tests, in order to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the suggestions already made in the Committee, as well as the views expressed at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly; requested particularly Governments that had been carrying out nuclear tests to take an active and constructive part in developing in the CCD, or in any successor body, specific proposals for an underground test ban treaty; and expressed the hope that these efforts would enable all States to sign, in the near future, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

253. Resolution 2831 (XXVI)

By operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly called upon all States to intensify their efforts during the Disarmament Decade with a view to promoting negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and for nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

254. Resolution 2832 (XXVI)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, solemnly declared the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, as a zone of peace for all time; called upon the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry.

Called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations was unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements were made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, 1972

255. Resolution 2934 A (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, in part I of the resolution, inter alia, stressed anew the urgency of halting all atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons in the Pacific or anywhere else in the world; and urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and, meanwhile, to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty.

In part II of the resolution, the Assembly declared that a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests was an important element in the consolidation of the progress towards disarmament and arms control made thus far and that it would greatly facilitate future progress in these fields; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments; and called upon the CCD to give urgent consideration to the question of a treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the views already expressed in the Committee, the opinions stated at the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly and, above all, the pressing need for the early conclusion of such a treaty.

256. Resolution 2934 B (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly stressed again the urgency of halting all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States; urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and meanwhile to refrain from testing in environments covered by that Treaty; called upon all Governments conducting underground nuclear weapon tests, particularly those States parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures that would suspend or reduce such testing, pending the early entry into force of a ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments; urged Governments that had been carrying out nuclear weapon tests to take an active and constructive part in presenting and developing in the CCD, or in any other appropriate body, specific proposals for a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to give first priority to its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking full account of views of experts and of technical developments bearing on the verification of such a treaty; urged Governments to take all appropriate measures further to develop existing capabilities for detecting and identifying underground nuclear tests through seismological and other technical means, and to increase international co-operation in the elaboration of relevant techniques and evaluation of seismographic data, in order to facilitate an underground nuclear weapon test ban; and called upon Governments to seek as a matter of urgency a halt to all nuclear-weapon testing, and to endeavour to achieve at the earliest possible date a comprehensive test ban and to obtain universal adherence to such a ban.

257. Resolution 2934 C (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs the General Assembly reiterated once again its condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests; reaffirmed its conviction that there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB; urged once more the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests at the earliest possible date, and in any case not later than 5 August 1973, either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

258. Resolution 2936 (XXVII)

By preambular paragraph 10 the General Assembly expressed its belief that renunciation of the use or threat of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be fully observed as a law of international life. By operative paragraphs the Assembly solemnly declared, on behalf of the States Members of the United Nations their renunciation of the use or threat of use of force in all its forms and manifestations in international relations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and the permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons; and recommended that the Security Council should take, as soon as possible, appropriate measures for the full implementation of the present declaration of the General Assembly.

259. Resolution 2992 (XXVII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, among other things, called upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to support the concept that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace; and decided to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to study the implications of the proposal, with special reference to the practical measures that may be taken in furtherance of the objectives of the resolution, having due regard to the security interests of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean and the interests of any other State consistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, 1973

260. Resolution 3078 A (XXVIII)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly once again condemned all nuclear-weapon tests; reiterated its conviction that there was no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB; and once more urged nuclear-weapon States to halt without delay all nuclear-weapon tests either through a permanent agreement or through unilateral or agreed moratoria.

261. Resolution 3078 B (XXVIII)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly emphasized its deep concern at the continuance of nuclear-weapon tests both in the atmosphere and underground, and at the lack of progress towards a CTB agreement; called anew upon all nuclear-weapon States to seek, as a matter of urgency, the end of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments; insisted that the nuclear-weapon States that had been conducting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere should discontinue

such tests forthwith; urged States which had not yet done so to adhere to the Partial Test Ban Treaty without further delay; urged CCD Member States, in particular nuclear-weapon Members and parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty immediately to start negotiations for elaborating a treaty designed to achieve the objective of a comprehensive test ban; requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of the highest priority, its deliberations on a CTB treaty, taking into account suggestions already made in the Committee and views expressed at the twenty-eighth and at previous sessions of the General Assembly, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-ninth session a special report on the question, including the areas of agreement on the achievement of a draft treaty; and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban" in place of the item entitled "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" which appeared on the agenda of the twenty-eighth session.

262. Resolution 3080 (XXVIII)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all States to accept the principles and objectives contained in Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace", (see above), as a constructive contribution to the strengthening of regional and international security; requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified experts and competent bodies selected by him, a factual statement, based on available material, of the great Powers' military presence in all its aspects, in the Indian Ocean, with special reference to their naval deployments, conceived in the context of great Power rivalry and to submit the statement to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean if possible by 31 March 1974.

Twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly, 1974

263. Resolution 3257 (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests in whatever environment they may be conducted; reaffirmed its deep concern at the continuance of such testing, both in the atmosphere and underground, and at the lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; emphasized once more the urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban agreement; reminded the nuclear-weapon States of their special responsibility to initiate proposals to this end; called upon all States to refrain from the testing of nuclear weapons, in any environment, pending conclusion of such an agreement; and requested the CCD to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the progress achieved.

264. Resolution 3259 A (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to give tangible support to the establishment and preservation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace; called upon the great Powers to refrain from increasing and strengthening their military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean as an essential first

step towards the relaxation of tension and the promotion of peace and security in the area; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to enter, as soon as possible, into consultations with a view to convening a conference on the Indian Ocean; invited all States, especially the great Powers, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions; thanked the Secretary-General for his efforts in the preparation of the factual statement of the great Powers' military presence in the Indian Ocean. */

265. Resolution 3261 C (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the USSR and the United States to broaden the scope and accelerate the pace of their strategic arms limitation talks, and stressed once again the necessity and urgency of reaching agreement on important qualitative limitations and substantial reductions of their strategic nuclear-weapon systems as a positive step towards nuclear disarmament; and invited the Governments of the two States to keep the General Assembly informed in good time of the results of their negotiations.

266. Resolution 3261 D (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, appealed to all States, in particular, nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; requested the IAEA to continue its studies on the peaceful applications of nuclear explosions, their utility and feasibility, including legal, health and safety aspects; called upon the CCD, in submitting its report to the General Assembly's thirtieth session on the elaboration of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, to include a section on its consideration of the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions and, in so doing, to take account of the views of the IAEA as requested above; expressed the hope that the NPT Review Conference, to be held in Geneva in May 1975, would also give consideration to the role of peaceful nuclear explosions as provided for in that Treaty; invited, in this connection, the USSR and the United States to provide the Review Conference with information concerning such steps as they had taken since the entry into force of the Treaty, or intended to take, for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes which was envisaged in article V of the Treaty.

267. Resolution 3261 E (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly reaffirmed its call upon all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a nuclear-free zone; reiterated its call upon all States to respect and abide by the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa issued by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity; reiterated further its call upon all States to refrain from testing, manufacturing, deploying, transporting, storing, using or threatening to use nuclear weapons on the African continent; requested the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the Organization of African Unity towards the realization of the aims and objectives of the present resolution.

The recommendations were subsequently further elaborated and reflected in General Assembly resolutions 3471 (XXX), 31/69 and 32/81.

*/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session, Supplement No. 29 (A/9629 and Add.1), annex.

268. Resolution 3261 F (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, among other things, decided to undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all of its aspects; requested that the study be carried out by an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts under the auspices of the CCD; called upon interested Governments and international organizations concerned to extend such assistance as may be required from them for the carrying out of the study; requested the CCD to transmit the study in a special report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

(See also document CCD/476, above.)

269. Resolution 3261 G (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly declared its firm support for the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States and recommended to Member States to consider in all appropriate forums, without loss of time, the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

270. Resolution 3263 (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; considered that, in order to advance the idea of a nuclear-weapon free zone in that region, it was indispensable that all parties concerned in the area proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, testing, obtaining, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons; called upon the parties concerned in the area to accede to the NPT; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the present resolution; requested the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of the parties concerned with respect to the implementation of the resolution, in particular with regard to its paragraphs 2 and 3, and to report to the Security Council at an early date and, subsequently, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

271. Resolution 3265 A (XXIX)

By the resolution, the General Assembly, among other things, recognized that conditions and procedures for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones differed from region to region; recognized further that, in appropriate regions and by agreement among the States concerned, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could promote the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and considered therefore, that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent.

272. Resolution 3265 B (XXIX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the affirmation by the States of the South Asia region not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons and to devote their nuclear programmes exclusively to the economic and social advancement of their peoples; endorsed, in principle,

the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; invited the States of the South Asian region and such other neighbouring non-nuclear-weapon States as may be interested to initiate, without delay, necessary consultations with a view to establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone and urged them, in the interim, to refrain from any action contrary to the achievement of these objectives; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, would lend their full co-operation for the effective realization of the aims of the resolution; requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting for the purpose of the consultations envisaged above, and to render such assistance as may be required for the purpose.

Thirtieth session of the General Assembly, 1975

273. Resolution 3466 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted; deplored the continued lack of progress towards a comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized the urgency of reaching agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to halt all nuclear-weapon tests through an agreed suspension subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States belonging to international agreements in which they had declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; urged the CCD to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session on the progress achieved.

274. Resolution 3468 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, noted that an agreement in principle on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean had emerged among the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean; requested the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations on the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean, with particular attention to the following six points: (a) Purpose of the conference; (b) Date and duration; (c) Venue; (d) Provisional agenda; (e) Participation; (f) Level of participation; requested the Ad Hoc Committee to continue its work and consultations in accordance with its mandate and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session a report on its work, including the results of the consultations referred to above; invited all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions.

275. Resolution 3472 A (XXX)

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the special report of the CCD containing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects; invited all Governments, the IAEA and other international organizations concerned to transmit to the Secretary-General before 30 June 1976 such views, observations and suggestions on the special report as they may deem appropriate; requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report based on information received and to submit it to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session.

276. Resolution 3472 B (XXX)

By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly solemnly adopted the following declaration:

I. Definition of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone

1. A "nuclear-weapon-free zone" shall, as a general rule, be deemed to be any zone, recognized as such by the General Assembly of the United Nations, which any group of States, in the free exercise of their sovereignty, has established by virtue of a treaty or convention whereby:

(a) The statute of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the zone shall be subject, including the procedure for the delimitation of the zone, is defined:

(b) An international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.

II. Definition of the principal obligations of the nuclear-weapon States towards nuclear-weapon-free zones and towards the States included therein

2. In every case of a nuclear-weapon-free zone that has been recognized as such by the General Assembly, all nuclear-weapon States shall undertake or reaffirm, in a solemn international instrument having full legally binding force, such a treaty, a convention or a protocol, the following obligations:

(a) To respect in all its parts and statute of total absence of nuclear weapons defined in the treaty or convention which serves as the constitutive instrument of the zone;

(b) To refrain from contributing in any way to the performance in the territories forming part of the zone of acts which involve a violation of the aforesaid treaty or convention;

(c) To refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States included in the zone.

III. Scope of the definitions

3. The above definitions in no way impair the resolutions which the General Assembly has adopted or may adopt with regard to specific cases of nuclear-weapon-free zones nor the rights emanating for the Member States from such resolutions.

277. Resolution 3474 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed the opinion that the Member States with which the Secretary-General had consulted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 3263 (XXX) (above) should exert efforts towards the realization of the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East; urged all parties directly concerned to adhere to the NPT as a means of promoting this objective; recommended that the Member States referred to above, pending the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards, should: (a) Proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing,

acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of such weapons in their territory or the territory under their control, by any third party; (b) Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards; recommended to the nuclear-weapon States to refrain from any action contrary to the purpose of the present resolution and the objective of establishing, in the region of the Middle East, a nuclear-weapon-free zone under an effective system of safeguards and to extend their co-operation to the States of the region in their efforts to promote this objective. The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 31/71 and 32/82.

278. Resolution 3476 A (XXX)

By the operative paragraph, the General Assembly decided to give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after it had been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned.

279. Resolution 3476 B (XXX)

By preambular paragraph 2, the General Assembly noted the report of the Secretary-General */ and by the operative paragraphs it, inter alia, urged the States of South Asia to continue their efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, as recommended in Assembly resolution 3265 B (XXIX) (see above); further urged those States to refrain from any action contrary to the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The recommendations were subsequently also reflected in General Assembly resolutions 31/73 and 32/83.

280. Resolution 3477 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly endorsed the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific; invited the countries concerned to carry forward consultations about ways and means of realizing this objective; expressed the hope that all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, co-operate fully in achieving the objectives of the present resolution; and requested the Secretary-General to render all necessary assistance to the States of the region in giving effect to the purpose of the present resolution.

281. Resolution 3478 (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, took note of the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests submitted to the Assembly by the USSR, the text of which was annexed to the present resolution; called upon all nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations, not later than 31 March 1976, with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests, and invited twenty-five to thirty non-nuclear-weapon States, to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly after consultations with all regional groups, to participate in those negotiations, and to inform the Assembly, at its thirty-first session, of the results of the negotiations; requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests.

282. Resolution 3484 A (XXX)

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, appealed once again to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to exert concerted efforts in all the appropriate international forums with a view to working out promptly effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and for the prevention of the further proliferation of nuclear weapons; invited the USSR and the United States to provide information on such consultations as they may have entered into or may intend to enter into for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in article V of the NPT, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session through the Secretary-General; requested the CCD to keep under review, in its consideration of an elaboration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, including the possibility that such explosions could be misused to circumvent any ban on the testing of nuclear weapons; stressed the need to ensure, particularly in the context of a comprehensive test ban, that any testing or application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes did not contribute to the testing or refinement of the nuclear-weapon arsenals of nuclear-weapon States or to the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability by other States; and called upon all Member States to support and assist in the fulfilment of these tasks.

Thirty-first session of the General Assembly, 1976

283. Resolution 31/66

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, condemned all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted; declared its profound concern that substantive negotiations towards a comprehensive test ban agreement had not yet begun and re-emphasized the urgency of concluding a comprehensive and effective agreement; called once again upon all nuclear-weapon States to suspend the testing of nuclear weapons by agreement, subject to review after a specified period, as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal and comprehensive test ban agreement; emphasized in this regard the particular responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States belonging to international agreements in which they had declared their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race; called upon all States not yet parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty to adhere to it forthwith; urged the CCD to continue to give the highest priority to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban agreement and to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the progress achieved.

284. Resolution 31/68

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, deplored the meagre achievements of the Disarmament Decade in terms of truly effective disarmament and arms limitation agreements, and the detrimental effects on world peace and economy of the continuing unproductive and wasteful arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race; called again upon all States, as well as the organs concerned with disarmament issues, to place at the centre of their preoccupations the adoption of effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, and for the reduction of military expenditures and to make sustained efforts with a view to achieving progress toward general and complete disarmament.

285. Resolution 31/70

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones could contribute to the security of members of such zones, to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goals of general and complete disarmament; drew the attention of Governments to the comprehensive study and the views, observations and suggestions on that study contained in the report of the Secretary-General; */ expressed the hope that the comprehensive study and the views, observations and suggestions on that study would enhance further efforts of Governments concerning nuclear-weapon-free zones and will be of assistance to States interested in the establishment of such zones; and commended the comprehensive study and the report of the Secretary-General to the Governments concerned, to interested international organizations and to the CCD for further consideration and for the adoption of measures that they may deem appropriate within their respective fields of competence.

286. Resolution 31/75

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urgently called for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States: (a) To bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race; (b) To undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament; (c) To find an early solution to the difficulties in reaching agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time as a step towards the realization of these objectives; emphasized the particular responsibility of the two major nuclear-weapon States in this regard; stressed the urgency of international co-operative efforts in appropriate forums to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; recognized that States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints had a right to full access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of all efforts to increase the availability of energy, particularly for the needs of the developing countries of the world; requested the IAEA to accord high priority to its programme of work in these areas.

287. Resolution 31/88

By the operative paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Ad Hoc Committee and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to continue their consultations with a view to formulating a programme of action leading to the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean; invited once again all States, in particular the great Powers and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, to co-operate in a practical manner with the Ad Hoc Committee in the discharge of its functions.

288. Resolution 31/89

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, again called upon all nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX), to proceed as soon as possible with negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States; requested the Secretary-General to render such assistance as may be necessary for the negotiations and to transmit to the group referred to in paragraph 1 above all documents relating to the consideration by the General Assembly at its thirty-first session of the item entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests".

*/ A/31/189 and Add.1 and 2. See also CCD/467, above.

289. Resolution 31/92

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, invited the States which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to implement fully and urgently all the provisions of the Final Act, including those relating to the Mediterranean, and to consider favourably the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation in the interests of international peace and security.

290. Resolution 31/189 C

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly requested the nuclear-weapon States, as a first step towards a complete ban on the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to consider undertaking, without prejudice to their obligations arising from treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon Powers; and decided to review at its thirty-second session the progress made on the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

291. Resolution 31/189 D

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly recognized that States accepting effective non-proliferation restraints had a right to enjoy fully the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of increased efforts in this field, particularly for the needs of the developing areas of the world; requested the IAEA to give special attention to its programme of work in the non-proliferation area, including its efforts in facilitating peaceful nuclear co-operation and increasing assistance to the developing areas of the world within an effective and comprehensive safeguards system; further requested the IAEA to continue its studies on the questions of multinational fuel cycle centres and or an international régime for plutonium storage as effective means to promote the interests of the non-proliferation régime; and called upon the IAEA to give careful consideration to all relevant suggestions presented to it aiming at strengthening the safeguards régime.

Thirty-second session of the General Assembly, 1977

292. Resolution 32/50

By the preambular paragraphs the General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its conviction that the objectives of the full utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be promoted by the establishment of universally acceptable principles for international co-operation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. By the operative paragraphs, the Assembly, among other things, declared that international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be under agreed and appropriate safeguards applied through the IAEA on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

293. Resolution 32/78

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, reiterated its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing had continued unabated in spite of repeated Assembly resolutions calling for a halt to testing in all environments; noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban; declared that the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the May-June 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; urged the three nuclear-weapon States concerned to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion as soon as possible and transmit the results to the CCD by the beginning of its spring 1978 session for full consideration; requested the CCD to take up the agreed text resulting from the trilateral negotiations, with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the May-June 1978 special session on disarmament.

294. Resolution 32/86

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, declared that as the next step towards the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean be convened in New York at a suitable date, which other States not falling within this category, but which have participated or have expressed their willingness to participate in the work of the Ad hoc Committee, could attend, and requested the Ad Hoc Committee to make the necessary preparations for the meeting.

295. Resolution 32/87 A

By its operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, invited all States that had not yet done so in particular those possessing nuclear or other mass destruction weapons, to ratify or accede to the Sea-Bed Treaty; affirmed its strong interest in avoiding an arms race in nuclear or any other mass destruction weapons on the sea-bed, the ocean floor or the sub-soil thereof; requested the CCD, in consultation with the States parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty and taking into account the proposals made during the Sea-Bed Treaty Review Conference and any relevant technological developments, to proceed promptly with the consideration of further disarmament measures to prevent an arms race in the sea-bed.

296. Resolution 32/87 B

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly reaffirmed the provisions of its resolution 31/189 C (see above); urged the nuclear-weapon States to give serious consideration to extending the undertaking proposed by the Assembly in its resolution 31/189 C and to take expeditious action in all relevant forums to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; and recommended that all possible efforts be made at the May-June 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to evolve binding and credible security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States, taking into account resolution 31/189 C.

297. Resolution 32/87 F

By the operative paragraphs, the General Assembly, inter alia, urgently called for determined efforts by all nuclear-weapon States: (a) to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race; (b) to take effective measures towards nuclear disarmament; (c) to find an early solution to the remaining problems in reaching

agreement to discontinue all test explosions of nuclear weapons. The Assembly also emphasized, in this connection, the particular responsibility of those nuclear-weapon States that had already accepted international obligations, namely in article VI of the NPT, with respect to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests, and noted as encouraging recent efforts underway towards those ends. Among other things, the Assembly underlined the importance of determined efforts, especially by the nuclear-weapon States, to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States; urged States that had not yet adhered to the NPT, in the first instance, to do so at an early date or, at a minimum, to accept other arrangements involving the application of safeguards to their complete nuclear fuel cycle that would provide assurances to the international community against the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons while guaranteeing to the States concerned unhindered and non-discriminatory access to the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy; solemnly affirmed that: (a) States should not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities to the production of nuclear weapons; (b) all States had the right to develop programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective and non-discriminatory safeguards against nuclear-weapon proliferation.

298. Resolution 32/154

By operative paragraph 6 the General Assembly urged effective measures to put an end to the arms race and to promote disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the creation of zones of peace and co-operation, the withdrawal of foreign military bases and the achievement of tangible progress towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control and the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in this regard. By operative paragraph 7 the Assembly expressed the hope that further positive results would be achieved at the meeting at Belgrade of States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe concerning the full implementation of the Final Act of the Conference, bearing in mind the close interrelation of the security of Europe to the security of the Mediterranean, the Middle East and all other regions of the world, and supported the conversion of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and co-operation.

XI. OTHER RELEVANT RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

First Session (1946)

299. Resolution 1 (I) of 24 January 1946

By the resolution, the General Assembly established the Atomic Energy Commission composed of members of the Security Council and Canada, whenever it was not a member of the Council, "to deal with the problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy and other related matters". Specifically, the Commission should make proposals:

(a) for extending between all nations the exchange of basic scientific information for peaceful ends;

(b) for control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use only for peaceful purposes;

(c) for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction;

(d) for effective safeguards by way of inspection and other means to protect complying States against the hazards of violations and evasions.

300. Resolution 41 (I) of 14 December 1946

The resolution, inter alia, provided for a general reduction of armaments, with the prohibition of the production and use of atomic energy for military purposes as the primary objective. It proposed the establishment within the framework of the Security Council, of an international system of control and inspection to control the reduction of armaments and to control the prohibition of the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

Third Session (1948)

301. Resolution 191 (III) of 4 November 1948

By operative paragraph one, the General Assembly approved the findings of the Atomic Energy Commission regarding the establishment of an effective system of international control of atomic energy to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only and for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons.

The Assembly in this connection requested the permanent members of the Atomic Energy Commission (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Canada) to hold discussions with a view to determining if a basis existed for ensuring the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy and the elimination of atomic weapons.

Sixth Session

302. Resolution 502 (VI) of 11 January 1952

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, abolished the Atomic Energy Commission and the Commission for Conventional Armaments created in 1947 by the Security Council and established the Disarmament Commission which was directed to prepare proposals to be embodied in a draft treaty or treaties for the regulation,

limitation and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments, for the elimination of all major weapons adaptable to mass destruction and for effective international control of atomic energy to ensure the prohibition of atomic weapons and the exclusive peaceful use of atomic energy. In listing the principles to guide the Commission in its work, the General Assembly stated, inter alia, that in a system of guaranteed disarmament there must be progressive disclosure and verification of all armed forces and all armaments, including atomic.

Ninth Session (1954)

303. Resolution 808 (IX) of 4 November 1954

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged further efforts to reach comprehensive and co-ordinated proposals to be embodied in a draft international disarmament convention providing, inter alia, for the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and mass destruction weapons of every type, together with the conversion of existing stocks of nuclear weapons for peaceful purposes; and for the establishment of effective international control, so that the whole disarmament programme would be such that no State would have cause to fear that its security was endangered.

Tenth Session (1955)

304. Resolution 914 (X) of 16 December 1955

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, urged the continuation of efforts by the States concerned to reach a comprehensive disarmament programme and as initial steps to give priority to early agreement on and implementation of proposals relating to control and inspection.

Twelfth Session (1957)

305. Resolution 1148 (XII) of 14 November 1957

The General Assembly, among other things, urged: the immediate suspension of nuclear-weapon tests with prompt installation of effective international control; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and exclusive peaceful use of such materials under effective international control; the reduction of stocks of nuclear weapons through a programme of transfer, on an equitable and reciprocal basis and under international supervision, of stocks of fissionable material from weapons uses to non-weapons uses; the reduction of armed forces and armaments through adequate, safeguarded arrangements; the progressive establishment of open inspection with ground and aerial components to guard against the possibility of surprise attacks, the joint study of an inspection system to ensure that the sending of objects into outer space shall be solely for peaceful purposes.

Fourteenth Session (1959)

306. Resolution 1402 A and B (XIV) of 21 November 1959

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its appreciation to the participants*/ in the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests for their

*/ The USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States.

efforts towards reaching an agreement on the question including an appropriate international control system. The Assembly urged those States to continue their voluntary discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests during their negotiations and appealed to other States to desist from conducting such tests.

Fifteenth Session (1960)

307. Resolution 1576 (XV) of 20 December 1960

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, called for a permanent agreement to prevent nuclear-weapons proliferation; called upon nuclear-weapon States, pending the achievement of such an agreement, to desist temporarily and voluntarily from transferring nuclear weapons or information that could be used to produce such weapons, to States that did not yet have them; called upon non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, temporarily and voluntarily, from manufacturing or acquiring by any other means, nuclear weapons.

Sixteenth Session (1961/2)

308. Resolution 1648 (XVI) of 6 November 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its deep concern and profound regret that nuclear-weapon test explosions had resumed; urged the States concerned to refrain from such further testing pending the conclusion of necessary internationally binding agreements on the subject; called upon the States concerned to undertake urgently and expeditiously to conclude such agreements.

309. Resolution 1649 (XVI) of 8 November 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, considered that negotiations on a treaty on the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons tests should proceed on the following basis: the treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms; international control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty and should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, avoiding self-inspection, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities would be used exclusively for purposes of effective control; the day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto, and administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single Administrator acting impartially and functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty.

310. Resolution 1652 (XVI) of 24 November 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, called upon member States: to refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form; to refrain from using the territory, territorial waters or air space of Africa for testing, storing or transporting nuclear weapons; to consider and respect the continent of Africa as a denuclearized zone.

311. Resolution 1653 (XVI) of 24 November 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, declared that:

(a) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, was contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity;

(c) The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was war directed not against an enemy or enemies alone but also against mankind in general, since the peoples of the world not involved in such a war would be subjected to all the evils generated by the use of such weapons;

(d) Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons was to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization. Also by the resolution, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consult the Governments of member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of member States to ascertain their views on the possibility of convening a special conference for signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons for war purposes and to report on the results of such consultation to the General Assembly at its seventeenth session.

312. Resolution 1654 (XVI) of 4 December 1961

By the resolution, the General Assembly, among other things, taking note of the suggestions that an inquiry be made into the conditions under which countries not possessing nuclear weapons might be willing to enter into specific undertakings to refrain from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring such weapons and to refuse to receive, in the future, nuclear weapons in their territories on behalf of any other country; requested the Secretary-General to make such an inquiry as soon as possible and to submit a report on its results to the Disarmament Commission not later than 1 April 1962; requested the Disarmament Commission to take further measures as appeared to be warranted in the light of that report; called upon the nuclear Powers to extend their fullest co-operation and assistance with regard to the implementation of the present resolution.

313. Resolution 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to secure the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons.

Seventeenth Session (1962)

314. Resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962

By the resolution, the General Assembly, inter alia, asked that all nuclear-weapon tests cease by 1 January 1963; took the memorandum jointly submitted to the ENDC on 16 April 1962 by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Nigeria, Sweden and the United Arab Republic, */ as a basis for negotiations towards a ban on nuclear-weapon testing; and recommended that should it not be possible to reach agreement by 1 January 1963 to cease all nuclear-weapon tests, the States concerned should conclude immediately an agreement prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by a provisional agreement suspending underground nuclear-weapon tests.

315. Resolution 1762 B (XVII) of 6 November 1962

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon the ENDC to endeavour to conclude a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban treaty under effective international verification; requested the participants in the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests to agree on a date in the near future for the resumption of their negotiations with a view to realizing an agreement prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests.

316. Resolution 1801 (XVII) of 14 December 1962

The General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to obtain the views of member States on the possibility of convening a special conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

Eighteenth Session (1963)

317. Resolution 1884 (XVIII) of 17 October 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, welcomed the expressions by the USSR and the United States of their intention not to station in outer space any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other kinds of weapons of mass destruction; and solemnly called upon all States: (a) to refrain from placing such weapons in orbit around the earth, on celestial bodies or in outer space; (b) to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the conduct of the foregoing activities.

318. Resolution 1908 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, expressed its satisfaction that agreement had been reached on a partial test ban treaty and on the establishment of a direct communication link between Moscow and Washington and noted that the parties to the partial test ban treaty had emphasized the need for additional initial disarmament steps.

319. Resolution 1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, requested the ENDC to study urgently the question of convening a conference for the purpose of signing a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons.

*/ ENDC/28, see above.

320. Resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, called upon all States to become parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty and requested the ENDC to continue with a sense of urgency its negotiations to achieve the objectives set forth in the preamble of that Treaty.

321. Resolution 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963

The General Assembly, inter alia, noted with satisfaction the declaration on the denuclearization of Latin America; */ expressed the hope that the States of Latin America would initiate studies concerning the measures that should be agreed upon with a view to achieving the aims of the said declaration; trusted that after a satisfactory agreement had been reached, all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, would co-operate for the effective realization of the peaceful aims inspiring the present resolution; and requested the Secretary-General to extend to the States of Latin America, such technical facilities as they might require to achieve the aims of the resolution.

*/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth Session, Annexes,
Document A/5415/Rev.1.

XII. OTHER RELEVANT PROPOSALS

- (i) Proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts to study the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on suspension of nuclear tests (1 July to 21 August 1958, Palais des Nations, Geneva) /

322. In communiqué number 30 of the Conference, issued following the last day of the Conference, on 21 August 1958, the following was stated, among other things:

"In the course of the work of the Conference there was an exchange of opinions on the question of the various methods of detecting nuclear explosions. The Conference came to the conclusion that the methods of detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time, viz. the method of collecting samples of radioactive debris, the method of recording seismic, acoustic and hydro-acoustic waves, and the radio signal method, together with the use of on-site inspection of unidentified events which might be suspected of being nuclear explosions, make it possible, within certain specific limits, to detect and identify nuclear explosions, and it recommends the use of these methods in a control system. The Conference noted that the combined use of the various methods considerably facilitates detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

The Conference of Experts noted that the effectiveness of the methods considered will increase in course of time with improvement of measuring techniques and with study of the characteristics of natural phenomena which cause interference when explosions are detected.

The Conference has adopted an agreed conclusion regarding the technical equipment of the control system necessary for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions.

The Conference of Experts reached the conclusion that it is technically feasible to set up, with certain capabilities and limitations, a workable and effective control system for the detection of violations of a possible agreement on the world-wide cessation of nuclear weapons tests. It was established in this connection that a network of control posts which were equipped with all the necessary apparatus appropriate to the various methods of detection of nuclear explosions should be disposed on continents and on islands, as well as on a few ships in oceans.

The Experts came to the conclusion that the control system should be under the direction of an international control organ which would ensure the co-ordination of the activities of the control system and the functioning of the system in such a way that it would satisfy the necessary technical requirements.

On the 21st of August 1958 the Conference of Experts adopted a final report for consideration by governments." **/

*/ See also General Assembly document A/3897 and Corr.1.

**/ Document EXP/NUC/28.

323. The following working papers were submitted at the Conference:

Technical factors which the Western Delegation considers relevant to a discussion of monitoring a nuclear test suspension (submitted on 1 July 1958; document EXP/NUC/1)

Agenda submitted by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation and adopted by the Conference during its 3rd meeting on 4 July 1958 (document EXP/NUC/2 and EXP/NUC/2/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on the possibility of using the air wave registration method to detect nuclear explosions (Presented by Mr. Sadovski of the USSR Delegation on 7 July; document EXP/NUC/3)

Summary of acoustic detection (Working paper presented by the Western Delegation on 7 July; document EXP/NUC/4)

Proposed revised draft of a conclusion as to the suitability of the method of registering air waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 8 July; document EXP/NUC/5)

Proposed draft of a conclusion as to the suitability of the method of registering acoustic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 9 July; document EXP/NUC/6)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of registering acoustic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (submitted on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/7 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/7/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on the suitability of the method for observing radioactive contamination in the atmosphere for the control purposes (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/8)

Proposed conclusion as to the suitability of the method of identifying radioactive debris from nuclear explosions (Presented by Dr. Fisk of the Western Delegation on 10 July; document EXP/NUC/9)

Proposed conclusion as to the applicability of using radioactive debris for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 11 July; document EXP/NUC/10)

Proposed conclusion as to the applicability of using radioactive debris for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 12 July; document EXP/NUC/11)

Examples of pinpointing in various points of the USSR some explosions caused by the United States (submitted on 12 July; document EXP/NUC/12)

Revised draft conclusion on the applicability of the use of radioactive debris to detect and identify nuclear explosions (Presented by the Western Delegation on 14 July; documents EXP/NUC/13, EXP/NUC/13/Corr.1 and EXP/NUC/13/Corr.1/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion about the application of a method of registering seismic waves for the detection of nuclear explosions (Presented by Academician N.N. Semenov of the USSR Delegation on 17 July; document EXP/NUC/14)

Draft conclusion on the applicability of the method of the use of radioactive debris to detect and identify nuclear explosions (Presented by Professor E.K. Fedorov of the USSR Delegation on 21 July; document EXP/NUC/15)

Conclusions on the applicability of the electromagnetic technique to the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Dr. Fisk of the Western Delegation on 21 July; document EXP/NUC/16)

Conclusions on the applicability of the electromagnetic technique to the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (Presented by Mr. Leipunski of the Delegation of the USSR on 22 July; document EXP/NUC/17)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of using radioactive debris for detecting and identifying nuclear explosions (submitted on 23 July; document EXP/NUC/18 and subsequently revised documents EXP/NUC/18/Rev.1, EXP/NUC/18/Rev.1/Corr.1 and on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/18/Rev.2)

Conclusions as to the applicability of the method of registering seismic waves for detecting nuclear explosions (submitted on 24 July; document EXP/NUC/19 and subsequently revised documents EXP/NUC/19/Rev.1 and on 19 August; EXP/NUC/19/Rev.2)

Conclusions on the applicability of registration of radio signals for the detection of nuclear explosions (submitted on 25 July; document EXP/NUC/20 and revised on 19 August EXP/NUC/20/Rev.1)

Conclusions on the detection of nuclear explosions carried out at high altitude (More than 30 to 50 km above the earth) (submitted on 28 July; document EXP/NUC/21 and Corr.1 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/21/Rev.1)

Draft conclusions with reference to technical equipment of control posts (Presented by Mr. Sadovski of the USSR Delegation on 31 July; document EXP/NUC/22)

Conclusions on the question of the technical equipment of the control system for the detection and identification of nuclear explosions (submitted on 6 August; document EXP/NUC/23 and Corr.1 and revised on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/23/Rev.1)

Draft conclusion on a network of control posts (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/24)

Draft conclusion on the organization and functions of a system for checking the implementation of an agreement on cessation of nuclear tests (Presented by the USSR Delegation on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/25)

Draft conclusions on a system of control (submitted on 11 August; document EXP/NUC/26)

Conclusions on a control system for detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests (submitted on 19 August; document EXP/NUC/27)

Report of the conference of experts to study the methods of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests (submitted on 20 August; document EXP/NUC/28)

- (ii) Proposals submitted at the Conference of Experts for the study of possible measures which might be helpful in preventing surprise attack and for the preparation of a report thereon to Governments (held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, from 10 November to 18 December 1958)

324. The report of the Conference, */ among other things, stated the following:

"In the course of the meetings, the participants in the Conference stated their positions, their points of view, and exchanged their opinions on the problem discussed. The meetings have been helpful in clarifying for each side the views of the other side."

325. During the course of these meetings various documents were submitted as follows:

Proposed Plan of Work submitted by the Western experts. 11 November 1958 (see Annex 1 to the Report of the Conference)

Draft Agenda: proposal submitted by the Delegations of the USSR, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Romania. 11 November 1958 (See Annex 2 of ibid.)

Proposed Plan of Work submitted by the Western experts. 17 November 1958 (See Annex 3 of ibid.)

Draft recommendation regarding the undertaking by States of an obligation not to carry out flights of their aircraft with atomic and hydrogen weapons over the territories of other States and over open seas: Proposal submitted by the Delegation of the USSR. 17 November 1958 (See Annex 4 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the first point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a survey of the relevant technical aspects of possible instruments of surprise attack as a prerequisite for examining means of detection and systems of inspection and control. 18 November 1958. (See Annex 5 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the second point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a survey of techniques which would be effective in the observation and inspection of the instruments of surprise attack. 19 November 1958 (See Annex 6 of ibid.)

Explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: an illustrative outline of possible systems for observation and inspection of long-range aircraft. 24 November 1958. (See Annex 7 of ibid.)

Declaration by the Soviet Government on measures for preventing surprise attack: submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 28 November 1958 (See Annex 8 of ibid.)

Proposal regarding the establishment of ground control posts, the taking of aerial photographs and the putting into operation simultaneously of a number of disarmament measures to reduce the danger of surprise attacks: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 28 November 1958 (See Annex 9 of ibid.)

*/ Document GEN/SA/15 and Annexes 1 to 15. See also General Assembly document A/4078.

Participants were: Albania, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Italy, Poland, Romania, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

Second explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: a paper illustrating a possible system for observation and inspection of ballistic missiles. 3 December 1958 (See Annex 10 of ibid.)

Third explanatory document of the third point of the proposed plan of work submitted by the Western experts: an illustrative outline of a possible system for observation and inspection of ground forces. 5 December 1958 (See Annex 11 of ibid.)

Proposal regarding the tasks and functions of ground control posts and aerial inspection: submitted by the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the USSR, 12 December 1958 (See Annex 12 of ibid.)

An explanatory statement regarding certain factors involved in the planning of an integrated observation and inspection system for reducing the possibility of surprise attack: submitted by the Western experts in explanation of Section IV of their proposed plan of work. 17 December 1958 (See Annex 13 of ibid.)

Statement on behalf of the Western experts by Mr. William C. Foster. 18 December 1958 (See Annex 14 of ibid.)

Statement regarding the position of the Delegations of Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the Conference for the prevention of surprise attacks: speech made by Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov. 18 December 1958 (See Annex 15 of ibid.)

(iii) Proposals submitted at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests (held at Geneva from 31 October 1958 to 29 January 1962) */

The following were the proposals submitted at the trilateral Conference composed of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States:

326. "Draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States on 18 April 1961 (GEN/DNT/110. See also A/4772 and Add.1, DC/134 and Add.1 and 2 and DC/185)

By the draft treaty each of the parties would, inter alia, undertake to prohibit and prevent the carrying out of nuclear-weapon tests at any place under its jurisdiction or control and refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of nuclear-weapon test explosions anywhere. To ensure compliance with the treaty's provisions, the parties would agree to establish a Control Organization.

327. "The United States Aide-Memoire concerning the Geneva test ban negotiations", delivered to the USSR on 17 June 1961 (A/4787, DC/186 and DC/187)

328. "The United States note of 15 July concerning the Geneva test ban negotiations", delivered to the USSR on 15 July 1961 (A/4819 and DC/188)

329. "Note verbale dated 29 August 1961 from the Chairmen of the Disarmament Commission to the Secretary-General transmitting a statement by the United States Government on the Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (A/4853 and DC/189)

*/ Includes only those proposals or documents submitted also to the General Assembly or to the Disarmament Commission.

330. Letter dated 15 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/4967 and DC/193)

The letter contained a Note from the United Kingdom Government to the USSR proposing resumption of the Geneva Conference on 28 November 1961.

331. Letter dated 13 November 1961 from the Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly (A/4969 and DC/194)

The letter contained a Note from the United States Government to the USSR proposing resumption of the Geneva Conference on 28 November 1961.

332. "Letter from the Acting Secretary-General, dated 14 December 1961, to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission forwarding an interim report to the Disarmament Commission on the progress of the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/195 and Add.1)

The interim report consisted of the verbatim records and documents of the Conference from its resumption on 28 November through 7 December 1961. One of the documents included in that interim report was a "Draft agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests" submitted at the Conference on 28 November, by the USSR (see also GEN/DNT/122).

By that draft, the States parties would undertake not to conduct tests of any kind of nuclear or thermo-nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water and would use their national means for the purpose of exercising mutual supervision of compliance with the undertaking prohibiting tests.

333. "Letter from the Acting Secretary-General, dated 19 February 1962, to the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission forwarding the verbatim records and documents subsequent to 7 December 1961 of the Geneva Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests" (DC/195/Add.2)

One of the documents included was a report of the United Kingdom and the United States submitted jointly to the Disarmament Commission */ on the deliberations at the Geneva Conference (see also GEN/DNT/PV.348 of 19 December 1961).

In their joint report, the United Kingdom and the United States, inter alia, stressed their view that the USSR draft treaty of 28 November 1961 on the discontinuance of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapon tests (see GEN/DNT/122 and DC/195 and Add.1, above), amounted to an uncontrolled agreement and a repudiation of previous USSR agreements for international inspection and control of nuclear-weapon tests. The United Kingdom and the United States saw the new USSR position as a step backwards in the discussions of the Conference.

In their supplementary joint report, **/ the United Kingdom and the United States, inter alia, expressed the hope that the USSR would reconsider its opposition to an

*/ DC/196, see above under "Proposals submitted at the Disarmament Commission"

**/ DC/196/Add.1, see ibid.

internationally controlled test ban agreement. They, furthermore, reaffirmed their desire to re-establish a common basis for negotiations either at the ENDC, through diplomatic channels, or through members of their delegations present at Geneva for test ban negotiations, and pledged to redouble their efforts to reach an adequately controlled agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests.

334. "Statement of the Soviet Government on the question of the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests", submitted at the 352nd meeting of the Geneva Conference on 26 January 1962 (GEN/DNT/PV.352 and GEN/DNT/127. See also DC/195/Add.2)

In the statement the USSR, inter alia, indicated its readiness to continue the Geneva Conference and reaffirmed its position that the final solution to the question of discontinuing nuclear-weapon tests could be found only in the conditions of the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Once nuclear weapons were prohibited and existing stockpiles eliminated, there would no longer be the incentive to conduct nuclear tests.

(iv) Proposals submitted at the Conference of non-nuclear-weapon States (held at Geneva from 29 August to 28 September 1968) */

335. The Conference **/ adopted several resolutions and a Declaration which embodied the principal conclusions regarding the problems debated at the Conference. The text of the Declaration read in part as follows:

"... Guided by the conviction that peace and security, like development in the world, are indivisible and recognizing the universal responsibilities and obligations in this regard, the Conference addressed itself to the problems of universal peace and, in particular, the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, cessation of the nuclear arms race, general and complete disarmament and harnessing of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, and has agreed on the following:

1. The participants of the Conference noted that there was a general acceptance of the fact that the future of mankind cannot be secure without the complete elimination of the use or threat of use of force in the spirit of the United Nations Charter. The Conference agreed that peace and progress could not be safeguarded for any nation unless the security of all nations is assured. The Conference stresses the necessity of further steps for an early solution of the question of security assurances in the nuclear era.
2. The participants consider as their sacred duty to appeal to all countries of the world to observe the United Nations Charter and the generally accepted norms of international law governing relations among States.
3. The Conference considers that an immediate cessation of the arms race and the acceleration of the process of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament under effective international control are indispensable for the safeguarding of world peace and security, independence and economic progress of all countries.

*/ Document A/7277 and Corr.1 and 2.

Participants included 92 non-nuclear-weapon States and four nuclear-weapon States: France, USSR, United Kingdom and United States.

**/ The Conference was convened pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2153 B (XXI).

The Conference recommends that, pending the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, steps be undertaken urgently with a view to reaching agreements on various collateral measures.

4. In this context, the Conference has noted the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was commended by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII). The Conference considers that the Treaty should be followed up by measures of disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament.

5. The Conference considers that nuclear-weapon-free zones, established under appropriate conditions, constitute an effective contribution to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the promotion of disarmament. It notes with satisfaction the progress already achieved with regard to nuclear-weapon-free zones established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America."