

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 20 April 1982, at 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio OKAWA

(Japan)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TALLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China: Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NÚÑEZ MOSQUERA  
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. VEJVODA  
Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE  
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W.E. VON DEM HAGEN

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK  
Mr. A. BAHRIN

Iran:

Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI  
Mr. J. ZAHINIA

Italy:

Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALES Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHALLI

Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Mr. A. MEERBURG

Mr. R.J. AKKERMAN

Nigeria.

Mr. G.O. IJEWERE

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Mr. T. AGUYI-IRONSI

Pakistan.

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. M. AKRAM

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru.

Mr. J. BENAVIDES DE LA SOTTA

Poland.

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALTHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTEINIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. G.V. BERDEMIKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES

Mr. L. MIDDLETON

Mr. J.I. LINK

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M.D. BUSBY

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mrs. M.E. HOINKES

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. M. MIHALJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA

Ms. E. EKANGA KABEYA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee  
on Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the one hundred and seventy-second plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee starts today its consideration of reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as of its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. As usual, in conformity with rule 30 of our rules of procedure, members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so at any time.

Before we start with our business for today, I would like to inform the Committee that I have received a communication from the Permanent Representative of Turkey, dated 16 April 1982, in which the Permanent Representative of Turkey reiterates the keen interest of his Government in becoming a full member of this Committee and states that "Turkey should be considered as a candidate when a review of the membership of the Committee takes place at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". I believe copies of this communication have already been circulated to members of this Committee. I would also like to inform members how I envisage proceeding from now on. It is now clear that our target date of 20 April, which happens to be today, for the conclusion of the first part of our 1982 session, cannot be met. We should, then, continue at least until tomorrow, provided that we can work speedily today as well as tomorrow, and I emphasize that proviso. The secretariat is making every effort to circulate this afternoon, at 4.30 p.m., Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2, which will contain the text of the report as agreed upon by the drafting group entrusted with that task, and since we concluded our work in the drafting group at 1 o'clock, or rather, after 1 o'clock this afternoon, the draft report you will be receiving at 4.30 will be circulated only in English.

I intend, therefore, to proceed as follows: firstly, this afternoon the plenary meeting will be mainly devoted to the introduction of reports of working groups for consideration by the Committee. Secondly, after this meeting of the plenary, an informal meeting will be convened to consider Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 which I have just referred to and which will be available in English. I would appeal to all members to agree to the use of the text in English during the discussions in the informal meeting. In the meantime, the versions of Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 in the other languages will be processed and will be made available in the delegations' boxes at 11 a.m. tomorrow morning for your consideration. For that purpose, and as well as to give some time for the secretariat to prepare the last papers, we will not meet tomorrow morning. It is clear, however, that if we wish to adjourn the first part of the session tomorrow, we will need to conclude our consideration of Working Paper No. 58/Rev.2 today and consequently, I have planned for an extended informal meeting this afternoon. I envisage the last plenary meeting of this part of our session to be held tomorrow afternoon at 3.30 p.m.

Any changes suggested in connection with the translations of the draft report in the other languages should be given directly to the secretariat, since I do not think we need to deal with them at our meetings.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan and France.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Czechoslovakia, His Excellency Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, taking into consideration the exchange of views during the informal meeting yesterday afternoon, the group of socialist countries wants to stress again that it does not want to stand in the way of the establishment of a working group on item 1 of our agenda, namely, on a nuclear test ban. In order to express our willingness to agree to immediate action and an immediate solution of the problem, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics wish to present the working paper in document CD/287, which bears the title "Proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under item 1 of the agenda entitled, 'Nuclear test ban'". Allow me to read the full text of our proposal:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral negotiating forum, in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the SSOD I, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

"The elaboration of the mandate of the working group will be completed at the very beginning of the summer session of the Committee, taking into account the results of the SSOD II."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda for his statement. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is contained in document CD/283.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament): I have the honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which I have had the privilege of presiding over during the Committee's 1981 session and the present part of its 1982 session, together with a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which is annexed to the report.

Since the content of the report is what is customarily termed self-explanatory, I shall confine myself to making a few comments on it. First, I should like to say that this has been one of the most industrious working groups of what the United Nations General Assembly has described as the "single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament", for as you know, it began its work this year by holding daily meetings during the last three weeks of January before the Committee met, and, after the resumption of the Committee's work on 2 February, it held an average of three meetings a week, without counting the very frequent meetings of its subsidiary bodies. As a result, the Group has been able to complete the task which was entrusted to it, albeit with the inevitable limitations imposed by circumstances which are familiar to you all.

In the report to which I am referring, there already appear the names of those who merit special mention for the valuable contribution which they made to the Group's work: Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria, who presided over the first 10 of the 59 meetings held, Ambassador François de la Gorce of France, Ambassador Gerhard Herder of the Democratic Republic of Germany and Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva of Brazil, who co-ordinated the work of

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their respective contact groups, and Mr. Tariq Altaf of Pakistan, who acted as co-ordinator of an informal drafting group. I should simply like, therefore, to record my especial gratitude to someone who, as a result of having undertaken to draft the report in consultation with the Chairman, was obviously unable to make an appropriate reference in the report to her participation in the Group as its Secretary. In the light of the experience which has enabled me to observe her at work at very close quarters and to rely on her untiring co-operation for approximately a year and a half, I consider it only just to take this opportunity of placing on record my view that Miss Aida Levín can serve as a model for the discharge of any office such as that which she has held in this Group, by virtue of her absolute objectivity, her knowledge of disarmament matters, her outstanding drafting abilities and her lively intelligence, which has so frequently produced formulas that have gained general acceptance.

With regard to the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Working Group transmits to the Committee as an annex to its report and which, in accordance with the provisions of resolution 36/92 F adopted by the Assembly on 9 December 1981, has to be submitted "in time for consideration and adoption by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament", I do feel that it is my duty on this occasion to make a few comments on the basis of my lengthy and intimate connection with the efforts made to prepare the programme.

I shall begin by emphasizing that the structure of the document which the Group is submitting to the Committee corresponds to that which has been approved since 1980 and which, as indicated in paragraph 68 (7) of the Committee's report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, should comprise ... in addition to an introduction or preamble which would be prepared last of all ... six chapters dealing with objectives, principles, priorities, measures, stages of implementation, and machinery and procedures, respectively. The only change that has been made in this structure is that, for reasons which would appear obvious, two of these headings have been merged to serve as a title for the fifth chapter, which deals with both "measures and stages of implementation".

As for the contents of the programme, the Working Group has endeavoured to keep as faithfully as possible to the mandate clearly defined in paragraph 109 of the Final Document, in which it was stipulated that the programme should encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated", reiterated word for word in paragraph 7 (b) of the "elements" approved, also by consensus, by the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 34/83 H of 11 December of the same year, and confirmed by the Committee on Disarmament when it adopted the report which the Working Group submitted to it in 1980, in paragraph 10 of which it was expressly agreed that "the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained".

The fact that a considerable number of the provisions of the programme are still between square brackets should not be a reason for discouragement but, on the contrary, should serve as a spur for efforts to find texts capable of gaining general approval. To this end, it should not be forgotten that the draft Final



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Document which the Preparatory Committee for the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament transmitted to the Assembly as a result of five meetings -- three of which were held in 1977 and the last two in the first half of 1978 -- had also been riddled with square brackets but that that did not prevent the Assembly from finally approving by consensus a document which was completely free of those symbols of differences of opinion.

However difficult the efforts required to achieve this purpose may be, this will probably not be one of the most difficult tasks that has ever been brought to fruition, especially if no delegation tries to renege on the commitments undertaken in the Final Document in 1978. It would also seem that it will be by no means impossible to reach an agreement on the number of stages that the programme should comprise, in the light of the flexibility that has been evidenced by many of the delegations that have formulated the main working papers submitted to the Group, since, with general acceptance, the Group has been able to channel its deliberations, as it were in the nature of "working hypotheses", firstly on the basis of four stages and subsequently on the basis of three. A similar comment might be made concerning the revision machinery or procedure, in respect of which too there already appears to be a more or less general acceptance of a five-yearly régime and of the fact that such revision or examination should be undertaken through specific special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If the foregoing is taken into account, there would appear to be some justification for concluding that the two most difficult problems still outstanding are that of determining whether or not the programme should have a timetable for its implementation and that of determining the extent to which the programme should be of a binding nature. If it is agreed, as we think it reasonable to do, that all the States participating in the second special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament may be expected to give evidence of goodwill and good faith in the formal and informal negotiations taking place at that session, there will be a solid basis for expecting that a satisfactory solution to these problems will be found.

With regard to the question of dates to be included in a possible timetable, it should first of all be pointed out that, for the moment, no one is thinking of rigid time-limits like those which appeared in the two draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in 1962 by the Soviet Union and the United States respectively. In this connection, it is also encouraging to note that reference was made in the deliberations on this subject -- and it is the more encouraging in that the reference was made by the representative of one of the most important members of the group known as the group of western European and other countries -- as an example of terminology that might be followed -- to that used in the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, in which the time factor undoubtedly occupies a prominent place.

With regard to the nature of the programme, although, on the one hand, it would seem that there is now no longer hope of winning a consensus in favour of giving the programme the legal status of a multilateral treaty, it is clearly apparent on the other hand, from the comments made at the various meetings which the Group devoted to consideration of this subject, that there is a general trend towards finding formulas which will enable the programme to be placed at a level far above that of the resolutions annually adopted by the General Assembly. This will undoubtedly require the inclusion in the programme of provisions similar to those contained in paragraph 126 of the Final Document, in which the States that participated in the first special session "solemnly" reaffirmed, inter alia,

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"their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war;" and "implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race". This will certainly require also that the Programme make an express provision along the lines of the statement in paragraph 17 of the Final Document emphasizing the pressing need to "translate into practical terms" the provisions adopted and to "proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament". Furthermore, in view of the fact that, unfortunately, the Final Document has been to a considerable extent treated by the nuclear Powers as a dead letter, consideration must be given to the possibility of including in the introduction and final paragraphs alike of the Comprehensive Programme, provisions which both politically and morally impart the greatest possible, though freely accepted, binding character to the text, a binding character which, it is to be hoped, will be greater than that achieved in 1978.

In this connection, it is also worth remembering that, at the Group's meetings, representatives submitted a number of valuable suggestions aimed at highlighting, through symbolic acts, both the importance of the programme and, more particularly, the political commitment of Governments to execute its provisions. Among these suggestions, pride of place -- in view of its originality and potential effectiveness -- should perhaps go to the suggestion that the programme should be signed by the Heads of State or Government of all the States Members of the United Nations. In my opinion, the fact that most if not all of them will almost certainly not be in New York at the closure of the Assembly's session should not be an obstacle to an acceptance of this suggestion; quite the contrary, in fact. A special representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations might very well be given the responsibility of taking the original text of the programme to all the capitals of those States for the purpose of collecting the signatures of their respective Heads of State or Government. This could, at the same time, help to ensure that public opinion in each of those countries has a true awareness of the significance of the programme.

Recently, particularly during the last year or so, there has been throughout the world an increasing number of acts of all kinds which reveal the concern that the nuclear arms race and the emergence of doctrines such as the credible possibility of a limited nuclear war or the illusory hypothesis of a nuclear victory, have aroused throughout mankind. If, as the Assembly stated in 1978, all peoples have a vital interest in the success of the negotiations on disarmament, it may be asserted without any exaggeration that the thousands of millions of human beings who make up these peoples will follow very closely the work of the special session of the Assembly devoted to disarmament which is to be held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 9 July 1982. This may very well be the decisive element in making the representatives of those peoples deliberating in New York realize the need to approve by consensus a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which, starting from the text which the Ad Hoc Working Group is today submitting to the Committee, may give new life to the pressing objectives which, for four years, have been set out in paragraph 109 of the Assembly's Final Document. It must never be forgotten that, as stated in the Final Document itself, the most acute and urgent task of the present day is to remove the threat of a nuclear war, since this threat has confronted mankind with a choice between proceeding to disarmament or facing annihilation.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador García Robles, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, for his statement and for introducing his report. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/281.

Mr. SUJKA (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, I have the honour to introduce a special report of this Group to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The text of the report is contained in document CD/281 which, I hope, is available to all the distinguished representatives in this Committee.

I would like to be as brief as possible, as I have always been during our meetings. First of all, I wish to state that in accordance with operative paragraph 5 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/92 F, this Committee has been requested to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament "a special report on the state of negotiations on various questions under consideration by the Committee". In a similar way, a specific requirement by the General Assembly has been stated in paragraph 4 of United Nations General Assembly resolution number 36/96 A, as far as chemical weapons are concerned. I hope that the report, as contained in document CD/281, does reflect the present state of negotiations in the Committee's Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The report itself being self-explanatory, I would like to share briefly with the Committee some important points of the discussion in the Working Group which led to the elaboration and adoption of this report. Thus, in its introductory part, the Group wished to refer directly to paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which, let me recall, stresses the importance and urgency of negotiations on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. On the other hand, the Group wished to refer, rather generally, to all other proposals and documents on the prohibition of chemical weapons which in the past had been presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee itself, assuming that merely listing them all would be a space-taking and not very productive task, especially in view of the second second special session.

The same approach has been displayed by the Group in elaborating the other parts of the report. Without going into details of its discussions in 1980 and in 1981, under its previous mandate, the Group emphasized the most significant points discussed in those two years as they, indeed, mark very important stages of negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. As far as the present state of the work is concerned, the Group has underlined the importance of a new mandate which allows the elaboration of a convention and succinctly described the topics of discussions for the first half of its 1982 session and the main differences of views and problems which emerged in the discussion in the past two months or so.

There is one thing I would like to make as clear as possible: the Group wished to avoid repeating in this report, all over again, all the various views of particular delegations or groups of delegations on countless smaller and/or bigger problems that emerged during the more than three-year-long discussions. These are sufficiently reflected in the Working Group's report of 1980 contained in document CD/131/Rev.1, and its report of 1981 in document CD/220. Both those reports are specifically mentioned in the present report of the Group.

In my concluding statement to the Group, I described in considerable detail a possible course of action for the Group during the second half of the 1982 session. In this connection, I appealed to the members of the Group asking them to do

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specific preparatory work for the summer session if we are to approach as closely as possible to the stage of drafting the provisions of the convention. I do not want to repeat myself because that statement, in view of the interest shown by members of the Group, has been circulated by the secretariat as a working paper of the Group on Chemical Weapons. But with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to appeal again for a display of serious efforts by all delegations during the summer session so that we can translate as many dissenting views as possible into the alternative elements and then elaborate compromise elements. A compilation of draft elements and proposed new texts has also been made available to all delegations to facilitate the kind of exercise I am appealing for.

I would like to apologize to my predecessors, Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, for not mentioning their names as chairmen of the Group in 1980 and in 1981 respectively, in the introductory part of the report. I personally was of the opinion that that kind of introduction should not contain all the details I have noticed in the reports of other working groups. But certainly I am for the uniformity of the reports of all the working groups in this respect, and I hope that the Committee will agree to cover these problems in paragraphs 61 and 62 of its own report. The same procedure could also be applied as to the participation of non-member States in the work of the Working Group.

Finally, let me refer to some recent discussions in the Committee's drafting group. My reply is brief: the Working Group, indeed, has not been directly reflecting in its activities the Committee's plenary discussions. It has conducted its work on the basis of a new, I repeat, new mandate which was adopted with the consent of all delegations. On the basis of that mandate and the programme of work, also adopted by consensus, the group has acted and its activities have been reflected in this report. Let me also say that, exactly, this the the principal aim of the Committee's report -- to reflect the course and trends of discussions that have been taking place in plenaries. The Group's report, in my view, had to be limited to the discussions in the Working Group itself. References to the discussions in plenary have, of course, been reflected in the Group's work, when such discussions contained specific proposals relevant to the subjects of negotiations in the Group.

As the distinguished members of the Committee are well aware, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has entered, with a new mandate, another, sensitive phase of its work. We have held another series of thorough examinations of difficult and complex problems. I wish to emphasize, as Chairman of this Group, that despite the great sensitivity and complexity of our negotiations, the work has been conducted in a spirit of mutual understanding, respect and co-operation. For this understanding, mutual respect and co-operation I should like at this moment once more cordially to thank all the members of the Group.

I would like to ask you Mr. Chairman, that this statement be distributed as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament in the same way as document CD/286, which contains the statement of the distinguished Chairman of the CPD Working Group, Ambassador García Robles.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Sujka, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for introducing his report. I am sure the request for his statement to be circulated as an official document will be duly taken care of. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His excellency Ambassador Wegener, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/284.

Mr. WEGENER (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons):  
Mr. Chairman, indeed I have the honour to introduce the Report which you just mentioned.

The Working Group had chosen to make use of its time for substantive negotiations as late into last week as possible. As a consequence, only one meeting was available for discussion and adoption of the report. This has placed a considerable burden upon the members of the secretariat, who had to put in extra hours to reproduce the report from a somewhat heterogeneous collection of oral and handwritten amendments designed to supplement the original draft. They have done an excellent job under these difficult circumstances, and I should like to thank them on behalf of the Working Group.

However, it was unavoidable in this situation that a small number of errors or ambiguities have crept into the printed text. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should therefore like to read out this limited number of amendments which have become necessary, none of which changes the general thrust and structure of the report, but which will help to clarify it. None of the amendments adds to the text a sentence or thought that was not already part of the Working Group's decision to adopt the report. I refer, then, to document CD/284, and in the English version, to document CD/284\*. I quote from the English text, on page 2, in the penultimate line of paragraph 6 we should strike out the words at the end of the line, "radiation from the decay of". On page 3, in paragraph 16, in the seventh line, after the sentence ending with the words "from attack", kindly insert the following additional sentence: "Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter". On page 5, in the last sentence of paragraph 27, there is a mere printing error: please replace the words "points of view" by "differences". And on the last page it has become necessary to clarify that some of the sentences written here are quotations from what delegations said. In paragraph 32, therefore, in the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be inserted. The sentence then read: "Since the basic objective was in their view, to prevent..." The following sentence should be prefaced with the words "they also believed that", so that the sentence then reads: "They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks...", etc. In paragraph 34, in the second sentence, the words "in their view" should be inserted, so that the sentence then reads: "A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize...", etc. In paragraph 33, in the fourth line, the term "thermal effect" should, for reasons of mere technical correctness, be replaced by "thermal power".

As delegations will recognize, while taking note of the contents of the report, the record of the Working Group is far from brilliant. While a promising start was made in early March with a practicable procedural decision that did much to unblock a deadlock situation, the sense of urgency which General Assembly resolution 36/97 B had initially instilled into the Group and which raised hope that convincing progress could be made at least on the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter, rapidly vanished, and the Working Group is now still faced with some of the same problems that made its work difficult in the preceding year. The willingness of delegations to consider

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compromise formulation and to join in a common effort to reach consensus results faded away, at least when the time came to draft this report. Instead of proudly going on record with the measure of progress achieved, delegations preferred to restate their earlier positions, in a clear attempt to keep their stance intact for the next round of negotiations. Some delegations even used the opportunity to phrase their demands with new vigour, although it must have been abundantly clear to them that their proposals harboured no promise of adoption by the Working Group. The Chairman, in various instances, attempted to put forward texts which in his view took a maximum number of positions into account, but he generally remained unsuccessful. When, in the closing stages of the session he offered to submit an integral draft text of a future radiological weapons treaty, covering the "traditional" radiological weapons subject-matter, a draft which, in his perception, could have served as a suitable basis for a compromise on which all delegations could eventually agree, he was given to understand that such an initiative was unwelcome; he thus abstained from circulating the text.

The several parallel meetings on questions relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities provided an opportunity for discussion in depth of some highly relevant issues. A number of delegations contributed to an elucidation of the technical problems involved, and it is fair to say that the Working Group as a whole gained considerable insights into the problems at hand. However, major divergencies as to the scope of possible prohibition appeared at an early point, and proved to be so considerable as to impede further progress even on the level of initial discussion.

While the Working Group's session has certainly contributed to providing a clearer perspective to all delegations on the issues and on certain options for solution, the field is still wide open. Once again, the Working Group, dealing with a subject matter of only limited significance for the global disarmament process, has been unable to live up fully to its responsibilities. That constitutes a serious challenge for the forthcoming summer session. It will still be my privilege to preside over the work at **that** time. When work is resumed, I will urge all delegations to renew their efforts to come to grips with the still unresolved problems, and I would already ask them now to clear their minds and to use the intermediate period for reflection about how some of the outstanding problems of principle can be tackled without undue loss of time.

While then, the spring session was disappointing in its results, I yet have to acknowledge that many delegations, and many colleagues personally, offered the Chairman an exceptionally fine co-operation and bore with him in the search for results and compromise. I should like to express my gratitude to them, just as I thank the secretariat and the interpreters for their fine work.

Should a mode be adopted according to which all the introductory statements by Working Groups' Chairmen were to be circulated, I would not want to be excluded. However, I would think that in my special case a rendering in the verbatim record would be sufficient.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Wegener, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, for his statement and for introducing his report. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmad, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group contained in document CD/285.

Mr. AHMAD (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances): Mr. Chairman, it is my honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the special report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons contained in document CD/285.

In accordance with the Committee's decision, the special report contains a reference to the origin of negotiations on this item and covers the work done during the previous three sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, besides describing the present state of negotiations on the subject and outlining certain conclusions and recommendations.

The subject of "negative security assurances" has a fairly long history which includes the unilateral declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States in 1978 and the consensus reached at the first special session to conclude effective arrangements on this question. At its first session, in 1979, the Working Group agreed that negotiations on the subject would need to cover both the form and the substance of the arrangements. At its sessions in 1980 and 1981, the Working Group concentrated mainly on an examination of the substance of the subject, on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. During the final stages of its work, last year, the Working Group concentrated its efforts on evolving a "common formula" for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations and agreed upon by all concerned, or a "common formula" which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States.

At the beginning of its work during the present session, the Working Group decided to continue these efforts, taking into account, inter alia, previous recommendations as well as resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 of the General Assembly. The general positions of delegations remained unchanged, although some new ideas and suggestions were advanced. Apart from hearing the reiterations of such general positions, the Working Group further considered proposals submitted to it for a possible "common formula" or "common approach" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. As in the past, there was once again no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Subsequently, the Working Group considered proposals for interim measures, particularly a possible resolution of the Security Council on the subject. Furthermore, other courses of action which could be taken in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were also examined. Some nuclear-weapon States reaffirmed that their declarations were credible and responsive to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States, while some other delegations suggested that these should be appropriately reviewed and revised at the forthcoming special session.

The conclusions of the Working Group speak for themselves. There is consensus that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that agreement on this item should be reached urgently. However, the evident divergence in the perceptions of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States continue to persist. And although many of the issues involved have been clarified, the Working Group has been unable to fulfil its mandate. The Working Group was able to recommend, in the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations on this item.

On a personal note, I am constrained to express my disappointment and concern at the failure of the Committee on Disarmament to make any substantive progress towards evolving an agreement on this question which is satisfactory to all concerned and

(Mr. Ahmad, Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group  
on Security Assurances)

particularly to the non-nuclear-weapon States. May I take this occasion to appeal to all States, and in particular to the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach an agreement on this question. I hope that this political will shall be evident at the forthcoming second special session.

In conclusion, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the Working Group for their co-operation which was indispensable for the work of the Group. I would also like on behalf of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to express our deep appreciation for the very able assistance provided to the Working Group by Mr. Lin Kuo-Chung, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire secretariat staff, throughout the session and particularly in preparing this special report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Ahmad, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, for his statement and for introducing his report. Distinguished delegates, I think that it might be useful if we request the secretariat to reproduce the oral statements of both the Chairman of the Radiological Weapons Working Group and the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances as we did in the case of the other two working groups. I give the floor to Ambassador Vejvoda.

Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Since the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the distinguished Ambassador of Poland, Ambassador Sujka suggested that the names of the previous Chairmen of that Group be included in the report, I would also like to suggest that, as far as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is concerned, the name of the distinguished delegate of Hungary, Ambassador Komives, who headed the Group before Ambassador Wegener, should likewise be included in the report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Vejvoda. The last speaker on my list for today is the representative of France, and I give the floor to His Excellency Ambassador de la Gorce.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, we are going to close the first part of our annual session tomorrow. On this occasion, the French delegation would like to draw a few conclusions from our work.

As was the case last year, this work has been conducted in politically unfavourable conditions. We know that negotiations on disarmament cannot progress independently of the international situation. Furthermore, the basic differences which we know exist on the conditions of and approach to disarmament have inevitably affected the progress of the discussions. Thus, despite the imminence of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a fact which ought to have stimulated our efforts, the results we have to show are extremely modest. We note, however, certain positive decisions aimed at extending the sphere of our work.

With regard to item 1 of our agenda, on a "Nuclear test ban", the French delegation would like to recall its position in view of the initiative for the setting up of a working group on matters of verification and compliance with a prohibition agreement. It will not object to a consensus on this proposal, subject to the terms of the mandate. But it would like to recall that in the words of the Final Document, the cessation of testing should take place "within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process". It ought not therefore, to be a preliminary measure, independent of this process. I would also like to recall the reservation made by the representative of France at the first special session of the General Assembly with respect to article 50 of the Final Document.



(dir. de la Gorce, France)

Item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", has not been thoroughly examined during the first part of our session, for lack of time. My delegation participated actively in the discussions held last year at informal meetings. It attaches great value to such discussions on these basic aspects of disarmament. It is prepared to continue its contribution to seeking and defining conditions which may lead to progress.

For the first time since our first annual session, the Committee has added a new item of substance to its agenda: "Prevention of an arms race in outer space". This item has already formed the subject of a number of substantial statements and I should like to make a few remarks on it at this point. We attach the greatest importance to the destabilizing effects which attacks against satellites would have. This is why we feel that examination of this question should be undertaken without delay. During our debates, the merits and also the inadequacies of the 1967 Treaty on **outer** space were clearly brought out. The resulting situation inspired the proposals which have been submitted to us.

One of them, that of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, does not appear to us to offer a satisfactory solution. In effect it amounts, paradoxically, to making each space power its own judge in matters of outer space. How are articles 1 and 3 of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union to be interpreted except as giving every State freedom to destroy a space object which it decides of its own accord, without consultation or reference to any pre-established criterion, is carrying weapons? Furthermore, the draft treaty makes provision only for national technical means of verification of compliance with its provisions. Moreover, we do not believe that there is any justification for bringing specifically into the discussion the question of reusable space vehicles -- the question of space shuttles. Is it the intention thus to extend the field of application of the treaty to objects whose trajectory is not exclusively orbital? On the other hand, there is no provision, it seems, for resolving the problems which may arise from the dual use -- for both civilian and military purposes -- of orbital platforms. Furthermore, nothing is said of the part that would be played in this approach by satellites which, as France and other countries have proposed, could be used on behalf of the international community for purposes of verification of disarmament agreements and crisis control.

In fact, our initial discussions on this subject in the Committee have amply demonstrated that outer space activities are so complex and so rapidly evolving that what we must do first is, on the one hand, to define more precisely, in relation to outer space, terms which are often used ambiguously, such as the word "weapon", and, on the other hand, to determine the priorities in examining this problem. In view of the large volume of the resources at present being invested in outer space activities for both civilian and military purposes, amounting in all to several billion dollars in orbit daily, and of the stabilizing part played by satellites, as has been expressly recognized in several international documents stipulating non-interference when the satellites are used for purposes of verification, it is essential for the international community to reach an agreement to prevent the occurrence of a situation where anti-satellite weapons or techniques would become a new factor of instability. In fact, in spite of the protections and reinforcements that might be possible, at great cost and with a reduction of the payload, the intrinsic vulnerability of satellites gives the attacker an advantage.

We therefore feel that the Committee should proceed to a more general examination of the problem in terms of the stability of strategic systems and security. What we need to do is to determine, among the existing or conceivable systems, which would represent potential factors of destabilization with a view to prohibiting them as a matter of priority. For example, the development of anti-ballistic missiles based on space stations would, we believe, be extremely destabilizing. The conclusion of this examination would also bring out the fact that it would probably not be in the

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

interests even of the great Powers, especially in view of the cost-effectiveness ratio, to keep all the options open. For all these reasons, we consider it very important for the Committee to examine the problem of anti-satellite techniques thoroughly when it resumes its work. We would have no objection to the establishment, for this purpose, of a working group which could have the help of experts.

The other items on our agenda have been discussed in working groups, as they were last year.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has finally been given a mandate appropriate to its task. We are pleased at this and we appreciated the attitude of the United States delegation in this connection. However, the work conducted very competently by Ambassador Sujka has not shown any very appreciable progress. In truth, there was insufficient time. The problem of verification was once more at the centre of the discussions. This is a fundamental problem the solution of which will largely determine whether or not it will be possible to take decisions on the prohibitions in question. For after all, what would be the point of instituting prohibitions if compliance with them could not effectively be verified? Some delegations put the accent on internal verification through purely national bodies. Others, ourselves included, stress the primary importance of an international system of verification. We do not deny that national authorities should be responsible for supervising the implementation of the convention on their territory, in order, in particular to prevent the chemical industry of their own country from engaging in prohibited activities clandestinely. But such control is far from meeting the requirements of an international convention. It does not constitute genuine verification. If a Government decided, in defiance of its commitments, to keep or to build up stocks of chemical weapons, a national control body could hardly prevent it from doing so, and much less would it denounce it. It is, however, essential that each State party should have the assurance that the convention is being fully applied by all, an assurance that can be given only by an international verification mechanism empowered to conduct on-the-spot investigations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, directed with authority and competence by Ambassador Wegener, was not able to achieve the progress for which we had been hoping. The French delegation is unfortunately obliged to note that the warnings it voiced were well-founded. The difficulties which have hampered the negotiations in certain respects are the result of the attempts, of which we are all aware, to include in them matters unrelated to their immediate object. As I said at the outset of our session in my delegation's preliminary statement, these involve either prejudging the solution of other problems, such as the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, or the solution of problems which fall within another field of international law, such as the prohibition of attacks against civilian nuclear installations. The French delegation does not deny the importance of these matters, but it believes it to be essential that the working groups should keep within the exact terms of their mandates. As a demonstration of goodwill, we did not oppose a consensus on the solution offered by the Chairman of the Working Group, which consisted in devoting a few meetings of this Group to a preliminary examination of the problems presented by the Swedish proposal on the prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations. But considering that this problem did not fall within the competence of the Committee, and does not, under the terms of its mandate, fall within the competence of the Working Group, the French delegation refrained from participating

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

in those meetings. It regrets the fact that it proved impossible, in the circumstances, to resolve the outstanding difficulties as regards the terms of the convention itself, and that we were unable to reach a conclusion under this item on a matter which unquestionably falls within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament.

We certainly attach importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, presided over with much distinction by Ambassador Ahmad. We are aware of the difficulties of the problem and we shall not dwell upon those relating to the search for a common formula. We have seen the proposals submitted by Pakistan and the Netherlands and we are certainly anxious that progress should be made in this matter, but it is difficult for us to say more on it at this stage. We shall obviously maintain our interest in this question and we are prepared to continue our participation in exploring paths which might lead to a common approach or to any formula capable of satisfying the international community as a whole.

Lastly, I should like to devote my concluding remarks to the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. This Group had the extremely heavy responsibility of completing a document in itself extraordinarily ambitious, and we came up against difficulties which in fact we knew beforehand we should encounter. I would like to pay a tribute here to the patience of Ambassador García Robles, who directed the very numerous meetings with great competence. We must take note of the result, namely, a document which is no doubt far from reflecting the unanimous agreement we were hoping for, but which represents an acceptable basis for the continuation of the consultations, and we hope that it will be possible in New York to reach an agreement. This is very important for our Committee, since this document is the principal contribution we were required to make to the work of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. In this very complex matter, where there are very divergent approaches regarding absolutely fundamental problems, such as the legal nature of the programme, the formulation of time-frames for the implementation of the measures and the different stages, and the link between nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, it is obvious that it will be very difficult for us to reach common formulas if we persist in trying systematically to reach what is called a compromise, which would mean in fact that all sides would be required to make concessions on conditions they consider essential. We therefore consider that what we ought rather to do is to try to adopt formulas that are sufficiently flexible to take into account not only the views of opposing sides but also the progress made in the matter of disarmament. The latter depends on the state of international relations, the maintenance of the security of States during the disarmament process -- which is crucial -- and the actual conditions of this security: a balance where it is necessary for security, international verification, consideration of regional factors, etc. It is only by seeking formulas which meet the needs -- the requirements -- of all sides that we shall be able to reach a solution. This is not an exercise in which we should try to win a victory over partners whose own needs in the matter of security deserve to be respected. The way to find a solution is to seek to overcome the difficulties through formulas which will satisfy everyone without requiring them to make sacrifices as regards their security and the conditions they can accept in that respect. We earnestly hope that a solution can be found, for it will undoubtedly be an extremely important element in the success of the second special session and an equally important element for the authority, the credit and the credibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I beg your indulgence and that of all my colleagues if I venture to ask for the floor a second time this afternoon. The few words I have to say now I will say in my capacity as the representative of Mexico and not as the Chairman of any subsidiary body of the Committee. Their purpose is to explain the submission, which will have been noted by all distinguished representatives this afternoon, the submission, I repeat, of document CD/282 entitled "Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981".

As we all know, on 9 December last, the General Assembly adopted resolution 36/81 B entitled "Prevention of nuclear war". The preambular paragraphs of this resolution recall and reproduce nearly word for word some of the concepts embodied in the 1978 Final Document, such as alarm at "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race"; the need to bear in mind the fact -- and again I quote -- that "removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day"; a reiteration of the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament; and a reminder of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States.

On the basis of facts such as these, the General Assembly included in the operative part of its resolution an exhortation and an invitation. The exhortation is addressed to all nuclear-weapon States, which are urged to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982 their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war so that these views, proposals and practical suggestions may be considered -- the resolution says -- at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The invitation is extended to all other States Members of the United Nations, if they so desire, to do likewise. I believe that the difference in the verbs used reflects a recognition of the fact that the degree of responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers in this matter is infinitely greater -- and this is why they have been "urged", while other States have been "invited". The Government of Mexico, which has always been very serious in contributing to the utmost of its ability to the achievement of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament, recently sent the Secretary-General of the United Nations its views and practical suggestions on this matter, and the full text of those views is reproduced in document CD/282.

I do not wish to go into great detail -- the text is self-explanatory. I merely wish to note that, as the document states, the Government of Mexico considers that, for the purpose in question, namely, the prevention of nuclear war, measures like those that are the only ones the nuclear-weapon Powers have so far managed to agree on, for example, the establishment of direct communication lines between the heads of State of the nuclear super-Powers, however laudable they may be, may in the context of the terrifying situation confronting the world, be regarded as merely cosmetic. The Government of Mexico also states that it is convinced that the recipe for the permanent removal of the threat of a nuclear war is very simple: it would be sufficient to take seriously the provisions which were adopted by consensus in 1978 and set forth in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. And if it were necessary to single out any of these measures, the choice would unhesitatingly go to those contained in paragraphs 47 and 50 of the Final Document, which I shall not quote here because they are so well-known. As the

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

communication I have been referring to states, it has not been the lack of clearly defined methods and procedures which has so far obstructed the adoption of effective measures for the prevention of a nuclear war. There has simply been a complete lack of political will on the part of the States which bear the greatest share of responsibility for remedying the alarming situation confronting the world. The communication ends with these words, with which I shall also conclude my statement: "It is to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the two nuclear super-Powers can reach the same conclusion and bring their international conduct into line with it. We believe this will not be difficult for them if they consider that it is absurd to try to achieve national security by increasing universal insecurity, that the nuclear arsenals accumulated are more than sufficient to produce, not once but many times, total death on the planet -- whether it be instant death or death through slow and agonizing disintegration, and that, as is stated in one of the conclusions of the Secretary-General's last report on nuclear weapons, it is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization should be used by some States to promote their security, which means that the future of mankind is then made hostage to a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably the two super-Powers".

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in accordance with paragraph 30 of our rules of procedure, I should like to make the following statement.

For three years now, the Group of 21 has consistently tried to achieve the establishment of a working group on item 1 of our agenda. The group of socialist countries supported these efforts. Yet, our proposals have been blocked by two nuclear-weapon powers of the West, and during that period the efforts of the Group of 21 have been to no avail. During this session of the Committee, laborious negotiations on the text of a mandate for a working group on item 1 were initiated. Yesterday, the Group of 21 declared its readiness to support a text which gave only minimum satisfaction to its stated position, in the hope that a consensus could be achieved. But since these efforts originated in an initiative from the opposing side it was the socialist group that blocked its approval. Today, document CD/287 has just been tabled by a group of socialist countries. It contains a proposal that was originally made in the drafting group for the elaboration of a mandate for a working group on item 1 of our agenda. Most certainly, it will not obtain consensus in the Committee because it originates from one super-Power, and will be vetoed by the other. The main reason for that is the prevailing state of confrontation between the super-Powers. They seem determined to ensure that any initiative originating in the opposite camp ends in failure. This seems a very effective way to block any multilateral action on a nuclear test ban, an objective that both have agreed to be of the highest priority and urgency and which they have committed themselves to pursue by virtue of binding international instruments. For this reason, my delegation does not see any point in participating at this late stage of our work in the power-game of the most heavily armed nations in the world. We will not join in this new display of a spirit of confrontation which totally disregards the interests and concerns of the greater part of mankind. After the results of the second special session are known and after the entire international community has had a chance to debate the real reasons for the failure of this Committee to discharge its functions, then we believe that the Committee on Disarmament may again look into the question of establishing a working group on item 1 of its agenda.

Mr. ALESSI (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, having been a member of the drafting group which, under your enlightened and active chairmanship, endeavoured to draft a mandate for a subsidiary body of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, and having myself had the honour of guiding the group's work when I served as Chairman of the Committee during the month of March, I would like at this juncture to express my delegation's deep regret at our failure so far to achieve any results on this item, in spite of all the efforts we have made.

I cannot say that the document which has just been submitted to us by the Ambassador of Czechoslovakia and bears the symbol CD/287 in itself offers any possibility of results. The drafting group started from the premise that a working group could have been set up. The real problem was not the establishment of a subsidiary body but the formulation of its mandate. Furthermore, only yesterday we had another discussion in an informal meeting in the course of which, among the other arguments put forward, I heard — I think it was Ambassador Herder say that there was no point in our rushing to establish a working group on the eve of the closure of this session, and that we might just as well take the matter up again at the special session of the General Assembly or when we resume our work. That is an argument which could, I believe, be applied even more to the establishment of a working group without a mandate and which would not, therefore, be able to begin its work immediately upon the resumption of the Committee's session but would have to wait until the Committee itself conferred upon it a mandate agreed on by consensus.

I must say that during the work of the drafting group I was aware of the efforts being made by all members of the group, as well as by the other members of the Committee who came to take part in its work, to try to reach a consensus on this question, and I often had the impression that we were very close to a positive result, which is what I believe all delegations very much want. My own delegation has, I must say, for years, been hoping that the Committee on Disarmament or the negotiating bodies that preceded it would be able to come to grips with this problem, which is an essential issue and one of the highest priority. That is why I wanted to express my deep disappointment. During the last few days, we have seen Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, trying to co-ordinate the efforts that were being made in the drafting group and draft a text which would strike a political balance between the various positions — a text which would involve sacrifices on all sides but would not be weighted in one direction or in another. With your permission, I would like to read out this text to the Committee; I shall read it in English, the language in which it was drafted. The text includes in its first paragraph an amendment that was formulated by the delegation of Mexico. It reads as follows:

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda, entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Alessi, Italy)

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

When I saw this text and realized that it had the support of a large number of delegations (and in particular of the Group of 21, subject to its forming the basis of a consensus), I earnestly hoped that this session could end with a result which, given the difficulty of setting up a working group on this topic with a suitable mandate, would in itself represent an important victory for the Committee on Disarmament. The amendments to this text proposed by the group of socialist countries naturally reflect that group's position, but, in my view, they add nothing to the substance of the text itself. I would really like to know whether the text I have just read out places such an important limitation on the work of the subsidiary body we want to establish that it justifies -- to state explicitly what I consider to be already implicit in the text -- jeopardizing the efforts at compromise made by all delegations, including those of the socialist countries, in order to reach agreement. I believe that the text that I read out could give the Committee a chance to undertake useful work, without confining itself strictly to certain aspects of the negotiation of a nuclear test ban -- for the entire effort of compromise was directed precisely at rendering implicit in the text what could not, for political and negotiating reasons, be stated more explicitly. However, I repeat, the amendments proposed by the socialist countries can in no way broaden the working group's possibilities as regards the task it is to undertake. Thus, all that these amendments do at the present stage is to make agreement impossible, while not, in my view, advancing the interests of the Committee, most of whose members are only too anxious to seize the opportunity offered them to embark on genuine substantive work on a matter which is of great concern to us, which is important and which has for years and years been a priority and a source of difficulties and polemics.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, it is clear that what we have in document CD/287 is a last-minute manoeuvre which merely distracts the Committee's attention from the outcome of the long and serious negotiations which have been going on since February and about which all delegations are well informed. In yesterday's discussion, here in this room, it clearly emerged that a majority of delegations were prepared to join in a consensus to accept the draft known as "J-1". Only the socialist group declined to agree to this, for what appeared to most of us insubstantial reasons. The procedure now suggested, in CD/287, that we set up a working group without first agreeing on its mandate, seems to my delegation to be unacceptable both in principle and in fact. Indeed, this idea has already been projected in the course of the negotiations in the drafting group. We are very sorry that the situation has turned out in this way after all the effort that has been made to try to achieve agreement. We hope it is still not too late to adopt "J-1" as the distinguished representative of Italy has just suggested.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): With reference to what I said a short while ago about France's position as regards the discussion of agenda item 1 in a working group, I should like to make it clear that the proposal contained in document CD/287 is unacceptable to my delegation. My delegation would be unable

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

in any case to join in a consensus on such a basis since, if it agreed to the establishment of a working group on item 1, that would be subject to the group's mandate. In other words, we could only agree to the principle of the setting up of a working group in the light of its mandate. Since this proposal does not contain any mandate and defers the elaboration of the mandate to the opening of the summer session, it is obvious that the French delegation cannot agree to it.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no further statements, I wish to thank delegations for their contributions this afternoon. I now intend to adjourn this plenary meeting and to convene an informal meeting of the Committee, in about 10 minutes' time, to consider the draft special report to the special session of the General Assembly. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held tomorrow, Wednesday, 21 April, at 3.30 p.m. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 5.25 p.m.