

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING
held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 15 April 1982, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Yoshio OKAWA

(Japan)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. BELKAD
Mr. A. TARTAR

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CAMASALES
Miss H. MASCHIBENE

Australia:

Mr. D.M. SADDLEIR
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium:

Mr. J.M. NOIRNALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. TELLALOV
Mr. B. GRINBERG
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRANOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG CYI
U THIAN TUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. J. GAUDREAU

China:

Mr. TIAN JIN
Mr. YU MENGJIA
Mr. YAN MING LIANG
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba:

Mr. P. NUÑEZ ROSQUERA
Mr. J. LUIS GARCIA

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. VEJVODA

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Mr. A. CIMA

Mr. J. JIRUSEK

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN

Mr. M.N. FAIMY

Mr. W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFE

Mr. P. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. de LA GORCE

Mr. J. de BEAUSSE

Mr. M. COUTHURES

Mr. M. VILLETTE

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER

Mr. H. THIELICKE

Mr. J. MOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. H. VEGENER

Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Mr. W. RÖHR

Mr. E. BAIER

Mr. P. MÄNNING

Mr. A. MERTES

Mr. H. SCHÄFER

Mr. W. WEISKIRCH

Mr. R.D. von SCHUBERT

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A. VENKATESWARAN

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. H. SUTRESMA
Mr. B. MAUIA
Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK
Mr. A. BAHRIH

Iran:

Mr. H.J. MAHALLATI
Mr. J. ZAHEDIA

Italy:

Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. C.H. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANIKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya:

Mr. D.D. DON HANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHEAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F. van DONGEN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD

Mr. H. AKRAM

Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA

Mr. B. RUSSIN

Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. B.P. PROKOPIEV

Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN

Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. V.A. KROKHA

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.H. SUMNERHAYES

Mr. L. MIDDLETON

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. H.D. BUSBY

Ms. K. CRITTEMBERGER

Mrs. M.E. HOHNES

Miss S. BURK

Mr. J. MISKEL

Mr. R.F. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O. AGUILAR PARDO

Yugoslavia:

Mr. H. NIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B. ADEITO NZENGEYA

Ms. E. EKANCA KABEYA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIRAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERNASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 171st plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

At the outset, I wish to extend a warm welcome to the Sub-Committee on Disarmament and Arms Control of the Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Sub-Committee is chaired by former Federal Minister Egon Bahr and is composed of members of all parliamentary groups. They have come to follow the work of the Committee, particularly in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I thank them for their interest in our activities and I wish them a successful visit to Geneva.

The Committee should consider today the reports of subsidiary bodies and its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. However, the reports of subsidiary bodies are not yet available for consideration by the plenary of the Committee and members may therefore wish to make use of rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure by which members wishing to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee may do so at any time.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany, Pakistan, Poland and Ethiopia. I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, His Excellency Ambassador Wegener.

Mr. WEGENER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, you have had the courtesy to welcome the important parliamentary delegation which is here today from my country and I should like, on their behalf, to thank you most cordially for the warm welcome you have extended to them.

During your chairmanship this month, I have had occasion to make a number of interventions and at that time I reserve my comments on your assumption of the chairmanship. Now that I am making a declaration of substance, I should like to express the pleasure of my delegation at seeing you in the Chair. For me, a junior member of this Committee, it is a particular matter of gratification to see you here. I admire the artfulness, the subtlety and the vast amount of experience with which you preside over our deliberations. It is experience from which we can only learn.

I would have liked also to say a word to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Alessi, but I know that he is absent for a very sad personal reason.

Now that the spring session of our Committee draws to a close, I should like to follow the example of other delegations and offer a brief assessment of some of the major aspects of our work.

Obviously, my approach will be a selective one.

When this Committee convened in early February, two and one-half months ago, many delegations realized that the political environment in which our negotiations would have to be pursued was not propitious. At that time, my delegation joined others in expressing grave concern about the international

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security situation and the continued violation of the United Nations Charter in many parts of the world. I also voiced concern about the deteriorating balance of forces in Europe. Like others, my delegation pointed out that the chances for substantial progress towards arms control and disarmament were impaired by such developments and called upon those causing these grave disturbances to return to a policy of restraint and moderation in the pursuit of external interests.

We all know that it is difficult for disarmament to flourish in such a political environment. And yet, this unsatisfactory situation makes it even more imperative that we explore every chance, every niche of potential progress. It is a matter of limited gratification to my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament has had a relatively good season even under these disconcerting circumstances.

In fact, we must note that negotiations in several fields have progressed markedly in these last few weeks. In several areas, stagnation has been overcome. Our consideration of the chemical weapons issue has reached the stage of a full-fledged negotiation and the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee on vital issues allowing progress towards a comprehensive test ban, a cherished objective of many delegations in this room, is imminent. In large measure, this progress is due to the determination and sense of realism of one major delegation and I for one would like to pay a tribute to it. You will forgive me if I also list the field of radiological weapons as one where some progress has been possible.

Finally, the Committee has, for the first time in many years, undertaken to deal in earnest with the problems of a possible arms race in space and some new important vistas have opened up in this field.

All these steps have taken place in a sober, constructive atmosphere which has led us, finally, to approach some of the real problems involved in the issues at hand. While verification can never be a substitute for disarmament, just as little as confidence-building measures alone can play this role, my delegation continues to believe that verification and compliance are the centre-pieces on which the ultimate success of disarmament negotiations depend. We therefore consider it logical and indeed a token of the progress achieved that on many subjects simultaneously, we have now come to look into verification problems in concrete terms and that this session of the Committee, like few others before, has been marked by a wealth of new working papers on this important and complex subject.

After these more general remarks, let me turn to some of our concrete problem areas. I intend to touch, in that order, upon chemical weapons, problems of outer space, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and radiological weapons.

Let me first turn to the problem of chemical weapons. My delegation has attempted to provide a specific input relating to the technical aspects of verification procedures and supplementing the detailed efforts undertaken in the same direction by other delegations, particularly the delegation of the United Kingdom. We are gratified by the interest which the Working Paper

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contained in document CD/265 has aroused among all regional groups. The method of casting lots as a means of random selection of chemical installations for regular on-site inspections has met with particular interest and has been recognized by many delegations as a possible way of providing a comprehensive verification régime and still maintaining a low personnel input and cost effectiveness. The mere prospect that any chemical installation, even one inspected only a short while ago, could be designated by lot for inspection would act as a powerful disincentive to any breach of the future convention.

Many delegations have asked how the system of casting lots would work in practice and I am pleased to use this intervention to reply to a certain number of these questions, thereby clarifying our approach. While our long-standing experience with the inspection system of the Western European Union has prompted us to make our general experience available to others, the system of random selection by casting lots has not been part of this particular verification régime. It has rather been developed independently with the assistance of computer-based studies.

The subjects of the regular random-selection inspections would be all the stocks and production units declared as such by States parties. Declarations would cover existing stocks and production facilities of supertoxic chemical weapon agents, the general industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds, as well as the limited quantities of supertoxic warfare agents permitted by the future convention. All declared substances and facilities would, without exception, be subject to the lot-casting procedure.

The number of lots to be drawn would depend on the general percentage to be set in advance by the consultative Committee of Experts. This percentage could vary from year to year, for instance because of a sudden increase in the total number of objects to be inspected resulting from an increase in the number of States Parties.

While all States would, from a legal point of view, be radically equal before the lot-casting authority, there might be variations in fact. States Parties which have no industrial production of phosphor-organic compounds and may therefore not have any object to declare would of course be exempted from inspections. A country which chose to conceal stocks or production facilities would, for the moment, be exempted from on-site inspection. However, if doubts arose as to the existence of such undeclared stocks or units, the on-challenge procedure would apply.

It has been asked how several related production units in one country should be treated, for instance if they were spread over a distance, but were nevertheless administratively connected. Here we would recommend a criterion of local propinquity. All production units situated within a certain local perimeter, sufficiently clustered to permit one single inspection, would be counted as one unit, while production units dispersed over several localities would have to be counted separately, even if they were administered by the same managerial authority. It is, however, obvious that the duration and intensity of the inspection and the number of inspectors needed would depend on the dimensions and sophistication of the plant.

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In the questions put to us, preoccupation with the safeguarding of industrial secrets and property rights has played a substantial role. I would therefore like to emphasize that, whenever samples were to be drawn, they would, according to our conception, be taken by employees of the production units inspected. All chemical analyses would be conducted on the spot, a procedure made possible by the limited range of chemical substances indicative of compliance with or breach of the convention. No samples would be taken out of the country. The precise composition of the substances examined could therefore not be detected by the inspectors.

In reply to some other questions put to my delegation, I should like to stress that our procedure would not envisage national quotas for the total number of inspections to take place in each country. Identical treatment of all is guaranteed by the objectivity of criteria and the unpredictability of the lot-casting method.

My delegation has followed the debate on problems of outer space with great interest. In our view, the Committee has made a good beginning in approaching this topic in response to the relevant resolutions adopted at the last session of the General Assembly, one of which was co-sponsored by my delegation. The debate has quite clearly shown that there is a considerable difference of views concerning the method to be used in future work. Many delegations have subscribed to a pragmatic, gradual approach by which concrete negotiating steps would, in a first phase, be taken to deal effectively with the most threatening and destabilizing weapons systems, i.e. anti-satellite weapons, especially since such systems have already been tested and made operational by at least one country; anti-satellite technology is available and deployment may already have taken place. There is another approach which aims at a purportedly broader, non-specific ban on all arms in outer space, but places very little emphasis on real effectiveness. It is also difficult to see in what order of priority the various complex issues involved would be treated under this approach. While my delegation is in favour of every possible step designed to exclude non-peaceful uses of outer space, it would appear logical and appropriate to us to adopt a step-by-step approach and to build upon the existing body of international regulations in this field. The establishment of a working group to take this work in hand in the coming summer session of the Committee would be welcomed by my delegation, if the mandate reflects this approach. I would like to remind the Committee in this respect that General Assembly resolution 36/97 C specifically requests the Committee on Disarmament to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of negotiating an effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems. The mandate of a future working group would have to reflect this and, in our view, the Committee, acting accordingly, will have to avoid clogging the agenda of a working group with broad and hazy projects which would not allow the Committee to deal with concrete problems in a limited time and not aim at a really effective peaceful space régime.

My delegation has already given its view on outer space problems in a more comprehensive manner during one of the informal meetings devoted to the subject; the text of our statement has been made available to delegations in an informal manner. Now that I have the opportunity to speak on the subject in a formal meeting, allow me to reaffirm one clarification. The draft treaty of 10 August 1981 contained in document A/36/192 and referred to in General Assembly resolution 36/99 does not appear to my delegation to be a suitable basis for

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negotiation in this Committee. We have already pointed out the many contradictions and inconsistencies which this draft treaty displays. In this connection, my delegation has asked a certain number of questions which so far have found no reply. We, like the Italian and the Dutch delegations, still wait for the necessary elucidation from the authors of that draft. In addition to the lacunae and ambiguities of the draft to which we have already drawn attention let me briefly mention two others. Article III of the draft makes it legitimate to intercept space objects if these are not operated for peaceful purposes. However, the determination and decision whether interception should take place lies with the interceptor alone, who would thus take on the role of a self-appointed space police. In the absence of firm criteria and of any objective determination of prerequisites for such a police role, this draft provision would seem to pave the way for misuse and serve, rather, as an incentive for the development and testing of additional anti-satellite systems. Secondly, the rules on verification contained in article IV appear to be insufficient even in the light of other existing multilateral disarmament agreements and certainly in relation to the purposes of the draft treaty. In the view of my delegation it would be indispensable to have a substantially more detailed verification régime, with at least an independent investigating authority, such as a Consultative Committee, lest the desired prescription remain totally ineffective in terms of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In the light of all these arguments and in conjunction with those already advanced, my delegation must confirm its view that the draft treaty in question is seriously flawed and particularly unsuitable as a basis for negotiations in this Committee.

I will resist the temptation to speak on the comprehensive programme of disarmament at great length. Despite the enormous efforts and time that have gone into the negotiations since January last, my delegation is still at a loss to assess present accomplishments. Is it that the representatives in the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament have become increasingly knowledgeable about an extremely complex topic and have succumbed to the danger of losing sight of the final objective? In any event, the non-initiated, trying to digest the stacks of paper that we see before us as the ultimate product of the Group for the season, fail to see how this instrument, even after additional negotiations, could provide the momentum for the international disarmament process which we all expect and the impact on public opinion which it would need. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that all the overriding issues of the comprehensive programme of disarmament remain unresolved. The mere juxtaposition of delegations' views is not a negotiation. Laudable efforts have been made, especially in the last few days, to streamline the various papers and make them more palatable to the reader. That is perhaps all that can be accomplished at this time and certainly the impossible cannot be attempted in the few remaining days of our session. To my delegation, it would therefore seem more useful to give some thought to how negotiating structures for the forthcoming process of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament in New York can be optimized.

It would certainly be inappropriate for us to effect a simple change of venue and continue where we have left off in Geneva. What is now needed is for delegations to address the overriding issues of the comprehensive programme of disarmament -- time-frames, periodicity of review, legal nature -- at an appropriately high level of abstraction and of rank of participants and to arrive

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at a generally shared perception of how these major issues should be resolved. Needless to say, there must be some give and take, building on the incipient compromises which we have seen in Geneva. A package deal should, if possible, be achieved. Once the finality of the comprehensive programme of disarmament has become clearer, the work accomplished in Geneva will then take on new and important meaning and many of the papers elaborated here may fit more easily into the agreed structure. It might also be a useful idea to allow delegations a short period of reflexion after the intensive negotiations which we have held and which may have led some, as the saying goes, to lose sight of the forest and see only trees.

In conclusion, I should like to touch upon the question of radiological weapons. I should make it quite clear that my comments are offered from the viewpoint of my delegation and that I am not necessarily speaking as the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons. That Group has worked intensively and has shown undisputed progress, especially in the earlier parts of this session. Stagnation and disenchantment with the subject were overcome and a procedural compromise made it possible for the Working Group to postpone the consideration of certain complex problems of legal form in order to achieve progress on substance. The convenient device of a temporary parallel negotiation on the two main items under consideration -- the so-called "traditional" radiological weapons question and the question of a possible ban on attacks on nuclear facilities -- has led to a series of fruitful and dense meetings. In the "traditional" radiological weapons field, the number of controversial issues has been substantially reduced and compromise formulations have had increasing appeal for delegations. Negotiations went on in a spirit of mutual understanding where all proposals were given careful and bona fide consideration by delegations. It is therefore simply not true, as one delegation recently proclaimed in plenary, that certain suggestions put forward by the Group of 21 have met with "fierce opposition" from the original proponents of a radiological weapons treaty. Rather, there appears to have been general willingness to accommodate the three notions so important for the Group of 21 -- a commitment to promote the peaceful uses of radioactive materials; a restatement of commitments in the general sphere of nuclear disarmament; and the inclusion of a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities -- in a manner which preserves the essential impetus of these notions. However, despite the seriousness of the work and the deadline set by the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly and General Assembly resolution 36/97 B, success has eluded us. In the final stages of the Working Group's activities, the spectre of stagnation again appeared and delegations seemed increasingly unwilling to move from established positions towards the necessary compromise. This is a grave disappointment and, more, a matter of considerable concern. It may very well raise the question of what negotiation in this Committee is all about. At some point -- after years of discussion and consideration -- the moment must come when all delegations appear ready to depart from initial positions and instructions and to align themselves on the median line of general compromise. It would be the view of my delegation that this time has come, at least for the question of "traditional" radiological weapons. One cannot interminably negotiate on a disarmament proposal of such limited dimensions. Yet, in the last few days, we have seen a certain number of

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inflated demands by some delegations which do not seem to take the possibilities of compromise into account. It is regrettable, if not ironic, that these are often the same delegations that so readily castigate certain other delegations in this room for the lack of "political will". If the Committee on Disarmament appears -- in this field as in so many others -- nearly empty-handed before the special session, these delegations would do well to do a little soul-searching of their own.

At least when the Working Group reconvenes later this summer, it would appear essential for some of the basic issues in the radiological weapons field to be decided on quickly. I see no reason why a suitable compromise solution to the question of linkage between the traditional radiological weapons question and the issue of a ban on attacks on nuclear facilities should not be found in the near future. A model which readily comes to mind would be a radiological weapons convention of general scope, as suggested by the original proponents, and an additional facultative protocol governing the ban on certain relevant nuclear facilities. Both instruments would be intrinsically linked and would come up for signature at the same time. However, there would be an option for States signatories to subscribe to the main convention in a first phase, while leaving accession to the facultative additional protocol open, at least during a period of reflection.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Ethiopia, His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe, who will speak in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to see you in the Chair during the crucial month of April, when the Committee on Disarmament is not only winding up its work for the first part of the 1982 session, but also reviewing the work of the past four years in view of the forthcoming second session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is therefore fitting that a man of your calibre and experience should preside over this important phase of our work.

My appreciation also goes to Minister Alessi of Italy for his diligent and wise leadership of the Committee during the month of March.

I would also like to associate my delegation with the appreciation and thanks you expressed in welcoming the parliamentary delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany.

The purpose of my statement today is to introduce document CD/280, which contains the following points and represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21 on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

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"1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear weapon States. The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on 'effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'.

2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear weapon States.

3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of 'effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' should be based on the following principles:

- (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- (iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21

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notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;

- (iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;
- (v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, His Excellency Ambassador Sujka, who will address the Committee in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, permit me first of all, as this is my first official statement this month, to begin by offering you my most sincere and heartfelt congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of April. I am deeply convinced that, under your able and experienced leadership, this Committee will fully and perfectly discharge its reporting tasks in preparing the special report to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons and in full consultation with the Group, I wish to present to the Committee on

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Disarmament my oral report concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session and to inform the Committee of the adoption of the special report of the Group to the Committee prepared in view of the special session devoted to disarmament.

At its 6th meeting, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons took note of the Chairman's report on issues relating to toxicity determinations and contained in document CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1. The Chairman was asked to inform the Committee on Disarmament of the results of these consultations and especially of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures for acute subcutaneous and inhalation toxicity criteria contained in the report and to ask the Committee to take note of the report, as well as of the recommended procedures annexed thereto.

On the basis of this report, the Group agreed that its Chairman should hold consultations with delegations on technical questions in the week of 2 to 6 August of this year, unless the Committee decides otherwise at the beginning of the second half of its 1982 session. The Working Group agreed to suggest to the Committee on Disarmament that it devote the week following the technical consultations to the consideration of the item "chemical weapons" in its plenary meetings. In order to allow for adequate preparations, the Working Group's Chairman should continue his consultations on the technical questions to be discussed during the consultations envisaged for the week from 2 to 6 August 1982.

Taking into account the report contained in document CD/CW/WP.30, the information obtained from delegations and the outcome of his informal contacts with delegations on this subject, the Chairman will announce, at the very beginning of the second half of the 1982 session, which technical questions he recommends for these consultations.

I take pleasure in informing you that last night, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons adopted the text of the special report to the Committee on Disarmament it has prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament. This report is now being processed by the Secretariat and should be available in all languages in time for the Committee's next regular meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I have taken note of his request and, at the same time, I wish to congratulate him on the successful conclusion of the activities of his Working Group, which adopted its report yesterday afternoon.

I now give the floor to the representative of Pakistan, His Excellency Ambassador Ahmed.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, It seems to my delegation entirely appropriate that a distinguished representative of Japan should preside over this Committee as it prepares its contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. There is hardly a parallel to Japan's deep-rooted and sincere devotion to the cause of disarmament. Your diplomatic acumen and acknowledged ability will ensure that the Committee on Disarmament makes an optimum contribution to the success of the special session.

I would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to Ambassador Alessi of Italy for his patient and dedicated efforts as our Chairman during the preceding month.

The spring session of the Committee on Disarmament has been unique in many respects. While the political climate for disarmament has remained as adverse as at our two previous sessions, there has been, I believe, a genuine endeavour on the part of delegations to register some progress to show to the second special session. It is unfortunate that the sense of urgency which has infused many of our negotiations this spring was not evoked earlier. This may have resulted in the conclusion of at least some substantive agreements in time for the second special session. As matters stand, a judgement on the Committee's performance since 1979 must be harsh. Clearly, the Committee has not lived up to its potential and possibilities. Our failure reflects, basically, the absence of political will on the part of the major military Powers and their alliances to commit themselves unconditionally to the process of multilateral negotiations on disarmament. By and large, this Committee has been treated by these States as merely another forum where their narrowly conceived positions can be extolled. The heated exchanges which we have heard at this session demonstrate that, despite the consensus adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament, there seems to be an almost complete absence of agreed premises between the West and the East on ways and means of promoting a concerted process of disarmament. Were it not for the persistent endeavours of the non-aligned and neutral States, work in this body would not reflect even that minimum momentum which we shall no doubt seek to highlight in our special report to the General Assembly.

The failure of the Committee on Disarmament to agree on a mandate for an ad hoc working group on the item which has the highest priority on our agenda, a nuclear test ban, cannot be counted as a collective failure. What was and is required is greater flexibility on the part of those delegations which have sought to erode the urgency and to limit the scope of this Committee's responsibilities on this item. The Committee's failure even to open negotiations on a nuclear test ban will, it seems, figure at the special session as a symbol of the stalemate in multilateral disarmament negotiations and the impotence of this body when confronted with the arbitrary imposition of the rule of consensus. Yet, the real implications of further delay in concluding a nuclear test-ban treaty will be far-reaching for the nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States and for future negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

My delegation also considers that a greater demonstration of political will on the part of the major nuclear Powers might have made it possible to achieve some progress in the negotiations concerning security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Unfortunately, most of the nuclear-weapon States have remained entirely inflexible about contemplating the changes in their unilateral declarations which are clearly necessary to promote an agreement on the question. The position of my delegation has been stated on previous occasions and I will not repeat it. I would like, however, to underline the significance of the statement made by the distinguished Ambassador of Ethiopia on behalf of the Group of 21 this morning on the subject. We hope that the nuclear-weapon States will heed the call to review their basic positions at the second special session. The demand by the neutral, non-aligned and other developing countries outside the two major military alliances that they be given legally binding assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should not be ignored. We look forward to a genuine response at the special session from the nuclear-weapon States concerned.

We admire the courageous efforts made by the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Wegener of the Federal Republic of Germany, to evolve the text of a treaty on this subject. It has been clear from the outset, however, that an agreement on this issue must respond to the basic questions raised, in particular, by the non-aligned and neutral countries regarding, inter alia, the definition of radiological weapons and the commitment of the nuclear Powers to pursue nuclear disarmament and to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Above all, agreement on an RW convention should be accompanied by an agreement regarding the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities -- which is, in our view, the only feasible way in which radiation can be used, at present, for hostile purposes. The Pakistan delegation remains open about the precise manner in which this issue should be resolved, i.e. whether under the RW convention itself, in an attached protocol or through an entirely separate international instrument.

Very briefly, in response to the remarks made by the distinguished Ambassador of the Federal Republic of Germany on the subject, I would submit with great respect that soul-searching is required first and foremost by those delegations which take the view that the Committee should adopt a virtually meaningless convention on radiological weapons, but seek to open the option to attack nuclear facilities causing mass destruction that would be no different from the effect of the use of nuclear weapons. It is the view of my delegation and of several other members of the Group of 21 that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective is to prevent mass destruction, there can be no justification for differentiating between civilian and military facilities. Mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facility. However, mass destruction is not the only criterion relevant to this issue. My delegation sees an important objective of the proposed instrument as being to restore confidence

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

among the developing countries regarding their nascent nuclear programmes. This confidence has been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities last June. Therefore, the scope of the prohibition should include not only larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities, but also smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries.

Pakistan has submitted a concrete proposal regarding the scope of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities on the basis of the criteria and considerations I have mentioned. We hope that the important political issues involved in this matter will be discussed in the near future.

The negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons currently being pursued under the sagacious guidance of Ambassador Sujka of Poland have assumed greater urgency in view of recent developments. Repeated allegations of the use of chemical weapons in various parts of the world have not been conclusively disproven. The acrimony surrounding the issue, however, attests to the overriding need to affirm in the CW convention that the use of chemical weapons is totally prohibited and to provide for adequate and credible means by which such allegations can be objectively investigated in the future. My delegation has made no technical determination as to whether the development of binary chemical weapons will further complicate the negotiation of a CW convention, particularly its verification procedures. Nevertheless, the current escalation of the arms race in chemical weapons, the implied reliance on these weapons in the "balance of terror" and persistent reports about the use of chemical weapons are ominous portents, especially if one bears in mind that the capability to produce these weapons of mass destruction is, unlike nuclear weapons, not limited to a handful of States. These disturbing dimensions of the problem must be addressed squarely at the forthcoming special session and in our subsequent negotiations.

As was to be expected, the most intensive work has been done at this session on the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Despite the political and conceptual difficulties encountered, considerable progress has been made in this task under the experienced and dedicated leadership of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico. Unfortunately, significant portions of the text remain in square brackets. My delegation believes that further progress in negotiating the comprehensive programme of disarmament depends on appropriate political decisions being taken especially by the major Powers. Before resuming work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, it is essential to reach some understanding on the fundamental conceptual issues involved. There seems to be de facto agreement that the programme should be elaborated in three stages. This agreement seems logical and natural and it should be formalized. Some members continue to entertain reservations about the concept of "time-frames" for the implementation of the programme and its stages. It is possible to link the notion of indicative time-frames with the procedure for the review of the implementation of the programme. The Group of 21 has made specific proposals in this regard. My delegation is flexible on the kind of linkage that may eventually be established. But the review mechanism in itself cannot serve as a substitute for a political indication that certain disarmament negotiations would be undertaken in good faith by the States concerned within a certain period of time. My delegation continues to regard the end of the century as a symbolically attractive and politically feasible target date for the completion of the comprehensive programme.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The value of the comprehensive programme will depend to a large degree on the nature of the commitment of States to implement its provisions. In a sense, this commitment will be represented by the extent to which States agree to include specific disarmament measures in the programme. Another indication of commitment would be the acceptance of time-frames for the implementation of the measures included in the programme. Most importantly, the nature of the commitment to the programme will depend on the manner and form in which it is adopted. The consistent position of my delegation has been that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should be a legally binding instrument. Some delegations are, however, not in a position to accept this concept of the comprehensive programme. It is our understanding, nevertheless, that there is an implicit understanding that the comprehensive programme should be more than another recommendatory document. In order to promote a compromise, perhaps the following procedure for the adoption of the comprehensive programme could be considered. First, the programme could be adopted by the General Assembly in a solemn declaration in which States would commit themselves to implement its provisions. After adoption, the declaration and the comprehensive programme could be transmitted by the General Assembly to the Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations for their signature. These signed documents could thereafter be deposited with the United Nations Secretary-General. Finally, the declaration and the comprehensive programme, together with the signatures of a required minimum number of States, could be submitted by the Secretary-General to the Security Council, which could note them in a resolution adopted under the provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. We hope this approach will be accorded further consideration at the second special session.

In conclusion, the Pakistan delegation would like to express the hope that the second special session will be viewed by States and, especially, by the major Powers not only as a political challenge, but also as a historic opportunity. The anticipated participation by several States at the highest level engenders a corresponding expectation about their contribution to the cause of disarmament and peace. We hope that the major Powers will be able to defuse current fears about the danger of a nuclear conflict and that they will demonstrate in a specific and tangible way their commitment to the noble goals which they espoused in 1978 and to which they profess continued adherence. Equally, we hope that a sincere effort will be deployed by all concerned to resolve those outstanding disputes and conflict which are the main cause of the present climate of international tension and insecurity.

Pakistan, for its part, will continue to make a constructive and positive contribution to the success of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words that he addressed to the Chair.

Does any other delegation wish to take the floor?

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, although I have, on two occasions during informal meetings, expressed my delegation's sincere satisfaction at seeing you preside over our work this month -- one of the most important in **our** 1982 session -- this is the first time I have had an opportunity to do so in a plenary meeting and I would therefore like to repeat **those** words so that they appear in the record of today's meeting.

When I asked for the floor, in other words, when I sent a message through one of the members of my delegation to the Chair indicating that I would like to speak, the distinguished representative of Pakistan had not yet spoken. Much of what he said makes it unnecessary for me to repeat the points I wished to make in my statement and I shall therefore be very brief.

The reason I asked for the floor was to make a few comments on the statement by Ambassador Wegener, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, concerning the work of the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I thought that my brief comments should appear in the same record as the statement made by the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany because, otherwise, readers of the record would, in my view, be left with an unfair impression of the industriousness of the members of the Working Group and the results of their efforts.

When I come to speak as Chairman of the Working Group, I shall have an opportunity to describe in greater detail the results as I see them. For the time being, I would like to refer to three points only. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany told us that he was afraid -- and I am going to read **his statement in English, since the text is in English -- that the members** of the Working Group had and I quote: "succumbed to the danger of losing sight of the final objective." I can assure you that that was not the case and that all the participants in the Group -- including, in fact, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany himself, and I am referring to Mr. Röhr, who played a very active and effective role -- all of them, I repeat, constantly bore in mind the final objective. Then, and this is my second point, Ambassador Wegener told us that he felt unable to digest "the stacks of paper", in his own words, "the stacks of paper that we see before us as the ultimate product of the Group for the session". I think it is somewhat exaggerated to speak of stacks of paper. Stacks of paper have resulted from two years' work, during which, on the one hand, delegations made very useful contributions and, on the other, the Secretariat prepared long and painstakingly detailed working papers. If this is what Ambassador Wegener is referring to, there have been stacks of paper; but if, as he said, he is referring to the "ultimate product" of that work, it **represents** only 60 or 70 double-spaced pages. Furthermore, if, as we all hope, we manage, in New York, to eliminate many of the alternatives that appear in brackets, the documentation will be only some 40 or 45 pages long -- far shorter than the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly.

Lastly, I would like to refer to another point and, in this connection, state that I fully share the view expressed by Ambassador Wegener when he drew attention to the need, and again I quote his words, to "arrive at a generally shared perception of how these major issues should be resolved". The "major issues" to which he referred were carefully considered on several occasions. At least half a dozen

(Mr. Garcia Robles (Mexico))

meetings of the Working Group were devoted exclusively to them, but, precisely because they are difficult, their solution has until now eluded us, as the saying goes in English. I hope -- and, here again, I share the Ambassador's wish -- that the situation will be different in New York. But, as he said, to that end, we shall have to be very much aware of the fact that "there must be some give and take"; there will have to be equal political will on the part of all those who have participated in the discussions to date and no one should claim that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is not a step forward compared to the Final Document or that, as has unfortunately been said, the comprehensive programme is, in some respects, a step backwards compared to the Final Document.

Therefore, to conclude on an optimistic note, let us hope that Ambassador Wegener's wish, which, I repeat, I share, will find fulfilment in New York and that all the parties will have this spirit of "give and take".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Would any other delegation like to take the floor?

That does not seem to be the case.

Members will recall that, at our informal meeting on Tuesday, the Committee considered a draft decision submitted by the delegation of Hungary. As a result of an exchange of views on that draft decision, it was decided that the plenary of the Committee would take up this matter today. The Secretariat has circulated Working Paper No. 62/Rev.1 1/ containing a draft decision under item 5 of the agenda of the Committee. I suggest that we now proceed to consider and adopt this draft decision.

If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision.

It was so decided.

1/ "The Committee decides to hold informal meetings during the second part of its 1982 session under item 5 of its agenda, 'New types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and new Systems of such Weapons', with a view to examine proposals and suggestions pertaining to this issue. Participation of experts will be welcome in these proceedings.

The informal meetings will be open to States non-members of the Committee and to their respective experts.

The number and dates of these informal meetings will be decided upon as appropriate when the programme of work for the second part of the Committee's 1982 session will be under consideration".

The CHAIRMAN: I have received a letter from His Excellency Ambassador Nettel, the representative of Austria, stating that Austria would like to be considered as a candidate for membership of the Committee on Disarmament. This is by way of advance information; the letter will be circulated to all members of the Committee.

I now give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament): I wish to inform the members that we in the Secretariat have received several communications addressed to the Committee on Disarmament by non-governmental organizations and private groups and persons on topics relating to disarmament. For example, 286 persons belonging to the Christian Community of Albertville in France have written to express support for this Committee's disarmament efforts. The 75 members of the Women for Peace organizations in Bern and Basel have declared their opposition to nuclear war. Similar communications -- about 20 -- declaring that "the Earth should be for Life" have come from Denmark, Italy, Nigeria, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom. These communications are available in my office for inspection by interested members.

The CHAIRMAN: I wish to thank Ambassador Jaipal for that information.

As members know, we usually circulate at the plenary meetings on Thursdays an informal paper containing a timetable for meetings of the Committee to be held during the following week. However, we have set as a target date for the completion of our work next Tuesday, 20 April, when we should adopt the special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Under the circumstances, I would like to urge the working groups to conclude their work not later than tomorrow, Friday, and I suggest that we should hold an informal meeting of the Committee on Monday at 3.30 p.m. in order to consider those sections of the draft report adopted by the drafting group.

I suggest that, in principle, we should schedule the plenary meeting for Tuesday, 20 April, at 3 p.m., on the understanding that it might be advanced or postponed by notification made by the Secretariat to the members of the Committee. I do not think that, at this stage, we can foresee how our work will proceed from now until next Tuesday.

If there is no objection, we will adopt this procedure.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to announce that, as foreseen in the timetable, the open-ended working group to consider the draft report to the special session will begin in Room I in five minutes' time and at that meeting we will start with the consideration of Working Paper No. 61/Rev.1.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.