

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT TO
THE SECOND SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT

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Appendices

- I. Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At the thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, by resolution 36/92 F of 9 December 1981, requested the Committee on Disarmament to submit to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a special report on the state of negotiations on the various questions under consideration by the Committee.
2. Pursuant to that request, the Committee on Disarmament submits its special report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Its annual reports for 1979, 1980 and 1981 1/ may be referred to for further information concerning the Committee's work.

II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

A. Work of the Committee from January 1979 to April 1982

3. During this period, the Committee held 174 formal plenary meetings at which member States as well as non-member States invited to participate in the discussions set forth their views and recommendations on the various questions before the Committee. The Committee also held 163 informal meetings on organization and procedures, as well as on items of its agenda and other matters.

B. Participants in the Work of the Committee

4. Representatives of the following member States participated in the work of the Committee: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

C. Rules of Procedure

5. The Committee elaborated and adopted its Rules of Procedure early at its 1979 session. 2/

D. Agenda of the Committee

6. In conformity with the provisions of section VIII of its Rules of Procedure, the Committee adopts its annual agenda within the following framework which was established at its 1979 session:

1/ Documents CD/53, CD/139 and CD/228.

2/ Document CD/8/Rev.1.

"The Committee on Disarmament, as the multilateral negotiating forum, shall promote the attainment of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The Committee, taking into account inter alia the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will deal with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in the following areas:

- I. Nuclear weapons in all aspects;
- II. Chemical weapons;
- III. Other weapons of mass destruction;
- IV. Conventional weapons;
- V. Reduction of military budgets;
- VI. Reduction of armed forces;
- VII. Disarmament and development;
- VIII. Disarmament and international security;
- IX. Collateral measures; confidence-building measures; effective verification methods in relation to appropriate, disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties concerned;
- X. Comprehensive programme of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

7. The following substantive agenda items have been considered by the Committee during its annual sessions:

1. Nuclear test ban;
2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament;
3. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
4. Chemical weapons;
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons;
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament;
7. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.

8. While the first five items have been inscribed in the annual agenda since 1979, item 6 on the comprehensive programme of disarmament was first discussed in 1980 and item 7, dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space, was included for the first time in the agenda for 1982.

9. On the basis of its annual agenda, the Committee establishes its programme of work at the beginning of each part of its annual session. The programme of work includes a schedule of the activities of the Committee in relation to the substantive items on its agenda and organizational matters, as necessary.

E. The Establishment of Subsidiary Bodies of the Committee

10. The Committee has established, at various stages of its work, ad hoc working groups on the following substantive questions on its annual agenda: effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and comprehensive programme of disarmament. A summary of the activities of those subsidiary bodies is given in Chapter III, sections C to F, of this special report.

11. Early during its 1979 session, the Committee decided that the arrangements made by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in connection with the work of the ad hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, should be maintained.

F. Participation by States not Members of the Committee

12. In addition to those States not members of the Committee attending its plenary meetings in conformity with rule 32 of the Rules of Procedure, the Committee received and considered requests to participate in its work from a number of States not members. In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, the Committee invited representatives of the following non-members to participate in the discussions in the Committee on substantive items on the annual agenda:

(a) in 1979 Denmark, Finland, Spain, Switzerland and Viet Nam;

(b) in 1980 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Spain and Switzerland;

(c) in 1981 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland;

(d) in 1982 Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey and Switzerland.

13. As from 1980 invitations were extended to the States not members listed in (b) to (d) of the preceding paragraph, which had requested to participate in the discussions held in ad hoc working groups established under substantive items on the annual agenda.

G. Modalities of the Review of the Membership of the
Committee and Related Matters

14. General Assembly resolution 36/97 J, taking into account the relevant parts of the report of the Committee for its 1981 session, 3/ states that "the first review of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament should be completed following appropriate consultations among member States during the second special session devoted to disarmament".

15. The Committee on Disarmament, at present composed of 40 members, has carefully reviewed the question of its membership, bearing in mind paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which declared, inter alia, that the negotiating body for the sake of convenience should have a relatively small membership. The Committee also took into account paragraph 28 of the Final Document which says, inter alia, that all States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations, as well as paragraphs 120 (g) and (h) of the Final Document. Since 1980, the Committee devoted a number of informal meetings to the consideration of this question.

16. At those informal meetings, views were expressed by members concerning the improved and effective functioning of the Committee. The Committee had before it document CD/200, dated 24 July 1981, submitted by a group of Socialist countries 4/ and entitled "Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament", as well as other proposals put forward by members.

17. The Committee is in the process of increasing its effectiveness and improving the organization of its work. To that end, it continues to examine ways and means of enhancing the effectiveness of its operations by streamlining the organization of its work and procedures and by increasing the activities of its subsidiary bodies through the allocation of more time, by holding more informal meetings and consultations with the participation of experts. The Committee agrees to continue its consideration of these questions during the second part of its 1982 session.

18. In accordance with rule 17 of the Rules of Procedure, the strengthening of the Secretariat of the Committee on Disarmament, as well as of the services needed, should be considered in view of the increase in the workload and the requirements of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

19. The Committee is aware of the need to facilitate still further the participation of non-member States in its work and will continue to interpret flexibly its Rules of Procedure and in such a manner as to enable interested non-member States to take part in its work more fully than at present.

20. As to the question of membership, many delegations are of the view that the present composition of the Committee is adequately representative of the world community of States for effective disarmament negotiations and, in their opinion, there is no strong reason at the moment for modifying or enlarging the present membership. Some delegations expressed themselves in favour of a small increase in the Committee's membership, while others mentioned the possibility that membership might rotate within

3/ Document CD/228.

4/ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

the respective regions or groups. Some delegations are of the opinion that non-aligned and developing countries are not adequately represented in the Committee, particularly in view of their security concerns in the present international climate and that any consideration of expansion should take this inadequacy into account. Some other delegations consider that, for the same reasons, the neutral countries are not adequately represented in the Committee. Other delegations believe that the membership of the Committee is now and should continue to be based on the principles of political balance and equitable geographical distribution. Some delegations expressed sympathy for the aspirations of certain States which they felt had shown a readiness to make a significant contribution to the work of the Committee.

21. The following States have formally informed the Committee of their interest in joining it: Austria, on 15 April 1982, Finland, on 16 March 1982, Norway, on 4 March 1982, and Turkey, on 16 April 1982.

22. The members of the Committee intend to continue consultations on the question of the review of the membership during the second special session.

H. Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

23. In accordance with rule 42 of the Rules of Procedure, lists of all communications from non-governmental organizations and persons have been periodically circulated to the Committee.

III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

24. The substantive work of the Committee has been based on its agenda and programme of work. At the beginning of each annual session, the Committee had before it a letter from the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitting all the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its previous regular session in particular those entrusting specific responsibilities to the Committee. The Committee also received, at the opening of each annual session, a message of the Secretary-General conveyed by his Personal Representative and Secretary of the Committee.

A. Nuclear Test Ban

25. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering the question of a nuclear test ban as item 1 of its agenda since June 1979, and continues to recognize that among measures in relation to disarmament, a nuclear test ban has always been regarded as a matter of highest priority. Several proposals have been made in this connection in statements at plenary meetings as well as in official documents of the Committee. 5/

26. It was generally recognized that, while nuclear-weapon States bear special responsibility for the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, all States have a legitimate interest in the early conclusion of a treaty that could inspire universal adherence. There is recognition of the Committee's indispensable role in the negotiations of a treaty which could attract the widest possible adherence, but there have been differences of approach.

5/ Documents, CD/7, CD/45, CD/72, CD/73, CD/93, CD/95, CD/130, CD/181, CD/192, CD/194, CD/257, CD/259 and CD/287.

27. The Group of 21 ^{6/} expressed the conviction that the Committee on Disarmament should proceed without delay to undertake multilateral negotiations on the question of a nuclear test ban. Having stated the view that working groups are the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 urged the setting up of an Ad Hoc Working Group to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft Treaty on a Nuclear Test Ban. The Group of 21 considered that such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come; should be equitable and non-discriminatory and thus be able to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system to which all States will have access. During the general discussion on this item, the view was expressed that the banning of nuclear testing would be instrumental in reducing nuclear threats only when carried out in conjunction with the implementation of nuclear disarmament measures. In this context, it was also stated that a nuclear test ban should be an integral part of an effective process of nuclear disarmament and should be considered in that framework. A group of Socialist countries has advocated that an early conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time would improve the international climate, create favourable conditions for curbing the nuclear arms race and promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime.

28. The first specific proposal for work on this agenda item was that the Committee could begin its work by examining the institutional arrangements for the verification aspects of a treaty. Others took the view that the technical and scientific aspects had already been fully explored and that only a political decision was necessary to achieve agreement on a treaty, taking into account the existing means of verification.

29. The view has been expressed that there should be an immediate moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests, which could be verified through existing national technical means. Others have pointed out that since a moratorium would not be based on international means of verification, it could therefore not promote mutual confidence.

30. Appreciation was expressed for the report transmitted by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (CD/86).

31. On 31 July 1979 and 30 July 1980, the Committee received reports made on behalf of the tripartite negotiators, i.e. the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, on the negotiations they had been having on a treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon test explosions in all environments and its protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, in which they re-affirmed their strong political commitment to completion of the nuclear test ban treaty and stated that several matters, including verification measures, were still under detailed negotiation. The trilateral negotiations have been suspended and the Committee has not received any further report.

^{6/} Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

32. Several specific questions were addressed to the trilateral negotiators seeking information on the scope, verification, compliance and other clauses of the treaty they had under negotiation. The Socialist countries recommended that the tripartite negotiators jointly elaborate answers to the questions put to them by the Group of 21. There was the view expressed, when the trilateral negotiations were in progress, that the most effective pursuit of a treaty would be through their continuation. Other members felt that the Committee itself should commence negotiations on the text of a treaty, since multilateral and restricted negotiations were not mutually exclusive, and to that end proposed in 1980 the establishment of a working group of the Committee. One of the participants in the trilateral negotiations, a member of the Socialist group, supported the proposal for a working group of the Committee for negotiating a treaty and at the same time expressed its readiness to resume the tripartite negotiations. The proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group were revived in 1981 but there was again no consensus on them.

33. The view was also expressed that the trilateral negotiators should resume their negotiations as soon as possible.

34. Thereafter, on the initiative of the Group of 21, a group of Socialist countries and other delegations, the Committee decided to hold informal meetings to undertake substantive examination of concrete issues under this item. At the informal meetings held on 6 and 13 April 1981, many delegations expressed views reinforcing previous proposals to proceed at once to negotiations in a working group on the formulation of a draft treaty.

35. On 24 April 1981, the Group of 21 submitted a proposal (CD/181) for the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the purpose of negotiating the provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and final clauses of a draft treaty, taking into account existing proposals and future initiatives, as well as the reports on the trilateral negotiations among the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. That proposal also drew attention to the specific questions addressed to the trilateral negotiators during the first part of the session and sought further information concerning the role envisaged by them for the Committee in the multilateral negotiation of a nuclear test ban, as well as on the scope, verification of compliance and other clauses of the treaty they had under negotiation.

36. A number of delegations said that there was an urgent need for the Committee to commence work on a comprehensive test ban. To that end, many explicitly supported the establishment of an ad hoc working group. Several noted that the international situation had not been conducive to reaching agreement on how to proceed on this priority agenda item. Some expressed the view that even if it could agree on nothing else, the Committee should begin to work on institutional arrangements of an international system for exchange of seismic data.

37. The question of a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests continued to engage the attention of the Committee in 1982 and various proposals were made for the establishment of an ad hoc working group under agenda item 1. The Group of 21 reiterated its proposal (CD/181) for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to

negotiate a treaty on a nuclear test ban and its view that whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of such a treaty. A group of socialist countries also proposed that a working group be established to negotiate on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives (CD/259). Other delegations also expressed their support for proposals for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to negotiate a treaty. One nuclear-weapon State expressed the opinion that the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee to undertake negotiations on a treaty would not be propitious at present, but that the Committee could make a useful contribution by beginning work on the issues of effective verification of and compliance with a nuclear test ban. That member State declared its consent to a subsidiary body being set up to discuss and define the issues relating to verification and compliance, which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test ban agreement.

38. The Committee established a drafting group to formulate an appropriate mandate for an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda. At the 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee decided as follows (CD/291):

"In the exercise of its responsibilities as the multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish an ad hoc working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled 'Nuclear Test Ban'.

Considering that discussion of specific issues in the first instance may facilitate progress toward negotiation of a nuclear test ban, the Committee requests the ad hoc working group to discuss and define, through substantive examination, issues relating to verification and compliance with a view to making further progress toward a nuclear test ban.

The ad hoc working group will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard."

39. Within the framework of the discussion of this question, the Committee has considered the successive progress reports of the Ad Hoc Group on Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, which was set up in 1976. An overview of the work done by the Ad Hoc Group since 1976 is given in the annex to document CD/260. The final report of the Ad Hoc Group is awaited with interest and the value and importance of an international system for exchange of seismic data for the purpose of identifying seismic events, so as to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban treaty is generally recognized.

40. A proposal was made that the Committee should consider the possibility of establishing an international system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions (CD/257). It was argued that such surveillance could play an important role in the monitoring of nuclear tests.

B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and
Nuclear Disarmament

41. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question as item 2 of its agenda since April 1979 and has continued to bear in mind the high priority given to it in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It has had before it a number of proposals, substantive and procedural, made in statements at plenary meetings as well as in official documents of the Committee. ^{7/} One of the proposals concerned a cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles until their final elimination. Other proposals related to the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and the prohibition of further flight testing of strategic delivery vehicles.

42. The documents relating to the SALT II Agreements were presented to the Committee during its 1979 session (CD/28 and CD/29).

43. The Committee has attempted to identify the prerequisites and elements for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament and to delineate the appropriate course of action for the achievement of this objective. The Committee held during its 1981 session informal meetings on 23 and 30 March to examine the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament as well as doctrines of deterrence and other theories concerning nuclear weapons. It also had substantive discussions aimed at clarifying issues and concepts so as to facilitate negotiations in the Committee.

44. While the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States is recognized as essential for attaining nuclear disarmament, an agreed basis for negotiations in the Committee has not been achieved. Several members held the opinion that multilateral negotiations would contribute to the relaxation of international tensions and that participation of all the nuclear-weapon States as well as of non-nuclear-weapon States in negotiations was essential, since nuclear disarmament was of general concern. Other members emphasized that multilateral negotiations with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States were essential, since the very existence of nuclear weapons directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of all States. It was also emphasized that the Committee provided the most appropriate forum for such negotiations. Some other members were of the view that suitable conditions do not exist for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. An appropriate degree of trust and confidence among nuclear-weapon States in particular was regarded by them as essential for making progress in negotiations.

45. At the two informal meetings referred to above, the complex character of this item involving security concerns and strategic doctrines, the wide range of the difficult issues it encompasses, its relationship to the international situation and the need for urgent action to reduce tensions and eliminate the danger of nuclear war were generally acknowledged. The discussions, inter alia, referred to consultations and preparations for multilateral negotiations, the importance of political will to engage in them, and the risks involved in the nuclear arms race, deterrence policies, and the use of nuclear weapons. Some delegations criticized doctrines of deterrence as tending to escalate the nuclear arms race and increase

^{7/} Documents CD/4, CD/36/Rev.1, CD/90, CD/109, CD/116, CD/143, CD/171, CD/180, CD/188, CD/193, CD/213, CD/216, CD/219, CD/225, CD/226, CD/227, CD/238, CD/256 and CD/259.

the risk of nuclear war. Many members stressed that international peace and security would be considerably enhanced by the cessation of the nuclear arms race and measures of nuclear disarmament, including the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Secretary-General's report "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons" (A/35/392) was taken into account in the consideration of this item.

46. Some members, while emphasizing their belief that efforts should be made to reduce tensions and the level of nuclear confrontation, expressed the view that the existence of nuclear weapons had been a critical factor in preserving stability in a large part of the world for many years. They believed that negotiations on nuclear arms limitation and disarmament issues should be undertaken initially by the nuclear-weapon States concerned, and drew attention to the complexities of undertaking such negotiations in the Committee as a whole.

47. Certain nuclear-weapon States expressed the view that nuclear disarmament should take place as part of a general process of disarmament involving conventional armaments and armed forces in their entirety. Otherwise, serious military, and hence, political destabilization could result. They considered that this process of disarmament could not be isolated from the security requirements of States and from the international political and military situation. In their view, the first aim of the maintenance of a military capacity, including nuclear capacity, was to prevent war by demonstrating the ability to defend a State against any level of potential attack, and convincing an adversary that the risks of launching such an attack far outweighed the potential benefits. They considered that in this way deterrence had served and continued to serve as an essential component in maintaining equilibrium between the two major military alliances, and thereby contributed to stability on a global scale.

48. The Group of 21 opposed this view, arguing that doctrines of deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lay at the root of the nuclear arms race and led to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. It stressed that, unlike conventional arms, nuclear arms were weapons of mass destruction. It rejected as politically and morally unjustifiable that the security of the whole world and the survival of mankind should be made to depend on the state of relations between nuclear-weapon States. While acknowledging the usefulness of bilateral and regional negotiations on nuclear issues, it further stressed that all States had the right to participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament so as to eliminate the risks of nuclear war, since such a war would have global consequences.

49. A group of socialist States, including one nuclear-weapon State, stressed the urgent need for measures related to the prevention of a nuclear war. In this connection they drew the attention of the Committee to their proposal relating to an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and to their support of proposals on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In their view, any attempt to launch a preventive nuclear strike was bound to provoke a not less powerful retaliatory attack and no region would be spared from the consequences of nuclear war. It was their belief that the most radical solution of the problem of a danger of a nuclear war is the cessation of the production, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which should be implemented on a stage-by-stage and mutually acceptable basis. To this end, they proposed the immediate initiation of negotiations with the participation of all the nuclear weapon States. The degree of participation by nuclear-weapon States in measures at each stage should be determined with due regard for the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of individual nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. The existing balance of nuclear arms should, in their view, remain undisturbed during the gradual lowering of levels of arsenals, and the security of all States should also remain undiminished. They stressed that parallel with the above, measures should be

taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. They further proposed that there should be no deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there were no such weapons at present and suggested that a working group or any other subsidiary body should be established in the framework of the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate a corresponding agreement.

50. The view was expressed that the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was dominated by two fundamental realities: nuclear weapons were to an overwhelming degree in the hands of two Powers, and the existence of nuclear weapons was a fundamental element of balance and hence of security in a certain region of the world. In accordance with this view, any progress therefore depended on a two-fold effort: that of the two Powers towards the reduction of their nuclear means, and the effort to be made within the geographical area of Europe to improve conditions of security and confidence and then gradually reduce the level of conventional weapons; these objectives were closely related, for an over-all balance was inseparable from balance in the European theatre; in view of the disproportion among nuclear arsenals, it was only after a radical reduction of armaments by the two major Powers that the other nuclear-weapon States could accept undertakings concerning the reduction of their own armaments.

51. The view was expressed that the two States with the largest nuclear arsenals bear the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and that, in view of the wide gap in the size and quality of their arsenals and those of other nuclear-weapon States, it was only after there had been a significant reduction of the nuclear arsenals of these two States that other nuclear-weapon States could undertake reductions in their own arsenals according to rational procedures and ratios.

52. Others pointed out that there also exists a very grave imbalance between nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and non-nuclear weapon States on the other, and that this imbalance must be addressed in multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

53. The main points made by delegations at the two informal meetings referred to above are contained, inter alia, in paragraphs 65 to 79 of the 1981 Report of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/228).

54. It was stressed by all members that acts of aggression, expansion, foreign occupation and other violations of the Charter of the United Nations have an adverse impact on negotiations on disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. In the context of promoting the goals of disarmament, the necessity of eliminating such manifestations and of resolving existing international disputes through negotiations was underlined.

55. Many delegations also stated that the aggravation of the international situation should not be an excuse for a weakening of efforts at negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

56. The group of socialist States put forward a proposal that the Committee undertake negotiations on a convention banning the nuclear neutron weapon. They stated that the prohibition of this weapon should be given prominence in the over-all framework of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and disarmament, since, in their view, the production and deployment of the neutron nuclear weapon would trigger a qualitative leap in the arms race, would lead to a lowering of the nuclear threshold and increase the possibility of escalation of armed conflict to the level of all-out

nuclear war. In this connection they referred to the draft of such a convention submitted by them to the Committee and suggested the establishment of an ad hoc working group for this purpose. This proposal failed to obtain consensus.

57. Some delegations stressed that since the enhanced radiation weapon was only one particular type of nuclear weapon it fell within the general context of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There was therefore no reason for giving it special treatment or for making specific provisions with respect to it in treaty form. Thus the establishment of a working group for the purpose of negotiations on that subject appeared unjustified.

58. Apart from differences over approach and over the basis for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee, there has also been no consensus on the establishment by the Committee of a subsidiary body for the conduct of those negotiations. Informal contacts and consultations that were held to identify the prerequisites as well as the issues for negotiations have led to no agreement. A proposal was also made by the Group of 21 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to undertake multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. A similar proposal was made by a group of socialist countries to elaborate, on the basis of paragraph 50, the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. These proposals did not secure the consensus of the Committee.

59. Those who are opposed to these proposals continue to point out that nuclear weapons questions are primarily matters of a bilateral and regional nature and fall within the competence of the States directly concerned, which should undertake negotiations in the first instance. They believe, however, that the Committee should continue to address questions relating to nuclear disarmament in its plenary and informal meetings for the present, and not embark on negotiations in a working group. This view is not shared by other members, particularly the Group of 21 as well as a group of socialist countries, who feel that the need for urgent multilateral negotiations under item 2 had been amply demonstrated.

60. The Committee will pursue the search for a common agreed approach in conformity with the responsibility entrusted to it by the United Nations General Assembly.

C. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

61. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this question as item 3 of its agenda since June 1979, most of the time in an ad hoc working group of the Committee. A description of the work done on the item is given in the report of the ad hoc Working Group prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/285).

62. During the 1979 and 1980 sessions, Mr. M. El Baradei (Egypt) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Mr. A. Ciarrapico (Italy) and Ambassador M. Ahmad (Pakistan) were, respectively, Chairmen during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1979-1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 49 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Switzerland.

63. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

"I. Introduction

"At its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament requested the Ad Hoc Working Group to report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the first part of its 1982 session, in view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Pursuant to that request, the Ad Hoc Working Group submits its report to the Committee regarding the present state of negotiations on the subject, taking into account negotiations conducted in the previous Ad Hoc Working Groups during 1979, 1980 and 1981 sessions.

"At the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978, unilateral declarations were made by the nuclear-weapon States in connection with security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group have been conducted primarily on the basis of paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in which '... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'. Other relevant paragraphs of the Final Document provided additional guidance on this question. During the course of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group also took into account the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-third, thirty-fourth, thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth sessions, namely: resolutions 33/72 A and B, 34/84, 34/85, 34/86, 35/46, 35/154, 35/155, 36/94 and 36/95. In addition, the various proposals on the subject submitted by delegations in the Committee on Disarmament and in the Ad Hoc Working Group were taken into account, as listed in document CD/SA/WP.1/Rev.4. a/

"At their request, representatives of the following States not members of the Committee on Disarmament were invited to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group during its 1979, 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Switzerland.

"II. Substantive Negotiations During 1979, 1980 and 1981 Sessions

"In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1979 annual agenda, entitled 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons', the Committee on Disarmament, at its 39th plenary meeting on 5 July 1979, adopted the following decision:

'The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its present session, an ad hoc working group open to all member States of the Committee to consider, and negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The ad hoc working group will present a report to the Committee on Disarmament before the conclusion of the 1979 session. The Committee further decides, in accordance with rule 32 of the rules of procedure, that representatives of non-member States shall have reserved seats in the conference room during the meetings of the ad hoc working group.'

a/ See Annex I of this report.

"During the 1979 session, the Ad Hoc Working Group devoted its efforts to identifying the elements to be considered and negotiated on with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements. Extensive discussions were held on the relationship of the non-use of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, the non-use of force in international relations, as well as the over-all question of strengthening of international peace and security, to the mandate of the Working Group. There was broad agreement that these elements could be divided into two general categories: (a) Scope and nature of the arrangements, and (b) Form of the arrangements, their number and binding character. There was also agreement that the arrangements had to be effective and international in character. In this connection, a series of relevant questions were considered, in particular the question of rationale, scope and nature of the arrangements, as well as the question of the definition of nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States, the criteria to be applied in such definition and the prerequisites for the extension of the arrangements. With respect to the latter, a number of ideas were submitted; related questions were raised and comments were made on these ideas. The Working Group also discussed the form, number and binding character of the arrangements, particularly the question of an international convention to which there was no objection, in principle, although the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Draft conventions were submitted for consideration by the delegation of Pakistan (document CD/10) and the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (document CD/23). Moreover, the idea of interim arrangements was also considered. As a result of its deliberations the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/47.

"In the course of consideration of item 3 of its 1980 agenda concerning the same subject, the Committee on Disarmament, at its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, adopted the following decision as contained in document CD/77:

'The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

The ad hoc working group will report to the Committee on the progress of its work at any appropriate time and in any case before the conclusion of its 1980 session.'

"During the 1980 session, the Working Group decided to focus its attention primarily on the scope and nature of the arrangements on the understanding that an agreement on the substance of the arrangements could facilitate the agreement on the form. Accordingly, a working paper (CD/SA/WP.2) was submitted by the Chairman as a basis for negotiations. It contained the different formulas which appeared in the unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and in the proposals and ideas presented to or expressed by other States, and which had a direct bearing on the scope and nature of the arrangements. The in-depth analysis of these formulas considered in juxtaposition helped the Working Group to clarify and amplify the various positions and to detect areas of agreement and divergence. The Working Group further considered the question of the form of the arrangements. In this regard, there was recognition that search should continue for a 'common approach' acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. In that connection,

notwithstanding the fact that there was once again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. In this regard, no agreement was reached. The possibility of interim arrangements was considered. It was broadly suggested that a Security Council resolution might serve as a useful interim measure towards the effective international arrangements and pending agreement on such a 'common approach'. In this connection, it was suggested that the value of a Security Council resolution would depend on its substance. On this point, different views were expressed. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/125, which recommended that ways and means be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations.

"At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided to re-establish its Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons with the same mandate as at the previous session in 1980.

"During the 1981 session, the Working Group decided to concentrate essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on the form. In the course of deliberations, various positions and ideas, relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (also referred to as security assurances or security guarantees), were expressed, namely:

- pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament, since any use of nuclear weapons, which constitute the greatest threat to humanity, would affect the security of belligerents and non-belligerents alike, there should be an agreement on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this connection a view stated was that the use of nuclear weapons should be prohibited concurrently with the renunciation of the use of force in international relations; another view was expressed that a complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons could be envisaged only in the framework of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, as part of progress towards general disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons without any conditions or limitations as an integral part of and initial step towards the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which have no nuclear weapons on their territory;
- the extension of security assurances to those States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not have them on their territories. In this connection, a view was expressed that reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present would be a step conducive to the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States;

- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or any other comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the nuclear-weapon State extending the assurance, its territories or armed forces or allies by such a State allied to, or associated with, a nuclear-weapon State in carrying out or sustaining the attack;
- the extension of security assurances to any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them provided that that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State;
- the extension of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear Powers;
- the extension of security assurances by means of concluding conventions with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to a nuclear-free zone, in order to give these assurances a mutually binding character.

The Working Group attempted the identification of the various features of assurances and considered the possible alternatives which could be explored in the search for a 'common approach' or 'common formula'. During the final stage of its work, the Working Group, without prejudice to further exploration of other alternatives, decided to concentrate its efforts on those alternatives which called for: (a) a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. In this connection, working papers were submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands (CD/SA/WP.6) and by the delegation of Pakistan (CD/SA/WP.7), containing draft 'common formulas' for consideration by the Working Group. The delegation of Bulgaria also submitted a working paper in this regard (CD/SA/WP.8). Different approaches to the question of developing a 'common formula' became apparent in the discussion. Nevertheless, the Working Group regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a 'common approach' or 'formula' as a positive step towards the agreement on the question of security assurances. Against this background, it recommended to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. The Working Group added, 'in this context further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character'. As a result of its deliberations, the Ad Hoc Working Group submitted a report to the Committee, as contained in document CD/215 and Corr.1.

"III. Present State of Negotiations on the Subject

"In pursuance of the Committee's decision at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982, as contained in document CD/243, the Ad Hoc Working Group was re-established to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Working Group held ten meetings between 26 February and 19 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, representative of Pakistan. Dr. Lin Kuo-Chung, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group.

"In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Working Group decided to continue its efforts on the recommendation contained in paragraph 19 of the report of the previous Ad Hoc Working Group established during the 1981 session (CD/215) which stated that: '...., the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context, further efforts should be devoted to the search for a 'common approach' acceptable to all, and in particular for a 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character.' The attention of the Working Group was drawn to resolutions 36/94 and 36/95 adopted by the General Assembly on the subject at its thirty-sixth session, as contained in document CD/231, and as referred to in paragraph 2 above.

"In the conduct of its work, the Ad Hoc Working Group decided to concentrate, as at the previous session in 1981, on those alternatives which called for: (a) a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as might be raised in the negotiations in the Committee and agreed upon by all concerned and (b) a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States. The Working Group noted that three working papers were previously submitted in connection with the examination of these alternatives by the delegations of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Bulgaria, as contained in documents CD/SA/WP.6, CD/SA/WP.7 and CD/SA/WP.8, respectively.

"Some general positions were outlined. Certain delegations, members of the Group of 21, expressed their view that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and, pending this, the complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. A group of socialist States noted that the implementation of measures provided for in the Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe would be a reliable safeguard for the elimination of the threat of a nuclear conflict and contribute to the strengthening of the security of all States in particular of those States which do not possess nuclear weapons. Different views were expressed in this connection. Other delegations maintained that these questions were outside the scope of the mandate of the Working Group.

"During the course of deliberations, the positions and ideas relating to effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, which were put forward at the previous session, as contained in paragraph 9 above, were reaffirmed in the Ad Hoc Working Group by various delegations.

"The discussion of proposals for a 'common formula' focused on the substantive elements involved. Regarding the substance of a 'common formula' to be elaborated, different approaches became apparent in the discussions. Under one approach, the nuclear-weapon States would provide assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States without any conditions, qualifications or limitations. In this connection, a working paper (CD/278) b/ was submitted by the delegation of China, in which China reaffirmed its position to provide unconditional security

b/ See Annex II of this report.

assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States and urged other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their political will necessary to reach agreement on a 'common approach' or 'common formula' which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Under other approaches, various criteria would be provided to describe the conditions for the inclusion of non-nuclear-weapon States in the scope of the assurances. The sponsors of documents CD/SA/WP.6 and CD/SA/WP.7, the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan, explained their suggestions for a compromise approach to a 'common formula' contained in these working papers. The proposal for reaching an agreement on non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present was also underlined. Various views were expressed on these suggestions and divergent ideas continued to be maintained.

"The question of an appropriate form was extensively considered in connection with the efforts to develop a possible 'common formula'. As in the previous sessions, there was again no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention; however, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. A view was expressed that the Working Group should proceed to the concrete elaboration of such a convention. As in previous sessions, however, it was pointed out that an agreement on the substance of the assurances could facilitate an agreement on the form.

"The Working Group subsequently took up the idea of interim arrangements, particularly the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution. A working paper, containing a draft Security Council resolution embodying a 'common formula' for security assurances (CD/SA/WP.9), c/ was submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands. The delegation of Pakistan also submitted a revised working paper containing a draft resolution for possible adoption by the Security Council (CD/SA/WP.3/Rev.1). d/ A group of socialist States expressed the view that declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which have no such weapons on their territories, could be examined and possibly adopted in the form of an appropriate resolution by the Security Council. Different views were expressed on these ideas and various comments were made on these proposals. On the one hand, it was held that appropriate interim arrangements would represent progress and create a favourable climate with the view to satisfying progressively the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States on the question of security assurances. On the other hand, however, the view was expressed that interim measures, particularly in the form of Security Council resolution, would have no utility and that they fell outside the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group and would merely undermine the necessary climate for elaborating credible security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. A number of delegations stressed that interim arrangements should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character. In this context, it was emphasized that, while considering alternative ways, the final aim of reaching an international convention on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should be constantly kept in mind. Any interim measure or other alternative means for strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be judged against its substance and could be justified only in so far as it would constitute a step forward towards this direction.

c/ See Annex III of this report.

d/ See Annex IV of this report.

"Other ideas were submitted regarding action that could be taken at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament on this question. It was suggested that nuclear-weapon States should appropriately revise their unilateral declarations, which could then be taken into account at the second special session. It was pointed out by some nuclear-weapon States that their unilateral assurances had been offered in response to, and given in recognition of, the security concerns expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and that these assurances were credible and reliable and represented firm declarations of policy.

"A statement by the Group of 21 was circulated to the Working Group, as contained in document CD/280, e/ which inter alia, stated that: "The declarations (of some nuclear-weapon States) do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons'. It further stated that there is every reason for the neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances to be covered by legally binding assurances and enumerated principles on the basis of which an agreement on this question should be reached. It expressed the view that 'further negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear-weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement'. The Group of 21 therefore urged the nuclear-weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States, and which would facilitate agreement on an international instrument of a legally binding character.

"IV. Conclusions and Recommendations

"The Ad Hoc Working Group reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. During the past three sessions, negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of security interests of some nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a 'common formula' acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Although the negotiations on the subject in the Working Group have clarified many of the issues involved, the Working Group has been unable to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"In the context of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that ways and means should be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in the negotiations of the Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

e/ See Annex V of this report.

"ANNEX I

"List of Documents on the Question of Effective International
Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the
Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

"I. Official documents of the Committee on Disarmament

- (1) CD/1 - containing General Assembly resolutions 33/72A and B.
(24 January 1979)
- (2) CD/10 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Conclusion of an International
Convention to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use
or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (27 March 1979)
- (3) CD/23 - submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, entitled "Draft international convention on the
strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear
States". (21 June 1979)
- (4) CD/25 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective International
Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the
Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (26 June 1979)
- (5) CD/27 - submitted by United States of America, entitled "Proposal for a
CD Recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly
Concerning the Security of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against
Nuclear Attack". (2 July 1979)
- (6) CD/47 - containing Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to consider and
negotiate on, effective international arrangements to assure
non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of
nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1979)
- (7) CD/55 - containing General Assembly resolutions 34/84, 34/85 and 34/86.
(5 February 1980)
- (8) CD/75 - submitted by Finland, entitled "Letter dated 12 March 1980
addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from
the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations
Office at Geneva submitting a working document containing the
views of the Finnish Government". (14 March 1980)
- (9) CD/77 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to
establish an ad hoc working group to continue to negotiate with
a view to reaching agreement on effective international
arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use
or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (17 March 1980)

- (10) CD/120 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution for adoption by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'". (17 July 1980)
- (11) CD/125* - Report of the "Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (7 August 1980)
- (12) CD/140 - containing General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155. (3 February 1981)
- (13) CD/151 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (13 February 1981)
- (14) CD/153 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (18 February 1981)
- (15) CD/161 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (4 March 1981)
- (16) CD/176 - submitted by USSR, entitled "Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea." (10 April 1981)
- (17) CD/177 - submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled "United Kingdom working paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (10 April 1981)
- (18) CD/184 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981", containing "Resolution No. 28/12-P: Strengthening the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (15 June 1981)

- (19) CD/207 - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on the Question of Security Assurances". (6 August 1981)
- (20) CD/215 - Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament. (14 August 1981)
and
Corr.1
- (21) CD/231 - containing General Assembly resolutions 36/94 and 36/95.
- (22) CD/243 - containing a decision of the Committee on Disarmament to re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons under its former mandate during 1980 session. (19 February 1982)
- (23) CD/278* - submitted by China, entitled "Working Paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". (15 April 1982)
- (24) CD/280 - submitted by the Group of 21, entitled "Statement of the Group of 21 on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (14 April 1982)
- (25) CD/285 - "Special Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons" to the Committee on Disarmament, prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (19 April 1982)

"II. Working papers of the Ad Hoc Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) CD/SA WP.1/
Rev.3 - List of documents on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. (23 February 1982)
- (2) CD/SA/WP.2 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: A. Scope and nature of the arrangements". (25 June 1980)
- (3) CD/SA/WP.3 - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft resolution by the United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (15 July 1980)

- (4) CD/SA/WP.4 - submitted by Bulgaria, entitled "Forms of arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (17 July 1980)
- (5) CD/SA/WP.5 - submitted by the Chairman, entitled: "Stages of consideration of the substance of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (26 March 1981)
- (6) CD/SA/WP.6 - submitted by the Netherlands, containing a suggested
(CD/SA/CRP.6) "common formula" for negative security assurances to be incorporated in a Security Council resolution. (8 July 1981)
- (7) CD/SA/WP.7 - submitted by Pakistan, containing proposals in connection
(CD/SA/CRP.7) with Alternative D in Stage Two of document CD/SA/WP.5. (13 July 1981)
- (8) CD/SA/WP.8 - submitted by Bulgaria, containing considerations in
(CD/SA/CRP.8 connection with "Alternative D, Stage Two, document
and Corr.1) CD/SA/WP.5" and the suggestions made under it. (21 July 1981)
- (9) CD/SA/WP.9 - submitted by the Netherlands, entitled "Draft resolution of the Security Council embodying a 'common formula' to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (1 April 1982)
- (10) CD/SA/WP.3/ - submitted by Pakistan, entitled "Possible draft
Rev.1* resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons' ". (7 April 1982)

"III. A compilation of material for the use of members of the ad hoc working group established by the Committee on Disarmament on 5 July 1979 to consider and negotiate on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

- (1) Statements made at the plenary and ad hoc committee meetings of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
- (2) Statements made at the plenary and the First Committee of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly
 - (a) Plenary
 - (b) First Committee (General)
 - (c) First Committee (Soviet Draft Convention);

- (3) Declarations made by the five nuclear weapon States containing assurances not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;
- (4) Security Council resolution 255 (1968);
- (5) General Assembly resolutions on the non-use of nuclear weapons;
- (6) Resolution on security assurances adopted by the Non-nuclear Weapon States Conference of 1968;
- (7) Part of the 1975 NPT Review Conference Final Document, relevant to security assurances;
- (8) Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, paragraphs 56-59 on security assurances;
- (9) Addendum and supplements to the Compilation:
 - (i) "Proposal of the United States of America on strengthening confidence of non-nuclear-weapon States in their security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" (A/C.1/33/7, 17 November 1978);
 - (ii) General Assembly resolution 2936 (XXVII): Non-use of force in international relations and permanent prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons;
 - (iii) "Working paper containing a draft additional protocol to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons regarding the establishment of a system of security assurances within the framework of the Treaty" (NPT/CONF/22, 15 May 1975);
 - (iv) Declarations made by the United Kingdom, China, France, United States of America and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics regarding Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

"IV. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly

"V. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly

"VI. A compilation of statements made on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons during the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly

"VII. Unofficial transcriptions of the proceedings of the ad hoc working groups on security assurances

- (1) Unofficial transcriptions of seven meetings of the ad hoc working group during 1979.

"ANNEX II

"CHINA

"Working Paper

"On Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons

"Since its establishment over two years ago, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons has held detailed and intensive discussions on the substance and form of negative security assurances. Faced with grave nuclear threat, numerous non-nuclear-weapon States call upon the nuclear-weapon States to provide unconditional assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, and to conclude an international convention of a legally binding character. The Chinese delegation supports this reasonable demand. In the past two years and more, because the major nuclear powers which possess the largest nuclear arsenals imposed various conditions on non-nuclear-weapon States, no concrete result has been achieved so far in the negotiations on security assurances. The Chinese delegation believes that it is a minimum obligation of all the nuclear-weapon States to provide non-nuclear-weapon States with adequate security assurances, and in particular that the major nuclear powers with the largest nuclear arsenals bear primary responsibility in this respect. What the non-nuclear-weapon States ask for is unconditional assurances. They have rightly pointed out that demanding conditional assurances is tantamount to seeking security assurances for nuclear-weapon States from non-nuclear-weapon States. This is obviously unfair and unjust.

"The Chinese delegation wishes to reiterate its position as follows: the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and nuclear threats. Pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear free-zones. China has already, on its own initiative and unilaterally, declared that at no time and in no circumstances would it be the first to use nuclear weapons. In connection with this fundamental position, China will unconditionally not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

"Resolution 36/95 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. It is our hope that the major nuclear powers shall not proceed from their own narrow interests and shall refrain from imposing various conditions with regard to security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. Moreover, they should respond positively to the reasonable demands voiced by a great number of non-nuclear-weapon States and demonstrate their political will to shoulder responsibilities with a view to ensuring progress in negotiations on security assurance. Together with the representatives of other countries, the Chinese delegation is ready to make further efforts to seek a "common formula" in consonance with demands of non-nuclear-weapon States and acceptable to all States.

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"INDEX III

"THE NETHERLANDS:- WORKING PAPER

"Draft Resolution of the Security Council embodying a common formula to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

"The Security Council,

"Considering the devastation that would be inflicted upon mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples,

"Convinced that the most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons,

"Recognizing that pending the achievement of this goal, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war,

"Further convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare,

"Welcoming therefore the acceptance by a large and growing number of States of internationally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices),

"Recognizing the need to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, and in particular to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Welcoming in this respect the adherence by five nuclear-weapon States to additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,

"Acknowledging that States find themselves in different security situations, and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of different States,

"Reaffirming the inherent right, recognized under Article 51 of the Charter, of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security,

"Welcomes the solemn undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon State that has committed itself not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons (or other nuclear explosive devices) or to acquire control over them, provided that State does not undertake, or partake in, an attack upon (the territory or the armed forces of) a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State.

"ANNEX IV

"PAKISTAN: WORKING PAPER

"Possible draft resolution for adoption by United Nations Security Council as an interim measure on 'Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons'"

"The Security Council,

"Bearing in mind the need to allay the legitimate concern of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples,

"Convinced that nuclear weapons pose the greatest threat to mankind and the survival of civilization,

"Deeply concerned at the continued escalation of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Convinced that nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons are essential to remove the danger of nuclear war,

"Recognizing that the independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of non-nuclear-weapon States need to be safeguarded against the use or threat of use of force, including the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,

"Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarter,

"Bearing in mind paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in which it requested the nuclear-weapon States urgently to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"Noting the negotiations undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament on the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

"Noting the report of the Committee on Disarmament,

"Further noting the general support expressed for the elaboration of an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and that there is no objection, in principle to the idea of an international convention,

"Acting under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter in response to the threat to peace posed by the possibility of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons:

"1. Calls upon those States possessing nuclear weapons to undertake in a legally binding instrument not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States;

"2. Urges the Committee on Disarmament to pursue negotiations for this purpose and conclude, without delay, a binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

"3. Requests the nuclear-weapon States to pursue these negotiations in good faith and to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a legally binding instrument, in particular by appropriately revising their respective unilateral declarations on this question, taking into account especially the views and positions of the non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

"4. Urges the nuclear-weapon States, as a provisional and immediate measure, to confirm, in a legally binding manner, that they will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of the two major military alliances;

"5. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

"ANNEX V

"STATEMENT a/ OF THE GROUP OF 21 ON EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL
ARRANGEMENTS TO ASSURE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES AGAINST
THE USE OR THREAT OF USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

"1. The Group of 21 believes that the most effective assurances of security against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should refrain from any activity in the nuclear field which would jeopardize the security and well-being of the peoples of non-nuclear-weapon States. The nuclear-weapon States have an obligation to guarantee that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. The Group of 21, therefore, welcomed the establishment of an ad hoc Working Group to reach agreement on "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

"2. Most regrettably, three years of negotiations in the ad hoc Working Group have produced only marginal progress. This is due principally to the inflexible positions taken by some nuclear-weapon States.

"3. The Group of 21 is firmly convinced that the limitations, conditions and exceptions contained in the unilateral declarations of some nuclear-weapon States reflect their subjective approach and that these declarations are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Taken together, these conditions, limitations and exceptions have the effect of severely restricting such positive features as may be contained in these unilateral declarations and they are, therefore, unacceptable to members of the Group of 21. The declarations do not offer a credible assurance to non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear-weapon States that they will not be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons.

"4. The Group of 21 notes that in accordance with paragraph 62 of the Final Document, the nuclear-weapon States have given undertakings to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States which are members of the existing nuclear weapon free zone. Besides these States, other neutral, non-aligned and developing countries outside the two major military alliances are committed not to acquire or manufacture nuclear weapons. There is therefore every reason for these States being covered by the same legally binding assurances, especially if one takes into account that the nuclear-weapon States were urged in paragraph 59 to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"5. The Group of 21 emphasizes that an agreement on the question of "effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons" should be based on the following principles:

- (i) The nuclear weapon States have an obligation to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

a/ The Statement represents the common denominator of the positions of the members of the Group of 21.

"(ii) Non-nuclear weapon States have the right to be assured by the nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;

"(iii) Such assurances should be provided in a legally binding and multilaterally negotiated international instrument. The Group of 21 notes with satisfaction that there is no objection, in principle, within the Committee on Disarmament to the idea of an international convention;

"(iv) A common formula or common approach to be included in an international instrument on this question should be clear and credible, and respond both to the legitimate security concerns of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States as well as to the views of the Group of 21 stated above;

"(v) The agreement on this question should encompass commitments by the nuclear weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament and pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament to prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"6. The Group of 21 considers that further negotiations in the ad hoc working group on this item are unlikely to be fruitful so long as the nuclear weapon States do not exhibit a genuine political will to reach a satisfactory agreement. The Group, therefore, urges the nuclear weapon States concerned to review their policies and to present revised positions on the subject to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which shall fully take into account the position of the non-aligned, neutral and other non-nuclear weapon States. Such an undertaking would facilitate the task of elaborating an agreed international instrument on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It would also contribute towards progress in achieving an international agreement on the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament."

D. Chemical Weapons

64. The Committee on Disarmament has been dealing with the question of chemical weapons as item 4 of its agenda since April 1979. As from 1980 this item has been mainly considered by an ad hoc working group of the Committee. The latest report of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which was prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, contains a description of the work of that subsidiary body (CD/201 Rev.1).

65. During the 1980 session, Ambassador Y. Okawa (Japan) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador C. Lidgard (Sweden) and Ambassador B. Sujka (Poland) were, respectively, Chairmen during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 54 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain and Switzerland.

66. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

"I. Introduction

"Taking into consideration paragraph 75 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament which, while noting that negotiations had been proceeding for several years stated that the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations, the Committee on Disarmament has consistently included the item 'chemical weapons' on its agenda since 1979. In 1979, before the establishment of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the item was dealt with in plenary meetings. In considering this item on its agenda, the Committee has been taking into account the provisions of existing international instruments on the subject as well as all proposals and documents, including draft texts of chemical weapons conventions and joint United States-USSR reports on progress in the bilateral negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons, (CD/48, CD/112) presented within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Committee on Disarmament (CD), the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. A list of all the documents of the Committee on Disarmament submitted under the agenda item entitled 'Chemical Weapons', as well as of the documents of the Working Group which included working papers and conference room papers, is contained in the annex to this report.

"II. Mandate and substantive considerations of the Working Group in 1980 and 1981

"In 1980, the Committee on Disarmament established an ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons by the following decision.

'In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1980 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to define, through substantive examination, issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives.'

"Under its 1980 mandate, the Working Group having agreed to structure its work under the three general headings of 'scope', 'verification' and 'other matters', undertook a substantive examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the basis of this examination, the issues on which convergence of views among participating delegations emerged and those where no convergence of views existed were ascertained (document CD/131/Rev.1).

"The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981, to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

"In 1981, the Working Group carried out a detailed examination of draft Elements of a chemical weapons convention, as proposed by the Chairman. These draft Elements covered the following issues: general provision; general definition of chemical weapons; prohibition of transfer; declarations; destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion; super-toxic lethal chemicals for non-hostile military purposes; relationship with other treaties; international co-operation; general provision on verification; national legislation and verification measures; national technical means of verification, consultation and co-operation; consultative committee; amendments; review conference; duration and withdrawals, signature, ratification, accession, and the distribution of the convention. The questions related to definitions and criteria, declaration of possession of stocks of chemical weapons and means of production of chemical weapons, plans for their destruction or diversion for permitted purposes in time frames as well as forms of making such declarations were dealt with in annexes to the Elements. The same approach was suggested by the Chairman with respect to the destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production, the recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system, as well as the details of the organization and procedures of the consultative committee. The Chairman revised the draft Elements on the basis of statements as well as of that of oral and written comments of delegations. These Elements, as revised by the Chairman, did not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues. The revised text of the Chairman's Elements, together with comments reflecting views put forward by delegations, were attached to the Group's 1981 report to the Committee (document CD/220).

"III. Present state in the elaboration of a convention

"In 1982, the Committee on Disarmament decided on the following mandate for the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons:

...'In discharging its responsibility for the negotiation and elaboration as a matter of high priority, of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an ad hoc working group of the Committee to elaborate such a convention, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiative with a view to enabling the Committee to achieve agreement at the earliest date.'...

"The Group, during the first part of its 1982 session began the elaboration of the provisions of a convention. At the suggestion of the Chairman, it carried out another detailed examination of the revised Elements and of the Comments thereto, with a view to elaborating alternative and supplementary formulations in particular corresponding to the views originally expressed in the Comments. These considerations of the revised Elements were grouped under the three previously agreed headings of 'scope', 'verification' and 'other matters'. A number of delegations submitted conference room papers containing new wording corresponding to their views originally reflected in the Comments. In addition, some delegations submitted related proposals in plenary statements and CD documents. Wording was also proposed for certain Elements and Annexes which had not been dealt with during the 1981 session. The Chairman submitted a proposal for the Preamble to a future convention.

"The process of resolving differences of views continued. There was common understanding that the scope of the prohibition should include all existing and possible types of chemical weapons. The ad hoc Working Group examined in greater detail the major outstanding problems of the scope of the prohibition and of questions related to verification. The main differences regarding the scope concern the inclusion of provisions in the convention prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, provisions regarding the applicability of the convention with respect to animals and plants, whether it should include the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the purpose of utilizing the toxic properties of chemicals in combat, and provisions on the non-stationing of chemical weapons on the territories of other States. Questions regarding the balance between national and international verification the appropriateness of the inclusion of a provision on the use of national technical means of verification, the organization and functions of the Consultative Committee and the national verification or implementation system, as well as the issues of when on-site inspection shall take place and how a prohibition of binary chemical weapons should be verified remain to be agreed upon. A better understanding was reached of the need to ensure that verification of compliance with the convention be based on an adequate combination of national and international means. Measures relating to the implementation of the convention, such as declarations, were examined in more detail. Specific proposals were also put forward by a number of delegations with a view to improving the possible structure of a future convention. The revised Elements and Comments included in the 1981 report of the Working Group to the CD as well as the proposals and suggested texts submitted during the first part of the Committee's 1982 session will constitute a valuable basis for the Group's future work.

"Following the practice introduced in 1981 by the Chairman to hold consultations on certain technical questions relevant to the future convention, the Chairman, at the Group's 1982 session, convened consultations on issues recommended for further examination in the Group's 1981 report. The 1982 consultations dealt specifically with methods to be agreed upon for toxicity determinations in connection with a chemical weapons convention. The Chairman reported to the Working Group that the participants in these consultations unanimously recommended standardized operating procedures for two specific types of toxicity determinations. The Working Group took note of the Chairman's report on the consultations and of the recommendations for standardized operating procedures. The Group agreed on the desirability of continuing consultations to allow for the examination of additional technical questions including some outstanding toxicological issues in relation to a chemical weapons convention.

"The urgency of achieving real progress towards the conclusion of a convention on chemical weapons was unanimously recognized by the Working Group especially in the light of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Accordingly, the Working Group endorsed the appeal of its Chairman for even more substantive contributions to advance the process of elaborating provisions of the convention at the earliest possible date.

"ANNEX

"List of Documents on Chemical Weapons

"A. Documents of the Committee on Disarmament

In 1979

- Document CD/5, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of Italy, containing a working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations.
- Document CD/6, dated 6 February 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, concerning some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons.
- Document CD/11, dated 9 April 1979, submitted by the Group of 21, containing a working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.
- Document CD/14, dated 25 April 1979, submitted by Finland, containing a working document entitled 'Chemical identification of chemical weapons agents; a Finnish Project'.
- Document CD/15, dated 24 April 1979, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom, on a visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979).
- Document CD/21, dated 20 June 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
- Document CD/26, dated 1 July 1979, submitted by the Secretariat in compliance with the decision of the Committee at its 31st plenary meeting, containing a compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament Working Papers and Statements, 1972-1979.
- Document CD/37, dated 12 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Working Paper on Some Aspects of International Verification of Non-Production of Chemical Weapons: Experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany'.
- Document CD/39, dated 16 July 1979, submitted by Finland, concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents -- an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data.
- Document CD/41, dated 25 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'A working paper containing questions relevant to a Convention prohibiting chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/44, dated 26 July 1979, submitted by the delegation of Poland, containing a working paper on an outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

- Document CD/48, dated 7 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, entitled 'USSR-United States Joint Report on Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/49, dated 8 August 1979, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'Chemical Weapons -- Answers to Questionnaire contained in CD/41'.
- Document CD/52, dated 13 August 1979, submitted by the delegations of France, Italy and the Netherlands, entitled 'Chemical weapons -- Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to a prohibition of chemical weapons'.

In 1980

- Document CD/59, dated 12 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Australia and entitled 'Chemical weapons: Proposal for Informal Meetings with Experts'.
- Document CD/68, dated 28 February 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Chemical weapons -- a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: working paper'.
- Document CD/82, dated 20 March 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 18 March 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam transmitting a document entitled 'Memorandum on the use of chemicals by the United States of America in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea'.'
- Document CD/84, dated 26 March 1980, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, containing a working document entitled 'Draft Initial Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/85, dated 27 March 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea transmitting two documents entitled 'Statement of 5 February 1980 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on the intensification by Hanoi of the use of chemical weapons and other activities to exterminate the Kampuchean People' and 'The use of chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea; Report issued by the Ministry of Information of Democratic Kampuchea on 25 February 1980'.'
- Document CD/89, dated 14 April 1980, and entitled 'Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan transmitting a 'Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980'.'
- Document CD/94, dated 18 April 1980 submitted by the delegation of Belgium and entitled 'Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions'.
- Document CD/96, dated 22 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Ad Hoc working group on CW -- Initial Work Programme: Working Document'.

- Document CD/97, dated 24 April 1980, submitted by the delegation of Sweden and entitled 'Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability'.
- Document CD/102, dated 19 June 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 19 June 1980 from the Acting Head of the Chinese delegation, transmitting a working paper on the 'Chinese Delegation's proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons'.'
- Document CD/103, dated 24 June 1980, entitled 'Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland transmitting a document entitled 'Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents'.'
- Document CD/105, dated 27 June 1980, entitled 'Elements of a reply by the French delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)'.
- Document CD/106, dated 27 June 1980, submitted by the delegation of France, containing a working paper entitled 'Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare'.
- Document CD/110, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled 'Working Paper on Medical Protection Against Nerve Gas Poisoning (Present Situation and Future Possibilities)'.
- Document CD/111, dated 2 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia and entitled 'Working Paper on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)'.
- Document CD/112, dated 7 July 1980, submitted by the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, transmitting a document entitled 'USSR-United States Joint Report on the Progress in the Bilateral Negotiations on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/113, dated 8 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled 'Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/114, dated 9 July 1980, entitled 'Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in Document CD/41'.
- Document CD/117, dated 10 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Canada and entitled 'Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/121, dated 17 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Poland and entitled 'Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a CW convention: working paper'.
- Document CD/122, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Morocco and entitled 'Proposed definition of chemical weapons'.

- Document CD/123, dated 21 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Mongolia, containing a working document entitled 'Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925'.
- Document CD/124, dated 24 July 1980, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia and entitled 'Some views on the prohibition of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/131/Rev.1, dated 4 August 1980, entitled 'Report to the Committee on Disarmament - Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/132, dated 1 August 1980, containing a working paper entitled 'Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of Document CD/89'.

In 1981

- Document CD/142, dated 10 February 1981, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper: Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/164, dated 19 March 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Creation of chemical weapons control capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project'.
- Document CD/167, dated 26 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities'.
- Document CD/168, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Working Paper - Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents'.
- Document CD/169, dated 27 March 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Working Paper: Dismantling of Production Facilities/Mean of Production for Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/173, dated 3 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'Disposal of Chemical Agents'.
- Document CD/178, dated 16 April 1981, submitted by Finland, which addressed an invitation of the Finnish Government to a Chemical Weapons Verification Workshop.
- Document CD/124/Rev.1, dated 24 April 1981, submitted by the delegation of Indonesia, entitled 'Revision of CD/124 on the Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent'.
- Document CD/179 and Add. 1, dated 23 April 1981, entitled 'The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.

- Document CD/183, dated 12 June 1981, submitted by the delegation of Canada, entitled 'A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification'.
- Document CD/195, dated 14 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents'.
- Document CD/196, dated 16 July 1981, submitted by Finland, entitled 'Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents'.
- Document CD/197, dated 17 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Romania entitled 'Working Paper - Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention: Definitions and Criteria'.
- Document CD/199, dated 24 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins'.
- Document CD/203, dated 30 July 1981, submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands, entitled 'Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction'.
- Document CD/212, dated 13 August 1981, submitted by the delegation of China, entitled 'Some Viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/220, dated 17 August 1981, entitled 'Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'.

In 1982

- Document CD/244, dated 18 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, entitled 'Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/253, dated 25 February 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Tass statement'.
- Document CD/258, and Corr.1, dated 9 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/263, dated 22 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Finland, entitled 'Working Paper on the Relation of Verification to the Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents'.

- Document C D/264, dated 23 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the United States of America, entitled 'The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare'.
- Document CD/265*/, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany, entitled 'Working Paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/266, dated 24 March 1982, submitted by the delegation of Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification'.
- Document CD/270, dated 31 March 1982, submitted by the delegations of Indonesia and The Netherlands, entitled 'Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and The Netherlands transmitting a document entitled 'Indonesia and The Netherlands - Working Document - Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java, Indonesia'.'
- Document CD/271, dated 1 April 1982, submitted by the delegations of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled 'Technical Evaluation of 'Recover' Techniques for CW Verification'.
- Document CD/275, dated 7 April 1982, entitled 'Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled 'Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals - Second Edition'.'
- Document CD/277, dated 7 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper - The concept 'precursor' and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention'.
- Document CD/279, dated 14 April 1982, submitted by the delegation of Sweden, entitled 'Working Paper - Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons'.
- Document CD/281/Rev.1, dated 26 April 1982, entitled 'Special Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament - Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'.
- Document CD/288, dated 21 April 1982, entitled 'Statement made by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group'.

"B. Working Papers and Conference Room Papers of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons

In 1980

Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.1 entitled 'Working paper introduced by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/WP.2 and Add. 1 and 2 entitled 'List of Documents' containing a list of Committee on Disarmament documents relevant to the work of the ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, circulated between July 1979 and July 1980
- CD/CW/WP.3 submitted by the United States of America entitled 'Issues to be defined by the Ad Hoc Chemical Weapons Working Group'
- CD/CW/WP.4 submitted by Sweden entitled 'Issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a Convention on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.5 submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled 'The impact of on-site inspections of current civilian production on the chemical industry'
- CD/CW/WP.6 submitted by France entitled 'Criteria for the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents'

In 1981

(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.7 and Rev.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 1'
- CD/CW/WP.8 and Corr.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 2'
- CD/CW/WP.9 submitted by Canada entitled 'Verification and Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.10 and Corr.1 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the Group -- Part 3'
- CD/CW/WP.11 submitted by Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled 'Chemical Weapons: types of activity to be covered by a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.12 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 4'
- CD/CW/WP.13 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 5'

- CD/CW/WP.14 entitled 'Outline suggested by the Chairman for the work of the group -- Part 6'
- CD/CW/WP.15 submitted by Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland entitled 'Chemical weapons: definitions'
- CD/CW/WP.16 submitted by France entitled 'Declarations and destruction of materials and facilities'
- CD/CW/WP.17 submitted by France entitled 'Chemical weapons -- definitions, criteria'
- CD/CW/WP.18 submitted by Australia entitled 'Initial Comments On the Consolidated Outline suggested by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.19 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.20 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.21 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/WP.22 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled 'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/WP.23 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Verification: Consultative Committee of Experts'
- CD/CW/WP.24 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Convention: Assistance to Parties'
- CD/CW/WP.25 submitted by Australia entitled 'Chemical Weapons Verification: The Methyl-Phosphorous "Finger Print"'

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.5 and Rev.1 and 2 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman for particular technical issues to be addressed during CD's 1981 work on chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.6 entitled 'List of topics to be discussed with regard to the definitions and criteria of importance for a chemical weapons convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.7 submitted by Belgium entitled 'Proposed definitions (revision of document CD/94)'
- CD/CW/CRP.8 submitted by France entitled 'Criteria for definition'

- CD/CW/CRP.9 entitled 'List of questions put to the delegations of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America at the meeting of 30 March 1981 with respect to the bilateral report CD/112, and outlines by the Chairman for the work of the Working Group'
- CD/CW/CRP.10 and Add.1 and 2 and Corr.1 and Rev.1 entitled 'Draft Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.11 entitled 'Note by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/CRP.12 entitled 'Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/CRP.13 and Corr.1 entitled 'Consolidated text of suggestions for elements I, I (bis) and Annex I of a Chemical Weapons Convention, received as at Friday, 26 June 1981'
- CD/CW/CRP.14 submitted by Australia entitled 'Delegation Amendments to CD/CW/WP.19 and CD/CW/WP.20, Subject to Revision'
- CD/CW/CRP.15 and Add.1 entitled 'Revised Suggestions by the Chairman for elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.16 and Add.1 entitled 'Compilation of suggested amendments to the draft Elements and Annexes proposed by the Chairman in documents CD/CW/WP.19 to 20'
- CD/CW/CRP.17/Rev.1, Add.1 and 2 and Rev. 2 and 3, and Corr.1 entitled 'Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.18 entitled 'Suggestion by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for recommendation by the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament regarding decision on further work to be undertaken on methods for toxicity determinations for a Chemical Weapons Convention'

In 1982

(i) Working Papers

- CD/CW/WP.26 submitted by the United Kingdom, entitled 'Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention' (also issued as CD/244)
- CD/CW/WP.27 and Rev.1 entitled 'Suggestions by the Chairman on the draft programme of work of the Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for the first part of its 1982 session'
- CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1 submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled 'Working paper: Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons' (also issued as CD/258)

- CD/CW/WP.29 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Questions related to the ban of binary chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/WP.30 and Corr.1 entitled 'Report of the Chairman to the Working Group on Chemical Weapons on the consultations held on issues relating to toxicity determinations'
- CD/CW/WP.31 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Working Paper: Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification' (also issued as CD/266)
- CD/CW/WP.32 submitted by the United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia, entitled 'Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for CW Verification' (also issued as CD/271)
- CD/CW/WP.33, entitled 'Compilation of revised Elements and Comments thereto (CD/220), proposed new texts and alternative wordings as well as comments on new texts'
- CD/CW/WP.34, entitled 'The Chairman's closing statement' (first part of 1982 session)

(ii) Conference Room Papers

- CD/CW/CRP.19 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision'
- CD/CW/CRP.20 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element II -- General definition of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.21 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Conference Room Paper relating to Element II -- Use of the general purpose criterion for the determination of the scope of prohibition of chemicals'
- CD/CW/CRP.22 submitted by Poland, entitled 'Suggested alternative for Element II.2'
- CD/CW/CRP.23 entitled 'Note by the Chairman -- Suggestions for consultations on toxicity determinations -- Draft time-table'
- CD/CW/CRP.24 submitted by Argentina, Australia, China, Indonesia, Pakistan, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element I -- General Provision'
- CD/CW/CRP.25 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Text proposed for new Element III bis -- Prohibition of Stationing'

- CD/CW/CRP.26 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.27 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Text proposed as a continuation to the wording for a new Element III (Bis) contained in CD/CW/CRP.25'
- CD/CW/CRP.28 submitted by Nigeria, entitled 'Text proposed in relation to Element IV.1.(b) -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.29 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Conference Room Paper, -- Abolition and non-acquisition of a chemical warfare capability after destruction of chemical weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.30 submitted by Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Proposals with respect to document CD/220, Element IV, comments 1 and 4, and Annex II, comments 1 and 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.31 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Precursors'
- CD/CW/CRP.32 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IV -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.33 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion'
- CD/CW/CRP.34 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production'
- CD/CW/CRP.35 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element IX -- General provision on verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.36 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.37 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'New text proposed as a continuation to suggested alternative wording for Element II.2 contained in CD/CW/CRP.22'
- CD/CW/CRP.38 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Comments in relation to document CD/220, Annex I, paragraphs 3 and 4 -- Definition and Criteria'

- CD/CW/CRP.39 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Proposal for new subparagraph for Element IV -- To be inserted between (b) and (c) in document CD/220, page 14 -- Declarations'
- CD/CW/CRP.40 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element V -- Destruction, diversion, dismantling and conversion'
- CD/CW/CRP.41 submitted by Yugoslavia, entitled 'Annex III -- Destruction, dismantling or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons and their means of production -- Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.42 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Annex IV -- Recommendations and guidelines concerning the functions and organization of the national verification system'
- CD/CW/CRP.43 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XI -- National technical means of verification'
- CD/CW/CRP.44 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Some observations concerning the definition of "precursors" for the purposes of the Convention'
- CD/CW/CRP.45 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element X'
- CD/CW/CRP.46 submitted by German Democratic Republic, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Elements XII-XIII'
- CD/CW/CRP.47, entitled 'Draft Preamble as suggested by the Chairman'
- CD/CW/CRP.48 submitted by Czechoslovakia, entitled 'Alternative wording for Element XVII, paragraph 3'
- CD/CW/CRP.49 submitted by Bulgaria, entitled 'Suggested text to be added at the end of existing Element XVI -- Duration and withdrawals'
- CD/CW/CRP.50 submitted by the United States of America, entitled 'Declaration of Stockpiles and Facilities'
- CD/CW/CRP.51 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for Element XIV and paragraph 1 of Element XV'

- CD/CW/CRP.52 and Rev.1, Rev.2 entitled 'Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament'
- CD/CW/CRP.53 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.54 submitted by The Netherlands, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for paragraph 3 of Element IX, paragraph 1 of Element XI, Element XII, Element XIII and text proposed for new Element XIII bis'
- CD/CW/CRP.55 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons'
- CD/CW/CRP.56 submitted by China, entitled 'Suggested alternative wording for the second paragraph of the draft preamble as suggested by the Chairman contained in CD/CW/CRP.47'
- CD/CW/CRP.57 submitted by Sweden, entitled 'Suggested wording for the report of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament concerning consultations held during the first part of the 1982 session'
- CD/CW/CRP.58, entitled 'Summary by the Chairman of initial comments made with respect to the draft Preamble (CD/CW/CRP.47)'
- CD/CW/CRP.59 submitted by Australia, entitled 'Suggestions for consultations with delegations, assisted by experts, by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons''

E. New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons;
Radiological Weapons

67. The item on the agenda entitled "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons" has been considered by the Committee since July 1979. The question of prohibiting radiological weapons has been mainly considered by an ad hoc working group of the Committee. A description of the work of that group is given in its latest report to the Committee, which was prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (CD/284/Rev.1).

68. During the 1980 and 1981 sessions, Ambassador I. Komives (Hungary) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador H. Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany) was Chairman during the 1982 session. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 49 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria and Norway.

69. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982 the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION */

"Taking into consideration paragraph 76 of the final document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, which stated that a convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, the Committee on Disarmament considered the question of concluding a treaty on radiological weapons in its 1979 session. During this session, the USSR and the United States submitted their joint USSR/United States proposal on major elements of the treaty (CD/31 and CD/32). Other proposals were also submitted.

"Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 34/37 A entitled "Conclusion of an international convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons", the Committee on Disarmament at its 69th Plenary Meeting held on 17 March 1980 adopted the decision reading, inter alia,

'The Committee on Disarmament decided to establish for the duration of its 1980 session an ad hoc working group of the Committee with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.'

"The Working Group was re-established by the Committee in 1981 at its 105th Plenary Meeting on 12 February 1981 to continue its work on the basis of its former mandate.

"During the 1980/1981 sessions of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Imre Kórnives (Hungary) held further discussions on the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the Chairman's Consolidated Text (CD/RW/WP.20) and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating the draft provisions for the treaty on radiological weapons (CD/133 and CD/223).

"The activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group during that period showed that, while further efforts were made to narrow down the existing difficulties, divergencies still existed, particularly on the scope of the prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the proposed treaty with other international agreements and other measures in the field of disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.

*/ A list of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers (1979-1982) submitted in connection with the question of radiological weapons is attached as Annex I to this report.

"In 1980 and 1981, several specific suggestions were put forward in the Working Group in connection with the scope of the treaty. It was stated that the work of the Committee on Disarmament should be oriented towards the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of use of radioactive material for hostile purposes.

"Some delegations argued that there existed a very real risk of mass destruction from dissemination of radioactive substances through attacks on nuclear facilities. Those delegations believed that the treaty on radiological weapons would form an appropriate legal framework for an undertaking not to attack nuclear facilities or to deliberately damage such facilities.

"Other delegations considered that an obligation to this effect would fall outside the framework of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. It was also felt that an attempt to deal in the same negotiations with the prohibition of radiological weapons and with the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities would complicate the negotiations and make elaboration of any agreement on either matter impracticable. They believed that the issues relating to nuclear facilities were already covered by the Geneva Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), 1977, and that any additional measures to protect nuclear facilities should be considered within the framework of international humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict.

"Other delegations expressed the view that the existing international instruments on the subject were partial and ambiguous, and that the Committee on Disarmament was fully competent to consider the matter.

"Some delegations also expressed the view that as a compromise the idea of holding separate negotiations on this question should be reflected in the text of the treaty or in a separate statement.

"II. Present state of negotiations on elaboration of the Treaty prohibiting radiological weapons

"A. Organization of work and procedures

"In pursuance of the Committee's decision on subsidiary bodies, on 18 February 1982 (CD/243), the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons was re-established on the basis of its former mandate. The Working Group held 12 meetings between 20 February and 2 April 1982 under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Dr. Henning Wegener (Federal Republic of Germany). Mr. Guennady Efimov of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament served as Secretary of the Working Group.

"At their request, representatives of the following States, non-members of the Committee on Disarmament, were invited to participate in the meetings of the Working Group during its 1982 session: Austria, Norway.

"In addition to the earlier resolutions the Working Group also took into account resolution 36/97 B of the General Assembly which contained an appeal to complete its negotiations in order to allow a treaty to be submitted if possible to the General Assembly at its Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament.

"Following consultations, the Chairman, on 9 March 1982, gave a comprehensive report (CD/RW/WP.25), advancing on a personal basis a certain number of suggestions as to the procedure to adopt, and as to possible compromises for the still unresolved problems.

"At the suggestion of the Chairman, on 15 March 1982 the Working Group agreed, as a procedural hypothesis and without prejudice to later decisions, to conduct separate meetings on the "traditional" */ radiological weapons subject matter, on the one hand, and on the question of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities on the other (CD/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1).

"In this connection, some reservations were expressed. Some delegations maintained that such a procedural hypothesis should not be interpreted as signifying the commencement of negotiations on the subject of prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities. Some delegations, while prepared to participate in the meetings, expressed doubts as to the competence of the Committee on Disarmament (or competence of the Working Group) to negotiate the question of protecting nuclear facilities from attack. Some delegations expressly reserved their position as to the competence of the Committee to deal with this matter. Some other delegations made clear that the consideration of that question could, in their view, only be of an exploratory nature at this time. Some delegations believed that the two subjects on which negotiations were being conducted in accordance with the proposed procedure should be treated equally on a non-discriminatory basis with a view to incorporating them in the same legal instrument. Other delegations expressly reserved their position with respect to the number and form of the future legal instrument(s) on the subjects under consideration.

"B. 'Traditional' RW subject matter

"The Working Group on Radiological Weapons held three meetings devoted to consideration of the matters related to the "traditional" radiological weapons subject matter. While some new possible compromise formulations were advanced, the negotiations showed that differences still exist regarding, in particular, the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of prohibition, verification and compliance, peaceful uses, relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with nuclear disarmament, and some aspects of the final clauses. Some delegations reminded the Working Group of their view that some draft articles might have to be revised, in view of their intention to have the ban on attacks on nuclear facilities included as an integral part of the Treaty.

"With regard to the formulation of a definition of radiological weapons and because of the objections by some delegations to the inclusion of an explicit clause excluding nuclear weapons from the treaty, attempts were made to develop a "positive definition" which would not include such a clause. Some specific suggestions were made in this respect (CD/RW/WP.26, 30, 31 and Add.1).

"Although no formulation was found to be entirely acceptable, from either the technical or legal point of view, the Working Group felt that efforts in this direction should be continued. While some delegations expressed their readiness to participate in those efforts, they still believed that the most effective way to define radiological weapons could be through maintaining an exclusion clause. Other delegations continued to believe that this would amount to a legitimization of nuclear weapons. Some delegations maintained their doubts as to the feasibility of including certain radioactive materials in the definition of radiological weapons.

*/ The Working Group agreed that for the purposes of this report the term "traditional" should be employed as a convenient reference to the scope of prohibition envisaged in the joint proposal contained in documents CD/31 and CD/32.

"In connection with the scope of prohibition some delegations maintained that the use of the term radiological warfare would depend on the scope of the future treaty. Other delegations felt that the concept of radiological warfare has no place in the framework of such a treaty.

"The view was also expressed that the treaty should not only address the prevention of the emergence of **radiological** weapons as a specific type of weapon, but also to the prohibition of the use of radiation from the decay of radioactive materials for hostile purposes.

"Some delegations maintained that the future treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons should contain an explicit commitment to urgently pursue negotiations for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, the conclusion of effective measures to prevent the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. In this connection the text of an article for inclusion in the treaty was proposed by the Group of 21 */ (CD/RW/WP.36). Other delegations were of the view that this article was inappropriate for inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty.

"As regards peaceful uses, there was widespread recognition that the treaty should contain an appropriately balanced article which would include a provision relating to the strengthening of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of sources of radiation from radioactive decay and a provision stating that nothing in the treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of the Parties to the Treaty to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to international co-operation in this field; the Working Group, however, had not completed its consideration of the precise wording of these provisions.

"On the question of compliance and verification, some delegations were of the view that the procedures provided in the joint USSR/United States proposal correspond to the subject and scope of the treaty on prohibition of radiological weapons and should be fully maintained, including the provision for lodging complaints, in case of an alleged breach of the Treaty, with the United Nations Security Council.

"Some delegations disagreed with these views and held that the procedures for lodging complaints under the Treaty should not refer to the Security Council or other organs of the United Nations, since such procedures were, in any event, available under the United Nations Charter, and that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be the focal point for complaints and verification matters under the treaty. It was suggested that the Consultative Committee of Experts should be provided with broad investigatory powers so as to include, in the view of some delegations, provisions for on-site inspections. Some delegations advocated a two-tiered structure for the verification régime under the treaty, with a Consultative Committee of Experts as a fact-finding and evaluating body, and a General Assembly of States Parties as a political forum for consideration of alleged breaches of the treaty. It was agreed that the issues of compliance and verification under the treaty needed further consideration.

*/ Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Some delegations pointed out that the detailed elaboration of the provisions on verification and compliance would require the prior solution of the outstanding issues relating to the scope of prohibition.

With regard to the final clauses, the proposal was made for a more elaborate procedure to act upon proposed amendments (CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1); the general idea of this amendment was supported by some delegations. While some divergencies persisted as to the time intervals between entry into force and holding of a first and subsequent review conferences, the view was expressed that these differences could, perhaps, be overcome.

The view was widely held that the treaty should enter into force upon the deposit of the instruments of ratification by a lower number than 25 hitherto discussed and the number of 15 was advanced in this context, while some delegations reaffirmed their position that the treaty should enter into force upon its ratification by 25 governments, including the nuclear weapon States.

"C. Consideration of the question relating to the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities

The Working Group also held three meetings devoted to consideration of some issues of relevance relating to the question of protecting nuclear facilities. During these meetings a number of delegations reiterated their reservation as stated in paragraph 16 above. One delegation did not take part in the meetings.

The discussion on the prohibition of attack on nuclear facilities followed the outline in the working paper CD/RW/WP.33 proposed by the Chairman and centered around the definition of facilities to be protected and the scope of a possible prohibition.

The Working Group heard technical explanations from some delegations as to the destructive effects that could result from attacks on nuclear power reactors exceeding a certain minimum thermal power, reprocessing plants and storage facilities of irradiated material and waste. It was pointed out that attacks on such facilities could possibly result in mass destruction, whereas in the case of certain other facilities, attacks on them would not result in mass destruction because of their low inventory of radioactive material or the lack of such inventory. A certain number of divergencies in relation to these issues appeared.

Some delegations proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should be as comprehensive as possible. Since the basic objective was, in their view, to prevent mass destruction, there could be no justification to differentiate between civilian and military facilities. They also believed that mass destruction would result from attacks on either kind of facilities. However, in their view, mass destruction was not the only criterion relevant to this issue. They argued that an important objective of the proposed instrument was to restore confidence among the countries regarding their peaceful nuclear programmes. This confidence had, in their opinion, been severely eroded in the wake of the Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of a developing country. Therefore, they argued that the scope of the prohibition should include not only the larger nuclear fuel cycle facilities but also the smaller research reactors and other facilities. To exclude the latter, in their view, would constitute gross discrimination against the developing countries. In this connection, a specific proposal on the definition of facilities to be protected was put forward by one delegation (CD/RW/CRP.16).

"Some other delegations felt that it would create serious and possibly insuperable difficulties to grant protection to all nuclear facilities and that in this context it would be appropriate to introduce a threshold of minimum inventory of radioactivity (and of a minimum thermal power in the case of nuclear reactors) so as to eliminate from the protection facilities which, in case of attack, would not cause mass destruction. In this regard, it was particularly emphasized by these delegations that a prohibition of attacks on facilities, which would not result in any radiological damage, would provide a disincentive to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes to the benefit of mankind. Some delegations held that the inclusion of military installations would entail very complex problems. A working paper on definition and scope of prohibition was put before the Working Group by one delegation (CD/RW/WP.34).

Some delegations noted however that this very working paper stated that "there may be good arguments that all facilities of the kind mentioned above should be protected by a radiological weapons convention be they civilian, military or dual purpose". A partial ban could, in their view, legitimize attacks on certain nuclear facilities resulting in mass destruction and thus contravene the main objective of the prohibition and increase the difficulties of compliance and verification. They also pointed out that the promotion of nuclear energy, at least in the developing countries was not being impeded by public opinion in these countries but by the restrictive policies of certain industrialized countries.

On the other hand, it was pointed out that such a comprehensive ban could not be reasonably expected to be successfully negotiated or, alternatively, to receive the necessary number of ratifications to make it a viable and effective instrument of international law, and thus to remove the danger of mass destruction. The delegation, whose Working Paper had been quoted in the preceding paragraph, drew attention to the fact that the Paper in this context also contained the following statement: "The political difficulties of protecting military facilities in an international instrument are obvious, and such facilities therefore seem to have to be excluded from a convention".

It was, however, stated by some delegations that such political difficulties as may be involved were not sufficient reason for a partial prohibition. In their view such an approach would leave open the possibility of legitimizing mass destruction in the conduct of warfare.

Some other delegations believed many of the arguments advanced above were inaccurate and further had little to do with the issues at hand.

The divergencies could not be settled in the course of the three meetings of the Working Group. Some delegations felt that the topic needed further clarification and discussion. They also felt that a detailed discussion on the remaining issues of the Chairman's provisional checklist (CD/RW/WP.33) would also require a solution of these basic differences of view on definition of facilities and scope of prohibition.

ANNEX I

LIST

of Documents, Working Papers and Conference Room Papers

I. Documents and Working Papers

1. CD/31 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
2. CD/32 United States of America: Agreed joint United States-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
3. CD/40 Hungary: Working paper on the draft preamble part of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
4. CD/42 German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
5. CD/104
 (also as CD/RW/WP.1) Secretariat: Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979-1980.
6. CD/133 Report to the Committee on Disarmament: Ad Hoc Working Group established with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. (1 August 1980)
7. CD/218 Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (14 August 1981)
8. CD/RW/WP.2/Rev.1 Chairman: Main elements in the negotiations of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons.
9. CD/RW/WP.3 Canada: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
10. CD/RW/WP.4 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposed new Article V.

11. CD/RW/WP.5 Federal Republic of Germany: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
12. CD/RW/WP.6 Sweden: Proposals for Articles I, II, and III of a treaty prohibiting radiological warfare including the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
13. CD/RW/WP.7 Italy: Comments on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons (Document CD/31 and CD/32).
14. CD/RW/WP.8 France: Proposed amendments to the agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a Treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.
15. CD/RW/WP.9 Pakistan: Revised Article V; new article after Article V.
16. CD/RW/WP.10 Yugoslavia: Proposal for an article of the treaty related to the definition of radiological weapons.
17. CD/RW/WP.11 Argentina: Observations of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons.
18. CD/RW/WP.12 Venezuela: Proposals for amendments to the "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapon."
19. CD/RW/WP.14 Sweden: Proposal for a study on IAEA safeguards.
20. CD/RW/WP.15 Tabulation of proposals submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons on a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons (prepared by the Secretariat).
21. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.1/Rev.1 India: Proposals for amendments of Article I, II, III, V and VII of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
22. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2 Indonesia: Statement delivered by the delegation of Indonesia at the fourth meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 13 March 1981.

23. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.2/Supp.1 Indonesia: Comment on the agreed joint USSR-United States CD/31-CD/32 especially paragraph 3, Article VIII concerning compliance and verification and on the French proposal contained in CD/RW/WP.8.
24. CD/RW/WP.15/Add.3 Yugoslavia: Proposal for amendments to Article II of the elements of the proposed Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Radiological Weapons.
25. CD/RW/WP.16/Rev.1 Report to the Committee on Disarmament.
26. CD/RW/WP.17 The Chairman's brief delivered at the First meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons held on 20 February 1981.
27. CD/RW/WP.18 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on definition and scope of prohibition of a future treaty.
28. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on activities and obligations and peaceful uses.
29. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on relationship with other Disarmament measures and agreements and compliance and verification.
30. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.2/Supp.1 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative text for Annex.
31. CD/RW/WP.18/Add.3 The Chairman's Working Paper containing alternative texts of Articles on Amendments, Duration and Withdrawal Review Conferences, Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary.
32. CD/RW/WP.19 Sweden: Memorandum on certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare.
33. CD/RW/WP.20 The Chairman's Working Paper containing consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman.
34. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1 Sweden: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
35. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.1/Supp.1 Morocco: Proposal for Article VI of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
36. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.2 Japan: Proposed amendment to Article V of CD/RW/WP.20.
37. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.3 Federal Republic of Germany: Proposal for Article VII and Annex of the consolidated text by the Chairman.

38. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.4 Sweden: Proposal for Article VIII of the consolidated text by the Chairman.
39. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.5 Venezuela: Proposed amendment to Article IX of document CD/RW/WP.20.
40. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.6 Morocco: Proposed amendment to Article VII of document CD/RW/WP.20.
41. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.7 The Chairman's Working Paper on definition and scope of prohibition.
42. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.8 The Chairman's Working Paper on peaceful uses.
43. CD/RW/WP.20/Add.9/Rev.1 The Netherlands: Proposed Amendments to Articles VIII and X.
44. CD/RW/WP.21 The Chairman's Working Paper containing time-table for the work of the Working Group during the Second part of the CD 1981 session.
45. CD/RW/WP.22 Australia: Working Paper on scope and definition of the future Treaty on Radiological Weapons.
46. CD/RW/WP.23 Group of 21: Working Paper on certain elements of the Convention on the Prohibition.
47. CD/RW/WP.24 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
48. CD/RW/WP.24/Rev.1 Draft Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.
49. CD/RW/WP.25 Chairman's Statement (9 March 1982).
50. CD/RW/WP.25/Add.1/Rev.1 Chairman's Amended Proposal for the organization of work during the opening session (adopted by the Working Group on 15 March 1982).
51. CD/RW/WP.26 Chairman's Working Paper: Positive formulations of an RW Definition (Synopsis).
52. CD/RW/WP.27* Tentative Programme of Work (Submitted by the Chairman).
53. CD/RW/WP.28 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulation of the provision on scope of the Radiological Weapons Treaty.
54. CD/RW/WP.29 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested formulations of the provisions on peaceful uses.
55. CD/RW/WP.30 Yugoslavia: Definition of Radiological Weapons - Article II.

56. CD/RW/WP.31 Australia: Proposal on Definition and Scope of Prohibition (giving two alternative texts).
57. CD/RW/WP.32 Chairman's Working Paper: Suggested mechanism of compliance and verification (following on Document CD/RW/WP.20).
58. CD/RW/WP.33 Chairman's Summary of suggested issues of initial relevance relating to protection of nuclear facilities for discussion during Working Group meetings on 26 March and 2 April 1982.
59. CD/RW/WP.34 Sweden: Memorandum of certain aspects of a convention prohibiting radiological warfare (5 April 1982).
60. CD/RW/WP.35 Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament in view of the Second Special Session devoted to Disarmament: submitted by the Chairman (Introduction) (Parts A and C).
61. CD/RW/WP.35/Add.1 Discussions on the provisions of the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons ("traditional" RW subject matter): submitted by the Chairman (Part 3).
62. CD/RW/WP.36 Group of 21: Text proposed for an Article in the Draft Treaty on Radiological Weapons (14 April 1982).

" II. Conference Room Papers

1. CD/RW/CRP.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, Canada and Italy.
2. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.1 and Corr.1 Definition: Proposals by Egypt, Pakistan, Italy and Australia.
3. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.2 Definition: Proposals by India.
4. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.3 Definition: Proposal by Yugoslavia.
5. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.4 Definition: Proposals by Venezuela and Argentina.
6. CD/RW/CRP.1/Add.5 Definition: Proposal by Morocco.
7. CD/RW/CRP.2 Scope of Prohibition: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, Sweden, Netherlands and Australia.
8. CD/RW/CRP.2/Add.1 Scope of Prohibition: Proposal by France.
9. CD/RW/CRP.3 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by USSR-United States, Italy, Canada, Sweden, Netherlands, Pakistan and India.

10. CD/RW/CRP.3/Add.1 Activities and Obligations: Proposals by Australia and France.
11. CD/RW/CRP.4 Peaceful Uses: Proposals by USSR-United States, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and Pakistan.
12. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.1 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by France.
13. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.2 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Pakistan.
14. CD/RW/CRP.4/Add.3 Peaceful Uses: Proposal by Romania.
15. CD/RW/CRP.5 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposals by USSR-United States, Pakistan, Egypt, Canada and France.
16. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.1 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Australia and France.
17. CD/RW/CRP.5/Add.2 Relationship with other disarmament measures and agreements: Proposal by Pakistan.
18. CD/RW/CRP.6 Compliance and Verification: Proposals by USSR-United States, Belgium, France and Sweden.
19. CD/RW/CRP.6/Add.1 Compliance and Verification: Proposal by Pakistan.
20. CD/RW/CRP.7 Annex: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
21. CD/RW/CRP.8 Amendments: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
22. CD/RW/CRP.9 Duration and Withdrawal: Proposals by USSR-United States and France.
23. CD/RW/CRP.10 Review Conferences: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia and France.
24. CD/RW/CRP.10/Add.1 Review Conferences: Proposal by Morocco.
25. CD/RW/CRP.11 Adherence, Entry into Force, Depositary: Proposals by USSR-United States, German Democratic Republic, Australia, France and Pakistan.
26. CD/RW/CRP.12 Preamble: Proposals by Hungary, Sweden, Egypt and Belgium.
27. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.1 Preamble: Proposal by Bulgaria.

28. CD/RW/CRP.12/Add.2 Preamble: Proposals by Sweden and Federal Republic of Germany.
29. CD/RW/CRP.13 Invitation to the International Atomic Energy Agency: Proposal by The Netherlands.
30. CD/RW/CRP.14 Scope on Prohibition: Proposal by The Netherlands.
31. CD/RW/CRP.15 Amendments to text of Draft Report.
32. CD/RW/CRP.16 Definition of facilities to be protected: Proposal by Pakistan.
33. CD/RW/CRP.17 Draft Consolidated Radiological Weapons Treaty" Provisions: Submitted by the Chairman.

70. Since 1979 several proposals have been made in connection with the general question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, in statements at plenary meetings and in official documents of the Committee. 8/

71. During informal meetings held with the participation of qualified governmental experts from some Member States, many delegations underlined the importance of urgent action to prevent the appearance of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Statements were made concerning possible areas for the development of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. It was generally perceived as a real danger if the latest achievements of science would be used for the creation of such weapons. In this regard the following examples for possible areas for the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction were quoted: radiological means acting with the aid of radioactive materials; technical means of inflicting radiation injury based on the use of charged or neutral particles to affect biological targets; infrasonic means using acoustic radiation to affect biological targets; means using electromagnetic radiation to affect biological targets. The nuclear neutron weapon was also mentioned. Other delegations, however, pointed out that the areas mentioned did not concern weapons of mass destruction and that the nuclear neutron weapon could not be considered as being based on new scientific principles. It was pointed out that no new weapons had made their appearance so far.

72. The view was expressed that the rapid advance in weapons technology necessitated an urgent agreement or agreements on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Some delegations stressed the urgency of negotiating a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and production of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, as well as separate agreements prohibiting the emergence of specific new weapons of mass destruction, and drew attention to the draft international agreement submitted by the USSR in 1977 (CCD/511/Rev.1). It was also suggested that an ad hoc group of experts should be established to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Other delegations were of a different opinion. They stated that it was not appropriate to negotiate a comprehensive agreement on unidentified weapons systems, but that agreements should be negotiated on a case by case basis as necessary. They also considered that the Committee on Disarmament should give periodic attention to this question. In that connection, it was proposed that annual informal meetings with experts should be held to keep the matter under review.

73. Other proposals were made in 1980 and 1981 for the consideration of the question of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It was suggested that a working group of the Committee might examine it more thoroughly and elaborate a definition of such weapons. Another alternative put forward was for the establishment by the General Assembly of the United Nations of a group of experts to review recent trends in scientific developments and recommend the most appropriate means to prevent the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction. The Committee felt that this question should be kept under continuing review.

74. During the first part of the 1982 session several delegations drew attention to resolution 36/89 adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session. It was pointed out by those delegations that the General Assembly called upon the States permanent members of the Security Council, as well as upon other militarily significant States to make declarations, identical in their substance, concerning the refusal to create new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such

8/ Documents CD/35, CD/118, CD/174 and CD/261.

weapons, as a first step towards concluding a comprehensive agreement on this subject. In the view of these delegations, the flexible approach adopted in the resolution offered new opportunities for progress in this field. Other delegations expressed reservations to this approach.

75. During the first part of the 1982 session, the Committee decided to continue to hold informal meetings, at which the participation of experts would be welcome, with a view to examining proposals and suggestions pertaining to the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The informal meetings will be open to non-members and to their respective experts.

F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

76. The Committee on Disarmament has been considering this item since February 1980, mainly in an ad hoc working group established subsequently to initiate negotiations on the subject.

77. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concluded its work at the end of the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee and submitted a report (CD/283) containing in an annex the Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament which is attached to this special report as Appendix I.

78. During the 1980 session, Ambassador O. Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador A. García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. In the course of its 1980/1981 and the first part of its 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 59 meetings. At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

79. At its 173rd plenary meeting on 21 April 1982, the Committee adopted the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which is an integral part of this special report and reads as follows:

"I. INTRODUCTION

"At its 69th plenary meeting on 17 March 1980, the Committee decided to establish an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to initiate negotiations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament, envisaged in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, with a view to completing its elaboration before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981, the Committee on Disarmament decided that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the 1981 session. In its report on that session, the Working Group, bearing in mind that considerable work remained to be done in resolving several important and complex issues and that the Committee on Disarmament had been called upon to conclude negotiations on the Programme in time for its submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, agreed to recommend to the Committee that the Working Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. The Committee on Disarmament adopted that recommendation at its 148th plenary meeting on 20 August 1981. In accordance with that decision, the Working Group resumed its work on 11 January 1982. At its 150th plenary meeting on 2 February 1982, the Committee on Disarmament confirmed that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue its work during the first part of the 1982 session.

"II. ORGANIZATION OF WORK AND DOCUMENTATION

"During the 1980 session, Ambassador Olu Adeniji (Nigeria) was Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group; Ambassador Alfonso García Robles (Mexico) was the Chairman during the 1981 and 1982 sessions. Mr. Guennady Efimov, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, served as Secretary of the Working Group in 1980 and Miss Aida Luisa Levin, United Nations Centre for Disarmament, did so in 1981 and 1982.

"In the course of its 1980, 1981 and 1982 sessions, the Ad Hoc Working Group held a total of 59 meetings, 10 in 1980, 24 in 1981 and 25 in 1982.

"At their request, the Committee invited the representatives of the following States not members of the Committee to participate in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group at various stages of its work: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey.

"In addition to the official documents of the Committee on Disarmament circulated under the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", the following working papers were submitted by Member States in the course of the three sessions of the Ad Hoc Working Group:

- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.3 and Rev.1)
- Working paper on the outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.4)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.5)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles and guidelines", submitted by Mexico. (CD/CPD/WP.6)
- Working paper on the main principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.8)
- Working paper entitled "Draft section of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament concerning the general guidelines for efforts to limit the arms race and achieve disarmament", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.9)
- Working paper on the principles of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.10).
- Working paper entitled "Comprehensive Programme for Disarmament and the concept of education for peace", submitted by Poland. (CD/CPC/WP.12)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Principles", submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.13 and Add.1)
- Working paper on forms and machinery, submitted by Czechoslovakia. (CD/CPD/WP.15)
- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.17)
- Working paper on the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, prepared by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Olu Adeniji, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.18).

- Working paper on "Stages of Implementation", prepared by the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, at the request of the Chairman. (CD/CPD/WP.19)
- Statement by the representative of the USSR on 3 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament under Strict International Control", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.20)
- Statement by the representative of the United States of America on 5 March 1981, in response to the question posed by the Chairman regarding the position of his Government with respect to the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World", submitted to the EMDC in 1962. (CD/CPD/WP.21)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Objectives", submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.22)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing supplementary proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.24)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing further proposals on the measures, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.25)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Pakistan. (CD/CPD/WP.26)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, relating to the section "Measures", submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.28)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Italy. (CD/CPD/WP.30)
- Working paper on the objectives of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.31)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.33)
- Working paper containing a text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Objectives", submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.35)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Corr.1 and Adds. 1-5)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to nuclear weapons, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.37)

- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, containing proposals with respect to zones of peace, submitted by Australia. (CD/CPD/WP.38)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by France. (CD/CPD/WP.39)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.40)
- Working paper on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.42)
- Working paper containing a draft text for the section of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament entitled "Machinery and Procedure", submitted by the German Democratic Republic and Venezuela. (CD/CPD/WP.43)
- Working paper on the first stage of nuclear disarmament measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CPD/WP.44)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.45)
- Working paper containing amendments to the sections "Conventional weapons and armed forces" and "Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CPD/WP.46)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Nuclear weapons" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the German Democratic Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.47)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Poland. (CD/CPD/WP.48)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Bulgaria. (CD/CPD/WP.49)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by Mongolia. (CD/CPD/WP.50)
- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CPD/WP.27, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CPD/WP.51)
- Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Australia, Belgium, Germany, Federal Republic of, Japan and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (CD/CPD/WP.52)

- Working paper containing amendments to the section "Other measures" (Stage I) of document CD/CED/MP.27, submitted by Nigeria, Poland and Venezuela. (CD/CED/MP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CED/MP.55)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CED/MP.56)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CED/MP.57)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CED/MP.58)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CED/MP.59)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CED/MP.60)
- Working paper containing an addition to the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by China. (CD/CED/MP.61)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by the Group of 21. (CD/CED/MP.63)
- Draft text for the section on "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Yugoslavia. (CD/CED/MP.64)
- Working paper on the chapter entitled "Measures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, submitted by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. (CD/CED/MP.67)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the United States of America. (CD/CED/MP.69)
- Working paper on Verification, submitted by the German Democratic Republic. (CD/CED/MP.70)

In addition, the secretariat prepared the following documents:

- List of documents. (CD/CPD/WP.1)
- Compilation of documents submitted to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1, EMDC/5, EMDC/13, EMDC/30 and Corr.1). (CD/CPD/WP.7 and Add.1)
- List of specific measures contained in the Final Document of the tenth special session and the 1979 and 1980 reports of the Disarmament Commission. (CD/CPD/WP.11)
- List of specific measures envisaged in the Draft Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament, submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1962 (EMDC/2/Rev.1), and the Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, submitted by the United States of America in 1962 (EMDC/30). (CD/CPD/WP.14)
- Tabulation of measures that are not explicitly included in the tabulations contained in documents CD/CPD/WP.11 and 14. (CD/CPD/WP.25)
- Results of the preliminary examination of chapters V ("Measures") and VI ("Stages of implementation") of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.27)
- Tabulation of the Principles contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.29)
- Tabulation of the Objectives contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.32)
- Tabulation of the provisions concerning Machinery and Procedure contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. (CD/CPD/WP.34)
- Compilation of certain proposals concerning Machinery and Procedure listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. (CD/CPD/WP.41)
- Results of the examination of Stage-I measures contained in document CD/CPD/WP.27 and of written and oral proposals made in connection therewith. (CD/CPD/WP.54)

" III. SUBSTANTIVE WORK

" In 1980, the Ad Hoc Working Group adopted an outline of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament (CD/CPD/WP.2/Rev.1) consisting of the following chapters: Introduction or Preamble; Objectives; Principles; Priorities; Measures; Stages of Implementation; and Machinery and Procedures. */ That outline constituted the basis for the consideration of the Programme in 1981 and 1982.

*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1980 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1980 report (CD/139, paragraph 60).

"In 1981, the Ad Hoc Working Group completed a preliminary examination of the substantive chapters of the Programme. It decided to defer the consideration of the Introduction or Preamble pending the elaboration of those chapters in view of the fact that the form and substance of the latter would determine its character and content. In the case of the chapters concerning measures and stages of implementation, which were considered in conjunction with each other, the Working Group was also able to have a second round of more detailed discussions on measures for a first stage. */

"In 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused on the task of elaborating the texts of the various substantive chapters of the Programme.

"With respect to the objectives of the Programme, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate the relevant chapter and designated Ambassador François de la Corce (France) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted to the Working Group a text that reflected different views on some points. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted that text (CD/CFD/AF.66).

"At its 50th meeting on 11 February 1982, the Ad Hoc Working Group established a contact group to elaborate the principles of the Programme and, at its 51st meeting on 15 February 1982, it designated Ambassador Gerhard Herder (German Democratic Republic) as its co-ordinator. As in the case of objectives, it did not prove possible to reach agreement on all questions of substance. In addition, differing views were held regarding the appropriateness of including certain paragraphs in the chapter on principles. The contact group agreed that questions concerning the placement of those paragraphs should be decided at a later stage in the context of the whole Programme, bearing in mind that duplication should be avoided. At its 56th meeting on 18 March 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group (CD/CFD/AF.65).

"With respect to priorities, the Ad Hoc Working Group, at its 49th meeting on 8 February 1982, established a contact group to elaborate that chapter of the Programme and designated Ambassador Celso Antonio de Souza e Silva (Brazil) as its co-ordinator. The contact group submitted an agreed text which was adopted by the Working Group at its 55th meeting on 1 March 1982 (CD/CFD/AF.62).

"With respect to measures and stages of implementation which, as previously, were considered in conjunction with each other, at its 54th meeting on 25 February 1982, the Working Group established a contact group to elaborate that part of the Programme and requested the Chairman to act as co-ordinator of the contact group. The contact group prepared a text that grouped measures in a first, an intermediate and a last stage, it being understood that this was without prejudice to the position of delegations with respect to questions relating to stages of implementation. An informal drafting group was convened, with Mr. Tariq Altaf (Pakistan) as co-ordinator, with a view to reconciling the alternative formulations contained in

*/ A full account of the work carried out in 1981 may be found in the Working Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament which is an integral part of the Committee's 1981 report (CD/228, paragraph 127).

that text. The drafting group narrowed the areas of disagreement and, to the extent possible, unified and streamlined some of the alternative texts that were under discussion in the contact group. The text it elaborated was adopted by the contact group on 14 April 1982 with some changes. At its 53th meeting on 15 April 1982, the Working Group adopted the text submitted by the contact group as orally amended at that meeting (CD/CPD/WP.71).

"The same contact group was also charged with the task of elaborating the chapter on machinery and procedures. It submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group a text reflecting differences of view on some points. At its 57th meeting on 8 April 1982, the Working Group adopted that text with some additions and amendments (CD/CPD/WP.68).

"At various stages of its consideration of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group focused attention on the question of time frames and nature of the Programme. Divergent views were advanced since the initial stage as indicated in the Working Group's report covering its 1980 session (CD/139, paragraph 58 (13) and (15)). In 1982, these two matters were examined at meetings of the Working Group and of the contact group referred to in paragraphs 12 and 15 above. Concerning the question of time frames, it was generally agreed that the Programme should be implemented in the shortest possible time. Beyond that, different views continued to be maintained. On the one hand, it was again stressed that there should be a time frame for the implementation of each stage, as well as the Programme as a whole. It was felt that, otherwise, there would be no standard by which to judge whether progress was being made towards the full realization of the Programme. It was also argued that the acceptance of time frames would be a manifestation of political will to implement the measures contained in the Programme. It was further argued that the implementation of the Programme in an agreed time frame would generate the requisite confidence of the international community and have a positive influence on the climate of international relations by introducing an element of predictability in the process of general and complete disarmament. At the same time, it was recognized that only an indicative time frame should be set since in the course of the implementation of the Programme changing circumstances might call for readjustments. On the other hand, it continued to be argued that it would be inappropriate to set a time frame, whether indicative or not, for the implementation of the stages included in the Programme, because the setting of such time frames was not compatible with the conditions of a negotiation, a fortiori with the requirements of a series of interdependent negotiations. In this view, periodic reviews, envisaged as part of the machinery and procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, would give impetus for continued progress in the implementation of the Programme, provide a standard by which to assess such progress, permit its evaluation and the readjustment of the Programme, if necessary. Regarding the nature of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, various views were advanced. One view was that the Programme should be embodied in a legally binding instrument. It was proposed that a solemn Declaration should accompany the adoption of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. A concrete proposal was made that the Declaration and the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should then be signed by Heads of State or Government of all Member States of the United Nations, and finally noted by the Security Council in a resolution adopted under those provisions of the Charter that are designed to create obligations for States. Another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should not be embodied in a legally binding agreement since States cannot be bound to the success

of negotiations before such negotiations have begun. But it was considered that a strong political undertaking by States to implement the Programme, for example, in the form of a resolution adopted by consensus at the special session of the General Assembly, would create the necessary impetus for the completion of the implementation of the Programme at the earliest possible time. Still another view was that the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should represent an agreed set of measures aimed at halting the arms race and at disarmament and should serve as an incentive for the broad development of constructive collective efforts in the disarmament field. It was noted that under the United Nations Charter the General Assembly may make recommendations with regard to principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments and that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament may serve as a precedent for the adoption of the Programme. While no conclusions were reached on these two matters, it was recognized that the discussions had served to clarify the questions at issue and would thus facilitate the search for generally acceptable solutions.

"The view was generally held that the deliberations at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will contribute to the harmonization of the divergent positions reflected in the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. Some delegations also felt that their final position with regard to the formulations contained in the draft Programme could only be determined in the light of the content of the Programme as a whole. Other delegations felt that the progress made in the Working Group should have a bearing on the future work, and that their final position on the entire Programme would be determined in the light of the agreement reached on the specific provisions of the Programme, the time frames and a binding commitment to the implementation of the Programme.

"IV. CONCLUSION

"The Ad Hoc Working Group agreed to submit to the Committee on Disarmament the draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that is annexed to this report, 9/ with the recommendation that it be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration at its second special session devoted to disarmament."

G. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

80. In March 1979, a proposal was made in the Committee on Disarmament concerning an additional protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies" (CD/9). Later in December 1981, the thirty-sixth regular session of the General Assembly adopted two resolutions requesting the Committee on Disarmament to consider certain aspects concerning the prevention of an arms race in outer space (resolutions 36/97C and 36/99).

9/ See Appendix I of this special report.

81. During the first part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament, an appropriate item was inscribed on its agenda (item 7) and the Committee considered it both at plenary and informal meetings. There was widespread recognition of the need to ensure that any activity in outer space should be for peaceful purposes.

82. A proposal was made for the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space (CD/274), as the best means of solving the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. Another proposal was that the Committee should negotiate effective and verifiable agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and that, in that context, it should consider as a matter of priority the question of prohibiting anti-satellite systems.

83. Several members suggested that an ad hoc working group be established by the Committee to start negotiations under this item. In that connection, a proposal was formally made concerning the terms of reference of a working group (CD/272). It was stated that a decision to set up an ad hoc working group on this question should be made in the light of the existing priorities before the Committee. The Committee intends to continue consideration of the proposals made during the second part of its 1982 session, as well as of any other suggestions on the further handling of this item.

H. Consideration of Other Areas Dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures

84. During its 1979 session, the Committee had before it a working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor which, although not considered under the items of the annual agenda, dealt with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures in other areas (CD/13).

I. Consideration and Adoption of the Special Report of the Committee to the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament

85. This special report is transmitted by the Chairman on behalf of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Signed)

Yoshio Okawa

Japan

Chairman of the Committee

DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAMME OF DISARMAMENT

I. Introduction or Preamble

(To be elaborated subsequently)

II. Objectives

1. The immediate objectives of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be to [prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war] [eliminate the danger of [war, in particular] nuclear war], to implement measures to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and clear the path towards lasting peace. To this end, the Programme will also aim:
 - to maintain and further the momentum generated by the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament;
 - [- to consolidate and develop the positive results achieved so far, in particular in the sphere of the curbing of the arms race and of confidence-building measures and of détente;]
 - [to [initiate [,] [or] resume] [provide for the initiation of] and [to] expedite] [at the initiation and expediting of] urgent negotiations on halting the arms race in all its aspects, in particular the nuclear arms race;
 - to open and accelerate the process of genuine disarmament on an internationally agreed basis.
2. [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme is to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is fully realized] [The ultimate objective of the Comprehensive Programme should be to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control, to avert the danger of war and to create conditions for a just and stable international peace and security and the full realization of the new international economic order]
3. Throughout the implementation of the Programme towards the progressive reduction and final elimination of armaments and armed forces, the following objectives should be pursued:
 - to strengthen international peace and security, as well as the security of individual States, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations [, bearing in mind that genuine security can be guaranteed only by the limitation, reduction and elimination of weapons through disarmament] [, bearing in mind that genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control (paragraph 13 of the Final Document)];
 - to contribute to the safeguarding of the sovereignty and independence of all States;

- [- to make, through the implementation of the Programme, an effective contribution to the economic and social development of States, in particular developing States;]
- to increase international confidence and relaxation of international tension;
- [to [consolidate the foundations of the peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems and] strengthen the development of co-operation between all States with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme] [to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding with a view to promoting conditions favourable to the implementation of the Programme (based on paragraph 12 of the Final Document)];
- [to stimulate in all countries the contribution that public opinion could make to the cause of disarmament] [to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament].

III. Principles

1. [The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible, and they have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.]
2. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.
3. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.
4. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security. They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.
5. [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the

political will to reach agreements.] [In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament.]

6. [It must be recognized that the political will of States is a decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament. States should therefore display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements.]

7. [The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States.]

8. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve the international situation in general.

9. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

10. [Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.]

11. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.

12. Negotiations should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere.

13. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitation, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security.
14. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States [, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals,] have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation. [All States are obliged to promote efforts in the sphere of disarmament. This applies first and foremost to the States possessing nuclear weapons and to other militarily significant States. The existing balance in the field of nuclear strength should remain undisturbed at all stages, with the levels of nuclear strength being constantly reduced.]
15. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]
16. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.
17. Disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples [, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order.].
18. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization.
19. The process of arms limitation and disarmament must be carried out without interruptions and proceed at a rapid pace, so as to outstrip the qualitative development and build-up of weapons which are the subject of the negotiations and, where possible, prevent the development of new types and systems of weapons, particularly weapons of mass destruction.
20. [The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be in accordance with the [fundamental principles enshrined in] [relevant provisions of]

the Final Document and should be carried out in such a balanced and equitable manner as to ensure the right of each State to security through the adoption of appropriate measures, taking into account the importance of nuclear disarmament and conventional disarmament, the special responsibility of the States with the largest military arsenals, the specific requirements of regional situations and the necessity for adequate measures of verification. At each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.]

21. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage [, taking into account the existing situation regarding armaments of different kinds, and in particular the situation of nuclear and conventional armaments, in order to avoid destabilizing effects.]. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. [In the negotiations between parties approximately equal militarily the principle of equality and equal security must be strictly observed.]

22. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

23. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

24. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

25. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

26. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions. [The negotiations on the [balanced] reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries.]

27. [States with the largest military arsenals have the primary responsibility for disarmament. They should immediately halt their arms race and take the lead in reducing their nuclear and conventional armaments. After they have substantially reduced their armaments, the other nuclear-weapon States and militarily significant States should join them in reducing armaments.]

28. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

29. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development or prejudice their security. [All arms control and disarmament agreements must provide for effective international verification, in order to create the necessary confidence between States and ensure that the agreements are being observed by all parties.]

30. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control [, proceeding from the fact that there is no type of weapon that could not be eliminated on a mutually agreed basis.].

31. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

32. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

33. All States, in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

34. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

35. In a world of finite resources, there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. [It must therefore be recognized that a continuation of the arms race is detrimental to and incompatible with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.]

36. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to the economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

37. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

38. [Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.]

39. [As security and stability should be assured in all regions taking into account the specific needs and requirements of their respective situation, bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.]

40. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

41. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences should be held where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed to by eight Latin American countries on 9 December 1974.

42. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

43. Draft multilateral disarmament conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the Assembly.

44. [Collateral measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further the relaxation of international tension.]

45. [In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament.]

46. [Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.]

47. [In particular, publicity should be given to the decisions of the special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.]

48. [Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, States hereby declare that they will respect the principles stated above [and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme in strict adherence to them] [in full implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament].]

IV. Priorities

1. In the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control as the ultimate goal, the priorities which reflect the urgency attached to the measures for negotiations are:

- nuclear weapons;
- other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons;
- conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and
- reduction of armed forces.

2. Effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. Along with negotiations on these measures, effective measures should be negotiated to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments.

3. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently. Bearing in mind these priorities, negotiations should be pursued on all measures which would lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

V. Measures and stages of implementation

First stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons */

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- (i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.
- (ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].) **/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

[Substantial progress towards] the cessation of the nuclear arms race in all its aspects and [substantial progress towards] the achievement of nuclear disarmament at the beginning of the implementation of the Programme would constitute a major contribution to the rapid achievement of general and complete disarmament. [In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.]

*/ Some delegations reserved their position with respect to the division of the chapter "Nuclear weapons" into separate sub-sections.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

[Measures designed to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war should continue to be considered as a matter of urgent priority in the first stage.]

[Integrated] measures for the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems, for the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and for the reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems should include:

- (i) Cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons systems:

Negotiations, during the first stage of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, to achieve an agreement or agreements, to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement,] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems [and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons], [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

These negotiations should [address] [achieve an agreement or agreements for the prohibition of]:

- (a) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles and on the complete destruction of their stockpiles,]
- (b) [research,] development, [testing] and deployment[, including for replacement purposes] of all new types and new systems of nuclear weapons;
- (c) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite weapons systems];
- (d) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems];
- (e) [the development, production, deployment and stockpiling of intermediate and medium range missiles as well as tactical nuclear weapons];
- (f) [the development, testing and deployment of anti-submarine warfare capabilities that could endanger the central strategic stability;]
- (g) [conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.]

- (ii) Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes:

Commencement of negotiations [with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States] [on an agreement,] [to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery along with a cessation of production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes].

[Such an agreement could be negotiated in the following step by step manner:] [Such negotiations could address:]

- [(a) [Declarations by all nuclear-weapon States, at a mutually agreed date, of their existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and of their existing and proposed facilities for the production of [all] nuclear weapons, delivery systems of such weapons and for fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes to be submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General.]
- (b) Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspections, as part of [the agreement] [or agreements] to be negotiated, to establish the base on which [the agreement] [or agreements] prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.
- (c) [Measures aimed at [eventually] bringing about the general and complete cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes along with [the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons] [measures to reduce nuclear weapons, and as appropriate integrated with such measures] involving the application of [international] [full fuel cycle] safeguards [under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency] to [all] nuclear facilities in all States to prevent the diversion of fissionable [and fusionable] material for weapons purposes. Such international safeguards would be applied [as a first step to the civil nuclear programmes of all States] [to all States on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].]]
- [(a) The cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons which should cover the cessation of manufacture of means of delivery and fissionable materials for the purposes of weapons development;
- (b) The gradual reduction of stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons;
- (c) The complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

Parallel with the above, measures should be taken to strengthen the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:

Such measures would include at the appropriate time and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned the progressive and balanced reduction of all nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

- (a) as a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of negotiations [already begun] [between the two States which possess the most important nuclear arsenals] on intermediate range nuclear forces and also on the process of strategic arms reduction:
- a continuation of the process aimed at agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic nuclear arms [belonging to these two States];
 - pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of [their] intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts;
- (b) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.] */

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States]:

[(a) Immediate ratification by the USSR and the United States of the SALT-II Agreement.]

(b) [The initiation, without delay, of further negotiations [on] [aimed at]] [measures for further limitation and reduction in the numbers of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic offensive arms and on the modernization of existing strategic offensive arms] [the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments between the USSR and the United States leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitation on, strategic arms. [These negotiations should culminate, as soon as possible, in the first stage, in a treaty which should achieve:

- a reduction of at least 20 per cent in the numbers of nuclear warheads and strategic delivery vehicles in the arsenals of the USSR and the United States.
- comprehensive limitations on the qualitative improvement of strategic armaments, including restrictions on the development, testing and deployment of new types of strategic armaments.]]

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

4. [Intermediate range nuclear forces]

[The early conclusion of an agreement negotiated between the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to achieve on the basis of the principle of undiminished security, [inter alia,] a substantial reduction of [intermediate and] medium range and other nuclear weapon delivery systems and warheads deployed with respect to the European theatre.]

[As a starting point, the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of the bilateral negotiations already begun on intermediate range nuclear forces and on strategic arms reduction:

Pursuit of negotiations on the limitation and reduction of their intermediate range nuclear forces based on the principle of equality within the framework of strategic arms control efforts.]

[The early conclusion of an agreement to limit and reduce medium range nuclear weapons in the region of Europe based on the principle of equality and equal security. The first step in this direction could be the agreed freeze on such weapons in Europe.]

5. Avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war

Pending the achievement of nuclear disarmament for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued and bearing in mind the devastating results which a nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, urgent measures should be negotiated to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war and avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, in the first stage [negotiations should address] [the following measures should be undertaken without delay]:

(a) [A binding international instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States, [that are committed to a non-nuclear status,] without any conditions, qualifications or restrictions, against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [The conclusion of a convention on strengthening guarantees of the security of non-nuclear weapon States, and, as a first step, the issuance by nuclear-weapon Powers of declarations of similar contents undertaking to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no such weapons on their territories, with approval of such declarations by the Security Council.]

(b) [An undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.]

(c) [An international agreement prohibiting the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.] [Measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement, bearing in mind various proposals designed to secure these objectives and in accordance with paragraphs 57 and 58 of the Final Document, and thereby to ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered.]

(d) Measures to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas and periods of tension, by the establishment of hot lines and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict, especially a nuclear conflict including through [unauthorized] or accidental use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, the respective

roles of nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the prevention of the outbreak of a nuclear war, especially through accident, miscalculation or failure of communications should be clarified. [Measures should also be undertaken for the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.]

6. [Nuclear non-proliferation] Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]

The nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should jointly take further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons as an integral part of the efforts to halt and reverse the arms race. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States besides the existing five nuclear-weapon States [---(horizontal proliferation)---] and on the other, progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether [---(vertical proliferation)]. The international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation should include effective measures at the national level and through international agreements to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures should include: [(a) measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament mentioned above;] (b) [the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs] [universal adherence to and full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, in particular the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] [adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (c) [unhindered access for all States to nuclear technology, including its latest achievements, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries] [the full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis]; (d) [respect for each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements or contracts for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy]; (e) [agreed measures of verification applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis].

7. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitute an important disarmament measure and should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, taking into account the characteristics of each region. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated, in particular: (i) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone; (ii) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed on the adherence to it at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the General Conference of OPANAL and other relevant fora, and including ratification of Additional Protocol I by all States concerned.

(b) In Africa the Organization of African Unity has affirmed the denuclearization of the continent. The United Nations General Assembly in successive resolutions has supported the African initiative for the denuclearization of the continent and at its tenth special session the General Assembly, by consensus, called upon the Security Council to take appropriate effective steps to prevent the frustration of this objective. [The threat to nuclear non-proliferation in Africa and to the peace and security of the continent arises from the nuclear capability of South Africa. To assist the implementation of the Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa, therefore, all States should:

- (i) keep a constant watch on South Africa's nuclear capability;
- (ii) refrain from any co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear field which would assist the apartheid regime in manufacturing nuclear weapons.]

(c) The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in compliance with General Assembly resolution 35/147 would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party, and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

(d) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination to keep their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly, which is keeping the subject under consideration.

(e) [The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the European continent [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].]

(f) Efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world should be promoted [at the initiative of States which intend to become part of the zone].

(g) Ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States constitute an important disarmament measure.

8. [Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present]

Conclusion of a treaty on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present; the renunciation by nuclear weapon States of further actions related to the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of other States.]

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed in Geneva on 17 June 1925.
2. [Promotion of] universal adherence to and strict compliance with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.
3. (a) [Renunciation of the manufacture and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons and also of the stationing of chemical weapons in countries where there are none at present.]

(b) Conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.
4. Conclusion of an international treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].
5. Commencement of negotiations [, when appropriate,] with a view to an early conclusion of a [comprehensive] agreement or specific agreements on [the prevention of the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of] such weapons [of mass destruction which may be identified], taking into account recent developments in science and technology. [As a first step towards the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, the permanent members of the Security Council and other States of military importance should make similar declarations of renunciation of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction; those declarations would be approved by a decision of the Security Council.]

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

Agreements and other measures on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis relating to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be achieved throughout the Programme, taking into account the right of all States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States.

[1. Renunciation by the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements of increasing their armed forces and conventional weapons as a first step towards the eventual limitation of armed forces and conventional weapons.]

1. The States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional arms reduction and disarmament and accordingly by the end of the first stage [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] should negotiate to [significantly] reduce their conventional armaments and armed forces [by at least 25 per cent].

2. Other militarily significant States shall [negotiate to] undertake an agreed [smaller proportion of] reduction in the levels of their conventional weapons and armed forces.

[2. (a) In the course of the process of conventional disarmament emphasis should be placed on the reduction of the armed forces and conventional armaments which are predominantly for offensive purposes, primarily tanks, airplanes, as well as airborne assault forces, amphibious forces and rapid deployment forces.]

3. A more stable and secure situation in Europe at a lower level of armed forces and armaments on the basis of approximate equality and parity should be achieved through negotiations by the end of the first stage. This will involve [besides the above-mentioned reductions by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] mutual reductions in the armed forces and [conventional] armaments of [other] members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization leading to agreed lower levels of armed forces and armaments. This would be achieved through the on-going negotiations in Vienna [and/or] at a broader [European Conference on Security, Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures] [Conference on Military Détente and Disarmament] [Conference on Disarmament in Europe]. */ [Negotiations as appropriate on the development of effective security and confidence building measures and disarmament measures on the basis of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. To those ends, the convening of a conference on disarmament in Europe should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting.]

[The above-mentioned measures of conventional weapons disarmament will involve:

(a) The demobilization of personnel and withdrawal of forces from foreign territories and the dismantling of foreign military bases;

(b) the destruction of agreed categories of conventional armaments and other military equipment especially weapons of great destructive capacity;

(c) measures for confidence building and security including restrictions on mobility of forces.]

4. [The above-mentioned measures should also include agreements for a reduction in the production of conventional weapons proportionate to the reduction in armed forces and conventional weapons agreed upon.] [The above-mentioned agreements should include as appropriate measures for a gradual reduction of the production of conventional weapons.] [Reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces of States would facilitate an agreed reduction in the production of conventional weapons.]

5. During the first stage, consultations and conferences should also be held at the bilateral, regional and multilateral level, among States for the consideration of various initiatives and proposals for confidence building and for the control, restraint or reduction of conventional armaments, particularly in regions of arms concentration, areas of tension, etc.

*/ The mentioning of the Vienna talks and the European Conference under the heading "Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces" is without prejudice to the content of the negotiations in those forums.

[In this context,] consultations should also be held among [major] arms suppliers and recipient countries with a view to the conclusion of agreements on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons on the basis in particular of the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States.

6. Prohibition or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons, including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects:

- (i) Signature and ratification by all States of the agreement adopted by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (ii) Broadening of the prohibitions or restrictions of use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, either through amendments to the existing Protocols or through the conclusion of additional Protocols, in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
- (iii) [The result of the above-mentioned Conference should be considered by all States, especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.]

7. [An agreement for the cessation of the development, production and deployment of new types of highly destructive conventional weapons.] [Agreements for the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments and the development of new means of warfare, in particular highly destructive conventional weapons.]

D. Military Expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. [Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.]

2. [Upon the commencement of this Programme, [the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States] [the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States] should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their military budgets. [All other nuclear-weapon States are invited to follow this example.] [During the first stage, these States should reduce their military budgets in both absolute and percentage terms.]]

- [- Achievement of greater transparency of military postures, i.e. the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures enabling their comparison as a step to their balanced reduction on a multilateral level;
- Establishment of registers within the framework of the United Nations for the recording of data necessary for transparency and comparability of military postures.]

3. [The nuclear-weapon States [,] [and] other militarily significant States [and other States] will make reductions during the first stage in their military expenditures [in proportion to] [taking into account] their reductions of nuclear, conventional and other weapons, reductions in the production of such weapons, reductions in their armed forces and dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.] [Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]

4. [Other States] [States] [may] [shall] also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; [or] [and] reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.

[5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.

6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and include, as an integral part, provisions for verification, satisfactory to all parties. All member States, particularly the most heavily armed States, should endeavour [, whenever feasible,] to make use of the reporting instrument, contained in document A/35/479, in reporting their military expenditures as a means to increase confidence between States by contributing to greater openness in military matters. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation, the reporting system may be further refined.]

[The basis for implementing the above-mentioned measures will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means for its implementation acceptable to all of them, including the continuation of efforts, within the framework of the United Nations, to identify and elaborate on the principles which should govern further actions of States in the field of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures.] */

*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 5 and 6.

- [1. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.
2. Upon the commencement of this Programme, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States should agree to an immediate freeze in the current levels of their defence expenditures. All other nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States are invited to follow this example.
3. During the first stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should start to negotiate agreements concerning reductions in their military expenditures leading to reductions of their nuclear, conventional and other weapons, their armed forces and their production of such weapons and to the dismantling of military facilities, bases, etc.
4. Other States may also make reductions in their military expenditures in the context of bilateral, regional or multilateral disarmament agreements; or reach agreement to freeze the levels of their military spending at certain levels.
5. The above-mentioned States should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.
6. Agreements on reduction of military expenditures should be elaborated on the basis of agreed methods of comparing military expenditures between different periods of time and between different countries and also include provisions for verification, satisfactory to all Parties.
7. An international standardized reporting system has been devised and adopted by the United Nations thirty-fourth General Assembly as recommended in document A/35/479. On this basis all States and particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States should endeavour to make use of the reporting instrument and report annually their military expenditures to the United Nations. In light of future experiences gained through a wider participation the reporting instrument may be further refined.]

E. Related Measures

1. Further steps to prohibit military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques:

Review of the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques with a view to the adoption of further measures to eliminate the danger to mankind from such use.

(2. Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) */

(3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the first stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind] [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.

[3. Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

(a) In order to preserve the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes and in order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. In particular such negotiations should aim at preventing, by verifiable means, the development of anti-satellite weapons and anti-ballistic missile capabilities.

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

(b) Further negotiations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aiming at the conclusion, in the first stage, of an agreement to ban anti-satellite weapons.

(c) Further negotiations to conclude an agreement to establish an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (ISMA);

(d) An agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;

(e) Measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration of outer space.]] */

4. The establishment of zones of peace, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Final Document

(a) The Indian Ocean

[Concrete action should urgently be taken to ensure conditions of peace and security within the region, and to the early establishment of the Zone of Peace as envisaged in the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and taking into account the decisions of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.] [In this connection, the Conference on the Indian Ocean should be convened not later than the first half of 1983.]

(b) South-East Asia

[Steps should be taken by interested States in this region to further elaborate the concept of a "Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality" with a view to concluding an agreement on its establishment.] [The establishment of a zone of peace and stability in South-East Asia.]

(c) [establishment of a zone of [stable] peace [and co-operation] in the Mediterranean.]

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to existing international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States which are not yet parties to those agreements.]

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

(a) All States [, especially the militarily significant States,] shall undertake confidence-building [and security] measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed upon, as a contribution to preparing for further progress in disarmament:

(i) (a) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict;

(b) Measures relating to the prevention of a possibility of surprise attack.

(ii) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

(iii) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security.

(b) States shall seek to reach agreement on [effective] confidence-building measures at a global and regional level, taking into account the specific needs and the situation of the region, [e.g.:

- publication and exchange of information on security-related measures including matters of arms [control] [limitation] and disarmament;
- [- regular bilateral and/or regional consultations of governmental representatives on such security-related matters;]
- [- provisions of scholarships in military schools for the military personnel of other States;]
- [- exchange of military delegations and military attachés;]
- indication of normal military conduct and information on scope and extent of specific military activities like manoeuvres, specified movements etc. according to pre-established procedures;
- limitations of certain military activities and movements;
- establishment of procedures for the containment of conflicts, including the establishment of hot lines;]
- negotiations [as appropriate] on the development of [effective security and] confidence-building measures [in the military field] [contained in] [on the basis of] the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe [and the achievement of agreement on new confidence-building and disarmament measures] [, taking into account all other aspects of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe]. To those ends, the convening of a conference on [military détente and] disarmament in Europe [should be decided in a concluding document of a CSCE follow-up meeting];

- [- the extension to the Mediterranean Sea area of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, agreed reduction of armed forces, the withdrawal of warships carrying nuclear weapons, the renunciation of the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear Mediterranean countries, the renunciation by nuclear-weapon States of the use of nuclear weapons against any Mediterranean country which does not permit the stationing of such weapons on its territory;]
- [- development of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the holding of negotiations to that end among all interested countries.]

In adopting such confidence-building measures, States will bear in mind the study on the subject to be prepared by the United Nations Group of Intergovernmental Experts.

Such measures should include agreements providing for the advance notification of major military movements and manoeuvres. [Such measures should include agreements for the advance notification of large [as well as small] scale military manoeuvres [and of manoeuvres containing amphibious and/or airborne troops].]

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

In addition to measures aimed at the strengthening of international peace and security at lower levels of forces by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments, the following measures, which would contribute to the relaxation of international tension, should be undertaken during the first stage:

- (a) Withdrawal of all foreign [occupation] [aggression] forces from the territories of other States in accordance with the relevant United Nations [Security Council] resolutions and observance of the principles of non-interference and non-intervention in the internal affairs of States.
- (b) [An international agreement for the dismantling of foreign military bases and the withdrawal and elimination of the military presence [and rivalry] of foreign powers from various regions of the world] [including the sea areas in particular the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the region of the Persian Gulf.]
- (c) [Mutual limitation of the activities of navies of the Member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Conclusion of an agreement to the effect that missile-equipped submarines of both sides should be withdrawn from their current extensive military patrol zones, that navigation by such submarines should be limited by mutually agreed lines. Negotiations with a view to the extension of confidence-building measures to the surface of the seas and oceans, especially to the regions that contain the busiest sea lanes so that the largest possible proportion of the world's oceans could become, in the very near future, a zone of peace.]
- (d) [An undertaking not to enlarge existing or to establish new military alliances.]
- (e) [The ending of the division of Europe into military-political alliances and, as a first step, the abolition of the military activities.]
- (f) [Conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and non-use of force between States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean.]

3. Preventing the use of force in international relations

[[An international agreement or solemn understanding] [Legal undertakings] by all States, particularly the militarily significant States, to [strictly observe] [strengthen the observance of] the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law regarding respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States, non-interference in their internal affairs, to conduct inter-State relations on the basis of sovereign equality and to refrain from the threat or use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.]

[Conclusion among all States participants in the European Conference of a treaty all parties to which would undertake not to be the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another.]

4. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] */

(a) In order to [mobilize world public opinion] [promote public awareness] on [behalf of] disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted.

(b) Throughout the implementation of the Programme, therefore, governmental and non-governmental information organs of Member States and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies as well as non-governmental organizations should, as appropriate, undertake further programmes of information relating to the danger of the armaments race as well as to disarmament efforts and negotiations and their results, particularly by means of annual activities conducted in connection with Disarmament Week. These actions should [constitute a large-scale programme to] further alert world opinion to the danger of war in general and nuclear war in particular.

(c) With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

It is important to show the disastrous consequences for mankind to which war, in particular nuclear war, would lead. To that end, [an authoritative international committee should be set up which would] [it is imperative to] demonstrate the necessity of averting a nuclear [or conventional] catastrophe. [The holding of a

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

world disarmament campaign, the collection of signatures in support of measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the limitation of the arms race and disarmament, and the implementation of the principles of the Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace would also be of great significance in this respect.] [All Governments should take steps to prohibit war propaganda in any form.]

As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. [Also, studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, in particular by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research established by Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979 within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research could bring a useful contribution to the knowledge and exploration of disarmament problems, especially in the long term.]

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT */

[1. Peace and development are indivisible. In order to ensure that the process of disarmament envisaged in the comprehensive programme makes an effective contribution to economic and social development, especially of the developing countries, and to the full realization of the [N]ew [I]nternational [E]conomic [O]rder:

[A close relationship exists between disarmament and development. Disarmament can and should make an effective contribution to economic and social development on a just and democratic basis and to the establishment of a new international economic order, inter alia by switching resources from military purposes to purposes of development, particularly of the developing countries.]

(i) [The militarily significant States shall undertake concrete measures at the national level to reallocate resources from military purposes to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries, and report to the United Nations and/or the international disarmament authority on the measures contemplated or undertaken.] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall create the necessary prerequisites, including preparations and, where appropriate, planning to facilitate the conversion of resources freed by disarmament measures to civilian purposes, especially to meet urgent economic and social needs, in particular, in the developing countries. They shall consider making the results of experiences in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]

(ii) [A significant part of the savings from the reduction of military expenditures particularly by the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States shall be provided as an additional flow of resources for

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

the economic and social development of the developing countries. Immediately after the adoption of the comprehensive programme, a separate account for the transfer of savings resulting from disarmament should be set up under the aegis of the United Nations Development Programme.] [Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear-weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. A special committee should be set up for the allocation of such funds.]

In the elaboration of measures under subparagraphs (i) and (ii) above, adequate consideration will be given to the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

[2. Concrete measures shall be undertaken by all States to strengthen international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, taking into account the provisions of all relevant paragraphs of the Final Document, in particular to ensure the success of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy to be convened in principle by 1983, as decided upon in General Assembly resolution 34/63 of 29 November 1979, as well as other promotional activities in this field in the United Nations system including those within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY^{*/}

[Disarmament represents a material guarantee of international security and must play a decisive role in preventing war and affording genuine security to peoples. Genuine security can be guaranteed only through arms limitation, reduction and elimination — through disarmament.]

1. All States shall [undertake a solemn commitment to] support [all] measures for strengthening [the structure, authority and operation of] the United Nations so as to improve its capability to maintain international peace and security. In this context, the conclusions of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security should be borne in mind.

2. All States shall undertake to utilize all appropriate means envisaged in the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes.

^{*/} This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Intermediate stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear Weapons

(1. Nuclear test ban

[The conclusion of an equitable and non-discriminatory treaty on a nuclear test ban would make a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(i) The Committee on Disarmament should undertake [without further delay] multilateral negotiations on a treaty on a nuclear test ban. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of nuclear [weapons] tests by all States in all environments for all time. It should be able to attract universal adherence. The treaty should include a verification system satisfactory to all parties concerned and provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

(ii) The parties who have been engaged in trilateral negotiations on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests and a protocol covering peaceful nuclear explosions which would be an integral part of the treaty" should [immediately resume and intensify their negotiations [and submit full information on the progress of their talks to the Committee on Disarmament, so as to] contribute to and assist multilateral negotiations on the treaty].)*/

2. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

(i) (a) ([Continuation of negotiations, if necessary, to conclude an agreement or agreements to bring about a halt to [qualitative improvement] [research, development, production and testing] [research, development, testing and qualitative improvement] of nuclear weapons systems and of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons. [in parallel with the measures to reduce nuclear weapons and as appropriate integrated with such measures] [as well as on gradual reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons leading to their complete destruction].) */

(b) effective implementation of the agreement or agreements concluded [to ensure the complete and universal halt to the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons systems.]

(ii) (a) ([steps to halt the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery;]) */

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) [Conclusion of negotiations on an agreement to bring about the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as [on an agreement to halt] the production of fissionable [and fusible] material for weapon purposes in accordance with the process outlined in the first stage;]

[Negotiations on measures of verification, both by national technical means and international measures, including on-site inspection, as part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated, to establish the base on which agreement or agreements prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, their means of delivery and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, would be implemented.]

- (iii) Further reduction, through an international agreement or agreements, of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, including:
 - (a) [a further reduction by 50 per cent in the strategic, tactical and other nuclear weapons and delivery systems of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States;]
 - (b) an agreed [proportionate] reduction in the nuclear weapons and delivery systems of [other] nuclear-weapon-States;
 - (c) [destruction of the non-nuclear components and assemblies of nuclear weapons reduced or dismantled by the nuclear-weapon States and transfer of surplus weapons-grade materials to peaceful purposes.]

[At the end of the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States will register and serialize the nuclear weapons remaining with them and register the remaining fissionable materials for use in such weapons.]

- [(iii) Reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time:
 - (a) (once [these reductions have reached an agreed stage] [the reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two parties concerned have reached a dimension such as to justify the acceptance by the other nuclear-weapon States of the principle of a limitation or reduction of their own nuclear forces], initiation of further negotiations among all nuclear-weapon States with a view to reaching agreement on the progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.) */
 - (b) effective and verifiable destruction of particular nuclear weapons components.]
- ((iv) Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the intermediate stage, providing for:

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;
- (b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;
- (c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) */

3. Limitation and reduction of strategic arms

Continuation of [negotiations on] [the process of] further limitation and reduction of strategic arms [between the USSR and the United States].

4. [Nuclear non-proliferation] [Further steps to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document]

Universal application of the international consensus to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons developed jointly by the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States during the first stage.

[Adoption of further measures for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, to that end, the achievement of universal participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the development of international co-operation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.]

[The full implementation and strengthening of agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis.]

5. Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones

- (i) Measures to further strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zones which are established and those which may be established during the first stage;
- (ii) Creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

1. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling [and use] of all chemical weapons and their destruction.

2. Universal adherence to and strict compliance with the treaty on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological [weapons] [warfare] [and the use of radioactive materials for hostile purposes].

3. (a) [Adoption of] [Universal adherence to and strict compliance with] [any specific] [an international comprehensive agreement] or [agreements] [on the prevention of the emergence of new types and new systems of weapons-of mass destruction] [on weapons of mass destruction which may have been identified].

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) Further efforts with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] new weapons of mass destruction.

C. Conventional weapons and armed forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of a multilateral agreement or agreements providing for:

(a) Further reductions [of fifty per cent] in the armed forces and conventional weapons of [the two major] [militarily significant States] [the permanent members of the Security Council and countries associated with them by military agreements] during the intermediate stage.

(b) Further [proportionate] reductions of the conventional weapons and the armed forces of other militarily significant States during the intermediate stage.

(c) [Consistent with reductions made by the above-mentioned States a freeze of the conventional weapons and armed forces of other States at agreed levels during the intermediate stage.]

(d) [Proportionate] reductions in the armed forces and conventional weapons of all other States during the intermediate stage.

(e) [Proportionate] reductions by the above-mentioned States of their production of conventional armaments during the intermediate stage.

2. Based on the results of the consultations held during the first stage, negotiations on and conclusion of appropriate agreements between arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons [to a level designed to ensure the limitations and relative balance agreed upon under paragraph 1 above].

3. [Negotiation of measures aimed at] [Conclusion of a multilateral agreement on] the cessation of the qualitative development of [all] [highly destructive] types and systems of conventional weapons [in parallel with the above agreements on the reductions of conventional weapons and armed forces, and as appropriate integrated with such measures].

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. Throughout the intermediate stage, the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States will make further reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reduction in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

2. [In the course of] [throughout] the intermediate stage, [the] other States [will] [may] make reductions in their military expenditures [proportionate to] [taking into account] [or leading to] the reductions in their armaments, armed forces, production of armaments and [any] dismantling of military facilities.

[3. [The above-mentioned States] should submit detailed reports to the appropriate international authority regarding the reductions made in their military expenditures including an itemization of the various categories of expenditures that have been reduced.]

4. All States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States, should continue to submit annually a fully itemized report on their respective military expenditures to the United Nations and/or the appropriate international authority.]

[The implementation, throughout the Programme, of the measures with regard to military expenditures should take place on the basis to be agreed upon by all participating states during the first stage.] */

5. [Human and material] resources released as a consequence of the reduction of military budgets should be reallocated for economic and social development especially [for the benefit] of the developing countries.

([Multilateral gradual and balanced reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, ensuring transparency and comparability of military postures through the establishment of a standardized and verifiable reporting system for military expenditures.]) **/

E. Related Measures

1. (Further steps to prevent an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof:

[Elaboration and adoption] [Consideration] of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof in order to promote the peaceful use of, and to avoid an arms race in that environment [, taking into account the emerging régime under the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference].) **/

2. ((a) Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:

In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies. Negotiations should be undertaken during the intermediate stage on an international agreement [or agreements] prohibiting States from [developing, testing and] deploying weapons [of any kind], [including] [in particular] [anti-satellite weapons systems] in outer space.) **/

*/ This text has been proposed as an alternative to paragraphs 3 and 4.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

- (b) [Further steps to prevent an arms race in outer space:
- (i) an agreement by States concerned to provide advance information of the launching of space vehicles to permit inspection;]
 - (ii) measures to promote international co-operation for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space;
 - (iii) [an international agreement by States to place all activities for the peaceful exploration [and use] of outer space under international supervision;]
 - (iv) [further attention to the prevention of an arms race in outer space.]

3. Further steps to establish and strengthen zones of peace and prevent military competition [on the seas]: establishment of zones of peace in [other] appropriate regions of the world.

4. Further steps to prevent military competition [on the high seas and international air space].

5. [[Promotion of] adherence to international agreements on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament by all States concluded during the first stage.]

OTHER MEASURES

1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures, especially in regions of arms concentration and where international tensions and disputes exist.

2. Measures aimed at achieving relaxation of international tension

([An international agreement for dismantling of all foreign military bases and elimination of all foreign military presence from all the regions of the world by the end of the intermediate stage.]) */

3. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] **/

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

**/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT */

[1. [All States concerned, especially the militarily significant States, shall submit periodically full and detailed reports to the United Nations on the measures undertaken by them to reallocate from military purposes to economic and social purposes, especially for the benefit of the developing countries;] [All States, especially the militarily significant States, shall consider making the results of experiences and preparations in their respective countries available by submitting reports from time to time to the United Nations General Assembly on possible solutions to conversion problems.]

2. An International Disarmament Fund for Development shall be established under the aegis of the United Nations to which contributions shall be made principally by the most heavily armed States [in proportion to their military expenditures as a means of generating sizeable additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries];]

[Funds released as a result of the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the reduction of their stockpiles should not be used under other expenditure headings of the military budgets of nuclear weapon States. The allocation of funds set aside for the benefit of developing countries should be carried out on a just basis, taking into account the most urgent needs and requirements of the aid-receiving countries, and without any discrimination. These funds should be distributed by the special committee to be established during the first stage.]

3. [States shall undertake to support full and unhindered international co-operation in all fields of scientific research to promote economic and social development particularly in the developing countries and, in this context, to engage in free exchange of scientific and technological information and free interchange of views among scientific and technical personnel and to provide full access to technology.]

4. [A substantial part of the savings resulting from the various disarmament measures envisaged in this stage of the Programme shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development as an additional flow of resources for the economic and social development of the developing countries.]]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY **/

1. [States shall conclude appropriate agreements with the United Nations to provide United Nations peace-keeping forces in accordance with Article 43 of the United Nations Charter.]

2. Commencement of negotiations by States with the United Nations with a view to concluding agreements to [place their internal security forces as required, at the completion of general and complete disarmament, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

**/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

Last stage

DISARMAMENT MEASURES

A. Nuclear weapons

(Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

Conclusion and implementation of an international [agreement] [or agreements], including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all the Parties by the end of the last stage, providing for:

(a) the elimination of all nuclear weapons and delivery systems remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon States;

(b) the dismantling or conversion to peaceful uses of all facilities for the production of nuclear weapons;

(c) the transfer of all fissionable [and fusionable] materials remaining at the disposal of the nuclear-weapon or any other States to peaceful purposes.) */

B. Other weapons of mass destruction

(Efforts should continue with a view to identifying and prohibiting [other] weapons of mass destruction.) */

C. Conventional Weapons and Armed Forces

1. Negotiations on and conclusion of an agreement or agreements on the elimination of conventional armaments and armed forces, including: the disbanding of armed forces, the destruction of all armaments by all States, the cessation of military production and the dismantling of production facilities, the abolition of military establishments, recruitment and conscription, planning and training and the prohibition of appropriation of funds for military purposes.

2. In the course of these negotiations, agreement should be reached on the level of a strictly limited number of personnel, equipped with light firearms, and the necessary support facilities, for the maintenance of internal order, which would include policing of borders and safeguarding the personal security of citizens. The level of such personnel and facilities should also provide for compliance by States with their obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

D. Military expenditures

Reduction of military expenditures

1. By the end of the last stage, all States shall cease all military expenditures and prohibit appropriation of funds for military purposes. Appropriations, as

*/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

expressly agreed upon, shall be permitted for the maintenance of internal security forces [within their own territories] and in order to meet obligations in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security under the United Nations Charter.

2. [All States shall submit detailed reports annually throughout the last stage regarding the progressive reductions made in their military expenditures and plans for further cuts leading at the end of the stage to complete cessation of military expenditure.]

E. Related Measures

[States would undertake to report to the appropriate international authority any scientific discovery and any technological invention having potential military significance. The international authority would make appropriate recommendations after examination and study of such reports and developments.]

OTHER MEASURES

(1. Confidence-building [and security] measures

All States shall endeavour to further elaborate and extend confidence-building measures especially in regions where international tensions and disputes may exist.

2. [Mobilization of world public opinion in favour of disarmament] [Promotion of public awareness of disarmament] */

Continuation of the programmes by governments, governmental and non-governmental international organizations to [mobilize world public opinion in favour of] [promote public awareness of] general and complete disarmament under effective international control.) **/

DISARMAMENT AND DEVELOPMENT***/

[[A substantial part of] the further savings resulting from the achievement of general and complete disarmament, at the end of the Comprehensive Programme, shall be placed at the disposal of an International Disarmament Fund for Development.]

DISARMAMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY****/

Conclusion of agreements by States with the United Nations to [place their internal security forces as required, at the disposal of the United Nations for the purposes of peace-keeping] [provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force].

*/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on a world disarmament campaign.

**/ This text appears in parentheses because of objections to its inclusion in this stage.

***/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on disarmament and development.

****/ This text is tentative. The definitive text will be prepared taking into account the conclusions and recommendations of the United Nations study on the relationship between disarmament and international security.

VI. Machinery and procedures

1. In order to assure the most effective implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, two kinds of bodies will continue to be required in the field of disarmament — deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.
2. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, should continue to have a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. (Further provisions regarding the special role of the United Nations on the various aspects of the process of disarmament envisaged in the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be elaborated subsequently, including the relationship between disarmament and development and its practical consequences.)
3. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.
4. The First Committee of the General Assembly should continue to deal only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions. (Further possible provisions regarding the manner in which the First Committee should annually consider the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament may be elaborated subsequently.)
5. The Disarmament Commission shall continue to function as a subsidiary deliberative body of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. (Further provisions regarding the specific responsibilities of the Disarmament Commission in relation to the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its procedures are to be elaborated subsequently.)
6. The Committee on Disarmament shall continue to be the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. (Further provisions relating to the Committee on Disarmament are to be elaborated subsequently.)
7. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.
8. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.
9. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it in the most effective manner, [the performance of the] disarmament Secretariat of the United Nations shall be [strengthened and developed in the light of the study of the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament (A/36/392)] [improved further]. (Further provisions on this aspect are to be elaborated subsequently.)
10. (This chapter on Machinery and Procedures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should include provisions concerning the mobilization of public opinion to be elaborated taking into account the provisions of paragraphs 15, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106 and 129 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament and the fact that, pursuant to resolution 36/92 C, the General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, is to take decisions with respect to the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign.)

11. [As part of the process of facilitating the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken on the decision of the General Assembly, when necessary for preparing the ground for negotiations or reaching agreement. (Further provisions regarding studies pursued under the auspices of the United Nations and on the possible role of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research are to be elaborated subsequently.)]

[As part of the process of facilitating and preparing the consideration of issues in the field of disarmament, studies on specific questions should be undertaken, whenever their result can be expected to have a positive influence on the course and outcome of negotiations. Studies should be envisaged especially in order to identify priority areas for arms control and disarmament measures, where negotiations seem necessary in view of a present or imminent destabilization of the relation of forces, and such fields where negotiations seem opportune in view of the existing political and security situation. Moreover, studies can also be undertaken to consider the contents and scope of collateral and other measures.

Decisions to prepare studies should be taken in conjunction with the periodic review of the Programme's implementation. They should be endorsed by the General Assembly, so as to provide the necessary link with other activities in the field of arms control and disarmament.

The studies should be pursued under the auspices of the United Nations, either by the Secretary-General, if necessary with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him on an equitable geographical basis or by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. Further procedures, such as the delegation of specific studies or parts of them to other bodies, may be envisaged should the need arise.

The studies to be undertaken within the framework of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should be concluded in time so as to permit the review to take its results into account and base its further recommendations for negotiations on these findings. Whenever feasible, studies should contain concrete proposals and suggestions for negotiations to be held or other steps to be taken.]

12. (Provisions regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies are to be elaborated subsequently.)

13. [In order to assure continued progress towards the full realization of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, a special session of the General Assembly shall be convened [every five years at the end of each stage of the Programme] to review its implementation. The first special session devoted to the review of the Programme's implementation shall be held in [June/July 1987]. Such special sessions of the General Assembly shall assess the implementation of the measures included in the stage under review. Should the assessment reveal that the full implementation of those measures has not been achieved, consideration would be given to the re-adjustments that need to be made and to the steps that are necessary to stimulate progress in the implementation of the Programme. In addition, the review shall also serve the purpose of elaborating in more concrete terms, the measures to be implemented in Stages II, III and IV of the Programme, taking into account the existing situation, including developments in science and technology. [United Nations studies could make an important contribution to the task of elaborating the specific measures to be negotiated in the second and subsequent stage.]]

[Conferences for the review of the operation of agreements play a substantial role in maintaining the viability and efficiency of fulfilment of agreements on arms limitation and disarmament. Taking account of useful experience in that respect, it is advisable to provide for a possibility of periodic review of the progress of implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament.

Special sessions of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament may be convened, as required.]

[The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is based on a phased step-by-step approach. Negotiations on disarmament and arms control measures which are specified in the Programme will be carried out in a sequence of phases. Each phase is to comprise negotiations on various interrelated measures which, taking into account the prevailing international political and security situation, aim at going one step further in lowering the level of armaments and military forces, while providing for the undiminished security of all States during that stage. Collateral and other measures, in particular confidence-building measures, will, during that stage, strengthen and consolidate the results achieved during the previous stages and, at the same time, prepare the ground for the successful outcome of negotiations during the next phase by further building and enhancing confidence among States. Studies will be undertaken in order to facilitate recommendations for which disarmament and collateral measures should be included in the next phase.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will be periodically reviewed until general and complete disarmament under international control will have been achieved. The first review could take place at the conclusion of the Second Disarmament Decade.

The review should be undertaken in an appropriate existing form of the United Nations with the participation of all Member States. The recommendations emerging from the review are to be taken by consensus. They should take into account progress reached in implementing the measures agreed upon previously, the state of negotiations in progress, and external events.

The objectives of these reviews will be to consider the implementation of measures agreed upon in previous phases and, where necessary, propose ways and means to ensure or enhance their strict observance, to decide on the question of when a current phase can be declared as concluded and if the following one can begin as well as to consider the measures which might most appropriately be pursued thereafter. The date of the next review will also be examined.]

14. In addition to the periodic reviews [to be carried out at the end of each stage] of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, there should be a continuous review of the implementation of the Programme. Therefore, an item entitled "Review of the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament" should be annually included in the agenda of the regular sessions of the General Assembly. To facilitate the work of the Assembly in this regard, the Secretary-General, with the assistance of United Nations Disarmament Secretariat, should annually submit a report to the General Assembly on progress in the implementation of the Programme.

15. During its annual review, or at its periodic special sessions to review the implementation of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the General Assembly may, as appropriate, provide for further measures and procedures to enhance the implementation of the Programme. [, including verification of agreed measures]. In this connection, the proposals listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will, inter alia,

be taken into account. (Further relevant provisions related to this question may be elaborated subsequently.) [The establishment under United Nations auspices of an international organization charged, inter alia, with the following tasks with respect to existing and future arms control and disarmament agreements:

- implementation
- verification including fact finding
- organization of review -- and amendment conferences
- provision of information.] [The creation of an international satellite monitoring agency would make an important contribution to the verification of the implementation of disarmament agreements. The negotiations should be pursued with a view to the conclusion of an agreement for the creation of an international satellite monitoring agency.]

([Verification is one cornerstone for progress in disarmament and arms control. Because arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interest of the States involved, such measures must be effectively verifiable. They should also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent and contribute to the strengthening of confidence between the States concerned. Without means of strict international and national verification, as appropriate, a sufficient degree of confidence of States in the observance of agreements cannot develop.

Effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of the undiminished security of States during the disarmament process. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating any difficulties involved in their implementation.

Negotiations on specific disarmament and arms control measures should therefore encompass the inclusion of appropriate verification arrangements, and States should accept appropriate provisions for adequate verification. Where the scope of agreements and their verification have reciprocal influence on each other, questions concerning verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. During treaty negotiations, progress on verification measures can have a positive effect on the negotiation of other elements of the treaty.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or, where appropriate, through the United Nations system in the verification process. A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.)) */

([Agreements on arms limitation and disarmament should provide for adequate reliable monitoring of their implementation so as to ensure compliance with the agreements by all parties. The forms and conditions of monitoring depend on the purposes, scope and nature of the specific agreement. Questions relating to

*/ This text is provisionally included in the chapter on "Machinery and procedures" with the understanding that its placement requires further consideration.

monitoring should be considered and decided upon simultaneously and in a manner organically linked with the consideration of specific disarmament problems rather than separately from them.

Accumulated experience shows that national technical means form a reliable basis for monitoring compliance with agreements. Where necessary, different methods of verification and other monitoring procedures, including international ones, should be combined on a voluntary basis. The strengthening of confidence would assist the application of additional monitoring measures.

A most important pre-condition for the application of specific agreed measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament is the political will of Governments; references to technical difficulties of monitoring should not be used as a pretext for refusing to reach agreement on measures for halting the arms race.)) */

([Adequate and effective verification is a key prerequisite to any progress towards arms control and disarmament. Acceptance of this principle, and application of it to specific steps undertaken towards disarmament will therefore facilitate over-all progress towards general and complete disarmament. The role of verification in the comprehensive programme of disarmament is threefold: as a principle upon which progress towards disarmament is based, as a part of the specific measures to be undertaken by States; and as an objective to be carried out by means of the over-all machinery and procedures called for in a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Arms control and disarmament measures concern the vital security interests of the States involved and the advantages accruing to any State party to an arms control and disarmament agreement comes from the fulfillment by the parties to such an agreement of the obligations and responsibilities contained therein. Thus, States must be confident that such obligations and responsibilities are being adhered to, and verification is the means by which such assurance is gained. Without effective verification, the confidence of States that agreements are being observed cannot sufficiently develop. In addition, since any agreement must be designed in such a way to ensure the security of the States party to it, and as it is through adequate verification measures that States can develop confidence that the agreement is being complied with, it therefore follows that effective verification is of paramount importance for the maintenance of undiminished security of States during the disarmament process.

The principle of effective verification must, in practice, be reflected by the inclusion of necessary and appropriate verification measures and arrangements in specific disarmament and arms control agreements. Negotiations must therefore include consideration of effective measures of verification, which will form a part of the agreement or agreements to be negotiated. Such verification measures should encompass, as appropriate, both national and international means, and include provisions, as necessary, for on-site inspection. Through the inclusion of appropriate measures of verification a sound basis will be established for the implementation of arms control and disarmament agreements.

In the negotiation of specific arms control and disarmament agreements, where the scope of agreement and verification measures have reciprocal influence, questions of scope and verification should be taken up and negotiated concurrently. And as verification measures are a vital part of any arms control and disarmament agreement, progress in the development of verification measures during the course of negotiation can have a positive effect on the negotiations of other elements of the agreements. The form, conditions, and modalities of verification to be provided for in specific agreements depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope, and nature of the agreements.

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Measures designed to ensure effective verification of compliance with agreements will, as noted, contribute to the increased confidence of States. Such measures should, in addition, also make the situation with respect to the remaining armaments more transparent. States should therefore take a positive approach to the development of the necessary and appropriate measures of verification for each particular arms control and disarmament agreement and show a willingness to accept such measures without exaggerating difficulties involved in their implementation.

A combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed. Suitable procedures, including on-site inspection, must therefore be envisaged.

The multilateral aspects of disarmament negotiations have become more significant, and experience has increasingly demonstrated the need for closer attention to the development by parties to agreements of appropriate machinery and procedures to ensure verification of compliance with multilateral agreements. Therefore, the possibility of establishing requirements and criteria of an institutional and procedural nature with broad application for effective machinery to ensure implementation of individual multilateral disarmament agreements, in particular their verification, should be considered. In this context, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should provide for examination of the various possibilities available in this regard. In the consideration of various possibilities, the experience accumulated by already functioning agencies, as they provide working prototypes from which an effective organization could be developed, should be of benefit.

The review processes for agreements already in effect vary widely, and many, as appropriate, rely to some extent on national evaluations. Many States may not, however, possess a national capability to effectively make national evaluations of compliance with agreements to which they may be a party. The consideration outlined above may serve to promote an improved verification process by providing for an evaluation of the implementation of agreements and a report to the involved parties at periodic review conferences.]) */

([Verification forms an important part of measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament, is inseparably linked with such measures, and must stem from a precise and clear agreement on them. Consequently, the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should contain basic provisions on verification, proceeding thereby from the principles enshrined in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament. These principles should find their concrete application in the elaboration of measures for verifying compliance with each specific agreement on arms limitation and disarmament to be concluded and implemented at the different stages of the CPD and within indicative time-frames. Due consideration should be given in this regard to the experience gained until now with the elaboration and implementation of agreements in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.

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Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. Thus, in order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements. In enhancing confidence in the observance of disarmament agreements, appropriate verification measures would contribute to attracting other States to adhere to them and promote the general disarmament process.

At the same time, a certain minimum of confidence is necessary as a basis for devising an effective verification system. Thus, normal relations between States based on détente and recognition of mutual interest are very conducive to the elaboration of reliable verification procedures, whereas a policy aggravating international tension and accelerating the arms race is not likely to promote agreement on far reaching verification measures. Verification is likely to be most successful in an atmosphere of co-operation.

The settlement of verification issues depends on whether or not the various parties have the political will to conclude the relevant disarmament agreements. It is universally recognized that strong political will is a prerequisite to reaching agreement on any significant or meaningful measure in the field of disarmament. Once such political will has been built up, it will not be difficult and certainly not beyond human ingenuity, to devise controls appropriate to any requirement in the field of disarmament, no matter how complex it may be.

Strong political will combined with a degree of mutual trust has to exist in respect of any measure in the field of disarmament; before a practical, least-onerous and fair system of verification can be devised and effectively implemented.

Disarmament negotiations should not be involved in an abstract verification discussion, diverting their attention from substantive disarmament problems. Arguments concerning complexities in regard to verification or controls should not become a camouflage for the lack of political will and a a priori refusal to trust others. With regard to disarmament measures of the highest priority, such as a comprehensive ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons, it is clearly the lack of political will, rather than the complexities involved in verification, which is holding up the conclusion of negotiations in this area.

In general, one may proceed from the assumption that a State becomes a party to a disarmament agreement in order to abide strictly by the obligations it has assumed under it, and therefore verification should not be built upon the principle of total distrust by States of one another, and should not take the form of global suspiciousness.

The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend on and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. To proceed the other way round would involve disarmament negotiations in endless debates on detailed and highly technical aspects of verification and lead to an actual postponement, if not prevention, of disarmament agreements.

Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures of verification which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

Verification measures should be an important link in the chain of the other measures ensuring confidence in the observance of a given disarmament treaty by all parties. Thus, they constitute an integral part of the broader system for ensuring compliance with such an agreement. The main function of this system is to give the parties to those agreements assurance of their observance by other parties, and through the employment of certain forms of co-operation to facilitate the resolution of questions in dispute. Therefore, where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

It is universally recognized that a system of controls, guaranteeing 100 per cent verification, is not possible, nor can a completely fool-proof system of verification be designed. The whole complex of available and possible verification methods, ranging from national control to certain forms of international verification, provides a high degree of assurance that violations of disarmament agreements could be detected. It is most doubtful that a militarily important violation could be concealed.

Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process.

Against this essential general background, it is clear that it would be wrong to make a fetish of verification. It would be equally wrong to devise or establish a machinery of controls in the absence of genuine measures of arms limitation or disarmament. To do that, would be like putting the cart before the horse. There can be no merit, either, in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of an international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitation.]) */

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List and Text of Documents issued by the Committee on Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/1	Letter dated 17 January 1979 ¹⁹⁷⁹ from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session
CD/2	Letter dated 16 January 1979 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the proposals and suggestions listed in paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session in accordance with General Assembly resolution 33/71L of 14 December 1978
CD/3	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Message of greeting from Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/4	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed
CD/5	Italy: Working paper on chemical disarmament negotiations
CD/6	The Netherlands: Some procedural suggestions with respect to the development of a ban on chemical weapons
CD/7	The Netherlands: On the use of short-period initial motion data for discrimination purposes
CD/8	Rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/9	Italy: Additional Protocol to the 1967 "Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies" with a view to preventing an arms race in outer space: memorandum
CD/10	Pakistan: Conclusion of an international convention to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/11	Group of 21: ^{5/} Working paper on negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction
CD/12	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/13	Poland: Working paper on further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor
CD/14	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Articles 30 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/15	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Visit to Britain by chemical weapons experts (14-16 March 1979)
CD/16	Letter dated 20 April 1979 from the Head of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 30 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/17	Letter dated 28 March 1979 from the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations for Political and Security Council Affairs addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa
CD/18	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Seventh Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/19	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (second part of the 1979 session)
CD/20	Hungary: Letter dated 19 June 1979 from the Permanent Representative of the Hungarian People's Republic addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held in Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979

^{5/} Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire.

Document No.	Title
CD/21	Poland: Prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction: working paper
CD/22	Mongolia: Letter dated 20 June 1979, addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, transmitting the Declaration by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic, published in Ulan-Bator on the occasion of the signature of the Soviet-United States Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)
CD/23	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working paper on draft international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States
CD/24	Letter dated 21 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Charge d'Affaires <u>ad interim</u> of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/25	Pakistan: Working paper on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/26	Compilation of material on chemical weapons from the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the Committee on Disarmament working papers and statements, 1972-1979 (prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)
CD/27	The United States of America: Working paper on a proposal for a CD recommendation to the United Nations General Assembly concerning the security of non-nuclear weapon States against nuclear attack
CD/28	Letter dated 27 June 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USA and USSR to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of the Strategic Offensive Arms between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Joint Statement of Principles and Basic Guidelines for subsequent negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms and the joint United States-Soviet Communiqué

Document No.	Title
CD/29	Letter dated 2 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting additional documents relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the limitation of strategic offensive arms
CD/30	Letter dated 2 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the Decision adopted by the Committee on 15 February 1979 concerning the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismological Experts
CD/31	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint USSR-United States proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/32	Letter dated 9 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Agreed joint US-USSR proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons"
CD/33	Italy: Letter dated 6 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a letter from the President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic to the President of the United States of America and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
CD/34	Letter dated 9 July 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Article 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/35	Letter dated 10 July 1979 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament on the negotiations on the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/36/Rev.1	Group of 21: Working paper on cessation of nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/37	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on some aspects of international verification of non-production of chemical weapons: experience gained in the Federal Republic of Germany
CD/38	Letter dated 10 July 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning rules 34 and 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/39	Letter dated 16 July 1979 from the Ambassador (Political Affairs) of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the identification of potential organophosphorus warfare agents - an approach for the standardization of techniques and reference data
CD/40	Hungary: Working paper on the draft preambular part of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/41	The Netherlands: Working paper containing questions relevant to a convention prohibiting chemical weapons
CD/42	German Democratic Republic: Working paper on draft paragraph XI, subparagraph 3, and paragraph XII, subparagraph 3, of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Development, Manufacture, Stockpiling and Use of Radiological Weapons
CD/43	Letter dated 25 July 1979 from the Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the second report of the <u>ad hoc</u> group

Document No.	Title
CD/45/Add.1	Second Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events (Appendices)
CD/44	Poland: Outline of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction: working paper
CD/45	Sweden: Working paper on international seismological datacenter demonstration facilities in Sweden
CD/46	Sweden: Draft CD decision for a continued mandate to the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Seismic Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/47	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use Or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons - Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/48	Letter dated 7 August 1979 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/49	The Netherlands: Chemical weapons - Answers to questionnaire contained in CD/41
CD/50	Statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the annual session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1979
CD/51	Results of the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament - Working paper submitted by a group of socialist States**/
CD/52	France, Italy and the Netherlands: Chemical weapons - Evaluation of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament in 1979 with respect to prohibition of chemical weapons
CD/53 CD/53/Corr.1	Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly
CD/54	Statement by Mr. Jamsheed Marker, Leader of Pakistan delegation to the Committee on Disarmament - 14.8.79

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**/ Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Document No.	Title
CD/L.1	Draft Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/L.2/Rev.1	Revised Working Paper on the Provisional Agenda and the Programme of Work
CD/L.3/Rev.1	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Consider, and Negotiate On, Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-nuclear-weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons - Revised Draft Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/L.4	Draft Report of the Committee on Disarmament

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CD/NGC.1 List of communications from Non-Governmental Organizations

Document No.	Title
CD/8/Rev.1	Rules of procedure of the ¹⁹⁸⁰ Committee on Disarmament
CD/55	Letter dated 25 January 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session
CD/56	Italy: Working paper on control and limitation of international arms transfers
CD/57	Romania's position on disarmament
CD/58	German Democratic Republic: Letter dated 12 February 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/59	Australia: Chemical weapons: proposal for informal meetings with experts
CD/60	Poland's policy on détente and disarmament
CD/61	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the ninth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/62	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (adopted at the 61st plenary meeting held on 19 February 1980)
CD/62/Add.1	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (adopted at the 67th plenary meeting held on 11 March 1980)
CD/63	Bulgaria: The position of the People's Republic of Bulgaria on détente and disarmament at the present stage
CD/64	Group of 21: Statement of the Group of 21 on the Establishment of Working Groups on Items on the Annual Agenda of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980
CD/65	Finland: Letter dated 21 February 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland concerning the participation of Finland in the work of the Committee on chemical weapons during the 1980 session

Document No.	Title
CD/66	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Note Verbale dated 25 February 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam concerning Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/67	Poland: Resolution of the Eighth Congress of the Polish United Workers' Party
CD/68	Poland: Chemical weapons - a possible procedural approach to the tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament: working paper
CD/69	Denmark: Letter dated 3 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Denmark concerning paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/70	Spain: Letter dated 3 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the United Nations Office at Geneva in connexion with paragraph 34 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/71	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Extracts from the address delivered by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, at the meeting of electors in the Bauman electoral district, Moscow, on 22 February 1980
CD/72	Statement of the Group of 21 on a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CD/73	Federal Republic of Germany: Working Paper - Workshop on the demonstration of procedures to obtain seismic data at individual stations under different conditions
CD/74	Austria: Letter dated 13 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning paragraphs 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/75	Finland: Letter dated 12 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva submitting a working document containing the views of the Finnish Government concerning the item "Effective International Arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons"

Document No.	Title
CD/76	Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 13 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure.
CD/77	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 7/Rev. 1)
CD/78	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 8/Rev. 1)
CD/79	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 9/Rev. 1)
CD/80	Decision adopted at the 69th plenary meeting held on 17 March 1980 (originally submitted as Working Paper No. 10/Rev. 1)
CD/81	Finland: Letter dated 18 March 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva concerning the participation of Finland in the Committee's work on chemical weapons during the 1980 Session
CD/82	Socialist Republic of Viet Nam: Letter dated 18 March 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires Ad Interim of the Permanent Mission of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Memorandum on the use of chemicals by the United States of America in Viet Nam, Laos and Kampuchea"
CD/83	Group of Socialist States: Statement at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 25 March 1980 by a Group of Socialist States

Document No.

Title

- CD/84 The Netherlands: Working Document - Draft Initial Work Programme of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons
- CD/85 Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 26 March 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of Democratic Kampuchea to the Office of the United Nations at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament and transmitting two documents entitled "Statement of 5 February 1980 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea on the intensification by Hanoi of the use of chemical weapons and other activities to exterminate the Kampuchean people" and "The use of chemical weapons by the Vietnamese aggressors in Kampuchea; Report issued by the Ministry of Information of Democratic Kampuchea on 25 February 1980"
- CD/86 Letter dated 24 March 1980 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, prepared pursuant to General Assembly Decision 32/422 of 11 December 1979
- CD/87 People's Republic of Kampuchea: Telegram dated 8 April 1980 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament
- CD/88 Egypt: Letter dated 11 April 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative and Head of the Delegation of Egypt to the Committee on Disarmament in connexion with CD/71 of 4 March 1980
- CD/89 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan: Telegram dated 13 April 1980 from the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a "Declaration of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan issued on 11 April 1980"
- CD/90 Australia and Canada: The Prohibition of the Production of Fissionable Material for Weapons Purposes

Document No.	Title
CD/91	Democratic Kampuchea: Letter dated 10 April 1980 and received on 15 April 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Kampuchea addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the Permanent Representative's communication of 13 March 1980 (CD/76)
CD/92	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations concerning the tasks of the Second Disarmament Decade
CD/93	Belgium: Prohibition of nuclear tests: proposal for an informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of experts members of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/94	Belgium: Proposed definition of a chemical warfare agent and chemical munitions
CD/95	Australia: An illustrative list of subjects might be examined by the Committee on Disarmament in considering Agenda Item 1 "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/96	Poland: Ad Hoc working group on CW - Initial Work Programme: Working Document
CD/97	Sweden: Working Paper on the Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Capability
CD/98	Poland: Letter dated 9 June 1980 from the Chargé d'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Representation of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva enclosing the declaration of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee in Warsaw on 15 May 1980
CD/99	Canada: Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals"
CD/100	Mongolia: Letter dated 10 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, enclosing the text of a statement dated 20 May 1980 by the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic in support of the Declaration adopted at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, held at Warsaw on 14 and 15 May 1980

Document No.	Title
CD/101	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament for the Second Part of its 1980 Session (Adopted at the 84th plenary meeting on 17 June 1980)
CD/102	China: Letter dated 19 June 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Acting Head of the Chinese Delegation to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a Working Paper on the "Chinese Delegation's Proposals on the main contents of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons"
CD/103	Finland: Letter dated 24 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a document entitled "Identification of degradation products of potential organophosphorus warfare agents"
CD/104	Compilation of relevant documents on radiological weapons covering the period 1979 - 1980 (Prepared by the Secretariat at the request of the Committee on Disarmament)
CD/105	France: Elements of a reply by the French delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament (CD/41)
CD/106	France: Working Paper - Control of the non-manufacture and non-possession of agents and weapons of chemical warfare
CD/107	German Democratic Republic: Letter dated 27 June 1980 from the Permanent Representative of the German Democratic Republic to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a letter of Mr. Oskar Fischer, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic
CD/108	Mongolia: Letter dated 27 June 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Leader of the Delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/109	German Democratic Republic: Working Paper - Proposal on behalf of a group of socialist countries concerning urgent steps for the practical implementation of "Negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed" (CD/4)

Document No.	Title
CD/110	Yugoslavia: Working Paper on Medical Protection Against Nerve Gas Poisoning (Present Situation and Future Possibilities)
CD/111	Yugoslavia: Working Paper on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents (CWA)
CD/112	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/United States of America: Letter dated 7 July 1980 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representatives of the USSR and the United States to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/113	Canada: Organization and Control of Verification Within a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/114	Australia: Reply at this stage submitted by the Australian Delegation to the questionnaire relating to chemical weapons submitted by the Netherlands to the Committee on Disarmament in Document CD/41
CD/115	Switzerland: Letter dated 2 July 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning Rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure and referring to the decision taken by the Committee at its 86th Plenary Meeting
CD/116	Group of 21: Working Paper on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament
CD/117	Canada: Definitions and Scope in a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/118	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft decision of the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> group of experts to prepare a draft comprehensive agreement and to consider the question of concluding special agreements on individual new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction
CD/119	Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts: Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Tenth Session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/120	Pakistan: Working Paper - Possible draft resolution for adoption by UN Security Council as an interim measure on "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

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CD/121	Poland: Some of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation on a CW convention: working paper
CD/122	Morocco: Proposed definition of chemical weapons
CD/123	Mongolia: Working document - Interrelationship between the future convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925
CD/124	Indonesia: Some Views of the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/125	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international agreements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Report to the Committee on Disarmament.
CD/126/Rev.1	Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/127	Canada: Letter dated 29 July 1980 from the Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations Office at Geneva, forwarding a document entitled "A quantitative working paper on the compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals"
CD/128	A Group of Socialist Countries: Proposal for the main elements of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/129	Mexico: Working paper containing draft amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, entitled "Participation by States not members of the Committee"
CD/130	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland/United States of America: Letter dated 30 July 1980 from the Permanent Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America transmitting a document entitled "Tripartite Report to the Committee on Disarmament"
CD/131/Rev.1	Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/132	Pakistan: Working Paper - Views of the Government of Pakistan submitted in response to the circulation of document CD/89

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CD/133	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group established with a view to reaching agreement on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/134	Group of 21: Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusion of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980
CD/135	Results of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament: Statement by the group of Socialist States
CD/136	Statement by Ambassador Yu Peiwen of the People's Republic of China at the Plenary Meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 7 August 1980
CD/137	Statement made by the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Yu Peiwen, at the 73rd Plenary Meeting of the Committee on 27 March 1980
CD/138	Declaration by the delegation of Mexico on the question of the Committee's documents relating to participation by States not members of the Committee
CD/139	Report to the United Nations General Assembly

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CD/124/Rev.:	Revision of CD/124 on the ¹⁹⁸¹ Definition of Chemical Agent and Chemical Warfare Agent
CD/140	Letter dated 2 February 1981 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session
CD/141	Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 session
CD/142	Working Paper : Prohibition of retention or acquisition of a chemical warfare capability enabling use of chemical weapons (4 annexes)
CD/143	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/144	Agenda and programme of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/145	Letter dated 5 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/146	Letter dated 10 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/147	Letter dated 12 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure

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CD/148	Letter dated 19 November 1980 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/149	Letter dated 8 January 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/150	Progress report to the Committee on Disarmament on the eleventh session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to consider international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events
CD/151	Decision adopted by the Committee on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 105th plenary meeting on 12 February 1981
CD/152	Letter addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the People's Republic of China and Pakistan, handed over 12 February 1981
CD/153	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/154	Letter dated 12 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/155	Working Paper : Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament "Objectives"
CD/156	Letter dated 19 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/157	Letter dated 20 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981

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CD/158	Letter dated 26 February 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of the Arab Republic of Egypt transmitting the statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt on the occasion of its ratification of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on 26 February 1981
CD/159	Letter dated 24 February 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/160	Letter dated 2 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the report of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. L. I. Brezhnev, to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, entitled "To Strengthen Peace, Deepen Détente and Curb the Arms Race"
CD/161	Working Paper : Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/162*	Considerations of a group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament concerning negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and also on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests
CD/163	Letter dated 2 March 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/164	Letter dated 18 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland, transmitting a working document entitled, "Creation of Chemical Weapons Control Capacity - present phase and goals of the Finnish project"

Document No.	Title
CD/165	Letter dated 19 March 1981 from the Representative of Venezuela addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, transmitting the text of the address given by His Holiness Pope John Paul II at Hiroshima on 23 February 1981
CD/166	Letter dated 23 March 1981 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the memorandum "Peace, Disarmament and International Security Guarantees" submitted by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. A. Gromyko, to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly
CD/167	Verification and control requirements for a chemical arms control treaty based on an analysis of activities
CD/168	Working Paper : Prohibition of Chemical Weapons: on the Definition of Chemical Warfare Agents
CD/169	Working Paper : Dismantling of Production Facilities/Means of Production for Chemical Weapons
CD/170	Letter dated 26 March 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of India transmitting extracts from the section entitled "Review of the international situation" contained in the New Delhi declaration issued at the conclusion of the Ministerial Conference of Non-aligned countries held in New Delhi from 9 to 13 February 1981
CD/171	Tabulation of proposals on nuclear disarmament since the First Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/172	Working Paper on the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament
CD/173	Disposal of Chemical Agents
CD/174	Working Paper : Proposal for informal meetings of the Committee on Disarmament with the participation of qualified governmental experts on the prohibition of development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons

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CD/175	Letter dated 1 April 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/176	Letter dated 7 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the reply of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, to the question put by the Greek newspaper, Ta Nea.
CD/177	United Kingdom Working Paper on the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
CD/178	Letter dated 15 April 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister-Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland addressing an invitation of the Finnish Government
CD/179 + Add.1	The Chairman's Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the work of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons
CD/180	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/181	Statement by the Group of 21 on item 1 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament entitled: "Nuclear test ban"
CD/182	Statement of a Group of Socialist Countries on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/183	A Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification Produced by the Arms Control and Disarmament Division, Department of External Affairs and the Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, Department of National Defence, Ottawa
CD/184	Letter dated 12 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament Transmitting Resolutions Adopted by the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers Held in Baghdad from 1 to 6 June 1981

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CD/185	Letter dated 9 June 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Spain addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 104th Plenary meeting on 10 February 1981
CD/186	Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament for the second part of its 1981 session (Adopted at the 129th plenary meeting on 16 June 1981)
CD/187	Statement by the Group of 21 on the Israeli air attack against a nuclear facility on 7 June 1981
CD/188	Working paper on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament for 1981 entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament"
CD/189	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia transmitting an Extract from the Report of the General Secretary of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural, Mongolian People's Republic Comrade Yu.Tsedenbal to the XVIII Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party
CD/190	Letter dated 22 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Deputy Permanent Representative, Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of Austria concerning the decision taken by the Committee at its 113th Plenary meeting on 10 March 1981
CD/191	Letter dated 30 June 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting the Appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Parliaments and Peoples of the World
CD/192	Statement of the Group of 21 (Item 1: Nuclear Test Ban)
CD/193	Considerations on the further proceeding of the Committee on Disarmament concerning item 2 of its agenda
CD/194	Statement of a Group of socialist countries concerning a nuclear test ban
CD/195	Working Paper: Incapacitating Agents (Some aspects of definition, classification and toxicological characteristics)

Document No.	Title
CD/196	Letter dated 13 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland transmitting a document entitled "Trace Analysis of Chemical Warfare Agents"
CD/197	Working Paper: Suggestions for Elements of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/198	Working Paper: Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/199	Working Paper: Definition and Characteristics of the Toxins
CD/200	Increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/201	Letter dated 28 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Permanent Representative of Mongolia enclosing the text of "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of all Asian and Pacific Countries"
CD/202	Letter dated 29 July 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the United States Representative to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of the Announcement made on 16 July 1981, by the President of the United States of America Concerning the Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Co-operation Policy of the United States of America
CD/203	Consultation and Co-operation, Verification Measures and Complaints Procedure in the framework of the Convention on the complete and effective Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of all Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction
CD/204	Working Paper: Establishment of subsidiary organs
CD/205 CD/CPD/WP.52	Draft Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/206	Working Paper: Views on Disarmament and its related Questions
CD/207	Working Paper: On the Question of Security Assurances
CD/208 CD/CPD/WP.55	Working Paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/209	Working Paper on the question of verification in the field of disarmament
CD/210	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Twelfth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/211	Letter dated 12 August 1981 from the Representative of Cuba to the Committee on Disarmament addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting part of the Statement made on 26 July 1981 by Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, Chairman of the Councils of State and of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba
CD/212	Some viewpoints on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
CD/213	Some viewpoints on the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament
CD/214	Working Paper on the Elaboration of a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/215 & Corr.1	<u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group to Continue to Negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons: Report to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/216	Letter dated 14 August 1981 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a Statement by Tass dated 13 August 1981
CD/217 & Corr.1	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/218	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons

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CD/219	Statement of a group of socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons
CD/220	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/221	Some observations of the Chinese delegation on the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981 (18 August 1981)
CD/222 & Corr.1	Statement of the Group of 21 on the Conclusions of the Annual Session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981
CD/223	Working Paper on the Chapter entitled "Measures of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"
CD/224	Statement by a group of socialist countries on the results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament
CD/225	Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba made on 19 August 1981
CD/226	Statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Mongolian People's Republic
CD/227	The Chinese delegation's denial to the Soviet allegation regarding China's position on the question of the neutron bomb
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- CD/229
CD/CPD/WP.56 Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
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CD/CPD/WP.57 Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/231 Letter dated 1 February 1982 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session
- CD/232
CD/CPD/WP.58 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Objectives" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/233
CD/CPD/WP.59 Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Priorities" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
- CD/234 Message of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament
- CD/235 Romania: Messages from the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, addressed to Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and to Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, concerning the Geneva negotiations on the halting of the deployment in Europe and the withdrawal from that continent of medium-range missiles
- CD/236 Romania: Appeal of the Romanian Parliament to the Parliaments, the Governments and the peoples of the European countries, the United States of America and Canada
- CD/237 Romania: Appeal by the people of Romania, to the peoples and forward-looking democratic forces of the world, for disarmament and peace, security, independence and progress
- CD/238 Letter dated 3 February 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by the Representative of Venezuela, transmitting the result of the study carried out in October 1981 by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, at the request of His Holiness John Paul II, entitled "Statement on the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons"

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CD/239 CD/CPD/WP.60	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and the USSR: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/240	Letter dated 10 February 1982 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, containing excerpts from the report on the reception by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, of Representatives of the Advisory Council of the Socialist International on Disarmament
CD/241	Document of a group of socialist countries: Considerations relating to the organization of work of the Committee on Disarmament in the course of its 1982 session
CD/242	Agenda and Programme of Work of the Committee on Disarmament (Adopted at the 156th Plenary meeting held on 18 February 1982)
CD/243	Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on <u>ad hoc</u> working groups at its 156th plenary meeting on 18 February 1982
CD/244 CD/CW/WP.26	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: Working Paper on Verification and the Monitoring of Compliance in a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/245	Bulgaria, Hungary, German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Czechoslovakia: Working paper on the agenda item entitled "Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament"
CD/246	Letter dated 2 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Denmark addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/247	Letter dated 18 November 1981 from the Minister Counsellor of the Permanent Mission of Finland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/248	Letter dated 20 November 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Norway addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/249	Letter dated 18 December 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Austria addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure

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CD/250	Letter dated 15 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/251	Letter dated 30 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Spain to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/252	Letter dated 2 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/253	Letter dated 23 February 1982 from the Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a TASS statement of 19 February 1982
CD/254	Letter dated 28 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/255 CD/CPD/WP.63	Group of 21: Working paper on the chapter entitled "Machinery and Procedures" of the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament
CD/256	German Democratic Republic and Hungarian People's Republic: Working paper - non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present
CD/257	Sweden: An international system for the Detection of Airborne Radioactivity from Nuclear Explosions
CD/258 and Corr.1 CD/CW/WP.28 and Corr.1	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Working paper - Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons
CD/259	German Democratic Republic: Working paper - Draft mandates for <u>ad hoc</u> working groups on a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament
CD/260	Progress Report to the Committee on Disarmament on the Thirteenth Session of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-Operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events
CD/261	Hungary: Working paper - Prohibition of the Development and Manufacture of New Types of Weapons of Mass Destruction and New Systems of Such Weapons

Document No.	Title
CD/262	Romania: Working paper - Scientists and Disarmament
CD/263	Finland: Working paper on the Relation of Verification to Scope of a Ban on Chemical Warfare Agents
CD/264	United States of America: The United States Programme to Deter Chemical Warfare
CD/265	Federal Republic of Germany: Working paper on Principles and Rules for Verifying Compliance with a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/266 CD/CW/WP.31	Yugoslavia: Working paper - Binary weapons and the problem of their definition and verification
CD/267	Letter dated 18 March 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a statement issued by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
CD/268	Letter dated 25 March 1982 addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitting part of the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to the seventeenth Congress of Trade Unions of the USSR
CD/269	Letter dated 26 March 1982 from the Head of the Delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the text of a decision, taken by the Federal German Government on 17 March, on the present state of the INF negotiations and Secretary-General Brezhnev's proposals
CD/270	Letter dated 31 March 1982 from the Heads of the Delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands transmitting a document entitled "Indonesia and the Netherlands - Working Document - Destruction of about 45 tons of mustard agent at Batujajar, West-Java. Indonesia"
CD/271 CD/CW/WP.32	United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia: Technical Evaluation of "Recover" Techniques for CW Verification
CD/272	Mongolian People's Republic: Working paper on the prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

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CD/273	Letter dated 2 April 1982 from the Head of the Delegation of India addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting a note of the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in New York to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in response to General Assembly resolution 36/81 A and B pertaining to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/274	Letter dated 6 April 1982 from the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the draft treaty on the prohibition of the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer space submitted to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly
CD/275	Letter dated 5 April 1982 from the Deputy Representative of Canada to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament forwarding a document entitled "Compendium of Arms Control Verification Proposals - Second Edition"
CD/276	Note Verbale dated 29 March 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Tunisia addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament concerning rules 33 to 35 of the Rules of Procedure
CD/277	Sweden: Working paper - The concept "precursor" and a suggestion for definition for the purpose of a Chemical Weapons Convention
CD/278*	China: Working paper on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/279	Sweden: Working paper - Suggestions for measures to enhance confidence between the Parties negotiating a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons
CD/280	Statement of the Group of 21 on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons
CD/281/Rev.1	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament
CD/282	Working paper containing the text of the opinion of the Government of Mexico on the prevention of nuclear war, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with the invitation extended by the General Assembly in its resolution 36/81 B of 9 December 1981
CD/283	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament

Document No.	Title
CD/284/Rev.1	Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group on Radiological Weapons to the Committee on <u>Disarmament</u> in view of the second special session devoted to disarmament
CD/285	Special Report of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons to the Committee on Disarmament prepared in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament
CD/286	Statement made by Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group and the draft Comprehensive Programme annexed thereto
CD/287	Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Proposal for the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under Item 1 of the agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/288	Statement made by Ambassador Bogumil Sujka, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Chemical Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group
CD/289	Statement made by Ambassador Henning Wegener, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Radiological Weapons, on the occasion of the submission to the Committee on Disarmament of the Report of the Group
CD/290	Statement made by Ambassador Mansur Ahmad, Chairman of the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Working Group on Security Assurances, on the occasion of the submission of the Special Report of the Working Group to the Committee on Disarmament
CD/291	Decision adopted by the Committee on Disarmament on the establishment of an <u>ad hoc</u> working group under item 1 of its agenda entitled "Nuclear Test Ban"
CD/292	Special Report of the Committee on Disarmament to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament

