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CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|---|-------------|
| Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2332/Rev.1) | 1 |
| Adoption of the agenda | 1 |
| The situation in the Middle East: | |
| (a) Resolution 498 (1981); | |
| (b) Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/14869); | |
| (c) Letter dated 16 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14875) | 1 |

NOTE

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2332nd MEETING

Held in New York on Thursday, 25 February 1982, at 4 p.m.

President: Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2332/Rev.1)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Resolution 498 (1981);
 - (b) Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/14869);
 - (c) Letter dated 16 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14875)

The meeting was called to order at 6.05 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Resolution 498 (1981);
- (b) Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/14869);
- (c) Letter dated 16 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14875)

1. The PRESIDENT: In accordance with decisions taken at the 2331st meeting, I invite the representative of Lebanon to take a place at the Council table; I invite the representative of Israel to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber; I invite the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to take the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tuéni (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table; Mr. Blum (Israel) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber; Mr. Terzi (Palestine Liberation

Organization) took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to document S/14888, which contains the text of a letter dated 23 February 1982 from the representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General.

3. Mr. DORR (Ireland): Sir, the month of February is drawing to a close. It is therefore with full knowledge of the skills you have deployed and the efforts you have made as President that I congratulate you on holding this office and congratulate ourselves on having had you as President for this month of February.

4. I should also like to express my thanks and appreciation to your predecessor, our colleague Mr. Troyanovsky of the Soviet Union, for the skill and courtesy which he displayed in turn when he was President during the month of January.

5. In December last [2320th meeting], the Council renewed the mandate of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) until June 1982 [resolution 498 (1981)]. The purpose of the draft resolution which will shortly be before the Council is not to change that mandate but to increase the strength of the Force from 6,000 to 7,000 men. Ireland will vote in favour of that draft resolution.

6. Countries like mine which contribute contingents to the Force have known for some time that it is thinly stretched in its effort to carry out its functions effectively in difficult conditions. The Secretary-General makes this clear in paragraph 6 of his special report [S/14869].

7. In one sense, this is good news because it refutes the criticism sometimes made that UNIFIL is ineffective. The truth is that UNIFIL has been very successful in one important aspect of its work—promoting peaceful conditions in the area where it has been allowed to operate. That area, it seems, is now regarded as comparatively safe and there has been an influx of people into it for that very reason. This, in turn, has led to a renewal of economic activity and indeed to something of a boom in the area.

8. This is a tribute to UNIFIL. But it does mean a greater strain on the Force, which is now responsible for a much larger population than before. There is

therefore a very good case for increasing the strength of the Force for practical reasons and irrespective of other considerations.

9. Clearly, therefore, the Council should approve the present request. But its responsibilities do not end there. We must always keep in mind the UNIFIL basic mandate as set out in resolution 425 (1978) and confirmed and endorsed by many subsequent resolutions. We must continue to press for UNIFIL to be allowed to fulfil that mandate and we must ensure that the opportunity created by this peace-keeping operation is used for a serious effort at peace-making in the region.

10. When UNIFIL was set up in 1978, the Secretary-General at the time said that three conditions were essential if it was to operate effectively: first, that it must have at all times the full confidence and backing of the Security Council; secondly, that it must operate with the full co-operation of all the parties; and, thirdly, that it must be able to function as an integrated and efficient military unit [S/12611, para. 3].

11. The present increase in strength will help to meet one of these three conditions since it will allow the Force to function more efficiently as an integrated unit protecting an increasing population. But what of the other two conditions—the full co-operation of the parties and the full confidence and backing of the Council?

12. Though the parties have accepted the Force, the co-operation they have given to it so far has, in our view, been less than adequate. As the Secretary-General notes in his report, efforts at infiltration by armed elements have continued and the encroachments on the UNIFIL area of deployment by the *de facto* forces have not been removed [S/14869, para. 2].

13. Both of these are serious issues. The task facing UNIFIL has therefore been a particularly difficult one. It seeks to prevent infiltration and to maintain peace. But it has been prevented from interposing itself fully along a continuous line between the hostile forces which it was designed to separate; it has been harassed at times by the *de facto* forces, which are encouraged to operate between its present lines and the Israeli border; and it has at best had a grudging acceptance rather than full co-operation from all parties concerned.

14. It is a tribute to the dedication and courage of the officers and men of UNIFIL that in these conditions it has had such considerable success in its effort to maintain peace in the area. But that success is less than it might have been if UNIFIL had been given full co-operation and had been allowed to carry out its mandate fully throughout the whole area of operations assigned to it.

15. What is the responsibility of the Council in face of this situation? In our view it is simply not good enough for the Council to limit itself time after time to renewing the mandate if it accepts with resignation that the Force must suffer occasional casualties from hostile action—as if there were a tolerable level of losses for a peace-keeping force. Nor should the Council accept indefinitely that an international force which it has created will continue to be hampered and harassed in its efforts to carry out its instructions. If this goes on, the concept of peace-keeping may be gradually discredited and the authority of the Council weakened. UNIFIL would then become part of the landscape in the Middle East—just one among the many other elements in a troubled region, useful enough in its own way but not of serious consequence. The Council too would come to be seen as just another actor of no great importance in a complex and dangerous play of forces. The tensions and dangers of the region are simply too great to allow this to happen and the risks of a wider conflict at any moment are much too serious to allow the peace-keeping role of the United Nations and the over-all authority of the Council in limiting and easing conflict to be gradually eroded.

16. What, then, should the Council do if it is to give its full backing to UNIFIL?

17. First, the Council must at all times insist on full respect for the peace-keeping Force itself. Like any international peace-keeping operation, UNIFIL cannot and should not enforce its will on hostile forces. It depends fundamentally on acceptance and, like any peace-keeping force, it should have no enemies. It is not tolerable therefore that it should be subjected at times to harassment or attack.

18. Secondly, the Council must maintain its pressure on all concerned not simply to accept the Force but to co-operate with it, and in particular to allow it to deploy fully so that it can be truly effective in the interests of all concerned.

19. Thirdly, it should be clear that the dispatch of a peace-keeping force such as UNIFIL is not a substitute for continuing efforts to negotiate a peace settlement and for pressure by the Council to that end. The main function of the peace-keeping force is rather to allow an opportunity for peace-making so that the parties concerned may seek a more permanent and lasting solution to their difficulties.

20. The present fragile cease-fire in southern Lebanon seems to be holding despite occasional incidents and despite ominous noises about a new invasion, which would present the most serious dangers to international peace and security. But as the previous Secretary-General emphasized in his annual report on the work of the Organization:

“No cease-fire, peace-keeping operation, or other expedient for containing the conflict can, in

the end, prevent new outbursts of violence as long as the basic elements of the problem are not tackled in negotiations involving all the parties concerned".¹

21. The continuing existence of UNIFIL and the courage and dedication of its officers and men in face of many difficulties have for four years now offered the international community a breathing space which has created and continues to create an opportunity for such wider negotiations. It is for others to see how such negotiations can be brought about, and we are glad to note that the efforts undertaken by a permanent member of the Council, through a special envoy charged with mediation, are about to be renewed. It is of course for the Council itself at all times to seek ways and means of encouraging the process of negotiation and mediation.

22. One important first step would be the phased programme to restore the authority of the Lebanese Government in the area which is referred to in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution which will shortly be before us. Another would be the revival of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission in accordance with operative paragraph 4. But ultimately some wider framework for negotiation will be needed, since the tragedy of southern Lebanon is that it has become the arena where many aspects of the wider conflicts of the region are played out. It is difficult to see how lasting peace and stability can be restored there without some progress towards a settlement of those wider issues.

23. In this statement I have referred frankly to the difficulties under which UNIFIL has been obliged to operate. But I want to emphasize that even under its present handicaps the Force has been remarkably successful. To see this one need only imagine for a moment what the situation would now be in southern Lebanon if UNIFIL did not exist; or what it could become if the Force were to be withdrawn. In such a case, the dangers and tensions in the area would greatly increase. They could quickly reach a flashpoint; new outside forces would be very likely to intervene and there would then be the most serious danger of a wider war.

24. All of us therefore, not just in the Council but in the international community as a whole, have a serious interest in the continuation of UNIFIL and in making its functioning increasingly effective. We all of us have reason to thank it for what it has been able to achieve in difficult conditions, despite criticisms levelled at it at times by some who have not always given it full co-operation or support.

25. There is one other point I should particularly like to emphasize. We have heard a good deal of public criticism of the United Nations in recent weeks. The usefulness of the Organization has been called into question and it has been accused of increasing rather than reducing conflict. This is not the place to under-

take a general defence of the Organization. Criticism is sometimes salutary and it is in any case for each of the many organs of the United Nations system to assess how far these criticisms are valid so far as they are concerned. What I should like to emphasize here is the positive value of the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations, of which UNIFIL is a good example.

26. Over the 25 years since United Nations peace-keeping operation began, some 360,000 officers and men have served with various United Nations forces in difficult and dangerous areas. Of these, I believe more than 600 have given their lives. Today, in difficult conditions in southern Lebanon, contingents from some 11 countries are serving at the orders of the Council. They come from small and medium-sized countries in Africa, Asia and Europe. They come from Fiji, France, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Senegal and Sweden. These countries have joined to send contingents to a distant region where they have no direct national interest at stake. Already the Force has lost some 70 men in carrying out its difficult mandate. My own country has suffered its share of these losses.

27. It is indeed a new and hopeful development in world affairs over the past generation that countries from all corners of the world are ready to send their troops to distant areas like southern Lebanon at the behest of the Council in the difficult and thankless task of seeking to maintain international peace and security. It shows that the United Nations, despite its many faults and inadequacies, is and can be a major force for peace in the world. I would hope that the Organization will continue to play that role and that the Council, as the responsible authority at whose request the troop-contributing countries serve, will continue to give its full backing and support to the peace-keeping operations which it establishes and that all those involved in any way in the issue will avail themselves fully of the opportunity and time for peace-making which the existence of these forces allows.

28. Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (*interpretation from Russian*): Sir, since today's official meeting of the Council is the first, and it would appear the last, in February at which my delegation will be speaking, I should like to congratulate you, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, not only on your assumption of the post of President of the Council but also on the successful work of the Council this month under your highly qualified leadership. I should also like to express my gratitude to those who have paid compliments to me personally in connection with my work as President last month.

29. The Council has met today in accordance with resolution 498 (1981) in which it decided, *inter alia*, to carry out an over-all review within two months of the situation as a whole in the light of a letter dated 14 December 1981 from the representative of Lebanon

addressed to the Secretary-General [S/14792], in which the Government of Lebanon quite justifiably requested of the Security Council an injunction calling on Israel to withdraw forthwith from the border area where UNIFIL had not yet been allowed to deploy and clearly to define the prerogatives of UNIFIL, enabling the Force to carry out its mandate and to deploy, fully unimpeded, in the totality of its area of operations up to the internationally recognized boundaries.

30. I should like to stress the fact that the Soviet delegation shares and supports the concern of the Lebanese Government over the absolutely abnormal situation in southern Lebanon and the failure of the Force to implement its mandate in that region.

31. As is well known, the Council, in resolution 498 (1981), reconfirmed the key provisions of resolution 425 (1978)—that is, the provisions calling for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries, and for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Lebanese territory. In that resolution, the Council also stressed that UNIFIL was created primarily to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces. However, it must be noted that these key provisions of resolution 425 (1978) have so far not been complied with, although almost four years have elapsed since they were adopted.

32. As we can see from the special report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL dated 16 February [S/14869], the encroachments established in the UNIFIL area of deployment by the *de facto* forces, which are supported and supplied by Israel, have not been removed, and violations of Lebanon's territorial integrity by Israel have also continued. The report further points out that "for reasons of which the Council is aware, UNIFIL has been prevented from making progress towards fully implementing the mandate entrusted to it by the Council in its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978)" [*ibid.*, para. 2].

33. In a word, serious obstacles still remain to the fulfilment by the Force of its task and the position in southern Lebanon as a whole still remains extremely dangerous. Furthermore, ever more alarming reports have recently been emanating from the southern Lebanese frontier, and in particular reports of a massive build-up of Israeli forces in that area. There is every sign of preparations for a new stage of Israeli aggression and the existence of a deadly threat to Lebanon. Therefore, a legitimate question arises: should the Council not take some preventive actions to forestall a new act of aggression on the part of Israel?

34. It would be appropriate in this regard to recall the repeated warnings addressed by the Council to Israel not to violate the territorial integrity of the Lebanese State. But, as our experience shows, Israel stubbornly refuses to comply with the decisions of the

Council, not to mention the fact that, as far as the Israeli leaders are concerned, any concept of respect for the view of the international community has long ceased to exist. There can be no denying that Israel would be unable to continue such defiant behaviour were it not for the comprehensive support it receives from the United States of America. The responsibility for the dangerous new deterioration in the situation in the Middle East lies wholly with both Tel Aviv and Washington. The policy of Israel is nothing but a direct reflection and extension of the global policy of the United States. To deny this would be to deny the obvious.

35. In the light of the completely abnormal situation obtaining in southern Lebanon, where Israel is essentially occupying with impunity a part of Lebanese territory, arming and supporting separatists of its stooge, Major Haddad, the task of ensuring its immediate compliance with Council resolution 425 (1978) is one that has become extremely urgent and indeed brooks no delay whatsoever.

36. The draft resolution before the Council includes provisions that reaffirm those of resolution 425 (1978), which contains the fundamental definition of the mandate of UNIFIL, that is to say, the confirmation of the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the restoration of international peace and security and the affording of assistance to the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. The draft resolution also stresses that the Council will act in accordance with resolution 498 (1981), which unambiguously reiterates the Council's determination to implement resolution 425 (1978) in the totality of the area of operations assigned to UNIFIL up to the internationally recognized boundaries. We attach significance too to the provision for continuing consideration of this question and the request to the Secretary-General to present to the Council a report on the situation as a whole in the region within two months. This will enable the Council to monitor the situation in southern Lebanon in a continuous fashion and to keep abreast of all matters connected with the increase in the strength of the Force in the area and its deployment in the field. This is extremely important in light of the extremely tense and explosive situation in southern Lebanon and in the areas bordering it.

37. For those reasons, the delegation of the Soviet Union finds it possible not to object to the strength of the Force being increased by 1,000 men—primarily to ensure the possible further deployment of that Force in accordance with the mandate approved by resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). The Soviet delegation confirms also its position with regard to the leadership of the Force, the principles governing the selection of contingents and the system of financing the Force. The question of how specifically the additional contingents can be attached to the Force is a matter, as always, for further discussion and agree-

ment in the course of consultations among members of the Council.

38. The Soviet delegation will abstain in the vote on this draft resolution by virtue of its position of principle with regard to UNIFIL—a position which has been repeatedly set forth in the Council.

39. The PRESIDENT: The next speaker is the representative of Israel. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

40. Mr. BLUM (Israel): Permit me, Sir, at the outset to express to you my respects on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. It is good to have a diplomat of your proven skill, experience and knowledge preside over our deliberations.

41. The historical bonds between our two peoples have a special dimension. When my people embarked on the Return to Zion of modern time after 18 centuries of exile and dispersion, your country played an important role in promoting that noble goal. Distinguished countrymen of yours led enlightened mankind in support of the cause of zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, and one of the noblest liberation movements in history. They saw the return of my people to its homeland as one of the most momentous events of our time and thus earned for your country the distinction of being entrusted by the international community with a mandate to promote and assist the restoration of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel. Many illustrious countrymen of yours who at various times lent their valuable support to our great national effort, including three former Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Arthur James Balfour, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, are well remembered in Israel, as is evidenced also by the naming of streets after them in our capital, Jerusalem, as well as in other major cities of our country.

42. I should also like to take this opportunity to express my appreciation to Mr. Troyanovsky, who conducted the Council's business last month with his customary aplomb and courtesy.

43. The Council has met on numerous occasions since 1978 to consider the situation in southern Lebanon. The Council has on its record Israel's position with respect to the more complex issues arising in this context, especially as regards the UNIFIL threefold mandate as laid down in Council resolution 425 (1978). The Council is also acquainted with our position regarding the broader context of the Lebanese tragedy.

44. The tragic reality prevailing in Lebanon must be recognized by all of us. We are all painfully aware that Lebanon's problems far transcend the issue of the UNIFIL area of operation in the south of that troubled country. The situation in the southern part of Lebanon cannot be detached from the situation in Lebanon as

a whole. The situation prevailing in the south of the country is merely one symptom of a much larger problem.

45. The internal problems of Lebanon are of long standing. They were greatly aggravated by the arrival of large numbers of armed PLO terrorists there. With its far from gentle expulsion from Jordan in September 1970 and its exclusion from other Arab countries, the PLO took advantage of Lebanon's inherent weaknesses to establish operational bases and headquarters there. Indeed, the erosion of Lebanon's sovereignty, to which Council resolution 425 (1978) refers, began in the early 1970s when the PLO set up what was virtually a "State within a State" in Lebanon, principally in southern Lebanon, where one of the areas was even dubbed "Fatahland".

46. Over the last few years, the PLO with increasing intensity turned southern Lebanon into a staging-post for its murderous incursions into Israel. Names like Avivim, Ma'alot, Kiryat Shmona, Nahariya and Misgav Am came to denote the scenes of bloody massacres of women and children. All of these acts were perpetrated by PLO terrorists operating from Lebanese territory.

47. Nor were the PLO terroristic activities confined to Israel. A reign of terror swept Lebanese villages in the south as the PLO gradually tightened its grip over the area.

48. Moreover, southern Lebanon became the training ground, logistic centre and refuge for members of the terrorist international from all over the world. Their activities have plagued numerous countries and the international community at large.

49. From the early 1970s onwards, Lebanon lost much of its sovereignty over its own territory to the terrorist PLO. But in the bitter and brutal war in Lebanon between 1974 and 1976 the country also lost its independence to Syria, which saw in the steadily deteriorating situation in Lebanon an opportunity to realize its long-standing ambition to swallow up Lebanon within what the Syrians refer to as "Greater Syria"—"Suriah Al-Kubra" in Arabic. Between 1974 and 1976, Syrian allegiances jockeyed and changed for reasons of political expediency to suit Syria's own purposes. At one stage, the Syrians presented themselves as the protectors of the Christian Lebanese against the PLO and did not hesitate at that stage to bombard and demolish PLO strongholds such as Tel el-Zaatar. Later, roles reversed and the Syrians turned brutally on the Christians with horrifying results, mercilessly bombarding civilian centres, killing uncounted thousands of civilians and turning up to a million Lebanese into refugees. Indeed, the images of Syria's indiscriminate brutality in Lebanon are familiar to anyone who watches television news. Most vivid are the pictures of last year of the merciless Syrian siege of Zahle, the largest Christian city in the Middle East. That siege went on for weeks and

by the time it was lifted it had resulted in more than 1,000 casualties.

50. In all these activities, both the Syrian army of occupation and the terrorist PLO have been aided, abetted, trained, equipped and financed by the Soviet Union, whose attempts at destabilizing and subverting the Middle East as a whole are well known and whose sinister role in the Lebanese tragedy is common knowledge.

51. As a result of all this, Lebanon has been in recent years and still remains a country occupied by alien forces. Syria still maintains in Lebanon a sizeable portion of its army, that is, about 25,000 troops and upwards, and the PLO still have over 15,000 armed terrorists operating in the country, of whom over 2,000 are positioned south of the Litani River. About 1,500 of these terrorists are located in the so-called "Tyre pocket" and around 700 are deployed in some 40 pockets and nests within the UNIFIL area of operation, with the clear intention of using that area as a springboard in their attempts to terrorize Israel's civilian population.

52. As long as these non-Lebanese elements are allowed to operate within and from Lebanon, no real progress will be achieved towards the return of the effective authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout the length and breadth of that country. Peace cannot be restored in Lebanon and the Lebanese Government cannot re-establish its effective authority while a massive Syrian army of occupation holds down the bulk of the country and while PLO terrorists trained and armed by the Soviet Union are given free rein on Lebanese soil.

53. Ever since its occupation of Lebanon in 1976, Syria has denied the Government of Lebanon any semblance of free and independent political decision-making and action. No decisions affecting Lebanese national policies, either internal or external, are taken any more by the Government of Lebanon and no longer are those decisions made in Beirut, its capital. They are now made by its fraternal neighbour, Syria. To rub things in, Syria, along its border with Lebanon, has eliminated all remaining vestiges of Lebanese sovereignty and authority, especially in the Bekaa Valley. International frontier demarcations between the two countries have been removed, Syrian currency has been introduced and various Lebanese Government signs have been taken down and destroyed. The statements of the representative of Lebanon in the Council must also be viewed against this background.

54. To the outsider it may seem that Lebanon has been divided into spheres of influence, principally between the Syrians, who keep their army in the north of the country, and the terrorist PLO, which operates throughout much of the south. The fact is that the PLO in Lebanon operates under complete Syrian control. It is Syria which oversees the supply of the PLO armaments and logistic facilities. It is Syria

which decides how that terrorist organization will be deployed and what tasks it will undertake within the framework of wider Syrian designs.

55. Over all these years of turmoil in Lebanon, the Council has not seen fit to devote any time to discuss the subversion of Lebanese sovereignty first by the PLO and subsequently by Syria, except for the five desultory minutes which it accorded the topic on 6 October 1978 [2089th meeting]—almost three and a half years ago—at the end of which it nervously adopted, without any formal debate, a milk and water resolution [resolution 436 (1978)] that avoided even indirect reference to Syria, which was then involved in the massive bombardment and destruction of civilian quarters of Beirut and the large-scale massacre of its population. This cynical approach by the Council, totally at variance with the facts and realities prevailing in Lebanon, will also be duly reflected in the resolution to be adopted by the Council today. The Council, apparently, is still not aware of the fact that Lebanon is an occupied country dominated by the Syrian army of occupation and the PLO armed terrorists. This bizarre pattern of behaviour by the Council may perhaps be understood by its members, but is certainly far from being comprehensible to world opinion. It can only further lower and compromise the Council's already badly shattered credibility on any matter affecting the Arab-Israeli conflict.

56. All these are facts that are well known by all of us and certainly by the representative of Lebanon. They should be known even to Mr. Maksoud, no matter how often he tries to pontificate them away.

57. Israel has profound sympathy for the agony of Lebanon and its people. I personally can also sympathize with the plight of our Lebanese colleague and with his need to please in his statements not only his Syrian overlords but also the various warring factions in Beirut, as well as the visiting Lebanese parliamentarians who are closely following his performance. But our sympathy for the predicament of Lebanon and Mr. Tuéni should neither serve nor be construed as an entitlement on his part to make statements competing in form and substance with those of the representative of Syria, or in other words fatalistic statements, statements *à la Fattal*.

58. We deplore the arrogant tone struck by Mr. Tuéni last Tuesday in his references to Israel [2331st meeting]. His statement, as well as those of other Arab speakers, resorted to terms gleaned from the realm of psychopathology. One could not help but think that we were confronted here with a classical example of what psychologists call a "negative projection", that is, the mental mechanism by which human beings read into the behaviour of others the destructive tendencies which they fear to recognize in themselves.

59. Our sympathy for Lebanon and its agony does not absolve its representative from a minimum of

honesty in these debates. His statement in the Council in the present debate, like so many of his earlier statements, has a ring of duplicity, which, regrettably, has come to characterize his country's position in these debates. It is essential to realize that from the viewpoint of the Lebanese representative the true object of the debates is to find a scapegoat for Lebanon's fundamental problems and a way to avoid facing up to them directly and honestly. This, sadly, has been Lebanon's approach for the last decade and more. For example, as early as December 1968, Fuad Boutros, the present Minister for Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, claimed in the Council that "Lebanon shelters no commando organization" [1461st meeting, para. 161]. This was a bare-faced lie and when the President of Lebanon, Mr. Hélou, was pressed about it, he later admitted to Lebanese parliamentarians that the claim was made in the Council—and I quote him—"in order to secure Israel's condemnation". This was reported in the Beirut newspaper *Al-Hayat* of 1 July 1969. This mendacious and duplicitous approach and the psychological problems it reflects continue to find expression in the positions taken by our Lebanese colleague in the Council.

60. Let me therefore tell him very plainly: Had Lebanon been prepared to face over the years its problems honestly and had it fulfilled its national and international commitments, it might not have come to the sorry pass it has reached. One could go further and suggest that the need for UNIFIL could have been avoided and all debates we have had in recent years obviated.

61. The UNIFIL mandate was originally set out in Council resolution 425 (1978). At the time that resolution was adopted, the Council was well aware of the problem of Lebanon in its entirety, recognizing that the presence of Syrian troops and the PLO terrorists on Lebanese soil constituted a major obstacle to the restoration of international peace and security and to the re-establishment of Lebanon's authority over its own territory. In that resolution the Council thus called for "strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries", and UNIFIL was entrusted with an appropriate threefold mandate, namely: first, to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces; secondly, to restore international peace and security; and, thirdly, to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area. In co-operation with the Israel Defence Forces, UNIFIL successfully carried out the first part of its mandate, as confirmed by the UNIFIL Commander on 13 June 1978 and recorded in the progress report of the Secretary-General of the same date [S/12620/Add.5, paras. 22 and 23]. Regrettably, the remaining two parts of the UNIFIL mandate have not yet been implemented because of the continuing presence of the Syrian army of occupation and the massive presence of PLO terrorists on Lebanese soil.

62. Israel expects that with the scheduled increase in the ceiling on UNIFIL troops, the efforts to keep the UNIFIL area of operation free of PLO presence and infiltration will be intensified. In this connection, it will be recalled that when the area in question was handed over to UNIFIL by the Israel Defence Forces in 1978 it was completely free of any PLO presence.

63. In the course of his statement [2331st meeting, para. 35], the representative of Lebanon has again relied on the now-defunct Israeli-Lebanese General Armistice Agreement of 23 March 1949.² As I have already pointed out in the Council on previous occasions, that Agreement was brought to an end by Lebanon in June 1967. I might add that, subsequent to June 1967, the Government of Lebanon also repeatedly demonstrated that it no longer considered the Agreement in force by concluding a series of agreements with the terrorist PLO that were totally incompatible with its basic obligations under the Armistice Agreement.

64. Although Israel's position of principle concerning Lebanon is well known, I should like to take this opportunity to reaffirm once again that Israel continues to support the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries. Israel wants peace both in and with Lebanon, and has repeatedly indicated its readiness to enter into peace negotiations with the Government of Lebanon, as indeed with the Governments of other Arab States. I wish to take this opportunity to renew this offer to the Government of Lebanon.

65. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. El-Fattal (Syrian Arab Republic), took the place reserved for him at the side of the Council chamber.

66. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to take a place at the Council table in order to make a statement.

67. Mr. EL-FATTAL (Syrian Arab Republic): I should like, Sir, to avail myself of this opportunity to extend to you our congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. I am confident that your deep knowledge of all the aspects of the Middle East conflict, and in particular of its root causes, will help the Council, whenever it discusses the Middle East problem, to reach a correct conclusion.

68. I should like also to express our admiration and thanks to your predecessor, Mr. Troyanovsky, who presided over the Council at a very difficult moment, both for my country and for the Arab nation. His skill, wisdom and objectivity were instrumental in preserving and enhancing the prestige of the Council despite the arrogant behaviour of those who tried—as they still are trying—to tarnish the image of the United Nations system.

69. I would not have asked to participate in this debate had the Israeli representative at least respected the framework within which the Council is discussing a very important and dangerous problem, that is, Israeli aggression against southern Lebanon.

70. Schizophrenia is a well-known phenomenon and I think that we have a case of schizophrenia on our hands. I am going to quote from a certain article by a professor *à l'israélienne*. The article was written by none other than one Blum in the *Israel Law Review* in 1968. I quote it to demonstrate the extent to which a person can use double standards to misrepresent his position and to mislead the Council. The article says, on pages 288 and 289 of volume 3, number 2, of this work:

“And it is a cardinal rule of the international law of belligerent occupation that

‘occupation does not displace or transfer sovereignty. The occupant is entitled to exercise military authority over the territory occupied, but he does not acquire sovereignty unless and until it is ceded to him by a treaty of peace (which is the commonest method), or is simply abandoned in his favour without cession, or is acquired by him by virtue of subjugation, that is, extermination of the local sovereign and annexation of his territory’ ”.

71. Those are the words of Mr. Blum. Two months ago Israel annexed the Golan and that is schizophrenia.

72. In the same article, on page 289, he says that:

“Castrén, likewise, points out on this matter that ‘sovereignty over occupied territory . . . is not transferred to the occupying Power. . . . [O]ccupied territory may not be *annexed*, and unilateral declarations to this effect are consequently void of legal effect’ ”.

73. The article is too long to quote in full, but its stress is on the non-acquisition of territory by force and the illegitimacy of occupation and annexation. Mr. Blum, *à l'israélienne*, quotes others as well and concludes that that is a factual truth and a principle of international law, but that it applies only to Israel and not to other countries. In this he is supported, I think, by the United States of America, which states that Israel has not annexed the Golan. That is what

we heard in the famous monumental speech by the representative of the United States in the General Assembly¹—and I shall revert to this in a moment.

74. At the very time when the Council was resuming its deliberations concerning the lawless Israeli annexation of the Syrian Golan Heights, Israel's decision to establish more settlements was made public. The plan is to quadruple the number of settlers in the occupied Syrian territories. Let us pause for a moment and contemplate this impudence—the impudence of yesterday and the impudence of today with regard to the Lebanese question.

75. Members of the Council may agree or disagree, but in my opinion, States, like people, tend to develop a personality of their own. Character traits which distinguish one individual from another will surface in the behaviour and action of States. I wish that the Council would help me find the appropriate terms to describe this defiance and to devise methods for the United Nations to deal with it.

76. The Syrian Arab Republic is very proud of having been one of the founders of the United Nations. We take pride in the fact that we contributed to the drafting of the Charter of the United Nations. We and all Arabs have been bringing our complaints to the Council; in the context of the Lebanese complaint, this is because the Arabs believe that the Council is the organ responsible for the removal of aggression and the establishment and maintenance of peace and security.

77. The problem before the Council is essentially a colonial one. Israel wishes to implement the Zionist plan for a “Greater Israel”. There is no “Greater Syria” and should a Greater Syria be created it will be created through the will of our masses. But Greater Israel is occupation and annexation, in the exclusivist manner used by Israel since 1948.

78. I shall now quote Mr. Begin, the arch-terrorist. He said:

“We call on the young generation, in the homeland and in the Diaspora, to arise, go forth and settle. Come from the East and the West, the North and the South, to build together Eretz Yisrael. There is room for millions of returnees to Zion.”

This call for the creation of Eretz Yisrael is nothing but a call for the creation of “Greater Israel” at the expense of the Arabs and Arab lives from the Nile to the Euphrates. “Greater Syria” or Arab unity will one day be realized through the will and the wish of our people, not through occupation and displacement.

79. What sort of State are we dealing with? What ideology? Mr. Blum has called his movement a national liberation movement. I wonder if anyone in the Council, even the United States delegation, can accept that.

80. The other day I heard a statement from the representative of the United States in which she accused us of name-calling tactics, and she included the word "zionism" in the category of names she was accusing us of using. Thus the United States does not even recognize zionism, according to the statement made by the representative of the United States. At the time she was angry because we had used the term "zionism"—not knowing, perhaps, that zionism is a "national liberation movement" according to Mr. Blum's interpretation.

81. You have to make up your mind. Either zionism is a national liberation movement or it is not. If it is a national liberation movement, you should give us the right to say the contrary. You ask us, "Why do you use this term?" But the term is to the liking of the representative of Israel. It is a "national liberation movement". It really is. It is a movement that has displaced 2 million Palestinians and extended its occupation and annexation to the remnants, which number 1.5 million. That is a "national liberation movement". A national liberation movement? It is an insult to the word "liberation". Zionism is a colonial movement; it is the result of colonialism. Zionism would not have been able to enter Palestine had it not been for the help of those who are behind it—the great colonial empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That is zionism. Zionism exports bloodshed, exploitation and occupation. It is, finally, no more than a garrison State which exists to protect the interests of the colonialist Power, on the one hand, and the imperialist Power, on the other. That is zionism.

82. The history of Israel must be considered in its proper context, a context which was and remains essentially colonial. Zionism is an outgrowth of the Western colonial incursions of the nineteenth century into Asia, Africa and Latin America, during the West's hectic race to carve out its colonies and build its empires. It is not a national liberation movement.

83. It is paradoxical that the late nineteenth century and the twentieth century should have witnessed the establishment of wider democracies in Europe that claimed to recognize the civil and political rights of individuals while simultaneously giving birth to racist colonialist philosophies directed against the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, depriving them *en masse* of their rights as individuals and peoples. The Zionist philosophy was born perverted and deformed. It was precisely at that juncture that the Zionist movement in Europe opted to emulate the colonial ventures. Liberty, equality, fraternity—the most cherished of ideals—were for home consumption, while subjugation, inequality and racism were to be exported abroad.

84. How many times must I come to the Council and say that the Arab deterrent forces have one task to perform—to deter a further civil war among the Lebanese people, our brothers? We are not and we shall not be an army of occupation.

85. I wish that the Israeli representative would come to this table and declare that Israel was willing to rescind the annexation of the Golan and unconditionally withdraw from all occupied Arab territory.

86. Our presence in Lebanon through the Arab deterrent forces is legitimate. It is a national duty. The Lebanese people, the Lebanese President, the Lebanese parties, Muslims, Christians and others, all called on Syria to come to stop the fractricidal war, which was on the verge of dividing Lebanon into small States along religious or sectarian lines. We have no objective in Lebanon except to serve Lebanon and the Arab national interest in Lebanon. Israel wishes to see Lebanon divided into small States. Israel wishes there to be small sectarian States because Israel is itself a sectarian State.

87. Mr. President, in order to alleviate your plight I shall only refer the Council to the verbatim record of the 2320th meeting, which contains the text of a statement in which the Syrian position on Lebanon is quite well clarified. That statement was made in reply to the misrepresentations of the Israeli representative.

88. The PRESIDENT: Members of the Council have before them document S/14890 dated 25 February 1982, which contains the text of a draft resolution prepared in the course of the Council's consultations. It is my understanding that the Council is ready to proceed to the vote on the draft resolution before it. Unless I hear any objection, I shall put the draft resolution to the vote now.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Spain, Togo, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire

Against: None

Abstaining: Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The draft resolution was adopted by 13 votes to none, with 2 abstentions [resolution 501 (1982)].

89. The PRESIDENT: I shall now call on those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

90. Mr. NOWAK (Poland): Sir, I should like at the outset to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for the month of February. We are grateful for your efforts to facilitate and expedite our work here. I should also like to express our sincere thanks to Mr. Troyanovsky of the Soviet Union for the skilful and effective manner in which he presided over our work in January.

91. In our statements on 21 April 1978 at the eighth special session of the General Assembly, we presented, in the Assembly and in the Fifth Committee, our substantive reservations concerning some important political and financial aspects of UNIFIL.⁴

92. We reiterated that position of principle of ours in the Fifth Committee at the thirty-third, thirty-fourth and thirty-sixth sessions of the General Assembly, and I wish to state that it stands equally valid today in the Council.

93. Consequently, we abstained in the vote on the draft resolution.

94. Mr. de La BARRE de NANTEUIL (France) (*interpretation from French*): Mr. President, since I believe that this is the last meeting of the Council we shall be holding this month under your presidency, I should like firstly to congratulate you on the way you have discharged your duties—with determination, talent, patience and a sense of humour, as well as the impartiality which was indeed warranted by the very difficult item on our agenda.

95. I should also like to congratulate your predecessor, Mr. Troyanovsky, for the excellent way in which he presided over our work during the month of January.

96. When it renewed the mandate of UNIFIL on 18 December 1981 [*resolution 498 (1981)*], the Council decided "to review, within two months, the situation as a whole in the light of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General dated 14 December 1981 [*S/14792*]".

97. The special report of the Secretary-General on UNIFIL, dated 16 February, has provided us with some very useful information in this respect. Although the cease-fire which was decreed last July has been generally respected, tension is still high in the area and the situation "has remained extremely volatile". Attempts at infiltration by armed elements which UNIFIL has had to face; the continued existence of *de facto* forces still supported and supplied by Israel; further violations of the territorial integrity of Lebanon [*S/14869, para. 2*]: that is the harsh reality which the Secretary-General's envoy, Mr. Brian Urquhart—to whom I should like to pay a tribute for his very useful mission—was able to observe in the field.

98. In the light of this situation, it is up to the Council to do everything in its power to preserve the present cease-fire and make it possible for the Force fully to discharge its mandate, as laid down in resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978). Need I repeat that France has always been in favour of the full and strict implementation of these two resolutions.

99. France, which continues to uphold the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of

Lebanon, fully sympathizes with the desire expressed by the Lebanese Government that UNIFIL be provided with additional means to enable it to fulfil its mandate and to increase both its military and its civilian presence in the southern part of the country. In this connection, we give our unreserved support to the proposals and comments which were made by Mr. Tuéni in the Council on 23 February [*2331st meeting*].

100. Aware of its particular responsibilities in the area and in keeping with the Secretary-General's recommendations, France endorses the increase in the strength of UNIFIL by an additional 1,000 men. We would also be prepared to consider the possibility of increasing its own already considerable effort if this should be expressly requested by the Secretary-General as part of the process of redeployment.

101. Indeed, the French Government believes that the use of UNIFIL thus strengthened will have to be seen in the context of a redeployment effort to be studied by the Secretary-General, the Force Commander and the contributing States, in the light of the need to offset the evident shortcomings of the present arrangement and to enable UNIFIL to effect a continuous link in the field between its two present emplacements.

102. The principle of granting UNIFIL the right to defend itself and to return fire, if there is any attempt to prevent it from performing its mission, should be endorsed and its implementation should be the subject of close and realistic scrutiny by the Secretary-General and General Callaghan, depending upon the situation prevailing in the field.

103. We also believe that it is necessary to reaffirm here Israel's obligation to withdraw from the enclave of the *de facto* forces, in accordance with resolution 425 (1978).

104. Finally, it seems essential today that the activities of the Israel-Lebanon Mixed Armistice Commission be resumed with the least possible delay if we wish to achieve concrete results in the field in order to ensure peace.

105. In the light of the foregoing, my delegation supports the resolution which has just been adopted by the Council. In so doing, France urgently appeals to all the parties to continue to respect the cease-fire, to avoid any action likely to lead to violent reactions and to make a determined effort to allow the UNIFIL zone to be consolidated.

106. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): Mr. President, I too should like to begin by thanking you, on behalf of the United States, for your dedicated, constructive and extraordinarily skilful conduct of the office of the presidency, which has been a model of patient problem-solving efforts by this body.

107. We should like also to express our gratitude to the representative of the Soviet Union for the skill and courtesy with which he conducted the presidency last month.

108. In the past week, the Government of the United States has worked alongside other Governments in this body and alongside you, Mr. President, to negotiate a text that would have the support of the Government of Lebanon, the troop contributors and others who support this important peace-keeping operation. We have also sought a text that would be acceptable to Lebanon's neighbours and respect the vital national interests of all concerned.

109. We believe that the Council has succeeded in negotiating such a resolution. An observer of the Council's activities might wonder why, in fact, it has been so difficult to find consensus on a question about which there was so little disagreement, notably the question of whether the Council should or should not support General Callaghan's request that 1,000 troops be added to the UNIFIL contingent and we do regret that the Council could not take the simple, straightforward step of enlarging the UNIFIL forces without adding to the resolution some elements that seemed to us extraneous to the basic purpose of the resolution. We regret that it is so difficult here to take constructive action without obstructive *ad hominem* attacks on one another.

110. The Government of the United States is none the less pleased to support this resolution which provides General Callaghan the additional 1,000 troops for the UNIFIL forces that he has said he needs to accomplish his task to provide the soldiers under his command with the reinforcement and the leisure that they require.

111. My Government is committed to the task of extending and reinforcing peace in this deeply troubled area. We are committed also to restoring the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Government of Lebanon. We believe that the cycle of violence that afflicts the area is profoundly dangerous to the security, peace and well-being of the region and should be addressed in all its aspects and complexities. We expect that the reinforced troops of UNIFIL will be able more effectively to deal with the incursions and violations of all kinds and from all sources. To help achieve these goals, the Government of the United States offers its moral, political, financial and diplomatic support. We also work through our bilateral and regional diplomacy to achieve these goals.

112. We desire to express our gratitude and admiration to the representative of the Secretariat for his hard work on behalf of peace in this troubled region.

113. Finally, we offer our warmest wishes to General Callaghan and to the UNIFIL troops as they continue their terribly important task.

114. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Israel has asked to speak in exercise of his right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table to make that statement.

115. Mr. BLUM (Israel): I was gratified to learn that the representative of Syria had the good taste to peruse some of my own writings published in learned journals. It is good that for a change he seems to be engaged in some serious reading.

116. I must confess, though, that the full impact of such reading could not yet be discerned in his statement. He did not really address himself to the question before us. He engaged, in the Council, in yet another diatribe against my country and against my people. Curiously enough, he spoke of exporting "bloodshed" [*para. 81*]. On this particular issue I believe he speaks with some expertise. What if not exportation of blood has the bloody régime that he represents been engaged in in recent years?

117. He did not speak about Syria's bloody record in Lebanon over the past few years. He skirted over that by referring all of us to the so-called inter-Arab peace deterrent force. I will not discuss the term; I find it strange that a force should want to deter anybody from peace. If that is the purpose—to deter somebody from peace in Lebanon—then the Syrian army of occupation has been singularly successful in recent years. It has deterred peace in Lebanon.

118. But let us look at this so-called inter-Arab peace deterrent force. This is not the first time that Syrian representatives would like the Council, and the United Nations, to believe that the Syrian army of occupation acts, as it were, in Lebanon on behalf of a wider objective, as a kind of regional peace-keeping force. But, as is well known, all the other national contingents which originally participated in that force, and whose task from the very beginning was to cover up the true character of the Syrian occupation, have since been withdrawn. It is only Syria that participates in this international force, as it were, this peace deterrent force in Lebanon. The representative of the régime of the Assad Brothers Ltd. can thus no longer hide behind such a transparent fig leaf.

119. Let me bring to the Council's attention a resolution adopted only three days ago by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Kuwaiti National Council in which it rejected the Kuwaiti Government's proposal to approve Kuwait's participation in the financial maintenance of that Syrian army of occupation masquerading under the name of the inter-Arab peace deterrent force in Lebanon. No reasons were given

for the decision, but parliamentary sources reported in Kuwait that this rejection came "in the wake of developments in Syria; the Syrian Government's position in the Iraq-Iran war, which is contrary to Arab interests; and also the fact that the inter-Arab deterrent force is no longer Arab"—in other words, it is solely Syrian. This was reported by the Associated Press on 22 February, three days ago.

120. Let me refresh the Council's memory by recalling that Kuwait was among the seven countries which expressed their reservations concerning the renewal of the mandate of the so-called inter-Arab peace deterrent force on 19 January 1982 at the meeting of the League of Arab States.

121. But the manner in which this army of occupation exercises its peace deterrent role became very obvious also last year when it brutally massacred the civilian population of Zahle—and I have referred to that before. In retrospect it would seem that this was nothing but a kind of dress rehearsal for similar peace-keeping activities which the Syrian representative's army performs in Syria proper. As members of the Council know, for many weeks now a massacre has been going on in the city of Hama, a city of more than a quarter of a million inhabitants. Hafez el Assad and his brother Rifa'at have been repressing with unbelievable cruelty a mass civilian uprising in that city, the fifth largest in Syria. For two weeks whole neighbourhoods of the city were shelled. The entire city was cut off from the outside world. The Syrian army—peace-keeping, I presume—went from door to door destroying districts by blowing up houses along with their inhabitants. Civilians were attacked with tanks and artillery. Thousands of men, women and children were killed and wounded. So much for the peace deterrent character of the army for which the Syrian representative spoke before.

122. The PRESIDENT: The representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization has asked to make a statement in reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make that statement.

123. Mr. TERZI (Palestine Liberation Organization): I hope that my being seated here in the place that has just been vacated does not have any political implications for the future.

124. Mr. President, thank you for allowing me to make a short statement. Before I do so, however, I wish to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency for this month. I do not really have to say too much in praise of your person. We have known each other for quite a long time and we have produced something constructive and positive during the period in which we have known each other. You know my country very well, so you are aware of how grateful we are to our friends.

125. Despite what your Government did against my people and what it did to bring this issue of the ques-

tion of Palestine to the forefront, I still feel sickened and nauseated when I listen to someone here speaking about the "bonds between our two peoples" [para. 41]. What bonds is he talking about? Is he talking about the Tommies that were booby-trapped, murdered and left hanging? The British Tommies who were fighting the Nazis and were arrested by the Zionist gangs and killed? Is he speaking about the British High Commissioner, Macmillan, who was fired at in an attempt to assassinate him when he was helping the Jewish Agency achieve its goals in Palestine? Or is it Lord Moyne's blood that makes us remember this collaboration that existed between your two peoples?

126. Among the great leaders, Winston Churchill was mentioned. I recall—I do not have the text before me—that it was Winston Churchill who was reported as having said once that those guns in the hands of Zionists merited for them the kind of treatment worthy of the Nazis. That was, I think, after the murder of Lord Moyne.

127. But I know that the British did help. They brought General Wingate to train the murderers and assassins of my people. They let them go free and even established for them a Jewish brigade, when the British were hanging our people just because they had a bullet or a knife in their pockets.

128. I am not a hypocrite. I do know that you personally, Sir, might not have agreed with those methods. There is a change in Britain. But I cannot really sit here quietly and coolly when something is said about the "bonds between our two peoples". For, during the war, when the Nazis were in the area, it was those Zionist gangs that blew up the headquarters of the civil administration of Palestine—I am talking about the King David Hotel. If these are the bonds between friends, then I do not think people need enemies in this world.

129. Then we are told that Zionism is the noblest liberation movement in history. Liberation movement of what? Against whom? What liberation movement is this? I can understand the Palestine Liberation Movement because we are fighting to liberate ourselves from foreign occupation, from racism. I can understand the liberation movement in South Africa, where the people are up in arms against the *apartheid* régime. But in the present case, I must ask: liberation movement of what? Here in New York there is a big place called the World Zionist Organization. Do they plan to liberate themselves from American administration or from American traditions or from American moral values? I cannot understand what this liberation movement is.

130. I recall that this so-called liberation movement from the very outset planned the achievement of its aims by, according to Herzl, "spiriting across" the Palestinian people or, according to Jabotinsky—the spiritual mentor of Menachem Begin—forcing the

evacuation of the Palestinians through an iron-fist policy. And Mr. Weitz, the head of the Colonial Department—mind you, the term is “Colonial Department”—of the Jewish Agency, said in 1940, when the Nazis were really giving us hell around the world, that the Zionist programme would be attained only when not a single village, not a single tribe, not a single Arab family remained there. What sort of liberation is this at the price of massacring people and throwing them out of their homes? This is an insult to the concept of liberation.

131. What liberation is this when the occupation forces are every day throwing school-children out of their schools, arresting them, shooting at them, killing them? What liberation movement is this that does not heed Council resolutions and since at least 1967 has refused to withdraw from the occupied territories, thereby enabling the Palestinian people to exercise their right to self-determination? This is no liberation movement. This is a racist movement. One need only read about that movement to know that this is a fact.

132. I merely wish to note here and to put on record very clearly that the statement made by the representative of Tel Aviv is only a prelude to new aggression against southern Lebanon. I should like this to be noted very clearly. Troops are being concentrated. Guns, airplanes and fleets—and these are not merely the “noises of war” referred to by one gentleman here—are being prepared for another invasion of, not an incursion into, southern Lebanon. The aim is to eliminate the Palestinian people and occupy Lebanese territory.

133. In the special report of the Secretary-General we are told that:

“The encroachments established in the UNIFIL area of deployment by the *de facto* forces, which are supported and supplied by Israel, have not been removed, and violations of Lebanon’s territorial integrity have also continued.” [S/14869, para. 2]

134. We understand that the UNIFIL mission is to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territory up to the internationally recognized borders of Lebanon. That very statement by the Secretary-General makes it clear that Israel is there—even if it is by proxy. When will Israel withdraw from Lebanese territory? The Lebanese people can take care of themselves. I do not think the Lebanese people want anyone to patronize them and take good care of them. They know how to handle their own affairs.

135. Mention was made of an arms build-up in Syria by the Palestinians. But in no way does that compare with the billions of dollars’ worth of United States arms and armaments being donated to Israel, converting it into an arsenal, a base, for further aggression and converting the area into a site for a forthcoming war.

136. I heard the representative of the United States speaking about the “cycle of violence” [para. 111]. Perhaps my English—or her English—is poor. There is no cycle of violence; there is a starting-point of violence. The term “cycle” makes us lose the starting-point. There is, of course, violence; there is counter-violence; but the starting-point is the fact that the Zionist groups have forced out the Palestinians, making them seek refuge in southern Lebanon. We have no intention whatsoever of converting Lebanon into a Palestinian State. Lebanon is for the Lebanese and we are there as guests. We are going back to our homeland in the Galilee, in Jerusalem, in Hebron and in Nablus. That will continue to be our aim. I am afraid that if we cannot find a peaceful way we shall have to fight our way back.

137. Next I would refer to the following from the statement made by the representative of the United States on 23 February:

“The PLO is . . . a political movement which presents its claims in the name of a collectivity whose members live under various political jurisdictions.” [233rd meeting, para. 7]

I suppose that the United States representative forgets there is a thing called the Palestinian people, that the United Nations has invited the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in its work, and that the United States is always championing—even if it is only on paper—the cause of that Palestinian people and asking that it should be enabled to return to its home. What members of a collectivity are they talking about? Are they denying us the right to be referred to as a people? Are they trying to obliterate our entity? That is not the way to peace, I assure the United States. They are making it more difficult ultimately to reach any peaceful solution.

138. Finally, I wish to say to you, Mr. President, and the members of the Council that the PLO and the Palestinian people are in Lebanon as guests in preparation for a return to their homes in their homeland; that we respect, fight for and will defend—should the Lebanese ask us to help them—the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of the Lebanese people.

139. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Lebanon has asked to be allowed to speak and I call on him.

140. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): It has become part of the ritual, now that there are 10 or 12 resolutions on this subject, that I should conclude every series of Council meetings by expressing to the President and the members Lebanon’s appreciation and gratitude. This is therefore no exercise of the right of reply, as I am not interested in replying to psycho-pathetic speeches about my Government and me. May I simply take note of the fact that the Israeli representative has broadened the scope of his didactic performances. I sin-

cerely hope that his latest lecture has amused the Council at the end of a very long day. I know it has not distracted the Council nor me, and will not distract us from the very serious business here.

141. In this serious vein may I, however, seek the Council's generosity to allow me to say that no amount of rhetoric will mask or undo the historic realities stated and confirmed in this body. One of them, and not the least important, is the call upon Israel to withdraw from Lebanon and cease all military actions against my country. May I repeat what I have already said more than once before, here and in the General Assembly: my country is not for hire nor for sale; it is not negotiable and it is not dispensable. There are people dying to safeguard Lebanon's independence. I shall not dishonour them by discussing the subject here.

142. Let me add one thing. Lebanon's determination to safeguard and preserve its independence and sovereignty and to restore its authority has led it to seek this body's assistance. We are grateful for the Council's action. We think that, with our friends in the international community, we need no unwelcome assistance, and we shall never become accessories to anybody's strategy in the destabilization process that is today tearing the Middle East apart.

143. I turn now to the resolution. Every resolution that has been adopted here has been a step forward, and the present resolution will be looked upon as a very important step indeed towards the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and the fulfilment of the UNIFIL mandate. In this connection, may I suggest that we should read the reproduction in the present resolution of the text of resolution 425 (1978) *in toto* as a signal of the determination to restore peace to all of south Lebanon up to the internationally recognized boundaries and to restore Lebanese sovereignty over the whole area, unhindered.

144. I wish to say that every time we read the resolutions we are tempted to say they are not sufficient—hence the very lengthy process of drafting resolutions to which you, Mr. President, have contributed in a very important manner with your patience and wisdom. And may I add that it is probably very significant and a very good omen that you should have been presiding here when the present resolution was adopted and that your predecessor presided over the Council in March 1978 when resolution 425 (1978) was adopted. Her Majesty's Government has thus presided for the second time during a vote on the same resolution—that is indeed a unique instance in the annals of the Council.

145. Every time a resolution is adopted we ask ourselves, as does the representative of Ireland, what the situation in south Lebanon would be if there were no UNIFIL. Those who decry UNIFIL are many—there are many in my country and there are some around this table. I wish to say that I am very grateful that the representative of Ireland has explained the vital impor-

tance of UNIFIL, not only for my country but also for the international community and the future of peace in our world.

146. May I conclude by saying that, while my thanks go to all the members who found it possible to vote for the resolution, my thanks go also to those who have not found it possible to vote for it. Their abstention has not masked their contribution to drafting a resolution which, I believe, will be important, although it probably does not answer all my Government's requests and does not include all the amendments that members of the Council might have wished to see included. Also, I wish to thank the Governments of the United States and of France, in particular, for their unique contribution, direct and bilateral—though different and distinct—in connection with my country's plight. Their contribution to peace is more than words can express, and I hope it will become even more widely known.

147. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Israel has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make his statement.

148. Mr. BLUM (Israel): It is regrettable that the representative of Lebanon should insist on ignoring the realities of the situation in Lebanon. Let me therefore acquaint him and the Council with a much more accurate description of the developments and the situation in Lebanon:

“the origins of the tragic . . . events . . . [in Lebanon] are to be found in . . . Arab rivalries and the assaults perpetrated by Palestinians against . . . Lebanon and . . . its people.

“[There has been] constant Palestinian intervention in the internal affairs of Lebanon and intolerable encroachment on its sovereignty.

“[In 1973], President . . . Franjieh . . . denounced the illegal occupation of parts of Lebanese territory by Palestinian elements . . .

“the Palestinians . . . increased the influx of arms into Lebanon . . . They transformed most—if not all—of the refugee camps into military bastions . . .

“common-law criminals fleeing from Lebanese justice found shelter and protection in the camps. . . . Those camps in fact became centres for the training of mercenaries who were sent and financed by some other Arab States Palestinian elements belonging to various . . . organizations resorted to kidnapping Lebanese—and sometimes foreigners—holding them prisoners, questioning them, torturing them and even sometimes killing them. . . . They committed all sorts of crimes in Lebanon They smuggled goods. . . . They went so far as to demand ‘protection’ money

“It is difficult to enumerate all the illegal activities committed by those Palestinian elements

“Whatever grievances the Lebanese may have had among themselves or in their relationship with their Government, the Palestinians had neither the right nor the justification to become a party to any internal dispute [There are—]”

and I might disclose that this was said in 1976—

“Fifty thousand dead, 100,000 injured, 1 million Lebanese refugees in Syria, the Arab world, Europe and America; . . . all that could not be justified by any objective of the Palestinian revolution

“it became apparent that the Palestinians had designs on becoming a major factor in the battle for political power in Lebanon. They openly allied themselves, and continue to do so to this very hour, with one group of Lebanese against another”.⁵

149. That was said in the General Assembly on 14 October 1976. The speaker was Mr. Emil Ghorra, the former representative of Lebanon, whom we have had the privilege of welcoming here today—perhaps he has already left; Mr. Ghorra, the immediate predecessor of Mr. Tuéni. One wonders whether this statement, so accurately describing the developments in his country, was not the reason, or one of the reasons, for the fact that in the place opposite me is now seated not Mr. Ghorra but Mr. Tuéni.

150. The PRESIDENT: The representative of Lebanon has asked to speak, and I now call on him.

151. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): I thought the item on the agenda was UNIFIL and how we could enable UNIFIL to perform its mandate fully. What happens between the Lebanese and the Palestinians—or the Lebanese and other Arabs—is a matter that the Lebanese are capable of handling by themselves.

152. The PRESIDENT: The Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on the agenda.

The meeting rose at 8.05 p.m.

NOTES

¹ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 1, p. 3.*

² *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.*

³ *Official Records of the General Assembly, Ninth Emergency Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 12th meeting.*

⁴ *Ibid., Eighth Special Session, Plenary Meetings, 2nd meeting, para. 139.*

⁵ *Ibid., Thirty-first Session, Plenary Meetings, 32nd meeting, paras. 60 to 68.*

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