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2331st MEETING

Held in New York on Tuesday, 23 February 1982, at 3.30 p.m.

President : Sir Anthony PARSONS (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

Present: The representatives of the following States: China, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Zaire.

Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/2331)

1. Adoption of the agenda
2. The situation in the Middle East:
 - (a) Resolution 498 (1981);
 - (b) Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/14869);
 - (c) Letter dated 16 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14875)

The meeting was called to order at 4 p.m.

Expression of thanks to the outgoing President

1. The PRESIDENT: As this is the first formal meeting of the Security Council for the month of February, I should like, on behalf of the Council, to express our thanks to the President for the month of January, Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky, the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, for the great skill, wisdom and courtesy with which he conducted our affairs last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in the Middle East:

- (a) Resolution 498 (1981);
- (b) Special report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/14869);
- (c) Letter dated 16 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/14875)

2. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have received a letter from

the representative of Lebanon in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Tuéni (Lebanon) took a place at the Council table.

3. The PRESIDENT: I should also like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 23 February 1982 from the representative of Jordan [S/14878] which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request the Security Council to extend an invitation to the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the Council's consideration of the item 'The situation in the Middle East', in accordance with the Council's usual practice."

4. The proposal by the representative of Jordan is not made pursuant to rule 37 or rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure but, if approved by the Council, the invitation to participate in the discussion would confer on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) the same rights of participation as those conferred on a Member State pursuant to rule 37.

5. Does any member of the Council wish to speak on this proposal?

6. Mrs. KIRKPATRICK (United States of America): First, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate you, Sir, on your accession to the office of President of the Council and to thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his service during the past month.

7. The United States delegation has on many occasions explained the reasons why we oppose the special procedure that appears to give the PLO the same rights of participation in the proceedings of the Council as if it represented a State. The PLO is not a State; it is a political movement which presents its claims in the name of a collectivity whose members live under various political jurisdictions. No formula justifies this departure from the rules of procedure of the Council. The formula proposed seems to us to

seek without basis to enhance the prestige, and indeed to falsify the status, of those to whom it is directed.

8. We have always stressed that we have no objection to the Council's hearing the PLO representatives; indeed, we have no objection to the Council's hearing the representatives of any political group with a stake in questions discussed here. But we consider that this can be accomplished legally only on the traditional basis of rule 39, which empowers the Council to grant hearings to persons speaking on behalf of non-governmental entities.

9. Accordingly, we ask, Mr. President, that you put to the vote the terms of this proposed invitation. The United States will vote no.

10. The PRESIDENT: If no other member of the Council wishes to speak at this stage, I shall take it that the Council is ready to vote on the proposal by Jordan.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

In favour: China, Guyana, Ireland, Jordan, Panama, Poland, Spain, Togo, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Zaire

Against: United States of America

Abstaining: France, Japan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The proposal was adopted by 11 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Terzi (Palestine Liberation Organization) took a place at the side of the Council chamber.

11. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter dated 23 February 1982 from the representative of Jordan [S/14883], which reads as follows:

"I have the honour to request the Security Council to invite Mr. Clovis Maksoud, Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States, to participate in the consideration by the Council of the question entitled 'The situation in the Middle East', in accordance with rule 39 of the provisional rules of procedure."

12. If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Council agrees to accede to this request.

It was so decided.

13. The PRESIDENT: The Council is meeting today in accordance with paragraph 10 of resolution 498 (1981). Members of the Council have before them document S/14869, which contains the text of a spe-

cial report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and document S/14875, which contains the text of a letter dated 16 February from the representative of Lebanon to the President of the Council.

14. The first speaker is the representative of Lebanon, on whom I now call.

15. Mr. TUÉNI (Lebanon): Of the now innumerable debates held by the Council on South Lebanon in the past few years, none resembles the present one: it is unique in that there is no mandate of UNIFIL to renew, no breach of a cease-fire, no attacks on Beirut, or even on the "area of operations", no sudden flare-up of violence. And yet the stage is set, as if we were nearing a major showdown.

16. The Council, when it met on 18 December 1981 [2320th meeting], ruled in its resolution 498 (1981) that it would

"review, within two months, the situation as a whole in the light of the letter of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the Secretary-General, dated 14 December 1981" [S/14792].

17. Hence, our debate today should take place in the atmosphere of intellectual serenity and political wisdom which we were denied in the past.

18. This, Mr. President, is, we believe, what prompted you to give us all, since you started your consultations on 16 February, time to reflect and exchange views on the best possible course to follow if we are to avoid another crisis and enable UNIFIL to perform the peace-keeping mission entrusted to it by the Council nearly four years ago [resolution 425 (1978)].

19. We have indeed been reassured not only by the style and perceptive spirit with which you conducted those consultations, but, more generally, by your presence in the Chair this month. While congratulating you, therefore, as is the custom, on the assumption of your responsibilities, I would add that your intimate and profound knowledge of Middle Eastern questions, not to mention your long record of objectivity and wisdom in the Council, is a guarantee—if any were needed—of enlightened leadership and, we dare hope, a successful conclusion as well.

20. May I also say, since it is now publicly known that you are about to retire from the United Nations, that your contribution to the constant concern of the Council with my country's plight has been more dramatic than appeared on the surface of things. For this, and for everything else, the known and the unknown, please accept Lebanon's sincere appreciation.

21. Mr. President, as soon as the Secretary-General issued his special report to the Council on 16 February

[S/14869], my Government found it necessary to write to you [S/14875] and reiterate our requests of last December [S/14792]. I need not, therefore, at this stage, elaborate on them again.

22. You have, further, received, as has the Secretary-General, a delegation of Lebanese parliamentarians who have expressed the legislative power's sentiment on the stand taken by this Government.

23. I am instructed, however, to emphasize that the increase in UNIFIL numbers recommended by the Secretary-General must clearly and unequivocally be related to the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978), and so must the notion of the "joint phased programme of activities".

24. This basic principle has, in fact, been stated in the Secretary-General's report, and we beg to insist that it should be reflected in the resolution which the Council will, we hope, find it possible to agree upon unanimously.

25. The prospective increase will then be not merely quantitative, but also qualitative. It will be an expression of confidence and determination, a renewed act of faith in peace and the necessity—and possibility, we hope—of "peace-keeping" Lebanon. It will also be a source of added strength and credibility to UNIFIL, and an encouragement to use, fully unhindered, all its prerogatives as a deterrent to adverse military action and all acts of violence that prevent it from carrying out its mandate forcefully and with determination, in the totality of its area of operations, up to the internationally recognized boundaries.

26. Over and over again, the Council has been called upon to assess the possibilities of ever fulfilling the objectives of resolution 425 (1978). In the light of those objectives and of the results reported by the Secretary-General over the years, it appears pertinent to us that the Council should ask itself the following three questions, which literally restate the terms of the mandate of UNIFIL.

27. First, how, and when, is Israel going to "cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw its forces from all Lebanese territory"?

28. Secondly, how, and when, is UNIFIL going to be enabled to achieve its purpose of "restoring international peace and security" in the area?

29. Thirdly, how, and when, is UNIFIL going to be allowed to complete its mandate successfully, by "assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area"?

30. We cannot be so unrealistic as to be unaware that there are no simple answers to such complex questions. But, from past experience, and notwith-

standing the present context of crisis escalation in Lebanon and the Middle East, we strongly believe that the Council has within its powers the capability of reversing what otherwise appears to be an irreversible process towards conflagration and war.

31. In the face of Israeli threats to re-invade Lebanon—often expressed with a unique genius for inventive scenario-writing—the Council is indeed called upon, and expected, by the peace-loving nations to reinforce the already existing conflict-control mechanisms and undertake the necessary actions to prevent a frail and volatile cease-fire from becoming yet another prelude to death and destruction.

32. The requests presented to the Council on 14 December 1981, and repeated last week, are very moderate when measured against the tremendous dangers the world is confronting. We are not falling prey to blackmail by terror. But the Council should not be pressured into accepting as a fact that the situation in South Lebanon will continue, spellbound by Israel's paranoiac obsessions, its grandiose designs, its apocalyptic war games and, last but not least, its capricious reading of history, geography and the law of nations.

33. We count on you, Sir, and on the Council to put an end to such an insane situation. We are confident that friendly Governments that are in a position to influence events will respond, as they have in the past, to the Council's call. For Lebanon cannot be allowed to drift as the one major casualty of a war that others have chosen to wage on its territory, with no hope for the Lebanese but to become the casualties of peace, as well.

34. What did we—what do we—request of the Council? To the three questions which we submitted earlier in our statement, here are our proposed answers.

35. First, an injunction to ensure Israel's total and unconditional withdrawal so that the General Armistice Agreement of 1949¹ may be reinstated.

36. Secondly, an enhancement of UNIFIL's capabilities, qualitatively and quantitatively.

37. Thirdly, a strict and forceful implementation of a joint phased programme of action, agreed upon between the Lebanese Government and the Secretary-General, to ensure the gradual transition of the responsibilities for peace and security from UNIFIL to the Lebanese army, thereby restoring Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity.

38. In previous debates, in the Council and in the General Assembly, when the nature of UNIFIL as a peace-keeping force was discussed, we suggested that rarely could such a dynamic mission be performed successfully by a force that would be restricted to only a static role. May we reaffirm here our strong conviction that if UNIFIL's dynamic character is not given

a new lease on life, the Force will remain a helpless hostage caught in the quicksands of the ever-expanding cycle of turmoil and violence.

39. The dynamics of war which hold my country hostage have also captured the peace-makers. The Council is left with no alternative but to save both: UNIFIL and Lebanon. We know of no greater service to the cause of peace in the Middle East, and probably in the entire world, today.

40. Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): I should like, Sir, to extend to you my most sincere congratulations on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month of February 1982. Sir Anthony Parsons has, over the years, rightfully earned the esteem, the affection and the recognition of all his colleagues because of his outstanding and most knowledgeable grasp of international issues, not the least those pertaining to the tragic turn of events in the Middle East, an area in which he had a long and meritorious service, and those people, including their afflictions, he understands with deep insight and sympathy, as not too many do. The constraints of diplomacy occasionally impel a delicate agonizing between one's powers of discerning and unpalatable situations over which control is inherently circumscribed. None the less, it is propitious that it is under Sir Anthony's presidency and guidance that the Council is seized of the unparalleled tragedy and ordeal of victimized sisterly Lebanon.

41. I wish to pay the highest and most heartfelt tribute to your predecessor, Mr. Oleg Troyanovsky of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who presided over the Council last month with great distinction, dedication and integrity and with consummate wisdom. His presidency shone the more brightly as the Council found itself seized of another fateful, unique and grotesque act of aggression, when expansionist Israel committed a blatant and audacious annexation of the occupied territory of a sovereign, independent State, the Syrian Arab Republic, with astounding disregard of the Charter of the United Nations, the Hague and Geneva Conventions, all norms of international law and the very foundations of the international system.

42. I wish to express the deep appreciation of my delegation to the Secretary-General for his objective and incisive special report of 16 February 1982 [S/14869] on the tragic agony of Lebanon. That agony, I should add, is manifested in the close to one million inhabitants of the south of Lebanon whose homes, farms, industries, lands and infrastructure have been ravaged by years of savage and incessant Israeli bombardment from the land, from the sea and from the air.

43. A well-earned tribute should also be paid to the indomitable Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, Mr. Brian Urquhart, for his strenuous efforts in assisting the Secretary-General in working towards implementation of the Council's repeated injunctions for withdrawal of Israeli forces of occupation from the hallowed soil of Lebanon.

44. That wanton Israeli devastation, committed under the very eyes and nose of UNIFIL—whose courage, fortitude and patience deserve deepest appreciation—has rendered it exceedingly difficult for the Force to fulfil the basic function for which it was established four years ago, namely, to confirm the total withdrawal of all Israeli forces from Lebanese soil as provided for in Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978), with a view to achieving full respect for the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries.

45. UNIFIL was never intended to be more than interim in nature, because perpetuating it without enabling it to overcome, in co-operation with the legitimate Government of Lebanon, the present totally unacceptable *status quo* would lead to an ever expanding situation of war—which looms so ominously and persistently that it has been acquiesced in as virtually inevitable. It is no longer a question of "whether", but of "when".

46. Lebanon was not a party to the war triggered by Israel in 1967 with its sneak air attack on Cairo, which resulted in massive occupation and annexation of adjacent Arab and Palestinian lands, which continue to this day. Yet Lebanon has been added to the list of occupied Arab and Palestinian territories. The Israeli so-called *de facto* enclave, established deliberately by Israel in 1978 to circumvent and thwart the implementation of Council resolution 425 (1978), has effectively prevented both UNIFIL and the Lebanese army from carrying out their assigned task of restoring the Lebanese Government's authority in the totality of the area assigned to UNIFIL up to the internationally recognized boundaries, so that UNIFIL and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) might resume unhindered their normal functions under the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement of 1949.¹

47. It would be almost cumbersome to recall all the resolutions on this matter which the Council adopted between 1978 and 1981, the last one being resolution 498 (1981). Suffice it here to state that their final objective of restoring Lebanon's sovereign independence and territorial integrity has largely remained ink on paper. There is not a flicker of light at the end of the tunnel. It is for that reason that the Lebanese Government and almost all other Governments—including those that met at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference held at Fez, Morocco, on 25 November 1981—are now asking for a fundamental reappraisal by the Council.

48. All the members of the League of Arab States, while giving their regional commitment to resolution 490 (1981) regarding the maintenance of the cease-fire, reiterated their collective view that the cease-fire was never to be considered as an end in itself but only as a step towards the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978) and towards the deployment of

UNIFIL in the totality of the area of operations assigned to it in resolution 426 (1978). They further stipulated that southern Lebanon should be under the exclusive authority of the Lebanese State, which would help the Lebanese Government to deploy the Lebanese army in the south and to carry out its national responsibilities.

49. The Israeli forces of aggression and occupation manifestly think otherwise and plan otherwise, and do not even attempt to mince words to beguile us about their real objectives and aims, which are generic and yet tailored in each instance to explain away their inherent nature of unalterable aggression. In the case of Palestine they invoke a distorted reading of heavenly dispensation even though it is blatantly untenable. In their annexation of the Golan Heights, they expressed their tender concern for regularizing the lives of the 13,000 remnants of what are in fact 200,000 full-fledged Syrian citizens, at present uprooted. These, incidentally, included 18,000 Palestinian refugees—perhaps refugees for the third time—from the demilitarized areas which Israel had usurped much earlier, even earlier than 1967.

50. Even in the Sinai, from which they are scheduled to withdraw with an exorbitant profit, the recalcitrant settlers expressed their opposition to withdrawal on grounds of love, tender love, for the scenic beauty, the birds, the sea reefs and even the environment, which they shudder to think the Egyptian people are not qualified to preserve. I am sure many around this table read an article in *The New York Times* in this regard less than a month ago.

51. Why is it that Lebanon is such a target, such an obsession for them? Quite apart from the irresistible penchant for additional acquisitions, I am convinced that the reason is subjective as well as objective. Lebanon has posed to the Israeli militaristic régime the deadly challenge of a highly dynamic and enlightened and truly democratic State in which adherents of all faiths, creeds and ideological affiliations have achieved miracles since the national accord of 1943 which culminated in Lebanon's independence. It became the recognized centre-piece of the cultural, financial, commercial and developmental accomplishments which civilized tolerance and dynamic energy had bestowed. It was a haven for figures of renown, regardless of their political affiliations or ideologies, when political or ideological adversity in a troubled Middle East whose serenity had been disrupted by Zionist aggression and exclusivity necessitated such a haven. All this was achieved without turning Lebanon into a military barracks and without racist oppressive exclusivity and intolerance. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees were welcomed and given haven in a civilized Lebanon while Israeli bigotry and intolerance denied them their birthright to return to their homes in Palestine, where their ancestors had lived for thousands of years.

52. The glaring comparison between a tolerant and enlightened Lebanon and a bigoted and militaristic Israel—camouflaged of course with pretenses and appurtenances of democracy—was too much for Israel to take. A decade ago a retired senior United Nations official was invited by an old friend to visit Israel. He spoke glowingly about some of the major projects which the latter had achieved. I told him to concretize his impressions to enable me to gauge in real terms the size of those achievements, and I followed that up by asking how he compared them with those of Lebanon. He immediately responded, "Well, Lebanon is a different story, and Israel could not withstand any comparison, except of course in its military pursuits."

53. Thus the process of destabilization, espionage and the sowing of the seeds of dissension was set in motion. Every country has dynamic tensions and differing venues, and Israel was determined to exploit them in full measure in its determination to destroy the fabric of Lebanese society and indeed of Lebanon itself.

54. At the close of 1968 I attended a dinner party in the mansion of the late and great co-founder of modern Lebanon, Riad as-Sulh, a mile or two from Beirut's international airport. At about 9 p.m., as we were about to be ushered in to dinner, the house reverberated from a barrage of heavy explosions which, as could be seen from the verandas, was occurring at the international airport, the famous Beirut international airport, where Israeli war planes had systematically destroyed 14 Boeings and other aircraft and maintenance facilities of Middle East Airlines, the national airline of Lebanon. In addition, low-flying helicopters were roaming the skies and firing their 500-calibre machine-guns indiscriminately into civilian houses, including the house where I was. In our host's house were gathered just a few distinguished ladies and gentlemen. It is needless to add that in their hunting spree the helicopters showered their deadly bullets on huts and fragile Palestinian refugee encampments, none of which had any arms, and not a bullet was fired at the raiding vultures. The Israelis then justified that murderous act by saying that it was carried out in retaliation for something done by one, two or more Palestinian resistance fighters who had allegedly departed from Beirut international airport.

55. Which other country in the world would destroy the entire national airline of another country and play havoc with the civilian population of that country on such flimsy grounds? The Lebanese Government—and the Israelis certainly know this—has absolutely nothing to do with who arrives at or leaves from the international airport of Beirut. I am sure that the only country that would do such a thing is Israel, whose supporters are angered because the General Assembly has described it as a non-peace-loving Member. That act was followed by a systematic campaign of destabilization, espionage, daylight bombings and assassi-

nations of Palestinians and their Lebanese brethren, including my own classmate at the American University of Beirut, Kamal Nasser, a highly gifted poet who had never carried a gun in his life, only a pen to write poetry, and whose family founded the Bir Zeit University near Ramallah decades ago. The victims are too many to enumerate. They include that late man of letters Mr. Kanafani and scholars that were doing research at the Palestine Research Institute, research which, as I am sure everyone is aware, involved data-gathering and the monitoring and compilation of Israeli violations in the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories; it did not do any atomic or other scientific research.

56. The carnage continued until everybody in Lebanon was forced to scramble for a minimum of arms to ward off that dastardly Israeli inhuman intellect-hunting. Eventually the civilian population of Lebanon was compelled to buy and carry arms to defend itself. This in turn created a tense situation which led to the tragic strife of 1975 even though the Lebanese people are essentially one homogeneous family regardless of creed or denomination; they have been so for decades, for centuries. Furthermore, every citizen of Lebanon was totally convinced that the Palestinians in Lebanon were involuntary guests and refugees whose only day of liberation would be the day when they could return to Palestine, and nowhere else. They wanted to go back to their land, their farms and their homes.

57. What I have just described was the genesis of sisterly Lebanon's seven-year tragedy and ordeal, which is virtually unparalleled in its magnitude and human suffering. More than 150,000 have lost their lives or been incapacitated as a result of those seven years of turmoil. But again we find Lebanon's agony continuing unabated because of objective designs which, even before its inception, Israel laid down against Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity. It was presented to the Versailles Conference in 1919 and debated officially in the Israeli Cabinet in 1954 and 1955, as excerpts from the diaries of the late Moshe Sharett disclose. Ben Gurion had received the plan of Mr. Sasson, an Arabist then acting as the Israeli Ambassador to Ankara. Ben Gurion approved the plan but had reservations on the timetable for implementation as premature. He told him that when the time came it would be implemented.

58. It is amazing to find the similarities between that scenario and the one which, as envisaged in the plan, is at present being implemented by a Lebanese major, that outlawed Major Sa'd Haddad who, at the instructions of his Israeli masters—and he is of course on their payroll—has prevented UNIFIL from operating unhindered up to the internationally recognized boundaries.

59. The objective of the Israeli occupation of an enclave—so-called *de facto*—is to use it to uproot

almost one million Lebanese citizens, including the Palestinian refugees, and to use it as a springboard for the seizure and annexation of south Lebanon with the determination of stealing the waters of the Litani River, which can produce 500 to 700 million cubic metres. According to an authoritative research paper by Mr. Stouffer, a research associate at the Harvard Center of Middle East Studies, published in *The Christian Science Monitor* of 20 January 1982, a maximization of the massive water robbery would require annexation of south Lebanon to the north beyond the Litani River in order to seize the Lebanese Qarun Dam. A second projected Lebanese dam in the early 1970s to irrigate the Central Bekaa Valley, the researcher asserts, was blocked by Israeli intervention with the United States Government and international financial institutions.

60. The Golan Heights annexed by Israeli occupation, are—according to the Harvard researcher—even more important, in the context of Israel's future policy, as, quite literally, a stepping-stone for the occupation of the south-eastern part of Lebanon and physical control of the Litani River. The researcher adds that, while estimates of the available flow from the Litani River differ considerably, Israeli sources argue that a minimum of 400 million cubic metres yearly could be diverted into Israel quite easily, or as much as 700 million if the Lebanese dam upstream could be destroyed or its spillways open.

61. The Harvard researcher explains:

“Control of the Golan is the necessary predicate for the final move into Lebanon to acquire the Litani River. Conversely, any return of the Golan area not merely compromises that longer-term objective but also threatens Israel's pre-emption of the entire flow of fresh water from the upper Jordan River basin.”

62. Members might recall the earlier phases, when in 1963 Israel diverted substantial amounts of the Jordan River to the Negev—which does not belong to that area, it is a different area; when after 1967 Israel destroyed the Khaled Dam at Mukhaiba, in Jordan, and large parts of the East Ghor Canal, the sole irrigation artery to the east bank of the Jordan River; the unabashed threat that, when implemented, would destroy Jordan's al-Maqarin Dam well upstream on the Yarmuk River; and the seizure of 95 per cent of the occupied West Bank's water resources and, finally, of the upstream waters of the Hasbani, Banias and Litani rivers.

63. Israel's determination to exact the last drop of blood as well as the last drop of water from the millions of people in the area is an integral and inseparable part of Israeli strategy to cannibalize and depopulate these historic and great lands and their peoples. It should make it easier to understand the turmoil, the wars, the annexations and the savagery which those

invaders have directly and indirectly inflicted and continue to inflict on the adjacent States.

64. All the talk about military build-ups and missile sites and the long litany of Israeli pretexts should be left to Israel's propaganda apparatus. The Council is not the appropriate forum for deceitful and naïve excuses. For the Lebanese army itself has been denied access to the south to help fulfil the Council's basic mandate as categorically provided for in its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) and all the subsequent relevant resolutions. The fact that the Lebanese people and their Palestinian refugee guests are determined to prevent a free ride into Lebanon and, if attacked, to fight to the last man, whatever the cost, is but a human imperative for survival and, of course, a national duty.

65. On the occasion of a recent debate on this subject, a number of dignitaries, a former Prime Minister and leaders and parliamentarians representing every denomination and political affiliation in Lebanon came to New York and other United States cities to press their case for Lebanon's long-delayed salvation. They spoke with one voice: the voice of a free, democratic and cohesive Lebanon within its territorial integrity and without Israeli forces stoking the pot in the south and elsewhere to the boiling point in order to continue the destabilization of Lebanon. The delegations portrayed the pulse, the hopes and the aspirations of true Lebanon—a harmonious and undivided Lebanon as so effectively portrayed to the Council over the years by its representative, Mr. Ghasan Tuéni.

66. The PRESIDENT: I should like to inform members of the Council that I have just received a letter from the representative of Israel in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the agenda. In accordance with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite him to participate in the discussion without the right to vote, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Blum (Israel) took a place at the side of the Council chamber.

67. The PRESIDENT: I now invite the representative of Israel to take a place at the Council table in order to make a statement in exercise of the right of reply.

68. Mr. BLUM (Israel): I do not think it is necessary for me to respond to the rambling and incoherent statement that was just heard from the representative of the Palestinian Arab State of Jordan, who incidentally interspersed it with reminiscences of his culinary joys in the past. If anything, he has given repeated evidence of his well-known fantasy and imagination—so much so that one had the impression at times that he was converting the chamber of the Council into the studio of the television series "Fantasy

Island". But if I may be permitted to make a very brief response to that rambling and incoherent statement, it would be this. The tragedy of Lebanon can be telescoped into one short phrase: Lebanon is paying the price for the fact that it did not follow the example set by Mr. Nuseibeh's King in 1970. King Hussein knew how to deal with the terrorist PLO in September 1970. The Government of Lebanon, for reasons of its own, did not choose the same path. Therein lie the seeds of Lebanon's tragedy.

69. The PRESIDENT: I understand that Mr. Clovis Maksoud, to whom the Council has extended an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure, wishes to make a statement. I now invite him to take a place at the Council table and to make that statement.

70. Mr. MAKSOUUD: Mr. President, I should like to take this opportunity to extend to you our hearty congratulations, knowing full well your distinguished career, your resilient wisdom and the great traditions of democracy that your country represents. I also take this opportunity to take note of the distinguished chairmanship of your predecessor, the representative of the Soviet Union, during the very grave deliberations last month.

71. We are meeting again today to examine a situation in the south of Lebanon, where the deployment of UNIFIL has not been effective in ensuring the implementation of Council resolutions 425 (1978) and 490 (1981). There has been a defect in the ability of the United Nations mechanism to implement the resolutions in the south of Lebanon.

72. We have sought to reflect over the last few weeks about the cease-fire which the United Nations was instrumental in bringing about. We have been able to examine the meaning of the cease-fire, to reflect about its significance and to realize, as the League of Arab States and the Arab Summit Conference have realized, that a cease-fire is not an end in itself and that it cannot be a substitute for a policy that implements the resolutions of the Council. This is the first lesson that brings about a reconvening of the Council today. That is why it becomes crucial for the Council to realize that, simultaneously with the cease-fire that has been obtained after arduous negotiations by several parties and by the United Nations itself, there has been an ominous deployment of Israeli forces in southern Lebanon—threatening at one time, blackmailing at another—trying to impose a situation whereby any movement in southern Lebanon towards implementation of the Council resolutions has to be carried out under duress and in a manner to pre-empt the aggressive disposition of those forces.

73. There have been attempts to calm our fears, to bring about a measure of strategic anaesthesia, by telling us that missions will be sent there to defuse the threat and that in a way Lebanon and the Arab

countries should be thankful that Begin did not carry out his aggressive designs and intentions. So we are meeting today in the Council with a cease-fire that is still in operation, yet equally threatened by the ominous deployment and logistic behaviour of the Israeli army in southern Lebanon.

74. We have heard in the past few minutes Israel's prescription for dealing with the situation. We have seen that it is only an attempt to disqualify and disenfranchise the Palestinians of their right to return to their homes and of their right to national self-determination and to force them into a permanent state of haemorrhage because of Israel's repeated attacks in the various countries in which they happen to be transient populations, and also to deny them in perpetuity of their right to self-determination. And we heard the United States representative today claiming—almost implying—that the PLO is usurping the representativity of the people of Palestine, despite the fact that they have a framework of peoplehood and are entitled to self-determination, and that this has been recognized by the international community. This was the prescription for dealing with the PLO implied by the representative of Israel. We see that what is taking place in southern Lebanon is an attempt by Israel to settle big accounts in a small territory. That is why, in reflecting today, without the sense of urgency and pressure that usually characterize the deliberations of the Council, we find that what is taking place is that Lebanon and the entire world community are faced with the blackmail of an overpowering Israeli logistical deployment near southern Lebanon, trying to say that any attempt to implement the Council resolution would be at the cost of a recognition of Israel's strategic hegemony in the region.

75. It is from this viewpoint that we have to look at the needs of the south of Lebanon, not only for its own reconstruction but so that the Government of Lebanon, the central authority of that country, can retrieve its full sovereignty and authority in the south effectively and without equivocation, the equivocation which Israel in the aftermath of its 1978 invasion sought to interpose—a mutineers' situation—with

the aim of helping itself under the pretence of open-door policy in the south of Lebanon. That was in fact an attempt to cause a haemorrhage in the credibility of the United Nations mechanism, the credibility of the central Government of Lebanon and the credibility of any resolution that allows and entitles the Palestinians to return to their homes and to build a State in their homeland, as is their right.

76. It is through these collective aspects of its policy—the tri-dimensional haemorrhaging of the Palestinians, of their credibility and of their effectiveness—that Israel attempts to sap the capacity of the PLO to play its role in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip as the representative of the people there. This is an attempt to undermine and destroy the Palestinian presence in the south of Lebanon physically and in terms of the objective of liquidation, and to render the Lebanese helpless and the Palestinians hopeless. It is an attempt at creeping annexation all over. So what we have in Israel is not a State but a nucleus of an empire.

77. That is why, although the Council meets today in the calm of the cease-fire, which is appreciated, it meets also in the atmosphere of tension and the ominous threat of an invasion that Israel has been planning for long and is only postponing, while keeping Lebanon and the entire world hostage to its objectives of colonial annexation, expansion and destruction. That is why the prescription that has been implied by the Israeli representative today is only a sign of the criminal intention to destroy and liquidate physically the Palestinian political and social presence everywhere, in all their places of abode, temporary or permanent, as is the case in the lands of Palestine.

The meeting rose at 5.05 p.m.

NOTE

¹ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 4.*

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