

## 13th meeting

Thursday, 22 April 1982, at 10.45 a.m.

President: Mr. Miljan KOMATINA (Yugoslavia).

E/1982/SR.13

*In the absence of the President, Mr. Velloso (Brazil), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

### AGENDA ITEM 3

#### Special economic, humanitarian and disaster relief assistance (E/1982/40, E/1982/44 and Add.1, E/1982/53, A/37/178)

1. The PRESIDENT said that as agreed, the Council would also, in connection with item 3, consider measures to be taken following the cyclones and floods which had affected Madagascar (E/1982/44 and Add.1) and measures to be taken following the heavy floods which had affected Democratic Yemen (E/1982/53).
2. Mr. SMYSER (United Nations Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees) said that the grave situation of refugees or displaced persons in the Horn of Africa and the Sudan had been the subject of several resolutions of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly in which the Secretary-General had been requested to report to the Council at its first regular session on the efforts of the international community to assist the affected persons.
3. While, very often, disaster relief must be provided, there was also a need to find lasting solutions: voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement. To that end, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) co-operated closely with the Governments concerned, enlisted the support of the United Nations system and drew on the resources of numerous non-governmental organizations.
4. In Somalia, the immediate difficulties had been surmounted by the end of 1981 and the state of emergency that had characterized the first three years of operations had been contained. In 1982, UNHCR's programme would continue to satisfy refugees' basic needs and to emphasize longer-term, income-generating projects. The Council had before it a detailed account of the mission sent to Somalia in January 1982 (see E/1982/40).
5. In Djibouti, refugees had constituted 10 per cent of the population by the end of 1981. In view of the difficulty of establishing self-reliant rural settlements and other types of local integration, UNHCR had continued to provide mainly relief assistance in 1981. Refugees now in camps who chose not to return to their country of origin would ultimately have to be involved in productive activities which would contrib-

ute to their self sufficiency and to the development of Djibouti.

6. With regard to the Sudan, it should be noted that, despite its economic difficulties as a least developed country, the Sudan had maintained a generous policy of welcoming refugees. The Government had estimated that there had been 550,000 refugees in the Sudan in 1981 to which UNHCR had continued to provide assistance. Various missions had been sent to the Sudan, including an interagency mission sent in June 1980, a joint ILO/UNHCR interdisciplinary mission sent at the end of 1982 and an interagency mission, led by ECA and including representatives of UNICEF, UNESCO and UNHCR, sent in January 1982 (see A/37/178). UNHCR had committed over \$19.8 million for assistance to refugees in the Sudan. In that connection, the contribution of voluntary agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system, especially WFP and the ILO, had been invaluable.

7. With regard to Ethiopia, a special programme of assistance to returnees to Ethiopia had been undertaken in 1980. Since many refugees had continued to return, a decision had been taken following consultations with the Ethiopian authorities and a high-level UNHCR mission in February 1982, to continue the programme into 1982 and to expand it.

8. Voluntary repatriation remained the ideal solution and the key to resolving any refugee situation. That was particularly true of the Horn of Africa and the Sudan, given the magnitude and complexity of the problem which called for a reasonable approach and also for flexibility on the part of UNHCR.

9. Mr. JENSEN (Director, Office for Special Political Questions) said that, at the request of the General Assembly (resolution 36/153), a mission had been dispatched to Somalia to review the overall needs of the refugees in that country. The report of that mission was contained in document E/1982/40. In 1981 the influx of refugees into Somalia had declined but, for a variety of reasons, it was very difficult to estimate the actual number of refugees in the camps at any one time. For the planning of relief efforts during 1982, however, the mission had recommended that the number of refugees in the camps should be taken to be approximately 700,000. The most important requirements of those refugees were for basic food items. While pledges would cover most needs, a deficit of 15,000 tonnes of food remained. It should be noted that WFP was ready to channel food assistance from bilateral and multilateral sources.

10. The Government of Somalia and non-governmental organizations were providing basic health care. International assistance was needed, however, to strengthen the health service infrastructure at the camps. In all, it was estimated that over \$138 million would be needed in 1982, for the main relief efforts for the refugees in Somalia.

11. Since many refugees would like to see an increase in self-help activities, programmes aimed at self-reliance for a temporarily settled refugee population must be planned and implemented. In that connection, the mission had suggested to the Government that it should entrust its functional ministries with the implementation of refugee projects and programmes. That would allow refugee self-reliance programmes to be co-ordinated with, and in some cases integrated into, international development plans. The National Refugee Commission should have the primary responsibility for planning, co-ordinating and supervising such programmes. The Government had agreed to those recommendations. None the less, international assistance was urgently required to organize and operate an improved refugee administration. In that connection, the Government had emphasized that it would welcome joint planning with the international donor community of refugee projects and programmes.

12. Since the refugee influx had begun in 1978, a number of voluntary agencies had provided valuable and timely assistance. The number of such agencies had increased and their activities had multiplied. Currently, some 30 voluntary agencies were participating in the relief effort.

13. Mr. LUTEM (Director, Liaison Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator) recalled that, in May 1980, the Government of Ethiopia had requested the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO) to lead a multiagency and donor mission to identify and estimate the immediate assistance needs of displaced persons in Ethiopia. The \$8 million received from various donors had not been sufficient to cover even the most urgent needs. Subsequently, UNDRO had organized a second interagency mission on which it had presented a report to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in November 1980. In its resolutions 35/91 and 35/183, the Assembly had requested the Secretary-General urgently to mobilize humanitarian assistance for displaced persons and voluntary returnees in Ethiopia. In its resolution 1981/32, the Council had appealed once more to all donors to provide prompt and generous assistance to the displaced persons in Ethiopia on the basis of the recommendations of the interagency mission. At its thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly had requested the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to continue his efforts in favour of the large number of voluntary returnees to Ethiopia.

14. The Government of Ethiopia, for its part, had undertaken a project to settle displaced persons in the province of Bale. Famine and the effects of internal conflict continued in northern Ethiopia but significant improvements had taken place in the southern provinces. It was estimated that there were 4.8 million people seriously affected throughout the country. In March 1981, the United Nations Co-ordinating Committee for Relief and Rehabilitation, in collaboration with the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission of Ethiopia, had published a report identifying the most urgently needed relief and rehabilitation assistance for about 1.5 million people within a time frame of 18 months.

15. According to the report, food needs were the most pressing. Food assistance required for an 18-month period had been estimated at 192,000 tons of grain, 17,600 tons of supplementary food and 14,400 tons of edible oil. Rainfall in some parts of the country in March and June 1981 and

January 1982 had not been sufficient to end the drought. In 1981, rains had come late in the area, which normally provided 90 per cent of grain production. Gross national availability of cereals and pulses had been only 328.5 grams per capita per day for 1981 and was expected to be lower in 1982; the United Nations survival ration was 400 grams. Consequently, the estimated shortfall in production for 1981/82 would be approximately 350,000 tons of cereals.

16. The shortage of trucks to distribute relief items had been a perennial problem for the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, which had to hire trucks to supplement the services of its own vehicles. The Swedish Government had contributed funds for the purchase of new trucks. The old planes belonging to the Commission also needed to be replaced by turbo-prop aircraft that could land on short, rough runways.

17. The health care activities in the short-term programme had two main components: improvement of services, including the provision of medicaments and supplies, and restoration of health infrastructure through the repair and reconstruction of damaged facilities. In May 1981, the members of WHO had requested the Director-General to mobilize, on an emergency basis, health and medical assistance for the Government of Ethiopia. The total cost of the health programmes was estimated at \$215 million, but so far contributions for the period 1980-1981 amounted to only some \$43 million. In July 1980, the League of Red Cross Societies had started operations in Ethiopia consisting of two components, relief operations and development programmes. The health and nutrition relief operations initiated by the League had been continued by the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, while the League had shifted its emphasis towards development programmes.

18. On behalf of the Secretary-General, he appealed to the international community to contribute generously towards the implementation of the programmes that were necessary for the survival of the displaced and drought-affected people in Ethiopia.

19. With regard to the measures to be taken following the cyclones and floods which had affected Madagascar, he drew attention to the letters dated 30 March and 14 April 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Madagascar to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (E/1982/44 and Add.1). After the floods of 1981-1982, UNDRO had offered to help the Government of Madagascar in co-ordinating relief assistance. On 26 January 1982, UNDRO had launched an appeal for emergency assistance to Madagascar and had seconded one of its staff members to the UNDP office in Antananarivo to assess the damage and co-ordinate international relief. In the Antananarivo area, more than 100,000 people had been rendered homeless and cyclones had caused serious damage to roads, bridges and railways. Those circumstances had aggravated an already serious situation with regard to food and fuel supplies. As sanitation facilities had been disrupted, the danger of epidemics had arisen, intensified by the shortage of medicines. It should be noted that as a result of the preventive measures which had been taken, the flooding had been less extensive and less destructive in 1982 than in 1959. UNDRO had recently stepped up its disaster preparedness and prevention activities. After the floods, the Government of Madagascar had promptly initiated relief operations, which had been complemented by those of Caritas, Catholic Relief Services and the Red Cross Society.

20. The priority emergency requirements were food, reconstruction materials, air-lifting of relief supplies to outlying regions, medicines and disinfectants to prevent the outbreak of epidemics and further international assistance

for the reconstruction of infrastructure and for recouping losses in agricultural production.

21. The contributions received thus far by UNDR0 amounted to approximately \$9 million, far below the country's emergency needs, although further contributions were expected. It should be noted that contributions had come from countries of different regions and economic systems, thus demonstrating that the plight of the Malagasy people had brought about a world-wide feeling of solidarity.

22. Finally, the recurrence of meteorological hazards threatening Madagascar and the effectiveness of the prevention and preparedness measures had stimulated the Government into taking such measures as the creation of a National Relief Council under the Ministry of the Interior. Co-operation at the local level with the international community had also been effective, and constant contacts were maintained with the Resident Co-ordinator of UNDP.

23. As to the measures to be taken following the heavy floods which had affected Democratic Yemen, he drew attention to the letter dated 19 April 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Democratic Yemen to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (E/1982/53). UNDR0 had been actively involved and, together with the UNDP representative, had led a multi-agency team to assess the situation in Democratic Yemen. In the reports it had circulated on 7 and 14 April 1982, UNDR0 had assessed the flood damage and indicated the emergency requirements and contributions and pledges by the United Nations system, Governments and national voluntary agencies. A third report would be circulated that day.

24. Mr. RABETAFIKA (Observer for Madagascar) thanked the Council for including in item 3 the measures to be taken following the cyclones and floods which had affected Madagascar in recent months. Although the current state of scientific knowledge made it possible to detect the formation of cyclones and predict their path, tropical cyclones were natural disasters against which mankind was totally powerless.

25. The explanatory note submitted by his delegation (E/1982/44/Add.1) described the magnitude of the damage and the difficulties of every kind which Madagascar would have to overcome in the very near future, if not immediately. The Director of the UNDR0 Liaison Office had added to the information contained in the explanatory note.

26. He stressed that at least one third of the people currently in distress would remain in that state almost indefinitely, with no hope of returning to their homes; that many towns and villages had suffered 80 per cent damage or been completely destroyed by floods or landslides; that, on the average, 80 per cent of all sectors of agricultural activity (for food and for export) had been affected; and that public works, communication and supply infrastructures had also suffered damage.

27. A provisional initial estimate of material damage was \$250 million, and a final count of the number of people affected had not yet been possible.

28. In the face of those problems, the international community had already provided assistance or had pledged substantial aid to Madagascar. His Government wished once again to express its appreciation to the States, the international and regional organizations and the associations which had helped his country at that difficult time.

29. There remained the problem of capital reconstruction and restoration of infrastructures, which would require resources that Madagascar certainly did not have. His Government therefore hoped that the States and internation-

al agencies concerned would participate in the reconstruction programme, and that the United Nations would do everything possible to establish an international natural disaster relief fund.

## AGENDA ITEM 2

### Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (*continued*) (E/1982/24 and Add.1, E/1982/25, E/1982/26, E/1982/49, E/1982/54, E/1982/L.18, E/AC.68/1982/L.5/Add.3)

30. Mr. JOHNSON (Benin) said that his country actively supported all peoples struggling for their liberation, both in the Organization of African Unity and the non-aligned movement and in the United Nations. The struggle for national liberation could not be isolated from the struggle against racism and racial discrimination in any form.

31. In 1977 and 1978, Benin had organized important international conferences, which had evaluated the ways of strengthening the struggle of peoples for liberation from foreign domination and the struggle against racism and racial discrimination in all its forms, against *apartheid*, against mercenaries and against zionism.

32. In OAU, Benin had always participated in the formulation of strategies, the adoption of resolutions and the taking of relevant decisions with a view to strengthening and radicalizing the struggle of peoples for their liberation.

33. In the United Nations, it had fully supported the relevant decisions and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights.

34. His delegation had seen from the reports submitted to the Council on the item under consideration how seriously the Secretary-General, the Economic and Social Council, the Commission on Human Rights and the Preparatory Sub-Committee for the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination were taking their combined efforts to carry out the tasks entrusted to them by the General Assembly.

35. Combating racism and racial discrimination was the duty of the entire international community, and the negative attitude of the Western countries which had boycotted the work of the Preparatory Sub-Committee was incomprehensible.

36. He appealed to the sense of responsibility of the Western countries, urging them to abandon that deplorable attitude and agree to co-operate in the preparations for the Second World Conference. Some of those countries were directly or indirectly responsible for the perpetuation of *apartheid* and zionism as forms of racial discrimination.

37. Benin welcomed the offer by the Government of the Philippines to host the Conference and recommended the application, if necessary, of the formula contained in General Assembly resolution 31/78 relating to the costs incurred by the host country during the first World Conference.

38. Benin would do all it could to ensure the attainment of the objectives assigned to the Second World Conference, which it hoped would enjoy the goodwill of Member States. However, the success of the Second World Conference was not totally assured. Some Western countries with a stake in protecting their economic interests and maintaining their strategic position in southern Africa and elsewhere might adopt a hypocritical attitude which would be prejudicial to the objectives of the Conference.

39. In that case, there would be no alternative but armed struggle. In view of that, Benin was convinced that the international community would not deny material aid to the struggling countries, with the aim of radicalizing and intensifying the struggle against racism and racial discrimination.
40. Mr. OKWARO (Kenya) said that, as preparations for the Second World Conference proceeded, it was important for all States Members of the United Nations to reflect on the contributions they intended to make in the future to achieving the objectives cherished by all, since it was apparent that racism and racial discrimination continued in many parts of the world.
41. Of particular concern to Kenya was the institutionalized racism and racial discrimination practised by the *apartheid* régime of South Africa. It was necessary to eliminate the *apartheid* system and create a new democratic system under which Africans would participate equally in all political, economic and social activities.
42. The pressure exerted on the South African régime during the Decade had not caused it to change its policies.
43. Those countries that had economic and military influence over South Africa should look for new ways of exerting pressure and bring about change. The struggle of the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia must also continue to be supported more substantially. The lack of co-operation on the part of transnational corporations should be publicized, especially in their home countries. Collaboration in the development of South Africa's military and nuclear capability had also made that régime more self-reliant and more defiant.
44. His delegation joined others in calling on certain non-governmental organizations planning to participate in activities which might be deemed to constitute collaboration with the South African régime not to undertake such activities. It supported any decision which would facilitate further examination of the matter in the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.
45. He regretted that some States had not participated in the Work of the Preparatory Sub-Committee, because they had valuable contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of the Decade; he therefore hoped that they would participate in future.
46. Lastly, his delegation welcomed the offer of the Government of the Philippines to host the Second World Conference.
47. Mr. FARIS (Jordan) reiterated his country's firm opposition to racism and racial discrimination. The Jordanian Constitution stipulated that all citizens were equal before the law, thus reflecting Arab religious and cultural values.
48. The crimes of *apartheid* and racial discrimination perpetrated by the Pretoria régime could be compared to the situation in the occupied Arab territories. As a result of Israeli policies, the indigenous Arabs of Palestine were being uprooted and replaced by immigrants from abroad. Intimidation was taking the form of infamous massacres, such as the recent bombing of refugee camps in southern Lebanon.
49. Other examples of racist discriminatory behaviour were the confiscation of lands, the proliferation of illegal settlements, the deportation of native Palestinian Arabs, the dismantling of the municipal council in the West Bank, the killing of unarmed demonstrators, the illegal annexation of territories and the sacrilegious acts against Moslem and Christian sanctuaries.
50. The General Assembly had equated zionism with racism because it denied the self-determination of the Palestinian people and their legitimate inherent rights.
51. Jordan, which supported and upheld the objectives of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, considered that the United Nations must take effective action under Chapter VII of the Charter by imposing sanctions on the racist régimes in Tel Aviv and Pretoria.
52. Mr. HASSOON (Iraq) said that his country had adopted legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures to prevent any manifestation of racism or racial discrimination, and its Constitution stipulated that all citizens were equal before the law.
53. Iraq was a party to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid* (General Assembly resolution 3068 (XXVIII), annex), did not maintain any relations whatsoever with the racist régimes and advocated action to isolate them, and had participated in numerous activities for the Decade.
54. Despite world opinion, the racist régimes remained in flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter. The United Nations must exert greater efforts to bring about an end to the illegal occupation of Namibia. South Africa was using the Territory for constant acts of aggression against neighbouring African States.
55. It was no accident that the South African régime and the Zionist régime in Palestine were close allies and collaborators. Both faced world-wide condemnation, both refused to recognize national liberation movements like SWAPO and PLO, and both opposed genuine endeavours to reach a comprehensive settlement.
56. Iraq supported the recommendations of the Preparatory Sub-Committee for the Second World Conference. It regretted that a number of Western countries had refused to take part and hoped that they would reconsider their attitude. Lastly, Iraq welcomed the offer by the Government of the Philippines to host the Conference.
57. Mr. ALMOSLECHNER (Austria) stressed the destabilizing effect of South Africa's policy of *apartheid* on the situation in southern Africa.
58. Despite common efforts, the *apartheid* system was counteracting all attempts to find a peaceful solution to the Namibian question. In view of the inflexible position of the Pretoria Government, the international community must take stronger measures.
59. The Austrian Government had urged the South African authorities to extend leniency to the three ANC freedom fighters who had been sentenced to death, thus responding to the appeal made by the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 503 (1982). That was also in keeping with Austria's well-known position on the death penalty.
60. With regard to the Second World Conference to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, he noted that items relating to the Middle East had been included in the provisional agenda. Austria had always opposed the equation of zionism with racism, and it hoped that the debates during the Second World Conference would not lead to a confrontation which would hinder its proceedings.
61. Mr. ADOSSAMA (International Labour Organisation) said that he wished to report, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2785 (XXVI) and Council resolution 1588 (L), on the activities carried out by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the field of racial discrimination.

62. The annual report of the International Labour Office contained detailed information on the application of the policy of *apartheid* in the labour field and the updating of the 1964 Declaration concerning the Policy of *Apartheid* of the Republic of South Africa. In addition, the Director-General had described in a special report the measures adopted by Governments, employers' and workers' organizations, and by the ILO itself to combat *apartheid*. In June 1981 the International Labour Conference had considered that special report and the conclusions of the International Tripartite Meeting on Action against *Apartheid*, which had been held in Zambia one month earlier.

63. In close co-operation with OAU and the front-line States and with the financial support of UNDP and the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, the ILO had organized training courses for African national liberation movements recognized by OAU. ILO assistance to those movements related primarily to vocational training, labour administration and legislation, workers' education and manpower planning.

64. In the latter field, the International Labour Office had established the Southern African Team for Employment Promotion (SATEP) in April 1980, for the purpose of developing indigenous manpower in an independent Namibia. In collaboration with SWAPO, it had also been studying priority aspects of the Nationhood Programme for Namibia, initiated pursuant to General Assembly resolution 31/153.

65. Despite such efforts, there had been little improvement in the living conditions of black and Coloured workers. Low wages, unjustified dismissals and the non-recognition of black trade unions had given rise to movements of workers' resistance.

66. In the 1964 Declaration, which had been brought up to date and adopted on 18 June 1981, the International Labour Conference had reaffirmed its determination to further and promote the freedom and dignity of the peoples of southern Africa.

67. The Conference had also confirmed the Director-General's mandate with respect to the situation in South Africa, established a permanent committee on *apartheid*, recommended the establishment of a voluntary fund and called upon the International Labour Office to increase its technical assistance to liberation movements, black workers and their independent trade unions, and to establish a training institute for South Africa.

68. Various missions of senior officials of the International Labour Office to southern Africa had had encouraging results. A number of countries had already pledged financial support for the preparation of programmes of technical assistance. With a view to eliminating racial discrimination, the ILO had continued to co-operate with the United Nations and other organizations, and had participated, in particular, in the activities of the Commission on Human Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, within the framework of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. In addition, the ILO had been represented at the International Seminar on Loans to South Africa, held in Zurich from 5 to 7 April 1981, in the consultations among representatives of specialized agencies held under the auspices of the Special Committee against *Apartheid*, and at the International Conference on Sanctions against South Africa.

69. Mr. LEVIN (Observer for Israel), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that he felt obliged to speak, given the liberty which had been taken by a number of representatives in speaking of *zionism* during the discussion. *Zionism* was the national liberation movement of the Jewish people.

Unfortunately, it was clear that racial prejudice against the Jewish people persisted in many countries whose representatives had been delivering statements against racism. He wondered how many Jews had been allowed to visit the Jewish holy places in Jerusalem between 1948 and 1977, or who had expelled tens of thousands of Shiites from Iraq solely because they were of Iranian origin. It had not been Israel.

70. He did not find surprising the accusations leveled by Arab delegations. However, when the representatives of the communist bloc spoke in the same manner as the Arab representatives, it was clear that there was a concerted campaign to prevent the Council from dealing in its discussion with the question of action to combat racism and racial prejudice. The meaning of genocide should be well-known to the warders of the Gulag Archipelago, the followers of Stalin, whose memory was still linked with the millions of Soviet citizens who had perished in labour camps and as a result of political persecution.

71. The work of the Council would be more meaningful and much more valuable if, instead of pointless attacks against *zionism* and Israel, more positive efforts would be made by some delegations whose countries were well known for their excesses in many areas. For its part, in the 34 years of its existence, Israel had been steadfast in the practice of tolerance and pluralism in the most perilous of circumstances.

72. Mr. FARIS (Jordan), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that at the very moment that the Zionist representative had been speaking, Israel's aircraft had been bombing and killing Palestine refugees in southern Lebanon in pursuance of one of the tenets of *zionism*, namely, the elimination of the Arabs from Palestine. The Israeli Minister of Defense had stated that the Jews had no intention of relinquishing the occupied Arab territories. Mr. Begin had said that there would never be another holocaust. However, the holocaust had been perpetrated by the Zionists against the Palestinian Arabs in southern Lebanon. If *zionism* was the liberation movement of the Jews, it should be recalled that not all Jews were Zionists.

73. Mr. OLEANDROV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was obvious that the security of the State of Israel could not be guaranteed by a policy of aggression, the annexation of territory, the violation of the legitimate rights of neighbouring States and a policy of genocide against the Palestinian people. Such conduct was political suicide and was inadmissible in international affairs.

74. Mr. AL-GEWAILY (Qatar), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that it was ironic that the statement of the Israeli representative had come only hours after the bombing of Beirut. A glance at the items on the agendas of United Nations organs showed the extent of the inhumanity of the so-called liberation movement of the Jewish people: the bombing of Beirut, the aggression against Iraq, the annexation of the Golan Heights—the list was endless. Nevertheless, a distinction should be made between the Jewish people, who deserved the respect of the people of Qatar, and the Zionist philosophy, which Qatar abhorred.

75. Mr. HASSOON (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that Iraq had decided to expel Iranian citizens because it had been discovered that they had links with the Khomeini régime. It was preferable not to make any reference to the practices of *zionism* and of the racist régime within and outside of Palestine, the West Bank, Jerusalem, southern Lebanon and elsewhere.



**AGENDA ITEM 1****Adoption of the agenda and other organizational matters (continued) (E/1982/55)**

76. The PRESIDENT drew the attention of the Council to a letter dated 21 April 1982, from the Chairman of the Executive Board of UNICEF addressed to the President of the Council concerning the expansion of the Board's membership (E/1982/55). Annexed to the letter was a recommendation to the Economic and Social Council, which had been adopted by consensus as a result of more than two years of difficult negotiations in which not only Board members had participated but also countries belonging to the various regional groups.

77. He had been informed informally that the President of the General Assembly intended to include consideration of the draft resolution contained in the annex to document E/1982/55, assuming that the decision to recommend it

would be adopted by the Economic and Social Council, among the matters to be dealt with by the Assembly the following week during its resumed thirty-sixth session.

78. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Economic and Social Council wished to adopt the draft decision contained in the annex to document E/1982/55.

*It was so decided* (decision 1982/111).

**(b) Control and limitation of the documentation**

79. The PRESIDENT recalled that no documentation on subitem 1(b) had been submitted and no delegation wished to speak on that subject.

80. If there were no objections, he would take it that no measures in connection with the control and limitation of the documentation would be taken at the current session.

*The meeting rose at 1 p.m.*