

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SECOND PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 11 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALESSI

(Italy)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. MAACHI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR
Mr. R.W. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss de CLERQ

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPCHEV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI
U NGWE WIN
U THAN TUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G.R. SKINNER
Mr. E.B. HAMBLIN

China: Mr. TIAN JIN
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN
Mr. LIN CHENG
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. P. NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Colonel GESBERT

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. J. MOEPERT
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. I. DAMANIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI
Mr. B. CARRAS
Mr. C.M. OLIVA
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
Mr. P. de KLERK

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. J. BENAVIDES de la SOTTA

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.J. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.F. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.E. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS
Mr. M. BUSBY
Ms K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MARTIN
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. P.S. CORDEN
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee
on Disarmament and Personal
Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 162nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Today, the Committee continues its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members who would like to make statements on any other subject relevant to the Committee's work are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Burma, the United States, Yugoslavia, China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all take this opportunity to express to you our sincere appreciation for the able and conscientious manner in which the work of this Committee is being conducted for this month under your chairmanship. I am confident that your endeavours will contribute positively to the work of this Committee.

The subject I propose to deal with somewhat briefly concerns the test ban issue, which the international community has rightly considered as a matter of top priority and is foremost on our agenda for this session. Despite persistent efforts and attention in this multilateral negotiating forum, as well as in other fora, a comprehensive test ban has continued to defy solution for over a quarter of a century. While this state of affairs continues to prevail, new generations of nuclear weapons have come into existence, made possible largely by the continued testing of nuclear weapons. Despite legal and political commitments by the major nuclear Powers, not to mention the moral aspect, a comprehensive test ban continues to recede before us like a mirage.

If we look back at the course of events in the history of its negotiations, a comprehensive test-ban treaty was negotiated with all serious intent and purpose in the multilateral forum and in 1963 an agreement was tantalizingly near, the negotiations having reached a stage where measures on adequate verification were then negotiated in detail and only a small gap remained to be bridged between the position of the two sides. It could perhaps be said that a certain degree of political will did exist at that time on the part of the Powers concerned, but perhaps that will was not sufficiently strong enough to give the necessary impetus needed for an agreement. And to allay the pleas of an anxious world concerning the threat to mankind posed by radioactive fallout caused by atmospheric testing, expediency made it possible to reach agreement on a partial test-ban Treaty, which continues to remain partial despite the fact that 19 years have elapsed since its signature. Yet today this Committee is confronted with the situation of not being able to solve the procedural aspect of the issue and substantive negotiations are nowhere in sight. In this state of affairs, it is relevant to reiterate what this delegation has said in its statement on 16 February. We said at that time that, on an issue of such multilateral concern, it would be most propitious to seek solutions through a multilateral approach and that the establishment of an ad hoc working group would be most appropriate for such a purpose, particularly in view of the fact that other approaches have not yielded any encouraging results.

(U Maung Maung Gyi, Burma)

We have been given an explicit mandate by the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly on how we should deal with this issue. Resolution 36/84 of the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly has clearly urged all members of the Committee to support the creation of an ad hoc working group, as from the beginning of 1982, which should begin multilateral negotiations on a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The resolution goes further on to say that this Committee should exert its best endeavours so that it may transmit to the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament a multilaterally negotiated text of such a treaty. We therefore have a mandate to comply with and the international community will not understand us if we could not even agree to negotiate on an issue of such importance.

It has recently been asserted in this Committee that a test ban cannot of itself end the threat posed by nuclear weapons and that limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues. We do of course realize that neither the test ban itself nor, for that matter, other measures of nuclear disarmament, each by itself, can eliminate the threat of nuclear weapons. For the only way to remove such threat is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. But each of these measures, including the ban on nuclear testing, could help eliminate such a threat. We feel that an attempt to link the solution of one measure with the solution of another would complicate the issue and to our mind would neither be practical nor desirable. The cessation of nuclear-weapon tests deserves to be treated on its own merit and not on the merit of other nuclear disarmament issues. This is the approach that has been taken all along and to depart from such an approach would make the solution of the test ban issue intractable.

Needless to say, in the solution of disarmament measures, the two principles that need to be resolved are the principle of equitable balance and the principle of adequate verification. The need for the principle of balance is mentioned explicitly in paragraph 29 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the principle of adequate verification is stated in paragraph 31 of the same Document. Because the test ban does not involve any physical change in the armaments of States, the principle of maintaining an equitable balance has resolved itself and we can say that, on this score, a test ban has its obvious advantage and we fail to understand why such an advantage could not be seized upon. Perhaps the tendency to assert that a test ban cannot of itself reduce the threat of nuclear weapons arises from the fact that it involves no actual reduction of nuclear weapons. No doubt a test ban by itself cannot alter the existing state of affairs. But what we should bear in mind is that its significance lies in curbing the qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race.

As to what the nature of a nuclear test-ban treaty should be, our long-standing attitude is that a direct approach to the main objective would be preferable to taking the road with detours. Nearly two decades have passed since the signing of the partial test-ban Treaty and surely it is not too much to opt for the ultimate treaty that would leave no loopholes. I think we should be able to get our bearings if we look at the matter from an objective approach rather than a subjective one. Our objective should go further than putting additional technical constraints on testing while continuing to condone the search for new weapons through testing. Our objective should be to achieve a treaty that would completely halt one very important aspect of the nuclear arms race by the total prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests for all time.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Burma for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the United States, Ambassador Fields.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, our agenda for this week concerns the subject of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. However, in light of the great interest evidenced in this Committee and the ongoing consultations being conducted by you, Sir, I will speak today regarding items 1 and 2 of our agenda, the nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

In this context, I want to address the numerous thoughtful questions and suggestions put to my delegation during our informal and plenary meetings on these items and to give the views of my Government on how the Committee on Disarmament might best proceed to consider the question of a nuclear test ban.

The position of my Government regarding a comprehensive test ban has already been clearly stated in this body. The achievement of a complete cessation of nuclear explosions remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives. However, we do not believe that, under present circumstances, such a ban could help to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons or maintain the stability of the nuclear balance. The United States is actively pursuing the first steps of the programme outlined by President Reagan last 18 November to reduce nuclear weapons. These issues are the most serious issues which any nation -- nuclear-weapon State or non-nuclear-weapon State -- can address. The elements of United States nuclear arms control policy -- including the ongoing negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces and the preparations to begin strategic arms reduction negotiations -- provide compelling evidence of the seriousness which the United States attaches to nuclear arms control and disarmament.

The issue now before this Committee is the most appropriate procedure to follow regarding items 1 and 2 of the agenda. A number of delegations have posed serious questions as to how the legitimate security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States should be considered in the light of the need for nuclear-weapon States to address amongst themselves issues affecting nuclear disarmament. Doubts have also been expressed as to how this Committee can function as a multilateral negotiating body if it does not address nuclear issues, which we all agree are of primary importance. And, specifically, questions have been raised and suggestions made as to the best way for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed on the nuclear test ban issue.

Let me briefly give the views of my delegation on the issues underlying these questions.

First, my delegation believes the Committee on Disarmament should address every issue which relates to the vital security interests of all States, including the control, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. The Committee on Disarmament, the only disarmament body in which all five nuclear-weapon States participate, is an appropriate forum for dealing with the interest in nuclear disarmament -- an interest deeply shared by all States. Nevertheless, my delegation continues to believe that establishing a subsidiary body to negotiate on nuclear disarmament would not be a productive step at this time, especially in view of the fact that such negotiations have begun among certain of the nuclear-weapon States. I also recall the numerous occasions on which the

(Mr. Fields, United States)

nuclear-weapon States have been reminded that they have the primary responsibility for undertaking such negotiations. Therefore, with regard to agenda item 2, while we recognize the legitimate role of the Committee, we continue to believe that these issues should be addressed in informal meetings, as we have done in the past.

Second, the United States fully shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament must effectively discharge its responsibilities. In evidence of this fact, my delegation is actively engaged in the efforts being made in the Committee to reach agreement on a multilateral convention on the complete prohibition of radiological weapons. Moreover, the Committee is also hard at work in laying the foundations for a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, whose use, sadly, is all too familiar to mankind and whose elimination is an urgent task. President Reagan has stated that achievement of such a prohibition -- effective and verifiable -- is a goal of the United States and we intend to pursue that goal vigorously in this forum.

Finally, I would like to speak briefly regarding the nuclear test ban issue which heads our agenda. My delegation has, on numerous occasions, made known its views on ways of dealing with this item and has stated that the establishment of a subsidiary body on the nuclear test ban issue did not appear to be the most effective way to proceed. At the same time, we have listened attentively to the numerous interventions made on this issue, in keeping with our pledge to consider carefully and seriously the views of other delegations. As is well known, our distinguished Chairman has been engaged in extensive consultations on nuclear questions, including the nuclear test ban. We have participated in those consultations and have carefully considered the positions of other delegations, particularly regarding agenda item 1.

I have already stated the position of my Government regarding the broad issue of a comprehensive test ban and that position remains unchanged. However, my delegation believes that the Committee on Disarmament has a legitimate interest in all disarmament issues and an obligation to make a substantial contribution to the disarmament process in all its aspects, including consideration of the issues, such as agenda item 1, on which the negotiation of an agreement, for whatever reasons, may not be propitious at the time.

Foremost among the concerns which surround the question of a comprehensive test ban are the issues of effective verification of and compliance with such an agreement. Indeed, these concerns have been a constant preoccupation of this Committee and its predecessor body for at least a decade.

My delegation believes that the Committee can make a useful contribution in this regard and, further, that work in this area can begin now. Therefore, if a consensus can be developed to establish a subsidiary body to discuss and define issues relating to verification and compliance which would have to be dealt with in any comprehensive test-ban agreement, my delegation will join that consensus.

I believe that a serious examination of these extremely important issues, in all their aspects, in the Committee on Disarmament would be a step forward. My delegation looks forward to consulting with you, Mr. Chairman, as well as with other delegations on the establishment of such a subsidiary body and the mandate to be given to it.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States of America for his statement and am very grateful to him for the very kind words he had to say about me and the relations between the United States and my country. The next speaker on my list is the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Mihajlović.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): In its statement today, the Yugoslav delegation intended to speak at some length on the item relating to the comprehensive test ban. In part of my statement, I wished to say that we are pleased that efforts have been made on your part through informal consultations with delegations to arrive at a satisfactory solution with respect to the Committee's handling of the two priority items, items 1 and 2, of its agenda. Whatever the outcome of your consultations, and we sincerely hope that it will be fruitful, we think that the Committee should take a decision as soon as possible with respect to the implementation of United Nations General Assembly resolution 36/84, which calls for the creation by the Committee, as from the beginning of its session in 1982, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

However, what was just said, what was just stated by the distinguished representative of the United States of America -- part of which we were glad to hear -- requires that we should carefully study this proposal before speaking on the subject. I will therefore reserve the right of my delegation to speak on the issue of the comprehensive test ban at a later date.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Yugoslavia for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of China, Minister Tian Jin.

Mr. TIAN JIN (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, today I would like to state briefly some views on the question of security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States.

The provision of security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States is a universal and urgent demand of non-nuclear countries as well as an obligation of nuclear States. This is an ineluctable requirement posed by the current state of world nuclear armaments. Of over 100 countries in the world, only 5 possess nuclear weapons and 97 per cent of the total number of nuclear warheads are concentrated in the hands of the two Superpowers. The two Superpowers are stepping up the arms race, ceaselessly expanding their nuclear arsenals and contending with each other fiercely, thus posing a grave threat to world peace and the security of all States. It is therefore evident that it is incumbent upon all nuclear States to provide security assurances to non-nuclear States and that the major nuclear Powers with the largest nuclear arsenals, in particular, bear a major and unshirkable responsibility in this regard.

(Mr. Tian Jin, China)

China's position on security assurances to non-nuclear States is consistent and unequivocal. We are aware of our responsibility as a nuclear State. We have on more than one occasion affirmed that the fundamental way to eliminate the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threat is the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. But since this is not something that can be readily achieved overnight, the least the nuclear States can do is to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and nuclear-free zones.

It is important to recognize that such negative security assurances by nuclear States to non-nuclear States are a minimal obligation, not an act of charity. Non-nuclear States want unconditional rather than conditional security assurances. They have rightly pointed out that conditional assurances often require non-nuclear States to guarantee the security of nuclear States first. This is obviously putting the cart before the horse and it is only reasonable that quite a number of non-nuclear States are strongly critical of this approach.

Last year, the United Nations General Assembly, in its resolution 36/95, launched a special appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach and, in particular, on a common formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. We believe that political will is a prerequisite. The key lies in the two major nuclear Powers. Without political will, the major nuclear Powers can find all sorts of excuses to obstruct the provision of security assurances to non-nuclear States. But with political will, it will be possible to find a solution to this question.

The situation in which we find ourselves in connection with this agenda item since the opening of the present session is not encouraging. We hope that the major nuclear Powers will truly demonstrate their political will by assuming their responsibility towards non-nuclear States so that progress may be made on this question before the opening of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The delegation of China will join the representatives of other countries in continuing explorations in the search for a sound common formula which is acceptable to non-nuclear States.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of China for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, allow me to begin by congratulating you on your appointment as Chairman of this Committee. You have taken office at a key point in the approach to the second special session on disarmament and I am sure that under your wise guidance, the Committee will make most effective use of its time. It gives me great pleasure to have this opportunity to pledge you my delegation's full support. I also take this opportunity to acknowledge the contribution made as outgoing Chairman by the distinguished representative of Iran, Mr. Mahallati, whose guidance during the first month of our work laid a firm foundation for the session.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

I wish in my statement today to address two important questions before the Committee, namely, the nuclear test ban and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In my statement at the 153rd plenary meeting on 11 February, I said that my Government well understood the disappointment which existed that it had not proved possible so far to achieve a comprehensive test ban. I said also that my Government would continue to seek progress on test ban issues. This remains the case today. Since I spoke on that occasion, many delegations have devoted time in their plenary statements to this issue, always eloquently and frequently very forcefully, and the strong sentiments voiced in these speeches have been registered by my delegation. We also studied carefully the remarks made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Eugene Rostow, on 9 February.

The trilateral negotiations held here from 1977 until the autumn of 1980 clarified many of the issues involved in negotiating a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The tripartite report which was made to the Committee on Disarmament in July 1980 showed where points of agreement had been reached, but it also pointed to important areas where difficulties still existed; there remained at that time serious problems, concerned particularly with verification, which had still to be resolved before further progress could be expected.

The achievement of a comprehensive nuclear test ban remains an important goal of the British Government in the field of disarmament. The question was and still is how best to work towards that goal. Having reviewed the current situation, having studied the views expressed in the Committee and, in particular, recognizing that it is evident that, for the present, no further progress can be expected in the trilateral talks, my Government has concluded that, in addition to the expert discussions already being held, there would be advantage in holding discussions within the Committee on Disarmament which would concentrate on the key issue of verification. My Government hopes that such discussions would not only throw light on the nature of the problem, but would indicate detailed ways in which it might be resolved. My delegation therefore welcomes the statement made this morning by the distinguished representative of the United States of America that his delegation would be prepared to join in a consensus to set up a subsidiary body to consider some of the issues relating to a nuclear test ban. My delegation believes that this statement will be welcomed by all delegations as representing a significant step forward and hopes that we can proceed rapidly to reach agreement on a mandate for a working group -- or whatever other form of subsidiary body may be acceptable to the Committee -- in order that it can begin its work without delay.

a It goes without saying that my delegation will also continue to participate actively in the work of the Group of Scientific Experts in the belief that it is important to reach full agreement on the technical aspects of the detection and analysis of seismic events as they relate to the solution of the problems of verification of a nuclear test ban. We have taken note of the proposal of the distinguished representative of Sweden that the possibility of improving present

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capabilities of monitoring radioactivity in the air should also be discussed in an appropriate context under the auspices of the Committee and believe that this suggestion should be carefully considered. Work in these technical areas will be a support and contribution to the wider examination of verification and other issues which I hope we shall now be able to conduct. With respect to item 2 of our agenda, I would emphasize that my delegation remains willing to contribute fully to the discussion on nuclear matters in the Committee and would be willing, as in the past, to participate in informal meetings.

I should now like to turn to the current item on our agenda, namely, effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Much time has been given to this over the past three years and the importance which is attached to these security assurances has again been stressed in plenary statements during this session, for example, by the distinguished representatives of the Netherlands, Pakistan and Canada; my delegation has taken careful note of these statements and of the thoughtful contribution of the distinguished representative of Romania earlier this week. Moreover, a Working Group on Security Assurances has already begun its work this session under the able chairmanship of the distinguished representative of Pakistan. But, perhaps just because we have discussed this topic in such detail in the past, I believe that we should for the moment stand back and re-examine the principles which underlie our exchanges.

The reasoning behind the form of the British assurance given in 1978 was fully described in document CD/177 of 10 April last year, but I want again to emphasize that the assurance by the British Government was given because of the awareness that States which had renounced nuclear weapons had fears as to their security and, in particular, that they might be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons or might even be the object of attack with such weapons. The assurance we then gave showed that the British Government accepted that non-nuclear-weapon States were entitled to a specific assurance in this regard, even though such assurance was implicit in the British Government's long-established policy that nuclear weapons would never be used except in self-defence in extreme circumstances. The assurance given in 1978 of course remains fully in force today.

Discussion of the topic in the Committee and its Working Group now centres on the possibility of finding a "common formula" and the form and substance which a common assurance might take. As to form, my delegation is very much aware of the strong feeling on the part of many delegations that a more binding form of legal instrument than the existing voluntary assurances is required. We remain open to suggestions as to how this might be done and are willing to explore alternative possible legal forms. Last year the report of the Working Group noted that there was no objection in principle to a convention and my delegation did not disagree with this conclusion. Nevertheless, we think it would be premature to reach a decision on form before we reach an understanding on content; we should keep all our options open at this stage.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

As to substance, there are two principle questions, namely, to which States should the assurances apply and under what circumstances? My delegation continues to believe that the first question should be answered in a way which is ascertainable and easily understandable. It would of course be possible to adopt a negative formulation that the assurances apply to all States which are not recognized as nuclear-weapon States. But my delegation considers that there are strong arguments in favour of a positive definition which extends security assurances to those non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or to other internationally binding commitments not to manufacture or acquire nuclear explosive devices. Not only is this criterion readily ascertainable, but it recognizes the obligations undertaken by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty or other similar internationally binding commitments which have been supported by the great majority of the international community. Other proposals which may have the effect of excluding from the security assurances States which have renounced nuclear weapons for themselves are not acceptable to my delegation; and, as the distinguished representative of Romania pointed out earlier this week, there are serious problems of interpretation with definitions which seek to exclude from the assurances States which may be parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon States.

The second point of substance concerns the conditions under which the security assurances should apply, or might be rendered invalid. Some delegations have argued that there should be no exceptions. Other proposals have included a generalized withdrawal clause. My delegation considers that assurances should be limited only under well-defined circumstances. The United Kingdom assurance contains only one qualification, that it would cease to apply "in the case of an attack on the United Kingdom, its dependent territories, its armed forces or its allies by such a State in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State." This limitation seems to us to be justified. It does not diminish the value of our assurance in any way for States whose intentions are peaceful; moreover, the assurance would continue to apply to any State or States which actually entered into conflict with the United Kingdom, provided only that they were not allied to or associated with a nuclear-weapon State.

My delegation believes that the problems of finding a "common formula" are already well understood and I do not propose to linger over them. The "common formula" proposal put forward by the Netherlands delegation in a working paper last year was based on principles broadly acceptable to my delegation, and my delegation is glad to see that it is once again before the Working Group. But there are some marked differences between the approach adopted in that paper and in others which are before the Working Group. These differences will have to be overcome before a "common formula" is achieved. It has been suggested that many of the difficulties that face us and, in particular, those that concern negative security assurances can be resolved by political goodwill. However, as the report of the Working Group last year pointed out, our negotiations on substance revealed that "specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a 'common formula' acceptable to all". The question of negative security assurances cannot in fact be divorced from the wider issues of security in general and we must bear this in mind while continuing our search for a "common formula".

My delegation will make every contribution it can to finding an agreed basis.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation, which is acting as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries for March 1962, has taken the floor in order formally to introduce the document of the Committee on Disarmament (CD/253) entitled "Binary weapons and the problem of effective prohibition of chemical weapons". The sponsors of this document -- the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic -- have set themselves a modest but important objective: to draw the attention of the countries members of the Committee on Disarmament to the fact that the well-known decision of the United States administration concerning the large-scale development of the production of binary chemical weapons with their subsequent stationing on the territories of other States, primarily European, entails, apart from other negative consequences, substantial additional difficulties in the matter of the elaboration of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The socialist countries consider that the Committee on Disarmament -- a body in which the international community at present places great hopes with regard to the elaboration of a draft of such a convention -- cannot behave as though nothing had happened and ignore the consequences of the above-mentioned decision. That would be to close our eyes to reality. I do not wish to anticipate or prejudge the Committee's attitude, but the socialist countries for their part are firmly convinced of the need for the future convention to prohibit all chemical weapons -- both traditional and new -- and to leave no possibility for the retention of any such weapons, particularly weapons with a binary charge.

The working paper submitted by the socialist countries does not by any means list all but only some of the difficulties with which the participants in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons will be faced in the light of the prospect of the production of binary weapons. The questions prepared by the Bulgarian delegation in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons spell out some additional aspects of the problem. Other delegations, too, no doubt, will have questions and comments in this connection. It is important to look into all this. And if we want the negotiations to be successful, we should do this within the Working Group in a businesslike manner, calmly, neither dramatizing the situation nor simplifying it. It is the duty of all of us to proceed in this way.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the Soviet Union for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, the Committee this week focuses on the question of so-called negative security assurances. I should therefore like to take this opportunity to offer a few general remarks on this topic and to state some views which my Government considers essential in this context. The Swedish position on this issue was outlined in great detail in my statement before this Committee on 16 April last year. I shall, therefore, be comparatively brief.

Let me first recall that the countries which have forsworn nuclear weapons have a legitimate right to expect legally binding assurances from the nuclear-weapon Powers not to be threatened or attacked with nuclear weapons. This has been recognized by all the nuclear-weapon States and has been laid down in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (paragraph 59).

The second special session is now approaching. It will provide an opportunity to review developments in the field of nuclear disarmament since the first special session. So far, there is virtually no progress in this field, as we all know. The most glaring of these shortcomings, in the view of my delegation, is the failure to agree even on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban in this Committee. I want however to express the great interest my delegation attaches to the statements made this morning by the distinguished representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States. We shall study them carefully. My comment on them today is of course only of a very preliminary character. If there is basic agreement that the goal is to create a comprehensive or a complete nuclear test ban, naturally, the questions of verification and compliance are the ones which will require the most consideration in the negotiations. Therefore, maybe, with further efforts, a mutually acceptable solution to the problem can be found in a not too distant future. This we would very much welcome. The continued lack of progress as far as negative security assurances are concerned continues, however, to add to the feeling of general failure on nuclear disarmament.

True, there is no complete assurance as long as nuclear weapons exist and no guarantees can replace nuclear disarmament. It is, however, a source of deep disappointment to my country and no doubt, also to the other non-nuclear-weapon States, which are entitled to adequate assurances, that no progress has been made. In the statement of 16 April 1961 to which I just referred, I emphasized that we, for our part, understood the intentions behind the existing unilateral declarations to be that States non-parties to nuclear security arrangements should permanently enjoy freedom from being the subject of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On the same occasion, I stated that Sweden considers itself covered, without any exceptions, by the unilateral assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, in so far as they relate to individual non-nuclear-weapon States. My Government has taken note of the fact that none of the nuclear-weapon States has contradicted this interpretation.

It is, however, not only our own security situation in a region of the world where the nuclear threat seems most imminent that worries us. Many non-nuclear-weapon States have referred to the relationship between the attitudes of the nuclear-weapon States and the risks of horizontal nuclear proliferation. This should be an important aspect for all of us. In that perspective, it is in the interest not only of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but also of the nuclear-weapon States themselves, to give generally acceptable guarantees without further delay.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The Swedish position on the contents and form of negative security assurances were outlined in detail before the Committee last year. My statement then still reflects the views of my Government. Let me, therefore, limit myself to repeating that Sweden would indeed have objections to a convention which would make new demands on those countries which have committed themselves to a non-nuclear status, for instance by becoming Parties to the NPT. As a consequence of fundamental features of Sweden's policy of neutrality, we would furthermore find it difficult to enter into a bilateral agreement with any nuclear-weapon Power on this issue.

As the present assurances given by the nuclear-weapon Powers are in many respects unsatisfactory, they must be improved in substance. It is also important that they be given in a form so that they cannot be changed or repealed at short notice. This is one of the problems with the existing unilateral declarations. One possibility would be to record the assurances in a resolution by the Security Council of the United Nations. It might also be useful to consider this as an interim measure. It should, however, be made absolutely clear that such a measure cannot be regarded as a substitute for the final objective, namely, to agree on arrangements satisfactory to all States.

It is now time for the nuclear-weapon Powers to act. We know that, in present circumstances, one cannot realistically expect much in terms of agreements between them. They must, however, make a determined effort to improve their present formulas, taking the legitimate interests of the non-nuclear Powers into account in a much more direct way than has been the case so far. They will thereby serve not only the interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States, but their own interests as well. The newly re-established Ad Hoc Working Group under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad provides a forum for negotiations on this matter. A good basis for its work has been provided in General Assembly resolution 36/95, which was adopted by 145 votes to none, with only 3 abstentions. It is the hope of my delegation that the nuclear-weapon Powers will not miss the opportunity of taking the many valuable comments and suggestions made in the Working Group into account in reconsidering their various positions. It is imperative that progress be made before the forthcoming second special session.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden. I have no other speakers on my list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? The representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, has asked for the floor.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): I have asked for the floor in order to give my delegation's preliminary reactions to the statements made today by the distinguished

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom. While clearly we are not entirely satisfied with their response to the justifiable demand of other members for the establishment of working groups under items 1 and 2, we can also not fail to note that there has been a positive change in their attitude toward the manner in which the Committee on Disarmament may discharge its responsibilities under items 1 and 2. We feel that the Committee on Disarmament should take advantage of this change and see what progress we can make during the current session on this vital issue. In saying this, we are aware of the allergy of the two delegations to the word "negotiations". We do not of course share their allergy, but we feel we should take advantage of any course of action, such as discussion or exchange of views on any aspect of items 1 and 2, if it would show promise of leading us towards negotiations on actual texts of treaties. This remains to be seen, of course, and we should not delay the setting up of a working group under item 1. In a manner of speaking, my delegation believes that we should begin to work when the trilateral negotiations end, carry forward the discussions as far as possible and make a report to the second special session on disarmament. My delegation is willing to participate in consultations on an appropriate mandate for such a group which would naturally include consideration of questions relating to verification. As regards item 2, we would again urge the immediate setting up of a working group for the modest purpose of embarking on such discussion, on questions such as those contained in document CD/180 of the Group of 21 and document CD/193 of the group of socialist countries. Unless we proceed in this manner, we shall have little progress to report to the second special session on disarmament. We regard the statements made by the United States of America and the United Kingdom as providing an important opening which we should make use of in the limited time available to us. I earnestly trust that the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom will, for their part, keep responding positively.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of India for his statement. Would any other delegation like to take the floor? If not, I would now like to go on to another matter.

At the request of the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, a proposal has been submitted to us in Working Paper No. 57. This draft relates to an invitation to the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme to nominate representatives to attend certain meetings of the Working Group. You will recall that a similar decision was taken last year by the Committee at its one hundred and thirty-seventh plenary meeting. This text was considered and agreed on by the Working Group at its meeting yesterday afternoon. I now submit it for the Committee's approval.

The representative of Argentina has asked for the floor.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Although my statement will be very brief, I cannot fail to express satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee during the current month and to pledge to you the fullest co-operation of the delegation of Argentina, while at the same time expressing my delegation's appreciation to the Ambassador of Iran for the brilliant manner in which he guided the work of this Committee last month.

My delegation wishes to state that it agrees with the draft decision which was submitted to this Committee by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and which, as you will recall, is similar to that adopted by the Committee last year on the same question. I wish to place on record the fact that my delegation agrees with this text because it takes account of some of the concerns which my delegation had occasion to express last year on this subject. In the first place, the draft decision states that the co-operation requested from the two entities mentioned involves "providing technical information" and I stress the words "technical information", which are in conformity with rule 41 of this Committee's Rules of Procedure. In other words, the purpose of the invitation to those entities is not for them to give opinions or advice in general, but, rather, technical information, and on points specifically mentioned, as is the case in the draft decision now under consideration. Similarly, the invitation addressed to those two entities refers to attendance by their representatives at certain meetings, i.e. at a limited number, perhaps only one; with a view to providing the technical information requested. The invitation will not therefore result in permanent, or almost permanent, attendance by representatives of international organs at the Working Group's discussions; this, on grounds of principle which have nothing to do with the two particular entities mentioned in this draft decision, namely, the World Health Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme, for which the delegation of Argentina has the greatest respect. The principle at issue, which my delegation is anxious to preserve and which is preserved in the draft decision under consideration, is the principle that international organs, whichever they may be, must not be directly or indirectly associated with the process of negotiation on disarmament questions, which is a matter exclusively for sovereign States. This is the principle which my delegation wishes to protect and which, as I have said, is taken into account in the draft decision under consideration; for that reason, my delegation supports this draft.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Carasales for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I am sure that the Committee has duly taken note of his comments concerning Working Paper No. 57 and the decision which the Committee is now called upon to approve.

The representative of the United States has asked for the floor.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I would like to propose formally that the draft decision be amended to include a reference to the International Atomic Energy Agency along the following lines: following the words "United Nations Environment Programme", my proposed amendment would insert the words "Director-General of IAEA" and then, further down, in the matter "of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons as well as consultations convened by its Chairman on toxicity determinations", I would substitute the words "on technical matters" for the words "on toxicity determinations" and then make appropriate adjustments to the end of that sentence by striking out the word "to" before the word "organizations" and ending the sentence with a full stop after the word "organizations". My rationale for this proposed amendment is as follows: the Committee will recall that, during the informal consultations with chemical weapons experts held by Ambassador Lidgard last summer (document CD/CW/WP.22/Rev.1), a presentation was made to the Group by the United States delegation concerning a system for remote continual verification, known by the acronym RECOVER. A number of delegations expressed interest in learning more about this concept. It is being developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in conjunction with its nuclear safeguards programme and a demonstration project is currently underway. My delegation and others have been very interested in the possibilities of remote continual verification and its possible application to CW verification problems. On behalf of interested delegations, I intend to request that time be allocated during the expert session next week for further informal discussions on this possibility. It would therefore seem appropriate to request that IAEA be invited to send a technical expert to participate in the appropriate session of the informal consultations for the purpose of providing technical information with respect to the work of IAEA in the field of remote continual verification and its possible application to a CW prohibition. In this regard, I think the same criteria would apply that have just been alluded to by the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina: this participation is only for the purpose of aiding the Working Group and the Committee in a derivative sense, concerning particular technical matters. It should be related solely to technical information without recognition of anything more than this contribution by technical experts from that body who have unique qualifications and expertise in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States for his statement. Before I give the floor to the representative of India, who has asked for it, I would like to request Ambassador Fields kindly to repeat his proposed amendments to the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I was apparently working from an earlier draft and therefore would merely add to this the phrase concerning the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The other amendment which I proposed would not be necessary as Working Paper No. 57 seems to have cured any problems that may have arisen in that regard.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States, who has proposed that, in the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57, the words "and the Director-General of IAEA" should be added immediately after the words "the regional office for Europe of the United Nations Environment Programme". The representative of India has asked for the floor in this connection.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): We have heard with interest the proposal made by the distinguished representative of the United States. But, as I recall, last year we went into this subject in some detail and the new proposal regarding the inclusion of experts from IAEA will have to be considered, by my delegation at least, most carefully. If I may therefore appeal to the representative of the United States through you, I would suggest that the existing draft decision may perhaps proceed and that we could, if necessary, prepare a subsequent draft decision inviting experts from IAEA after we have had more time to consider this particular question.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has also listened with great interest to the proposal made by the Ambassador of the United States, but, as the Ambassador of India stated a moment ago, we consider that the Committee now has before it a draft decision which was discussed and proposed by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons and which involves a request for technical information from two entities with regard to two specific points, namely, the establishment of toxicities of chemicals and the international register of potentially toxic chemicals. As I understood the Ambassador of the United States, his suggestion has a different purpose, namely, to invite the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to send a representative to provide technical information on a point that may be described as the mode of operation of the RECOVER system at present underway on an experimental basis within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in co-operation with seven countries possessing installations with which the RECOVER system can be used. In other words, the subject is a different one and, in my opinion, it would therefore be preferable to separate the two questions by taking different decisions: we would approve the draft decision now under consideration if there is a consensus on it and we would then draft another decision, perhaps within the framework of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, which is the body that will ultimately have to make recommendations to the Committee on this matter. In this connection, I would like to state that my delegation will consider the matter in the same spirit in which it has approached this draft decision. On that basis, I urge the Ambassador of the United States to consider this possibility.

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I am fully prepared to consult with the delegations concerned on this matter and to see whether we cannot make some accommodation. As the matter was presented to my delegation only this morning, we have not had the time to consider it in detail here. However, we are certainly prepared to enter into discussions with the other interested delegations or to participate in a discussion on this matter within the Working Group. We would prefer that the decision await those consultations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of the United States and would like to ask the Committee whether, in its opinion, it would be possible to solve this problem through rapid consultations between the delegations directly concerned. In this connection, I note that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons is to hold informal consultations tomorrow morning and that its next formal meeting is on Monday morning. It would thus be possible for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons to reconsider the matter and, on the basis of the outcome of the consultations, to make possible new proposals at the beginning of next week with a view to solving this problem. Are there any objections to this way of proceeding?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): At my request, the secretariat distributed today an informal document containing the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week. As usual, this time-table is only indicative and it may, if necessary, be adjusted later according to the requirements of our work.

The representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, has asked for the floor and I give it to him.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, since you talked about the future consultations with the Working Group, I was persuaded that this meant that you are going in the direction of the motion made by the delegation of India, supported by Argentina, that we adopt this decision as it has been drafted by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and that the additional invitation should be the subject of other consultations. However, my neighbours have a different interpretation of your decision. I would therefore like to clarify the situation because the work of the experts begins on Monday and appropriate letters should be sent to the organizations which are mentioned in Working Paper No. 57, so as not to delay our work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Sujka. The decision we have just taken was in line with the suggestion I made to the Committee, i.e. that, if there were no objections, the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 would be submitted to consultations which I myself would like to be rapid and which could be completed in a very short time so that there would be no unreasonable delay in our work and our hearing of the representatives of WHO and the United Nations Environment Programme. It was on that basis that I considered that agreement had been reached in the Committee and, therefore, that the decision should cover all the problems at hand and it was on that basis that I announced it.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, the matter of concern to me is the same as that stressed by the Ambassador of Poland. It was my understanding that what was going to be postponed was only the question of the suggestion made by the United States that the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency should be invited to send a representative for the purpose already mentioned and that this was what was going to be the subject of consultations. It was my understanding that there was no objection to the adoption of this draft decision, on which agreement exists and which refers to a different matter, since the date of the meeting of chemical weapons experts is very close at hand and time might be lost if we delay the sending of notes to these two entities, namely the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Health Organization, a question on which a consensus has been reached. Moreover, my delegation has stated that it prefers to see these two questions dealt with in two separate decisions.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, frankly speaking, the Soviet delegation, too, understood your decision as implying approval of the draft decision in Working Paper No. 57. In fact, a general agreement was reached in the Working Group yesterday and, as I understand it, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons has submitted a recommendation. So far as I know, no one in the Working Group on Chemical Weapons objected to that recommendation. It seems to me, therefore, that the course to take is the one we have always followed, namely: questions are considered by the Working Group; the

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Working Group recommends a decision to the Committee, and the Committee adopts that decision. I would be in favour of our adopting a decision on this question, leaving the new proposal that was made today to be considered separately. In any event, these are two different issues, and an invitation to experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency is quite unconnected with the work of the Group of Experts on toxicities of chemicals.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I am sorry if the way in which I presented the decision has given rise to different interpretations. I must put myself in the Committee's hands on this matter; and I think I can say that the amendment proposed by the distinguished representative of the United States does not have the Committee's full agreement. Some delegations would like it to be dealt with in a separate decision. I would like to ask whether there is a consensus that the text of the draft decision contained in Working Paper No. 57 can be accepted in the form in which it was transmitted to us by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons?

Mr. FIELDS (United States of America): I have listened to the concerns expressed here and I cannot myself distinguish the difficulty that people are having. The two organizations mentioned in this decision are both located here in Geneva, whereas IAEA is in Vienna and so the question of timing about an invitation and the arrival of appropriate technical experts would seem to me to be more keen in the direction of my amendment to this draft decision. We have sought to amend the paper through the Chairman of the Working Group, but that did not appear appropriate. I therefore think that we are perfectly sound in suggesting that this go back to the Working Group, where we shall have an opportunity to debate the respective merits of these proposals and then present the Committee with something on which we can agree.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Fields. I note from his statement that there is no consensus on the immediate adoption of the text of the decision contained in Working Paper No. 57. I therefore suggest that the matter might be taken up again as soon as possible at one of the forthcoming meetings, after consultations and a possible new decision by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

I come back to the question of the time-table of meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the coming week and, in this connection, the representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, has asked for the floor.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I have asked for the floor merely, with your permission, to make a brief announcement to prevent any mistaken interpretations. On Monday, 15 March, at 3 p.m., it will still not be possible for the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to meet. There will, rather, as during this past week, be a meeting of the contact group in the usual room, Meeting Room No. I.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Garcia Robles for his clarification; the time-table will be amended accordingly. I therefore take it that the draft time-table for the coming week is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I would like to inform representatives about possible dates for the Committee's informal meetings on item 7 of its agenda, "Prevention of the arms race in outer space". My concern is to ensure that delegations which would like to take part in the exchange of views on this new item on our agenda have enough time to prepare their contributions. I therefore suggest Friday, 26 March, at 3 p.m. and Tuesday, 30 March, at 3 p.m. These dates seem convenient, in view of all the work the Committee has to do. I suggest that you should consider the possibility of agreeing to these dates so that we can take a decision in this connection when we adopt the time-table for next week or earlier, if possible.

You will also recall that, in this week's time-table, we tentatively planned to hold an informal meeting tomorrow afternoon, Friday, at 3 p.m. Today, we have heard statements in the plenary meeting, particularly the statements by the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom, who have introduced new elements whose importance for the Committee's work on items 1 and 2 of the agenda cannot be underestimated. I intend to continue, with all due urgency, the informal consultations that I have been holding since the beginning of this week, taking account of these new elements. Accordingly and bearing in mind the legitimate desire of delegations to have some time for reflection, I tend to think that the informal meeting which we had planned in principle for tomorrow afternoon could be more usefully held during next week when the Chairman's consultations have been completed, thus giving delegations time to reflect and to consult.

If there is no objection, we might therefore cancel, for the time being, tomorrow's informal meeting and postpone it until next week, if possible.

I would like to make an announcement: the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will meet here tomorrow at noon. If there is no other matter for discussion, the next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Tuesday, 16 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.