

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-FIRST PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 9 March 1982, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mario ALBESSI

(Italy)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. D.M. SADLEIR  
Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Miss de CLERQ

Brazil: Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. A.R. MENZIES  
Mr. G.R. SKINNER  
Mr. P. BASHAM

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO

Cuba: Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de LA GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. J. MOEPERT  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVLS  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. N. SUTRESNA  
Mr. I. DAMANIK  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. C.M. OLIVA  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. L. BAYART  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHALLI  
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM  
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. B. RUSSIN

Romania: Mr. M. MALITZA  
Mr. T. MELESCANU  
Mr. M.J. DOGARU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD  
Mr. C.M. HYLTEINIUS  
Mr. H. BERGLUND  
Mr. G. EKHOLM  
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN  
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV  
Mr. V.M. GANJA  
Mr. V.A. EVDOKOUSHIN  
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV  
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES  
Mr. L.J. MIDDLETON  
Mrs. J.I. LIHK

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS  
Mr. M. BUSBY  
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER  
Mr. J. MARTIN  
Mr. J. MISKEL  
Mr. R.F. SCOTT  
Mr. P.S. CORDEN  
Mr. R. MIKULAK

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO  
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC  
Mr. H. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Ms. ESAKA EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal  
Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the one hundred and sixty-first plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Today the Committee begins its consideration of item 3 of its agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". However, members who would like to make statements on any other matter relevant to the Committee's work are free to do so, in accordance with rule 30 of the Rules of Procedure.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of Bulgaria, Romania, Nigeria and Sweden.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Tellalov.

Mr. TELLALOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you warmly on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of March and to register our appreciation of the work done by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati of Iran.

My delegation followed closely the discussion on item 1 and item 2 of our agenda: nuclear test ban and cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. After nearly three weeks of deliberations, it would be only precise to note, that due to the negative, indeed obstructive, attitude of certain delegations, the Committee has been impeded from initiating negotiations. I would like to associate my delegation with the overwhelming disappointment with the results of the consideration of the two highest priority items on our agenda, which are in the focus of the international community. Throughout the globe, literally hundreds of thousands of ordinary people have spontaneously rallied in support of measures to prevent nuclear war, to stop nuclear weapon testing and for nuclear disarmament.

It is the conviction of my delegation that, under the circumstances, we, as Government representatives, have the right and the duty to weigh the implications of this situation in a broader political context and to attribute the responsibility in a clear-cut manner.

We were particularly alarmed by the intervention of the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Rostow. We are told that "a complete cessation of nuclear explosions must be related to the ability of the Western nations to maintain credible deterrent forces". To our delegation, as to many others, this statement sounds like an excuse put forward to block the start of negotiations on a CTBT in the Committee.

There is no denying the fact that nuclear weapon testing remains in the front line of the arms race. While a CTBT is presented to the Committee as a "long-term aim", the world is being kept hostage to the fierce competition among the United States nuclear weapon laboratories in creating a whole line of deadly products needed for "first strike", "limited nuclear war" and other absurd projections that could detonate a global nuclear catastrophe, so eloquently described by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles.

On the other hand, the Soviet delegation, while reiterating its readiness for an immediate resumption of the trilateral negotiations, presented to the Committee

(Mr. Tellalov, Bulgaria)

its positions on the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and stated its favourable approach to the utilization of the possibilities of the Committee on Disarmament for multilateral negotiations leading to the conclusion of such a treaty. Our delegation looks forward to more comments of other delegations, including those of the nuclear-weapon States, on the statement made on 18 February by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic proposed draft mandates for ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 which are another practical step on the part of the socialist countries to find a solution to the urgent necessity of starting meaningful negotiations.

Several socialist countries, among them Bulgaria, are taking an active part in the Group of Scientific Experts on Seismic Events. At the same time, it is clear to all of us that the proposals to concentrate the attention of the Committee on the administrative, legal and financial aspects of an international data exchange system and other "limited steps" make sense only in close connection with the elaboration of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse. As pointed out in document CD/209 introduced by the delegation of India, "There can be no merit, either in sterile and abstract discussions of the complexities of verification issues, kinds of verification régimes, or in stressing the need for some kind of international verification organization, without reference to any concrete measure of real disarmament or serious arms limitations".

In connection with item 2 of the agenda, we have noted the wide convergence of opinion in favour of starting without delay negotiations in an appropriate subsidiary body of the Committee on halting and reversing the nuclear arms race in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We are deeply convinced that the most concrete step that the Committee can take in this direction is the beginning of negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons of all types and on their gradual reduction and final elimination. It is indeed regrettable that the Committee has failed so far to even begin consultations to prepare the ground for such negotiations.

In view of the explicit reluctance of a well-known limited number of delegations to endorse the creation of working groups and the initiation of negotiations on items 1 and 2, a new priority arises, namely, the consideration of the question of ensuring the prevention of nuclear war. This is a problem directly connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The delegations of Sweden, Brazil, Mexico, Yugoslavia and other countries have already stressed the importance of this question.

The Bulgarian people and Government are deeply convinced that today there is no more urgent task than that of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war and solving the problems of the nuclear arms race. There is no doubt that this will be one of the major issues at the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It is in this connection and from the point of view of an actual contribution to the beginning of negotiations on nuclear disarmament that one should examine the positions and the attitude of any State -- nuclear or non-nuclear -- towards the vital issue of securing the prevention of nuclear war. This is how we see the meaning of resolution 36/81 B, adopted by consensus at the last session of the General Assembly on the initiative of the non-aligned countries.

(Mr. Tellaov, Bulgaria)

In light of the serious setback we are faced with in relation to the most important items on our agenda, we note with satisfaction the adoption of the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for the start of consultations under your leadership. My delegation is ready to support any meaningful idea that may come out of these consultations.

According to our programme of work, this week is dedicated mainly to item 3 of our agenda, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". Permit me, while I have the floor, to dwell briefly on this subject.

The interest my delegation takes in this question is well-known and I do not want to go over our position once again, particularly because it is closely connected with the views I have just stated on the problems of nuclear disarmament.

We have noted with satisfaction the consensus on the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan. This step is in conformity with General Assembly resolutions 36/94 and 36/95.

The conclusion of an international convention remains the goal of the majority of the member States of this Committee and of the international community as a whole. The formula of guarantees proposed by the Soviet Union has widely acknowledged merits. We welcome the renewed pledges of the Soviet Union, made at the highest political level, concerning the guarantees for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States that do not have nuclear weapons on their territories. Here I have in mind the letters of President Brezhnev in response to the appeals of concerned groups and organizations in Japan and Australia.

As to the main direction of our efforts in this field, we believe that we should concentrate mainly on those aspects of the problem whose solution could enable us to achieve some meaningful steps forward, especially in the search for a common approach acceptable to all, the content and the character of the arrangements, the possibilities and parameters of interim arrangements, etc. The adoption of an interim measure of any kind would, however, not eliminate the need for an international convention or other appropriate international arrangements of a legally binding nature.

Along with all this, we should take into account other relevant and significant developments which are directly connected with the non-use of nuclear weapons and are thus aimed at solving the problem of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, such as General Assembly resolutions 36/100, 36/81 E and 36/92 I. Accordingly, we would like to stress the importance of the "Declaration on the prevention of nuclear catastrophe", the main points of which should be taken into consideration when examining different aspects of elaborating effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

It is our conviction that the members of the Committee and, first of all, the nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate a spirit of constructiveness if we are to elaborate an international convention, which will go a long way towards strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.



The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Romania, Ambassador Malitza.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my statement today is concerned with the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The fact that discussions on this topic have been going on for two decades makes it very difficult to introduce any new ideas at the present stage of the negotiations. Nevertheless, there is one factor which the Romanian delegation would like to underline with all due force, namely, the rapid increase in the danger of the use of nuclear weapons as a result of the tension evident today in the international sphere and the entry into a new stage in the nuclear arms race.

In this Committee, we discuss many matters related to international security, all of them extremely important. But can there conceivably be any greater source of insecurity for a small or medium-sized country than the possibility of being completely destroyed if someone merely presses a button controlling a nuclear-weapon system?

It is a well-known fact that, in addition to nuclear weapons, there are nuclear strategies represented by nuclear maps on which nuclear-weapon targets are plotted. Different colours for different scenarios indicate with astonishing simplicity acts fraught with tremendous consequences for the existence of entire nations and, first and foremost, the allies of the nuclear powers. These things are secret, but politicians and the general public have found out about them. This explains why there is today a current of unprecedented intensity whose purpose is very simple: nations do not wish to be the theatre of nuclear war; public opinion no longer wants to be an actual, potential or even alternative target for nuclear strikes.

The non-nuclear-weapon countries' insistence on being given security assurances going as far as the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is therefore just, logical and realistic. As was pointed out by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, "It is the legitimate right of every State renouncing nuclear weapons to have the assurance that no one will encroach upon its national independence and sovereignty".

In last year's report of the Committee on Disarmament, it was recognized that there was an urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons while bearing particularly in mind the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

The negotiations on the substance of arrangements aimed at outlining a common approach acceptable to all and suitable for incorporation in an international instrument of a legally binding character have shown that there are difficulties which will have to be overcome this year by the Working Group presided over by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Mansour Ahmad.

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

In the view of the Romanian delegation, the questions to be solved by the Working Group in its search for a "common formula" for inclusion in an international instrument are the following:

1. States covered by the assurances. - The very essence of security assurances is the undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons and force in general against the non-nuclear-weapon States. The Romanian delegation is therefore of the opinion that all non-nuclear-weapon States should be given such assurances. Nevertheless, in the course of our discussions of this question, a number of qualifications have been put forward by various delegations and I would like to comment briefly on them:

(a) The undertaking by the non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain from producing or receiving such weapons or acquiring control over them. Such a qualification may require either the participation of States in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or other instruments, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, or solemn declarations by States not parties to such international instruments;

(b) The stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. Although it reduces the number of States which will benefit from the assurances, this qualification is objective in character. If a non-nuclear-weapon State considers that its security is better guaranteed by the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, it can act accordingly.

(c) Non-participation in nuclear security arrangements concluded by certain nuclear-weapon States. At the present stage of our negotiations, this qualification raises problems of interpretation which make its practical application extremely difficult.

2. The content of the assurance or the substance of the commitment. Since 1965, the Romanian delegation has maintained that the nuclear-weapon States should undertake never under any circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or force in general against the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Consequently, our position is that no exception or saving clause is acceptable as part of such an obligation. In our discussions, the condition that the non-nuclear-weapon States will not carry out or participate in an attack against the territory or the armed forces of a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of another nuclear-weapon State has, of course, been laid down and backed up by arguments whose sincerity and practical importance for their authors we do not challenge. Such an exception would, however, introduce a subjective element in favour of the nuclear Powers that would virtually negate the security assurances. We are, moreover, supposed to be negotiating measures to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, not specifying, by means of exceptions, the cases in which nuclear weapons may be

(Mr. Malitza, Romania)

used. Such an approach is contrary to the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Weapons adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 24 November 1961. The fact that we find such an exception unacceptable does not mean that we are unaware of the concerns of the States which have put forward proposals on this subject. But the solution should, rather, be sought by way of a formula allowing for withdrawal from a commitment in the event of exceptional circumstances imperilling the highest national interests.

3. The legal form of the arrangements. It is quite obvious that, if they are to have any practical significance, security assurances must be of a legally binding character. The Romanian delegation considers that in this respect the best solution would be the conclusion of an international convention. While there has been no basic objection, during our discussions, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved have been stressed and the possibility has been studied of interim arrangements, such as a General Assembly resolution, a Security Council resolution or new unilateral declarations by the nuclear-weapon States. I would like to assure you that the Romanian delegation is open to the idea of an interim arrangement as a first step towards the conclusion of an international convention. I should also point out that in my delegation's view, this type of solution would imply that such an interim undertaking would be regarded as a first step along the road to the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances whatever, and that the nuclear-weapon States would undertake to implement as rapidly as possible effective measures for nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of such weapons.

These are the few observations my delegation wanted to make at this stage in our work. Let me stress once again that, in view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is urgently necessary to achieve tangible results in this field. The Committee cannot ignore the fact that the non-nuclear weapon States are determined to escape from the domination of armaments and the danger of their use, as is more than clearly shown by the growing number of proposals for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. My country supports these proposals since it regards the establishment of denuclearized zones as a positive step in the direction of the elimination of nuclear weapons and as a promise of a world without the nightmare of nuclear war. That great monument to patience, foresight and legal precision -- the Treaty of Tlatelolco -- is a constant source of encouragement and a proof of the possibility of carrying out such measures. In this connection, the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Balkans is a matter of special interest to us. As in the past, Romania consistently supports any initiative taken in this direction and is ready to make its own practical contribution to such a project.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Romania for his statement. I now give the floor to the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Ijewere.

Mr. IJEWERE (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, allow me at the outset to convey the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee for the month of March. The warm and very cordial relations that our two countries have enjoyed over the years and the strong commitment to the cause of peace have again been demonstrated in the recently concluded successful visit of His Holiness Pope John Paul II to my country. To us, the papacy is a symbol of peace and disarmament. We are confident that, under your able guidance, this Committee will make significant progress during this crucial month. I pledge to you the full co-operation of my delegation. My delegation would also like to express its appreciation to Ambassador Jafar Mahallati of Iran for the able manner in which he guided the commencement of this year's session of the Committee.

My statement today will be devoted to item 2 of the Committee's annual agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". My delegation is one of those that still believe that this subject is of the highest priority on the agenda of the Committee and this view is also shared by the international community, which, at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the item, namely, General Assembly resolutions 36/92 E and 36/92 F. Both resolutions called not only for multilateral negotiations on the items, but also specifically urged the establishment of an ad hoc working group early in the current session.

At our 158th plenary meeting held on 25 February 1982, I had occasion to register once again my delegation's regret and total dissatisfaction that, to date, the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum, had not been able to undertake concrete negotiations on a nuclear test ban and that it had not even taken the first step towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race. On that occasion, I concluded that failure to undertake such multilateral negotiations in the Committee could lead to serious consequences and that those nuclear-weapon States that have not seen their way to agreeing with the rest of us would bear the responsibility.

At our plenary meeting on Thursday, 4 March 1982, the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, gave a moving on-the-spot account of a nuclear holocaust. In the view of my delegation, his exposition was an adequate scenario of an apocalypse. The young war poets of World War I did stress the horror and pity of war, but certainly a nuclear war begs description and can rightly be cited as a crime against humanity. The proponents of competitiveness and superiority in the arms race need to look beyond their parochial security interests and give further consideration to the universality and broader perceptions of security. It is in this context that the need for the "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" becomes imperative.

Nuclear disarmament becomes imperative when one recalls the numerous statements that we have heard in this Committee during the last month. These statements have clearly testified to the fact that we are living in times of strained international relations. The continued escalation of the arms race and the increasing danger of a nuclear war call for a large measure of sanity and reflection on the part of those whom Providence has made trustees of the future

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

of mankind. This is not the time for inaction and my delegation holds the view that the Committee on Disarmament can, through multilateral negotiations, play a vital role in lessening international tension. A major ingredient for success in the Committee is flexibility (or what some have termed "goodwill") on the part of delegations, especially those of nuclear-weapon States. But is this "goodwill" forthcoming even from those that preach it in this Committee?

It is important that, in all negotiations conducted in this negotiating forum, all delegations should bear in mind paragraph 2 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which reminds us that:

"Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind".

These are very chilling words which were adopted by consensus in 1978. For three years now, the Committee has, in varying degrees, been considering item 2. The time is now more than ripe to consider the item in depth and make concrete progress.

At its 1981 session, a detailed examination was undertaken of the prerequisites for negotiations on nuclear disarmament, including the so-called doctrines of deterrence, balance and parity. While the majority of the members of the Committee were prepared for serious negotiations, two delegations deliberately refused to join the consensus in the Committee to establish an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. My delegation has consistently rejected the idea that security should be based on higher and higher levels of armaments, especially when such assertions are compounded by theories of flexible response, limited war and survivable nuclear war. The latest manifestation of that view that seeks security through greater and greater quantities of nuclear weapons was stated in this Committee barely five weeks ago, namely, that there should be "equal deterrence in order that no side would brandish nuclear weapons as an instrument of aggression or political coercion".

In the view of my delegation, only nuclear disarmament can really ensure equal deterrence. We believe that the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the States that possess those weapons of high destructive and over-kill capacity, the greater the risk of a nuclear war, either by deliberate calculation or by accident. I therefore seize this opportunity to refer to General Assembly resolution 36/81 B which is entitled "Prevention of nuclear war" and urges the nuclear-weapon States to submit views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war to the Secretary-General by April 1982. As a co-sponsor of that resolution, my delegation hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will, with all sense of responsibility and genuine security concerns, respond objectively to this call because my delegation firmly holds the view that a nuclear war will affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike.

(Mr. Ijewere, Nigeria)

In previous interventions, we had cause to remind the nuclear-weapon States of their special responsibility and obligation to undertake nuclear disarmament. As a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, my country attaches great importance and significance to article VI whereby:

"Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

My delegation is of the opinion that the two most important phrases in this article are "negotiations in good faith" and "an early date". They both underline the obligation which was assumed by the nuclear-weapon States and which, regrettably, they have been unable to discharge. Document CD/180 contains substantive proposals by the Group of 21 which could provide a firm basis for negotiations. While my delegation welcomes constructive proposals on how best to move forward, it is hoped that those nuclear-weapon States which have so far withheld their consensus will soon be able to agree to the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

At this juncture, my delegation would like to clarify once more its position with regard to the so-called nuclear neutron weapon. While we welcome the proposal that these inhumane weapons be prohibited, we reiterate what we stated in plenary on 21 August 1981, namely, that such a prohibition should be in the over-all package and context of the achievement of nuclear disarmament, which requires urgent negotiations of agreements at appropriate stages, particularly the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems. My delegation therefore sees the development of the neutron weapon in the context of the irrational race for armaments — a situation which underlines the urgent necessity of establishing an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

My delegation firmly believes, contrary to some views, that there is an arms race. It is an irrational race, fuelled by the presumed superiority perceptions of the two sides. The nuclear-weapon States are also, in my delegation's view, captives of an uncontrollable technological advance where competition is aimed at achieving an impossible end.

As we approach the second special session, the nuclear-weapon States cannot be insensitive to the cries of the international community outside this Committee. My delegation agrees with paragraph 520 of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons that "So long as reliance continues to be placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method for maintaining peace, the prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing and as uncertain as the fragile assumptions upon which they are based".

With the present impasse in the Committee on the establishment of an ad hoc working group to initiate substantive negotiations on the top priority questions, my delegation is ready to go along with the proposal by the German Democratic Republic for informal consultations as a way of finding solutions, but we do believe that such consultations are not and should not become substitutes for negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Nigeria for his statement, for the kind and friendly words he addressed to me and for his reference to the cordial relations enjoyed by Nigeria and Italy. I now give the floor to the last speaker on my list for today, the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for this month, a function which I am confident you will carry out with skill and efficiency, I wish to assure you of my delegation's full co-operation. At the same time I want to express to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Mahallati, our great appreciation of the efforts he made during his chairmanship to give the Committee a good start at this year's session.

I have the honour to introduce today the working paper contained in document CD/257, which has been distributed this morning and which is entitled "An international system for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions".

This working paper should be seen as an effort on the part of my delegation further to prepare the ground for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. The Swedish delegation deeply regrets the lack of consensus so far on the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the Committee on the negotiation of a CTBT. This must, however, not paralyse our efforts to prepare ourselves for the many difficult issues such a negotiation will no doubt entail.

A great deal of valuable work is being carried out in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. However, seismic methods apply primarily to underground tests. It would therefore, in our view, be useful at this stage to take up also other aspects of the verification of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, namely, the monitoring of airborne radioactivity.

The working paper proposes that the Committee on Disarmament should consider questions relating to the establishment of an international data exchange for the detection of airborne radioactivity from nuclear explosions. Such an international exchange would be complementary to a system for the international exchange of seismic data, as elaborated in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. The techniques for collecting and analysing radioactive substances are well advanced and a number of stations in at least 30 countries all over the world are already monitoring the atmosphere. The costs of establishing the new stations which may be required for a satisfactory coverage of the globe are likely to be modest.

A global network for the surveillance of the atmosphere would no doubt add substantially to the present means of verification of nuclear explosions. It would not only be of great importance for the verification of compliance with a future treaty banning all nuclear tests, but is also likely to make a valuable contribution to confidence in existing agreements, such as the partial test-ban Treaty and the non-proliferation Treaty. It would, furthermore, contribute to the identification of possible nuclear explosions carried out by countries which are not parties to any of these treaties. Thus, it is likely that the identification of the much debated event south of Africa on 22 September 1979 would have been considerably facilitated if a system of the kind envisaged in the present

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

working paper had been in operation on that occasion. Such a data exchange would not only add to the efficiency of present means of verification, but it would also be truly international and non-discriminatory in character, which is an important aspect for the vast majority of countries represented around this table, including my own.

With these words, I submit that the working paper contained in document CD/257 should be carefully studied and considered by the members of the Committee. As to the appropriate framework for dealing with this matter, it seems to my delegation that the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts provides a suitable forum with an accordingly amended mandate. My delegation is, however, open to other proposals in this regard. One alternative might be to convene an ad hoc meeting of experts to discuss the matter.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no more speakers on my list. Would any other delegation like to take the floor?

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 11 March, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.