

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIFTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
On Tuesday, 16 February 1982, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Mohammad Jafar MAHALLATI

(Iran)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M.A. SALAH-BEY  
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES  
Mr. V. BEAUGE  
Miss N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.W. STEELE  
Mr. T.C. FIDDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINA  
Miss R. de CLERCQ  
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA  
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. K. TELLALOV  
Mr. I. SOTIROV  
Mr. P. POPCHEV  
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U MAUNG MAUNG GYI  
U NGUE WIN  
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL  
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. TIAN JIN  
Mr. YU MENGJIA  
Mrs. WANG ZHIYUN  
Mr. LIN CHENG  
Mr. FENG ZHENYAO  
Mr. HU XIAODI

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA  
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. J. STRUCKA  
Mr. A. CIMA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN  
Mr. M.N. FAHMY  
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE  
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de La GORCE  
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE  
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER  
Mr. H. THIELICKE  
Mr. M. KAULFUSS  
Mr. J. HOEPERT

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. H. WEGENER  
Mr. W.E. von dem HAGEN  
Mr. N. KLINGLER  
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES  
Mr. F. GAJDA  
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A. P. VENKATESWARAN  
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. CH. ANWAR SANI  
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO  
Mr. HARYOMATARAM  
Mr. B. SIMANJUNTAK

Iran: Mr. M.J. MAHALLATI  
Mr. S. MOHAMMADI

Italy: Mr. M. ALESSI  
Mr. B. CABRAS  
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. T. OKAWA  
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI  
Mr. K. TANAKA  
Mr. T. ARAI

Kenya: Mr. C.G. MAINA  
Mr. D.D. DON NANJIRA  
Mr. J. MURIU KIBOI

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES  
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG  
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. S.M. RAHHALI  
Mr. M. HALFAOUI

Netherlands: Mr. H., WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. G.O. IJEWERE  
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA  
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD  
Mr. T. ALTAf

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO  
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA  
Mr. G. RUSSIN  
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden:

Mrs. I. THORSSON

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. C.M. HYLTIENIUS

Mr. H. BERGLUND

Mr. G. EKHOLM

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN

Mr. Y.K. NAZARKIN

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. V.M. GANJA

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

Mr. S.B. BATSANOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES

Miss J.E.F. WRIGHT

United States of America:

Mr. L.G. FIELDS

Mr. M. BUSBY

Ms. S. BURKE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J. GUNDERSEN

Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Mr. R.R. NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRIJUNEC

Mr. M. MIHAJLOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA

Mrs. C. ESAKI EKANGA KABEYA

Secretary of the Committee on  
Disarmament and Personal Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the  
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In The Name of God The Most Compassionate, The Most Merciful, I declare open the 155th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Venezuela, Algeria, Burma, Argentina and Sweden.

We might not be able to listen to all statements in the morning and, therefore, we will resume the plenary meeting this afternoon in order to conclude the list of speakers. Immediately afterwards, we will hold an informal meeting to continue our consideration of those organizational matters which require decisions by the Committee.

I now give the floor to the first speaker on my list, the representative of the German Democratic Republic, Ambassador Herder.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, at the very beginning of my statement, I would like to offer you my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament during this month. I assure you of the full support and co-operation of my delegation in carrying out the tasks for which you are responsible. May I also pay a tribute to Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia who so ably guided our work last August and actively contributed to the preparation of the present session. Furthermore, I would like to extend my sincere welcome to the many new colleagues who have joined us recently. I wish to assure them that my delegation looks forward to maintaining the same excellent relations it had with their predecessors. I also wish to associate myself with the deep condolences already conveyed to the delegation of Italy by many other representatives on the death of our distinguished colleague, Ambassador Montezemolo.

This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament is of particular significance. It is called upon to live up to its responsibilities at a time when the arms race has reached tremendous dimensions. Only a few weeks separate us from the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to which the Committee will have to report on the results of its activities.

In my statement today I would like to touch mainly on two problems: the general international situation and its impact on the Committee on Disarmament; and the CTB and nuclear disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament is holding its 1982 session under very complicated international conditions. Never since the Second World War has peace been in as much danger as now. Two major approaches to world affairs are becoming more and more evident, as shown at the first meetings of the Committee on Disarmament during this spring session.

One approach strongly supported by the German Democratic Republic aims at the maintenance of peace, at mutually advantageous co-operation among States, at the cessation and reversal of the arms race and at the prevention of a nuclear holocaust. It favours the continuation of the policy of détente by concrete steps in these directions. All international problems should be solved by means of a constructive dialogue.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

One of the recent expressions of this approach was the latest proposal of the Soviet Union on a step-by-step reduction of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. The implementation of this proposal would lead to a reduction of two-thirds of these weapons by both sides until 1990. It is our conviction that, given the political will of the parties to negotiate such an agreement on the basis of the principle of equality and equal security, the Geneva talks on the reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe can and should be brought to a successful conclusion.

Only a few days ago, the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Erich Honecker, expressed a strong support for this proposal. He stated that, despite the campaign of slander led by the "overarmers", the Soviet Union in full agreement with its allies to proceed with the course aiming at the solution of the most important question of our time -- the maintenance of peace. This approach should also guide the work of our Committee when discharging its responsible tasks. My delegation is strongly working for that.

At the same time we cannot close our eyes to the revitalization of another quite different approach to international affairs. At the threshold of the 1980s, certain well-known circles have strengthened their efforts to replace détente by confrontation, arms limitation and disarmament by overarmament or, as they call it, "additional armament". Indeed, the cornerstone of this policy is an attempt to achieve military superiority by means of gigantic armament programmes. One cannot but assume that these forces are striving for the creation of a real pre-war situation, both in the material and in the propaganda fields. Wherever international conferences or negotiations are being held -- in Geneva, Madrid, Vienna or elsewhere -- the enemies of détente have considerably multiplied their activities. Part and parcel of this policy is the campaign which has been started recently on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean against the Soviet Union and other socialist States and which was also introduced into this Committee some days ago. The arrogant statements made by the representatives of the United States and other Western States and aimed at telling a sovereign State how it should build its social order constitute grave interference in the internal affairs of Poland, a friendly neighbour State of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, this campaign is a clear attempt to make the Committee believe that Poland's internal problems have provoked an international crisis.

In more than one regard, these attempts represent a violation of the United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Besides the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, such basic guidelines for international conduct as the principles of sovereignty, fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law and co-operation among States were violated. There should be no doubt: such an approach is not likely to promote reliability, calculability and stability in international relations. It is more than ironic that such attempts are undertaken by a State which not only supports the apartheid régime of South Africa and the annexationist policy of Israel, but also does not rule out, as announced by a member of its Government, the possibility of using military force in the Caribbean region and regards Central America as the "heart of its strategic concerns". Unfortunately, those are not only mere declarations.

(Mr. Horder, German Democratic Republic)

Last year, the majority of the members of the Committee, with full justification and on the basis of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, rejected the attempts of some States to make the Committee's activity a function of the international situation, which, in the opinion of those States, was "not ripe" for disarmament. This year again, we were told by those who are responsible for the recent aggravation of the international situation that there should be a link between disarmament and the so-called "restraint" of certain States in international affairs.

At least two basic factors seem to underlie this dangerous "linkage concept". Firstly, it implies that only socialist, non-aligned and other States are interested in disarmament, but that the United States would do them a favour by joining disarmament negotiations. But are not the maintenance of peace and the achievement of disarmament the common objectives of all States and peoples? Secondly, whereas other States should conduct their foreign policy in a way conducive to the United States, the latter claims unrestrained rights and world stability to its own taste, similar to the "Pax Americana" of the cold war years.

In this connection, one cannot but agree with the well-known American politician, W. Averell Harriman, who, in an article published in November 1981 in the "International Herald Tribune" wrote: "In place of the 'real arms control' that was promised a year ago, we have only the promise of endless talks on nuclear arms in Europe and no talks at all on strategic arms until next year". After recent events here in Geneva we have to ask whether we will see, even this year, the start of the negotiations in question.

It is quite obvious that such linkage not only hampers disarmament negotiations, but is also in clear contradiction with the Final Document, paragraph 1 of which states that: "The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future".

Just one week ago, we were given a lecture on the United Nations Charter, international behaviour and "a realistic appreciation of the role of arms limitations". We were told a lot about a "new approach to arms control", "significant reductions" in nuclear weapons and so on. Yet there was no clear commitment to such priority items on the international disarmament agenda as the continuation of the SALT process, with the preservation of all the positive accomplishments already made and there was no mention of a comprehensive test ban and a complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Moreover, there have been attempts to downgrade those vital issues. But does this approach correspond to the letter and spirit of the Final Document of the first special session; Is this the right way to contribute to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and to prepare for the second special session? What "system of peace" is to be constructed by such an approach? Except for rhetoric, nothing was actually said about the role of the Committee as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. No concrete proposals were submitted or even mentioned.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In addition, an attempt has been made to transform the Committee into some kind of court to condemn socialist society. It is not our intention to start here lengthy discussions on the pros and cons of socialist and capitalist societies. But I assure those who were so keen to raise this subject here that the people of my country are very proud of the achievements of more than 30 years of socialist development. It is a matter of fact that, during this historically short time, the German Democratic Republic, a small socialist country with but a population of 17 million, has developed into one of the 10 leading Powers in the world, with a highly developed industry, modern farming and a high income growth rate. It is not under socialism that social programmes have constantly been reduced to augment military budgets. It is not under socialism that millions of workers are out of work while a thin layer of people is making huge profits. Moreover, due to the policy of the socialist countries, Europe is now experiencing the longest peace period in its history. For years, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty strove for and finally achieved the convening of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This policy was reaffirmed at the end of last year at the Bucharest meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty. The States represented at this meeting declared that for them "there was, is and will be no strategic doctrine except a defensive one. They do not intend to build a first-strike nuclear capability. Such was not their intention in the past nor will it be in the future. They do not seek military superiority and never will. They are in favour of ensuring military parity at a lower level by implementing disarmament measures, and for lessening and eliminating military confrontation in Europe. The States represented at the meeting are convinced that nobody stands to gain in the arms race. Should anyone resolve to unleash a nuclear war in the hope of winning it, he would conjure up a nuclear catastrophe for mankind and would inevitably be destroyed in it himself. A nuclear war cannot be limited." As far as the people of the German Democratic Republic are concerned, this was mentioned just one week ago by the distinguished representative of the United States, so let me assure him that the people of my country do not feel at all threatened by the country which liberated us from fascist rule and lost 20 million people in the Second World War. The real threat to the very survival of my people emanates from the West. Thousands of nuclear weapons are already deployed in our Western neighbourhood. According to NATO plans, still more nuclear missiles should be added in 1983 and thereafter.

We are nevertheless convinced that a policy which endangers peace and international co-operation has no chance of success. The broad peace movement developing now in Europe and in other regions of the world demonstrates that people are becoming increasingly aware of the dangers involved in the development and stationing on their soil of new, ever more sophisticated systems of weapons of mass destruction. We in the Committee should not neglect this movement.

In this regard, allow me to quote the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Erich Honecker, who emphasized at the beginning of this year: "Reason and goodwill must prevail to save mankind from a nuclear catastrophe. The answer to questions of war and peace is too important to be left to those forces striving for military superiority and deflating the word 'disarmament' to an empty fine phrase".

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Let me now turn to the two priority items on our agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; and a comprehensive test ban.

Nuclear disarmament continues to be one of the priority items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. In view of the mounting danger of a nuclear war, effective steps in this field are more urgent than ever if we want to avoid the risk of being pushed into a nuclear catastrophe. Let me recall in this connection the unanimous view of the participants in the first international congress of "physicians for nuclear disarmament" that the interests of the present and all future generations require the prevention of nuclear war.

The Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe submitted by the Soviet Union at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly takes account of this urgent necessity of our time. It is an expression of a consistent and continuous course directed towards safeguarding peace. The resolution declares the first use of nuclear weapons the gravest crime against humanity and condemns any doctrine envisaging the first use of nuclear weapons and thereby provoking the risk of a nuclear war. If all nuclear-weapon Powers accepted the idea of the Declaration, it would be an effective step towards averting the danger of such a war. May I be permitted to recall what was said by L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union: "If there is no first nuclear strike, there will, of course, be no second or third strike". It is only logical that unanimous support for this declaration would impart a strong impetus to efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, this seems not to be the case. We cannot hide our deep concern about statements trying to accustom mankind to the idea of the possible use of nuclear weapons. As an example, I would only like to mention a statement made by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, E. Rostow, in January this year. In this statement he said that "for us deterrence means two things: it means deterring nuclear war and it also means -- with reference to our supreme national interests -- retaining the possibility, if necessary, of using nuclear weapons if our supreme interests are threatened by conventional attack. This is a fact," Mr. Rostow stressed, "that many people forget sometimes -- both in the United States and in Europe and in Japan -- but it is a fact". But it is also a matter of fact that mankind does not need new doctrines on deterrence, on a "winnable" nuclear war or whatsoever. In that regard, the Committee on Disarmament has to play a more active and efficient role. It has to meet its responsibility and to start without delay negotiations on nuclear disarmament in full accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session.

As before, my delegation is in favour of using all the possibilities available to the Committee on Disarmament for the initiation of negotiations on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them. Our basic approach to this problem is contained in document CD/4.

Such negotiations could be prepared by an appropriate body of the Committee, such as an ad hoc working group or any other subsidiary organ.

The establishment of such a body could be considered during the consultations proposed in document CD/193. These consultations should be resumed without delay. They should facilitate the achievement of a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 2.

General Assembly resolution 36/92 E has given the Committee a concrete mandate to this end.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

At the beginning of its work, such a group could, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session, consider all aspects connected with the stages of nuclear disarmament and their tentative content. Thereafter, the group could concentrate its attention on the first stage. Within the framework of the discussion on the content of measures to be carried out during the first stage, the question of the cessation of the development and deployment of new types and systems of nuclear weapons should be addressed.

Thus, it should be the aim of the first stage to stop the nuclear arms race in its qualitative dimension, thereby creating favourable prerequisites for nuclear disarmament measures in the next stages.

In general, the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament should be based on the following major principles:

All nuclear-weapon States should participate in negotiations on nuclear disarmament and corresponding agreements;

The degree of the participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in the measures of each stage is to be determined by taking into account the quantitative and qualitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and the other States concerned;

Each individual step should be part and parcel of an over-all nuclear disarmament programme which would guarantee the necessary comprehensive approach to solving the problems connected with the elimination of nuclear weapons;

The measures of each stage could be implemented gradually according to a predetermined order or in parallel according to a time-table;

These disarmament measures should be backed up by appropriate political and international legal guarantees.

These principles are fully in keeping with the security interests of all States. They do not contain any preconditions, but are aimed at maintaining the undiminished security of all sides concerned during the whole process of nuclear disarmament.

Proceeding from these considerations the delegation of the German Democratic Republic suggests the following mandate for an ad hoc working group on item 2: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, on the basis of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session, the stages of nuclear disarmament with the aim of preparing appropriate multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of the first and second parts of the Committee's 1982 session".

The development of the nuclear neutron weapon underlines the need for a comprehensive nuclear weapon test ban. We are now more than ever before convinced that this item continues to deserve the highest priority in our work. Year after year in the United Nations General Assembly, in this Committee and in other forums, the urgency of such a step has been emphasized. Unfortunately, at least one of the participants in the former trilateral negotiations has, in contravention of the Final Document and the Committee's agenda, now declared that a CTB is no longer on

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

the order of the day. Why? What has changed in recent years? It may be assumed that, now, more than in recent years, the country concerned is interested in using nuclear tests for the build-up of its forces, which is necessary in order to maintain "credible deterrence", as we have been told. Obviously, there is an established interest in precluding in this way the following effects cited in a 1978 hearing before the United States Senate Sub-Committee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services: "In general, a CTB is highly likely to preclude any new warhead development and the stockpiling of any warhead design which has not been previously tested. Therefore, during the period a CTB is in effect, future strategic force modernization is likely to be influenced by, and limited to, those warhead designs which have been tested and which can be adapted to meet requirements ... A gradual degradation rather than a disintegration of the nuclear weapon community is the more likely consequence of a CTB of unlimited duration. Based on experiences during the test moratorium prior to 1964, it will be difficult over time to retain our best nuclear scientists and technicians, to maintain the high level of expertise of those who do remain, and to attract and train new people".

I think there is nothing left to add. In view of the great importance attached to a CTB, we appeal to the participants in the trilateral negotiations to resume them immediately and to bring them to an early and successful conclusion. The time has now come for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to negotiations on all aspects of a CTBT. Therefore, it would be most appropriate to establish an ad hoc working group for negotiations on the text of a CTBT. All nuclear-weapon States would have an appropriate opportunity to explain their positions and to participate in the fulfilment of this vital task in the field of nuclear disarmament.

The ad hoc working group to be established should take into account all proposals and initiatives advanced in recent years on a CTB, as well as the tripartite reports to the Committee on Disarmament.

To promote the early establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 1, we propose the following mandate: "The Committee on Disarmament decides to establish, for the duration of its 1982 session, an Ad Hoc Working Group of the Committee to negotiate a treaty prohibiting all nuclear weapon tests, taking into account all existing proposals and future initiatives. The Ad Hoc Working Group will report to the Committee on Disarmament on the progress of its work before the end of the first and second parts of the Committee's 1982 session".

In addition to nuclear disarmament and a CTBT, the Committee will have to deal with the prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon. In this connection, the Committee has to implement General Assembly resolution 36/92 K, which explicitly requests the Committee to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. It is not my intention to elaborate on this item. I would only add the voice of my delegation to that of the delegations which proposed that immediate steps should be taken with a view to negotiating the text of such an agreement.

Due attention should also be paid to the problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. In concluding, I would like to ask you, Mr. Chairman, to make the necessary arrangements to ensure thorough consideration of items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, with your permission, may I first of all convey to the delegation of Italy the sincere and deep condolences of my delegation on the untimely passing away of our distinguished colleague from Italy, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

My delegation and I join all the distinguished speakers who took the floor before me in welcoming you most warmly as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. Together with our best wishes and congratulations. I offer you full co-operation and support on the part of my delegation in your difficult task.

May I also take this opportunity to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to Ambassador Sani of Indonesia for his contribution to the successful conclusion of its 1981 session and for his effort in the preparation of this year's session.

On behalf of my delegation, I welcome in this room our new colleagues, the ambassadors of Australia, Bulgaria, Burma, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of America, as well as the new representatives of Czechoslovakia and Italy, who have joined us for the first time at this session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Let me also, Mr. Chairman, bid farewell to Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands, with whom, despite political differences, I shared excellent personal contacts. I wish him every success in his new assignment and would appreciate it if the delegation of the Netherlands would kindly convey these wishes to Ambassador Fein.

Mr. Chairman, we hope that the negotiations we are going to continue here in the next two months or so will significantly contribute to the results of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation came to Geneva with instructions to make every possible effort to be constructive and flexible wherever possible in order to contribute here to the noble cause of disarmament and peace. Therefore, I would like, first of all, to elaborate on the topics which are on our agenda since, in the considered view of my delegation, this is and should be the substance of our deliberations in this Committee.

For my delegation, the constructive negotiations here in the next two months would mean: the elaboration of a draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, specific accomplishments at least in the process of the elaboration of a draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, at least the commencement of work on the text of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as negotiations in the ad hoc working groups on such vital agenda items as the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the nuclear disarmament and the comprehensive test ban treaty. I would like to highlight some of these priority topics:

The Final Document of the first special session as well as countless resolutions and different disarmament initiatives aim at specific negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. Some of them were initiated by Poland and it sponsored many others. We are determined to work in accordance with their letter and spirit. We give our full support to the recommendations of resolutions 36/92 E and 36/92 F adopted at the last session of the General Assembly. More specifically, my delegation lends its unqualified support to the call by the General Assembly for the establishment at this session of the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Together with the delegations of other socialist countries, my delegation has actively participated in this Committee in all debates and in the preparation of the appropriate documents on this agenda item, starting with document CD/4 at the beginning of existence of the Committee on Disarmament in its present form. We] shall continue to do so with a deep conviction that the establishment of the working group would constitute the next and necessary step forward in fulfilling the Committee's mandate on this agenda item.

I would like to support the draft mandate for the working group just proposed by the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic.

It is equally so with the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The Committee should not delay any longer the establishment of the ad hoc working group on this item, in accordance with the General Assembly resolutions that have been adopted in the last several years and, most recently, resolutions 36/84 and 36/92 F. We should, indeed, bear in mind the fact that, as stated in General Assembly resolution 36/84, "... since 1972 ... all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary ...". It is deplorable that, as emphasized in the reports from its last year's session and in the above-mentioned General Assembly resolution the Committee on Disarmament was prevented from responding to the general wish for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item only as a result of the negative attitude of two nuclear-weapon States. The working group should be established without any further delay and should consider all the aspects of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests and aim at the early elaboration of the text of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Speaking on the complex problem of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, I must touch on the question of nuclear neutron weapons. In its resolution 36/92 K, the General Assembly requested this Committee "to start without delay negotiations in an appropriate organizational framework with a view to concluding a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons". My delegation believes that the best organizational framework for elaborating such a convention would be an ad hoc working group which could be established by this Committee. We have at our disposal a comparatively good background for such an exercise: the draft convention submitted by the group of socialist countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and a broad exchange of views on the subject matter which could be continued and deepened in the working group.

With regard to the agenda items on which we concentrated our efforts last year in the work of the working groups, I would like to present the views of my delegation on chemical weapons and the comprehensive programme on disarmament.

With regard to chemical weapons, we note with great concern the news of dangerous developments in the chemical arms race. The United States Government is making preparations for the production of a new generation of chemical weapons, specifically binary weapons. As the members of the Committee are aware, we have so far not been able to start concrete negotiations on the draft text of a chemical weapons convention. This was so mainly because of the position of at least one delegation which favoured a rather limited mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group

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on chemical weapons. Now, we have learned with satisfaction that the United States would be ready "to support efforts to achieve a ban on chemical weapons". My delegation welcomes such a statement, which we take as an expression of the consent of that delegation to a broader mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. In view of the above, my delegation believes that a proposal on the broadening of the mandate will achieve consensus. With an enlarged mandate, which will oblige us to start the elaboration of a draft convention, the working group should obviously base its work on the solid foundations that have been built at the Committee's last two sessions under the very able chairmanship of the Ambassadors of Japan and Sweden. How to proceed further? As we all realize, the present stage of negotiations makes it possible to determine the level of convergence and divergence of views on numerous issues around the table. From this point on, this year's group should start elaborating specific provisions of the convention on issues where convergence or unanimity of views has been reached and try to narrow the gap on issues where the views still differ. The group could possibly work in turns, that is, concentrating at a time on elaborating specific provisions and, at another time, on narrowing the gap between the diverging views.

My delegation, which was a co-sponsor of General Assembly resolution 36/96 B, wishes to refer to its operative paragraph 5, which "calls upon all States to refrain from any action which could impede negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons and specifically to refrain from production and deployment of binary and other new types of chemical weapons, as well as from stationing chemical weapons in those States where there are no such weapons at present". We are convinced that this stipulation should be clearly reflected in our work on the future convention on chemical weapons.

The distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia, who spoke on 2 February, expressed in considerable detail the views shared by the socialist countries, including Poland, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament as a whole, as well as on its particular chapters. I do not have much to add, except to underline and emphasize once again that, in the light of the coming second special session which will approve the programme, my delegation belongs to those very many others who consider that the draft CPD should be elaborated by this Committee at its current spring session. What we need is a realistic and genuine approach to the main objective: to negotiate for general and complete disarmament. In this connection, I totally share the view expressed here one week ago by the distinguished representative of India.

In fact, I have one remark to add to the discussion of the principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. I have in mind the "linkage" argument. If each of us in this room is to apply the "linkage" approach, then, indeed, we shall not be able to work out a genuine comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation therefore suggests that the disarmament negotiations, known from past experience as a time-consuming and painstaking process, should not be linked with other events in international life. We are of the opinion that that should become one of the principles of the future CPD.

This is the position on the main topics that my delegation has brought with it in coming to participate in the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament. We are ready to co-operate with every delegation, as we think it essential that tangible progress should be made this year. For socialist Poland's foreign policy, there is no objective more important and urgent than to secure lasting peace and multilateral co-operation for all nations of the world. This can be done only by stopping the mad arms race with a view to arriving at a general and complete disarmament.

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This is why we become more and more concerned about the increase of tensions. There are, indeed, numerous causes for this concern. Unextinguished fires of international armed conflicts are still glowing. There are cases of annexation of foreign territories, of various forms of foreign interference and of pressure on States and nations. These are realities. We are also witnessing manoeuvres aimed at creating artificial centres of tension, at using various pretexts for justifying the policy of intensified armaments, including the production of new kinds of weapons.

Right from the first day of this year's session, we have witnessed here, in the Committee on Disarmament, attempts to play the Polish card. True enough, some of those playing this card recognize that the Committee is not the right forum for such a game, but they nevertheless go on playing it.

My delegation feels all the more compelled to raise this subject since, until now, it has limited itself to patiently listening to all the false accusations directed against my country, my Government and my nation. We have done so because our main concern has been to save precious time to enable the Committee to go on with the work it is expected to do.

Formally, those who bring into this forum the affairs of my country argue that they are not merely an internal matter. By lowering the level of confidence in international relations and by threatening international security, the events in Poland are allegedly hindering all disarmament talks.

This is a one-sided, politically biased interpretation, convenient to those who would be glad to seize any pretext for their own aims and who will not hesitate to take advantage of every move which is not in line with their own politics and make it into a handy excuse for their actions. Today, we hear that the responsibility for the new United States policy on armaments falls not only on the Soviet Union, which "has gained a considerable advantage in nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons", but also upon Poland, which is accused of "undermining the climate of international confidence so indispensable for disarmament negotiations".

Why is it that Poland should deserve such grave accusations? All this, because of the institution in Poland of martial law, in full agreement with the Constitution and with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, by the constitutionally empowered authority. Martial law, instituted in the name of the highest national interest, does, indeed, stipulate temporary derogation from some constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties. But leaders of some delegations to this Committee seem to ignore the fact that the Prime Minister of the Polish Government stated on 13 December 1981 that "I wish for all to understand the motives and objectives of our action. We are not heading towards a military coup, towards military dictatorship. The nation has enough strength, enough wisdom to develop an efficient democratic system of socialist Government. In this system the armed forces will be able to stay where is their rightful place — in the barracks. None of the Polish problems can be solved by force in the longer run;" and that "I address world opinion as a whole. I appeal for understanding of the exceptional conditions which occurred in Poland, of emergency measures which have become necessary. Our actions endanger nobody. Their only objective is to remove internal threats and thereby to prevent dangers to peace and international co-operation. We intend to keep the concluded treaties and agreements." Those speakers also did not heed what was stated earlier by representatives of their own countries who, rationally motivated, were showing much concern over the destiny of

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Poland, overwhelmed at that time by chaos and anarchy. Let me at this point quote again the words of the Prime Minister of my Government when he spoke on 24 December last year: "Let every one of us in his own conscience find a frank answer today to the question: what was Poland heading for? How long could a country survive torn every day by strikes, hot from tensions, immersing in the climate of artificially flared up hatred? I address this question also to those foreign quarters which already about a fortnight ago advised the Poles to set to work, to restore order and discipline. Today the same quarters noisily deplore the measures which have been taken precisely to this end. One can have the impression that it is in somebody's interest to make Poland a country of chaos, an insolvent debtor, a sick organism of the continent".

To some delegations in the Committee, all this is of little importance. They have their own information from their own sources, which are not the only credible ones, and nobody is entitled to know where and who it comes from. Right here, at this forum of multilateral disarmament negotiations, we are being accused of violations of human rights, but slyly ignored is the fact that the Polish authorities have notified the United Nations Secretary-General of the introduction of martial law, in full conformity with article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which admits the right of derogation from its obligations if public emergency requires it.

We are being subjected to pressures, blackmail and economic restrictions, threatened and accused of violating the Helsinki Final Act. And yet, this very document solemnly states, inter alia, that: "The States Parties shall respect the sovereign equality and individual character of each of them, as well as all the rights constituting sovereignty and comprised in it, including, in particular, the right of every State to equality before the law, territorial integrity, as well as freedom and political independence. They shall equally respect the right of each of them to freely determining their political, social, economic and cultural systems, and the right to promulgate laws and regulations". I would like to ask who is the one who is violating the Final Act of Helsinki? Is it the one who promulgates laws that he considers as indispensable for the salvation of his nation's statehood and for maintaining stability on the continent, or rather the one who announces the world over that such an action is not what he likes and brutally demands, even in this room, to change these laws according to his wishes?

In the interventions of some delegations here, we have heard polemics casting doubt on the fact that the introduction of martial law in Poland is exclusively Poland's internal affair. But today, after having listened to the statement by Mr. Rostov, I think I understand better the purpose of such polemics. They serve to create in this Committee artificial problems which would provide a screen to make us believe how greatly justified are military budget increases, the production of new kinds of weapons and how important is the struggle of the "free world" against the "threat of communism".

Are we not given to understand that the Committee on Disarmament is not much more than just a group of "noble and bold defenders of democracy, justice and freedom in the world" and, on the other hand, a group composed of an "oppressor with

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imperial ambitions" and a handful of "oppressed" States, so oppressed that they do not even dare admit it? The rest are those non-informed ones who are in need of guidance and instruction from the "wise free world" as to who is who and what he is aiming at.

The attempts to make the situation in Poland an international issue also serve some delegations as grounds for giving us advice, directives and conditions, which, they think, should be fulfilled by Poland to bring back her credibility and restore a good climate for disarmament negotiations. The distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has done so in the clearest way. One is almost tempted to remark that advice and recommendations, if they are not asked for, can only be given in one's own house. However, it is rather unbecoming to offer them to others without being invited to do so. This has particular importance in international relations. My delegation has asked neither the delegation of the Federal Republic of Germany nor any other for advice or recommendations as to when and why and with whom we are to negotiate in Poland. If the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany has presented himself here as an expert in the sociology of human relations, may I ask him why he did not advise his own Government how to cope with unemployment or how to prevent discrimination in the employment of "politically suspected" elements in his own country? We in Poland still remember very well the advice and instructions regarding the so-called Gdansk corridor given to Poland 45 years ago by a State whose succession was claimed after the war by those political forces which contributed to laying the foundations of the Federal Republic of Germany. The Government of Poland of that time did not follow that "advice". History knows what followed.

We remember this lesson of history remarkably well and this is why we firmly demand that no country should ever offer such instructions to another and that States and nations should co-operate with each other in an atmosphere of mutual respect. The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany even availed himself of the opportunity of calling the constitutional Government of my country a "military regime". Such a term is not even being used by the members of his own Government. Ironically enough, he used this term when expressing hope for a "return of the atmosphere of confidence". Mr. Rostow, in turn, could not help calling the Prime Minister of my constitutional Government a "military dictator". This seems, indeed, a peculiar way of restoring mutual confidence.

I come from a country which may be poor and is certainly much poorer than the country Mr. Rostow comes from, but it possesses a high sense of dignity and I will therefore not take advantage of the right of reciprocity and will not use abusive terms when referring to the Chief of Mr. Rostow's Government. To my mind it is inadmissible to use offensive language in the mutual relations of representatives of States, because, when epithets come in, then, obviously, arguments must be lacking. Let me remark that it was quite easy for the United States representative to wield the arguments of power when he tried to indoctrinate us on matters unrelated to the agenda of the Committee. It was much more difficult for him, as

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pointed out by the distinguished ambassadors of the Soviet Union, Hungary, Bulgaria and the German Democratic Republic, to use the power of his arguments when he, although briefly, touched upon the agenda items.

I would not like to take more of the Committee's time for matters unrelated to the agenda and will therefore confine myself in the final part of my intervention to quoting a small excerpt from the statement made by the Prime Minister of my Government, Wojciech Jaruzelski, at the session of the Polish Parliament held on 25 January this year: "We are acting in a highly complicated international situation. I shall speak openly without diplomatic subtleties. It was here, in Poland, that the process of dismantling the post-war balance of force in Europe and, by the same token, in the world, was to start. In the drive for destabilization, for gaining unilateral supremacy, it was staked on crushing the foundations of peace in Europe, i.e., on the Yalta and Potsdam agreements. The cost of that plan would have to be paid by the Poles. This objective was made impossible to be implemented before 15 December. It is now tried to be achieved by means of threats, boycotts and the so-called sanctions.

We welcome with recognition the realistic, far-sighted policy of those Governments and those political, economic and financial circles which have opposed the dictate, and which are determined to defend the right to taking sovereign decisions. We note this today and we shall well remember it for the future.

Unfortunately, other States of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance have launched a psychological and propaganda war against Poland. The economic and the food weapon has been applied. It is being maintained that the economic sanctions are directed against the Government of the Polish People's Republic, against the Military Council for National Salvation. This is not true. In the final count those sanctions are directed against the Polish people. Against every Pole. The target of the sanctions is clear: to paralyse the Polish economy, to make impossible coming out from the crisis, to starve the nation into surrender, to provoke an internal conflict. That is the measure of the so-called humanitarian approach. That is a lesson which we have to learn by heart. The Poles are to be punished because they did not let construct in the heart of Europe a sacrificial pyre on which their State was to be burned, because at least once they turned out to be wiser before the loss.

Hypocrisy knows no boundaries. A Government which for years has been torpedoing the application of sanctions against the greatest concentration camp, that is, the Republic of South Africa, does not hesitate to apply sanctions against Poland.

The head of the Polish Government has not demanded the release from American prisons of hand-cuffed leaders of the air traffic controllers union, the Polish Government did not make statements concerning an assessment of the respect for human rights in Northern Ireland. The Polish Parliament has not discussed whether a ban on performing a job by people of inconvenient views, in force in the Federal Republic of Germany, is compatible with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We

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observe the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. We have the right to expect reciprocity. Dictates by certain countries as to who in Poland is to negotiate and with whom are simply ridiculous and anachronistic. It was like that in the past century when the metropolises spoke in such a manner to their colonies.

Never in history have the Poles yielded to a foreign ultimatum. Apparently, not every one abroad can understand our history, our sense of pride and dignity. There are controversies and conflicts in our country, but no outside forces will settle them.

Likewise, we reject the insinuation that allegedly the decision on instituting martial law was imposed upon us and inspired. Attempts are being made at spreading the belief that a socialist, sovereign country with a millenary history of its statehood, a country having a strong army, is a child that must be led by the hand. The truth is that the decision was ours, that it was taken on the basis of our own assessment and implemented on our own.

It is to be regretted that the role of the main organizer of anti-Polish actions has been taken on by the present Government of the United States, a country with which Poland is linked by bonds of traditional friendship. We are not giving up hope for a return to realism there." I trust that the quoted text provides a clear reply to each of those who have touched here upon my country's affairs.

Before concluding, I would like to return briefly to the question of "linkage". Sharing the critical view on "linkage" expressed here by many delegations, my delegation wishes to reiterate its position that the Committee on Disarmament has been called upon by the international community to conduct multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the arms race, on disarmament agreements in a world just as it is, with the membership of States as decided four years ago, in mutual respect for their equality and partnership, as well as for the specificity of their socio-political systems and membership in military and political blocs or the non-aligned movement. Let no one try to teach or change anyone. We have enough work and the time is short. I fully agree with the distinguished representative of Mexico who, in his statement on 2 February, said, inter alia, that: "... to accept the 'linkage' argument ... would mean that there could never, or virtually never, be serious negotiations on disarmament." As to some "experts" who try to impose on the Committee the "linkage" argument, I would like to ask them the following question: if every one of us applies such a method, and everybody has such a right, shall we be able to fulfill the expectations which the international community has linked with the Committee on Disarmament? Such a question is justified not only because of our previous experience, but also because of the perspectives which emerge from some statements made so far in our debate.

Guided by the supreme interest of peace and international security, my delegation declares its readiness for active participation in the common endeavour for the Committee to keep its role of a negotiating forum. We would like to express our deep conviction that it is not too late for this yet.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Navarro.

Mr. NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of this Committee; we also extend our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Sani of Indonesia, for the skill with which he has guided our work at last month's meetings. We also welcome the distinguished colleagues who have joined us to carry out the important work of the Committee on Disarmament and wish to express our sympathy to the delegation of Italy on the death of Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo.

The purpose of our statement today is to give a brief introduction to the document which our delegation has seen fit to present to the Committee on Disarmament and which, thanks to excellent co-ordination by the Secretariat, is available in all working languages.

This is document CD/238, which is entitled "Statement concerning the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons" and is the result of the study on this subject requested by Pope John Paul II from the Pontifical Academy of Sciences.

The study was prepared by a group of 14 specialized scientists from different countries and, as soon as it was completed, His Holiness John Paul II transmitted it directly to the leaders of the nuclear Powers and, through the Papal Nunciature, to the other countries of the international community.

Thanks to its content and especially to the spiritual authority of His Holiness, this study, which was carried out by the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, supplements the other studies prepared by governmental and non-governmental organizations in this field.

After reading this document, we reaffirm our conviction that nuclear weapons are unjustifiable and that it is also unjustifiable to claim that peace can be achieved on the basis of a threat of such magnitude.

We consider that peace is to be found in the union of peoples in all aspects of human life and that acceptance of this fact will enable us to achieve the objective of disarmament and the other great goals mankind has set itself with a view to complete development.

The problem of nuclear weapons is not only that they threaten the survival of mankind, but also that they hamper its over-all progress.

With these few words, we have tried to draw attention to the relationship between disarmament and the other aspects of human life, with the intention of putting disarmament back into its proper perspective so that we may work for disarmament in this Committee, but with our sights set on mankind's supreme ideals.

In conclusion, I should like to say that our delegation will address the Committee at another time in order to explain its position with respect to the items on the agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the Floor to the representative of Algeria, Ambassador Salah-Bey.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to express my *délégation's* satisfaction at seeing the representative of Iran occupy the office of Chairman of the Committee. I congratulate you wholeheartedly and assure you once again that my delegation is fully prepared to co-operate with you. My congratulations are also addressed to Ambassador Sani of the Indonesian delegation on the manner in which he presided over our work. It also gives me pleasure to welcome our colleagues to the Committee on Disarmament and wish them every success in their task. One of our former colleagues, Ambassador Cordero di Montezemolo, has passed away; I should like to associate my delegation with the condolences which have been addressed to the delegation of Italy, and request that they be transmitted to Ambassador di Montezemolo's family.

All the member delegations of the Committee on Disarmament agree that the international situation has worsened since the end of the Committee's summer session. Of course, opinions vary as to the reasons for that deterioration. We all seem to agree that discussion of this point need not be prolonged, but it is still worthwhile to emphasize once again that there is a relationship between the arms race and the worsening of international tension and, consequently, worthwhile to raise the question of the real purpose of the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament.

Speakers periodically take the floor to explain to us that, since international tension is on the increase, this Power or that is obliged to build up its means of destroying or deterring its potential adversary.

Similarly, we are assured that what is conventionally called the arms race is nothing more than the legitimate pursuit of military parity.

My delegation has had occasion to state the reasons why it refuses to recognize the inevitability of the arms race and the pursuit of military parity or superiority, which both lead to the unacceptable conclusion that all genuine disarmament efforts will be unsuccessful.

We note that there has not been any session of the Committee on Disarmament at which delegations have not drawn attention to the worsening of international tension. Unfortunately, our Committee's work suffers from the fact that the major military Powers continue to stir up international tension and to escalate the arms race.

The Committee on Disarmament is beset by a number of dangers. The danger of paralysis is certainly the most obvious, as it would set the seal on the futility of multilateral disarmament negotiations. Our work has not reached this terminal stage, even though virtually no progress has been made on various agenda items and, in particular, the first two.

The second danger would be to turn this Committee into a platform that would relay the attacks and accusations made by one side against the other. Such attitudes are exactly the opposite of negotiation and polemical exchanges are no substitute for negotiations. We cannot but consider them a screen that ill disguises the refusal genuinely to tackle the fundamental items on the Committee's agenda.

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The dramatic trend towards confrontation highlights the deadlock of a system of international relations that is based on zones of influence divided between the two blocs. This approach, whereby international peace and security depend solely on trust between the blocs and the fate of the majority of mankind is linked to that of a particular region, cannot fail to have direct consequences on the disarmament effort and the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

A concept of international peace in which the settlement of disputes necessarily involves accommodation between major Powers is dangerous, for, when it is successful, it restricts the relative benefits of détente to a particular region, at the expense of the rest of the world.

The so-called period of détente, which has been confined to the political sphere and has involved attempts to establish a balance of power, has proved incapable of preserving peace and still less of slowing the arms race. What is least surprising is that, during this period, there has been a qualitative and quantitative acceleration of the arms race.

Every year, we have watched, helpless, as increasingly sophisticated, increasingly murderous and increasingly costly weapons have been developed. The arms race in outer space and in the oceans is taking on new dimensions that are a further source of tension. New weapons technologies lead to dangerous tactical and strategic changes which, with every passing day, lower the probability threshold of nuclear disaster. We seem to be moving further and further away from the objective of general and complete disarmament, which has been on the agenda of the international organizations for several decades.

The existence of nuclear arsenals is now regarded as the most serious threat to the future of mankind. The strategy of nuclear deterrence, allegedly standing as a guarantee for the maintenance of international peace and security, carries with it the seeds of endless competition in the sphere of nuclear weapons. Instead of encouraging détente, it increases mistrust between the partners and stirs up the ideological differences of the two blocs. It underpins the policy of zones of influence and feeds the rivalry between the blocs.

Still more absurd, the enormous waste of human, material and financial resources, to which this policy gives rise is a huge drain on the world economy, to the detriment of economic and social development.

It is true that a system of international security cannot be built on nuclear arsenals and undeniable that any progress made in the disarmament effort will create favourable conditions for widening and strengthening genuine détente.

In painting a rather grim picture of the international situation, our aim is not to add to the general pessimism; but the gravity and seriousness of the situation do not allow us to overlook the dangers that threaten us.

Anxiety and concern at the arms race which is now part of our daily environment increasingly find expression in the form of collective awareness of the need to avert nuclear catastrophe.

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The demonstrations in favour of disarmament that have taken place in many countries in recent months are encouraging symptoms of the refusal passively to accept the risks for the survival of mankind created by the policy of nuclear deterrence.

In my delegation's opinion, this widespread protest movement which has no political, ideological or geographical frontiers cannot be regarded merely as a demonstration by fringe elements which have lost contact with reality. It is, on the contrary, "one of the greatest political promises of the day" and we must take account of this deep and legitimate desire to live in a world without constant fear of catastrophe.

This demand for genuine, immediate disarmament, which is being voiced by ever wider sectors of public opinion, echoes the many recommendations and resolutions of international bodies in favour of disarmament. Is there any need to recall, in this connection, as many speakers have done before me, that, at its latest session, the General Assembly adopted some 50 resolutions on disarmament problems?

Without any doubt, the present session of the Committee is of particular importance, as it is being held on the eve of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. While we believe that the Committee is not obliged to carry out all the tasks entrusted to it before the second special session, we do not see how it can go before the General Assembly with no significant results whatever to report.

It cannot be denied that the absence of positive results would considerably reduce the Committee's credibility and give rise to doubts about the effectiveness of the machinery set up at the first special session. And yet, at the outset, this machinery seemed bound to succeed: for the first time, the five nuclear Powers were seated around a negotiating table; the framework for achieving general and complete disarmament was outlined in the Final Document adopted by consensus at the first special session and the principles, objectives and priorities were clearly defined; and many studies were carried out in various disarmament spheres.

How then can we explain the fact that, after four years of negotiations, none of the recommendations of the first special session devoted to disarmament has really been implemented?

We can, unfortunately, see no other explanation than the lack of political will and determination on the part of the major Powers. We are more and more convinced that political will is, at the present stage, the decisive factor for genuine negotiations on disarmament measures.

How is it that, after three annual sessions, the Committee on Disarmament has not even been able to begin formal negotiations on the top priority items of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and the cessation of the arms race which have been on the agenda for negotiations for two decades and all aspects of which have been explored?

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Furthermore, how can one fail to judge severely the intransigence of some nuclear Powers which have not changed their unilateral declarations aimed at providing security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States, but have imposed further obligations upon the latter! How can the nuclear-weapon Powers be so indifferent to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, those which have refused to throw in their lot with either of the two superpowers, without thereby incurring harsh judgements of their attitude?

Now that the dangers of a resumption of the chemical arms race are becoming clear, we wonder what logical basis there may be for refusing to give the Working Group on Chemical Weapons a more specific mandate to enable it to negotiate the text of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We are, however, aware that, thanks to the results obtained by the Working Group, we are closer to an agreement on chemical weapons than to any other measure within the purview of the Committee on Disarmament.

We also wonder whether we shall be in a position to submit for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament whose elements have been defined by the Disarmament Commission? Because of the little time we have left and the remaining differences of opinion, we see no cause for optimism, despite the efforts made by the member countries of the Group of 21.

These are questions to which we can find no other answer than the lack of will to hold genuine negotiations.

The fact is -- and this is what is most regrettable -- that some Powers obstinately continue to regard disarmament as something which depends on their mission in the world and give no credit to the multilateral approach.

My delegation has had occasion to reject this conception. It has also had occasion to stress the fact that the great military Powers bear particular responsibility for safeguarding peace in the world.

My delegation is thus of the opinion that the Committee on Disarmament must fully shoulder its responsibility in the preparation of disarmament measures. Bilateral or regional efforts should, of course, be encouraged and we welcome any agreement reached within such a framework. Such efforts can, however, not be a substitute for the work of the Committee on Disarmament and, still less, serve as a pretext for preventing this negotiating body from carrying out its principal task.

My delegation is convinced that the system of ad hoc working groups is the only means of conducting substantive negotiations on the various items on the Committee's agenda. It is therefore of the opinion that the four ad hoc working groups should be re-established so that they may immediately resume their work under their existing terms of reference, while the Committee on Disarmament considers the question of widening those terms. We have in mind, in particular, the terms of reference of the Ac Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

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We also firmly hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to reach a consensus without delay on the creation of two working groups to negotiate a nuclear-test-ban treaty and to work out measures to halt the arms race. As we all know, these are two questions of the highest priority that lie at the heart of the disarmament issue. Is there any need to recall that, last year, the United Nations General Assembly again urged, in its resolutions 36/84, 36/85, 36/92 E and 36/92 F, that negotiations on these two questions should take place as a matter of priority at the 1982 session of the Commission on Disarmament?

With regard to chemical weapons, another important question whose priority is second only to that of nuclear weapons, we are convinced that, thanks to the remarkable work carried out by the Working Group, positive results may be achieved if all the participants accept the necessary mutual concessions on pending issues.

Despite the scant progress made by the Ac Hoc Working Group on Negative Security Assurances, my delegation believes that this Group should continue its work because we are convinced that an agreement can be reached if some nuclear-weapon States reconsider their positions from the standpoint of the general interest and take into account the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States for their security.

The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament should seek to reach a comprehensive agreement on concrete disarmament measures in clearly defined stages according to a specific time-table. To be effective, this agreement should embody a formula that creates an obligation for States in relation to the implementation of the agreed measures. My delegation firmly supports the proposals contained in working paper CD/223, which is, in our view, realistic and constructive. We sincerely hope that an agreement can be submitted for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament, as we are sure that this would be an essential element for imparting new momentum to disarmament.

Finally, although we do not attach top priority to negotiations on radiological weapons, we consider that progress can be made if the positions of the various groups are taken into account in a genuinely constructive spirit.

My country has always militated in favour of reducing the tension between the blocs, the disappearance of military alliances and the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. My delegation represents a non-aligned country, which, together with many other countries, defends the right of the vast majority of the population of our planet to benefit from economic and social progress and to live without fear of the threat of world war.

Many studies have stressed the close dependent links between development and disarmament and we share the conviction that disarmament and the pursuit of peace are indissolubly bound together. Despite the difficulties and obstacles that stand in the way of decisive progress in our work, my delegation fervently hopes that the ideals of peace among nations, the development of peoples and the establishment of a more just international society will carry the day against the temptations of power and domination.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Burma, Ambassador Maung Maung Gyi.

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI (Burma): First of all, may I take this opportunity to express the Burmese delegation's appreciation for the effective and impartial manner with which the business of this Committee is being conducted by you, Mr. Chairman. My delegation is confident that progress will be made under your able chairmanship.

Before I embark upon the substantive part of my statement, I would also like to thank those distinguished representatives who have spoken before me for their kind words in welcoming me to their midst, together with those of our colleagues who, like me, have recently joined this Committee. I feel that it is my privilege to assume my responsibilities as my country's representative to the Committee on Disarmament and to participate in its work, which is so important for the future of the entire mankind. Despite the many obstacles we may encounter and the challenges we may face, it is our earnest hope that progress can be achieved during this session which is commensurate with the devotion and effort that all delegations are putting into our work.

In every field of human endeavour it is necessary at certain times to take stock of the situation. For this reason my delegation feels that we should also make our views known like the many other delegations which have done so in their interventions since this Committee began its present session on 2 February. This, we feel, is all the more necessary considering that the Committee will be approaching during the present session the twentieth year since its original inception. We must also bear in mind that there is little time left before we report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

If we look at our achievements, in retrospect, we are obliged to join the chorus of voices that is heard around this table since the Committee began its present session that our achievements fall far short of our goals and objectives. In saying so, we do not underrate the importance of agreements reached so far for it has taken years of painstaking efforts in their negotiations. No doubt they are significant in themselves. However, substantive measures on disarmament have to be realized if we are to make headway towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament. At the same time we are not operating in a static environment. The momentum and magnitude of the continuing arms race far outweigh this Committee's efforts on disarmament and is making our task ever more difficult.

As the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, this Committee, though technically autonomous, owes its responsibility to the international community and its link with the United Nations through its resolutions is an indispensable element of its functioning process. Without the guidelines set out

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for us by the international community, we would be sailing in an uncharted sea. Minimizing the importance or underrating the significance of United Nations resolutions will not do justice to our work.

The mandate which the international community set out for us at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and which is embodied in the Final Document provides an integrated and universal strategy for disarmament that has the widest support and approval of the international community. It is incumbent upon us to translate the principles embodied in the Final Document into an integrated programme of action. The work that we do here during the time that is left before the opening of the second special session will have a significant bearing on its outcome. It is important that we do our utmost to fulfil our commitments which the international community so anxiously expects of us. We should also bear in mind that the essential ingredient that is necessary for progress on negotiations is the political will of States, without which all our efforts here will not amount to very much.

Much has been said about the deterioration of the international political climate and its bearing on disarmament. It cannot be doubted that a favourable political atmosphere creates mutual trust and confidence between States which is conducive to the success of disarmament negotiations. This logic has equal validity in its reverse application. The recourse to a vast build-up of military arsenals by the major Powers, which was due to lack of mutual confidence, has now become, by the very nature of the arms race and the threat to their vital security interests, the major obstacle to improvement of relations between them. Tangible results on disarmament could in turn create conditions favourable to mutual trust and confidence. Therefore, the deterioration of the international political atmosphere should not be considered as a reason to defer negotiations on disarmament, particularly in the field of strategic armaments.

The foremost concern of the world today is the possibility of a general nuclear war and the vital importance of avoiding such a catastrophe to ensure the survival of mankind. So long as nuclear weapons exist, their threat will hang over mankind like the sword of Damocles and the danger of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications will always be possible, for no one can say that the machines that control these weapons and the men who control the machines are infallible. The search for security by States through the acquisition of nuclear weapons and their ever-increasing accumulation threatens the security of mankind. For these reasons, nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the nuclear arms race are the crux of the disarmament issue. The cause of world peace and security will not therefore be served if we tend to minimize the danger of a nuclear war or diffuse the solution of nuclear disarmament matters with other aspects of disarmament.

The limitation of the strategic components of nuclear armaments is an indispensable element in the nuclear disarmament process. Meaningful restraints on the strategic arms race could create favourable conditions that could have a positive effect on the prevention of the danger of a nuclear war and facilitate the process of nuclear disarmament. High expectations were placed by the international community on the ratification of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. However,

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these expectations were not realized due to shifts in the orientation of strategic doctrines and the political level decisions taken in their wake and a feeling of deep concern by the international community is reflected in resolution 36/97 I adopted at the thirty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament declared that effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority and that it was essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. It is therefore incumbent upon this Committee during its present session seriously to consider this all-important issue. The establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament, which is long overdue, would provide an appropriate body to conduct multilateral negotiations on concrete measures of nuclear disarmament.

The prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is a priority item that must also be effectively resolved by this Committee. International negotiations on the complete cessation of nuclear tests began more than two decades ago -- well before the inception of this Committee -- and, despite persistent efforts in this as well as in other forums, it has persistently defied solution. Hopes were raised when the Partial Test Ban Treaty was signed that it would be a step towards a comprehensive test ban, but these hopes were not to be realized and nuclear testing, particularly by the major nuclear Powers, continues without respite. It has been stressed time and time again that nuclear testing by the major nuclear-weapon States is being conducted with a view to further sophistication of their nuclear arsenals. Moreover, the effect that the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons have on the horizontal spread of such weapons is also an important factor that cannot be ignored.

What is now needed for an agreement on a test ban is the political will of the major nuclear Powers. In this connection, it is pertinent to recall that, in 1972, the Secretary-General declared that all the technical aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve a final agreement. This has been mentioned again in resolution 36/84 of the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

In the past, failure to achieve a consensus for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in this Committee, as proposed by the Group of 21, has inhibited substantive negotiations. While the responsibility for the cessation of nuclear weapon tests lies with the nuclear-weapon States, there is a universal concern by all States for the early conclusion of a test ban treaty. Therefore, in an issue of such universal concern it would be most propitious to seek solutions through a multilateral approach and the establishment of an ad hoc working group under an effective mandate would be most appropriate.

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I wish now to make a few comments on the topical subject which many of the distinguished speakers before me have appropriately referred to as one of the most urgent issues that is before this Committee. The international community places great expectations on what sort of a comprehensive disarmament programme this Committee will present. We must live up to its expectations if we are to prove our worth as an effective multilateral negotiating forum and justify our commitments to disarmament by the resolution of this all-important issue. In our task we must first realize that fundamental approaches and concepts must be reconciled if we are to move forward in working out the details of what a CPD should constitute.

In this regard, my delegation would like to join other representatives, particularly those of the Group of 21, in urging all concerned to show political will in our joint endeavours for the evolution of an acceptable comprehensive programme.

My delegation shares the consensus view of the Group of 21 that a tangible framework could be evolved in accordance with proposals contained in the working papers submitted by the Group. We feel that this is a step in the right direction when we take account of the fact that these papers were formulated on the basis of United Nations General Assembly resolutions relevant to the work of this Committee, particularly the Final Document, the report of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

These are some of the thoughts that we would like to express as the Committee begins its work for this session. We will, of course, during the course of the present session, elaborate our views further on these and other matters which are on the agenda of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair.

We have exhausted the time available for the morning. If there is no objection, I would suggest that we suspend the plenary meeting now and resume it this afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: In the name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful, the 155th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed. The Committee will listen to the remaining speakers inscribed to take the floor today. I now give the floor to the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Carasales.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I should like first, Mr. Chairman, to express my satisfaction at seeing you preside over the work of this Committee and to assure you of the fullest co-operation of the delegation of the Argentine Republic in helping you to carry out your important task. At the same time, I should like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Sani of Indonesia for the very efficient and cordial manner in which he presided over our deliberations until the beginning of this month. I should also like to add my welcome to the new representatives who have joined this Committee and to assure them that they will receive the fullest co-operation from the delegation of the Argentine Republic. What I have said so far has been a source of satisfaction to me, but now it is my painful duty to convey to the distinguished delegation of Italy the condolences of my delegation on the death of the distinguished Ambassador Cordero de Montezemolo. I would ask the Italian delegation to convey these sentiments to its Government and to the family of Ambassador Montezemolo.

In the statements which have been made so far in this Committee, there have been two common themes, as I am sure we have all noticed. In the first place, speakers have emphasized the ineluctable fact that in four months' time the international community, as reflected in the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, will embark on an in-depth study of one of the fundamental problems of our time, disarmament, and inevitably, it will pronounce judgement on the task accomplished by the body especially responsible for achieving concrete results in this field, namely, the Committee on Disarmament.

The second common theme which has marked this debate has been the general recognition of the deterioration in the present-day international political climate, with a readiness to attribute responsibility for that situation. Accusations and counter-accusations, criticisms and rebuttals, have succeeded each other with unusual frequency and have radically changed the tone of the deliberations which, in principle, should revolve around the items on our agenda or, at any rate, around questions which are specifically within the competence of the Committee.

True, none of the remarks I have just made is original. They merely highlight a reality which we cannot ignore, one which we must face.

The politicization of a discussion intended to be technical is not, per se, a negative factor. Disarmament is not a subject that can be dealt with outside the context of international events and their protagonists, particularly those who, by their power and influence, play a fundamental role in the process. Disarmament and security are two sides of the same coin.

The perception each of us has of the international situation in which we are all involved is certainly a valid element in our work. In any event, awareness of the international situation helps to prevent us from becoming too immersed in the consideration of the topics within our competence, in isolation from the reality which surrounds us, a reality which we must take into account if we are not to be disappointed through attempting the impossible.

But if a political debate occasionally has its value, this value ceases if it is prolonged in time, absorbs our energies and becomes the constant theme of our deliberations. All or nearly all representatives have already expressed their

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views, have evaluated the circumstances which dominate the international scene in various parts of the world, have appraised situations and judged those responsible. To continue that exercise would be repetitive and counter-productive. It is to be hoped that, once this stage which is perhaps necessary and even useful has been passed, the debates will return to their normal course and enable us to devote our attention, without distractions, to what constitutes our short-term challenge: to make the maximum possible contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly within the limits of the meagre results achieved as a result of our efforts in recent years.

Unfortunately, we cannot escape that reality. The results of the work of the Committee on Disarmament will certainly not earn warm praise, and that is particularly serious in the field of nuclear disarmament.

There ought not to be any doubts about the urgency and priority of this problem, and I have used the words "ought not" purposely because my delegation has heard with surprise and bewilderment, particularly in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, certain interpretations in the opposite sense.

The very concept of "priority" implies an order of preference and importance. To assign priority to a series of questions covering nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons, including those which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects, without establishing a degree of hierarchy among them, is to deprive the concept of priority of its content, for if the entire range of questions is assigned priority, then in actual fact nothing has priority.

We have heard, in justification of this position, a somewhat strained interpretation of the Final Document. While it is true that that Document, like any other product of a compromise, may contain some ambiguous phrases, there are many others of such crystal clarity as to preclude any variations in the interpretation of them. I will not quote them textually, for the sake of brevity. In any case, we are all familiar with them, and we cannot ignore them without violating the basic principle of any analysis of an international instrument: good faith.

But over and above the priorities assigned in the Final Document, and over and above what is propounded in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, all of which declare the urgent need for the cessation of the nuclear arms race, there is one undeniable reality: the whole world is concerned -- deeply concerned, judging by the daily press -- at the possibility of a nuclear war and at the continuous increase in the number and destructive power of the weapons capable of unleashing such a war.

One question which will dominate the work of the special session of the General Assembly from the very outset will be: what has the Committee on Disarmament done on this question, to which the most important items on its agenda relate? Regrettably, the reply to this question could not be more negative. Not only has the Committee on Disarmament failed to negotiate anything so far as regards the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, much less on the wider issue which forms the subject of item 2 of its agenda. It has not even managed to establish the machinery which is recognized as to be the most effective means for the conduct of negotiations, namely, appropriate working groups.

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We should not delude ourselves. This will be the most serious shortcoming which will influence any critical assessment of the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. Although other questions with which the Committee is actively concerned may have more intrinsic importance, in public opinion and in fact, no question is more momentous than that of nuclear disarmament.

We fervently hope that, at its current session, the Committee on Disarmament will succeed in making real progress in this field. The Group of 21 has striven unremittingly and submitted written proposals for translating into action that concern which all claim to share. It is not too late to take a first step. Let us do so and let us initiate a process of genuine negotiations which the international community is demanding and our mandate requires of us.

Precisely because the "prevention of nuclear war and reduction of the risks of nuclear war are matters of the highest priority, which should be considered by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament", the General Assembly adopted, by consensus, at its recent session, resolution 36/81 B, from one of the preambular paragraphs of which the above words are taken.

It was the Argentine delegation which, together with the delegations of other, friendly countries, presented the original draft of resolution 36/81 B. That resolution -- which also reproduces expressions from the Final Document -- recognizes "the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race" and the fact that "removal of the threat of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day".

"Aware of the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States", the General Assembly, in paragraph 1 of the resolution, "Urges all nuclear-weapon States to submit to the Secretary-General by 30 April 1982, ... their views, proposals and practical suggestions for ensuring the prevention of nuclear war".

Paragraph 2 of the same resolution contains an identical request to all other Member States that so desire to do likewise because "it is the shared responsibility of all Member States to save succeeding generations from the scourge of another world war". But precisely because they possess arsenals of weapons capable of inflicting nuclear war, it is for the nuclear-weapon countries in the first instance to make suggestions and proposals for the prevention of such a war.

30 April 1982 is not far off. We earnestly hope that the nuclear-weapon States will not ignore the appeal made to them by the General Assembly and will ensure that when the most important question of our time is discussed at the special session of the General Assembly -- as it inevitably will be -- this can be done on the basis of serious, viable and meaningful proposals. It is unlikely that further disappointments will be accepted passively.

General Assembly resolutions 36/97 C and 36/99, likewise adopted by consensus, entrust the Committee on Disarmament with fresh responsibilities pertaining to the prevention of the arms race in outer space. Although it has already established priorities which must be respected -- those to which I referred earlier -- the Committee on Disarmament must not hesitate to take up a new item of undeniable relevance. A preliminary discussion will no doubt be necessary in order to map out the road to be followed, identify the principal issues at stake and indicate the procedures to be adopted. But obviously, the main objective should be the early establishment of a working group. If the function of the Committee is to negotiate,

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each item must be placed on its agenda with the intention of conducting negotiations on that subject in due course, and not simply so that it can be discussed indefinitely. This applies to each and every one of the items on our agenda. Sooner or later, at the appropriate time, the adoption of a new item, relating to outer space, must lead to the establishment of the machinery best suited for conducting negotiations, namely, a working group.

It is barely two months to the end of the first part of the Committee's current session. There is certainly not much time left in which we can try to achieve something concrete to place before the General Assembly at its second special session. The least we can submit is a sufficiently detailed and really meaningful comprehensive programme of disarmament. Fortunately, the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject has been working since the beginning of January, under the expert guidance of Ambassador García Robles. It has made progress, but much still remains to be done. We must concentrate our efforts on this item, because of the inexorable time-limit. If necessary, the Working Group or its contact groups should be given additional time for their meetings. Although in general it is debatable whether all the working groups should have exactly the same working hours, irrespective of the state of their deliberations, in this particular case I believe there can be no doubt that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament calls for special consideration.

In due course, it will be necessary to revert to the consideration of the Committee's methods of working. Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands -- whose departure from this Committee I sincerely regret -- made some very interesting comments on this topic on 2 February last. On this occasion, I should like to reiterate and support one of them: the need for the Committee to have at its disposal the resources necessary to ensure the rapid distribution of the verbatim records of plenary meetings.

Debate means dialogue and for that dialogue to be meaningful, each speaker must be able to reflect without delay on what the others have said. The distribution by each speaker of the text of his speech cannot replace the almost immediate provision of the complete verbatim records, among other reasons because not all speakers circulate their interventions, or only those prepared beforehand or -- and this is common practice -- only speeches delivered in a generally known language are distributed.

The First Committee of the General Assembly has its records practically the next day. It is not too much to ask the same for the Committee on Disarmament.

The methods of work of this Committee are being constantly improved, and while procedural matters cannot replace substantive issues, they can help towards their successful solution.

The Committee has a great deal to do and must do it quickly. One effective measure which would contribute towards that end would be to lighten speeches, and for that reason I will not make any comments on other items, which I shall refer to later.

On this occasion, I will merely express the hope that the results of the current session will constitute a valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament and to the work of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly devoted to this supreme and all-important subject. That is the spirit which will always preside over the action of the delegation of the Argentine Republic.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you for the kind words you addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking the floor for the second time at this early stage of the session and I shall be very brief. The reason for my statement today is what the distinguished Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Dr. Rostow, had to say about the CTBT issue in his statement on behalf of the United States delegation a week ago. Against the background of the requests of the overwhelming majority of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament that it should now, finally and long overdue, establish a working group on this the highest priority item on its agenda, I should like to review the part of Dr. Rostow's statement dealing with the CTB.

In 1977-1978 we were given to understand that the achievement of a CTBT might well be imminent. The three nuclear-weapon States, which had entered into negotiations on the issue in the summer of 1977, all voted in favour of the General Assembly resolution of autumn 1977 which established certain time-frames for such an achievement. It should therefore not be difficult to understand the feelings of disappointment, yes, even resentment, among many of us around this table, when, more than four years later, we cannot even discern the establishment of a Committee on Disarmament working group on the subject. Of course, adding to the depth of our feelings is the fact that the trilateral preparatory negotiations have been dormant for more than one year and a half. The veto right ensuing from the consensus rule in the Committee has been applied ad absurdum when it is used to block procedural decisions on setting up subsidiary bodies to deal with items on our agenda.

Now, I want to devote my attention to what Dr. Rostow had to say on this matter in his statement a week ago. True, he did state the United States position in principle, that the ultimate desirability of a test ban has not been at issue; unanimity has been lacking, however, on questions of approach and timing.

But he went on to say the following, which seems quite startling to me: "Limitations on testing must necessarily be considered within the broad range of nuclear issues." Would this statement imply the United States position to be one of refusing negotiations on a CTBT except in the context of and as a subitem to nuclear disarmament? If that is so, would that be the reason underlying the United States proposal that, in the Committee's agenda for 1982, items 1 and 2 should be merged into one agenda item? I am happy to note that this proposal has been withdrawn; Sweden for one would have opposed it most firmly. Against the prolonged resistance of the United States to establishing a CTBT working group, and against the sentence just quoted, one could easily foresee what would have happened, had the Committee on Disarmament agreed to the United States proposal. The CTB issue would have been sunk to the bottom of the morass of the very complex nuclear weapon issues, not to be raised to the surface until we have reached the millennium of complete nuclear disarmament.

True again, the statement goes on to say that "a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing remains an element in the full range of long-term United States arms control objectives". I take note of the word "long-term", as the United States has joined repeated decisions to make the CTBT the highest priority item on the Committee's agenda. And it is very difficult to understand how the lumping together of the CTBT and "the broad range of nuclear issues" can be in conformity with the legally binding commitments of, inter alia, the United States to a CTBT as expressed in the second preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, which reads as follows:

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"Seeking to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end ...",

as well as in the tenth preambular paragraph of the non-proliferation Treaty of 1968, which reads:

"Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end ...".

There is nothing in these legally binding documents, which were signed and ratified by the United States, that links the CTBT to "the broad range of nuclear issues". On the contrary, a CTBT is explicitly said to be sought for on its own merits. The United States has not abrogated these preambular paragraphs, nor made any announcement of its intention to interpret them in a new and less binding way. The United States is thus, as far as I can see, committed to multilateral negotiations on a CTBT on its own merits.

Let me also note the rather surprising fact that Dr. Rostow's statement did not in any respect take the non-proliferation aspect of a CTBT into account. The risk of nuclear proliferation is, I would have thought, one of the main concerns in this context.

Furthermore, in times past one of the arguments put forward against establishing a CTBT working group in this Committee was the uselessness and the difficulties of running multilateral negotiations in parallel with the trilateral preparatory talks. This is now an invalid proposition, as the trilateral talks have, as I stated earlier, been dormant for one year and a half. It is in fact, in a completely unacceptable situation that the Committee on Disarmament finds itself -- one in which the highest priority item on its agenda is not at present and has for quite some time not been under negotiation anywhere.

Two members of the Committee on Disarmament have been blocking the efforts of this 40-nation body to fulfil its obligations under its mandate and agenda. They challenge an increasingly stronger world public opinion in their unyielding resistance to the most reasonable of all requests -- that this body live up to its duties and commitments.

I believe that for most Governments represented in this room the present situation is totally unacceptable.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank you. That concludes my list of speakers for today. Poland has asked for the floor. I give the floor to Ambassador Sujka.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a very brief statement in my capacity as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries. As I announced during our last informal meeting, my delegation was in the process of preparing a working document consisting of some considerations relating to the organization of the work of the Committee on Disarmament at this session and I would like to place on record that the group of socialist countries will be ready very soon to transmit this document to the secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? If not, I will now adjourn the plenary meeting and convene an informal meeting of the Committee in five minutes' time to continue our consideration of those organizational matters still pending.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee will be held on Thursday, 18 February, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 3.50 p.m.