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REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ESTABLISHED
UNDER RESOLUTION 496 (1981)

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LETTER DATED 15 MARCH 1982 FROM THE MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY ESTABLISHED UNDER RESOLUTION 496 (1981)
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

We have the honour to submit to you herewith the report of the Security Council Commission of Inquiry established under resolution 496 (1981), in accordance with paragraph 3 of that resolution.

(Signed) C. OZORES TYPALDOS, Panama
(Chairman)

J. M. CRAIG, Ireland

K. SEZAKI, Japan

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Report of the Security Council Commission of Inquiry
established under resolution 496 (1981)

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Establishment of the Commission of Inquiry

1. By a letter dated 9 December 1981 (S/14783), the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Seychelles to the United Nations requested that a meeting of the Security Council be urgently convened to consider the invasion of the Republic of Seychelles, on 25 November 1981, by 45 mercenaries and the threat to international peace and security resulting from that situation. The letter stated that the mercenaries, who had come from South Africa, had attacked Seychelles' international airport, causing heavy damage, and taken hostages. Later on, the invaders had been repulsed by the Seychelles defence forces, and those among them who were not captured had fled by hijacking an Air India aircraft and forcing its pilot to fly them to South Africa.
2. The Security Council considered the question entitled "Complaint by Seychelles" at its 2314th meeting, held on 15 December 1981.
3. At that meeting, the representative of Seychelles outlined the events of 25 November 1981 as follows. On that day, at 14.30 Greenwich mean time, a group of 44 foreign mercenaries landed at Seychelles international airport on board a scheduled flight of the Royal Swazi Airlines via Comoros. Royal Swazi Airlines confirmed that the mercenaries had arrived at Matsapha airport in Swaziland by coach from South Africa, posing as members of a sports club. The mercenaries disembarked in the Republic of Seychelles, posing as members of a beer-drinking convention. As they went through customs, customs officers, who had become suspicious after discovering a sub-machine-gun in a piece of luggage belonging to the group, alerted the security forces. Having realized that their plot had been foiled, the mercenaries unpacked their weapons and took over the airport, including the air traffic control tower. They also took everyone at the airport - a total of 70 people - hostage. The defence forces of Seychelles then moved into position and contained the mercenaries at the airport. However, the mercenaries managed to deceive an incoming Air India aircraft into landing, then hijacked the craft and ordered the pilot to take them to Durban, South Africa, with all passengers on board. In all, 44 mercenaries left on the aircraft for Durban, including 1 dead and 2 seriously wounded. Left behind were members of the rear guard of the mercenary force, some of whom had infiltrated the country prior to the arrival of the group of 44. Six of them were captured and were being detained. They were all foreigners, and they had taken part in the fighting. The representative of Seychelles stated that the mercenary attack had resulted in loss of life, injuries and considerable hardship for the whole Seychelles population, as well as extensive material damage estimated at about \$40 million, with serious repercussions on the country's economy. She further stated that there was every reason to believe that South Africa might have been involved in the organization of the invasion.

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4. At the same meeting, the Security Council adopted unanimously, as resolution 496 (1981), a draft resolution (S/14793) prepared in the course of the Council's consultations.

5. The operative paragraph of resolution 496 (1981) read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"...

"1. Affirms that the territorial integrity and political independence of the Republic of Seychelles must be respected;

"2. Condemns the recent mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles and the subsequent hijacking;

"3. Decides to send a commission of inquiry composed of three members of the Security Council in order to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as assess and evaluate economic damages, and to report to the Security Council with recommendations no later than 31 January 1982;

"4. Decides that the members of the commission of inquiry will be appointed after consultations between the President of the Security Council and the members of the Security Council and the Republic of Seychelles;

"5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the commission of inquiry with the necessary assistance;

"6. Decides to remain seized of the question."

B. Composition and mandate

6. In a note dated 24 December 1981 (S/14816), the President of the Security Council stated that following his consultations with the members of the Council, an agreement had been reached, according to which the Commission of Inquiry established under paragraph 3 of resolution 496 (1981) would be composed of Ireland, Japan and Panama. The representative of Ireland would be Mr. Jeremy Craig, the representative of Japan would be Mr. Katsumi Sezaki and the representative of Panama would be Ambassador Carlos Ozores Typaldos.

7. It was subsequently agreed, during consultations among the members of the Commission, that Ambassador Ozores Typaldos would serve as its Chairman.

8. Between 11 and 21 January 1982, the Commission held four meetings at Headquarters, in the course of which it examined its terms of reference, determined the procedure to be followed in the conduct of its work and established a schedule of activities.

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C. Organization of work and outline of activities

9. The Commission determined that, for the purposes of fulfilling its mandate, it was necessary for its members to undertake a visit to the area as a means of acquainting themselves at first hand with the situation. Accordingly, by letters dated 12 January, the Commission informed the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Seychelles to the United Nations and the Permanent Representatives of South Africa and Swaziland to the United Nations of its intention to visit their respective countries in the near future and requested the assistance of their Governments to that effect.

10. In a reply dated 14 January, the representative of Seychelles expressed her Government's readiness to receive the Commission and assured it of its full co-operation. Similarly, by a letter dated 15 January, the representative of Swaziland extended his Government's welcome to the Commission. Up to the time of its departure, the Commission had received no response from the South African Government.

11. Based on that information, the Commission initially organized its visit to the area as follows: Seychelles, from 23 to 30 January; Swaziland, from 31 January to 2 February.

12. However, while on its way to the area, the Commission received a letter dated 22 January 1982 from the representative of South Africa. The text of that letter, together with subsequent communications between South Africa and the Commission are reproduced in annex I to this report. It was in the light of that exchange of communications that the Commission made arrangements to visit South Africa from 3 to 6 February.

13. Prior to its departure from New York, the Commission discussed the issues arising from its mandate under Security Council resolution 496 (1981).

14. At its 2nd meeting, on 12 January, the Commission noted that while its mandate derived specifically from paragraph 3 of resolution 496 (1981), which did not require it to go into the hijacking aspects of the case before it, the hijacking of an Air India aircraft on 25 November 1981 by the retreating mercenaries was indeed an element in the aggression committed against the Republic of Seychelles. The Commission felt, therefore, that discussions with the people directly involved might yield some clues that would help it to fulfil its mandate. Consequently, the Chairman orally requested the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations to arrange for the Commission to interview the crew of the hijacked Air India aircraft. The Commission was assured of the Indian Government's full co-operation in that regard.

15. While making the necessary preparations for its visit to the area, the Commission realized that it would not be in a position to report to the Security Council by 31 January 1982, as called for by paragraph 3 of resolution 496 (1981). Accordingly, the Chairman requested the President of the Security Council to allow the Commission to complete its report and expressed the hope that the Commission would be able to submit its report by early March 1982.

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16. Following informal consultations with the other members of the Council, the President informed the Chairman that no member of the Council objected to the Commission's request.
17. The Commission left New York on 21 January and arrived in Seychelles in the early morning of Sunday, 24 January. The members of the Commission were welcomed at Mahé airport by H.E. Mr. Jacques Hodoul, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ms. Giovinella Gonthier, Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Seychelles to the United Nations. Later that day, the Commission held an introductory meeting with the Seychelles Co-ordinating Committee to discuss the Commission's programme of work and schedule of activities during its stay in Seychelles.
18. On 25 January, the members of the Commission were received by H.E. Mr. France Albert René, President of the Republic of Seychelles.
19. Also on 25 January, the Commission met with the Commissioner of Police, Mr. James Pillay, who provided it with a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the mercenary aggression of 25 November 1981. Later that same day, the Commission, assisted by its experts, visited the airport, where it inspected the damage caused to the facilities as a result of the military action of 25-26 November 1981 and heard explanations from Mr. Loustau-Lalanne, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation.
20. On 26 January, the Commission met with the Minister of Economic Development and Planning, H.E. Dr. Maxime Ferrari, and later had a meeting with the Minister of Youth and Defence, H.E. Mr. Ogilvy Berlouis. Thereafter, the members of the Commission, assisted by the military expert, inspected the weapons left behind by the mercenaries or subsequently retrieved by the police.
21. On 27 January, the Commission spent the whole day hearing the testimony of the seven captured mercenaries.
22. On 28 January, the Commission devoted most of the day to hearing the testimony of the captain and crew members of the Air India aircraft hijacked by the mercenaries on 26 November 1981. The members of the Commission also paid courtesy calls on diplomatic representatives of permanent members of the Security Council.
23. On the final day of its stay in Seychelles, the Commission had a meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and other officials. Later that day, the Commission heard the testimony of some of the people who had been held hostage at the airport during the night of 25-26 November 1981. Finally, at the Ministry of Information, the Commission inspected various other items captured from the mercenaries.
24. On its arrival in Swaziland, on the morning of 30 January, the Commission immediately held an introductory meeting with the Swazi delegation headed by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and including, in addition to officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Works, Power and Communications, the Attorney-General, the Deputy Commissioner of Police, the Director of Civil Aviation and officials of the Royal Swazi National Airways Corporation.

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25. On 31 January, the Commission heard the testimony of Mr. E. E. Hillary, the Deputy Commissioner of Police. Later, at the same meeting, the Commission interviewed several witnesses, including customs and immigration officials, as well as the crew and ground personnel of Royal Swazi Airlines.
26. On 1 February, the members of the Commission were received by H.E. Prince Mabandla Dlamini, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland and also by H.E. Mr. Polycarpe Dlamini, Minister of Justice. The Commission also had a meeting with H.E. Dr. Victor Leibrandt, Minister of Works, Power and Communications, who was accompanied by his Director of Civil Aviation, Mr. D. F. Litchfield.
27. Also on the same day, the Commission met with Mr. Daniel Langeler, Chief Executive Officer of Royal Swazi National Airways Corporation.
28. On 2 February, the Commission interviewed Ms. Colette Hamer, sales representative of Royal Swazi Airlines based in Johannesburg, South Africa.
29. Shortly before leaving Swaziland, on 3 February, the Commission, accompanied by the Deputy Police Commissioner, inspected the security procedures at the airport.
30. The Commission departed on the same day for South Africa. As the members of the South African Government were in Capetown for the session of Parliament, the Commission travelled first to that city in order to meet with the appropriate officials.
31. On 4 February, the Commission had a meeting with H.E. Mr. R. F. Botha, South Africa's Minister for Foreign Affairs.
32. Later that same day, the Commission met with the Minister of Police, H.E. Mr. L. Legrange and the Minister of Justice, H.E. Mr. H. J. Coetsee, as well as with the head of National Intelligence Service, Dr. Lucas D. Barnard.
33. The Commission then travelled to Johannesburg, where it met with the Attorney-General of Natal, Mr. C. Rees and later with the head of Military Intelligence, General P. van der Westhuizen.
34. On 6 February, the Commission interviewed the director of Budget Tours Travel Agency, through which the mercenaries had made their travel plans to go to Seychelles on 25 November 1981.
35. The Commission thus concluded its visit to the area and left for New York.
36. Thereafter, the Commission held two further meetings and a number of informal working sessions at Headquarters, and adopted its report to the Security Council on 15 March 1982.
37. To a large extent the present report is based on the investigation which the Commission was able to conduct during its visit in Seychelles, Swaziland and South Africa.

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38. While the Commission has received full co-operation from most of the Governments concerned, its investigations had to take place within the constraints referred to in paragraphs 272 to 275, below.

39. Furthermore, the Commission, after its return to New York, considered additional elements of information relevant to its mandate. Those developments are the subject of chapters III and IV below.

40. The Commission wishes to express its deep appreciation to the Government of Seychelles for the wide-ranging co-operation it extended to the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate.

41. Similarly, the Commission is most grateful to the Government of Swaziland for its full co-operation.

42. The Commission also appreciates the assistance provided to it by the Government of South Africa in facilitating its contacts with various officials. At the same time, the Commission regrets its inability to meet with the mercenaries in South Africa, which has significantly reduced the effectiveness of its efforts aimed at investigating the background and financing of the mercenary attack of 25 November 1981 against Seychelles.

43. The Commission wishes to express to the Government of India and to the officials of Air India its gratitude for enabling the captain and crew of the hijacked Air India aircraft to testify before the Commission.

44. Finally, the Commission wishes to thank all the other Governments which co-operated with it in the fulfilment of its mandate.

II. VISIT TO THE AREA (21 January-6 February 1982)

A. Visit to Seychelles (24-30 January 1982)

1. Call on the President of the Republic of Seychelles

45. On 26 January, the members of the Commission paid a courtesy call on H.E. Mr. France Albert René, President of the Republic of Seychelles, who welcomed the Commission and assured it of his full support. The President also urged the Commission to seek every piece of information that would help in the fulfilment of its mandate. He inquired, in particular, about the Commission's plans to visit other countries in the area. The Chairman explained that the Commission's plans at that point had not yet been finalized.

2. Initial meetings with Ministers of the Seychelles Government

(a) Seychelles Co-ordinating Committee

46. Soon after its arrival in Seychelles on 24 January, the Commission had a meeting with the Seychelles Co-ordinating Committee to discuss the Commission's

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programme of work and schedule of activities during its stay. The meeting was presided by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and was attended, on the Seychelles side, by the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other officials of that Ministry, as well as officials from the Ministry of Economic Development and Planning, the Director of Civil Aviation and the Attorney-General.

47. Following words of welcome from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, thanked the Co-ordinating Committee and the authorities and people of Seychelles for their welcome and the facilities that had been provided. He then made some preliminary remarks regarding certain aspects of the Commission's schedule of work while in Seychelles. In the light of those remarks and of further discussion with the Co-ordinating Committee, a flexible programme was established, which left it to the Commission to determine, to a large extent, the details of its programme of work. It was also understood that a major statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs would be made at a later stage of the Commission's visit to Seychelles.

(b) Minister of Economic Development and Planning

48. On 26 January 1982, the members of the Commission had a meeting with H.E. Dr. Maxime Ferrari, Minister of Economic Development and Planning. Also attending the meeting were Mr. Robert Grancourt, Principal Secretary of the Ministry, and Mr. Faure, chief economist.

49. In a brief opening statement, the Minister welcomed the members of the Commission and informed them that his Department had prepared a comprehensive paper on the effects of the 25 November 1981 mercenary attack on the whole Seychelles economy, particularly on the crucial tourist industry. He said that the paper was available to the members of the Commission, and he urged them to study it carefully. The paper underscored the extreme vulnerability of a small country like Seychelles to mercenary attacks of the sort carried out on 25 November 1981. As a result of that attack, the country's economic activity had slowed down considerably. In order not to be totally dependent on tourism, Seychelles was in the process of diversifying its economy, particularly in the fields of agriculture and the fishing industry.

50. In response to questions from the members of the Commission and the economic expert assisting them, the Minister indicated that Seychelles international airport had had to be closed for nine days following the attack. He also indicated that during that time about 1,000 tourists had been stranded in various hotels in Seychelles and that the Government had had to work out special arrangements for them.

51. The Minister said that although the Government had indeed expected a 3 per cent drop in the entry of tourists as a result of a 15 per cent revaluation of the Seychelles rupee in March 1981, that measure had not adversely affected tourism and had helped to cut down on inflation in Seychelles. The serious decline in tourists had occurred after the 25 November 1981 attack.

52. In the particular case of South African tourists, the Minister indicated that the attack did not seem to have had any discernible effect; although a drop in the

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entry of tourists from South Africa was expected in the future. He added that the Seychelles Government did not envisage terminating tourism from that country.

53. Asked about the requests for assistance already made by the Seychelles Government, the Minister said that approaches had been made to the European Economic Community (EEC) for emergency assistance involving repairs to the damaged airport installations and for emergency budgetary assistance. He pointed out, however, that apart from a pledge from Sweden for 1.5 million kronor, it was not clear as yet what effective assistance could be expected. He further stated that other countries, including Japan and Australia, had been approached and that small contributions had been received from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the United States of America. He said that the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland had allowed immediate disbursement of £1.5 million granted two years ago to Seychelles for balance-of-payments deficits.

54. The Principal Secretary of the Ministry also answered questions put by the members of the Commission. He indicated, in particular, that the Seychelles Government, through aggressive marketing and reorganization, had been engaged in a major effort aiming at reviving the declining tourist industry prior to the 25 November attack. He assured the Commission that additional material on the subject would be made available to it.

55. At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, thanked the Minister and his officials for their co-operation.

(c) Minister of Youth and Defence

56. On 26 February, the Commission met briefly with H.E. Mr. Ogilvy Berlouis, Minister of Youth and Defence.

57. In response to questions put to him by the members of the Commission, the Minister stated that according to available information, the plan of the mercenaries was to capture the whole leadership of the country while they attended a regular meeting of the Central Executive Bureau. Such meetings, he said, were common knowledge; therefore, the mercenaries could easily have known about them in advance.

58. With regard to the weapons used in the attack, the Minister said that the mercenaries who had left Seychelles in the hijacked plane had taken away with them many of the weapons which they had brought initially. The weapons left behind were mostly sub-machine-guns of Romanian manufacture, together with some ammunition. It had been alleged that the weapons had been supplied by Mr. Khashoggi, a man known for his friendship with the former President of Seychelles, Mr. James Mancham, but the Government had not yet confirmed that.

59. In response to another question, the Minister said that, as a result of the attack by the mercenaries, Seychelles would be forced to increase its defence budget.

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3. Meetings with other government officials

60. The Commission held two meetings with the Commissioner of Police. At the first meeting, which took place on 25 January 1982, the Commissioner was accompanied by the Attorney-General of the Republic of Seychelles. The Commissioner gave a detailed account of the planning and attempted execution of the plot to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Seychelles by hired mercenaries under the direction of their leader, Michael Hoare, 1/ which, he said, was based on factual evidence established by the Seychelles investigating authorities. A great deal of his account was based on the report of the investigations conducted under his direction to date, a copy of which he made available to the Commission. Although the report was of an interim nature, the Commission decided that in view of its importance and central relevance, the report should be included in its own report in toto, 2/ in addition to the summary of the Police Commissioner's account, which is given below.

61. The Commissioner of Police told the Commission that the events of 25 November 1981 at the Seychelles international airport were the result of an international plot to overthrow the Government of Seychelles and reinstate the former President of that country, James Mancham. The Commissioner believed that a meeting had been held in London sometime in September 1981 between Mancham and Michael Hoare, a South African resident of Irish nationality who thereafter proceeded to prepare the necessary ground work for execution of the plot. He recruited a number of men with current or former military experience, particularly those from South African and former Southern Rhodesian élite military forces; it was understood that he organized the procurement of arms through a well-known arms dealer, Adnan Khashoggi; he supervised the disbursement of funds for the expenses and emoluments of the hired mercenaries and drew up the plan for the operation. Several meetings were held in his home town of Hilton and Durban, in the Natal Province, South Africa, during September, October and November 1981, at which details of the plan were discussed between various groups of the recruited mercenaries.

62. According to the findings of the Commissioner of Police, the plan consisted of sending to Seychelles an advance group of mercenaries under the guise of tourists, with specific assignments allotted to them. Eight men and one woman were chosen for that purpose, and they travelled to Seychelles on various dates during October and November 1981, prior to 25 November, when the main party of mercenaries were to arrive in Seychelles to accomplish the plan. Among the advance group, Robert Sims (South African), brother-in-law of Michael Hoare, and Susan Ingle (South African

1/ Michael Hoare passed through Swaziland and entered Seychelles under the alias of Thomas Michael Boarel; apparently his passport was forged by changing his surname to read "Boarel" instead of "Hoare", presumably for the purpose of entering Seychelles (or any other African country for that matter) without being easily detected, in view of his notorious mercenary record.

2/ See annex II to the present report.

resident of British nationality), common-law wife of Robert Sims, were put in charge of operating the mercenaries' expense and emolument accounts, for which purpose they opened bank accounts in Seychelles in their individual names, to each of which an amount equivalent to \$US 10,000 was transferred from a Swiss bank. They were also to secure a "safe house" in Seychelles to be used as the base for preparatory operations. Another member of the advance party, Martin Dolinschek (South African), described as a senior intelligence officer in the South African National Intelligence Services (NIS), 3/ was assigned to collect relevant information in Seychelles and translate it into intelligence. The other members of the group, Des Botes (South African), Aubrey Brooks (Zimbabwean), Bernard Carey (British), Kenneth Dalgliesh (British), Charles Dukes (United States) and Roger England (Zimbabwean) were given a variety of other assignments, including surveying the location and security arrangements of key installations and assuring the safety and comfort of the main group upon its arrival in Seychelles. The members of the advance group were given bags containing concealed sub-machine-guns and rounds of ammunition, in addition to other requisite equipment, to carry to Seychelles. 4/

63. The plan also provided for the main body of mercenaries to arrive in Seychelles in time to mount the operation on the appointed day. The men would have been divided into groups during the operation, with instructions to take control of key points and installations, particularly the State House, army headquarters, the international airport and the Pointe Larue army camp near the airport. As it happened, the main group of the mercenaries arrived in Seychelles on 25 November 1981 and went straight into premature action, owing to the discovery of a machine-gun in his bag belonging to one member of the group. If the operation had gone according to plan, the Commissioner of Police said, the Government of the Republic of Seychelles would have been overthrown by the mercenaries, a taped recording announcing the return of the former President would have been played on the national radio and, according to information attributed to Michael Hoare, the former President himself, together with other accomplices as potential members of the proposed new Government, as well as contingents of troops and police, would have been flown to Seychelles in chartered aircraft from Kenya. The terms of the mercenaries' engagement were that each was given a down payment of 1,000 rand 5/ and each would receive 9,000 rand on successful completion of the plot.

3/ Formerly the Bureau of State Security (BOSS).

4/ It should be mentioned that in the aftermath of the abortive execution of the plan on 25 November 1981, all but three (Des Botes, Kenneth Dalgliesh and Charles Dukes) of the advance group and one member of the main group (Cornelius Puren) were arrested and are currently in custody in Seychelles.

5/ The South African currency. The average rate of exchange of the rand during October 1981 was 1 rand = \$US 1.0365 (IMF: International Financial Statistics: December 1981).

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64. The Commissioner of Police then gave an account of the events leading to the armed encounter at the Seychelles international airport on 25 November 1981. He said that the main group of mercenaries, numbering some 45 men, had travelled by road that day from South Africa to Swaziland, where, by prior booking through an established South African travel agency, they had boarded a scheduled Royal Swazi flight to Seychelles under the guise of being members of a sporting organization, the so-called Ancient Order of Froth Blowers (AOFB). Each was carrying, among other things, a bag with a false bottom concealing a machine-gun and rounds of ammunition. On arrival at the Seychelles airport (about 5.40 p.m., local time), they were met by their colleagues in the advance party as they came out of the airport building, and everything seemed to be going according to plan until an alert customs officer saw a gun apparently protruding through a torn part of the bag of one of the last mercenaries to check through customs. There was immediate confusion, and, on learning of the discovery of their plot, the mercenaries quickly assembled their guns and went into action against the airport security police and, later, the military troops from the Pointe Larue barracks. Intense shooting broke out and continued sporadically throughout the night and well into the next day. It resulted in one Seychellois soldier and one mercenary dead. In desperation, the mercenaries importuned the captain of the Royal Air Swazi aircraft, already in his hotel, to go back to the airport and fly them out of Seychelles, but he declined; in any case, the aircraft had already been too severely damaged in the course of the shooting to be operational at all.

65. At about 10.45 p.m., the Commissioner of Police concluded, a scheduled Air India flight from Salisbury (Zimbabwe), en route to Bombay (India), was induced by the mercenaries in the control tower to make a hazardous landing at the airport. Shortly afterwards, they commandeered the aircraft and forced it to fly the mercenaries, including one dead, to South Africa. The Air India aircraft left Seychelles at about 1.30 a.m. on 26 November 1981 and eventually landed at Louis Botha airport in Durban that same day.

66. In answer to questions from the Commission for clarification, the Commissioner of Police said that it was the captured mercenary Robert Sims, rather than Martin Dolinschek, who had indicated during interrogation that, according to Mike Hoare, the South African Government had sanctioned the mercenary operation against Seychelles. Dolinschek had testified that although he was an intelligence officer in the service of the South African Government, he was on holiday, and that his Government had no knowledge of what he was actually involved in at the time.

67. The second meeting with the Commissioner of Police took place on 28 January 1982. It was principally an organizational meeting at which the Commission sought his assistance and guidance in selecting the most appropriate witnesses to be interviewed by the Commission. In the course of that meeting, the Commission also learned that when the mercenaries commandeered the Air India aircraft, they had menaced the 63 or so hostages being held in the airport building; the Seychelles authorities had therefore decided to let the Air India aircraft depart rather than risk the lives of the hostages. At the time of their departure, no one knew exactly how many of the mercenaries had managed to reach the aircraft in time and how many had been left behind.

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68. The Commissioner of Police also made available to the Commission photocopies and photographs of various relevant evidence, including immigration records; travel documents abandoned by or seized from the mercenaries; airport buildings, showing the damage caused; and testimonies of the captured mercenaries.

4. Meetings with the heads of diplomatic missions in Seychelles

69. The Commission decided that it would be appropriate to call on the heads of the diplomatic missions in Seychelles of the permanent members of the Security Council.

70. On 28 January, the Commission called on the Ambassador of France, the High Commissioner of the United Kingdom and the Chargé d'Affaires of the People's Republic of China and the United States. The Commission did not make a call at the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been informed that the Ambassador was away from his post.

5. Hearing of testimony by captured mercenaries

71. On 27 January, the Commission, with the agreement and assistance of the Government of Seychelles, interviewed individually the seven mercenaries captured or arrested by the Seychelles security forces following the mercenary aggression of 25 November 1981. In each case, the Chairman introduced the members of the Commission and then recited the Commission's mandate. He expressed to each mercenary the Commission's hope that he or she would co-operate in answering to the best of his (or her) knowledge and of his (or her) own free will the questions that the Commission might ask.

72. After establishing the identity, nationality, normal place of residence and occupation of each mercenary from his (or her) response to the Chairman's questions to that end, each mercenary was invited to make an initial statement. In view of the importance and central relevance of the mercenaries' testimony, the Commission decided to include in its report the entire interview conducted with each mercenary, ^{6/} in addition to a summary of the testimony of each mercenary, which is given below.

Jeremiah Cornelius Puren ^{7/} (South African, resident of Johannesburg and Durban, company director)

73. Jeremiah Cornelius Puren stated that he was recruited by Michael Hoare (whom he referred to as Colonel Mike Hoare) to go with him to Seychelles for the

^{6/} See annex VI to the present report.

^{7/} The only one captured from the main group that arrived in Seychelles on 25 November 1981.

purpose of overthrowing the Government there and reinstating former President James Mancham. He went to Mike Hoare's home at Hilton, outside Pietermaritzburg, Natal, where details of the plan were worked out and he was told to join a group of persons committed to that same cause for travel by road to Manzini, Swaziland, and thence by air to Seychelles.

74. For that trip, he said, he was assigned to check the names of the group against a list to ensure that everybody was on board. He said that he did not know anyone else in the group except Michael Hoare. Of the chain of command in the group, he confirmed that Michael Hoare was undoubtedly in charge, with Peter Duffy as the "master of ceremonies"; he, himself, was to be the assistant to Peter Duffy. Describing the preparations for the journey to Seychelles, he said that he applied for a new passport at the Ministry of the Interior in Durban on Monday, 22 November, and obtained it on Wednesday, 25 November 1981, just in time to join his colleagues for the overland trip to Swaziland.

75. On the matter of the arms to be used, he understood from Michael Hoare that the arms were already in Seychelles but was surprised to learn on the final day, too late for him to withdraw from the venture, that members of the group had to carry their own arms and ammunition. However, he said, he had rejected a combat role during the operation; therefore he did not carry a gun-bag to Seychelles, only a bag full of beach toys, which would be used deceptively to reinforce the group's assumed sporting character.

76. As to the financing of the operation, he again understood from Michael Hoare that the money had come from private sources and had been raised by James Mancham. With regard to the involvement of other Governments in the plan, he said that Michael Hoare had not said anything to him.

77. In answer to the Commission's questions, he said that he had served in the South African Air Force during the war, in the Royal Air Force after the war and, in 1961, in the air force of the Katanga forces during the Congolese civil war. He said that his assignment in Seychelles would have been to secure and operate the control tower on the day planned for the operation. In fact, when things went wrong at the airport, he said that he ended up, among other things, marshalling and confining the hostages, telephoning the Swazi aircraft captain to plead for evacuation and imploring Michael Hoare to arrange a cease-fire in view of the hopelessness of the situation resulting from the premature and accidental execution of the operation. Later, he said, he fled to the mountains where he wandered and hid for 17 days and had no knowledge until his surrender that most of his colleagues had escaped back to South Africa aboard the Air India aircraft.

78. He admitted to the role of a mercenary but disclaimed the motivation of money. He said he had done it because of his friendship with Michael Hoare, whom he had known since the days of their mutual adventures in the Congo.

Martin Dolinschek, 8/ alias Anton Lubic (South African, intelligence officer with the South African National Intelligence Services (NIS) based in Durban)

79. Martin Dolinschek said that he did not consider himself a mercenary at all but a respectable officer in the intelligence service of the South African Government. 9/ He had been recruited by Michael Hoare to do reconnaissance and intelligence work for the operation against Seychelles at a time when he said he was on vacation from his official duties. He had known Michael Hoare since 1974, when, on instructions from the South African Government, he had delivered a message to him officially, advising him to abandon the operations he was discovered to be planning unilaterally in Southern Rhodesia. Since then, the two had become friends.

80. He did not intimate to his superiors this plan against Seychelles, he said, because he assumed that they already knew about it. He indicated, moreover, that all along the Government of South Africa was aware of plans to overthrow the Government of Seychelles; the operation attempted on 25 November 1981 was only one of several that had been hatched since the coup d'état in Seychelles in 1977. He said he himself had prepared an intelligence report on the last plan he had heard of in 1980 and given it to the army general at his intelligence headquarters but heard nothing of it afterwards. He did not know whether it had been approved or not. He also explained that another reason why he did not report on the 25 November 1981 plan was because, on the latter occasion, Michael Hoare had all the requisite ingredients for the operation - a sponsor, money and supplies - and, therefore, did not require any assistance. In his belief, the Government of South Africa was not privy to the plan but had given tacit approval to it.

81. He indicated that his actions were motivated by ideological considerations and practical, professional reasons. He said that Seychelles was believed by South Africa to be a strict Marxist régime under outside influence; South Africa therefore thought that it would be doing the people of Seychelles a great service by rescuing them from such a régime. Since his arrival in Seychelles, however, he said, he had not found evidence to support that analysis.

8/ According to his testimony to the Seychelles authorities during interrogation he obtained a passport officially under his pseudonym of "Anton Lubic". He repeated this information during his testimony to the Commission. In answer to a question in the South African Parliament on 19 February 1982, the Minister of Interior, Mr. Heunis, admitted that the authorities had indeed issued a new passport to Martin Dolinschek under the alias of Anton Lubic.

9/ According to press reports published early in December 1981, an alias of Dolinschek was "Martin Donaldson"; an official of the Durban regional office of NIS reportedly indicated that Martin Donaldson had worked for the organization but "had left about two months ago".

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82. On the practical side, he said that on the basis of its intelligence reports, South Africa was apprehensive about the outcome of the forthcoming elections in Mauritius; in the likely event of a change of Government there, he said, South Africa would have no guarantee of continued landing and refuelling facilities in that country for its long-haul flights to the East, Far East and Australia. Permission to use Diego Garcia, a United States military base, was not certain. Therefore, it was desirable to have a friendly régime in Seychelles which would be obliged to grant the requisite facilities to South Africa in return, if necessary.

83. He then described the details known to him of the plan to accomplish the government change-over operation following the proposed coup d'état by the mercenaries. He said that, according to Michael Hoare, contingents of some 60 to 70 military troops and police personnel were to be flown to Seychelles from Kenya for the purpose of taking over the law enforcement work. The mercenaries would then withdraw immediately aboard the aircraft that had brought in the security forces from Kenya, so that the whole operation would look like a completely black African affair; otherwise it might look like South African aggression. He was certain of this because, he said, he had been approached at one time to find a possible source for the provision of the requisite aircraft, after Michael Hoare's original plan to charter an aircraft had fallen through. According to his account, Dolinschek discovered that the company he had in mind for that purpose had gone into liquidation. However, before his departure in advance for Seychelles, Michael Hoare had told him not to worry about the problem, since the Kenya Government would fix the whole thing. He believed that without the Kenya connexion the whole operation would be a flop. He was unable to say whether there had been any direct co-ordination between the Governments of Kenya and South Africa over the operation.

84. On the question of financing, he said that Mike Hoare had told him that they had \$1 million for the operation. According to his understanding, each mercenary would get 1,000 rand when they signed on, and they were each promised \$10,000, or 12,000 rand, later. As for himself, he did not receive any financial benefit, except his expenses in Seychelles. He would not accept any money; Mike Hoare could pay for the defence of others, but he was not taking it. Only if his Government wanted to pay for his defence, would he accept it, and he thought it was its duty.

85. On the questions of the arms used by the mercenaries, he said that the South African Government had possibly provided the arms. He gave the instance of South Africa's recent foray into Angola, during which, he said, the South African forces captured several truckloads of arms and ammunition of East European manufacture. However, he added that it was very easy to purchase arms in South Africa, particularly those made in East European countries, which sold very cheaply. These could also be procured easily in South Africa. It would thus be easy for the Government to provide the weapons.

86. As regards the events at the airport during the mercenary aggression, he said that when the hostilities broke out, he returned to his hotel overlooking the airport, from where he witnessed the events of the evening and the next day.

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Robert Charles Sims (South African, resident of Hillcrest, Natal,
horse trainer)

87. Robert Sims told the Commission that he had been recruited by his brother-in-law, Michael Hoare, to go to Seychelles a month in advance and participate in an operation to overthrow the Government of Seychelles which was expected to be bloodless, but that he did not know that the purpose was to reinstate the former President. He did not know of any involvement of any Government in the plan.

88. His specific assignment was to manage bank accounts established in Seychelles in order to facilitate the operation, although he had also carried two weapons into the country. He had already given funds to members of the advance group as required. If the operation had gone according to plan, he said, he would have handed over the guns and the funds to the appropriate people, and his role in the operation would have ended. Asked about his motivation for participating in the venture, he stated that he was not prompted by any political convictions; he was just lured by the prospect of a month's vacation in Seychelles "with all expenses paid". He had been paid 5,000 rand initially, with the promise of a further 5,000 on successful completion of the operation. He subsequently admitted to his being a mercenary.

89. On his relationship with Marin Dolinschek, he said that he had first met him when the two drove in their individual cars to a firing range in South Africa where the guns acquired for the mercenaries were being tested. Sims himself had been involved not only in testing the guns but in reassembling them according to Michael Hoare's specifications. It was only after Dolinschek's arrival in Seychelles, he said, that Dolinschek identified himself as looking after the interests of his Government. On the day the main group arrived in Seychelles, he said, he went to the airport to meet them, but on hearing a gunshot, he got into his car and drove off.

Susan Josephine Ingle (South African resident of British nationality,
housewife)

90. Susan Josephine Ingle told the Commission that she had gone to Seychelles with Robert Sims but that she had no knowledge of the real plan of what was going to happen, although Michael Hoare had assured her and Robert Sims that there would be no bloodshed. All she knew, she said, was that she was to operate a bank account in Seychelles for the convenience of herself and her common-law husband, Robert Sims.

91. She had been told by Robert Sims that some people would be arriving in Seychelles on 25 November 1981. Sims went to the airport to meet them, but she stayed at the house. While in Seychelles, she said, she and Robert Sims had received telephone calls from Mrs. Hoare, conveying messages from Michael Hoare.

Roger England (dual British and Zimbabwean citizenship, resident of Durban,
South Africa, unemployed at time of the operation)

92. Roger England told the Commission he had been approached by Barry Gibbon with regard to the operation and had accepted recruitment for the material reward it

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offered - 1,000 rand in advance and 10,000 afterwards - bearing in mind his unemployment and desperate search for a job at the time. He said that he had never met Michael Hoare before, although he knew of him from his (Hoare's) publicized exploits in the Congo. On his departure for Seychelles as part of the advance group, of which he said Barney Carey was designated to be the commander, he was given a bag to carry which he suspected from its weight must contain a weapon. He was familiar with the AK-47 rifles, since he had used them during this military service in the Southern Rhodesian army. He was required to be at the airport in Seychelles on the day of arrival of the main party of the mercenaries, just in case anything went wrong, for the purpose of securing the airport. When things actually did go wrong on 25 November 1981, he was, instead, ordered by Michael Hoare to join three other mercenaries in an attempt to storm the Pointe Larue army barracks.

93. He said that prior to his departure for Seychelles to join the advance group, he had participated in several preparatory meetings and briefings under the direction of Michael Hoare. It was at those briefings that he learned vaguely about the command structure and assignments for the operation: Michael Hoare was the over-all commander, and Peter Duffy was his deputy. There would be three groups, two of which would be under the care of Peter Duffy and Barney Carey. England was in Group I, which was assigned to take control of the army and the barracks and the radio station, where they would play a taped recording; Group II was to take control of the army headquarters and the State House. Group III was to take control of the airport, the airport terminal and the barracks at the airport. There were one or two other targets; the telecommunications centre in town was to be Mike Hoare's command centre, manned by three persons. No resistance was expected, as they were told that many members of the army and the population would be sympathetic.

94. Roger England recalled being told by Michael Hoare at two briefings that the Government of South Africa had been very helpful. Hoare had also said that if there was any problem in South Africa with the weapons they should phone him and he would get on to the appropriate people. Hoare had added that within 24 hours of successful completion of the operation troops might be sent to the island from Kenya. England estimated that the total cost of the operation might amount to some \$2 million, and he also recalled being told by Michael Hoare that the money was being provided by James Mancham.

Aubrey Frank Brooks (Zimbabwean, resident of South Africa, printer by trade)

95. Aubrey Brooks started his testimony by explaining his motivation for joining and participating in the mercenary operation: he and his wife had recently lost a joint printing business, and he desperately needed immediate capital to start a new one. He was recruited by a Ken Dalgliesh, who afterwards introduced him to Michael Hoare.

96. He described in detail the preparatory meetings held in South Africa prior to his departure for Seychelles as one of the advance group. In addition to the familiarization assignments to be conducted with his colleagues in the advance party, he said, he also had a special assignment to play two taped recordings on the radio after a successful take-over of the Government. He was assured that the operation would be bloodless, since virtually the whole populace badly wanted a change of Government.

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97. He said that on the day of his departure for Seychelles with three other colleagues (Des Botes, Barney Carey and Ken Dalgliesh), he was given a travel bag to carry which he soon realized contained a concealed weapon, although he had been assured by Micheal Hoare that the weapons for the operation were already on the island.

98. On the exact details of the plan, he said, his knowledge was only sketchy. Michael Hoare was the central figure in the whole operation, who told them only the basic minimum for their individual assignments. But he remembered hearing from Hoare that two Governments were backing the operation, though no specific Governments were mentioned. He was also unaware of any precisely defined command structure of the whole group, which he said might have been left vague on purpose, but as for their advance group in Seychelles, he felt that Barney Carey was in charge.

99. Of his involvement in the events of 25 November 1981 at the airport, he said that on the outbreak of hostilities, following the discovery of a gun in one of the mercenaries' bag, Michael Hoare instructed him with three other colleagues to go to the army barracks at the airport and block the gate so that no one should get out. There, he related, they were fired on by the army, and he himself was wounded in the leg, whereupon they retreated. He wandered up the hill during the night, and the following morning he surrendered to the police.

Bernard Stanley Carey (British, resident of South Africa, businessman)

100. Bernard Carey told the Commission that he had been recruited by Michael Hoare, who assigned him to carry a concealed weapon on a test run to Seychelles on 31 October 1981, a mission he successfully accomplished, handing the weapon over there to Robert Sims. On the second mission, he returned to Seychelles on 21 November 1981 to be in charge of the advance group of mercenaries, pending the arrival of the main group on 25 November 1981.

101. He said that he did not know much about the total plan; he had attended only four meetings in Durban and near Pietermaritzburg, but he believed that Michael Hoare had quite a lot of money for the cause and he was under the impression that the Swazi aircraft that carried the main group to Seychelles had been chartered by Hoare. He was also led to believe that the operation would not be military, since, according to Michael Hoare, the vast majority of the people, including the army, would eagerly support the operation. He quoted Hoare as saying, "you won't hear a shot fired".

102. Bernard Carey then described in detail the events at the airport after the arrival of the main group on 25 November 1981. After the discovery of the gun with one of the mercenaries and the subsequent gunshots, four members of the advance group were sent to secure the army barracks at the airport. Meanwhile, the first members of the main group were already starting to move in their mini-bus towards their hotel, followed by Carey's car carrying Michael Hoare to his living quarters. But when the four that had been sent to the army barracks were shot at and the shooting at the airport continued, Hoare decided that everybody must turn back to the airport. There they all assembled their weapons and went into action. Shortly afterwards the Air India aircraft arrived, and Michael Hoare negotiated

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a cease-fire with someone on the telephone; the result was that he secured the evacuation of most of the mercenaries aboard the Air India aircraft. Carey himself had declined the opportunity of getting away on the aircraft because he wanted to go to look for the wounded Brooks. He searched for Brooks through the night. He spent the morning halfway up the hill, from where, he said, he could see clearly heavy firing and shelling going on at the airport. He then fell into the hands of the Seychelles soldiers and was arrested.

6. Interview of witnesses

103. On 29 January 1982, the Commission, after prior consultation with the Commissioner of Police and with the co-operation of the Minister of Defence interviewed, individually or in groups, 10 of the people held as hostages by the mercenaries on 25 November 1981. The 10 people consisted of a station officer for aviation, three security police officers on duty at the airport on that day, an air traffic controller and five military personnel, including a major, who had been involved in the engagement against the mercenaries.

104. The witnesses outlined their individual experiences and gave eyewitness accounts of the events at the airport from the arrival of the Royal Swazi Airlines flight until they were freed the next day. They all described the mercenaries as panic-stricken and their behaviour as disorganized, once their true identity had been discovered. When the mercenaries realized that the odds were heavily against them, some of the witnesses related, they sought to establish contact with the Seychellois security forces and pleaded with them to agree to a cease-fire. Some of the mercenaries who entered into conversation with the hostages, it was said, asserted that the whole operation was being undertaken in order to reinstate former President James Mancham, who, the mercenaries claimed, would be returning to Seychelles shortly.

105. The three security police officers gave details of how a gun was discovered in the bag of one of the mercenaries and of the events that followed, leading to exchanges of fire between the mercenaries and the security forces. The first shots had been fired by the mercenaries, who seemed to be in commanding control of the situation until the arrival of military reinforcements from the Pointe Larue barracks. One of the security officers had managed to reach the police headquarters and the military by telephone. For their part, the five military witnesses described their engagement against the mercenaries, which had included the mercenaries' attempt to storm the military barracks and solicit support for their cause.

106. The air traffic controller related that about five mercenaries went upstairs and forced their way into the control tower. She told them that a scheduled Air India flight was due in shortly but that in the circumstances she felt obliged to advise the captain not to land. However, she said they told her to do nothing of the sort; instead they compelled her to act as if everything was normal.

107. Generally, all 10 witnesses appeared not to have engaged in any extensive conversation with the mercenaries or to have made close scrutiny for the purpose of establishing their identity. But many of them recalled hearing very often the name and authority of "Tom" (Mike Hoare), who clearly appeared to be the leader of the mercenaries.

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7. Interview of the officers and cabin crew of the hijacked Air India aircraft

108. As indicated in paragraph 14 above, prior to its departure from Headquarters, the Commission, through the good offices of the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations, explored the possibility of interviewing the officers and crew members of the Air India flight No. 224 scheduled from Salisbury (Zimbabwe) to Bombay (India) via Seychelles on 25 November 1981. It was that flight which, having landed at Seychelles airport, was hijacked by the mercenaries for their escape back to South Africa. The Commission hoped that the Air India flight personnel might have gleaned useful information on the identity, motives and other aspects of behaviour of the mercenaries.

109. While in Seychelles, the Commission was able to interview the manager of Air India in Seychelles and the officers and crew of the flight in question, who had travelled from India for that purpose. The Commission wishes to reiterate its gratitude to the Indian authorities and its deep appreciation to the Air India personnel concerned for their co-operation in this matter.

110. The interview took place on 28 January 1982, and the local manager and Air India flight personnel were accompanied and assisted by an attorney representing Air India. In addition to the local manager and the attorney, the group consisted of eight other persons: the captain, the first officer, the supernumerary first officer, the navigator, the flight engineer, the aircraft maintenance engineer and two cabin crew members. In summarizing the testimony of the Air India personnel given below, the Commission paid particular attention to those parts of the testimony having direct relevance to the terms of its mandate.

111. The local manager of Air India informed the Commission that at about 6.45 p.m. on 25 November 1981, he received a telephone message at home from his assistant that there was trouble at the airport, which apparently had been taken over by hostile elements that had just arrived on the Royal Swazi flight. Gun-fire had broken out, and the Government had imposed a 24-hour curfew starting at 7 p.m. Feeling great concern for the scheduled Air India flight from Salisbury due in the airport at 10 p.m., he said, he tried frantically for almost two hours to get in touch by telephone with all possible authorities but was unable to get any further details about the events at the airport. He then made unsuccessful attempts to put through a call to his regional director in Nairobi, as he wished to relay a message to the captain of the Air India flight, advising him not to land at Seychelles. He added that he could not leave his house, in view of the curfew.

112. The Air India attorney assured the Commission that the actions of the local Air India manager indicated without doubt that Air India had neither prior knowledge of the events at the Seychelles airport on 25 November 1981 nor any spontaneous intention of accommodating the mercenaries.

113. The captain and commander of the Air India aircraft described in detail the events relating to his landing at Seychelles airport and the subsequent events. Although he had failed to get any response to his signals from the Seychelles control tower until just before landing, he said, he did not suspect anything

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unusual, such as closure of the airport, because he had been in touch with Nairobi, the flight information centre (FIC) controlling Seychelles, as well as with other terminals en route, but had not been advised of any adverse situation.

114. He was not aware of any attempts by the security forces, such as the use of pyrotechnics or tracer bullets, to warn him against landing. In any case, bearing in mind the physical geography of Seychelles, he could not have risked aborting the landing after having descended below a certain level. All that time, he said he was receiving instructions from the control tower that appeared to be normal and technically correct.

115. The landing was hazardous. As he was about to land, he saw that the runway was partially obstructed by two camouflaged army vehicles; he tried to avoid a collision but one wing flap hit the second vehicle on touchdown and was damaged.

116. After the plane had taxied to a stop, he was summoned to the airport building where he went under armed guard, together with the first officer. From that point onward, the plane fell under the control of the mercenaries. The mercenaries, after refuelling the aircraft, forced him to fly them, together with his 65 passengers and 14 crew members, to South Africa at gunpoint. Prior to taking off, the captain observed, he overheard Michael Hoare in a telephone conversation offering to let the Air India plane and its passengers go if the Seychellois security forces would stop firing and clear the runway. The captain himself was instructed to speak to the Commissioner of Police in that vein without mentioning the mercenaries' demand to be flown to South Africa. Consequently, he was allowed to inspect the runway before taking off.

117. After taking off, the captain said, he was unable to contact the Nairobi FIC, but managed to contact Mauritius, which alerted Johannesburg. The captain was able to indicate to Johannesburg that his plane was being hijacked to Durban. At that time, Johannesburg informed him that Durban was closed for the night. Shortly afterwards, Johannesburg came back to him and assured him that he would be able to land at Durban.

118. On arrival at the Louis Botha Airport, Durban, the mercenaries asked for a doctor and "top security personnel". They were surprised to see that armed militia men surrounded the hijacked aircraft so soon after it landed.

119. The other officers and crew members of the Air India aircraft related similar accounts of the events. In answer to various questions from the Commission, they all said that they had not engaged in conversation with the mercenaries; nor had they overheard any conversation between them that would have given any indication as to the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression.

120. Regarding the reference to "top security personnel", one Air India officer recalled that one mercenary in the cockpit elaborated by instructing him to ask for "senior personnel from the Security Branch" and not "top security personnel". At the Durban airport, the persons who met the plane on the tarmac and the mercenaries who made physical contact with them did not appear to him to be strangers to each other.

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8. Inspection of the airport and damaged installations

121. On 25 January 1982, the Commission made an inspection tour of the international airport conducted by the Acting Director of Civil Aviation, who was accompanied by the officer in charge of the airport defence. It saw material damage resulting from the attack by mercenaries. The facilities which had suffered considerable damage included the control tower, air traffic control building, cargo building, administration building, aviation workshop, meteorological office, electrical and mechanical department, arrivals and departure hall, VIP building, baggage handling area, as well as the international flight apron. Several vehicles had been damaged, and a caravan containing valuable equipment had been completely destroyed. Electrical and mechanical equipment damaged in the course of the fighting had suffered further deterioration as a result of heavy rains in the days following the attack. Evidence was also shown of those parts and installations that had since been repaired or replaced in order to render the airport operational again. A number of portable articles had been found to be missing when the civil authorities took inventory after the incident and would have to be replaced.

122. The Commission also saw the Royal Swazi aircraft on which the main group of mercenaries had travelled to Seychelles. It was standing on the flight apron in a damaged condition.

123. After the inspection of the airport, the Commission had a meeting with the Acting Director of Civil Aviation who had been held hostage by the mercenaries. In the course of the meeting, he elaborated on his eyewitness account of the events at the airport during the mercenary aggression. He had previously submitted to the police authorities a written report of his account, and he made a copy of that report available to the Commission. In view of the detailed nature of the account from such an authoritative eyewitness, the Commission decided to include in its report the full text of the report of the Acting Director of Civil Aviation. 10/

9. Examination of the weapons and ammunition left behind by the mercenaries and other material evidence

124. On 26 January, at Police headquarters, the Commission was shown a collection of the weapons and rounds of ammunition that had been captured from the mercenaries during the gun battle at the airport, or found or taken subsequently from the mercenaries in the advance group. The military expert accompanying the Commission made a thorough examination and study of the weapons and ammunition. The collection altogether consisted of 19 AKM sub-machine-type guns, 11/ six of them of Hungarian make and 13 of Romanian make, as well as several rounds of ammunition, some in loose form and some in unopened boxes. A descriptive list and technical

10/ See annex III to the present report.

11/ Witnesses have variously described the weapons as sub-machine-guns and assault rifles. These are apparently alternative descriptions of the same weapon.

explanation of the weapons and ammunition prepared by him for the Commission is reproduced in annex VII to the present report.

125. On 29 January 1982, at the Ministry of Information, the Commission inspected various items of material evidence left behind by or captured from the mercenaries. They included a number of the sports bags with false bottoms used by the mercenaries to conceal the weapons, blood-stained clothing, travel bags, books, toys and children's items, photo-copies of travel and other documents. Photographs of some of those items are reproduced in annex IX, which contains a selection made by the Commission from relevant photographs provided by the Seychelles authorities.

10. Concluding meeting with the Minister for Foreign Affairs

126. On 29 January, the Commission held a meeting with H.E. Mr. Jacques Hodoul, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was accompanied by the Principal Secretary of his Ministry and by the Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

127. Speaking first of his country's relations with South Africa, the Minister stated that South Africa had very good reasons to want to destabilize Seychelles and overthrow its present Government. In the first place, it would like to see in Seychelles a régime more favourable to its own interests and to its policy of apartheid. South Africa, he said, had a well-established tradition of committing aggression against countries that pursued an independent policy, and that aggression was becoming more violent as the independence of Namibia drew nearer. Another reason for South Africa's displeasure with the Seychelles Government could be the active campaign pursued by that Government in favour of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. Still another reason could be that Seychelles had closed its tourist promotion office in Johannesburg and thwarted South Africa's plans to develop the Seychelles airport as a transit airport for South African Airways in order to bypass the African continent.

128. South Africa's hostile attitude towards Seychelles and others in the region took many forms, including articles in the official press and a more subtle propaganda in other publications. South Africa used trade relations as an instrument for penetrating the country.

129. Before the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression, there had been other attempts, but those plots had been discovered in time and denounced before they could materialize. Concerning the latest plot, the Seychelles Government believed that it must have been in preparation for at least a year and a half. The Minister suggested that perhaps the Commission could ask the intelligence services of some of the big Powers if they had any knowledge about it, especially since the attempt had taken place while the "Bright Star" operation was still on.

130. All those aspects, he continued, related to the policy of the current Government in Seychelles, which came to power in June 1977. Prior to that, Seychelles had had a corrupt, neo-colonial régime which had entertained very close, although not diplomatic, relations with South Africa and whose former President had, according to press reports, personal relationships with certain South African individuals.

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131. In response to questions from the members of the Commission, the Minister further indicated that the present régime in Seychelles had inherited a tradition of trade with South Africa, to which it had been unable to put an end thus far. However, its declared policy was to try to reduce trade links with South Africa by exploring alternative sources. In the particular case of tourism, the Government's current policy was that it would not prevent South African tourists from coming to Seychelles.

132. Turning to the second topic, which related to Kenya, the Minister said that much had been written in that regard which did not always reflect the view of his own Government or of the Government of Kenya. The whole matter had started when Kenya was somehow mentioned in the course of a meeting with journalists and then blown out of proportion in world press. In order to prevent the relations between the two States from being conducted by journalists and newspapers, the President of the Republic of Seychelles had decided to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs as a special envoy to see President Moi of Kenya and had later written a letter to him. While it would be improper for the Foreign Minister to reveal what was said during that meeting, he could tell the Commission that President Moi had fully agreed to give all his personal co-operation in any way he could in order to throw as much light as possible on the matter.

133. The allegations in question concerned the role of former President Mancham and his activities in Nairobi shortly before the mercenary attack of 25 November 1981. It had been alleged that Mr. Mancham would have been flown in from Nairobi as soon as whatever was intended to happen in Seychelles had happened; that he would have launched an appeal for assistance to friendly countries; and that troops - whose nationalities were not specified - would have been flown in from Kenyan territory.

134. The position of the Seychelles Government was that even if those allegations were true, that did not necessarily implicate the Kenyan Government. Kenya and Seychelles might just have been victims of their geographical proximity.

135. However, there were certain points which the Commission might wish to verify, with the assistance of the Kenyan Government. The first point concerned Mr. Mancham's alleged presence in Nairobi in the month of November 1981 and his alleged discussions with certain people there; the second concerned the identification of the taped message which one of the mercenaries was supposed to broadcast; and the third concerned the Beechcraft Kingair plane chartered from the company called Sunbird Charters, which was allegedly due to fly to Seychelles shortly after things had happened.

136. Responding to further queries from the Commission, the Minister said that he had not put any specific questions to President Moi in the course of their meeting but that the President of Seychelles had written to President Moi since. He added that the Seychelles authorities were still in the process of gathering information at that time. The Minister also made it clear that apart from the allegations by mercenaries, and perhaps others, the Seychelles Government had no factual information directly linking ex-President Mancham to the alleged plan to fly him in from Nairobi. On the other hand, he said, it was known in Seychelles that Mr. Mancham had friends in Nairobi.

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137. Responding to questions of a technical nature concerning the flight of the chartered Beechcraft plane, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation said that he could not confirm at the time the exact date on which the first application for clearance had been received or whether the plane was to fly from Nairobi or Mombasa. He added that whether that type of airplane could fly directly from Kenya to Seychelles depended on a number of factors.

138. The third point raised by the Minister concerned the violation of Seychelles airspace by unidentified aircraft. The Seychelles Government felt great concern about those violations. The Minister gave three specific incidences of such violations, indicating that one incident took place just before the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression and the other two shortly afterwards. In the case of the first incident, a report had been prepared for the Seychelles authorities. 12/

139. The Seychelles Government regarded the other two violations as even more serious, since they had occurred on two successive days following the aggression, while a state of emergency was in force over the whole territory of Seychelles. The Minister reminded the Commission that the Government of Seychelles had drawn attention to the violation of its airspace in a letter dated 1 December 1981 (S/14777) addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in which the Government gave warning against any further such violations of its airspace. The violations stopped only when the Government issued the warning that it would shoot down any other plane that violated its airspace.

140. In response to questions on that subject, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation said that all three incidents had occurred after dark, the first one on 15 November. While there was no equipment at the time to trace the flights mechanically, the planes had been flying low enough for the senior controller to hear them and identify a certain type of engine. He also indicated that the first aircraft to arrive in Seychelles after 25 November were two planes from Tanzania, early in the afternoon of 26 November. The Seychelles authorities knew about those flights, which had been cleared in the usual manner. Although not all the equipment at the airport was functioning at the time, it was possible for the control tower to communicate with the pilots from approximately 60 miles and to provide them with essential navigational assistance. The Acting Director of Civil Aviation further indicated that the Seychelles authorities were in the process of instituting a controlled airspace of a radius of 150 nautical miles. All the relevant aviation authorities would be informed of that measure and of the fact that prior permission would be required for overflying and landing.

12/ The Commission was provided with the report prepared by the senior air traffic control officer. In transmitting that report to the Minister of Youth and Defence the Acting Director of Civil Aviation had expressed the assumption that, in all probability, the aircraft concerned could be that of a United States Air Force P3B Orion type. The texts of the transmittal letter and of the report itself are reproduced in annex VIII to the present report.

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141. The final point raised by the Minister in his statement related to Royal Air Swazi. The Swazi Government, he said, had been quite helpful from the beginning. However, certain questions remained to be answered, particularly with regard to the scheduling of certain flights of Royal Air Swazi to Seychelles.

142. At his request, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation then gave the Commission a historical view of the relations between Swaziland and Seychelles in civil aviation matters and answered pertinent questions.

143. He said that the first request for a meeting to start negotiations for an air-service agreement between the two countries had been made in March 1977 by Swaziland, while Mr. Mancham was still President. For some reason, nothing was done until May 1980, when a similar request was made through an office of the Swaziland Government based in Nairobi. At that time, a formal bilateral agreement had been signed between the two Governments. It provided, *inter alia*, for Royal Air Swazi to fly to Seychelles, via Tananarive, on a weekly (Tuesday, Wednesday) basis. However, after the first flight on 5 May, Swaziland had requested certain changes in routing and flight frequency. It had first requested that Moroni (Comoros) be substituted for Tananarive. That change was motivated by the refusal of the Government of Madagascar to grant the company the exercise of the fifth-freedom traffic right. Then came a request for four additional flights for Sundays, 13, 20, 27 December and 3 January, with the explanation that those extra flights were for the coming peak winter season, when the company had additional demand of traffic. Finally, the scheduled flights had not been carried out regularly. More particularly, the 25-26 November flight had been cancelled then reinstated, and its reinstatement had been communicated only through a "verbal notification" and not in accordance with standard procedure.

144. In response to a question, the Acting Director of Civil Aviation said that, to his knowledge, the company was experiencing economic difficulties on that route.

145. At the end of the meeting, the Minister reaffirmed his Government's desire to help the Commission in its investigation and expressed the hope that it would establish certain things which the Seychelles Government had not been able to establish themselves.

146. The Chairman thanked the Minister for his statement and expressed the Commission's warm appreciation for all the co-operation and hospitality it had received in Seychelles.

B. Visit to Swaziland (30 January-2 February 1982)

1. Call on the Prime Minister

147. On 1 February, in the afternoon, members of the Commission called on His Excellency, Prince Mabandle Dlamini, the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Swaziland.

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148. In a statement, the Prime Minister stressed his Government's belief in good neighbourliness.

149. He regretted that owing to the size of his country and because something of that kind had never occurred before, Swaziland had not been able to detect beforehand what had happened on 25 November 1981. Swaziland's sister country, Seychelles, and the people there had suffered a great deal because of that incident; Swaziland had also suffered as a result of having lost its only commercial aircraft and having its name connected with such an attempt. The people of Swaziland were very happy to know that the mercenaries had been brought to account.

150. The Prime Minister also stated that people had now realized that Africa was coming together to try to speak with one voice. Swaziland was worried by some evil elements which were trying by all means to destabilize African countries and disrupt their unity. He welcomed the Commission's visit to Swaziland and hoped that the Commission was going to ascertain all the facts and help in obtaining clarification on the unfortunate incident.

151. The Chairman of the Commission thanked the Prime Minister for the hospitality, kindness and co-operation extended by the Swaziland Government to the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate.

2. Meetings with Ministers of the Swaziland Government

(a) Minister of Justice

152. On 1 February, at noon, the Commission paid a call on H.E. Mr. P. L. Dlamini, Minister of Justice, in the absence of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who was indisposed. The Minister of Justice welcomed the visit of the Commission and deplored the fact that subversive elements had used his country's airline for their own selfish ends. He emphasized that Swaziland was totally opposed to subversive activities directed against other States. The Minister told the Commission that as a result of the events of 25 November, Swaziland had suffered along with her sister country, Seychelles.

153. The Chairman of the Commission thanked the Minister of Justice for his statement and expressed gratitude for the assistance of the Swaziland Government in arranging for the Commission to meet all persons relevant to its inquiry into the mercenary attack which had been launched against Seychelles on 25 November 1981.

(b) Minister of Works, Power and Communications

154. In the morning of 1 February, the Commission held a meeting with H.E. Mr. Leibrandt, the Minister of Works, Power and Communications, and Mr. Litchfield, the Director of Aviation. The Minister and the Director were accompanied by their aides.

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155. The Minister and Mr. Litchfield informed the Commission that the Government of Swaziland had begun preparations to establish their national airline in 1977. The airline had commenced operation on 1 August 1978 with a single aircraft, a Fokker F28.

156. The Minister told the Commission that his Ministry had established contact with the Government of Seychelles in 1977, with a view to concluding an agreement which would enable the Royal Swazi Airline to operate the route between Swaziland and Seychelles. However, Seychelles had indicated that it was not then ready for such negotiations. In 1980, Swaziland had revived its initiative on the matter and an agreement had been concluded on 13 February 1981. The Royal Swazi Airline had started to fly the route between Swaziland and Seychelles as of 1 May 1981. The airline was subsidized by the Swazi Government to an extensive amount each year. The route between Swaziland and Seychelles did not have many passengers, since it was a new route, and they were going to give it a good chance to prove its profitability.

157. The Chairman of the Commission thanked the Minister and his assistants for their co-operation.

3. Meeting with other government officials

158. In the morning of 31 January 1981, the Commission met with Mr. Hillary, the Deputy Commissioner of Police of the Swaziland Government. He informed the Commission of the investigation which the Swaziland Government had undertaken after having learned, on the night of 25 November, that the Royal Swazi Airline was involved in the conveyance of the mercenaries to Seychelles.

159. After investigations, it was established that the mercenaries had entered Swaziland by coach on the morning of 25 November 1981 through the Mgwanya border post and had left for Seychelles on the same day from Matsapa airport on board the Royal Swazi airplane.

160. At the Mgwanya border post, the group had entered posing as tourists, and, consequently, the border guards had not opened their luggage. In the past, tourists had complained about the delay at the border resulting from luggage searches. The Swazi Government, in order to promote tourism, had therefore decided not to search tourists travelling groups. If those concerned had entered individually, their luggage would have, as a routine, been searched.

161. At Matsapa airport, the mercenaries had had their bags checked in. Unlike the procedure employed for hand baggage, which is X-rayed, checked-in baggage was not normally searched.

4. Interview of immigration and customs officials as well as other witnesses

162. After hearing the Deputy Police Commissioner, the Commission interviewed, individually or in groups, the immigration and custom officials who had been on

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duty at the border post or at the airport on 25 November 1981 and the ground staff on duty at the airport on that day. The information given by the officials and staff in connexion with that particular group of passengers, confirmed the information given by the Deputy Police Commissioner. While they had not noticed anything abnormal, the ground staff who handled the check-in luggage had, however, noticed that all of the bags of this group were of approximately the same weight. They had also remarked that all of the bags had been placed on the weighing scale by one person named Duffy.

163. The Chairman expressed thanks for the statements that had been made.

5. Interview of officials and personnel of the Royal Swazi Airline

164. On 1 February, the Commission interviewed the officials of the Royal Swazi Airline.

165. Mr. Daniel Langeler, the chief executive officer of the Royal Swazi Airline, a Dutch national, had worked in Liberia as a commercial pilot with AfricAir for 20 years and, subsequently, with a cargo airline, Trade-Winds, in the United Kingdom for one year before he joined Royal Swazi. He told the Commission that the number of passengers booked on the flight to Seychelles was normally low; if there were only two or three passengers the flight would be cancelled. The booking for the particular group of 44 passengers for the 25 November 1981 flight had been made by Budget Tours, a South African travel agency. It was the first firm block-booking Royal Swazi had received for the route. On 25 November 1981, he had been at the airport briefly when those passengers were leaving.

166. Mr. Langeler also told the Commission that the Chairman of Budget Tours, Mr. Geldenhuys, who handled the booking, had originally booked the group for the 18 November flight. However, on 10 November, he had informed the Royal Swazi Airline that as he had been unable to obtain the right accommodation for the group, he wished to change the booking to the 25 November flight, with a return flight for the same group on 10 December. In response to a question, Mr. Langeler indicated that Royal Swazi had planned a number of chartered flights additional to their scheduled flights in December 1981 to accommodate group bookings by a travel agency other than Budget Tours.

167. Mr. Langeler learned about the mercenary attack on Seychelles at approximately 8.30 p.m. on 25 November and immediately passed on the message to the Deputy Police Commissioner of Swaziland. He had been in contact with various authorities in Seychelles, including the Minister of Defence, Mr. Berlouis, who had asked for a passenger list, which he had sent by telex that night.

168. Mr. Friedlander, the legal adviser to the Royal Swazi Airline explained to the Commission that the Royal Swazi Airline is owned 50 per cent by the Government and 50 per cent by the Swazi nation through the King. He also informed the Commission of the estimated cost of the repair of the Swazi airplane that was damaged and grounded in Seychelles and wondered if the terms of reference of the Commission would encompass Swaziland's loss.

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169. On 31 January 1982, the Commission interviewed the captain and crew of the Royal Swazi aircraft.

170. Captain Farquharson, a British national, told the Commission that during the flight everything had been normal. After arrival in Seychelles, he had learned about the mercenary incident at about 7 p.m. on 25 November after having arrived at his hotel. He had been contacted by telephone by one of the mercenaries, called Tom, who had asked him to fly the mercenaries out of Seychelles. He had immediately informed his company in Swaziland between 8 and 9 p.m. by telex that the passengers flown into Seychelles were mercenaries, that the attempted takeover had failed and that the mercenaries had asked him to fly them out, which he had no intention of doing. The Captain also said that the person by the name of Tom had further told him to pass on a message to the Seychelles Government that they were holding hostages but that nobody had been harmed. The Captain had passed the message on.

171. The other crew members told the Commission that during the flight they had heard passengers speaking Afrikaans and other languages which the crew members could not understand. At one stage, most of the passengers had come to the cockpit, had a look and then gone back. When photographs were shown to them, the two air hostesses recognized the man sitting beside Mike Hoare on the plane as Puren. Everything during the flight had seemed to them to be normal.

6. Interview of the Royal Swazi Airline sales representative based in Johannesburg, South Africa

172. On 2 February 1982, the Commission interviewed in Mbabane, Swaziland, Miss Collette Hamer, the sales representative of the Royal Swazi Airline in Johannesburg, a British national by descent, born in Southern Rhodesia. The Commission hoped that it might obtain useful information from her regarding the movements of the mercenaries and the financial transactions relating to their journey to Seychelles aboard the Royal Swazi scheduled flight on 25 November 1981.

173. The sales representative informed the Commission that, as she was an employee of the Royal Swazi Airline, and as there were seats available, she had decided a few days before the flight to take the opportunity of travelling to Seychelles for the purpose of visiting some friends there, and with the intention of returning on the aircraft the next day. She had booked her own hotel accommodation at the Reef Hotel. To catch the Royal Swazi flight to Seychelles she had travelled by air from Johannesburg to Swaziland, together with two other passengers who were destined for Comoros aboard the same Royal Swazi flight. She knew that 44 other passengers had been booked to take the same flight to Seychelles from Swaziland, but their bookings had been made through a travel agency in Johannesburg, which had transmitted their names to her office in Johannesburg only 24 hours before the flight.

174. Miss Hamer knew two of the group of passengers. One was Peter Hean, whom she knew very well, and the other, Vernon Prinsloo, was the brother of a friend of hers. She had known them in Southern Rhodesia while they were in the Southern Rhodesian army.

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175. On the flight from Swaziland to Seychelles, she said, the group of 44 passengers had appeared quite relaxed and acted normally. In conversation, her two friends had said that they were travelling to Seychelles as a charity group, taking Christmas gifts for children. She had not heard any conversation relating to any planned overthrow of the Seychelles Government. She recollected that the passengers had been speaking in English.

176. She stated that after the arrival at the Seychelles airport, she had gone directly to her hotel, but had heard a lot of gun-fire from the airport shortly afterwards. The shooting had continued through the night and, she observed, had been heavier the following day, after the Air India aircraft had left. She had remained in Seychelles for 10 days before taking the first flight out to South Africa.

177. She recalled that, while at her hotel on 25 November 1981, the same hotel where the Royal Swazi Airline crew were booked, she had learned that a certain "Tom" had telephoned to the captain of the aircraft and requested him to return to the airport and fly the mercenaries out of Seychelles, but that the captain had refused. "Tom" had then asked the captain to contact the Seychelles Government and inform them that the mercenaries were holding hostages, which the captain had done. She said that, eventually, she had managed to reach the chief executive of the Royal Swazi Airline in Mbabane by telephone and had briefed him of what was happening at the Seychelles airport.

178. The Chairman expressed the Commission's gratitude to the Royal Swazi Airline sales representative for her co-operation, particularly in view of the fact that she had travelled from Johannesburg for the purpose of appearing before the Commission in Swaziland.

7. Inspection of airport facilities

179. On 3 February 1982, before departure from Swaziland, the Commission, accompanied by the Deputy Police Commissioner of Swaziland, inspected facilities at Matsapa airport. They were shown the luggage-handling procedures and also had an opportunity to examine the X-ray machine which had been used to scrutinize handbags for some time.

180. One of the members of the Commission had previously had the opportunity of observing the procedures employed at the Mgwenya border post.

C. Visit to South Africa (3-6 February 1982)

181. As indicated in paragraph 12 above, the Commission, while already on its way to visit the area, had an exchange of communications with the Government of South Africa concerning the Commission's request to visit South Africa in order to meet with Government officials and those most directly involved in the mercenary attack on Seychelles. Although the South African Government's replies did not fully clarify the extent to which it was prepared to co-operate with the Commission

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in that regard, the Commission nonetheless felt that, for the fulfilment of its mandate, it had to pursue its efforts to meet the mercenaries in South Africa. Consequently when in Swaziland it made arrangements to visit South Africa from 3 to 6 February. In the course of that visit, it was able to meet Ministers of the South African Government and other Government officials, but, regrettably, did not meet any of the mercenaries.

1. Meetings with Ministers of the South African Government

(a) Minister for Foreign Affairs and Information

182. On 4 February, the members of the Commission met in Capetown with H.E. Mr. R. F. Botha, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information of the Republic of South Africa.

183. In a prepared statement, the Chairman began by expressing the Commission's satisfaction at having the opportunity of discussing with the Minister matters pertaining to its mandate.

184. After recalling the Commission's mandate and its activities in Seychelles and Swaziland, the Chairman said that its purpose in coming to South Africa was to continue its investigation and to establish the facts relating to the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against Seychelles. Since the information gathered thus far clearly indicated that the persons responsible for that aggression had travelled from South Africa and that most of them had returned there shortly afterward, the Commission wished to interview those persons who were directly involved, as a necessary step in the fulfilment of its mandate. As those persons appeared to be either citizens or residents of South Africa, the Commission believed that it should seek access to them through the Government of South Africa. The Commission, he said, had taken note of the South African Government's views in the matter and was aware that a court case involving the hijacking aspects of the events of 25 November 1981 was under way in South Africa. It reiterated the view that that aspect did not constitute the main object of its mandate. The Commission also appreciated the offer made earlier to arrange meetings with relevant Ministers and other Government officials. It hoped that those officials would also include those responsible for police and intelligence matters.

185. Following a brief suspension of the meeting so that he could attend to the requests just made on behalf of the Commission, the Minister announced that he had arranged for the Commission to meet that same morning with the Minister of Police, and then with the Minister of Justice. Furthermore, he said, in a spirit of co-operation on the part of the South African Government, it had also been possible to arrange meetings with the head of the National Intelligence Service and with the head of Military Intelligence.

186. Mr. Botha said that that spirit of co-operation was in sharp contrast to the attitude of the majority of the United Nations General Assembly vis-à-vis his Government. It believed that international disputes ought to be resolved in

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negotiation and in a spirit of co-operation without vindictiveness, even if the parties held differing views. South Africa did not claim to have a perfect Government, but that Government had a case that it wished to put to the world, and that case was not anti-African. Africa, the Minister added, was beset by enormous economic problems, the depth of which was not understood by the industrialized nations; and whatever assistance it received was given in terms of the power struggle between the East and the West rather than in terms of its own needs. As a result the continent had been the scene of large-scale destabilization, with no less than 55 coups d'état in 30 years.

187. So far as Seychelles were concerned the Minister drew attention to the statement made by the Prime Minister of South Africa on 3 December 1981, in which he had declared that the South African Government had neither initiated, approved of nor known about the attempted coup. He himself, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, had issued a statement on 28 November 1981 which read as follows:

"It is no secret that there are at least two dissident groups from Seychelles which wish to depose the present Government there. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Information has been approached several times by persons purporting to represent dissident groups asking for assistance for their plans, and claiming that they had considerable support for their cause in Africa and elsewhere. On each and every occasion the representatives were told categorically that it was the policy of the South African Government not to concern itself with adventures of this nature." 13/

188. The Minister concluded his statement by reminding the Commission that there were a considerable number of Seychellois living in South Africa, whose daily lives, he said, could not be controlled. He also recalled that there had been contact between official entities of the South African Government and officials of the Seychelles Government, before the 1977 coup, including Mr. René, and that there was contact with Mr. René after the coup.

189. The meeting terminated without the opportunity for further discussion as the Minister stated that other Ministers with whom appointments had been arranged were waiting to see the Commission.

(b) Minister of Police

190. The members of the Commission then held a meeting with H.E. Mr. L. Legrange, Minister of Police, who was accompanied by the Police Commissioner, General Geldenhuys.

191. Following introductory remarks, the members of the Commission proceeded to ask questions which the Minister answered as follows:

13/ The Commission later received through the Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations as aide-mémoire, listing occasions (23 January 1979, 19 June 1979, 26 November 1980, 23 September 1981) on which members of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs and Information were said to have been approached to lend support to plans for staging coups d'état in Seychelles.

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192. Regarding the possibility that his Department might have been alerted to plans by citizens or residents of South Africa to overthrow the Government of the Seychelles, he said that any information that might have come to the attention of the Foreign Minister in that regard would not normally have been forwarded to the South African Police Department, because it would not have been of any particular interest to them at that stage. With regard to the events of 25 November 1981, his Department knew nothing of the matter until the following morning when the hijacked Air India plane was already on its way to South Africa.

193. Concerning the weapons used by the mercenaries, the Minister said his Department had no knowledge about the matter up to the time of the mercenaries' arrival in Durban. As a member of the Cabinet, he was at present fully informed regarding the origin of those weapons, the manner in which they were purchased and all other circumstances. Since then the Police Department had made a full investigation covering all aspects of the matter and all the information gathered in relation to the case had been forwarded to the Attorney General of Natal, who was the only person who could decide to what extent the Commission could receive that information.

194. Asked whether any of the 44 mercenaries who had come back from Seychelles were government officials, he said that he did not know them personally, but that, according to his information, some of them might have been or were still in the employment of a particular Department of State. He was not denying that information on that matter did not exist. He simply did not have that particular information. The Attorney General might be of more assistance to the Commission in that regard.

195. Concerning a statement that the Minister was reported to have made to the effect that the mercenaries had "not committed any offence under South African law but had merely run around the bush", he said that that statement had been made in the course of a light hearted conversation with a young journalist. He stressed that from the beginning he and the other members of the South African Government had regarded the matter as very serious. When notice had been given that the Air India plane was heading for South Africa, there was a particular team of officials who immediately attended to the whole question. After the first part of the operation in which the railway police, which has jurisdiction over railways and airports, had met the mercenaries, senior members of the South African police took over from then onwards as the investigating officers. It was also made clear from the very beginning that charges would be brought against those involved, under South Africa's Law on Civil Aviation, which covers cases of hijacking. The decision, taken initially, to charge only 5 of the mercenaries and to release 3 others was not an unusual procedure, either in South Africa or elsewhere. Not charging them at that stage did not imply any judgement as to their guilt. In any case there was no possibility of their leaving the country. Their passports had been taken away from them.

(c) Minister of Justice

196. Later, the members of the Commission met with the Minister of Justice, H.E. Mr. H. J. Coetsee, who was accompanied by the Director-General of his Department.

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197. Once again the Chairman explained the mandate of the Commission and the exact purpose of its visit to South Africa, and inquired whether the Minister wished to make a general statement with regard to the matters pertaining to the Commission's mandate.

198. The Minister responded by saying that, as far as the judicial process was concerned, the matter had been referred to the Attorney General of Natal who, as an independent official, would decide what charges would be brought against the accused individuals at the trial, which was to proceed around 10 March. Because in South Africa, as elsewhere, the prosecution took place independently from the Executive, it was impossible for him to tell the Commission what steps the Attorney General would take, or what area he would traverse as a background to the charges, but he had no doubt that the case would be prosecuted properly and in accordance with a tradition of objectivity. The Minister did not completely agree with the Commission's approach that the main object of its mandate dealt with the "preliminaries" rather than with the matter that formed the major part of the charges, especially as one of those charges bore a very clear relation to the events in Seychelles. He, as Minister of Justice had to honour the sub judice rule, on the subject of which the Speaker of the House had very recently made a ruling to the effect that it was difficult to draw a line as to what formed part of the background of the case.

199. Asked if the Commission could see the Attorney General of Natal, the Minister promised to arrange such a meeting. He added that, since 1910, the Attorney General had not been a member of the Government. His decisions were independent and the intervention of the Minister of Justice was confined to administrative supervision, except in cases involving the security of the State.

200. In response to other questions, he said that, to his knowledge, the original charges against five persons had been superseded by those brought in connexion with the hijacking. However, under the South African system, it was still possible to add or omit charges, provided proper notice was given to the defence. The Minister also said that, in general terms, he was not aware of any law, either statutory or common law, which, as such, prohibited people from conspiring against another Government. Only if some law had been contravened in the process, might prosecution be warranted.

201. Regarding the Commission's interest in meeting the mercenaries, the Minister, again invoking the sub judice rule, said that it was difficult for him to speak on their behalf, since there was a clear definition of the responsibilities of the prosecution and the defence in the matter. However, he was aware of the fact that some of the mercenaries had legal representation and he would perhaps be able to arrange for the Commission to contact a legal representative, subject to what the Attorney General might have to say in the matter. 14/

14/ Before leaving South Africa, the Chairman of the Commission received a message from the Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information, indicating that the legal representative of some of the mercenaries could not "take the chance of advising clients to jeopardize their position in any way". The full text of that message appears in Annex I of this report.

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2. Meeting with the Attorney General of Natal

202. On 5 February, the members of the Commission met in Johannesburg with the Attorney General of Natal, Mr. C. Rees.

203. After thanking him for coming from Natal to meet the Commission, the Chairman explained to him the purpose of the Commission's visit to South Africa and asked him if he wished to make a general statement before responding to some questions.

204. The Attorney General began by making some general comments on the legal aspects of the case. Under the South African legal system, he said, jurisdiction of the courts was based on the principle of territoriality and, in respect of offences involving civil aircraft, that jurisdiction had been specifically enlarged to give effect to the pertinent international conventions. Therefore, for all practical purposes, he, as Attorney General, had jurisdiction which was concomitant with that of the Supreme Court of Natal in respect to everything that had happened on the hijacked Air India aircraft "in flight". His preparations were primarily directed at the elements of the offence that he had to prove under Civil Aviation Offence Act No. 10 of 1972, although the other elements could also be raised. He had to prove first that the 45 accused had committed the act, that they had done so intentionally and that they had done so unlawfully. He had to make sure that whatever decisions he took would be justifiable in open court.

205. The Attorney General hoped that the crew of the Air India plane would come and give evidence as, without their testimony in person, it would then be more difficult for him to prove the case.

206. He concluded his general remarks by saying that the accused persons were subject to the accusatorial system, which meant that they were entitled to a fair trial and that the prosecution had to act within the law but objectively.

207. He then enumerated various charges which he had prepared against the accused, and the substantial facts on which he would rely to prove those charges on the basis of evidence passed to him by the police.

208. Asked whether he had considered the possibility of charging the accused with conspiracy to commit an offence outside the country, he said that he had looked at that possibility, but, because the principle of territoriality had to be respected, he had come to the conclusion that he had no jurisdiction. He had also given consideration to prosecuting the accused individuals for illegal possession of firearms in South Africa, but had felt that he would have some difficulty in that regard.

209. In response to further questions about the weapons brought back by the mercenaries, the Attorney General said that it appeared that those weapons were of different sources, including some taken from security forces on the island. The weapons currently in the hands of the police included 38 AK-47 assault rifles, 2,435 rounds of live ammunition, and three active stick hand grenades which had been destroyed because they were dangerous items.

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210. Concerning the occupation of some of the mercenaries, he said that he was not specifically aware that any of them were government officials as such. Some of them were members of the Citizen Force, although that only meant that they had had their military training and could be called up at any time by the Army. In response to a question about Mr. Kenneth Kelly, one of the mercenaries, Mr. Rees confirmed that he had definite connexions with the South African Army, whether it was with the Permanent Force or the Citizen Force, he did not know.

211. The Attorney General also confirmed, in response to another question, that he was not in a position to give details of the information he had received for the purpose of prosecuting the case.

212. As to the financing aspects of the mercenary operation in Seychelles, he said that he had not yet come across anything although he would be very much interested in this matter.

3. Meetings with other government officials

(a) Head of the National Intelligence Service

213. On 4 February, the Commission met with Dr. Lucas D. Barnard, head of the National Intelligence Service.

214. After recalling the mandate of the Commission and its meeting in Seychelles with the captured mercenaries, the Chairman asked Dr. Barnard if he could clarify certain matters raised in connexion with the statement of one of the mercenaries, Mr. Dolinschek, and the possibility that other mercenaries used to be members of the National Intelligence Service of South Africa.

215. Dr. Barnard said that, before discussing the issue raised by the Chairman, he wanted it clearly understood that he was not prepared to betray what he regarded as the ethics of intelligence work by revealing the identity of members of his Service, the kind of work they did or the information they handled. That was the attitude not only of the National Intelligence Service of South Africa but of intelligence services everywhere. He added that the meeting he was holding with the Commission was the first public meeting he had ever agreed to have, and that he had agreed to it only because he felt that it was important to have a discussion with the Commission.

216. With regard to Mr. Dolinschek, there had been speculation about him in the media. He was aware of what he had said at a news conference in Seychelles. But he was not prepared to answer or deny anything that had been said, or discuss with anyone - except those to whom he was responsible - the membership of Mr. Dolinschek or anyone else in the National Intelligence Service of South Africa.

(b) Head of Military Intelligence

217. On 5 February, the Commission met, in Johannesburg, with the head of Military Intelligence, General P. van der Westhuizen.

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218. In response to questions, General van der Westhuizen said that it was true that some of the people involved in the mercenary attack on Seychelles had military connexions - but only in the sense that almost every South African was involved in the military through the national service. He added that none of them was serving in the Permanent Defence Force, although an investigation had revealed that a non-commissioned officer had fraudulently issued a call-up in the reserve force. The matter would be handed over to the civilian judiciary authorities, because the people concerned were not in service at the time.

219. Regarding the source of the arms used by the mercenaries, General van der Westhuizen said he could not say anything in the matter since it was the responsibility of the internal security police. He added that there could be a flow of weapons in southern Africa, as a result of all the military actions that happened in the past 10 or 15 years.

220. In response to other questions, he said that General Charles Lloyd (mentioned by Dolinschek) did not belong to military intelligence in the South African Army and that Mr. Dolinschek - whom he knew only through what he read in the press - was not a member of his organization.

4. Meeting with the Director of Budget Tours Travel Agency

221. On 6 February, shortly before leaving South Africa, the Commission interviewed the Director of Budget Tours Travel Agency, Mr. Geldenhuys.

222. After providing the Commission with some background information about himself and his organization, Mr. Geldenhuys proceeded to describe the events connected with the travel plans of the groups which later participated in the mercenary aggression against Seychelles.

223. He made it clear from the beginning, however, that, he would not mention any specific names for fear of jeopardizing the forthcoming court case involving those individuals.

224. The story began, he said, when a "gentleman" came to see him in early October 1981 and asked him to organize for the end of November a trip for a group of people to Seychelles. The "gentleman" said that the group had originally planned to go to Mauritius but had to cancel due to a currency devaluation which had made accommodations more expensive.

225. While he had had no problem with the availability of accommodations in Seychelles, he did encounter certain difficulties with regard to getting sufficient seats on that route because South African Airways had lost its landing rights in Seychelles and British Airways was more interested in passengers on the long haul to the Orient. That left only Royal Swazi Airlines, which he approached for 25 November, the date originally requested by the group. However, Swazi Air could only give him 18 November; so he booked their aircraft for that date and flew to Seychelles to make the necessary arrangements with the tour operator that handled his Agency's clients. Upon his return to Johannesburg, the "gentleman" in question insisted

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that the group be booked for 25 November because, he said, the earlier date did not allow sufficient time for some of the group's members to organize their leaves. Thus he went back to Swazi Air. First they refused, because they wanted to service their aircraft, then they consented.

226. In answer to questions, Mr. Geldenhuys said the "gentleman" who contacted him for the organization of the tour had estimated the number of passengers to be between 40 and 50, and that 45 had actually travelled. He added that there had been constant changes in the list of names given up to a few days before the departure date.

227. As to whether his suspicions had not been aroused, he said that there had been nothing unusual about the group's size or requests and that he had dealt only with two people, the "gentleman" mentioned earlier and his son, who was in charge of making the bookings and the payments. He had not looked at any passports since no visas were required.

228. Regarding the cost of the operation, Mr. Geldenhuys said that the package had cost R 70,000 which he had received in cash instalments. The group was supposed to stay 14 days in Seychelles. All arrangements were made for them including land transportation in Seychelles through a local agency, Coralline United. Mr. Geldenhuys added that on the day following the mercenary attack on Seychelles he had cabled that agency to apologize.

229. Asked if he had been contacted by any South African officials, he said that his only contact had been a visit paid to him by a high-ranking member of the police department who had taken a statement from him.

III. FURTHER CONTACTS WITH GOVERNMENTS

A. Contact with the Government of Kenya

230. In statements made to the Commission by officials of the Seychelles Government and by some of the mercenaries during its visit to the area, references were made to Kenya in connexion with the mercenary aggression of 25 November 1981 against the Republic of Seychelles.

231. Upon its return to Headquarters the Commission made a careful study of all the information available to it and, with regard to the references to Kenya, decided that it should seek the comments of the Kenya authorities on some aspects of the information so obtained. The Commission had taken careful note of the statement issued by the Government of Kenya on 8 December 1981 (A/36/808-S/14785), in which the Government categorically denied allegations, attributed to one of the captured mercenaries, that the Government of Kenya was in any way involved in the events leading to the attempted overthrow of the Government of Seychelles.

232. Accordingly, the Chairman addressed a letter dated 1 March 1982 to the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kenya to the United Nations for transmission to his Government, in which the Commission indicated the particular

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points upon which it was requesting comments from the Government. Those points concerned particulars about the hire agreement, and identity of the parties thereto, with the Nairobi firm of Sunbird Charters for the charter of an aircraft to fly certain persons to Seychelles from Mombasa on or about 27 November 1981; information as to whether certain persons, among them James Mancham and Gerald Hoareau, known to have been members of the former Government of the Republic of Seychelles, had been in Nairobi on or immediately before 25 November 1981; and comments on a statement made to the Commission that those who had planned the mercenary aggression had envisaged that, following the aggression, had it been successful, and with the knowledge of certain persons connected with the Government of Kenya, contingents of armed personnel would have been flown to Seychelles from Mombasa aboard two aircraft. The text of the letter from the Chairman to the Permanent Representative of Kenya is reproduced in annex I to the present report.

233. By a letter dated 5 March 1982, the text of which is also reproduced in annex I to the present report, the Government of Kenya responded to the Commission's inquiries by quoting therein the text of a letter dated 4 February 1982 from the President of Kenya addressed to the President of Seychelles. In that letter the Kenyan President had given particulars or comments regarding two of the points raised by the Commission. The letter stated that an agreement for the charter of an aircraft from the Nairobi firm of Sunbird Charters, which never materialized, was made by five tourists from the United States of America, who had initially planned to be flown to Moroni, in the Comoros but, after having been denied landing rights to Moroni, had chosen to be flown to Seychelles from Mombasa on 27 November 1981. The letter also stated that neither James Mancham nor Gerald Hoareau had been in Kenya at or about the time in question. As regards the third point raised by the Commission, namely the reported plan to airlift armed personnel from Kenya to Seychelles, the Permanent Representative of Kenya pointed out that that issue, as a matter of Government responsibility, was already covered by the Government of Kenya in its statement of 8 December 1981.

234. The Commission wishes to put on record its appreciation for the co-operation it has received from the Government of Kenya, in particular the dispatch with which the Government responded to the Commission's letter of inquiry.

B. Letter from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Swaziland to the United Nations

235. On 18 February 1982, the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of Swaziland to the United Nations wrote a letter to the Chairman of the Commission stating that "the financial losses suffered by the Swazi Airline as a result of the grounding of the aircraft Fokker F28 amount to some 2 million emalangeni ..." and "on behalf of the Swaziland Government, formally requests the Commission of Inquiry ... to extend the terms of reference to cover the assessment of loss sustained by the Swaziland Government as a result of the coup attempt". The text of the letter is included in annex I.

236. On 26 February 1982, the Chairman of the Commission sent an acknowledgment to the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Swaziland, informing him that his letter had been put before the members of the Commission of Inquiry.

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C. Contact with the Government of the United States of America

237. Following its return to Headquarters the Commission gave consideration to the reported airspace violations which the Government of Seychelles had raised as of possible relevance to the Commission's mandate. Given the statements in the report furnished by the Seychelles authorities, the Commission decided to seek the comments of the United States authorities.

238. The Permanent Representative of the United States of America, by a note addressed to the Chairman, replied that the Government of the United States had informed the Government of Seychelles that, after a thorough examination of records, including the flight logs of all United States Government aircraft during the month of November 1981, there had been no flight activity by United States aircraft in the vicinity of Seychelles during that month. The full text of the letter from the Permanent Representative of the United States is reproduced in annex I to the present report.

IV. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

Interview of certain individuals at Headquarters

239. Upon its return to Headquarters the Commission felt that, following its review of information gathered in the field, it should seek further information from certain individuals in relation to the mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles. Among such persons the Commission was particularly interested in the information that might be obtained from Mr. Paul Chow and Mr. James Mancham, both citizens of Seychelles currently living outside Seychelles.

240. On 24 February 1982, the Commission decided to contact Mr. Chow and Mr. Mancham. Accordingly, the Commission sent cable messages on the same day to Mr. Chow and Mr. Mancham, 15/ stating that the Commission believed that they might have information relevant to its mandate and that it was prepared to receive any relevant written information from them, or to interview them personally in New York, at the earliest opportunity.

241. On 4 and 5 March 1982 the Commission interviewed Mr. Mancham and Mr. Chow, respectively, in New York. A summary of their remarks relevant to the terms of the Commission's mandate is given below. 16/

15/ The Commission was aware of the addresses of Mr. Paul Chow and Mr. James Mancham through two cables from them, individually, addressed to the United Nations, following the establishment of the Commission.

16/ On 5 March 1982, the Commission also heard Mr. David Joubert who had travelled to New York with Mr. Chow. He outlined his views on the developments in Seychelles, but he gave no additional information specifically relevant to the terms of the Commission's mandate.

1. Interview of Mr. James Mancham

242. Mr. Mancham began by making a statement in which he gave an account of the recent political history of Seychelles, including his personal role and the events relating to the independence of Seychelles until his ouster as President of the country in June 1977, as well as his views on the recent mercenary aggression against Seychelles.

243. He described the attitude he had taken since he started his exile in London, saying that he would not concern himself in any plans to regain power by force, as he was completely opposed to any adventure that might result in bloodshed. This is the line he had taken in meetings with Seychellois groups in exile over a long period of time. Other persons had approached him, ostensibly to seek financial support for commercial ventures, but he later discovered that their real intention was to solicit his support and "blessing" for their plans to overthrow the Government of the Republic of Seychelles.

244. As an example, he recalled one particular occasion when he said he had held a meeting at the Churchill Hotel in London, with a man who he discovered had a plan "to take Seychelles". The cost of the plan was estimated at \$3.5 million. However, Mr. Mancham said that he had rejected the overture as he was not interested in activities of that kind and that he did not have the money.

245. In September 1981, he related, he tape-recorded a message by telephone at the request of one Seychellois, which he believed was for use by persons planning to establish a new government in Seychelles. The message was one of reassurance to the people of Seychelles, and accepting their invitation to him to return. He was in fact expecting to be invited to go back to Seychelles in a leadership role, but said he was not aware of the detailed plans. He said that on 25 November 1981 Mr. Paul Chow informed him by telephone that "the movement" was "on the march" and, without giving further details, promised that they would be in touch with him again. The following morning, according to him, he read from newspaper reports of the mercenary aggression.

246. In answer to questions from members of the Commission, Mr. Mancham stated that since he left office, he had not visited Kenya, or any other African country, and that he was not in Nairobi at the time of the mercenary aggression. He also denied having had any contact with any member of the Kenya Government.

247. Of his contacts with the South African Government, he said that while in power, he had once met with the then Minister of Information, Dr. Rhodie, who subsequently agreed to provide funds to Mancham's political party for the purpose of defraying the party's election expenses. But he denied subsequent allegations by Rhodie that he had received vast sums of money as payoffs from the Government of South Africa. Those allegations had been published by the Financial Times of London and he had been awarded damages in a successful libel suit against the publishers.

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248. On the question of the financing of the operation, his view was that the bulk of the money was contributed by business people of various nationalities, who were disenchanted by the policies of the Government in Seychelles. He did not believe that Mr. Adnan Khashoggi had contributed any funds.

249. Finally, he said, though he had been contacted by the mercenaries, he had never had any meeting with anybody identifying himself as Michael Hoare.

2. Interview of Mr. Paul Chow

250. Mr. Paul Chow stated that he had formerly been a businessman in Seychelles, and was now residing in London. He outlined his views on political developments in Seychelles and described the circumstances in which he came to leave the country in August 1980.

251. During the interview Mr. Chow, who referred to himself and his associates as the "Mouvement pour la résistance", claimed that they were responsible for the mercenary intervention on 25 November 1981. In fact they had been contacted by mercenary groups on previous occasions. As regards the operation of 25 November 1981, he was not aware of the details of the contacts with Mike Hoare, whom he had never met; these had been handled by his associates, probably in South Africa. Mr. Chow said he and his associates had paid \$400,000 towards this operation and he believed this sum had been paid to Mike Hoare. Although some mercenary groups had asked for \$2-3 million Mike Hoare eventually agreed to \$400,000. Mr. Chow added that while he was not prepared to identify individuals, this sum was collected over a period of a year from Seychellois in Seychelles and abroad. Asked about Mr. Khashoggi, Mr. Chow said that he did not think Mr. Khashoggi would be interested in contributing money since, if this became known, it would have serious implications for his business internationally.

252. With regard to the role of Mr. Mancham, Mr. Chow said that Mr. Mancham, after 1977, no longer seemed to be actively interested in Seychelles but, Mr. Chow and his group felt, in the short term Mr. Mancham would be the most plausible person to head a new government. Contact with Mr. Mancham had been established by Mr. Gerard Hoareau, who was more involved in the actual operation. Mr. Hoareau had visited London from South Africa and had met Mr. Mancham in September 1981. On this occasion, Mr. Mancham indicated that he would be prepared to play his part and had made a statement on a tape for broadcasting after the event.

253. Mr. Chow stated that he was in Nairobi on 25 November 1981 together with some other Seychellois, including Gerard Hoareau. He said that had things gone according to plan they were planning to hire an executive aircraft from the Sunbird Firm in Nairobi in order to fly to Seychelles, but no contract had been signed. On 25 November, he phoned Mr. Mancham in London to inform him that the "movement was on the march".

254. When questioned whether he or his associates had asked any foreign Government for help, Mr. Chow replied that he though there had been approaches to various Governments and certainly to the South African Government, but they were informed that South Africa would not have any hand in it. He did not know whether Mr. Hoare had any connexion with the Government of South Africa.

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V. SUMMARY ACCOUNT OF THE 25 NOVEMBER 1981 MERCENARY AGGRESSION
AGAINST SEYCHELLES

255. Before taking up the question of the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression of 25 November 1981 against the Republic of Seychelles, in accordance with its mandate, the Commission considers that it would be useful to give to members of the Security Council the following brief factual outline of the events, on the basis of information received by the Commission in the course of its visit to the area.

256. Michael Hoare, who had been involved in previous mercenary activities in Africa, made plans for an attempt to overthrow the Government of Seychelles with a force of mercenaries in 1981. He recruited in South Africa over 50 individuals to serve as mercenaries for that purpose. A series of preparatory meetings was held in South Africa from early September 1981 onwards and weapons were tested.

257. Had things gone according to plan, the mercenaries would all have entered Seychelles as tourists and would have taken action, at the earliest, on the day after they had all arrived in the country.

258. Nine persons travelled in advance to Seychelles at different times by scheduled commercial flights and proceeded to carry out assigned tasks, including preparations for the arrival of the main body of mercenaries. Most of them carried with them an AK-47 assault rifle, concealed in their baggage.

259. The main body of the force assembled at Ermelo in the Transvaal, South Africa, on 24 November 1981. They departed in the early morning of the next day by bus for Swaziland. The men carried large sports bags, each containing, concealed in a false bottom of the bag, an AK-47 assault rifle and ammunition. They also carried bags suggesting that they were members of a beer-drinking convention, and items such as toys purportedly for charitable purposes in the Seychelles.

260. They entered Swaziland as a tourist group. At the Swaziland border post, in accordance with regular practice for tourist groups, the baggage compartment of the bus, in which the sports bags were contained, was not searched.

261. They proceeded to Matsapa Airport at Manzini and checked in for the scheduled Royal Swazi Airline flight to Seychelles, on which they had bookings. The sports bags, after check-in, were loaded into the luggage hold of the Fokker Fellowship F-28. In accordance with normal airport procedure, the hand-carried cabin baggage was examined electronically, but the bags loaded in the hold were not examined.

262. Following a stop-over at Comoros, where two passengers disembarked, the aircraft arrived at Pointe Larue International Airport in Mahé, Seychelles at about 17.30 hours local time on 25 November.

263. Most of the mercenaries passed through customs and immigration without their weapons being detected, and loaded their bags on to waiting buses. As one of the last mercenaries passed through, a customs officer noticed a weapon through a torn false bottom of the bag. The police inspector on duty ordered the buses not to

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move. Realizing that they had been discovered, the mercenaries removed their weapons from the bags and assembled them for action. In the subsequent firing a police sergeant was wounded in the shoulder and one mercenary (Fritz) fatally wounded.

264. The police at the airport alerted police headquarters and Army authorities. Some members of the advance party of mercenaries who had come to the airport attempted unsuccessfully, at Hoare's orders, to prevent the Army from coming out of the camp adjacent to the airport.

265. The mercenaries took control of the airport buildings and control tower. They assembled all persons found in the airport and around the airport buildings and grounds into a room in the main terminal building, and held them as hostages.

266. The security forces contained the mercenaries in the airport buildings. In the course of the subsequent efforts by the Seychelles Army to retake control of the airport, an armoured personnel carrier was ambushed by mercenaries. Army 2nd Lieutenant David Antar was killed.

267. Hoare attempted unsuccessfully to persuade the Royal Air Swazi captain to return to the airport from his hotel and fly the mercenaries out of Seychelles.

268. Subsequently, at about 21.45 hours, a scheduled Air India flight requested landing instructions from Seychelles air traffic control. After some delay, mercenaries in the control tower coerced an air traffic control officer to clear the landing of the aircraft. The Air India Boeing 707 landed at about 22.45 hours, incurring slight damage when the wing hit an obstruction which Seychelles forces had placed on the runway in an endeavour to prevent its being used.

269. The Seychelles authorities ordered a cease-fire, in order to safeguard the Air India passengers and crew, as well as the hostages. With this in mind, the Seychelles decided to permit the Air India aircraft to depart again. The mercenaries then took over, hijacked the aircraft and ordered the crew to fly to Durban, South Africa. The aircraft took off at about 01.30 hours on 26 November 1981 with its original 65 passengers and 14 crew, along with 45 mercenaries and the body of Fritz.

270. Although seven mercenaries were captured later, it was not known in Seychelles precisely how many mercenaries had left with the Air India aircraft. The security forces conducted mopping-up operations through the night and the following morning until they took control of the airport before noon.

VI. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE COMMISSION

A. Origin, background and financing

271. The mandate of the Commission was to "investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as assess and evaluate economic damages". While the numbers

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involved in this aggression may be small, the Commission would wish to emphasize that, given the small size and limited resources of Seychelles, the aggression posed a grave threat to the sovereignty and independence of the country and seriously disrupted its daily life. This event underscores the vulnerability of small States, particularly those in geographical situations such as that of Seychelles, to aggression by mercenaries.

272. While the Commission received full co-operation from the Governments of Seychelles and Swaziland, it was unfortunately limited in its investigations by not being permitted to interview the mercenaries who returned to South Africa aboard the hijacked Air India plane. In particular it was handicapped by not having an interview with the leader of the mercenaries, Michael Hoare. The main source of information which the Commission has on the events leading up to the mercenary aggression are the statements of the mercenaries in custody in Seychelles. While certain information was independently held by several of them, it will be evident from their statements that much of the information which they had relating to the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression derived from statements made to them by Hoare. The Commission bore in mind that their statements were made while they were awaiting trial for serious offences.

273. The Commission also feels that it must treat the information contained in statements made by Mr. Mancham and Mr. Chow with a certain reserve.

274. In these circumstances, the information available to the Commission is far from complete. The Commission does not have full knowledge of the origin and background of the mercenary aggression. The Commission cannot exclude that further significant information relating to its mandate may become available, particularly during the course of the trial on the hijacking charges under way in South Africa.

275. Subject to these constraints, the Commission would draw the following conclusions, on the basis of the information available to it.

276. The object of the mercenary aggression was to overthrow the Government of Seychelles and, it seems, install Mr. James Mancham as head of State. The leader of the mercenaries was Michael Hoare, who had led earlier mercenary operations in Africa.

277. It is clear that Michael Hoare had contact with Seychelles exiles in South Africa and in London. The Commission has, however, little knowledge of the details of these contacts. Furthermore, the Commission does not know what other prior contacts Hoare may have had or with whom. It is also clear that a number of Seychellois living in exile intended to charter a plane to fly immediately to Seychelles from Kenya had the mercenaries successfully taken over Seychelles.

278. The immediate preparations for and planning of the mercenary aggression, including recruitment of over 50 mercenaries by Hoare, took place in South Africa. A small number of those concerned had previous experience as mercenaries. For the most part they were persons who had military experience in the South African and former Rhodesian forces. A number were reservists in the South African defence forces, to whom call-up papers had been issued. The South African authorities have recently stated that this was not done officially.

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279. The weapons used by the mercenaries (AK-47 assault rifles) were tested by them in South Africa before departure. The Commission has no evidence to enable it to reach definitive conclusions as to how the weapons were obtained. Such weapons could be easily obtained from a number of sources, both outside and inside South Africa. They must either have been imported into South Africa, or obtained in South Africa from supplies seized by South African forces in the course of their armed invasions into neighbouring independent African States.

280. The South African Ministry for Foreign Affairs has stated that Seychellois resident in South Africa have made approaches seeking support for attempts to overthrow the Government of Seychelles but were informed that such support would not be given. The South African authorities were thus generally aware of such intentions.

281. Martin Dolinschek, who is in custody in Seychelles, stated to the Commission that he was a serving member of the National Intelligence Service of South Africa. He further stated that he had informed his superiors about previous plots by Seychellois exiles to overthrow the Government of Seychelles, but that he had not done so on this occasion, although he believed they knew about the plans otherwise. The Director of the National Intelligence Service refused, as a matter of policy, to confirm or deny that Dolinschek was an official of the Service. The Commission believes that Dolinschek has connexions with South African intelligence but cannot fully evaluate his statements when they are not otherwise confirmed.

282. Given the tight and effective control exercised by the security authorities in South Africa, and the nature of the preparations for the mercenary operation of 25 November 1981 in South Africa, particularly the procurement and test-firing of the weapons, the Commission finds it difficult to believe that the South African authorities did not at least have knowledge of the preparations in this matter. The South African Prime Minister has stated that the South African Government had neither initiated, approved of, nor known about the mercenary operation of 25 November 1981. On the basis of information available to it at the time of submission of this report, the Commission cannot reach a definitive conclusion on the extent or level of South African knowledge or responsibility.

283. As regards the financing, the Commission estimates, on the basis of information available to it, that the expenses incurred in the mercenary operation, and those which would have been incurred had it been successful, would have amounted to at least three quarters of a million dollars. The only direct statement made to the Commission regarding financing was that of Mr. Paul Chow, who stated that he and his associates had raised \$400,000 for this purpose. He was not prepared to identify the contributors in detail. The mercenaries in custody in Seychelles mentioned figures of \$1 million or more as the cost of the operation. Even were Mr. Chow's statement to be taken at face value, finance may have come from other sources. The Commission did not receive information to enable it to identify such sources.

284. The Commission believes that the mercenaries used Swaziland merely as a means of transit to Seychelles and that the Government of Swaziland had no knowledge of the planned aggression until after it had taken place.

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285. The Commission further believes that the crew of the hijacked Air India aircraft were innocent victims of the mercenary aggression.

286. As regards statements made to the Commission that had the mercenary aggression been successful contingents of armed personnel might have been flown from Kenya, the Commission would draw attention to the exchange of communications between the Commission and the Government of Kenya and to the statement made by the Government of Kenya on 8 December 1981 categorically denying any involvement by that Government in the events leading to the attempted overthrow of the Government of Seychelles.

B. Assessment and evaluation of economic damages

287. The Commission gratefully acknowledges the help given by senior officials of the Government of Seychelles in gathering the information required by the Commission in this regard, and in particular for the two papers which they furnished, entitled "Request for emergency assistance as a result of the mercenary attack to the Seychelles International Airport" and "Impact of the mercenary attack on the Seychelles economy".

288. It will be seen from these documents (see annex IV) that the Government has incurred an expenditure of R619,000 or about \$100,000, in connexion with urgent repair works needed to reopen the airport. Additionally, the Government has estimated that it would cost R7.69 million or about \$1.28 million to make permanent repairs to damaged installations and to replace the equipment damaged or lost as a result of the attack. While the Commission could not evaluate in every detail the damage at the airport, it considers that repairs at a cost of the order of magnitude indicated in the Government paper are necessary to restore the airport to full working efficiency.

289. As regards the effects on the economy, the most severe impact is likely to be caused by a fall in income from the tourism industry, which is highly sensitive to political, social and economic disturbances. Tourism normally provides about 70 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings of Seychelles and gives employment to 3,000 out of an economically active population of 25,000. Tourism in Seychelles experienced a phenomenal growth with the opening of an international airport in 1971. The number of visitors rose year by year, reaching 78,852 in 1979. Since then there has been a decline of tourism, not only in Seychelles but in the entire region, mainly due to world-wide recession and higher air fares in the wake of the rise in oil prices. Thus, the tourism industry received a further setback with the mercenary aggression.

290. On the assumption that the number of tourist arrivals would decline by approximately 18 per cent, the Seychelles Government anticipates a total loss to the economy of R101 million or about \$16.7 million, taking into account the loss of tourism revenue and its multiplier effect on the economy. Tourist arrival figures for November and December 1981 were made available to the Commission during its visit. These do not, however, provide a full basis for projecting tourist arrivals for 1982. The airport remained closed for 10 days during these two months and

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there was a prolonged period of dusk to dawn curfew. The situation should become clearer when the tourist arrival figures for the first quarter of 1982 become available, since they would reflect a period of normalcy after the attack. There might then also be more information available about the effects on the inflow of foreign private capital.

291. In these circumstances it is too soon to make a definitive assessment and evaluation of damage to the economy at this time. It is clear that there will be a significant adverse impact on the Seychelles economy resulting from the aggression.

292. In interpreting the terms of its mandate, the Commission has confined its consideration of economic damage to that suffered by the Republic of Seychelles. However, the Commission would draw attention to the letter dated 18 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Swaziland in this regard.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION

293. The Commission agreed on the following recommendations:

1. The Commission endorses the view of the Government of Seychelles that the reconstruction of the airport would constitute a serious burden on the economy. This is at a time when there has been a serious diminution of earnings from the tourism sector. The Commission recommends that financial, technical and material assistance should be provided urgently by Member States and international organizations to enable the country to deal with the difficulties it is facing because of the mercenary aggression. Such contributions could be channelled through an appropriate fund.

Without wishing to prejudge any decision in this regard, the Commission notes that there is a special account for Seychelles in the United Nations Trust Fund for Special Economic Assistance Programmes which is already in existence and through which, should donors wish, assistance could be channelled.

2. As the possibility of aggression by mercenaries remains a grave threat to the sovereignty and independence of States, particularly small developing countries, the Commission recommends that the work at present under way on an international convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries be brought to a speedy conclusion so that the convention may be opened for signature as soon as possible.

3. The Commission also wishes to recommend that States, and the international community as a whole, should make every effort to prevent mercenary operations, having regard to the grave threat which these operations pose particularly to small island States with limited resources, such as the Republic of Seychelles.

4. In this effort and in co-operating towards the prevention of mercenary activities, Governments and Member States having information related to mercenary activities should, without delay, communicate such information directly or through the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Governments concerned.

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5. It is also the view of the Commission that ICAO should, in the light of the apparent ease with which weapons can be transported in checked baggage on commercial airlines, give further consideration to preventive measures, while taking into account the wish of Governments to facilitate tourism.

6. Should the Security Council so desire, the Commission might be authorized to furnish a supplementary report in due course containing any further information relative to its mandate.

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Annex I

COMMUNICATIONS SENT OR RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSION

A. Communications with Governments

1. Letter dated 13 January 1982 from the Chairman addressed to the Permanent Missions of Seychelles, South Africa and Swaziland to the United Nations

As you are aware, the Security Council, at its 2314th meeting, held on 15 December 1981, adopted resolution 496 (1981) by which it established a three-member commission of inquiry in order to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as to assess and evaluate economic damages and to report to the Security Council with recommendations.

On behalf of the members of the Commission, I would like to inform you, and through you, your Government, that the Commission, which consists of Ireland, Japan and Panama, is preparing to begin its work. On the basis of the information at present available, the Commission thinks that it would be useful, in fulfilment of its mandate, to visit a number of countries including Swaziland. The Commission would greatly appreciate your co-operation to this end.

2. Letter dated 14 January 1982 from the Chargé d'Affaires of the Permanent Mission of Seychelles to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman

With reference to your letter dated 13 January 1982 informing the Seychelles Government of the commencement of the Commission's work, please be assured of the Government of the Republic of Seychelles' full co-operation.

My Government is looking forward to receiving the Commission in the Republic of Seychelles and pledges that every effort will be made to assist the Commission in its work.

It is understood, however, that all expenses incurred by the Commission will be paid by the United Nations.

3. Letter dated 15 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Swaziland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman

Pursuant to our telephone conversation of 11 January 1982, and with reference to your letter dated 13 January 1982 regarding authorization of the Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981) on 15 December 1981 by the Swaziland Government to carry out its mandate in the

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Kingdom of Swaziland, I have the honour to confirm, as instructed, that the Commission is welcome to Swaziland.

I would be grateful, Sir, if you could communicate flight details as soon as possible.

4. Letter dated 22 January from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman a/

I wish to refer to your recent request to interview persons in South Africa in execution of the mandate entrusted to you by the Security Council in its resolution 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981.

While the South African Government has no objection to your Commission visiting South Africa, your attention must, however, be drawn to the following. The accused or witnesses in the case of the alleged seizure of an Air India aircraft cannot be compelled to grant interviews. Nor for that matter can any other person. Regard must also be had to the sub judice rule.

If you, however, were to be interested in the court case as such, arrangements can be made to make a copy of the court record, after the conclusion of the proceedings, available to you.

Should you and the other two members of your Commission wish to continue with your intention to visit South Africa, arrangements can be made, after arrival, for appropriate officials to meet you.

5. Letter dated 25 January 1982 from the Chairman addressed to the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 22 January 1982 addressed to me through the President of the Security Council in which you indicated that the South African Government has no objection to a visit to South Africa by the Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981).

The Commission notes the view of the South African Government that "The accused or witnesses in the case of the alleged seizure of an Air India aircraft cannot be compelled to grant interviews" and that "Regard must be had to the sub judice rule".

The Commission would point out that its mandate, as you know, is to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as to assess and evaluate

a/ Letters Nos. 4 to 8 were exchanged while the Commission was away from Headquarters and were transmitted by telegram through the good offices of the President of the Security Council.

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economic damages, and that the hijacking aspect does not constitute the main object of this mandate.

While the Commission has noted with satisfaction the offer of a copy of the court record of the case after conclusion of the proceedings, and the indication that arrangements could be made for the Commission to meet appropriate officials, the Commission would wish, in particular, in order to carry out its mandate effectively, to interview those who participated or were directly involved in the mercenary aggression.

I should be grateful if Your Excellency's Government could indicate whether it would facilitate contact by the Commission with those concerned in South Africa, with a view to determining if they would be prepared to be interviewed by the Commission.

The Commission is eager to finalize its arrangements for the extent of the field of its investigations while still in the area, and would therefore greatly appreciate receiving the Government's response to the foregoing at the earliest opportunity. In this connexion, I would mention that the Commission intends to leave the Republic of Seychelles on Saturday, 30 January 1982.

6. Letter dated 29 January 1982 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman

In your telegram conveyed to me by the President of the Security Council on 27 January 1982 you express the wish "to interview those who participated or were directly involved in the mercenary aggression". You also indicated that you would like to be informed whether the South African Government "would facilitate contact by the Commission with those concerned in South Africa, with a view to determining if they would be prepared to be interviewed by the Commission".

I wish to draw your attention again to my letter of 22 January 1982 setting out the legal position in South Africa which does not differ from that in other countries. The South African authorities will let the Commission have a list of names and addresses of the accused in the above-mentioned case, if it wishes to approach them. Please let me know whether you require such a list.

7. Letter dated 1 February 1982 from the Chairman addressed to the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations

I wish to refer to your letters dated 22 and 29 January 1982 regarding the request of co-operation made to your Government by the Commission established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981).

As stated in our communication of 25 January 1982, the Commission noted with satisfaction that arrangements could be made for it to meet with appropriate officials in South Africa. In that regard, the Commission would consider it pertinent to meet His Excellency, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also to discuss with him arrangements to meet other appropriate officials.

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The Commission would reiterate that its mandate, as you know, is "to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles, as well as assess and evaluate economic damages", and that the hijacking aspect does not constitute the main object of this mandate.

The Commission is aware, from your letter of 22 January 1982, that a court case involving the hijacking aspect of the event of 25 January 1981 is under way.

While appreciative of the offer made in your letter of 25 January 1982 to make available to it a list of names and addresses of the accused in the case, the Commission obviously needs the co-operation of the South African authorities in approaching the persons involved.

The Commission will be leaving Swaziland on Wednesday, 3 February 1982 on the completion of its work in that country. It would, therefore, appreciate your response while it is in Swaziland and confirmation that arrangements are being made to facilitate its visit to South Africa starting 3 February 1982 accompanied by its staff.

8. Letter dated 2 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman

I wish to refer to your letter of 1 February 1982 concerning the request for co-operation made to the South African Government by the Commission established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981).

I wish to inform you in this regard that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Information, the Honourable R. F. Botha, will be happy to receive the Commission. Although the parliamentary session commenced its work only yesterday and has a heavy programme, the Minister will do his best to arrange meetings also with some other Ministers and officials.

The South African authorities would therefore be glad to receive as soon as possible the Commission's detailed itinerary with an indication of when it will be available for meetings in Cape Town.

Should the Commission require assistance with the reservation of accommodation, it would be appreciated if it would please furnish the relevant details to the South African authorities as soon as possible.

9. Letter dated 5 February 1982 from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information of South Africa addressed to the Chairman

I have been asked by the Director-General for Foreign Affairs and Information to convey the following message from him to you:

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"I conveyed your wish to interview the persons involved in the events on the Seychelles on 25 November 1981 to a legal representative of a number of the persons concerned. His response was as follows:

'My clients are facing certain criminal charges in South Africa. We are not prepared to do anything that might possibly prejudice them in relation to these charges. Evidence given to the United Nations Commission might be prejudicial and I cannot take the chance of advising clients to jeopardize their position in any way.'

"You may also wish to consult the Attorney-General of Natal whom, I understand, you are meeting today in Johannesburg."

10. Letter dated 18 February 1982 from the Permanent Representative of Swaziland to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman b/

I refer you to the Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981.

In accordance with the above resolution, the Security Council decided to send a commission of inquiry in order to investigate the origin, background and financing of the 25 November 1981 mercenary aggression against the Republic of Seychelles as well as assess and evaluate the economic damages and report to the Security Council with recommendations not later than 31 January 1982.

The financial losses suffered by the Swazi Airline as a result of the grounding of the aircraft Fokker F28 amount to some 2 million emalangeni and will continue to increase until the aircraft is returned in an operational condition.

The Swaziland Mission, on behalf of the Swaziland Government, formally requests the Commission of Inquiry, when it prepares its report, to extend the terms of reference to cover the assessment of loss sustained by the Swaziland Government as a result of the coup attempt.

The Swaziland Mission counts on your valuable assistance on this important matter.

11. Letter dated 1 March 1982 from the Chairman addressed to the Permanent Representative of Kenya to the United Nations

I have the honour to refer to the work of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981, with a mandate to investigate the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression committed against the Republic of Seychelles on 25 November 1981. Since its

b/ On 26 February 1982, the Chairman sent an acknowledgement to the Permanent Representative of Swaziland, informing him that his letter had been put before the members of the Commission.

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establishment, the Commission, pursuant to the implementation of the mandate entrusted to it by the Security Council, has undertaken various activities, including the gathering of relevant information on the matter and visits to a number of countries in the field for that purpose.

The Commission has now carefully studied the statements made to it, including those made by mercenaries in custody in the Republic of Seychelles, in which reference was made to a number of matters which may have relevance to the Commission's mandate. In so far as these included references to Kenya, the Commission considers it should seek the comments of the Kenya authorities. The Commission has, of course, already taken careful note of the statement issued by the Government of the Republic of Kenya on 8 December 1981 in which the Government categorically denied allegations attributed to one of the captured mercenaries that the Government of Kenya was in any way involved in the events leading to the attempted overthrow of the Government of the Republic of Seychelles. However, as it may be necessary to refer to these matters in the course of its report, the Commission feels that it should give the Kenya Government the opportunity to comment on them in detail in advance.

The Commission has in its possession documented evidence that a Kingair Super 200 Beechcraft with identity call signal N821CA was hired on charter from a firm in Nairobi, Sunbird Charters, with a schedule to fly a party of persons from Mombasa to Seychelles on or about Friday, 27 November 1981. The Seychelles authorities gave clearance for over-flying and landing rights for that flight, but in the event it never took place. In order to establish whether this has any relevance to the Commission's mandate, the Commission would be greatly obliged for the assistance of the Kenya authorities in establishing certain facts regarding the proposed charter flight, namely: the identity of the persons who hired the aircraft, details of the hire-agreement, including the financial terms (especially the mode and currency of payment), and the identity of the persons who would have been flown to Seychelles on the chartered aircraft.

It has also been said that persons by the names of James Mancham and Gerald Hoareau, possibly among others, known to have been members of the former Government of the Republic of Seychelles, were in Nairobi on or immediately before 25 November 1981. The Commission would be grateful if the Kenya authorities could assist in establishing the facts in that regard. In the event that those individuals were in Kenya at that time, the Commission would appreciate any information relating to their stay in Kenya, such as the purpose and duration of their visit, and the places of their residence, etc.

Finally, it has been stated that those who planned the mercenary aggression envisaged that contingents of armed personnel would be flown to Seychelles from the Mombasa airport aboard two aircraft, with the knowledge of certain individuals connected with the Kenya Government, following the mercenary aggression, had it been successful. The Commission would welcome comments by Your Excellency's Government on that statement.

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In view of the limited amount of time available to it to prepare and submit its report to the Security Council, the Commission hopes that Your Excellency's Government will direct its urgent attention to the subject-matter of this letter, and would appreciate receiving a reply at your earliest convenience.

12. Letter dated 5 March 1982 from the Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman

I have the honour to refer to your letter of 1 March 1982 on the work of the Security Council Commission established to investigate the origin, background and financing of the mercenary aggression committed against the Republic of Seychelles on 25 November 1981 and, in particular, to references to Kenya made in the course of your investigations. I have instructions to inform, Your Excellency, that the points raised in your letter were covered in a letter dated 4 February 1982 written by the President of the Republic of Kenya, H.E. Mr. Daniel T. arap Moi, to the President of the Republic of Seychelles, H.E. Mr. René, as follows:

"I thank you very much for your letter of 14th January, 1982. Acting upon the request that Your Excellency put to me, I did institute investigations into all the matters mentioned in your letter and I now have pleasure to communicate my findings. Thorough and extensive investigation has been carried out to determine whether ex-President Mancham was in this country from 10th to 20th November, 1981. All available evidence indicates that Mr. Mancham has not been in Kenya for several years and could not, therefore, have met with any Kenya Government officials as alleged. I have also investigated the allegation that Mr. Gerard Hoareau was in Nairobi on 25th November 1981. It has been fully established that Mr. Hoareau has also not been in Kenya for several years. Our records show that the last time this man entered Kenya was during Mr. Mancham's period as President of Seychelles. It is possible that Mr. Edward Raoul Hoareau, a Seychellois who has lived in Kenya for over thirty-two years and currently the resident manager of the Nairobi Inter-Continental Hotel, could have been mistaken for Mr. Gerard Hoareau.

"As appertains to the identity of the persons who chartered a Beechcraft Super King Air 200 plane for a flight to Seychelles, investigations have revealed that there were five American nationals seeking to visit your country as tourists. These persons had initially made approaches to the Nairobi Charter firm Sunbird to fly them to Moroni in the Comoros on 26th November, 1981 but upon refusal to grant air clearance for the flight to Moroni, the Americans requested to be flown, instead, to the Seychelles on 27th November, 1981. Request for air clearance was made and the Government of the Seychelles granted permission for the flight scheduled for 27th November, 1981. However, when the news of the attack was received on 25th November, 1981, the Americans decided not to travel to the Seychelles. The flight did not therefore depart from Nairobi as the charter company was informed that the airport in Seychelles was closed. The intending passengers, all United States nationals were, Mr. and Mrs. Morgan, Mr. and Mrs. S. P. C. Bowman, and Mr. Nescott.

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"I trust that this information will help you to guide the Commission of Inquiry and I wish to assure you of continued co-operation in this effort to discover the perpetrators of this heinous act of international terrorism. Please accept, Excellency and dear Brother, the assurances of my highest consideration."

13. Note verbale dated 12 March 1982 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Commission

The Mission of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Commission of Inquiry established under Security Council resolution 496 (1981) and has the honor to provide the Commission with the following information which may be relevant to its current investigation.

In response to requests from the Government of the Seychelles, United States authorities have conducted a thorough examination of their records, including the flight logs of all United States Government aircraft in operation within the Indian Ocean during the month of November 1981. As a result of this examination, the United States Government has informed the Government of the Seychelles that there was no flight activity by United States aircraft in the vicinity of the Seychelles during November 1981.

B. Communication received from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Letter dated 22 December 1981 from the Secretary-General of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and forwarded to the Commission

I have the honour to inform you that on 17 December 1981 the Council of ICAO adopted, by consensus, a resolution relating to the unlawful acts against the safety and security of civil aviation, committed on 25 November 1981 in the Republic of Seychelles.

The text of that resolution is sent herewith.

As you will kindly see from the last resolving clause of the resolution, the Council of ICAO has decided that it will further consider these unlawful acts against the safety and security of civil aviation at its next session, in the light of any additional information which the Secretariat may obtain in the course of monitoring and assessing developments on this issue. Accordingly, I shall be grateful if you could keep us advised of any information available to you in this regard, particularly in the light of Security Council resolution 496 (1981) of 15 December 1981.

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Enclosure

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE ICAO COUNCIL ON 17 DECEMBER 1981

THE COUNCIL:

TAKING NOTE of the memorandum AK/37 dated 9 December 1981 of the President of the Council about the request of the Republic of Seychelles in connection with the unlawful acts committed on 25 November 1981 against international civil aviation and its facilities,

BEARING IN MIND that all Member States parties to the Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944, the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at The Hague on 16 December 1970 and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971, must fully and expeditiously discharge their responsibilities and obligations under these international conventions,

RECALLING resolutions A17-1, A17-6, A17-9 and other resolutions of the ICAO Assembly and the ICAO Council resolutions of 26 June and 23 November 1981 relating to the safety of international civil aviation:

- 1) CONDEMNNS the unlawful acts against the safety and security of civil aviation committed in the Republic of Seychelles on 25 November 1981;
- 2) REAFFIRMS that, for the purpose of deterring such unlawful acts, there is urgent need for Member States concerned to implement appropriate measures as provided by the relevant international civil aviation conventions and ICAO Assembly resolutions;
- 3) DECIDES that the Council will further consider these unlawful acts against the safety and security of civil aviation at its next session, in the light of any additional information which the Secretariat may obtain in the course of monitoring and assessing developments on this issue.

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Annex II

REPORT OF THE POLICE COMMISSIONER OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES ON THE
MERCENARY AGGRESSION OF 25 NOVEMBER 1981 AGAINST SEYCHELLES

Planning

1. Around the middle of September 1981, Robert Charles Sims went to Hilton, which is in the province of Natal, South Africa, and his common-law wife, Mrs. Susan Josephine Ingle, went to Howick, 14 kilometres away from Hilton. Sims went to see his brother-in-law, Michael Hoare, and Ingle to see her relatives. It was at Hilton during Sims' visit that Hoare discussed with him the plan to stage a coup d'état in Seychelles. According to Hoare's instructions, Sims was to operate from a "safe house" on Mahé, in Seychelles, where he and his wife would hand out money to Hoare's men. Sims and his wife, Ingle, were to open two bank accounts in the sum of ten thousand dollars (\$10,000) each in Seychelles. Ingle's account with Standard Bank, was to be for household expenses, whereas Sims' account with Barclays Bank was for Hoare's men and transportation.

2. Besides the money side, Sims was also to make transport arrangements and hide a certain quantity of automatic weapons. Hoare also informed him that he would be joined by Barney Carey and Martin Dolinschek, alias Anton Lubic, while in Seychelles.

3. On her return from Howick to Hilton to meet Sims at Hoare's place, Mrs. Ingle was told about the plan by Sims, who outlined the same to her. Ingle understood that there would be a coup in Seychelles, and she agreed to Sims' proposal.

Dolinschek and the National Intelligence Services (NIS) (South Africa) connexion

4. At the end of September 1981, Michael Hoare phoned Martin Dolinschek, a senior intelligence officer from Durban, to call at his place in Hilton, which he did. Hoare told Dolinschek that he had been to see ex-President Manham in England and that, he, Hoare, was going to stage a coup d'état in Seychelles aimed at overthrowing the present Government and installing Mr. Manham in power. Hoare also told him that someone by the name of Gerard would be Vice-President and a former Seychelles judge presently living in Australia would become Prime Minister. He told him that the Kenya Government was involved, that it would be flying troops and police to Seychelles and the government-in-exile would assemble in Nairobi and fly to Seychelles.

5. Hoare requested Dolinschek to interpret information he received into intelligence, which he did. Hoare showed Dolinschek a few pictures of the army camp at Pointe Larue at the airport, and gave him a political background of the Seychelles. He described the present régime to Dolinschek as being oppressive, with Soviet Union, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization having their presence there.

6. A pamphlet purported to have emanated from the Seychelles Revolutionary Movement was shown to Dolinschek by Hoare. It contained allegations of

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mistreatment of parents who demonstrated against their children being sent to the National Youth Service, etc. Hoare described ex-President Mancham to Dolinschek as being a playboy but very much useful in the coup d'état that was to take place, as he would legitimize it in the eyes of the international community, since Mancham was the elected President prior to his being ousted in a coup d'état staged by the present Government.

Acquisition of arms

7. Around mid-October, Hoare contacted Dolinschek by telephone. Dolinschek went to see Hoare in Hilton. Hoare showed him 60 brand new and 20 second-hand AK-47 assault rifles of Romanian make but still in good condition. There were three boxes of R.P.G. and some hand-grenades. Hoare told Dolinschek that he had received those arms through a business transaction with a Saudi Arabian arms dealer going by the name of Khasshoggi (Adnan Khasshoggi). Those AK-47 assault rifles were sometime later in the same month taken from Hoare's place to Durban by Sims and Ingle. Sims carried out some modification on those rifles (removed the butts). The same rifles were later tested by Sims, Chris Hoare, Simon Hoare and Dolinschek at a disused airport at Umslanga Rocks, north of Durban, under the supervision of Dolinschek. All were in good working order, except for only one. The rifles were taken to Sims' place for cleaning and oiling and later taken to Michael Hoare's place in Hilton by Sims and Ingle.

8. Around that interval, Sims purchased a certain quantity of sports bags (containing false bottoms) from a factory in Durban, and those were taken to Hoare's place by Sims and Ingle. The rifles were packed in the false bottoms of those bags at Hoare's place, with the assistance of Mike Hoare's sons, Chris and Simon.

Original plan for arms transportation

9. Originally, Dolinschek had proposed to Hoare that arms be shipped to Seychelles in the fuel tank of a yacht. However, Hoare later on told Dolinschek that the skipper of the yacht had asked for R 40,000 and the yacht would cost about R 150,000; apparently Hoare abandoned Dolinschek's proposition.

The role of Carey: his first visit to Seychelles

10. Around 21 October 1981, Hoare contacted Bernard Stanley Carey by phone and asked him whether he was interested in organizing a tour for him. Carey said he was, and they met the following day at Hilton Hotel, Hilton. At that meeting, Hoare explained the meaning of the Ancient Order of Froth Blowers Association (A.O.F.B.) to Carey. Hoare asked Carey to organize a tour for about 40 people pertaining to A.O.F.B. and to obtain some T-shirts and badges for him. Carey accepted to obtain the T-shirts and badges but referred Hoare to Budget Tours Travel Agency, Johannesburg, for the air tickets to Seychelles.

11. Carey met Hoare at the same hotel about 3 or 4 days later, and Hoare outlined his plan to Carey about his real intention to change the Seychelles Government. Hoare told Carey that he had been planning that for a long time and asked him

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whether he would like to travel to Seychelles to test how strict the Seychelles customs control was and look for suitable accommodation for a group of about 40 people. The following day, which was a Friday, Carey and Hoare met at Hoare's place and Hoare asked Carey to take a rifle in a false-bottom bag and gave him an air ticket to travel to Seychelles the next day. Hoare introduced Carey to Sims and Ingle, and told him to deliver the bag with the rifle to Sims upon his arrival in Seychelles. The following day, Saturday, Carey, Sims and Ingle travelled from Louis Botha airport. Hoare gave one bag to Carey and two to Sims. Each bag contained an AK-47 and 2 full magazines of 30 rounds each. They arrived in Seychelles on 31 October 1981 at 8 p.m. They got through the customs without their weapons being detected. Carey went to stay at the Reef Hotel and Sims and Ingle were met at the airport by Guy Hoareau and taken to Fairview Estate (the "safe house") where they stayed. (Guy Hoareau is the son of the owner of the house.)

12. On Sunday, 1 November 1981, Sims went to see Carey at the Reef Hotel, and Carey gave him the bag containing the rifle. Sims and Ingle opened their bank accounts in Seychelles as had already been instructed to them by Hoare. The money in the sum as previously stated was transferred from a bank account in Switzerland. The money transferred from Switzerland to Sims and Ingle was in the name of M. Thomas Sims and M. Thomas Hoare, respectively.

13. Communication between Hoare in South Africa and Sims in Seychelles was done by telephone (No. 23591), which had been previously installed in the "safe house" by Guy Hoareau. Calls were made by Phyllis Hoare, Michael Hoare's wife (using the cover name Angela) in South Africa, and Ingle answered all the telephone calls. This went according to Hoare's instructions. Meanwhile, Carey visited the large hotels on Mahé to find a suitable one for the group of about 40 men mentioned by Hoare. He telephoned Hoare and advised him that the Reef Hotel was the most suitable and available for that purpose. He went back to South Africa on 7 November 1981.

14. In the beginning of November 1981 Dolinschek had lunch with Hoare at the latter's request. During the lunch, Hoare asked Dolinschek to try and get two (2) turbo-propelled aircraft for the Kenya side of operation, as apparently the Kenyan Government had backed out and would not provide the aircraft. Dolinschek contacted Venan McWilliams - airline operators - but found out that it had gone into liquidation through bankruptcy.

15. Around 12 November 1981, Hoare told Dolinschek that the Kenyan Government would supply two (2) aircraft to discreetly fly troops and police from Mombasa to Seychelles.

The role of England, Brooks and others

16. In early November 1981, Roger William England was met by his friend Barry Gibbon, who informed him that there was a bit of work coming up. England was taken by Gibbon to see Mike Webb regarding the bit of work. Webb told England that there were about 50 people involved in a plan to overthrow the Seychelles Government and that they would each receive R 1,000 as downpayment and R 9,000 upon the successful completion of the operation. England and Gibbon were told by

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Mike Webb that there would be a meeting at the Riviera Hotel on 12 November 1981. Around the same period of time, Aubrey Frank Vincent Brooks was approached by Kenneth Dalgliesh at the Riviera Hotel, Durban, and asked him if he was interested in doing a job in the same line he was doing in the T.V. studios in Borrowdale, Zimbabwe, before he came to settle in South Africa. At Dalgliesh's invitation, Brooks attended a meeting at the Riviera Hotel on 12 November 1981; Carey, England, Brooks, Dalgliesh, Mike Webb, Barry Gibbon, Hein, Simon Willar, Des Botes and others attended that meeting. Apparently this was a meeting for introductions.

17. On 14 November 1981, Carey, England, Brooks, Dalgliesh, Mike Webb, Peter Duffy, Barry Gibbon, Des Botes, Charles Dukes, Christopher Hoare, Mike Hoare and others attended a meeting at Coastlands Flat, No. 19, in West Street, Durban. Mike Hoare chaired the meeting. Hoare told the participants that he planned to stage a coup d'état in Seychelles and install ex-President Mancham in power. He told them that, at present, the country had lost about 75% of its tourist trade and that about 95% of the population was in favour of the coup d'état. He told them that about 50 people would participate in the operation. Hoare showed them a map of Seychelles, some photographs of the international airport, the army barracks (at Point Larue) and Radio Seychelles (Union Vale). Hoare gave them 1,000 rand each as down payment and told them they would each receive 9,000 rand upon the successful completion of the operation. Hoare told Brooks that his task would be to put two tapes at Radio Seychelles at a given signal; one of the tapes was to run at 15 feet a minute, whereas the other one at 7 1/2 feet a minute. He was not given the tapes.

18. Sims had a telephone call from Angela announcing the arrival of Dolinschek on 14 November 1981. Dolinschek flew into Seychelles from Durban on 14 November 1981. He travelled under the pseudonym of Anton Lubic, a professional cover he had acquired to protect his true identity and the operation; and by virtue of his profession and position, he had obtained a false passport in that name from the Secretary of Passport Section of the Department of the Interior, Durban.

19. On the day of his departure, Dolinschek was given an extra suitcase by Hoare, who told him that it contained maritime communication equipment, with labels attached indicating care of Victoria Port Captain (in case of detection by Customs). Hoare placed the bag on the conveyor belt to the aircraft hold. (Dolinschek claimed he did not handle the bag.)

20. Arriving at Seychelles international airport on 14 November 1981, Dolinschek picked up the bag, and he immediately realized that it contained a gun. He took it through the customs. It was checked by the customs officer, but the concealed weapon was not discovered. He passed through customs. Dolinschek was met at the airport by Sims and Ingle. Dolinschek carried with him a letter for Sims from Hoare. He also handed over to Sims the bag given to him by Hoare, as per Hoare's instructions. Sims took Dolinschek to his Reef Hotel room, and Dolinschek asked to return the empty bag to him.

21. On 14 November 1981, Sims gave Dolinschek 1,000 rupees and another 1,600 rupees on 20 November 1981. On 16 November 1981 and 17 November 1981, Dolinschek went on bus tours, and, on 18 November 1981, Sims provided Dolinschek with a car to drive around and observe things.

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22. On 18 November 1981, Carey went to Hoare's place around noon (S.A. time). Peter Duffy and Mike Webb were present. Hoare introduced Carey, Duffy and Webb to Jean Dingwall and one Gerard, an ex-Seychelles footballer (apparently Gerard Hoareau). Hoare and others discussed the plan to stage a coup d'état in Seychelles. Jean Dingwall produced a plan which he had drawn himself, showing the Government Printing House, Radio and Broadcasting Station, and he told them that there would be thirty to thirty-five (35) people (in Seychelles on the day of the operation), wearing white shirts to ease language difficulties and to assist in locating certain places. Dingwall and Gerard said that 95 per cent of the population were in favour of the return of ex-President Mancham and that Hoare and his men had to show only a little strength and the population would come to them with open arms. Dingwall told Carey that he would meet him on 22 November 1981 at a petrol station in Victoria, Seychelles.

23. There was another meeting at Coastlands Holiday Flat, No. 19, attended by Carey, Brooks, England, Dukes, Dalgliesh, Botes, Duffy, Webb, Hoare and his son Chris. Chris showed the participants how to dismantle and assemble an AK-47 rifle. Carey, Brooks, England, Dukes, Dalgliesh and Botes obtained their air tickets from Budget Tours.

24. On the following day, 21 November 1981, Carey, Brooks, Dalgliesh and Botes flew to Seychelles from Durban. They were each given a sport bag with a false bottom. Each bag contained an AK-47 and two full magazines, except for Carey, whose bag contained three radios (walkie-talkies) and spare batteries. Sims was informed by Angela of the arrival of Carey and the others. Sims and Ingle went to meet Carey and his group at the airport. Dolinschek went, too, as he already knew from Hoare that he was involved in the operation. Carey gave certain instruction to Sims, according to a note which had been given to him by Hoare. Brooks, Dalgliesh and Botes got through customs with their false bottom bags containing an AK-47 rifle, which were not detected by customs (Brooks went through the Green Area and was not checked). Carey went to the Coral Strand Hotel, and Brooks and others went to Beau Vallon Bay Hotel.

25. On 21 November 1981, Dolinschek moved from Reef Hotel to Beau Vallon Bay Hotel.

26. England and Dukes travelled to Seychelles on 22 November 1981. They were each given a bag at Louis Botha airport in Durban containing an AK-47 rifle in its false bottom. Similar to Brooks and others, they put extra clothes and other items in the bags to conceal the weapons, as instructed by Hoare. They got through customs without their weapons being detected as the customs officer had only a brief look into their bags. Carey came to meet them at the airport. England and Dukes went to stay at the Reef Hotel. Before they left South Africa, they had been told by Hoare that their job would be to secure Radio Seychelles with the help of three other men arriving on 25 November 1981. Hoare had also told them that the group arriving on 25 November 1981 would be split up in two; one group responsible to secure the State House and Army headquarters, and the other group to secure the airport and the Pointe Larue army camp.

27. On 22 November 1981, Brooks, Dalgliesh and Botes took their hired car provided to them through Budget Tours and drove around Mahé on a familiarization tour past Radio Seychelles and Long Pier.

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Puren's involvement

28. On Sunday, 22 November 1981, Jeremiah Cornelius Puren of Durban, on his way back from a Lion's convention at Drakensburg Garden Hotel, accompanied by his wife, went to see Hoare. Hoare had, on the previous Friday, 20 November 1981, met Puren at his place of business in Smith Street, Durban, and asked him to go to his place. Hoare took them to his private study and told them about the intended operation in Seychelles. He gave Puren an air ticket for his flight to Seychelles. Puren questioned Hoare about arms and the number of people involved in the operation. Hoare told him that the arms were already in Seychelles and also a large advance party was there already. He told Puren that approximately 100 people would take part in the operation but did not tell him how he had managed to get the arms or how he had had them transported into Seychelles. Puren was told that he would be Assistant Master of Ceremonies and to secure the control tower at the airport during the operation; Duffy (Peter) was to have been generally responsible in helping the smooth running by everyone in Seychelles when the group went out fishing or going on tours; to see that everybody was occupied and not just sitting down at the bars and getting themselves drunk.

29. On 23 November 1981, Puren obtained a new passport, as his old one had lapsed. On the same day, Carey, England and Dukes met at the Reef Hotel, Mahé, and had a few drinks, after which Carey took England to Hertz Car Hire and rented a car for him.

30. On Tuesday, 24 November 1981, Brooks, Dalgliesh and Botes went again on a familiarization drive past Radio Seychelles. Carey took England and Dukes on top of the hill overlooking the Union Vale army camp and Radio Seychelles on a "recce" and afterwards drove past Radio Seychelles itself.

31. Puren flew to Johannesburg in the afternoon of 24 November 1981, where he boarded a bus, together with about 40 people or so. Peter Duffy came up to Puren and introduced himself. He asked Puren to tick against a list of names the persons who boarded the bus. The bus departed, not for Pretoria as he had been told by Hoare previously, but for Ermelo which lies about 120 miles from Pretoria. They stayed for the night at the Holiday Inn Hotel, Puren sharing a room with Duffy.

32. After dinner, Puren attended a meeting chaired by Duffy. He was asked by Duffy to say a few words about the Seychelles. (Puren had been to Seychelles about 3-1/2 years previously.) Duffy continued the meeting and explained the meaning of A.O.F.B. He then told the group leaders and section leaders to retire to his room, which they did. Hoare and Puren were present too. Hoare told them about the false-bottom bags containing the AK-47 rifles which they were to be given the next day. Hoare told Puren that his arms would be provided to him in Seychelles, as he (Puren) would not be transporting arms across the border. Hoare also explained about the four or five bags of toys and who they were intended for the handicapped (?).

The events of 25 November 1981

33. Early morning of Wednesday, 25 November 1981, Hoare and his group departed from Ermelo to Manzini, Swaziland. The bags containing the rifles were distributed

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among the group prior to their departure for Manzini. At Manzini airport, the bags were taken off the bus and routed via the customs desk to the hold of the aircraft which was waiting for them.

34. Only the group's hand luggage was subjected to random checks by the X-ray machine. The mercenaries thus encountered no problem in South Africa and in Swaziland. On their way from Manzini to Comoros, Hoare told Puren to attach himself to Webb's group for convenience's sake, as he would be the one responsible for controlling the airport and its area. He also told Puren that he would be the one responsible for signalling the beginning of the operation but did not know when it would start. Puren had only a vague idea as to what was Hoare's plan if the guns were discovered at the airport.

35. Meanwhile, England made arrangements to move from the Reef Hotel to Beau Vallon Bay on 25 November 1981. About 2.45 p.m. that day, England, Brooks and Dukes left the Beau Vallon Bay Hotel for the airport in their hired car. Carey, Dalgliesh, Botes and Dolinschek also went to the airport. England, Brooks, Dukes, Botes and Dalgliesh had to bring their weapons with them, as they had been instructed by Hoare previously. They had all been asked to be present in case something went wrong at the airport. The Royal Swazi Air flight on which Hoare and his group flew into Seychelles touched at Pointe Larue international airport around 5.40 p.m. The mercenaries a/ went through customs, most of them went to the Green Area (nothing to declare) without their concealed weapons being detected and placed their bags on top of the Reef Hotel buses.

36. Customs officer Vincent Pillay found a gun in one of the mercenaries' bags and informed Sgt. Kerchan Esparon of the airport security (his colleague Hansel Laljee also claims he, too, saw a gun a short while later).

37. Meanwhile, Hoare who had passed through customs, was conversing with Sims and Carey. Dolinschek went up to him and inquired from him as to whether he wanted to have the intelligence report, but Hoare told him that he would see him later on in the evening or early next morning about it. Hoare added that his group was a bunch of drunkards and, therefore, the operation would have to be carried out the following day, Thursday, 26 November 1981.

38. The airport police and customs immediately ordered the buses not to leave, as they intended to carry out a thorough search of all the bags of the mercenaries who had already passed through customs. Realizing that their cover had been blown off, the mercenaries quickly jumped into action. They hastily removed their weapons from the false-bottom bags. A person among the group of mercenaries (identified by Assistant Superintendent of Police Benot as Puren) shouted to mercenaries, "We are in groups, boys, come on", and shooting started. There was a lot of confusion, with panicky people running around to avoid being caught up in the shooting.

39. Early, when shooting started (from the mercenaries' side), Sgt. Esparon was hit in the left shoulder. The rifle which had been seized by the police was in his

a/ The name list of the mercenaries was attached to the Commissioner's report, and is reproduced in annex V below.

hands, and a few shots went off from it as his finger accidentally pressed the trigger. The rifle fell to the ground. A young mercenary (Fritz, South African) was hit, it is not known by whom, and apparently died at the airport. The mercenaries began taking people on the airport as hostages b/ and kept them in the airport terminal and kept them under armed guard. Puren sent four (4) men to seize and secure the airport control tower, which they did. He switched off the lights in the main building.

40. Dolinschek asked Sims for his gun as he was to be Hoare's driver, bodyguard and adviser, but Sims withheld the guns, though he had Dolinschek's and Carey's guns with him at the airport. Dolinschek then drove off from the airport for the Reef Hotel. Sims too drove off to the "safe house", where he stayed and hid the guns in the bushes.

41. Hoare dispatched England, Brooks, Dukes and Dalgliesh to the Pointe Larue army camp to prevent anyone from coming out, which they did. Arriving at the entrance of the Pointe Larue army camp, Dukes (or England) told the guards to stand still and that they would not be harmed. (However, according to Private Gaetan Marie's version, it is alleged that one of the mercenaries, not identified by the army, went up towards the gate with a rifle in his hand and asked, "Whose gun is this?" - a ruse to get them off guard. Marie was seized at gunpoint but managed to escape when Sgt. Samson and others fired at the mercenaries. (This is vehemently denied by England and Brooks, who had gone to the camp.) The soldiers fired on them, and England returned the fire to keep the guards' heads down. Brooks was wounded in the right leg and Dukes in the arm. They retired and retreated. Brooks got separated from the others, as he had gone uphill after he was wounded.

42. Later on, Hoare came to the camp with another group of men, but sometime later on returned to the airport. That same evening, Dolinschek hid a diary, in which he had kept the highlights of his movements in Seychelles, under a rock in the bushes next to the Montague Posee public road (Dolinschek took the police and army officers to retrieve it on 5 December 1981).

43. Around 8 p.m. that night, an army armoured vehicle rolled down the public road from south of the airport past the cargo terminal towards the airport entrance. Its crew had been involved in blocking the runway and, after that, they were engaged in pounding the mercenaries' positions at the airport. The vehicle was fired upon by the mercenaries and its tyres were blown. As its driver, Lance Corporal Andre Florine, tried to move in on the airport through the airport entrance, he had to reverse, as the vehicle could not negotiate the narrow entrance at one go. The vehicle was still being fired upon, and it fell off the road and got stuck in the mud. The mercenaries forced its crew, consisting of 2nd Lt. David Antat, Lance Corporals Andre Florine and Wilfred Morel, and Private Egbert Labrosse, out. They at first refused to do so, even though the mercenaries used a captured soldier to inform the crew that they would not be harmed if they surrendered. They finally got out when mud was spurted on the glass screen and petrol poured down the gun turret and fire set to it, causing smoke inside.

b/ The name list of the hostages was attached to the Commissioner's report, but is not reproduced here.

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Florine, Morel and Labrosse got out, leaving Antat inside. He said he would soon follow them. (He was, however, found shot dead beside the armoured vehicle the following day. It is not certain who shot him.) England took a tractor from the airport and pulled the armoured vehicle onto the public road. John McKay started its engine, but as the electrical system was damaged, the armoured vehicle was placed across the road near the airport as a road-block.

44. Around 2245 p.m., Air India flight AI 224 from Salisbury arrived. The Seychelles security forces tried in every possible way to prevent it from landing at Pointe Larue, including blocking the runway and firing tracer bullets at the aircraft. The Air India plane did land. It has been established that Mr. M. J. Lousteau-Lalanne, Acting Director of Civil Aviation (Seychelles), was forced at gunpoint by the mercenaries to authorize the landing of the Air India. Likewise, Mr. Elizabeth was forced to negotiate with high-ranking police officials (Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of Police) to allow the Air India plane to leave. This was granted in the face of the many lives that had to be spared (approximately 65 passengers on board). The mercenaries left on that plane around 1.30 a.m. on 26 November 1981, after the plane had been refueled. They diverted the plane to Durban instead of Bombay.

45. Those left behind, Puren, England, Carey, Dolinschek, Sims, Brooks and Ingle, were picked up one by one and detained.

Annex III

REPORT OF THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CIVIL AVIATION TO THE POLICE
AUTHORITIES ON THE MERCENARY AGGRESSION OF 25 NOVEMBER 1981
AGAINST SEYCHELLES

Upon my return from D'Arros Island, where I had gone on official duty, shortly after landing some 20 minutes after the Royal Swazi flight had landed, I saw two immigration officers running aimlessly past the Seychelles Aero Club hangar and they eventually leapt over the security fence and disappeared behind the trees. Once our aeroplane had come to a complete stop in front of the Aero Club hangar upon disembarkation, I noticed that most of my fire personnel were concerned about something. At that same instant rifle shots were heard by myself, the pilot of the aircraft, Mr. Roy Marsh, and the rest of the passengers. I immediately went back to the aeroplane and talked via radio to the controller on duty in the tower. After repeated calls, Miss M. Pragassen, the air traffic controller on duty, replied. I enquired if there was a problem, to which she answered: "Please come up to the tower." I then continued asking the control tower as to what was happening and why was my presence required. An unfamiliar voice to me replied that my life was in no danger and that he wanted me to come up to the control tower. I then switched off the radio, closed the aeroplane and started walking along with the pilot and the passengers towards the fire station, all of us with our hands in the air.

By this time the fire station building had two mercenaries standing at the extreme ends of the building. We were all bunched together (approximately 20) and were ordered to remain in a corner of the building. Later we were joined by meteorological staff, the electrical staff and maintenance staff. We were then asked to walk forward on to the concrete access road in front of the fire service station and in sharp orders asked to lie flat on our stomachs, stand up and run towards the control tower, lie flat on our stomachs, stand up and run. Eventually we arrived at the entrance of the arrival hall at the terminal building after having crossed the flight apron.

On reaching the arrival hall, I noticed at least 20 armed men around the arrival hall. We were asked to take up the seats in the arrival hall, which we did. A few minutes later we were again directed through the baggage claim and customs area where I, probably most of the others, witnessed a dead person lying face up at the end of the red customs channel. He did not look to me as being a local person. We were then moved into the Aviation Seychelles traffic office which is situated behind the check-in counters. When I entered the room at approximately 6.30 p.m. there were already a number of airport staff which I recognized as health and customs. During my stay in the Aviation Seychelles traffic office more persons were brought in and these included my airport staff, members of the public, tourists, Skychef personnel and members of the defence forces. During that time one armed man made a statement to the effect that they were helping Mr. Jin Mencham to return to the islands because he loved them so much.

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At around 7 o'clock I decided to relieve the air traffic control officer, Miss Pragassen, in view of the fact that

- (1) I was an air traffic control Officer previously (still hold a valid licence) and
- (2) I am in charge of civil aviation in Seychelles.

Mr. Roy Marsh then made the request to the armed men. This they agreed, and I was then escorted by three armed men through the arrival hall out on the apron and to the control tower. When I reached the control tower, there were five armed men and my Controller was on the tiled floor in a shocked state. I enquired whether she was all right and I informed her that she was free to go to the traffic office under escort and that I would take over control in the tower. Two of my escorts remained in the control tower, I was then asked to switch on the runway lights, the approach lights and the taxi-way lights. These remained on throughout the night.

At approximately a quarter to eight, the armed men were becoming more and more restless as both I and they could see approaching headlights from the south-west end of the runway towards the control tower. One of the armed men relayed this information via walkie-talkie to someone else. Frequent similar exchanges took place until some minutes later shots were fired both from the tower and at the control tower. I then ducked under the control desk. The firing was rapid and frequent. All the armed men fled from the control tower, some through the door and others via the fire-escape door. I was left alone and the tower was still being fired at. As an act of survival I placed a metal dustbin over my head for protection against falling glass. The exchange of rapid fire continued for sometime but gradually moved away from the control tower and the technical block towards the apron and terminal building.

After some time I decided to make a number of phone calls. All the telephones which were within easy reach were not functioning except for a direct telephone/radio link between the tower and the police headquarters in Victoria. I tried this number unsuccessfully on a number of occasions but finally, at around a quarter to ten, the phone was answered and I spoke with somebody at headquarters to whom I confirmed my identity, what had happened, the approximate number of armed men which I had seen, and then requested that I be informed of what action to take in respect of the incoming scheduled Air India flight from Salisbury, as I had no intention whatsoever to allow this flight to land at the airport. I repeatedly informed the armed men prior to the attack on the tower that this flight should be informed that it should divert as early as possible and I was repeatedly told that it should land as per normal and all actions taken by me must indicate that everything is as normal. There was no reply to my request by phone.

Shortly after the telephone call, I heard some running noises on the top of the roof of the meteorological and technical offices. Soon after the armed men entered the control tower and immediately asked about my well-being. By this time the Air India flight was on frequency and I was then asked what the call sign of the aeroplane was and other vital data that needed to be communicated to the

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aeroplane. One of the armed men decided to control the aircraft in view of my insistence in not allowing the aeroplane to land. Under threat at intervals I had to furnish the correct information to be relayed to the aeroplane by the armed men. Eventually the aircraft was established on final approach to runway 31 and at that point I again repeated my request that the flight be told to divert, that the safety of the aircraft and its occupants were fast approaching extreme dangers and, in view of the fact that certain procedures that apply to all aircraft landing at this airport had not been complied with, placed the aircraft and its occupants in an even more delicate situation. I requested that since they, the armed men, wanted this aeroplane to land that an inspection of the runway be done especially at the far end of the runway by the landing threshold because I was most certain that it would be blocked. The armed man in charge of the control tower then relayed my concern to somebody else over the walkie-talkie, and eventually the armed man who was talking to the aircraft informed the captain that there may be some interference at the threshold and that he needed to land a little "deep". At the same instant I saw two red pyrotechnique rocket flares which had been fired crossing the final approach track of the aircraft. This was followed by a series of red pyrotechnique flares which were fired directly in front of and at an approximate location of somewhere on the undershoot of the runway. I was surprised to see that the Air India aircraft continued on its stabilized approach and I then again told the armed men to warn the aircraft of the imminent danger ahead on the runway and he repeated his former instruction to the flight. The Air India flight landed at approximately 10.45.

At this point most of my calm senses had reached a point where I became close to being disturbed and I then requested that I be escorted back to the confines of the traffic office so that I could get some rest. After talking with someone via the walkie-talkie I was escorted to the traffic office. I was given a torchlight by one of the armed men and asked to return to the arrival hall. I proceeded by running across the apron and soon after I noticed that the armed men were running behind me, lagging by some 10 yards. By this time the Air India flight was coming to a stop at the far end of the runway. I was escorted through the arrival hall and into the traffic office.

Heavy exchanges of fire continued and later some armed men entered the traffic office and requested the services of those persons that normally refuel aircraft, engineering services and they also called for Patrick Elizabeth, the duty officer of the handling agent, Aviation Seychelles. I was also later called and escorted by armed men to the health office/airport security officer's office, which is situated well inside the arrival lounge. When I entered the room I saw Patrick Elizabeth who sat on a chair in a corner, the captain and co-pilot of the Air India flight, some armed men and the person whom I concluded was in charge of the operation. He then informed me that the flight should not have landed and that he was prepared to negotiate with the Government and instructed Patrick Elizabeth to telephone to the commissioner of police. I was then requested to speak to the authorities in town and the same authorities agreed that the Air India flight which landed would be allowed to take off safely. Our army would hold its fire from now until the safe departure of the aircraft but the armed men were not to board the

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aeroplane. I then requested that a full runway inspection be carried out and this was agreed to by both parties and I provided transport for the captain and the co-pilot, themselves to drive up and down the runway to conduct the inspection. I then waited in the office with Mr. Elizabeth in the company of two armed men, whilst the leader, captain and co-pilot left the room. Firing had since stopped.

Some 30 minutes later the captain and co-pilot returned and confirmed to me that they had removed some items off the runway, that it was clear and that since they had completed the refuelling of the aircraft they would be in a position to take off although they had lost part of the flap to the starboard. Patrick Elizabeth was again instructed to make a second phone call to the commissioner of police and I confirmed that all actions requested had been complied with. The leader then spoke directly to the authorities, followed by the captain of the Air India flight. Some time later I was told that I would be escorted back to the traffic office but somehow I remained standing in the arrival hall, surrounded by armed men. One in particular seemed very angry or displeased with me. It was during that time that I noticed that an awful lot of activity was taking place in the arrival hall. Most of the bags were spread all over the floor, approximately 20 to 25 trolleys had been stacked with baggage and were placed outside the arrival hall next to the travel agents' desks. I again spotted the leader with the captain and co-pilot walking towards the aeroplane, followed by another half a dozen armed men.

Soon after, however, I was escorted in the traffic office and joined the rest of the hostages. Two armed men then proceeded to disconnect by either cutting or tearing all the telephone lines and switchboard. They then left and from that time, which was approximately 1.30 in the morning, until we eventually made our escape at around 9 o'clock in the morning we saw no more armed men.

Air India cranked and started up engines and it was another peculiar starting procedure and I was certain that the aircraft was being started by its own emergency power reserves with cross feeding starting to the other engines (not utilizing the normal ground power unit starter). Messrs. Patrick Elizabeth, S. Maillet and T. Pragassen later returned unescorted and joined us in the traffic office. The Air India flight then took off.

After I had consulted with Roy Marsh, Pragassen and Roy Marsh in turn with Patrick Elizabeth, Maillet and Major Lucas, we agreed to telex Cable and Wireless from the traffic office telex and relayed an appropriate message "Some 12 men have left by Air India, the rest we presume have taken up the hills, we are in the traffic office behind the ASL check-in counters". The message was acknowledged and relayed to the army/police and we were informed that at 5 a.m. something would be done about our safety. We made a running escape at 9 a.m. to Cascade Police Station.

(Signed) M. J. L. LOUSTAU-LALANNE
Acting Director of civil aviation
24 December 1981

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Annex IV

PAPERS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SEYCHELLES ON THE ECONOMIC DAMAGES CAUSED AS A RESULT OF THE MERCENARY AGGRESSION OF 25 NOVEMBER 1981 AGAINST SEYCHELLES*

(a) Request for emergency assistance as a result of the mercenary attack to the Seychelles International Airport

1. Background

On Wednesday 25th November 1981 the Seychelles International Airport was savagely attacked by a group of mercenaries and they inflicted heavy damages to the airport buildings and equipment.

The damages must be viewed as extremely serious in the Seychelles context because the international airport constitutes one of the few vital communication links which the country has with the outside world.

It must be stressed that the situation is serious and worrying because as a result of the attack almost all of the airport equipment including the meteorological equipment have been ruined and thus international flights to Seychelles are, at present, risky.

The roof of most of the airport buildings has been extensively damaged and needs to be urgently replaced.

The electrical installations have been seriously affected during the attack and because of heavy rains recently, they have been exposed. It is most likely that in the medium and long term almost all the electrical gears would need to be replaced.

2. Action taken by the Government following the attack

Immediately after the attack Seychelles Government undertook two urgent actions.

(i) ACTION ONE

The first one consisted of doing urgent temporary repair works to the airport in order to re-open it in the shortest possible time so as to resume international

* The appendices referred to in the following two papers have not been reproduced in this report. They are kept in the Secretariat and will be made available in the original language to any member of the Security Council wishing to see them.

flights. It must be noted that a large number of tourists were stranded in the Seychelles and Government had to take urgent action so that they could leave the country at the end of their holidays.

The urgent temporary works were carried out by a number of Contractors including Electro Builders, Aluminium and Steel and public agencies. Labour was also shifted from other projects to work on the airport.

In short, from the 26th November to date, most of the urgent temporary repair works were carried out by various agencies. The expenditure incurred to date is as follows:

Labour:	R113,000
Materials:	R506,000

For details see Appendix VII.*

(ii) ACTION TWO

The second action which was taken was for National Consultancy Services, a consulting firm, to undertake a proper assessment of all the damages to the buildings and equipment. This work was completed on the 4th December. National Consultancy Services have done a detailed estimate of the repairs required to the buildings in order to restore the airport into its original state. These repair works are referred to as permanent repairs. Details of the permanent repair works are shown in Appendix I. As mentioned in previous telexes the permanent repair works will be carried out by Allied Builders, a contractor presently involved on the airport extension project. Allied Builders has been chosen for economic reason, because it is presently on site and thus mobilization costs are minimized.

3. Implementation of permanent repair works

There are two types of repair works. Firstly there are the buildings and secondly there is replacement of equipment which was damaged during the attack. The restoration works to the buildings will be done by Allied Builders whilst the installation of new equipment will be done by the specific airport agency such as for example the Meteorological office will do the meteorological equipment. It must be noted that a lot of the equipment destroyed is portable and thus there is not much need for installation. As for the electrical department a lot of materials have to be replaced and these are shown in Appendix VI.

4. Cost of repairs and replacement of equipment

All details are annexed. Please note that the table below is a summary and all figures have been rounded to nearest thousand.

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SUMMARY COST OF REPAIRS AND REPLACEMENT OF EQUIPMENT
REPAIRS TO BUILDINGS

<u>BUILDING</u>	<u>A</u> <u>LABOUR</u>	<u>B</u> <u>MATERIALS</u>	<u>C</u> <u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>D</u> <u>TOTAL</u>
1. Control Tower	79	466 (Appendix I)	200 (Appendix II)	745
2. Cargo Building	97	161 "	15 (Appendix III)	273
3. Aviation Seychelles Administration Building	1	3 "	-	4
4. Aviation Seychelles Workshop	90	141 "	21 (Appendix III)	252
5. Aero Club Hangar	21	35 "	26 "	82
6. DCA's Office	48	90 "	10 "	148
7. Meteorological Office	135	299 "	1 168 " IV	1 602
8. Air Traffic Control Building	110	233 "	850 " II	1 193
9. Aviation Seychelles Office	22	54 "	197 " V	273
10. VIP Building	1	2 "	-	3
11. International Flight Apron	5	6 "	-	11
12. Arrivals Hall	17	55 "	-	72
13. Departure Hall	3	8 "	-	11
14. Duty Free Shop	8	16 "	-	24
15. Baggage Handling Area	2	4 "	-	6
16. Roof Sheeting & Gutters in International Passenger Terminal	100	261 "	-	361
17. Electrical Installations	10	30 "	-	40
18. Electrical & Mechanical Department	-	-	2 160 " VI	2 160
19. Caravan	-	200 "	136 " V	336
20. Vehicles	-	-	100 " III	100
TOTAL	749	2 064	4 883	7 696

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5. Assistance sought from the European Economic Community (EEC)

The reconstruction of the airport is a serious burden on the Seychelles economy and assistance is thus sought from the EEC to finance the urgent temporary repair works, the permanent repair works and replacement of equipment. The Seychelles Government will attempt to meet the labour cost. However any assistance from the EEC would be highly appreciated.

23 December 1981

(b) Impact of the mercenary attack on the Seychelles economy

1. Summary

The mercenary attack on 25th November to the Mahé International Airport is a cause for great concern to the Seychelles economy. The attack will have significant adverse effects on the fulfilment of the country's economic plan.

Not only will the economy need to mobilize significant financial, human and technical resources to repair the airport, but also the economy will lose substantial revenue as a result of a decline in tourist arrival caused by the attack.

The attack came at a time when the decline in the tourism industry was being arrested after two bad years. The tourism industry in Seychelles boomed from 1971 to 1979. However, in 1980 and 1981 because of adverse trends in the world economy the industry suffered a major set-back. Tourist arrivals fell by 9% in 1980 compared to 1979 and by 16% in 1981 compared to 1980.

But from November 1981, with increasing investment in publicity and improved local facilities there were encouraging indications that the industry was reviving.

The loss to tourism income in December 1981 has been estimated at R13 million and the loss to be incurred in 1982 at R53 million, a total of R66 million. But we have also looked at the multiplier effect of that loss. Thus starting with a R66 million loss in tourism industry, it has been calculated that the economy would lose an additional R35 million, giving a total loss to the economy of R101 million or \$US 16.7 million. To this figure should be added the cost of repairs to the airport which has been estimated at R8.3 million. The cost of the mercenary attack to the economy is therefore \$17.6 million. This figure is probably conservative and it is most likely that the total cost would exceed \$20 million. It is still too early to judge the long-term effects of that attack but there is no doubt that it will take a long time for the economy to recover from this vicious attack.

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It must be stressed that \$17.6 million represents only the quantifiable cost of the attack, but there are other non-quantifiable and equally important losses which must not be overlooked. These include adverse climate for foreign investment because of a psychological fear that the economy could suffer a similar setback. In such a climate of uncertainty and fear investors would be reluctant to invest and this could create a vicious circle holding back economic development. However, it must be noted that the Government will ensure that a similar attack does not take place and thus investors would have no fear to implement their investment programmes in Seychelles.

2. Methodology utilized in calculating the cost of the attack to the economy

In calculating the cost of the attack we utilized a "with and without attack" situation. Without the attack the situation would have been as follows:

(i) WITHOUT THE ATTACK

The country had suffered a decline in tourist arrivals in 1980 and 1981, but 1982 was expected to show an up-turn. The 1981 and 1982 tourist arrival figures without the attack, were estimated as follows:

	<u>TOURIST ARRIVALS WITHOUT ATTACK</u>	
	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982 (2)</u>
Q 1	18,933	17,130
Q 2	13,448	13,919
Q 3	14,950	14,989
Q 4	<u>15,819 (1)</u>	<u>16,060</u>
TOTAL	<u>63,150</u>	<u>62,098</u>

(1) Estimate

(2) Projection based on
1980 and 1981 trends

N.B. The 1981 figures are actuals except for the last quarter which is an estimate.

On average, a tourist spends during his stay in Seychelles R4,670. Tourism expenditure for 1981, without the attack, was expected to be R295 million and for 1982 R290 million.

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(ii) WITH THE ATTACK

The attack caused a sharp decline in the number of tourists in December 1982. In fact, there were record cancellations. It is foreseen that because of the attack a large number of tourists will cancel their plan for holidays in Seychelles in 1982. The projected 1982 tourist arrivals are as follows:

<u>1982</u>	
<u>TOURIST ARRIVALS (AS A RESULT OF THE ATTACK)</u>	
Q 1	11,991
Q 2	11,349
Q 3	11,991
Q 4	<u>15,418</u>
TOTAL	<u>50,749</u>

It can be seen that the decline in the number of tourist arrivals would be approximately 18%.

In terms of revenue, it means that in December 1981 the country lost R13 million. Without the attack the country would have earned R28 million. But because of the attack the country would lose about 45% of R28 million which is R13 million.

As for 1982 without the attack, we were expecting to earn R290 million, but as a result of the attack we are now expecting R237 million thus giving a loss of R53 million. Totalling the loss for December 1981 and that of 1982 we have a figure of R66 million.

3. Loss in tourism earnings = R66 million a/

4. The multiplier effect of the loss of R66 million in the tourism industry

The loss of R66 million in the tourism industry will affect adversely the gross domestic product (GDP), the balance of payments (B-P), and government revenue.

(i) GDP

R66 million in the tourism industry will generate the loss of R74 million during December 1981 and through the whole of 1982 in the national economy. This is calculated through the multiplier effect. The basis of multiplier effect is that any spending provides income for those who are involved in producing and

a/ Details are given in appendix A.

selling touristic services. Some of this income is paid in taxes and some is saved, but a large proportion is spent and so provides further income, and thus we have the various round effects. The total increase in spending and in income is thus a multiple of the initial increase which started the process.

The strength of the multiplier in an open economy such as the Seychelles depends on how much of the tourism income is spent on imported goods and how much on locally produced goods and services. The more that is spent on the latter generates more income, employment and other benefits. However, if a substantial part of the income is spent on imports, saved, paid in taxes then the multiplier effect is reduced.

We assume that 40% of tourism expenditure goes on direct import and 60% to the Seychelles economy. Of this 60%, 5% is saved and 95% is spent on consumption. Fifty per cent of the consumption expenditure is imports and the rest is domestic production.

Based on these assumptions, the multiplier for tourist expenditure is R1.12. ^{b/} It indicates that for every R1 million not received as tourism earnings, the loss to the national income would be R1.12 million.

GDP for 1978 was R574.6 million. This amount converted into 1981 prices gives GDP of R865 million. The ratio of R295 million to the above figure (R865 million) is one third or 34% of GDP generated by tourism expenditure. It is also estimated that tourism income in 1982 would have been R290 million or 33% of GDP, if there had not been the mercenary attack.

If the Seychelles economy loses R66 million (R13 million in December 1981 and R53 million in 1982) the contribution of tourism expenditure to GDP will fall by 2% in 1981 and by 6% in 1982. The loss of R66 million will have a severe negative effect on the economy which is still very dependent on tourism. Also, the loss of R74 million will reduce GDP by 9%, from estimated R865 million to R791 million.

(ii) BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

The relevance of tourism to the Balance of Payments can be seen in table 1.

^{b/} Details are given in appendix B.

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Table 1
1980 (in R million)

Imports	Exports	Re- Export	Tourism Revenue	Total Export	Visible Deficit	Tourism Revenue	
						As % of Total Export	As % of Visible Deficit
1	2	3	4	5(2+3+4)	6(1-2+3)	7	8
627	33	78	330	441	-516	75	64

(Source: Monetary Authority Quarterly Review, July-September 1981, Vol. III, Table 19).

The tourism revenue represents about 75% of the total export, a very high proportion of export earnings. It shows clearly the dependence of the Seychelles economy on tourism. It must also be noted that the Seychelles economy sustains a heavy deficit in visible trade.

Import

It is estimated that imports in 1982 will be about R650 million. The reduced imports in 1982 is still not known but it is expected that there will be a fall between 10%-20% in the first quarter of 1982. We estimate that in 1982 imports will be reduced by 10% or R60 million as the result of the loss of R66 million in tourism expenditure (R26 million loss in direct import and R34 million through the multiplier effect).

The belligerent attitude of South Africa has meant that Government will be sharply reducing its trade with that country.

The estimates also show that an additional R13 million which is not included in the total loss of R74 million will be lost by the Seychelles economy as a result of the increase of imports from other countries to make up for those that would have come from South Africa. About R65 million of goods would otherwise have come from South Africa but the result of diversification will mean an increase of 20% of the import bill due to higher prices and higher transportation costs. For example the c.i.f. price of poultry feed will be 40% more expensive if it comes from Mauritius and 100% more expensive if it comes from Australia.

Private investment

It is known that Seychelles has an open economy which welcomes foreign private investment. As the result of the mercenary attack we assumed that this item of the Balance of Payment will be reduced by R10 million in 1982.

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(iii) GOVERNMENT REVENUE

The estimates show that the revenue in the recurrent budget in 1982 will be reduced by about R16 million or 4%. Because of shortage of time and lack of precise information we could not estimate what items in the Government recurrent expenditure will be affected most.

The figure of R16 million has been arrived at after calculating the losses on import duty and turnover tax. These taxes are expected to be the hardest-hit.

Import duties

It is estimated that import duties in 1981 will be about R133.5 million, but as the result of the revaluation of the rupee in March 1981 the actual income will be about R112 million.

We estimated earlier that the import in 1982 will be about R650 million and that this figure will be reduced by 10% or R60 million as the result of the fall in tourism consumption. It is difficult to predict the exact loss in import duties, but the rough figure will be about R11 million, or 8% of the estimated R138 million for 1982.

Turnover tax

The estimates showed that the turnover tax will be reduced by R5 million. c/ This represents about 19% of the expected revenue of R26 million in 1982.

It is known that 77% of the total tourism expenditure is spent on services etc. on which 10% turnover tax is charged. If tourists spend R66 million less, the hotels, restaurants, tourist agencies and car hires will not be able to get the income of R51 million on which they would pay 10% turnover tax R5 million. This loss will reduce the recurrent budget for 1982 by 1%.

5. Conclusion

It is obvious that the loss of R66 million in tourism expenditure will generate the loss in the Seychelles economy of R109 million or \$17.6 million. This amount represents 13% of GDP in 1981 prices. For a country the size of Seychelles with a fragile economy this is a large amount and may not be compensated only by domestic resources.

It is also shown how our economy is dependent on tourism and how any adverse effect on this industry can have disastrous consequences for the economy. The paper also illustrates that though tourism contributes directly about 30% of the GDP as a result of the multiplier effect, its impact is far greater than that.

5 January 1982

c/ Details are given in appendix C.

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Annex V

NAME LIST OF THE MERCENARIES

Advance party

<u>Name</u>	<u>Country of nationality</u>
1. Robert SIMS (brother-in-law of Michael Hoare)	Republic of South Africa (RSA)
2. Susan INGLE (common-law wife of Robert Sims)	United Kingdom (UK)
3. Martin DOLINSCHKEK, alias Anton Lubic (Intelligence)	RSA
4. Bernard CAREY (Group leader)	UK
5. Aubrey BROOKS	Zimbabwe
6. Kenneth DALGLEISH (Group leader)	Britain
7. Des BOTES	RSA
8. Roger ENGLAND	Zimbabwe
9. Charles DUKES	United States of America (USA)

Main body a/

1. Thomas Michael HOARE, alias Thomas Boarel (Commander)	Ireland
2. Andrew STANDISH-WHITE	Ireland
3. Peter DUFFY (Second in command)	UK
4. Richard STANNARD	UK
5. Robert JONES-DAVIES	UK
6. Kenneth BARNES	UK

a/ The name list of these mercenaries, which was provided to the Commission by the Government of the Republic of Seychelles, is identical with the passenger list provided by the Government of Swaziland.

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Main body (continued)

7.	Nicholas WILSON	UK
8.	John MACKAY	UK
9.	Donald KENNY	UK
10.	Michael WEBB (Group leader)	UK
11.	Simon WILLAR	UK
12.	Dewet SHYN	RSA
13.	Janolot SYDOW	RSA
14.	Patrick HENRICK	RSA
15.	Jeremiah PUREN	RSA
16.	Johan FRITZ (Killed)	RSA
17.	Theodours van HURSTEEN	RSA
18.	Trevor BECK	RSA
19.	B. de VOS	RSA
20.	Desmond WALKER	RSA
21.	Christo HILLEBRAND	RSA
22.	Louis BOUCHER	RSA
23.	William PAUL	RSA
24.	Tulio MONETA	RSA
25.	Pieter DOOREWAARO	RSA
26.	Johannes DE BEER	RSA
27.	Jochemns DEKKER	RSA
28.	Frederick GOUWS	RSA
29.	Patrick FURELLE	RSA
30.	Alan MANN	RSA

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Main body (continued)

31. Ernest DEETLEES	RSA
32. Keita MACLOOD	RSA
33. Alex DEACON	RSA
34. Peter HEAN	RSA
35. Charles GOATLEY	Zimbabwe
36. Vernon PRINSLOO	Zimbabwe
37. Stephen BIBBLECOMBER	Zimbabwe
38. Jacob DUTOIT	Zimbabwe
39. David GREENHAUGH	Zimbabwe
40. Peter ROHWEIN	Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
41. Kunt PRIEFERT	FRG
42. Seven FORSELL	Austria
43. Kenneth KELLY	Australia
44. Barry GRIBEIN	USA

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Annex VI

TRANSCRIPT OF THE HEARINGS OF THE CAPTURED MERCENARIES

(For the introduction and general remarks concerning the conduct of the interview with each of the mercenaries, see paragraph 71 of the report proper.)

Jeremiah Cornelius Puren

PUREN: I am a South African. My full name is Jeremiah Cornelius Puren. I live in South Africa, and I am director of a company. It is a going concern in Durban.

Q (question): Do you have your residence in Johannesburg?

A (answer): I have a residence in Durban, as well.

Q: Before we ask some questions, Sir, do you desire to make a statement?

A: Well, let me just tell you briefly: I do know the person who recruited me. When I say "recruited", he came to see me in my business. I could not speak to him in the business, but we did make an appointment. I had a meeting, a congress - an auto congress - which was quite near his home, and I went to see him. That is in a place called Hilton, Outside Pietermaritzburg, in Natal. It is about 120 kilometres from where I live.

This person, of course, is - as you probably know - Mike Hoare: Colonel Mike Hoare. He apologized for the shortness of the advice and asked me if I would like to go with him to Seychelles. He briefly gave me the background, saying that they would like to reinstate the old Prime Minister or President, Mr. James - or Jimmy - Mancham in Seychelles, and he did not have much time to talk to me. He told me that the people here were very unhappy, that things were going from bad to worse, and he gave me an air ticket. I never took any money from him. He may have paid some money into my account; I do not know. He gave me an air ticket and told me he would meet me in Pretoria, as a matter of fact. But he did say to go to Johannesburg by air on a certain day. I would see certain people, and they would take me on a bus trip to Pretoria. But they did not take me to Pretoria: they took me to another town - a place called Ermelo in the eastern Transvaal. And from Ermelo we rode to Manzini, in Swaziland, to the airport there, and took off from there to Seychelles.

But there were certain pertinent questions I did ask him. The matter of arms: he told me that the arms were already here in this country. Only when it was too late to withdraw did he tell me different. He told me that the arms were here in the Seychelles, but only when I was on a trip with him, in the final stages, did he tell me that, no, the people themselves were going to carry their arms with them in the bottom of their bags. I could not withdraw at that stage, and I came along. I had to come.

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The money side, as far as your mandate is concerned - he did tell me that the money was from private sources and that it would come from Mr. Mancham and there had been a struggle to collect this money. It had not been an easy task. I do not know if there is anything else you would like to know.

Q: Have you ever served in the armed forces or security services of any country?

A: Yes, I have. I used to be, in the last war - the Great War - in the South African Air Force, and after the war I was in the Royal Air Force. And then in 1961 I was in the Congo, and I joined their service there, in Katanga, and - I think you remember, because it was a United Nations affair - they used to have an officer commanding, called Delain, who was in charge of the Katangese Air Force. They told him to leave the country. I was not there then; I had gone back to South Africa. And he left Katanga, and then Mr. Tchombe asked me to come back to Katanga to take over his air force, which was not really an air force: it was about five small airplanes that we were using for time off, flying in Katanga to help with ravitaillement. What is that in English?

Commission member: Supply.

Q: Did Mr. Mike Hoare tell you about your participation in the whole operation?

A: He did, yes. He told me that he wanted me to come along to do the tower - the control tower. I did not think of asking him. You know, when he asked me that, I said, "Fine, I will come and do the control tower for you." But when I was in the bus there were at least two or three air force chaps in there already - young men, you know. They had just finished flying. I had not flown for 15 years - I have been in business - and I did not think of asking him: "You have these young chaps here. Why did you ask me to come?" But there were at least two or three air force chaps already in the bus, from what they were saying. They actually did not need me to do that. And they did not need me, because when the problems started here I was the one who went to the telephone to try to contact the Government to stop the thing. I said, you know: "Make a cease-fire, because," I told Hoare, I said, "it is impossible. The thing has started. You haven't got sufficient forces." He told me there were would be at least 200 people coming to help us, you know - that we were in. I said: "Nobody has turned up yet to help. There will be unnecessary bloodshed in the place."

By then, only one person had been killed, and that was a mercenary. I think he shot himself by accident. I think so; I am not sure. I did not see it happen. But he said: "Fine, we can do that." So he went with me and two other people - one civilian - over to the telephone. It was across the road from the airport. And the answer I got back was not from the Government. I phoned the Air Swazi pilot who had brought us, and he contacted a high authority. He had been in contact with a high authority, and this high authority had said, no, there would not be any such thing; they would come and clean up everybody there. So Hoare went back to the airport and he told me to wait by the telephone for further developments. Well, the further developments were that I was cut off by an

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armoured car. I could not go back to the airport, and I was in the bush for 17 days - 17 days in the forest. I was completely cut off from the airport, and when I gave myself up - because I was starving, I was thirsty, I was dying of thirst - I asked the chaps, you know: "Where is everybody?" because I was under the impression that everybody had been shot. I really was. I thought they had all been shot, because I tried to give myself up the following day. I hurt my legs very badly. I had had a bad fall and couldn't walk; I was crawling, and I tried to give myself up. But they were still coming to get me; they were shooting at me.

Now I heard why: there was big trouble in the airport in the liquor store, with the soldiers, and they did not come and fetch me. I could not ever understand that. I was not too far; I could not have been more than 80 metres up, a little bit away; I could see the people there, and then when they started shooting at me I just lay low.

That night I crawled back, right into the bush, and I rested in one place for about four or five days, recuperating from my leg; and after that I started to walk. I got myself a stick, and I walked slowly in the bush. I tried to climb, but it was too far. In my condition it was impossible, and it took me the rest of the 17 days to get about four kilometres, or three kilometres, through very dense bush. The forests are really dense up there, and have a lot of rocks and things. So after he told me to await developments, I was completely out of it. I was completely cut off.

Q: Tell me: the Swaziland plane arrived at about a quarter to six, more or less, is that correct?

A: I would say about half past five - a quarter to six; that's right. It was late.

Q: As soon as the operation was discovered by the Sechellois authorities, you went directly to the control tower of the airport; is that correct?

A: No, I went to look for Hoare, to find out what gives, because I was - you know, I was - I did not have charge of anything. I was not a group leader, or anything. I went to him to see what instructions he had, because he was very vague on something happening at the airport. I do not think he ever thought anything would happen in the airport itself. He took me by surprise. But by then somebody told me he had already gone to the army camp with a group. You have the apron where the aircraft taxies, where the passengers get on. I went through there and I saw a lot of chaps standing around. I said: "What are you supposed to be doing? Is there a programme for you?" They said: "Yes." I said: "Aren't you supposed to go to the control tower?" And then they went to the control tower.

Q: Oh, you did not go to the control tower?

A: I went to the control tower and they went to the control tower. I went to the control tower and came back into the airport building, because there were a lot of civilians walking around. I put them into a place of safety in the airport building, in the big room. I said: "Please sit down there." There were three Air

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Swazi hostesses. I had seen them and went and took them in there. I told them to sit down. There were about 20 people in that room.

Q: When you left the tower, did you see any damage?

A: The control tower was not damaged - not that I could see, anyway - nothing, not at all. There were no shots fired - nothing like that.

Q: Not around the tower?

A: No.

Q: How many of the people who came with you in the Air Swazi plane did you know from before?

A: Only one: Mike Hoare. I did not know one other person. I was told he came to see me on a Friday in my business. I could not talk to him. I made an appointment. I saw him on a Sunday afternoon. He gave me the information I gave you; he gave me an air ticket, and I would meet him in Johannesburg and they would take me to Pretoria. When I got on that bus there was nobody I knew. Everybody seemed to know where they were going. They were going to Ermelo. I did not say that I was told I was going to Pretoria. I just kept quiet. But I ticked off the names, because the man in charge of the group was a person called Peter Duffy, and he gave me a list. He said: "Please, as the chaps get onto the bus, just tick off their names", and as they went into the bus they each gave me their name and I ticked it off for him. I never met them before. They were all young people. I had never seen them before.

Q: When you arrived in Seychelles, how long did you think you were going to stay here?

A: Everything was in the hands of Mike Hoare. He would give all the timing - everything. But I came here; I think they booked us in for two weeks at the hotel. If they would have kept the two weeks, I do not know. But I do know one thing: that Hoare did tell me, he said: "Tomorrow, which is Thursday, is a free day." Those were his words to me. And I was supposed to organize swimming and fishing excursions - that was another one of my jobs. But Thursday would have been a free day. What he would have done on a Friday or a Saturday, I could not tell you. But he kept that to himself.

Q: When Mike Hoare approached you, did he give you any picture of the plans or of the operation?

A: I know Mike very well. When I say I know him very well, I knew him in the Congo; we knew one another: I was in the air force and he was in the ground forces. But we backed a different horse: I was a Tchombe-ist and he was a Mobutu-ist. So we saw one another. Then we came back to South Africa and I did not see Mike Hoare for at least 8 to 10 years. And one day he came into my business and - well, not actually the business: he came into one of our offices and we renewed our friendship. That was about four or five years ago - four and a

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half, five years ago. It is only since then. And then, whenever he came to Durban and he was in my part of town - the motor town is in a different area from the general shopping area. A motor-town is always in a different area. And when he found himself in that area, he came into my business and we would have a cup of coffee or a cup of tea. But generally I am a very busy person, because my sales floor is one of the busiest in Durban. But he never told me. He was very secretive about this business - very secretive. He never told me a thing. But I did know, or still do know, a few Sechellois, because many young Sechellois people, when they come to Durban to look for work, they come to my business and I help them.

All right. I introduce them to people to get work permits, because without work permits you cannot get a job. And that is how I became known to a few Sechellois people. But I believe the politicians, they came to see me too - three of them: Mr. D'Offay, Mr. Hoareau - two Hoareaus.

Q: From the former Government?

A: From the former Government. I did not know they were in the former Government; that I did not know. But I do know they had aspirations.

Q: Could we just ask you to repeat those names?

A: Mr. D'Offay and two Mr. Hoareaus. Actually, Mr. D'Offay was one of my clients before I knew where he was.

Q: So he lives in South Africa?

A: He lives in South Africa. I have not seen him for about eight months - at least eight months. I do not know how he is involved in this business, but I do know that the two Hoareaus are involved, because the Commissioner told me. One of the peace-people told me.

Q: Mr. Hoare, though, in discussing what you were going to do, told you that there were going to be others involved, as well as those who came on the ...

A: Yes, he told me that there were at least members of the police, members of the army and civilians in the region - about 200 who would come and help - come and join us.

Q: Sorry: was that supposed to mean people living in Seychelles?

A: People living here - that were here.

Q: But did you understand that any would come, apart from those in the Air Swazi plane, from outside?

A: No. What I did understand was that there was already a group of people here - but he did not tell me how many - and also that Mr. Mancham would be arriving within about 12 hours of anything starting. But where from, he never told me. He never told me a thing.

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Q: And in asking you to join this operation, why do you think Mr. Hoare approached you? Was it your common background in the Congo, or was it your connexion with Sechellois people in South Africa?

A: I would say, possibly, Sechellois people but thinking that I am air force. But I do not think, being an army chap - you know, in 15 years things change a lot - I do not think he would think that, basically. I think he just wanted me along. I do not know why - because I was sick. I told him: "Listen ...". He said: "Please come along", and I came.

Q: In so far as the clearest thing you seem to have known - about the role you would play to secure the control tower - could you describe what you envisaged that would involve?

A: I suppose that I would possibly have helped him call Mancham to come. I do not think, you know - you know, it is the Air India business that is the problem. I think that was just a plum, possibly, that fell into his lap. I do not want to make excuses for Hoare, but, you know, we were supposed to arrive here at 5 o'clock. Now, what time did that airplane take off? Somewhere around 10 o'clock. It is five hours. I do not think he visualized that business, because if anything starts in the airport we are finished; they do not have the means to secure anything. That took him completely by surprise.

Q: So your role, if things had gone completely according to plan, would have been at the airport at some later stage, but not at the time of arrival?

A: No, at some later stage. I know that he was very concerned about Mr. Mancham arriving. That I do know.

Q: But you had been told, I think you said, that the next day would be a free day?

A: The next day would be a free day.

Q: So your belief was that you would go to the hotel from the airport?

A: Yes, that's right.

Q: And then await ...

A: Further instructions from him - because he was not living at the hotel. He was booked somewhere else. Where, I do not know, but he was not booked in the hotel.

Q: Did you know whether he was travelling under his own name?

A: No, he was not. He was travelling under the name of Tom Boarel.

Q: I think you already mentioned to us that you were not given any money.

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A: I may have, now.

Q: But at the time you went into the bush here ...

A: No.

Q: Did you know how much money you were going to be given for the operation?

A: He did mention 11,000 rand. He did mention that, but, of course, I do not know.

Q: But you would have expected to receive some remuneration, would you not?

A: Yes.

Q: And you would have expected to get that money from him in due course?

A: Yes.

Q: Given that you have a full-time company in South Africa, did you envisage that your departure on this operation would affect that in any way?

A: Actually, my partner is there, and the school holidays were just starting. My wife normally helps me on the floor, and I have another salesman.

Q: Coming back, then, to the question of what happened when you arrived here, you already told us that you made an effort - you contacted the Air Swazi people at their hotel, I assume, and - just a side-step for moment - the pilots had gone to their hotel, but you mentioned that the hostesses were still in the airport.

A: The hostesses - I saw the hostesses in a room that somebody had put them in. I said: "Please, I am very sorry, I apologize: come away from here. It's too dangerous." There was a dead body lying there, as well. I said: "Come with me", and I took them to a place around the side where there was a much safer place.

Q: Then after that, you came back to Mr. Hoare and said the authorities would not ...

A: No, no: he was with me.

Q: He was with you?

A: Yes. He went with me to a telephone, and the Air Swazi pilot had told me: "Please, I have been in touch with a very high authority, and they do not want to know about your problem at all." That is what Mike Hoare told me, but I also told the Air Swazi pilot something else. I said: "Please come along and take us away from here." That is my own - not what Mike Hoare told me to say: "Just take us away from this place." But, of course, he did not come.

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Q: So what did you do then after that?

A: Well, he told me to stay, to await developments. And when the armoured car came and started firing, and with the cross-fire from the other side, Manuel and myself - there was also a mercenary with us, but he had gone back by himself - so Manuel, the civilian, and myself went up into the hillside. There we waited quite a while about an hour or so - and when they started shooting that cannon very wildly, very erratically - they were spraying shells all over the place - I told Manuel - I had already fallen very badly - I told Manuel: "You had better go home."

Q: Manuel was a local contact of yours?

A: Yes. I told him to go home. And then I crawled up into the hills.

Q: Did you ever carry a weapon in the airport?

A: I never carried a weapon in the airport. They tried to give me a weapon. I said no - as long as somebody comes with me. So he sent a mercenary with him, and I also Mike Hoare came with me.

Q: You do not consider yourself a mercenary?

A: Well, you know, as soon as you take money you are a mercenary, whether you like it or not. But I was happy in my business when he came and called me up. It may have been an old affiliation, because it was Mike Hoare that came and asked me. I may have felt flattered about it; I cannot say. You never know. Human nature - the human mind - is a funny thing.

Q: So you went into the bush before the Air India plane was hijacked?

A: Yes.

Q: Could I just ask one or two more questions.

I know it is probably difficult for you to recollect, but if you could give us some idea of the time of the various stages of what you did; how long after the arrival of the flight would you say it was that you left the airport?

A: Myself?

Q: Yes, yourself.

A: To go and telephone?

Q: No: to go the bush - to leave the airport.

A: That thing is out of the airport area anyway.

Q: I see. You were already out of the airport then?

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A: I was outside of the airport area completely. I was on the other side of the road. I would say when he came back from the army camp - it is difficult to say. The aircraft landed about a quarter to 6. I would say about a quarter to 7 - between a quarter to 7 and 7 o'clock - around there. I cannot be sure, but in there, I would say.

Q: And for most of that period you were on the other side of the road in this garage area?

A: I was in the back of the garage.

Q: And in that time you witnessed firing in the airport?

A: Yes - firing from the airport.

Q: Can you describe briefly what you saw?

A: The only firing that took place - there was no wild firing: the only firing that took place was when the armoured came. When the armoured car came they fired at the armoured car, because the armoured car had fired at them. And there was cross-fire in our direction - the return fire. So we waited for that to finish and we went straight up into the hills.

Q: And where did the mercenary fire come from at that stage: from the main airport building or from the control tower?

A: No, from the main airport: facing the airport, at the right-hand side - on the army barracks side, that's right.

Q: Thank you very much.

Commission member: I have some questions. You said you did not know anybody except Mike Hoare.

A: Only Mike Hoare, yes.

Q: During your flight from Manzini to Seychelles, did you say anything to anybody about a mercenary attack or a coup d'état? Did Mike Hoare or some other fellows talk about this situation?

PUREN: It is not a very big airplane, that particular one. I never left my seat once, because I was sitting with Mike Hoare, right in front - right in the front, on the outside seat. I was sitting there. There were other passengers, in the aircraft - two or three, but I never spoke to anybody in the airplane, excepting Mike Hoare - nobody else.

Q: You did not know that some of the members of the group carried weapons?

A: Oh, I did know - no, not in the airplane. They were in the baggage. Oh, yes, I knew about that; that I knew about. That I knew about.

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Q: During the flight nobody discussed a coup d'état?

A: No, not that I heard, because I was sitting right in the front. But I do not think so.

Q: Well, you said that you carried weapons. But didn't Mike Hoare give everybody baggage which contained a gun?

A: Each one had a bag. But my job was to bring in toys. We had four or five of toys. I had a bag of toys - because he promised that I would not carry anything, and I did not - which I put on the counter. And I brought in another bag, with the beach toys - beach tennis and a football and my valise, of course.

Q: When did you find out that the customs officer had detected weapons?

A: Outside, Peter Duffy came and told me that one of the chaps' guns had been discovered, and I was outside. I was just loading my valise onto the bus. And, well, there was nothing I could say. That is when I went back to look for Hoare. But Peter Duffy was ... I saw the senior customs man. I saw him there, this chap, and people were milling around. So I thought, gee, I must not stand here; I must go back in the airport and tell Hoare. But I couldn't find Hoare.

Q: Weren't you in the bus?

A: There were three buses, but I just put my valise on top.

Q: But no bus had left the airport?

A: No. I had not left the airport. I had not even got into a bus yet. I was outside.

Q: Did the fighting start as soon as the weapon was discovered?

A: No, no. I went for Mike Hoare - to tell him - and when I got into the airport building there were still about eight or nine mercenaries there. I told them: "Please, you had better get moving because they found a gun on one of the chaps." And then there was a very wild scramble and, I believe, outside the people were fitting together their guns.

Q: Well, everybody received money, an air ticket, and a weapon. Can you figure out the total cost of the operation?

A: More or less, I would say - I have had plenty time to think, I will tell you - there is the hotel, there is the air tickets, the return. I would say, in the region of between \$400,000 and \$500,000 - not more.

Q: And you said in your statement that this money came from a private source. Was that private source Mr. Mancham himself?

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A: I do not know. That is what Hoare told me. It may have come from somebody else. It may have come from a firm. But Mike told me that it came from Mr. Mancham, or, oh, that Mancham had had a difficult time - a hard time - raising the money. So he must have got it from somebody else too.

Q: You also said that after something happened, within 12 hours Mancham would arrive; is that right?

A: That, I do not know. But I was told that it would be within 12 hours. That was the period that was mentioned to me by Mike Hoare.

Q: Twelve hours?

A: Within 12 hours of calling for him.

Q: Yes. So you would have had to commence your operation before that 12-hour period began.

A: That's right.

Q: You also said you stayed in the bush for more than two weeks?

A: Seventeen days.

Q: When did you hear the last firing?

A: Well, the last firing I saw and heard was when the armoured car was there, and then the cannon started firing, and then I let Manuel - the local inhabitant - go, and then I went up into the hills. And if you see the hill you will know you cannot hear; you cannot hear. You can hear if you listen for it, but it also started to rain. It was miserable, and I felt miserable, too, I can tell you. I could not say, but I did not know about the Air India until the day I gave myself up. An army chap told me. He did not tell me who; he just said that some chaps had gone off on Air India.

Q: Had you any picture of the organizational structure of your force of 50 or so?

A: Yes.

Q: Obviously, Hoare was in charge, but below that level.

A: Peter Duffy was called the "master of ceremonies" because this was supposed to be some sort of society's outing or holiday. I would be his assistant, in that I would be helping to organize games, to see that people were occupied in their free time. Exactly what they wanted me to do, I still did not know. But I do know that I had a beach tennis set and I had a football in my bag. So that would have been some of the stuff. I belonged to a group controlled by a Mr. Webb - I do not know what his first name is - because he was in charge of the operation at the airport: Mr. Webb.

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Q: You mean that if things had gone according to plan Mr. Webb would have been in charge of the airport as a whole, and you would have been in charge of the control tower?

A: No, I was not going to be in charge of anything: I was going to operate in the control tower, but, as I said, there were other air force chaps there, too - two or three - who had much more recent experience. But I don't even know who they are, anyway.

Q: When you say "air force chaps", which air force? South African Air Force?

A: No. Hoare told me - no, he just told me "air force". He did not designate any particular air force.

Q: In the course of your conversations with Mr. Mike Hoare, did he in any way indicate the involvement of foreign Governments?

A: Will you just say that again?

Q: During the course of your conversations with Mike Hoare, did he mention the involvement of foreign Governments in this operation?

A: No.

Q: Not at all? How about South Africa?

A: South Africa would not involve itself - not with Mike Hoare.

Q: Or some intelligence agencies?

A: You know, Mike, in the Congo, had plenty of contacts with the British, with the Americans, with the Belgians, with the French, because of his particular job. So he may have met a lot of people. I do not know. I mean, it is only in the last five years that I have had contact with him, and then intermittently, when he comes to town.

Q: As a former military man, Sir, is it your opinion that this operation was well planned or badly planned?

A: Very badly planned - very badly planned.

Q: Are you aware of any rehearsals at any stage?

A: No. Do you know, I have never handled an AK-47 myself. That is one of the reasons I would have refused, anyway, to carry a gun like that. But as far as I am concerned, I knew on the Sunday - I never had a passport; I had to apply for my passport on a Monday, which I got early on Wednesday morning, and I was on the airplane at half past ten on Wednesday morning, but I personally was not aware of any rehearsals. There may have been. From what I hear, I believe so - you know: chaps talking. I believe so. But at that stage I did not know at all. But when I

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came to the airport I thought it was a very badly organized operation. But I had not been in that thing now for so long, anyway, I do not know how they do things these days.

Q: You touched a bit on the command control structure of the group: Hoare with his second-in-command, Duffy. Were you sort of being a branch of Duffy and Mr. Webb? Can you give us an idea of who the other commanders were?

A: I do not know who they were, but I believe there were four different groups; I believe so. What the targets were I do not know. Mike, these days, played everything very close to his chest. He did not say a thing. He kept very quiet.

Q: You say your aircraft touched down at a quarter to six?

A: It was a bit late, yes.

Q: About how long after that did the Seychellois army elements arrive - the first elements?

A: You mean, the armoured car?

Q: Well, yes, if they were the first army units.

A: I would say - no, I could not tell you. I waited at that place quite a long time. I am guessing now. Half past 8, or 9 - somewhere around there. But it is purely guess-work. I did not have a luminous watch or anything.

Q: I gather that most of the people from the Air Swazi aircraft had already checked through customs?

A: Yes.

Q: And the lady who was caught was one of the last. That would have been what: about 7?

A: Around 7, I would say.

Q: You said they were firing a cannon.

A: Yes.

Q: Can you give us an idea of what sort of calibre we are talking about?

A: I am guessing again. It was far, but from what I saw, what I heard - because you hear the shrapnel, or the stones, or whatever it is. I would say it was a 75 - it could have been bigger - a 75-mm rifle, you know, and it would have been firing at extremem range, because normally with a cannon like that you should be able to put the stuff in within 20 yards all the time, or around 10. But this stuff was flying. Some hit the hill where we were sitting. That is why we moved out. And some hit the airport.

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Q: My last question: are you aware as to whether or not your group had weapons larger than AK-47s and hand grenades? Did you have hand grenades, do you know?

A: Shall I tell you this?

Q: Please.

A: All I know is that Hoare said AK-47s, and nothing else. But, as I say, he plays things very close to the chest. I do not know if he would have given anybody else anything. But, somehow, I do not think so. But I do not know; I cannot say. He may have.

Q: Did you discuss the element that was already on the ground - the advance party?

A: No, he just told me there was a group. I said: "How many people are going to ...?" Then he said something about people would be coming from the police and from the army and the civilian population to help us. There should be around 200 people, easy, to come and help us - because, you know, with 40 people you can do nothing. Anyway ...

Q: Let me ask you: when you went into the bush because of your leg, did you stay near the airport for a few days?

A: I could hear these light aircraft, the Légers, taking off all the time. So I could not have been more than half a kilometre away, at the very most.

Q: Was there any shooting the next day?

A: Well, I tried to give myself up. I tried to give myself up. And instead of their coming to fetch me, I just got a lot of bullets in my direction.

Q: And what kind?

A: AK and mortar.

Q: And that would have been in the morning of the following day?

A: And right through the day. They were not shooting at me. I would say they were shooting at me at least up to 12 o'clock - well, in my area. I feel they did not know exactly where I was - although I was shot. I could not move my legs. My legs and knees were very bad. They were not broken, but they were bleeding very bad. And I suppose they did not know exactly where I was. So it was just a matter of putting a couple of bullets in my area, and then I just lay low after that. It was raining on and off, and that night I just crawled into the bush. But there was fighting going on that day and the next day - at night, especially. It was wild - young people, I suppose.

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Q: Could I ask you this: how would you describe your own motivation for taking part in the exercise?

A: I want to tell you: I do not want to think about it. I left a very nice business. As I say, it was Mike Hoare who came to ask me. I was flattered, I suppose. Hindsight, you know - hindsight.

Q: But it was basically because Mike Hoare asked you?

A: I was basically because Mike Hoare asked me. I do not need the money, because I do well. You can check in South Africa. My business is a very good business.

Q: And had you previously visited Seychelles yourself?

A: I had been on a holiday for a week. I enjoyed it here very much. But I came to Victoria - to the city - two times. But I spent most of my time at the bottom part of the island, fishing. I needed the holiday badly. That was about three and a half - four years ago.

Q: You said just now that you applied for a passport on a Monday. What date was that?

A: Wednesday was the 25th; Tuesday was the 24th. The 22nd.

Q: The 22nd would be a Sunday.

A: Sorry: on Monday I applied for a passport, and I got it two days later, in the morning.

Q: At what time did you get the passport?

A: At about half past 8 - just after 8 o'clock, just after they opened.

Q: Where did you apply for this passport?

A: In Durban, at the Ministry of the Interior - at the usual passport office. I lost my passport in the bush.

Q: And how long does it usually take for a citizen to apply for a passport and to obtain it?

A: It depends. I had a passport before, but it lapsed two years ago. It lapsed, and I did not bother renewing it, and when he spoke to me on a Sunday I said: "Listen, I haven't got a passport. I will have to apply on Monday." So very early Monday I applied for my passport, and they said: "Come and fetch it on Wednesday" which I did.

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Q: You did not ask anybody to help you obtain a passport on Wednesday morning?

A: No. I am in very good standing in my town. I did not have to.

Q: And at what hour did you leave?

A: From Durban, I left at about half past 10 - 10.30.

Q: Just one point arising out of a previous question: in making application for the passport, what did you say your purpose was? Do you have to say that on a South African passport?

A: I said "holiday and business".

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much.

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Martin Dolinschek

DOLINSCHKEK: My name is Martin Dolinschek. I am a South African; I am an intelligence officer employed by the National Intelligence Services, formerly referred to as NIS - National Intelligence Service of South Africa. I am married, I have two children, and I am based in Durban.

Q: Would you like to make a statement about the whole situation before we start asking some questions?

A: I would say one thing: that in situations like this there's lots of propaganda. It is the same thing like with South Africa: they think we have horns - we are sort of devils - which we are not. Of course, we are like anybody else. And so it goes. In any case, we believed that Seychelles is under a strict Marxist Soviet régime, helped along by Libyan Arab nationalism, and that the Palestine Liberation Organization is involved in Seychelles - that they are running the place in cahoots with Mr. René, and that we would be the knights in shining armour to come and rescue the people.

Since my arrival here I realize that it is not so, and to my regret I was sort of faced with a Hobson's choice: I could not turn around against my co-conspirators, so to speak, and so I had to go forward. But in a way I am glad we did not succeed, because I believe I knew very little about Mr. Mancham and company. But since then, with hindsight, I realize that they were very bad for Seychelles. So that is more or less all I want to say. I am not a preacher or a speaker.

Q: Were you here before 25 November?

A: I arrived here on 14 November, which was about a fortnight - no: about 10 days - before the main group.

Q: And what was the purpose of the group that came earlier?

A: I came, sir, independently. My task was to "recce" the place independently, to translate - independently again - information I so gathered, mainly visually or second-hand, if possible, to translate it into intelligence - which I have done. I kept a diary, which I handed over to the police one week later. I hid it. And my diary reflects very well what I found - what I thought of people.

My thoughts were positive towards this Government - not that I am saying that because I am scared or so that the Commission might help me. I realize that people here are poor but happy - proud - that they are not against their Government, that they are not aggressive, they are not anybody's stooges. I admit, I saw some Soviet personnel here at one soccer match that I attended with the purpose of seeing how many foreigners were around. I counted over 50 Soviet officials - mainly single, or without their families yet, which gives a good indication, as far as I am concerned, that they could be from the KGB or military side of the Soviet

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régime. That was a bit worrying, and I expressed the same thing to military personnel here.

I will try to be as frank as possible.

Q: On the understanding you are doing it willingly.

A: Yes, I am doing it willingly. I am a realist; I never look backwards. It happened. The operation failed. I would like to look forward, and I am prepared to mend fences. As I said to the military authorities, as I said to the Seychelles officials, I have to be frank.

Q: You said you came here "independently"; right?

A: Indeed. I mean, as part of the operation. I was the sole member, a one-man recce squad, so to speak, to assess the situation independently - if you understand what I mean.

Q: And as a member of the Security of South Africa?

A: Intelligence Service. I must underline one thing: we have no executive powers whatsoever; we work under lines similar to the CIA; we have no goals; we only have offices. We do not arrest people; we only investigate events and incidents and refer them to the police, which has executive powers. In case you think we are sort of a KGB with our own goals and so on, we are not.

Q: I wonder if we could go back, Mr. Dolinschek, to the beginning of the operation, as far as you were concerned. What was the first you learned of it, and through what channel?

A: I learned about it on an official level. As you know, South Africa is short of friends, especially in Africa itself. Elections are looming in Mauritius, and the chances are that a certain Mr. Baranjee will win the elections and our air carrier to the East and Far East and Australia might come a bit short of landing. So Seychelles might have been a good alternative, with Diego Garcia a possible alternative - with American permission. It might not be granted. I believe there is congressional approval we would be seeking there, if South Africa asks for it, because it is a military base. So the whole thing hinged on whether South Africa would tacitly support an operation like this, provided that certain favours are forthcoming in return from the Government that is installed.

Q: Who introduced you to the particular plan for this operation?

A: I know Mike Hoare, for example, since 1974, when I met him on an official level. He was planning certain operations against Rhodesia independently, and I was sent along to find what it was all about. The last time I had seen him in the same year was to convey to him the message from my Government to stay out of it - that he is not a one-man government to form his own task force or to shape a foreign policy for another country. That was under the régime of Prime Minister Vorster at the time, and my chief, General Van den Bergh, fell out of his favour since then.

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Q: That was when you first met Mike Hoare?

A: Mike Hoare. And he became sort of a friend and a source. He has connexions here, for example, and generally with French-speaking Africa. And he was useful - nothing of earth-shattering proportions, but he was a source of information.

Q: And in connexion with this particular operation in Seychelles, did he contact you about it at some stage?

A: Yes, he did. Guys like this, like Mike Hoare, they live for this kind of operations. They probably go to bed praying that something else will crop up. So, of course, as far as Mike Hoare was concerned, he could not care less who was in Seychelles, but he was counting profits which would come out of the operation. I realize now from hindsight, unfortunately, because all this propaganda which I had heard before was all whitewash. It was manufactured, probably, in Mike Hoare's study to justify the actions, of course. I believe now - not that he spelled it out - but it appears to me that he pushed the idea himself very strongly and that he tried it around looking for sponsors. I must say, also, that my Government and John Vorster and my immediate chief, General Van den Bergh dislike Mike Hoare very much, because they regard him as a meddler - meddling in things which are not his province.

Q: I wonder if I could ask you to describe for us, then, the nature of the initial contact with Mike Hoare on the operation.

A: Well, he had a plan worked out on paper. That was before Seychelles made a contact with the Soviet Government and signed a pact for Aeroflot landing rights and fishing ...

Q: An agreement?

A: Yes, an agreement, basically, which was partly public, but in a "cloud" so you could read into it more than Aeroflot and fishing. But as soon as the Russians entered this scene - entered that agreement - and before the Seychelles army received armaments from the Soviet Union, Mike Hoare was very enthusiastic. But afterwards, he was not enthusiastic, because he thought that the Russians were all over the place. That was in 1978, I would say. But later on, I believe, Mike Hoare and some of his friends made a personal recce of the island, and they realized themselves that the agreement with the Soviet Union is exactly what it was: Aeroflot landing rights, fishing, fueling facilities, and out of gratefulness the Soviet Union provided certain armaments to the Government. That is all it was.

Then he became enthusiastic again. He said it could be done, but the whole operation, of course, depended upon a high degree of surprise, a high degree of unguardedness: catch the guy with his pants down.

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Q: But when did Mr. Hoare make contact with you about this operation?

A: He made several of them. As a matter of fact, he made about three or four, which, as a matter of course, I told him exactly: "I am not in a position to decide one way or the other; I will forward your plans and thoughts to my Government - to my superiors, I mean - to the generals - which I did. And the last one I gave to an army general who is a good friend of mine, General Lloyd, who was commanding officer in South West Africa - in Namibia. That is where the matter rested. It was in about 1980, and I had forgotten the whole thing. It cropped up again late last year.

Q: So the South African Government was, because of your information, aware of Mike Hoare's plans against Seychelles?

A: Yes, we were aware of lots of things, but it does not mean that we agreed with them. My job is to gather information, be it positive or negative. What they do with that information is none of my business, basically. It is like any Government: you do your job, the Government does theirs. You do not question them about it.

Q: Coming down, then, to this year, when the actual specifics of the plan in which you were involved came along, could you describe your contacts with Mike Hoare in the period from when this particular plan came to be evolved?

A: Yes. I was not actually privy to the behind-the-scenes bartering with the Kenyan Government, for example, or our Government, but I entered the scene when it was finalized, I would say - not that I am saying that the Government should consult me - by no means.

Mike Hoare asked me to be his intelligence adviser, so I said: "Fine, I will". So he gave me certain photographic evidence, certain propaganda material, which he tried to give me as factual. I realized it was a political pamphlet, and anybody with a Mickey Mouse printing outfit can make it.

Then, of course - now again with hindsight - I see certain things he did not tell me at all. For example, he said I would be in his headquarters; I would effect all the major decisions - because I told him from the very beginning: "Seychelles is a small country; you cannot go and kill people or damage and destroy infrastructure, because you will make enemies out of people, and there are not so many miles you can run away; people will spit on you." He wanted to bring, for example, RPGs along. So I said: "Listen, you cannot use those armaments here because you will kill lots of people with them. The whole operation must be as bloodless as possible." As a matter of fact, I said: "Every pack leader must be personally responsible for any death or serious injury."

Now, why I say that was because his key word was a "push-over". The whole operation would be a "push-over". In other words, the resistance would be almost nil, provided you can maintain a high degree of surprise on your side. The basic plan was to scoop the Government in an afternoon when they were in a cabinet

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session and simultaneously attack the three army strong points - not attack - well, attack and then hold them there - box them into their bases and seize the radio station. And then the Kenyan Government would send troops, a contingent of military and a contingent of police, to take over the law enforcement work, and then the mercenaries would withdraw with the same aircraft that the Kenyans came in on, so the whole thing would look like an African affair - a black African affair.

Q: Excuse me. Did Mr. Hoare tell you this?

A: It was in the planning - basic planning. He told me.

Q: Was your office in South Africa also aware of this operation?

A: Yes, but basically the Government was not privy to planning. The Government gave tacit approval to it - gave the armaments - and that's all. But no money, no personnel, no nothing, except for the armaments.

Q: You said earlier, I think, that you were not necessarily privy to all the contacts with the Government.

A: No, no.

Q: Did you mean to suggest by that that Hoare had contacts with other people in South African official positions, apart from yourself?

A: As I say, I knew Mike Hoare since 1974. I used to open the door for him. It's like me coming to the United Nations: I know nobody, so I know Mr. ... from Panama and Mr. Military Adviser from Canada. If you say "please open the door for me" I will do it. I used to open the door, but, all of a sudden, he found his own way around and he would open his own doors.

I am not blaming him. It is human nature, of course.

Q: Could we just ask you for the rough date when Mike Hoare spelt out to you the plan originally? When would it have been that he first spelt it out to you?

A: That was the beginning of October.

Q: Did he show you anything in writing, or was this all verbal?

A: I beg your pardon?

Q: Did he give you any of the details of this plan in writing?

A: No. I said to Mike, I said, "Listen, Mike, there must be no paperwork in this thing, because this thing is basically a conspiracy. Do you agree with me? It is basically a conspiracy, and in a conspiracy you do not write things down." But since then I learned from my own police friends and military people here that they did write down specifics, but they did not show them to me. They sent them to

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Seychelles behind my back. They made so many mistakes because they did not consult me, so no skin off my nose, so to speak - though lots of it came off.

Nothing was in writing; it was just a basic plan which was kept as simple as possible. But I did advise Mike Hoare not to send armaments and people together - not that I am proud of it - but speaking operationally - militarily. I even suggested a plan, for example, to send a motorized yacht, which would work, and to keep the men and armaments apart, which he promised. He did not do it, so ...

Q: When he first outlined this plan to you, did you report it to your superiors?

A: No. I presume my superiors knew.

Q: You presumed your superiors knew, without your having to tell them?

A: Yes.

Q: And is that the case right up to your departure from South Africa?

A: Yes.

Q: You did not report it to your superiors?

A: No.

Q: But you presumed they knew about it?

A: Yes.

Q: Because of Mike Hoare's contacts?

A: Yes, sure.

Q: Perhaps the Major knows more about intelligence matters than I do, but if you are in an intelligence operation, would it not be normal practice to report any intelligence you receive to your superiors?

A: Well - and I think the Major will agree with me - if you know basically that your top superiors know about it, and if you are requested to report, you will do so. But I took a precaution: I kept a diary; I kept a coded diary: part 1, what was going on in South Africa, which I left in a safe. And as soon as I landed here, I started part 2 of the diary, which is in police possession. So, in other words, I did not go blindly into the whole thing. I kept a record, which can become a document. But in the matter of reporting to my superiors, I thought that if I did, my superiors might presume I am meddling into things which are not my province. In other words, I thought they knew, so they do not need me repeating things they know about.

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Q: Let me ask you this question. When you left your office to participate in this operation, did you ask for leave?

A: Yes, for leave, from 5 November until 17 December. I got accumulated leave, sufficient.

Q: When you made your assessment that your superiors already knew generally about the operation, would you have believed that that extended to your involvement in it?

A: It is difficult to answer that.

Q: Are you saying that the only participation of the South African Government in the operation was in regard to the weapons?

A: Yes.

Q: And the weapons were given to Mr. Hoare?

A: Well, the whole thing depended on strict secrecy. So you could not deliver a weapon somewhere and say, "John, take it to Mike" - something like that. The whole thing depended on a great degree of surprise, so you must keep it wrapped up; you must know who knows.

Q: Had you known before any other members who participated in the operation, who came on the plane or who were here before with you?

A: No. Well, for example, this older gentleman, Jeremiah Puren - I know him strictly from newspapers. I saw his pictures in local papers. He was running for a local election, council election - that is how I know him. The only other person I knew was Mike Hoare, of course, and Peter Duffy. That is all.

Q: Going back again to the planning of the operation, I understand from what you have said that the plans changed a bit from when you first heard of them.

A: Yes, but I do not know how much. The police know - the army indicated to me certain things from written orders which were delivered to Seychelles that I realize I was not told about; I was not informed about that.

As a matter of fact, I would like to see them. Then I could gauge. For example, the army tells me here that there were certain lists, execution lists, which I resent very much, because it is against the gentleman's agreement between Mike Hoare and myself. And there are some other things changed. Operational positions were changed. I got an indication from the army chief. This makes me realize that Mike was not frank with me. Indeed, as a matter of fact, he said he was sending the weapons separately from the men. He gave me a suitcase at the airport - I did not handle the suitcase - with a weapon in it. When I landed here and I picked it up, I immediately feel the weight. It must be an AK inside. So I said, "Oh, my God". Again I was faced with the Hobson's choice. I had to go through. Lucky for me, I got through.

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Q: The question of the plan: you say yourself that it may have changed from the original intentions, in a way that you did not know about. But, as you understood the plan, was the force that travelled by the Swazi airplane flight the entire mercenary force, or were there to be others as well?

A: Again, I was not aware about Swazi Air until the last minute. My advice to Mike was to filter the people into the place via different routes. Spend money, send them via London, Paris, Germany, Salisbury - and so on. He agreed. Again, he found a cheap-rate operator somewhere and did it on the cheap side. I was not aware that Swazi Air would be used at all.

Q: When did you become aware of that?

A: I was told that by our safehouse-keeper here, a stupid man called Bob Sims. Actually, I did not know his surname; the police told me. He was in telephone contact with Mike Hoare or his wife ... that they were coming by Swazi Air. There was nothing I could do about it because, I mean, preparations had to be made and to cancel in the nick is just impossible.

Q: And when he told you they were coming in by Swazi Air, he did not tell you about any others coming by any other way?

A: No. There was another party coming a week before via BA. I came by BA myself. This was acceptable as far as I was concerned. You had more chance of successful entry.

Q: But that was a small number of people.

A: Six. I was happy with that.

Q: But, as far as you know, those six and the Swazi 40-plus were all there was to it?

A: Yes, that was - originally we planned for 80 people, but for reasons unknown to me - only known to Mike Hoare - and I believe it was again greed; he was counting dollars - he scaled the whole thing down to about 50 people. That is cutting the meat to the bone.

Q: When you arrived in Seychelles before 25 November, did you have any contact with local people?

A: No, not officially. I did, for example - I did give lifts to military personnel, if I saw them walking. That is, you know, getting something for nothing. Once I fixed up one of their lorries. It was a Sunday. He was stuck, so the driver told me where his base was - which we did not know about. Then I socialized - not in a big way - with other people, which gave me a glimpse of information. But nothing on an official level. I would not do that, because I hate to implicate innocent people. I would not like to see a friend which I innocently met being in gaol like I am.

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Q: Regarding the compensation, how much money did Mr. Hoare give you and promise?

A: To begin with, I am not a mercenary, Sir.

Q: He did not give you ...

A: Only expenses were paid for me; that's it. I am not a mercenary, and I never will be, because it is below my dignity. I am a professional intelligence officer. I never belonged to a political party. I am a professional officer; that's it.

Q: In your contacts with Mike Hoare, did he discuss finances with you?

A: As I understood it, as he told me, they had a million dollars, which was collected by the Seychellois outside Seychelles, in Europe, possibly South Africa, or Australia. That sort of money - that it is for the operation. How they got it, I do not know. Maybe they got a Swiss credit or maybe some Arab States advanced them money. I do not know. They did not tell me, and I did not ask, because in operations like this you do not ask questions. But the police here tell me that they mentioned the figure of \$2 million. So as far as finances are concerned, I did not bother about it; it is not my province. I couldn't care less.

Q: But did he make any mention of specific names, like ex-President Mancham?

A: Yes, as a matter of fact, Mancham was regarded as a bit of a playboy - not a bit, as a hell of a playboy, as a bad politician but necessary to this operation because it will legitimize the whole operation. The international community will say, "Well, he is a legitimate President; therefore he is back in the saddle", and that will be that. Without Mancham, the Russians would come here in a hurry, or even the French under the new régime, and the whole thing might turn sour.

I also learned from Hoare that Mancham himself is very reluctant to return to Seychelles unless the present Chief of State, President René, is removed. How? By execution? I do not know. But he said Mancham will never return unless Mr. René is removed, physically or - I do not know. Again, I am not a politician. I do not ask specific questions - why?, who?

Q: So the only name you heard was Mancham?

A: Yes. There was another chap called Gerald, which I only knew as Gerald. They were talking about Gerald. I think they presumed I knew who Gerald was. I did not. I did not ask, either. There was a former Chief Justice, who now lives in Australia - his name escapes me, but I wrote it down years ago.

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Questioner: I think we can identify that.

Q: In your earlier testimony, which was carried by newspapers, you said to the Seychellois that the Kenyan Government was ready to dispatch two aircraft. You have already mentioned that in your statement today. Did you really believe that?

A: Yes. Look, why I believe that, why I believe it is not a fairy-tale, is because Mike Hoare had somebody lined up to charter an aircraft, a turbo-prop Skymaster, in that category - not too expensive, but enough to carry about 60 or 70 people. That somehow fell through. He did not tell me who the people are or where. Probably they thought that the risks were too high, and they pulled out.

So he says to me over lunch "We need somebody with an aircraft." So I suggested a name, but after checking I found that the company went into liquidation. Then, just before my departure, Hoare informed me - he says, "Don't worry about that. The Kenyan Government will fix the whole thing. The only thing is that those two aircraft have a shorter range. Therefore the flying into Seychelles will have to be done from Mombasa." Again, I said, "That is nothing to do with me; that is purely your operational arrangements."

Q: So you think that the Government of Kenya gave tacit approval to this whole operation?

A: Yes, of course. Look, otherwise you do not do things like this. You can hardly fly a Cherokee out of the place without the authorities knowing it.

Q: Could I just follow up on that point? You mentioned flying 60 to 70 people out of Nairobi. Would those have been the same people who ultimately travelled on the Swazi flight, or would they have been different people?

A: No. You see, there were three groups. One, the Seychelles Government in exile - if I might refer to them like that - under Mancham, would be flying on one aircraft, which I believe was an Executive, or something, jet. The other two aircraft would be used to fly in Kenyan police contingents and Kenyan army contingents. And as soon as they land, the mercenaries - when they secure the place for the Kenyans, the Kenyans take over the law enforcement duties and the mercenaries withdraw, on the same aircraft, back to Mombasa, from Mombasa to Nairobi, and from Nairobi on commercial flights back.

So, in other words, the mercenaries keep the low profile all the time. Otherwise the world would say, "caught you".

Q: When you were here in Seychelles and heard in the safehouse that people were coming by Royal Swazi - the mercenaries - did you still believe at that stage that planes would arrive from Kenya as well?

A: Yes.

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Q: You did?

A: Look, Kenyans were the ace in the pack, so to speak. Without Kenyans the operation would be a flop - Kenyan military, police and political recognition.

Q: I have just one final question on this point. In the course of your contacts with Mike Hoare, he gave you differing indications at different times of the extent of the Kenyan involvement. Is that it? It varied?

A: It varied as the situation developed. But he only told me what was necessary for my intelligence interpretation - or, in other words, approval. I said, "This is fine. We need black people to enter into the area. Otherwise it will look like South African aggression."

Q: And your information regarding Kenyan involvement came exclusively from Mike Hoare?

A: Indeed.

Q: You had no other source of information?

A: I could - if I went deeper into it, if I wanted to, I could; but I took Mike Hoare's word for it because ...

Q: This is only a factual question I am asking.

A: I had no reason that he would tell me fibs. Because why? Otherwise he would lead the whole thing up a false trail.

Q: But did it seem plausible to you as an intelligence officer?

A: Excellent. I say "excellent" - if I planned something like this, I would look around for an African Government to give me support. Excellent, vital, I would say.

Q: Can you state briefly what happened as soon as the plane was discovered at the airport? When the Swaziland plane arrived, you were at the airport, were you not?

A: I was very unhappy. To begin with, some of the Mike Hoare people who were here already ... group 2 came. This is by the way; I do not think it has much reference to the whole thing, but since we are discussing the whole operation, let us discuss the whole thing.

I object to people who drink, who mix alcohol with work. I believe strictly that if you are going to drink, drink - but keep it on the side; if you are going to work, work sober. So I overheard at the hotel certain gentlemen - they were drinking for two days and two nights; they did not sleep. I was in the corner. I was horrified. So I mentioned it to our safehouse-keeper. I said, "This is

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terrible. Some people are not sleeping; they are drinking. This operation will go all down the drain if they carry on like this." So this safehouse-keeper, he probably thought I am a nosey Parker. He told his pack leader. The pack leader comes to me and he says, "I hear you talking something funny against us. We are going to shoot you at the first opportunity." I said, "You are talking lots of nonsense." So he said, "Listen, lots of people die in cross-fire." I say, "I know." I say, "If something happens to me, I am not the only one here." I just fobbed him off a bit. I said, "I am going to report to my people and if something happens to me, you people will all hang when you come back to South Africa."

So we started the whole thing on the wrong leg as far as I was concerned.

I went to bed that night - that was Tuesday night before Wednesday, the 24th, on the eve of Hoare's arrival. So I was thinking to myself, "Hell, if you say to somebody he is drinking too much, he would not over-react and threaten you with execution or something like this." So I thought there must be some other reason. Maybe Mike Hoare, with his replanning the whole thing, resented - maybe he had a second thought and resented my presence, because I might be an obstacle. Maybe they did not feel that they would have a free hand as they would have on their own.

However, I went to the airport the next day, in the afternoon. The gentlemen from the second group were there already. Mike Hoare was chatting with them outside in the car lot when I came out. Mike Hoare just glanced at me. So I said, "Hello, Mike". So he says to me, "Oh, I could not recognize you." Well, the arrangement was that I would drive Mike. As his intelligence officer, him and myself would make a headquarters. But he said, "No, I changed the whole lot." So I said, "Well, fine". I said, "Here is your abbreviated intelligence report. Do you want it now or later?". He said, "Tell you what. See you late tonight or early tomorrow morning." Now, again, that indicated to me that something is wrong. If I am operational commander, first I want to know how the wind blows. I would take intelligence reports - abbreviated, all on one page, point by point.

So I said, "Did you have a happy landing?". So he said, "My God, I got a bunch of people" ... Now, he done the recruitment. He said, "I got a bunch of people who are drinking all the way from Swaziland here and I do not think they will last." Those were his actual words to me. He said, "We will have to do it tomorrow because that bunch will not last until Friday" - this was Wednesday.

Those guys who had threatened me with a zap-off, they were all chatting with him, probably telling him something about me, because nobody was looking in my direction. They were "skinnering" - a good Africaans word. They were probably telling him something or other.

So then I said, "Fine, Mike, see you later." I went to sit in my car. I was watching how they were throwing suitcases on the top of the bus. And I thought, "These suitcases contain AKs." So I thought to myself - I had a gut feeling: there will be something wrong. I was sitting there all tense. I am not usually tense, but I thought, "Oh, God". All of sudden I hear a single shot fired,

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somebody shouting "They caught us". There was gunfire all over the place. Suitcases started flying around, because everybody was getting at his gun in the suitcase. And the whole shambles broke out.

Q: And you stayed there, stayed in the airport?

A: Then I drove down towards the south and I saw four people attacking the army barracks, which is on the end of the airport. You see, at the end of the airport there is a strong point with an AA-gun and a heavy machine gun. I believe that is their strongest point, very strategically placed. If you can grab that, you can control the whole airport, the road north and the road south, and not a single thing can come near unless you run out of ammo. The idea was to grab this point if something goes wrong.

Now, when I was driving past, a lorry overtook me. It nearly went over my head, flashing lights, and people are shouting and jumping all over the place. I see three people attacking the barracks at 4 in the afternoon, at the strongest point, the guardhouse. I thought, "Oh, my God, it is like sending somebody to die - suicide." Instead of going behind there - they could easily get their lorries on the airport, race down the runway and grab the strong point up there. See what I mean? But somebody made a ... you know - and this is how they started.

I was unarmed because the fellow who was supposed to give me my gun did not bring it along. So I drove past, went to the hotel, had a beer, went up there. Some soldiers stopped me to give them a lift, and I gave them a lift. I buried my operational documents. Then I returned to the hotel and tried to find out what was going on. As a matter of fact I had a front-row view of the action. The hotel is just on the end of the runway.

Q: This is the Reef Hotel?

A: Yes.

Q: Were there any rehearsals, or anything like that, before the whole operation started?

A: Now, I must emphasize: I am not proud that I took part in this operation - not because I am in gaol; I genuinely think that the people are lovely, are not aggressive, are very placid, with good dispositions, happy people. I said to Mike, "Before you depart, you must get people together, rehearse with each platoon. Let them get familiar with their targets. Rehearse." He said, "There is no time for this. We will get only professionals." But, unfortunately, I can say that I was right and he was wrong. Because when the crunch was down, everybody was panic-stricken. Nothing concrete, in military terms, was done.

Q: Are you familiar with the command structure, the command control structure that Hoare had organized for the operation here? You were talking about platoons, but he had sections organized. Do you know who the section commanders were?

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A: No, I do not. I knew it only in general terms. Mike was ... he already had the officers. The officers he selected, they would recruit their own platoons. In other words, sort of a buddy-buddy system, if you get what I mean. And he said that this system is a good system because no platoon leader will recruit bad people; he will only recruit good people. But since then, the people I knew or the people who are in gaol with me - I would not even class them as third-rate soldiers. One was a cook in the Grey Scouts. You do not take a cook on operations like this. Some are not in the best health. Obviously, they were either recruiting in bars or on street corners. Anybody who thinks this was a cream or élite or a special task force sent here is well off the mark. They were rubble.

Q: It strikes me that the only one who really had complete knowledge of the plan was Mike Hoare.

A: Yes.

Q: Is that a fair comment to make?

A: Quite fair.

Q: I do not think he shared with anybody, not altogether.

A: He was supposed to share it with me, but I must say that he was bent on changing things. You see Mike Hoare is an over-glorified soldier. His colonel title comes from Mobutu Sese Seko, and from the late Moise Tshombe. It was easy in the Congo. Any sergeant could do it, because they were a bunch of peasants in the bush, unsophisticated people. There was a bunch of whities coming with sophisticated armoury and they gave them a hell of a hiding. That is easy. Any sergeant can do that. But when you come up with a conspiracy-type of operation, I am afraid he was not up to standard. That is my honest opinion. I would tell him that myself. I have no bad feelings against him. I went willingly into it, so no bad feelings - but I would tell him.

Q: Do you think there was some co-ordination between the Government of South Africa and the Government of Kenya in this operation?

A: Not that I know of.

Q: Or on the intelligence end?

A: Of course, it takes two to tango. That is quite so. To what extent, I do not know. It would be very unfair of me to make accusations. But possibly.

Q: As an opinion?

A: As an opinion, I would say it is necessary, but I do not know.

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Q: What do you know about the money that was promised to the other members of the operation? Have you heard anything about this?

A: Yes, of course, I had to know that. Mike Hoare said to me, "We will give the guys a thousand rand when they sign on", and they were promised - now I am not sure, 10,000 or 12,000 dollars or rand. I am not quite sure but the figure was either one or the other. They were promised that on successful completion of the operation. Why he made this arrangement, he explained to me, was that it gives the guys an incentive to successfully accomplish the task. I do not think it is very bright from the military side, because one drawback is that you will only collect the rubble. No good professional will go to face death or high risk for, let us say, \$10,000, unless he is desperate. So there you are.

Q: To revert to the question of the weapons, the AK-47s, you said earlier that this was something of which the South African Government had knowledge. You do not, I presume, mean to say that they supplied the weapons. You mean that they were aware of their import into South Africa. Is that correct?

A: Well, weapons like this could be bought on the free market for \$10. Poland, for example, in their dire economic straits, with a big armaments industry and no customers - they will custom-make any AK for you. Order it, and they will sell it to you for \$10 a piece gross. AK, per se, means very little. There is no significance. The only significance, I would say, is that it is a damn good weapon. It is the best assault rifle on the market. Wouldn't you say so, Major?

Questioner: It is a good weapon.

Q: Would you have any knowledge whether Hoare made the arrangements for the purchase of the weapons?

A: Could be. Look, I would not like to go into ... look, I would be out of my depth if I would make accusations or point fingers. I might be terribly wrong, and then somebody grabs me by my neck and says, "Hey ...".

Q: I am not asking you anything beyond what you know as fact. Please understand that you do not have to answer any question, unless you know something that you want to tell us.

A: I have great respect for the United Nations as an impartial body.

Q: So I would just ask you this on that point: those weapons would not have been in South Africa; they would have had to be imported?

A: Look, if you remember we have got lots of Russian armament. The latest foray into Angola I know of ... look, I have been two months in chooky; I am not up to date with the news ... but we captured over 60 lorries full of armaments, brand new in boxes, Russian-made. We have plenty of that going around: Katyushas, this SS rocket - the Russians call it Katyushas; we call it Red Eye; the Yanks call it Stalin organs. Actually SS-120; it is 42 rounds. We manufacture it now, but in a

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better, more sophisticated form. About 12 fall into our hands, brand new. So to lay hands on the Russian weaponry is no mystery and no great difficulty, either in the open market or from South African internal sources.

Q: So there are so many alternatives that you can make no judgement.

A: So many options, yes.

Q: Again, you do not have to reply to this, but I think you did say earlier something on the lines that the South African Government would have been aware of the weapons - something like that. I just wonder if you can explain that.

Q: Just on a point of clarification. As I understand it, you mentioned before that the weapons were provided by the South Africans.

A: I see that I have got into a bit of a hassle here. South Africa gave a tacit approval for the operation. Let us insert the word "possibly" provided the arms. Let us stick to the facts. Look, I do not want to mislead or tell stories to anybody.

Q: That was my concern, both on our part and for your own part, that we should be quite clear as to what you were saying. I thought there was scope for uncertainty. The Major has already asked you what you knew about the command structure. You replied that there were various groups, I think. Was it your impression that there was any deputy, or was it all in Mike Hoare's hands? If Mike Hoare had been killed or incapacitated, would anybody else have been in a position to take over?

A: Funnily enough - that is a very good question - we never discussed this. Now, either Mike Hoare thinks he is superman and cannot get killed - I did not think about it. But I think as an experienced field commander, he would have a deputy. I was supposed to be in his headquarters - not as deputy, only as intelligence officer to help him to reach decisions on the spot. But possibly he had a deputy. However, who that was I do not know. He never discussed it. But this is a good question. It was his party. I did not ask. Well, as I say, Mike Hoare is bigger than life, so he would not have thought ...

Q: There is a question related to this: if Mike Hoare had died in the operation, who had the money, the money to give to the other chaps?

A: I think that this was a bankers' arrangement. I believe Mike Hoare had certain funds to finance immediate expenses; for example, in Seychelles he paid my hotel, travel and what-not. But the pay-off was not, I think, his province altogether. The money came from Europe. It would be basically a banking transfer - the usual business, banking from one account to another, something like that. I do not think that Mike would go into that finance; it is a bit too much.

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Q: You mentioned that among the other participants, the only person you knew was Peter Duffy. Can you tell us anything about him?

A: He is a free-lance press photographer in South Africa. I believe he is Irish - your countryman.

Q: Not by nationality, but by extraction, possibly.

A: I believe he came from Ireland to Africa. He eventually landed up in South Africa. I believe he is a ... but it is all second-hand information from what he told me. He is a very good man. He knows his business, I would say, but I do not know how much he knows of this kind of business. Photography ... he is very good; he earns a very good living. That is as far as I know about him.

Q: But, as far as you know, he is not an intelligence officer?

A: No, no. He would tell me from time to time some nonsense ...

Q: He was a source of information for you?

A: Yes, sure. It is like if I know you very well and we drink now and then and get together and have a beer together and then you say to me, "Driving down, I saw so and so", I could use it in any way I see fit, without telling you "Thank you very much for your good information". You see what I mean - that kind of thing.

Q: And to your knowledge, had he been involved previously in any kind of mercenary operation?

A: I believe he was in the Congo.

Q: So he would have been an associate of Mike Hoare in that period also?

A: I do not know. I think he was after Mike Hoare there. But he knows Mike Hoare. I do not think, however, that he was under Mike Hoare's command. He was afterward, when Mike Hoare withdrew. That is what I heard.

Q: As far as your travel to Seychelles was concerned, you did not travel under your own name; is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And you got a passport in another name?

A: Indeed.

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Q: And did you do that - you do not have to answer, of course - simply by applying for a passport in another name or because of your connexions in the intelligence?

A: Because of my intelligence. I said that on TV, at a press conference. As an intelligence officer, it is good to know the right people. So any intelligence officer must make sure that he knows the right people, so that in time of need he can turn to them and obtain anything that he wants, basically. I obtained that through those channels - which is nothing; everything is possible. I could get it on the black market and get it for \$50 also.

Q: You said that you went back to the Reef Hotel after it was all over. How much later were you taken in by the Seychelles authorities?

A: On Friday afternoon, and they released me because I gave them a jolly good cover story. But then, obviously, they checked. I knew it was coming. But the Commissioner is a bit cross with me because he believes I should be an honest man and say "Look, you are looking for me; I am Mr. so and so. Look me up." But it does not work like that. Anyway, he means well.

That safehouse-keeper, he hired a car for me without asking me first, giving my name and his name as a payee and his banking account. That is tickets as far as I am concerned. So I was a prisoner of my - ... whatever happened to him would happen to me. And then Saturday afternoon they came back again. I was waiting for them all right. I was sitting at the swimming pool drinking Coca-Cola, and then they came and picked me up. They said, "Pack up". I said, "This is it?". They said, "Yes".

Q: I think that you said that at the Reef Hotel you had a full view of everything that happened?

A: Yes.

Q: What, in your view, did happen? You do not have to answer that if you do not wish to.

A: I know that Seychelles is very cagey about the whole thing. I will give you my honest opinion. Most of the damage was done by the local soldiers obviously, because - poor intelligence; hell of a shock they had, unexpected attack and they were shooting like mad. For example, the incident which I personally witnessed was the next day, on Thursday morning, two fishermen came in a little boat - you know they go out and fish all night. Now, a state of emergency was declared the night before. Those simple fishermen, simple folk, they did not know about it. They come past the hotel, asked if anybody wants to buy fish. We told them, "Don't go down there, because soldiers are there and you must get out of the water because there is a state of emergency on the water and on the land." So they do not believe it - either they could not understand or they did not believe it. They went straight toward the airport. I said, "Oh, my God". They opened up at them with an AA. Those two guys, they stood up in their little boat, threw their

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hands up. The next thing, the boat was cut in half and they fell into the water. I do not know if they were killed or whatnot, and then the police came with a big white flag and they could not get near there because the military were shooting from that strong point - and things like that. On Friday morning, soldiers broke into the duty-free liquor shop and they looted that. The local superiors, they had a hell of a trouble to pacify them. They were forming their own little committees or something, and it was a bit of a shambles. But I am not blaming them. It was their first experience. As I said to one officer, "You had a good manoeuvre. But this is the real McCoy. It is no make-believe."

Q: From the hotel, did you see the Air India plane land and take off?

A: Yes, and it looked quite normal.

Q: And were you aware that most of the party had left on the Air India flight?

A: I was aware the next day. The Swazi Air captain was in touch with Commissioner Pillay here, and Commissioner Pillay told him and the Swazi Air captain told me. I was sitting at the same table. I said, "Skipper, what is up?". He said, "Oh, my God, they are all gone. My airplane has two big holes in it." And that is how it was.

Q: How would you describe your personal motivation for taking part in this exercise?

A: To be quite frank with you: (a) personal friendship with Mike Hoare. I believed he was an absolutely sincere person. Now, with hindsight, I do not believe that any more. Basically, I do not like people who are greedy. Money means nothing to me. But you do need money to live, make no mistake about it. And then (b) from ideological orientation, because I really believed that these islands, from sketchy reports we had, were under heavy Soviet influence, under Libyan financial and physical sponsorship and that the army is guided and oriented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which I personally believe is an outlaw organization. You people might have different beliefs, but it is a free world.

Q: In the first part of your statement, you said clearly that this action had the tacit approval of the South African Government and that they had provided the arms.

A: Possibly. I asked that the word "possibly" be inserted.

Q: That was in the later part after a previous question. The questioner may have got the wrong impression. You said "knowledge". You said they had provided the arms. But the questioner asked you a question and you said you would like this word "possibly" to be inserted.

A: Yes.

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Q: Now, regarding this tacit approval, and this provision of the arms, you also mentioned in your statement that you are a professional intelligence officer, that you are not a mercenary.

A: I am not a mercenary.

Q: So you did not accept any money?

A: Expenses.

Q: Except the hotel expenses that Mike Hoare paid you. Would you take it that your participation in this action is part of the tacit approval of the South African Government?

A: That is a tricky question, Sir. Hell, you see whatever way I answer it I will be in fix, so to speak. I would say it like this: you might interpret it like this; Seychelles Government might interpret it the way you put it. But the actual fact is that I am not part and parcel of that tacit approval myself. I breached my organization's ground rules by including myself into this foray into Seychelles. I will have to face the music after this concert here. So I am not part and parcel of South Africa's tacit approval.

Q: Perhaps I could put a question that might make it possible for you to clarify this both for you and for us on a hypothetical basis. It might be less difficult for you to do it that way than by dealing with specifics. Suppose the operation had been a success and you had returned to South Africa and your superiors had come to know officially about your involvement. What action, if any, do you think they would have taken in your case?

A: We are like British or Canadians, for example. We always take the long view and imagine the worst. Now, anybody would think immediately that they would say, "Good boy, you done a good job." I do not think that would happen. They would say, "Look, it turned out fine, but the chances were that you would be caught and embarrass our Government, embarrass this and that." They would punish me.

Q: You said that when Mike Hoare talked to you about this plan, this conspiracy, you assumed that your superiors had knowledge of it. That is what you said.

A: That is right.

Q: On what grounds would you assume that your superiors had knowledge of it?

A: Look, I reported on this Seychelles plan, coup d'état, foray into Seychelles since 1977, since the original coup. My Government was very well aware of Mike Hoare's plan. And all of a sudden Mike Hoare gets the armaments, gets a sort of a free hand to do this and this and this. So I presume that the powers-that-be know about it.

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Q: You mentioned also a first plan, in 1980 I suppose it was?

A: No, I said that the last one was in 1980; the last plan that I heard of was in 1980. I gave a copy to my headquarters. I gave a copy to the Army General, Charles Lloyd, and then I heard nothing until all of a sudden the whole thing was resurrected.

Q: And that was the plan before this plan?

A: There were very many. I believe there were other free lancers going around trying to catch ... at least I heard that through the grapevines.

Q: So your Government was aware of the 1980 plan?

A: I sent it forward.

Q: You sent forward a report?

A: If they approved, I do not know, but they were aware, certainly.

Q: Could you brief us a little about this plan? Was there any similarity with the present plan or any connexion between the two?

A: I would say that the only difference would be of approach. Somebody might fly in like Mike decided to, somebody might buy a fishing fleet and land at night; somebody might come in as a circus or something like this. You see, that is the only difference. Otherwise, the plans are similar - to make a quiet coup d'état, possibly with help from other southern African States and withdraw - get paid for it and leave the Seychelles people to their own ways, bad luck or good luck, whatever.

Q: I should like to follow up on the previous question - and I hasten to say again that you do not have to reply if you do not wish to.

I am still slightly puzzled as to why in 1980 and previously you reported details of plans for mercenary involvement in a coup in Seychelles to your superiors - and not just to your superiors but also to the army - and yet in 1981, you did not so report, but instead presumed that they were aware of it. Can you throw any light on why there was this difference?

A: The basic thing is that previous plans, he plainly requested that he is looking for a sponsor; he is looking for help. So therefore he gave me the plan. He said, "Try to secure help, official help, either in armaments, funds, whatever, to further this plan." Well, all of a sudden there he is, he has the money, he has the supplies, he does not need help anymore, so to speak.

Questioner: That reply has clarified the matter for me entirely.

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Q: Just one matter of clarification. You said that when the fighting broke out you went to your car and drove away towards the hotel and that a lorry passed you going towards the airport, and that one reason why you had driven away was that you did not have your gun; the fellow who was going to give you your gun did not give it to you, for some reason.

A: Probably to keep me unarmed.

Q: You said, on the other hand, that at the beginning, when you saw Mike, he handed you a bag. I believe you said it was very heavy and you said, "Oh, my God, there must be a gun in here."

A: That is right.

Q: Where did you put that bag? Where did you keep your gun? I thought that this was the purpose of your being handed the bag.

A: That was against my plan. I had advised him not to couple men and weapons together. Basically - I didn't explain this - how he gave me a gun was, he said to me, "Do you mind taking a bag for me to Seychelles?". I said, "Sure. What's in it?". He said, "It is a maritime communications equipment which will serve as a radio receiver for headquarters." I said, "Fine, I will take it." He said, "Don't worry if the customs seize it." He showed me one; there was written, "For the port captain." He said, "Just tell him it is for the port captain." He said, "If they want to take it, let them take it. If the port captain says he doesn't know nothing about it" - which he did not - "then you just say that you don't know, somebody gave it to you and it is for the port captain." That I accepted. He brought it to the airport and he said, "Just throw some shirts and something into it so it looks full." So I threw in a few shirts and a flipper and a camera and a few books, which could not weigh more than about 10 pounds or 12 pounds. But when I picked up the bag I immediately realized that there was a gun inside. I opened it and then I said, "The gun must be concealed inside."

Funny enough, when I came to the customs - it was about 9 at night - the fellow said to me - I had three suitcases - and he said to me, "That one." So I said, "The small one?". He said, "No, that one." I thought, "Oh, here we go." I put the thing on the table. If the customs officer had picked up that bag, he would have immediately realized something fishy. As soon as he would have picked it up, he would have said, "It is impossible for this thing to weigh so much." He would probably think I was smuggling gold.

But he opens the bag and he gets hold of a book and he looks at the book, throws it back and says to me, "Any guns?". So I looked at him. I said, "I beg your pardon?". He said, "Any guns?". So the policeman standing next to the customs officer, he said, "He means spear gun." Spear guns are forbidden in Seychelles. So I said, "Oh, spear guns. No, no." He says, "If you have got any, leave it here; you can take it with you when you depart." I said, "No, I have none." He said, "Fine." I nearly had a heart attack.

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Q: Concerning your activities for the 14 days or 10 days you were here before ...

A: A fortnight.

Q: ... you gave a record of your activities to the police. Now, those papers are for the Government of this country. But there is one intriguing element that I would like to bring up, because it indicates that you must have had some extensive local contacts during those days. When you went to the football match, you were able to identify 50 Soviet people ...

A: They stick out like a sore thumb.

Q: How did you know them?

A: They stick out. They talk loud. They talk Slavic. They talk loud. They stick together. Funny enough, I went to the soccer match with a local fellow. I came up there and the stadium marshall says to me, "Sit here." He told my friend, "Sit right on top." So I say, "But he is my friend, we want to sit together." He says, "No." The marshall mistook me for a Soviet fellow, because all of a sudden about 50 of them trooped in and were sitting all around me. I took a photograph - not myself, I asked my friend. I said, "Take your camera and take a shot."

They stick out like a sore thumb. You can ask the locals. They could not hide themselves even if they wanted to. Nothing personal.

Q: I have one more question. In answer to one of my questions, you said that you are a professional intelligence officer and that you did not receive any money from Hoare.

A: Not cash, not for services.

Q: But did he promise you anything afterwards?

A: No, it would be unethical as far as I am concerned.

Q: So you did not receive any financial benefit from this action?

A: Nothing. I even - look, I believe they appointed a QC, a lawyer for the whole thing. I refused to take him, because I believe that they were paid by mercenary money and I do not want to be tainted by it. I am defending myself. The rest - Mike Hoare can pay for their defence, as far as I am concerned, but I am not taking it. If my Government wants to pay for my defence, I will accept it, because I think it is their duty - or good will.

Q: But in that case, if you accept payment by your Government because you are an employee of the Government - since you are not receiving any financial benefits from Hoare's side, from the mercenary side ...

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Q: Did you not say that you received expenses?

A: I meant expenses.

Q: So you did get money?

A: Not for services rendered, just expenses for going from point A to point B.

Q: But then would you not say that actually you were carrying out a duty for your Government?

A: I do not know, I get a little confused. Well, I do not know. You can interpret it anyway you please. No hard feelings whatever - you are doing your job, that's all.

Q: Just one minor question. Since you were arrested, you have had no contact with any of the others in custody here who were involved in the operation?

A: No, we are all in - what is it? - solitary detention, in handcuffs, day and night, until recently. I am not blaming them. Probably South Africa, if they had tried the same thing, it would happen the same thing to them. It is part and parcel of punishment, and I accept it like a man. I have had no contacts whatsoever. Contacts with local officials, yes. We talk together. We even discuss intelligence strategies. That is how it goes.

Q: If the Government of Seychelles should put you on trial, do you expect the Government of South Africa to send a lawyer for you?

A: It is very difficult for them. You must understand one thing. I would say that by specifically sending a lawyer to defend me, it would give credence to accusations, be it from the United Nations or the Seychelles Government or anybody else, that I was specifically sent here by my Government for this mission. So I very much doubt that they would do it. I would not refuse, you know. But I am not afraid or anxious about the court case here, because I will plead guilty. I am being charged with illegal importation of weapons of war - which is a fact. But I will plead mitigation; that is all. I do not need a lawyer to lie on my behalf. I will not lie. Sorry, if there is any lawyer among you, my apologies.

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Robert Charles Sims

SIMS: I have made a statement to the police on the whole affair. Basically, I have told them everything they have asked me and there has been nothing held back at all.

One thing that I am a bit perturbed about is another member of our party, a lady by the name of Susan Ingle. I do not know if you have spoken to Susan Ingle. Have you?

Commission member: Not yet.

SIMS: Well, her crime is loving me. She has done 61 days in solitary confinement. That is her crime. Why I say "her crime": she came over here to look after a little cottage for me, do my cooking, wash my clothes, look after me like a normal housewife. We have been together for the last 10, 12 years, and she has been locked up for 61 days because she loves me. It seems a bit odd.

As far as this other affair is concerned, I will gladly answer any questions that I can answer.

CHAIRMAN: Will you please tell us your name, nationality, residence and occupation.

A: My name is Robert Charles Sims. My occupation: I am a race-horse trainer. My residence is 36 Homestead Avenue, Hillcrest, Natal. My religion is Church of England.

Q: And your nationality?

A: I am South African.

Q: Can you tell the Commission what your responsibility was in the whole operation?

A: My sole and only job was to hand out pocket money to two men that were coming over for the operation, which I did do. Pocket-money - not paymaster or anything else; just pocket-money. We are talking about a figure of a thousand dollars.

Q: When did you arrive in Seychelles?

A: This is a bit difficult, because, you know, it was some time ago, but it was within a couple of hours of the 1st of November. Why I say that is because some people have said that we arrived on the 31st. But it was 10 o'clock or 11 o'clock, a couple of hours either way.

Q: Who contacted you in South Africa for this operation?

A: Colonel Hoare.

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Q: Had you known him before?

A: Yes, I know Colonel Hoare quite well.

Q: What was your relationship to him?

A: He is my brother-in-law.

Q: And did you ask him questions about the whole purpose of the operation?

A: Let us put it this way: he approached me about coming over to the Seychelles islands for a bloodless coup, whatever he called it - something to that effect. He told me, basically, that all it boiled down to was a bloodless coup. So I said, "Well, I am interested in going over as long as it does not involve me with any violence, shooting, firearms, running around the bush, attacking women and children and dogs with guns and ammunition. If that is the position, I am not interested. But if I go over with no violence, no firearms, no spying, no running around and so on and so forth, I would like to go". It was a month's holiday in the Seychelles, all expenses paid. I said I would love to go over under those conditions, if I am not involved in any way with fighting, violence, spying or anything else.

Being the brother-in-law, I think he said, "Well, it is a nice way to give my brother-in-law a holiday. Bye-bye. Go over."

He gave me a banking account, a working account for the housekeeping, and another banking account for money to be handed over to the men that arrived here. The one banking account was in my common-law wife's name. It was for housekeeping, for food and general household expenses. The other account was for pocket money for men who arrived here. One thousand dollars was paid out.

Q: You did not carry any weapons when you came here?

A: I brought in two weapons into the country. When we were arrested, I explained to the police where the weapons were, plus I also drew a plan to show them exactly where they were so they can find them easily, without having any trouble at all. The weapons were never used.

I went to the airport. As soon as things broke out and I saw things happening, I said, "Bye-bye, cheerio; I am not interfering. I do not want to be involved." I jumped in the car and drove away.

Q: So when the Swaziland airplane arrived, you were at the airport?

A: I was in the tea kiosk having a sandwich and a cup of tea at the time, I think.

Q: Can you tell the Commission what your activities were as soon as you arrived here in Seychelles?

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A: From the day I arrived until the morning I was arrested, we basically were every-day common tourists. We swam at just about every beach it is possible to swim at. We went skin-diving. We had dinners and lunches at all the different restaurants and hotels around the town. That is all we did. I must have taken 200-plus photographs, which the police have been through, and not one of them is a photograph of an airplane or an army barracks or a police station or anything else. Two hundred photographs. I have shot 400 feet of movie film - a Canon movie camera - which the police have gone through. Swimming scenes, yachts, skin-diving: that is all it is. Four hundred feet of movie film, 200 photographs, postcard-size, that the police have gone through. Everybody has had a look at it.

Q: Had you ever participated in an operation like this one before?

A: Never. This is the first time I have ever been in a police station, never mind a court. I must be like the black sheep of the family. No member of the family, as far as I know, has ever been in gaol or any courthouse at all. And it is my fault. Holiday in Seychelles, all expenses paid. You see these stars, fantastic things. You do not think any further. It is my fault. I suppose I should have sat down and thought about it, but this fantastic idea of living in the Seychelles islands for one month, all expenses paid - and, when I say "all expenses paid", as my brother-in-law said to me: "Don't spare the expenses. If you want to go out and have dinner five nights a week at hotels and restaurants, go right ahead." Now it is very hard to say, "Hang on, let me think about it." And so I did it.

My main operation on the Seychelles islands was to pay out money to the men arriving. I paid out to Barney Carey. I paid him some money. I paid Anton Lubic. I paid him some money.

Q: Had you known them before, or did you meet them here?

A: Nobody I have ever met before this operation. This involvement was the first time with them. Not one of these people I ever knew before. They have never been friends of mine. I have never seen them before. They have never been to my house or homestead or anything else.

Q: And when you arrived in Seychelles, did you make any contact with local people here?

A: No, no - no local contacts.

Q: You said that you believed you would be involved in a bloodless coup, that was how Mike Hoare described it to you.

A: I was not to be involved in it. It was what he came over to organize. My involvement was strictly no violence whatsoever. That was my involvement. Whether it was a bloodless coup or not had nothing to do with me. I was not going to be there and frighten anyone in any way with any gun. A bloodless coup could be someone walking in here with a firearm and saying, "I am holding everybody up" - frightening people. I was not to be involved in frightening anybody with a gun or anything else.

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Q: When Mike Hoare described the coup to you, or his intentions, did he give you any idea of the number of people who would be involved in the exercise?

A: I had done a few little odd jobs on these guns he brought over, and I was under the impression that it would be about 50 people.

Q: When you came to Seychelles, so far as you were a contact point for some of the other people here, how did you maintain communications?

A: We had a phone installed in the cottage and we had a phone call from South Africa saying that Anton Lubic is arriving on Saturday night. They said, "Would you please meet him? He will be smoking a cigar", and so on. Letters that I have handed over to the police all confirm this. When I say "letters", they phoned up, but they also sometimes wrote a letter, a note. They did not post it; they gave to him. So when I met him at the airport, I walked up and said, "Are you Anton Lubic?" He said, "Yes, here are my letters of introduction." Those letters I handed over to the police.

Q: How did you learn that the group would be arriving on the Swaziland flight?

A: Barney Carey told me.

Q: Did you not get that directly in a phone call from South Africa?

A: No, Barney Carey arrived just like a week before, on the Swazi flight. He arrived here, and I gave Barney Carey 8,000 rupees. He told me that I must draw extra money for a flight that was arriving from Swaziland on the day of the 25th, and so on. I must draw so much money from a banking account and have it ready for the pay-out. I did not pay it out. The Commissioner has it.

Q: When you went to the airport on the day of the arrival of the Swazi flight, what did you expect to happen?

A: Well, at the time, I asked Barney Carey whether it was necessary for me to go to the airport. He said, "You can please yourself, you know. It is entirely up to you." I went home, and about half-past 3 or 4 o'clock in the afternoon, I turned around and said to my little wife, "I think I better go down to the airport to see how things are." It was on the spur of the moment. I jumped in my car and drove down to the airport. I sat down, and the flight arrived. Everything seemed to be going fine. I sat in the tea kiosk. Then I heard a gun go off. I went out and jumped in my car and drove around to where Barney Carey was. This is not part of the agreement, as far as I am concerned, and I drove away.

Q: If things had not gone wrong, what would have happened as far as you were concerned, next?

A: My next job would be to hand over the guns that I brought with me. That was one of the big things I wanted to do, to get rid of those damn things and hand the money over to the persons in question. Then my job would be finished.

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Q: Going back to the preparations in South Africa: you mentioned that you had some involvement with the guns.

A: Firearms, yes.

Q: You said, I think - I cannot remember the exact words you used - that Mike Hoare had got hold of them. Did he indicate in any way how he had got hold of these firearms?

A: He did not mention a word. When I say "did not mention a word", it is not the type of thing that I would ask him, for the simple reason that he would tell me to mind my own bloody business, you know - or stronger language.

Q: Had you any picture in your mind about what would have happened if nothing had gone wrong at the airport? What would have happened next in regard to the operation as a whole?

A: I had no instructions to do anything. That is what I am saying. As far as I was concerned, once the men had arrived at the airport - the figures were not right. When I say "the figures were not right": I was told to get 2,000 rupees ready for delivery at the airport - not delivery at the airport, but for delivery to this new lot of people. By my reckoning, the amount of fellows that were on the island plus 28 arriving was not the full quota of men. So I did not think that this was the main group.

I understand there were a lot more than 28 people on the aircraft, but my instructions, which are with the Commissioner upstairs, were 28. So I thought at the time, "Well, there are 28 arriving now and there is another 20-odd arriving in another week or 10 days." Myself, I did not even think Colonel Hoare would be on the flight. I thought these 20-odd people arriving, they will be booked into a hotel, and a week or 10 days later, somebody else will arrive. Then there will be the full quota of men. That is why, you know, I say that I went down to the airport just as a matter of interest. I did not expect anything really to happen at all.

Q: You said earlier that you thought about 50 would be the number involved.

A: Yes, because of the number of guns involved.

Q: And your own compensation, reward, for taking part in this was, you indicated, just the trip to Seychelles.

A: No, I also received a salary. I received 5,000 rand - plus a further 5,000 rand on the successful completion of the job. Well, I presume I do not qualify for the second 5,000.

Q: And how would you describe your personal motivation for taking part, for doing what you did?

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A: I got a month's holiday. Politically, I have no involvement whatsoever - no reason at all why I should come over here, except a month's holiday. Stars in my eyes. All expenses paid. That is all there was to it. No politics involved. I understand some of these men have said that they were negotiating to put an ex-president back into power. I do not know anything about putting the ex-president back into power. Mike Hoare never said anything to me. I said to Mike at the time, "Who is going to be president after the coup?" He said, "That is not your business. Go over there and do your job and do it properly." He says, "It has got nothing to do with you." I said, "I would like to know." He said, "What difference does it make?"

Now, I was here for a month before anybody came over. I was on a month's holiday. There was nobody on the island with me. Well, I would not say "nobody"; fellows were coming and going, but I was on a month's holiday and the Colonel did say to me that there is a big possibility that nothing will take place, that I might be here for a month, I might be here for three or four months, and then just be called back home again.

So, I thought, "This is wonderful. Go over for a month's holiday, all expenses paid." The operation might fall down completely and I might be here for two or three months, on a spending-spree holiday, all expenses paid. You can see from my account of the money what I spent while I was on holiday here. We were living high. We were spending \$70 to \$100 a day.

Q: Do you consider that you were a mercenary in your involvement?

A: You see, we must be honest; let's be honest about it. At the time, no. Now, when I think about it, I suppose I must carry the stigma of being a type of mercenary, I suppose. But firearms, shooting people and so forth - this I never do. But it does appear this way. But I am not a mercenary in any way whatsoever. I had never shot anybody. I had never intended to shoot anybody. It is just not in my nature. When Mike spoke to me about coming over, I said, "With the understanding that I am not involved in any violence, any shooting, carrying arms, and so on." He said, "Okay, fine." I said, "Otherwise, I am not going."

Q: You said you had an account of your own.

A: I had a banking account.

Q: Do you remember how much the deposit was?

A: \$10,000.

Q: Only \$10,000?

A: My account, and \$10,000 in my wife's account. That was for the housekeeping, and mine was for money to be paid out to the men arriving here, which was 60,000 rupees.

Q: You mentioned Anton Lubic.

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A: Yes.

Q: You said you had never met him before.

A: I met him in South Africa.

Q: In South Africa?

A: Yes, I met him there at the time of this - but I never met him before this involvement with Mike Hoare and so on.

Q: Do you remember when you last met him?

A: Well, gee whiz, two weeks, I would say. Look, Sir, I am talking about like four or five days either way. Around about the 15th of October.

Q: And on that occasion did you discuss this mercenary operation in Seychelles together with Mike Hoare and Anton Lubic?

A: No.

Q: What did you talk about?

A: I did not meet Anton Lubic at Mike Hoare's house. I met him on the road. He was waiting on the side of the road in his little car and he took us to an area where the guns could be fired and tested. I had not met him up until then.

Q: And at that time Mike Hoare was with you?

A: Mike Hoare was not with me, no.

Q: Who introduced you to Anton Lubic?

A: Well, nobody really introduced us. I was told that he would be on the side of the road and I would drive along and flick my lights and he would follow me, then pass me; then I would follow him to the testing site to fire his guns.

Q: And at that time did you call him Anton Lubic, or do you remember that he had another name?

A: You know, I must be honest. I think he did tell me his name was something else, but I am damned if I remember what it was. It was some time ago, but I think he told me his name was something else - but I am not sure.

Q: Do you know his occupation?

A: I know now, but I did not know then.

Q: What is he now?

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A: I understand that he is connected with the South African State Security. Is that right? At that time when I met him then, I did not know.

Q: At that time, you did not know that he was a South African intelligence officer - not at all?

A: No. In fact, if you had told me at the time that he was, I would not have believed you or anybody else. He just did not seem this type of man, you know - the way he spoke and so on.

Q: After he arrived here, he did not say that he was ...

A: When he arrived here?

Q: Did he tell you?

A: Well, he told me that he was here to look after the interests of his Government. He did not say he was a BOSS man or State Security man.

Q: So you knew that he must be a Government official.

A: Well, that was what he said. I do not say that I believed him. You know, this is what he told me. When you talk to him - and when I say "talk to him" I am talking about sitting down and having a pint of beer with the man - he does not strike you as this type of fellow. He told me that he was here to look after the interests of his Government. And I said to myself, "That's a shame, because I would hate to have a fellow like this looking after my interests, never mind my country's interests." You know what I mean. I did not believe him at the time, I am afraid.

Q: Knowing that he is a Government official, did you get an impression that his participation might have certain implications that the South African Government might be involved in this whole operation?

A: As I say, I did not believe him when he told me. If I had believed him when he told me he was a BOSS man, maybe I would have thought things out a bit different. But I did not believe him. You know, talk is cheap.

Q: Did you ever think that there was somebody else behind Mike Hoare in this operation?

A: Well, I would say yes.

Q: Who?

A: Why I say "yes" is because I know Mike Hoare. I have known him for a long time. I know that he has got no idea of ever trying to be President of the Seychelles islands. So it must have been somebody else behind him. But who that would have been, I have no idea.

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Q: And you did not know where he was getting the money for the whole operation?

A: No idea, Sir. I must be honest with you that as far as Mike Hoare is concerned, he has always treated me - I am talking about the last 18, 19 years - like the baby brother. You know: "Come up and have a look at my car; it is not running so well." Baby brother goes up and gets the car going a bit better, you know. This is the way it has always been. Because of this, I do not spend much time with the man at all. He has got a rather domineering type of personality and I do not spend much time in his company. He is a nice fellow. I get along with him all right, but I feel as though it is like thin ice and it is all right while it is holding but too much of Mike Hoare is not good for me and causes friction in the family.

Q: You say that you are Mike Hoare's brother-in-law.

A: That is correct.

Q: What is the connexion?

A: Through marriage.

Q: Is he married to your sister?

A: He is married to my sister.

Q: You said that you learned about the arrival of the group on the Swazi flight through Barney Carey.

A: Correct.

Q: Did Barney Carey say anything about the second group coming to this country?

A: No. If there was a second group, Mike Hoare would have been with the second group and not with the first group. I thought there was another group arriving because of the 28,000 rand I was told to draw. This figure did not balance up with the number of guns involved. Nobody said to me that 50 or 60 or 70 people were coming out. But knowing how many guns were involved, I of course assumed that that was the number of people arriving, and 28 was not the full allocation of firearms. So I did think there was another group arriving. Nobody said to me there was anybody coming or that this was only the starting party - whatever it might be.

Q: Do you have a drinking habit?

A: Me?

Q: After your arrival here, you got drunk and you might have disclosed that there might be this operation?

A: Gee whiz, Sir, no, definitely not. I am a one or two beer man, and with dinner I usually have a glass of wine. But a drinking problem I have never had.

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Q: Prior to your arrest, did you have any Seychellois friend?

A: No, Sir. I did try to make friends with a couple of Seychellois people. Why I say that is because we wanted to find out a bit about the local food and how it is cooked, and so forth. We went along and you could not buy a Seychellois Creole cookbook in this town. You cannot buy a Creole cookbook in this town to find out how they do their dishes and their curries. We thought we would go along to a private house and find out how they cook with coconut oil, and so on, and how they use this and that. Susan and myself, we did say that if anybody invites us around to their house for a drink or a meal, we will say "Yes, please; thank you very much", and go. But it never happened.

Q: You said that the weapons were tested in South Africa before?

A: Yes, north of Umslanga Rocks.

Q: You did not participate in the testing of the weapons?

A: Me? Yes, I fired the weapons, yes. Firearms have always been a bit of a hobby. When I say "a bit of a hobby", I now and again manage to buy an old gun and I strip it down and I rub it and reglue it and recut the stock and hang it up on the wall.

Q: But I am talking about the ...

A: These AK rifles?

Questioner: Right.

A: Yes, I fired them.

Q: So you were already familiar with them?

A: Yes, I have fired the AK rifle, yes.

Q: And did you ask your brother-in-law where he had got those weapons?

A: No, I did not ask him. As I said, at the time I would not have asked him because he would have told me that it was none of my damned business.

Q: You modified all the weapons, the AKs?

A: Yes. When I say "modified them", Colonel Hoare asked me to take the stocks off of them - the butts, you know. I gather that this was to reduce the weight and the bulkiness of them.

Q: I looked at the weapons yesterday. Where did you get all the spare parts for the modification? You put a plug where the stock was.

A: Oh, that plug - we had no end of trouble. We got that from the radio shop just around the road. When you trade your motor car in and take the radio

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out of your car, the hole that is left for the aerial - you buy these plugs, they cost three cents each, and plug the hole. You know what I mean?

Questioner: Yes, I do.

A: I went to a radio shop and asked, "Have you anything to block a hole?" I told them the size and they came up with a box of stuff and I said, "There we are."

Q: Had you been involved in the modification of weapons before this, or was this the first time?

A: The first time I had ever done this at all. I say that prior to this, the only guns I messed around with were old guns that I bought and tried to do things with.

Q: Are you able to tell us the type of AKs they were?

A: AK 47s. This is what I have been told. There were two different types of guns, one is - Norwegian? I do not know, I am afraid. But there is one gun that is different from the other one. One has got more steel than the other, and one has got a lot of wood on it.

Q: Did you work with any hand grenades or with any anti-tank weapons - or just these weapons?

A: Just these weapons.

Q: You mentioned that you had effectively no contact with the Seychellois. Presumably you must have had an initial contact with somebody in relation to the safehouse when you arrived.

A: I must be getting a bit dumb. Could you give me the question again?

Q: You said you did not have very much contact with the local people here.

A: I had no contact.

Q: But when you arrived, in order to get the house where you stayed, did you have contact of some kind for that purpose?

A: That was organized by Colonel Hoare, not me. He told me that he had rented the cottage through somebody in South Africa, Mr. Destel. I knew it had been arranged with Mr. Destel. I was told that when I arrived here Mrs. Hoareau would meet me at the airport and would take me up to the cottage. Because even he did not know where the cottage was. He could not describe it; he could not give me the address. I did not know where it was. Mrs. Hoareau would meet me at the airport and take me to the cottage.

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Q: And that was what happened? She met you at the airport?

A: No, she did not. Her son came down and met me at the airport. There was some reason why she could not come down.

Q: But that was the last contact you had with the Hoareaus?

A: No, no. Our cottage was here (indicating), and theirs was right in front of us, a bit further than that red roof (indicating) away from us. We got friendly. We popped down and said "hello" to them every now and again. They gave us some fruit for the house - what they call passion fruit, and mangoes, and so on.

Q: They did not cook Creole, so you could ask them for recipes?

A: Mrs. Hoareau is Creole. She is Seychellois. We did ask her about cooking, and so forth, and she told us all about her early life on some island, and so on. They were very nice people. Also with her was a man by the name of Harry Savey. I got a little booklet that was left in our cottage for us to read - not a little booklet, a proper book. Harry Savey is mentioned there as the uncrowned king of the Seychelles islands. He is a very, very nice fellow, a thorough gentleman. He is a man of 65 or 68 years of age. But many years ago he owned half a dozen islands around here. You know, a man at ease.

Q: How big was the house you rented?

A: Three bedrooms, dining room and lounge combined, kitchen, one bathroom.

Q: Did you have an involvement in preparing the bags that were used for bringing the weapons?

A: No. You mean the false bottom and covering?

Questioner: Yes.

A: No, I was not involved in that.

Q: Does your interest in guns stem at all from a military background? Did you have military experience?

A: I have never done any military training anywhere. I have had no military training whatsoever. In South Africa it is compulsory to have military training. At the time when I was a little guy, it was done by lot, a draw system, that if your name came out you got military training. If your name did not come out, you did not go in. Now, my name did come out for military training. I was 17 at the time, and my name came out. I had to report to a place called Auckland Park, which is a military unit in South Africa. I had to report to Auckland Park at the ripe old age of 17 to do my two or three years of army training. At that time, I was a jockey. When I went along to the place, they handed my gear out to me. I was about a size 3 and 1/2 shoe, and they do not make a 3 and 1/2 size army boot. The smallest army boot they make is size 6. They gave me a bag and my bed roll

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to put on my back. I walked out of there. I walked across a bit of a courtyard and there was a step, some pavement. When I went to pick up my foot to step off the step - it was high - the weight of my pack made me fall on my back like a tortoise. I stuck there and the sergeant came along and picked me up and said, "Take the bloody stuff off and get out of here." That was the only day I had in the army.

Q: You mentioned your residence to the Commission. Which city did you mention?

A: Where I stayed was in Durban, in South Africa, just outside - Hillcrest. Durban is right on the coast and Hillcrest is, you might say, a little village inland.

Q: Secondly, you said you are a racehorse trainer. At what race course did you train horses?

A: Hillcrest is basically here (indicating), and next door there is a place we call Summerfield, which is the main training centre for race horses in Natal, South Africa. The distance between the two points is 3 kilometres. That is why I am in Hillcrest. It is right next door to Summerfield.

Q: Is it an organization or a company?

A: It is a company. Summerfield is an organization sponsored by the Jockey Club of South Africa, which is affiliated to the Jockey Club of England. It is basically stabling for 2,000 horses in a given area, with accommodation for the grooms in one area, with canteen facilities, and so forth. The whole area - Hillcrest and Summerfield - is all horses, either race horses or jumping horses or you play polo.

Q: You said 5,000 rand or 5,000 dollars?

A: Rand. Dollars is what was deposited to my bank account. \$10,000 was deposited into the banking account for me to pay out to men arriving here. Of that money I paid out approximately \$1,000. But it was \$10,000 into my banking account.

Q: And you received 5,000 rand in South Africa?

A: In South Africa.

Q: Paid in cash or in bank accounts?

A: Cash. Oh, sorry; when I say "cash", it was a cash cheque; it was not hard cash. It was a cash cheque from Colonel Hoare.

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Q: How many persons told you that they were looking after the interests of their Government?

A: How many persons told me that they were looking after the interests of this Government?

Questioner: Of their Government.

A: Like Anton Lubic? Only one.

Q: And he is South African?

A: Anton? Yes, he is. I presume he is South African. You know, he is not the easiest fellow in the world to talk to. He gets - sorry, I should not say this - but, all right, he gets on my nerves when he talks to me. I do not know why. There is something wrong with me or something wrong with him, but we just do not - it is like two pieces of sand paper rubbing together. I think he talks in his sleep.

Q: Before you came here, did you have your passport or did you ask for a passport for this trip?

A: Yes, my original passport had expired.

Q: So you asked for a new passport?

A: A new passport, Sir.

Q: Do you remember when and how long it took to get it?

A: Well, I applied for the passport in Maritzburg, which is the capital of Natal, and there was a normal procedure. They gave me a form and I had to hand in two photographs, and I had to go back, I think, a fortnight later to get my passport.

Q: Fourteen days later?

A: A fortnight.

Q: That was about the normal procedure?

A: The normal procedure, yes. The little girl in the office did say to me that if I wanted it quicker, they could send it to Durban by express post, but I would have to pay the express charges. It was not necessary.

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Q: When did you apply for this new passport?

A: You mean prior to my coming here?

Questioner: Yes.

A: About two weeks.

Q: Two weeks before you came here you applied for the passport?

A: Yes.

Q: And you got it after two weeks?

A: Yes, I got the passport literally two or three days before I came here. I could have got it earlier. I presume so, because I left on a Saturday and I went there on Thursday and I said, "Is my passport here?" She said, "It has been here for a couple of days." And I got it.

The CHAIRMAN: We have no further questions.

Sims: As regards Susan, Sir, I would be obliged if you could please do something about her.

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Susan Josephine Ingle

INGLE: I am Susan Josephine Ingle. I am South African, but I was born in England. I am a housewife.

Q: And you live in South Africa?

A: In South Africa, yes.

Q: Before we ask you any particular questions, is there anything you would like to say to us of a general character in regard to your involvement in the episode we are investigating?

A: Not really. I can tell you that I have been very well treated here. They are being marvelous. Everything has been done for me.

Q: You came to the Seychelles with Mr. Sims?

A: Yes.

Q: Only the two of you?

A: Yes, only the two of us. We came together.

Q: And when you came here, what did you know about the whole operation?

A: I must say that I did not know anything. I did not know what was going to happen or anything. I was just told that we were coming here to look after some financial arrangements and that it was intended to be bloodless. They did say to us that there would be no ... they did not expect any bloodshed.

Q: Your information, what you knew about what was going to happen - the fact that it was to be bloodless, but that there was going to be an attempted coup of some kind: did you get that personally from Mike Hoare?

A: Yes.

Q: You met him yourself?

A: He is Mr. Sims' brother-in-law.

Q: So both of you talked with him together?

A: Yes. I think Bob more than I. I did not sort of attend very many - only a couple of, you might say, meetings.

Q: You were given charge of one banking account?

A: Yes, in my name.

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Q: And what was its purpose?

A: For our convenience while we were here.

Q: For your own convenience?

A: Yes.

Q: When you came here with Mr. Sims, did you know that he was carrying weapons with him?

A: I did not see them, but I presumed that they were there. I did not see him put them into the bags, or anything like that, but I did assume that they were there.

Q: You have already said that when you were in the house here in the Seychelles your main task was to disburse money. Did you have any other function at the same time? Was it a contact point or anything like that?

A: No, no. Apart from ... there was another fellow on the plane with us and he handed over his bag and then, later on, we had a phone call from Mike Hoare, through his wife, to say that another fellow would be coming and also with a bag. But apart from that, nothing.

Q: There was only one single phone call you had from South Africa?

A: No, we had a couple of phone calls, but most of them were just - you know - family, to find out how we were, things like that.

Q: Did you request a passport for the trip or did you already have a passport?

A: My passport had lapsed. I had to get a new one.

Q: And how many days did it take for you to get the passport, from the time you asked for it?

A: Just over a week.

Q: Did you think that Mr. Sims was going to be involved in the actual fighting?

A: No.

Q: But did you think that one of the guns was intended for him, or for other people?

A: No, I did assume that it was for other people. I did not ... I sort of got the impression that he would not be involved in anything like that.

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Q: Did you know Anton Lubic before you came here?

A: No, I only met him when he arrived here.

Q: Did he say what his occupation was?

A: No.

Q: Nothing at all?

A: No.

Q: Did he say for what purpose he was here?

A: I did not have much to do with him, really, you know. He was just somebody that came, and I did not ask him any questions.

Q: On the 25th of November, did you go to the airport?

A: No.

Q: You were at home?

A: Yes I was at home.

Q: Mr. Sims went to the airport?

A: Yes.

Q: Did you know that a number of people would be arriving on that day?

A: He did tell me somebody was arriving, but I did not know how many people.

Q: Did he indicate the number of people?

A: No.

Q: Not at all?

A: No, I do not know if he knew how many people. But he did not say. I knew there would be some people. It was more than one, but I did not know how many.

Q: More than one. And you did not know anything about another group coming to Seychelles?

A: I beg your pardon?

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Q: On the 25th, one group arrived; but, following that group, did you have any information that another group might come?

A: No, not at all.

Q: The operation took place on 25 November. When did the local authorities arrest you?

A: On the 28th, the morning of the 28th.

Q: Was that in the company of Mr. Sims?

A: Yes.

Q: You were in the house?

A: Yes.

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Roger England

ENGLAND: My name is Roger England. My nationality is British and Zimbabwean - dual nationality. My occupation - before I left, I was an assistant manager of a bar in Durban, but I was not working at the time that I came over here.

Q: Where did you reside?

A: In Durban.

Q: And your age?

A: I am 26 years old.

Chairman: Before we ask you any questions, would you like to say anything yourself of a general character about the affair that we are looking into?

A: You want me to tell you the whole ...

Q. If you would like to tell us about your own involvement, that would be useful.

A. How I was recruited?

Questioner: Exactly.

A: I was approached by a friend of mine. I had left my job. It was a very poorly paid job in Durban. I kept on getting - it was quite a rough part of town. Obviously, you get a lot of drinking problems there. I kept getting involved in too many fights, and that sort of thing, so I decided to leave.

I had gone to Johannesburg. I was looking for another job in Johannesburg. I was staying with a friend of mine, Barry Gibbon, and he said, "Are you interested in this" - he put this proposition to me. He said there was a take-over - hand-over, is how he described it - in an unknown place. He did not know where it was. And the payment for it would be 1,000 Rand in advance and 10,000 afterwards. He said there was not going to be any sort of - it was not going to be a heavy soldiering type of job, but just a quick in-and-out sort of thing. He said it would be about three weeks' duration at the very most.

I did not have any work at the time and I had been a soldier before, so I agreed - well, provisionally agreed. So we travelled back to Durban and we went to see a friend of his, Mike Webb. This was about the beginning of November. Mike Webb basically told us the same details, and then he said there would be a briefing - I think there was a briefing the following Friday. This was on a Sunday, and the briefing, I think - yes, it was a Friday. He also told us that Mike Hoare was the man who was running the whole - the man organizing the whole thing.

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Q: Had you known him personally before?

A: Mike Hoare? No, I had never met him before. I had heard of him. Obviously he had been involved in the Congo and that sort of thing. But I had never met him before. I was too young for the Congo, when the Congo took place.

I went to a briefing at the Coastland Holiday Flats in Durban. There we met Mike Hoare and his son and the other characters who had been recruited with us. He gave us a brief outline of the operation, told us that we would certainly be taking over power - or we would be reinstalling the ex-President into power and it would be in the Seychelles; that there was not intended to be any killing or any activity of that nature, just simply a case of taking over power, and that once the job was done we were to leave and go back. He showed us a map of the place, showed us some photographs of the place, and told us just the minor details. He said there would be a final briefing on Monday, when he would put us all into our various groups and tell us exactly what we were going to do.

A week later - that was a Friday - we went for this final briefing, in the same place. We were told - there were just about 10 of us there, mainly all the guys who came with me on the advance party. Do you want to know all their names?

Questioner: Yes.

A: There was myself, Barney Carey, Aubrey Brooks, a man called Des - I do not know what his second name was - and Ken Dalgleish. Mike Webb was also there, but he was there because he was commanding one of the other groups. They showed us a map of our target area and said, "You will be in the advance party. You will have three guys joining you at a later date, and you will arrive at this place. Basically your job when you arrive is to protect the main group, should anything go wrong when the main group arrives on the following Wednesday". He then said, "Your task in the actual coup will be to take control of the radio station and also the barracks overlooking the radio station" - for the simple reason that the barracks overlooked the radio station. He pulled out a plan, a pencil-drawn plan of the area. He said, "Barney Carey will be your commander". And what else did he do? He just gave us the details of our travelling arrangements. We also got paid - no, we were paid 1,000 rand at the first interview. What else? He told us that the weapons were already on the island. He said that we could pick them up when we arrived. He said that this would all be sorted out once we arrived.

That was basically it, and off we went.

We flew here, myself and another man - Charley Dukes is the other man in the advance party - I flew here with him. We left on the 22nd of November, which was a Sunday, in the morning, and flew from Louis Botha airport in Durban to Réunion. At Réunion we caught the Air France flight, and we arrived here about 10 o'clock at night. At the airport we were given a bag, and in the bag we were told there is some equipment. By the weight of the bag - you could not see what was actually inside it, it had a false bottom - but by the weight of the bag I reasoned that it was possibly a weapon.

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Q: You never saw those weapons in South Africa?

A: No, we did not see - there was no way we could see them because it had a false bottom. It was just an ordinary grip and it was like a false bottom which had been stuck around the edges. So unless we were going to rip open the lining, we could not actually see what it was.

Q: But you did not know what kind of weapon it was?

A: No. We had been told we would have AK-47s.

Q: Are you familiar with that weapon?

A: Yes, I had used it in the Rhodesian army.

Anyway, we put some of our clothes in the remainder of the bag, and Mike Hoare had some other sorts of useless bits of - tennis rackets, and that sort of thing, balls - just to fill up the bag. We got on the plane.

We spent most of the day waiting at Réunion, and arrived here at 10 o'clock. We brought our bags through customs, in the normal procedure, and we then just went to our hotels and waited in our hotels.

Monday we met up with the rest of the group, who were already here. They had flown in on the Saturday.

Q: This was the rest of the advance party - which then totalled how many?

A: Six. We met up with the rest of the group at the Reef Hotel. After a few drinks at the bar, we went and we got - Barney Carey, who was in charge of the group, went and organized a car for us to drive, a Hertz car, just for myself and Mr. Dukes. Nothing else that day.

Then, on the Tuesday, we went and we had a look around town. We met Barney Carey in town, and then we just had a quick look at our task, involvement - what we had been briefed to do: the barracks and the radio station. We just drove past it. We did not really have an in-depth look; just looked at it.

Q: Did you know before coming here the military experience of your companions?

A: A lot of the men I knew, who had served in the Rhodesian army with me. So I either knew them or I knew of them. It was mainly the guys who came from Rhodesia. There was a group of South Africans whom we did not know, but we were told that there was nobody who was a novice at being a soldier. They were all thoroughly experienced soldiers who were coming in.

I suppose ...

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Q: You had just got to the point where you had been inspecting the barracks and the radio station.

A: Yes, that is right.

Q: Could you just go on from that point?

A: So then we went back - that was Tuesday - we went back to our hotel. Then, on Wednesday - as I said, our task was to be there at the airport in case anything went wrong - which did happen. One of the men's weapons was discovered by the customs official - which we all feared, because this is something nobody knew about. Mike Hoare had told us the weapons were on the island. Nobody realized until the last moment that we were actually carrying them through.

Q: Did you carry a weapon when you came?

A: I brought this bag through, which I did not know at the time ... I was not certain it was a weapon.

Q: When you came to the airport on that day, did you bring your weapons?

A: Yes, we brought our weapons with us. We had them in the car. This man's weapon was discovered. When that happened, the rest of the men - there were some men who had passed through customs and were in the entrance to the airport; other men were still in the building and had not passed through. The ones we could see were getting their weapons out of the bags and assembling them.

We then drove up - Mike Hoare was there; we drove our car up to the entrance of the airport and he said, "We want you to go and block off the entrance to the military camp", which is at the end of the airport. He had mentioned in the briefings before ... he had said that if anything goes wrong we were just basically to secure the airport and then make our way out by whatever means available at the time.

Q: What do you mean by "make our way out"?

A: Leave the country. As soon as something went wrong, we were not going to go ahead and carry on the rest; we were going to forget about it. We were only 50 men and we knew that in the island there was a force of approximately 500, when fully mobilized here. So obviously we were not going to take them on. We did not come in intending for there to be any fighting as such. Our weapons did not have any stocks on them, which makes them sort of fairly useless from a soldier's point of view. We had only two magazines.

Q: Nobody told you anything about some other units coming from another place?

A: No, they told us there was a small group of Tanzanians on the island training the army here.

Q: No, I mean to help you, to support your operation.

A: Yes - not in support. We were told that Kenya might send troops within 24 hours, if things went drastically wrong, just to straighten everything out.

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Q: Who told you that?

A: Mike Hoare. That was at the briefing. We were told this. Now, what else?

Q: You were saying that Mike Hoare had told you to go to the camp.

A: That is basically what we did. We drove up to the entrance of the airport. We got out of the car and we told them - I think there were two or three men standing in the entrance to the barracks, guarding the gate - and we just told them to stand still.

Q: Did you have weapons?

A: We had our guns in our hands, yes. There was a man who had walked up to the car when we pulled up. I do not think he was armed, but when he saw our weapons he just ran straight through the gate. We never saw him again. Then the man behind the wall panicked and he just let rip. He wounded two of us - Charley Dukes and Aubrey Brooks, who is here, who was shot in the leg. When that happened, we fired back. But by this time, basically what happened - the guy opened fire, he dived - he was behind cover. So when we fired back, there was not much point in doing anything. We then just took cover around the local area.

We just stayed there for a while. After about five minutes we came under fire from a heavy machine gun up on the hill. It was a 12.7 Russian thing, I think. When they started firing at us, we pulled back across the road to where there were some rocks opposite the camp. When we got into the rocks, they had another weapon up on the hill; it was a 45 anti-aircraft gun, and that fired on us.

So then we moved down, back down into the valley, where we could not be seen.

Q: All four of you were still together at this stage?

A: We lost Ken Dalglish. I do not know what happened to him. I do not know - in the confusion.

Q: You were three?

A: Yes, three, when we pulled back down. It was just getting dark at this stage when we started to move back down from the rocks, and this is when we lost Aubrey Brooks. There was a lot of confusion and we lost him.

In fact, what happened was - we went into the rocks and when the gun fired at us, we fired a few rounds back. Because Aubrey was wounded, I sent him back and I said, "Go down to the road and link up with the other guys". He was of no use; he was wounded. Thinking the other fellows were coming from the airport, we sent him back. I never saw him again. I found out since then that later he fainted from loss of blood and it was getting dark. We were away in the rocks. It was quite thick. We never saw him again.

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We then - once we made it back to the road, we linked up with the men. There were about 20 guys, and we linked up with those. We waited in the general area of the barracks, stayed there for about half an hour or three quarters of an hour, and then we just decided to move back to the terminal, because our position was not particularly good. We did not have any heavy weapons. None of us had any ammunition. I only had one magazine, because I left one of my magazines in the car. There was a lot of other fellows in the same position. Obviously, at this stage we could not even consider taking on the whole army, you know, the whole barracks. So we moved back down to the airport terminal.

At the airport terminal, there was a lot of confusion as well. The control tower had been taken control of.

Q: By people connected with your ...

A: Yes, in fact at the briefings we had been broken into groups. We were group 1, the advance party. Three other guys were going to join us from the main party on the day. There was group 2, which consisted of the South African fellows, who we did not know, and group 3 was mainly the ex-Rhodesian group.

Q: And by that time the control tower building had been damaged?

A: No, no; there was no real damage at this stage. When we took control, we had nothing to do any damage with. We had small arms. It is not going to blow any holes in anything. We had nothing really to do any great damage with.

The South African group had taken control of the terminal building, and then, when we came back, they blocked the road leading to the town. Then, when we came down, we blocked off the road. That was basically our defensive position.

Q: Blocked the road on the other side?

A: Yes, and that was it. There were some fellows in the terminal and we sat down and waited.

After about an hour or so, one of the armoured cars came along the airport side of the road - well, not the airport, but down the airfield, and opened fire on us from a long distance away.

Q: When you say "opened fire on us", do you mean the whole area?

A: Opened fire on the terminal building. They fired and then went away and then, after about half an hour, they came back down the main road, drove into the airport terminal and fired directly into the airport terminal. Then we tried to drive out and it came - it went and came maybe twice, I think. It came once and then went away, fired into the terminal building and went away and then came - no, it came three times: came once down the airfield, once down the road and fired into the building, and came back and then came back down again. It came down a third time, fired into the terminal building, and the fellows were blocking off the

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road at the far end. It tried to drive away. They shot at the tires and the lights and it drove off the road into some mud and got stuck in the mud. There were very deep ditches full of water. The armoured cars are not suited for this land. Once off the road they are pretty useless. It stuck there. Obviously, it still had the weapon inside and the crew inside, and they could still use the gun. So we had to get the crew out, and they surrendered. We got a member of the security forces, who was wearing a plain green uniform, to walk over to the armoured car and tell them, "You must come out and surrender. You are not going to be harmed", and so forth. He did that and nothing happened.

We poured some petrol on the armoured car, just to make some smoke inside and then they came out. Three guys came out, all dressed in camouflage uniforms. We just put them with the rest of the people who were held captive in the terminal building.

Then, when we got everybody out, we got one of the tow vehicles from the airport. We towed the vehicle out of the mud and tried to get the thing going. But it would not work. The reason we wanted to get it to move was that by this time the men from the barracks had blocked off the runway - not all of the runway, but their end of the runway - with vehicles. We were going to use the armoured car to clear the runway, so to speak, but we could not get it started. The petrol had short-circuited everything, I think, plus there was ... the power steering had gone and the vehicle was sort of unsteerable.

So we just decided to block off the far end of the road. We just put it across the road.

While all this was going on, the Air India plane had arrived. This was just the scheduled flight, as far as I know. It arrived and Mike Hoare spoke to the captain. I do not know what the arrangement was, what went on between them. They refueled the aircraft, and word came round that we were going to leave on this aircraft.

While the aircraft was on the ground, we came under fire from a 75, I think it was, a recoilless weapon. It was about a thousand metres away, as far as we could make out, from the tower end. We came under fire. They fired about six rounds at us. Also I think there was a couple of RPs, a couple of smaller arms which were being fired at us, just aiming up in the air. He could not get it going a long distance. I think a couple of rounds from these was fired at us, at the airport generally.

Basically that was it. It did not do much damage. It did not hit any of our ... I do not think it wounded or killed anybody.

Then, we were told we were going to leave on the aircraft. When we were leaving - this is where I made my big mistake - I saw Barney Carey. He has not spoken to you yet? He was here with me. He was leaving, going out, and I asked him where he was going. He said he was just going to try to make it back to his hotel and get out by some other means. I am not sure of his motive, really. But for myself, the reason I went with him was that I had all my belongings over here, everything I owned, and I did not want to lose them.

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What we did - we went up into the bushes in the hill and we waited there. While we were waiting there, I decided that this was not the best thing, that the best thing would be to get on the aircraft. I tried to make my way back down, but it was too late. The aircraft started to move on and I missed the aircraft. It was my own stupid fault. I made a rash decision.

Anyway, after the aircraft had gone, myself and Barney Carey ... he had to make it back to his hotel. We were staying at different hotels. He was at the Beau Vallon and we were at the Reef. So I decided to go back to the Reef Hotel. I walked down the far side of the airfield until I reached the sea and then I swam around the coast. I did not swim all the way. There was sort of rocks in some places, and we had to swim or climb over the rocks.

Q: You say "we"?

A: No, just myself then. I had either to swim ... and in other places it was just beach or something I could walk along. I made it back to the hotel.

I got back to the hotel about 5 o'clock in the morning. I got into my room. I waited there. There was nothing else I could do because there was a curfew on in Seychelles. The police picked me up later on.

Q: How much later?

A: The police came to see me that day. This was Thursday morning. The police came to me Thursday afternoon. I think they were just checking on all the people that had come from South Africa. You see, what I was concerned about at that time was the fact that the car which we had hired and had driven to the gate was in my name. I realized that. So I decided to tell them that we had been at the airport at the time of the arrival and that the car had been stolen from us.

They took away my passport. I spent another day there, Friday afternoon. I was brought to the police station for questioning, and I have been here ever since.

That is basically the story.

Q: Let us talk about the weapons - back to South Africa. Did you at any time participate in any practice with the weapons that were going to be used?

A: No, at the second briefing we were shown an AK. Mike Hoare showed it to us. He said, "If anybody is not familiar with this weapon, have a look at it now". Most of us in the room were familiar with the weapon anyway. They did not have the stocks on them there. They were the folding butt type, with the hand grip at the front. It was an AK. We did not take part in any weapon training, or any training of any sort. The only time we saw a weapon was at this time in South Africa at the briefing - and only briefly, for a few minutes, and then the weapon was put away, since everyone was already quite familiar with it.

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Q: Have you said when you met Dolinschek?

A: Dolinschek? No, I did not meet Dolinschek.

Q: And Anton Lubic? Did you meet Anton Lubic?

A: No, this other fellow ... no, I did not. Dolinschek - I had never met Anton Lubic. I have only met them since. There was only Mike Hoare, his son, Barney Carey, and the other fellows I have mentioned at this briefing.

Q: To go back to the method by which you were recruited, I think you said you were introduced by a friend of yours ...

A: Yes, by Barney Carey.

Q: And he was one of those involved as well, was he?

A: He came here with me.

Q: He introduced you to Mike Webb?

A: Yes.

Q: He had a role in the command structure, so to speak?

A: Yes, he was put in charge of the Rhodesian group.

Q: The Rhodesian group that was coming in the main body?

A: Yes, he was an ex-British army officer, an ex-Rhodesian army officer, and he was in charge of the main group. I do not believe he had any involvement in the organization - what have you. Just purely he was commander of the main group. He in turn was in contact with Mike Hoare.

Q: The briefings you attended were briefings essentially of the advance party. Did you attend any briefing of the whole group?

A: Put all together?

Q: Yes.

A: No, it was essentially the advance party. The first briefing - we had a few more extra people there, because at that time we were not sure who was going to be in the advance party. So there was about 10 guys. Then, once it had been established who was going to do what, at the second briefing it was just us, the advance party, and Mike Webb.

Q: Did you have a picture as to how many were going to be involved all together?

A: About 50, close to 50.

Q: You never heard a larger figure?

A: No.

Q: You said you had two roles, so to speak. One was to come to the airport in case something should happen, and the second was your role in the main operation.

A: Yes.

Q: In regard to your role in the main operation, did you have any expectation as to when this would take place?

A: No, we were told that the decision as to the day and the time of the operation would be taken at a later moment. The thing Mike Hoare was concerned about was in case a Russian cruiser or something unexpected occurred, came into the island, into the port. He was concerned - obviously, we were not going to do anything with 800 men aboard a Russian cruiser, you know.

Q: Did you think you had adequate resources to do what you had been asked to do?

A: For the outline of the job we had actually been told. First we were told it was not a military operation as such, just simply take over key points on the island. It was sort of ... now that I think about it, it was very optimistic, you know. It was: take over these points. We were banking on the fact that in the first minutes the army would disintegrate, and they were not going to put up any large resistance. We were told that many members of the army were sympathetic to the cause. We were told many members of the population were sympathetic. We were told that therefore there would not be any resistance whatever, and we were also told that the operation was going to take place during the day. From intelligence - I do not know how he had got that - but from intelligence which he knew of, the army here operates mainly at night. During the day they all go back to the barracks and the weapons are put away in the armoury. So we were hoping to take control of the armoury and the radio station. In the barracks, as I say, the weapons were in the armoury. There was going to be no resistance, no problem.

Q: Before you left South Africa, did you know that the main party was going to come on the Swazi commercial flight?

A: No, we knew it was due to arrive on the Wednesday.

Q: That the party was going to arrive?

A: Yes, but we did not know how; we did not know about Swaziland.

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Q: And when you discovered that you were being asked to bring your weapon with you, did you realize that that would be the case for all the participants?

A: No, you see, at the time, at the airport, we were just given the bag. Mike Hoare said to us, "Here's some equipment I want you to take in for me". Now, by its weight - I am not stupid, you know - the thought crossed my mind that it was a weapon. It weighs - with two magazines - 9 or 10 pounds, and in the bottom of a light hand bag that does not feel quite right. It crossed my mind that it was a weapon. And Mike Hoare had told me that the weapons were already on the island. So the thought crossed my mind that it was radios. So I thought it best just not to ask what it was.

Q: When you went to the airport, when the flight was arriving, even then you did not know that they would be bringing their weapons with them?

A: You mean the main group?

Questioner: Yes, the main group.

A: Obviously, once we arrived here, I asked Barney Carey - I said, "Are these our weapons in our bag?". He said, "Yes. I am sorry we could not have told you, because if everybody had known it would have been - it was just good security sense not to tell everybody until the last minute."

Q: Barney Carey is a Rhodesian?

A: He is English.

Q: Had you met him before?

A: No.

Q: He was not connected with the Rhodesian background, so to speak?

A: No.

Q: Do you know how he knew Mike Hoare?

A: I think he was just friendly with him; I am not sure. He lived near him. I do not really know what his involvement was.

Q: You said at an earlier stage that Mike Hoare had told you that Kenya might send troops if things went well. Those are as close as you can recall to his exact words?

A: In fact, what he said was that we have been - I cannot remember - promised troops, or there is a possibility of troops from Kenya within 24 hours if things are going well.

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Q: In the briefings that Mike Hoare gave you, or in any other contacts you had with him or with other members, did you have any indication of official South African involvement?

A: Yes. I do not know whether it was official or not, but we were certainly told that the South African Government had given a large amount of assistance.

Q: It was Hoare who told you that?

A: Yes, Hoare told us that. He said the South African Government has been very helpful. Those were his exact words. In what form, I do not know.

Q: As far as the weapons were concerned, did he state or did you ask at all what their origin was?

A: No, we did not ask. But, you know, AKs now in southern Africa - in Rhodesia we had thousands of these things which we collected from the terrorists. The South Africans must have thousands of these things from their war in Namibia - plus, I think they manufacture their own; I am not sure. But there is a fair amount of these things floating around the world at the moment. So there was no requirement to ask where they came from. There are so many of them.

Q: All the ex-Rhodesians, if I may so call them, whom you were aware of: did they all have army experience, to your knowledge?

A: Yes, to my knowledge. Some - I think Ken Dalglish, he had been in the police; he was in the police special branch. One or two other members had served in the police, as opposed to the army, but they all had some paramilitary or military experience.

Q: You said that in the briefings Mike Hoare mentioned the possibility of Kenya's sending troops.

A: Yes.

Q: Apart from Mike Hoare, did anybody mention the possible involvement of Kenya?

A: No.

Q: Not at all?

A: Mike Hoare was really the only - of course, this was only a ... I got the impression it would have been a political decision at the time, depending on the circumstances. Obviously, he indicated Kenya knew about it. Whether they were involved in what was going on, I do not know.

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Q: Did Mike Hoare tell you that the South African Government was involved, or not at all?

A: He told us the South African Government had been very helpful.

Q: Had been very helpful?

A: Yes, had been very helpful. He also told us at the airport that if there was any problem with the weapons in South Africa, we were just simply to give him a ring and he would get on to the various people.

Q: When did he say the South African Government had been helpful: in the first or the second briefing?

A: He told us this at both briefings.

Q: On both occasions?

A: Yes, he told us first at the first briefing that the South African Government was being very helpful, a lot of assistance; and then he spoke about it again at the second briefing.

Q: Did he say that the South African Government had given weapons to him?

A: No, we did not know where these weapons had come from. But I should not imagine they are hard to obtain.

Q: What is your military background, Mr. England?

A: Five years in the British Army, parachutist; two years in the Rhodesian Army, in the SAS. I was a medical assistant.

Q: In which army?

A: The British Army.

Q: When were you in the British Army?

A: Just an ordinary soldier, an infantry soldier.

Q: What rank did you achieve?

A: Corporal.

Q: I am not very clear as to the structure of your organization. I wonder whether you could clarify this.

A: What do you mean - for the actual ...

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Questioner: The commander was Hoare. His deputy was Duffy. One of the section commanders was Webb.

A: Yes.

Q: Another section commander was Carey - your group. Who were the other section commanders?

A: The other group was the South African group. These fellows we had never met before. We did not know them. We did not meet them at any of the briefings. I do not know the name of the guy in charge, but he was a South African.

Q: Do you know what their mission was?

A: Yes, Mike Webb's group was group 3, the South African group was group 2, and we were group 1. We were to take control of the army and the barracks where we are staying now, and the radio station. At the radio station our task was to play the tape. That was our job. Group 2 was to take control of the army headquarters and the State House. Group 3 was to take control of the airport, the airport terminal and the barracks at the far end. There were one or two other targets - the telecommunications centre here in town. That was where Mike Hoare's command centre was going to be. There were going to be three men, as far as I know, at that place. That was basically it.

Q: When you were attending these briefings, were you satisfied that the plan was fairly sound?

A: It was well organized, I thought, in view of the factors that we had been told about - that the troops and the weapons would be in the barracks, that they were not well trained - the usual sort of bullshit, if I may say so; and the fact that they generally sleep during the day, as they operate at night. In view of those factors, it was sound. Now that I think about it, I would say it was optimistic, because mainly I am not - first of all, we did not have any situation if anything had gone wrong, which it did. We were in a very poor military position. We had literally nothing with us to defend ourselves with. And so it was unsound from that point of view.

Mike Hoare was very optimistic. He told us these factors were there and there should be no problem.

Q: Was this your first operation as a mercenary?

A: Yes, I have served in the regular armies which I mentioned.

Q: Did you form any view as to how much the whole operation would cost?

A: I think we were looking at a couple of million dollars.

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Q: Rand or dollars?

A: Rand, dollars: they are approximately the same value. First of all, there was the payment of 50 men at 11,000 each; the provision of their air tickets, which was another 600 rand each; accommodation in the hotels; and the remainder, the sort of other expenses which would have occurred.

I did not get any indication that finance was a problem at any stage.

Q: Did Hoare give any indication to you as to the source of the financing?

A: He told us that President Mancham was providing the money. As far as we knew, it came from that direction. Obviously, President Mancham had got this money from other places, I presume.

Q: How would you sum up your motivation in taking part in the whole affair?

A: My motivation?

Q: Why did you do it?

A: Why did I do it? I have this ambition to become a commercial pilot. I fly. I am a private pilot. At the time when the offer was made to me, I was not working. I did not have a job - although I do not think I would have - it is not hard to get a job as such. I probably could have got another job. My main reason was flying. I wanted to go on flying. And the offer came up, 10,000. It was approximately the sum I needed. We were told it was not going to be a great deal of risk, plus it was not supposed to be a big - there should not be any killing as such. Just a fairly simple type of operation, which would be fairly easy. And so I decided the risks were acceptable, so to speak. I took up the offer.

Q: So it was for the money and not for any political reasons?

A: No, no political reasons, but for my own ambitions.

Aubrey Frank Vincent Brooks

BROOKS: My name is Aubrey Frank Vincent Brooks. I am a Zimbabwean national, at the moment living in South Africa, with a residence permit in South Africa. I have been there for two and a half years now. I am a printer by trade, but I have my own - well, I did have my own - business up until I came here on the 25th - 21st.

I am 38 years of age next month, married, have a 17-year-old son and a 5-year-old son.

CHAIRMAN: Before we ask you specific questions, would you like to make any kind of a general statement about your involvement in the incident which we are investigating?

A: I think the only thing I can really relate to you - I have had a lot of time to think about it - was my reason for being here.

About eight months ago, or nine months ago now, I lost my family's printing business through a bit of lapse of foresight on my behalf. Two years ago I started off a little printing firm with one machine and myself, with 19,000 rand, and with the help of my wife and my son we worked very hard for two years and built up this business and, in the process of building the business up, being under-capitalized we ran into a cash-flow problem, so to alleviate that I increased my turn-over, which increased my cash-flow problem. So finally, in the last months of the business, my wife, my eldest son and myself worked every day, including Saturdays and Sundays, for the last seven months. So it was truly a family business as such, and we could not overcome our financial difficulties and the cash-flow problem, so I put the business up for sale.

A bigger printing firm contacted me and approached me with a view to doing an amalgamation because of my printing expertise, which I finally agreed to. We amalgamated the two firms: I became the works director; the other partners - one was the managing director; the other was the sales director. Four months after that, I asked to see a balance sheet, because our pay was, you know, on a pay scale which was not coming up to expectations, and every month we were having a bit of financial hassle - "Next month we will make up last month's pay for you and your wife" - till eventually I established that the managing director had another firm, an electronics firm, and he was putting all the money from the printing firm into the electronics firm.

In short, when I finally found out, I got hold of my lawyer and we tried to take it to court. The amount involved was about 40,000 rand, and it was too much. It had to go to the supreme court. But in the period before that, the firm was put into liquidation. In it I lost my entire firm, my car and just about everything we had. And I think I knew I would be starting another business straight away - well, not straight away: as soon as I possibly could.

So I went and saw my creditors. What he had actually done was also sort of collected from the debtors of my firm, and I never paid the creditors of my firm. So I went and saw my creditors, and my wife and I were the only two partners in the

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business, and through the help of my lawyer we arranged a distribution - a monthly distribution - to sort out the company debt into my personal name, thinking at the time that everything was going to be all right. I started the new firm up, things became a little bit harder, and I in fact was trying to sell insurance; I pulled a new business up and promoted a motor-racing venture for extra funds. I was trying to do three jobs at once. Nothing was working out.

And I think this is basically why, when I was offered this money for my particular role in this thing - it sounds ironic now - it was in order to provide for my family. That is basically why I got involved in this whole set-up.

Q: Who approached you first?

A: A chap by the name of Ken Dalgliesh. He owns a hotel in Durban. I went there quite a few times - probably about once a week. It was on the way home to where I lived on the south coast. He ran the hotel; he was always there, and we got chatting. He actually approached me.

Q: And he introduced to you to Mike Hoare?

A: Right at the very end, two weeks before we left. It would be the 14th. There was a meeting on the 14th, which we went to on a Saturday, and I was introduced to him then, given a bit of the background to what was going to happen here, and that was my first meeting with Mike Hoare. Two weeks later we were here.

Q: Can you tell us about the background - about what was to happen here?

A: At the first meeting - firstly, I used to work at the television studios in Salisbury - master control, you know - at the studio. I worked there a very short time, but I knew master control and the use of tapes, and this was how Ken Dalgliesh actually approached me. He said there was a similar type of work for a short period of time, for good pay. We went to that meeting. Well, do you want fairly good detail of what actually happened at that meeting?

Questioner: I think it would be useful.

A: Ken first approached me and then he said that if I was interested to let him know and he would tell me more about the job. Anyhow, on or about the 12th or so, he phoned and said: "Look, there is a meeting on Saturday. Would you still like to come alone?" So at that stage, with the whole financial burden, plus the prospects of 10,000 rand, I went along. We met at this building in Smith Street. We had to go in sort of two at a time, or one at a time. We went up - I forget what floor - and in there there was about 11 or 12 of us - 6 of us that actually came. We came, four on the 21st and two on the 22nd - us six and about another five or so people, including Mike Hoare.

He then set down a broad sort of picture. He said there was going to be a military coup - a bloodless military coup. It was a country of a tourist-type or origin - a tourist country - and then he clewed us in with some details that

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95 per cent of the population wanted this change - that since the present Government came in, they had a loss of about 75 per cent of the tourist trade, which they actually existed on. He said that people were queuing in the streets for food. He said it was a very sad state of affairs and everybody wanted it. It would be a matter of formality going there, getting ourselves into position. It would be bloodless, a small operation, and everything would revert; the resisting forces would come onto this side and there would be no problem. He then said that if there was anybody who wanted out of it he could leave then and there would be no obligation.

Well, all of us were still busy talking about it, and it seemed, at the time, apart from the money aspect, that it would be a good thing for the country we were going to.

Well, not to sound like a good Samaritan, but if one looks at 95 per cent as against 5 per cent, your risk factor is very much lower, and it looked like they all wanted it; they needed it; and on 25 per cent of the tourism the country cannot exist. So while we were still discussing it and everyone was in agreement - I think everybody; I can say that without any reservation at all they were all in agreement that it would be a good thing - he said: "No one is going to leave now."

He then produced a map of Seychelles, and once, obviously, he had produced the map, we were now committed. And at that stage, while we were discussing - just the basic thing about it - he then showed us photographs of Victoria, the main street in Victoria - you know, photographs of the army barracks and the radio station and the Government printer. And then I found out that my task was to take two tapes to the radio station and play the tapes. There would be one tape running at 15 feet a minute and another tape at 7 1/2 feet a minute.

Q: Were those tapes already prepared?

A: Yes. I never saw the tapes, because when he spoke about it, our task - the six of us who arrived here first: you know, that came three days before - we were told to have a look around. He showed up on the map where the radio station was, next to the Government printer, and to familiarize ourselves with the area. When the main group arrived, we would have a proper meeting and he would tell us where, when, what time, and give me the tapes then. So I never actually saw the tapes or anything like that. Whether he had them at the time, on the 14th, I do not know.

And that has been - basically, the discussion just revolved around that. There was no military sort of plan or ideas put forward at all at that stage. It was a broad-based picture: "Here is the map of Mahé; here is the radio station; that is the hotel you will be staying at in this area over here" - that sort of thing, you know. "We want you to go to have a look, familiarize yourself, and when we get there I will put you in the picture at a meeting."

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Q: And did he say anything about weapons?

A: No, not at that stage. It was mentioned at the next meeting, but at that stage there was nothing mentioned about weapons at all. Everything was just general discussion, you know, and the whole thing was - it would be no problem. It was wanted; it would be bloodless. So, you know, at the end of that meeting I felt quite happy with myself, and what I was going to do was not particularly a bad thing. As we later found out, it probably was quite the wrong thing to do. But my own personal feeling when I left there was that what I was going to do there was a good thing and that my family would be looked after financially for the first time in two years. So I left there a relatively happy man. I knew there was a risk involved. Obviously, people do not pay you that kind of money without due cause, so I knew there was risk involved. But at the time, when you have got a lot of financial burdens, one tends to, I think -

Questioner: Let us go to the second meeting.

A: All right. At the second meeting we were then told there would be another meeting where they would finalize the plans. On the Wednesday following, I got a phone call saying my airline tickets were ready and would I come into town. My business was about 30 kilometres away, so I drove into town and I met Ken Dalgliesh again, and him and I went down to Budget Tours, where they had the tickets for us.

Q: Excuse me. Were those tickets round-trip tickets?

A: Yes. They included accommodation and, for Ken Dalgliesh, included car-hire. They thought I might need a visa, and they made a few phone calls, I think, to the Zimbabwean trade mission, and eventually they said: "There is no problem: you can go in without a visa, on a Zimbabwean passport."

Q: Did you have your passport already?

A: Yes, I had it with me, and we were also told to get an international driver's license, which I had with me already, you know. So we picked up our tickets and I was then told that the meeting would be on Thursday and Ken Dalgliesh would give me a ring and tell me what time.

We met on Thursday, around about, I think it was, 10 o'clock - no: mid-day - 12 o'clock on Tuesday. At this meeting there was the six of us: Mike Hoare and two other people, who I don't know. I was not introduced to them, but we spoke. Obviously, looking back in retrospect now, they did not want to tell us too much in case we got caught.

At this meeting he told us basically what we were to do in the period of time on the way for them to arrive on Wednesday. We were to familiarize ourselves well with the radio station, the area - you know, the entrance to it and things like that - not too much, but just to know how to get there reasonably quickly. So we did, anyhow I will come back to that. He then pulled out a weapon. I say "pulled out". There was a blanket or a newspaper - I cannot remember now - lying on the bed, which he unrolled, and there was this AK.

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Q: Did you recognize, as soon as you saw it, what kind of a weapon it was?

A: Yes, Sir. I was in the Rhodesian army, as a territorial - not as a regular soldier - and I was doing my one month in and three months out, as everybody was doing at the time. So I recognized it. It was an AK without a butt - just two handles on it. Somebody did ask about weapons, and he said the weapons were there: nothing to worry about; he just wanted us to familiarize ourselves with the weapon and how to strip it and assemble it. So he showed us - no, he did not show us: one of the other blokes stripped it, reassembled it, and then passed it around to us so we could have a look at it and handle it. We did not strip it or assemble it; it was passed around and put back into the blanket. At that stage, when we had looked at the weapon - as I say, somebody did ask - I cannot remember who - and he said: "The weapons are there; don't worry about it." He then produced a little radio, a small walkie-talkie-type radio - two-way, very small range: I think about, I would say, one and a half to two Ks - and he said the area the radio would be used in was a very small area, anyhow, and he did mention that someone would have to act as a relay on a high point.

He showed us the relays and I think Barney Carey was given the two radios at that stage. He then said to us that when we packed our clothes we were to pack extra clothing because he had some parcels he wanted taken to Seychelles, and to bring it to the airport in an extra bag - but, you know, in an extra bag with some extra clothing in it. Our flight was due to leave at a quarter to 8 in the morning.

Q: When you say "our", who was travelling with you?

A: Do you want the names of the blokes I was travelling with?

Questioner: Yes.

A: Myself, Barney Carey, Ken Dalgliesh and Des Botes. So I said for us to meet him at the car park at Louis Botha Airport in Durban at about a quarter past 7 on Saturday morning, which we did, and to bring our luggage with us. We would go to his car, one at a time, and there he had a little travel bag in which he asked me to bring extra clothing and put it into that travel bag. He said: "There's something in there, but don't worry about it." So when I lifted it up - because obviously it was quite a big bag and the amount of clothing I brought was not sufficient - he said: "Don't worry", because I had enough: I had my flippers, my face-mask and snorkel, and he gave me a ball - a beach-ball - and a tennis set, just to fill the bag up. And I said: "Is there a weapon in here?" And he said: "Yes." And that was the first time he told me that we were going to bring weapons into the country.

He then said to me: "It's no problem. Just book your luggage from here direct to Seychelles. So when you go by Johannesburg it's just direct, straight through. When you get there, just walk through; don't worry about it", he said, "they won't check it."

Well, that was the first we knew of our bringing weapons into the country, and it was not a very comforting thought, but at that particular point in something like this, I suppose a better man than myself probably would have stopped, but ...

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Q: Were all four of you similarly aware at that point?

A: Yes.

Q: But you did not discuss it with the other three persons?

A: It was difficult, Sir, because they called us, and my wife and children and everyone were standing there waiting to see me go off. They thought I was going on a holiday with Ken Dalgliesh. They did not know I was coming to do this, because Ken Dalgliesh, who owned the hotel, was in the process of selling it. So because I was doing three jobs for so long and having all those hassles, we told my wife that Ken was paying for me; all I had to do was take my spending money while he looked after the hotel trades here. So my wife and family thought I was going on a holiday. There was no time for dilly-dallying, and suddenly it was boarding time - not boarding time, but we were asked to go in, and we said goodbye to our families and we took our bags through. So it was done very, very quickly.

I think if one had time to change one's mind it was cut to a minimum, so the pressure was on you to speed up, and that was the first I knew about bringing weapons through into Seychelles. And from there we boarded the plane and came through.

When we arrived here in Seychelles on that Saturday night there was some delay at Jan Smuts Airport, and I think the flight was delayed an hour and a half. And by the time we got here to Seychelles, I think the airport was very busy and there was no problem.

Q: Excuse me. In your second meeting in South Africa, when you saw the weapons for the first time and Mike Hoare said that all the weapons were already in Seychelles, did you ask where he had obtained those weapons?

A: I don't know, Sir.

Q: Nobody asked?

A: No. In fact, everyone took it for granted that we would not be taking weapons into the country, I think, and it was just one of those passing sort of questions. It was, you know: "Are there weapons?" "Don't worry about them." And it was just sort of glossed over. Obviously, looking back in retrospect, he sort of cuffed it, because if he had told us then, on a Thursday, I think he would probably have lost half his men.

Q: When you came here, did you already know there was another group coming later?

A: Yes, Sir. The actual group that was going to do the actual military takeover was coming on a Wednesday by Swazi Air. Oh, at that meeting we were also told - at the second meeting - that when we got here we would be given our weapons and to assemble them and to bring them to the airport on the Wednesday when the plane arrived. If there was a problem at the airport, we were to create a

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diversion - just fire shots and draw away any army unit there. The whole thing was played on a very non-aggression type of role - if it makes sense having a military coup without aggression - but no bloodshed, no shooting of people. It was, I think, one of Mike Hoare's things. Obviously, I am not very happy with the man. In my situation, with what has been told to us and what has happened to us, and the lies that were told to us, including bringing the weapons into the country, and things like that, which was a blatant lie, I am not very happy about it. But one thing that is clear in my mind is that he was totally dedicated to "no blood". I did not go - obviously, none of us went - to any of the meetings of the other guys, the main group, but I should imagine the general feeling would have been the same: it was a non-contact sort of thing.

Q: Did he ever mention another group, or troops, coming from another country?

A: No, Sir.

Q: To support the coup d'etat against the Seychellois Government?

A: No. The feeling I got from him, Sir, was that - and I think it was a general feeling too, because it gave one a feeling of confidence that people wanted it, including the army and all the forces, you know - that once it was established that we are here and that the ex-President is coming back, that they would immediately be on our side. And, in fact, our information was that within six hours we could go back to our hotels, finish our holiday if we wanted to, or go back to our families, and everything would be all over; there would be no shooting, no contact and all that sort of thing. And the picture that I had conjured up in my mind was that at a particular time I would be given a signal, I would go down to the radio station with the six of us, or however many it was going to be, and we would go in and ask them to put the tapes on. If they could not, I would attempt to do it, because I would know what the radio set-up is here. But my feeling was that it was just a just a matter of: "Here's two tapes from the ex-President. Could you put them on the air for us?"

Q: When everything was discovered at the airport and the shooting started, did you stay at the airport?

A: At that time we had our weapons, as he told us to do - to bring the weapons with us to the airport. We brought them in the bag, in the hired car. When it all happened we were sitting in the cafeteria having a cold drink - a beer - at the time. It was half past 5, and I just walked outside and everything seemed to be all right. So I was walking back to the cafeteria when suddenly I heard this shot fired.

Now, I heard a woman shouting: "He's got a gun", and she was running towards us. So I went back in, and Roger England and Charley Dukes and myself were sitting there, and I said to them: "Look, something has gone wrong. We had better get outside and see what happened." So I went out to the car park, and on the way there was a shot fired. I think it was fired outside, because I think somebody had assembled a weapon outside and had opened their bag, but as that happened Mike Hoare said to us: "You four" - there was Roger England and Charley Dukes in

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the cafeteria, and Ken Dalgliesh was standing talking to them. He sent Ken in the car with us; he said: "Go to the barracks gate at the army barracks near the airport", and he said: "Just block the entrance; don't let anybody come out" - which is what we did do. We drove the vehicle up to the - Roger was driving - we drove the vehicle up to the front gate, stopped the vehicle; him and Charley Dukes got out with their weapons, and while I was getting out I heard him say - either him or Charley - to the guard: "Put your weapons down and nobody is going to get hurt."

The words had no sooner come out than there was a lot of firing, and I got it in the leg there. So I immediately took cover around the back and lay down. There was a lot of firing, and when the firing sort of quieted down a little bit, we managed to get out. My leg was bleeding pretty badly. That was the actual involvement.

Q: Did you go into the bush - or where?

A: When the firing quieted a little bit - there was a house behind us, built like up on stilts, and I crawled backwards, got underneath it, and Roger and Charley and Ken Dalgliesh met me at the house. Roger was there already. We walked further back and across the road and up the hill, on the far side of the barracks. They went further around on the hill, and my leg was bleeding very badly, and Roger sent me back down. He said to get down on the bottom of the hill and to wait for the rest to come, because I could not walk very properly. On the way down there, I passed out, probably through loss of blood, or shock, or whatever it was. I do not know at this stage. But when I came to, it was dark and there was a lot of shooting all over the place, so I did not know who was who, or anything like that, and I spent most of the night going back up the hill again to get out of trouble. I went past a house at the top of the hill - towards the top of the hill; I picked up some cloth that was outside, and a tin mug, and I got myself some water and I walked off - about near the top of the hill - and got under a big tree, put my leg up and tied my leg up with the cloth as a "tourni" to stop the bleeding. I do not know what time it was, and I blacked out again. I do not know.

In the early hours of the morning I was awakened; I could hear shooting, and just before first light - it was raining quite heavily - I could see what appeared to be a cave - some big rocks there - and I made my way into that cave, and that is where I spent the whole of Thursday. And Thursday, late evening, I came down - down to where the houses were. I went into one house and I asked them there to assist me - give me a shirt - because I had my shirt tied as a "tourni" when it first happened - put around my leg - and I asked for directions to the Reef Hotel - I was going to give myself up - in exchange for my watch.

I started to black out again: you know, my weapon was lying on the table. This bloke picked it up. Then I asked him: "Can you run and fetch the police or the army?" And from there we actually walked down the hill to the police station, which was not very far away. I did not know it existed at the time, which was why I was making my way to the Reef Hotel. And that is when we walked down to the police station, where I was arrested.

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Q: As for Dolinschek, or Lubic, did you meet him here or did you know him from South Africa?

A: I met him here. He stayed at the same hotel as me. I did not know he was actually involved in this thing until we came to do a press conference here when we first arrived, and he was sent back in the cell with me. I was under the impression he was working for the South African Government. I had spoken to him on three occasions in the hotel.

The first occasion I spoke to him was on a Sunday. We had arrived on a Saturday, so it was on a Sunday evening, at about 6 o'clock. He said he had just come back from a football match, which his work had taken him to. You know, I knew he was a South African, and I just conjured up that he was with the South African Government. I knew he had been; I did not know for how long. I just was under the impression he was working for the South African Government. Doing what, I really do not know. I did not ask him.

Q: So you did not know he was part of the group?

A: No. I think - you know, he probably knew me by name. We met in the hotel, but I did not know he was actually part of this set-up until I saw him here at the police station on the following Tuesday - Thursday - afterwards.

Q: When you were approached by Mr. Dalglish, was he a friend of Mike Hoare's or what do you understand his connexion was with Mike Hoare?

A: I have given this a lot of thought. He was with the Security Branch up in Zimbabwe, and when he first approached me I did not know what his involvement was with Mike Hoare, or how well he knew him. I still do not know. But I do know that a lot of recruiting was actually done at his hotel, because that is where I met Charley Dukes, Roger England, Barney Carey and Des Botes. I did not know these people before. I met all of them at his hotel. It was just a central point that he used. Whether he managed the place or owned the place, or whether he was actually part of that whole set-up or not, I actually do not know.

Q: Do you think, or know, that he was connected with the Rhodesian Security?

A: Yes.

Q: Have you any belief that he was doing a similar job in South Africa after he moved to South Africa?

A: I do not know, Sir. I never really thought of that. I know he owned the hotel - the Riviera Hotel. His father and sister and his mother were all assisting in the hotel. But whether he was doing that - he may have been - I think once you have been a policeman for that long and in that kind of line, one probably continues. I do not really know. He did not discuss anything with me like that.

Q: In the operational role, he did not have a command position, did he?

A: Nobody had a command position at all; no Sir.

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Q: Except for Hoare himself?

A: Yes. What was said - there would be no rank structure, but once we had the final meeting on the Thursday, or whenever it was going to be - Wednesday or Thursday - depending on the degree of difficulty of the task given to you, you would be paid extra. This was the arrangement that we were told - well, six of us - at our meeting. Whether they had a separate arrangement for the blokes that came on Wednesday, I do not know. But for us, we were told that it would be one pay - 10,000 rand - and that is it. But if we had a particular role that was a little bit more demanding, we would be paid extra before we went out.

Q: And you were paid 1,000 rand before you left?

A: That is right - in cash.

Q: You mentioned again that you did not know some of the people you met at your meeting. Did you know anybody in the operation except for Dalgliesh?

A: I did not know him at all until ...

Questioner: I mean, recently.

A: No.

Q: Had you previously known any of those involved?

A: No.

Q: Did you have a picture of the total number who were going to be involved in the whole operation from the briefings?

A: Yes, Sir: my picture, it was 46, including ourselves. I have since been told that I am incorrect; 46 was the picture I had in my mind, though. I still do not know what the total number was. I was told that 46 was not right. In fact, I took a couple of wallops. How I got 46, I do not know, but 46 is in my mind. It has been there ever since, and even after a few clouts I still say 46.

Q: When Hoare was briefing you, did he give any indication as to where the financial backing might have come from - where the money for this operation was coming from?

A: All we knew, it was being financed by the ex-President. In fact, I did not even know the ex-President's name when I arrived here. I embarrassedly asked the Commissioner when I was being interviewed by the press. I did not really know who the President was at the time. So I have really hashed everything up since I have been here. I knew that it was the ex-President who was financing it. How, I do not know.

I am sorry: I can say one thing. I knew the money would be going into a Swiss bank account, and from there we could have it sent ...

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Q: Oh, your money would be paid into a Swiss bank account - not in South Africa?

A: It was going into a Swiss bank account, but we could have it paid in South Africa, in Switzerland, or anywhere else. Whether the money was already in a Swiss bank and we could draw from it, or where it was going to be sent, I do not know. But the money would be coming from Switzerland; we could either have it there or have it sent to us.

Q: Perhaps the Chairman already asked you this, but when the question of the weapons was mentioned, nobody asked - or nobody volunteered - where they were coming from; is that correct?

A: No, Sir. I think it was just glossed over very quickly and it was just sort of matter-of-fact. We did not expect to carry our weapons into the country, and I think he, in turn, was hoping the question would not be asked. So, when it did crop up, it was just sort of cuffed: "They are already there; don't worry about it."

Q: Did you have any feeling, or was there any indication, as to the attitude of the South African Government to the operation?

A: The feeling I got, Sir, was that it was sort of known to the South African Government. Whether that was correct or not, I do not know. But the feeling I got and I derived - I have had a lot of time to think about it - was that taking weapons out of a country like that without their knowledge is as bad as bringing them into Seychelles. You know, we probably are going to have to go and face those charges when we do get back finally, one day. I do not know. But the feeling I got was that they must have had a bit of knowledge about it, or known about it, for him to take the chance - the risk - of 46 of us walking out of South Africa with a bag with a rifle in it.

Q: That is a feeling you have. Did anybody ever mention the South African Government to you? Was anything else involved?

A: No.

Q: Hoare did not either?

A: No. He might have. On the occasions we went to these meetings - on the first occasion we were the first two in, and there was general talking going on already. And on the second occasion, Charley Dukes and Roger England were the first two in. I know there was a bit of talk prior to us coming in on the first occasion. He might have - I do not know - but not that I knew.

Q: Did you hear any other Government mentioned as being involved in any way as a possible supporter of the operation?

A: There were two Governments that were backing it or were with it.

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Q: Which two Governments?

A: He did not elaborate on which two Governments. He just said there were two Governments that were sort of in support, or that once everything happened they would give recognition almost immediately.

Q: Who said so?

A: Mike Hoare.

Q: In the briefings?

A: In the briefings.

Q: You said you came here a few days before those events.

A: Yes, sir: on the 21st.

Q: Before your departure, you were told that 95 per cent of the people in Seychelles were against the present régime; is that correct?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: And after your arrival, did you still have such a feeling - that the coup d'état would take place without any bloodshed?

A: Apart from going to look at the radio station, we were told to act as tourists, and I am a very keen shell collector, of cowrie shells, so I spent much of my time diving off the reef at the Beau Vallon Hotel. I came in contact with one Seychellois that I met and had a drink with, and that was on the aircraft flying here. We met a couple that had just got married, and another couple, and we would meet them in the hotel in the evening. This Seychellois chap, he danced with one bloke's wife one night, and that is how I was chatting with them. So I did not really get a picture; I do not really know even now whether the people were behind it or against it. I spent Sunday - we went and had a look at the radio station in the hired car. We then went to the Reef Hotel and had a beer - because Barney stayed at the Reef Hotel before - had a beer there, and then went back to our hotel. I dived on Sunday afternoon. Monday, I spent most of the day in the hotel with our friends we had met on the aircraft. I found that they were keen divers as well, so I teamed up with them. Tuesday morning, we went to - did the same thing again: we took a drive down by the radio station so we knew where it was, where the gate was; we went down to the Reef Hotel again and had a beer there - it was lunch time - and went back to the hotel. It was raining on Tuesday, so we went to the aquarium, just out from the Beau Vallon Hotel, and I bought a book on cowrie shells and had a look at the fish, had a chat with the chap who owns the aquarium about shells, and on Wednesday - that was when everything happened. So I did not have time to really assess the situation about how the people felt.

Q: How was your hotel bill paid?

A: In South Africa, through Budget Tours.

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Q: So it was all paid beforehand?

A: All paid - including the car-hire. All we had to do was pay for our drinks. We got a continental breakfast and one meal a day. If you had lunch, you had to pay for your lunch yourself. But the hotel accommodation included continental breakfast and one meal a day. Whether you had lunch or supper was up to you.

Q: That money was not part of the 1,000 you received?

A: No, Sir.

Q: Did you receive some money from other sources to pay these bills?

A: I brought my own money from South Africa.

Q: So you were paying your own money?

A: Yes. I drew money out of my own bank account - what little I did have left in it - and I brought 300 rand.

Q: You said everybody was required to have an international driver's license.

A: No, Mike Hoare asked us to please be sure we had an international driver's license, and the words he used were: "Some of you will be getting a hired car, and I do not know if you require an international license in Seychelles, but to be safe everybody brings a license with him. Then you are all covered."

Q: And when did you get this license? When did you apply for it?

A: I got mine on Saturday morning. It does not take very long. I think the whole thing took me about 30 minutes. I took my driver's license in. They checked the endorsements, and they issued a new one now which is ... everyone I had ever seen before is the old type. But the new one is just a small folder with a photograph in it. I think it cost me 4 rand or 5 rand - I am not sure. They stamped it: "Valid for one year". The whole thing took 15 minutes.

Q: Where did you obtain this?

A: In Durban, at the AA - the Automobile Association offices.

Q: One further question: from the picture you have given us, Hoare's role seems to have been a key role. Have you any feeling that there was any second-in-command, so to speak? Supposing something had happened to Hoare: was anybody clearly designated to take over the operation?

A: No. I knew that my sort of contact man was Barney Carey. If I wanted anything, Barney was the man to see. I think I probably looked on him being that, because I think he was actually in charge of getting the air tickets and things

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like that. I think it was my sort of feeling that he was. But I know there was no one designated to be second-in-command. He probably would have been in the main group that came. I think, looking back on it, we never had solid information in case we got caught coming in here, and, of course, this has been rather detrimental to us here, when it comes to question time. So, whether there was anyone - 2-RC - or other rank structures, I do not really know, Sir. I am sorry I cannot be any more helpful. I think this was done purposely so that if we did get caught we would not spill the beans on everybody else coming and blow the whole operation. To me, I think the whole thing was - well, just misguided - totally wrong.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Bernard Stanley Carey

CAREY: My full name is Bernard Stanley Carey; I am British.

Q: Your place of residence?

A: Is South Africa now.

Q: Your occupation?

A: I am in business with my father - auto-electrical.

Q: And your age?

A: Thirty-eight.

Q: Before we ask you any specific questions, I wonder: would you like to make any general statement about the matter under our investigation?

A: Well, I think I would rather wait for your questions and talk about that afterwards.

Q: What were your responsibilities in the whole operation?

A: Very, very minor, actually, Sir. I actually arrived here on the 31st of October. Basically, I was asked by Colonel Mike Hoare to bring up a weapon. I would bring it up in a little bag concealed in the bottom to find out whether we could clear it from South Africa and bring it up to Seychelles. This was as a dummy-run for his way of getting his weapons in for the rest of his men. He actually met me on the morning of the 31st, gave me this bag, and I checked it right through to Mahé and that was the last I saw of it until I got here and I handed it to a certain gentleman named Mr. Sims, and I have never seen the weapon since. That was virtually the end of my job for that particular week. I returned to South Africa and I came back here on the 21st, four days before the 25th, and my actual job was being in charge of five other men, just to make sure that they had spending money, which I got from Mr. Sims, and motorcars, which was already pre-arranged from South Africa from vouchers, and just generally to keep them in sober habits until the arrival of Colonel Hoare. That was virtually my sole job. I was no sort of leader; I had no rank. I had been up here before, and he gave me this sort of responsibility.

Q: Had you known Mike Hoare for many years?

A: I actually met him, because I had only been in South Africa 10 months before I came here. And to get extra money I used to do little tours down the coast. I had a few cards made, and I think that somebody either gave him a card or mentioned that this person does tours, and he thought it would operate something like this: he phoned me up and when he told me what it was all about, I said: "That is out of my league completely; you will have to go through a proper travel

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agent." So he got talking to me, because I do a lot of sky-diving and fooling around. He thought I might be useful to him up at this end, and it was only a couple of weeks before I actually first came here that I met him.

Q: Did you participate in any meetings in South Africa in preparation for these operations?

A: No, not as much as the preparation of what was going to happen - no plan. I mean, I do not think he told any of us his plan of how the operation was going to work. All he said to us was that this was going to be a bloodless coup. From information we were given, there would be no shots fired, or anything, because we had the population on our side and he said it was the return of the legitimate Government of Seychelles and the people here wanted it to be returned.

Q: You said you knew Seychelles previously. Had you been here on holiday?

A: No, I did two trips here: from the 31st through the 7th and then from the 21st until whatever the date is now.

Q: So you came a second time ...

A: Yes, two weeks prior to the thing.

Q: So you did not really form any independent judgement of the situation in Seychelles?

A: The only thing I could say is that the people I met in the hotel - it was just very much a holiday atmosphere so I had not met anybody; I had no contacts with Seychellois that were involved in the plot as such. But I did meet, on returning to South Africa, a gentleman - a local gentleman - that was in South Africa - obviously having meetings with the Colonel, and his name was Dingwal - John Dingwal - and he was talking to a fellow by the name of Gerard - I think his name is Hoareau, or something. And they were at the Colonel's house because he wanted to give me some instructions to relate to Mr. Sims regarding finances for the blokes when they came up here. So I was introduced to Dingwal and this Gerard, and the only other meeting I had was when I arrived back here on the 21st. I suppose I thought he was doing his little bit for the cause as such, and he showed me a few places like army headquarters, which I knew, anyway, from the first trip, travelling around.

Q: This man was just visiting South Africa at the time you were there?

A: Dingwal is a local businessman here, and he was involved in the internal sort of - whatever you want to call it - and I know Gerard was making some tapes, because that was basically our job when we arrived back here - a broadcasting station. That is exactly how I envisaged it was going to start - by commandeering a broadcasting station and putting tapes on, letting the people know that this was the start of their Government returning, as such.

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Q: And did Hoare give you any idea as to the origin - the financing - of the undertaking?

A: That I do not know. I do not even know how much money he had. Obviously he had a lot to throw around. He gave everybody that came up here 1,000 rand in advance, plus all the air tickets back and forth, hotels - and the hotels are pretty expensive here, as I noticed from their tariffs - and chartering an aircraft. I mean, he had a lot of money.

Q: When you say "chartering an aircraft", what did you envisage the aircraft would cost?

A: That was that Swazi Air that he brought the men up on.

Q: I see. That was a charter flight?

A: I believe it was a charter flight.

Q: But you, of course, did not travel on it?

A: I was here already, yes.

Q: Your involvement with bringing in the gun - the test run with the gun - did Hoare himself give you the gun and the bag for that purpose?

A: He handed it to me at Durban Airport, yes.

Q: And did you know when you arrived at Durban Airport that you were going to be asked to do this?

A: Well, not exactly. He said: "I want you to take something up for me" - which turned out to be this.

Q: And he asked you, I think you said, to report to him on whether that was a feasible way of bringing in guns?

A: Yes.

Q: What did you report to him in that respect?

A: I said it was a piece of cake, because all I did was check it in at the check-in counter at Durban. I picked it up at the end. There was no security check at this end. I had my own suitcase and this bag and a bottle of Scotch in duty-free, and that was it.

Q: There was no customs check ...

A: There was a customs check. They said "What is in there?". I said: "My Scotch". And away you go.

/...

Q: Did you ever participate in a meeting in South Africa where they showed you any weapons?

A: Once in Durban. There was about 15 people, I suppose, and there was one person showing how to assemble this piece. Nobody knew much about an AK-47, and they just showed how it had been stripped down and put into the bag, and how to put it back together again - you know, back in working order.

Q: Do you have any military background?

A: I have never been in the army in my life.

Q: In your discussions with Hoare or at the meeting, was it just one meeting that you attended, all told, or were there several meetings?

A: No, I had two down in Durban and two in Pietermaritzburg, or just up from Pietermaritzburg, where the Colonel invited me to his house.

Q: So you were at his house twice - twice in his flat?

A: In Durban, yes.

Q: At any of these meetings, did anybody say anything or did you form an opinion about the attitude of the South African Government to what you were doing?

A: I asked Colonel Hoare. I said: "What happens about the South African involvement?" - you know, the Government. He said: "If they find out what I am doing, they will deport me in 48 hours".

Q: He said that to you?

A: Those are exactly his words.

Q: And was any other Government ever mentioned in your discussions?

A: No.

Q: He never said to you that a number of Governments were supporting the activity?

A: He never said I would get recognition from anybody; he never said anything like that.

Q: As to this person named Dolinschek - or Lubic - did you meet him here?

A: I was introduced to him when I arrived the second time here, yes.

Q: As part of the group?

A: I beg your pardon?

/...

Q: Was he introduced to you as part of the group?

A: When I arrived here, Mr. Sims actually introduced me to him at the airport. Apparently, from what he told me, he was going to be the Colonel's driver, or something, when he arrived here.

Q: Do you know his profession or his activity?

A: No, I just found him a very, very strange bloke: you know, he talked a hell of a lot. I did not know how to take the man and, there again, he told me he was running around the island six miles a day, swimming six miles a day, doing this, doing that. Well, I never saw him hardly anytime during those four days before the Colonel came, and I am quite pleased, actually.

Q: Could you just repeat again - I did not quite catch it the first time: when did you first meet Mike Hoare and in what context?

A: This is when I was going to do these tours, like down the coast, and he thought I could probably arrange to do this tour up here.

Q: But he approached you out of the blue?

A: Yes, I had this phone call. He did not say, "This is Mike Hoare". He said: "This is Mike James." I met him, actually, as Mike James, but it came out in the wash.

Q: And did you know anybody else involved in the operation prior to it?

A: Not at that time.

Q: As to the people you had here who are with you, you had not known them previously; is that correct?

A: No, I was introduced to Sims the day before I arrived - because he was on the same flight as me on the 31st - and Sue, his wife. Dolinschek I had met here the second time on arrival. Brooks I had met in Durban only at the meetings. I had not met him sort of before I was introduced to Hoare.

Q: You said you had only been in South Africa 10 months. Did you come from Britain to South Africa?

A: From the UK - from London.

Q: Had you previously lived in southern Africa before?

A: I had been down before, because I had lived in Kenya at one time. That was during my school days and then I went back to England. My family - my mother and father - moved down to South Africa and I went over there for just a short while, and I moved back to England. And for the last eight years in England I was running a pub.

/...

Q: And at what stage did Hoare offer you money for being involved in the operation?

A: Well, on that dummy run, that was - he said, basically, that was my total involvement at that stage, and I got actually 200 rands.

Q: Over and above your expenses?

A: Yes. He paid my hotel. Then, when I arrived back, he said: "Would you be interested in the phase 2", as I think he called it and I think he paid me on the 14th. He gave me 1,000 rand.

Q: With the understanding that there would be a further amount paid later?

A: Another 9,000.

Q: Where would that be paid to you?

A: Well, I asked him to hold it in Geneva.

Q: This was an option that he offered?

A: He said: "You can either have it or be paid anywhere." I actually did not want it in South Africa: it is very difficult to get money out of South Africa.

Q: Did you have a picture of how many people were going to be involved in the whole operation?

A: He told me, between 50 and 70. But it turned out that there were only 50.

Q: When you arrived here the second time and when you travelled here, did you already know that the party would be coming on the Swazi flight?

A: On the 25th. I was going to meet the Colonel and take him back to his residence, because he asked me to find out exactly where it was and to drop him back to his ...

Q: And did you inform the other people here that these were the plans?

A: Well, he actually told everybody that they would all be at the airport waiting for the flight.

Q: Who told them?

A: The Colonel. The Colonel told everybody to be waiting at the airport for him.

/...

Q: But some of them had been here for some time. What I am asking is: I know he told you, but were you asked to tell any of the others?

A: Yes. He gave me a little list that he had written down and said: "Tell Bob to come to the airport; tell Anton and Martin" - or whatever he called himself - "and the rest of them to be at the airport."

Q: Now, the people you were asked to contact by him were, for the most part, part of your party, so to speak, with the objective of the radio transmitter in due course; is that correct?

A: That was our sole job - for the advance party.

Q: But did Anton fit into that category?

A: No, apparently he was going to be the driver of the Colonel, and he said something about interpreting intelligence reports, or something like that.

Q: You said there was a meeting. When did that meeting take place? You said there were about 15 people?

A: I think that was on the 14th. I think it was a week before we actually came up here.

Q: Can you remember which of those 15 people were with you?

A: All of them. There's Brooks, England and myself; Dolinschek was here; Sims was here; Sue was here. Puren I have met only since I have been in prison; I had never met Puren at all.

Q: But at that meeting you did not know their names?

A: Only Brook's. I had met some of the others that were here. There was Dalgliesh, who came up with us; Botes, the South African fellow; an American fellow, Dukes; an English fellow by the name of Webb; another Englishman, Willar; another South African fellow, Hean. Most of these people I sort of met. There was actually going to be 10 of us coming up initially on the 21st, and then the Colonel cut it down to six. So these other four I sort of got to know, but then they got pushed back again.

Q: Did you know why he cut it down to six?

A: He thought 10 was too many. Ten blokes might be a bit conspicuous, I suppose.

/...

Q: And did you think it at all odd that he asked you - with no military experience - to join him in this effort?

A: Well, the way he put it, it would not be any sort of military operation at all, as such. To me it looked quite like a simple straight-cut operation. He said approximately 95 per cent of the population, including the army, would be in total, full support of us, so there was no ... he said: "You won't even hear a shot fired."

Q: Did you say there was no real command structure but that you had a co-ordinating role in relation to the ...

A: He did have blokes with him that would be sort of more of these military types.

Q: Nevertheless it was envisaged that you and five others should take over ...

A: Yes.

Q: And you had the co-ordinating role for that group?

A: I was going to say basically what tapes. I know there were three tapes.

Q: Your role was in relation to the tapes?

A: Yes - what tapes to put on, when, and why.

Q: But as regards the actual physical take-over, so to speak, which was sort of a military operation ...

A: Well, not really, because apparently there was no guard, as such.

Q: But there was a military barracks above?

A: Somebody else was going to take that.

Q: You were not going to be involved in the military barracks?

A: Not in the barracks, no. There was going to be another section or group of people, from the main group, that would be actually taken there. The barracks overlooks the broadcasting station, so, obviously, you are going to have somebody looking after you below there. So it would have been a different group.

Q: You would have awaited the barracks being taken over before you had acted?

A: Definitely.

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Q: So in your view there would have been no military action, as far as the radio station is concerned?

A: We would have walked right in.

Q: Have you ever heard of troops from another country coming to support the group that came in from Swaziland?

A: You mean, was there another group coming?

Q: At that meeting, was anything said?

A: There was no suggestion of anyone else being involved. We were not told of anyone else being involved with us, no.

Q: Or having the support of, say, certain Governments?

A: No. As I said, I was never told at the meeting; no mention was ever made of anyone or any other Government being involved at all.

Q: Could I just ask again: were these meetings attended by all of your advance party?

A: Two in Durban. But a couple of times I was up at his house.

Q: I think we had been taking you through the chronology and we had reached the point where you had been asked to come to the airport along with the others when the Swazi flight arrived. Could you just describe what happened to you from that point on?

A: Yes. I was waiting, actually outside, and Mike Hoare - he was actually the first one out of the terminal building. I was going to take him to his residence. So I carried his bags, put them into the back of the car that I had and he was telling me about a bit of a punch-up they had in Johannesburg: one of the blokes got out of hand. You know, he was sort of in a bit of a fight, and there was a bit of confusion up at the terminal, and we could see all of these blokes pulling these weapons out. "Jesus, here we go." And I never had a weapon. So he said: "Just hold on here a minute and I will just go see what is happening." And after - you know - a few minutes, he called me across and I pulled up the car right outside the terminal, and what was told to me was that someone had some fruit or something in his bag and declared it, and apparently that is not the right thing to bring in to any country and they started searching all the bags and finally these guns were found. And during all this, one of the blokes got killed - one of our own blokes. He got shot by one of our own blokes - not anybody else - and Mike Hoare said: "We had better get down to the barracks at the end of the runway", and England, Brooks and Dalgliesh and Dukes - they went off ahead, and one of the tour coaches loaded up with about 20 blokes and they went down and I followed behind with Colonel Hoare. He said: "Drive me down there." And when we got down, there was quite a bit of shooting going on. It had already started, and

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apparently - from what I had heard, anyway - England and Dukes had already gone in, or gone through the barracks gate and told everyone - you know - "Don't shoot or anything like that" - you know. But someone did return fire, and a couple of our blokes got shot. And after about five minutes, Hoare said: "Look, this is ridiculous. C'mon, let's get back to the airport."

So I left my car there; we put all the luggage onto one of the coaches. I walked back; a couple of other people walked back, and the coach drove up. I mean, there was no sort of fighting at that stage. There was no one driven back. He just pulled the blokes back. He said: "This is ridiculous. We didn't come to kill anybody." This is really his theme; he did not want any bloodshed. And when we got back to the airport - you know - obviously, we had a couple of road blocks on either side of the terminal. Some of the blokes who were left behind went up and took the control tower and they sort of set little blocks up on either side of the runway, and on a couple of occasions this armoured car came up and put a few shots into the terminal building, and there was not really a lot going on. Then the armoured car came up the runway and shot up their control tower.

Q: It shot up the control tower?

A: Oh, yes. So the blokes in there all came scampering out with all the lights out and came back to the terminal. And that was it until, oh, a couple of hours, and Hoare was on the phone to some local military bloke in one of the terminal offices trying to get a cease-fire, because they started firing this - what they call a - 75 into the building.

Q: That was at the main building?

A: Yes. But it never actually hit the building at that stage, but all this stuff was hitting on top of the roof. It was quite scary, actually. And he spoke to this military fellow here to get a cease-fire, because actually Air India had already landed at this stage and the two pilots were brought out. A couple of blokes had gone out and surrounded the aircraft, and Mike was trying to get a cease-fire so they would get the aircraft off the ground again, during which time it was being refuelled. And he asked the pilots where they could go on a full tank and the first thing they said was Bombay. The fellows did not really want to go there, and there were two alternatives: Oman and Durban. And they said Durban would be preferable to any other place.

Q: Nairobi was not suggested?

A: Not at all. It was only Durban or Oman. It was apparently an RAF base they were talking about. One of the blokes said he had done some service out that way. Anyway, they got the cease-fire. I do not know who they were talking to. I think the bloke was very cagey about giving his name. I do not know if it has come out since. I did not talk to anyone on that subject. They were also told that two pilots would go out to the runway and inspect the runway, because a lot of these shells had been hitting nearby and they just wanted to make sure there was no damage to the runway. And that was it, you know. After they got the go-ahead, all

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the men started to go on board, and Mike Hoare said to me: "Well, get yourself loaded up" - you know, I knew Brooks was down there, so I went to go look for Brooks. I said: "I will stay here" and I went to look for him.

I did not know how bad he had been shot up so I said I would go and help the bloke - go and get him some help. So they took off. Unfortunately, when I was going across the road, Roger England was looking for a bag or something - you know. And he said: "Where are you going?" I said: "I am staying here; I am going to look for Brooks and then go back to the hotel." So he said: "I think I will stay as well." He has never forgiven himself since.

So I was searching all night for Brooks. Apparently, he was in a coma, so he could not hear me calling. I went right up past the barracks, right to the other side, right back again that night until it started getting light. So I started going up into the hills to get a better cover so that I could wait there during the day and then go and have another look the following evening. And I had a very, very good view of what happened the next morning when they shot up the terminal. They got the hostages out. They did a very good commando raid on the empty terminal - shot the hell out of it - and I think they must have put about 30-40 shells into the building and really tore the place to pieces.

Q: Do you have an idea of what time?

A: I would say this started at about 7 in the morning, and it did not finish until about 11. They really gave it a pounding. And, of course, I was a bit worried: I was half-way up the hill and they were shooting above my head as well. So, obviously, I had to stay where I was. I could not get down because they were down below and up above me. So later on in the afternoon, I sort of sneaked across a bit when it died down, and I thought, "Well, I will come and cut across and see if I can find Brooks", and I walked into this load of people dressed in "banana trees" and they all had guns. They said: "Hands up", and I came down. I walked right into them.

Q: That was what time?

A: About 6 that evening.

Q: So you never got back to the hotel?

A: No way.

Q: I have one more question: when they were discussing these alternatives, one, you said, was Durban and the other, Oman. What reasons were they discussing for going to Durban or Oman?

A: Obviously, the majority of the blokes - all of them actually - came from South Africa - a mixture of Englishman, Australian - everything. The only reason I think Oman was mentioned is that Mike Webb was serving in the Oman army, and he said: "You know, there is a possibility we might get a bit of safety there." They

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were not sure they would get the right treatment in Bombay, I think. You know, obviously, Durban was the only one they could really take. Oman, I think, was an alternative. If they could not have made Durban, I think that is what they would have taken. I do not suppose they knew the distances.

Q: Was anything mentioned about there being an RAF installation in Oman?

A: He said there is an ex-RAF base. I do not know whether it is still there. I do not know if it is still a British air force installation.

Q: I think it is a British-managed base.

A: But it used to be an RAF base.

Q: Was anything mentioned about the possibility of getting sort of better treatment in Durban as among these choices?

A: I'm sorry?

Q: In your discussion of alternatives, was it that one would be a better choice, that you would get some sort of support or better treatment in one of these places?

A: Durban was where they came from and South Africa was where most of them were resident. So I think it was just to get back there and take their chances with the Government there.

Q: Could I just ask you this: you said that you left the airport in the knowledge that you would not get the Air India plane. Or did you hope to get back in time?

A: No, I knew there was no way on earth I could get back.

Q: You left because of Brooks?

A: Yes.

Q: Was that your only motive in leaving?

A: I had no other motive at all.

Q: And this was on the basis of your friendship with Brooks that you had formed?

A: I only knew him, maybe, for a fortnight.

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Q: That is why I am impelled to ask this. Many people would see it as a very noble act for somebody you had not known for very long, particularly since you had no military experience.

A: Military experience does not come into it. I think if I was left out I would hope somebody would come and help me. This is basically human nature, isn't it? If I could not have helped him personally, I could have got someone to help him. Who knows?

Q: Would you have been able to operate an AK-47 rifle?

A: I have never fired an AK-47. In actual fact I never assembled one here. As a matter of fact, I handed my bag to Sims, and he assembled it. That is to say, he took it back to his house, and I have never seen that thing since.

Q: If the plan had gone as intended and you had gone to the radio station, do you think you would have had a rifle on that occasion?

A: Quite possibly, and from the information I have, I do not think I would have had to use it anyway.

Q: So you would have carried it just for show?

A: Right. This is basically what we were told - as a token of our strength.

CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

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Annex VII

DESCRIPTIVE LIST OF THE WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
CAPTURED FROM THE MERCENARIES

No.	Country of origin	Serial number	Magazine	Rounds (30 rds)	Owner	Found	Found by	Date
1	Hungary	272969	-	-	-	Airport	ARMY	26 Nov. 81
2	Hungary	831989	-	-	-	Airport	ARMY	26 Nov. 81
3	Hungary	982392	-	-	-	Airport	ARMY	26 Nov. 81
4	Hungary	854092	-	-	-	Airport	ARMY	26 Nov. 81
5	Hungary	446685	-	-	-	Airport	ARMY	26 Nov. 81
6	Hungary	682643	1 1	30 30	Sims Sims	Safe house	Police	28 Nov. 81 Sims in custody
7	Romania	034813	1 1	30 7	England	Bush near Pt. Larue	Police	20 Jan. 82 England in custody
8	Romania	019384	1		Puren(?)	Near Shell Station Airport	Police	11 Dec. 81 Puren in custody
9	Romania	568781	1	27	BROOKS	Anse aux Pins	Police	27 Nov. 81 Brooks in custody
10	Romania	047728	1 1	30 30	Dukes or Dalgliesh	In rental car near army barracks	Police	26 Nov. 81
11	Romania	248247	1 1	30 30	Sims Sims	Safe house	Police	28 Nov. 81 Sims in custody

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No.	AKM	Country of origin	Serial number	Magazine	Rounds (30 rds)	Owner	Found	Found by	Date
12	AKM	Romania	502651	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
13	AKM	Romania	328575	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
14	AKM	Romania	566957	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
15	AKM	Romania	701631	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
16	AKM	Romania	902321	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
17	AKM	Romania	659616	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
18	AKM	Romania	892854	-	-	-	Airport	Army	26 Nov. 81
19	AKM	Romania	080437	1 1	30 30	Sims Sims	Safe house	Police	28 Nov. 81 Sims in custody
				1 1 1 1 1	30 30 30 30 30 18 (loose)		Airport " " " " "	Army " " " " "	26 Nov. 81 " " " " "

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Annex VIII

REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SEYCHELLES AUTHORITIES CONCERNING
VIOLATIONS OF SEYCHELLES AIRSPACE

Letter of transmittal dated 18 November 1981
addressed to the Minister of and Defence by
the Acting Director of Civil Aviation, and
copies to the Minister of Transport and
Civil Aviation

UNIDENTIFIED AIRCRAFT HEARD IN FLIGHT IN VICINITY OF SEYCHELLES INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT ON 15 NOVEMBER 1981

Further to our telephone conversation on Monday 16 November on the above subject, please find enclosed the official signed reports from the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer (SATCO), the Duty Controller* and the Duty Meteorological Forecaster* in respect to the above.

I am rather concerned of this low flying incident especially as it occurred at the same time, over the same location and approximately the same altitude with that of an international scheduled airliner landing at Seychelles International Airport. Furthermore, when analysing the existing situation in our region and a previous incident on Wednesday, 11 November at 1800 hours local time in which myself and my father heard a similar sound moving in a northwesterly direction at an altitude of approximately 10,000 feet, I can safely assume that in all probability the aircraft concerned could be that of a United States Airforce P3B Orion. Ever since bases were afforded to them in East Africa there has been a number of overflights by similar type aircraft. These were restricted to altitudes between 20,000 and 30,000 feet and did not overfly directly over Mahé.

We at the airport will continue to be vigilant and I trust that this information will be of help to you in your analysis to identify this aircraft.

REPORT OF THE SENIOR AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL OFFICER

At 1804z (2204 local time), I heard turboprop aircraft, the sound of which indicated that it was close to my overhead. (I was at my home at Anse aux Pins.) As I looked out towards the sea I saw the landing lights of an aircraft on base leg for Runway 31. This was later identified to be AF464, a B-747. The engine sound I heard was definitely that of turbine propeller engines. I immediately phoned the Deputy Air Traffic Control Officer (DATCO) at the airport and reported the above. By that time the sound was no more audible as the aircraft had obviously continued on a southerly heading.

* The reports by the Duty Controller and the Duty Meteorological Officer were initially submitted to the Senior Air Traffic Control Officer, who incorporated them into his own report to the Acting Director of Civil Aviation.

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The DATCO informed me that only AF464 was on frequency and he had no knowledge with regards to any other flight. I was then asked to hold the line as he had another call on the same subject. I asked the Deputy Air Traffic Control Officer, W. Fock Tave, to ring me back at my residence with details and findings of his preliminary investigation of the matter.

Below is a summarized transcript from the Air Traffic Control (ATC) tapes covering the period concerned:

- 1801 - AF464 in the procedure turn on approach to Runway 31.
- 1803 - AF464 on final with the runway in sight. Cleared to land.
- 1804 - SATCO on the unlisted telephone inquiring about the turboprop aircraft. DATCO answered in the negative as he had no knowledge and no visual contact.
- 1805 - Call from Meteorological (Met.) Officer, G. Sauzier, who informs DATCO that he has heard a propeller aircraft overhead and ascertains that it was not AF464 as he saw AF464 on final while the unidentified aeroplane passed overhead on a reciprocal course. Sauzier stated that no navigation lights were visible, only the sound.
- 1807 - The Army Duty Officer (D.O.), Pointe Larue Camp, on direct line. Asked DATCO if there was another aircraft in the system. Army sentries had spotted a "small propeller aeroplane" flying low going "westwards". DATCO stated that he had no contact or information with any other aircraft except AF464. The D. O. Army thanked him and signed off.
- 1810 - DATCO phoned Met. Officer, G. Sauzier for more information. G. Sauzier repeated his previous statement and estimated the aircraft to have been between 4,000 and 6,000 ft. He again said that he had had AF464 in sight with the unidentified aircraft overhead the field.
- 1812 - DATCO reported to SATCO. Verified that the Merlin aircraft, SY005 was in the hanger. The DATCO was advised to log all occurrences and to check with the Captain of AF464 if any aircraft had been seen by them. SATCO requested that the Army be asked to provide at least 3 or 4 more vehicles for runway blocking as only 2 vehicles had been made available.
- 1825 - D.O. Army informed DATCO that they had no vehicles available and "to use the two you have". DATCO said that he will advise them before he starts blocking.

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Conversation with that night's ASL D.O., C. Benoiton, indicated that he had also heard the aircraft overhead whilst he was on the apron awaiting AF464's arrival.

The Acting Director of Civil Aviation (Ag. DCA) was informed of the events the following day, Monday 16 November. Additional reports have been submitted by DATCO Fock Tave, and Met. O. G. Sauzier. (The latter's report has an annotation written by the Senior Meteorological Officer (S.M.O.), Mr. R. Marpole.)


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Annex IX

SELECTION OF RELEVANT PHOTOGRAPHS MADE AVAILABLE
TO THE COMMISSION BY THE SEYCHELLES AUTHORITIES

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
1. Travelling bag with false bottom



2. The mercenaries' travelling bags




3. Arms left behind by the mercenaries




4. President and Minister Ferrari accompanied by army officials during their inspection at the airport




5. Royal Air Swazi plane



6. Funeral of Second Lieutenant David Antat



7. Airport damages



8. Airport damages (control tower)

