

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/228
Appendix III/Vol. V
21 August 1981

ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME V

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

GE.81-65328

CD/PV.130
18 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTIETH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 18 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I. Komives (Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina: Mr. E. ROS
Mr. J. CARSALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Mr. J.M. CANTILO
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERRETFE
Miss K. SINEGIORGIS
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran:

Mr. M. JALALI
Mr. D. AMERI
Mr. T. AFSAR
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. H. SHARIFIV

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. I. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. L. ABDELHAMID

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

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Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

United Kingdom:

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Mr. B. NOBLE

United States of America:

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Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to His Excellency Ambassador Enrique Ros, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina. Ambassador Ros was appointed Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs at the beginning of last April. He is a career diplomat who served in the Organization of American States, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the People's Republic of China and twice in the United Nations, lately as Permanent Representative in New York. Before being appointed to his present position, he was Director-General for Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry. He is listed to speak today and it will be my pleasure to give him the floor as second speaker.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, allow me to second you in extending my warmest welcome to Ambassador Ros, representative of the great country so close to mine. Permit me also, on behalf of the Brazilian delegation, to express our pleasure on your assumption of the Chairmanship for the month of June and to assure you of our continuing co-operation in order to facilitate your difficult task.

Last Tuesday the Committee adopted the programme of its work for the second part of the 1981 session. In this connection, the delegation of Brazil would like to put forward some thoughts regarding our task, for we believe that the Committee should step up its efforts to ensure a positive contribution to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are convinced that the limited results of the Committee's work during the first part of its 1981 session laid a modest basis for some substantive progress. The international community, represented in its entirety at the next special session of the General Assembly, will undoubtedly expect the Committee to present, four years after its establishment, concrete achievements in at least some of the areas to which it has devoted its efforts, and particularly on priority questions.

The outcome of our endeavours must be commensurate with the mandate given by the international community to this negotiating body at its inception. We all recognized, in drawing up the Final Document of the first special session, the difficulties that lay ahead. Nevertheless, we have all agreed, in June 1978, that there were priority questions to which the Committee should devote special attention. The Programme of Action embodied in the Final Document represents a commitment by the entire membership of the United Nations to work constructively towards the achievement of progress mainly on those priority issues. It is the hope of my delegation that in this, the second part of our 1981 session, it will be possible to build upon the work accomplished during the past two and a half years. The areas on which the Committee has worked are clearly defined in the six substantive items of its agenda. Let me examine briefly the possibilities for progress in those specific areas.

First and foremost among the issues under consideration is the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, of which the ban on the testing of nuclear weapons would constitute a significant first step. On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee held this year a number of informal meetings on some substantive aspects of both questions, at the end of which the Group issued two separate documents. The first one, CD/180, presents an assessment of the informal discussions on item 2 of the agenda and renews the Group's call for the establishment of a working group, whose mandate would be based on the elements set forth in that paper and on paragraph 50 of the Final Document. The second one, CD/181, puts direct questions to the three parties that until late last year were engaged in private talks on the cessation of their own tests of

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

nuclear weapons, and suggests specific wording for the mandate of a working group. Furthermore, at the request of the Group of 21, the secretariat circulated a summary of the informal meetings held on those two items (CD/UN.SUM/1). At this point I should like to put on record a word of praise for the secretariat, more specifically its documentation service, for the preparation and distribution of this excellent paper in time for our summer session, as requested by the Committee at its spring session.

The Brazilian delegation expects that the trilateral negotiators of a nuclear-test ban will have had ample time to consider the substantive points raised with regard to the matter and will be at long last in a position to respond, jointly or separately, to the important concerns of a significant number of delegations. It seems now reasonable to expect from the nuclear-weapon Powers a constructive attitude to the suggestions and proposals contained in both documents of the Group of 21.

The recent Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities of Iraq, a State which had accepted IAEA safeguards and which adhered to an international instrument whose non-nuclear-weapon parties renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons and at the same time accepted that a handful of nations had the right to possess such weapons, adds to the complexity of the issues of nuclear disarmament and lends weight to the often-repeated argument that nuclear disarmament is of vital concern to all States, nuclear and non-nuclear alike. And in this respect may I also state for the record that my Government, on two occasions, in Brasilia and in the Security Council of the United Nations, this week had the opportunity of expressing its views against this unjustified attack. No longer can we simply say that the whole world is held hostage to a situation in which the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of a few Powers directly and fundamentally threatens the security of all States. It seems that individual States now feel entitled to decide unilaterally on the intentions of other States concerning their peaceful nuclear activities and thus to utilize whatever means are at their disposal to promote their security as they perceive it. Isn't this the same basic argument of the theories of nuclear deterrence? If individual States, or alliances of States, continue to claim their right to rely on nuclear armament to maintain and expand their capacity to deter any outside threat to their security, and accept no commitments to nuclear disarmament, wouldn't other States feel justified to acquire the means with which to wipe out, at whatever cost, any perceived threat to their security? It seems obvious that the possession of nuclear weapons does not necessarily entail the possession of wisdom or the monopoly of responsible international behaviour; if it did, the nuclear-weapon Powers would have realized long ago that there can be no stable security based upon the maintenance and perpetuation of a discriminatory situation. Discrimination and inequality do not make a sound foundation for lasting and equitable international instruments, either. It is only through the constructive participation of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States in meaningful international negotiations that permanent and just solutions can be found to the ever-increasing dangers inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons. My delegation urges the Committee, and in particular those Powers which have hitherto opposed the start of concrete multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, carefully to ponder

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the consequences of the continued lack of progress in this field. Brazil, for its part, continues to believe that nuclear disarmament is the most pressing problem facing the international community and that it must find agreed multilateral answers to a threat that puts in jeopardy the vital security interests of all nations alike.

The Committee must also continue its work on the other substantive items on its agenda through the subsidiary bodies entrusted with specific tasks. My delegation believes that the time has come to revise the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, so as to enable it to build upon the work accomplished during the first part of the session. The new mandate should contain specific directions to start negotiations on the text of a convention on the destruction of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their manufacture, stockpiling and development, and we trust that those who already possess a chemical warfare capability will not stand in the way of a consensus on the revision of the mandate, so as to enable the Committee to proceed towards the discharge of its negotiating function with regard to chemical weapons, in time to present the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament with concrete results, and preferably with a final negotiated text.

The Committee must also present the General Assembly at its second special session with a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the final text of which is to be adopted by the special session itself. My delegation will continue to co-operate in the effort to achieve formulations that can reflect the commitment of the international community to the goals expressed in the Final Document and which will represent a blueprint for action.

Much work remains to be done on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We trust that the Working Group charged with this question will be able to do further work along the lines of its current deliberations. The question of the non-use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, should also be given serious consideration.

Finally, the Committee will resume negotiations on the so-called "radiological weapons". The low priority assigned to this item of its agenda should not deter the Working Group from its task. Several basic questions are still open, including the scope of an eventual convention. The recent developments I mentioned above have brought to the forefront the question of the dangers inherent in a direct attack on peaceful nuclear facilities. In view of the many technical and practical difficulties involved in assembling and putting to actual military use a device that would qualify as a "radiological weapon", it seems to my delegation that for the current negotiations to have meaning and substance it is imperative that the Working Group looks in depth at three main points, besides the actual definition of whatever specific weapons or groups of weapons are to be prohibited under the proposed convention: first, the relationship of such a convention to actual measures of nuclear disarmament; secondly, the promotion of the peaceful uses of sources of radiation; and thirdly, the ways to prevent peaceful nuclear facilities from being converted into agents of death through an attack, even by means of conventional warfare.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

This brief summary of the tasks that lie before this Committee underscores the need to utilize the scarce time available in the most constructive ways possible. My delegation is certainly interested in the discussions that may emerge out of the concerns expressed for the efficiency of the work of the Committee. We believe that its negotiating function should be enhanced through appropriate procedural decisions, and we look forward to listening to concrete proposals that will promote that objective. In our view, the substantive aspects of the Committee's work are contained in the specific items of the agenda; on all but two of them, which are also those to which the highest priority has been assigned, the CD has established adequate subsidiary organs. My delegation urges, therefore, that organizational discussions concentrate on the arrangements to deal with those two priority questions, and that the Committee does not lose sight of its negotiating function. As an illustration of this point, I might recall the very interesting document presented last week by the delegation of Canada on the general question of verification, and which my delegation referred to the appropriate Brazilian authorities for examination. As a preliminary reaction, I would say that this Committee is not the appropriate forum to discuss, in abstracto, the problem of verification. It would be adequate, of course, for the Committee to negotiate on the actual verification provisions of specific agreements. If a question such as verification is taken in its general terms, my delegation would believe that it is up to the deliberative body to discuss it. The Committee on Disarmament is not the place for debates on general issues, that could distract it from the specific tasks and from the priorities reflected in its agenda. The United Nations Disarmament Commission, for its part, might hold a very interesting and perhaps useful debate on the general question of verification or other related issues, and make recommendations through the General Assembly.

In this context, may I be allowed to say a word on the recent session of the Disarmament Commission, just ended in New York. We consider the results of the session much below what could be reasonably expected. It is worth while to notice, however, that the only item of its agenda on which a substantive report could be reached was the one dealing with nuclear weapons, a fact that shows the continuing and overwhelming concern of the international community with the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Unfortunately, after lengthy consultations and negotiations on a text for the report on that item, one of the major nuclear-weapon Powers found it necessary to make a formal reservation on it. The Commission was thus unable to come up with specific recommendations on the questions related to nuclear disarmament, a subject which still awaits adequate multilateral treatment. We still dare to hope that those who bear special responsibilities and who profess to recognize the profound concerns of non-nuclear-weapon nations will eventually find it in their interest to enable the international community to discuss in depth the issues that affect so deeply the security and the very possibilities for survival of mankind.

Those were the points that my delegation wanted to bring today to the attention of the Committee. We trust that a constructive and responsible attitude will prevail at this second part of our 1981 session and that the Committee will be able to build upon the work accomplished during the first part of the session, with due regard for the priorities established and with due respect for the aspirations and interests of the world community at large.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement and kind words addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ROS (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, presiding over the work of the Committee on Disarmament is probably one of the most difficult tasks with which a diplomat may be faced. Knowing how difficult this body's task is politically and how complicated it is technically, I would like to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation and to express our sincere determination to contribute to the success of your term of office.

The international situation is still marked by the persistence of centres of tension in Asia, the Middle East, southern Africa and central America. For my country it is clear that this neither promotes the disarmament process nor facilitates the task of this Committee. Nevertheless, we must renew our efforts in order to achieve meaningful results.

In the past decade, the members of the international community have observed, in most cases as simple witnesses, the inordinate acceleration of the world arms race. The more than \$500,000 million wasted in 1980 -- a figure alarming in itself -- symbolizes a trend which seems to worsen day by day.

We all know where the principal responsibility for this situation lies: analysis of the percentages that go to make up this waste of resources makes further clarification unnecessary. It is necessary, however, to stress that the basis and cause of this trend are not to be found solely in the accentuation of differences between the major military alliances or the emergence of new international problems. On the contrary, we think that this trend is stimulated almost mechanically by the combination of doctrines on the use of force and the development of advanced military technology. In this connection, we share one of the conclusions reached in the United Nations "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" that: "It is clear that in many cases technology dictates policy instead of serving it and that new weapons systems frequently emerge not because of any military or security requirement but because of the sheer momentum of the technological process ... In this situation it is imperative that statesmen and political leaders accept their responsibility. If they do not, the arms race is certain to go out of control." (Document A/35/392, para. 493).

It also seems clear to us that the doctrines of deterrence or strategic superiority contain within themselves the seed of disequilibrium and danger that could plunge the world into catastrophe. In fact, the experience of the past 30 years proves that the originally defensive concept of nuclear deterrence has served as a smoke-screen for the investigation and development of weapons systems with a clearly offensive capability, and that the security of the States involved has in no way been strengthened, owing to the error of claiming to strengthen that security through quantitative and qualitative increases which only move the potential adversary to follow suit and keep pace.

These facts and considerations, which are applicable to any of the super-Powers and their military alliances, have a consequence to which my country attaches the greatest importance. I am referring to the fact that the security of third States and of all mankind has been undermined and compromised by the existence and constant development of nuclear arsenals. A technical or human error in the unreliable control, communications and command systems, a preventive attack or an over-stepping of the fine line between conventional and nuclear warfare, would produce a catastrophe whose consequences would make no distinction between friends and enemies or neutrals and belligerents.

(Mr. Ros, Argentina)

The situation I have described means that nuclear disarmament is a vital imperative of our time, not only for the very pragmatic reason that the arms race does not increase the security of the States involved, but above all, because of our duty to ensure the survival of civilization and of mankind.

These are the reasons that impel the Republic of Argentina to make an earnest appeal in this forum to the nuclear-weapon States, and especially the United States and the Soviet Union, to exercise the prudence which their responsibility imposes on them and to negotiate meaningful measures to halt and reverse the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Programme of Action adopted by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, particularly in paragraphs 49-53, indicates the most urgent and appropriate steps to achieve this objective. My country is fully aware of the difficulties implicit in the development of these negotiations but it is also aware of the political commitment undertaken by those States by virtue of their participation in that body and of their agreement to the measures outlined.

Those measures include several to which I would like to refer specifically. The SALT process, even though bilateral, has always been linked to the possibility of progress in the sphere of multilateral disarmament. If that link is assured, if the resumption and successful conclusion of strategic arms limitation talks is the precondition for progress in other, more important areas, then we must urge the Governments involved to resume their contacts. They would thus contribute not only to the process of disarmament but also to the relaxation of tension and the creation of a political climate making it possible to negotiate existing differences.

On the other hand, the urgent need to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and the lack of significant results in the trilateral negotiations on this matter confirm us in our conviction that this Committee must fully assume its responsibilities as a negotiating body. The appropriate means for achieving this objective is the establishment of a working group on the subject in accordance with the mandate suggested by the Group of 21 in document CD/181.

We believe that such a treaty must include a number of features which will enable it to secure universal adherence. Among them I think it is sufficient to mention the protection of the interests of non-nuclear-weapon-States, the absence of discriminatory features, a comprehensive and lasting character, and the necessary safeguards for the right of the developing countries to make full use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

In order to ensure these features through formulations providing for a proper balance between obligations and duties, the instrument must be the subject of multilateral negotiation. Otherwise we shall see a repetition of what has happened with other treaties, whose ineffectiveness is painfully obvious.

My country also thinks it necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to approve the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal with item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". We believe that no one should fear a frank discussion of these matters in what is the international community's most competent body for that purpose. The Group of 21 has already put forward some sound suggestions in document CD/180, which might serve as a basis for guiding our action in this matter.

(Mr. Ros, Argentina)

My country attaches importance to the need to avoid horizontal proliferation and is opposed to the very existence of nuclear weapons, no matter what State possesses them. The halting of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertically and horizontally deserves the support of the entire international community. However, in the judgement of the Argentine Government, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is not adequate to achieve this objective. We believe that it is necessary to achieve international consensus-- which does not yet exist -- based on universal and non-discriminatory principles, to ensure a balance of reciprocal obligations between nuclear-weapon-States and non-nuclear-weapon States.

Pending the emergence of this consensus, Latin America continues to set the world an example reflecting its historical calling for peace and development in the form of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. My Government, which is a signatory of this instrument, recently participated in the seventh General Conference of OPANAL, the body responsible for supervision of compliance with the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We take this occasion to renew explicitly Argentina's commitment to the spirit and letter of this Latin American Treaty, a position that was noted by the General Conference in a resolution which mentioned the positive attitude and adherence of Argentina to the provisions and principles of the treaty.

In conformity with this policy, my country has, since June 1979, been negotiating with the International Atomic Energy Agency regarding the scope of the agreement on safeguards provided for in article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in order to be able to establish its eventual obligations and rights in this matter. At present we are concentrating our efforts on persuading the Secretariat of IAEA to prepare a text which is in conformity with the provisions of that Treaty. Unfortunately, the IAEA Secretariat has so far confined itself to modifying slightly the model agreement on safeguards for the non-proliferation Treaty and presenting it as suitable for the Treaty of Tlatelolco. My Government hopes that the Secretariat of that body in Vienna will change its attitude in the near future.

On the other hand, we believe that efforts towards the establishment and perfection of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the various regions of the world are positive. Nevertheless, we are convinced that this type of regional agreement cannot be a substitute for nor should it delay the adoption of effective measures to reduce existing nuclear arsenals.

I should now like to refer briefly to the question of chemical weapons. My country favours prohibition of the use, development, production, stockpiling and storage of these weapons, with reasonable exceptions to meet the needs of protection and defence.

In supporting the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons within the framework of a multilateral convention we have no intention of in any way undermining the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, since it should not be very difficult for this Committee to find a formula to link the two instruments without weakening either.

Furthermore, we feel that the verification system is a more difficult question here than in most disarmament treaties. We are in favour of a system commensurate with the scope of the convention, with a combination of national and international measures and a predominant role for the advisory committee, the nature of which was the subject of much of the discussion in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We also wish to state again that this Group's mandate should be modified to enable it to negotiate the text of a treaty. If necessary, it could also continue to consider pending technical questions or it could delegate them to experts.

My Government wishes to express its satisfaction at the progress achieved in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. Although we have reservations regarding

(Mr. Ros, Argentina)

some of the texts which are being considered, we feel that the general balance is positive. The prohibition of this category of hypothetical weapons has low priority, but an agreement on a draft treaty would relieve the Committee's agenda of this item and so facilitate the consideration of the truly important topics.

It has also been suggested in this Committee that the treaty on radiological weapons should also include prohibition of attacks on non-military nuclear installations. This proposal has become more pertinent since the recent Israeli attack on nuclear installations in Iraq. My Government, which has already expressed its profound disapproval of this attack -- this subject has been discussed among the Group of 21 and the Group's views will be brought to the Committee's attention in the course of this very morning -- considers that this action once again demonstrates the fragility of the nuclear-non-proliferation Treaty. The Iraqi installations were subject to the safeguards of this international instrument, whose reliability as an effective way of promoting the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes has now been further eroded. We believe that this incident merely confirms the rightness of our constant objections to the non-proliferation Treaty, following, as it does, the failure of the two conferences for the review of the Treaty and the views expressed by many States parties.

We consider that, in order to avoid so far as is possible a repetition of such actions, the international community should agree to the prohibition of attacks on non-military nuclear installations through legally binding multilateral norms, either in the convention on radiological weapons or in a separate instrument.

My country considers that the results achieved in 1978 at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament were extremely positive. The Final Document embodying the consensus achieved by the international community at that time must be implemented with full respect for its Programme of Action, priorities and principles. The second special session of the General Assembly to be held in 1982, will give us the opportunity to evaluate this implementation, in which the Committee on Disarmament plays an important part. We hope that this body can count on sufficient political will on the part of its members to contribute significantly to the success of the 1982 special session of the General Assembly through the preparation of the texts of the treaties mentioned in its mandate and the reaching of meaningful agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament. Argentina promises its co-operation and will take the measures necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Final Document of 1978 do not remain a dead letter as far as it is concerned. In this context, we have initiated the process which will shortly result in our signing the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its three Protocols.

Argentina's foreign policy with respect to disarmament and the limitation and control of armaments is the result of a careful evaluation of the present international situation. It was formulated mainly in the light of the following factors: The legitimate defence interests of States, the need to strengthen international peace and security, the global interdependence that exists between disarmament, security and development, and the direct negative impact of the arms race between the great Powers and the military blocs on the security of third States.

As a result of its analysis of these factors, Argentina is participating actively in all efforts designed to achieve a world in which peace is secured through the negotiated solution of conflicts and differences rather than through reliance on the precarious balance offered by doctrines of deterrence or military superiority. In this context my country has for decades consistently advocated the conclusion of international agreements whereby the global arms race may be halted and reversed.

We believe that Argentina's foreign policy in these matters should be interpreted as a positive contribution -- a policy based on a balance of rights and obligations while taking account of the needs of defence, one which will not jeopardize our efforts toward economic and social development, but will help to strengthen international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Argentina, His Excellency the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Ros, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to perform the pleasant task of offering you the Moroccan delegation's warmest congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June, and to express to you our best wishes for your success in the accomplishment of your heavy responsibilities. We are convinced that, thanks to the exemplary competence, wisdom and devotion to duty which you have amply demonstrated, particularly as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the Committee will be able to make substantial progress in its work during the summer session this year.

We also wish to congratulate and thank your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for the brilliant and effective way in which he guided the work of our Committee during the month of April.

I would also like to take this opportunity to welcome our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Argentina and Sri Lanka, and to assure them of our full co-operation.

The resumption of the Committee's work has been marked by an extremely sad event, the seriousness and the consequences of which have been emphasized by all.

I am speaking of the attack by the Israeli air force on 7 June on the Iraqi nuclear research centre.

In a message to the President of Iraq, His Majesty the King of Morocco stated: "We learned with distress and great indignation of the odious attack by the Israeli air force against one of your important industrial installations and of the damage resulting from this treacherous and premeditated attack. This barbarous and unwarranted act flouts all international rules, all civilized values and the moral principles of humanity, and constitutes an attempt irreparably to compromise the sincere efforts that have been made towards the establishment of peace and security in the Middle East...".

Morocco, like all countries which love peace and justice, cannot tolerate this irresponsible act and strongly condemns it. By committing this base and insolent crime, Israel has once more shown that it intends to remain outside the law and to continue to ignore and to flout universally recognized and respected principles.

There is no doubt that this criminal enterprise represents a challenge to the sovereign and inalienable right of all States to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

Iraq, by acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and by signing a safeguard agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency, has clearly shown its intention and will to use nuclear energy for strictly peaceful purposes and thus to abide by the principles governing international co-operation in this sphere.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

By destroying the nuclear research centre at Tammuz, Israel which, moreover, has not signed the non-proliferation Treaty, refuses to allow inspections by the IAEA and has acquired a nuclear capability, is deliberately attempting to disrupt the non-proliferation régime and to endanger the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Zionist State is thus attempting seriously to compromise the efforts being made by all those of goodwill throughout the world, whether governmental or non-governmental, effectively and sincerely to initiate the disarmament process.

Faced with this unprecedented act of vandalism, which has provoked the unanimous disapproval and indignation of the entire world, we in the Committee on Disarmament must go beyond verbal condemnation and take all measures necessary to prevent the repetition of any action of this kind.

The attack by the Israeli air force against the Iraqi nuclear centre was -- alas -- only too well timed to prove how right and how necessary was the Swedish proposal that the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, which we are in the process of negotiating, should contain provisions prohibiting attacks against civilian nuclear installations.

Our Committee would therefore be extremely well-advised seriously to consider the Swedish proposal, which my delegation warmly welcomes.

In any case, Morocco would like to take this opportunity to condemn the Israeli attack, which represents a new challenge to international order and jeopardizes all the efforts being made to secure peace in the Middle East.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Skalli of Morocco for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of June. For me there is the pleasure of seeing in the chair not only the representative of a country that is a neighbour and friend of Romania but also a long-time colleague and friend whose competence and authority in United Nations matters have never ceased to increase. Allow me to wish you all success in your important activities and to assure you of our fullest support.

We should also like to offer our congratulations to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for the competence and industry he displayed in carrying out his tasks.

I should also like to take this opportunity to welcome to the Committee the distinguished representatives of Argentina -- Mr. Julio Carasales, of Iran -- Mr. Ahmad Jalali, and of Sri Lanka -- Mr. Tissa Jayakoddy, and I look forward to co-operation between our delegations, which I hope will be both friendly and fruitful.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

As the Committee on Disarmament resumes its work, the Romanian delegation shares the conviction that the present stage of our activity can and must be marked by intensive and conscientious efforts to achieve tangible results on all the agenda items, including in particular the completion of the drafting of certain specific texts which are to be put before the General Assembly at its special session next year. The inclusion of particular items on the Committee's agenda reflects a broad consensus that they offer the best chance for the achievement of practical results. The meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the special session which was held recently in New York urgently reminds us that our deadline for producing results in our negotiations is very close at hand. The Romanian delegation is therefore in favour of any practical organizational approach which will expedite our work and render the Committee's negotiations more effective. We believe that that end is served by the proposals to amend the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons so as to permit it to undertake the drafting, through negotiation, of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons, as also the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. We are also in favour of immediate and accelerated negotiations to prepare the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament, whose central importance for the forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament was stressed by the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Alfonso García-Robles. Similarly important is the continuation and intensification of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the same time it would be appropriate and wise for the Committee to respond during this part of its session to the General Assembly's urgent and well-founded appeals to it to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament -- an item which has been on the Committee's agenda since it was established -- by setting up a working group for that purpose. The initiative to that effect of the Group of 21, contained in document CD/180 of 24 April 1981, which was presented by Ambassador Sallah-Bey, the distinguished representative of Algeria, is of pressing urgency. It represents what we hope will prove to be a unanimously acceptable basis for action which is in fact aimed at facilitating the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The informal discussions on nuclear topics that took place during the first part of the Committee's session, the conclusions of the United Nations comprehensive study on nuclear weapons (document A/35/392) and the recent Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI, Yearbook, 1981) show that such a debate would be useful and timely.

The fact is that nuclear weapons and the strategic concepts underlying their development and use are the primary cause of insecurity in the world today. The so-called progress in the development of these weapons, which are being improved in geometric progression, as well as the related strategic theories, have generated a current of anxiety of unprecedented proportions. In practice the experts seem to be trying to divest the atomic bomb of its aura of horror so as to endow it with a virtue previously denied it, namely, that of an instrument designed to be used. Of course, the erosion of doctrines of deterrence goes hand-in-hand with technological refinements. The range of atomic mini-products which can be used in a variety of situations is widening. The danger of such a development is obvious because it foreshadows the ultimate development of a veritable detonator of nuclear-war, capable of unleashing a devastating conflict

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

with incalculable consequences. Reflecting this concern of the European countries, Romania and Austria, in the final communiqué issued after the recent visit of the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, to Austria, stressed that "the cessation of the arms race, particularly in the field of weapons of mass destruction, is of the greatest importance. Romania and Austria are in favour of the initiation of comprehensive negotiations with a view to the adoption of specific measures to achieve this objective. The balance of forces should be achieved, not through the acceleration of the arms race but through the progressive reduction of armed forces and armaments".

Referring to the situation with respect to the nuclear area in general, the SIPRI Yearbook stressed that even if the disarmament negotiations had scored no practical results, they still had one positive and encouraging element, which was to increase the concern of all people in the face of the danger of a world conflict. The popular movements which have emerged in recent years against the increase of military expenditures in general and those on nuclear weapons in particular are a hopeful sign (SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p.18).

We would particularly like to draw attention to the real danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war by accident, to which Ambassador A.P. Venkateswaran, the head of the Indian delegation, referred in his statement of 11 June 1981.

The prevention of the outbreak of nuclear conflict through miscalculation or accident was already among the concerns of the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament. There are also bilateral arrangements in this connection between certain nuclear-weapon countries. But all States, including small and medium-sized ones, developing and non-aligned States, are entitled to expect a multilateral control and guarantee system capable of preventing an accident which might cause a war that would instantly involve those countries, without their agreement, purely inadvertently. The impressive number of accidents involving nuclear weapons, 125 in the past 30 years, shows that the question is not a purely academic one. The self-operating nature of atomic war techniques and the increasing use of computers and automatic retaliation systems, mean that the fate of mankind depends more and more on the proper functioning of complicated electronic systems which are nevertheless themselves subject to failure.

These trends increase the possibility of nuclear war by accident, particularly in a climate in which political efforts to create confidence between States have reached a sorry pass, as we all know.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

At the same time, things are happening which reveal the fragility of existing international arrangements. I am referring to the very serious act of aggression -- the bombing by Israeli planes of nuclear installations situated near Baghdad. The Romanian people learned with deep concern and indignation of the air raid by Israeli military planes on the territory of the Republic of Iraq. The Romanian Government and people strongly condemn this totally unwarranted act of aggression which constitutes a serious violation of the elementary norms governing relations between States and of the sacred principles of national independence and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, territorial integrity and the non-use or threat of use of force. It is absolutely necessary that it should be understood, with the utmost clarity, that no one, under any pretext or circumstance, can presume to violate the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of another State and that the security of one State cannot justifiably be defended by flagrantly violating the security of other States.

In international events, the Committee on Disarmament occupies a unique position. It has a precise mandate, conferred upon it by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament -- that of negotiating multilateral disarmament agreements, and in the first instance agreements on nuclear disarmament. The basic premise of its work is that all States wish to put an end to the arms race and to agree on concrete measures of disarmament with the guaranteeing of their security at progressively lower levels of military forces and armament. Our failure to reach agreement on such precise and practical measures is used as an argument for the intensification of the arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race. The monstrous size of military budgets eloquently illustrates the consequences of this vicious circle. As the Romanian delegation has already stated during the Committee's discussions, any progress we may make in our negotiations will have favourable repercussions on the international situation as a whole. At its session next autumn, the General Assembly will once again have on its agenda dozens of items relating to disarmament. In the debates which take place delegations will be at pains to seek out the very smallest indication of the Committee's contribution. The forces that are in favour of disarmament -- the popular movements in various countries, the efforts of men of science and progressive political personalities -- are obviously outside the sphere of our Committee. However, we are convinced that their existence is an encouraging factor which can but have a positive influence on our work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Malita of Romania for his statement and the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, first of all, allow me to welcome you, the representative of a fraternal socialist country -- the Hungarian People's Republic -- in the office of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament.

You are confronted with a difficult task -- to set in operation the complex multilateral machinery of negotiations in the Committee as quickly as possible and to its full capacity. Various organizational problems facing us should not take much of our time, although their effective solution to a certain extent determines also the final outcome of our work. The Soviet delegation wishes you every success.

We also express our appreciation to the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Pfeiffer, who chaired the Committee last April.

We welcome the presence at today's meeting of the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Ambassador Ros, with whom we are all acquainted because of his work in the United Nations. We are also happy to greet the new representatives in the Committee -- the Ambassador of Argentina, Mr. Carasales, the Ambassador of the friendly nation of Iran, Mr. Ahmad Jalali and the Ambassador of Sri Lanka, Mr. Tissa Jayakoddy.

Comrade Chairman, a number of delegations in this Committee have already touched upon the question of the gangster-like Israeli action against Iraq. The position of the Soviet Union on this subject is clearly defined in the TASS statement published by the Soviet press on 10 June last.

In escalating its criminal war against the Arab peoples, Israel has committed another act of armed aggression, this time against Iraq. Israeli aircraft carried out a raid on Baghdad in order to destroy the nuclear research centre there.

However, it is well known that Iraq is a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and consequently, all its nuclear activities are subject to control by the IAEA. In contrast Israel, which has been long striving to develop nuclear weapons, flatly refuses to accede to this Treaty.

The Soviet leadership resolutely condemns the barbarous attack by the Israeli air force on the capital city of Iraq and considers that the responsibility for this act rests with Israel and with the United States of America which arms the aggressor and renders it every possible assistance and support.

The Committee on Disarmament has resumed its work against the background of a considerably aggravated international situation in which the opponents of détente are endeavouring seriously to undermine it. They have embarked on a course of further whipping up the arms race, the result being that the pace of accumulating armaments, including the most dangerous types, is outstripping efforts aimed at curbing the arms race. Negotiations on a number of specific issues relating to the limitation and restraining of the process of the qualitative and quantitative build-up of arms have been broken off or suspended.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In these circumstances the task of bridling the arms race is becoming ever more urgent, ever more pressing, and the responsibility placed on the work of the Committee on Disarmament ever greater, and filled with a new meaning. Indeed, our Committee, whose purpose is to work out realistic disarmament measures, has been expected and is expected to be capable of making a definite contribution to the consolidation of the process of détente and to the attainment of concrete disarmament agreements.

A number of events of recent years have created quite favourable conditions for the successful advancement of negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. They include the series of important international agreements concluded in the 1960s and 1970s in the sphere of the limitation of armaments and disarmament. They also include numerous proposals and initiatives on disarmament questions put forward by the Soviet Union, by socialist countries and by other States. In addition, a number of useful disarmament decisions have been adopted by the United Nations.

Certain changes made in recent years in the composition and in the character of the work of the Geneva Committee could also have had a positive impact on the negotiations. The Committee's membership has been increased with the admittance of a new group of States. For the first time, all five nuclear-weapon Powers and the militarily most advanced States are participating in multilateral disarmament negotiations. It is also important to note that the major groups of States -- socialist, capitalist, non-aligned and neutral -- are represented in the Committee on the whole in a balanced way.

New elements have also appeared in the very character of this Committee's activities. While in the past this body confined itself to general discussions on disarmament issues, the Committee has now acquired the character of a multilateral organ negotiating a wide range of disarmament problems. The main purpose of the activities of the Committee on Disarmament is that all the States participating in its work on an equal basis should work out important international disarmament instruments, such as agreements, conventions and treaties, of a legally binding nature.

A certain organizational restructuring of the Committee's work effected in recent years could have facilitated a transition from wishes and recommendations -- and the United Nations has adopted a plethora of those -- to agreements and accords. The emphasis in the Committee's activities is now laid on the work of its ad hoc subsidiary bodies -- the working groups, each of which is engaged in business-like negotiations with a view to elaborating this or that concrete agreement in the sphere of disarmament.

Of course, the Committee could have initiated negotiations on other topics, too. Indeed, its agenda encompasses virtually the entire broad spectrum of problems related to the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The Committee's rules of procedure devised and adopted two years ago are designed to help enhance the effectiveness of its work. It should be noted that many of the above-mentioned changes in the Committee's work reflect ideas and observations put forward by the Soviet Union in connection with its proposal concerning a world disarmament conference.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

However, despite all these positive developments, the Committee on Disarmament has no positive achievement to show for these years; it has merely been marking time. How can this situation be accounted for? Its root cause, first and foremost, is the policies of certain States members of the Committee, which hamper its work. The activities of the Committee on Disarmament clearly demonstrate that it is an arena of acute confrontation between two major directions in world politics, between two approaches to disarmament negotiations: on the one hand, the course towards curbing the arms race and attaining real results in the sphere of disarmament and, on the other, the course towards protracting or torpedoing negotiations. It is towards this end that the advocates of the latter course undertake attempts to prevent the Committee from conducting negotiations on the most pressing disarmament problems, unwarrantedly to reduce the time period of its work, and so on.

For example, who would deny that the most urgent disarmament problem is the cessation of the nuclear arms race? Over three years ago the Soviet Union, supported by other socialist countries, put forward a proposal concerning the cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons until they have been completely eliminated. A document to this effect (CD/4) was tabled in the Committee on Disarmament by socialist countries as early as 1979, and they were actively backed up by non-aligned and neutral States. Furthermore, a number of decisions have been adopted by the United Nations and in particular by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, calling upon the Committee to undertake negotiations forthwith on the cessation of the nuclear arms race. And yet, no such negotiations are under way in the Committee. What is the reason for this? The opposition of those countries whose representatives contend that negotiations of this kind would be, as they put it, "premature". This is an utterly false pretext.

The Soviet delegation believes that the exchange of views on the agenda item entitled "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" held during the first part of the current session of the Committee was useful. However, this is not what the world community expects from us. It is time -- it is high time to start within the Committee negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The Soviet delegation once again draws the attention of all delegations to the considerations and ideas contained in working paper CD/4 and urges that concrete negotiations on that subject should be initiated immediately in the Committee on Disarmament within the framework of any acceptable procedures and organizational forms.

To take another question -- that of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Quite auspicious conditions now seem to exist in the Committee for making headway in the solution of this issue -- for its membership includes all five nuclear-weapon Powers which could, together with the non-nuclear-weapon States members of the Committee, make a constructive contribution to the elaboration of an appropriate agreement. The group of neutral and non-aligned States has put forward a specific proposal -- to set up an ad hoc working group within the Committee and to commence forthwith negotiations on this urgent disarmament issue. Naturally, consideration of the question of a nuclear test ban in all its aspects with a view to the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

should not complicate the USSR-United States-United Kingdom negotiations on this subject which, by the way, were suspended through no fault of ours at the end of last year. In this matter as well the Committee is facing an impasse. The United States and the United Kingdom are stubbornly opposed to the establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban, while the representatives of China and France state that they have nothing against setting up such a group, but they promptly add that they are not ready to end nuclear tests, at least at the present stage.

The Soviet delegation supports the proposal of the group of non-aligned countries for the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the participation of all the nuclear-weapon Powers for the consideration of the problem of nuclear tests in all of its aspects with a view to the speediest possible conclusion of a treaty on a total and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Let us take the question of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, a highly important question in world policy. The position of the Soviet Union on this question was recently once again confirmed by President Brezhnev in his answer to the question of the Greek newspaper "Ta Nea". The Committee has before it a draft international convention on strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States submitted by the Soviet Union together with other socialist countries. Some non-aligned countries have also tabled their own draft convention. There are also quite a number of General Assembly decisions on that subject which speak in favour of concluding an international convention. Yet, despite all that, the work in the Committee on Disarmament on a draft convention is practically at a standstill. What is the reason for this? Once again it is the resistance on the part of those who maintain that the elaboration of an international convention on strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States is an "unrealistic" enterprise.

In our view, there are favourable conditions for achieving progress in the negotiations on this subject in the Committee on Disarmament. We could at least take the first joint steps in the right direction, but here too what is required is the good will of all participants in the negotiations and, in the first place, of the nuclear-weapon States. The Soviet Union has already more than once manifested such readiness.

An utterly contrived pretext is put forward to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from considering the proposal on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction and a draft treaty on this subject. The long-winded arguments of some representatives in the Committee about the "non-urgent nature" of this issue are accompanied, according to press reports, by an intensive development in various western States of new lethal types of weapons of mass destruction.

It may well be asked whether it is not the primary duty of the Committee to follow closely the evolution of this matter and to take the necessary concrete measures to prevent the emergence of new types of such weapons. This purpose could be served by the establishment of an ad hoc group of experts.

The Soviet delegation welcomes the Hungarian proposal for the holding of special informal meetings on the question of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, with the participation of experts.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

It is not the first year that the world community is insistently demanding the prohibition of neutron weapons. As early as 1978, the Soviet Union together with other socialist countries submitted a draft treaty on this subject to the Committee on Disarmament. In view of the revival of plans for the production of neutron weapons and their deployment in western Europe, this issue has acquired special urgency, as has repeatedly been stated in the Committee by representatives both of socialist and of non-aligned countries. However, here again, the "veto" of the NATO countries prevents the Committee from working out measures aimed at the banning of neutron weapons.

From time to time one may hear arguments to the effect that in the present difficult international situation it is hardly possible to conduct negotiations on disarmament matters. But nobody has yet devised a more effective way of settling questions in dispute than by an exchange of views, discussions and negotiations at various levels, provided, of course, that the parties want peace and not war.

The Soviet Union has been and continues to be a staunch and steadfast champion of the cause of disarmament. This was again emphatically reiterated by President Brezhnev on 12 June of this year during his meeting with Mr. Palme, Chairman of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, which is a non-governmental international organization. Mr. Brezhnev stressed that "we are in favour of immediate constructive negotiations, honest agreement, the lowering of the level of military confrontation both in Europe and on a global scale. The limitation of armaments and real disarmament -- these are the true guarantees of peace and a tranquil future for all peoples". Mr. Brezhnev also pointed out the need for all States and all social forces to exert their efforts to secure the intensification of negotiations with a view to achieving a firmer and more lasting peace on our planet. He affirmed that the USSR is always ready to co-operate towards the curbing of the arms race and the strengthening of peace with the representatives of all political and religious trends. These are precisely the principles that guide the Soviet delegation in the Committee on Disarmament.

We believe that there neither has been nor is a fatal inevitability of a military clash, or of a return to the cold war. The Soviet Union proceeds from the belief that there is no controversial question in relations among States which could not be resolved at the negotiating table. Likewise there is no type of armaments which the USSR would not be ready to limit or to prohibit on a reciprocal basis by agreement with other States.

The current session of the Committee on Disarmament has a particular significance. We are close to the completion of the first cycle of the work of the enlarged multilateral disarmament negotiating body with the participation of all five nuclear-weapon Powers. The Committee in its new composition has been working for three years. Scores of meetings have been held, hundreds of statements have been delivered and large numbers of documents have been circulated. We would like to see the efforts of all genuine champions of disarmament crowned with success, the wishes expressed at the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in connection with the expansion of the Committee's membership translated into life, the results of its work -- both in number and in nature -- surpassing the achievements of the Committee on Disarmament in previous periods of its activity. We would like the Committee's work -- and this is the most important thing -- to live up to the expectations of all ordinary people all over the world, thousands of whom write letters to us every day requesting, demanding that for the sake of the lives of the present and future generations we should turn from words to deeds. The Soviet delegation believes that the Committee should not come empty-handed to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We for our part will do our utmost to help achieve positive results.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Issraelyan of the Soviet Union for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation is happy to extend to you its congratulations and best wishes for your term as Chairman. It has often had occasion to appreciate your diplomatic talents, your experience and your courtesy.

You have already contributed most effectively to the organization of our work for this second part of our session. We are convinced that under your guidance our Committee will make as much progress in its work as is possible. The French delegation wishes to assure you of its wholehearted collaboration.

It also wishes to express its thanks and congratulations to our distinguished colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Pfeiffer, who presided in such a distinguished and efficient manner over our work during the month of April.

I am also pleased to welcome today Ambassador Ros, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, a great country in which I had the honour to represent France, as well as our new colleagues, Ambassador Carasales, the representative of Argentina, whom I am particularly happy to see here once again, Ambassador Jalali, the representative of Iran, and Ambassador Jayakoddy, the representative of Sri Lanka. I extend to them my congratulations and my best wishes for the success of their mission.

Several of our colleagues have made statements here expressing the reactions of their respective Governments to the Israeli attack on the Tammuz nuclear reactor.

I, too, feel compelled at this juncture to state the position of the French Government with regard to this incident, in the first place because of the gravity of the incident itself, and secondly because French industry participated in the construction of the Iraqi nuclear centre and the French Government is therefore in a better position than others to judge the nature of these facilities and the possible effects of their operation from the standpoint of the non-proliferation régime.

The Israeli attack brought a clear and immediate response from the French Government. In a statement published on 8 June, the Prime Minister described the bombardment as "an unacceptable act which the Government condemns and which only increases the tension in the region". On 15 June, in the Security Council, the representative of France condemned the Israeli attack as a "violation of the fundamental principles to which all States signatories of our Charter have subscribed, and especially of the right of every State to respect for its sovereignty and independence and the universal obligation not to resort to the use of force".

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

I would remind you that the Israeli raid cost a French engineer his life.

I come now to the question of the possible or alleged effects which the operation of the Tammuz reactor could have had on the non-proliferation régime.

The Israeli Government has asserted, and I quote that Government's own statement, that the purpose of the Tammuz reactor "was to produce atomic bombs".

The French Government rejects this allegation. On this point, I wish to quote the statement of the representative of France in the Security Council:

"The only purpose of the Tammuz reactor is scientific research and the agreements concluded between France and Iraq rule out any utilization, even indirectly, for military purposes.

"We are in a position to state the facts about the Tammuz I and Tammuz II reactors because they are exact replicas of the Isis and Osiris reactors built for the purposes of the French civilian programme, which are in service at the Saclay Centre and are used for irradiation experiments and the production of radioisotopes.

"At yesterday's meeting, attention was drawn to two fundamental dangers: the diversion of enriched uranium and the production of plutonium.

"There are no grounds for the first hypothesis. The IAEA inspections are aimed precisely at verifying that these fuels are not being diverted. They have given every satisfaction, moreover. Furthermore, as soon as the fuels have begun to be irradiated in the core of the reactor, the highly enriched uranium they contain becomes unsuitable for the manufacture of explosives. Lastly, I would remind you of the statement issued by the French Government in 1960: 'deliveries of this uranium correspond solely to the needs of the research reactor. They are programmed for that purpose and all necessary precautions are taken'.

"The second hypothesis is likewise unfounded. The Tammuz reactor is designed exclusively for scientific research. Any attempt to use it for the production of plutonium for military purposes, which would involve the massive irradiation of natural uranium in order subsequently to obtain plutonium by reprocessing, would call for considerable modification of the installations and the handling of dangerously irradiated substances in quantities amounting to several tonnes. Such an operation, which would take many years, would be immediately detected.

"To conclude this technical explanation, it would be absurd for a country wishing to manufacture a nuclear bomb to build a reactor such as the one at Tammuz in order to obtain substances for military purposes. As everyone knows, there are simple ways of achieving that end: the purchase of centrifuges for the enrichment of uranium or the construction of plutonium reactors using natural uranium, for example.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

"Iraq has given France, through agreements concluded in 1975 and 1976 and made public in due course, precise and formal undertakings with regard to controls and safeguards. In accordance with its obligations under the NPT, Iraq has concluded with IAEA all the necessary safeguards agreements. It has provided IAEA with all the required information. IAEA inspectors have visited Tammuz twice (the second time this very year), and found nothing abnormal. The French Government, for its part, in its concern to see that no diversion took place and to avoid any criticism or suspicion, had only recently taken steps to ensure that no measure would be overlooked to guarantee that deliveries were used purely for peaceful purposes.

"In these circumstances, the Israeli attack, among other consequences, seriously threatens the very principles of peaceful nuclear co-operation between States within an international non-proliferation system. It could shake the foundations of international co-operation in this field. In this connection, the French delegation cannot but subscribe to the views expressed by Dr. Eklund, Director-General of the IAEA, to the Agency's Board of Governors:

'The Agency inspected the Iraqi reactors and found no sign of activity contrary to the NPT. Apparently, a country which is not a signatory of the NPT did not trust our reports or our capacity to continue effectively to discharge our responsibilities as regards safeguards. The conclusion may therefore be drawn that the Agency's verification system itself has been attacked. Where will this lead us in the future? This is a matter of grave concern and should be carefully studied'."

The statement of the representative of France in the Security Council ended on that point.

The French delegation very much shares the concern expressed by other speakers here. The disarmament effort can make headway only if there is respect for international order. The use of force is the very negation of that order. Furthermore, the action we are condemning jeopardizes the only international system that exists in the field of verification -- that of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It calls into question the very conditions for international technological co-operation in the sphere of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- a co-operation which is a goal of the utmost importance for all nations.

All these reasons justify the misgivings and alarm that have been voiced on this subject by members of the Committee. The Security Council is at present discussing the matter: we can but hope that it will take the decisions which the international community is entitled to expect of it.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de la Gorce of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): My Government has made known its condemnation of the attack by the Israeli air force on the Iraqi nuclear installations, most recently through the representative of Italy to the United Nations on 15 June during the debate that the Security Council is holding on the subject. I would also wish to associate my delegation with the statement that I understand is about to be made by the distinguished representative of Japan on behalf also of other western States.

I can therefore confine my statement, now, in this Committee, to the expression of our deep concern over the potential harm that such an attack can cause to the credibility and effectiveness of the non-proliferation régime. In this connection, I wish to reaffirm that Italy has always attached great importance to the provisions of article IV of the NPT which calls for the promotion of international co-operation among States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Article IV provides also that due consideration should be paid to "the needs of the developing areas of the world". As one concrete initiative in implementation of article IV of the Treaty, Italy engaged in a programme of co-operation with Iraq in the field of nuclear energy.

The sale of five nuclear research laboratories was stipulated in full accordance with the letter and the spirit of the NPT. Iraq is a party to the NPT since 1970 and has opened its nuclear installations, including the laboratories supplied by Italy, to IAEA inspections. Moreover, in the framework of the above-mentioned programme of co-operation, it has voluntarily accepted more stringent forms of control, in keeping with the guidelines for nuclear transfers adopted by the London Suppliers' Club. The compliance of Iraq with the obligations under the provisions of the NPT was authoritatively confirmed by the Director-General of IAEA in a statement published on 9 June: "Iraq has been a party to the NPT since it came into force in 1970. In accordance with the Treaty, Iraq accepted safeguards on all its nuclear activities. These safeguards have been satisfactorily applied to date, including during this recent period of armed conflict with Iran. The last safeguard inspection at the Iraqi nuclear centre took place in January this year and all nuclear material there was satisfactorily accounted for. This material included the fuel so far delivered for the Tammuz reactor. A further inspection was planned to take place on 7-8 June."

In the view of my Government the NPT and IAEA safeguards requirements remain the agreed framework for the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies for peaceful uses. My Government considers it its obligation, as a member of the international community, to foster such co-operative activities vigorously as our contribution to the development of other countries.

We have therefore rejected, as totally unfounded, the allegations made in Israel with regard to our co-operation with Iraq in the field of nuclear trade. They are evidently prompted by the need to try to legitimize an action which is in every respect inadmissible and gravely prejudicial to international peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Minister Ciarrapico of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I now give the floor to Ambassador Carasales of Argentina in his capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): As you stated, Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21, in order to inform the Committee of a statement by the Group on the air attack against a nuclear facility perpetrated by Israel on 7 June 1981. The Group's statement reads as follows:

"1. The members of the Group of 21 have consistently upheld the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations. The members of the Group have always opposed and continue to oppose all acts of aggression and violation of these principles.

"2. Therefore, the Group of 21 condemns the blatant aggression committed by Israel against the peaceful nuclear facilities in the vicinity of Baghdad on 7 June 1981. It considers that this unprecedented attack, and the untenable reasoning used to justify it, are matters of special concern to the Committee on Disarmament. This action by Israel furthermore contravenes the provisions of paragraphs 65 to 71 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament relating to nuclear non-proliferation and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It also poses a challenge to the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

"3. This attack is all the more unwarranted as the developing, non-aligned and neutral countries are strongly opposed to nuclear weapons and have been in the vanguard of efforts for nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 rejects the assertions that have sought to portray the development of peaceful nuclear energy programmes in developing countries as an inevitable threat of horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation.

"4. The Group of 21 is convinced that the international community should condemn this aggression and take all the necessary measures to ensure against the repetition of such an aggression by Israel or any other State. It urges the Committee on Disarmament to reaffirm the international principle prohibiting an attack against the peaceful nuclear facilities of a State under any circumstances. The Group recommends that the Committee take appropriate steps which would contribute to reversing the adverse implications of this action."

That is the end of the statement by the Group of 21. I should only like to add that I have asked the Secretariat -- and I think it has already been done -- to circulate this statement as an official document for the consideration of the members of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Carreras for his intervention presenting the statement of the ~~Group of 21~~ on the Israeli air attack against a nuclear facility on 7 June 1981, and would like to assure him that his statement has already been circulated.

Mr. JALALI (Iran): Mr. Chairman, allow me at the outset to associate myself with the distinguished representatives who have congratulated you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June, and to assure you at the same time of the full co-operation of my delegation in your efforts to achieve progress in the negotiations of the Committee on Disarmament.

We would also like to express our gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany.

We should also like to extend our heartiest welcome to the distinguished representatives who are heading their delegations for the first time in the Committee, and I wish at the same time to express my gratitude for the kind words of welcome addressed to me.

In spite of the fact that Iran is the obvious victim of the blatant and cruel aggression of the Iraqi régime, my delegation did not object to the consensus of the Group of 21 on the recent Israeli air attack against nuclear facilities of the Iraqi nation. In order to dispel any doubts I deem it necessary to put on record the position of my Government.

Under the present most pressing circumstances when responsible and peace-loving nations direct their utmost efforts towards maintaining and strengthening international peace and security, we have learnt with grave concern about the Israeli air attack against Iraqi nuclear facilities in violation of the basic norms of international law and conduct.

The destruction of the nuclear installations of Iraq is a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations.

The Israeli régime, already steeped in all sorts of crimes of aggression, a régime which has on infinite occasions proven that consistent breach of international law is, in fact, its sole "raison d'être", has been trying in vain to justify its conduct. Nevertheless the peace-loving nations committed to the noble ideals of humanity will judge such behaviour for what it truly is, a most shameful and despicable act.

The Iranian nation that has been victimized and compromised by the conspiracy of silence directed against it by other Governments, at the time when it is heroically resisting the outrageous aggression of the brutal régime of Iraq and is fighting in the exercise of the legitimate right of self-defence with courage and selflessness for its political independence and territorial integrity, knows only too well and with bitter insight what it means when the divine rights of human beings and the principles of international law are violated, an unjustifiable act of aggression is committed and the international community maintains silence.

It is now over nine months that the wilful and despotic régime of Iraq, with total disregard for the basic principles of the Charter of the United Nations, devised as a safeguard against the waging of wars, has opted to use force against Iran in order

(Mr. Jalali, Iran)

to satisfy its petty ambitions. It is a sad truth that the Iraqi war of aggression against my country has not been confined to a mere act of military intervention across the Iranian frontiers. The aggressor has ignored and, indeed, trampled upon every international humanitarian principle governing the treatment of civilians in times of war and prohibiting the destruction of the civilian institutions and economic resources of occupied territories. Iraqi indiscriminate bombardment of villages and towns has caused massive destruction resulting in thousands of casualties among civilian populations. The use of chemical weapons, in violation of the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol is another example of the criminal deeds of the Iraqi régime in Iran. The refugees whose homes and communities have been ruined, number over two and a half million. Many economic centres have been either destroyed or severely damaged and residential areas in the southern part of Iran have been the favourite target of the ground-to-ground missiles of the Iraqi régime. The crimes of the Iraqi régime have not been limited to Iranians. Our Iraqi brothers are also being led by this inhuman régime to unknown altars of sacrifice, ignorant of the evil intentions of their leaders and their ultimate destiny.

Despite the fact that the criminal behaviour of the Iraqi régime has cost both nations the lives of thousands, untold damages in the cities and economic destruction of incredible dimensions, we do not for a single second choose to negate the need to keep faith with international law and regulations. Quite the opposite, in fact: we feel the necessity for strict respect of international law much more keenly than everyone else. We therefore do not believe that "evil should cure evil".

Even though the international community has not played a fair hand with the Islamic Republic of Iran and has exercised silence and purposeful oversight in dealing with Iraq's blatant aggression, we cannot keep silent ourselves when international peace and security is threatened by acts of stark adventurism and aggression in violation of international law.

In this context, the importance of respect for the principles of international law cannot be overemphasized and we feel absolutely committed to those principles. The fact that Israeli aggression was directed against the cruel régime of Iraq, which has imposed an inhuman war upon us, does not affect our basic convictions. Our support for the declaration of the Group of 21 derives from our belief in those principles.

Now that the world conscience is concerned about the dangerous consequences and implications of acts of aggression it is imperative, more than ever, that the international community condemns the use of force and acts of aggression wherever and in whatever form they may occur.

Irresponsible and adventurous régimes should not for a second suppose that they can achieve their illegitimate objectives by inhuman and unjust wars such as the one Iraq has imposed upon my country.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jalali of Iran for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. FLOWERRIE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the United States delegation I would like to express our pleasure at your assumption of the Chair for the month of June and to assure you of our wish to help in all possible ways to facilitate your difficult task. I would also wish to convey our thanks to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, for his effectiveness in guiding us through our work during the busy month of April.

We would like in addition to extend a warm welcome to the new representatives of Sri Lanka, Iran and Argentina as well as to our distinguished visitor today, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Ambassador Ros.

My purpose in taking the floor is to make a brief statement on a subject that has been raised by many delegations both at this meeting and during our two previous plenary meetings -- the Israeli attack on the Iraqi reactor, a subject that has been well aired this morning.

First I wish to recall that the United States Government has condemned the 7 June Israeli attack.

There are, as all of us are aware, many ramifications of this incident that go beyond the competence of this Committee. This development and certain of its implications have been considered by the Governing Board of the IAEA, and in its broadest aspects it is now actively under consideration in the United Nations Security Council. The definitive views of the United States on these questions, which are of great importance to regional and world security, will be put forward in that forum.

It is to be regretted that in his statement on this incident this morning the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union sought to impugn the motives of the United States in providing arms to Israel. In this connection I would like to quote from a pertinent section of the United States-Israel Mutual Defense-Assistance Agreement of 23 July 1952:

"The Government of Israel assures the United States Government that such equipment, materials, or services as may be acquired from the United States ... are required for and will be used solely to maintain its internal security, its legitimate self-defense, or to permit it to participate in the defense of the area of which it is a part, or in United Nations collective security arrangements and measures, and that it will not undertake any act of aggression against any other States."

This section of the Agreement was cited by Secretary of State Haig in a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 10 June. He concluded that letter with the following paragraph:

"In responding to this incident we will make clear the seriousness with which we view the obligations of foreign countries to observe scrupulously the terms and conditions under which the United States furnishes defense articles and defense services. We will, of course, inform the Congress of the outcome of our discussions with the Government of Israel and our deliberations on the response warranted."

I trust that this statement will set the record straight.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Flowerree of the United States for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): A number of western delegations have taken the floor this morning in connection with the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre. The other western delegations, whose Governments, including my own, have already expressed their views on this matter, have nevertheless asked me to make the following statement on their behalf:

"The Governments represented by these delegations reconfirm their position that only a policy based on respect for and strict adherence to the principle of the renunciation of the use of force can lead to durable solutions to the problems with which the world is confronted. This is of particular relevance to the Middle East.

"These Governments wish to place on record their condemnation of the recent Israeli attack. Such military operations are not only detrimental to efforts to restore peace and security in the region: they are harmful to the efforts of the international community to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons based on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the associated safeguards system administered by the IAEA, and they are harmful to the cause of disarmament in general."

The delegations on whose behalf I have the honour to speak note that the Security Council is currently addressing the issue.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Okawa of Japan for his statement expressing the position of some western countries concerning the Israeli air attack of 7 June 1981.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I asked for the floor to speak on a slightly different subject, and I will do that very briefly in a moment. Before doing so, I want, in the vein of the discussion of the last few minutes in this Committee, simply to make clear our own position. I made no reference, in my remarks to the Committee a week ago, to the Israeli action against Iraq. I did not make any reference because our strong condemnation of Israel's action had been made abundantly clear in the Canadian House of Commons on 9 June by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and by means of the motions from all sides of the House of Commons on this matter. You, as also members of the Committee, will know the position of the Canadian Government in discussions of this kind.

We are anxious to recognize within this Committee the right of all members to raise matters which they consider appropriate for discussion here, but the question which has been before us for the last few moments is before the Security Council and we do not really feel that it is appropriate for the Committee on Disarmament to address itself to that subject in any detail. This is, after all, a negotiating body and we think it unhelpful that it should be deflected from its negotiating tasks by debating resolutions on subjects that are not clearly within its competence. But I would not in the least want our failure to comment on the subject to be taken as indifference. On the contrary, I subscribe fully to the statement that has just been made by the Ambassador of Japan and my Government subscribes to the position contained therein.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

I asked for the floor simply to reply to some comments made earlier today by my Brazilian colleague, as I think the Committee deserves a quick response. He referred to the document which I tabled a week ago on verification and I just want to make one or two observations on his comments.

I think a close study of the proposal that we put forward then will satisfy any concerns he may have. We intend, at an appropriate moment, to suggest an informal exchange of views for the benefit of all on the question of verification and we think that can take place outside the Conference room, and we would propose that that exchange should relate to general problems of verification. It is perfectly true that there is no place in the Committee's work programme which we have just adopted for the Committee to address this subject as a separate item, and the Committee has indeed a heavy schedule and -- a point that I have made on several occasions -- we do not want to distract the Committee from its priority work. But I would remind the Committee that verification is one of the ten subjects in the so-called decalogue which defines the permanent structure of the Committee's interest and concern, and I think, accordingly, that it is perfectly appropriate to consider the matter of verification if it will contribute to our collective enlightenment and thus permit us to negotiate better. Our intention, therefore, is to invite members of the Committee to participate in a kind of open-ended seminar on verification, perhaps within the next several weeks. We hope that the results of our exchange of views will contribute to a greater awareness and understanding of what is, quite obviously from the deliberations of the Committee, a difficult and a demanding subject. In sum, I would suggest that this is a matter we have raised which should be considered to be horizontal rather than vertical. Indeed we have used the word generic although I would not necessarily want to emphasize the abstraction. It is not a matter for deliberation or debate of the kind that goes on in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. We are talking about methodology, and we have some methodological problems relating to negotiations. That, I think, is what should be looked at by the Committee informally; it should not treat the matter as a substantive disarmament question, because that is not the spirit in which we have raised it. The representative of Brazil made it clear that his reaction was a preliminary one but I thought it might be helpful to offer these observations.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, since we have only a few minutes left, I shall refrain from congratulating you, thanking Ambassador Pfeiffer and welcoming our new colleagues, and go straight into the substance of my statement.

In the course of the present and of preceding meetings of this Committee a number of representatives have raised the question of Israel's criminal attack on the capital of the Republic of Iraq, as a result of which the nuclear research centre near Baghdad was destroyed. In this connection, I should like to state on behalf of a group of socialist countries that -- as can be learnt from their official declarations published in the past few days -- the socialist States resolutely condemn the military aggression against the Republic of Iraq and the bombing of its capital by Israeli military aircraft.

Such an act constitutes a gross violation of the generally recognized principles of international law enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in other international instruments. It is necessary to take all appropriate measures to ensure that similar acts will not be repeated in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic for his intervention and I take note of the statement he made on behalf of a group of socialist countries concerning the Israeli air attack against a nuclear facility in Iraq.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, just a brief word, through you, to say to my distinguished colleague from Canada, that by no means are we detracting from the importance of his document. We realize its usefulness and I am happy to hear the way he put it as not being a subject for debate in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the revised time-table for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies for the present week, we should have held today, immediately after the plenary meeting, an informal meeting for the consideration of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies and other questions relating to the organization of work. However, in view of the lateness of the hour and the fact that at 3 p.m. today the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet, I suggest that we start our discussion on these questions at an informal meeting tomorrow, Friday, at 3 p.m. and continue at a further informal meeting to be held on Monday, 22 June, at 3 p.m. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today the time-table of meetings to be held during the coming week. I have not listed in that time-table, for the time being, additional informal meetings, except for Friday afternoon. The allocation of further meetings will depend on our discussion tomorrow at the informal meeting, as well as on the possibility of cancelling the plenary meeting on Tuesday if there are no speakers on that occasion. At present, there are no speakers listed for the plenary meeting on Tuesday, and I would appeal to members desiring to speak on Tuesday to inscribe their names by Monday morning. As usual, the time-table is merely indicative and subject to change, if required. If there are no objections, we will be guided by it during the coming week. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is for the present scheduled for Tuesday, 23 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.131
25 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 23 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. I. KOMIVES (Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. IATI

Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina:

Mr. J. CARASALES

Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO

Mr. J.M. OTLGUI

Miss N. NASCITBENE

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. K. PRANOV

Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma:

U NGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. D.S. McPHAIL

Mr. G. SKINNER

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mr. LI Changhe

Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. PREDO NUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran: Mr. D. AMERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. H. SHARIFI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLIES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. L. ABDELHANID

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela: Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia: Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire: Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General: Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee: Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time I am speaking at a plenary meeting, allow me to extend to you my delegation's most sincere congratulations on your presiding over the debates of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of June. Needless to say, you may rely upon our co-operation and support at all times.

Allow me to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, on the way in which he guided our work.

I should also like to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassadors Carasales of Argentina, Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka and Jalali of Iran: we are sure that we may look forward to a period of fruitful collaboration with them.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, I had hoped to address the Committee last Thursday, but I was unable to attend the meeting and therefore although, according to our programme of work this week should be devoted to the subject of nuclear-weapon tests, I should like, with your permission, to refer to other topics of interest to my delegation.

In the first place, I wish to say that, as soon as it learned of the underhand attack perpetrated by the Israeli air force against a civilian nuclear installation of Iraq, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba expressed its most vigorous condemnation of that criminal action which violated the most elementary rules of international law. My delegation wishes to place its condemnation of that action on record, and to stress that the Committee on Disarmament cannot remain impassive in the face of such an act of vandalism: at the very least, we should begin to consider, with all due urgency, what position we should take. For that purpose we have before us the document submitted by the Group of 21 and the statements made by other groups of States.

At the meeting of the Security Council convened as a result of these events, the Cuban Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Malmierca, declared that the United States was directly responsible for the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear power station, and for the dangerous deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. He also stressed that if that aggression remained unpunished, all the peoples of the Middle East would be exposed to similar actions and a dangerous precedent for world peace would be established.

We should be mindful of the fact that this act of aggression is not an isolated incident, but rather part of an entire strategy towards the region, as is further shown by the indiscriminate attacks against Lebanon, the Palestinians and the Arab deterrent forces, and the threats made against Syria and other States in the area.

At the request of Iraq, Cuba convened an emergency meeting of the non-aligned countries to discuss the case. At the plenary meeting which they have just held at the United Nations, those countries condemned the Israeli aggression and called upon the Security Council to apply against Israel the sanctions provided for in chapter VII of the Organizations' Charter.

At the same meeting, the movement of non-aligned countries also requested all States, and especially the United States, to put an end to all military, political and economic assistance to Israel, in order to prevent it from continuing to pursue its policy of aggression against the Arab and Palestinian peoples.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

I have begun my statement with this subject because I know that many delegations have already expressed themselves in a similar manner and attach great importance to this matter, as does the Cuban delegation.

We have heard various views as to what a statement in plenary meeting ought to be, and how useful such meetings are. My delegation considers that plenary meetings are very useful, especially if we discuss questions of substance and do not waste too much time dilating upon general aspects.

In keeping with this position, I intend to be very brief in presenting the Cuban delegation's ideas with regard to the work of the Committee. I should like to say first of all that my delegation is glad to note that the Committee was able to adopt its programme of work for the summer part of this year's session at an early date. To be frank, I should have preferred it if we could have decided at this stage to end our discussions at the end of August, but I know that a consensus is necessary and I recognize that the formula reached is extremely flexible and constitutes a good basis for the conduct of our work.

My delegation attaches particular importance to the fact that the working groups began their work on Tuesday last, 16 June. We are all agreed, or at least so it has always seemed, that the best machinery available to the Committee for advancing in the fulfilment of the mandate entrusted to it is that of working groups.

In this connection, my delegation wishes to emphasize once again the need for the Committee to decide to set up the other two working groups proposed by the member countries of the Group of 21 with the support of the socialist countries. I am referring to the working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, and the working group on the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, proposals contained in document CD/180 and CD/181 respectively.

We can, by the attitude we adopt with respect to the establishment of these working groups, but even more by the efforts we make to see that they are set up without delay, demonstrate our political will in the matter of disarmament negotiations.

My delegation firmly believes that these two working groups, on items which have obvious priority in the work programme we have adopted, should be set up at the present session, so that we can tell the United Nations General Assembly that the Committee considers them subjects fit for negotiations, in conformity with the views of the international community. There would be no justification whatsoever for any other course of action.

One question we cannot pass over in silence is that of the broadening of the terms of reference of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons. This is recognized in the work programme we have adopted, and my delegation is ready to co-operate in the search for a formula acceptable to all to ensure the best possible prospects for our negotiations on this item.

At the beginning of the summer part of the Committee's session for this year, the international situation is still clouded. The reasons remain the same as those I mentioned in my statement to the Committee on 14 April last.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

However, as is clear from your opening speech on 11 June, the Committee cannot wait for this situation to improve in order to consider the many proposals before it and to endeavour to achieve tangible results.

This is all the more important since this Committee is the only forum in which disarmament negotiations are still under way. We thus bear a major responsibility before world public opinion.

Furthermore, as many speakers have already pointed out, we shall be devoting a large part of our spring meetings next year to preparations for the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which is why we must make the greatest possible effort at this session to reach some concrete agreement, particularly with regard to the four items which are at present the subject of negotiations in the working groups.

In this connection, I should like briefly to state my delegation's position with respect to each of those items.

With regard to new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, we are in favour of the adoption of a general agreement for the prohibition of the development of such weapons, without any prior identification of those weapons since, logically, that would presuppose that they existed. However, we recognize the importance which the adoption of partial agreements on this matter would have, and we are prepared to continue working in this direction.

As regards so-called negative guarantees, we are in favour of the adoption, as soon as possible, of an international instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States having no such weapons on their territories or under their jurisdiction or control. We firmly believe that this is a very broad approach and could prove acceptable.

With respect to chemical weapons, we consider it very important that a convention should be adopted which provides, among other things, for the destruction of stocks of such weapons, the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling, and the fostering of co-operation for peaceful purposes among States parties.

With regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, we should merely like to stress the urgency of the need for its adoption so that it can be considered by the United Nations General Assembly at its forthcoming special session devoted to disarmament. As is stated in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should encompass all measures thought to be advisable in order to attain the goal of general and complete disarmament in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is consolidated.

My delegation believes that when we are considering these measures we ought not to neglect those which some seek to relegate to a secondary level, such as the dismantling of foreign military bases and the cessation of acts of hostility and aggression against other States.

In conclusion, we earnestly hope that, at this part of our session as during the spring part of the session, a constructive atmosphere will prevail within the Committee. That offers the best way for us to carry out the mandate entrusted to us and to fulfil the responsibility we have assumed towards our peoples.

THE CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Cuba, Ambassador Sola Vila, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SALAH-BEY (Algeria) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, allow me first of all to extend to you, in the name of the Algerian delegation, my congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for this month. I have no doubt that thanks to your experience, to your extensive knowledge and also to the respect which you yourself and your country command in the Committee on Disarmament, you will help us make headway in our work.

Our thanks go also to Ambassador Pfeiffer, the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, for the way in which he presided over our work during the month of April.

Last week the Committee adopted its programme of work for the second part of its 1981 session. My delegation would now like to express a number of views concerning the mandate entrusted to us.

The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in the near future will assuredly be the occasion for an evaluation of the progress made in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The relatively modest results achieved during the spring part of the Committee's session offer a small but adequate basis for the achievement of more substantial progress.

The questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and, in connection with this fundamental issue the halting of nuclear tests are among the main concerns of world opinion. On the initiative of the Group of 21, the Committee on Disarmament held a number of informal meetings during the first part of its session, in the course of which questions were discussed which are considered essential not only by my own delegation but also by all the countries represented in the Group of 21.

My delegation regrets that the Committee has not yet been in a position to take a positive decision with regard to the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 for the establishment of two working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda. In the case of item 1 of the agenda, I had the privilege to propose, on behalf of the Group of 21, the terms of the mandate which could be entrusted to a working group on a nuclear test ban.

Since a specific proposal for the mandate of a working group on a nuclear test ban has been formally put before the Committee on Disarmament, my delegation hopes that, through informal consultations or at informal meetings, the Committee will take steps to decide to set up a working group on a nuclear test ban and to draw up the terms of reference for it.

The second proposal of the Group of 21 concerns the creation of a working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. This proposal has not yet been the subject of an agreement within our Committee. Nevertheless, in the course of a series of informal meetings the Committee on Disarmament has begun to consider some important aspects of this question.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

It was also my privilege to present, on 16 April, on behalf of the Group of 21, various important issues which might be examined in the course of multilateral negotiations. This rapid assessment of the essential areas in which it appears that significant progress might be made has been deliberately confined to items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda in view of the particular importance which my delegation attaches to these two fundamental questions.

The agenda for the summer part of the Committee's session also includes the consideration of questions relating to the organization of our work. In earlier statements my delegation has stressed the fact of this Committee's being a multilateral negotiating body. While it is clear that substantive discussions and progress towards disarmament can be facilitated by the adoption of procedures and measures relating to the organization of the Committee's work, nevertheless my delegation considers that these discussions should not cause us to lose sight of our real objective or to waste the time which many delegations agree in finding limited in view of the breadth of the tasks entrusted to the Committee.

The work of the Committee on Disarmament cannot be divorced from the context of the international situation which has certainly not improved since the opening of the Committee's 1981 session. An exceptionally serious incident has just demonstrated to international opinion and particularly to all States members of the Committee on Disarmament just how far the policy of military force and the will for political domination can lead.

On 7 June last, the Zionist air force attacked and destroyed a peaceful nuclear facility in Iraq. My country's Head of State described this aggression as an act of international banditry.

My delegation believes that this extraordinary serious incident should be approached from two standpoints.

The first is the condemnation of Zionist aggression. The entire international community, and just recently the Security Council, have condemned this criminal act. The Arab countries, and my country in particular, which have constantly opposed Israel's policy of fait accompli, are today not particularly surprised by its recent behaviour which carried to its apogee a permanent policy of cynicism and destruction.

The second aspect of this affair more directly concerns the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation has noted with satisfaction the position expressed in this connection by the Group of 21 and hopes that the Committee will adopt a position in line with the statement of the Group of 21 presented on 17 June.

The Zionist attack was psychologically prepared by international campaigns waged by various information media with the concealed objective of prohibiting access by certain countries to nuclear technology. It would seem that, according to the reasoning underlying this attitude, some countries, Israel and South Africa in particular, claim that they have the right to acquire nuclear technology and to manufacture and possess nuclear devices.

(Mr. Salah-Bey, Algeria)

In this connection, the position adopted by my country with regard to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has been substantiated, since not only have the nuclear-weapon Powers failed to live up to their undertakings regarding the development of technical co-operation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes but in addition we see that a country, assisted in different ways at the international level, presumes to exercise sole responsibility for setting the limits to a neighbouring State's economic and technological development.

Finally, the attack on a nuclear facility for peaceful purposes gives peculiar relevance to the consideration of the discussions of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons based on the Swedish delegation's proposal for the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear facilities.

The present difficulties and dangers of the international environment should encourage the Committee on Disarmament to intensify its efforts to clear the way for substantial progress in the field of disarmament.

An incident of exceptional gravity has just shown to what aberrations a policy of force and domination may lead. Other incidents, possibly accidental, could at any moment engulf our peoples in uncontrollable processes of armed conflict. My delegation's wish is that the countries now possessing considerable military and nuclear power should genuinely express their will to negotiate with a view to general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Salah-Bey of Algeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be brief, not because item 1 of the Committee's agenda lacks any importance, but because it has already been the subject of exhaustive examination, for more than two decades, by many organs of the United Nations. I am not going to make, for the record, a recapitulation of all resolutions, reports, studies and other documents from many authoritative sources which deal with the cessation of further tests of nuclear weapons; neither do I propose to recall in detail, once again, the commitments undertaken by the nuclear-weapon Powers, in several international documents, to engage in serious negotiations to achieve a nuclear test ban. Some of those texts, as is the case of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, commit all five nuclear-weapon Powers together with the remainder of the membership of the United Nations; others, like the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, set out legally binding obligations to achieve the conclusion of a treaty banning all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time. Still another international instrument, which has not received the adherence of many non-nuclear-weapon States, but which is continually referred to by its few nuclear-weapon Parties as a very important treaty, whose provisions must be scrupulously respected, contains in its article VI an obligation that has been interpreted by its non-nuclear members, at the periodical reviews of that agreement, as setting out a clear obligation for the nuclear-weapon Powers to achieve the discontinuance of their tests of nuclear-weapons, as a means to impede the continuing vertical proliferation of those weapons.

(Mr. De Souza e Silva, Brazil)

Such commitments, expressed in the form of legal international obligations, and the repeated call of the community of nations for the cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons seem, however, to have been completely forgotten by those who undertook the obligations they spell out, sometimes in return for the relinquishing, by non-nuclear-weapon States, of sovereign rights of vital importance to the security of the latter.

In this situation, there is little else that the community of nations can do but to express, in the most clear terms, its profound dissatisfaction, and indeed its indignation, at this state of affairs, even at the risk of repeating itself endlessly to deaf ears.

The latest attempt by the non-nuclear-weapon nations which do not belong to either of the two military alliances to impress upon the nuclear-weapon Powers the importance and urgency that the former attach to the multilateral negotiation of a treaty prohibiting the further testing of nuclear weapons was the document issued at the close of the first part of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. Document CD/181 calls specifically upon the Committee to establish an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda and proposes the wording of a mandate for that working group; moreover, it poses specific substantive questions to the trilateral negotiators of a test-ban treaty. As all members of the Committee are aware, only two nuclear-weapon Powers have refused to agree to the establishment of the proposed subsidiary body.

Many years have elapsed since the commitments I mentioned above were undertaken; more than a year has gone by since the Group of 21 first proposed the establishment of a working group on item 1, and almost two months have passed since the presentation of document CD/181. The trilateral negotiators, among which are the two nuclear-weapon Powers that oppose the consensus otherwise existing in the Committee, have been asked simple, straightforward questions, dictated by a genuine desire to tackle an issue which touches directly and fundamentally on the vital security interests of all States. The cessation of the further testing of nuclear weapons does not belong exclusively to the province of the three negotiators, or even to that of the five nuclear-weapon Powers; indeed, all nations in the world have a legitimate interest in a treaty that would ban all nuclear-weapon testing in all environments for all time.

My delegation would be unfaithful to the responsibility resting upon all Members of the United Nations were it not to recall at this opportunity the need for agreement on the start of urgent multilateral negotiations on item 1 of our agenda. At the recent session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which unfortunately could not achieve agreement on all the other items on its own agenda, a consensus text on nuclear disarmament was painstakingly negotiated, once again demonstrating the importance attached by the international community to that question, to which the nuclear test ban is so closely related. The report of the Disarmament Commission on nuclear disarmament states, among other things, that the "special responsibility" incumbent upon the nuclear-weapon Powers entails "the respect for the security concerns of non-nuclear nations, the refraining from any action conducive to the intensification of the nuclear arms race and above all the pursuit of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. De Souza e Silva, Brazil)

It is the exercise of that responsibility that all Members of the United Nations expect from the three negotiating Powers and particularly from the two States that have so far opposed the consensus on the establishment of a working group on item 1 within the Committee. My delegation is convinced that these States will not shirk their special responsibilities, and that they will have utilized constructively the recess of the Committee to evolve, at long last, their response to the unanimous concern of the non-nuclear-weapon nations with regard to the multilateral negotiation of a nuclear-weapon test ban. They are the ones who should be making statements this week, under item 1 of the agenda.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Comrade Chairman, taking the floor today for the first time at the second part of our 1981 session, I am happy to see you, the representative of a brotherly socialist country, as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of June. Congratulating you and wishing you every success in the chair, I am also expressing my personal conviction that thanks to your skill and experience the Committee will this month make further progress in the disarmament dialogue. I also wish to extend my sincere thanks and appreciation to Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany for his remarkable performance in the chair of this Committee last April. My delegation welcomes the new representatives in the Committee on Disarmament: Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Jalali of Iran and Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka. We wish them all the best in their new posts and offer them our full co-operation.

Since we closed the spring part of our session, the international political environment has not improved. On the contrary, just a few days before we resumed our deliberations, the international community learned with dismay of an unprecedented act of aggression committed by Israel, this time against Iraq: the bombardment of the nuclear centre near Baghdad. I join my delegation's voice to the expressions of protest and indignation raised in this room by other delegations and groups of delegations from the beginning of our session. The bombing of the Iraqi nuclear centre by Israeli planes was an unparalleled act of terrorism and international piracy. The Government of Poland has strongly condemned the attack. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a statement issued after the Israeli attack, declared: "Polish public opinion, Polish society and the Polish Government indignantly condemn this overt act of aggression as a violation of all norms of international law, and hold the Israeli authorities and the forces backing and helping them in the pursuit of this aggressive policy totally responsible for its consequences."

My delegation notes with satisfaction that the Committee on Disarmament, through the representatives of all of its groups, has condemned that act of piracy. The resolution in this respect unanimously approved by the Security Council reflects a universal condemnation of this Israeli aggression by the whole community of nations.

I have no doubt that it is in just such situations that the Committee should demonstrate its will and strength through the unity of approach and action of its members in conducting the disarmament dialogue and thus leading up to the diminishing of international tension. My delegation notes with satisfaction in this context the fact that the Committee managed to agree, in a relatively short time, on its

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

programme of work as well as on the commencement of activities of its four existing working groups. This reflects, in my view, the will of the members of the Committee to accelerate the pace of its work and to increase its effectiveness, calls for which have been heard from many speakers since the beginning of the present part of our session. It also fully corresponds with the main lines of the instructions that my delegation arrived with at this session. On our part, we shall spare no efforts to contribute, to the utmost of our possibilities, in the strengthening of such sound tendencies in the Committee.

If I put it this way, it is partly because of the criticism from some Polish mass media which asked me this straight question: has the Committee on Disarmament, acting for the last three years with its enlarged membership, been able to achieve any concrete, positive result, or has it been for these three years marking time, without any significant progress? I think that the Committee is universally judged in such a way. Sharing the impatience of public opinion, I summarize my reply to the above question by stating my view that in our Committee there is enough will and dedication from the overwhelming majority of its members to make this unique, world-wide negotiating forum an effective mechanism for specific actions on the restraint of the mad arms race and on opening the way towards gradual disarmament. It is the more necessary today as the worsening of the climate of international relations, instead of alarming and bringing the representatives of all interested countries to the negotiating table, serves them as a pretext for increasing armaments and imposing the arms race. Could it be that it is reasoned according to this logic: international tension for armaments and armaments for increasing tension? Poland, the other socialist countries and all countries which do not seek the future of their economies and the future of the world in the arms race, aims at reversing that dangerous way of thinking, and replacing it by the following logical sequence: détente for disarmament and disarmament for détente. Being guided by such a formula, the Polish delegation offers its full support to the demands to intensify the Committee's work and to seek all possible means of increasing the effectiveness of its activities. We shall, as we have always done, adhere to our principles as far as these goals are concerned; at the same time, we shall be very flexible in our approach as far as the methods of achieving tangible results are concerned.

In accordance with our principles, we fully share the view that the Committee should produce specific results for the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The question arises whether the elaboration of a comprehensive programme on disarmament, to which we have been formally obliged, or the draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons, possibly to be worked out, indeed exhaust all our physical and political possibilities for producing results that we could present at the second session?

In the framework of its approach, my delegation believes that the Committee should proceed immediately to concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive nuclear test ban. As you know, socialist countries from the first moments of the debate in the Committee on Disarmament in February 1979 considered as a matter of highest priority the question related to the cessation of the nuclear

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Let me emphasize at this moment that my delegation fully supports and calls for the establishment of an ad hoc working group in this respect. We welcome in this context the statement by the Group of 21 contained in document CD/180 and particularly its call for the establishment of such a working group. Let me also express the hope that such a group will finally be established very soon, during this part of the session. It is indeed high time.

With regard to item 1: nuclear test ban, my delegation favours the Committee's active role in this respect. We strongly support the proposal by the Group of 21 to set up within the framework of the Committee an ad hoc working group with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers. Needless to say, the establishment of working groups on these two extremely important items on the Committee's agenda would constitute the best guarantee for putting the deliberations conducted so far in a specific organizational form.

We intend to be flexible with regard to the question of the adjustment -- or broadening, as some put it -- of the mandates of existing working groups, including the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. We do not to be sure, think, that the results of the negotiations in any working group would depend substantially on the contents of its mandate. It is equally possible that with a good and broad mandate the Group might be unable to make any progress or -- on the contrary -- that within the presently available, relatively limited mandate, the Working Group on Chemical Weapons might be able to make progress in business-like negotiations. In other words, it is not the mandate which will provide the panacea to cure our non-efficiency. I wish to recall, however, that the Polish delegation has been pronouncing itself from the very beginning in favour of a broad mandate for the Working Group on Chemical Weapons so that it can conduct business-like negotiations on the prohibition of this lethal weapon. Let me also point out that, as a matter of fact, we are in the first phase, if not in the middle of the real negotiation process. Thanks to the skill and great personal dedication of both Chairmen of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Okawa and Ambassador Lidgard, we have come -- as all of us know -- to the negotiation of elements of a future convention. Not all of us, however -- as the exchange of views during informal meetings shows very well -- are yet prepared to enter into the last phase of the negotiation process: the drafting of the text of the said convention. Guided by a sense of realism, the Polish delegation would wish to continue to seek for a mandate which could be adequate to the real possibilities of all delegations. At the same time, things should continue to be done in a way which would not impede, and in any case not lead to a suspension of the activities of the Working Group. We consider the working papers put forward by the Chairman as a very good basis for the process of negotiation of elements of the draft convention. Therefore we pronounce ourselves for the straight continuation of discussions in that forum. Let me also once again express the opinion that the resumption of the bilateral Soviet-American talks in this respect would greatly facilitate the elaboration by the Committee of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

As far as the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons is concerned, the Polish delegation maintains the view expressed in the statement made in this room on 14 April. While realizing that the prohibition of radiological weapons has only relative meaning in comparison with such primordial problems as nuclear disarmament or the prohibition of chemical weapons, we are at the same time of the opinion that there is a chance for reaching agreement on the text of a treaty which could convince Governments and international public opinion that here in Geneva we are not spending time, money and energy in vain. As the delegations of socialist countries put it in document CD/182, we shall continue to work perseveringly for the earliest achievement of a final agreement on the text of a treaty, the importance of which is underlined both in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in numerous resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The delegation of Poland wishes to express its support for the proposals put forward by the Hungarian delegation in document CD/174 on the setting up of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

My delegation undoubtedly attaches the utmost importance to the discussions conducted by the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. As all of us here know only too well, the elaboration by the Committee of a really comprehensive programme of disarmament and its submission to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament next year is one of the most urgent musts of the Committee on Disarmament. We agree that considerable work will have to be done if the programme is to be adopted more or less within a year from now. My delegation hopes that the discussions on the identification and acceptance of the measures to be included in the comprehensive programme will create favourable and realistic conditions for their realization in the future. May I add that, in the view of the Polish delegation, the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, the reports of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade provide an essential framework for elaborating the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

It is not my intention at this moment to summarize the position of the delegation of Poland on all the items on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Having expressed in general the views of the Polish delegation on some of them, I wish to point out once again that the very urgent and most important task of this Committee is to conduct in good will negotiations on the most pressing problem of our times: disarmament. The more we do now, during this session, the more confidence we shall deserve from the nations of the whole world in the future.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to thank the distinguished representative of Poland, Ambassador Sujka, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Since, as the General Assembly explicitly recognized at its first special session, the existence of nuclear weapons and the continued arms race are a threat "to the very survival of mankind", it is not surprising that the General Assembly should have declared at that same session that "all the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations" and that "all States have the right to participate in "those negotiations, for which it was expressly provided that this Committee on Disarmament would be the "single multilateral negotiating forum".

All of us here know, however, that the two vetoes which have been hampering the Committee's work in this direction since last year have had the effect of nullifying those provisions of the Final Document. That is why my delegation has believed, since the beginning of the 1981 session, that in view of the impossibility of making a more effective contribution it should at least help to ensure that the Committee is duly informed of the results of the deliberations of other international bodies which have the good fortune of not being prevented from dealing with what is theoretically one of the two priority items on our agenda: the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It was for this reason that, in February, we asked the Secretariat to reproduce in a working paper the declaration approved, at the conclusion of its third session held in Vienna from 6 to 8 February, by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, which is presided over by Mr. Olof Palme, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, and has a membership of nearly 20 eminent persons from countries of Europe, Asia, Africa and the two Americas, including a number of high-ranking officials of the States members of NATO, among them a Prime Minister, and of the Warsaw Pact and the third world.

The working paper in question appeared as document CD/143, and the declaration reproduced in it was devoted to a consideration of "The SALT process: the global stakes". Among its conclusions were some which I shall read out, for I feel that it would be useful to recall them because they have even greater relevance and force today than they had when they were first formulated:

"The overriding purpose of the SALT process is to help prevent nuclear war. Nuclear weapons have confronted mankind with unprecedented dangers; civilization as we know it can literally be destroyed in moments. There are grounds for criticizing the SALT process. It is cumbersome, and slow. Its accomplishments have been limited. But it is the only existing means to deal with the most pressing threat to man's survival. If the process comes to an end, what little progress had been made in containing the risk of nuclear war would be set back immeasurably. It would mean a return to the futile propaganda wars of the 1950s in place of serious discussions of practical limitations on weaponry. And it would mean removal of one of the most important initiatives to ease the risk of nuclear war.

"...

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"For these reasons, the Commission believes it is essential for the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union to follow through on their pledges to resume the SALT negotiations. Because of these pledges and the global stakes involved, the Commission hopes that the United States and the USSR will continue their 12 year effort to negotiate limits of nuclear weapons at the earliest possible opportunity and that both sides should show maximum restraint in the interim. This is not only in the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of the whole world."

It is for the same reasons as motivated us in February that my delegation has now requested the circulation of working paper CD/188. The working paper reproduces the two declarations approved by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues at the conclusion of its fourth and fifth sessions, concerning, respectively, the urgent need for the resumption of negotiations on so-called "theatre nuclear weapons" or medium-range nuclear weapons, and the Treaty concluded between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 26 May 1972, during the first stage of the SALT talks, bearing the title "Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems".

In the first of these declarations, approved on 26 April last here in Geneva, the Commission began by expressing its "serious concern about the present state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament". It pointed out that "along with resumption of the SALT process, the most important step to arrest the present adverse trend would be negotiations on the limitation of theatre nuclear forces", and called on "the United States and the Soviet Union to start such negotiations without any loss of time". It plainly stated its conclusion that "failure to begin talks and make progress soon towards the control and reduction of these weapons would result in aggravating the present dangerous situation in Europe, with repercussions for the rest of the world", and ended by emphasizing that "the sides along with their respective allies should proceed with a sense of urgency consistent with the standard of equality and equal security".

The second of these two declarations was approved only a little over a week ago, as it emerged from the meeting held in Moscow from 12 to 14 June. On that occasion, the Independent Commission reaffirmed, in the same terms as those used at its fourth session, "its serious concern about the present state of affairs in the field of arms control and disarmament", and made a detailed study on the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, taking particular note of the significance and scope of its provisions as well as of the fact that next year the parties will "together conduct a review" of the Treaty, as provided for in its article XIV.

The outcome of this study was the conclusions set forth in the second declaration quoted in working paper CD/188, the most important of which are as follows: the ABM Treaty "provides the foundation of strategic stability necessary for the continuation of SALT in such a manner that substantial reductions and important qualitative limitations of nuclear weapons may be achieved"; the broadening and modernization of intercontinental ballistic missile defence systems

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

would offer only marginal benefit towards that end, and would require abrogation or major modification of the ABM Treaty; with regard to anti-ballistic missiles for the defence of cities and populations against a massive nuclear attack, there was still no technology which could be described as effective.

The Commission therefore considered that "a negotiated settlement reducing substantially the levels of strategic forces would be a much more effective way of promoting peace and stability", and consequently that "the United States and Soviet Union should continue to preserve the letter and spirit" of the ABM Treaty, which it considered a "most important document".

My delegation is convinced that it will be impossible to continue indefinitely preventing the Committee on Disarmament from carrying out what must, according to the provisions of the Final Document, be considered its primary task -- the conduct of multilateral negotiations on disarmament, giving nuclear disarmament its proper priority. We venture to hope that information such as that provided in the two working papers submitted by the delegation of Mexico -- CD/143, of 11 February 1981, and CD/188, circulated today, which I have introduced in this brief statement -- may contribute, if only in some small degree, to underscoring the desirability of accepting the proposal of the Group of 21 set forth in document CD/180, of 24 April 1981, concerning the setting up of an ad hoc working group on item 2 of the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament: "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.132
24 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 24 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. Komives

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina: Mr. C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Mr. J.M. OTEGUI
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. PREDONUNEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. B. NEUGEBAUER
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. NOTZEL
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULIER

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran:
Mr. M.A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA
Mr. H. SHARIFI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. A.T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. J. PRAWITZ
Mr. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE

United States of America:

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its consideration of item 1 on its agenda, "Nuclear test ban". First of all, I would like to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to His Excellency the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Bernhard Neugebauer. He will speak today as first speaker and it will be my pleasure to invite him to address the Committee.

Mr. Neugebauer joined the diplomatic service in 1953. He holds his present position as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs since 1978. He served as representative of his country to the Economic Commission for Europe between 1963 and 1966, when he became Head of Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until 1970. Between 1973 and 1977 he was Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations and he acted as Chairman of the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

Mr. NEUGEBAUER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, first of all I would like to thank you for your kind words of welcome. It is a great pleasure and a privilege for me to have the opportunity to address the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its summer session.

At the same time, I should like to congratulate you, Comrade Chairman, on your assumption of the important and demanding office of Chairman for the month of June. May I express my best wishes to you and through you to all members of the Committee for a constructive and fruitful session. May I add that it gives me particular pleasure to see as representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, with whom I had the pleasure of co-operating closely during his term of office in New York.

The German Democratic Republic has always devoted much attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The responsibility of this body as the single multilateral negotiating forum on global issues of arms limitation and disarmament is all the greater today as the arms race is being stepped up enormously, threatening to get completely out of control. The risk of the outbreak of a global nuclear conflict would, as a result, rise dramatically. An alarmed world public has, therefore, come increasingly to judge the Committee by the extent to which it succeeds in stemming this trend and in working out agreements that are long overdue.

Whether in the west or the east, in the north or the south, the peoples want the course of peaceful coexistence, détente and disarmament to continue. It is the course of reason in the nuclear age.

The present situation is bound to remind us of a historical parallel. Almost half a century ago here in Geneva -- only a stone's throw away from this hall -- the disarmament efforts of the League of Nations failed, because they were boycotted by aggressive forces. They tried -- even if it was only scantily -- to

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camouflage their war preparations and their striving for military superiority with the slogan "first rearm, then negotiate". The consequences for all nations were terrible, and it is hard to imagine today, in a world of thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, what would happen if we did not succeed in preventing nuclear war.

However, it is extremely dangerous and adventurous that politicians in responsible positions have been making statements to the effect that armament is more important than negotiation, and that, in a questionable kind of logic, they see more significant tasks than that of preventing a war. Regrettably, the present situation in the Committee on Disarmament shows that these statements have not been verbal slips. Otherwise it would be hard to explain why some quarters are stubbornly trying to block negotiations for which there is a most pressing need. The interrelationship between this attitude and the armament decisions of NATO is only too obvious.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, said on this subject at the Tenth Party Congress:

"The policy of peaceful coexistence is the only feasible way in which the danger of a new world war can be banished and a lasting peace can be assured. There is no acceptable alternative to this. In order that the peoples may be spared the catastrophe of a nuclear holocaust, the soundness of this policy must gain acceptance as the motive for practical action."

In the light of historical experience and of an analysis of the present situation, the German Democratic Republic has reached the following conclusion: the intensive continuation, the initiation or the resumption of negotiations is the decisive link. Acting in accordance with this awareness is in the best interest of all States without exception. Willingness to negotiate, therefore, is not a gift by one side to the other. Neither is it a suitable matter for bargaining. What is required is neither more nor less than what was unanimously agreed upon in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, and in resolution 35/152 E adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

He who does not seek military superiority and who declares himself in favour of the principles of equality and equal security has no reason to evade serious negotiations, especially when one takes into account that this particular principle is supported by the fact that, in the real world, an approximate military parity prevails between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO. The existence of such an approximate parity has also been recognized by many politicians and representatives of the

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military as well as by scientific institutions in western countries. Thus, the London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, in its 1980 annual report, concludes: "We see no reason to alter our conclusion of earlier years that the over-all balance is still such as to make military aggression appear unattractive."

It is well known that the States members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization do not seek military superiority. Yet, similarly, they will not tolerate military superiority on the other side.

For us, military parity is not an end in itself but the starting-point for an agreed gradual reduction of the level of military forces under conditions of undiminished and stabilized security for all parties concerned. So, our position is clearly distinguished from all varieties of the deterrence doctrine, which thrive on the legend about a threat from the east. The fortieth anniversary of the fascist attack on the USSR recalls to memory the fact that this legend has always served to camouflage and justify armament, aggression and intervention.

Like the other socialist States, the German Democratic Republic will reliably and perseveringly pursue its foreign-policy course aimed at arms limitation and disarmament. We shall make every effort to help ensure that the possibilities of improving the international climate be used and the Committee's tasks be met. This purpose is served by our programme for a safer peace and for disarmament, which is forward-oriented and, at the same time, realistic. The proposals of the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union provide fresh stimulants for the continuation of détente and the prevention of a nuclear war. In this connection, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, stated at the Tenth Party Congress: "These proposals, taken singly and together, are proof of a consistent quest for peace and a constructive approach to the most urgent international problems. Their aim is no mere temporary improvement in the world situation, but a sweeping, long-term one, so that peace can be stabilized on a permanent basis."

The initiatives of the socialist States are aimed at measures of political as well as military détente. They relate to nuclear as well as conventional weapons, to global, bilateral and regional aspects. Their primary purpose is to revive the détente dialogue and to bring about fruitful negotiations. We agree with the non-aligned countries that priority must be given to nuclear disarmament, that is, to a ban on the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of existing stockpiles until they are completely done away with.

That is the central task before the Committee on Disarmament. A working group, with the participation of the nuclear-weapon States, would make it possible to discuss and determine the basic elements of relevant agreements. The security interests of all those concerned could be duly taken into account.

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

A factor of extraordinary significance for the over-all problem of nuclear disarmament consists in continuing the SALT process while preserving all the positive elements that have so far been achieved in this area. We should like to recall that the United Nations General Assembly, at last year's session, adopted by consensus a resolution on this subject. The constructive attitude of the USSR with regard to the SALT process was also manifest at the Twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Closely related to the global aspects of the reduction of strategic nuclear arms is the issue of medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe. This matter has acquired particular urgency as a result of NATO's decision to deploy a qualitatively new generation of nuclear weapon systems -- Pershing II and cruise missiles. The idea behind this decision is to put into practice the doctrine of a wageable, limited nuclear war and to create a potential for blackmail and threats. It has been declared that the point is the closing of an alleged arms gap. But, in reality, there exists an equilibrium, covering all relevant means of delivery. In the case of nuclear warheads, NATO even has a preponderance of as much as 50 per cent. Growing opposition to NATO's missile deployment decision and categorical calls for negotiations in many West European countries testify to an increasing awareness that the people of these countries have been chosen as hostages of a policy of nuclear threat and called to become the first victims of a so-called limited nuclear war.

No effort should be spared in order to start Soviet-American talks on medium-range nuclear weapons, including the forward-based systems of the United States. Such talks would be facilitated by adopting the moratorium proposed by the USSR, taking into account, by the way, ideas stated by Western statesmen. A freezing of the medium-range nuclear missile weapons deployed in Europe will prevent a further build-up of nuclear capabilities and their modernization. There would be no unilateral advantage because of the prevailing approximate parity. And the negotiations on reductions could proceed free from strains which would otherwise be caused by a continued arms race in this field.

It is easy to understand that the German Democratic Republic, which is situated along the dividing line between NATO and Warsaw Treaty countries, attaches special importance to questions of military détente in Europe. Their solution is all the more significant for our people's security interests as the German Democratic Republic's neighbour to the west has the highest density of nuclear-weapon deployment on its territory.

We also firmly support the convening of an all-European conference on military détente and disarmament. For a continent with the largest concentration of the most dangerous weapons it is of vital importance to continue along the road of détente and to lessen military confrontation. This would be beneficial for all European States and peoples. It is, therefore, completely absurd to

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demand that the socialist countries pay a price for the convening of this conference. The socialist States have submitted clear-cut proposals for the preparation and holding of such a conference and have responded constructively to Western ideas expressed in this respect. This applies, for instance, to the declared readiness of the USSR to extend the application of confidence-building measures to the entire European part of its territory, provided the Western side, too, extends the area covered accordingly. Thus far, unfortunately, the United States and other Western States have not been prepared to respond to these proposals.

We, for our part, would underline that we attach great importance to reaching agreement on confidence-building measures, especially since the policy of military confrontation is increasingly causing concern and distrust.

Generally it is true of confidence-building measures that they are not an end in themselves but designed to foster and speed up disarmament. They cannot be a substitute for disarmament, nor can they gloss over a policy of military confrontation; rather, they are intended to help overcome such a policy. And here again it applies that bringing about confidence-building measures depends on the observance of the security interests of all parties concerned.

This year's summer session of the Committee is already marked by the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The purpose of that special session should be to consolidate what has been achieved and, furthermore, to obtain new results. The German Democratic Republic deems it to be important to mobilize the public still more against the acute dangers involved in the arms race. For the rest, we hold the view that the special session should be dominated by:

The consideration of new draft agreements in the field of disarmament;

The adoption of the comprehensive disarmament programme; and

New proposals and initiatives by member States.

The contribution which, we believe, the Committee on Disarmament should make in this respect consists, above all, in making progress and, if possible, completing work on projects which are still pending. In particular, this concerns the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. The prompt resumption of the trilateral negotiations would be a decisive step to resolve the remaining problems. This is all the more urgent as intense efforts are being made to introduce and test new terrible types of arms, such as the neutron bomb. The German Democratic Republic supports the demand that a working group be set up on this subject, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, so that the Committee on Disarmament can live up to its responsibility in this field.

(Mr. Neugebauer, German Democratic Republic)

Progress towards a ban on chemical weapons would be of major significance. A stimulating effect in this respect would, no doubt, result from the resumption of the relevant bilateral talks between the USSR and the United States. We share the concern which has been voiced that current measures for the manufacture of binary weapons amount to escalating the arms race in the field of weapons of mass destruction and, at the same time, lead to a severe setback in efforts to solve the problem as a whole. Here again, there is a distinct risk that the arms race which certain States are stepping up, will wreck partial successes gained in the course of negotiations.

A comparatively advanced stage has been reached in drafting a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. We see chances for the negotiations to be brought to a successful completion by the time the special session is to convene.

The German Democratic Republic will continue to participate actively in the work of the Committee on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. We wish to recall that this matter was given great attention by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament. It is our conviction that concrete progress on this issue would serve the security interests of all States and be conducive to measures to bring about nuclear disarmament and to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The remarkable efforts being undertaken in the Working Group to draft a comprehensive disarmament programme merit high appreciation. In accordance with the Final Document of the first special session, the emphasis of its work should be on concrete and effective measures.

The Committee on Disarmament bears a great measure of responsibility for the entire disarmament process. I am convinced that the experience embodied in this multilateral negotiating organ and the great efforts made by the representatives of its member States are an essential basis on which disarmament agreements, which are so vital for all of us, can be worked out. In the final analysis, what counts in fighting the arms race is not studies or declarations, statistics or analyses, but binding agreements whereby the means of material war preparation are curbed and ultimately eliminated.

Comrade Chairman, let me assure you that it is the firm intention of the German Democratic Republic to continue to do everything it can to contribute with the utmost resolve and perseverance to meeting the greatest challenge -- to ensure the survival of mankind; for there must be no recurrence of what happened here in Geneva almost fifty years ago. The conscience of the world must stay awake, and politicians must spare no pains in order to put an end to the irrational arms drive.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, Deputy Minister Neugebauer, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, my first words in my first statement in the month of June must be to express the pleasure of my delegation at serving once more under your chairmanship. This is a frequent pleasure, because if my calculations are right, you preside over two plenaries each week, two sets of informal meetings of the plenary and at least one meeting of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, which you also chair. That is not to mention the various other consultations and informal meetings which you direct. My delegation believes that the Committee should be grateful to you for this service and devotion. I have had occasion earlier to compliment your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer, for the way in which he discharged the duties of Chairman of this Committee.

It is also a pleasure to welcome the three new representatives amongst us, the distinguished Ambassadors of Iran, Sri Lanka and Argentina. My delegation welcomes their personal contribution to the work of this Committee. I would like also, Mr. Chairman, to welcome, and to echo your welcome to our distinguished visitor from the German Democratic Republic.

The Committee on Disarmament is currently addressing its agenda item 1: Nuclear test ban. I propose to speak on this subject but also to take the opportunity of touching on other nuclear issues on which the Committee is currently working. In this statement I shall give particular prominence to the question of nuclear non-proliferation in its narrow sense of measures to resist the spread of nuclear weapons to countries other than the five present nuclear-weapon States. Nuclear non-proliferation is by no means the only aspect of arms control and disarmament to which the Australian Government attaches importance, but it is one facet of that complex of issues which we believe must be kept at the forefront of our collective attention.

Why do we attach such great importance to nuclear non-proliferation?

We in Australia believe that an effective non-proliferation régime -- that is to say an effective network of national and international agreements and other arrangements designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons -- that such a régime contributes directly to the security of all countries. We believe that an effective non-proliferation régime can also make an important indirect contribution to the security of States, by removing a potential source of fear and conflict. This is of particular relevance in areas where there is a high level of international tension, as recent events have demonstrated. We also see an effective nuclear non-proliferation régime as necessary for the civil nuclear trade and international co-operation in the civil uses of nuclear energy. We do not believe that it would be a responsible attitude to envisage such trade and co-operation outside a rigorous non-proliferation régime.

For Australia a central element of the non-proliferation régime is the non-proliferation Treaty and its attendant system of safeguards. But we believe that many other elements -- including, for example, other bilateral and multilateral agreements -- contribute to that régime, which has widespread ramifications.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

One of these other elements - one which is explicitly recognized in the NPT -- is the logical and political connection between vertical and horizontal proliferation, that is to say, the connection between measures of nuclear restraint and disarmament on the part of nuclear-weapon States and measures to restrain and block the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

Negative security assurances have a place in this Australian perspective. They relate to the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States which deny themselves the possibility of acquiring their own nuclear weapons. Moreover an undertaking, through effective non-proliferation arrangements, that they will not develop or acquire nuclear weapons is in our view important in establishing the non-nuclear status of countries which are to benefit from such assurances. The Working Group, which has already held two meetings this session, is fortunate in having the able Italian Minister Ciarrapico as Chairman because it faces the difficult task of reconciling and accommodating widely diverging approaches.

Australia's concern for nuclear non-proliferation is also important to the approach which we bring to the attempt to draft a comprehensive programme of disarmament. I elaborated on this point in the statement I made at the conclusion of our spring session. My delegation continues to be impressed by the difficulty of the task facing the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and its Chairman, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico. We wish the Working Group to succeed in drafting in good time a programme that will, by its realism and constructive nature, attract the enthusiastic adherence and support of all countries.

Turning now to our current agenda item, let me recall that the Australian delegation, like many others, has drawn attention to the important role which a comprehensive test-ban treaty is called upon to play in reinforcing the non-proliferation régime of which I have been speaking. Indeed, of itself, a comprehensive test-ban treaty would serve the important purposes which I identified at the beginning of my statement as being served by the non-proliferation régime. In addition, a comprehensive test-ban treaty should contribute directly to a cessation of the nuclear arms race. Moreover, it should free people in many countries of their concerns and fears as to the direct physical effects of continued nuclear testing.

This is the perspective which led the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Street, on 30 May to welcome the announced decision of the new French Government to suspend testing in the South Pacific -- testing which, like the nuclear testing of the other nuclear-weapon States, has drawn expressions of concern from Australia and many other countries. In that statement the Minister expressed the hope that the suspension of French testing might lead to its permanent end.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

Unfortunately, a few days later, the Minister had to express regret at reports that an authoritative spokesman of the French Government had said that these hopes were not to be fulfilled. On both occasions Mr. Street reiterated Australia's determination to work actively for a comprehensive test-ban treaty in multilateral forums.

This Committee on Disarmament is less deeply involved in the preparation of such a treaty than many delegations would wish. Delegations should not, however, lose sight of the fact that the Committee is not entirely inactive on this important question. Nothing should deter delegations from the work now open to them. In the spring we held a number of informal meetings at which important statements were made on this issue. I explained at the end of the spring session why my delegation thought these exchanges had been useful. I would today add to those comments an expression of appreciation to the sponsors of document CD/181 -- the delegations known as the Group of 21 -- for contributing that document to the body of papers before the Committee. Important and useful work has also continued in the seismic experts Group. My delegation renews its call on all delegations to contribute actively to the work of that Group and to co-operate fully in its activities. I would wish furthermore to take this occasion to refer once more to the Australian proposal that the administrative and institutional arrangements for an international seismic network constitute a subject which the Committee should waste no time in addressing.

In conclusion, since I have broadened the subject matter of this statement to include other nuclear issues, I wish to say a very few words about the proposed radiological weapons convention. My delegation warmly welcomes the positive and constructive attitude which many delegations, hitherto reserved about this convention, have now brought to the Working Group. We believe that it is important for the Committee as a whole to respond positively to this development and to make a determined effort to seek to find answers to all questions and concerns which are raised in a constructive spirit in connection with the proposed convention on radiological weapons. We see here the possibility of real progress, provided all concerned can find the requisite good-will, imagination and above all open-mindedness. No country represented here can be expected to concede vital interests but all can be expected to make a major effort to accommodate each other's concerns.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Walker of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes first of all to offer you its warm congratulations on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee for the month of June. We have seen you for two consecutive years chairing the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons in a very efficient manner, with full flexibility and competence. My delegation has therefore every reason to be confident that, under your chairmanship, the Committee will make further substantive progress during this second part of its 1981 session. I pledge you the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your difficult and heavy responsibilities.

I should also like to take this opportunity to extend the appreciation and gratitude of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, who presided over the Committee during the month of April, and to welcome the new representatives in this Committee, Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Ahmad Jalali of Iran and Ambassador Tissa Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka. Allow me also to greet the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, H.E. Mr. B. Neugebauer.

Looking back at the spring session of our Committee, we note that while substantive results have been achieved in various fields, some issues remained unresolved. In the view of my delegation, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons has, during our spring session, completed its task under its existing mandate. We have expected, therefore, that as from the beginning of this summer session of the Committee, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons would move further by transforming the elements identified and the relevant proposals submitted into a draft convention. It is, regrettably, not the case, at the moment at least, because the Ad Hoc Working Group was not provided with a new mandate for the performance of its new task. We still hope that, perhaps at a later stage during this summer session, the Committee will be in a position to agree on an adjusted mandate for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to enable it actually to draft the text of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling as well as the use of chemical weapons.

The question of assuring the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is of paramount importance to non-nuclear-weapon States, considering the continuing arms race and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the possible use or threat of use of such weapons. In this connection, the Twelfth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held early this month in Baghdad, in the second preambular paragraph of resolution 28/12-P, stated the following:

"Considering that, until nuclear disarmament is achieved on a universal basis, it is imperative for the international community to develop effective measures to ensure the security of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from any quarters".

In the second operative paragraph of the said resolution the Conference stated further:

"Requests the members of the Committee on Disarmament to reach an urgent agreement on an international convention to assure non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

We note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has started the second stage of its work, namely, the exploration of various alternatives in searching for a common approach to the problem. While continuing to hold the view that the most effective assurances for the security of non-nuclear-weapon States would be the banning of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments and nuclear disarmament and, pending these, a complete prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, my delegation is willing to consider other feasible alternatives set out in document CD/SA/WP.5, without, naturally, implying our preference or acceptance of any of those other alternatives.

We also note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has resumed its substantive work. The time available to this Ad Hoc Working Group is indeed very short to enable it to complete the formulation of a draft programme for submission to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year, considering the wide range and the complexities of the issues involved. We have no doubt, however, that also during this summer session of the Committee, the Ad Hoc Working Group will succeed in making significant progress as was the case during our spring session.

With regard to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, my delegation is pleased to note that, thanks to your competent chairmanship, it was able to make substantive progress. With your continued wise guidance and the co-operation of all the members of the Committee in the Ad Hoc Working Group, I am convinced that further progress will be made during this summer session and that a draft treaty text, reflecting all the working papers and proposals submitted, could be produced. In the opinion of my delegation, the questions relating to the definition of the weapons to be prohibited, the scope of the prohibition and the uses of radioactive materials for peaceful purposes are some of the questions of major importance to be dealt with by the Ad Hoc Working Group during this summer session of the Committee. With a view to assuring the sovereign and inalienable rights of every State to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, my delegation would be in favour of including a provision in the proposed convention prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities. My delegation disagrees with the arguments that the inclusion of such a provision would not be necessary because this is already stipulated in the 1977 Protocol I of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, more specifically in its article 56. As was pointed out by my delegation during the spring session in its statements on chemical weapons, the inclusion of identical provisions in various international instruments is not unusual, and it would only reinforce the provisions concerned. My delegation referred to three Conventions and one draft convention which contain identical provisions. In addition, there are also practical considerations for having the provision I referred to earlier in the proposed radiological convention: if a State is not a party to the 1977 Protocol and if the radiological weapons convention to which that State is a party does not contain a provision prohibiting attacks on nuclear installations for peaceful purposes, this would mean that that State would not be legally bound by such a prohibition. The recent Israeli attack on the peaceful nuclear facilities near Baghdad, which was entirely without justification and has posed a serious threat to international peace and security and was condemned by the international community and most recently by the Security Council, renders the inclusion of a provision prohibiting attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities in the proposed radiological weapons convention all the more relevant. As was rightly stated in the statement made by the Group of 21 on 18 June, the blatant aggression committed by Israel poses a challenge to the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It is totally unjustifiable that peaceful nuclear facilities, situated in a country party to the NPT and put under IAEA safeguards, were subject to an attack. The irresponsible Israeli act was

(Mr. Darusman, Indonesia)

strongly condemned by my Government immediately after it took place. In a statement made on 10 June, the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated as follows:

"The Government of the Republic of Indonesia condemns the Israeli air raids against the nuclear installations outside Baghdad on 7 June 1981. The attack, which was entirely without justification, once again demonstrated the complete disregard of Israel for the norms of international conduct and purposefully increased the tension in the Middle East".

The Israeli attack was also jointly condemned by the ASEAN member countries. In a statement issued in Manila on 17 June 1981, on the occasion of the annual meeting of Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN member countries, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers stated as follows:

"The Foreign Ministers condemn the recent unwarranted Israeli air attack on Iraqi nuclear installations near Baghdad and regard it as a serious violation of the United Nations Charter and international law. They express grave concern that this dangerous and irresponsible act would escalate the existing tension in the area and pose a serious threat to international peace and security".

If I may now turn to item 1 of our agenda, namely, "Nuclear test ban", I wish to express the full support of my delegation for the recommendation contained in document CD/181 submitted by the Group of 21 that in the light of the discussions held in informal meetings of the Committee, an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban be set up at the beginning of this summer session of the Committee. Much has already been said in the past on the necessity of establishing such a working group. The Group of 21 has even gone further by also proposing in the document I have just referred to, a specific mandate for the ad hoc working group. Considering that working groups constitute the most appropriate forums for the conduct of negotiations, it is the hope of my delegation that those delegations which during the spring session of the Committee manifested their reservations on the creation of the said working group are now in a position to go along with the proposal made by the Group of 21 in order that actual negotiations can be conducted soon and that the Committee will be able to report to the second special session next year accordingly.

As regards item 2 of the agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", in document CD/180 the Group of 21 has proposed that the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this item and its mandate should be the immediate objective of the considerations at the start of this summer session of the Committee.

We hope that this pending issue, i.e. the creation of ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2, can be resolved without delay. Without the establishment of appropriate working groups, I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that actual negotiations could never be conducted and that, consequently, this Committee would cease to be a negotiating body and would become a deliberative organ, at least as far as a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia for his statement, and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. JAYAKODDY (Sri Lanka): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Sri Lanka wishes at the outset to express its best wishes and congratulations to you on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee for the month of June. We are confident that your long experience, skill and enduring patience will help to guide the Committee to constructive and successful endeavour. My delegation pledges its fullest support and co-operation with you. We also wish to express our appreciation of the excellent work that was done by Ambassador Pfeiffer during his tenure of the chairmanship of the Committee in the month of April. Permit me also to extend our own welcome to the distinguished Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, H.E. Mr. Neugebauer.

It is a pleasure for me, Mr. Chairman, to thank you and the distinguished Ambassadors here, who have welcomed me so warmly to this Committee. Your words of cordial welcome are a source of great encouragement as I start work in this Committee.

Last week in our deliberations the distinguished Ambassador of Argentina presented on behalf of the Group of 21 a statement regarding the Israeli attack on a nuclear facility on 7 June. The delegation of Sri Lanka fully supports this statement which expressed the just indignation and concern of all peace-loving people in the world. In connection with this attack, the Government of Sri Lanka issued a statement condemning the action. May I be permitted to quote the text of this statement.

"Sri Lanka is greatly perturbed over the Israeli bombing of a nuclear reactor in Iraq.

"This is a violation of the sovereignty of nations. This disregard for international law can have the most serious consequences. Sri Lanka condemns this action and calls on the international community to deal suitably with this violation of international law.

"Sri Lanka expresses her support and solidarity with Iraq on this issue."

The implications of this violation of international law have been extensively analysed by the distinguished Ambassadors who have spoken earlier. Therefore, it is not necessary for me to cover the same ground. I would like to emphasize, however, that in our view this disregard for international law threatens the security not only of one country or one region of the world, but threatens international peace and security as a whole. It undermines confidence in the NPT and raises doubts about the Treaty's usefulness. The action was designed, we feel, to intimidate developing countries that are constructing, or planning the construction of their own nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes in the course of their economic development. It is a totally unacceptable form of international behaviour which must not be allowed to repeat itself.

This session of the Committee is invested with important significance for two compelling reasons. On the one hand, the negotiations that will be conducted in the next 10 weeks will bring to a close the last full round of the Committee's work before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. What the Committee achieves will necessarily serve next year, together with the work of the spring session of this Committee in 1982, as a basis for discussions at that special session. What is accomplished in this Committee will naturally lie on the table for consideration by States Members of the United Nations. My delegation is convinced that what the Committee will transmit to the General Assembly at its special session will not fall completely short of the expectations of all Member States and the millions of concerned people around the world who justifiably expect that something concrete in the form of negotiated agreements will come out of our work.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

This session also draws special significance from the currently deteriorating international political environment. We are witnessing a steady drift away from a period of relaxed relations when the voices of international dialogue were less strident and more co-operative than they are now. We seem to be losing some of the ground that was gained in avoiding crises and lessening tensions around the world. Anxiety and fear are not diminishing. On the contrary they grow stronger and the causes that generate them are increasing.

Against this background it is claimed by some that the present time is inopportune for genuine negotiations on disarmament and a variety of reasons are adduced to sustain this point of view. However, for my delegation the time of tension and growing crises calls for renewed and vigorous efforts at working towards multilateral disarmament negotiations. The work of this Committee, my delegation would wish to urge, cannot and should not be subject to the blowing of hot and cold in the relations between individual States or groups of States. Multilateral disarmament negotiations are an integral part of the struggle to avoid catastrophic annihilation of the people of this planet, and the destruction of the planet itself. We, therefore, hope that this session of the Committee will turn out to be a productive and constructive one despite the cold winds that might blow elsewhere.

The two priority items of the Committee's work have been and remain a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 has submitted proposals to this Committee on both these items, calling for the setting up of working groups on them. My delegation is of the view that the reasons that were adduced by the Group of 21 and many other delegations in favour of an urgent beginning of negotiations on these two items are convincing. The case for the setting up of these working groups in the view of my delegation is clear and rational and should be beyond controversy. However, this Committee has not been able to arrive at a consensus on the setting up of these working groups. It is said by those who do not support the setting up of the working groups that the two priority items are too complicated in their nature, and are not ripe enough for negotiations in this forum.

No one could quarrel with the assertion that the issues are complicated, but that is reason enough in itself for making a start at resolving them through working groups of this Committee which is, after all, the only multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. The very dangers that nuclear weapons pose and the utter futility of using them must surely make items one and two of our agenda ripe enough for negotiation in this Committee. These two priority items have earned their place at the top of the agenda of this Committee out of their very importance for the survival of all mankind. It is only rational, therefore, that they should be so treated by the Committee.

There is today repeated assertion that national and international security can be defended and maintained only by resort to, and reliance on, theories of deterrence and military superiority which, it is said, can provide the only certain and effective shield for survival. The question that my delegation would wish to pose is whether there is no other course for survival. Cannot the collective wisdom of mankind plot a new course to ensure that the world lives in lasting peace, security and harmony?

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

The Sri Lanka delegation is convinced that negotiations in two new working groups of this Committee on the two high-priority agenda items, combined with the work on the other agenda items, could lead the way towards this other course. My delegation, therefore, earnestly urges that this Committee agrees by consensus to set up immediately working groups on the two priority items of the agenda. A consensus agreement on this issue will be the Committee's positive response to the universal cry for nuclear disarmament.

As regards the item on security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, my delegation is pleased to see the Working Group on that subject, under its able Chairmen, has proceeded beyond the existing unilateral declarations of the nuclear-weapon States and got down to the business of examining substantive issues in the form of alternative proposals for a common formula for security assurances. My delegation shares the realistic view that the examination of alternatives should lead the working group to concentrate on the most promising alternative in terms of its acceptability to all concerned. This realism should, however, be a two-way street. While I do not wish to engage in a polemical discussion as to why and how the need for security assurances arose, I should like simply to say that the nuclear-weapon States ought also to take account of the reality of the very nature and the mobility of existing nuclear weapons, and of the fact that the primary consideration in giving security assurances should be to meet the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States rather than the perceived security concerns of the nuclear-weapon States themselves. It would be unrealistic and unjust to expect the States who have renounced the nuclear option in unambiguous terms to accept an assurance against the threat or use of nuclear weapons which will eventually be invalidated through a series of qualifications.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under its very efficient Chairman, has presented a programme of work for its next phase of negotiation with which my delegation is in general agreement. My delegation is of the view that the Committee should give urgent consideration to the question of expanding the mandate of this Working Group to enable it to proceed towards actual elaboration of a convention on the basis of the large measure of convergence of views that was evident during the first part of the session and also to make further progress in narrowing down the differences that exist on several issues. My delegation feels that in respect of certain issues, consideration of texts would be the next logical step to facilitate the latter exercise.

As to the question whether the Working Group should concentrate on making further progress on areas of agreement or whether efforts should be intensified to narrow the differences, my delegation keeps an open mind as flexibility on the part of all delegations would facilitate a decision on this question depending upon the progress of negotiations.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, through the untiring efforts of its Chairman, has already been able to achieve considerable progress in examining the measures to be included in the programme. The work that lies ahead of us during the second part of the 1981 session will be crucial, not only because it involves substantive discussion of the measures and the important question of a time-frame for the programme, but also because definitive progress in finalization of the comprehensive programme of disarmament will make a concrete contribution to the deliberations of the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Jayakoddy, Sri Lanka)

Despite the low priority attached to it in our agenda, my delegation believes that the negotiation of a treaty banning radiological weapons will be a contribution to the disarmament effort in that it will hopefully eliminate at least one option for the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and, more importantly, indirect methods of waging radiological warfare. The recent Israeli attack on an Iraqi nuclear plant has brought into sharp focus the validity of the argument that a treaty banning radiological weapons should encompass the possibility of waging radiological warfare by attacks on peaceful nuclear power installations. My delegation wishes to stress strongly that a future treaty on radiological weapons should include positive provisions to facilitate access, for all States, to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and international co-operation for the peaceful application of nuclear technology and radioactive materials.

My delegation is prepared to co-operate fully in your dedicated efforts as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to facilitate the speedy finalization of negotiations on this item.

My delegation will continue to make its contribution, modest though it be, towards the success of this Committee's work.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKALLI (Morocco) (translated from French): My delegation would first like to express its satisfaction at the speedy resumption of substantive work in our Committee. It is a pleasure to note, in this connection, that at the very outset of its session this year the Committee embarked on the active phase of its work, thus breaking with the distressing trend seen in previous years, when our negotiating body appeared to be condemned to spend the bulk of its time on procedural matters and the organization of work.

There is, indeed, no denying that this year there has been evidence of a general will to initiate without delay, and in a constructive spirit, negotiations on the majority of the items on our agenda. These negotiations have been of a breadth and an intensity which we are happy to recognize. The ad hoc working groups have been able to make some progress, thanks to the genuine efforts made by all delegations and the impetus given to them by their respective chairmen, to whom we wish to pay a well-deserved tribute.

The experience we now have confirms that working groups do indeed constitute the best machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee. It cannot but be regretted, therefore, that it should not yet have been possible -- for reasons with which everyone is familiar -- to reach a consensus on the establishment of two working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, namely, a "nuclear test ban" and the "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

It is, to say the least, paradoxical that we should find ourselves unable to negotiate on these two questions which, I need hardly remind you, have been given absolute priority and which everyone agrees are of the utmost importance. My delegation certainly can neither understand nor agree with attempts to gain acceptance for the idea that the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and nuclear disarmament are not appropriate topics for negotiation within the Committee. On the contrary, we believe that these two fundamental questions fall within the jurisdiction and the terms of reference of this multilateral negotiating body. It is, moreover, no accident that they appear high on our agenda.

With regard to the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the fact that this question has been under study for a quarter of a century clearly indicates the lack of political will on the part of the major nuclear-weapon Powers to achieve a positive and satisfactory outcome.

Yet the urgent need to conclude a treaty completely banning nuclear-weapon tests has been constantly proclaimed and affirmed both by the United Nations General Assembly and by the various bodies responsible for disarmament negotiations. No one can be unaware of the impact that such a treaty would have on the chances of success of the efforts to put an end to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the proliferation of such weapons.

It is inconceivable that the nuclear-weapon Powers should feel no obligation to respond to the deep-rooted concerns and the long-standing expectations of the international community other than with such reluctance to conclude a nuclear test-ban treaty. We believe that this situation cannot last indefinitely without risk of grave damage to the non-proliferation regime itself. That is why we must pay heed to the urgent appeals contained in the many resolutions of the General Assembly which call on us to take the steps necessary to initiate negotiations and conclude such a treaty.

In this Committee, the neutral and non-aligned countries, supported by many other delegations, have again and again emphasized the urgent need to set up an ad hoc working group to conduct negotiations to this end. In a recent proposal, contained in document CD/181 which, my delegation wishes to repeat, it fully supports, the Group of 21 reiterated its position yet again, calling for the establishment, for the duration of this summer part of the Committee's session, of a working group with a mandate "to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty relating to item 1 of its agenda".

The Group of 21 also sought to make a further contribution to the Committee's work by drawing the attention of the nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the trilateral negotiations to a number of specific questions to which it would be very wise and extremely desirable for them to provide appropriate answers.

We should like to express the hope that common sense and wisdom will eventually prevail and that we shall then be able to get down without further delay to the task that has been entrusted to us.

The question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is one to which the international community has also attached the highest priority. For no one can be unaware of the grave threats that loom over the world as a result of the pursuit of the nuclear arms race or of the disastrous consequences that the outbreak of a nuclear war would have for the whole of mankind.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

My country is firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is an essential measure capable of instituting a climate of trust between States and peoples and of strengthening peace and security in the world.

Consequently, we cannot subscribe to the view expressed by certain delegations that peace and stability have been maintained in the world because of nuclear deterrence.

My delegation would like to refer in this connection to the statement that was submitted by our Group of 21 during the first part of this session and that, in particular, refuted the doctrine of deterrence in these terms:

"The Group of 21 is ... convinced, as a result of the discussions, that doctrines of nuclear deterrence, far from being responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, lie at the root of the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear armaments and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations. Moreover, such doctrines, which in the ultimate analysis are predicated upon the willingness to use nuclear weapons, cannot be the basis for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war, a war which would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike."

It has often been said in the Committee that the political will of States, and especially of the nuclear-weapon States, is the prerequisite for the success of any negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We fully share this opinion and hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers will manifest that political will by initiating appropriate negotiations in the working group whose establishment has been requested by the Group of 21, with the reasonable and realistic mandate proposed.

Until nuclear disarmament has become a reality, the non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to seek and obtain guarantees against the use or threat of use of such weapons.

The question of negative security guarantees is one of those that are the subject of negotiations in the Committee's ad hoc working groups.

I should like very briefly to state my delegation's views on a number of important aspects of those questions.

With regard to the item entitled "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", my delegation favours the adoption of an international instrument of a legally binding nature, which might take the form of an international convention. Meanwhile, we hope that the Working Group will be able to agree on interim arrangements, perhaps through a Security Council resolution.

From the discussions that have been held so far in the Working Group, my delegation has the impression that certain nuclear-weapon Powers are more concerned with their own security than with that of the non-nuclear-weapon countries for whose benefit the Working Group has been charged with negotiating these international undertakings. We should like to hope that our misgivings and doubts will be rapidly dispelled, for the States which have voluntarily renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons legitimately expect the Powers possessing such weapons to give them, without any ambiguity whatsoever, guarantees against the use or threat of use of those weapons.

(Mr. Skalli, Morocco)

With respect to radiological weapons, the Working Group has as its task the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Although the conclusion of such a convention would not constitute a disarmament measure in the strict sense, we are, none the less, favourably disposed towards any initiative or measure aimed at preventing the emergence, and prohibiting the use, of new types of weapons of mass destruction.

When this question was examined by the Working Group, a major objection was raised with respect to the definition of radiological weapons as proposed in the draft text of a treaty submitted jointly by the United States and the Soviet Union. In this connection, the Moroccan delegation is of the opinion that whatever the definition we adopt, it must not in any way justify or legitimize the possession or use of nuclear weapons.

In addition, I should like to take this opportunity to reiterate my delegation's support for the Swedish proposal for the inclusion in the future convention of provisions prohibiting deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

The Moroccan delegation attaches very great importance to the negotiation and conclusion of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. The elaboration of a convention on this question, which is, moreover, an urgent one and one which has been given high priority, would unquestionably constitute an effective and genuine disarmament measure.

In the view of my delegation, it would be desirable for this convention to be general in scope and to include also a prohibition on the use of chemical weapons. We do not share the view expressed by certain delegations that the inclusion in the convention of a provision banning the use of chemical weapons would have the effect of weakening the Geneva Protocol. Such a provision could in no way prejudice the earlier instrument, which we consider to be very valuable.

We are convinced that, in view of the progress made in its work by the Working Group on Chemical Weapons, the Committee will shortly take a decision for the broadening of its mandate so as to enable it to apply itself to the elaboration of the text of a convention.

I will conclude my statement with a few words on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As everyone knows, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is the only Group whose mandate is subject to a time-limit, since it is required to submit the programme to the United Nations General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, which will be held in June 1982. Little time remains, therefore, before that important date. We feel, nevertheless, that the Group has made good progress in its work and that, under the impetus of its Chairman, the distinguished representative of Mexico, it has acquired such momentum that we are justified in hoping that we shall by then have a document containing a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, let me first of all extend the warm welcome of my delegation to H.E. the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic, Mr. Bernard Neugebauer. We have listened with keen interest to his thought-provoking and constructive intervention in our Committee this morning.

Today is the last plenary meeting of the current session at which the Committee will be considering the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban, which is the first item on our agenda, not without good and sufficient reason. Of course, we may revert to this important subject later in the session, perhaps in the first week of August, because we have yet to take a decision on certain formal proposals made by the Group of 21. I am referring to document CD/181 of 24 April 1981, in which the Group of 21 has put forward for approval a draft mandate seeking the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the CD to negotiate on the provisions of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests.

We would expect the Committee to take a formal decision on this proposal of the Group of 21, as, indeed, we would expect the same treatment for the other proposal of the Group of 21 in document CD/180 proposing the setting up of a further working group on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In both cases the Group of 21 has proposed precisely defined mandates indicating how best the Committee on Disarmament may fulfil its responsibilities at the present time in regard to two questions which have been accorded the highest priority by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament.

At our last plenary meeting, on 23 June, the distinguished Ambassadors of Brazil and Mexico raised these very same points. The Ambassador of Brazil referred to the series of questions addressed by the Group of 21 to the trilateral negotiators on the test ban. He said: "The nuclear-weapon States concerned should not shirk their special responsibilities and they should respond to the unanimous concern of the non-nuclear-weapon States". We agree with him, and we certainly expect replies to our questions, if not from the trilateral negotiators as a group, then from the individual States concerned. Refusal on their part to answer those questions would inevitably diminish the role of the Committee as a multilateral negotiating forum -- a role which has been conferred on this Committee by the consensus of its members and of the General Assembly. In that event we shall have to review the fundamental attitudes of the members towards the Committee in relation to the functions entrusted to us.

These questions are particularly relevant, since despite the sustained consideration of a nuclear test ban over the last quarter of a century or more, we are still no nearer to a treaty. Verification has been said to be a major stumbling-block. But is that really the case? In 1958, a group of experts from both Western countries as well as socialist countries, studied the possibility of detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests. The experts had detailed a viable verification and control system and then came to the unanimous conclusion:

"The Conference of Experts, having considered a control system for detecting violations of a possible agreement on the suspension of nuclear tests, has come to the conclusion that the methods for detecting nuclear explosions available at the present time, viz., the method of collecting samples of

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

radioactive debris, the methods of recording seismic, acoustic, and hydroacoustic waves, and the radio-signal method, along with the use of on-site inspection of unidentified events which could be suspected of being nuclear explosions, make it possible to detect and identify nuclear explosions, including low yield explosions (1-5 kt). The Conference has therefore come to the conclusion that it is technically feasible to establish, with the capabilities and limitations indicated below, a workable and effective control system, to detect violations of an agreement on the world-wide suspension of nuclear weapons tests."

That was in 1958. Technology has made rapid strides in the intervening years. And yet, some countries still continue to argue that adequate verification of a nuclear test ban remains an obstacle. The experts of the same countries had, more than 20 years ago, accepted that verification was not a problem, given the technology then available. Does not this demonstrate the validity of our assertion that the real difficulty lies in a lack of political will, not verification? Our Committee cannot evade this issue and still retain its credibility.

This is a matter of vital importance to the future of the Committee on Disarmament. In that connection, we shall also have to bear in mind the decisions we eventually take in the CD on the proposals of the Group of 21 for the establishment of two working groups, one on the nuclear test ban and the other on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. So far we have only discussed these matters at several informal meetings, and while those meetings have contributed to our general education, they have not moved us one inch closer to the undertaking of multilateral negotiations on any aspect of the nuclear questions, which understandably deserve the highest priority. The time has come now for the Committee to take formal decisions on the formal proposals before it. It is not enough to have them discussed at informal meetings whose proceedings are not even recorded.

The members of the Group of 21 have in all seriousness and earnestness of purpose assumed their responsibilities and put forward concrete proposals concerning the most important question facing all of us -- the question of human survival. They have demonstrated good faith and good intentions, and they cannot be held responsible for lack of progress. As the Ambassador of Poland said on 23 June, at the plenary meeting of the Committee, questions are being asked as to what the CD has achieved since the first special session, and if it has achieved nothing, who is responsible for that. My delegation would certainly not blame the CD as a whole, or the Group of 21, for failure to deliver the goods collectively expected of us.

One thing is very clear. It is not for lack of initiatives or absence of proposals that we have made no progress on nuclear issues. There is no shortage of proposals within the CD or outside it. The other day the Ambassador of Mexico referred to the proposals of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues. One has only to read journals, newspapers and other publications to become acutely aware of the intensity of public concern for the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race. Former diplomats, political leaders and negotiators of arms control measures, not to speak of scientists and retired generals -- people who have

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

had intimate inside knowledge of the arms race and its dangers -- have warned about the risks inherent in the present situation and have put forward various suggestions as to what ought to be done. Concerned non-governmental organizations have also done the same. Why is it, then, that we, in the Committee on Disarmament, have not given adequate attention to these mounting expressions of public concern? Why is it that we have not even made a compilation of the various proposals made, in all sincerity, by eminent persons? We have received literally thousands of communications from citizens of many countries, voicing their simple desire for survival in a world freed from the danger of a nuclear holocaust. What is to be our response to their cries of anguish?

Evidently, the expectations from the Committee are great indeed. Are these expectations misplaced? No, I do not think so, because the General Assembly, at its first special session on disarmament, gave us a clear enough mandate to concern ourselves with the prevention of nuclear war, with the cessation of the nuclear arms race and with the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament is, in a sense, accountable not only to the General Assembly but also to the public at large for its non-performance in regard to these nuclear questions. At our informal meetings we have discussed the prerequisites for negotiations, but we have not yet reached any consensus on the actual commencement of negotiations on an agreed basis. Doctrines of nuclear deterrence have been subjected to strong criticism by us on the ground that they have in fact fuelled the arms race and increased the risks of nuclear war. We have also questioned the legitimacy of the use of nuclear weapons, as they have the potential for endangering the very survival of the human species.

There is now very little more left for us to do as a body except to begin negotiations on a variety of urgent nuclear disarmament issues. If the Committee on Disarmament, constituted as it is, cannot tackle questions of direct relevance to the survival of mankind, we might as well confess our impotence. Or else we should try to identify the obstacles in the path of our undertaking negotiations. What could be these obstacles? What really are the causes underlying this senseless nuclear arms race? We do not believe that man is powerless before the so-called technological momentum of the arms race. Every decision concerning the arms race is man-made and is directly related to State policies. What, then, are State policies made of? -- fear, suspicion, envy? No longer is the security of one State unrelated to the security of other States, for in a nuclear war we shall all be victims. We have demonstrably not really addressed ourselves so far to the root causes; unless we do so, we shall not be able to create the proper climate for success in disarmament negotiations.

Some would have us believe that we cannot have disarmament unless we first agree to verification and control measures. Others tell us that we must first agree on the disarmament package before verification and control can be accepted. It is futile to argue about which comes first -- control or disarmament. My delegation stated in 1962, on 20 March of that year, in the EMDC at its fifth meeting, presided over by Mr. Krishna Menon, that "My Government has at all times regarded control and disarmament as being inseparable. We do not think one should follow the other or should obstruct the other".

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

It is in the light of this position that we have examined in a preliminary manner the Canadian conceptual working paper on arms control verification. It is a useful and interesting compilation of various verification and control measures and it outlines the merits and demerits of specific systems. One thing is abundantly clear to us, and that is that there is no such thing as a universally applicable verification process, and that each system has to be geared to the special requirements of particular measures of disarmament. The Canadian paper has correctly assessed the missing ingredient as "political will".

I have the distinct feeling, Mr. Chairman, that so far we have been looking only at the symptoms of the disease without really trying to go into or remove them. It seems to us, therefore, that we should really be addressing ourselves primarily to the reasons for the absence of this political will, and to related questions such as, "Why is there mutual fear and suspicion?"; "What is it that States are deterring one another from?"; "What are their legitimate fears?" and "How should we establish mutual confidence and trust?". These are basic questions facing us and the answers will decide the future of mankind. As long as there is mutual fear and suspicion, there will be need for verification. But once the climate of mistrust is dispelled, verification will be less of an obsession. Unfortunately, today the more powerful a nation is, the more afraid it seems to be. The search for security does not lie in acquiring more arms but rather in establishing an equilibrium of peace with one's earlier perceived adversary.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to add the voice of my delegation in extending a warm welcome to the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the German Democratic Republic to our Committee. I would also like to express my delegation's satisfaction at the efficient and effective way in which you have been conducting the work of our Committee during the current month. I have asked for the floor this morning in order briefly to express the views of the Pakistan delegation on the item listed on our programme of work for this week: a nuclear test ban.

For nearly two decades, Pakistan has actively advocated the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty as an important instrument to arrest the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Developments during this time, including the hundreds of nuclear tests conducted by the major nuclear-weapon Powers to perfect their nuclear weapons, and the techniques developed for this purpose, have no doubt eroded the ultimate impact of a nuclear test-ban treaty on disarmament and increased the difficulties in negotiating a treaty which could gain universal adherence.

Nevertheless, Pakistan considers that the achievement of an effective test-ban treaty would constitute an important and indispensable step in the broader process of halting and reversing the nuclear arms race, especially between the two Super-Powers. It is quite evident, however, that a nuclear test-ban treaty will not be effective or gain universal adherence unless it is equitable and non-discriminatory. An unequal and discriminatory treaty, such as the NPT, can no longer be imposed on the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

It remains the firm conviction of my delegation that such an equitable treaty, which responds to the national security concerns of all States, can be evolved only within this multilateral body set up for the purpose of conducting disarmament negotiations. This conviction is shared by all the members of the Group of 21. The Group has proposed, in document CD/181, that the Committee establish an ad hoc working group with a precise mandate "to negotiate on provisions relating to the scope, verification of compliance and the final clauses of a draft treaty" relating to item 1 of the Committee's agenda entitled, "Nuclear test ban".

Besides the point of principle to which I have referred, the opening of concrete negotiations in the Committee on the nuclear test ban have become indispensable for two additional reasons.

First, it was agreed in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that the three nuclear-weapon States which have chosen to conduct separate and restricted negotiations on this subject should urgently conclude these negotiations and submit the results for full consideration by this Committee. Almost three years have elapsed since this agreement was unanimously adopted. The trilateral negotiations have not been concluded. Indeed, these talks have been suspended for almost a year. There is no assurance that they will be resumed and if they are resumed, whether they can be concluded successfully. In the circumstances, the Committee on Disarmament is the natural and only available forum for negotiations on the subject.

Moreover, such information as has been made available about the substance of the trilateral negotiations makes it seem rather unlikely that the kind of arrangements being negotiated by the three nuclear-weapon Powers will provide the basis for a treaty that can, in the words of the Final Document, "gain universal adherence". The doubts and questions which arise with regard to the effectiveness and equity of the treaty being evolved in the trilateral negotiations were expressed during the informal meetings of the Committee on the subject earlier this year. These doubts and misgivings are reflected in the questions posed to the trilateral negotiators by members of the Group of 21 and which are outlined in document CD/181.

It should be self-evident, therefore, why my delegation and other members of the Group of 21 do not agree with the conclusion of the three negotiating parties contained in their report submitted last August that the trilateral negotiations "offer the best way forward". It has often been argued that negotiations on a nuclear test ban within the CD may have a negative influence on the trilateral talks. It is time to say that surely the shoe is on the other foot. It is the restricted talks, which cater to the national interests of three States, which must be conducted, if at all, in a way that does not impede the conduct of multilateral negotiations on a measure that affects the vital security interests of all States.

It is apparent that the vast majority of the members of the Committee strongly favour the establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban and the commencement of concrete negotiations under the aegis of the Committee. Indeed, one could say that a consensus, as normally understood, exists on the proposal of the Group of 21. But of course we have chosen to interpret consensus in the Committee

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

as meaning unanimity. Therefore the CD may well find itself unable to approve the proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group. Nevertheless; we hope that the Committee will make a formal determination on the subject and at least record the overwhelming support for the proposal of the Group of 21.

At the same time, we hope that the three negotiating parties will demonstrate their good faith by responding, jointly or individually, to the number of pertinent questions which have been addressed to them by the members of the Group of 21 and which are listed in document CD/181. It is our understanding that not all of the three negotiating parties are engaged in a review of their policies. Some of them should surely find it possible to provide this Committee with clarifications regarding their position on the issues raised by members of the Group of 21. My delegation would, therefore, like to address the following question to each of the trilateral negotiators: are they prepared to provide -- and if so, when -- the information and clarifications requested by the Group of 21 in document CD/181?

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mr. Akram of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Before adjourning the plenary meeting, I would like to suggest that we hold, in five minutes' time, a brief informal meeting to consider a communication addressed to me by a non-member State, as well as the relevant draft decision. Both documents were placed in the delegations' boxes yesterday morning and have also been circulated in the Committee today. I would also like to suggest a timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. If there is no objection, we will suspend the plenary meeting and convene the informal meeting.

The meeting was suspended at 12.35 p.m. and resumed at 12.40 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The 132nd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is resumed.

Working Paper No. 41, containing the draft decision concerning the participation during 1981 of the representative of Austria in the meetings of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, is before the Committee. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee adopts the draft decision. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: A timetable for meetings of the Committee and its subsidiary bodies has also been circulated today. As I explained at the informal meeting, the time timetable is merely indicative and subject to change if necessary. If there are no objections, I will consider that the Committee decides to be guided by it.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 30 June, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.133
30 June 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 30 June 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. I. KOMIVES

(Hungary)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina: Mr. C. CARASALES
Mr. J.M. OTEGUI
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Miss L. CHAZERIAN

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Miss H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM

Iran:
Mr. M.A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:
Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. V.M. GANJA

United Kingdom: Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela: Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I declare open the 133rd plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee starts today its consideration of item 2 on its agenda, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. I wish to note the presence among us today of the participants in the 1981 United Nations Programme of Fellowships on Disarmament. I would like to welcome them in the Committee and to wish them a successful and fruitful stay in Geneva.

Mr. TERREFFE (Ethiopia): Comrade Chairman, today being the last day in the month of June during which you have presided as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament, may I take this opportunity to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the very high degree of efficiency and competence with which you have discharged your duties and responsibilities, not only as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament but also as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

I wish also to extend our appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Pfeiffer of the Federal Republic of Germany, for the valuable services he rendered as Chairman of the Committee during the month of April. At the same time, I would like to extend a warm welcome to our new colleagues in the Committee, the distinguished representatives of Argentina, Iran and Sri Lanka.

Comrade Chairman, I would also like to join you in welcoming the participants in the 1981 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship Programme who are present here this morning and I wish them success in their training. The purpose of my intervention today is to speak on items 1 and 2 of our programme of work. Before doing so, however, I would like to comment briefly on the work of the four ad hoc working groups. With regard to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, we would express the hope that the outstanding issues, such as the definition of a radiological weapon and the scope of the convention, will be speedily resolved so that the Committee can present a draft convention to the General Assembly as soon as possible. My delegation is also cognizant of the efforts being made by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, to negotiate a convention for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. We hope that differences of views with respect to the scope of the prohibition, verification and other provisions will be resolved under a revised mandate of the Working Group. The provisions relating to the destruction of chemical weapons and the dismantling or conversion of chemical weapons facilities, together with the procedures whereby these provisions are scrupulously carried out and complied with, are features which require maximum effort by all parties in the negotiations.

My delegation is also pleased to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament is being chaired by the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles who, I am sure, will live up to the great responsibility entrusted to him. My delegation extends its full co-operation in the efforts being undertaken by the Group to recommend effective

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

disarmament measures within a framework of a phased programme including stages for implementation with a view to attaining general and complete disarmament at least by the end of the century. The crucial point is that such a programme, in order to be ready for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, requires not only careful but expeditious preparation and also the political courage to support its main tenets.

With regard to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, the position of my delegation is that the various statements made by the nuclear-weapon States still reflect underlying differences. The Working Group should, therefore, continue to look for a common denominator with a maximum degree of flexibility and a sense of realism. However, we should not be satisfied with an eroded form of assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. If the genuine concern of non-nuclear-weapon States for security assurances is sincerely recognized, it should not be difficult to evolve a common approach acceptable to all, which could be included in an effective international convention of a legally binding character.

The Ethiopian delegation believes that all nuclear-weapon States should work towards renouncing the production and acquisition of all nuclear weapons and should refrain from stationing nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We hope that the examination of the various forms of alternative assurances will result in an acceptable common approach. An important step and positive contribution towards the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons could be provided by the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. This possibility, although widely acknowledged by all, has not been adequately explored. In particular, the decisions of the African Heads of State and the United Nations General Assembly concerning the denuclearization of Africa have not been heeded and consequently, the apartheid regime of South Africa has emerged as a potential nuclear Power. I do not find it necessary at this stage to reaffirm my Government's unequivocal stand against this policy except to state that the question of South Africa's nuclear-weapon capability continues to pose a grave threat to international peace and security.

The frightening dimensions of the event that took place three weeks ago near Baghdad is an additional grave concern for the preservation of international peace. In this connection, the Group of 21, in document CD/187, has taken a categorical stand to which my delegation has subscribed. In particular, the Ethiopian delegation would like to stress the importance it attaches to the first paragraph of this document which I would like to quote:

"The members of the Group of 21 have consistently upheld the principles of the United Nations Charter regarding strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and the non-use of force or threat of force in international relations. The members of the group have always opposed and continue to oppose all acts of aggression and violation of these principles."

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

I now turn to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, namely, Nuclear test ban and Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The United Nations General Assembly has adopted numerous resolutions calling upon the nuclear-weapon States to prohibit all nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, and urging them to exert and to intensify concerted efforts to achieve effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Ethiopia, together with other States, has for a long time called for the speedy conclusion of an international treaty on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in all environments, which would be a major step towards halting the arms race and gradually reversing its course until general and complete disarmament can be achieved. It is to be recalled that as far back as 1959, Ethiopia proposed a United Nations declaration of principles which would condemn and outlaw the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. Further, during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Ethiopia together with other States initiated a draft resolution stressing the urgent need for the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons.

More recently there have been numerous initiatives and proposals on this subject. I would like to make only a brief reference to the proposal of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/181. I also wish to note in this regard the valuable contribution made by the Secretariat in the preparation of the tabulation contained in document CD/171.

In CD/181, the Group of 21 has presented a positive and realistic approach to deal with the question of a nuclear test ban. The proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban has also been supported by a group of socialist States and others. In this connection, let me point out that the Ethiopian delegation and many others endorsed the proposal contained in document CD/4 as early as February 1979. This was considered a sound basis for initiating serious negotiations by the Committee. Thus the question of finding a sound negotiating framework through the establishment of an ad hoc working group is found to be acceptable to almost all the members of the Committee, to all, that is, except two of the States engaged in the trilateral negotiations. A specific mandate for the working group was also proposed in the Group of 21 paper. In the absence of a mechanism such as the proposed ad hoc working group, it would be impossible to initiate negotiations and to make progress in this urgent and high-priority item. The informal meetings devoted to these issues are of some value in themselves, but cannot be regarded as a substitute for a working group which is the most promising machinery for conducting negotiations. Despite the fact that the establishment of a working group is no guarantee for success, nevertheless, we hope that the prevailing view will persuade the two nuclear-weapon States in question to examine the value of this proposal seriously, so that the Committee can commence negotiations on this urgent and high-priority item.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

Furthermore, in CD/181 pertinent questions have been put forward, the answers to which the Committee as well as the international community are entitled to receive from the trilateral negotiators. In this regard, several delegations have made the point that the series of questions deserves replies and I would add that if these questions were fully answered that might enable the Committee to re-examine its course of action.

The proposals of the Group of 21 in documents CD/180 and CD/181 do not claim to resolve all the issues or even to offer a way of making significant progress. But CD/180 in particular provides a realistic analysis of the doctrines of deterrence and offers sound proposals which my delegation believes could be utilized as a basis for initiating serious and genuine negotiations, the conduct of which has been entrusted to the Committee by the General Assembly.

Ethiopia, like the overwhelming majority of States, believes that all nations have a vital interest in measures of nuclear disarmament and that doctrines of nuclear deterrence lie at the root of the arms race and lead to greater insecurity and instability in international relations.

With increasing crisis and tensions in various regions of the world, the call for disarmament seems to have encountered a serious setback. Certain States appear to be showing diminishing interest in and less concern about the ever-increasing arms race. There are many indications of this sad state of affairs, including increased military budgets with a concomitant decrease in international aid programmes. My delegation would like to express its deep concern at this development, which one cannot fail to note in statements and briefings of high officials from some nuclear-weapon States. In the capitals of some of these countries, disarmament issues appear to occupy less prominent attention. Most important of all, and regrettably so, the sense of the urgency of these questions seems to be dwindling. The heightening of international tension and the sharp deterioration in the international situation signal the beginning of a new era of anxiety with the increased possibility of nuclear catastrophe. Unless tangible progress is made to curb the nuclear arms race and to halt the vertical as well as the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, the chances for nuclear war will be increasing considerably.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, before embarking on the substantive part of my statement, I should like to comply with the request made to me by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, who had the privilege of addressing a plenary meeting of this Committee some days ago. As this is the first plenary meeting at which the delegation of Argentina is taking the floor since the Vice-Minister's address I should like, on his behalf, to express his thanks for all the expressions of welcome offered to him at the meeting at which he spoke. He very much regretted that he could not stay longer and continue the dialogue with the distinguished members of this Committee, but he was obliged to return to Buenos Aires that same day. He therefore asked me to extend to you all his thanks for the warm welcome he received in this body.

I should like, at the same time, on my own behalf, to express my thanks for all the words of welcome I have received since the day on which I joined this Committee, beginning with yourself, Mr. Chairman. I deeply appreciate the friendly welcome I have received in this forum and I can assure you all that I shall always participate in this Committee with the best of good will and in a profoundly constructive spirit. I thank very sincerely all those members of the Committee who welcomed me on the occasion of my joining the Committee.

To conclude this introduction, Mr. Chairman, since this is the last day on which you will preside over the work of this body, I should like to extend to you my delegation's congratulations on the extremely efficient manner in which you have done so during what is always a particularly difficult period, that of the initiation of the Committee's activities at the beginning of each of its sessions. You have guided the Committee's deliberations and the necessary informal negotiations with the greatest effectiveness, and I should merely like to place on record my appreciation as well as my admiration in this connection. At the same time I should like to wish the next Chairman of the Committee, the distinguished Ambassador of India, every success in his term of office.

I should now like to refer very briefly to the specific issue before the Committee today, namely, agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The position of the Argentine Republic on this question has been stated consistently and repeatedly both in the Committee on Disarmament and in the United Nations General Assembly, and also in other bodies concerned with disarmament. In coming here today to reiterate that position, we do not wish either to contribute to the conduct of an exercise in rhetoric or to promote the fiction that this Committee is concerning itself with those matters which most seriously affect international security. On the contrary, we have come to express the very serious concern of the Argentine Government at the non-existence of negotiations to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, which currently appears to have acquired new and regrettable vitality.

The present international situation in this regard is grave, especially since we find no indication that the major Powers have either sufficient political will to change it or any understanding of the urgency of negotiating solutions.

We do not at all accept the argument of those who maintain that questions concerning the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be the preserve of a few. We do not accept that view for two principal reasons: because our own security is involved, and because past experience has shown that that road leads to failure. The special responsibility which the possession of nuclear arsenals entails carries with it the duty to exercise caution in political matters and moderation in military matters.

(Mr. Carasales, Argentina)

This is valid not only in the context of the nuclear arms race, but also in the context of military rivalry in general. Time and again we have been told that the qualitative development of the nuclear arsenal of one group of States is the cause of the quantitative growth in the arsenal of their potential adversaries. Time and again we have also been told that the increase in the conventional forces of one military alliance makes it essential for the other military alliance to strengthen its security by expanding its nuclear forces, in a spiral which never seems to stop. No one could consider us so unrealistic as to believe that nuclear disarmament alone would be enough to strengthen security in some regions of the world. We fully understand that some cases necessitate the simultaneous negotiation of measures relating to other categories of weapons and forces. However, an understanding of the realities of some areas does not prevent us from putting first the general interest of mankind, and we repeat that comprehensive nuclear disarmament is the vital imperative of our time.

As far as this Committee is concerned, again we find that stagnation is the predominant feature. Item 2 of our agenda, so designated as long ago as 1979, seems to be a dead letter. My delegation reiterates its firm support for the statement of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/130, and maintains that no member State should fear the frank discussion of these questions in an ad hoc working group established to deal with item 2.

Paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament provides us with an adequate mandate for the work of that subsidiary body. Its content was negotiated with the participation of the nuclear-weapon States and includes all the conditions which they themselves considered it necessary to insert to enable them to accord it their assent. Thus what is now needed is the political will to enable them to overcome their objections to the establishment of the working group. We hope that that will can be expressed in such a way as to facilitate a positive decision by this Committee on the proposal of the Group of 21.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Carasales of Argentina for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer some further observations on the item before us today, namely, Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The formulation of this item is precise. There can be no room for ambiguity and all the members of this Committee have accepted it. The word "cessation" could not mean anything else but a total stop and a final halting of the nuclear arms race, and is not merely its regulation or control. That is our declared and agreed collective objective, and we are here to enter into negotiations with a view to attaining that goal.

The Committee on Disarmament has been created by consensus by the United Nations General Assembly as a multilateral negotiating forum. What is the meaning of this word "negotiate"? I have consulted two well-known dictionaries -- the Concise Oxford Dictionary and Webster's Dictionary -- and both are agreed that "to negotiate" means "to confer with one another with a view to reaching compromise or agreement".

I have for very good reasons taken the trouble to define the terms "cessation" and "negotiate", because apparently some members seek to give these terms a different interpretation. These differences became apparent during the informal meetings we had during the spring session and which are continuing in the current session.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Some members, notably a very small but powerful minority, maintain that "negotiations" on the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament should be conducted between those nuclear-weapon States having the largest nuclear arsenals, through the SALT process and other bilateral contacts and that the Committee on Disarmament is not an appropriate forum for the purpose of these negotiations, although of course they generously concede that we may continue to discuss this question ad infinitum. This minority also admits that the object of their bilateral negotiations is the "controlling" of the nuclear arms race, whereas our mandate and declared objective is its complete cessation. In the light of these differences of views, it is clear as to why we have not been able to agree on the establishment of a working group under this item.

I wish to make it clear that my delegation does not share the views of this minority which, having once agreed to the inclusion of this item on our agenda, now opposes it and by so opposing prevents the Committee from undertaking meaningful negotiations of any kind under this item. This is a great pity, and it is also unfortunately the result of the operation of the consensus rule. In any case, it is clear that there is no absence of political will on the part of the vast majority of the members of the Committee to begin negotiations in an ad hoc working group.

A question has been addressed to us as to what it is that we wish to negotiate. I wonder whether any answer we give to this question would convert those who have taken a negative attitude on the proposals of the Group of 21. Perhaps not. If so, I wonder why this question was put to us in the first place. Since, however, it has been put, it deserves an answer. There are a number of proposals that could be negotiated by us and I would refer in the first instance to the compilation of proposals prepared by the Secretariat. So far as my delegation is concerned, India put forward its proposals as early as 1956 concerning areas such as the halting of nuclear-weapon tests, a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, the dismantling of nuclear weapons, etc. etc.

India is not the only country that has presented proposals, and I know several other members have also done the same. Mexico has a large number of proposals to its credit. Nigeria suggested that we might begin by negotiating a freeze in the nuclear arsenals. Other members, including some West European countries, have suggested considering a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for military uses, a ban on further flight testing of delivery vehicles, a nuclear-test ban and some other matters as well. The socialist countries also proposed that we take up the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. One socialist member has suggested a troika, namely, no more development of new weapons, no more deployment and no more tests.

As you see, we have a large number of proposals to choose from, but the fact is that because of the attitude of a handful of delegations towards the negotiating role of the CD, we are unable to do anything in the way of negotiations on nuclear issues. In these circumstances what is the Committee to do? Well, for one thing, it can accept the views of these delegations and adopt the amiable posture of urging the major Powers in the direction of bilateral negotiations on objectives they may agree upon between themselves. Secondly, we may limit ourselves "nobly" to having "great argument about it and about, and come out of the same door as in we went", to quote Omar Khayyam. This would be the line of least resistance and may appear superficially attractive to several members who see in it the supreme virtues of "realism" and "pragmatism".

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

My delegation, for one, will not acquiesce in any abdication of any part of the CD's responsibilities and functions. The CD cannot accept the dictates of a few countries as to what it may or may not do. The CD's powers and functions derive from the collective authority of the international consensus represented in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. It goes without saying, therefore, that at its second special session the General Assembly should be given a clear picture of the reasons for the inability of the CD even to begin negotiations in the field of nuclear disarmament.

For the present, it would appear that the CD is stricken with a strange paralysis of action, although not of articulation. Let us then articulate our conclusions as best we can. If we are not able to do anything concretely to stop the nuclear arms race except to talk about it, what shall we then talk about?

My delegation, recognizing the unpleasant fact of our present inability to stop the nuclear arms race has sought repeatedly to draw attention to its consequences to all of us, to the threat to human survival that is inherent in the situation and to the imperative need, therefore, for an international convention to be concluded on the non-use of nuclear weapons. We have been advocating this since September 1953 when we first proposed a declaration on the non-use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Even before we took up this cause, and as early as December 1946, the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in its first report to the Security Council stated that "international agreement to outlaw the national production, possession and use of atomic weapons is an essential part of any international system of control". The nuclear-weapon States were parties to that report in 1946. We earnestly trust that we they still of the same view although they may have differences over the measures of international control.

My delegation is of the considered view that nuclear-weapon stockpiles, warhead megatonnage, delivery systems and their increasing accuracy, and strategic doctrines concerning nuclear weapons being what they are today, our immediate objective should be to seek ways and means of ensuring our collective survival. This surely is not a matter to be negotiated only between the two major Powers. It must involve all of us and indeed this must be of primary concern to the nuclear-weapon States themselves, since they cannot disregard the consequences not only to themselves but also to others from their actions, and especially the consequences to the future of the human race. At the moment this still remains a sort of grey area in their minds, despite a dozen references to it in the Final Document of the first special session.

What has the CD actually done about this? Nothing so far, despite our urgings to take up the question of the non-use of nuclear weapons and the question of ensuring the prevention of nuclear war as a measure of protecting what is likely to become an endangered species -- the human being. Quite to the contrary, the CD is considering two other matters, the radiological weapon and security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, in a manner that, unless vigilantly checked, may result in our acquiescing implicitly in the legitimization of the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. My delegation once again solemnly draws the attention of non-nuclear weapon States to this inherent danger.

Why do we keep sounding a note of warning against this danger? Because some nuclear-weapon States claim to have the right to use nuclear weapons in their own defence, regardless of the consequences of this action. I submit that consequences must influence all sensible action. There is a moral as well as a practical relationship between means and ends that we cannot afford to ignore. And where the consequences of an action deriving from so-called legal rights are such as to imperil the very survival of mankind, it is clear that both in law and morality these actions

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

should be sternly prohibited, and those questionable rights from which the actions emanate should be curtailed and redefined.

Given the nature of the nuclear weapon, it is absurd to take the position that its use is sanctioned by the general principles and ordinary rules of international law. Such theorizing belongs to a bygone age. It is equally absurd to take the view that since there is no specific prohibition in customary rules of international law, therefore, it is legal to use nuclear weapons. Such positions run counter to the unfolding process of international law, which has consistently aimed at moderating the use of force, discouraging the use of unnecessary force, banning the use of weapons that cause excessive and needless damage, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants, etc.

Even the existing non-proliferation arrangements in effect constitute a convention for preventing the possible use of nuclear weapons, but they only bind non-nuclear-weapon States since the nuclear-weapon States already have this weaponry. How can those that prescribe the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons for the rest of the world, claim for themselves the untenable and unacceptable right to use these same weapons? There is an outrageous anomaly in this, both in law and in morality. I do not wish to recall how many resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and with what majorities, have consistently called for the outlawing of nuclear weapons and their use. The Secretariat could perhaps make another bulky compilation of these repeated demands of the General Assembly. Is not the general will of the vast majority of mankind, expressed in these resolutions, enough to justify the prohibition of nuclear weapons?

I should like to quote here the opinion of a well-known legal authority, George Schwarzenberger, who says in one of his books on international law:

"The right of self-defence enables each sovereign State to decide for itself on retaliation in the event of an armed attack against it and such retaliation should be in good faith, should be appropriate and not exceed the frontiers of self-defence and should not infringe the rights of third States. The right of self-defence is not an absolute right exercised regardless of considerations of equity. It is a relative right to be exercised reasonably, and certainly not in a manner to destroy the very structure of society maintained by international law. The use of nuclear weapons under existing rules of war would be an illegal form of warfare and the commission of a war crime."

Yet another established legal authority has this to say:

"The radioactive fallout from the use of nuclear weapons is an entirely new weapon of war. Mass and indiscriminate destruction is clearly beyond the requirements of any situation, and the use of nuclear weapons is impermissible and incompatible with existing rules of law. The exercise of the right of self-defence cannot be above the laws of mankind designed to preserve human society and its civilized values."

There is a growing awareness that events may be pushing us inexorably towards a nuclear holocaust if something is not done quickly to check this trend. We have therefore been advocating a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons and the need for collective action to prevent a nuclear war. We do so in the strong belief that there are principles, ideals and standards that transcend not only national interests but also the exigencies of power politics. If I may conclude with the words of the first Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in our Parliament in 1950:

"Nuclear war will be a war not only between two parties but against the entire creation. The conflict in the contemporary world is really between the nuclear bomb and the spirit of humanity."

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished representatives, you will recall that at our informal meeting yesterday afternoon the Committee considered a proposal contained in document CD/174 which was submitted under item 5 of the agenda. The relevant draft decision has been circulated at this plenary meeting as Working Paper No. 42 and reads as follows:

"The Committee decides to hold informal meetings under item 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Delegations may be assisted by their own experts during the consideration of this item. The number of these informal meetings and their dates will be announced by the Chairman after consultations with members".

If there are no objections I will consider that the Committee agrees to the text circulated as Working Paper No. 42.

Mr. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, as you said, this question was discussed yesterday and the Committee decided that a text would be presented by you this morning. I have no objection to the text, or to the consensus in the Committee but I would like to point out that in the view of my delegation the second sentence in this draft is not necessary because at any time, in any meeting, delegations may be assisted by their own experts. If there is consensus in the Committee on the draft as a whole, however, my delegation will not object to it.

Mr. de BEAUSSE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleague from Brazil has just made an observation which I myself was about to make. I associate myself entirely with what he has just said, and my delegation would like the second sentence in the draft decision you read out to be deleted.

The CHAIRMAN: If there are no objections to the proposals made by the delegations of Brazil and France, the Chair would be ready to delete the second sentence, with the understanding that it is the normal practice of the Committee for every delegation to have the right, at any time, to use the participation of experts. Is this agreeable to the Committee? I see no objection.

Mr. MELESCANU (Romania): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to insert the definite article "the" in the last line before the word "members". I do apologize as English is obviously not our mother tongue, but as the text is now, it could be interpreted to imply consultations only with some members.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is no objection, the Chair would be ready to agree, in this case, with the addition of the definite article. The last sentence, the second sentence of the decision would then read as follows: "The number of these informal meetings and their dates will be announced by the Chairman after consultations with the members of the Committee." Is this decision thus acceptable to the Committee? I see no objection.

It was so decided.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Comrade Chairman, I had no intention of standing in the way of the consensus adopting the decision the Committee has just taken. However, in this connection I would like to note that my delegation would have preferred to maintain this sentence. I would like to appeal to delegates to be represented as far as possible by experts, in order to provide these meetings with the necessary qualitative expertise as it certainly would contribute to the successful outcome of these unofficial consultations. With this understanding, my delegation joins the consensus on your paper.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Comrade Chairman, the Soviet delegation did not object, either, to the adoption of the Committee's decision in the form of the text you read out. But surely the whole point -- I repeat, the whole point -- of the holding of informal meetings of the Committee is that qualified persons acquainted with the subject from the scientific and technical points of view should take part in them. If we are going to discuss this problem in a group composed of the same people as those now sitting around this table, it is unlikely that we shall say anything more than was said yesterday by the representatives who spoke on this question. On the whole, I regret that the delegations of Brazil and France made their proposal. I should like to support Ambassador Herder and appeal to all delegations to see that they are represented by eminent scientists able to make an authoritative contribution on this question. I have no doubt that in every country there are scientists who could answer the question that is raised from time to time by someone in the Committee: is not the development of new types of systems and weapons of mass destruction a matter of fiction, of fantasy -- something illusory? I should like to hear a different voice -- the voice of men of science, who would surely say something different. I have no doubt that they would say that new types of weapons of mass destruction can be developed, that human intelligence is working in that direction, and that the Committee on Disarmament is in duty bound to concern itself with this problem. Therefore, in agreeing with the decision taken, I trust that those delegations which are genuinely interested in a serious examination of the problem of the prevention of the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction will do everything in their power to ensure that their countries are represented by real experts in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, since this is the last plenary meeting in June, the period of my chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament is over. I would like to express my gratitude to all of you for the spirit of co-operation you have shown during this month of our work. This spirit of co-operation -- in my view -- helped the Committee to achieve whatever has been done during the first month of our summer session.

I would like to take this opportunity briefly to summarize the work done by the Committee on Disarmament during the month of June.

What can be considered the most important is that the business-like atmosphere of our Committee has been upheld. Its first result was that, regardless of the different opinions, the Committee was able to agree relatively fast on the programme of work for the second part of its 1981 session. Another positive factor was that the four ad hoc working groups of the Committee have resumed their work without delay. On the basis of the programme of work the Committee started informal meetings devoted to the consideration of the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies and other questions relating to the organization of work.

(The Chairman)

The Committee has done a good deal of exchanging of views in order to reach an understanding on the question of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. I think it is the desire of all of us that a solution should soon be found on that issue.

We have conducted intensive consultations during the informal meetings on the very important issue of setting up further subsidiary organs of the Committee on Disarmament, and in particular on creating ad hoc working groups on the questions of the general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Although the exchanges of views often went beyond the framework of a debate of a procedural nature and involved discussions of a substantive character, I cannot help expressing my dissatisfaction that these exchanges of views have not yielded final results. I would like to hope that delegations will do their utmost to find a solution soon so that these issues can be dealt with the way they deserve, taking into account the expectations and demands of the international community.

I can state with pleasure that the Committee was able to reach an agreement on the proposal made concerning informal meetings with experts on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. I am sure that the implementation of that decision will contribute to the appropriate handling of this important issue. I wish to associate myself with the appeal just made by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union concerning the participation of experts.

I can state with satisfaction the growing interest of States non-members in the substantive work done in the ad hoc working groups of the Committee. During the month of June the Committee, upon their request, has invited Austria and Spain to take part in the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

Concluding my statement, I would like to thank all delegations again for their support and co-operation in carrying out my duties.

I also wish to thank the distinguished Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, his deputy, Mr. Verasategui, the staff of the Secretariat and the interpreters and translators, for their valuable work which assisted me greatly in discharging my duties.

Finally, on behalf of all of us, I wish my successor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, good luck and success in furthering the work of the Committee during the month of July.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 2 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. P. VENKATESWARAN (India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI
Mr. M. MEDKOUR

Argentina: Mr. C. CARASALES
Mr. J.M. OTEGUI
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES
Miss L. GHAZERIAN

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. DARUSMAN
Mr. F. MOH. SIDAK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ENNY SUPRAPIO
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. S. ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mrs. L.V. GRATCHIKOVA
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. S.N. RYUKHINE

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE

Miss K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. R. SCOTT

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, before beginning our proceedings today I would like to extend a warm welcome in the Committee to the representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro, who has been appointed recently. In doing so, I wish him a successful mission in this Committee and at the same time assure him of the close co-operation of my own delegation.

The inexorable law of rotation which rules our solar system and also governs our Committee has ordained that the manifest symbol of the Committee's will, the gavel, shall be with the Indian delegation for the month of July. It is a great honour and privilege for me to preside over such an august assembly engaged in the pursuit of the most noble of causes -- the pursuit of peace through the creation of a world free from the fear of war, a world free of suspicion and distrust among fellow human beings.

I assume this office in all humility, conscious of the skill and ability with which my very distinguished predecessors have charted the course of this Committee in the months that have passed. It will be my sincere endeavour to live up to the high standards set by them. I know that in this endeavour I can count upon full co-operation and assistance from all my colleagues. Needless to say, in the days to come, the Chair will rely heavily on the rich experience and advice of Ambassador Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and personal representative of the United Nations Secretary-General, as well as his able and efficient team in the Secretariat.

Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary has, in his usual thorough and meticulous manner, during his chairmanship tied up most of the loose ends concerning the work before the Committee, since it resumed its 1981 session in June. May I warmly congratulate him on his fruitful tenure, and convey to him my gratitude for handing over to me, as they say, a smoothly running outfit. I hope that the next Chairman will have as good a fortune as I have had in this regard.

Distinguished delegates, while we engage ourselves in the serious business of negotiations on measures of disarmament, we must obviously remain conscious of the national and security interests of the countries we represent. In safeguarding those interests, we are no doubt guided by our own national perceptions. But we must not forget that the United Nations family is a much larger one. There is an ancient Sanskrit that says: "The whole world is our motherland; we are all children of the earth." We live in an increasingly interdependent world, where the pursuit of one country's national interests has to be consciously tempered and moderated by the awareness of the impact of our actions, or even lack of them, on the collective well-being and security of the international community as a whole. Our Committee serves two major and interlinked functions. Firstly, it gives each one of us the opportunity to articulate the security concerns and perceptions of the countries we represent. At the same time, it enables each of us to understand and appreciate the security concerns and perceptions of others. But this should not be the end of our exercise. Rather, this process of articulation and mutual understanding should lead to a serious and meaningful dialogue through which we can benefit from each other's point of view, identify the rationale behind the policies adopted by States and finally begin a process of reconciliation of our divergent views and interests. This is the essence of our negotiations. At present, our Committee is engaged in what is, in the main, a process of articulation and exposure. But the more fundamental aspect of conducting an earnest dialogue, with a view to accommodating and not merely rejecting, has yet

(The Chairman)

to materialize in full measure. Without such a sincere dialogue, the difficult process of the reconciliation of the divergent security concerns with which we are entrusted would have little chance of getting off the ground.

The desire for security, after all, stems from fear, mistrust and a mood of pessimism. We crave for security mainly because we apprehend danger. And nothing serves to sharpen such apprehensions more than ignorance, lack of understanding, prejudice and preconceptions. We all profess peaceful intentions, but unfortunately too often we tend to mirror each other's fears and apprehensions. And this reflection, with its exaggerated and distorted image, can be overcome only through a process of dialogue, an attempt to understand what lies behind the fears and suspicions. Once a proper and undistorted perspective is established, collective security will no longer be the elusive goal that it has proved to be all these years.

Successful negotiations require a spirit of mutual accommodation, and mutual accommodation in turn requires a better understanding. This calls for individual delegations as well as members of groups or alliances, to resist the temptation to exaggerate their own narrow security perceptions while all too easily dismissing the similar concerns of others as inconsequential or as not worthy of serious attention. Let us, therefore, translate our commitment to the goal of collective security into practical day-to-day decisions in the conduct of negotiations within this Committee.

It is true that the international situation today is characterized by a spirit of confrontation and tension. I believe that it is all the more necessary, in this context, for us, as a collective body, to promote a dialogue amongst ourselves, and to lay the basis for better mutual understanding. If we fall victim to the mood of gloom and apprehension that besets the world today, we would be accepting failure before taking the first few steps on what is admittedly a long and arduous journey. Let us remind ourselves that the longest journey starts with the first step we take. Let us avoid a situation where the pursuit of our individual security concerns endangers our collective survival.

I have dwelt at some length upon issues which I believe must be addressed squarely and frankly if we are to fulfil our mandate as the single multilateral body which exists for negotiations in the field of disarmament. With the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament only months away, we need some concrete evidence to underline the continuing relevance, indeed the importance, of our Committee, for bringing about the realization of the cherished goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

Before I conclude, I would like to wish the Chairmen of the four ad hoc working groups which have been set up by the Committee every success in their endeavours and trust that their efforts will enable us to present to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament next year proposals worthy of this Committee and each and every delegation represented here.

If, as I hope, during this month of July, the Committee and its working groups are able to get down to a serious and earnest dialogue through which we all become aware of what lies behind each other's individual security concerns and national perceptions, and begin the process of evolving mutual understanding, then I would be able to say with satisfaction, that this truly has been an Indian summer.

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I should like first of all to congratulate you sincerely on behalf of the Venezuelan delegation on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. We are sure that under your wise and efficient guidance the Committee's work will be extremely useful and effective. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Venezuela is at present on an official visit to India, a fact which illustrates our two countries' desire to forge closer links of friendship and co-operation. I should also like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the warm words of welcome to the Committee on Disarmament you were kind enough to address to me. I intend to participate with the utmost interest and enthusiasm, together with my other distinguished colleagues, in the work of this important disarmament negotiating body, in which the international community places great hopes.

I should also like to extend my delegation's thanks and congratulations to Ambassador Komives, who discharged his duties as Chairman of the Committee in June with the skill and efficiency which have characterized his well-known activity in this multilateral body.

I wish now, on behalf of my delegation, to make some brief comments of a general character on certain items of the agenda.

It is becoming more difficult every day to make a statement about matters connected with armaments and disarmament without lapsing into inevitable repetitions. The basic solutions to the problems dealt with here have been constantly repeated in this and other international forums and stated in a great many resolutions of the General Assembly. However, the growing complexity and gravity of the international situation, as a result, principally, of the implacable nuclear arms race, make it more than ever necessary to reiterate with the utmost conviction the importance of disarmament, and to intensify efforts to achieve concrete measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament has again in recent weeks, been considering the question of a nuclear test ban. We, too, wish to refer once more to this issue, in order to stress its importance and at the same time to emphasize the urgent need for it to be dealt with in an appropriate manner under the auspices of this Committee with a view to bringing about the adoption of a treaty on this subject.

Time and again, irrefutable arguments and reasons have been put forward in support of the early conclusion of an international agreement on this important and urgent issue. Unfortunately, these legitimate appeals have not, in practice, had the desired effect, owing to the positions adopted by certain delegations on the basis of their narrow, national perceptions, which are clearly incompatible with the overwhelming desire of the majority for the conclusion of a nuclear-test-ban treaty as an important step towards achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament. As a result, after a number of years of intensive consideration, no real progress can be said to have been made, for the fact is that nuclear tests are still being carried out, under various pretexts, thus fostering the nuclear arms race in both its quantitative and its qualitative aspects.

Nevertheless, far from resigning ourselves to such a discouraging situation, we wish today to reassert more vigorously than ever the basic affirmations made by our delegation, together with the other countries in the Group of 21, on item 1 of the Committee's agenda. Our insistence on this point stems from our conviction that,

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above all else, it is necessary to continue with perseverance and tenacity a thorough examination of the various alternatives which might lead to the adoption of a convention on an issue which has repeatedly been recognized by the General Assembly as being a matter of high priority.

I shall not repeat in detail Venezuela's position on this matter but would like simply to remind the Committee that my delegation is in favour of a complete prohibition of nuclear tests, including tests for peaceful purposes, since it is impossible to establish a clear distinction between tests for military purposes and tests for peaceful purposes. However, this does not imply the absolute exclusion of the possibility of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, but they should be carried out only in very special circumstances. Subject to very strict control by an international authority, a State could be authorized to explode a nuclear device, on condition that its purpose is demonstrably peaceful and that adequate measures are taken to prevent its being used for military purposes.

Document CD/181 submitted recently by the Group of 21 contains concrete proposals, stated clearly and concisely, which are designed to give a decisive impetus to the work on the prohibition of nuclear tests and thus to enable the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its role in dealing with this subject, through the establishment of the proposed working group. The document further contains some very specific questions addressed to the nuclear-weapon Powers engaged in the trilateral negotiations. These deserve a response in keeping with the urgency and importance of the subject, and in the precise form in which the Group of 21 has expressed its anxieties in the matter.

In document CD/180, the Group of 21 likewise reiterated its proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 of the agenda entitled, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The informal meetings held by the Committee on item 2 which, as we pointed out at the time, were rather a preliminary step towards a negotiation process, merely strengthened our belief that doctrines of nuclear deterrence must be relinquished in order to prepare the way for a better future for mankind, in which international peace and security may be based on firmer and more just foundations. A treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, as proposed here, would be a significant step in the right direction.

Useful though they undoubtedly were, the informal meetings also pointed to the need to discuss the complex issues involved at the higher level of multilateral negotiations. The Group of 21 has suggested the main elements of the mandate that might be conferred on the new working group.

The importance of item 2 is quite obvious. And yet the action which the Committee on Disarmament ought to undertake on this question of the highest priority in conformity with paragraph 50 of the Final Document, has been constantly restricted and obstructed by certain States which, precisely because they are nuclear-weapon Powers, bear primary responsibility for the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

This paramount interest in the Committee's carrying out to the full the mandate entrusted to it by the international community through the United Nations General Assembly stems from the right of non-nuclear weapon States to demand nuclear disarmament and to demand that they themselves should participate in the negotiations on disarmament because, in the final analysis, it is a matter of ensuring their own survival amidst this senseless confrontation between a very few States, a

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confrontation which places the fate of all mankind at stake. Our countries cannot be content with, much less resigned to a passive or subordinate role in this critical world situation, the most alarming aspect of which is the nuclear arms race.

Since then, nuclear disarmament is the most urgent and important question, of vital concern to all the peoples of the world, it is only natural for the States members of the Group of 21 to insist that the Committee should, without further delay, undertake substantive negotiations with a view to the adoption of tangible measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, these legitimate demands of the Group of 21, which are reaffirmed in the two documents I have referred to, closely concern the essential nature of this Committee, its very raison d'être. It is the duty of all of us, members of the Committee, to preserve and where necessary strengthen, its character as a negotiating body. The Committee on Disarmament was set up to consider the important items on its agenda from the standpoint of negotiation and to conduct substantive negotiations for the purpose of proceeding towards the adoption of instruments embodying concrete measures of disarmament.

The negotiations taking place in other, restricted forums should not be an obstacle to this Committee's carrying on negotiations on the same issues, in keeping with its role as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. Consequently, those participating in the restricted negotiations should keep the Committee fully and constantly informed of the progress of these talks. Furthermore, the most practical and useful way in which the Committee on Disarmament can carry out its role as a negotiating body is, as has been pointed out, through working groups, the importance of which requires no further comment.

At this stage, the least we can do is to express the hope that the nuclear-weapon Powers which have so far stood in the way of a consensus on the establishment of the two working groups proposed will amend their attitude in the interests of disarmament and the very credibility of this Committee. The appeals of a large number of delegations, which reflect the aspirations and expectations of many peoples of the world cannot and should not remain unheeded indefinitely.

My delegation would like to refer briefly to the question of so-called radiological weapons. Venezuela's position on this subject is already well known. At the outset of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject we proposed a different approach, for the sole purpose of contributing to the achievement of a genuine measure of disarmament in this connection.

We stated at that time that the convention to be adopted as a result of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group ought not to refer to radiological weapons, which do not exist, but to the prohibition of the use of radioactive materials for military purposes and the prohibition of radiological methods of warfare or methods of radiological warfare.

It was not, as we stressed, an inflexible position. Nevertheless, we merely followed with interest the deliberations of the Working Group, hoping that new elements would emerge which would result in additions or modifications more or less in line with the basic features of our delegation's original proposals.

Today we note with satisfaction that in recent weeks there has been a growing trend in favour of the inclusion of new elements designed to improve and broaden the draft convention. This trend became apparent with the proposals submitted by the Swedish delegation for the inclusion of provisions relating to the concept of

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radiological warfare and attacks on nuclear reactors. This last point has proved relevant with the attack by Israel on Iraq's nuclear reactor, which the Government of Venezuela has condemned both individually and in conjunction with the other countries of the Group of 21.

These proposals have met with support in most quarters. If they are finally approved they will give a new slant to the convention on so-called radiological weapons, the substance of which will be greatly improved.

The new proposals, particularly as regards the concept of radiological warfare, reflect some of those very concerns which prompted the delegation of Venezuela, some time ago now, to propose a different approach. This is why we broadly support them. True, the Swedish delegation's proposals call for certain clarifications from the political, legal and technical points of view, but the basic idea is undoubtedly very valuable and ought therefore to be incorporated in the draft treaty.

My delegation wishes also to stress that the use of the term radiological weapons in a convention should in no way signify or imply the consequent legitimization of the use of nuclear weapons. In the treaty now being negotiated there should be a suitable linkage with nuclear weapons since, when all is said and done, so-called radiological weapons would be intrinsically related to nuclear weapons. A convention on this subject which, as we all know, does not have the same priority as other items on the Committee's agenda, will be really valuable only if it contributes to the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons, whose existence and potentially devastating effects of course leave no one in doubt.

The Venezuelan delegation attaches special importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group responsible for drawing up a comprehensive programme of disarmament to be submitted in due course for examination and consideration by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The comprehensive programme will obviously be one of the main documents to emerge from the special session of the General Assembly since, as has been pointed out, it should provide the requisite framework for the substantive negotiations on disarmament. It is clear, therefore, that this Committee is required to draw up a comprehensive programme of disarmament in accordance with the priorities set forth in paragraph 45 of the Final Document, which states unequivocally that priority attention should be given to measures of nuclear disarmament.

These are difficult and critical times for the whole world. We are going through a crucial stage in international affairs, in which we all have the opportunity to help lay the foundations for States to live together in harmony and mutual respect, in an atmosphere of peace and justice. Nuclear disarmament is an essential prerequisite to the achievement of this goal. The second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in the near future will be one more demonstration of the international community's unswerving determination to promote disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum, is faced with the supreme challenge of making a significant contribution to improving the world situation and meeting the expectations of the international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro of Venezuela for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, it is a satisfaction for my delegation to see you presiding over our deliberations during the current month of July. We are sure that under your guidance our work will be conducted with great competence, skill and total impartiality. May I also express my appreciation for the work performed by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives, who deserves our gratitude and admiration for the outstanding contribution he made to this Committee during his chairmanship in the month of June.

Since the inception of this Committee, the delegation of Brazil, together with many other delegations, especially those in the Group of 21, has consistently spoken in favour of the commencement of substantive negotiations on the top-priority item on our agenda, namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The reasons for the urgency and importance of multilateral negotiations on that issue are well known and need not be repeated here; moreover, they have been explicitly recognized in many international documents adopted by consensus by all members of this Committee. It is only natural to believe that such a consensus should be enough to ensure that the Committee is able to tackle the matter substantively. By adopting the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, all members of the United Nations, and particularly the membership of the Committee on Disarmament, have agreed on taking the action it calls for, and have therefore entered into a formal commitment that should be fully respected. By placing the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament on the agenda and programme of work of the Committee, its members have also accepted that it should be the subject of negotiation in this body, which has been created with a clear negotiating mandate.

My delegation cannot understand, therefore, the reticence and hesitation of two members of the Committee in joining the consensus otherwise existing within this body on the establishment of an ad hoc working group to deal substantively with item 2. My delegation would have thought that the commitments undertaken by all of us should not be open to question, particularly when such commitments were the result of long and careful negotiation, expressed in a consensual document only four years ago.

Those two delegations have thus shown a very disturbing stand that reflects the current trend in some quarters towards the revision of some of the concepts that have been agreed to, in the field of disarmament, in the not too distant past. In the latter part of the 1960s, three nuclear-weapon Powers, including the two Superpowers, formally committed themselves in an international treaty to undertake, "at an early date", negotiations on nuclear disarmament. They continue to profess their strong attachment to that treaty; their devotion, however, seems to be confined only to some of the provisions of that instrument.

More recently, all nuclear-weapon Powers participated in the drafting of the Final Document and joined the consensus that permitted its adoption, thereby establishing the multilateral negotiating body which was supposed to take action on the issues embodied in its Programme of Action. During the three years of operation of the Committee on Disarmament, however, every attempt to bring to substantive examination and negotiation the two issues that were considered to

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be of first priority have been systematically thwarted. The argument that such issues were "too important", or "too sensitive", or "too complex" to warrant multilateral scrutiny was often advanced, together with the strange reasoning that nuclear disarmament involved the "vital interest" of the nuclear-weapon Powers alone, and as such should be better dealt with in ever smaller circles of great Powers.

Lately, however, the disturbing trend I mentioned above has become increasingly present in the reasoning and in the attitudes of some nuclear-weapon Powers. Such reasoning seeks to justify the existence and possession of nuclear weapons with the argument that such weapons are an essential instrument for the assurance of the security of those Powers, and hence they ensure the maintenance of a balance that in turn is responsible for the existing "peace, stability and order". Have we so downgraded the concept of "peace" as to equate it with a tolerable state of tension? Is the rest of the world expected to be satisfied with a concept of "stability and order" that condones the persistent spiralling upwards of the nuclear arms race? Can the "vital interests" of the non-nuclear nations continue to be ignored by those who have conceived such a grand design of world affairs?

Brazil is convinced that no equitable and lasting solutions to questions of disarmament can ever be achieved unless the legitimate concerns and aspirations of nuclear and non-nuclear nations alike are duly taken into account. There can be no justification for theories that assume that those who possess the power and the means to destroy civilization are thereby entitled to take decisions affecting the whole of mankind. If that were true, if power were the only recognized yardstick for international relations, indeed all nations would feel justified in seeking for themselves the acquisition of all the means with which to impose their will upon others. My delegation remains convinced that, through a careful and enlightened process of review of the current concepts in the field of disarmament, those delegations that so far have not found it possible to adhere to the premises upon which this Committee was established will finally realize that their individual security needs are best served if due account is taken of the wider picture of the security interests of the entire community of nations, and that the Committee on Disarmament is the adequate forum for the relevant negotiations. The opposite attitude would prove to be a tragic mistake that history would record sooner or later.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador de Souza e Silva for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HEIDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, let me first of all express the satisfaction of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on seeing you preside over this Committee. We are convinced that, guided by your well-known diplomatic skills and experience, you will ably lead us through the month of July in which we will undoubtedly face the bulk of the work of the summer session. At the same time I would like to thank your predecessor, Comrade Ambassador Kónives from Hungary, for his excellent and successful performance as Chairman for the month of June. Mainly through his perseverance, it was possible to secure a smooth start of our negotiations from the very beginning of our summer session. At the same time, I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to extend our sincere welcome to Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro of Venezuela, to whose statement we have listened with great interest. We wish him every success in his new assignment and are looking forward to constructive co-operation with him.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Allow me now to address the two central questions of the Committee's agenda — a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

There can be no question as to the importance of these items. This is especially evident under present-day circumstances when the nuclear arms race is driven to new and dangerous dimensions by well-known circles beyond the Atlantic Ocean striving for military superiority. Ever more than before, concrete measures are needed to spare mankind a nuclear holocaust. Dialogue and negotiations on an equal basis are on the order of the day. These are the main ideas on which the recent appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "To the parliaments and peoples of the world" is based and which, I noticed, was circulated just a few minutes ago as an official document. My country associates itself with this appeal. The People's Chamber of the German Democratic Republic solemnly declared in this regard:

"The peace appeal is launched by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at a time when world peace is again seriously endangered. The transition of the aggressive military forces to a policy of confrontation and arms drive, to a policy of interference and whipping up conflicts, not only threatens to destroy the results of détente which the peoples have won in a hard struggle, but also brings mankind to the brink of a nuclear Armageddon."

Thus, the most authoritative bodies of nations have again raised their voices in favour of peace and disarmament. Naturally, the question arises: what will the Committee on Disarmament do to respond to these appeals, to fulfil its role as the single multilateral negotiating forum? Shall we continue to sit and wait for the outbreak of a nuclear catastrophe, or shall we settle down to the business entrusted to us by the peoples of the world and come to concrete solutions?

I think the latter is the right way. My delegation regards the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the Committee on a nuclear test ban and on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as a first step in this direction.

In the absence of a consensus concerning this question at our spring session, we supported the holding of informal meetings on items 1 and 2. These meetings played a useful role in the clarification of some basic aspects connected with nuclear doctrines and the nuclear arms race. The urgent necessity of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament was widely recognized. On the other hand, no concrete steps leading to the preparation of such negotiations could be agreed upon.

My delegation cannot but deplore that in this connection a tendency endangering the very basis of this Committee is emerging on the part of two nuclear-weapon States. Contrary to the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the repeated appeals of the General Assembly and the expressed wish of world public opinion, these States seem to be not prepared to take an active part in negotiations on the crucial questions of our time. Sometimes one may have the impression that at best they are only ready to take part in not binding discussions. Owing to this attitude, even a procedural decision on the establishment of additional ad hoc working groups has been blocked up to now. To justify this position, the argument was advanced that "the time was not ripe" for negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. This argument holds no water. It is certainly not necessary to go into details. As in other cases, too, the Final Document of the

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first special session speaks clearly in this regard. For the sake of clarity I would like to emphasize only one historical parallel. All here around this table are certainly familiar with the history of the disarmament negotiations in the framework of the League of Nations. Years were spent on sometimes very abstract deliberations. After all, they were doomed to failure by the ill-famed linkage concept used by the opponents of real disarmament. This concept was, inter alia, reflected in the report of the "Mixed Commission" of September 1921. I would like to quote from it:

"Of all the problems confronting the League of Nations, none is more difficult than that of disarmament, for armaments depend on policy, and policy depends on circumstances, while circumstances vary from year to year and from country to country."

The parallel to present-day arguments is obvious. My delegation cannot but repeat its appeal to the two nuclear-weapon States which up to now are not ready to join in our efforts to move ahead in nuclear disarmament to change their attitude and to accept at least a positive formal decision on the establishment of additional subsidiary bodies on items 1 and 2.

An ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban could deal in a comprehensive manner with all aspects connected with the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests. All nuclear-weapon States would have an appropriate opportunity to explain their position and to reach agreement on these vital problems. To our knowledge, no single nuclear-weapon State has until now officially questioned the need for a comprehensive test ban. Thus, favourable conditions for the establishment of a CTB working group seem to exist. A first step to be agreed on by all five nuclear-weapon States could be a one-year moratorium on all nuclear-weapon tests. This would, without any doubt, favourably influence future CTB negotiations. At the same time we believe that such a working group should not interfere with the resumption of the trilateral negotiations but should rather help to promote them. These talks were interrupted by the Western side in November 1980 and, despite the readiness of the USSR and repeated appeals in this Committee, have not been resumed since then. The reasons are well known.

The reports submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the trilateral negotiators show that considerable progress has been made on the road to a treaty on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Key provisions of such a treaty were agreed upon. The understanding reached on verification is of particular importance. The use of seismic monitoring methods which, according to some reports, can detect 1 to 2 kt-yield nuclear explosions, on-site inspections on a voluntary basis in special cases, as well as a committee of experts, would ensure reliable verification of compliance with a CTBT. In this regard my delegation wishes to express its satisfaction at the work of the Committee's Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events, which has already done much of the groundwork for the establishment of an international seismic data exchange system within the framework of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In view of all these achievements, we firmly reject all attempts to use a so-called verification question to justify a reluctant attitude to CTB negotiations. It is all too obvious that alleged verification difficulties are simply a cover for a lack of political will to agree on a CTB.

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Not long ago, the United Nations General Assembly solemnly declared the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. We hope that that Declaration does not remain a dead letter. There are more and more signs that we are entering a period which poses a greater danger of nuclear war than ever before. This is caused by the renewed advocacy in one major nuclear-weapon State of limited nuclear war as a realistic political option, by conceptions that nuclear weapons must be used as active instruments of foreign policy. At the very heart of this policy lies a fundamental unwillingness of this nuclear-weapon Power to acknowledge the need to stabilize the nuclear strategic balance and to bring it down to agreed limits.

It seems to us that instead of thinking about a constructive attitude to agreements and negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament, this nuclear-weapon Power is giving more and more thought to enhancing the "credibility of nuclear deterrence". Efforts are being made to move quickly towards a first strike counter-force doctrine and capability. Whereas the start of new SALT negotiations is continuously postponed, new destabilizing military programmes are coming smoothly into existence. Today nobody knows how long the "pause" in SALT and other negotiations imposed and foreseen by such a policy will endure, and what results dangerous for the security of all peoples it will still bring about.

The policy of military strength, confrontation and containment puts existing agreements into question. Already at the beginning of the spring session of this year my delegation drew the attention of the Committee to attempts by certain circles in the United States to abrogate the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. Only some days ago the Moscow meeting of the Palme Commission with all seriousness underlined its importance and urged the countries concerned to maintain the treaty (CD/188).

The German Democratic Republic favours the earliest possible resumption of the SALT negotiations and the entry into force of the SALT II agreement. This would not only enhance international security; it would also have a favourable impact on the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee itself, with due regard to the stipulations of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, should concentrate on the basic aspects of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Already at the very beginning of the work of this Committee in its new form, a group of socialist countries tabled in document CD/4 clear proposals on how to prepare and initiate appropriate negotiations. Concrete ideas about the subject and stages of such negotiations were put forward. All these proposals are still valid today. We cannot but express our concern that up to now it has not been possible to reach any agreement in this Committee concerning the questions raised in document CD/4 and in documents presented by the Group of 21. There can be no justification for a position blocking the start of business-like negotiations on the most crucial question of our time. Perhaps the two nuclear-weapon States concerned have concepts and ideas on nuclear disarmament different from those of the majority of the Committee's

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members. But this should not prevent them from joining a consensus on the creation of an ad hoc working group in which they may explain their concepts and concerns. Negotiations are the only reliable way to cope with the vital problems of our day. An ad hoc working group could determine the set of questions to be dealt with in the relevant negotiations and solve matters connected with the organizational preparation of the negotiations.

As far as the mandates of the two additional working groups are concerned, useful ideas were expressed by the group of socialist States as well as by the Group of 21. Now the time is ripe for a serious debate and a formal decision on them. It is our understanding, Mr. Chairman, that it fits into the role entrusted to you by the Committee for you to initiate this process by holding appropriate consultations, in particular with the delegations of the nuclear-weapon States, or to set up a special contact group.

Closely connected with the cessation of the nuclear arms race is the prevention of the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. Therefore, let me remind this Committee that under resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly, it was called upon to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We hope that the Committee on Disarmament will respond with all seriousness to this resolution. Appropriate proposals were made by the socialist countries at the beginning of this session.

At the conclusion of my statement, permit me to say a few words about a recent event. Some days ago the German Democratic Republic, together with other socialist countries, strongly condemned the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear research centre near Baghdad. We cannot but state our concern that following this attack, in Western mass media, and not only there, attempts were made to put into question the safeguards system of the IAEA and to justify the Israeli attack. At the same time the fact that the aggressor, according to some reports, already years ago clandestinely acquired nuclear weapons is widely neglected. As a party to the NPT we strongly oppose such attempts. In our view, this act of State-directed terrorism should make those countries which closely collaborate with Israel in the nuclear field review their policy in that respect and take appropriate sanctions against the aggressor. Thereby legitimate non-proliferation concerns can be met. Otherwise, we fear, such an aggressive régime as the apartheid clique in Pretoria will be encouraged tomorrow to attack nuclear facilities in African countries under the pretext of "securing its survival".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. DARUSMAN (Indonesia): Mr. Chairman, to begin with, allow me to offer you the warm congratulations of the Indonesian delegation on your accession to the chair of the Committee. You represent a country which is well-known for its untiring efforts for the cause of international peace. It is therefore a great pleasure to my delegation to see you chairing this important Committee and may I offer you the full co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your difficult task and heavy responsibility. With your vast experience and deep knowledge of the problems we have to deal with, my delegation is convinced that, under your competent guidance, our Committee will make further progress.

Allow me also to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my delegation to your predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, for the competent and efficient manner in which he presided over our Committee during the month of June.

Allow me also to welcome the distinguished representative of Venezuela, H.E. Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro.

When the first United Nations Disarmament Decade was proclaimed by the General Assembly on 16 December 1969, the objectives of which were the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament, the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control and the possible channelling of the resources freed by the disarmament measures to promote development in developing countries, there was a high hope that the 1970s would be marked by substantive progress and concrete achievements in the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Two years before the end of the decade, the General Assembly, at its tenth special session, which was devoted to disarmament, emphasized in paragraph 47 of its Final Document that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and civilization and that the nuclear arms race, in the context of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, should be halted and reversed. It is with regret and concern that we note that the first United Nations Disarmament Decade has ended without the accomplishment of its objectives. On the contrary, we have witnessed the continued increase in the number and destructive capability of nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, as well as the continued improvement of the accuracy of their delivery systems. Concerned with such a situation, the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement,

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in the Declaration issued at the conclusion of their meeting held in New Delhi last February, stated, inter alia, as follows:

"The actions of the nuclear-weapon States, which are engaged in a new and frenzied round of the nuclear arms race, have created a situation in which mankind seems to have been condemned to live in the shadow of nuclear annihilation."

The Group of 21, in its statement at the conclusion of our spring session, emphasized the special responsibility of all the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. This special responsibility was recognized not only in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in 1973 (paragraph 48) but had also been previously affirmed in another international instrument, namely, the non-proliferation Treaty (article VI) which was concluded ten years earlier. While believing that bilateral and regional negotiations are useful and should be intensified, it is also the view of my delegation that this Committee, the only multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament and in which all nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear-weapon States participate, should start without further delay multilateral negotiations in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly and, more particularly, in order that the Committee shall be in a position to submit its report on the results of those negotiations to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, to be held next year. The cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are of concern to the international community as a whole, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, because the continued quantitative and qualitative increase in nuclear armaments has not resulted in the strengthening of international peace and security; on the contrary, these armaments continue to pose a threat to international peace and have only created a deeper sense of insecurity on the part of the majority of the nations of the world. The concepts of nuclear superiority or of a balance of nuclear deterrence can only lead to an endless nuclear arms race, thus making nuclear disarmament more remote. A slight sense of nuclear inferiority on the part of one nuclear-weapon State would push this State to make up for it by increasing its own military expenditures in order that the nuclear balance be restored or even to tilt it in its favour. Such a process may go on ad nauseam, running counter to the common man's profound need for peace and security. A spiralling arms race will also jeopardize the endeavours by the world community to cope with the present international economic problems and to achieve a new international economic order. The competition in deterrence, as stated by the Foreign Ministers of the Non-Aligned countries in their February meeting in New Delhi, "has only heightened the nightmare of uncertainty and fear

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which characterizes international relations today because the arms race stems particularly from the persistent recourse to the use of force in order to maintain the status quo in international relations. There is only one real deterrent, namely, mankind's desire to survive".

When this Committee was created, three years ago, it was the expectation of the community of nations that this single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament would be more successful than the ENDC or the CCD. The credibility of this organ would be at stake and the confidence that the international community has in this organ may be shaken if we fail even to engage in negotiations on nuclear weapons which were given first priority among the items listed in paragraph 45 of the Final Document of the first special session. Up to the conclusion of our spring session, negotiations on this priority item, including the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, had not even been started. Informal meetings did take place, but although the discussions in those meetings were not totally futile, no significant results have actually come out of those informal deliberations. It is a matter of regret and concern to us to note that today, at the beginning of the third week of our work this summer, there seem to be no indications that the proposals of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/180 on the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 of our agenda and its mandate will receive a positive response. In response to arguments that only bilateral, trilateral or regional forums are suitable for effective negotiations, the Group of 21 has stated in its document CD/180 that such forums for negotiations continue to be useful, and negotiations taking place therein should be intensified, while multilateral negotiations of vital interest to nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike should be initiated without delay in this Committee as the only multilateral organ in the field of disarmament in which both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States are participating. This view is in conformity with the provision in paragraph 121 of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Disarmament negotiations in the nuclear field are not an area of activities reserved solely for nuclear-weapon States. Paragraph 113 of the Final Document of the first special session states, inter alia, that nuclear disarmament is essential for the survival of mankind. Mankind does not consist of nuclear-weapon nations only; it consists of all the nations in the world which have now been affected by the continued escalation of the nuclear arms race and which would suffer from a nuclear war, regardless of whether they are nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon nations. This Committee therefore constitutes the most appropriate forum for the conduct of negotiations on disarmament in the nuclear field, which are of vital interest to mankind as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): In the history of every people there have been times when its very existence as a nation was jeopardized. To survive in such circumstances required the mobilization of all the forces and internal resources of one country or another. The first world armed conflict put at stake the fate of several States and caused not only the loss of many millions of human lives and tremendous devastation but also radical changes in the political map of Europe -- and not Europe alone, either. The Second World War involved the greater part of the countries of the world, and for many of them the preservation of their national independence, their statehood and sometimes even their mere physical survival entailed unheard-of destruction and sufferings and losses amounting to millions upon millions of human lives. At the present time, in the era of thermonuclear weapons, it is not only the fate of many nations but also the preservation of human civilization and the very life of man on earth that are imperilled.

Can there be a people that in the face of this universal threat would seek its own destruction? Can there be a Government, if it really represents the interests of its people, that would not do its utmost to help put an end to this bridled nuclear Bacchanalia? Can any sober-minded person stand aside from the struggle to save peace, to avert the threat of thermonuclear holocaust?

It was precisely these thoughts, this anxiety for the future of all mankind that imbued the speech delivered by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR L.I. Brezhnev on 23 June 1981 at the session of the highest State body of the Soviet Union, as also the appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world which has been circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the face of the unprecedented aggravation of the international situation in recent times, the head of the Soviet State declared: "Only one conclusion can be drawn: now, today, everything possible must be done to bar the way to those who love unrestricted rearmament and military gambles. Everything possible must be done to safeguard the right of people to life. No one can be an indifferent onlooker in this matter: it affects all and everyone. It affects Governments and political parties, public organizations and, of course, parliaments elected by the peoples and acting on their behalf". 1/

This task also directly concerns our Committee. We representatives in the Committee of Disarmament know perhaps better than anyone not only about the great objective difficulties that are connected with this multifaceted complex of problems relating to the limitation of armaments but also about those subjective factors that are possibly even more important at the present stage and which may be brought together under one heading -- "the political will of States". Yes, it is indeed the political will or, more precisely, the lack of it in the leading Western Powers that has up to now been the principal obstacle to practical headway being made in the negotiations on the limitation of the nuclear arms race and to really tangible measures being adopted in the sphere of nuclear disarmament.

1/ Pravda, 24 June 1981.

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Who will deny that in present-day conditions the gravest peril to peace and the security of peoples lies in the continuing arms race, and first and foremost the nuclear arms race?

The main feature of the current stage in the nuclear arms race is that its focus has shifted from the quantitative to the qualitative aspect. In the era of scientific and technological revolution, qualitative innovations in nuclear weapons systems can entail far-reaching consequences both of a military and strategic and of a political nature.

The monstrous consequences of the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular cause legitimate anxiety on the part of the world community.

In this connection permit me to refer to the unbiased opinion of competent scientists in various countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear, who are entirely justified in thinking that any war in which weapons of mass destruction were used would inevitably become nuclear omnicide -- the total self-destruction of civilization on earth. Thus, for instance, the participants in the authoritative Pugwash Conference recently stated that, unless effective measures are taken to alleviate and remove dangerous trends in the qualitative and quantitative arms race, a nuclear military catastrophe will break out even before the end of the present century. Such a war will sow death and devastation which human society will no longer be able to cope with. The very survival of a human being as a biological species will be endangered. 1/

I would like to stress once again that this opinion is not merely that of some representatives of the general public but of renowned scientists who know the value of their words. One of them, Professor Rotblat, an eminent British authority in the sphere of radiation biology, stated in no uncertain terms at the 30th Pugwash Conference that military experts are either unable or unwilling to take into account the consequences of the policies of the arms race and seek to secure public acceptance of the doctrine of a "limited" nuclear war.

A similar viewpoint is held by an eminent American scientist, John Somerville, an honorary Professor of New York University, who, in particular, said: "Now each and every person, all people on earth are participating in a sort of a world referendum on the subject of whether the ever-growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction should continue to exist or whether life should continue. Those who take no action against these types of weapons are in fact voting for omnicide". 2/

In late March of this year a conference of "international physicians for the prevention of nuclear war" took place in the vicinity of Washington with the participation of prominent scientists and physicians from 11 countries. The conference studied the consequences of various types of nuclear strikes. It was established, for example, that the explosion of a one-megaton bomb in the air over a

1/ World of Science, vol. XXIV, 1980, p. 29.

2/ Problems of Peace and Socialism, No. 6, p. 70.

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city with one million residents would cause the death of 300,000 people as a result of the blast, burns and radiation, while 400,000 more would suffer from the after-effects of the nuclear explosion. The explosion of a 20-megaton thermonuclear device would wipe out all buildings within a 24-km radius and the luminous radiation would be so intense as to burn everything alive to a distance of 140 km from the epicentre of the explosion.

The explosion of 10,000 megatons -- and this is precisely the yield of nuclear devices which, according to the estimates made by American experts, will be exploded in the event of a thermonuclear war -- will reduce the ozone layer of the atmosphere by 30 to 40 per cent. The so-called hard ultraviolet radiation will sharply increase, the result being the destruction of agricultural crops and animals.^{1/}

Scientists and military experts in various countries have described the tremendous human losses and destruction that would result from a nuclear war, including a so-called limited nuclear war.

With the present-day level of the development of strategic arms, guidance systems and missile early-warning systems it is impossible to launch a preventive nuclear strike, which the architects of the new nuclear strategy count on, without inevitably suffering a no less powerful retaliatory attack. Illusory, therefore, are the hopes of those who wish to find some foolproof "recipe" for a nuclear war that would enable them at an auspicious moment to disarm the enemy with, so to speak one knock-out blow, without themselves risking destruction in such a war.

One cannot make prior judgements as to the nature and methods of nuclear warfare. The architects of the concept of a limited use of strategic nuclear arms are actually proposing to wage a nuclear war in accordance with some predesigned "rules" whereby nuclear missiles should explode in "gentlemanly" fashion, that is, not over cities but over targets which they would consider it advantageous to call military objects. It is clear to any sane-minded person that this is impracticable. Military facilities are at present deployed in such a way that in any case selective nuclear strikes against them will at the same time cause massive annihilation of the civilian population. Any attempt to portray a nuclear war as "an exchange of selective strikes solely against military targets", without the possibility of its escalating into an all-out war, seems altogether naive.

From the military standpoint, as the advocates of the new nuclear strategy are perfectly well aware, a nuclear "mini-war" is an absurdity, since it is clear to everyone that any limited nuclear war will inevitably and immediately escalate into an all-out global war.

It is difficult to imagine the consequences of even a limited number of nuclear strikes against the territory of an industrialized State. Experts of the United States Department of Defense prepared a report on the effects of a "limited nuclear war" which was presented in 1975 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It contains the following data on possible losses in the United States in the event of the launching of selective nuclear strikes against various targets within the territory of the country. A strike against the Whiteman (Missouri) airbase alone could kill 10.3 million people, and attacks on other ICBM bases 21.7 million people.

^{1/} Komsomolskaya Pravda, 10 April 1981

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One cannot help wondering whether the apologists of the new nuclear strategy comprehend the magnitude of these figures and of the possible consequences? In truth, a glance at the figures is enough to convince anyone of the danger to the world that is being created by the nuclear maniacs.

Despite convincing data about the catastrophic consequences of a war in which nuclear weapons are used, here and there in the West the advocates of such a war raise their voices ever more loudly in its defence. The apologists of the doctrine of deterrence even try to theorize on the subject of the advisability for the United States to employ nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. A nuclear war is possible say Colin S. Grey and Keith Pane in the magazine, Foreign Policy. But unlike Armageddon, they say -- an apocalyptic war which is prophesized to mark the end of history -- a nuclear war can have the most varied outcomes. 1/

However, to the authors of this article, judging by its title, "Victory is Possible", the outcome of a war is clear. It will be waged to "force the Soviet Union" to give up those foreign policy actions whose character is misinterpreted by Washington.

More frequent attempts have been made lately to provide a "theoretical basis" for the need to continue resorting to the doctrine of deterrence which has more than once been refuted by life itself. Furthermore, it is characteristic that whereas in the past the advocates of this doctrine used it mainly with respect to the continent of Europe, nowadays they are trying to extend its sphere of application to include the entire globe. Illustrative in this regard is the article by a former director of the CIA, Admiral Stanfield Turner, entitled "Towards a New Defence Strategy" which was published in the New York Times Magazine in May of 1981.

We agree with those representatives who have declared that a nuclear war would not be confined to those countries which possess nuclear weapons or have military alliances with nuclear-weapon Powers. In the present-day geopolitical situation it is hard to think of a region which would be spared by a nuclear conflict.

The peace initiatives of the Soviet Union spring from its understanding of this objective reality and not from some other considerations. The readiness of the Soviet side to start a dialogue on the whole spectrum of disarmament issues has been repeatedly reaffirmed in recent statements by the head of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow, in Prague, Kiev and Tbilisi, at the recent Soviet-Algerian, Soviet-Jordanian and Soviet-Libyan negotiations and during meetings with prominent political figures such as O. Palme, W. Brandt, etc. A concentrated expression of Soviet willingness to conduct negotiations is provided by the appeal to the parliaments and peoples of the world referred to earlier. It is symbolic that the appeal, whose urgency in the present world situation is indisputable, was adopted on the eve of the 40th anniversary of the outbreak of the bloodiest war in the history of mankind. Does anyone need weightier evidence of the sincerity of our initiatives in the sphere of disarmament than the unparalleled human and material losses suffered by the Soviet Union in that war?

Nevertheless, there are persons, persons holding responsible posts furthermore, who are trying to brush the Soviet proposals aside without, for their part, offering any constructive initiatives.

1/ Foreign Policy, No. 39, summer 1980, p. 14.

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There is no more important or more urgent task today than preventing the world from sliding into war, warding off a nuclear conflict. The best way of doing this is by negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament. That is the view held by the broad masses of the world's population; it is also the position of many States members of the Committee on Disarmament. This is clear from the statements of their representatives in this body. A vivid manifestation of the strong desire to proceed to practical negotiations is to be found in the proposals tabled by socialist States for specific measures, in particular within the framework of our Committee, towards the major goal of disarmament.

The Soviet Union has been and is in favour of the consideration in the Committee on Disarmament, as a matter of priority, of the problem of nuclear disarmament.

The proposals of the Soviet Union and of other socialist countries on this subject should be very well known. We therefore find frankly incomprehensible the requests addressed by some delegations either to "the two most powerful States" or to all nuclear powers in general to set forth their positions on nuclear disarmament issues. In this connection we once again draw the attention of those delegations, and of all other delegations also to documents CD/4, CD/109 and CD/141, to numerous statements on these issues by leaders of the Soviet Union some of which have been issued as official documents of the Committee this year (CD/160, CD/166, CD/176 and CD/191).

Document CD/4 contains specific proposals aimed at the earliest possible starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It defines our attitude to the subject of the negotiations, to negotiating stages, to arrangements in preparation for the negotiations, to their time-periods as well as to other issues connected with the conduct of the negotiations. The document also emphasizes the need to reach agreement on appropriate verification measures.

I would also recall that the delegation of the Soviet Union along with the other co-authors of document CD/4 have repeatedly provided explanations regarding the proposals put forward by them.

The socialist countries consider that the cessation of the production, the reduction and the elimination of nuclear weapons should be carried out on a stage-by-stage, mutually acceptable and agreed basis. The degree of participation of individual nuclear-weapon States in measures within each stage should be determined with due regard for the quantitative and qualitative significance of the existing arsenals of nuclear-weapon States and of other States concerned. At all stages, the existing balance in the matter of nuclear arms should be maintained, with a gradual lowering of their levels.

Arguments have often been heard of late to the effect that nuclear disarmament issues are inseparably linked with the highest national security interests of States and that negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments should not be held without account being taken of those interests. We fully subscribe to such a statement, provided, of course, it is not used as an excuse for refusing to negotiate on nuclear disarmament. We have repeatedly stressed, both in document CD/4 and in our statements, that we are in favour of the elaboration and implementation of measures for the limitation of the nuclear arms race and for nuclear disarmament being inseparably linked with the strengthening of the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States.

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As a measure aimed at the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Union has proposed that on the territories of States where there are no nuclear weapons at present, such weapons should not be deployed. No one can deny that such a measure would contribute to restraining the spread of nuclear weapons and would thus curb the nuclear arms race. We are ready to reach an agreement whereby all nuclear-weapon States undertake not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of countries where there are no such weapons at present, irrespective of whether or not such a country has alliance relations with this or that State. We have put forward quite a number of other, very specific proposals aimed at the curbing of the nuclear arms race and we have stated that we should be interested to hear the reactions to those proposals of other States and especially of nuclear-weapon States.

As a preparation for negotiations, socialist countries have proposed the holding of consultations within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament in order to draw up a set of questions for consideration and to resolve organizational issues.

Naturally, the initiation of such negotiations and a dialogue with other nuclear-weapon Powers are possible only if they for their part show a readiness to engage in negotiations, if they display a constructive approach. Unfortunately, we have not yet received from them a positive response to our proposals.

As for the Soviet delegation, we are ready to embark on informal consultations with the other nuclear-weapon Powers, with any delegation or delegations on this subject.

Thus, on the one hand, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have submitted to the Committee proposals which offer a good basis for advancing in this direction. There are also quite a number of useful proposals put forward by the non-aligned and neutral countries. Furthermore, active discussions have taken place in the Committee which have shown that there is wide support for the idea of the conduct in the Committee of specific negotiations on this urgent and important problem and the setting up of an ad hoc working group to this end.

On the other hand, the other nuclear-weapon Powers and some of their allies persist in refusing to undertake negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments and on nuclear disarmament in the Committee. Their ideas run in exactly the opposite direction.

In these circumstances we believe that it is time, indeed it is high time to move from general debates to practical negotiations.

"In our nuclear age", says the appeal by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the parliaments and peoples of the world, "dialogue and negotiations are needed equally by all, just as all need peace, security and confidence in the future. There is now no other sane method of solving disputed problems, no matter how acute and complex they are, than by negotiations. Not a single opportunity must be missed. Time does not wait.

With each day lost for negotiations, the risk of nuclear conflict grows greater. The solution of urgent problems confronting each people and all peoples is being shelved. Time does not wait". 1/

Yes, indeed, Mr. Chairman, time does not wait. And our Committee should at last set to work.

1/ Pravda, 24 June 1981.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Little more than a year has passed since you became head of the Indian delegation to the Committee on Disarmament. In that relatively short time, however, you have won the high regard of all your colleagues, among whom you have today rightly come to occupy a prominent place.

That is unquestionably due both to the sincerity and ardour of the concern for the cause of disarmament that is always shown in your statements, and to your wide knowledge of the subject and the implacable logic that always prevails in those statements, a logic which you use with such skill to demolish the many artificial obstacles that we so often encounter here in our work.

We are confident that your outstanding qualities will enable you to carry out an equally productive task in the performance of the important duties you are taking up today as Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. My delegation is pleased to see you in that office and offers you its fullest co-operation.

We should also like to reiterate to your predecessor, Ambassador Komives, the distinguished representative of Hungary, the congratulations which we had occasion to offer him at the start of his period of chairmanship, on 11 June. What we said then on the basis of mere expectation we can repeat today in the light of his constructive and in every way exemplary performance which began with the speedy organization of work for what is known as the summer session and ended successfully last Thursday with the decision to hold informal meetings on item 5 of the agenda, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

Lastly, my delegation would like to add its warm welcome to the greeting which you extended at the beginning of this meeting to the new representative of Venezuela, the distinguished Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro, from whom we have already this very day heard an eloquent statement.

During the first part of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament I spoke only very briefly on the item which comes first on the agenda of this multilateral negotiating body, namely, "Nuclear test ban". Furthermore, in that address, delivered on 19 February, I confined myself to listing the ten statements my delegation has made in the Committee on earlier occasions on the item under consideration, and to recalling the appeal addressed by the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/145 A of 12 December 1980, to "all States members of the Committee" to "support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

This brevity was due in part to the belief that it is difficult to say anything new about a question which has been considered by the United Nations for more than a quarter of a century, and in part to our hope that at the informal meetings which were shortly to begin it would prove possible to overcome the stubborn resistance of two of the three nuclear-weapon Powers which have been conducting negotiations outside the Committee for more than four years, to the Committee's adoption, with respect to the item that has the highest priority on its agenda, of the modest procedure which has been used since last year in connection with four other items, namely, the establishment of an ad hoc working group.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Unfortunately, we were mistaken, as were all the other members of the Group of 21. The failure of our combined efforts and the untenable pretexts used to frustrate them provoked in the Group the justified impatience -- it could almost be called indignation -- which is reflected in the statement read out on 24 April at the final meeting of the Committee's so called "spring session" and reproduced in working paper CD/181 of the same date, which says, inter alia, the following:

"The Group of 21 firmly believes that the Committee on Disarmament is entitled to know without further delay the specific reasons that have so far prevented the three nuclear-weapon States, which have been carrying out among themselves separate negotiations for the past four years, to heed the often repeated and pressing appeals of the General Assembly to the effect of expediting such negotiations 'with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency' and to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament."

The state of mind shown in this paragraph, as well as in the 12 well-considered and pertinent questions put thereafter in document CD/181 to the nuclear-weapon States engaged in the trilateral negotiations, is all the easier to understand if we remember, on the one hand, that it is only two of the 40 members of the Committee that seem to tend to confuse it with the Security Council, and, on the other hand, that the "repeated and pressing appeals" of the General Assembly referred to in the statement of the Group of 21 not only formed the subject of consensus in the Final Document, but were actually voted for by those two members in three other General Assembly resolutions adopted between 1977 and 1979. In resolution 32/78, adopted on 12 December 1977 and voted for by the United States and the United Kingdom, some six months after the trilateral negotiations had begun, the General Assembly:

1. Reiterated its "grave concern" that "in spite of the repeated resolutions of the General Assembly related to nuclear-weapon testing in all environments, adopted by very large majorities, such testing has continued unabated during the past year";

2. Noted with satisfaction that "negotiations have begun among three nuclear-weapon States with a view to the drafting of an agreement on the subject of the present resolution";

3. Declared that "the conclusion of such an agreement and its opening for signature would be the best possible augury for the success of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in May and June 1978";

4. Urged the "three nuclear-weapon States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible and to use their best endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the beginning of its spring session in 1978";

5. Requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to "take up the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 4 above with the utmost urgency, with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second of the three resolutions to which I referred earlier is resolution 33/60 of 14 December 1978, adopted, like the previous one, with votes in favour by the United States and the United Kingdom. In that resolution the Assembly began by reaffirming "its conviction that the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States in all environments would be in the interest of all mankind, ... as a major step towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons" and by recalling both its previous resolutions on the subject and "the determination of the parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressed in those Treaties to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions for all time".

In the operative part of the resolution the General Assembly then:

1. Reiterated "its grave concern over the fact that nuclear-weapon testing has continued unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States";
2. Reaffirmed "its conviction that a treaty on the subject of the present resolution is a matter of the highest priority";
3. Regretted "that a treaty has not been concluded during the past year";
4. Noted that "the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States acknowledge the need to bring their negotiations to a speedy and successful conclusion";
5. Urged them to "expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results to the Committee on Disarmament before the beginning of its 1979 session for full consideration"; and
6. Requested the Committee on Disarmament to "take up immediately the agreed text resulting from the negotiations referred to in paragraph 5 above with a view to the submission as soon as possible of a draft treaty, which will attract the widest possible adherence, to a resumed thirty-third session of the General Assembly".

It should be noted that in that resolution the General Assembly, no doubt in order to stress the urgency of the request it was making, provided that the draft treaty to be submitted to it by the Committee on Disarmament would be examined not at the next session, the thirty-fourth, but at "a resumed thirty-third session", i.e. at the same session at which the resolution was adopted.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The third of the resolutions that are particularly relevant in this matter and, like the other two, also adopted with the favourable votes of the two nuclear-weapon Powers which today appear to have wholly forgotten its contents, is resolution 34/73 of 11 December 1979. In that resolution, the General Assembly, among other things:

1. Reiterated "its grave concern at the fact that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States";
2. Expressed "its conviction that positive progress in the negotiations by the Committee on Disarmament on such a treaty is a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and will contribute towards an end to the arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament";
3. Requested "the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations on such a treaty as a matter of the highest priority"; and
4. Called upon "the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States to use their best endeavours to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion in time for consideration during the next session of the Committee on Disarmament".

Indeed, the attitude of the two nuclear-weapon Powers whose vetoes, as I said last week, have been hampering the work of the Committee for the past year, really seems utterly irreconcilable with the attitude they adopted at the thirty-second, thirty-third and thirty-fourth regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, as manifested by the resolutions I have just quoted show. It should be borne in mind that those two Powers agreed, not through participation in a consensus, which can sometimes mean passive acceptance, but through the positive and unequivocal action of a vote in favour, that, in three separate resolutions adopted in three successive years, the General Assembly should urge the three negotiating States -- in other words, themselves -- first, to bring those negotiations to "a speedy and successful conclusion", and secondly, to transmit immediately thereafter the results thus obtained to the Committee on Disarmament. At the same time, the General Assembly requested the Committee to undertake negotiations on the treaty in question either "with the utmost urgency", or "as a matter of the highest priority" or "immediately", whichever expression one prefers to choose from any of the three resolutions in which they are respectively used.

To have adopted thrice in a row this position which appears so positive and then, after completely disregarding in practice the three resolutions for which they were partly responsible, to refuse openly, as they have been doing, let us not say to

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

transmit to the Committee on Disarmament the results of their negotiations that have been going on for four years now, or to reply to the concrete questions of the Group of 21, but even to allow the Committee on Disarmament to carry out its duty as the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum", and that with respect to no less a matter than the item which has the highest priority on its agenda, constitutes not merely disrespect for but mockery of the body that is the most representative of the international community, namely, the General Assembly of the United Nations.

My delegation has, from the outset -- that is, from the time when in 1978 it participated in drawing up what was to become the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament -- interpreted the "consensus" requirement expressly provided for in paragraph 120 of the Final Document, as something designed to prevent the adoption either of hasty decisions or of decisions which might harm the vital interests of the members of the Committee, but certainly not as something which for incomprehensible and sometimes even capricious or arbitrary reasons should allow consensus to become an insurmountable obstacle to the Committee's fulfilment of the basic functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

My delegation therefore believes that the time has come to clarify some fundamental points relating to this matter. To this end, we believe that first of all it would be desirable for the Committee next week, at one of its formal meetings -- plenary meetings, as it is customary to call them -- to take a public decision on the proposal first made by the Group of 21 on 4 March 1980 (CD/72) and reiterated very forcefully on 6 August 1980 (CD/134) and 24 April 1981 (CD/181) for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on the item entitled "Nuclear test ban".

If, contrary to what we venture to hope, there is continued opposition to the establishment of this working group by the nuclear-weapon States which have up to now been an obstacle to its creation, my delegation considers it necessary for the Committee to undertake a searching examination of the significance and scope of the term "consensus" as used in article 18 of its rules of procedure. We believe in fact that this would be indispensable, for we find it inconceivable that the constituent body -- that is, the General Assembly, at its special session of 1978 -- should have wished to leave open the door for the flagrant abuse of the application of that term, which in practice would come to mean the paralysation of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of Mexico, His Excellency, Mr. García Robles, for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all express the admiration of my delegation to Ambassador Komives of Hungary for the skill, efficiency and good humour with which he steered the Committee during the difficult stage of its work in June. Under his chairmanship the Committee reached expeditious decisions on various organizational and substantive issues in the resumed summer session.

The assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee by you for this month is a matter of great satisfaction for the Pakistan delegation and for me personally. We have no doubt that with your great experience and wisdom and the dedication of your country to the cause of disarmament, you will guide the Committee towards important achievements. To this end, the Pakistan delegation pledges to you its full and unreserved co-operation.

Mr. Chairman, your country is a great neighbour of Pakistan with which we desire close and improved relations. The recent visit by the Foreign Minister of India, His Excellency Mr. Narasimha Rao, to Pakistan has made an important contribution to the process of promoting greater understanding between our two countries. It may not be out of place to mention in this Committee that in the joint press statement issued in Islamabad on 10 June after talks between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and India, "both sides reiterated their policy of using nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes", and "they called upon all nuclear-weapon States to engage in serious discussion on nuclear disarmament".

The Committee is currently considering the item on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Everyone agrees that this is the most urgent task before the international community. Pakistan's views on nuclear disarmament and the ways and means to promote this objective have been stated in the Committee on previous occasions and I do not intend to repeat these today. Yet, it is necessary to underline that the complete absence of any efforts to address this priority goal is an important impediment in the pursuit of other disarmament measures and a contributory factor to the current international climate of confrontation.

The Pakistan delegation has consistently favoured the consideration of questions relating to nuclear disarmament in this Committee since it was established. Although useful informal discussions were held earlier this year under this item, the Committee has not as yet initiated the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament outlined in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

The Pakistan delegation considers that the Group of 21 has made an objective analysis of the situation in document CD/180 and submitted timely and realistic proposals for the commencement of the process of multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We hope that the Committee will reach early and positive decisions on these proposals.

I consider it relevant to underline that the proposals submitted by the Group of 21 in document CD/180 contain two distinct elements. First, it has been proposed that the CD should examine certain specific issues relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. Secondly, the Group of 21 has suggested the creation of an ad hoc working group of the Committee to undertake this task of examination and clarification.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

It may be helpful to acknowledge that the issues presented for examination by this Committee in document CD/180 would not amount to the conduct of negotiations on specific measures of nuclear disarmament. What has been proposed in this document is, in the opinion of my delegation, a process of clarifying concepts and positions in order to lay the ground for concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament. The consideration of these issues would not prejudice the policies of any State or group of States. But we believe that such a process of clarification could make a most useful contribution to bridging the gulf in understanding and comprehension which characterizes current dispositions regarding the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It is the assessment of my delegation that no member of the Committee on Disarmament is opposed to the consideration of these issues and if possible to reaching agreed conclusions on them. Such conclusions could constitute important guidelines for negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

As regards the second element of the proposal of the Group of 21, i.e. the establishment of a working group, my delegation shares the view that this constitutes the most effective modality for the process of clarifying the issues which have been suggested. Those members of the Committee who do not find the creation of such a working group to be acceptable have an obligation to suggest an alternative modality for the examination of these issues. May I say that, for its part, the Pakistan delegation is flexible as regards the mechanism to be used for the consideration of the issues identified in document CD/180. What is important, in our view, is that these issues should be addressed in depth by the Committee on Disarmament during the present session, with a view to reaching appropriate conclusions that can enhance the prospects for negotiating concrete agreements to bring about the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It should be noted that the Committee on Disarmament will have to reach a consensus within the next ten months on the specific measures of nuclear disarmament to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. My delegation believes that the examination of the issues called for by the Group of 21 in CD/180 would be indispensable to permit the elaboration of a meaningful consensus on nuclear disarmament measures within the comprehensive programme. It should be self-evident that the comprehensive programme will fail to achieve general acceptance unless it contains specific and concrete measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

Therefore, it is the hope of my delegation that the Committee on Disarmament will be enabled to make a meaningful contribution to initiating the process of nuclear disarmament before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Unless this Committee makes such a contribution, its credibility as an organ for multilateral disarmament negotiations will be completely eroded. The serious consequences this would have for the goals of disarmament and for peace and security require no elaboration.

There is one further question which my delegation would like to mention today. This concerns the grave implications of the Israeli military attack against Iraqi civilian nuclear facilities. The Security Council and the Governing Body of the IAEA have both pronounced themselves on the Israeli military attack against Iraq within

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

the context of their respective mandates. Many members of the Committee have addressed this issue and unanimously condemned the Israeli attack. Every group has made a statement in the Committee and expressed its collective condemnation. The Group of 21, in its statement circulated in document CD/187, has asked that in addition to condemning this attack, the Committee on Disarmament should take the necessary measures to ensure against the repetition of such an aggression by Israel or any other State. The Group of 21 has urged the Committee "to reaffirm the international principle prohibiting an attack against the peaceful nuclear facilities of a State under any circumstances" and recommended "that the Committee take appropriate steps which would contribute to reversing the adverse implications of this action".

The Pakistan delegation therefore proposes that the Committee on Disarmament should adopt an appropriate decision on the Israeli military aggression and its implications. We submit the following text for the Committee's consideration:

"The Committee on Disarmament strongly condemns the Israeli military attack against the Tammuz Nuclear Research Centre near Baghdad on 7 June 1981 as a clear violation of the Charter of the United Nations and the norms of international conduct. This act of aggression has given rise to grave implications for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the prospects of disarmament.

"The Committee on Disarmament reaffirms that the goal of disarmament can be achieved only on the basis of strict adherence by all States to the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter regarding respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of States and the non-use of force or the threat of force in international relations. Furthermore, the Committee considers that this aggression constitutes a violation of the sovereign and inalienable right of every State to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. It also contradicts the basic principles outlined in paragraphs 65-71 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which provide the only agreed basis on which the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States can develop an international consensus on ways and means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

"The Committee considers it entirely unacceptable that Israel should have arrogated to itself the right to carry out this military attack on the basis of its own arbitrary and untenable assertions regarding the intentions of another State which are refuted by all objective evidence. It is Israel's nuclear programme, capability and intentions which are the primary cause for concern in the Middle East and the greatest threat of nuclear proliferation in that region.

"The Committee considers that any repetition of such aggression by Israel or any other State, besides its grave consequences for international peace and security, would seriously jeopardize the efforts of the international community to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The Committee strongly affirms that civilian nuclear facilities should under no circumstances be the object of military attack or sabotage for any reason whatsoever."

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

Mr. Chairman, my delegation would request you to convene informal consultations among members of the Committee as soon as possible to consider this text and to reach an appropriate decision on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Ambassador Mansur Ahmad for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I hope the Committee will forgive me for asking for the floor at this hour. It had been the intention of my delegation to speak today on the very important question of nuclear disarmament, but in view of the large number of delegations that have spoken, we will do that at a later date. I understand also that there are other speakers who are in the same position.

There is, however, one matter I would like to raise briefly before we conclude today. You will recall that the Canadian delegation submitted, as an annex to document CD/183, a Conceptual Working Paper on Arms Control Verification. On that occasion, we announced our intention to arrange for an exchange of views on that subject with other delegations in this Committee. In accordance with the established Committee practice of responding favourably to requests for the provision of facilities for informal consultations with other interested delegations, I have requested the Secretariat to provide us with Conference Room 1 tomorrow, Friday, 3 July at 9.30 a.m. I would therefore like to take this opportunity to invite those members of the Committee and others who might have an interest or wish to participate in a discussion on verification, to join us in Conference Room 1 tomorrow, as I believe Ambassador McPhail has already indicated to Ambassadors in this room.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Canada for his statement and trust that all delegates have taken due note of it. Distinguished delegates, I have requested the Secretariat to circulate today a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. It is not the practice for the timetable to include informal consultations that may be held between members within the framework of the various organizational arrangements agreed upon by the Committee. As usual, the timetable is only indicative and may be changed or adjusted as the Committee proceeds.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, after listening to your introduction of the timetable, and in conformity with what you have said, I should like to take this opportunity to remind delegations of what I have already announced in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, namely, that the consultations on toxicity determinations will take place next week, starting on Monday, 6 July, at 10 a.m. in Room VII.

The CHAIRMAN: At the moment, we have only one speaker for the plenary meeting on Tuesday next. I would urge those delegations wishing to speak on Tuesday to inscribe their names before Monday morning at 10.30 a.m.

(The Chairman)

Distinguished delegates, if there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee agrees to follow the timetable as a guideline for the coming week.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament will meet this afternoon from 3.30 p.m. to 6.30 p.m. This announcement is being made at the request of the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador García Robles.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 7 July, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.30 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV. 135
7 July 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.P. Venkateswaran (India)
later: Mr. S. Saran (India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. C. CARASALES
Mr. J.M. OTEGUI
Miss N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mr. P.N. MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. F.M. SIDAK

Iran: Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. M. TAKAHASHI

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. OLU ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mrs. INGA THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. S. ERIKSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. T.F. DMITRICHEV

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America: Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. MISKEL

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPUL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, I declare open the 135th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. The item on our agenda today is "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", but of course members are at liberty to make statements on other issues on our agenda, in accordance with rule 30 of our rules of procedure.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to congratulate you, the representative of friendly India, upon the assumption of the high office of Chairman of the Committee during this important period of the annual session. Your delegation is contributing a great deal to the activities of this body, and we look forward to your leadership in the efforts to secure some positive results during the current session of the Committee.

I should not fail to pay tribute at the same time to your predecessor, Ambassador Imre Komives of Hungary, who displayed enviable energy in setting in motion the summer part of our annual session.

May I, through you, Mr. Chairman, welcome the new leaders of the delegations of Argentina, Iran, Sri Lanka and Venezuela. As you have just stated, today, according to the programme of work, the Committee should start discussing the question of new weapons of mass destruction and radiological weapons. However, as you also said, any delegation has the right to discuss any question on the agenda, and as I withdrew the name of my delegation from the list at our last meeting, today I will return to items 1 and 2 of our agenda, which have the highest priority, being the items on the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. While presenting briefly some considerations of my delegation in regard to the current state of our discussions both formally and informally, I am compelled to look into some wider aspects of these vital issues.

The position of the Bulgarian delegation on the urgent need to achieve a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is well known, and I need not present it in detail now. We support the proposal of the Group of 21 for the creation of an ad hoc working group on this subject, and we insist on the active participation in it of all five nuclear-weapon States. We regret the suspension of the trilateral negotiations, for we believe that their outcome was to provide a basis for the future treaty, and that is why we call for their early resumption. On our part, we are contributing to the limited activities that the Committee on Disarmament carries out in this field, and here I have in mind the group of seismic experts elaborating co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. Bulgaria is regularly represented in this group by one of its leading seismologists. At the same time, however, without underestimating the useful work of the group of seismic experts, our delegation shares the view of the distinguished representative of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, who reminded us recently that as early as the late 1950s internationally renowned experts from both East and West concluded that there were no technical barriers for verifying a complete and general test ban. It is not even necessary to turn to the qualitative leap of technological advance in the field of seismology to reach the conclusion that both in the late 1950s and today, in the early 1980s, the decisive factor in achieving a complete and general test ban remains the political will of the nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

Taking into consideration the positive and constructive position of the Soviet Union, we appeal to the western participants in the suspended trilateral negotiations to display the long overdue constructive approach that the world awaits from them.

A good and meaningful beginning could be their consent to start truly multilateral negotiations in the framework of an ad hoc working group in this Committee. In this connection, we share the anxiety and the reasoning of the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, India, Mexico, Yugoslavia and others in the Group of 21, expressed in their statements in the Committee during this session.

Unfortunately, we face a similar situation on item 2 of our agenda, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". The delegations of the socialist countries, two and a half years ago, tabled a reasonable ground-laying proposal relating to the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons of all types and their gradual reduction until their complete elimination is achieved, that is to be found in the well-known document CD/4, whereby the socialist countries initiated the idea of starting early negotiations in the CD on the complex issues of nuclear disarmament.

During the extensive discussions that have followed the introduction of this document, the Soviet delegation and the other socialist delegations have answered numerous questions and have expressed their readiness to study any other constructive ideas for multilateral negotiations on this item. While proposing the creation of an ad hoc working group, as was noted the other day by Ambassador Herder, the leader of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, we are not turning the issue of the creation of a working group into a fetish; we stand ready to discuss any sensible proposal and our rules of procedures provide us with certain possibilities in this respect.

However, the CD is confronted now with the refusal of the western countries to start even preliminary negotiations in this field. We have respect for their legitimate security interests and we attach great importance to the principle of undiminished security for all participants during the process of disarmament. But we cannot accept the assertion that nuclear weapons and the ever-perpetuated nuclear arms race are a sound base for strengthening the security of any State or international security at large.

At the 12th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party held in April 1981, the Secretary-General of the Party and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, stressed the significance of the peace initiatives drawn up and proclaimed at the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and underlined their potential for strengthening the course towards détente, restoring and increasing confidence among States and eliminating the danger of nuclear war. The realization of these noble tasks requires meaningful and constructive negotiations, above all in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. In the context of the present state of international relations, the rejection of negotiations on nuclear disarmament is a sign of dangerous negativism. The CD should not tolerate a situation where certain States use every means to oppose the constructive proposals concerning the initiation of multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

In the opinion of our delegation, this Committee should no longer shirk the top priority issues relating to the weapons that threaten the very existence of our civilization. We should no longer keep them as ritual items on our agenda and make statements instead of engaging in meaningful negotiations on reducing the nuclear danger.

Against the background of mounting awareness by world public opinion of the urgent need for nuclear disarmament negotiations in the field of both intercontinental and medium-range missiles, it is utterly embarrassing to see the Committee on Disarmament spending more than a year in discussion over the creation of an ad hoc working group on the top priority item on its agenda. When are we to expect any concrete suggestion from the West on how to proceed in relation to this item? We are not begging for negotiations and, as President Brezhnev stated at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet on 23 June: "The might of the peace forces opposing the potential aggressor today is greater than ever before. But we know something else; the very nature of modern weapons is such that, if they were used, the future of all mankind would be at stake".

The statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, that we heard at our previous plenary meeting, has underlined that point in a convincing manner and at the same time exposed the dangerous character of the schemes of those who dream of "a limited nuclear war". Let me quote also the leader of the British Labour Party, Mr. Michael Foot, who stated recently: "We resolutely demand meaningful international negotiations -- not preludes to negotiations and not negotiations about negotiations, but serious negotiations aimed at eliminating the danger of war and mutual annihilation".

During the informal meetings we have had both during the first part of the annual session and during the last three weeks, many delegations have put forward different ideas, proposals and suggestions relating to these two items. Most of them are reflected in the synthesis of the discussion on items 1 and 2, a very useful document for which we are grateful to the secretariat of the Committee. We believe that an eventual working group on item 2 should concentrate on establishing or identifying a number of concrete issues that could usefully become the subject of multilateral negotiations. It is our conviction that the proposal of the socialist countries contained in document CD/4 will take a prominent place among them.

I would like to conclude this statement by bringing to the notice of the Committee an excerpt from the speech of the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, at the International Meeting-Dialogue "For détente, peace and social progress" held in Sofia in May this year:

"Let us not lock up ourselves in the fortress of suspicion; let us sit down and engage in a dialogue permeated by mutual desire to solve the problems in the interest of peaceful coexistence -- this is the challenge of the day, this is today a sign of realistic statesmanlike thinking and political conduct. Those who have failed to understand this have missed the most significant feature of the contemporary situation."

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I would like to welcome Mrs. Inga Thorsson who has joined us today and to whose statement next Thursday I am sure we are all very keen to listen.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): Taking the floor for the first time under your chairmanship, I cannot refrain from expressing, together with my long-standing esteem for you as a colleague, the thought that you are bringing to us a precious breath of humanism generated by the great philosophies of your country, India, philosophies which have sought an alternative to violence and force as a vindication of hope in the moral and intellectual quality of man. I am sure that under your chairmanship the month of July will prove an auspicious one for our work.

I also wish to take the occasion to pay tribute to the efforts of Ambassador Komives, who may congratulate himself on having, like his predecessors during this session, achieved some visible and tangible results.

May I also welcome our colleague from Venezuela, Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro, and assure him of our full co-operation.

My statement today will be devoted to nuclear issues, which have formed the subject of our discussion under the items entitled "Nuclear test ban" and "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament".

The Romanian delegation has already amply stated its views on the absolute priority that should be given to nuclear disarmament in the Committee's activities. As the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, has said: "Nothing and no theory on military balance can justify arms increases. We realize that a balance must be maintained during the process of disarmament so that security of every party remains unaffected: however, this must be done, not through the escalation of armaments, but through their diminution, through the systematic and continuous reduction of military expenses and troops, through a progression to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control". This position of my country was also expressed recently in the appeal for peace launched by the Grand Congress of Workers' Councils and in the appeal by the Grand National Assembly of Romania to the parliaments of the countries signatories of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.

It is difficult to put forward fresh arguments in favour of starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament. Our colleagues on the Committee have made clear in their excellent statements the advisability and more particularly the urgency of starting such talks, and I would not wish to repeat what they have said. The pressing appeals of the United Nations General Assembly, the movements of scientists, the activities of non-governmental organizations in favour of halting the nuclear arms race and, if you permit me to say so, the unusual frequency of articles on the subject in the international press, all bear witness to the profound concern and anxiety of Governments and of people everywhere before the risks of thermonuclear conflict.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Thus, while taking as my starting-point the priority that attaches to the subject that appears first on our agenda, I feel obliged at the same time to take account of the difficulties as to the precise way in which it can be dealt with. As you yourself have emphasized in your eloquent statements as representative of India and as Chairman of the Committee for this month, everything argues for starting such negotiations in a multilateral framework. For the fact is that there has been a completely new qualitative development in the nuclear-weapons field. In the past, the question of multilateral negotiations would have been a rather academic one, because the non-nuclear-weapons countries considered that negotiations were a matter for those who, possessing the tools of deterrence, at the same time accepted the risks of their destruction.

Today, however, we are all nuclear-weapon States, not in the sense that we possess nuclear weapons but as potential victims of nuclear destruction.

Can the fact that they are targets for nuclear weapons and that there is no valid system of guarantees against such use of nuclear weapons be expunged from the consciousness of peoples? No country is any longer safe from the possibility of nuclear destruction, and the blocking of discussion on that subject is an infringement of the very principle of the equal security of all States.

The problem before us, therefore, is not whether multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament are desirable, urgent or a matter of priority, but how to start such negotiations.

The vast majority of the Committee's members consider that the establishment of working groups on the subjects of (1) a nuclear test ban and (2) the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, offers the best practical approach. Specific proposals to this effect have been submitted by the Group of 21 and by the socialist countries. However, it has not been possible to achieve a consensus in this connection, and a number of arguments against the proposed bodies have been advanced during our discussions.

One argument, of a more general nature, is that the deterioration of international relations makes nuclear disarmament negotiations inopportune and inoperative. In reply to that argument, I will take the liberty of quoting from a statement made by Sir John Simon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, at the League of Nations Disarmament Conference in 1932:

"Even now, voices are heard which declare that the moment is not opportune. The paradox is pointed out that, while disarmament is being discussed at Geneva, in the Far East armaments are being

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

employed, bombs are dropping from the sky, troops are now on the move ... I do not agree with those who suggest that this paradox makes our meeting inopportune. I would rather declare that these sombre events illustrate and reinforce the urgent necessity of undertaking and discharging our task."

We share this view and we believe that, particularly in the nuclear age, the difficulties that exist at the international level ought not to inhibit but rather to stimulate negotiations.

The well-documented statement by His Excellency, Ambassador Issraelyan, the head of the delegation of the USSR, at the plenary meeting on 2 July 1981, has given us a picture of the intolerable consequences of failure to achieve results in halting the nuclear arms race.

Another argument that is frequently advanced concerns the link between nuclear disarmament and the security of the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. The existence of such a relationship cannot be denied. But we find it difficult to understand why this link should prevent us from starting negotiations. We believe that it argues in favour of a discussion on the security perceptions of all States and accordingly of the establishment of a subsidiary body of the Committee in which we could discuss the relevant problems openly and honestly, with the necessary respect for the position and interests of each. The balance necessary for the security of all can and should be achieved at progressively lower levels of armaments in general and of nuclear armaments in particular. Greater security at lower cost is in the interests of all.

The complexity of nuclear problems has also been presented as an obstacle to the establishment of working groups. Yet we have to recognize that human intelligence has succeeded in finding solutions to much more complex problems. Developing micro-processors that use human language, putting an artificial intelligence on silicon chips, penetrating the mysteries of the living cell, or even managing the economic and social affairs of a big city like Geneva, say, are problems of a complexity exceeding that of nuclear-weapon systems. Thus, to claim that the complexity of nuclear disarmament -- which, when all is said and done, can be dealt with in terms of probabilities we learned about at grammar school -- is an obstacle to our activities, is a paralysing idea which blocks all our deliberations.

Consequently, we cannot accept the idea that the complexity of the subject should be used as an argument against the starting of negotiations. A problem does not increase in complexity because of the magnitude and scope of the effects involved.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

The absence of concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament has also been invoked against the setting up of a working group. A mere list of Committee documents on nuclear disarmament -- CD/4, CD/72, CD/109, CD/134, CD/141, CD/180, CD/181 -- is enough to refute this argument. In addition there are all the various proposals on nuclear disarmament that have been put forward in the United Nations, among which I should like to mention the Indian proposal on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the Canadian proposal on halting the production of fissionable materials for military purposes, also presented in this Committee.

It is for all these reasons that the Romanian delegation supports the proposal made by the delegations of India, Pakistan and Mexico on the need to adopt a formal decision of the Committee, in plenary meeting, on the proposals for the establishment of working groups on the questions of a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament.

If, contrary to all logic and in dereliction of its responsibilities, the Committee proves unable to adopt the decision necessary for the establishment of such groups, the Romanian delegation cannot view this matter as closed. We believe that no single delegation nor the Committee as a whole can assume the responsibility for our proceeding merely to record our failure.

Like the Brazilian delegation, as was pointed out by its distinguished leader, Ambassador de Souza e Silva, our delegation has made no secret of the fact that as far as we are concerned the establishment of a working group is not an end in itself.

If, for reasons that escape us, working groups cannot at present be established to carry out the urgent and necessary priority task of starting negotiations on nuclear disarmament, we are nevertheless convinced that the Committee's rules of procedure offer us the possibility of finding other practical means of fulfilling our mandate. With this in mind, the Romanian delegation proposes the establishment of an ad hoc sub-committee of the Committee to deal with nuclear questions. Rule 23, in chapter VII of the rules of procedure, on the organization of work, provides for the possibility of establishing such a body.

We wish to emphasize that from the point of view of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, it is inconceivable that the theoretical priority the Committee has given to nuclear disarmament questions by their inclusion in its agenda should not be reflected in practice by the establishment of bodies able to deal effectively with these questions.

Mr. Saran (India) took the Chair.

The CHAIRMAN: Unfortunately, Ambassador Venkateswaran has been called away on urgent and pressing business, but he will rejoin us in a very short while. On his behalf I would like to thank the representative of Romania, Ambassador Malita, for the very kind words he addressed to the Chair and particularly the very generous remarks he made about my country.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, it is a particular honour and pleasure for me to congratulate you on your taking up of the duties of Chairman of the Committee for the month of July. You represent a country to which we are linked by traditionally good, friendly and most sincere relations that are founded on the common interests of the non-aligned movement. There is no doubt that your experience and well-known diplomatic abilities will give new, urgently needed impetus to the work of our Committee in order that we may take significant steps forward in the process of negotiations in the field of disarmament.

I would also like to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Imre Komives, for the exceptional work he did as Chairman for the month of June.

I avail myself of this opportunity to greet our new colleagues, Ambassador Rodríguez Navarro from Venezuela, Ambassador Carasales from Argentina, Ambassador Jalali from Iran and Ambassador Jayakoddy from Sri Lanka, and to wish them success in their work.

Taking the floor in today's debate, I would like to point out that I am not doing so because I have something new or important to say. The Yugoslav delegation has on several occasions, as is after all the case with all the delegations members of the Committee, taken the opportunity to express our basic position and to submit proposals as to how to initiate the process of disarmament. We consider that the problem is not due to an absence of proposals or suggestions for the successful work of the Committee, but rather to the fact that the Committee finds itself in the unsatisfactory situation that, because of a lack of political will on the part of a certain number of members to engage in substantive negotiations on the problems that are on the Committee's agenda, it is unable to perform its principal functions and to fulfil the obligations laid upon it as the only multilateral negotiating body in this field.

This time, I take the floor first of all to stress that the Yugoslav delegation associates itself with all those who have voiced their disapproval of the fact that the Committee, despite its having met for three years, has not succeeded in substantively opening negotiations on two of the most important as well as urgent issues, namely, a comprehensive test ban and the halting of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In voicing our disapproval and concern over the present situation, I would like to emphasize that the arguments presented to the Committee by two member delegations against the setting up of two working groups on these items have not convinced us of the justification of their opposition. On the contrary, we deem these arguments unjustified, unfounded and unconvincing and we therefore cannot accept them.

Many questions have been raised by the Group of 21 with regard to nuclear disarmament during the work of the Committee. They have, nevertheless, remained unanswered. This is why we associate ourselves with the request made by India which you, Mr. Chairman, tabled in your remarks, seeking an answer to these questions as early as possible so that we may be able jointly to create a means for finding a way out of the existing unsatisfactory situation. We do this all the more since the East European socialist countries have also opted for this. The present situation is even

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

more disquieting in view of the fact that during the past years several solemn declarations and decisions have been adopted by various forums within and outside the United Nations in which all countries without exception have committed themselves to launching negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is particularly significant that all of us adopted the decisions of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, including the Governments of the two countries members of the Committee which oppose the creation of working groups. We therefore have a full formal and moral right to ask the CD to deal with the issue of nuclear disarmament and to organize negotiations on the subject. In spite of this, however, the Committee is still blocked and has no clear prospect of the opening of permanent negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is thus right to ask the question whether the refusal to open negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee means that the Governments of the two delegations voluntarily renounce the obligations they assumed under the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session? Does it mean that by that token these Governments do not want nuclear disarmament? If this were the case, it would be extremely disquieting. We are nevertheless inclined to believe that it is only a transitory occurrence since the achieving, as soon as possible, of concrete positive results in the work of the Committee represents one of the most important conditions for the safeguarding of peace, the strengthening of international security and the realization of equitable international co-operation based on the Charter of the United Nations. This, however, cannot be achieved without opening the process of nuclear disarmament. This is why we hope there will be consensus with regard to the setting up of working groups or other appropriate bodies which would initiate the negotiations on an issue of such importance for the future destiny of the world. At this juncture I would like to stress, as we have done on several occasions, that in the event of the contrary, my delegation is not prepared to assume any responsibility for the absence of a solution to the question of nuclear disarmament and the consequences this entails for international relations as a whole.

It can often be heard in the Committee and elsewhere that the over-all international situation is not favourable for the opening of negotiations on disarmament. I would once again like to point out that such an attitude cannot be accepted, as is very clearly formulated in the final document of the Ministerial Meeting of the non-aligned countries that was held in New Delhi this year. The non-aligned countries are of the opinion that the situation is exactly the opposite. Progress in the field of disarmament and the taking of genuine disarmament measures would have a considerable positive influence on the improvement of international relations and would create conditions for finding a way out of the existing crises -- both political and economic. Of special significance in this connection is the freeing of resources that are now spent on armaments and their reallocation for development needs, and in particular for the more accelerated development of the developing countries which would put a stop to the unfavourable world economic trends, poverty, hunger and other misfortunes, and would give rise to more stable and harmonious development. It is constantly being said that the world economy is in a crisis and that inflation cannot be stopped. However, it is clear that as long as we continue to spend such enormous sums for such unproductive purposes as armaments, it cannot be expected that it will be possible to curb inflation and to give a more significant impetus towards lifting the world's economy out of stagnation or

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

stagflation. The process of disarmament would open the possibility for these huge material and intellectual resources to be used, not for destruction but for giving a new impetus to the world's economy and creating favourable conditions for entering a new period of prosperity for all countries without exception.

This is why today there is no task that is more urgent than to work for the opening of a genuine disarmament process, and especially nuclear disarmament.

In this connection, we highly appreciate the efforts of those countries members of the Committee which strive for the settlement of particular issues on the Committee's agenda. We think that the work done by the working groups is going in the right direction and that no efforts should be spared in order that such a trend can continue.

However, there is reason for thought as to how the work of the Committee and its bodies can be improved. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation, this can be done in two ways. First, negotiations should concentrate on the most important questions, which should be approached as concretely as possible in order that we may arrive at agreed texts of conventions on these subjects as soon as possible. The framework of the mandates should be adapted to this task so that negotiations will not be brought unnecessarily to a standstill.

Secondly, the time available for negotiations should be used better and more fully. We should try to have as few procedural debates as possible and fewer general and extensive discussions and statements. We should also consider the possibility of extending the duration of the session, especially of the working groups, when this is indispensable to the negotiations. If there really is a political will on the part of all to conduct substantive negotiations aimed at reaching the earliest possible agreement on particular issues which are the subject of negotiations, then we ought not to interrupt the deliberations of the working groups nor should they work for only a few months a year. The same criterion should also be decisive in determining the duration of the Committee's sessions. Nevertheless, if there is no readiness for genuine negotiations, the extension of the period of negotiations in itself cannot contribute to more effective and successful work by the Committee.

The Yugoslav delegation thinks that the application of these two methods would improve the work of the Committee and the working groups in terms of both quality and quantity. We are ready to examine and adopt every proposal aimed at promoting and accelerating the negotiating process, when obvious political will has been shown by all really to conduct substantive negotiations. If the contrary is the case, it is better not to conceal with pointless meetings the fact that the Committee is not fulfilling the role and tasks laid upon it by the world community.

The CHAIRMAN: On behalf of Ambassador Venkateswaran I would like to thank His Excellency Ambassador Vrhunec for his statement and for the very kind words he has addressed to the Chair. I would now like to consult the Committee about the informal consultations which were scheduled for this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. in Conference Room 1. Since we now have some time at our disposal it has been suggested that we might hold our informal consultations at the end of this plenary meeting in this room. If there is no objection I shall adjourn the plenary meeting and begin our informal consultations in this room in five minutes' time. Is that acceptable to the members of the Committee?

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I adjourn this plenary meeting I would like to make a short announcement on behalf of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons will hold informal consultations on 9 July at 9 a.m. in the conference room of the Disarmament Unit on questions relating to the definition and scope of the prohibition. The informal consultations will have an open-ended character. The Chairman would like to request the participation of the delegations of the United States, the USSR, Sweden, Yugoslavia, India, Venezuela and Australia, which have submitted proposals on these questions. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 9 July at 10.30 a.m. This meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.40 a.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 9 July 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN (India)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. SALAH-BEY
Mr. H. HATI

Argentina: Mr. C. CARSALES
Mr. J.H. OTEGUI
Miss N. HASCHEBE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. P. POPTCHEV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U AUNG THAN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. P.N. MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES

Egypt: Mr. A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAIFY
Miss W. BASSIH

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. H. MULLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVLS
Mr. F. GAJDA
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. E. SEBOK

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. F.M. SIDIK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. HARYOMATARAN
Mr. ACHDIAT

Iran: Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. YOSHIO OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILIG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI
Mr. M. ARRASSEN

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FLIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. OLU ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. G. EKHOLM
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. S. ERIKSSON
Mr. G. ANDERSSON
Mrs. I. SUNDBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
Mr. T.F. DMITRICHEV
Mrs. L.V. GRACHIKOVA
Mr. V.F. KULESHOV

United Kingdom:

Sir A. ACLAND
Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENDERGER
Mr. R. SCOTT
Mr. J. MISKEL
Mr. K. MIKULAK
Mr. M. SANCHEZ
Mr. S. WARD
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
Mr. H. ARTEAGA

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy-Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished delegates, the Committee continues today its consideration of item 5 of its agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons", but of course, members wishing to do so are at liberty to make statements on any subject relevant to the work of the Committee, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure.

May I welcome today the presence amongst us of Sir Antony Acland, Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, who is responsible, inter alia, for British policy towards the Committee on Disarmament. Sir Antony Acland has a wide diplomatic experience, having served in the United Nations at New York and Geneva. He was Principal Private Secretary to the Foreign Secretary between 1972 and 1975 and later served as Ambassador to Luxembourg and Spain.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, every time I take the floor in this Committee I am tempted by the idea of omitting at the beginning of my speech the customary words of congratulation to the current Chairman and to the Chairman for the previous month. Such congratulations, often very eulogistic, frequently take up the first page of our speeches, both in the Committee itself and in its subsidiary bodies. Perhaps they are an important source of moral support for the Chairman; perhaps they help him to perform the hard tasks before him; I have nevertheless often thought that they take up too much of our Committee's time. When I spoke to you before the meeting, you told me of your concern at the length of the list of speeches, and I should have been further encouraged in my idea of leaving out words of congratulation. However, seeing you in the chair, I cannot resist. Once again, it is not today that I shall break with tradition and I should like very simply and above all very briefly to tell you how happy I am to see you presiding over our work this month. Ever since you joined us in this Committee you have impressed your colleagues by your drive, your competence and also your sense of humour, and I am sure that you will discharge your duties to perfection. Furthermore, you represent a country which, thanks to eminent leaders, has always played an important part in post-war international relations and more particularly in the field with which we are concerned, namely, security and disarmament. And since I have not wished to break with tradition, I shall follow tradition completely by addressing words of thanks also to our friend Ambassador Komives, who presided over our work last month in a noteworthy manner. Before beginning my speech, I should also like to welcome here Mrs. Thorsson, to whom we shall all listen very attentively after I myself have spoken, as well as Sir Antony Acland, the British Under-Secretary. Their presence here is proof of the interest which those two countries continue to take in the work of our Committee.

Since we resumed our work at this summer session, it has become clear from the discussions at plenary meetings and the activities of the Committee's subsidiary bodies how much importance very many countries attach to the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Obviously, this special session is not a goal in itself. It ought rather to be a particularly appropriate moment for the international community to reflect on the impact of the decisions -- especially those regarding structures -- taken by the General Assembly at its first special session, in 1978.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Evaluation of the work of the Disarmament Committee will be one of the most important elements in this exercise of reflection, for what the international community will want to know is whether this multilateral negotiating body, set up more than three years ago, is capable of justifying the hopes that have been placed in it.

It will therefore be up to us to show that our Committee, in its present composition and with its present methods, can achieve concrete results by way of negotiations.

The ability of the Disarmament Committee to do so itself depends on a number of factors, of which I should like to mention those that seem to me the most important. First, there is the question of international security conditions, for the Disarmament Committee cannot negotiate in a vacuum, and it seems obvious to me that a tense international climate is -- alas -- not propitious for the attainment of any great progress in the sphere of disarmament. At the same time we ought not to underestimate the impact that efforts in this sphere could have on the restoration of confidence in international relations.

Secondly, the multilateral approach to disarmament cannot be divorced from developments in the separate negotiations going on in a number of priority spheres of disarmament. Belgium, which has always been in favour of these two approaches, naturally expects that the States responsible for the separate negotiations will take account of the overriding importance which the international community attaches to those negotiations.

Lastly and, I would say, particularly, the Disarmament Committee will be judged according to the combined will we have shown to make progress where that was possible.

Taking account of these factors, and bearing in mind the limited time available before the second special session, I should like to indicate three themes which would permit the Committee on Disarmament to demonstrate that this multilateral negotiating body merits the central role attributed to it in 1978.

In indicating these themes, I am not claiming that they are all of priority importance in relation to the problems posed by the gravity of the armaments race. I merely wish to point out that these are questions on which progress can be made and that it is important, in the present circumstances, not to neglect any possibilities for making progress, however limited they may be.

Thus, I consider that the time has come for the Disarmament Committee to conclude its negotiations regarding the prohibition of radiological weapons.

I also believe that between now and next spring the Disarmament Committee should complete the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

I would also like to see our Committee making substantial progress in the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons before the second special session.

Since, according to our programme of work, our discussions in plenary meeting this week should deal mainly with the question of radiological weapons, I should like to devote the remainder of my statement to that subject.

There are several reasons why Belgium attaches particular importance to the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons:

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

It would be one way of demonstrating that the negotiating machinery offered by the Disarmament Committee can function effectively;

It would also be the first time in the nuclear field that a treaty had been negotiated with the participation of the five nuclear-weapon Powers;

The very fact of the existence of an international agreement in the disarmament field would, in present circumstances, have a symbolic value which we cannot afford to disregard;

Furthermore, the procedure that has been followed with respect to these negotiations on radiological weapons coincides with our idea of the correct method to adopt in the matter of the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction, namely, first to identify these weapons and then to negotiate, one by one, their prohibition or limitation.

The negotiation of a convention on radiological weapons has made good progress since the submission to the Committee by the United States and the Soviet Union of their joint proposal on major elements of a treaty. We are particularly grateful to Ambassador Komives, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, for the manner in which he is carrying out his important task.

Certainly, we would have wished these negotiations to be brought to a speedier conclusion, but we are aware of the importance of the points raised by many delegations, points which are themselves evidence of the importance we all attach to the question of radiological weapons.

We now have a consolidated text based on proposals submitted by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Belgium considers that this document, which is a combination of different proposals, should constitute the principal basis of our further work.

My delegation is particularly gratified to note that several of its own suggestions have been incorporated in the consolidated text.

We shall continue to make any contribution we can in the search for solutions to the various important problems which have not yet been resolved. Among these problems I would draw attention in particular to the following.

The problem of the definition of radiological weapons. The definition can obviously not include a reference to a nuclear explosive device. We understand the concern of those who fear that the fact of not mentioning nuclear weapons might be interpreted as justifying their use. Such justification was clearly not the intention of the bilateral negotiators, any more than it was their intention to settle the question of the legitimacy or otherwise of nuclear weapons. Would it not, then, be a good idea, as my delegation suggested last year, to include in the preamble to the convention a specific reminder of the goal of nuclear disarmament?

I would like to point out that in the negotiation of a number of disarmament instruments, use has often been made of the technique of incorporating in the convention an undertaking to negotiate subsequently either on matters on which it did not prove possible to reach immediate agreement, or on wider aspects of the general subject of disarmament. I might quote by way of example article V of the Sea-Bed Treaty, article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article IX of the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. We should not overlook this as a possible means of resolving a number of the difficulties which we have encountered in the negotiation of a convention on radiological weapons.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Another question to be decided is whether, in this convention, we ought explicitly to prohibit deliberate attacks on civilian nuclear installations in order to cause the release of radioactive substances. We are grateful to the Swedish delegation for drawing our attention to this important question, which is already partly covered by article 56 of the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention. The question raised by Sweden is important in itself. It also adds to the field of application of the first Additional Protocol. Furthermore, this question has become much more relevant since the attack on an Iraqi nuclear research centre, an attack which the Belgian Government has strongly condemned and which, although it was not the subject of the Swedish proposal, could have foreshadowed what Sweden specifically wished to prohibit in the convention on radiological weapons.

We already, last year, raised the question whether this aspect should be included in the present convention or should appear in a different context. We do not wish the matter to be settled at this stage, because the arguments for and against are so complicated. My delegation is nevertheless ready, here too, to help find any solution that might be acceptable to all members of the Committee.

We ought, however, to be aware that, if we incorporate the Swedish proposal in the convention on radiological weapons, we shall substantially alter the scope of this convention and raise various problems, both of a legal nature and as regards the need to devise an adequate verification procedure. If, on the other hand, we consider that the Swedish proposal would be better placed in another context, either in an instrument complementing the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Conventions or in an entirely new instrument, we ought also to realize that it will take a great deal of time to work out the details of the Swedish proposal so that it can be implemented, and to resolve all the difficult questions that will arise. Could we not therefore make use of the technique I mentioned earlier and establish in the convention prohibiting radiological weapons the principle contained in the Swedish proposal, at the same time undertaking to negotiate on all its implications at a later date.

Another question to which my delegation attaches particular importance concerns the peaceful uses of radioactive materials. In this connection, we can accept the proposal made by the Chairman of the Working Group regarding article V of the proposed convention. In fact the provisions contained in that article in no way restrict the use of radioactive materials as authorized by article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. However, article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty balances two ideas. The first is the one I have just mentioned. The second concerns undertakings relating to the promotion of peaceful uses. Belgium believes that it would be appropriate to include this dual concept also in the part of the convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons dealing with the peaceful use of radioactive materials. My delegation therefore supports those delegations which would like to see included in the convention prohibiting radiological weapons a provision on the promotion of peaceful uses. The precedents for this that exist in disarmament treaties such as the non-proliferation treaty or the Convention prohibiting biological weapons, should enable us to find an appropriate form of language.

Those are the comments I wished to make at this stage of our work. I hope that my remarks will have been enough to show the constructive spirit in which my delegation approaches all the matters that are before our Committee.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I would first like to thank you for your kind words of welcome to me two days ago.

Secondly, it is with the greatest pleasure that I see you chairing the Committee on Disarmament during the month of July. We are all aware of the outstanding qualities that you bring to this important and burdensome task, as well as the well-known ardour with which your great country pursues the course of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear weapons. The effect might well be that we shall look back on the month of July 1981 as the "Indian summer", to use your own words. Needless to say, you will get the consistent co-operation and support of the Swedish delegation.

The thanks of the Swedish delegation are also gladly given to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, for the excellent way in which he, during the month of June, set the summer part of the 1981 session going. I should also like to say a few words of welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Argentina, Iran, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, and I am sure that we shall find possibilities of excellent co-operation between their delegations and my own.

A few weeks ago we commenced the second part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, the last full session before the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. What shall we be able to produce this time, in terms of progress towards the achievement of the goals set in the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly? Does any one of us, representing Governments which are charged with the responsibility to negotiate multilaterally the terms of achieving these goals, find any reason for optimism about the prospects ahead of us during a few summer weeks, considering what we have produced since January 1979? Do, in fact, the leading military Powers, on whose terms, unfortunately, we find ourselves around this table, have the sincere will to achieve, together with us, the goals which they supported three years ago?

In this assembly I have asked questions like these repeatedly. At no point in time have they been as legitimate as they are in the summer of 1981.

Since I last made a general statement in this Committee -- that was on 3 February -- nothing has changed for the better in the field of disarmament. On the contrary. In reply to what it deems to be a threatening build-up of Soviet military forces, nuclear and conventional, and in order to increase its strength world-wide, the United States has adopted its largest military budget in peace-time, with further steep increases to follow in the next few years. Furthermore, we have followed, with the utmost concern, the continued debate around the production of all components of the so-called neutron warheads, a weapon designed specifically for use on European soil. This combines with the tendency to move into new areas, such as binary chemical weapons, mobile ICBMs and anti-satellite and ABM warfare in outer space. All this so that this unique and only earth of ours will become, if possible, an even more threatened and insecure home for man. Added to that is the fact that owing to the advance of new technologies in search of a mission, which are being ruthlessly pursued toward the complete militarization of the human environment, physical and spatial boundaries are being pushed ever farther in a grotesque rivalry for universal military domination.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

For fear of seeing its empire crumble, one Superpower subjugates and threatens its neighbours and could end up leaving the détente it so much cherished in ruins.

Not unexpectedly, the other Superpower feels justified in downgrading what hopeful signs there were of a more compassionate, humane and humanitarian approach to world problems, and embarks again upon the simple but futile, and in our times dangerous and impossible road of military superiority.

And so here we sit; SALT II is considered dead; all bilateral arms negotiations between the Superpowers have been suspended and their commitment to multilateral negotiation is doubtful. It must, of course, be legitimate, and even to the outside world desirable, for a new Government to take time to define its policies. But it is difficult to believe that the year-long paralysis which has now been imposed on multilateral negotiations, including disarmament, as a result of the election campaign and the change in the United States administration, will in the final analysis benefit anybody.

With regard to European theatre nuclear forces, serious negotiations are still not in sight owing to the posturing and conditional approach of both sides. True, after the first initial sparring round of last year, the parties seem to be moving towards formal negotiations "by the end of the year", to quote the 4-5 May NATO communiqué. But how can one escape the conclusion that by that time -- two years after the momentous December 1979 NATO decision -- agreement to reduce theatre nuclear forces will be infinitely more difficult? The SS-20 programme will then, in all likelihood, have proceeded well beyond its present considerable number of some 200 missiles or more. In such circumstances, will the intention expressed in 1979 that NATO deployment of Pershing IIs and cruise missiles might be rendered inoperative through negotiations ever amount to anything more than just an intention?

The Swedish Government has never believed that the dual deployment of SS-20s and Pershing and cruise missiles has been or is necessary in order to maintain the existing rough equilibrium of forces in Europe. It appears instead increasingly likely that this deployment will risk becoming another series of tragic mistakes which, as in the past, could in the end leave both sides more vulnerable and insecure than before.

We have, therefore, the right to request that theatre nuclear forces negotiations start without further delay. The objective must be that the rapidly growing number of Soviet SS-20s is so drastically reduced that the deployment within NATO of new medium-range missiles can be avoided. Negotiations should also aim at limiting other nuclear-weapon systems intended for use in Europe.

Equally, the SALT process on strategic systems seems to face an uncertain future. Those who might have thought that SALT II could after all be wrapped up, with some minor amendments to take account of certain doubts expressed, were obviously wrong, and the results of some eight years of arduous negotiation will be laid aside and replaced by new approaches. Assuming that the SALT process will nevertheless resume again, such new approaches might in themselves offer new opportunities. It has been rumoured that the new United States administration is moving in the direction of proposing the aim of future strategic talks to be far-reaching reductions of nuclear weapons. The acronym SALT already appears frequently. This would seem to be an approach reminiscent of the unfortunately ill-fated Carter initiative of 1977, which was then flatly rejected by the other

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

side. In so far as a serious attempt is made to elaborate a credible and balanced offer for reductions of strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, it could prima facie appear to be an approach which should be investigated. In the meantime, I wish to repeat our demand to both Superpowers to respect the stipulations of the SALT II Treaty.

The prospects are that most negotiations -- multilateral as well as bilateral -- will remain suspended for most of the remainder of 1981. If this period of time is put to good use for a constructive -- I repeat, constructive -- reassessment of central issues, and without neglect of the interests of the international community, then too much need not be lost in the process. But if the only result will be one-sided reliance on increased military power in international relations, interruption of the vital multilateral and bilateral dialogue and the discarding of international agreements laboriously brought together, then we may all be in for troubled times. We consequently urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise restraint in their international and bilateral relations in order that what we have all together built not be irretrievably lost.

Meanwhile, here we sit, trying to do our best, under painful circumstances, to have something to report to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I shall have a few words to say on how we view our performance so far and the prospects ahead. This would imply reviewing the work so far of the ad hoc working groups and, added to that, another few words on the non-existent working groups.

First, let me comment on the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. I understand that under the able and effective chairmanship of the veteran disarmament negotiator, our colleague and friend, Ambassador Garcia Robles, the Group will advance consistently towards a draft programme to be submitted to the General Assembly at the second special session. The Group has indeed a particularly onerous task in trying to arrange in a logical and acceptable sequence most of the disarmament and arms control issues which have so long defied solution by the international community. We shall support every realistic effort in this field, although we fear that no ingenuity in the ordering and priority-setting of the relevant issues can ever replace the political will to negotiate multilaterally, which is so singularly lacking on the part of some delegations. We should make every effort to agree in this Committee on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, but may be well advised to leave the final say on certain central issues to the 1982 special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Secondly, a few words on the work to establish acceptable so-called negative security assurances, an issue which has taken on considerably increased importance and the accompanying public attention in many parts of the world. Not least is this a fact in the Nordic countries, where an intensely ongoing public debate on possibilities to establish these countries as a nuclear-weapon-free zone has involved Governments and parliaments. I shall return to this matter towards the end of this statement.

As far as the Working Group is concerned, we find it encouraging that, under the able chairmanship of our Italian colleague, Minister Ciarrapico, it is concentrating on efforts to evolve a common formula, which could serve as a basis for the conclusion of effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. We are convinced that only co-ordinated and binding undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States can constitute satisfactory assurances in the true interest of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

As we have stated, both here in plenary and in the Working Group, we do not consider a common formula as an end in itself. To be acceptable, such a formula must bring about a considerable improvement as compared with the present situation. The existing undertakings by the five nuclear-weapon States are impaired by important deficiencies. There are basic dissimilarities between these undertakings; they are burdened with certain conditions and limitations, and they leave room for subjective interpretations by the nuclear-weapon States. The composite effect of all these factors is that there is considerable ambiguity and uncertainty as to the applicability of the assurances. As has been pointed out by several delegations -- including my own -- the discussion in the Working Group has demonstrated that the unilateral declarations are framed primarily to suit the nuclear-weapon States and their allies. Only in the second place are the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States outside the two military blocs taken into consideration. This is a priority-setting which is, of course, unacceptable.

In order to justify the conditions and limitations in the existing unilateral declarations, reference has been made to the security preoccupations of the nuclear-weapon States. Even if it can be argued that certain exceptions may be justifiable in view of the implications of certain nuclear security arrangements, there is no reason why these exceptions should have a general application.

On the other hand, the vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States are, in legally binding form, committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status. They do not -- either directly or indirectly -- threaten anybody with nuclear weapons and they are therefore by definition entitled to firm assurances without any exceptions that they will not be subjected to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Their security preoccupations are at least as valid as those of the nuclear-weapon States, not to speak of the fact that they are not charged with the heavy political and moral burden of possessing and threatening to use nuclear weapons.

Despite the deficiencies and ambiguities of the existing assurances, the Swedish Government has interpreted the intention behind the declarations by the five nuclear-weapon States to be that States outside the alliances and committed to a permanent nuclear-weapon-free status are exempted from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As the Committee may recall, Ambassador Lidgard said, in a statement on 16 April 1981, that we take it for granted that a country with a non-alliance status and a non-nuclear-weapon record is covered without any exceptions by the unilateral assurances of the nuclear-weapon States. On the same occasion, he asked the representatives of the nuclear-weapon States to confirm that our understanding of their respective assurances is correct. We have not as yet received any answer. Therefore, I repeat our question and request the nuclear-weapon States shortly to give us the confirmation that we have asked for.

I now turn to the proposed convention banning radiological weapons, which is being negotiated in the third Working Group, chaired by my old friend and colleague, Ambassador Komives. This issue is an obvious example of the limited importance which the Superpowers seem to attribute to the Committee on Disarmament. While they have steadfastly refused for a number of years now to enter into multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty and are prepared to accept only limited negotiation activities in the chemical weapons area -- both areas being of the highest concern to most peoples and nations of the world -- they

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have not hesitated to put before the Committee a draft treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, which has, during our negotiations, been convincingly shown to be completely lacking in substance. It is my belief that the Committee made a mistake in agreeing to take up this item on its agenda to the detriment of more urgent questions.

In order to give some meaningful content to the draft convention on radiological weapons, the Swedish Government has proposed the inclusion of a prohibition of attacks against nuclear installations, releasing the radioactivity contained in such installations to the detriment of the people living in the area and their environment. Such attacks would, actually, apart from nuclear explosions, which are expressly exempted from the draft treaty, seem to be the only credible ways of waging radiological warfare. We firmly believe that such a prohibition should be added to the draft and are much encouraged by the support given to our proposal. Needless to say, the alarming event just about a month ago, which showed a horrifying distrust of the non-proliferation efforts of the international community, and which has been so sharply condemned in this Committee, should convince any rational mind that the original drafters of the proposed convention would do well to listen more carefully to the arguments that support our proposal. As matters now stand, we entertain grave doubts about the usefulness of going forward with the deficient text originally provided to us by the United States and the Soviet Union, as we do not think that it would add to the already suffering credibility of the Committee on Disarmament.

Finally, in this part of my statement, I should like to make some comments on the eternal issue of banning the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, which is under negotiation in the fourth Ad Hoc Working Group under Swedish chairmanship. The deliberations in the Committee have, in our view, confirmed the existence of a political consensus on the need for an effective convention to that end. Since last summer the Working Group has striven with great intensity and the active and constructive contributions of delegations have generated a strong momentum towards a chemical weapons convention. It is now essential to maintain and to strengthen this momentum.

On this occasion I should like to touch briefly upon one aspect of the question which is of particular importance to the Swedish delegation, i.e. our proposal concerning "chemical warfare capability" -- the capability to use chemical weapons. This proposal has gained valuable support in the Committee and, although some objections have been voiced, no one is really denying that it would be advantageous to enlarge the scope of a chemical weapons convention as we have suggested. We for our part fully recognize the concerns of those who have voiced reservations concerning our proposal, in particular as regards the verification aspects of the matter. On the whole, we have no quarrel with those who at present favour the more restricted "classical" approach. In fact, we agree with them that a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of production and stockpiling of all kinds of chemical weapons would constitute a major achievement in itself. This does not, however, detract from the fact that it would be an obvious advantage to enlarge the scope in order to close the loopholes which would allow the maintenance of a "chemical warfare capability". Such an enlargement of the scope would increase confidence among the parties to a convention, which is burdened with the problem of the effective verification of stipulations in a convention restricted to the "classical" scope approach.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

I wish to take this opportunity to draw the attention of the Committee to the further clarification that the Swedish delegation has given in the Working Group regarding our proposal on chemical warfare capability. We have pointed out that the prohibition of planning, organization and training for the use of chemical weapons need not enter into force immediately. The destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons will, for instance, take a long time, perhaps up to 10 years. As long as the stockpiles exist, parties to the convention can be expected to claim that they will need a capability to retaliate against an attack with chemical weapons. But once all stockpiles are destroyed, there can be no justification for maintaining such a capability. To meet this concern, the Swedish delegation has proposed to the Working Group that the prohibition of certain activities like planning, organization and training should become effective at a later stage but not later than 10 years after the entry into force of the convention itself.

I would now like to say a few words about the unfortunately still non-existent ad hoc working groups, particularly that on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test ban.

In spite of our misgivings in regard to negotiating the deficient United States-USSR draft convention on the banning of radiological weapons, we did, generously, accommodating ourselves to the wishes of these two Powers, enter such negotiations. I have, a few minutes ago, given voice to our serious disappointment in facing firm resistance on the part of the original drafters towards sound and well-founded proposals to improve and make more meaningful the original draft text.

If we had hoped to gain some corresponding concession from the Superpowers, particularly on the convening of a working group on a CTBT, we were obviously mistaken. The attitude of "give and take" is indeed not theirs. In glaring contrast to our willingness to accommodate and compromise, some delegations of nuclear-weapon States still refuse to enter into multilateral negotiations on the highest priority item on our agenda, disregarding their own votes in favour of such a step in the United Nations General Assembly, disregarding repeated appeals, and requests in this Committee, shielding themselves behind their unsuccessful trilateral negotiations. We simply do not understand the reasons for their refusal. Do they dislike, do they fear, do they distrust the multilateral negotiation procedure that they themselves have endorsed by their vote in the General Assembly? Anyhow, I think that we are not going to forget the lesson that this experience has given us. And we shall come back, again and again, to this issue. For the time being I associate the Swedish delegation firmly and fully with the position of the Group of 21 on which I understand that we shall hear more from the spokesman of the Group, the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil, later this morning. The unsuccessful trilateral negotiators had better prepare themselves for severe and adamant criticism of their failure at the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. As regards the other non-existent working group, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, I also associate the Swedish delegation firmly with the position taken by the Group of 21.

Before I enter upon the concluding part of my statement today, I have to say a few words on an increasingly threatening aspect of our daily existence, and our efforts to end the increasing militarization of this existence. The possibility of a continued militarization of outer space, which opens up horrifying prospects of a disastrously continuing upward spiral of the arms race and of which we have been given ample proof recently, was one of the issues of my short statement to this Committee on 24 April last.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The keen concern of the Swedish delegation, as of other delegations, has not diminished since then. Although the issue of the military use of outer space is not on the current agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, it seems to us necessary for the disarmament community to find ways and means to place it firmly on its agenda, in the immediate future. The hope of the Swedish delegation is to make this possible through the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, where the issue is bound to appear.

While I deeply regret to say that official disarmament negotiations, the success of which is so desperately needed, have continuously shown a dismal record -- and we know where to place the blame for this -- another phenomenon is emerging to which we, as representatives of Governments in all parts of the world, should give careful attention.

The ongoing and intensified arms race has created a popular resistance movement, which obviously is gaining ground in western Europe, including the Nordic countries, in fact wherever a free debate on matters of life and death is possible. A growing number of people refuse to be drawn into what they conceive to be a Superpower conflict. For them the arms race has turned from being an issue of deterrence, of military balance, of inferiority or superiority, into being an issue of survival.

I should like here to quote from a column in the International Herald Tribune some weeks ago, written by the well-known British thinker and writer Wayland Young and called "On the New Wave of Disarmament". He there recalls the times of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the times of popular protest against nuclear weapons. In one of the many marches in England and among the many bearers of official-looking banners, there was a girl who held up a small placard saying: "Caroline says No". His immediate reaction was: "The general staffs and the cabinets of the world must bear Caroline in mind". The general staffs and the cabinets have not been that sensible: they have forgotten her. It might well be that the new wave of disarmament is the result. If things are going to be put right, concludes Wayland Young, there is a need for harder thought, within and among Governments, than is probably yet realized, including a new look at matters which were hotly debated 20 years ago, but which have since then been forgotten.

But it isn't only Caroline; it is not only individual human beings at grassroot level; it is not only the concerned general public who refuse to say yes any longer and who have, in fact, started to say no. Among the many people who ask for a way out of our present dilemma, the dilemma which the arms race has created and worsened, and who are looking for the means to give it political force, are distinguished scientists and diplomats. The well-known American diplomatic historian George F. Kennan, who cannot be said to be unfamiliar with the way in which the Soviet mind is working, made a strong case in a statement a few weeks ago for a new approach to the nuclear arms race dilemma. Against the background of the grotesque redundancy and overkill capacity of present nuclear-weapon systems -- he states that anything beyond 20 per cent of existing arsenals is overkill of dimensions defying rational understanding -- he would like to see President Reagan propose to the Soviet Government, as a first step, an immediate and across-the-board reduction by 50 per cent of these arsenals by the two Superpowers -- affecting in equal measure all forms of nuclear weapons -- all this to be subject to the national means of verification now at the disposal of the two Powers.

Mr. Kennan does not deny the possibility of risks involved. But, he states, "is it possible to conceive of any dangers greater than those that lie at the end of the collision course on which we are now embarked?"

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Thanks to the free access of the rest of the world to the public debate in the United States, we know that Mr. Kennan's is not an isolated voice in that country. It would be possible to quote from hundreds of persuasive statements, articles and debates, all aiming at the same goal: to enable us to break out of the present vicious circle. The same is the case in western Europe. What about the other side? From there we listen to the many disarmament proposals by President Brezhnev. It is an obvious fact that the public passivity, since January 1961, of the present United States administration in matters of arms control and disarmament has, in the eyes of a concerned world public opinion, given Soviet proposals a particularly sharp relief. The meeting of these proposals with indifference has not, again in the eyes of this concerned public opinion, diminished the sharpness of their relief.

But why not test their seriousness? After all, as another columnist in the International Herald Tribune stated a month ago, "no people are more acutely aware of the pains war brings than those who live in the European parts of the Soviet Union".

The fact is that there is a new wave of disarmament in Europe, growing stronger every week. It is in my view a serious psychological and political mistake to dismiss this movement, as several prominent statesmen and military leaders have done, as a new wave of "neutralism", however unrealistic and irrational their arguments and slogans may sometimes be. This way of reacting is, of course, a sign of the concern at these developments felt by these commentators, but it is also an indication that they have not understood well enough what the movement is all about. One example: a top NATO military leader declared in an interview a few weeks ago that "we again see anti-nuclear demonstrations, which we had hoped were a thing of the past". And he added that "the peoples of those nations must ... be prepared to make sacrifices for their security".

In fact, what the peoples of those nations, and many others as well, are preparing is a call to their leaders to remember the first paragraph of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament, adopted by the world community three years ago, from which the following sentences should be quoted.

"States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms."

"Yet the accumulation of weapons ... today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind."

"The time has therefore come ... to seek security in disarmament ..."

The new wave of disarmament means that the peoples have taken for granted what the leaders of the world agreed on three years ago. This growing wave -- is it an indication that the time has come for the idea of disarmament? Let us hope so. In any case it is a memento to be taken very seriously by all of us, but particularly by some of us.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank Mrs. Inga Thorsson for her statement and for the kind words she has addressed to the Chair. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to rectify a lapse on my part by sincerely thanking Ambassador Onkelinx for the very kind sentiments he expressed to the Chair, both past and present.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, at the outset let me congratulate you on your assumption of the important office of Chairman for the month of July. In expressing to you my best wishes I offer you the fullest co-operation of the Hungarian delegation. I also take this opportunity to welcome our new colleague, Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro, the distinguished representative of Venezuela, and wish him the best in our common and responsible activity. My words of welcome go also to Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished Under-Secretary of State for Disarmament of Sweden, and to Sir Antony Acland, the distinguished Deputy Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom.

Although the Committee starts today the consideration of item 5, entitled: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons, let me be permitted to deal first in a brief manner with some questions related to items 1 and 2 of our agenda.

Many delegations have underlined the responsibility of our Committee, as the single multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, in connection with the present alarming situation which is characterized by the growing danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. The reasons for this situation are well known: the decision of NATO to seek military superiority, the so-called doctrine of limited nuclear war, the decision to deploy medium-range nuclear missiles in western Europe and, let me add, the constant danger of a nuclear holocaust which could be caused by a technical failure or by human error.

Last week we all heard a moving statement by the head of the Soviet delegation on the terrifying consequences of a nuclear war, including its so-called limited version. As to the pretext advanced by the United States and its allies to justify their drive for military superiority, it has been time and again proved, both here in the Committee and elsewhere, as completely false. In the International Herald Tribune of 4-5 July, Mr. Stephen Cohen, Professor of Politics at Princeton University and a member of the American Committee on East-West Accord, joined his voice to that of many others criticizing the present policy course of the United States Administration and pinpointing the real cause of tensions in the world today and the factual motives of Washington in its rush for another headstart in the arms race. "The crisis", writes S. Cohen, "existed well before 1979, and the United States contributed significantly to it by violations of earlier détente promises to Moscow -- for example, promises of most-favoured-nation status in trade and credits, of ratification of SALT-II, and of an evenhanded policy toward China..." "That underlying cause", continues the author, "intuitively understood but almost never stated -- is the issue of political, not military, parity, or what may be called the parity principle." And he goes on to say: "Enthralled by 64 years of anti-Sovietism and by a long history of being the only superpower, many U.S. leaders and substantial segments of public opinion persist in seeing the Soviet Union mainly as 'godless', 'terroristic' and an 'evil force' without any legitimate political status or entitlement in the world... But it is this unwillingness to concede political parity that repeatedly causes U.S. diplomacy to succumb to militaristic policies, as acceptance of the necessity of military parity succumbs to the chimera of superiority, and episodes of détente succumb to cold war."

This is where the American shoe pinches.

Under the present dangerous circumstances the most important task is to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war, to curb the arms race in general and the nuclear arms race in particular. These lofty aims call for negotiations. In the nuclear age, in the shadow of a nuclear holocaust which could lead to the elimination of mankind and human civilization, there is no other method of solving the problems, however acute and complex they are.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

In this connection the Hungarian people, Government and parliament attach special importance to the appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union to the parliaments and peoples of the world. During the meeting of the Hungarian National Assembly on 25 June the speaker of this high body stated the following: "The Hungarian National Assembly declares its agreement with and support to the Soviet peace initiatives. It is convinced that by common efforts of the peoples and by effective actions of all peaceloving and reasonable forces it is possible to avert the dangers threatening the peace and security of mankind. As it has done so far, the Hungarian People's Republic will take part in the future in these initiatives and is ready to contribute to their realization".

The threefold maxims aimed at the prevention of a nuclear war and curbing the nuclear arms race could be characterized the following way: no more development of nuclear weapons; no more nuclear weapons tests, and no more deployment of nuclear weapons. My delegation shares the view expressed by many delegations that the Committee on Disarmament should start substantive negotiations on these vital issues if the Committee, or more precisely each member of the Committee, really adheres to the consensus reached during the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as contained in the key paragraph 50 of its Final Document.

In connection with the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, I see no need to go into the details of how important this achievement would be for curbing the nuclear arms race, for strengthening the NPT régime and for the improvement of the international political climate. The Hungarian delegation supports the establishment of an ad hoc working group with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States aimed at the elaboration and adoption of a CTBT also with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

The comprehensive test-ban negotiations would be greatly and very favourably influenced by a one-year moratorium by all nuclear-weapon States. The Hungarian delegation, like many others, considers as very important the resumption of the trilateral negotiations, which were interrupted by the Western side in November 1980.

In connection with a CTB, my delegation attaches great importance to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts in the work of which a Hungarian expert has actively participated. The results of the experts' work have already provided considerable ground for the establishment of an international seismic data exchange system within the framework of a treaty on a general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Turning to agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", the Hungarian delegation shares the view expressed by many delegations that negotiations on these issues are the best way to curb the nuclear arms race and to eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. It was with this lofty aim in mind that the delegations of a group of socialist countries already in 1979 submitted the well-known document CD/4 which contains proposals aimed at facilitating the earliest possible starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To be quite frank, the Committee has lost more than two years: because of the opposition of some western countries, the Committee has not been able to start substantive negotiations on this vitally important issue.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Now we are confronting the same refusal of some western countries in connection with the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 on our agenda. The Hungarian delegation supports the establishment of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament, but, at the same time, is ready to consider any other constructive ideas for multilateral negotiations on this item. In this connection, my delegation looks forward with great interest to the proposals which will be submitted today by Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic and expresses the hope that these proposals may facilitate the further work of our Committee on this vitally important issue. The participation of all nuclear-weapon States in the process aimed at the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament continues to be a prerequisite of meaningful negotiations.

In the field of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, special responsibilities are borne by the USSR and the United States. The Hungarian Government welcomed the signature of the SALT-II agreement, the ratification of which has been postponed indefinitely by the United States.

Hungary favours the resumption of the SALT negotiations, the sooner the better, and attaches great importance to the entry into force of the SALT-II agreement.

As is well known, the Soviet Union called for an early resumption of the SALT negotiations and for the continuation or the start of other talks on nuclear disarmament questions with the United States. But it looks as if some highly placed Administration officials are still not in a negotiating mood. Apart from the long delays which have been caused by them regarding such talks, they have adopted and steadfastly pursue linkage tactics. This dangerous approach actually boils down to a capricious condition: either the Soviet Union behaves like Washington wants it to or there will be no talks. Such tactics, which have been the subject of extensive and most unfavourable commentaries in the world press, are rightly causing great concern in the international community, particularly now that the global situation has been deteriorating. It is precisely because of growing tensions that talks on nuclear arms limitations should be resumed as soon as possible and not delayed under artificial pretexts. The socialist States, including the Soviet Union as well as non-aligned-countries, as is clear from the statement by their Foreign Ministers in New Delhi earlier this year, firmly believe that increased tensions in the world today demand more urgently than ever before a resumption of a constructive dialogue between the USSR and the United States on matters in question.

My delegation has already expressed its support for the establishment of two working groups on items 1 and 2 of our agenda. In connection with the possible mandates of these working groups, useful ideas have been put forward by the Group of socialist countries and by the Group of 21. These proposals require serious consideration and appropriate decision.

The Hungarian delegation attaches great importance to the prevention of the geographical spread of nuclear weapons. It was the Hungarian delegation which, on behalf of 16 delegations, submitted a draft resolution on this issue to the United Nations General Assembly at its last session. The draft resolution was adopted

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

by an overwhelming majority. Resolution 35/156 C calls for our Committee to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are no such weapons at present. Unfortunately the Committee has not yet responded to this resolution in an appropriate manner, despite the growing importance and urgency of the matter.

I would now like to turn to item 5 of the Committee's agenda, "New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons."

As members of the Committee will recall, it was the delegation of the Soviet Union which in 1975 submitted a proposal and a draft international agreement to the United Nations General Assembly aimed at effectively prohibiting new types of weapons of mass destruction. The importance and urgency of this question is clearly reflected in paragraph 77 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session on disarmament which states: "In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction."

The Hungarian delegation continues to be convinced that the best organizational way to deal with these questions would be the establishment of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts, as proposed by the delegation of the Soviet Union early in 1978, and a comprehensive approach would be the best method for preventing the emergence of new weapons of mass destruction, in the form of a comprehensive agreement supplemented by individual agreements on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction.

At its last session the United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 35/149, which requests our Committee, "... in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and to draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons."

Unfortunately the CD has been prevented from dealing in an appropriate manner with these questions because of the reluctance of some countries. These delegations consider the problem of new weapons of mass destruction either as non-existent or as not urgent, despite the press reports on the development of new weapons of mass destruction. In this connection I would like to mention only the question of neutron weapons. The revival of the plans aimed at the production and deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe gives special importance and urgency to this question. The draft treaty

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in connection with the prohibition of neutron weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries already in 1978 under these circumstances must have more importance and actuality.

Led by the desire to promote the in-depth consideration of issues related to the question of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, and taking into account the differing approaches to the organizational aspects as well as to the basic approach to the substance of the question, the Hungarian delegation proposed, in document CD/174, the holding of informal meetings of the Committee on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction, with the participation of experts.

The Committee on Disarmament at its 133rd meeting, on 30 June, adopted a decision which says: "The Committee decides to hold informal meetings under item 5, New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons ... The number of these informal meetings and their dates will be announced by the Chairman after consultations with members". Since then, the Chairman of the Committee has announced that the two informal meetings on this subject will be held on 27 and 31 July.

On behalf of the Hungarian delegation I would like to express our thanks to delegations for supporting this modest Hungarian initiative and also to express the hope that many delegations will be assisted by experts when the Committee deals with this important question in the framework of informal consultations. These informal meetings offer a special opportunity for every delegation to address itself in connection with questions related to the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction.

The Hungarian delegation is convinced that the Committee's informal meetings on this matter will be a step forward in the discharge of the responsibilities assigned to it in connection with the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, our plenary meetings this week are devoted to a highly topical question -- the prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Since 1975 when the USSR advanced this proposal, it has been supported by my country. In doing so we have recognized the importance of such a step for halting the arms race. It would, especially, curb the qualitative arms race which not only is likely to destabilize the international military balance but also threatens to undermine negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

It stands to reason that the prohibition of existing weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons, should be given highest priority in negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. This direction of our efforts should be effectively complemented by a preventive prohibition of weapons of mass destruction which may be developed in the future, either on the basis of scientific and technological principles that are known today but have not yet been applied individually or jointly to develop weapons of mass destruction, or on the basis of scientific and technological principles that may be discovered in the future, and which will have properties similar to or more powerful than those of existing mass destruction weapons.

This what I would call double or parallel approach was reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. Why is it then, we may ask, that a comprehensive preventive agreement in this field has up to now not been achieved? Everybody here around this table knows the answer. It is too obvious that those who are not yet ready to prohibit and eliminate existing weapons of mass destruction are also not prepared to bar future developments in military research and development from the exploitation of which they expect to obtain unilateral military advantages.

Instead of playing an active and constructive part in elaborating appropriate instruments to close the road to the development of new weapons of mass destruction, some delegations here have chosen the opposite course. It has been argued that the subject of the Soviet proposal was unclear, and that a prohibition on this subject would hamper the freedom of science and could not be adequately verified.

As to the scope of the prohibition, since 1976 a whole range of interesting ideas and proposals have been advanced in the course of the deliberations held in this Committee. This concerns a general definition of new weapons of mass destruction, on the one hand, and concrete examples of such weapons, on the other. At the same time it is obvious that one cannot expect to have already today a 100 per cent foolproof definition and an exhaustive list of weapons which should be the subject of preventive action. Demanding this would mean postponing such a step endlessly and letting the qualitative arms race go on. Nobody today is in a position to foresee concrete future developments which may lead to the creation of new weapons. Very often even great scientists have misinterpreted the pace and directions of the use of science and technology for military purposes. The opinion of Ernest Rutherford concerning nuclear energy was already mentioned here some days ago. Let me quote some other examples. Thus, Dr. Vannevar Bush,

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one of America's most well-known scientists during the Second World War, maintained that the ICBM was a technical impossibility. During the 1950s some scientists believed that manned spaceflight should be abandoned because "the human system could not survive its rigours".

Thus the experience of mankind fully speaks in favour of a comprehensive agreement. Already today such dangerous weapon concepts as particle beam weapons, infrasonic weapons, electromagnetic radiation weapons, ethnic weapons, etc., are entering the stage of feasibility. I do not intend to elaborate on them. This should be done by appropriate experts. Let me only briefly touch upon the so-called particle beam weapons. Particle beams are streams of highly energetic atomic or subatomic sized particles like electrons, protons, hydrogen atoms or ions, which can burn, melt or fracture the target and generate secondary radiation. According to some American sources such weapons could be ready for military use in the early to mid 1990s. They are expected to revolutionize warfare. It is no secret that corresponding long-range military programmes are under way in the United States of America. Generally it is emphasized that particle beam weapons should be used for defensive purposes against such targets as satellites and missiles. Very often it is forgotten that they could have a mass destruction capability against biological targets as well. Such a weapon could be space-based and operate like a large-scale neutron bomb. In this context a United States official was quoted as saying, "This would destroy a population without breaking a single brick."

It has sometimes been argued that an international agreement on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction would hamper the freedom of scientific research. We do not share this perception. It is not the aim of the proposal to block the peaceful uses of new scientific findings. It is their military use that should be prohibited; i.e. States parties to an agreement on this subject would establish and implement appropriate rules to forestall certain military misuses of scientific findings. I think nobody today complains that the Convention relating to biological weapons hampers the peaceful uses of biological findings.

In past debates the question of verification has also been brought up. It is surely too early to dwell upon verification at this stage. Detailed verification arrangements could be agreed upon after the scope of the prohibition is established. But there will be a broad range of possibilities for coping with this question. A verification system could use such means as internal constitutional procedures, analysis of scientific literature, national technical means of verification, international exchange of information and other international procedures. It is widely recognized that an adequate combination of these means would make the detection of new weapon developments very likely, especially when they enter the test stage or the stage of production.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

After all, the question of a practical approach to the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction should be given an answer. Here we see great merit in setting up an ad hoc group of experts. Such a group could consider possible areas of development of new weapons of mass destruction and elaborate a general definition of such weapons to be included in an international instrument. Thus, an adequate scientific approach to this highly complex problem would be assured. Its study by appropriate scientific experts would allow the CD to concentrate on its main task, i.e. the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

Having said this, I would like to express the disappointment of my delegation that some delegations from the Western group are not yet prepared to join a consensus on the establishment of such an expert group which, for the time being, would only have the modest aim of exploring the areas mentioned. This is especially regrettable because only one or two years ago even some Western delegations favoured an expert examination of the question of new weapons of mass destruction. We do not know what has changed their position so fast. But how else than by means of constructive negotiations can the question of new weapons of mass destruction be explored and solved?

As for the format of a possible international instrument in this field, we prefer a comprehensive agreement prohibiting once and for all the development and production of new weapons and systems of mass destruction. Such an agreement could contain a list of individual types of new mass destruction weapons, which could subsequently be amended following scientific development. At the same time we are prepared to conclude special agreements on individual types of new weapons of mass destruction, as is the case with radiological weapons. Thus, there could be a general framework treaty and more detailed agreements concluded subsequently. As a useful precedent we regard the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons and its protocols.

Let me once again appeal especially to those delegations coming from highly industrialized countries to send their experts to the forthcoming informal meetings and to play a constructive role in solving the problems connected with the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. At the same time we should not lose sight of the fact that this question should also be addressed in an appropriate manner within the framework of the comprehensive programme of disarmament since it is an indispensable part of a comprehensive approach to arms limitation and disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic regards an international agreement on the prohibition of radiological weapons as a useful means to stop the development of one new weapon of mass destruction. Furthermore, such an agreement would be a valuable contribution to the forthcoming second special session of the

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General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Therefore the Ad Hoc Working Group should expedite its work in order to finish the draft treaty and thereby allow the Committee to concentrate on its main items. During the first part of this session the Ad Hoc Working Group made some headway under the efficient leadership of its chairman, Ambassador Komives of Hungary. We highly appreciate the consolidated text submitted by him in April. In our opinion it constitutes the basis for elaborating the final draft treaty.

With regard to items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda I would like to say the following. My delegation has followed very attentively the consideration by the Committee of these main items during the spring session and the first part of the summer session. In the same way, I am sure, as many other delegations here, we came to the conclusion that the Committee must not allow itself to be paralysed in its proceeding to the crucial questions of its mandate. It should exhaust all its possibilities to make at least some headway before the second special session.

With regard to a comprehensive test-ban, there are two main problems involved. Firstly, we favour the earliest possible resumption of the trilateral talks with the aim of completing the task the three negotiators set before themselves four years ago. Secondly, we would like to see a more active involvement of the CD in the solution of problems connected with a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The views of the German Democratic Republic as well as of other socialist countries on this issue have been repeatedly stated. As we understand it, the Group of 21 maintains the same approach. I would like to draw your attention to document CPD/WP.36 which in particular says: "The Committee on Disarmament should undertake without further delay multilateral negotiations on a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Such a treaty should aim at the general and complete cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons by all States in all environments for all time to come". The tripartite negotiators have determined their attitudes to this proposal. Out of them, only the Soviet Union has expressed its readiness to participate in the consideration of the issue concerning a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States in all environments for all time to come. We would like to put a question to the two nuclear-weapon States outside the trilateral negotiations. As we understand it, they seem to be ready to join a consensus on the establishment of an ad hoc working group. It is not clear to us, however, if they are ready to take part in elaborating a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and to assume appropriate obligations. We ask for a response to our questions. Their reply will largely determine the destiny of further efforts made by the Committee as regards the issue of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation sees especially two advantages in a multilateral approach to a CTB in the framework of an ad hoc working group. Firstly, all nuclear-weapon States could explain their concrete approach to such a step which they subscribed to at the

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first special session on disarmament. And what is more, they could contribute in a practical way to its achievement. Secondly, through the involvement of non-nuclear-weapon States a truly multilateral CTBT could be considered. The proposals tabled by the Group of 21 in document CD/181 we regard as a useful basis for the elaboration of a mandate for an ad hoc working group on a CTB.

At our last informal meeting on Tuesday, 2 July, I proposed to submit today a proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on further actions concerning item 2 of the Committee's agenda. In line with this I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to distribute as a formal CD document the paper my delegation has just tabled. In this working paper we have tried to give an assessment of the consideration of item 2 during the first part of our 1981 session. We deem the informal meetings held in March and April to have played a useful role. But no practical conclusion leading to the commencement of actual negotiations was reached. Just at this point the CD should proceed with further actions the aim of which should be the preparation of substantive negotiations. Therefore my delegation proposes that you, Mr. Chairman, initiate consultations, in particular with the delegations of the five nuclear-weapon States, individually or together, to clarify their approach to the practical preparation of substantive negotiations. In particular those nuclear-weapon States which have until now opposed the creation of an ad hoc working group could come out with their alternatives. It is our hope that the informal character of such consultations would be very much conducive to building up further momentum concerning the commencement of negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. After these consultations you, Mr. Chairman, could report your conclusions to the Committee to allow a formal decision on its further proceeding. If you come to the conclusion that there is sufficient common ground to go ahead, we could find the appropriate forum in which to solve questions connected with the start of concrete negotiations. Such questions have been raised by delegations in different documents.

In the view of my delegation the following substantive and organizational questions should, inter alia, be addressed in a structural manner and within the framework of the preparation of negotiations on item 2:

What could be the concrete approach to the implementation of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

What parallel steps are necessary to strengthen the international political and legal guarantees of States?

What could be the role of the Committee on Disarmament?

What should be the relationship to other negotiations dealing with questions of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament?

As to the form of such deliberations -- ad hoc working group, contact group, structured informal meetings, etc. -- my delegation is very flexible.

If, on the other hand, you, Mr. Chairman, come to the conclusion that there is no possibility of proceeding in this way we should confess our inability to cope with our main item and state this as well as the reasons for it in our report to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as co-ordinator of the Group of 21 I have the honour to read out a statement, but before doing so I should like to offer a word of praise to the Secretariat and particularly to its documentation service for the expediency with which this document (CD/192) was processed.

"STATEMENT OF THE GROUP OF 21

(Item 1: Nuclear test ban)

"The Group of 21 deeply regrets that its proposal on the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament on item 1 of the agenda, first formulated specifically in document CD/72, dated 4 March 1980, and reiterated most recently in document CD/131, dated 24 April 1981, has not yet been the subject of a decision, despite the urgency of the issue and the consistent interest and effort of the Group.

"The Group of 21 firmly believes that the general aspects of the question of the Nuclear Test Ban, as well as technical issues related thereto, have been exhaustively and thoroughly discussed and studied. The results of such discussions and studies, together with the many General Assembly resolutions dealing with the matter, clearly indicate that the commencement of multilateral negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this priority item are long overdue. The Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating body on questions of disarmament, is the appropriate forum for such negotiations.

"Accordingly, the Group of 21 requests that the proposal contained in document CD/181, which includes the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 1 of the agenda and the formulation of its mandate, be taken up by the Committee at its next official meeting for a decision.

"If, contrary to what could reasonably be expected, it were not possible to reach a positive decision, the Group believes that it would be necessary to examine what further steps should be taken by the Committee to ensure that its Rules of Procedure are not used in such a way as to prevent the Committee from taking procedural decisions enabling it to conduct negotiations on the items included on its annual agenda.

"The Group of 21 expects further that the parties to the trilateral negotiations should give careful consideration and provide, jointly or individually, an adequate response to the questions submitted in document CD/181 which raise some issues of deep concern and legitimate interest to the world community."

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of satisfaction to see you presiding over the work of the Committee in this month of July when a substantial part of our work for the 1981 session will be done. Your well-known competence and diplomatic skill, coupled with the untiring efforts of your delegation and your country in the cause of peace and disarmament, will no doubt assist the Committee and advance its work. My delegation pledges its fullest co-operation with you in the discharge of your onerous task. Your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Komives of Hungary, deserves our gratitude and appreciation for the very able manner in which he steered the work of the Committee to a successful take-off in the month of June. May I also welcome to the Committee the distinguished Ambassadors, Ambassador Carasales of Argentina, Ambassador Jalali of Iran, Ambassador Jayakoddy of Sri Lanka and Ambassador Rodriguez Navarro of Venezuela.

Before I speak on the subject of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons and in particular radiological weapons allow me to address a few words to the two most central and priority questions before this Committee, namely, a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The intensity of the consideration of these two items underscores the importance of these questions not only as indicated in the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, but also as a direct response to the legitimate concerns of the international community over the increasing nuclear arms race and the daily threat of a nuclear war. No one in this Committee can deny the importance and the urgency attached to these questions, and the need to initiate substantive multilateral negotiations as indicated in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind, and to international peace and security. However, despite the concern of the international community against the irrationality of the race for the development and deployment of sophisticated nuclear weapons, despite the statements made in this Committee, the arms race continues unabated. My country, a non-aligned and developing country, firmly believes that the arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspects, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding on the basis of the new international economic order.

It is a matter of regret and dissatisfaction therefore that the Committee on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating body, has not been able to initiate substantive negotiations on these two very important items. The reasons, of course, are well-known. Two of the five nuclear-weapon States sitting in this Committee have not been able to join the consensus which almost exists within the Committee for the establishment of the relevant working groups. It is very frustrating that those nuclear-weapon States should continue to hold back the work of the Committee owing to what I believe are their narrow security perceptions. This development is certainly not a good omen for negotiations within the Committee, yet it is expected that the Committee on Disarmament should make a positive contribution to the achievement of general and complete disarmament through the early conclusion of agreements on the urgent disarmament measures listed in

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

paragraph 50 of the Final Document, as well as the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States. The responsibility of the CD for making progress on the accomplishment of these tasks becomes more pressing as we enter the Second Disarmament Decade and approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament scheduled for 1982.

My delegation remains convinced that working groups provide the most effective mechanism for negotiations in this Committee. This is why we would like to recall and fully endorse the proposals of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/180 and 181, and support the call that this Committee should examine those proposals in detail and take concrete decisions on them. We have for some time held informal meetings on these two subjects. If further informal meetings are to be productive, then the discussions should be arranged to address specific issues relating to the general subjects under agenda items 1 and 2. In view of the time factor and the fundamental importance of item 1, in particular, it is my belief that some priority consideration should be given to that item. Ambassador de Souza e Silva this morning read a statement on that item on behalf of the Group of 21; needless to say, my delegation fully associates itself with that statement. The three nuclear-weapon States which were engaged in separate negotiations -- we no longer presume that those negotiations are in progress -- should respond, either collectively or individually, to the pertinent questions that were raised in document CD/181 so that we may know why the call for an early conclusion of their negotiations and the submission of the treaty to the CD has not been heeded up to date. It is pertinent also in this connection to recall the proposal made by the distinguished representative of Pakistan that a structured discussion on the issues of scope, verification and the final clauses of a nuclear test ban treaty should be undertaken. This is a constructive proposal and we hope that it will be considered with all the seriousness it deserves by the Committee.

As regards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, my delegation continues to find unacceptable the delay in the work caused by the reasoning that nuclear weapons act as a deterrent to war and that we should therefore learn to live with a continuous increase in these weapons. The reverse, we believe, is the case, as the accumulation of such weapons, and indeed the competitiveness of the arms build-up, is by itself a source of insecurity to the major military Powers and to the world at large. The doctrines of deterrence, strategic balance and parity are all based on the narrow security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which fail to take into consideration the vital security interests of all States. It is a fact that the more nuclear-weapon Powers there are, the greater is the probability of a nuclear war the consequences of which will affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. And by the same token the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of nuclear war, either by deliberate calculation or by accident.

Here again my delegation fully endorses the proposals which have been made by the Group of 21 regarding the mandate of the proposed working group on item 2 of our agenda. The elaboration and identification of substantive issues in paragraph 50 of the Final Document would provide an appropriate basis for multilateral negotiations. The basic factors which have been accepted by all as prerequisites for effective nuclear disarmament negotiation include the undiminished security of all States at progressively lower levels of existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; adequate measures of verification; negotiations in stages, and the special responsibility devolving on the two nuclear-weapon States with the largest arsenals.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

These basic factors have been accepted and reflected in the consensus document that emanated from the first special session on disarmament and therefore should not raise any difficulty. While we agree with the multilateral negotiation of nuclear disarmament measures in stages, emphasis would no doubt have to be placed on the cessation of the qualitative and quantitative improvement in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. Otherwise, scientific and technological advances could render disarmament negotiations ineffective, if not irrelevant, as we have seen in the past.

In an address to the inaugural meeting of the third United Nations Fellowship Programme on Disarmament, I observed that certain Governments perpetuate the myth that the more heavily armed a country is the greater is its security. I use the word myth because the proposition in my view ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one super-Power provoke in the other super-Power. It ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one alliance provoke in the other alliance. It ignores the competitiveness which increased armaments in the possession of one regional Power or even one country in a region provokes in another regional Power or in another country within the same region. Such competition gathers its own momentum; it becomes, as we now see, a way of life, and yet we know that this competition, whatever else it may do, certainly does not assure the security of any of the States concerned although the question of security is the ostensible reason which is used to justify this mad race.

Anyone who listened to the facts about the effects of a nuclear war so eloquently given by Ambassador Issraelyan of the USSR at the 134th plenary meeting, on Thursday, 2 July 1981, would not only insist that the Committee get down to concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament but would also, in the words of another very distinguished international civil servant, the Commonwealth Secretary-General, Mr. Ramphal, wonder at "the false rationality which has overtaken reason", in which "theories of institutionalized deterrence, of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, of global war and theatre war, all underpinned by the doctrine of mutual assured destruction -- very appropriately termed 'MAD' -- are aired and promoted with cool detachment to enlarge the overkill capacity which already exists".

Indeed, if the present trend in research and development continues, it may become impossible to control and verify any agreement which may subsequently be reached.

The present situation in the Committee on Disarmament, which is nothing short of a stalemate, has to be broken very soon as it is affecting the morale even of those of us who sit in the Committee, not to talk of the great disappointment of those who come to observe our work. How long can we continue to invoke the complexity of disarmament issues when even the marginal observer of our work knows that we just do not seem to be trying.

Allow me now to offer some brief comments on the item on our agenda for this week. In the statement I made to the plenary on 14 April 1981, I indicated that the early conclusion of a radiological weapons convention would give further impetus to other disarmament negotiations, and would be a positive contribution by the CD to an appropriate atmosphere for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. I also indicated my delegation's preference for a broad and comprehensive text that would contain explicit provisions on nuclear disarmament

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

and the peaceful uses of radioactive materials for the economic and social development of all countries but particularly the developing countries. My delegation is happy to note that the Ad Hoc Working Group, under the leadership of Ambassador Komives, continues to try to reconcile views and proposals made by various delegations on the substantive issues of scope and definition.

Mention should be made of the Swedish proposal that the scope of a future convention should include the prohibition of radiological warfare and the protection of nuclear facilities from attacks. The proposal seems to my delegation the more relevant in the light of the recent unprecedented Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility. This act of aggression has received world-wide condemnation, including that of my own Government. The joint statement of the Group of 21 contained in document CD/187 also fully conveys the views of my delegation. I should also indicate that I fully agree with the concluding part of the statement made on 2 July 1981 by Ambassador Herder of the German Democratic Republic, as follows:

"... this act of State-directed terrorism should make those countries which closely collaborate with Israel in the nuclear field review their policy in that respect and take appropriate sanctions against the aggressor. Thereby, legitimate non-proliferation concerns can be met. Otherwise, we fear, such an aggressive régime as the apartheid clique in Pretoria will be encouraged tomorrow to attack nuclear facilities in African countries under the pretext of 'securing its survival'."

Let me quickly add that in urging the Committee on Disarmament to conclude work on the radiological weapons convention, I do not wish to be misunderstood as overrating the importance of such a convention. It should be disposed of, however, partly -- and this is quite significant -- partly to make available the time now used by the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons for what we believe to be more important subjects. I believe that if the Committee on Disarmament is to contribute as much as it is potentially capable of doing to the second special session on disarmament, then it will have to conclude agreements not only of a preventive nature, on non-existent weapons, but also of a positive disarmament nature on existing weapons. Given the political will of member States, especially those that have so far held back, I believe that the Committee on Disarmament may yet be able to avoid the inevitable criticism of its performance at the second special session on disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. Before I give the floor to the next speaker, I would like to consult delegations on the question of time for including all the five remaining speakers on our list for this morning. In view of the fact that this afternoon the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has already been scheduled, I would like to put before the Committee the following alternatives: we could either continue tomorrow afternoon at a plenary meeting and schedule the informal meeting for the remaining time, or we could suggest that the remaining speakers, at the end of this morning's session defer their statements until next Tuesday, when the regular plenary meeting is scheduled.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): I understand your well-founded concern, Mr. Chairman, as five speakers have yet to take the floor. I should like to propose the following -- that the representative of Mongolia, and, if there is still time, the following speaker, the representative of Czechoslovakia, should be allowed to make their statements. The Soviet delegation, for its part, in accordance with the policy of unilateral steps and mutual example which the Soviet Union, as you know, follows in disarmament questions also, requests that its name should be moved to the list of speakers for Tuesday morning, and it calls on other delegations in a similar position to follow our example.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, in line with the Netherlands' policy of reciprocating any unilateral step, we will agree with the proposal of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is time for the representatives of Mongolia and Czechoslovakia to make their statements, there would still be one other delegation which is on the list of speakers for today. May I take it that the distinguished representative of Romania has no objection to the procedure agreed to by his two colleagues, namely, to speak on Tuesday? Thank you very much, Ambassador Malita. It is therefore decided.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, we are glad to welcome you, the distinguished representative of India -- a country with which the Mongolian People's Republic is linked by bonds of long-standing friendship and close co-operation -- as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of July. The Mongolian delegation expresses the hope that under your guidance the work of the Committee on Disarmament will move forward towards the achievement of the desired results.

I should like to note with particular satisfaction the important contribution made towards the Committee's activities by your predecessor, the esteemed Ambassador of Hungary, Comrade I. Kómives. His energetic and active efforts were largely responsible for the successful solution of a number of organizational problems in the month of June.

Allow me to extend a sincere welcome to our new colleagues in the Committee, the representatives of Sri Lanka, Iran, Argentina and Venezuela, and to wish them every success in their important mission.

The Mongolian delegation, like many others, attaches paramount importance to the starting of real negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on the question of ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. That does not mean that we underestimate the importance of negotiations on questions relating to new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and especially radiological weapons, on the discussion of which the Committee has embarked this week.

In this statement I should therefore like to concentrate once more on the question of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Committee members are well aware that a group of socialist countries took the initiative of proposing that negotiations should be started on ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them. That proposal was presented formally in document CD/4 of 1 February 1979, which contains concrete suggestions by the sponsors regarding the subject of negotiations, the stages and timing of negotiations and preparations for them. With respect to timing, the sponsors proposed that the preparatory consultations should be started at once, with a view to beginning the negotiations on the substance of the problem that very year -- in 1979.

In the same proposal, the socialist countries once more reaffirmed and emphasized their steadfast view that agreement on this important problem can be reached only provided there is strict observance of the principle of the inviolability of the parties' security. The sponsors of the proposal also stressed that the elaboration and implementation of measures in the field of nuclear disarmament should be buttressed by the parallel strengthening of political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. They especially emphasized that appropriate negotiations should be conducted with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States without exception, as well as of a certain number of non-nuclear weapon States, and that the Committee on Disarmament therefore offered a suitable forum for preparing and conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

We are regretfully obliged to note that the Committee on Disarmament is now engaged in its third session since the well-known proposal by the group of socialist countries was placed before it, but still no progress has been made on this matter.

To be fair, it should also be noted that during this period, first at the informal consultations and later at both informal and formal meetings of the Committee, there has been a useful exchange of views in the course of which the sponsors of document CD/4 have given detailed explanations of their position of principle on the matter and have replied to questions of interest to individual members of the Committee.

More recently, the Group of 21 has submitted proposals for the establishment of ad hoc working groups for the consideration of items 1 and 2 of the agenda -- proposals which have been supported by the delegations of socialist countries. As you know, these proposals have met with objections on the part of certain nuclear-weapon States.

As you know, too, the delegations of socialist countries have also made a number of other concrete proposals, including a proposal for the establishment of a working group to consider the important and urgent problem of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of States where there are none at present, and a proposal for the establishment of a group of experts to consider the question of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. These are only two of the various suggestions and proposals put forward by the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament.

However, for reasons we all know, negotiations on the substance of the question of ending the production of nuclear weapons and destroying them have not yet begun in this forum. We have never denied the positive developments in the activities of the Committee on Disarmament. On the contrary, we have always noted and we again emphasize the importance of maintaining in the future the business-like trend that has appeared in the Committee's work.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Unfortunately, the constructive spirit shown in the Committee has come up against opposition from certain delegations which have attempted to poison the business-like atmosphere of the negotiations and to introduce into the Committee's work questions which bear no relation to its activities, as happened, for example, during the spring part of its 1980 session. In saying this we do not wish in any way to dramatize the occurrence of undesirable situations of this kind in the Committee. Now as before, we are for a business-like and constructive approach to the substance of the problems before us and for the manifestation of political will and determination in seeking ways of achieving genuine results in the difficult task of solving urgent problems in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

In this connection, I should like to draw attention to document CD/182 containing a statement of a group of socialist countries, including Mongolia, on the results of the first part of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. I do not think that it is necessary for me to dwell in detail on the contents of that document. It states clearly and unequivocally its sponsors' positions on all the main items on the Committee's agenda, as well as on other urgent problems.

I should like to supplement the above by saying that Mongolia's supreme legislative body, the Great People's Khural, addressed a message some days ago to the parliaments and peoples of all countries of Asia and the Pacific Ocean. The message contains an appeal for united efforts in the struggle to avert the threat of war, to establish a durable peace and to develop mutually advantageous co-operation among States. It reaffirms Mongolia's firm support for the proposal to convert the region of south-east Asia and the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and co-operation and for the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Pacific and the elaboration of confidence-building measures in the Far East.

The message emphasizes that Mongolia, for its part, has proposed the conclusion of a convention on mutual non-aggression and the non-use of force in relations among States of Asia and the Pacific Ocean and the convening for that purpose of a conference of the countries of those regions, to which all permanent members of the Security Council could be invited.

As you know, this proposal by Mongolia was formulated in the foreign policy programme enunciated in the decisions of the eighteenth congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party which was held recently.

Reaffirming the Mongolian People's devotion to the lofty ideals of peace, détente and disarmament, our Party Congress proclaimed in its decisions that the Mongolian People's Republic, in close co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, would:

"Actively and consistently pursue the policy of consolidating détente and improving the international situation;

Promote in every way the implementation of the peace initiatives advanced by the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as a follow-up to the Peace Programme;

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Support the efforts of peace-loving States to curb the arms race and adopt effective measures in the field of military détente and disarmament;

Contribute within the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations to efforts aimed at finding constructive solutions to the pressing problems of today;

Contribute in every way to strengthening peace and security in Asia through joint efforts of Asian States;

Work for a further expansion of the political dialogue and equal co-operation in various fields with the countries of Asia."

(Document CD/189)

In giving a detailed description of the foreign policy line adopted by the Mongolian People's Republic I am prompted by the fact that many of the proposals and initiatives in the field of disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have a direct connection with the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

In his report to the eighteenth congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the MPRP, President of the Presidium of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic, Comrade Yu Tsedenbal said: "An important part in the implementation of the foreign policy of the Mongolian People's Republic is played by our activities in the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and other international organizations. In those organizations, our country, together with the Soviet Union and other States of the socialist community, is actively working for a positive solution to the key problems of our time, including problems connected with the deepening of détente, the strengthening of universal peace and security, the halting of the arms race and the adoption of effective measures in the sphere of disarmament".

As an Asian State, the Mongolian People's Republic, together with other peace-loving countries, is deeply concerned at the serious aggravation of the situation in the vast Asian continent, the growth of centres of tension and conflict as a result of the stepping-up of attempts by imperialist and hegemonist forces to revive militarism and knock together a new military and political alliance, and to expand "strategic partnership" through deliveries of United States offensive weapons.

During the period since the Second World War there have been more wars and conflicts in Asia than in any other region of the world.

The tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are still fresh in the memories of the peoples of that great continent. The horrors of the Korean war, when bacteriological means of destruction were used, have not been forgotten. The wounds are not yet fully healed that were inflicted upon heroic Viet Nam by repeated foreign aggression, in the course of which extensive use was made of chemical weapons, napalm and other pernicious means of destroying the peaceful population and the environment.

The crisis in the Near East is being exacerbated every day. An attempt has been made to test the reliability of "rapid deployment forces" in the area of the Persian Gulf, with results that are known to all.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In that connection I should like to mention the recent savage bombing raid carried out by the Israeli air force against a nuclear research centre in Iraq, which has been widely condemned in many countries throughout the world, including Mongolia. This act of international terrorism and tyranny, elevated by Israel to the status of State policy, has been resolutely condemned in the Committee on Disarmament and other forums as a flagrant violation of the norms of international law.

As for the policies and actions of those who inject tensions into the international atmosphere and nurture military ideas of various kinds concerning the possibility of waging "limited nuclear warfare", they represent a direct challenge to the vital interests of the peoples of Asia and the whole world.

Tens of hundreds of millions of people today, and not in the countries of Asia alone, are in acute need of better food and housing and of a solution to the pressing problems of development.

That is why it is essential to find a speedy solution to the most burning problem of our time, that of nuclear disarmament.

In the Mongolian People's Republic, whose working people are at present solemnly commemorating the glorious sixtieth anniversary of the establishment of people's power, exceptional importance is attached to the cause of the relaxation of international tensions, the achievement of practical measures towards the halting of the arms race and disarmament, and the preservation of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world.

It is precisely for this reason that the Mongolian Parliament unanimously supported the recent appeal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Parliaments and peoples of the world, saying that the appeal represents a passionate call for energetic and immediate action to curb the nuclear weapons race and to solve outstanding international problems by the only sensible method, that of negotiations.

In conclusion, I should like to make some observations on the question of the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

The Mongolian People's Republic has from the first advocated the comprehensive solution of this urgent problem, and is still doing so, convinced that only such an approach can help to limit the possibility of the further qualitative refinement of nuclear weapons.

It was, after all, the failure to deal with this problem comprehensively that made possible the emergence of a new generation of weapons of mass destruction, namely, nuclear weapons. A serious danger lies in the existence of forces which, taking advantage of the absence of a comprehensive solution of this problem, are seeking to achieve the further improvement of this weapon of mass destruction in order to secure a unilateral superiority.

Hence the urgent need for the earliest possible elaboration and implementation, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon Powers without exception, of an international agreement prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. Such an agreement would make it possible to take practical measures to prevent the further improvement of these weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Mongolian delegation is of the view that a situation must not be allowed to recur in which one or two nuclear-weapon Powers or a number of so-called near-nuclear States will again stand aside from an international agreement on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. That is why, together with other delegations of socialist countries, we firmly advocate that all nuclear-weapon States without exception should become parties to any future agreement. This means that a comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is possible only with the participation of all States possessing nuclear weapons.

At the Committee's meeting this morning, Ambassador G. Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, has submitted a working document containing a business-like proposal for breaking the deadlock in the consideration of the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, whose position is very close to that of the Group of 21 and which supports the ideas advanced in documents CD/180 and CD/181, considers that in the present situation of a lack of consensus on the question of the establishment of an ad hoc working group, the Committee should use all available possibilities in order to ensure the preparation of negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation, together with other socialist countries, fully supports the proposal of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic that the Chairman should hold consultations involving the representatives of the five nuclear-weapon States to determine the future forms and methods of the start of negotiations and to work out what specific questions shall form the subject of discussion at such negotiations.

We should now like to hear something from the other participants in the future negotiations, and in particular the representatives of the other four nuclear-weapon States, including the two nuclear-weapon States not participating in the tripartite negotiations. We wonder whether this time they will show any willingness. If it again proves impossible to achieve a consensus, the majority of the Committee will once more be perfectly aware of the essential reasons which are preventing this multilateral negotiating body from embarking on a concrete examination of the most urgent priority issue of halting the nuclear weapons race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I am glad to announce that, in view of the lateness of the hour, the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia has also kindly agreed to defer his statement to next Tuesday's plenary meeting. We deeply appreciate his gesture.

May I now know if any other delegations would like to take the floor? If there are none, I would like to draw the Committee's attention to the informal paper circulated by the secretariat containing a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 13 to 17 July 1981. Distinguished delegates will recall that, at our informal meeting on 3 July, I suggested a timetable for informal meetings during the month of July, which was accepted by the Committee. In accordance with that recommendation, informal meetings to be held on 13 and 17 July will be devoted to the consideration of questions relating to the organization of work which are mentioned in the statement of the Chairman at the 129th plenary meeting, at the time of the adoption of the Programme of Work for the second part of the session. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee accepts this timetable on the understanding that it is indicative and that we can make adjustments as we proceed.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I have, of course, no objection to the programme of work which you have outlined for the meetings of the Committee and the working groups for next week. However, I do have a question which I would like to pose at this point. This concerns, firstly, the manner in which you propose to proceed with regard to the further consideration of items 1 and 2. I believe that the Group of 21 has just made a proposal with regard to the formal consideration of document CD/181 and we have also received a proposal from the German Democratic Republic regarding item 2. I think we would all be happy to know how you would like to proceed on that matter. Secondly, I would be grateful to be informed of your intentions regarding the further consideration of the proposal made by my delegation regarding the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facilities.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation, the delegation of the Netherlands, the delegation of Romania and the delegation of Czechoslovakia have obligingly renounced delivering their addresses. We proceeded on the assumption that you were closing the meeting, and therefore if you intend to continue the discussion I request the floor in order to read out my statement; it is true that it is 15 pages long, but I shall be obliged to do this. I request that you immediately close the meeting, and that all organizational matters, including those raised by the representative of Pakistan, should be discussed tomorrow at the informal meeting. I ask you to decide to close the meeting immediately or to give the floor to the next speaker for our work to continue.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the USSR and would like to assure him that the intention is not to continue our deliberations but to decide upon some of the procedural aspects which I have raised. I would like also to tell the distinguished representative of Pakistan that the points he has raised are fully engaging the attention of the Chair and that decisions on this will be announced shortly.

If there are no further comments, I would now like to take it that the programme of work, as I have outlined it, is accepted. I have seven speakers for our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 14 July 1981, including those delegations which agreed to defer their statements to that meeting. I would like to invite any other delegations wishing to speak on that occasion to inscribe their names as soon as possible. I may add that Switzerland has also indicated its intention to speak next Tuesday on chemical weapons.

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 14 July, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 1.20 p.m.

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