

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/228
Appendix III/Vol.I
21 August 1981
ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME I

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u>			
101	France (the Chairman) The Secretary of the Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General Mexico Sweden Italy India		
102	German Democratic Republic Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Japan Romania Canada USSR Yugoslavia Nigeria		
104	France (the Chairman) Belgium Canada Pakistan India Mexico		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium Cuba France (the Chairman) Mexico United Kingdom United States		
107	France (the Chairman) Sri Lanka Egypt Algeria Pakistan Ethiopia Nigeria		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work (continued)</u>			
108	Yugoslavia United Kingdom India Iran Canada Indonesia German Democratic Republic Venezuela Peru		
109	Burma Nigeria France (the Chairman)		
110	Mongolia Venezuela India Indonesia Romania Egypt USSR Australia Netherlands Hungary India		
111	German Democratic Republic (the Chairman) Hungary Cuba		
112	Kenya Czechoslovakia USSR Yugoslavia India Pakistan Brazil		
113	Italy China Pakistan Venezuela Norway (non-member State)		
114	Bulgaria The Secretary of the Committee		

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I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u> (continued)			
116	German Democratic Republic (the Chairman) Venezuela United Kingdom USSR Yugoslavia United States Pakistan France Nigeria		
117	Denmark (non-member State) Finland (non-member State) France		
118	USSR		
119	USSR Pakistan German Democratic Republic (the Chairman)		
120	Germany, Federal Republic of (the Chairman) Netherlands		
121	Venezuela Nigeria United States		
125	Canada Argentina Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) Germany, Federal Republic of (the Chairman)		
126	Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) India		
127	USSR Pakistan Germany, Federal Republic of (the Chairman)		
128	Hungary (the Chairman) Mexico India Canada Pakistan China		
129	Hungary (the Chairman)		

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I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u> (continued)			
130	Brazil Argentina Morocco Romania USSR Canada		
131	Cuba Algeria Brazil Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Australia Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco India Pakistan		
133	Ethiopia Argentina India Hungary (the Chairman)		
134	India (the Chairman) Venezuela Brazil German Democratic Republic Indonesia USSR Mexico Pakistan Canada		
135	Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia		
136	Belgium Sweden Hungary German Democratic Republic Brazil (on behalf of Group of 21) Nigeria Mongolia Pakistan		

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I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work (continued)</u>			
137	Czechoslovakia Romania USSR Morocco India (the Chairman) United Kingdom France United States USSR Mexico		
138	Canada Bulgaria		
139	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Peru Burma		
140	India (the Chairman) Bulgaria Brazil German Democratic Republic Morocco Czechoslovakia		
141	Australia Indonesia Mexico Sweden China Yugoslavia Argentina Brazil		
142	China Egypt Netherlands Bulgaria Venezuela Poland Romania India Pakistan Norway (non-member State) Brazil India (the Chairman)		
143	Indonesia (the Chairman) Mexico USSR Nigeria		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>			
1. <u>General and Organizational Work</u> (continued).			
144	Japan		
145	German Democratic Republic Zaire Mongolia		
146	Egypt Bulgaria Sweden (Chairman of Scientific Expert Group on Seismic Events)		
147	Italy (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances</u>) Hungary (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons</u>) Cuba Pakistan Romania Mexico Japan Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) USSR Hungary Czechoslovakia Italy Indonesia (the Chairman)		
148	Mexico (Chairman, Working Group on Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament) Sweden (Chairman, Working Group on Chemical Weapons) Belgium Brazil Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) China Poland Ethiopia Burma (on behalf of Group of 21) Cuba Indonesia (the Chairman) United States United Kingdom France USSR Mongolia Pakistan Indonesia (the Chairman)		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	I. <u>Organization and Procedures</u>		
	2. <u>Participation of non-member States</u>		
104	France (the Chairman) Pakistan Mongolia German Democratic Republic USSR Bulgaria China Cuba Ethiopia Canada Yugoslavia India Hungary Mexico		
108	France (the Chairman)		
109	France (the Chairman)		
110	France (the Chairman)		
112	Spain (non-member State)		
113	German Democratic Republic (the Chairman)		
129	Hungary (the Chairman)		
133	Hungary (the Chairman)		
142	China		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u>			
101	Mexico Sweden Italy India		
102	German Democratic Republic Australia Czechoslovakia		
103	Japan Romania Canada USSR Nigeria		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium		
106	Sweden (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc</u> Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events) Sweden Australia Japan United Kingdom France (the Chairman)		
107	Sri Lanka Algeria Pakistan Ethiopia Nigeria		
108	Yugoslavia United Kingdom India Canada Indonesia German Democratic Republic Mexico Venezuela Peru		
109	Japan Kenya Netherlands Burma		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u> (contd)			
110	Mongolia USSR Mexico		
111	Brazil Hungary Cuba		
112	Nigeria Kenya Czechoslovakia Spain (non-member State) Pakistan		
113	GDR (the Chairman) China Pakistan Venezuela Norway (non-member State)		
114	Bulgaria		
116	GDR (the Chairman) Venezuela United Kingdom USSR Yugoslavia USA Pakistan Nigeria		
117	Denmark (non-member State)		
119	GDR (the Chairman)		
120	FRG (the Chairman) Poland		
121	USA		
124	Cuba		
125	Canada Argentina Cuba		
126	Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) India		
127	Sweden Australia Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Brazil Indonesia Kenya FRG (the Chairman)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u> (contd)			
128	Mexico India Canada Pakistan		
130	Brazil Argentina USSR		
131	Cuba Algeria Brazil Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Australia Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco India Pakistan		
133	Ethiopia Hungary (the Chairman)		
134	Venezuela German Democratic Republic Mexico		
135	Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia		
136	Sweden Hungary German Democratic Republic Brazil (on behalf of Group of 21) Nigeria Mongolia		
137	Czechoslovakia USSR India (the Chairman) United States United Kingdom Mexico		
138	Canada Bulgaria		
139	Bulgaria (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Peru Burma		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
II. <u>Nuclear Test Ban</u> (contd)			
140	India (the Chairman) Bulgaria Brazil German Democratic Republic		
142	China Norway (non-member State)		
143	Indonesia (the Chairman) Mexico Nigeria		
144	Japan		
145	Zaire		
146	Egypt Sweden Sweden (Chairman of Scientific Expert Group on Seismic Events)		
147	Cuba Pakistan Australia Japan Italy Indonesia (the Chairman)		
148	Belgium Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) China Ethiopia Burma (on behalf of Group of 21)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>III. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament</u>			
101	The Secretary of the Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General Mexico Sweden Italy India		
102	Sweden German Democratic Republic Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Japan Romania USSR Nigeria		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium Cuba		
107	Sri Lanka Egypt Algeria Pakistan Ethiopia Nigeria		
108	United Kingdom Iran Venezuela Peru		
109	Kenya Burma Nigeria France (the Chairman)		
110	Mongolia German Democratic Republic United Kingdom Venezuela India Indonesia Romania Egypt USSR Mexico		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>III. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament (contd)</u>			
111	Yugoslavia Brazil Hungary Cuba USSR Mexico		
112	Poland Nigeria Kenya Czechoslovakia USSR Yugoslavia Spain (non-member State) India Pakistan Brazil		
113	Italy China Pakistan Norway (non-member State)		
114	Belgium Bulgaria Germany, Federal Republic of		
116	Brazil Nigeria Finland (non-member State) GDR (the Chairman) Venezuela USSR Yugoslavia USA Pakistan France Nigeria		
117	India		
118	USSR		
119	Mongolia Czechoslovakia GDR (the Chairman)		
120	FRG (the Chairman) Pakistan France		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>III. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament (contd)</u>			
122	USA Romania Brazil Indonesia		
123	India USSR Mongolia		
124	Cuba Netherlands USSR India		
125	Sweden Canada Argentina Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) Cuba		
126	Algeria (on behalf of Group of 21) India		
127	Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Brazil Indonesia Kenya FRG (the Chairman)		
128	Hungary (the Chairman) India Canada Pakistan		
130	Brazil Argentina Romania USSR		
131	Algeria Brazil Poland		
132	Mexico German Democratic Republic Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco India		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>III. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race</u> <u>and Nuclear Disarmament (contd)</u>			
133	Ethiopia Argentina India		
134	Venezuela Brazil German Democratic Republic Indonesia USSR Pakistan Canada		
135	Bulgaria Romania Yugoslavia		
136	Sweden Hungary German Democratic Republic Nigeria Mongolia Pakistan		
137	Czechoslovakia India (the Chairman) United Kingdom France United States		
138	Canada Bulgaria		
139	Peru USSR India Burma		
140	India (the Chairman) Bulgaria Brazil German Democratic Republic Finland (non-member State) Czechoslovakia		
142	China Egypt Norway (non-member State) Brazil		
143	Indonesia (the Chairman) German Democratic Republic Mongolia Mexico Nigeria China		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>III. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race</u> <u>and Nuclear Disarmament (contd)</u>		
144	Germany, Federal Republic of Japan Belgium India		
145	German Democratic Republic Zaire Mongolia		
146	Egypt United States Bulgaria USSR France		
147	Cuba Pakistan Australia Romania United Kingdom Mexico Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) USSR Hungary Czechoslovakia India Canada United States		
148	Belgium Brazil Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) China Poland Ethiopia Burma (on behalf of Group of 21) Cuba Indonesia (the Chairman) United States United Kingdom France USSR Mongolia China Pakistan		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>IV. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons</u>		
101	Mexico		
102	Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Romania USSR		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium		
107	Algeria Pakistan		
108	Bulgaria		
110	Mongolia Egypt		
111	Hungary		
112	Spain (non-member State)		
113	Norway (non-member State)		
115	Bulgaria Pakistan		
116	Yugoslavia Romania Brazil Nigeria USSR United Kingdom Egypt Finland (non-member State) Switzerland (non-member State)		
117	China India Pakistan		
119	Mongolia		
121	Hungary		
122	Indonesia		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons (continued)</u>		
124	Cuba Netherlands USSR India		
125	Sweden Canada Argentina		
126	India		
127	Australia Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of Socialist States) USSR Pakistan Kenya Italy Bulgaria		
128	India Pakistan		
130	Brazil USSR		
131	Cuba		
132	German Democratic Republic Australia Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco		
133	Ethiopia		
134	USSR		
135	Romania		
136	Sweden		
139	Burma		
140	Finland (non-member State)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	IV. <u>Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear-weapons (continued)</u>		
142	China Egypt Netherlands Bulgaria Poland Romania India Pakistan Austria (non-member State) Norway (non-member State) Brazil		
143	German Democratic Republic Mongolia USSR China		
144	Japan		
145	Zaire		
146	Egypt		
147	Italy (Chairman, <u>Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances</u>) Cuba Pakistan United Kingdom		
148	Belgium Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States) China Ethiopia Burma (on behalf of Group of 21) Indonesia (the Chairman)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u>			
101	Mexico Sweden Italy India		
102	Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Japan Romania USSR		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium		
107	Algeria Pakistan		
108	United Kingdom		
109	Netherlands		
110	Mongolia Australia USSR Netherlands Hungary India		
111	Brazil		
112	Spain (non-member State)		
113	Norway (non-member State)		
117	Sweden Indonesia Denmark (non-member State) Finland (non-member State)		
118	Germany, Federal Republic of Canada China Brazil		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u> (continued)			
119	Mongolia USSR Pakistan Czechoslovakia		
120	Australia Poland Netherlands Yugoslavia France Belgium		
121	Hungary Venezuela United Kingdom Canada Nigeria		
122	Romania Brazil		
123	Japan		
124	Cuba		
125	Canada Argentina		
126	India		
127	Australia Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Pakistan Kenya Sweden		
128	Mexico India Canada Pakistan		
130	Brazil Argentina		
131	Cuba Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	V. <u>Chemical Weapons</u> (continued)		
133	Ethiopia Hungary (the Chairmān)		
136	Sweden		
137	Switzerland (non-member State) India (the Chairman)		
138	Japan Yugoslavia United Kingdom Germany, Federal Republic of United States Poland Finland (non-member State)		
139	USSR Romania Canada Argentina Burma		
140	Finland (non-member State) Morocco Czechoslovakia German Democratic Republic		
141	Australia Indonesia Mexico Sweden China Yugoslavia Argentina		
142	India		
143	Netherlands		
145	Zaire		
146	Egypt United States		
147	Cuba Pakistan Australia United States		
148	Sweden (Chairman, Working Group on Chemical Weapons) Belgium China Ethiopia Burma (on behalf of Group of 21) Indonesia (the Chairman)		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>VI. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons</u>		
101	Mexico India		
102	German Democratic Republic Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Romania USSR		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil Poland Belgium		
107	Pakistan		
108	United Kingdom		
110	Mongolia		
111	USSR Spain (non-member State)		
117	Denmark (non-member State)		
119	Czechoslovakia		
122	Hungary Yugoslavia Romania Brazil Sweden		
123	Italy India USSR Mongolia		
124	Cuba Poland Nigeria		
125	Canada Argentina Cuba		
126	India		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons (continued)</u>		
127	Australia Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Pakistan Kenya		
128	Hungary (the Chairman) India Pakistan		
130	Brazil Argentina Morocco USSR		
131	Cuba Algeria Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Australia Indonesia Sri Lanka Morocco		
133	Ethiopia Hungary (the Chairman)		
134	Venezuela		
136	Belgium Sweden Hungary German Democratic Republic Nigeria		
137	Czechoslovakia Romania USSR Netherlands Morocco Indonesia		
139	Burma		
140	Finland (non-member State)		
141	Mexico		
143	USSR		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VI. <u>New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons (continued)</u>		
146	Egypt		
147	Hungary (Chairman, Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons)		
	Cuba		
148	Belgium		
	Mongolia (on behalf of a group of socialist States)		
	China		
	Ethiopia		
	Burma (on behalf of Group of 21)		
	Netherlands		
	Indonesia (the Chairman)		

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PV -	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	1. <u>Annual Report of the Secretary-General</u>		
101	The Secretary of the Committee, on behalf of the Secretary-General		

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111	USSR		

Consideration of other areas dealing with the
Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament
and Other Relevant Measures

2. United Nations role in Disarmament

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	3. <u>Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament</u>		
101	The Secretary of the Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General Mexico Italy		
102	Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Romania Yugoslavia Nigeria		
105	China Belgium		
107	Ethiopia		
110	Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research Brazil		
113	Norway (non-member State)		
127	The Secretary of the Committee		
128	Mexico India Canada Pakistan		
130	Brazil Argentina		
131	Cuba Algeria Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Sri Lanka Morocco India		
133	Ethiopia		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>VII. Consideration of other areas dealing with the</u> <u>Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament</u> <u>and Other Relevant Measures</u>			
3. <u>Special Session of the General Assembly on disarmament</u> (continued)			
134	India (the Chairman)		
	Venezuela		
	Brazil		
	German Democratic Republic		
	Indonesia		
	Pakistan		
136	Nigeria		
140	Czechoslovakia		
143	Indonesia (the Chairman)		
144	India		
146	Egypt		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	4. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free Zones</u>		
101	Mexico		
107	Egypt		
109	Kenya		
110	Egypt		
116	Finland (non-member State)		
127	Kenya		
128	India Pakistan Japan China		
130	Argentina Morocco Romania USSR France Italy Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21) Iran United States Japan Canada German Democratic Republic (on behalf of group of socialist States)		
131	Cuba Algeria Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic Indonesia Sri Lanka		
133	Ethiopia		
134	Venezuela German Democratic Republic Pakistan		
136	Mongolia Pakistan		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	4. <u>Nuclear-weapon-free Zones</u> (continued)		
140	Finland (non-member State)		
142	Egypt Bulgaria Norway (non-member State) Brazil		
143	German Democratic Republic USSR China		
145	Zaire		
146	Bulgaria		
147	Pakistan		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	5. <u>Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</u>		
101	Mexico Sweden		
102	Czechoslovakia		
103	Japan Nigeria		
105	Hungary		
107	Egypt Pakistan Nigeria		
108	United Kingdom Iran		
110	Indonesia Egypt Australia Germany, Federal Republic of Mexico India Netherlands Hungary United States		
112	Kenya		
113	Norway (non-member State)		
116	Yugoslavia Romania Nigeria Finland (non-member State) Switzerland (non-member State)		
117	Pakistan		
122	Indonesia		
125	Canada		
128	Pakistan		
129	Egypt		
130	Brazil Argentina Morocco Italy		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	5. <u>Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (continued)</u>		
131	Algeria		
132	German Democratic Republic		
	Australia		
	Indonesia		
	Sri Lanka		
	Morocco		
	Pakistan		
133	Ethiopia		
	India		
	German Democratic Republic		
138	Canada		
139	India		
140	Finland (non-member State)		
142	Pakistan		
	Austria (non-member State)		
	Norway (non-member State)		
	Brazil		
143	German Democratic Republic		
	China		
144	Japan		
145	Zaire		
146	Egypt		
	United States		
147	Pakistan		
	Canada		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	6. <u>Peaceful uses of nuclear energy</u>		
101	Sweden		
128	Pakistan		
129	Egypt		
130	Brazil		
	Argentina		
	Morocco		
	France		
	Argentina (on behalf of Group of 21)		
132	Australia		
	Indonesia		
	Sri Lanka		
	Morocco		
134	Venezuela		
	Pakistan		
136	Belgium		
137	Netherlands		
139	India		
142	Brazil		
145	Zaire		
146	Egypt		
147	Pakistan		
148	Burma (on behalf of Group of 21)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>			
7. <u>BW Convention</u>			
113	Norway (non-member State)		
118	Germany, Federal Republic of		
121	Nigeria		
140	Morocco Czechoslovakia		
146	United States		
147	United States		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<u>VII. Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	<u>8. Geneva Protocol of 1925</u>		
101	Sweden Italy		
102	Germany, Federal Republic of		
105	Belgium		
112	Spain (non-member State)		
117	Sweden Indonesia		
118	Germany, Federal Republic of China		
119	Czechoslovakia		
120	Australia Poland Netherlands France Belgium		
121	Hungary Venezuela		
123	Japan		
130	Argentina Iran		
132	Morocco		
137	Switzerland (non-member State)		
138	Poland		
139	Argentina		
140	Morocco Czechoslovakia		
141	Indonesia		
145	Zaire		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	<p>VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u></p> <p>9. <u>Certain conventional weapons.</u></p>		
123	Italy		
130	Argentina		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	10. <u>Peace Zones</u>		
136	Mongolia		

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PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	11. <u>Outer Space</u>		
127	Sweden		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<u>VII. Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>			
<u>12. General and complete disarmament</u>			
101	France (the Chairman) The Secretary of the Committee on behalf of the Secretary-General Mexico Sweden Italy India		
102	German Democratic Republic Australia Czechoslovakia Germany, Federal Republic of		
103	Japan Romania USSR Yugoslavia Nigeria		
104	Canada		
105	Bulgaria Hungary Brazil China Poland Belgium Cuba		
107	Sri Lanka Egypt Algeria Pakistan Ethiopia		
108	United Kingdom India Iran		
109	Kenya Burma		
110	Mongolia Italy Romania		
111	GDR (the Chairman) USSR		
112	Poland Nigeria Kenya Czechoslovakia Spain (non-member State)		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
<p>VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u></p> <p>12. <u>General and complete disarmament (contd)</u></p>			
113	Italy Indonesia China Yugoslavia Pakistan Venezuela United Kingdom Norway (non-member State)		
114	Romania Hungary Brazil Bulgaria USSR Burma Germany, Federal Republic of		
115	Pakistan Japan		
117	India Denmark (non-member State)		
118	USSR		
120	FRG (the Chairman) Poland France		
122	USA		
123	Italy		
124	Cuba		
125	Canada Argentina		
126	India		
127	Australia Mexico Hungary (on behalf of a group of socialist States) Brazil USSR Indonesia Pakistan FRG (the Chairman)		
128	Mexico India Canada Pakistan		

Chronological		Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
	12. <u>General and complete disarmament (contd)</u>		
129	Egypt		
130	Brazil		
	Argentina		
	Romania		
	USSR		
	Canada		
131	Cuba		
	Algeria		
	Poland		
132	German Democratic Republic		
	Australia		
	Indonesia		
	Sri Lanka		
	Morocco		
	India		
133	Ethiopia		
134	India (the Chairman)		
	Venezuela		
	German Democratic Republic		
	Indonesia		
	USSR		
	Pakistan		
	Canada		
135	Bulgaria		
136	Belgium		
	Sweden		
	Hungary		
	German Democratic Republic		
	Nigeria		
	Mongolia		
137	Morocco		
138	Canada		
139	Bulgaria		
	Peru		
	USSR		
	India		
	Burma		
140	Finland (non-member State)		
	Czechoslovakia		
	German Democratic Republic		

	Chronological	Alphabetical	
PV	Country/Speaker	Country/Speaker	PV
	VII. <u>Consideration of other areas dealing with the Cessation of the Arms Race and Disarmament and Other Relevant Measures</u>		
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142	China Venezuela Poland Norway (non-member State) India (the Chairman)		
143	Indonesia (the Chairman)		
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146	Egypt United States Burma (on behalf of Group of 21) France		
147	Cuba Pakistan Romania United Kingdom Mexico USSR Hungary Czechoslovakia India United States		
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Chronological		Alphabetical	
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121	Hungary		
122	USA		
123	USSR Mongolia		
128	India		
132	German Democratic Republic		
134	USSR		
140	Finland (non-member State)		
144	Germany, Federal Republic of Belgium		
146	Bulgaria USSR		
147	United Kingdom		
148	China		

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CD/PV.101
3 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Tuesday, 3 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. A. MAATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY
Ms. M. WICKES

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. P. BERG
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE
Mr. J.-M. VAN GILS

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. SA Benwang
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. LEI Chen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:
Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:
Mr. E.A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BÜNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. M. SIDIK

Iran:
Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy:

Mr. E. SPERANZA
Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CALBRAS
Mr. U. DE MOHR
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. L. BAYART
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMED
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:
Mr. L. MALITZA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. L. TVADER
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:
Mrs. I. THORSSON
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOLENKO
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININ

United Kingdom:
Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE
Mr. E. YEO
Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:
Mrs. R. MUJICA DE ADAMES
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA

Mr. N'KONGO DONTONI BWANDA

Mr. LONGO B. NDAGA

Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Assistant Secretary-General
Centre for Disarmament:

Mr. J. MARTENSON

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): The honour of presiding over the inauguration of our work this year falls to the representative of France.

I therefore declare open the third session of the Committee on Disarmament and its one hundred and first plenary meeting.

I am sure I can speak for all of us in expressing our satisfaction at taking up again today the task that has been entrusted to us in the service of disarmament. I should like to say to my colleagues how happy I am personally to be with them again and to be able to continue with them a co-operation which has always been courteous and friendly.

Needless to say, I am at the disposal of all delegations to do whatever may help forward the accomplishment of the Committee's mission. I shall need your assistance in the carrying out of my tasks as Chairman, and I should like to thank you in advance for it.

On behalf of the Committee I wish to thank our distinguished colleague from Ethiopia, Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe, who conducted our work with great competence and authority during the month of August last and who has continued to discharge the responsibilities of Chairman up to today.

I should like to welcome among us today Mrs. Thorsson, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Sweden, and Mr. Speranza, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. We are grateful to them for their participation in our opening meeting and for the interest their Governments have thus shown in our work. Mrs. Thorsson is, of course, as head of the Swedish delegation in the Committee, a member of our "family".

I should also like to welcome our new colleagues, Ambassador El Reedy, the representative of Egypt, Ambassador Ahmad, the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Malita, the representative of Romania and Ambassador Nzengeya, the representative of Zaire.

We are also happy to see here at the opening of our session Mr. Martenson, Director of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

Lastly, it is a pleasure to have among us here Mr. Bota and Mr. Huntzinger, Director and Assistant Director, respectively, of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the establishment of which was recently welcomed by the General Assembly.

I should like now to make a few remarks about our work for this year.

The Committee's last session, in 1980, took place against the background of a difficult international situation. A number of us at that time expressed our concern at the increase in tensions and the threats to confidence and security. The prospects for disarmament were thereby affected, for they cannot be dissociated from the political situation in general.

(The Chairman)

We nevertheless all recognized that the very risks inherent in that situation should prompt us to seek ways of restoring confidence and security, and consequently to pursue, wherever possible, the goal of disarmament.

The Committee thus, albeit tardily, began last year to tackle its basic tasks. Certain results, modest, but not negligible, were achieved by the working groups we set up.

The political climate in which we are opening our third session is scarcely different from the one prevailing at the same time last year. There are even new causes for concern. Nevertheless, as in 1980, we should not allow the difficulties of the present situation to deter us from making efforts to achieve disarmament.

The success of these efforts will, of course, depend to a very large extent on a return to better conditions in international relations.

The task before us this year is of particular importance for the disarmament effort under the aegis of the United Nations. What we must do, in fact, is, by making real progress, to help maintain the impetus given by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, and in that way to create the conditions for the success of its second special session. That success will depend for the most part on the results achieved by the Committee on Disarmament, which is the negotiating body and consequently the keystone of the system established in 1978.

The outcome of all this for us is clear, it seems to me. We should devote ourselves to our real task without delay and to that end fashion the necessary working tools as quickly as possible. The spirit of co-operation that should guide all of us and the experience we have already acquired should help us this year to achieve better results. We shall then be able to make the contribution which the community of nations expects from us in the search for progress towards a world system of security more acceptable to all.

Ambassador Jaipal, personal representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, will now read out the message sent to us by the Secretary-General. I give him the floor.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): The following is the message from the Secretary-General to the Committee on Disarmament at the opening of its 1981 session:

"The Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work at a time of strain and uncertainty in international relations. In my message to the Committee last year, I noted disturbing trends in the international situation and expressed the hope that they would not affect ongoing negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament. I am glad that despite these trends, the Committee was able to make some progress through its subsidiary bodies on important substantive questions on its agenda.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

"But it also has to be acknowledged that the goal of disarmament remains as elusive as ever. While discussions and negotiations continue in various fora, armament expenditures are increasing at an alarming rate and have now risen to 500 billion dollars per year. Never before has so much money been spent on military pursuits.

"The tense situation that prevails in the world is reflected in and indeed contributes to the accelerating spiral of military expenditure. What we need now are co-operative endeavours by all nations, and in particular the major military powers, to enter into serious negotiations based upon concrete proposals in order to reach genuine disarmament agreements.

"In recent months, the deliberative process relating to disarmament has been strengthened by two events: the decision to convene a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. It is my sincere hope that the detailed programme for this decade, which contains goals, principles and activities, will be speedily implemented.

"Important as these steps are in the deliberative sphere, they cannot but highlight the expectation for results in the negotiating process. Parallel progress at the deliberative and negotiating levels is essential to avoid a gap which would otherwise adversely affect the functioning of the machinery established at the first special session.

"There is one specific area, namely, nuclear issues, which deserves priority attention, as has been underlined by the adoption of many resolutions on this subject by the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. Two measures, already recognized as essential in the Final Document of the first special session, are of paramount importance: a nuclear test ban and nuclear disarmament. With all the nuclear powers represented in the Committee on Disarmament, the world now looks to this forum to chart the course towards substantive negotiations on these complex issues.

"It has often been stressed that in a nuclear war there can be no winners, but only losers. As we now enter the Second Disarmament Decade, there is real need to prove that we are seriously addressing ourselves to the most pressing problems on the disarmament agenda. While the long history of disarmament negotiations has been uneven and sporadic, the arms race has been rapid and incessant. Rather than being discouraged by this development, it should compel us to break the vicious circle of increasing tension and intensification of the nuclear arms race.

"I extend to the Committee my best wishes for a successful 1981 session."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Jaipal for the text he has just read out to us and I should be grateful if he would kindly convey to the Secretary-General our warm gratitude for the important message he kindly addressed to the Committee.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): My delegation considers it fortunate both for the Committee on Disarmament and for all its members that through the rotation of the office in accordance with the rules of procedure, it fell to France to assume the Chairmanship of the Committee during this month of February that has just begun.

This means that, during the initial phase of our so-called "spring session", which is always a most difficult and complex one, we have someone like yourself to guide our work -- a person who can rightly pride himself on being one of the pioneers who have contributed most to the tasks already accomplished by the Committee, such as the drafting of its rules of procedure, the formulation of the so-called "decatalogue" and of the agendas of the last two years, and the establishment, in March 1980, of four ad hoc working groups.

We must also say that in you, Ambassador de la Gorce, we find not only the professional competence and experience you have already so often demonstrated, but also many other qualities that are rarely found together in the same person, such as intelligence, sense of humour, receptivity towards the views of others, modesty and affability.

Since all these qualities, like the two which I first mentioned, are invaluable for the work of directing and guiding the discussions of a negotiating body like this one, it will be readily understood why we consider ourselves fortunate in seeing you in the post which from today onwards you will occupy during the entire first month of the third session of the Committee on Disarmament, and why it is a source of particular pleasure to us to offer you unreservedly the co-operation of the delegation of Mexico in the discharge of your important functions.

Before concluding this brief introduction I should like to express my delegation's gratitude and congratulations to the distinguished representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Terrefe, for his able and at the same time discreet exercise of the Chairmanship of the Committee during his period of office.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, my delegation wishes to echo the words of welcome you addressed both to the distinguished representatives who have just joined the Committee and to the eminent members of the United Nations Secretariat who are with us today.

Mr. Chairman, the year which is now beginning is the first since the unanimous approval by the General Assembly, in December last, of the resolution declaring the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. It is also the third year of work of the Committee on Disarmament since this "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum"

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was constituted at the special session of the General Assembly in 1978. Both facts, it seems to us, should act as a powerful incentive to us to ensure that our deliberations in 1981 do not resemble those of the two previous years, during which -- we have to admit -- the progress achieved with regard to the substantive aspects of the items on our agenda has been insignificant.

We also believe that it would be desirable to keep well in mind the conclusions to be drawn from the following three events which have occurred during the period since last year's session was concluded on 9 August 1980 and which may usefully be recalled here:

1. The Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was held in this very city of Geneva from 11 August to 7 September 1980. As my delegation pointed out at the closing meeting, the failure of that Conference held clear lessons which should be pondered by the nuclear Powers if they are concerned with the fate of the Treaty and wish to help strengthen it and enable it one day to secure universal adherence. Among those lessons the very first is the obvious need to adopt concrete and effective measures to bring about without delay the "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date", as stated in article VI of the Treaty. The States members of the Group of 77 which took part in the Review Conference pointed this out in an irrefutable manner, declaring in the working paper they submitted on 26 August 1980:

"Instead of cessation there has been an intensification of the nuclear arms race. Thus between 1970 and 1980 the total of nuclear warheads in the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union has almost tripled, jumping from 5,800 to 16,000. Likewise, world military expenditure during the same period has increased from 180 thousand million dollars to 500 thousand million dollars. New technological developments have occurred in the military field. New generations of nuclear weapons have been developed and deployed at a faster rate. Increasing deployment of new nuclear weapons in the territories of non-nuclear weapon States and in the oceans has taken place.

"An alarming trend has also developed lately favouring a so-called 'new strategy' for the use of nuclear weapons, based on the theory of a limited nuclear war which could be won by one of the parties in conflict. Such a theory is doubtless illusory, but it does involve the very real danger of making 'thinkable' and bringing closer the hypothesis of a nuclear world war, which according to the General Assembly may well mean the end of the human species."

2. The publication, in October 1980, of a report by the Armed Services Committee of the United States Senate which provided the most conclusive proof of how relative and uncertain is man's control over nuclear weapons and the carriers of these terrible instruments of mass destruction. This report in fact, with the unimpeachable authority lent it by its source, states that in a period of 18 months the North American Air Defense Command recorded 147 nuclear false alarms which were

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sufficiently serious to require an evaluation as to whether or not they represented a potential attack, in addition to four other alarms which had been much more serious and had resulted in orders being given to B-52 bomber crews and intercontinental ballistic missile units to be ready to go into action.

3. The adoption by the United Nations General Assembly, at its ~~thirty-fifth~~ session, of no fewer than 42 resolutions relating to disarmament questions. It would be inappropriate to attempt to analyse today the content of so many resolutions. We should risk being unable to see the wood for the trees. I shall therefore confine myself to a rapid review of some of them, beginning with the six which I shall enumerate, whose provisions, although intended, with one exception, for implementation outside the framework of the Committee on Disarmament could perhaps serve, as it were, as a backdrop and in some respects as an inspiration for the deliberations of this negotiating body.

The most important of these resolutions is, without doubt, resolution 35/156 K on the SALT negotiations which was adopted by consensus and whose significance it would, I think, be difficult to exaggerate. In this resolution the General Assembly recalled or reaffirmed previous resolutions on the subject; urged the two signatory States of the SALT II Treaty not to delay any further the implementation of the procedure provided for in article XIX of the Treaty for its entry into force, taking particularly into account that "not only their national interests but also the vital interests of all the peoples are at stake in this question"; expressed its confidence that, pending the entry into force of the Treaty, the signatory States, in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, "will refrain from any act which would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty"; reiterated its satisfaction at the agreement reached in the joint statement of principles and basic guidelines, signed the same day as the Treaty, 18 June 1979, to the effect that both parties would continue "in accordance with the principle of equality and equal security", to pursue negotiations on measures for the further limitation and reduction in the number of strategic arms, as well as for their further qualitative limitation; invited the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to "keep the General Assembly appropriately informed of the results of their negotiations, in conformity with the provisions of paragraphs 27 and 114 of the Final Document" of the first special session devoted to disarmament, and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled "Strategic arms limitation talks".

In second place I wish to mention resolution 35/143, which was adopted by 130 votes to none, both because the Government of Mexico has the privilege of acting as depositary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, Additional Protocol I of which forms the subject of the resolution, and also because of the importance the Committee on Disarmament has always attached to everything relating to the only nuclear-free zone existing which covers densely populated territories, as is the case with the Latin American zone. In this resolution, the General Assembly, after recalling with

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satisfaction that the United Kingdom and the Kingdom of the Netherlands had become parties to Additional Protocol I in 1969 and 1971 respectively, expressed regret that the signature of the Protocol by the United States and by France, which the General Assembly had duly noted with satisfaction and which had taken place on 26 May 1977 and 2 March 1979 respectively, had "not yet been followed by the corresponding ratifications, notwithstanding the time already elapsed and the invitations that the Assembly has addressed to them", invitations which were reiterated "with special urgency" in the resolution from which I am quoting, whose implementation in practice by those for whom it was intended is to be examined by the General Assembly at its next session.

Another resolution on a similar theme is resolution 35/147, on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, the adoption of which offered the encouraging novelty that, for the first time in the succession of years during which the subject has been under consideration, it took place by consensus. The content of the resolution is almost identical with that of the resolutions adopted at the thirty-third and thirty-fourth sessions, and in it the General Assembly, inter alia, urged all parties directly concerned "seriously to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish" the zone in question, and reaffirmed again its recommendation to the nuclear-weapon States "to refrain from any action contrary to the spirit and purpose" of the resolution.

Undoubtedly, resolution 35/47 also deserves to appear on this short list; in it the General Assembly unanimously decided to establish a preparatory committee for its second special session devoted to disarmament which, in accordance with what was decided in December 1978, will be held in the spring of 1982; defined the functions of the Committee and took the opportunity to reaffirm the "validity of the Final Document" of its first special session devoted to disarmament and its "conviction that disarmament remains one of the essential objectives of the United Nations"; expressed its concern over "the continuation of the arms race, which aggravates international peace and security and also diverts vast resources urgently needed for economic and social development", and reiterated its "conviction that peace can be secured through the implementation of disarmament measures, particularly of nuclear disarmament, conducive to the realization of the final objective, namely, general and complete disarmament under effective international control".

Resolution 35/152 I, which was adopted by 132 votes to none, is another which in spite of its apparent modesty, has more than sufficient merits to qualify for inclusion in this list, however strict the criterion of selection applied. The object of this resolution is in fact to contribute to the implementation of that very important task which was described in the Final Document as the mobilization of world public opinion on behalf of disarmament. To that end the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with the assistance of a small group of experts, to carry out a study on the "organization and financing of a world

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disarmament campaign under the auspices of the United Nations", a study which is to be examined by the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

Lastly, resolution 35/156 F which the Assembly adopted by 126 votes to none, also incontrovertibly merits inclusion among those falling within the category I mentioned earlier. It may be recalled that this resolution refers to the report of the Secretary-General, prepared and unanimously approved by a group of 12 experts, all of differing nationalities, which contains a "comprehensive study on nuclear weapons". In the resolution, the General Assembly declared that the report was "a highly significant statement on present nuclear arsenals, the trends in their technological development and the effects of their use, as well as on the various doctrines of deterrence and the security implications of the continued quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear-weapon systems".

Although the requests and recommendations of the General Assembly in this resolution are aimed principally at ensuring the widest possible dissemination of the report in as many languages as possible, for which purpose it seeks the co-operation of the Secretary-General, all governments, the specialized agencies and national and international non-governmental organizations, nevertheless there is one paragraph in it which is specifically addressed to the Committee on Disarmament in which it is recommended to "take the report and its conclusions into account in its efforts towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in particular in the field of nuclear disarmament".

The paragraph I have just quoted and to which I referred earlier, is the only one in the six resolutions that I have very briefly reviewed in which there is a reference to the Committee on Disarmament, since, as I also noted earlier, these resolutions were intended for implementation outside the framework of the Committee.

If we now turn to consider the resolutions which -- in the words used each year by the Secretary-General -- "entrust specific responsibilities to the Committee on Disarmament", it seems to me desirable to divide them into two categories, the first consisting of those which refer to the four items on the Committee's agenda which were dealt with in 1980 by the four ad hoc working groups, and the second consisting of those referring to the two other items on the Committee's agenda in respect of which repeated efforts to set up two further working groups proved fruitless.

With regard to the resolutions in the first category, which include both the resolution on the Second Disarmament Decade, which refers to all the items mentioned, and a number of specific resolutions, it is sufficient, I think, to say that not only is there nothing in any of them which might be interpreted as being incompatible with the conclusions contained in the reports of the four ad hoc working groups, all of which were approved by the Committee in accordance with the consensus rule, but, rather on the contrary, they contain provisions whose effect cannot be other than to reinforce those conclusions.

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There is thus reason to affirm, without fear of contradiction, that the aforesaid conclusions should serve as a guide for the decisions which the Committee ought speedily to adopt. This means that, as is set out in the reports of the working groups, which form an integral part of the Committee's report for 1980:

1. As regards the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was given not an annual mandate but one which covers also at least the year 1981, it is "essential", as is stated in its report for 1980, that it should be enabled "to resume its work immediately" upon the commencement of the present session, which we are inaugurating today.
2. With regard to the two ad hoc working groups which were concerned with chemical and radiological weapons respectively, both were established by the Committee "for the duration of its 1980 session". What must be done without delay, therefore, in accordance with the conclusions which were approved by consensus, is to establish in both cases new working groups with the mandates that the Committee may deem appropriate.
3. Lastly, as regards the ad hoc working group on the subject usually referred to as "negative guarantees", which, like the two working groups I have just mentioned, was established by the Committee "for the duration of its 1980 session", it may be said that although the Group's final recommendations do not include any which would expressly require the establishment of a new working group in 1981, it would seem that the recommendation it made to the Committee "to continue to negotiate at the beginning of its 1981 session with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements" in that connection, should be interpreted as meaning that the Group was in favour of such a line of action, which is, moreover, in harmony with the tenor of the two resolutions recently adopted on the subject by the General Assembly -- resolutions 35/154 and 35/155 -- which explicitly mention the report of the Working Group. If this interpretation is accepted as valid, the Committee should proceed in this case in the same way as with the two groups I mentioned earlier.

The situation is different in the case of the second category of resolutions to which I referred a moment ago, namely, those that deal with the cessation of all nuclear weapons testing and those that deal with nuclear disarmament in general, **since** it has not so far been possible to set up ad hoc working groups for those subjects. Consequently, and in order to deal with two questions to which the General Assembly has accorded as a matter of principle the highest priority, I shall examine at greater length the relevant resolutions of the thirty-fifth session, including also a brief survey of the main background of these matters in the Committee on Disarmament.

In December last the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on the first of the two subjects which I have just mentioned, that of the cessation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons. Whatever may be the differences on some points between these two resolutions -- 35/145 A and 35/145 B -- they entirely coincide as regards the need for the Committee on Disarmament to proceed to the immediate establishment of an ad hoc working group which should begin without delay, as a question of the highest priority, the multilateral negotiation of a treaty to achieve this objective.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The first resolution, after reaffirming the Assembly's conviction that such a treaty "is a matter of the highest priority and constitutes a vital element for the success of efforts to prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and a contribution to nuclear disarmament", in its paragraph 4 urges "all States members of the Committee on Disarmament" to "support the creation by the Committee, upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981, of an ad hoc working group which should begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests".

The second resolution, in its paragraph 5, requests "the Committee on Disarmament to take the necessary steps, including the establishment of a working group, to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its session to be held in 1981".

The United Nations General Assembly thus supported in an unmistakable manner the proposal which, as early as February 1980, was submitted formally by the Group of 21 of the Committee on Disarmament in its working document CD/64, and which it subsequently reiterated and amplified in working documents CD/72 of 4 March 1980 and CD/134 of 6 August 1980, in the second of which there appears the following paragraph which is basically identical with the decisions of the General Assembly that I have just quoted:

"The Group of 21 expresses the hope that a working group on the complete cessation of nuclear weapon testing in all environments will be set up without any further delay and undertake substantive negotiations at the beginning of the Committee's 1981 spring session".

Bearing in mind what I have just recalled, together with the fact that, as they reiterated expressly in working paper CD/135 of 7 August 1980, the group of socialist States "supported the proposal of the Group of 21 for the creation of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament to discuss questions of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", as well as the fact that more than one of the States in the group known as the Western group and other States have also in the past expressed their sympathy for such a move, it would appear that there are good reasons for being confident that finally, during this first phase of the 1981 session, the Committee on Disarmament will decide to lend an ear to what can truly be described as a universal cry of impatience.

To give you a general idea of the many reasons which make this step so necessary, and in order that you may well understand how long ago such a decision should have been taken, I shall simply recall here the main provisions of the preamble to resolution 35/145 A, the draft of which I myself had the honour of presenting to the First Committee of the General Assembly on behalf of its co-sponsors, the delegations of Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico.

In that resolution, the General Assembly began by emphasizing three things: that the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests is a question that has been under consideration for more than a quarter of a century and over 40 resolutions have been adopted on the subject; that the cessation of tests is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, the attainment of which it has repeatedly requested should be given the highest priority, and that on

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seven different occasions the General Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms, having since 1974 stated its conviction that "the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing will intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war".

It then reiterated the categoric assertion made in several previous resolutions that "whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of an agreement on a comprehensive test-ban".

It then recalled that since 1972 the Secretary-General of the United Nations has declared that "all the technical and scientific aspects of the problem have been so fully explored that only a political decision is now necessary in order to achieve final agreement"; that "when the existing means of verification are taken into account, it is difficult to understand further delay in achieving agreement on an underground test ban", and that "the potential risks of continuing underground nuclear-weapon tests would far outweigh any possible risks from ending such tests".

Lest anyone should think that the Secretary-General might have changed his mind in the time that had elapsed since he first expressed those views, the General Assembly took good care to recall also that the Secretary-General himself, in his foreword to the United Nations report on a comprehensive nuclear test ban (which was distributed to the Committee on Disarmament in document CD/86 on 24 March 1980) had reiterated with special emphasis the opinion he expressed nine years ago and, after specifically referring to it, had added, "I still hold that belief. The problem can and should be solved now".

Following up the reference to that report, the General Assembly pointed out that it had been prepared in compliance with an express decision by itself and that the experts who had drafted it had emphasized that "non-nuclear-weapon States in general have come to regard the achievement of a comprehensive test ban as a litmus test of the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to halt the arms race, adding that verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement".

The last paragraph of the preamble of resolution 35/145 A, which I have been quoting, draws particular attention to a fact that there is a tendency at times to forget, the fact that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, undertook in that Treaty, almost 20 years ago, to seek the achievement of "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and that such an undertaking was explicitly reiterated in 1968 in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

These, briefly, are some of the main reasons why it is imperative that an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament should be set up at once to begin the multilateral negotiation of a treaty for the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The arguments in favour of setting up another ad hoc working group to deal with the subject which in the Committee's agendas for 1979 and 1980 was entitled "cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament" are equally clear and convincing.

Suffice it to recall in this connection that the first of all the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, resolution 1 (I), which was adopted unanimously on 24 January 1946 by the 51 Members making up the General Assembly at that time, concerned the establishment of a commission one of whose principal tasks it should be to make specific proposals "for the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons", and that 32 years later, at its first special session devoted to disarmament, that same General Assembly, after solemnly declaring that "effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority", made this unequivocal statement:

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

Nearly two years ago, on 19 April 1979, at the Committee's twenty-eighth meeting, my delegation gave the reasons why it seemed to it "unthinkable" that an attempt might be made to prevent the Committee on Disarmament from "fulfilling its duty concerning what has been said and repeated over and over again, that the disarmament which should have top priority is nuclear disarmament".

Last year, on two separate occasions -- at the 80th meeting, held on 22 April, and at the 87th meeting, held on 26 June -- I explained and amplified the reasons why it seemed to us -- and it still seems to us -- that "it would be difficult to find a body more suited to deal with a matter which, as has been stressed in so many international documents, is of 'vital interest' to all peoples", than this Committee which, as you well know, was declared by the United Nations to be the "single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum".

At the second of the two meetings I mentioned, the one held on 26 June 1980, after recalling that the Group of 21 had stated on 27 February that it supported in principle the establishment of working groups on the items on the Committee's annual agenda, my delegation gave clear expression to its views on this subject in the following words:

"It is greatly to be hoped that that positive statement may be given practical application before the end of the Committee's current session, in the matter of negotiations on the cessation of the uncontrolled nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, on which -- we should always remember -- nothing less than the fate of mankind depends."

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As we all know, it did not prove possible for these hopes to be fulfilled during our last session, despite the fact that the Group of 21, in its working paper CD/116 of 9 July 1980, formally proposed the setting up of an ad hoc working group to begin negotiations immediately on this subject, in the course of which it should take up various issues, including, in the first instance, the following:

"The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including identification of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of achieving nuclear disarmament".

As in the case of the question of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, the General Assembly has fully supported the initiatives to which I have just referred, and it has done so, again, not in one resolution but in two different resolutions -- 35/152 C, which was based on a draft sponsored by 13 countries of the Group of 21, among them Mexico, and 35/152 D, the draft text of which was submitted by the socialist countries. These two resolutions, in spite of their differences, are identical in seeking the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question too, although the first of them does so in stronger terms than the second, for in its paragraph 1 the General Assembly "urges the Committee on Disarmament" to establish the aforesaid ad hoc working group "upon initiation of its session to be held in 1981".

We therefore hope that the Committee may be able in respect of this matter also to respond to the evident yearnings of mankind, and that two new ad hoc working groups will be set up at the very beginning of the present session.

Clearly, although we are at one with the Group of 21 in believing that ad hoc working groups are "the best available machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament", we nevertheless do not believe that such groups have magical powers. In order to attain the results the peoples of the world hope for from the Committee, there will be a need for that rare element that it is customary to call "political will" and in particular the political will of the nuclear Powers. It will be necessary to convert into substantial realities the powerful exhortations that fill the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, following the advice contained in the Document itself that the pressing need now is to translate its provisions into practical terms and "to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament".

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

This course of action is becoming more and more imperative every day because, in the words used by the General Assembly at its special session, "the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race" pose such a threat to the "very survival of mankind" that mankind is confronted with a choice: "we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

We ought therefore to bear constantly in mind that, as Mr. José López Portillo, the President of Mexico, said last week in one of the speeches he made during his recent visit to India:

"During the last quarter of a century the arms race has reached a level without historical precedent both as regards the quantity and as regards the degree of sophistication of the instruments of war in use, in reserve, in production and under development.

"The fabulous cost of this arms race is consuming resources essential for subsistence and development. This squandering of resources on warlike purposes generates new tensions and exacerbates those already existing, closing the vicious circle between inequality and poverty and the arms race and war.

"All peoples who are for peace and law must endeavour to reduce the tensions and reject the pressures which are impelling us towards a new cold war."

Clearly, no one has fuller information or a better basis for judgement than the heads of State of the nuclear Powers. It is all the more to be regretted, therefore, that these men should generally have refrained from the public expression of some of their most important views until the moment at which they lay down or were on the point of laying down their high office. Thus, for example, few opinions have been more authoritative than the oft-quoted advice that President Eisenhower gave to his fellow countrymen in his farewell speech when he warned them against the "acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex", and of the "danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite".

Something similar, we believe, will happen in the case of the following analysis, made barely three weeks ago in another farewell address, that of President Carter, who was the thirty-ninth head of State of the United States. After recalling that 35 years had passed since the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima and that since then the nuclear shadow had hung constantly over the world, he said:

"Our minds have adjusted to it, as after a time our eyes adjust to the dark.

"Yet the risk of a nuclear conflagration has not lessened. It has not happened yet, but that can give us little comfort -- for it only has to happen once.

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"The danger is becoming greater. As the arsenals of the superpowers grow in size and sophistication and as other governments acquire these weapons, it may only be a matter of time before madness, desperation, greed or miscalculation lets loose this terrible force".

We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should not delay in adopting effective measures to initiate negotiations on nuclear disarmament that would bring about the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the gradual attainment of the specific goals set forth in paragraph 50 of the Final Document.

At one point in this statement, I spoke of what I called a "universal cry of impatience". If we continue indefinitely postponing the accomplishment of the priority tasks for which the Committee was set up, this cry will become a "universal cry of indignation" since what is at stake -- I will repeat it for the nth time -- are the vital interests of all peoples and the very fate of mankind. As the General Assembly expressly recommended us to do in one of its resolutions to which I have referred today, we ought this year very much to bear in mind the conclusions of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons of which, to close this statement, I should like to quote the three following:

"In order to claim that it is possible to continue, forever, to live with nuclear weapons, the balance must be maintained at all times irrespective of any technological challenges that may present themselves as a result of the arms race. In addition, there must be no accidents of a human or technical nature, which is an impossible requirement as shown by the various incidents of false alarms and computer malfunctioning that are reported from time to time. Sooner or later one of these incidents may give rise to a real accident with untold consequences. For these and other reasons it is not possible to offer a blanket guarantee of eternal stability of the deterrence balance and no one should be permitted to issue calming declarations to this effect...

"Even if the balance of deterrence was an entirely stable phenomenon, there are strong moral and political arguments against a continued reliance on this balance. It is inadmissible that the prospect of the annihilation of human civilization is used by some States to promote their security. The future of mankind is then made hostage to the perceived security of a few nuclear-weapon States and most notably that of the two super-Powers. It is furthermore not acceptable to establish, for the indefinite future, a world system of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. This very system carries within it the seed of nuclear-weapon proliferation. In the long run, therefore, it is a system that contains the origins of its own destruction...

"So long as reliance continues to be placed upon the concept of the balance of nuclear deterrence as a method for maintaining peace, the prospects for the future will always remain dark, menacing and as uncertain as the fragile assumptions upon which they are based. Fortunately this is not the only alternative that is available to mankind... The Charter of the United Nations and nuclear weapons date their existence from the same time. The future road should point to a full reliance on the Charter and to the elimination of all nuclear weapons."

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador García Robles for his statement and I should also like to thank him for the very kind - indeed too kind - words he addressed to the Chair.

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): When today we start the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament, we have to look back on two consecutive years -- the first two years of the Committee's existence -- of failure to achieve real results in our work. And we ought therefore to tell ourselves in all sincerity that our main task now, two and a half years after the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, and only one and a half years before the convening of the second special session on disarmament, must be to analyse the reasons behind these failures and to try to find new approaches in order to achieve genuine progress in our efforts.

True, last year the CD managed to establish working groups in four areas of our activities. Sweden is participating -- and will continue to do so actively in the year to come -- in the endeavours of these working groups. But it is essential to the true purpose of these endeavours to be realistic in the assessment of what can be achieved in relation to the request for negotiations, with particular emphasis on two high-priority areas, that is, a CTBT and a CW convention, directed to us by the United Nations General Assembly.

I shall not now try to make such an assessment. A more appropriate time for that will come later. My point in this early part of my statement is really that these two high-priority areas must be, and remain, the centre of our attention and our efforts in the time remaining to us up to the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. They will also be the subject of the main part of my statement today.

Mr. Chairman, I should like, before continuing, to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chairmanship of the Committee during the first part of this very important session. The competence you have demonstrated in the Committee during the past two years bears witness to the wealth of experience you have had in the sphere of international relations as the representative of a great nation. I am sure that your skill as Chairman will help make our negotiations fruitful.

Allow me, now, for a while to continue with some general observations on our work before I turn to my main subjects.

The agenda of the CD during its 1981 session looks like being a very full one. There is even a risk that it will become overloaded. It is my opinion that for this session and also for later ones we must set strict priorities and elaborate a workable, perhaps pluriannual, programme of work, lest we get bogged down in too many issues in too many working groups at one and the same time. This would not help us to achieve results, so urgently, so desperately needed. We realize of course the interest which various delegations attach to various disarmament items but we feel nevertheless, and quite strongly, that the Committee must concentrate on its negotiating role on a strictly selected number of items, namely, the ones given the highest priority by the United Nations General Assembly when it referred these items to us for negotiations -- a CTBT and a chemical weapons convention, as well as a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the elaboration of which the CD has been asked to complete before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We fear that otherwise the Committee's reputation will suffer and that

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it and its members will be the object of harsh criticism, not least at the 1982 special session on disarmament. Mr. Chairman, I emphasized the word negotiations, as the CD is the multilateral negotiating body, and as the two superpowers have participated in the decision to create the CD for that purpose. I shall return to this issue towards the end of my statement.

Continuing developments in the nuclear field underline the need urgently to conclude a CTBT, which the world has been promised for so long. We all know the argument, and we have repeated it until we are almost sick of it, that this is a necessity in order to prevent or, at least render more difficult, the acquisition of nuclear explosive capability or the further improvement of already existing capabilities. In spite of that, the superpowers challenge their own legally binding commitment to a CTBT, in an almost demonstrative way. This will not do any more.

The difficulties, to use a mild word, of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT -- of specific significance to the work of the CD although not formally a matter for its consideration -- demonstrated what I would call a myopic and dangerous disability -- or perhaps a lack of will -- to come to grips with the problem of the proliferation of nuclear arms. The non-proliferation régime has become bogged down in contradictory policies within and between States and groups of States. Whereas the NPT, with all its shortcomings in letter and implementation, will hopefully continue to receive the strong backing of its some 115 Parties, it seems obvious that the real challenge to the non-proliferation régime outside, and perhaps also within the Treaty, become more acute with every day. Obviously, if these threats are not checked much more forcefully and consistently, the relevance of the Treaty risks to suffer. Its lifetime, without prolongation, is 25 years, so by that standard, it has already reached maturity. It is, therefore, probably none too soon to start considering the future. Rather than attempting to elaborate new treaties, however, we should try to build on what exists in order to find a new consensus, both in relation to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and in relation to the reduction and abolition of nuclear weapons.

It is probable that the considerable technological, environmental, safety and economic problems encountered by nuclear energy could take some of the heat out of the controversies surrounding nuclear co-operation among States. Further practical efforts to this effect are also under way in the IAEA and in the preparations for the 1983 Nuclear Energy Conference to be held in Belgrade. Such multilateral work, combined with certain bilateral agreements, could go some way towards defusing the peaceful co-operation aspect of the problem, at least for the majority of States, through the establishment of a workable balance between non-proliferation endeavours and co-operation commitments.

There seem to be cases, however, where the allure of nuclear weapons takes precedence over any interest in peaceful nuclear co-operation, where, indeed, the interest in developing a peaceful nuclear industry seems secondary to the interest in achieving a nuclear explosive capacity. In such cases all efforts must be made to discourage States from choosing the dead-end road of acquiring nuclear weapons.

It must be demonstrated that the nuclear weapons mystique, the notion that a nuclear weapon can in any way increase the national security of any State, is a fraud -- what I have earlier called "the greatest fallacy of our time" which, far from increasing anybody's security, is certain to reduce it for all.

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Here, of course, the nuclear Powers are requested to recognize their particular responsibility to set an example. There is, regrettably, little sign that such a recognition is forthcoming. It would indeed be more accurate to term the performance of the superpowers in this respect a study in irresponsibility.

Let me take two examples.

Dramatic revelations have been made recently concerning the alarm and nuclear weapons safeguards system of one superpower.

According to a United States Congressional report in October 1980 there were, in an 18-month period, 147 false alarms that were serious enough to require an evaluation of whether they represented a potential nuclear weapon attack.

Four other alarms, including two that had not been disclosed previously, were considered even more serious and resulted in orders that increased the state of alert of B-52 bomber crews and intercontinental ballistic missile units.

Finally, there were also 3,703 lesser alarms, primarily caused by atmospheric disruptions, or to use a simpler expression, thunderstorms and lightning. Mr. Chairman, I believe that such "atmospheric disruptions" will continue to occur around the systems of surveillance. Should human survival be dependent on natural phenomena and technological or human failures of this kind? And how could nuclear weapon States face that responsibility?

From another recent report, also quoted in the United States press, we learn that at least 27 accidents, so-called Broken Arrows, have occurred involving United States nuclear weapons. One of them is reported to have left only one out of six control mechanisms intact to prevent the explosion of a 24-megaton nuclear weapon, 1,800 times stronger than the 1945 Hiroshima bomb, over United States territory. It has further been alleged, in the same context, that 10 further accidents occurred in the territories of other States.

In addition to all this, there is increased alarm over late increases in leukemia as a result of exposure to nuclear weapons testing in the United States in the 1950s.

Some of the cases may be overstated or tendentious and, as always, there is no information of a similar nature from the other side. There is, however, little reason to believe that the same false alarms, accidents and exposures are not occurring there, too, as well as, in a more limited way, in the other nuclear weapon States.

But a weapon which causes such dangers to a country's own population and other populations even in peace-time should clearly be declared unacceptable already on such grounds, not to talk about its impossible consequences for everybody if used in wartime. There is much concern about the environmental and other hazards of nuclear power. Perhaps recent revelations will help to bring home to everybody that the peacetime dangers of nuclear weapons also are too grave to contemplate.

We shall probably be told that such alarmist talk is completely unfounded. Management and control routines will be improved, and so on and so forth. But the basic fact remains that we are talking about a weapon which can, in a matter of minutes, reach every corner of the globe, a weapon a few of which can, in a matter of seconds, extinguish civilization as we know it. Such weapons cannot ever be safely managed and controlled; they must simply be abolished.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

But instead of choosing a joint path of responsibility and reason the superpowers and, to some extent, the lesser nuclear Powers seem bent on pursuing the course of mutual and general annihilation.

Already last year SALT II was in trouble for a variety of internal and external reasons. To assess its fate today is all but impossible. Strong voices have been raised recently to have these eight years of negotiations shelved in another vain attempt at achieving that elusive, yes, impossible, nuclear superiority instead of a possible parity or equivalence of forces. New weapons systems, projects of a complexity and cost beyond imagination but of doubtful military benefit, are already far advanced and ready to be implemented. The era of mobile ICBMs and new ABMs, ground- or space-based, would not be far away if this new round of arms competition is allowed to get under way. There are few experts who do not see a grave threat to stability in such policies. If there has been any constant feature of the nuclear age it has been that action provokes counteraction ad infinitum or until such time as the weapons come to be used.

We therefore today request the superpowers to stop a further futile round in the armaments race, to find a way finally to complete the laboriously negotiated SALT II agreement and to move from there to negotiations to further reduce the level of nuclear arms.

Preparatory talks to this effect started last October in relation to theatre nuclear weapons in Europe. However much there is an opportunity here which must not be lost, serious doubts seem indicated. Already more than a year has passed since the NATO decision to continue the qualitative arms race in developing 572 Pershing IIs and cruise missiles, something which is euphemistically called "modernization". Their deployment, although apparently somewhat delayed, is getting closer. The Soviet SS-20 programme, preceding the NATO decision and being an expression of the same trend, is already far advanced. At the pace negotiations are moving, there is every likelihood that they will never become much more than a fig-leaf for failure and will result, if at all, in an agreement which does little but ratify the military dispositions already taken -- and which will leave Europe an even more dangerous place to live in.

It goes without saying that limitation or reduction agreements must be accompanied also by mutual restraint in the general foreign policies of the superpowers, and a strict application of all norms of international behaviour. Serious breaches of these norms in the recent past and a continued reliance on power politics have eroded the basis of confidence on which arms limitation and reduction must build.

If there is an intention, as was agreed by all, including the superpowers, at the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament, to pursue serious negotiations on nuclear matters in this Committee, there are, of course, certain things which can be done and which are long overdue. As has been stressed time and again, there is no measure which could more decisively contribute to a halting of the nuclear arms race than a CTBT adhered to by all States. It is not a total panacea but its intrinsic and symbolic importance would be very considerable.

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We have no idea of where the trilateral negotiating parties stand today on the CTB issue. But we know where they stood last summer, and that knowledge was far from reassuring. Assuming that the remaining problems of verification can be resolved -- a very uncertain assumption as they seem to have been highly politicized -- the tripartite negotiations, we are told, aim not at reaching a treaty of unlimited duration, to which these three Powers pledged themselves in Moscow in 1963 -- a pledge repeated in the tenth preambular paragraph of the NPT in 1968 -- but at an agreement of a mere three years' duration.

In the General Assembly's First Committee last autumn, I stated my doubts about such a limited treaty. It would probably remain limited mainly to the original three parties and would hence not promote the world-wide adherence so badly needed as an effective means to prevent horizontal proliferation. It could well stall multilateral negotiations on a CTBT "for all time" -- to use the words of the pledge made in 1963 and confirmed in 1968 -- and would consequently have a negative impact on our joint efforts within the CD to achieve and maintain an international verification system. This may all be of less concern to the tripartite States, but it is certainly unpalatable to outside non-nuclear weapons States.

In practice, a three-year CTBT would not be a treaty in the sense of the commitment made in 1963 but would amount to a moratorium on nuclear tests. When we achieve it, I think we should all consider it as such in a positive spirit. If it were agreed to accept a three-year moratorium, the remaining problems of verification between the tripartite States would not be of immediate concern and could well be solved within the moratorium period. We have, of course, been told ad nauseam that a CTBT and hence a moratorium cannot at present be adequately verified through national means only. But I think that we have been able to demonstrate satisfactorily that the likelihood of detection of clandestine nuclear testing is very high. The danger of loss of face and credibility would no doubt constitute a sufficient deterrent. We are, of course, also aware that suspicions of possible violations of existing disarmament agreements or protocols on B and C weapons have strengthened the case for adequate verification measures in relation to any agreement, including a CTBT. We are convinced, however, that the means of verification in relation to nuclear tests that exist now are fully adequate to police a three-year moratorium.

Apart from continued tripartite negotiations, that period should also be utilized to the full for intensified multilateral negotiations within this body, including in particular all aspects of the international verification system. The goal of such parallel negotiation must, of course, remain the earliest possible conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear tests in all environments and for all time.

Last year's session, and to a considerable degree also the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, were marred by the sorry procedural wrangle, which was again repeated at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, about whether to establish a working group of the CD on a CTBT. Let me only say today that I should like to take it for granted that such a group will now be set up without further delay or foot-dragging on the part of some of the nuclear Powers. Their arguments against it -- in so far as they exist -- are not convincing, and in a historic perspective their credibility in this context is very low. We must simply avoid a repetition of last year's despicable performance on

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that and other procedural issues before the Committee. I therefore formally propose the establishing of a CD working group for multilateral negotiations on a CTBT early in the 1981 session. The close links between nuclear arms restraint on the part of the superpowers, as expressed in Article VI of the NPT, a CTBT and non-proliferation are obvious. It is certainly correct in principle, as some hold, that non-proliferation is desirable and justified in its own right, since, as I have just stated, nuclear weapons do not add to anybody's security.

It is also correct that the arms race is only partly fuelled by developments in nuclear testing and mainly a function of various technological advances.

But it is nevertheless also correct, politically and morally, to stress the immense importance of a CTBT and the full implementation of Article VI of the NPT in order to promote non-proliferation and military and armaments restraints generally. Responsible action to this effect on the part of the nuclear Powers would constitute a tremendous boost in these respects. And, of course, the armaments race itself must be stopped. The problems that will face the world and the superpowers themselves in the years to come -- such as those of the environment, natural resources, food and population -- cannot be resolved through the squandering of immense funds and skills on a continued military build-up of all kinds. To change this insane course is the real challenge before the great Powers, to which we -- the small -- can only prod them with all the means at our disposal.

Again in the other high-priority area of work in the CD, second only to the CTBT, that of achieving a ban on chemical weapons, a sinister development to the contrary seems to be threatening. Things have been said, preliminary decisions have been taken lately, that seem to put in jeopardy whatever progress has been achieved during more than ten years of arduous negotiations and to make possible a new wave of chemical rearmament. This development includes reports that chemical weapons have been used in recent wars and certain military operations in various regions of the world. It also includes preliminary decisions to manufacture new generations of chemical weapons and suggestions concerning the storage of such weapons. These things together may indicate a greater implicit acceptance of the use of chemical weapons and could mean a serious erosion of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

It goes without saying that the CD will have to put whatever willpower and force that it can mobilize behind efforts to counteract such a development.

And it will have to happen now. We have the tools. So let us start working again.

In my last intervention in the CD, on 10 July 1980, I took the opportunity to welcome the fact that -- at long last -- it had been possible to start preparations for negotiations in the CD on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The Swedish delegation views the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group which was established for this purpose as so far constructive and fruitful. As reflected in the report of the CD, the discussions in the Working Group reconfirmed the general recognition of the urgent need to negotiate and elaborate a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The achievements of the Working Group prove that it is possible to pursue within the CD concrete

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

negotiations on a very important and, both technically and politically, very complicated subject. Although provided with a rather ambiguous mandate, the Working Group succeeded -- thanks to the serious approach taken by participating delegations -- in defining the areas of convergence and those where views remain to be reconciled. The performance of the Working Group has clearly demonstrated that such an Ad Hoc Working Group provides the most appropriate organizational framework for our negotiations on a CW-convention.

In General Assembly resolution 35/144 B, which was adopted by consensus, the CD is urged to continue negotiations on a multilateral CW-convention as from the beginning of its 1981 session. My delegation considers it highly important to set up now, at the very beginning of our session, an Ad Hoc Working Group in order to continue and advance the work already undertaken. Since there is general agreement on the urgent need to elaborate a truly multilateral CW-convention, we trust that agreement on an appropriate mandate can be reached without undue delay. Without committing our position in this regard, it seems to us that one possible solution would be simply to state that the Working Group shall continue negotiations on a multilateral convention on chemical weapons. A similar wording was used in the General Assembly resolution I just referred to.

The first task of the Working Group will be to organize its own work. We have an open mind to the ideas that have already been advanced by some delegations and we intend ourselves in due course to present our detailed views in this respect. At this point I would, however, like to state that our further efforts should be organized in such a manner as to avoid a repetition of the discussion of subjects where we have already reached agreement. The 1980 Ad Hoc Working Group has set the scene for further progress in 1981 and, by taking its report into full consideration, it should be possible to start our work at the point where we stopped last year.

The 1980 Working Group agreed to structure its work under three general headings, namely, "scope", "verification" and "other matters". The Swedish delegation has stated its views on all these aspects. I would, however, at this juncture like to refer briefly to the question of scope. There appears to be general agreement in the Committee that in order to achieve an effective prohibition the scope will have to be comprehensive. In the course of last year's discussion the Swedish delegation explained its understanding of a comprehensive prohibition and we introduced in that context the concept "chemical weapon capability". This concept, inter alia outlined in document CD/97, attracted considerable support in the Committee, and we feel encouraged to pursue it. Although the term as such was not acceptable to all delegations during last year's discussion, we believe that our approach is well in line with the general direction of the discussions so far undertaken. The report of the Ad Hoc Group lists some of the activities and specific items to be prohibited under a CW-convention. In order to render such a convention truly comprehensive we believe that it is highly essential that it should cover a broad range of activities which are needed for chemical warfare, including planning, organization and training to the extent that they are intended for the use of chemical weapons. A convention without a ban on such activities would not prohibit parties from organizing and planning for the establishment of military chemical warfare units and training them to use chemical weapons. The physical acquisition of chemical weapons, including chemical warfare agents, may take a comparatively short time. Such agents could in fact even be taken out of civilian industrial production of toxic chemicals.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

In order to outline its thoughts further, the Swedish delegation will shortly present another working paper on this subject. My words today should serve as an introduction to that working paper.

Mr. Chairman, this Committee should allow no-one to drag his feet in order to stop or put obstacles in the way of urgent work in this field. I urge the early continuation, at this session, of the work begun in 1980 through the establishment of a Working Group with an appropriate mandate.

I should like to link the concluding part of this statement with what I said at the beginning in elaborating some further thoughts on our present predicament.

This point in time when we open the 1981 session of the CD is marked by uncertainties and warnings.

Events have happened recently which make it even more difficult for us to see clearly ahead or to understand present realities, against the background of which we have to work and which we shall have to try to change.

This point in time witnesses new developments in the field of nuclear weapons through further and gigantic leaps forward in military technology. For at least the first part of this crucially decisive decade these are ill-boding in the extreme. We must ask ourselves if they are irreversible and, if that should be the case, where that would lead us.

Let us keep in mind that everyone in the world under the age of 45 has no, or only very vague, memories of Hiroshima and its realities. Is that one of the reasons why the recent United Nations Study on Nuclear Weapons has almost disappeared from the public debate and even from the debate on the official level? I find it of the utmost importance that the conclusions of the Study be kept intensely in the public's eye, in spite of the fact that -- or better -- more particularly because the nuclear weapons States boycotted the Expert Group that produced the report, did not participate in its work and did not provide it with the requested open material.

Fortunately, it was possible for the Expert Group to overcome the obstacles created by the nuclear weapons States and to present its conclusions based on a wealth of factual information.

From this and other sources we know that the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers are many times larger than those needed for the effective fulfilment of their declared purpose of deterrence. The technological diversification of nuclear weapons has made it more and more difficult to maintain that the so-called balance of terror is a functioning instrument for peace. The risks that the development will get out of hand are increasing. Particularly worrying is the fact that new delivery systems permit nuclear weapons "to be used" in the same way as other weapons, leading up to the ill-boding idea that a nuclear war could be fought and won. The study shows, on the contrary, that there can be no winner in a nuclear war and that its primary and secondary effects would be catastrophic for all countries of the world. The notion that a nuclear war could be kept under control is found to be unrealistic. This means in political terms that the superpowers arrogantly keep the peoples of the world hostage for what they perceive as their own security needs. But the study shows that a system based on a precarious balance of nuclear deterrence can never be a reliable long-term solution for international security.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Furthermore, in the gloomy atmosphere in which we live and work, it is at least heartening to know that groups of dedicated physicians in various countries are determined to bring to the attention of world public opinion the medical effects of a nuclear war, in other words, the unbelievable horrors of human sufferings that would follow. This indispensable knowledge should be brought home to citizens everywhere, to enable them to raise their voices in an invincible protest cry: No more Hiroshimas! And still there are wise men, in East and West, who from their desks and their computers preach the gospel of the limited nuclear war that can be fought and won. Shame on their blindness and their inhuman theories!

The realities of today show us, Mr. Chairman, that in spite of what common sense and an ordinary amount of foresight would tell those who consider themselves big and mighty, we shall in the foreseeable future witness no farewell to arms. The predictions for the early years of this decade point to a continuing arms race, a further increase in military expenditures beyond the disgusting figure of well above 500 billion dollars annually, further leaps forward in military technologies.

The new Defense Secretary in one of the superpowers said less than two weeks ago: "I am very much aware of the need to add greatly to my country's military strength."

This would lead me to the unfortunately realistic assessment that in the early 1980s, and in spite of the coming second United Nations General Assembly special session on disarmament to be held in 1982, there are limited reasons to expect a conclusion of a CTBT for all time, a cessation of the nuclear arms race, a convention banning production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, a start of a disarmament process.

And we should keep in mind that the crucial factor, time, is not on our side. The longer negotiations and agreements are delayed, the more difficult they tend to become.

We often speak about the need, even the necessity, to have an increasingly widespread public opinion engaging itself in the struggle for peace and survival. But we do not make it very easy for concerned citizens to come on speaking terms with us. The armament-disarmament debate deals with facts and figures, which understandably transcend what can easily be grasped. Who can catch the proportions of a reality where the present worldwide storage of nuclear weapons correspond to 1,300,000 Hiroshima bombs? And let us further agree that the language itself, with its tremendous power over the human mind as well as over the process of decision-making, has been corrupted by means of the frequent euphemisms which have entered the vocabulary of the armaments community, such as bonus-kills and mega-death. This has the effect of throwing dust into people's eyes. Everybody knows what a cannon or a gun is, but what is the general cognitive value, one may ask, of a mininuke or a MIRV, of Honest John or Fat Boy?

Part of this development is furthermore accounted for by the very approach to disarmament which has been adopted for practical purposes in the absence of general and complete disarmament -- the step-by-step approach. As we all know, disarmament negotiations thereby necessarily engage in highly technical matters and issues, which unfortunately tend to obscure the very purpose of the whole process. But we must always keep in mind that disarmament is too important to be left solely to experts and governments. We must be able to communicate with people in human terms in order to get their indispensable support and demand for results.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

A prerequisite for a decisive increase in public awareness of "present dangers" is, of course, that a radical change in thinking, attitudes, values, decision-making and actions should take place soon. Now, in the international debate, reference is often made to the need for a display of political will of nations and governments in order to reach results in the decades-long, gray drudgery of disarmament talks. This is without doubt correct, but by now, somewhat worn out. Because of that, another radical change is needed. What is required now is a clear expression of the political will of peoples, materializing in the action needed, to make governments mobilize their political will to move decisively towards real and genuine disarmament.

This is not sheer rhetoric, although I sometimes feel that the words we use are losing any real meaning. If, in the medium- or long-term perspective, we are going to survive the consequences of our own actions, these worn-out words must be given back their true and very concrete purport.

More than two and a half years have passed since the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament. What has happened since then? Which paragraphs of the Final Document's Action Programme have been implemented since then? Less than one year and a half remains to the second special session on disarmament. What will the CD have to report then? Real progress in the multilateral negotiations on high priority issues entrusted to us? Or nothing else but the fact that such multilateral negotiations were denied us by forces beyond our collective control?

It is high time to choose. The doomsday clock has again moved closer to twelve. Does that mean that we have shown our inability to stop what must be stopped?

Mr. Chairman, I spoke earlier in this statement of the amount of harsh criticism the second special session on disarmament will bestow upon us if we do not improve our performance. Perhaps the special session will remember Oliver Cromwell's famous shout to the Rump Parliament in 1653: "Give place to better men!" But I do hope not. I do hope that, facing what sometimes seems the impossible, we shall not give up, nor shall we give in to forces which continue to put obstacles in our way. I believe that we should all agree to make another and another and another try, to find new ways, new approaches.

This is the message that should guide us: four per cent of world military expenditures, less than fourteen days of present use of resources for military purposes, would eradicate the worst consequences of mass poverty and create a brighter future for the children of the earth.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Mrs. Thorsson for her statement and for the kind words she addressed to the Chair.

I see that we do not have time now to hear the two speakers remaining on our list for this plenary meeting. I would therefore suggest that we suspend this meeting now and resume it at 3.30 p.m.

It was so decided.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and reconvened at 3.45 p.m.

Mr. SPERANZA (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, at the beginning of the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, most of the delegations represented here noted the serious deterioration of the international situation, with its serious repercussions on the process of détente, and hence the added difficulties of successfully conducting negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

Today, one year later, it would be difficult to find any reasons for greater optimism: the occupation of Afghanistan continues and other conflicts and tensions have compounded this crisis in different parts of the world, thus providing fertile ground for the acceleration of the arms race. But although the political climate in which the Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work is not in itself favourable to our efforts, it nevertheless makes them still more necessary and urgent. The events I have just mentioned have shattered international confidence, which is the basis for any negotiations likely to be crowned with success. It is this confidence which must be restored, through conclusive actions testifying to the determination, on the part of all States, to achieve peaceful co-existence in observance of international commitments and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.

This is the task that has been undertaken by the Madrid Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, within its own geographical context. In this connection, I should like to draw attention to the initiative, in which my country is participating, aimed at defining, as part of the balanced progress of the CSCE process, the terms of a mandate for convening a Conference on Disarmament in Europe. This Conference should provide, in an initial phase, for the negotiation of confidence-building measures applicable to the whole of the European continent, from the Atlantic to the Urals. Such measures, which will have to be meaningful at the military level and mandatory, would be accompanied by provisions calculated to ensure adequate verification of the commitments made. This could pave the way for subsequent arms-control and disarmament measures.

To this same end, my country is working for the achievement of concrete results at the Vienna Conference so as to arrive at a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe, and for related measures to strengthen confidence, security and stability throughout Europe.

More generally, Italy expresses the hope that the SALT process concerning the control and limitation of the strategic weapons of the two main nuclear Powers will continue. It noted with satisfaction the opening at Geneva, last autumn, of preliminary talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the object of reducing long-range theatre nuclear forces to the lowest possible level, and reaffirms its determination to contribute to the continuation and success of those talks.

The United Nations General Assembly, whose deliberations form the basis of our work, adopted, at its thirty-fifth session, resolution 35/47 concerning the second special session devoted to disarmament, to be held in 1982. The work of this Committee

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is therefore destined to proceed with that date in mind. In view of the complexity of the task before us, 18 months will not be too long in which to create an auspicious climate for the success of the second special session.

In order to achieve this goal, all States must strive scrupulously to fulfil one prior condition, namely, to ensure that peace and security are not subjected to further attacks through the use or the threat of use of force in international relations.

The outcome of the special session will also depend on the efficiency and dispatch with which the Disarmament Committee manages to deal with the matters falling within its competence. As the only multilateral negotiating body in the disarmament field, it is, in fact, a key element in the mechanism established at the first special session. The Committee has been entrusted with prime responsibility in applying the Programme of Action contained in section III of the Final Document.

If, in 1982, the fruits of four years of discussions and work in this Committee were to be judged unsatisfactory, the very credibility of this body as well as that of the system established in 1978 to promote world disarmament, could suffer.

Any slowing-down of the momentum imparted by the first special session, and the feelings of frustration and insecurity that would inevitably ensue, might give fresh impetus to the arms race and increase the risk of conflicts.

It is bearing this prospect in mind, and having regard to the limitations it imposes with respect to time, that this Committee should, in my view, prepare itself to tackle the problems which will arise at both the procedural and the substantive levels. The criterion which must govern our work is that of continuity and gradation, in particular, by building on the basis of what has already been achieved in the past. In this way, it should be possible to resume, from the outset, constructive discussions on those agenda items for which it has already been possible to reach the stage of concrete negotiations. I refer, in particular, to questions for which four ad hoc working groups were established at the last session and have, on the whole, achieved appreciable results.

For my part, I should like to make a few comments, here and now, on some of these questions.

In the area of the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons, the substantial work accomplished last year -- of which, moreover, the General Assembly took note with satisfaction -- must constitute the point of departure for taking up the threads of the negotiations at the current session. The problems on which a consensus has emerged and those on which more or less acute divergencies still need to be removed have been identified with sufficient clarity. The Committee would

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therefore appear to be in a position fully to discharge its role, which is to negotiate a multilateral convention. The experience of last year showed that the continuation of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union -- which we would like to see rapidly concluded -- and the parallel holding of multilateral negotiations are not only not incompatible, but may prove to be mutually beneficial.

The progress made, at both the multilateral and the bilateral levels, on the crucial issue of verification, holds out hope that a positive conclusion to the talks is henceforth no longer unattainable. Italy is convinced that an efficient system of verification can be based on a number of reasonable measures acceptable to all States; the agreement to include "on-site inspections" in some cases is an important step forward in this respect.

Verification of the use to which chemical weapons may have been put is an essential aspect of the question of verification in general. Italy, aware of the need to establish, here and now, a form of international procedure, especially in a situation demanding the strengthening of mutual confidence, firmly supported resolution 35/1440 adopted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. In entrusting to the Secretary-General the task of carrying out an investigation into reports regarding the use of chemical weapons in some parts of the world, this resolution pursues the dual objective of strengthening the Geneva Protocol of 1925, by filling certain gaps, and helping to improve the climate of confidence among nations which has been seriously undermined by certain international events.

The elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is an initiative whose potential advantages have always been recognized by Italy. It would seem realistic to believe that, by resuming the negotiations begun last year at the outset of the current session, the Disarmament Committee will be able to complete its work in time for the programme to be submitted to the second special session for consideration, as requested in the relevant General Assembly resolution. The Italian delegation is ready to participate in this work, in a constructive and open-minded spirit. Its position on the various points at issue is well-known and has been set forth in the working papers that have been submitted from time to time. It rests on a number of general principles which, in our view, should be suitably reflected in the comprehensive programme: above all, respect for the fundamental right of each State to its security, which means, in the words of the Final Document, that "at each stage, the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments." The concept of security is complex and may have different meanings depending on the geostrategic situation of each State and other factors. It is essential that an effort be made to take account of these diverse interpretations and to adopt a balanced approach to the various problems -- one which respects the balance between nuclear disarmament measures and conventional disarmament measures, between global disarmament measures and regional measures, and between the scope of the limitations agreed and the extent of verifications.

(Mr. Speranza, Italy)

For many countries, including my own, the criterion of balance is fundamental, and the main attraction of a disarmament programme purporting to be "comprehensive" is precisely that such a balanced approach is possible. Each part of the world has passed through different historical experiences. As regards Italy, and its own particular situation in the European region, security can only be achieved, at the present stage, within the context of a collective self-defence alliance, in conformity with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

It is on the basis of these facts, resulting from the geopolitical reality, that my country is doing its utmost to promote arms-control and disarmament measures. Other States and other regions have had different experiences and acquired a different outlook. The problem is to try to understand these differences and to harmonize them as much as possible.

The particular insistence of my delegation, and of other delegations, on the search for a balance between nuclear disarmament measures and conventional disarmament measures, stems from this reality.

The priority which is rightly accorded to nuclear disarmament because of the devastating effects of nuclear weapons should not make us overlook the fact that, since 1945, millions of people have been victims of conventional weapons, and that four-fifths of military expenditure in the world is allocated to conventional weapons and armed forces. These statistics assume even greater significance when the interrelationship between disarmament and development is taken into consideration.

In my opinion, the Committee would be well advised, in the interests of the general balance and efficiency of its work, to consider, also, specific problems relating to conventional disarmament. In this connection, I would remind the Committee of a working paper (CD/56) which Italy submitted to it last year on a subject which it regards as being of top priority, namely, the control and limitation of the international transfer of weapons.

In this context, the comprehensive programme of disarmament may provide a useful reference framework, capable of co-ordinating particular initiatives if it succeeds in proposing an integrated set of disarmament measures to be applied, under adequate control, in successive stages of the disarmament process. A set of balanced measures would be more effective in precluding the risk of unilateral advantages and in ensuring that each phase met the same criterion of balance and stability. Seen in this light, neither the establishment of time-limits nor the imposition of legally binding obligations can play a decisive role; the safeguarding, at each stage, of an over-all balance capable of stimulating the indispensable political will of the parties concerned, it seems to us, is certainly more important.

My delegation is convinced that useful negotiations on radiological weapons and on strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States can be resumed immediately. Progress on these matters would constitute a positive element in the over-all balance of the Committee's work. My delegation is willing, moreover,

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to discuss the most appropriate means whereby the Committee could give adequate consideration to the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Two elements emerged during the second half of 1980 which deserve special attention: the detailed three-Power report submitted to this Committee on 31 July 1980 (CD/130), and the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in August the same year.

The tripartite report marks a very important stage in efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban. It outlines a universal type of treaty which could certainly include a truly international verification system. This possibility, which is gratifying, leads us to believe that conditions are ripe for the opening of concrete negotiations in this forum. If the CTB is developed as an authentically multilateral legal instrument, it will retain all its value as a restraining influence on vertical and horizontal proliferation. The most effective way of committing the entire international community would be for all States to participate in the verification system envisaged: this process of "multilateralization" can take place only within the Disarmament Committee, the only multilateral negotiating organ in the disarmament field.

The work of the second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT revealed the limitations of the existing non-proliferation system. That system is threatened with progressive erosion; consequently, it is desirable to elaborate new measures calculated to strengthen it and at the same time to encourage the search for a new international consensus on nuclear matters. To this end, a comprehensive test-ban treaty could represent an effective measure that could be speedily applied. Again in this field, experience shows -- and I refer to the excellent work carried out so far by the group of seismic experts -- that the results of the multilateral efforts made in this area could also make a useful contribution to the trilateral negotiations.

Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament is still the principal negotiating body for the disarmament process at the global level, owing to its mission and the institutional tasks entrusted to it. Last year, it registered limited but significant progress, both on the structuring of its activities and on the substance of negotiations. Those results were achieved largely through the common determination of participating delegations to see in the worsening of the international situation an encouragement to negotiate, rather than a reason to down tools.

Italy hopes that the work which has just begun will be imbued with this same spirit of determination. It reaffirms its complete readiness to act in a constructive manner to promote the necessary agreements in a field of such vital importance to mankind as that of arms limitation and disarmament. World public opinion, rightly concerned by developments on the international scene, must be able to find a source of hope in the work of our Committee and in that of other international organizations engaged on the same task.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Mr. Speranza, Under-Secretary of State of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy, for his statement. I should also like to thank him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, it is a matter of great satisfaction to my delegation to see you assume the Chairmanship of our Committee, not only because of the close and extensive relations between our two countries but also because we have, through our association, learnt to admire your diplomatic skill and have come to repose confidence in your ability to chart the work of the Committee over a constructive course. I pledge to you the fullest co-operation of my delegation in the discharge of your difficult duties.

I take the opportunity also to express the appreciation of my delegation to the distinguished Ambassador of Ethiopia, H.E. Tadesse Terrefe, who so ably conducted the work of the Committee at its concluding session last year. To him fell the difficult task of reconciling the sometimes divergent and opposing views of member delegations into a coherent consensus eventually reflected in the Committee's report to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session.

On behalf of the Indian delegation, I welcome in our midst today four new colleagues, namely, the distinguished Ambassadors of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire. We have no doubt that their presence in the Committee will further advance the common cause to which we are all committed.

In reviewing the work of the Committee during its last session, my delegation has drawn some relevant conclusions. We would like to share these with the Committee in the hope that they may help us in using the limited time at our disposal during the session more efficiently in discharging our mandate.

During 1980, the Committee on Disarmament spent an inordinately long time over procedural questions. We strongly believe that the Committee has sufficiently flexible rules of procedure to enable it to discharge its main function of undertaking substantive negotiations, without getting wrapped up in what is a common disease with most international forums, namely, a preoccupation with procedure. The decision last year to set up four Ad hoc Working Groups was extremely important and significant, but our delegation would have wished that these Groups could have started their substantive work right at the start of our 1980 session without losing an inordinate amount of time for the rather formal decisions to be taken on their detailed mandates. This experience leads us strongly to urge that the four Ad hoc Working Groups which functioned so effectively in the latter half of the 1980 session, and which the Committee agreed in its report should continue their work in 1981, should be set up now, immediately, without any loss of time. They should be requested to commence sittings under the existing mandates while we negotiate new mandates, wherever they may be considered necessary, for any particular Working Group. My delegation is prepared to proceed on this basis straight away and to participate in their work.

With respect to the agenda of our Committee for the current session, I am sure everyone would agree that none of the seven items on the agenda of the Committee last year have in fact been dealt with exhaustively or in a conclusive manner. It would be therefore quite appropriate if essentially the same agenda were to continue to serve us during our current session as well.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

As far as the programme of work is concerned, my delegation as always has an open mind. These are matters which may be settled to the best interest of all the delegations in this Committee through mutual consultations that may be conducted by our distinguished Chairman. The Chairman as well as the Secretariat are quite aware of the major preoccupations of the various delegations represented in this Committee. I have no doubt that they would be able to work out a successful and flexible programme of work for this Committee, taking these preoccupations into account.

My delegation has consistently attached the highest urgency and importance to the negotiation of urgent measures for the achievement of nuclear disarmament and for the prevention of a nuclear war. We have stated before, and we would like to reiterate again, that we consider it ironical and inexplicable that an issue which has a direct bearing upon the very survival of mankind is yet to receive the kind of intensive and urgent attention it clearly deserves in this multilateral negotiating body. Few in this Committee would disagree that Working Groups are the best mechanism for conducting substantive negotiations on the various items on our agenda. Nuclear disarmament is an item on our agenda. Nuclear disarmament is also the most important item on the agenda since the use of nuclear weapons anywhere will have catastrophic consequences for mankind as a whole. We fail, therefore, to understand why there is still opposition to the setting up of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations on this vital question which affects the security of all nations of the world. The Group of 21 already at the last session put forward a proposal for the setting up of such a working group. This call was also reiterated at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly in its resolution 35/152 C. It is the earnest hope of my delegation that the Committee will be able to achieve a speedy consensus on this proposal and that the working group can commence its deliberations at the very beginning of the 1981 spring session. It will be a shameful reflection on this Committee if the delegations represented here go to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament without some concrete progress to report on what the Final Document of the first special session categorically declared to be the most urgent problem facing mankind.

The Group of 21, during the 1980 session of the Committee, also strongly pressed for the setting up of a working group for the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Unfortunately, such an ad hoc working group could not be set up in 1980 owing to the negative attitude of some nuclear-weapon States and their allies. I would appeal to these delegations to reflect upon the consequences of opposing the wishes of the vast majority of the nations and peoples of the world who quite rightly regard the continuation of nuclear weapons testing as a particularly cynical disregard of the interests of the world community and harmful to the human race as a whole. India was amongst the earliest proponents of a comprehensive test ban treaty and hopes that all nuclear-weapon States will demonstrate the necessary political will in agreeing to a consensus on this proposal, which would also serve to establish the credibility of their professed commitment to the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament.

It is not the intention of my delegation at this stage to dwell at length on each item on our agenda. However, it has traditionally been the practice of delegations to use their opening statements in the plenary to highlight what they consider to be the most urgent questions that must be dealt with by the Committee on

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Disarmament. As must already be obvious from our strong support for the proposal for the setting up of a new ad hoc working group for the conduct of negotiations on nuclear disarmament, my delegation continues to attach the highest importance to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war.

While the Committee on Disarmament opens its deliberations today, it is significant that the Commission on Human Rights has already been in session for the past few days here in Geneva. Perhaps we ought to remind ourselves of the integral link which exists between the achievement of disarmament and the promotion of human rights. After all, the most basic and fundamental human right is the right to life itself. It is precisely this right which is threatened by the continued accumulation and refinement of the instruments of death. And who would deny that the most horrific instrument of death that man has created so far is the thermonuclear weapon?

When nuclear weapons came into existence, towards the close of the second world war, they were recognized as constituting a totally new dimension in the history of warfare. The destructive power of these weapons puts them in a class apart from even the most destructive conventional weapons ever known. For the first time, the instantaneous annihilation of an entire State or group of States had become feasible. Also for the first time, here was a weapon against which no effective defence was possible.

In a world, therefore, with opposing States possessing nuclear weapons, a war using nuclear weapons could only mean swift annihilation of all belligerents alike. Also, unfortunately, even if just a few nations were to choose this path of insanity, the consequences would not be limited merely to these individual States, since the effects of thermonuclear weapons cannot be confined to national boundaries. The entire human race has thus become hostage to the possible irrationality of a few who hold these weapons and who, against all evidence, are busy evolving new theories of nuclear warfare based on the fallacy that nuclear war is wageable, and what is even more absurd, winnable. As members of the Committee are aware, many distinguished strategists belonging to nuclear-weapon States have themselves repeatedly exposed the fallacy of such theories.

Could nuclear weapons ever be conceived as a credible instrument of warfare? Military strategy becomes meaningless without a political objective capable of realization. Nuclear weapons have for the first time made possible what was regarded by strategic thinkers as being until then only a theoretical possibility -- an Absolute War. Absolute War is senseless, precisely because it would leave neither victor nor vanquished and would therefore serve no conceivable political or, for that matter, military purpose. Despite the fact that the use of nuclear weapons would serve no rational political or military aim and would almost certainly result in assured mutual destruction, how is it that such weapons not only continue to exist but are continuously being accumulated and refined?

In order to escape the illogicality of the notion of an absolute war that is inherent in the invention of thermonuclear weapons, the concept of so-called nuclear deterrence has been advanced. In a nuclear age, deterrence involves the theoretical ability of a State to impose unacceptable destruction on its adversary and, at the same time, its willingness to withstand massive destruction, perhaps even to the

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point of self-annihilation. Such a state of affairs, it is implied, would hopefully prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. Since, however, any political aim would be irrelevant in the aftermath of an actual nuclear war, deterrence in this context is in the last analysis based on dangerous bluff. It is ultimately based on the irrationality of accepting the idea of national suicide.

The lack of rationality as well as credibility that is inherent in such a doctrine has not been lost on those who espouse it. However, instead of acknowledging the illogicality of the use of nuclear weapons and taking urgent steps to achieve nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon States have chosen to attempt the impossible and to square the nuclear circle by adopting two different tacks both equally invalid when examined closely. On the one hand, nuclear weapons technology has moved in the direction of evolving a whole range of so-called tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons that would create the illusion of bridging the gap between conventional arms and strategic nuclear weapons. Concurrent with this technological development is the attempt to apply traditional doctrines of use relevant only to conventional weapons to this new generation of so-called tactical nuclear weapons. But as has been pointed out time and again and acknowledged by strategists in nuclear-weapon States themselves, even the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons would inevitably cause massive destruction unprecedented in human history. The effects would be not only immediate in character but also of a long-term nature. The experience of the Bikini and Marshall islands where nuclear-weapon tests had been conducted, prove that even after several decades it may not be possible for people to return safely to an area once devastated by nuclear weapons. The contamination of soil and vegetation, and genetic distortions of the human population exposed to nuclear radiation, which has been the experience in these islands where nuclear-weapon tests were carried out, should warn those who continue to believe that somehow the use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons would result in acceptable damage as compared with the use of strategic nuclear weapons. Even if a nuclear exchange could be kept to an illusory "tactical" threshold, no rational political or military aim could possibly be achieved.

In any case, nobody believes that once nuclear weapons of any kind are actually used, escalation to a global nuclear war using strategic nuclear weapons could possibly be avoided. An irrational zero cannot be divided into rational fractions. Let us acknowledge once for all that the very nature of nuclear weapons makes it impossible to use them for achieving any conceivable rational political or military objective. A nuclear war, by its very nature, would serve no purpose other than to threaten the existence of the human race.

We come next to the question whether a nuclear war can be avoided and peace in this nuclear age safeguarded somehow by the competitive accumulation of growing and sophisticated arsenals of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. This is what is implied by the current theories of nuclear deterrence and strategic balance. My delegation would submit that inherent in the concept of deterrence is an implicit commitment to a continuing and accelerating nuclear arms race. A state of so-called parity or strategic balance is, from the point of view of any particular participant in the nuclear race, the least satisfactory point on the variable scale of so-called deterrence. After all, the greater the power to destroy the adversary

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while at the same time being able to limit or escape damage to oneself, the higher the level of so-called "deterrence" which is presumed to have been achieved. It is not strange, therefore, that those who subscribe to these doctrines assert that a nuclear war can be fought and won. It is also not strange that the impossible goal of an ultimate defence against a nuclear attack continues to be pursued. Proponents of such views argue for the accumulation of larger and more refined nuclear arsenals on the postulate that unless it is demonstrated that a nuclear-weapon Power has achieved the capability of fighting and winning at every level of a possible nuclear exchange, deterrence would not be a credible posture. Thus the perverted logic of so-called deterrence keeps feeding on itself, requiring a continuous escalation of weapons systems in a vain search for the will o' the wisp of strategic superiority. Thus, while so-called parity or strategic balance is trumpeted as the keeper of the peace in the nuclear age, there is, in fact, a continuous endeavour to overturn that balance, precisely because of the logic which the concept of deterrence imposes.

The foregoing analysis leads us to two major conclusions. Firstly, no doctrines concerning the use of nuclear weapons have so far been designed, or in fact can be designed, which would be credible in the sense that their adoption could lead to the achievement of any conceivable political objective. Attempts to try somehow to fit the use of nuclear weapons into the familiar mould of doctrines applicable to the use of conventional weapons become untenable abstractions. The reality is that the use of any type of nuclear weapon anywhere will inevitably result in a global nuclear holocaust. The second conclusion is that concepts of so-called deterrence carry within them the dragon-seed of a relentless nuclear arms race. Deterrence involves a perpetual search for military superiority over an adversary. Although in the nuclear age the search for such a military superiority is irrelevant, it is precisely such a pursuit of illusory and unattainable superiority that has continued to fuel the nuclear arms race which we are witnessing today.

As we see it, the achievement of nuclear disarmament has become a categorical imperative precisely because nuclear arms can no longer serve any conceivable political purpose for any State which claims to conduct its policy on a rational basis. On the other hand, the concept of nuclear deterrence which has been evolved to fit nuclear weaponry into the realm of a rational war strategy will tend to perpetuate a technological race for the perfection of nuclear arms in the vain hope of achieving the capability of visiting total annihilation on an adversary while escaping such annihilation oneself.

Mr. Chairman, while all nuclear-weapon States have solemnly and formally committed themselves to the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament, developments in nuclear weaponry over the past two decades, as well as the evolution of strategic doctrines governing their use, have made this commitment less and less credible. Today, the nuclear-weapon States have fully integrated their nuclear arsenals into their war-fighting machines and we increasingly hear assertions that, for at least some of these States, national defence is incomplete without the possession of nuclear weapons. Even where negotiations have taken place among some of the nuclear-weapon States, they have not been directed towards the achievement of nuclear disarmament, but rather towards devising ingenious means to enable them to live with the reality of nuclear weapons, at higher levels of accumulation. The regulation of

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nuclear competition rather than the genuine achievement of nuclear disarmament has been the thrust of negotiations concerning nuclear weapons so far. The rest of us are accordingly entitled to ask when we can hope that nuclear weapons will be eliminated. Nuclear-weapon States owe us a duty to explain the inconsistencies and contradictions between their formal commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament and the pursuit of contrary policies which seek to integrate nuclear weapons permanently into their military apparatus. They must also explain how they reconcile their avowed aim of achieving nuclear disarmament with their espousal of the concept of deterrence. To my delegation it is obvious that the nuclear arms race cannot be controlled or checked, so long as the concept of deterrence remains the central feature of the nuclear landscape.

If the above analysis is correct, and if nuclear disarmament may no longer be a credible objective to be hoped for, then we, the non-nuclear nations of the world, are entitled at least to be made clearly cognizant of this fact. We must know if we are offered no alternative except to reconcile ourselves to a world condemned to live perpetually under the shadow of an impending nuclear catastrophe. We must know that for the foreseeable future we shall continue to be exposed at every moment to the possibility of a nuclear war that would result in our annihilation, without our being a party to the waging of such a war. Perhaps, once it is clear to everyone that nuclear weapons are here to stay, that those who possess them will adamantly refuse to agree to their elimination, then the world community may be able to recast its assumptions about the kind of world we are doomed to live in.

We have now reached a point where some of the most fundamental assumptions on which the whole structure of our negotiations on disarmament measures have so far been based require to be reviewed and examined. If these assumptions are not carefully scrutinized now, we continue to run the risk of chasing after shadows with little hope of tangible results. It is for this reason that we believe it is urgently necessary to set up an Ad hoc Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament, so that the Committee on Disarmament, as a negotiating body, can examine objectively whether the assumptions on which we have relied with regard to the bringing about of nuclear disarmament continue to be valid. This scrutiny would be in the interest not merely of non-nuclear-weapon States but of the nuclear-weapon States also. For, once it is established beyond question that the accumulation of nuclear arsenals and the espousal of strategic doctrines concerning the use of nuclear weapons have not brought about security for them, but on the contrary condemned them to a state of perpetual insecurity, these countries may perhaps be persuaded to change their line of thinking and join the mainstream of world opinion. Once it is realized that nuclear war is unwageable and unwinnable, nuclear disarmament ceases to be merely an ideal: it becomes a paramount necessity.

During this session our Committee will also be considering questions relating to the prohibition of chemical weapons and radiological weapons. My delegation's stand on these two issues has been made clear in the statements we have made both in the plenary as well as in the Working Groups during the session of the Committee on Disarmament last year. As far as chemical weapons are concerned, we are gratified by the substantive work done by the Working Group last year. We hope that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will recommence its sittings and resume its substantive work without delay. Progress in this area is important

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because there are already certain ominous developments which, if allowed to proceed unchecked, could constitute yet another curse to the existence of mankind. By this I mean the danger posed by the development of binary chemical weapons. These dangerous trends must spur us on to achieve a chemical weapons convention, if possible during this very session of the Committee. Soon after attaining independence, India abjured the production and use of chemical weapons. My delegation is therefore fully committed to this objective and will make a positive contribution to the best of its ability. My delegation continues to have a positive attitude also on the negotiation of a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. During multilateral negotiations on this subject last year we raised certain important points of principle concerning the definition of radiological weapons. We trust that during the consideration of the problem this year, a reasonable solution to this question can be found.

One of the important tasks before this Committee is the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. While the elements of such a programme have already been set forth by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, this Committee would have to put in a considerable amount of work in regard to its formulation and negotiation. My delegation believes that the programme has to be as specific as possible and should also contain some indication as to the time-frame within which the various disarmament measures contained in the programme are to be realized. Without a built-in time-frame, the programme would have little practical political relevance. We earnestly hope that during the current negotiations we may be able to find a broad consensus on this issue.

We are only a little more than a year away from the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. This Committee was set up in 1978 as a negotiating body by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament in order to formulate urgent measures of disarmament. If we are unable to record any substantial progress in negotiations on the various items on our agenda before the second special session is convened, we shall be seen as having failed in the responsibility placed on us by the international community. We hope, accordingly, that all delegations present here will make a conscious attempt during the current session to avoid procedural wrangles and also to resist the temptation of turning this body into a forum for polemical exchanges. The business of this Committee is to negotiate on disarmament measures. We cannot, as a pretext for delaying our work, use the argument that the international environment has worsened. If we do not discharge the responsibility given to us, the international environment will undoubtedly worsen further.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize the urgency which my delegation fervently hopes will infuse the proceedings of this Committee during its current session. In a speech at the United Nations General Assembly in 1961 the late Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru said, "I am convinced that the modern world cannot continue for long without full disarmament. It is perhaps true ultimately that the material advance which has taken place in the world and which is magnificent has gone far ahead of the development of the human mind. A mind which lags behind and thinks in terms of how nations functioned and wars occurred a hundred or two hundred years ago does not fit in with the modern age. Emotionally, we do not fully understand the possibility of a nuclear war. Otherwise it seems to me impossible that there should be continuing deadlocks and impasses, for under modern conditions war must be ruled out or human civilization has to submit to the ending of all that it has laboured for thousands of years to build. If that is true, it is important and urgent that we should approach this question of disarmament with speed, deliberation and determination to solve it". Mr. Chairman, India's approach to questions of disarmament continues to draw its inspiration from these words.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Venkateswaran for his statement and I am grateful to him for the kind and friendly words he addressed to the Chair.

The statement we have just heard is the last, according to the list of speakers, for this plenary meeting. I should like to know if any other delegations wish to take the floor.

If not, I propose that we now look briefly at some questions concerning the organization of our work for the coming days.

I should like to draw the attention of delegations to the following documents which they now have before them: first, document CD/140, entitled "Letter dated 2 February 1981 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament transmitting the resolutions on disarmament adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session". Then there is document CD/INF.1/Rev.4, entitled "Basic information for delegations on conference arrangements and documentation".

As you know, rule 29 of our rules of procedure provides that "the provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the Chairman of the Committee with the assistance of the Secretary and presented to the Committee for consideration and adoption".

In conformity with that rule I have submitted to the Committee a working paper which could, if the Committee agrees, be examined at an informal meeting to be held tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m. If there is no objection, we could at the same meeting consider the requests submitted by States not members of the Committee concerning their participation in our deliberations. The Secretariat has today distributed informally, at my request, the texts of the communications so far received on this subject.

Lastly, if we have time, we could, still at the informal meeting, have a first exchange of views on the subject of working groups.

If there are no other comments in this connection I propose to adjourn this plenary meeting now. The next plenary meeting will be held on Thursday, 5 February, at 10.30 a.m., and I understand that the Committee has agreed to the proposal I made for the holding of an informal meeting tomorrow, Wednesday, at 3 p.m. If there are no further observations on these proposals, I shall adjourn the meeting.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.

CD/PV.102
5 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE HUNDRED AND SECOND MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 5 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. de la Gorce

(France)

GE.81-60114

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. MAATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER

China: Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LIN Cheng
Mr. PAN Ju-Sheng
Mrs. GE Yi-Yun

Cuba: Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. SCHNEIDER
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BÜNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. M. SIDIK

Iran: Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:

Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMED
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru:

Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. DE SOTO
Mr. J. AURICH MONTERO
Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. L. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mrs. I. THORSSON Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. U. ERICSSON Mr. S. STROMBACK
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO Mr. V.V. LOSCHININ
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES Mr. N.H. MARSHALL Mrs. J.I. LINK
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER Mr. J.A. MISKEL Mr. H. WILSON Mr. S. FITZGERALD
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. O.A. AGUILAR
<u>Yugoslavia:</u>	Mr. M. VRHUNEC Mr. B. BRANKOVIC
<u>Zaire:</u>	Mr. OSIL GNOK
<u>Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General:</u>	Mr. R. JAIPAL
<u>Assistant Secretary-General, Centre for Disarmament:</u>	Mr. J. MARTENSON
<u>Deputy Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament:</u>	Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): I apologize for asking for the floor also at this session's second plenary meeting. I do have some reasons for this request. And I shall be brief.

In yesterday's newspapers we were informed about some statements made by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, at his first Pentagon news conference last Tuesday. These statements indicated that Secretary Weinberger might favour the deployment of neutron warheads in Europe. He is quoted as saying: "I think that the opportunity that this weapon gives to strengthen tactical nuclear forces is one that we very probably would want to make use of."

Mr. Weinberger's statement seems to confirm the fact, stated last Tuesday, that we live in times of uncertainties and warnings. When we receive an early warning of this kind what should be our reaction? To wait and see? Or to try to do something?

Well Mr. Chairman, on this occasion I shall have to recall that in 1977 and 1978 strong popular movements arose in many countries, not least in Western Europe, in severe protest against the so-called neutron bomb. There was reason to consider, with some satisfaction, that this was one of the factors behind President Carter's decision in autumn 1978 to defer the production of this weapon, rightly characterized by its opponents as abominable. At that time one could argue, as I did in my statement in the General Assembly's First Committee in November 1977, that "public opinion is a political reality."

But this political force was reassured by President Carter's announcement in autumn 1978. Not even when he later authorized the Energy Department to start production of some critical elements of the weapon did this seem to put public opinion on the alert again.

What has happened in this area since then is that another nuclear weapon power is developing and testing a neutron weapon. I do not have to repeat the Swedish Government's consistent denouncement of this weapon, which would give a new aspect to nuclear warfare, adding further to its terrifying effects, and which entails the inherent risk of lowering the nuclear weapon threshold.

In accordance with the Swedish Government's actions over the years, I want today to draw attention to Secretary Weinberger's statements two days ago. I am aware that they revealed no immediately forthcoming decision on this gruesome matter. What we have received is, in fact, as I said, an early warning. That is exactly the reason why I have taken up the issue in the Committee on Disarmament today. Governments and peoples should take note of the Defense Secretary's announcement and ponder over its eventual effects on the future of nations in the densely populated European continent.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, at the outset of my statement I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament during the first month of this year's session. I hope that your considerable experience, your knowledge and the respect which you enjoy among the members of the Committee will make it possible to take effective decisions, which would allow us to work effectively from the very beginning, thus laying the ground for tangible progress in our endeavours. I wish you success in discharging your important duties.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It is also a pleasure for me to take this opportunity to express my thanks and my admiration to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Terrefe from Ethiopia, for his performance as Chairman during the month of August and during the interim period. It was thanks to his able and flexible leadership that the Committee was in a position to solve all problems in connection with the elaboration of its report to the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, thus inspiring conditions for making further strides in our efforts to achieve progress now, during the 1981 session.

Furthermore, I would like to welcome the newly appointed heads of the delegations from Romania, Pakistan, Zaire and Egypt. I am confident that our cordial and useful relations and the co-operation we had with their predecessors will continue with them. This year's session of the Committee on Disarmament is starting its work in a situation characterized by serious international tensions. In spite of all the efforts exerted by peace loving forces, the arms race is acquiring ever more dangerous dimensions.

The policy of intensifying the arms race pursued by certain imperialist circles, which is often called "the additional armament", is beginning to undermine the results of political détente attained with great efforts in the 1970s. Armed conflicts continue in various regions of the world. In spite of the resolute appeals made by the world community, the SALT II Treaty has not yet entered into force. At the same time, one nuclear Power is propagandizing a doctrine aimed at making a nuclear war, as it was said, wageable and winnable. In this regard my delegation fully shares the concern expressed at our meeting on 3 February by the distinguished representatives of Mexico, Sweden and India. While we here in Geneva in the Committee on Disarmament are undertaking great efforts to achieve progress in the field of curbing the arms race and while we are searching for new and concrete ways and solutions, we at the same time are confronted with a threat -- the production of a new barbaric weapon -- coming from other places.

There is, however, no reasonable alternative to peace and international co-operation. We must do everything to continue the process of political and military détente in the 1980s as well. In this context, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, underlined the following: "To make peace more secure, the most essential task in world affairs today is to stop the arms race and to supplement political détente with disarmament. This task is more pressing today than ever before. In order to restore a healthy international atmosphere, it is imperative to ensure a shift in this respect right now, in the 1980s. Losing time now can only please those who have embarked on an imperialist policy of confrontation and of continued and even heightened tension, thus intentionally risking the plunging of mankind into a nuclear Armageddon."

Mr. Chairman, never before has the responsibility that rests with the Committee on Disarmament, as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations, been so apparent as now in view of the complicated and aggravated international situation.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic believes that the Committee should make more vigorous efforts now to achieve tangible progress at least on the most important issues on its agenda. This obligation is underlined by the fact that the Committee has started its last full session before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

With full determination and in the spirit of the proposals advanced by the Warsaw Treaty member States last May we will contribute our best to the solution of the tasks facing the Committee. The programme of disarmament proposed by the socialist States is based on the principle of undiminished security for all parties. It is a clear evidence of the intention of the socialist defence organization not to seek a military supremacy. The validity of the programme was endorsed once again at the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty member States held in Moscow in December of 1980.

This programme not only takes into account the need for global steps towards arms limitation and disarmament as they are being discussed here in the Committee but also provides for measures of military détente on the regional level. We expect that the States participating in the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, which is now in session, will make arrangements for a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. The German Democratic Republic attaches great importance to the Soviet-American negotiations on the limitation of nuclear armaments in Europe as well. In its capacity as Vice-Chairman of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, the German Democratic Republic is in favour of convening, as early as this year, a United Nations conference on the Indian Ocean. The underlying objective is to turn this region into a zone of peace.

But good words and programmes alone are not enough. What is needed is concrete deeds to maintain peace. There are many examples emphasizing the seriousness of our endeavours. This is also evidenced by the withdrawal of 20,000 Soviet troops and 1,000 tanks from the territory of the German Democratic Republic which ended last year. This fact is a genuine confidence-building measure and by no means a "propaganda manoeuvre", as certain forces in the West would like us to believe. In this case as well as with regard to other similar initiatives of the socialist States, unfortunately, they try only too quickly to heap up lies and aspersions around those proposals.

We are aligning ourselves with the overwhelming majority of States in striving for military détente and disarmament. This is testified by a number of significant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session. As for my country, we are ready to do everything in our power to help the Committee on Disarmament at its current session to translate those resolutions into concrete agreements. This would be a real contribution to preparing for the United Nations General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament.

We give priority to nuclear disarmament. In addition, measures should be taken to halt the conventional arms race which continues to escalate. This objective constitutes the basis for resolution 35/152 G adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session on the initiative of the German Democratic Republic. This resolution provides for specific measures, such as the obligation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and their military allies not to increase their armed forces and conventional armaments effective from an agreed date. This would, without any doubt, create favourable conditions for a subsequent reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. The Committee should pay due attention to this issue as well.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In General Assembly resolution 35/152 E, the Committee on Disarmament is requested to intensify its negotiations. It should, in our view, concentrate its work on the substantive and priority issues on its agenda with a view to reaching tangible results.

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic urges all States present here not to waste time in long discussions on procedural and organizational items but to move on without delay to the accomplishment of the Committee's real tasks. We view the work of relevant ad hoc working groups as an appropriate means to achieve this end. The four working groups which already existed last year should continue their activities. At the same time, we reiterate our proposal to set up an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic firmly advocates the early ratification of the SALT II Treaty and the continuation of the SALT process.

This process, of course, does not preclude to search for comprehensive solutions within the framework of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's first special session devoted to disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament is an appropriate body for such negotiations. As for the mandate of such a working group, a number of useful ideas have already been set forth.

My delegation supports the initiative of the Group of 21 for the setting up of an ad hoc working group on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests in which all the nuclear-weapon States should be represented. The establishment of such a group would in no way impede the trilateral negotiations, which -- we hope -- will be resumed at the earliest possible date. We urge the nuclear-weapon States finally to take into account the vital interests of all peoples and to end their nuclear-weapon tests. A first step in this direction would be an arrangement between the nuclear-weapon States not to carry out any nuclear explosion within one year starting from a date agreed by them, as was proposed by the USSR at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Measures to prevent the geographical spread of nuclear weapons are imperative. Therefore, the Committee on Disarmament should take into account the recommendation made by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session and establish an ad hoc working group on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

A group of scientific experts should take up its work with a view to harmonizing differing views on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction and in particular to fix in clear terms the scope of such a prohibition.

In proposing the establishment of eight ad hoc working groups, we by no means have any illusions that they could immediately take up their work and solve all the tasks facing us. Essential for this is the political will of all sides involved, as was rightly pointed out by Ambassador García Robles of Mexico in the statement he made at our last meeting. Of special importance in this regard is the political will of some nuclear-weapon Powers to fulfil the obligations they assumed under the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

At the end of my statement, I have the honour, on behalf of a Group of socialist States, to present to the Committee a working paper on some questions of the organization of its work at its 1981 session. The document contains the considerations of this Group on how the Committee could turn to the principal issues of its activities without any delay. It reads as follows:

"1. To curb the arms race and to achieve genuine disarmament are main objectives of foreign policy of the socialist States. The fruitful debate on disarmament issues at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly showed that these endeavours are shared by the overwhelming majority of the United Nations Member States. In the current seriously aggravated international situation, there is an urgent need for resolute action to translate into practical terms the provisions of the final document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Any concrete agreement now on arms limitation and disarmament would have a favourable impact on the international situation as a whole. The issues of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament legitimately hold the central place in the negotiations pursued in international fora, because their solution would meet the interests of the entire mankind.

"The Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum has a special role to play in this process. Its membership represents all the major groups of States, namely socialist, non-aligned and neutral, as well as Western. Forty States participate in its work, including all the nuclear-weapons States, as well as other States with the largest military potentials. The Committee's agenda includes virtually all important items, the solution of which would result in furthering international peace and détente. The 1981 session of the Committee will be its last full session before the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982. An important task in this regard would be to consolidate the results achieved in this field in recent years, and in particular to implement the initiatives advanced by the socialist countries at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The discussion and approval of those proposals have demonstrated their topicality. These proposals have evoked a broad positive response. The achievement of tangible progress in the negotiations on the main items before the Committee on Disarmament would be one of the most important contributions to the preparation of the forthcoming special session.

"Therefore, in the view of the Group of socialist countries, all Member States of the Committee on Disarmament should duly respond to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly, contained in resolution 35/152 E, "to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament". The resolution also recommended that the Committee "should concentrate on the substantive and priority items on its agenda with a view to achieving tangible results".

"Having this in mind, the Group of socialist States appeals to all member countries of the Committee to start concrete, businesslike negotiations at an early time. The Committee must not waste time on issues which bear no relation to its agenda and which are deliberately introduced in the debate to divert its attention from the questions of substance. Less time should be devoted to the discussion of procedural and organizational matters.

"2. Ad hoc working groups are regarded as the appropriate machinery within the Committee on Disarmament for concrete negotiations. In discharging its responsibilities, the Committee should re-establish at the outset of its 1981 session appropriate ad hoc working groups on its agenda items. The four ad hoc working groups which were set up in 1980, namely on

- radiological weapons;
- chemical weapons;

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

- effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons;
- comprehensive programme of disarmament

should proceed without delay with their negotiations.

"At the same time, as is demonstrated by the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament, including at its current session, many a country stand for a more serious examination of the nuclear disarmament issue, for the establishment of an ad hoc working group to this end. From the point of view of the socialist countries, it is expedient to set up such a group as soon as possible. Its work should facilitate the earliest start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. All nuclear-weapon States as well as non-nuclear countries should participate in this work.

"The socialist countries are consistently in favour of the Committee on Disarmament playing an active part in the solution of the tasks of complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and support the proposal concerning the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this question.

"In accordance with resolution 35/156 C of the United Nations General Assembly the Committee on Disarmament is requested "to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present". Having this in mind, the socialist countries deem it necessary to set up an ad hoc working group on this question, too.

"The socialist countries believe that the Committee should continue to pay close attention to the issue of the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. In this connection, the socialist States propose to establish an ad hoc group of experts on this problem and are willing to consider the question of its mandate, proceeding from the general task of banning such types and systems of weapons.

"Being interested in ensuring effective work of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of socialist States holds that it is not advisable to link the creation of one ad hoc working group with the creation of another. The chairmanship in the ad hoc working groups should rotate on a reasonable basis among the heads of delegations of various countries.

"3 Further on, the Group of socialist States deems it necessary that the Committee promptly decide at this session the question of the invitation of States not members of the Committee. Those decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament which were elaborated after careful negotiations and which have proved their value.

"As for the distribution of documents of non-member States in the Committee, it is necessary to continue the practice which was developed last April and which was followed by the Chairmen of the Committee in June, July and August 1980.

"In submitting their Considerations on the Organization of Work of the Committee on Disarmament during its 1981 Session, the socialist countries proceed from the premise that at present it is particularly important to concentrate efforts on the businesslike search for concrete agreements on the main items on the disarmament agenda."

Mr. Chairman, in our opinion, the paper offers a good starting point for effective and fruitful work in the Committee on Disarmament without losing much time on deliberations on secondary questions. Therefore, we recommend to examine those proposals and to make them a basis for our future activities. Should a need arise to hold an exchange of views and to provide more detailed explanations, we will be ready to do it.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, my first words must be to add my voice to those who have welcomed you to the Chair of our Committee for the month of February. As do all delegations in this room, the Australian delegation knows and appreciates the personal qualities and long experience which you bring to this difficult task. We greatly welcome the contribution which France, which you so ably represent, brings to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

I also wish to join my colleagues in welcoming to the Committee the new representatives of Egypt, Pakistan, Zaire and Romania. My delegation looks forward to the personal contributions they will make to the work of the Committee. We look forward to continuing the close co-operation which we enjoyed with their predecessors.

In your remarks at the inaugural meeting of this 1981 session two days ago, you drew the Committee's attention to the sobering fact that the international situation is no better than it was twelve months ago. Other speakers, too, have referred -- in the words of the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation -- to "the gloomy atmosphere in which we live and work". My delegation wholeheartedly endorses the conclusion which others besides ourselves have drawn, that the work of the Committee on Disarmament is for these reasons more important than ever. We must now allow the state of the world to cause us to despair or to slacken our efforts. While realistically acknowledging the limitations which the current international situation imposes on what we can hope to do, we must at the same time draw heart from the fact that the Committee on Disarmament demonstrated in the later stages of its 1980 session a determination to concentrate on practical issues rather than sterile polemics or procedural complexities. The Australian delegation particularly welcomes the statements by other delegations which show that they wish to continue in this constructive vein. This is a pragmatic and realistic approach. It is also our approach.

Last year was an anxious one for mankind and many of those anxieties are still with us. The military occupation and repression of a non-aligned country by one of the super Powers, which cast such a shadow over 1980, continues. New threats have arisen during the past year. International confidence remains in a critical condition and, as one consequence thereof, the SALT II agreement has not been ratified. There has been a further growth in arms expenditure, in the deployment of weapons and in plans for the further development of military capabilities. This is both a cause and a consequence of international tensions. The testing of nuclear weapons has also continued. Lest I convey the impression of attributing all troubles to the nuclear-weapon States, we must also record with concern, for example, that there are still countries with nuclear facilities which have not yet adhered to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or which raise obstacles to measures of international control and accountability which would provide assurances against the spread of nuclear weapons.

Partly for these reasons, and partly because of the coincidence of items on the international disarmament agenda, 1980 was a year of review and stock-taking. Attention focused on advances in weapon technology which seemed to be outpacing progress in arms control negotiations and threatened to create new vulnerabilities. It also focused on the twin problems of vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation. It once again brought to prominence the importance of effective verification measures as an essential requirement of arms control agreements.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

But despite these anxieties and questioning, the picture was not entirely bleak in 1980. An agreement was finalized in this city, imposing limitations on the use of certain conventional weapons. The edifice of international disarmament agreements built up over the previous decade survived and there was, moreover, a widespread reaffirmation of the importance of these existing agreements. Against the inability of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to resolve all differences in its final document should be set the continuing strength of that Treaty, the reaffirmed commitment of its Parties and the sustained increase in their number. It was also heartening that the Committee on Disarmament, set up by the United Nations General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament as the principle multilateral disarmament negotiating body, should have established appropriate mechanisms and begun to focus on practical issues in a way never before attempted.

It is the fervent wish of my delegation that this practical approach should be further carried forward in the current session. It is also our determination to do everything we can to assist such a process. We hope for rapid agreement on our work programme and the working groups, their mandates and chairmanships, so as to enable delegations to get to grips quickly with the substantive tasks before us. In this connection my delegation welcomes and supports the proposal by the distinguished representative of India that the four working groups which we established last year should resume work straight away under their previous mandates. Should members see a need to revise any of the mandates, this can be discussed and then implemented if and when the Committee reaches agreement; but it would be a mistake, in our view, to allow such discussions to delay the start of substantive work.

For Australia, two issues on our agenda are of outstanding importance; they are those concerning a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention. I would like to say a few words about each in turn.

Australia's commitment to work for the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions in all environments for all time is well known and was once more made evident at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. We see such a treaty as the most readily achievable measure that would offer effective and practical assurances to the international community against the dangers of continued testing, against the further growth of existing nuclear arsenals and against the extension of nuclear weapons to other countries. We place high value also on the contribution which such a treaty could make to reducing regional tensions in many parts of the world, and on its other many benefits. Australia believes that this is an appropriate, indeed an urgent, issue to be tackled by this Committee.

I have spoken from the outset of the need for realism and practicality. For these reasons the Committee on Disarmament cannot set about its task on a test-ban treaty in a vacuum, without due consideration for relevant developments elsewhere. I refer specifically to the negotiations which have been pursued by three of the States which carry out nuclear tests. There is universal disappointment at the slow rate of progress in these tripartite negotiations. Australia does not attribute this to a lack of political will on the part of the three countries involved. On the contrary, we believe that there are difficult and delicate issues still to be resolved, particularly as regards verification.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

Last year we welcomed the report on the trilateral negotiations which was presented to the Committee, the information it contained and the progress it recorded.

We also saw value in the discussion and comments which this report of the trilateral negotiations provoked in the Committee on Disarmament. Continuation of the trilateral negotiations does not, to our mind, exclude a role for the Committee on Disarmament. As others have pointed out -- the distinguished Ambassador for Nigeria most eloquently -- a CTBT must attract widespread -- we would hope ultimately universal -- adherence. Otherwise it cannot serve the purposes of which I spoke earlier. The road to such a treaty surely passes through the Committee on Disarmament. We believe the Committee on Disarmament can do useful work towards such a treaty without awaiting the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations. The Committee on Disarmament's expert group on seismic detection of nuclear tests continues to do essential work which must be completed before a CTBT can be fully put into effect. Another such practical task is to consider the administrative and institutional arrangements for CTB verification -- as Australia proposed last year in document CD/95. For our part we would welcome other practical proposals as to specific tasks for the Committee on Disarmament at this stage. We firmly reject the view that such practical work could be diversionary and cause the Committee on Disarmament to focus on peripheral issues, or neglect the central issues. Australia does not propose to divert its attention from the central issues of the test ban and we do not believe the other members of this Committee would do so either.

Of course such work cannot proceed without the concurrence of the trilateral negotiators. That is not possible in a body which operates by consensus. And even if it were theoretically possible under our rules of procedure it would be pointless in practical terms.

We look to a mutually compatible, complementary and supportive role between the trilateral negotiators and the Committee on Disarmament.

The other priority item is a chemical weapons convention. Here too, as with the test ban, the need for effective action is urgent. Delay, for whatever reason, carries awesome risks for the international community and for the inhabitants of our planet.

We know from the expert advice we have heard that many countries have the potential to manufacture chemical weapons. We know -- press accounts abound -- of reports of large arsenals of chemical weapons and the training of troops in their use. We know the pressures this causes for other countries to arm themselves in turn with even more fearsome new chemical weapons. The one hope of avoiding the chemical arms race which now threatens is to negotiate and put into place a chemical weapons convention. Such a convention must have reliable and convincing verification provisions if it is to provide the security which could remove the rationale for any country to arm itself with these weapons.

It is generally agreed that the Committee on Disarmament's most constructive work last year was on the subject of chemical weapons. We must now build on this basis. My delegation looks forward to contributing actively to this year's Working Group. Last year, on Australia's initiative, the Committee on Disarmament set aside a few days for informal meetings with technical experts present. Many delegations praised the results of this initiative. At an informal meeting yesterday, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands suggested that further such meetings should be held

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

this year. I now wish to associate my delegation with this proposal and to invite the Committee on Disarmament to make provision for such meetings in its programme. As the Netherlands representative suggested, we might seek to take advantage of the projected presence in Geneva from 2-4 April of a number of leading chemical weapons experts from many countries, by timing our own meetings immediately before or after those dates. This is something for consideration at our next informal meeting. Here again we must express appreciation for the report tabled last year by the United States and the Soviet Union on their bilateral negotiations. This report was valuable both for its own sake and for the help it was to the Committee on Disarmament's own examination of issues.

The Committee has before it a number of other important issues on which it should be possible to make good progress this year, if we are practical and realistic.

Despite its lesser importance as an arms control measure, we see many good reasons to take the work on a radiological weapons convention substantially closer to conclusion this year. The topic is unequivocally in the hands of the Committee, it presents us with an opportunity to demonstrate our ability to negotiate in a practical and expeditious manner on a matter which holds some complexities.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament must be fully drafted before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament to be held in March next year. To meet this deadline, our work must be nearing completion by the end of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation's aim is a realistic programme that will be of practical use in facilitating future negotiations. We want to avoid a programme which stimulates polemics or raises unrealistic expectations.

The subject of negative security assurances for States which do not possess nuclear weapons is one of importance to the international community. Committee on Disarmament deliberations over the last two years have shown, however, the difficulties of finding a general formula that would meet the concerns of all countries. Discussions of this topic must not degenerate into attempts by one or another group to seek to improve its military posture in relation to others. It may be more useful to work for a consensus embodying different formulations which reflect the different bodies of concern.

There are other items on the international disarmament agenda of which we must not lose sight. For our part, for example, we retain our special interest in a "cut-off" of the production of nuclear material for weapons, as described in our information paper, CD/90. There are also deliberative and political forums in which we are willing to address issues appropriate to them.

But Australia's approach to the Committee on Disarmament, here and now, is simply this: no polemics; no political statements; just a determined, realistic attempt to get results.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank our distinguished colleague from Australia for his statement and also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair. I should also like to repair an omission and to say to the distinguished representative of the Democratic Republic of Germany that I thank him, too, for his kind words to the Chair.

Mr. RUZEK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, may I, first of all, join the previous speakers and welcome you, the distinguished representative of France, in the responsible post of the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February. We believe that under your chairmanship the Committee will succeed in dealing with the necessary organizational questions within a short time and that we will be able to start substantive negotiations as soon as possible.

At the same time I should like to express the appreciation of our delegation to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, the Chairman for the month of August 1980 and the interim period, whose work contributed so much to the final stages of the Committee's 1980 session.

Allow me to take this opportunity to extend my warmest greetings to our new colleagues, Ambassador Malitza of Romania, Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, Ambassador Ahmad of Pakistan and Ambassador Adeito Nzengeya of Zaire. We are looking forward to co-operating with them. Their participation will certainly help to advance our common work.

May I also greet most cordially Mr. Martenson who came from New York to assist at the beginning of our session, Ambassador Jaipal, the Secretary of our Committee, as well as all other members of the Secretariat.

The atmosphere which characterizes international relations at present is generally regarded as disquieting. Disquieting first of all is the fact that the process of the relaxation of international tension -- the prevailing tendency of the decade just terminated -- is being called in question; and what is much more dangerous, that direct attacks are even being made against its foundations. The present campaign directed against the relaxation of international tension is not accidental. In the present policy of the NATO countries fully apparent and documented proofs of the endeavour to reverse the historically established relationship of forces in the world to their advantage are to be found. We need only recall the decision of the NATO Council in May 1978 concerning the increase of military budgets by its members up to the year 2,000 as well as their far-reaching armament programmes, the decision of the same body in December 1979 on the basis of which the already extensive arsenals of weapons in Europe are to be "supplemented", with the addition of hundreds of further United States medium-range nuclear-missiles directed against the USSR and other European countries of the socialist community, Directive No. 59 of the President of the United States issued last year, which establishes the so-called new nuclear strategy of the United States, or the postponement of the ratification of the SALT II Treaty, which could become one of the most effective obstacles to the further stockpiling of the most destructive and most expensive types of weapons. These and a number of other decisions represent the sources of negative phenomena in the world developments. These and a number of other measures are direct attacks against the policy of peaceful co-existence of States with different social systems.

The process of the relaxation of international tension, about whose beneficial influence on the development of relations among all States of the

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

world there can be no doubt, is indisputably exposed to a severe test. Every realistically thinking man, however, sees clearly that it is in the interest of all to find a way out from the present complicated international situation and to continue the relaxation of international tension.

The countries of the socialist community, and among them the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, have been developing systematic efforts at moving the negotiations forward as far as all disarmament efforts are concerned. This is also clear from the far-reaching programme adopted last year at the Warsaw meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member States. The Warsaw Declaration contains a broad programme of proposals for the strengthening of peace, international security and the achievement of tangible progress in the field of disarmament. It is a programme of peace, which corresponds to the vital interests of all States and nations of the world. It is at the same time an answer to all those forces which would like to keep the disarmament negotiations in a sort of "idle running" in an effort to defer their own decision on concrete disarmament measures till the period when they will be able, as they obviously believe, to obtain unilateral advantages. However, the solution of the problems of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament requires the systematic, purposeful and constructive co-operation of all participants already now, for the danger of a world conflagration, which is brought nearer by each delay in this field, is growing in a geometrical progression. It would be not only irresponsible but also extremely dangerous to ignore the danger of war and to close our eyes to the necessity of taking energetic measures in order to prevent it.

We are convinced that a significant step toward the reduction of the risks of war and the strengthening of confidence could be the conference on military relaxation and disarmament in Europe, a proposal which -- as the deliberations at the Madrid meeting of the participants in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe show -- is gaining an ever wider response and support. The World Disarmament Conference should exert an influence in the same direction, too. We strongly support the idea that this conference should be convened as soon as possible after the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

The Warsaw Declaration of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty emphasized last year, among other things, the urgent necessity of a successful conclusion of the disarmament negotiations in progress. In this respect we attach a key significance to the constructive activity of our Committee. The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic has on many occasions emphasized and will continue to emphasize that the Committee on Disarmament must actively discharge its duties as the main multilateral negotiating body for the preparation of specific measures in the field of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. It is on this basis that we approach our work in the Committee; and we shall co-operate in every constructive manner with other members in order fully to contribute to the fulfilment of the important tasks placed before the Committee, their urgency being -- in our view -- beyond any doubt. We are convinced that the

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

CD has all the pre-requisites for working successfully and effectively. We believe that this year's session will not be complicated by new attempts to raise issues which cannot be solved here, and that the spirit of realism and constructive co-operation will prevail in this hall especially as far as organizational and procedural problems are concerned.

Among those questions of international policy which agitate people in all corners of our planet, the most significant place is occupied by that of how to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. It would be difficult to enumerate all the speeches and statements of the representatives of States belonging to groups which regard the problems of nuclear disarmament as a priority task of the present time.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, together with the other countries of the socialist community, supports actively an early beginning of deliberations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament. We consider as entirely logical the condition that all member countries of the Committee and -- in the first place -- all permanent members of the Security Council, should join the negotiations. As is known, the socialist countries submitted here in 1978 a proposal for the opening of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (CD/4), which has met with understanding and growing support from all countries. We are of the opinion that the time has come to consider the formation of a working group within the framework of the Committee which should start, without any delay, businesslike discussion on this topic.

Of no less importance in our view is the question of the general and complete prohibition of tests of nuclear weapons. A treaty to this end, the conclusion of which was proposed by the Soviet Union in 1975, would undoubtedly contribute in a considerable measure to the slowing down of the nuclear arms race and to the stopping of the further improvement of nuclear weapons. In this connection we expect that the participants in the tripartite negotiations dealing with the practical solution of this problem will exert maximum efforts and the necessary political will and persistence to bring these negotiations to an early and successful end. We consider the active participation of all five nuclear Powers in the work of the group as a necessary condition for the successful outcome of its work, which in our view should be an elaboration of the CTBT. While negotiating on this problem the Committee and its working group should use also other numerous background materials which have been tabled in the Committee, including the results of the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events.

Among important questions dealt with by the Committee on Disarmament there also belongs the consideration of the problem of the strengthening of the security safeguards of non-nuclear countries. The continuation of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject regarding the content of an international treaty concerning the strengthening of the security safeguards of non-nuclear countries is clearly necessary.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection due consideration should, in our view, be given to the idea that, as a first step on the road towards the conclusion of a treaty, an appropriate solemn declaration should be made by the five nuclear Powers and confirmed by the United Nations Security Council.

The ten years of validity of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have convincingly shown that this Treaty plays a key role in the prevention of the further spreading of nuclear weapons and thus in the lessening of the risk of a nuclear conflict. The obligation to refuse a further proliferation of nuclear weapons has become a widely acknowledged norm of contemporary international law, on which those countries which have not so far signed the Treaty can also rely. All countries benefit in equal measure from the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation and all would lose if this régime were weakened, irrespective of the part of the world in which they are located.

The socialist countries, including the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, have been systematically emphasizing for a long time and continue to emphasize the urgency of taking radical measures to prevent the further misuse of the achievements of science and technology and the waste of human and material resources for the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Being aware of the responsibility we have before future generations, we cannot accept arguments for the further postponement of the solution of this urgent question. We are of the opinion that it would be very useful, for the examination of the possibilities of concluding individual specific agreements, to set up an authoritative group of experts which would simultaneously follow and consider developments in the given field. In addition, the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons submitted to the Committee by the USSR and other socialist countries, is awaiting an early consideration.

The joint Soviet-American draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons in our view represents a balanced basis for an early elaboration of a definitive text. We are convinced that this question, too, should be dealt with in a constructive and realistic spirit without delay in the Ad Hoc Working Group set up for the purpose at the last session.

The Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons last year carried out, under Ambassador Okawa's leadership, useful consideration of the question of the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and destruction of stocks of such weapons. We are of the opinion that if the necessary political will prevails, there will be enough possibilities for the achievement of a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons, including the establishment of an effective system of control. This, however, requires that the negotiations are not hampered by new attempts to create complications. We see a welcome contribution towards the activity of the Working Group in the results of the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the preparation of a draft treaty, since the report on these discussions submitted to the Committee last year showed that further progress had been made.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic attaches considerable importance to the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and, as is known, last year it tabled on behalf of the group of socialist countries a proposal concerning the main elements of such a programme. We believe that further negotiations on this question in the appropriate Ad Hoc Working Group and in the Committee itself will lead to realistic and useful results, and that they will make a fruitful contribution to the work of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are of the opinion that it is necessary to prepare a programme sufficiently broad to embrace all the main directions of negotiations and all the major issues which will have to be resolved. At the same time, the programme should fit into the framework of all world-wide efforts and should represent an instrument acceptable and applicable by all countries and in all spheres, respecting the principle of equality and equal security. Finally, it should reflect all the realities of the present stage of development without setting objectives in an unrealistic way. We consider it necessary that the programme should unite the efforts of States for the resolution of these questions in an atmosphere of fruitful and constructive co-operation.

This year we are entering the second disarmament decade. Furthermore, the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is already in sight. All peace-loving countries and nations expect from this special General Assembly session practical results and concrete progress in the decisive direction of efforts for the cessation of the feverish armaments race and for disarmament. The importance of this year's negotiations in our Committee follows also from the fact that it will be the last complete session of the Committee before the second special session.

We are of the opinion that one of the best ways to ensure the success of this session is to make effective use of the remaining time for initiative and for constructive negotiations in our Committee. In this context let us not forget the idea of purposeful and fruitful international co-operation contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament which was initiated by my country at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, as a State in the heart of Europe — a continent with the highest concentration of military potential and a continent whose nations have experienced the horrors of world wars — always was and will be prepared to contribute effectively to international co-operation in the field of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador Ruzek for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, let me begin by expressing the great satisfaction of my delegation at your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee. I am confident that your great diplomatic skill and your profound knowledge in matters concerning arms control and disarmament will enable you successfully to guide our Committee in this important phase of our session. I assure you that my delegation will do everything in its power to help you in your responsible task.

I should like to take this opportunity to thank the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, who, in bringing our negotiations to a close last year, showed great patience and displayed a very careful approach to the difficult problems which arose. I wish to congratulate him on that success.

It is a particular pleasure for me to welcome to the Committee, on behalf of my delegation, four new colleagues, the distinguished Ambassadors of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire. I pledge to them to continue the excellent co-operation which my delegation enjoyed with their respective predecessors.

The restructured Committee on Disarmament has this month entered its third year of negotiations. In 1979, the Committee undertook mainly preparatory and organizational work. One of the more important results of that year was the adoption of the decalogue of long-term objectives in the field of disarmament which sets the framework for the Committee's activity.

Last year, substantive negotiations started with the establishment of the four ad hoc working groups. In spite of a difficult international climate which did not fail to exert its influence on the Committee's work, a common effort made it possible to bring the 1980 session to a successful conclusion. It is true that the momentum in the different working groups was of varying impact; it can be said, however, that some steps were taken in each group which led to a clarification of the respective items under review.

My delegation hopes that this work can be actively continued and even considerably intensified during this year's session. We know that this will not be easy.

One thing remains clear to my delegation: negotiations on disarmament cannot be disconnected from the international political situation. It would be an illusion were we to believe that such negotiations could proceed in an ivory tower, without taking note of what goes on in the world outside our council-chamber.

That is why my Government sincerely hopes that obstacles which impede speedier progress in our negotiations will be removed and that no new ones will be added. In this connexion it would be of great significance if the appeal contained in resolution 35/37 adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan were to be implemented.

It is, however, precisely in difficult international circumstances such as those which we encounter today that our Committee gains increased significance for the dialogue between nations. My delegation therefore is of the opinion that a successful outcome of this year's session is of particular importance for the international situation. In order to live up to the expectations of the international community, the Committee should focus its attention on those items more likely to be solved.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

For the same reasons, we should avoid a protracted debate on organizational matters. We all recall the difficulties the Committee encountered last year before the actual work could commence. This not only took valuable time away from the working groups; it also gave the international community an unfavourable impression of the Committee's capability to solve its tasks. Although the chairmen of the four working groups directed their work with great ability and in all seriousness, everybody was aware at the end of last year's session that the time available had been too short for an in-depth discussion, let alone for the negotiation of texts, which is, after all, the real task of the Committee.

We should see to it that such a delay does not occur again. To this aim, I should like to suggest that the working groups start their work immediately under the mandates established in 1980 in order to allow them to continue last year's deliberations and to arrive at concrete texts to be referred to the plenary for decision. The Committee could, parallel to the on-going negotiations in the working groups, take up in plenary any questions which members might deem of importance. This procedure would, without prejudging the final number and respective mandates of the working groups, ensure the early commencement of substantive negotiations.

In all negotiations, whether within this Committee or outside its purview, the Federal Republic of Germany will be guided by the objective of contributing to peace and security, of establishing stable and balanced military relationships, and of developing a security partnership between States in all parts of the world.

Negotiations on arms control and disarmament can only be successful if they are orientated towards the establishment of a stable military equilibrium and assure undiminished security and independence of all States at each stage of the arms control and disarmament process. They must be pursued in a realistic manner and must aim at concrete and verifiable results. Special emphasis should be placed on those fields where effective agreements under efficient international control can most readily be achieved.

The concept of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany regarding arms control and disarmament negotiations is germane to these basic requirements. The building of confidence among States on one hand and the necessity for adequate verification of agreements on the other hand are the corner-stones of this concept. It is aimed at bringing about concrete, balanced and verifiable measures which increase confidence among States and limit the arms competition through concrete and balanced reduction and limitation agreements. Such measures help create, in our opinion, conditions in which the release of resources which have hitherto been devoted to military purposes to economic and social development becomes possible.

One of the important developments in the field of arms control and disarmament is the SALT process. Balanced results in this process which contribute to a more stable nuclear relationship between the Powers involved will be of great significance in the effort to enhance peace and security. This is why the Federal Republic of Germany has, from the very outset, attached great importance to the SALT negotiations. We welcome the beginning of talks between the United States of America and the Soviet Union on the limitation of nuclear medium-range systems as part of the SALT process in Geneva last year, and we hope that it will be possible to achieve concrete results in future negotiations on the basis of parity and equality for both sides.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

My Government attaches great importance to the on-going talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Vienna. In order to facilitate these negotiations the western negotiators have proposed the conclusion of an interim agreement including a package of associated measures designed to guarantee observance of such an agreement, ensure greater transparency of military activities and thus strengthen mutual confidence among the negotiating States. The West is still waiting for a comprehensive Eastern answer, in particular for a concrete contribution to solve the data question.

The western participants in the negotiations strive for a more stable relationship of forces at a lower level as a means of achieving genuine parity in military manpower in the form of a common collective ceiling for each side on the basis of agreed data.

The policy which my Government pursues, together with our allies, thus fully corresponds with paragraph 32 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The on-going deliberations on the military aspects of security at the follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe being held at Madrid provide an opportunity for new impulses in the multilateral efforts to promote arms control and thus enhance security in Europe. The confidence-building process initiated by the Conference at Helsinki in 1975 must be pursued and extended. In order to achieve this, new, more effective and more far-reaching measures must be developed. In this spirit, my Government supports the proposal submitted by the French delegation at Madrid, which aims at the adoption by the follow-up meeting of a concrete and substantial mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe to be held within the framework of the CSCE. This mandate must make clear that the objective of this conference will be to agree upon new militarily significant, binding and verifiable confidence-building measures which must be applicable to the entire European continent.

Let me come back to the negotiations in our Committee. I shall not now go into any details as to which priorities we should set for this year's deliberations. I shall merely stress once more that, in the opinion of my Government, the early commencement of the work in the working groups is of primary importance. This would not only increase the chances of the Committee being in a position to submit the comprehensive programme of disarmament to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament, but it would also provide an opportunity for the continuation of the negotiations on a ban on the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons on the basis of the substantive report of the two negotiating parties, the United States and the Soviet Union. In this field particularly, a reliable verification procedure seems indispensable. The absence of any verification procedure with regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use of biological and chemical weapons, led to lengthy discussions at last year's session of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly at the thirty-fifth session. My Government therefore welcomes resolution 35/144 C which requests the Secretary-General to set up an impartial fact-finding mission to investigate alleged violations of the Geneva Protocol.

As to radiological weapons, this is the only item with respect to which the elements for a treaty are already on the table and can thus be negotiated. The existence of this joint proposal by the United States of America and the USSR as such is an asset which the Committee should make use of.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic of Germany)

As for the negative security assurances, my delegation feels that efforts should be made to come to conclusions on the basis of the in-depth discussions held during the two previous years.

This will be the last full session of the Committee before the beginning of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982. If we want to achieve substantive results to present to that session, we will have to achieve them now.

We should therefore concentrate our efforts on those items where such results can now be reached. My Government is confident that, if we work along the lines laid down above, the work of this Committee during the year 1981 will be a successful one.

The CHAIRMAN: (translated from French): I thank our distinguished colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement. I also thank him for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Do any other delegations wish to take the floor?

In view of the time, I think we should put off to this afternoon the informal meeting we decided to hold today. That meeting is to be devoted to a continuation of the discussions we have begun on the draft agenda and programme of work, and we could also, if we have the time, begin the consideration of the requests that have been submitted concerning the participation in our work of States not members of the Committee.

I am informed that the Group of 21 wishes to hold a consultation meeting. In view of the hour, I think the group could meet in this room after this plenary meeting.

So, then, if the Committee agrees, we shall meet again this afternoon for an informal meeting.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

ERRATUM TO CD/PV.103

Replace page 3 of the list "PRESENT AT THE TABLE" by the following:

<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILA Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. M. RUZEK Mr. P. LUKES Mr. A. CIMA Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ
<u>Egypt:</u>	Mr. E.A. EL REEDY Mr. I.A. HASSAN Miss W. BASIM
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. T. TERREFE Mr. F. YOHANNES
<u>France:</u>	Mr. F. DE LA GORCE Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE Mr. M. COUTHURES
<u>German Democratic Republic:</u>	Mr. G. HERDER Mr. H. THIELICKE Mr. M. SCHNEIDER Mr. M. KAULFUSS Mr. P. BUNTIG
<u>Germany, Federal Republic of:</u>	Mr. G. PFEIFFER Mr. N. KLINGLER
<u>Hungary:</u>	Mr. I. KOMIVES Mr. C. GYORFFY
<u>India:</u>	Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN Mr. S. SARAN
<u>Indonesia:</u>	Mr. S. DARUSMAN Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO Mr. F. QASIM Mr. KARYONO
<u>Iran:</u>	Mr. D. AMERI

CD/PV.103
10 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. MAATI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NICRFALISSE
Miss G. VANDENBERGH

Brazil: Mr. C.A. SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. C. CACCIA
Mr. B. THACKER

China: Mr. LIANG Yufen
Mr. PAN Ju-Sheng
Mrs. GE Yi-Yun

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. E.A. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
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Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
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German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. SCHMEIDER
Mr. M. KAUFUSS
Mr. P. BÜNTIG
Mr. G. PFEIFFER
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Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. G. GYORFFY

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Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. B. SOEPRAPTO
Mr. P. QASIM
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. A. SKALLI
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. J.O. COKER
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMED
Mr. M. AKRAM

Peru: Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. B. RUSSIN
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania:

Mr. L. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV
Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.V. LOSHCHININE
Mr. A.G. DOULYAN
Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mr. B. NOBLE
Mrs. J.I. LINK
Mr. E. YEO

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. J.A. MISKEL
Mr. H. WILSON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT
Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC
Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. LONGO BEKPWA
Mr. OSIL GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee on Disarmament:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, I must, of course, warmly congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of our Committee for the month of February, but just as warmly I have to congratulate you on the extremely efficient manner in which you have been guiding us since last week in our consideration of procedural matters which need to be taken care of at the beginning of our session. I am sure I am not the only one who hopes that the results of our first week augur well for the rest of our work in the weeks and months ahead. May I express my delegation's gratitude to your predecessor, Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia, for the solid work he did for us last August, notably in the delicate task of securing the adoption of our report to the General Assembly.

Finally, I wish to join those who have preceded me in welcoming amongst us this year Ambassador El Reedy of Egypt, Ambassador Mansur Ahmad of Pakistan, Ambassador Malita of Romania and Ambassador Bagbeni of Zaire, while regretting the departures of their respective predecessors.

Japan has pleaded time and again that the task of the greatest urgency in the field of disarmament is the achievement of nuclear disarmament. However, we have maintained the view that, in order to make progress towards nuclear disarmament, the only realistic approach is to lay one brick upon another and gradually accumulate concrete measures which are actually feasible under the international situation prevailing at the moment. While doing so, we must for ever bear in mind the need not to upset the framework of the security balance in any given region or the global framework of international security. It goes without saying that it is the nuclear-weapon States which have the foremost responsibility to move forward in the direction of nuclear disarmament and that it is those States which must take specific steps to apply the brakes to the development and production of even more nuclear weapons. May I inform this Committee that Mr. Masayoshi Ito, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, stated in his foreign policy speech to the two Houses of the Diet on 26 January 1981 that "Japan is resolved, as a nation dedicated to peace and as a Party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to play a greater role in promoting disarmament and especially nuclear disarmament".

The promotion of nuclear disarmament is also of the highest importance in preserving and strengthening the non-proliferation régime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In this context, we must recall that, at the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty held in Geneva last summer, virtually all countries stressed the urgency of reaching agreement on a comprehensive nuclear test ban -- a question that has been pending on the disarmament agenda ever since 1963 -- which would represent one specific step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. My Government once again urges the three States engaged in tripartite negotiations on a comprehensive test ban to strengthen their efforts towards a speedy conclusion of their negotiations. At the same time, my delegation wishes to appeal to all the distinguished delegates around this table, and to the Governments they represent, to agree that the question of a comprehensive test ban be taken up for consideration at this session of the Committee on Disarmament as the agenda item of the highest priority. From that point of view, the Government of Japan strongly hopes that

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

a consensus can be arrived at in this room -- a consensus including the representatives of all the nuclear-weapon States -- to undertake a substantive consideration of the CTB question at this session of our Committee, including, inter alia, the institutional and administrative aspects of the envisaged international seismic data exchange and the verification system in general. My delegation hopes that such a consensus would cover the methodology of the Committee's substantive considerations, including the possibility of establishing a working group as a subsidiary organ of the Committee on Disarmament. It goes without saying that the work on the CTB to be undertaken in this Committee should be conducted in a manner and to an extent that would be complementary and not prejudicial to the ongoing trilateral negotiations.

A further step in strengthening the non-proliferation régime is the achievement of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It has recently been reported that the Government of Egypt has taken the decision to begin the process of ratifying that Treaty. The Government of Japan welcomes this news and wishes to pay tribute to the Government of Egypt for its statesmanlike decision, since the adherence of Egypt to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be of the highest significance in the context of international efforts towards universalization of the Treaty and the denuclearization of the region of the Middle East. My Government wishes to take this occasion to appeal to the two nuclear-weapon States and the remaining non-nuclear-weapon States who have so far stayed outside the NPT régime to follow the momentous example of Egypt at the earliest possible opportunity.

In a more general context, the state of international tension is continuing in the wake of various regional confrontations, conflicts and military intervention that have been witnessed in the course of the last few years. This is to be regretted. However, it is important from the point of view of achieving strategic stability between East and West and promoting nuclear disarmament that the East-West dialogue in the field of disarmament and arms control should not be allowed to stagnate, but rather that it be promoted and accelerated. It is in this sense that my Government wishes to express its emphatic hope that the Soviet Union and the United States will continue their talks -- the so-called SALT process -- on the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and the mutual restraining of the never-ending qualitative improvement of those weapons.

Our work in the Committee on Disarmament must also move ahead and we must follow up on the results of our work at last year's session. My delegation appreciated the fact that last year we were able to establish four ad hoc working groups and that each of them was able to do some useful work in its respective field. My delegation therefore requests that the four working groups of last year be re-established and recommence their work without delay, from the beginning of this session, as each of them recommended in its report to the Committee last year.

In particular, my delegation hopes that an Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons will be established without delay and that it will be enabled to continue and advance the work which was undertaken by its predecessor last year. We would welcome a more positive and precise mandate being agreed upon by consensus for this Working Group, but if that were to create difficulties, the Working Group should at least start working immediately, under a mandate identical to that of last year, while discussions could be held separately on the elaboration of a new mandate.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

My delegation considers this to be the most practical way in which to proceed. We would, of course, support the continuation of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the creation of two other working groups to deal with negative security assurances and radiological weapons, respectively, which would continue the work of their predecessors under identical mandates. I thus fully endorse the constructive suggestion on this matter that we heard last week from Ambassador Venkateswaran, my distinguished colleague from India. As to the other disarmament matters which figure on our agenda, we look forward to their continued consideration at this session of the Committee.

With the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament looming ahead of us for next year, the responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament is of even greater significance at its 1981 session. We have begun our work in a most efficient manner under your inspired guidance, Mr. Chairman, and my delegation very sincerely hopes that we shall be able to continue in this manner, without having to devote too much time to procedural questions and moving ahead into the consideration of matters of substance as quickly as possible. It is my happy feeling that all delegations around this table share the same sentiment and are willing to try to make progress at this session in the true spirit of international co-operation.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Okawa for his statement and I should like to express my great gratitude for the very kind and friendly remarks he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): At the beginning of my statement I should like to thank you for the words of welcome which you, as well as my colleagues, have addressed to me. I should like to assure you of my most sincere desire to maintain and develop the co-operation already established in the Committee with my predecessors.

Allow me to express the satisfaction I feel on joining the Committee at a time when the Chair is occupied by the representative of a great country which encourages reflection upon and research into the vital problems of mankind, among which disarmament occupies an important place. Your style, imbued as it is with flexibility and tact, reveals the negotiator. You are, Mr. Chairman, one of that breed of great French diplomats who have been raised on the wise counsels of Monsieur de Callières, written in 1716.

It was he who said that the good negotiator should aim above all at long-term success based on good faith, remembering that he will have many an issue to negotiate in the course of his career.

In this connection I wish to stress the fact that our Committee is a negotiating forum. Of course, diplomacy has a parliamentary side to it, with the fine rhetoric and the immediate impact through the mass media that this implies. But, unlike many other forms of co-operation between States, our Committee is also something like a laboratory for working out solutions to the grave and pressing problems created by the arms race.

Such an endeavour calls for the virtues and skills necessary in any negotiating effort, namely, perseverance, imagination in the search for acceptable solutions and the eschewing of polemics. To this should be added the fact that ours are multilateral negotiations, which necessitates in addition a respect for equality, fairness and democracy, principles which, moreover, the General Assembly, at its special session on disarmament, incorporated into the Committee's new structure.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

However, we must not lose sight of a factor of the highest importance, that of time. For, at this stage in the negotiations, no one could express satisfaction with the rate at which they are proceeding. The first session was dominated by the elaboration of the rules of procedure; the second was devoted to the establishment of negotiating machinery through the setting up of working groups, a process which took up a great deal of time. The session that has just begun must speed up the rate of its work if it is to meet the demands of international life.

The Romanian delegation wishes clearly to state its belief that it is urgently necessary to proceed, without further delay for procedural or any other reasons, to effective and authentic negotiations -- to the real consideration of the problems on our agenda.

We believe that the Committee must do everything in its power to explore possibilities that might lead to solutions and to find formulas likely to command a consensus.

The general interest of mankind as a whole places the highest responsibility upon us, as the General Assembly at its last session made clear.

Reference is sometimes made to the favourable or less favourable conditions in which the work of our Committee is taking place -- to the temperature, as it were, of the political climate. In that connection I should like to stress that all the processes which characterize or form part of contemporary society combine to plead for the immediate cessation of the arms race, the scale of which has gone far beyond the limits of reason.

In the first place, present weapons systems are a source of insecurity. Their huge quantity, their immense destructive power that makes them capable of annihilating mankind, this whole vast panoply of explosive material that makes us the inglorious holders of a record for per capita armaments expenditure -- a figure far higher than any per capita national income figure or, for that matter, the amount of cereals per inhabitant -- all this can only inspire and maintain a psychosis of fear and insecurity both among governments and among the peoples of the world at large.

Can we speak of security while there is the risk of the outbreak of a conflagration at any moment as a result of unwanted escalation, error, miscalculation or accident?

Technological progress means a constant increase in the speed and precision of weapons. It means also, by the same token, a constant reduction in the time available for decision and in the safety margin, along with all the possibilities for technical errors mentioned by H.E. Alfonso García Robles, the Ambassador of Mexico. New refinements tend to make credible the possibility of the utilization of nuclear weapons.

For all these reasons, the Romanian delegation considers that we are faced with a threat to general security and with ever-increasing risks, bearing in mind that policies of force and domination, of pressure and diktat are still being espoused.

Secondly, the arms race is harmful to world economy. No in-depth analysis of the crises by which the world is beset today, such as the energy crisis, the raw materials crisis or the financial crisis, can overlook the vast sums being spent on arms.

In many countries, the increase in military expenditures is greater than the increase in national income. The 500 billion dollars swallowed up by the arms race each year serve only to intensify the crisis, increase economic instability and help to maintain and aggravate underdevelopment.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

As is pointed out in the 1978 report by the United Nations Secretary-General on the "Economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures", the gigantic sums spent on arms are so many resources diverted from the solution of the problems of mankind, among which development is the first.

Thirdly, the proliferation and refinement of weapons is profoundly harmful to international life through the maintenance of attitudes based on force.

Existing armaments systems inevitably offer themselves as the means of resolving disputes, either by threats or by outright wars. The reduction of armaments must go along with the strengthening and refining of the instruments for the peaceful settlement of disputes provided under the Charter of the United Nations.

All these factors, military, economic and political, have created a new awareness among governments, parliaments, professional groupings and social movements, all of which are calling for a rapid improvement in international relations and for the cessation and reversal of the arms race.

References have been made to the influence of certain political factors or external events on the work of our Committee. I should like to draw attention to the other side of the coin, that is, the influence the Committee could exercise in opposing the mentality of force and the attempts to use force or the threat of force, a mentality engendered by the development of a large number of warlike institutions and systems.

Any good news that may come from our laboratory, any prospect of a solution coming from this quarter, will facilitate the task of political leaders throughout the world, alarmed by the increasing insecurity, deficits and inflation as well as by the crisis in development resources.

Any progress within our Committee will be appreciated even more by the peoples of the world, resolved to defend their right to existence, to life, to survival.

As the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, stated recently: "Our country will always strive tirelessly for the attainment of the great goal of disarmament, and, in the first place, nuclear disarmament. The worthy achievements of modern science and technology must not be used for destruction and war but for the well-being and happiness of the peoples. All the nations of the world must rise resolutely in defence of the fundamental human right -- the right to life, to peace, to a free existence."

Throughout the disarmament negotiations, Romania has always regarded nuclear disarmament as a matter of high priority and has emphasized that it was in this field that the most urgent and far-reaching measures were required. That position remains unchanged, the more so as developments in the nuclear weapons field amply demonstrate that nothing short of their total eradication will provide a definitive answer to problems of security.

This position finds a solid basis in the conclusions of the report of the Group of Experts on a Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons, which emphasizes that "nuclear weapons are the most serious threat to international security" (document A/35/392, p. 153).

The resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, transmitted to the Committee and extensively quoted during our discussions, lay upon us precise obligations.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

It is my delegation's sincere conviction that the Committee must respond to those appeals, which have been repeated ever since the foundation of the United Nations.

A failure to negotiate on the subject of nuclear weapons would be unjustifiable in any disarmament negotiating forum. The Romanian delegation therefore declares itself in favour of an immediate start to concrete negotiations on nuclear disarmament in this Committee.

The conditions necessary for that purpose already exist.

First, all five nuclear-weapon States, as well as a number of non-nuclear States, are taking part in the Committee's work.

Secondly, these topics already appear on the Committee's agenda and have formed the subject of an impressive number of specific proposals.

Thirdly, working groups have proved to be the mechanism best suited for tackling well-defined subjects.

That is why my delegation strongly supports the proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, which should hold discussions with a view to identifying the problems to be negotiated and drawing up a clear programme for the opening and conduct of structured talks capable of leading to the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to the outlawing of such weapons.

We consider it necessary that the Working Group responsible for devising effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons should continue its work. On the basis of the results achieved last year, the Group should concentrate on working out a formula acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States whereby those States will undertake never and under no circumstances to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons, or force in general, against States which do not have such weapons.

The Romanian delegation also supports the proposal of the countries members of the Group of 21 and other countries for the establishment of a working group to undertake negotiations on the substance of an agreement on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

In the light of our position of principle, we also support the proposal made by H.E. Gerhard Herder, Ambassador of the German Democratic Republic, for the establishment of a structure for the elaboration of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

We should also like to stress that the Committee ought to be in a position to report progress to the General Assembly at its session this year on the subjects of non-resort to nuclear weapons, which was mentioned by the Indian delegation, and cessation of the manufacture of fissionable materials for military purposes, to which the Australian delegation has referred.

As a European country, Romania is deeply alarmed by the military situation in this region of the world, which houses 80 per cent of the world's arsenals, and by the prospect of a new escalation of nuclear arms on the continent of Europe. We earnestly hope that the meeting now in progress at Madrid will decide to convene a conference on confidence-building measures and disarmament in Europe, which should elaborate concrete measures towards the cessation of the arms race and the reduction of the military potential existing on this continent.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

Nuclear disarmament questions have, of course, formed the subject of negotiations in other forums, and I refer to the strategic arms limitation talks between the USSR and the United States, known as SALT. Romania welcomed the conclusion of the SALT II agreements and we hope that these agreements will be ratified in the near future, for that will be an important step forward, opening the way to further measures aimed at effectively halting the nuclear arms race.

The concentration of our efforts on nuclear disarmament in no way means that we should ignore the urgency of measures aimed at the prohibition of other weapons of mass destruction, and first and foremost chemical weapons. The Romanian delegation is in favour of the continuation of efforts to draft an international convention on this subject. The useful work done last year within the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, as well as the informal meetings with experts, in our view offer a basis from which the Committee can proceed to a higher stage, that of negotiations on the drafting of the text of an international agreement on the complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. This qualitative aspect should be reflected in the Working Group's activities; the conclusion of the Soviet Union-United States negotiations in this connection could greatly contribute to the attainment of this objective.

As at the last session, we intend to make a constructive contribution to the preparation of the text of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, on the basis of the joint draft submitted by the delegations of the USSR and the United States of America and the proposals put forward by other States in the course of the previous negotiations.

There is something paradoxical about the fact that the development of science and technology, which bring so many benefits to mankind in all spheres, is also a driving force in the arms race.

The use of new discoveries for the purpose of producing ever more destructive weapons cannot fail to cause us concern. At the stage we have reached in our consideration of this question, it is important for us to take a decision as to the manner in which we are to continue our work. In view of the highly technical nature of the subject, we support the proposal for the setting up of an ad hoc group of scientific experts with a mandate to study the problems caused by new types of weapons and the question of the conclusion of an agreement or agreements aimed at the effective prevention of the use of science and technology for the development of weapons of mass destruction.

The Romanian delegation considers that pending the conclusion of a general agreement on this subject, States which have the necessary technological potential should undertake to take appropriate steps at the national level for the prevention of the utilization of the attainments of science and technology for destructive ends.

As H.E. Olu Ideniji, the Ambassador of Nigeria, rightly pointed out, the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, as required of us by the United Nations, is of special urgency this year in view of the preparations in progress for the second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. This task reflects the urgent need to formulate, in a concrete and binding manner, a strategy and a practical negotiating programme aimed at mobilizing all efforts in favour of general and complete disarmament, and in the first instance nuclear disarmament. The inclusion in the document, in addition to concrete disarmament measures, of provisions likely to contribute to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and to increasing its effectiveness in the co-ordination and the supervision of the efforts undertaken in various negotiating forums ought, given present international conditions, to be a major objective of our endeavours.

(Mr. Halita, Romania)

At this point in my statement I should like to sum up the Romanian delegation's position with regard to the various proposals made in the Committee. We believe that all these initiatives reflect the real advantages to be derived from using the working instruments which the ad hoc groups are considered to be. It should be stressed, however, that our discussions in this connection ought not delay the immediate commencement of work by the four Groups which were already in operation last year.

The matter of setting up flexible and practical subsidiary bodies of the Committee for the purpose of considering solutions or bringing us up to date on certain problems, should not be raised to the level of institutional and political questions, as has sometimes been the case in the past. A negotiating forum like ours should adopt a much freer approach towards the problems with which it is concerned. It is in that spirit that the Romanian delegation intends before long to raise the question of the freezing and reduction of military budgets. We attach special importance to this problem, which is written into the Committee's decalogue. The argument concerning the "maturing" of certain subjects cannot and should not discourage us from examining them; we are convinced that negotiation itself helps to mature a subject.

I should also like to emphasize that according to the terms of the "Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade", adopted by General Assembly resolution 35/46 of 3 December 1980, "... it is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present world armaments situation, so that world public opinion will be mobilized on behalf of peace and disarmament. This will be of great importance to the strengthening of international peace and security, the just and peaceful resolution of disputes and conflicts and effective disarmament". In our view, the manner in which the Committee on Disarmament could contribute towards a closer link with public opinion, by ensuring that it is better informed about the Committee's activities, should also be a subject for our attention. The Romanian delegation intends, at an appropriate time, to submit concrete proposals on this point.

We appreciate the broadening of the debate on disarmament among men of science and the objective and lucid sense of responsibility they are displaying in face of the dangers engendered by armaments and the use of science for military ends. In that context, we welcome the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research and we express the hope that the Institute will direct its work towards the major objectives defined in United Nations documents. Among the small and medium-sized developing countries the need is felt for scientific research capable of providing effective support to disarmament efforts.

As H.E. Mrs. Inga Thorsson, the distinguished representative of Sweden, pointed out, this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament is taking place under the sign of the second special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, whose task it will be to make a public evaluation of the results we have achieved. If those results are deemed inadequate, the reasons for this, including the Committee's work structures, might well be subject to very close scrutiny.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 35/152J our Committee, as the single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, should play the central role in substantive negotiations on priority questions of disarmament by combining its efforts with those undertaken in other forums.

In concluding these introductory remarks, allow me to emphasize that any delay in solving the problems before us will lead to situations of still greater complexity. We all agree that much simpler solutions might have been found in the early stages of modern weapons systems. Time does not ease the negotiators' task. My delegation is sincerely convinced that we have not reached irreversible situations. That is why it will spare no effort at this stage to try to help make our negotiations meaningful and fruitful.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Malita for his statement and I am especially grateful to him for the very kind and friendly terms in which he spoke of me. I should add that I was particularly touched by his reference to Mr. de Callières. Times have changed, but there is no doubt that the precepts contained in his work still retain a great deal of their value.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, I should like to add my voice to that of others who have already expressed their pleasure at your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee. The way you have been conducting our discussions leads us to think that this session of the Committee on Disarmament may prove to be more productive than we would have dared to hope. At the same time, my delegation is encouraged by the general desire that has been apparent in the Committee for the speedy completion of consideration of the agenda. We believe that the part you have played in this process has been crucial, and we should like to congratulate you on it.

I should also like to associate myself with my colleagues in welcoming to the Committee the new representatives of Egypt, Pakistan, Zaire and Romania. My delegation is convinced that the personal contributions of these representatives will be of value to the Committee in its deliberations.

My statement today will be brief. I want simply to survey in outline form the prospects for this year's session of the Committee as we see them. If I refer to the role and objectives that should be expected of this forum at this session, I do so without any intention of recounting today the history of past deliberations of the Committee on Disarmament, or for that matter of proposing any new measures. Instead, I do so at this juncture in the history of the Committee, and bearing in mind the events outside these chambers which inevitably affect our work, in order to stress the view of my Government that it is incumbent upon us to adopt the most practical and business-like approach possible to our work, and to aim at what realistically we might expect to achieve.

I accordingly hope that the Committee this year will proceed on the basis of three fundamental considerations:

- (1) Our proceedings should go forward on a basis of what is possible in the period leading up to the second special session on disarmament in full recognition of the fact that the Committee on Disarmament does not work in a vacuum, but is influenced by the international environment. In this regard we need to be sensitive to this environment, and if we are to achieve progress our aims for this session, and for others, must be fine-tuned accordingly.
- (2) We should therefore limit our objectives to realistic proposals lending themselves to items where prospects of agreement are high or where we have reasonable chances of achieving consensus. Only through registering progress can we be confident that the credibility of the CD will be strengthened.
- (3) In this regard, I suggest that it is particularly important that this Committee show progress now. We welcome the forthcoming and flexible attitudes expressed by many delegations and their determination to avoid the lengthy treatment of organizational and procedural questions which consumed so much time at the session of the Committee on Disarmament in 1980.

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

With these considerations in mind, I agree with those speakers who have urged that working groups be convened as soon as possible; I also agree with those who have suggested that the four working groups established last year--- the working groups on negative security assurances, chemical weapons, radiological weapons and the comprehensive programme of disarmament--- should be re-established or continued on the basis of their mandates of last year. New mandates if eventually needed or desirable can be taken up by the Committee on Disarmament in parallel with the substantive work of those working groups, and when that work demonstrates the desirability of change. This is the kind of business-like and flexible approach appropriate to a negotiating forum of this kind.

I would now like to prognosticate on the outcome of those working groups, if as we hope, they are able to commence work at once:

(a) The chemical weapons and radiological weapons working groups: our assessment is that conditions are favourable for progress in these working groups if all parties maintain a sense of realism.

(b) Comprehensive programme of disarmament: the work of this working group is most relevant to preparations for the United Nations General Assembly's second special session on disarmament, and should proceed firmly and quickly, bearing in mind the work programme established by the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

(c) Negative security assurances: this working group has performed a valuable if difficult function of clarifying the issues and differences involved. The time may now be right for early consultation outside the working group framework by those most directly involved to determine whether at this stage, and how, further progress within the working group will be possible.

As for the proposed establishment of a working group on a comprehensive test ban, we believe that the effectiveness of any working group on this or any other question depends upon the adoption of a realistic mandate acceptable to all and particularly to those most directly concerned. This should be borne in mind in our deliberations on the creation of this working group, which we wish to see established at the earliest possible date. I repeat, however, that we want an effective working group, and that means there must be a readiness on all sides to consider the mandate question seriously and realistically. My Government holds firmly to the belief that we are not here to score debating points.

On the basis of these considerations and prognostications, which I know are shared by a great many other members of the Committee, I hope that it will be possible at this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament to move ahead in a business-like and constructive manner, that we will register substantive progress before the second special session in 1982, and that we shall build on the glimmering of progress recorded last year in the substantive efforts of our working groups, to make the Committee on Disarmament the true negotiating forum on disarmament matters it is intended-- and expected by the world-- to be.

Finally, and in the spirit of the remarks I just made concerning the interest in our work of those usually outside this Committee, I want to say the following. A week ago, we had a manifestation of the interest of youth on the occasion of the presentation of a book on disarmament written specially for them. Today I want to

(Mr. McPhail, Canada)

draw the attention of the Committee to a different and certainly no less significant manifestation of such interest. I am pleased to tell the Committee that we have duly informed the Secretary of the presence within the Canadian delegation today and for the next two weeks of two parliamentary advisers: Mr. Charles Caccia and Mr. Blaine Thacker, who represent respectively the Government party and the Official Opposition in the Canadian Parliament. Mr. Caccia in particular has been involved in disarmament and security questions in the Inter-Parliamentary Union and as adviser at the Madrid Conference. They are here to familiarize themselves with the work of the Committee and look forward to its plenary discussions and to the opportunity to meet members of other delegations for informal exchanges of views on the subjects before us.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank His Excellency Ambassador McPhail for his statement and I should also like to express to him all my gratitude for his very kind words about myself. I take this opportunity to welcome Mr. Charles Caccia and Mr. Blaine Thacker and I wish them an interesting stay among us.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): We extend greetings to you in the post of Chairman of the Committee as the representative of a country which has done much to reduce tensions in Europe and other parts of the world. The Soviet delegation hopes that, as Chairman at the initial stage of the Committee's activities this year, you will direct all your outstanding experience and knowledge of international affairs towards ensuring that our common endeavour gets off to a good start and that our work is business-like and productive.

The session of the Committee on Disarmament now beginning is notable in many respects. From the point of view of working time, it is really the last full session before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982. This places a special responsibility upon all States represented in the Committee. On their political will, their readiness to reach real agreements in the disarmament sphere, will depend-- among other things-- the judgement passed on the Committee's activities at the special session.

The start of our Committee's work coincides with the resumption of the Madrid meeting, whose object is to reach agreements in the interests of the security and peaceful future of the European peoples, agreements which should, in particular, open the way for the convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. Multilateral negotiations on the joint reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe are continuing in Vienna. We believe that the accomplishment of positive results in the Committee on Disarmament and constructive, business-like negotiations within the Committee would be conducive to progress in those important international forums as well.

I should also like to draw attention to the fact that the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and congresses of other parties of the fraternal socialist countries are to be held during the period of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. The socialist countries have always played and are playing an active, constructive part in all the most important areas of our multilateral body's activity and in solving problems of disarmament as a whole. To mention only the past year, the socialist countries have to their credit a broad

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programme of specific measures for the strengthening of peace and détente put forward at the May meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, business-like proposals on the same subject drawn up in October 1980 at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, and initiatives by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament and in other disarmament negotiating forums.

The decisions of the forthcoming 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the congresses of other parties of socialist countries, which always devote considerable attention to questions of strengthening peace and détente and reducing the danger of war, will without doubt make a fresh contribution towards the struggle of the peoples for the curbing of the arms race.

As is well known, the Soviet Union has constantly singled out the problem of disarmament, both as a whole and in its various aspects, as being of prime importance among the problems of contemporary international life whose solution brooks no delay. "The foreign policy of the Soviet Union," L.I. Brezhnev emphasized in his New Year's message of greetings to the Soviet people, "is pursuing clear and noble aims. We want peace for all peoples. Our allegiance to the ideals of freedom, justice and progress is unshakeable. The Soviet Union resolutely champions détente and the strengthening of co-operation, and opposes a firm 'no' to the arms race and to the complications and conflicts engendered by imperialist policies".

We are firmly convinced that the world can find genuine security, not through an endless succession of ever more terrifying and, by the same token, ever more expensive means of warfare, but by restraining the pace and the scale of the arms race until it is completely halted. Proceeding from the principle that there are no international problems that could not be solved through negotiations with reasonable regard for mutual interests, our country makes concrete and practically realizable proposals in the disarmament field. During the period since the Second World War, the USSR has put forward more than one hundred proposals of this kind, from those relating to individual measures -- and this applies particularly to the banning of atomic and, later, of thermonuclear weapons -- to general and complete disarmament.

At the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet delegation put forward, as is known, a broad programme of urgent measures aimed at reducing the danger of war. In the interests of improving the effectiveness of work in specific areas of the struggle for peace and the security of peoples, the Soviet Union submitted to the session of the General Assembly a memorandum entitled "Peace, disarmament and international security guarantees". The most important among the more than 40 resolutions on disarmament questions approved by the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session are based on proposals by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries dictated by a concern for the improvement of the political climate throughout the planet and the deepening of the process of détente. As the results of the General Assembly's work in this sphere demonstrate, a significant majority of States are resolutely in favour of placing disarmament on a track leading towards practical solutions and of taking without delay steps -- not, perhaps the most radical steps, but real ones nevertheless -- on the path towards the elimination of military confrontation. The conviction is growing throughout the world that the 1980s must become the decade of genuine advances in the limitation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

And this needs to be done without delay, for, as the Memorandum of the Soviet Union submitted at the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly points out, the arms race is in certain fields "approaching a point beyond which it may become impossible to curb it effectively by means of agreements based on mutual verification". This applies, first and foremost, to the development of strategic weapons. As is generally recognized, the success of the SALT process forms the core of international security as a whole. It is not by accident, after all, that one of the resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly contains an urgent appeal not to delay any further the implementation of the SALT-II treaty. The entire responsibility for the fact that the treaty has not yet entered into force rests with the United States. The provisions of the SALT-II treaty touch upon the most important aspects of the security of the Soviet Union and the United States. Our country, as has been repeatedly stated at the highest level, finds completely unacceptable an approach which would place one of the parties in a position of advantage in relation to the other. In his telegram of greetings to Mr. R. Reagan, the new President of the United States, L.I. Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union favours a positive development of relations between the USSR and the United States and their constructive co-operation in solving urgent international problems, which, together with the efforts of all other States, would best serve the ends of improving the international situation and strengthening peace.

The Soviet Union's unwavering desire to unravel the tight knots of conflict situations in various corners of our planet is supported by concrete initiatives. The international community received with profound interest and attention, in particular, the new important proposals on ways of ensuring peace and security in the Persian Gulf area advanced by L.I. Brezhnev during his recent visit to India. These proposals, which provide for the conclusion of an appropriate agreement between the countries of the region, the Soviet Union, the United States of America, other Western Powers, China, Japan and all States interested in the matter, offer a real possibility for the attainment of lasting peace in one of the world's most explosive areas.

It goes without saying that the present state of international affairs cannot fail to arouse the concern of all those who hold dear the interests of peace and the security of peoples. The actions of the forces of militarism, aggression and oppression threaten to bring to nought all the positive results achieved during the past decade towards the development of mutual understanding, trust and peaceful co-operation among peoples and States. The fly-wheel of the continuing lethal armaments race is spinning more and more uncontrollably. Mankind has no loftier or more noble task than that of halting this process, preventing a world catastrophe, preserving détente and proceeding on the path of strengthening international peace and security, the path of disarmament.

We consider that the Committee on Disarmament, which remains a viable, representative and effective body in the disarmament field under present conditions, when the machinery of a number of bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations has ceased to function, is called upon to play a role of considerable importance in this matter. As one of the initiators of the establishment of this multilateral negotiating body, the Soviet Union has, throughout the entire period of existence of the Committee on Disarmament, repeatedly submitted various proposals both of a general and of a specific nature for the Committee's consideration. Many of these have been put into effect in specific multilateral agreements halting the arms race in certain fields.

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

This year, too, the Soviet delegation, together with the delegations of other countries, intends to work actively towards the productive consideration of items on the agenda for the current session, so that the greatest possible headway may be made. The Committee's agenda is very heavy. It includes such important items as the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition of chemical weapons, the prohibition of radiological weapons and of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the preparation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States and other problems. These questions are at different stages of consideration; with regard to some of them, a sufficiently solid basis for the attainment of agreement already exists, while in respect of others Committee members are still groping for approaches and business-like negotiations have not really yet begun. We are aware that all these questions are extremely serious and that they touch upon many aspects of a political, military and technical nature and therefore call for comprehensive and thorough examination.

In a recent article published in the review "Kommunist", A.A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, wrote: "If a possibility is found which, when realized, will open up the prospect of solving any question in this field, it will be enough to call, 'Eureka!' and the Soviet Union will be prepared to react positively to such an idea or proposal, no matter from whom it may emanate. The Soviet Union claims no monopoly in putting forward such initiatives. Any State can advance them. All that is needed are good intentions."

Despite the existence of considerable difficulties (which, incidentally, are sometimes artificially created), the Soviet delegation, remaining within the bounds of realism, believes that, given goodwill and the appropriate desire on the part of participants in the Committee, significant progress can be achieved in our common work and the consideration of specific items can culminate in concrete agreements. We think that what matters most is to concentrate from the very outset on the substance of the matter in hand and not to disperse the efforts of Committee members on questions of secondary importance or even on trumped-up issues unrelated to our agenda.

The Soviet delegation proceeds from the consideration that last year, when all the nuclear Powers took part in the Committee's meetings and it was operating with an expanded membership, good preparatory work was done, on the whole, for the achievement of practical results at the current session of the Committee. The resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly directly concerning our multilateral negotiating body and directly addressed to it should play a major role. A positive example in this respect was given by the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, held last autumn. That Conference, as is known, culminated in the elaboration of a general convention and of the corresponding protocols attached to it in respect of "excessively injurious" types of conventional weapons.

We should also like to remind the Committee that its files contain a number of concrete proposals submitted by the Soviet Union over the years; these, naturally, are still valid and relevant. It goes without saying that the Soviet delegation is prepared, as always, to treat with due attention all other initiatives or proposals aimed at the constructive consideration and solution of the tasks before us.

Pending more detailed statements of our position on separate agenda items, we should like in this connection to make a few comments of a general nature today. Bearing in mind that the nuclear arms race carries the greatest threat to peace, the Soviet Union together with other socialist countries submitted proposals in February 1979 for negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear

(Mr. Prokofiev, USSR)

weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed (CD/4). However, because of the obstructionist line adopted by some States, negotiations on this issue have not yet started. In this connection we cannot fail to recall that both the resolution on "Nuclear weapons in all aspects" of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly and the resolution of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly recommending, in particular, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this problem, call for negotiations on this subject. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that at the present session the deadlock will be broken and negotiations on nuclear disarmament will begin, in the course of which account will be taken of the various views expressed on this subject and those contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In our view, there exist definite possibilities for progress in the matter of strengthening security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States. The Soviet delegation, as before, favours the conclusion of a multilateral convention in this sphere, while at the same time accepting the possibility, as an interim measure, of achieving appropriate agreement in the form of a Security Council resolution. Such an approach, as is known, is reflected in a resolution of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. We are, of course, ready to co-operate actively with other States in the search for a universally acceptable formula of guarantees.

In this connection, it is appropriate to recall that the Soviet Union has stated more than once that it will never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounce the manufacture and acquisition of such weapons and have no such weapons in their territories.

Within the complex of nuclear disarmament questions, that of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is particularly acute. The Soviet Union has consistently taken the line that the Committee on Disarmament should play an active part in the solution of this urgent problem. Bearing in mind the well-known resolution of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, we believe that it would be advisable to set up an appropriate working group, whose activities could be productive on condition of the participation in it of all the nuclear Powers. We consider that such a group should concern itself with the examination of all aspects of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to the early conclusion of a treaty, to which all nuclear Powers would be party, on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. At the same time, our country attaches great importance to the tripartite negotiations on this question and is ready to contribute to their successful conclusion in every way possible. We take the view that consideration of this question within the Committee on Disarmament need not interfere with the process of the tripartite negotiations.

At its thirty-fifth session, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the Committee on Disarmament to proceed without delay to talks with a view to elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. This question is becoming particularly urgent today, when a genuine danger exists of nuclear weapons spreading over the entire globe. Our Committee can play an important role in the elaboration of measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form. We have proposed that this item should be included in the agenda of the current session of the Committee.

The Soviet delegation intends to take an active stand in favour of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction on a wide scale. The Soviet Union's approach of principle to this problem is a consistent and unchanging one; we favour the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty, but, at the same time, we are willing to reach agreement on the prohibition of individual new types and new

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systems of weapons of mass destruction. Bearing in mind the views expressed by various countries, it would be useful to set up an ad hoc group of experts with a suitable mandate within the framework of our Committee.

When examining the question of radiological weapons, one of the new types of weapons of mass destruction, the Committee should, in our view, concentrate on completing the elaboration and preparation for signature of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons, as one of the resolutions of the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly calls upon it to do. A solid basis for the completion of this task exists in the form of the basic elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons and also the comments and suggestions made by various delegations in 1979 and 1980. We urge that the conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons should not be shelved for an indefinite length of time.

The Soviet delegation wishes to draw attention to attempts to revive plans for the production of neutron weapons and their deployment on the territories of western European countries. Such attempts cannot but arouse the deep alarm and concern of the world community. In this connection we should like to recall that the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, submitted in March 1978 a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, the danger of whose appearance in the arsenals of States is again increasing.

The Soviet Union continues to be in favour of prohibiting neutron weapons by means of a treaty at the international level.

A great deal of work lies before the Committee in the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons. A certain amount of progress was made in the Working Group last year; however, as the Group's report indicates, not all questions were duly considered owing to shortage of time. It would be advisable if this Working Group were to continue its activities and to concentrate its efforts more particularly on those issues on which a general consensus had already emerged. We believe that during the consideration of problems relating to chemical weapons, account will be taken of the General Assembly's appeal for the completion, as a matter of high priority, of the text of an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

I should also like to mention the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, which has been included in the Committee's agenda. Attaching great importance to the elaboration of such a programme, the Soviet delegation believes that, in accordance with a practice which has proved its worth, it would be expedient for this question to be considered within the framework of a working group.

Those are some of our delegation's views on a number of points relating to our agenda and the organization of our work which we wished to express during the general debate.

The Committee on Disarmament, which has resumed its work, occupies a special place among the many bodies for negotiations on disarmament. All the nuclear-weapon Powers and States with the largest military potential participate in the Committee. Its agenda covers the widest spectrum of disarmament problems. There can be no doubt that, as in past years the international community will watch the Committee's work with close attention and hope. It is our common task not to disappoint the hopes of the world's peoples, who expect genuine progress in the field of limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

The Soviet delegation, for its part, is prepared to engage in business-like negotiations and constructive co-operation with all delegations in the interests of fulfilling the responsible and noble tasks facing the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and I thank him also for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. VRHUNEC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, permit me to extend my most sincere congratulations for your taking up of the duties of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. You represent a country with which Yugoslavia maintains traditionally good and friendly relations and which is known for its initiatives in the field that we are discussing here. The role of Chairman in the forthcoming intensive work of the Committee is considerable and important. We are confident that with your well-known diplomatic skill and experience, you will contribute to the achievement of corresponding results.

I would also like to express my gratitude to the representative of friendly Ethiopia for the successful work he has done as Chairman of our Committee.

I avail myself of this opportunity to greet our new colleagues, the representatives of Egypt, Zaire, Pakistan and Romania, and to wish them much success in their work.

No one today denies any more that disarmament is one of the most significant problems of the international community. This has, after all, been stressed many times and is reflected in the conclusions of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The accumulation of weapons and the spending of enormous resources in order that humanity can destroy itself many times over today is in itself absurd and incomprehensible. All the more so if one recalls that millions of people in numerous developing countries live on the brink of famine and poverty. The scope of the arms race has come into conflict with the most basic human beliefs and aspirations, degrading all that which is most humane and vital in man. No excuse of a security or ideological nature can justify this. This is why it is clear that the opening of the process of genuine disarmament presupposes the most urgent taking of measures to halt the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race.

Nevertheless, we see that despite all these facts, contemporary mankind has not been able so far to bring an end to the arms race and begin a process of real disarmament. On the contrary, we are witnessing its acceleration, the sophistication of existing weapons and systems and the use of scientific achievements for the production of new, more destructive weapons of mass destruction. Military budgets of almost all countries, especially the nuclear Powers, are constantly increasing; while some of them even dare assert that there is a lack of resources required for development, particularly for the needs of the developing countries.

As early as 1976, when he proposed the convening of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament at the fifth conference of non-aligned countries, President Tito said:

"The continuation of the arms race, which has already acquired gigantic proportions, is increasingly becoming one of the main sources of instability, tension and threat to peace and security in the world."

Unfortunately, the situation has become even worse since then.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

There are those who would like to justify this race with assertions that there is no confidence between States. However, how can there be confidence in a situation in which everyone is arming himself? Furthermore, it is claimed that stable international relations and an ideal military balance should be established first, and only then could disarmament come about. It is justified to ask the question whether the opposite is not more correct -- that the opening of the process of genuine disarmament creates the conditions for the improvement of international relations and the establishment of a more stable balance of powers in the world. On the other hand, some stress that disarmament is possible only when parity in armament is reached, and the like. All such or similar assertions lead to a constant aggravation of international relations, a disquieting state of affairs in many areas of social activity, a stagnation in economic development throughout the world, particularly in the developing countries, the continuation of power politics, interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the exercise of political and economic pressure on small and less developed countries, a lack of solutions to the existing crises and the creation of new hotbeds of crisis, etc. In addition to this, some countries do not respect the decisions of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly of the tenth special session, which they solemnly accepted. Neither do they respect the opinions and aspirations of a vast part of mankind. If this continues, we will increasingly find ourselves in a situation of going around in a vicious circle and, through the stockpiling of weapons, of being closer to general catastrophe.

The strengthening of world peace and international security and the development of international co-operation, based on peaceful coexistence, with respect for the independence of countries and the promotion of the economic development of all peoples, is the only alternative for all of us. This is the only approach which will accord the right place and role to genuine disarmament and its concrete implementation without delay -- of this Yugoslavia is deeply convinced. Therefore, we are deeply concerned with the policy of those circles which try to justify the arms race by advocating that it is in the interest of peace and security. The advocates of such positions must be clearly warned about all the negative effects caused by such behaviour and the historical responsibility they assume towards the whole of mankind. This is why the over-all problem of disarmament should be approached in a much more resolute manner, with more confidence, optimism and real political will to start this process without further delay. All of us here who are, by the concurrence of events, in charge of this task, as well as the governments that we represent, should take up this work, conscious of the historical responsibility that we face.

Since the very beginning, the non-aligned countries, and among them Yugoslavia, have attached the greatest importance to the development of the process of disarmament. They strive to make this process universal and to make possible the most active participation in it of all countries, regardless of their size or military strength. Proceeding from its authentic principles, the non-aligned movement considers that international relations are indivisible and that peace and security can be ensured and developed further only through a universal process of relaxation of tensions and by way of a general democratization of international relations. It is only on these bases that it is possible successfully to solve the two main problems of our times: peace and security through disarmament, and the equitable economic development of all countries through the creation of the new international economic order. In these efforts, the non-aligned countries are prepared to assume their part of responsibility, which is otherwise manifested in the over-all work of the United Nations as well as

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

this Committee. Nevertheless, the main responsibility certainly rests with the protagonists of the arms race and first of all with the nuclear super-Powers. They are primarily responsible for the tension in the world and the use of power politics, the broadening of the spheres of interest of military alliances and the accumulation of weapons, nuclear in particular.

Progress in international relations is closely linked with the process of disarmament. On the other hand, its implementation would in itself bear upon the removal of the atmosphere of fear and distrust and would open the way to general coexistence and co-operation on an equitable basis, in all areas of man's activity. This is why disarmament, as today's imperative, does not have any alternative but should rather be understood as a unique process which should encompass all the necessary elements conducive to the adoption and implementation of specific disarmament measures as soon as possible. The ways to achieve this are varied, but they should all have one goal -- the reaching of corresponding agreements.

Both the multilateral and the bilateral negotiations that have been conducted so far have shown certain, but very modest results. This is insufficient, and progresses rather slowly. It is indispensable to accelerate the present negotiations as soon as possible and to open new fields of negotiation. All countries opted for this at the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament. At that session, we established principles that were adopted by consensus and which should serve as permanent landmarks in the process of the attainment of the final aim -- general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We also established then the mechanisms for the consideration of disarmament on a democratic basis, which offer a possibility for broad action, with the engagement of all Members of the United Nations.

A part of that mechanism is, surely, our Committee as well. All of us here are aware of its role and significance. As the only multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament, our Committee has a very clearly defined mandate and responsibility for carrying out the task accorded to it by the Final Act of the special session on disarmament. With the aim of the further affirmation of the Committee on Disarmament, we attach particular importance to two basic characteristics: (1) that its work is carried out on consistent equitable bases and the democratic recognition of the rights of all States members of the Committee on Disarmament, both large and small, belonging to blocs, non-aligned or neutral, in order that they may fully participate in the Committee's work and engage themselves with regard to all the relevant questions; and (2) that negotiations concerning specific questions are conducted directly and effectively, with a view to the earliest possible attainment of international agreements on the creation of instruments for the prohibition of various types of weapons.

This is the third year that the Committee is working. We must analyse the results achieved so far and ask ourselves, first, whether we have fulfilled the expectations of the international community and carried out the responsibilities set at the tenth special session, and secondly, what are our immediate obligations with regard to the forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament which has been envisaged for 1982.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

As the answer to the first question, my delegation would like to underline the following: during the past period the Committee has carried out a praiseworthy activity and intensity of work in which a solid basis for work has been created. However, we have not achieved yet a single specific substantive result, which is far from the responsibilities assumed. The slowness of specific negotiations is such that we must ask ourselves why this is so and what should the Committee undertake in order to speed up the negotiating process. We cannot consider as progress in the Committee's work the fact that we have reached agreement only on the rules of procedure, the programme of work, the agenda and the creation of four working groups. The yardstick for the results of the Committee's work can only be the reaching of specific and concrete agreements on the essential questions being considered, and this has not been achieved. In order to achieve such results, we must show political will and the readiness to reach international agreements on the basis of democratic consideration, without attempting to impose solutions which have as their aim the solution of the problem within narrow circles of particular group interests or the interests of those who hold the monopoly in armaments, nuclear in particular. In this process we must take care to preserve the authenticity of the Committee's work. For there is no doubt that world events influence the work of the Committee on Disarmament. However, we cannot allow these events to be the hindrance or excuse for hampering the Committee's work. On the contrary, the successful solution of disarmament problems which are on the Committee's agenda will be of even greater importance in certain situations of crisis that pose a threat to peace and international security and will also have a positive impact on the solution of problems concerning other international issues.

The road which our Committee chose last year, represents a good direction for the realization of the set goals. This is why my delegation strives for the urgent resumption and continuation of the work of the working groups which were in operation last year. The question of the renewal of the old mandate or the formulation of a new one should not obstruct the work of these working groups. According to need, this question can be considered in parallel, during the work of the Committee. However, what should be carried out right away is the greatest possible intensification of the negotiating work of all four working groups and the immediate creation of two additional ones, for the CTB and nuclear disarmament. In its final statement, delivered at the closing of last year's session of the Committee, the Group of 21 clearly indicated that the Committee should proceed in the cited manner this year. The position of the non-aligned and neutral countries is clear. The proposal for the creation of two new working groups is, in fact, based on the request of a great majority of United Nations Members and has been expressed in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly regarding the need to halt the nuclear arms race and stop all nuclear testing, in all environments. This is the only way in which we can intensify the work of the Committee, through substantive negotiations, and fulfil all the responsibilities that stand before us until the next special session. We shall thus justify the confidence in the Committee shown by the decision on its creation and at least partly fulfil what is expected of us.

(Mr. Vrhunec, Yugoslavia)

I would like to express my delegation's satisfaction over the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has already succeeded in reaching consensus on the agenda and programme of work for this session.

The rules of procedure we adopted at the first session in 1979 are, undoubtedly, suitable, and there is no need to consider them once more. They also clearly regulate the question of our Committee's work, as well as the participation of non-members in it. I do not deem it necessary to cite particular provisions which deal with this. Nevertheless, I would like to emphasize that we must not permit our Committee to find itself in the situation it was in last year -- that substantive negotiations are delayed by discussions on procedure and that solutions are sought outside the framework of the adopted rules of procedure, on unacceptable bases.

The Yugoslav delegation, together with other non-aligned and neutral countries members of the Committee, will resolutely strive, this year also, for the most intensive possible working character of the session, and we shall endeavour to participate in the negotiating process in a manner of utmost co-operation. However, what is unacceptable for us is any further postponement of work and the avoidance of substantive negotiating for one reason or the other. We shall not reconcile ourselves to the Committee's failure to achieve any substantive results again this year. On our part, we shall give support to all proposals envisaging an active and constructive approach to the solution of certain questions. It is up to the protagonists of the arms race to give their contribution in order that the Committee can achieve the best possible results. To this effect, Yugoslavia firmly believes -- since there is no other way out of the dilemma with regard to peace, independence and progress -- that our work will be governed by wisdom and the will to put an end to armaments. We shall do all that is within our power -- in the Committee on Disarmament, at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe held in Madrid, in the United Nations and on any other occasion and in any other area where it may arise -- to encourage and immediately initiate a specific and comprehensive process of disarmament so that it will not be too late tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank his Excellency Ambassador Vrhunec for his statement and I should also like to thank him very sincerely for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, seeing you preside over the meeting of the Committee on Disarmament gives my delegation immeasurable satisfaction for quite a number of reasons. First of all, you are, as all members of the Committee have found out these past two years, a diplomat of great talent and distinction; you are a fine gentleman whose word -- as I have personally found out several times -- is always his bond, and you are a devoted worker in the cause of disarmament. Secondly, your chairmanship of the Committee is -- in my view -- as it were, the completion of the institutional agreement which was reached at the first special session devoted to disarmament when the way was cleared for the participation of the nuclear weapon States, China and France, which then did not participate in the multilateral negotiating body. Sir, you have within a week of your accession to office, proved your great leadership ability and my delegation promises to co-operate with you throughout your term of office.

Allow me to convey to your predecessor in office, Ambassador Tereffe of Ethiopia, the gratitude of my delegation for his valuable service to the Committee. Allow me also to welcome to our midst the distinguished Ambassadors of Egypt, of Pakistan, of Romania and of Zaire. I look forward to working closely with them.

In deference to and as my own contribution to the business-like approach which, under your wise leadership, the Committee appears to be resolved to adopt to its work this session, my opening statement will be quite brief.

At its thirty-fifth session, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. The intention of the Declaration was not just to add another document to those in the archives of the United Nations. At least that was not the intention of my delegation when we took the initiative. Rather, it should be seen as a further expression of the grave distress of the General Assembly at the ever-growing insecurity of the world arising from the spiralling accumulation of armaments on the one hand, and the fast depletion of the world's resources not as an investment for present and future generations, but as glorification of the war machines in a few countries. The Declaration embodied the aspiration of mankind that the end of the 1980s would see a world much more secure through effective disarmament measures and much more economically equitable through progress towards the New International Economic Order.

The first major event during the Decade will probably be the second special session devoted to disarmament in 1982. Indeed, paragraph 24 of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade required that its implementation should be included in the agenda of the second special session devoted to disarmament. In the Declaration, the General Assembly stated: "The accomplishment of those specific measures of disarmament which have been identified in the Final Document as worthy of priority negotiations by the multilateral negotiating organ would create a very favourable international climate for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament". The Declaration then went on to enumerate again those items. They are: a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction; a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons, and effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, taking into consideration all proposals and suggestions which have been made in this regard.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In joining the consensus in the General Assembly for the adoption of resolution 35/47 on the second special session devoted to disarmament, my delegation believed that the second special session should not be seen as a routine review conference of parties, as if the Final Document of the first special session is a convention and an end in itself. On the contrary, we see the decisions on this second special session as providing an impetus for specific measures of disarmament, to be negotiated with increased intensity and seriousness, particularly in the Committee on Disarmament. The Committee will thereby -- and this is the hope of my delegation -- provide a substantive input to the success of the second special session. What is more important, the Committee will thereby retain some credibility in its efficacy as the single multilateral negotiating organ.

It is with this dual purpose in mind that I would hope we will approach our work during this session of the Committee. We should ask ourselves at this very beginning of the one full session which we will have before the second special session how the Committee can measure up to the task of making an effective contribution on the one hand and retaining its credibility as the single multilateral negotiating organ on the other. The Committee -- in the view of my delegation -- will have to achieve results in the area of nuclear disarmament as a very first precondition. The threat to the very survival of mankind is daily made more real by the increase in the quantity and sophistication of the nuclear arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States. In a study commissioned in 1968 by the United Nations General Assembly on the Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of these Weapons, it was stated:

"The solution of the problem of ensuring security cannot be found in an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons or, indeed, in the retention of nuclear weapons by the Powers currently possessing them.... Security for all countries of the world must be sought through the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the banning of their use, by way of general and complete disarmament".

Twelve years later, in 1980, another study commissioned by the General Assembly, entitled "Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons", which was submitted to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, noted that the important technological and other developments which have taken place since 1968 have made the danger of nuclear disaster even more awesome. For one thing, the total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon Powers may be in excess of 40,000, with a total strength of 13,000 million tons of TNT or the equivalent of 1 million Hiroshima bombs. Moreover, the number of strategic warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers has increased from 4,500 to 9,200 for the United States and from 1,000 to about 6,000 for the USSR. Then, of course, there has been the development of the anti-ballistic missiles, of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs), cruise missiles, mobile land-based missiles and lately, the neutron bomb, of which we have heard so much. Research and development are still proceeding fast and there is no end in sight. Side by side with the technological development is the alarming popularization of the theory that a nuclear war can in fact be survivable and may even be fought and won. Thus the theory of the balance of mutual destruction which for long has been the main rationale for the upward spiral of accumulation of nuclear weapons may soon give way to a strategy of deliberate launching of nuclear war based on the calculation of acceptable levels of retaliatory destruction. One of the psychological

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

barriers to any conceivable nuclear holocaust has been the hope that except by accident, neither of the two super-Powers would consciously launch a nuclear war on the other. The Congressional Report to which both the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Ambassador García Robles, and the distinguished Swedish Minister of State, Mrs. Inga Thorsson, made extensive reference in their statements on the opening day of our current session is alarming enough. The number of false alarms of imminent nuclear attacks given out by the American Early Warning System cannot be peculiar to that system. It can be presumed that the USSR also has had its share of false alarms. In a period of a reasonable level of mutual trust between the two super-Powers, false alarms may be contained, or so we hope and pray, anyway. In a period of tension, mutual suspicion and recrimination reminiscent of the cold war days, there may not be the opportunity to -- and I use an American expression here -- second guess a succession of false alarms.

It is bad enough to have to live with the argument of the deterrent effect of the accumulation of nuclear weapons. If it does act as a deterrent, we will not know until present nuclear arsenals have been dismantled as a result of disarmament agreements and there has been no nuclear war. Inasmuch as the further accumulation of nuclear weapons continues, however, inasmuch as the "modernization" of weapons systems continues, we can only presume that deterrence will work. The nagging question, however, will always haunt us. Thus, how much further destructive capacity is required on either side of the nuclear divide before it is considered sufficient to deter? Deterrence rests inevitably on parity or balance between the forces at the disposal of the States concerned, and parity or balance in turn rests on the subjective perception by each side. It depends on a premise which is constantly changing and which can be quite difficult to evaluate. The present impasse on the ratification of SALT II, is an instructive example. It was negotiated by the highest political and military experts on both sides. Yet, in one of the two participating States, controversy immediately arose as to whether SALT II does assure parity. Indeed, it has been asserted that it does give advantage to the other side and this has provided justification for its non-ratification. The lesson to be drawn, therefore, is that security based on ever higher levels of nuclear armaments will ever remain unstable, unsatisfactory, and downright dangerous not only to the nuclear-weapon States themselves but to the world at large.

The gradual shift, therefore, towards the doctrine of flexible response or limited nuclear war offers no consolation whatsoever. This doctrine, based on what some refer to as deterrence by denial, such as the threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons in a limited battlefield conflict, forgets the probability of escalation to full-scale nuclear exchange. Herein, in my view, lies the greatest danger of the development of the neutron bomb or, to use the technical term preferred by its advocates, the enhanced radiation and reduced blast bomb. Apart from the cynicism of those who developed the bomb in hoping that destruction of human lives will be acceptable to an enemy as long as equipment and property are left intact, the development of this bomb will blur that threshold between a conventional and a nuclear war. The beginning of a nuclear war will no longer rest on the probability of a computer error but on the probability of deliberate decision of the political and military authorities. To emphasize the dense population in Europe where the neutron bomb is likely to be deployed is one thing, but this should not make us forget the greater danger of escalation to a nuclear exchange of world-wide proportion from which none of us will have a hiding place.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

The question that comes to mind with developments such as that of the neutron bomb and others is whether man has not lost control over nuclear-weapon technology. It seems clear that in many cases the sheer momentum of military research and technology stumbles on new weapon systems which have not been conceived of, in anticipation of military or security needs. Of course, once the discovery of any weapon is stumbled upon, pressure for production becomes inevitable and justification by military strategists can always be made.

Enduring international peace and security, it has to be emphasized again, requires the prevention of the danger of nuclear war, not through the false theory of deterrence whose upper ceiling will never be reached, but through nuclear disarmament. To use the words of the experts who undertook the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, "the concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence is perhaps the most dangerous collective fallacy that exists".

If it is to discharge its responsibility as the single multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament would have to embark immediately on negotiations on nuclear disarmament, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document. Working papers on which the Committee can base its work have been submitted. What is left is a consensus within the Committee to set up the machinery for negotiation through the establishment of a working group. This decision, in the view of my delegation, can no longer be delayed.

An indispensable basic step for preventing the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. This is not only a priority item on the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament, it should, in my view, constitute the main contribution of the Committee to the success of the second special session devoted to disarmament to be held in 1982.

It is superfluous to stress again the central importance of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty in efforts to halt both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Group of 21 has in this Committee presented several proposals on the necessity of embarking on concrete negotiations through the setting up without delay of an ad hoc working group to negotiate the prohibition of all nuclear test explosions by all States for all time. It is a matter of regret that such positive initiatives have not yet been seized by the Committee.

At its thirty-fifth session the General Assembly, in resolutions 35/145 A and B, specifically requested the Committee on Disarmament to undertake and urged all members of the Committee to support the creation of an ad hoc working group to initiate substantive negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority at the beginning of its 1981 session. Resolution 35/145 B further calls upon the Committee to exert all efforts to draft a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that can be submitted to the General Assembly not later than at its second special session on disarmament.

The failure of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT to adopt a document is still fresh in our memories. It is the hope of my delegation that the promise to support the establishment of a working group on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty which all three nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty made informally

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

during the Review Conference will be maintained. After all, the failure of the Review Conference arose out of the non-implementation of Article VI on negotiations for nuclear disarmament. If the NPT is to continue to play a role in the régime of non-proliferation, then it must not be subjected to further reverses such as occurred at the Review Conference. The commencement of negotiations on a basic and vital measure such as the CTBT should not be seen as a concession made by some Parties to the NPT to other Parties. It is part and parcel of the obligation which all Parties to the Treaty assumed. Similarly, support for a working group on a CTBT will not be a concession by some members of the Committee on Disarmament to others; it will be a recognition by all members of their duty to give credence to the negotiating role of the Committee. World opinion demands a CTBT as a measure which must not be delayed any longer.

Mr. Chairman, the business-like approach to our work this session will, I hope, result in substantial progress in negotiations on a convention on chemical weapons, on a convention on radiological weapons and on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. With serious negotiations and given the political will, these items on which the Committee has already established working groups, should be concluded and submitted to the General Assembly not later than the deadline for the submission of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. In order to have the chance of achieving this desired result, we should assure fertile preliminary negotiations, we should embark on negotiations of substance and we should bear in mind a phrase which one of my distinguished colleagues here very often uses: that the best can sometimes be the enemy of the good.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Adeniji for his statement and I express to him my warm gratitude for his kind words and the too flattering, certainly, but very friendly remarks he made with respect to me. We have come to the end of the list of speakers for this morning. I think it is too late to go on to other matters and we have not received any further requests to make statements in plenary. In view of the hour, I propose to adjourn the meeting and -- if the Committee agrees -- to hold another plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. to discuss and take appropriate decisions regarding the adoption of the agenda and programme of work and regarding the participation of States not members of the Committee. If there are no objections to this proposal, I shall take it that the Committee is in agreement.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.

CD/PV.104
10 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 10 February 1981, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. MERTI

Argentina: Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss L. VAN DEN BERGH

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. B. THACKER

China: Mr. LIANG Yufen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLÁ VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BLAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BÜNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary:

Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. KARYONO

Iran:

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKIWA
Mr. R. ISHII
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. A. CACERES

<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. CHRAIBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AKF
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. F. VALDIVIESO Mr. A. DE SOTO Mr. A. THORNBERRY
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. O. IONESCU Mr. T. MELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV Mr. L.A. NAUMOV Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D.M. SUMMERHAYES
<u>United States of America:</u>	Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER Mr. J.A. MISKEL Mr. H. WILSON
<u>Venezuela:</u>	Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 104th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. I propose that the Committee should now examine Working Paper No. 21/Rev.2 which, in conformity with the rules of procedure, contains the Chairman's recommendations concerning the provisional agenda and the programme of work of the Committee. Before we take a decision on this document I should like to make the following statement, with the contents of which you are already familiar and which has to accompany the adoption of the agenda. It is understood that the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present can be considered under item 2 of the Committee's agenda "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". It is also understood that the report of the Committee, item 7 of the agenda, will deal, inter alia, with the question of a consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee, mentioned in General Assembly resolution 35/156 I. I draw the Committee's attention to the fact that organizational questions are not mentioned in the programme of work, in compliance with the Committee's wish that these questions, and in particular the question of amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure, should be dealt with at informal meetings.

If there are no objections, I take it that the Committee decides to adopt Working Paper No. 21/Rev.2. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): I intend to make a general statement in the debate at one of our forthcoming meetings, but I am grateful to you for giving me the floor today for a very brief intervention.

First of all I should like to say that I am particularly happy that the Committee should have been able to adopt its agenda and its programme of work so rapidly, and I think it is no exaggeration to say that you deserve most of the credit for this.

This morning, our Romanian colleague, in speaking of you, referred to Monsieur de Callières, but it seems to me that I discern a difference of method between Monsieur de Callières and yourself. From the quotation which our Romanian friend included in his speech, Monsieur de Callières appeared to aim at long-term success. You, however, it seems to me, are for pressing on in the pursuit of immediate success, for which the Committee should be very grateful to you. My delegation did not want to complicate the discussion on the agenda for this session by expressing preferences or suggesting new additions, but I should like the Committee to bear in mind, particularly when considering agenda item 6, "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", the possibilities which a regional approach to disarmament problems can offer. As we all know, resolution 35/156 D, on the study on all the aspects of regional disarmament, was adopted by consensus at the last session of the General Assembly, and the United Nations Secretary-General has drawn our attention to this text, which is reproduced in document CD/140. For the present, Governments are invited to make known their views regarding the study on this subject which has been prepared by experts during the past few years, and the subject is to be taken up again at the next session of the General Assembly in

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

New York. We hope that between now and the special session of the General Assembly to be held in 1982, the subject of a regional approach will receive maximum attention and will form the subject of discussions, exchanges of views and careful thought. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to make this brief statement.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Onkelinx for his statement and for his friendly remarks. As for Monsieur de Callières, I think his advice goes for all of us; it is very simple. It amounts to this: take care not to tell lies early on, because afterwards no one will trust you. I believe that this goes also for the Committee on Disarmament, where everyone strictly observes the rule of the most absolute sincerity.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, in the same vein as my Belgian colleague, I want to make two very brief observations with respect to the draft provisional agenda which has been adopted. You stated the understanding of the Committee with respect to the fact that under item 7 we will in due course be considering the question of the review of its membership.

I would simply like to point to the fact that this inclusion within the concept of agenda item 7 does not, I am certain, mean that there will be a delay in tackling that problem. I would therefore reserve the right to revert to this question in accordance with the rules of procedure, at any appropriate time during our plenary debates and, in due course perhaps, after some informal discussions.

Furthermore, the agenda that we have before us does not contain a separate item with respect to a very important matter, "Verification". It is, however, something that is dealt with in the decalogue, under item 9. In accordance with the rules of procedure, I would like to point out that at an appropriate moment in plenary, and under the rules of procedure, we would like to touch upon this subject.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I should now like to consider, with you, the question of the participation of non-member States. At an informal meeting we considered the requests submitted on behalf of some of those States regarding their participation in the Committee's work this year. In accordance with the established practice, I propose to submit to you, one after the other, in chronological order, the requests on which there was a consensus in the Committee. The secretariat has circulated the draft decisions, which are placed before you. You will find them in Working Papers Nos. 23-27.

(The Chairman)

The first request is submitted on behalf of Finland, and the corresponding draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 23. 1/ If there are no objections, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

The second request is submitted on behalf of Denmark, and the corresponding draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 24. 2/ If there are no objections, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

1/ "In response to the request of Finland [CD/145] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Finland to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1981 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Finland is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Finland."

"Participation in meetings of the Committee's other subsidiary bodies will be decided later when those bodies have been established."

2/ "In response to the request of Denmark [CD/146] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Denmark to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1981 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Denmark is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Denmark."

"Participation in meetings of the Committee's other subsidiary bodies will be decided later when those bodies have been established."

(The Chairman)

The third request is submitted on behalf of Spain, and the corresponding draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 25. 3/ If there are no objections, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

The fourth request is submitted on behalf of Austria, and the corresponding draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 26. 4/ If there are no objections, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

3/ "In response to the request of Spain [CD/147] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Spain to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1981 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Spain is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Spain."

"Participation in meetings of the Committee's other subsidiary bodies will be decided later when those bodies have been established."

4/ "In response to the request of Austria [CD/148] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Austria to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1981 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Austria is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Austria."

"Participation in meetings of the Committee's other subsidiary bodies will be decided later when those bodies have been established."

(The Chairman)

The fifth request is submitted on behalf of Norway, and the corresponding draft decision is contained in Working Paper No. 27. ^{5/} If there are no objections, I will take it that the draft decision is adopted. There are no objections.

It was so decided.

Two other requests have been submitted, the one on behalf of Democratic Kampuchea and the other on behalf of the People's Republic of Kampuchea. I would remind you, for the record, that on this point there was no consensus in the Committee.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation is most satisfied that the Committee has been able to approve the requests for participation from five States not members of this Committee, and we would like to extend our welcome to these States when they join in the work of the Committee.

However, Sir, in your concluding remarks you mentioned that there were two other requests for participation: that from Democratic Kampuchea and another from an entity which is not recognized by the United Nations, the so-called People's Republic of Kampuchea.

It was the hope of my delegation that the Committee, in its plenary session, would not have to introduce that subject, since it was discussed at length in the informal meetings of the Committee. But, since it has been mentioned, as you said, for the record, I would like to state on behalf of my delegation, and for the record, that, as far as we are concerned, there is no such entity as the People's Republic of Kampuchea and that this Committee, as an affiliate of the United Nations, is not empowered to consider or contemplate any communication from that entity.

At the same time, I would also like to express the regret of my delegation that the delegation of a Member State of the United Nations, Democratic Kampuchea, has been prevented from participating in the work of this body because of positions taken by certain of the members of this Committee.

^{5/} "In response to the request of Norway [CD/149] and in accordance with rules 33 to 35 of its rules of procedure, the Committee decides to invite the representative of Norway to participate during 1981 in the discussions on the substantive items on the agenda at Plenary and informal meetings of the Committee, as well as in the meetings of the ad hoc working group on the comprehensive programme of disarmament."

"With reference to the agenda of the Committee for the 1981 session and the programme of work for the first part of its session, the representative of Norway is invited to indicate in due course the particular concerns of Norway."

"Participation in meetings of the Committee's other subsidiary bodies will be decided later when those bodies have been established."

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Mongolian delegation intends shortly to make a statement at one of the Committee's plenary meetings, when I shall have the opportunity, on behalf of my delegation, to extend sincere greetings to you on your accession to the important and responsible post of Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament. The Mongolian delegation did not intend to speak today. However, a statement has just been made by a delegation which compels our delegation also to take the floor.

First of all, my delegation would like to welcome the granting of the requests of those countries which expressed a wish to participate in the work of our Committee. A similar decision was taken last year as well. As for the second part of your statement, the Mongolian delegation had no particular objections. However, I repeat that in connection with the statement just made by the distinguished representative of Pakistan, the Mongolian delegation deems it necessary to make the following statement.

The Mongolian People's Republic, as we have repeatedly declared, does not recognize so-called Democratic Kampuchea. We have most resolutely condemned and we still condemn the sanguinary régime of Pol Pot, who pursued a policy of genocide towards his own people. That Sanguinary régime was liquidated by the Kampuchean people themselves. And there now exists the People's Republic of Kampuchea, with its capital at Phnom-Penh, which has been recognized by many States Members of the United Nations. The time will come when the United Nations will recognize the only lawful representative of the people of Kampuchea -- the State which is called the People's Republic of Kampuchea. And we regret that on this occasion the Committee has failed to reach consensus on the request from the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, the question of disarmament is, without any doubt, of vital interest to all States. Therefore, the German Democratic Republic supports the participation of non-members in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

We would like to welcome the representatives of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway. By supporting their requests we are convinced that these States will effectively contribute to the work of the Committee by participating actively in our negotiations on concrete items. At the same time, my delegation regrets very much that no consensus could be reached on the participation of the People's Republic of Kampuchea in the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. My country maintains close and friendly relations with the People's Republic of Kampuchea, which is at present undertaking great efforts to reconstruct their country, devastated by the Pol Pot clique. The constructive policy of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is ever more recognized by other States throughout the world. At present it maintains diplomatic relations with more than 30 countries. We are confident that this situation will not last a long time and that other States also will officially recognize the true facts and establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

The German Democratic Republic regards the People's Republic of Kampuchea as the sole and legitimate representative of the people of Kampuchea, and accepts no other Kampuchea whatsoever.

Mr. PROKOFIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):

Like the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, the delegation of the Soviet Union would like to welcome the decision to invite representatives of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway to participate in the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1961. We regret that the Committee did not succeed in reaching consensus on the question of an invitation to representatives of the People's Republic of Kampuchea to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament. The people's revolutionary council of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is the only lawful and plenipotentiary representative of the Kampuchean people, and only its representatives can represent the People's Republic of Kampuchea in international organizations and in other international forums. We should like to state once more that references to the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of Kampuchea is not as yet recognized by the United Nations do not stand up to any criticism. We also resolutely reject the importunities of the criminal group of persons claiming to represent the non-existent so-called "Democratic Kampuchea" and demanding to participate in the work of the Committee.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to join with others to sincerely welcome the invitation of the delegations of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway to participate in our work on disarmament. Here again is an example of the interest in disarmament of other countries not members of the Committee.

At the same time, I would like to express our deep regret that the People's Republic of Kampuchea has not been invited at this moment. I was not prepared to make a statement, but as another delegation has raised the question, I would like to read some excerpts which were published just three days ago, when we were discussing the question here.

This article is certainly not by a communist newspaper, but printed in the International Herald Tribune by the known journalist Iain Guest. It is entitled "Khmer Rouge: a Western Contradiction", and he has written here: "A vote for the Khmer Rouge in the United Nations is in effect a vote for genocide ... The Khmer Rouge were guilty of crimes against humanity. They should be tried on the charge, not cosseted by the international community." "The Khmer Rouge", says Guest, "abolished money, reneged on their international obligations, initiated the mass upheaval of peasants, attacked their neighbours and systematically killed off the middle class." The writer makes a comparison with Hitler, who "perished 35 years ago in the flames of the Third Reich", and says, "No such fate awaited his Cambodia counterparts, the Khmer Rouge. They are tucked up along the Thai border where they are given refuge by the Thai army, arms by the Chinese, and food and medical supplies by the international agencies." Mr. Guest writes only two very humble sentences about the representative of the People's Republic of Kampuchea but they speak for themselves: "Heng Samrin has encouraged a free economy and a return to the villages, and has allowed the sale of rice at market prices." Rice for Vietnamese, for Kampuchean, for people, means life. Life has returned to the People's Republic of Kampuchea after three million people have been killed. This, I would think, is a real judgement, as Iain Guest writes: "A vote for the Khmer Rouge in the United Nations is in effect a vote for genocide." Is it not time to think about a new Nuremberg, a place where this genocide should be tried?

Mr. LIANG Yufan (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, the Chinese delegation has studied the question of participation in this session by non-member States, and wishes to state its position. It is our view that in order to enable the Committee on Disarmament to benefit from a wide range of constructive proposals and views put forward by various countries, all the States Members of the United Nations as well as the States Members of the relevant specialized agencies, should be accorded the opportunity to participate in those meetings where topics of particular concern to them are being discussed. Proceeding from this basic consideration, we warmly welcome the participation of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway in the relevant meetings at this session of the Committee on Disarmament. This delegation is convinced that their participation will contribute to the work of our Committee.

At the same time, we cannot but express our regret at the fact that consensus has not been reached on the request of another State Member of the United Nations, namely, Democratic Kampuchea. As is well known, Democratic Kampuchea is the lawful Government representing the people of Kampuchea. The General Assembly of the United Nations has discussed this matter at successive sessions and unflinchingly affirmed it as a fact. Accordingly, the request made by Democratic Kampuchea is entirely lawful. Moreover, it has repeatedly expressed its wish to participate in the discussion on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, precisely as a victim of chemical warfare. This Committee should have approved its reasonable request and invited its participation in the discussions on relevant questions. But as a result of the repeated obstructions posed by certain countries, so far, consensus has not been reached on this matter.

The Chinese delegation opposes the discussion by our Committee of the request of the so-called "People's Republic of Kampuchea". It is necessary to point out that the Heng Samrin régime is entirely a puppet régime established and propped up single-handedly by foreign aggressors. It can never survive without the support of foreign troops. It has no right whatsoever to represent the people of Kampuchea. At both its thirty-fourth and its thirty-fifth sessions the United Nations General Assembly accepted the credentials presented by the delegation of Democratic Kampuchea, and with an overwhelming majority of votes adopted resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of foreign aggressive troops from Kampuchea. This is a clear reflection of the international community's just position of opposing foreign armed aggression and refusing to recognize the puppet régime imposed by military force on the people of Kampuchea. It is our demand that this Committee, as a forum directly affiliated with the United Nations General Assembly, should respect the relevant General Assembly resolutions and uphold United Nations purposes and principles by refusing to discuss and rejecting the request of this puppet régime which in no way represents the people of Kampuchea.

A few minutes ago, the representative of Bulgaria mentioned the so-called question of Hitler's crimes. As is well known, the main crime of Hitler was none other than armed aggression. Who is the aggressor in Kampuchea today? Who is carrying out armed occupation of a sovereign State? Who is the Hitler? Is it not amply clear what the answer will be?

Mr. AKRAI (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, this unfortunate discussion, which, however, came about because of the reference to the so-called régime of People's Kampuchea, is something that my delegation would have wished to avoid. In any case, we think that this discussion has a certain sense of *déjà vu*, because we went over much of this ground last year. Nevertheless, certain statements have been made rather extensively on this question and my delegation feels the need to expand on its own position.

First of all, we believe that the Committee on Disarmament is a body which is affiliated with the United Nations General Assembly since, in our view, it was created as a result of a decision taken at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament.

Secondly, the Committee on Disarmament is not a Credentials Committee and for the orderly procedure of its work it must abide by the credentials which are approved by the General Assembly. If this were not to be the case, if the credentials of any delegation which is not recognized by another delegation on this Committee were to be cast into doubt, I think that the work of the Committee on Disarmament would become extremely complicated.

The Government of Democratic Kampuchea, whatever one's judgement about its record, is a government which is recognized by the majority of the States Members of the United Nations; its credentials are accepted by the United Nations General Assembly by overwhelming majorities, and its legal status has been recognized by the United Nations.

This Committee is not so empowered, nor can it in any way reopen the question of the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea. Much less can this Committee, by its actions, give any form of legitimacy to a régime whose credentials are rejected by the overwhelming majority of the international community, by the majority of the non-aligned States, by the majority of all the States in the world.

The so-called People's Republic of Kampuchea, Mr. Chairman, as has been stated, is a régime which is entirely a quisling régime, a "puppet" régime that has been installed by the force of 200,000 foreign troops in the capital of another country, the legitimate government having been ousted by those foreign troops.

If it is presented that this is the legal régime of the Kampuchean people, then the proof would be in the withdrawal of the 200,000 foreign troops. If that régime survives after the withdrawal of those foreign troops, then one could claim that it is a legitimate régime representing the people of Kampuchea.

If this Committee were to allow the consideration of a request from a régime such as this, what is the criterion that we would apply to other requests that we may receive for consideration? For instance, would we contemplate a request from the Turnhalle Alliance in Namibia for participation in the Committee on Disarmament? That is a régime installed by South Africa and it has sought recognition for the Turnhalle Alliance. Would we recognize a request from the régime in the Transkei of the Bantustan Land created by South Africa also?

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

These are some of the questions which arise as a result of this request which was purportedly received from the "puppet" régime in Phnom Phen. And it is because of these questions, these very weighty and important considerations, that my delegation believes that this Committee should in no way prejudice its standing and its integrity by giving in to such ploys on the part of certain States.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I take this opportunity, on the occasion of our first intervention -- although I had not intended to speak this afternoon -- to congratulate you, not only on your appointment as Chairman of the Committee for this month, but more particularly on what you have accomplished in so few days. Our Committee, under your guidance and direction, and fired with your enthusiasm, has managed to agree on an agenda, a work programme and the participation of non-member States.

As regards the participation of non-member States, we are sure that the participation of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway will contribute to the advancement of our work in the Disarmament Committee. We welcome their participation, and we are sure that we shall be able to co-operate fully with them and they with us in achieving success in our activities.

However, you referred to two further requests: that of the People's Republic of Kampuchea and that of a self-styled Democratic Kampuchea. We should like to place it on record that, as far as we are concerned, the so-called Democratic Kampuchea does not exist. The State of Kampuchea, with its capital Phnom Phen and its constituted Government, its population and its territory, is the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Mr. TERREFE (Ethiopia): Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate you briefly for assuming the Chair, in the hope that in the near future I will have more ample time to congratulate you and others on the occasion of their participation, as well as on the occasion of their arrival.

I did not intend to speak at this time, but was hoping that the wise decision that you made in achieving the participation of five non-members of this Committee would have led us to a rational solution. Unfortunately this does not seem to be the case, and for this reason I would like to state my delegation's position that, as regards the approval of requests from five countries for participation, namely, Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway, my delegation is very pleased to welcome them and is sure that they will contribute to the discussion on appropriate topics at the time that they choose.

As far as the representation of Kampuchea is concerned, I think it is a matter of record that my Government recognizes, as the lawful and legitimate representation of Kampuchea, the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

Mr. McPHAIL (Canada): Mr. Chairman, how could one fail to join the many congratulations to the non-members who are to join in our work for the session? I have to say, however, that, while recognizing the great progress we have made in moving this question forward at such an early date in our session compared with a year ago, I am struck by the fact that all of the comments seem to emphasize another problem, one on which you were reporting no consensus.

We have a position on the question which has been debated, and I repeat "debated", in the last few minutes, but feel that it is inappropriate for such a debate to take place in a negotiating form such as the Committee on Disarmament. We accept that the consensus rule will, on occasions perhaps, go against what decisions there may have been in the United Nations General Assembly itself. But the problem which has been debated, if there is one, is a problem for the United Nations General Assembly and not for the Committee on Disarmament. I therefore ask that the record of the Committee show that the failure of the Canadian delegation to take part in this debate is not because we do not have a position on the matter which has been debated, nor because we subscribe to the views which have been put forward in this debate by any of the preceding speakers, but because it is a debate we believe should not have taken place.

Mr. BRANKOVIĆ (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the delegations of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway as they are going to take part in the discussions in our Committee, and to express my delegation's deep satisfaction at this fact. We offer our full support and co-operation to those delegations, and would like to say that, in granting these applications, the Committee is fully implementing the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

At the same time, I would like to express my delegation's deep dissatisfaction with the fact that we were not in a position to reach a consensus on the application of another State Member of the United Nations to take part in the negotiations in our Committee. Unfortunately, such proceedings do not follow the lines of the implementation of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

Allow me to quote what my delegation said last year at one of the meetings when this problem was discussed and which was reflected in document CD/PV.74.

"In our opinion, we should immediately give a positive response to a request received from a State Member of the United Nations and accept its participation within the requested scope."

I do hope that in the very near future the Committee will be in a position to reach a consensus on the application made by one State Member of the United Nations, namely, Democratic Kampuchea.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, we quite agree with the observation made by the distinguished Ambassador of Canada, that this debate should not have taken place at all. But the fact is that such a debate is taking place. We agree that the CD should be guided in its work by the United Nations General Assembly and that there is an integral link between the United Nations General Assembly and this body. However, we should recognize that this Committee has its own rules of procedure and that these rules of procedure have to be followed by us in all circumstances, including in relation to the question that we have been considering.

(Mr. Saran, India)

As you very rightly announced with respect to the question of the participation of some of the States, or so-called States, which have requested participation, there is no consensus.

The views of my delegation on this particular question are well known. I would really just like to reiterate at this point that the Government of India does not recognize the so-called régime of Democratic Kampuchea. In our view, the sole legal government of Kampuchea is that of the People's Republic of Kampuchea, headed by President Heng Samrin and only the representatives of this Government have the right to participate in the proceedings of this Committee.

Mr. GYORFFY (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to join those delegations who congratulated you and the Committee on the speedy decision concerning the requests for participation by five States non-members of the Committee: Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway. However, as far as the rest of the debate which has taken place here is concerned, my delegation would have preferred to avoid it. I would therefore like to express the disappointment of my delegation that such a debate has been provoked by certain delegations.

In view of the debate, however, I feel compelled to put on record the position of the Hungarian Government that the People's Republic of Kampuchea is the sole and lawful representative of the people of Kampuchea and to express the disappointment of the Hungarian delegation that the Committee could not come to a decision to respond positively to its request.

The sinful Pol Pot régime has been ousted by its own people, by the Kampuchean people; therefore it represents no one except itself.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If no one else wishes to speak, I propose that the Committee should hold an informal meeting at 3 p.m. tomorrow to continue considering the question of the re-establishment of its ad hoc working groups.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, my delegation did not intend to take part in this afternoon's deliberations, but in view of the debate which has just taken place, I am compelled to do so. I should like to begin by congratulating the delegations of Finland, Denmark, Spain, Austria and Norway and to express to all of them our pleasure and satisfaction at their presence among us, in accordance with the requests just approved by the Committee.

As you will recall, Mr. Chairman, since you mentioned it twice at our informal meetings, the Mexican delegation on 31 July 1980, as is noted in paragraph 17 of the Committee's report for last year, submitted a working paper contained in document CD/129, dated 29 July 1980, entitled "Working paper containing draft amendments to section IX of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, entitled 'Participation by States not members of the Committee'."

My delegation was very glad to see that this year there appeared to be every reason to hope that there would be no repetition of the discussions which so often took up our time last year. What made us hope this was the fact that — for example, as we saw today, in a matter of five minutes we approved five requests. If

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

this spirit were to prevail in the Committee, and if, neither at this spring session nor at the summer session, no further opportunity were to arise for a debate such as the one we have had during the second part of our meeting this afternoon, my delegation would not press for a discussion of its proposal for amendments, to which I have just referred. However, if such an occasion were to recur, then we would press for our proposal to be examined. That proposal neither had nor has any other purpose than to overcome, once and for all, the difficulties that may arise when there is controversy regarding the international representation of a State.

In this connection my delegation, as early as April 1980, devoted an entire intervention to explaining its point of view, and later, on 31 July, we again set forth our views, more briefly. In this connection, I repeat, my delegation believes that we must be realistic, and if we are realistic we must begin by recognizing that this Committee is a body sui generis and that, rightly or wrongly, its members do not, as far as credentials are concerned, recognize United Nations decisions as something which has the force of law for the Committee.

That being the situation, and since the Committee's decisions must be taken by consensus, my delegation continues to believe that the only way to overcome all these difficulties once and for all is to make the appropriate changes in our rules of procedure.

Obviously, the key words in the amendment we are proposing are those referring to cases where the international representation of a State is the subject of controversy. My delegation would prefer it if we could settle this matter without having to engage in a discussion that might be lengthy and which, I repeat, would involve the amendment of the rules of procedure; but if a discussion unfortunately proved necessary, my delegation would like to point out here and now to all the distinguished representatives in this Committee that those are the key words of the amendment, and that what would then be necessary, in this eventuality, would be to find an objective criterion for determining when the international representation of a State should be regarded as being the subject of controversy for the purposes of this Disarmament Committee. That would be the first thing.

The second is this: once we have defined the circumstances in which such a case exists or shall be deemed to exist, it will then be necessary also to define and establish an objective and fair procedure --an objective procedure that can be applied automatically and that will save us from losing time again in discussions which my delegation considers do not legitimately belong in a disarmament negotiating forum like this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If there are no other speakers who would like to take the floor, I will repeat the proposal I made a few minutes ago, namely, that we should hold an informal meeting tomorrow at 3 p.m. to continue considering the question of the Committee's ad hoc working groups. I have been asked also to announce that the Group of 21 will meet here tomorrow at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.

Erratum to CD/PV.105

Page 16, paragraph 2; amend the quotation to read "convention on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their development, production, stockpiling and transfer".

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 12 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
Mr. M. MATI

Argentina: Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA
Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE
Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J-M. NOIRFALISSE
Miss G. VAN DEN BERG

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. R. DEYANOV
Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. G. SKINNER
Mr. B. THACKER
Mr. C. CACCIA

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. LIANG Yufan
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. YANG Mingliang

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHA

Egypt:

Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. H.N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BUNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MULLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOHIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. DARUSMAN
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran:

Mr. M. DABIRI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. H.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAH
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. DE SOTO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. HALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. S. STROMBACK

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOPIEV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV

Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV

Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMNERHAYES

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Ms. K. CRITTEMBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee
and Personal Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all express the satisfaction of the Bulgarian delegation at your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament at an important juncture, when we are laying the foundations of our activities for the current session. Please accept my most sincere wishes for a successful and fruitful performance in this demanding post, and permit me to note the efficiency and the purposefulness you have displayed in setting in motion the 1981 session of the Committee. May I also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador Tadesse Terrefe, as well as to the new heads of the delegations of Romania, Pakistan, Egypt and Zaire.

This session of the Committee is important in several respects. The international situation, which is an essential background and factor for success in our field, remains complex and contradictory. Certain well-known circles in the West, driven by the illusive dream of military supremacy, are pushing humanity into a new and even more frightful spiral of the arms race and thus, nearer to the danger of a nuclear holocaust. We have to note with regret that all possible means to block the entry into force of the SALT II agreements have been employed, and a decision to deploy in Europe a new generation of medium-range nuclear missiles has been taken, while a number of other military programmes, both in conventional and in nuclear fields, are being unfolded.

In the campaign accompanying the current boom in the policy of the position of strength there are some signs of reviving the plans for the production and deployment in Europe of neutron nuclear weapons, that ominous symbol of the arms race, which has been stigmatized with such force by the world community.

We fully share the view expressed by Mrs. Thorsson, the distinguished leader of the Swedish delegation, contained in her statement of 5 February this year, that Governments and people should take note of these reports and ponder over the eventual effects on the future of nations in the densely populated European continent.

As a European country, the People's Republic of Bulgaria could not watch undisturbed the attempts to question the achievement of détente, to present it as a unilateral advantage to one of the sides. Hundreds of millions of Europeans living on the continent, where the concentration of military forces and armaments is 20 times larger than the average for the world, could not agree with the efforts to pronounce as non-existent the 70s of the twentieth century. As has been stated recently in this regard by Todor Zhivkov, the First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party and President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria: "However short this period may have seemed, it demonstrated to the peoples, to the business circles, to the politicians and statesmen its incomparable advantages to the 'cold war' era; it bore fruits, and opened up even greater perspectives for mutually advantageous co-operation between the European States". In this respect I should like to express our hope that the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe will follow a constructive path and concentrate on the major issues on which peace and security in Europe depend, including the question of a European conference on disarmament.

At the present stage the role and the responsibility of our Committee increases even more and we should exert ever greater efforts to secure progress in our endeavours to help in curbing the arms race and to agree on concrete measures of

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disarmament. Our delegation backs the appeals in this regard made in the statements of all previous speakers, and particularly in those of the representatives of the Soviet Union, Mexico, Sweden, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Romania, India and others.

May I now briefly outline the approach of the Bulgarian delegation to the main issues the Committee faces during the current session.

Firstly, a few words on the problems of organization and procedure. Our delegation is gratified to note that these matters are being solved in a constructive manner with a view to not losing precious time that must be allotted to the main items on our agenda. As to the concrete points, the position of our delegation is fully reflected in the joint document of a group of socialist countries, CD/141.

Undoubtedly, the problems related to nuclear weapons occupy the central place in our work and constitute the corner-stone of the efforts of the international community in the field of disarmament.

The well-known proposal of the socialist countries on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until their complete destruction represents a solid foundation for a radical approach to the multilateral negotiations. We are glad to note that the majority of the States members of this Committee share our view on the creation of an ad hoc working group on nuclear disarmament and the holding of consultations without delay to prepare the ground for the future negotiations, which is in compliance with General Assembly resolutions 35/152 B and C. We are deeply convinced that the Committee on Disarmament is the most appropriate forum for such consultations and eventually for the nuclear disarmament negotiations, taking into account the provisions of paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

A number of facts in recent months have strengthened our conviction that neither the perfection of nuclear weapons nor the creation of new nuclear strategies but rather the clear realization of the growing danger of a thermonuclear war is the major concern of human civilization at this stage, and from this premise we must proceed to profound and purposeful negotiations demonstrating political will. Today, the cause of peace becomes a vivid embodiment of humanism in our times, of a striving for a new and just world. Permit me to quote once again the Bulgarian party and State leader who stated from the high rostrum of the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace, held at Sofia in September 1980, the following:

"We know that the main differences between capitalism and socialism cannot vanish by themselves, that each system will try to prove its right to existence, its advantages. But in our view, all this does not necessarily mean that we should reach for the nuclear bombs and missiles. In our view, the dispute between the two world systems can and should be conducted in conditions of world peace, of peaceful coexistence and competition between States with different social systems."

The socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty stated unequivocally and categorically in their Declaration of 15 May 1980: "the States represented at the meeting affirm that there are no types of weapons which they would not be willing to limit or reduce on a basis of reciprocity" (CD/93, p. 10). We believe that this Declaration has not been lost on world public opinion.

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One of the items that will attract the Committee's attention during this session is the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. I would like to point out that in spite of the constructive steps of the Soviet Union, steps that have had quite a positive impulse, the trilateral negotiations have not for the time being brought the expected results. Without underestimating in the least the importance of the trilateral talks, we support the idea of the non-aligned and neutral countries for the creation of an ad hoc working group with the active participation of all five nuclear-weapon States. The Committee should proceed to the elaboration of a mandate for such a group without delay.

Another important aspect of the efforts for reducing the danger of nuclear weapons will be our discussion on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in countries where there are no such weapons at present. This will be fully in line with General Assembly resolution 35/156 C, bearing in mind that the Committee is to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session on the results of its proceedings on this important question.

My country attaches particular importance to the subject of negative security assurances. Our views on some of its aspects were stated last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item as well as at the second Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT and in the First Committee of the General Assembly, where we presented working papers and a draft resolution. We have already had opportunities to positively assess the work done so far by the Ad Hoc Working Group in the search for a common approach acceptable to all, which could lead us to a legally binding international instrument. At this session, the re-established Working Group will have another chance to complete the examination undertaken last year of the substantive aspects of the negative security assurances. With this perspective in mind, the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/155, appealed "to all States, in particular the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will necessary to reach agreement on a common approach which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character".

While remaining a firm proponent of the idea of an international convention as the most effective way to strengthen the security guarantees of the non-nuclear-weapon States, the Bulgarian delegation believes that the possibility of some interim agreements could also be explored at this stage. To prepare for such a course of action the General Assembly, in its resolution 35/154, called upon "all nuclear-weapon States to make solemn declarations, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States having no such weapons on their territories, as a first step towards the conclusion of such an international convention". It also recommended "that the Security Council should examine declarations which may be made by nuclear States ... and, if all these declarations are found consistent with the above-mentioned objective, should adopt an appropriate resolution approving them".

The Bulgarian delegation holds that the Ad Hoc Working Group should continue to examine the proposed non-use formulations with a view to finding out possible common points between them. Proceeding from these premises, an effort could be made to evolve the basic elements of a common formula to be included in a legally binding international instrument, or of a general basis for individual declarations, identical in substance, which the nuclear-weapon States might wish solemnly to make

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on their own initiative, taking into due account the results achieved in the negotiations. In this regard, the period prior to and in the course of the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament could become, as in 1978, another turning point in the efforts effectively to strengthen the security guarantees of the non-nuclear-weapon States. Opinions could also be exchanged in the Ad Hoc Working Group as to the most appropriate parameters for a Security Council approval, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and Security Council practice, of individual non-use declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States.

The Bulgarian delegation will shortly present a working paper concerning the questions that should be addressed, along these lines, by the Ad Hoc Working Group on negative security assurances. We believe that substantial progress on this item could be achieved if all States members of the CD, and in particular the nuclear-weapon States, were to pursue a constructive approach and display maximum flexibility with a view to arriving at a solution acceptable to all. We welcome in this regard the readiness expressed in the statement of the Soviet delegation at the 103rd meeting of the Committee, to engage in active co-operation with other States in the search for a mutually acceptable formula of guarantees.

During this session we look forward to intensive work in the field of chemical weapons. We share the opinion that the Ad Hoc Working Group achieved certain progress although, as was stated in its report, not all questions were thoroughly discussed owing to the limited time. Now, we are to finish the work commenced, concentrating on points of convergence of views.

We attribute due importance to the bilateral USSR-United States talks on chemical weapons and we expect their early resumption.

As to the problem of banning the development and production of new types of weapons and systems of mass destruction, it has been occupying an important place in the recent sessions of the Committee on Disarmament. The advantages of a comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are quite obvious. What is necessary at this stage is a display of political will on the part of all States which are in a position to develop such weapons. There are some trends in this field raising justified concerns and confirming the need for further intensive efforts to forestall them by agreeing on concrete disarmament measures.

With regard to the question of radiological weapons, we hold the view that favourable prerequisites exist for the early elaboration of a draft convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, on the basis of the joint USSR-United States proposal. The work done during the last session in the Ad Hoc Working Group led to further clarification. We share the view that the differences on certain points could perhaps be narrowed, thus bringing about the conditions for the successful accomplishment of this task by the end of this session of the Committee.

At the end of the Committee's 1980 session, a group of socialist countries, including Bulgaria, introduced document CD/128 presenting our views on the main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Committee should spare no effort to secure the timely elaboration of the programme, while striving to achieve a fair balance of the positions of different countries and groups.

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In conclusion, I should like to assure you that the Bulgarian delegation will do its utmost to render its modest contribution to business-like and purposeful negotiations in the Committee and its subsidiary bodies.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Bulgaria for his statement and I should also like to thank him warmly for his kind words with respect to myself.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, taking the floor for the first time at a plenary meeting, I would like to extend to you the congratulations of the Hungarian delegation on your assumption of the responsible office of Chairman of our Committee for this month and to express my appreciation of the dynamic way you conduct the business of the Committee. I do hope that the Committee, under your experienced guidance, will soon tackle the rest of the outstanding problems of procedure and set itself to the tasks of substance.

My words of appreciation go also to Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia who chaired the Committee last August, at a decisive stage of our last year's work.

May I also extend a hearty welcome to our new colleagues, the distinguished representatives of Romania, Egypt, Pakistan and Zaire, wishing them successful work. My delegation stands ready to continue friendly co-operation with them, as we did with their predecessors.

My delegation has observed with satisfaction that the Committee was able quickly to reach a consensus on its agenda and programme of work for the first part of its present session, and a similar fast result has been reached in re-establishing the four working groups set up at our last year's session, and in addition provision has been made for setting up new ones as proposed by several groups or delegations. Experience of our last year's session has proved beyond doubt that negotiations conducted in the framework of working groups constitute the most efficient method for achieving advance towards our goals. What we consider the most important is that the working groups start functioning and make progress in the negotiations themselves.

Some speakers taking the floor before me referred to the present international situation as grave and deteriorating. While agreeing with that view one can not but consider it as a direct consequence of a policy neglecting the realities prevailing in the international relations, renouncing the principle of parity and equal security, openly declaring plans for gaining military superiority. New nuclear doctrines are being worked out to reduce or to abolish the political, technical and psychological barriers before the use of nuclear weapons. To meet this end a new wave in the nuclear arms race is being initiated by NATO in its decision to deploy in western Europe huge arsenals of new generations of medium-range nuclear missiles. Ratification of SALT II has been deferred and its future is becoming more and more bleak.

The position of the Hungarian Government concerning the present state of the international situation has been clearly expressed in the Declaration of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty adopted at the meeting of its Political Consultative Committee last May. In that Declaration the States parties clearly declared that they do not aspire to military superiority but stand for parity and equal security at progressively lower military levels. The Declaration gave a practicable programme to meet this end, which was reiterated by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty last December.

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Parallel with our proceedings, important negotiations are being conducted at the Madrid meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, among other things on the military aspects of détente. Hungary, together with the other members of the socialist community, is doing its best to achieve agreement on the earliest possible convening of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe. In our view those meeting in Madrid can and should reach a decision on the convening of such a conference, as well as on the main lines of its work and agenda. Holding such a conference would become an important landmark in strengthening the foundations of European peace and putting into practice the obligation of all States participating in the conference to take effective steps and to reach tangible results in reducing military confrontation and in promoting disarmament in Europe.

Although Hungary is not a full member of the Vienna talks, it attaches great importance to this process and hopes that the negotiations will lead to positive results, and the earlier the better.

The Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum has a vital role to play in curbing the arms race and achieving genuine disarmament. The General Assembly of the United Nations also demonstrated, at its thirty-fifth session, that there is an increased urgency to put into practice the provisions adopted at its first special session devoted to disarmament. My delegation considers it very important that the Committee on Disarmament should achieve substantial advances in its work before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament has on its agenda all the major subjects of disarmament to be solved. The programme of work and the working groups, once established, constitute the necessary and suitable framework for our successful activity. The working paper submitted by a group of socialist States, of which my delegation is a co-sponsor, contains all the major considerations for the work of this Committee.

In the work of the Committee my delegation, like many others, gives the highest priority to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. During its last two sessions the Committee had extensive exchanges of views on this issue, including consideration of the proposal submitted by the socialist delegations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until their complete destruction. My delegation strongly urges the setting up of an ad hoc working group without any delay, with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States.

In connection with nuclear disarmament, the Hungarian delegation attaches special significance to the continuation of the SALT process between the USSR and the United States of America. It is a matter of deep regret that the continued postponement of the ratification of SALT II holds up this vitally important process. It is our hope that following the ratification of that Treaty the negotiations will continue to achieve a more substantial reduction of strategic nuclear armaments.

In the field of nuclear disarmament my delegation gives special attention to the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

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In continuation of the substantive work done last year in the Working Group on this subject, my delegation is of the opinion that the Committee should consider formulas for solemn declarations by the nuclear-weapon States, identical in substance, concerning the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States, to be confirmed by the Security Council in an appropriate resolution. This could be a first step towards an international convention, against which there was no objection in principle in our last year's deliberations.

The Hungarian delegation notes with satisfaction that the Committee decided to include in its agenda the question of the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, in the context of nuclear disarmament. The best way to consider this issue also would be to set up a working group as proposed in the recent working paper of the socialist delegations.

Questions related to nuclear disarmament in every aspect were widely and deeply discussed during the second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons held last year. Experiences at the Conference have shown beyond doubt the basic interest of States in retaining and strengthening the non-proliferation régime. However, it was also obvious that this cannot be done without achieving real advance in other fields of nuclear disarmament.

The general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is another item of the highest urgency. The early conclusion of a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests would be a major contribution towards ending the qualitative improvement, development and proliferation of nuclear weapons as well as towards the improvement of the international climate. Resolution 35/145 B of the General Assembly requests the Committee to set up a working group to initiate negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. My delegation hopes that the Committee will meet this request and start substantive work soon, with the active participation of all nuclear-weapon States, now all represented in the Committee. It is our conviction that a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests by all nuclear-weapon States would greatly increase the chances of success. One more word on this question: in the opinion of the Hungarian delegation, the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on this issue should in no way hinder the trilateral talks, which my delegation hopes will soon be resumed.

The Committee has urgent and very important tasks also outside the field of nuclear disarmament. The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction is one of them. The early achievement of an agreement assumes special urgency also in the light of the alarming reports and official statements concerning the planned production and deployment of the new generation of chemical warfare agents, the binary weapons. It is the hope of my delegation that the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will soon resume its work and further advance towards the elaboration of an agreement on the effective prohibition of all chemical weapons on the basis of the useful work done last year in the Working Group.

My delegation is of the view that this year the Committee on Disarmament should pay more attention than previously to the question of the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The drive by certain circles for technological superiority in the military field inevitably means that the latest achievements of science and technology will be used for military purposes, which may lead to a qualitatively new phase in the arms race even more difficult to control. The socialist delegations of the Committee have long been proposing that the most radical solution to prevent the emergence of new types

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of weapons of mass destruction would be to work out a comprehensive agreement banning the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, supplemented by specific agreements or protocols banning particular types of such weapons. Resolution 35/149 of the General Assembly adopted on this issue practically reiterates this request to the Committee.

While dealing with this question I think it necessary to remind the Committee of a proposal made last year and supported by several delegations. During the discussions of this issue which had taken place in the course of the last few years it became more and more evident that new ways need to be found to handle this complicated and wide-ranging issue in a more efficient way. The setting up of a working group of qualified governmental experts would provide an appropriate forum to survey this question more deeply and with more expertise, and the Committee too could profit from it in its proceedings. This is why the socialist delegations reiterated in working paper CD/141 their proposal for the setting up of such a group.

It is a matter of concern that according to official statements the new United States administration is considering again the production and deployment of neutron weapons. I profoundly agree with the statement of Mrs. Inga Thorsson made before the Committee on 5 January to this effect. Renewing this plan, which had been dropped earlier in face of the protest of European public opinion makes timely and topical again the proposal by the socialist delegations to start negotiations on an agreement banning the production and deployment of neutron weapons which was submitted to the CCD in 1978.

A specific area pertaining to this field is the prohibition of the development, stockpiling and the use of radiological weapons. Last year the Committee was considering it in one of the working groups. Although my delegation considers that work as a positive development, I think the Committee this year should try to tackle that task in a more ambitious way and do its best to be able to present to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session a complete draft convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons. On the basis of the existing proposals and last year's work this seems quite possible to us if the necessary political will is manifested on all sides.

The Hungarian delegation attaches considerable importance to the question of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We support the continuation of the work of the relevant Working Group and are ready actively to participate in it. We hope that the activity of the Working Group and of the Committee on this important question will lead to realistic and useful results embodied in a sufficiently broad programme acceptable to all countries. My delegation considers it very important that the programme should reflect the principle of equality and equal security.

This is what I wanted to say at this stage of the work of the Committee. In the course of our work my delegation will return to specific subjects in a more detailed manner according to the schedule contained in our programme of work.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Hungary for his statement and for the kind words he was good enough to address to the Chair.

Mr. DE SOUZA E SILVA (Brazil) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, it is a source of lively satisfaction to the delegation of Brazil to see you guiding our deliberations. A bare two weeks ago the President of Brazil paid a visit to France, giving a new impetus to the age-old and untroubled relations between our two countries. At a more personal level, we enjoy seeing you almost daily display your skills as a professional diplomat. Your patient encouragement, your competence, persuasive rather than importunate, your gentle firmness, have earned you the friendly and affectionate respect of your colleagues around this table. Allow me to take this opportunity also to offer a warm welcome to our colleagues from Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire, with whom I look forward to working in the closest co-operation.

It has become customary at the start of each year of our deliberations to attempt a general overview of the world situation and of its implications for the subject matter which concerns us most directly in this Committee, that is, disarmament. It has also become customary for that overview to reach the conclusion that in the period of twelve months since the start of the previous session of the CD, the pace of the armaments race and the destructive power of arsenals have far outrun the efforts of the world community to halt and reverse these trends. The year 1980 has been no exception; once again we have witnessed the continuation, and even the acceleration, of the trend toward the development and deployment of new weapons and weapons systems designed to spread death and destruction with greater speed, accuracy and power than ever before. This ominous tendency has been coupled with the emergence of the notion that a nuclear war can actually be fought and won, a notion which is in turn backed by the reasoning that the doctrines of nuclear deterrence deserve the credit for the avoidance of the outbreak of nuclear war.

Surely, since the appearance of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the Superpowers and in those of the three other nuclear-weapon Powers, no conflict has escalated far enough to cause one, or both, or all of them to wield their full-scale military might in the fallacious search for victory; and fortunately so, for otherwise certainly none of us would still be sitting in this chamber trying to formulate permanent solutions to the problems posed before us.

We must collectively recognize that the security needs of one nation, or block of nations, cannot be served by keeping in constant jeopardy the security of the whole world, including, of course, the security of the very Powers which seem to expect more security in an increasingly insecure environment. In the United Nations disarmament forums, and particularly during the last session of the General Assembly, the overwhelming majority of the world community has repeatedly stressed this single point: it is imperative that current attitudes be fundamentally changed if we are to achieve genuine progress in disarmament negotiations. Yet, the argument has been advanced from some quarters that the notion of "undiminished security" during the process of disarmament would provide justification for what is euphemistically referred to as the "modernization" of arsenals and strategic doctrines, even in the absence of a disarmament process. The Brazilian delegation cannot condone such ideas, which tend to seek not only the legitimization of the possession of nuclear weapons, but also to justify the efforts for their increased sophistication and destructive power. Recent developments in the strategic and tactical thinking of the two main military alliances seem only to confirm the conclusion that, for the Superpowers, the concept embodied in the phrase "arms control" means simply the adjustment of the arms race to mutually tolerable levels, in terms of the resources

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devoted to the ceaseless improvement of the weapons at their disposal. The vast majority of mankind, on the contrary, has repeatedly and unmistakably expressed its desire for genuine disarmament, meaning of course the immediate cessation of the nuclear arms race and the start of tangible measures of nuclear disarmament.

Brazil has always attached the utmost priority to these goals, and we will continue to seek practical ways to bring about progress on such measures. At the last session of the General Assembly, Brazil co-sponsored resolution 35/152 C, which calls for the commencement of such negotiations on this item and provides the framework for their conduct in this Committee. We likewise supported the call of the Group of 21 for the early establishment of a working group, within the Committee on Disarmament, to deal with specific aspects of this all-important question. My delegation fully endorsed the proposal that six working groups on the six substantive items on our agenda should be enabled to start their work without any further delay.

With that preoccupation in mind, may I be allowed to turn now to some brief comments on the substantive items on the agenda that the Committee has approved for this year's session. My delegation will, of course, make more detailed statements on each of the items at the appropriate time, hopefully in the context of the negotiations to be undertaken by the six working groups.

I have already underlined above the urgency and priority that not only my delegation, but the whole community of nations, attach to the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament which, for reasons known to all of us, appears as item two on our agenda. We believe that there is more than enough material, also in the form of concrete proposals, to warrant the commencement of serious substantive negotiations on this subject. I would only repeat at this point our earnest hope that the Committee be enabled to deal substantively with this question.

The next important and urgent item on our agenda is the negotiation of a treaty to ban all tests of nuclear weapons in all environments. We see no reason why the establishment of a working group on the CTB should be viewed as a hindrance to talks that have been going on for quite some time, with little apparent progress, among three of the five nuclear-weapon Powers. On the contrary, it would appear that a condition of success for a measure of this kind would be precisely its universal character, that is, the achievement of a treaty which would contain provisions designed to attract the widest possible adherence. The recent history of agreements in the general field of disarmament provides eloquent proof that it is not prudent, nor indeed realistic, to expect the international community to lend full support and credence to arrangements which do not take into account their legitimate concerns or which aim at perpetuating imbalance and discrimination. Brazil conceives a treaty prohibiting the further testing of nuclear weapons not as an end in itself, nor only as a protective step to ensure that the nuclear weapon club is not enlarged, but as a meaningful step on the path towards nuclear disarmament. Such a treaty would, in fact, institute a freeze on the improvement of nuclear weapons, thus providing an effective tool to check vertical proliferation. The next step, to be explicitly linked to the test ban, must be directed toward the start of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament itself. Furthermore, the treaty should not hinder the full development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, and indeed should be seen as a positive instrument for the promotion of the peaceful utilization of nuclear power and of international co-operation in this field.

My delegation is firmly convinced that negotiations within the CD would greatly contribute to the clarification of important issues and would result in the formulation of an equitable and lasting treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests for military purposes.

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

The question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been in the forefront of the disarmament debate for quite some time now. Brazil has consistently stated its conviction that the only meaningful and lasting assurance is nuclear disarmament itself. Pending nuclear disarmament, some proposals have been advanced, including the negotiation of a convention banning the use of nuclear weapons. In lending its support to that proposal, Brazil has observed that a ban on the use must not be interpreted as in any way legitimizing the possession of nuclear weapons, and must therefore contain an explicit, binding commitment to nuclear disarmament. In the absence of even a convention on the non-use, alternative suggestions have been formulated, such as some form of arrangements by which nuclear-weapon Powers would provide assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is appropriate to establish and stress here that the inherent nature of the nuclear weapon is expressed in its unique and hitherto unsurpassed capacity to destroy the very foundation of human life upon this planet. The recent report of the Secretary-General on the harmful consequences of nuclear war provides a vivid, yet realistic, illustration of this point. By its very nature, the lethal effects of the nuclear weapon are not confined to the belligerents, and its use has already been decried by the United Nations as "a crime against humanity". For those reasons, it is obviously not enough that the nuclear-weapon Powers formally forswear the use of nuclear weapons against the countries which decided not to exercise their sovereign right to the nuclear military option. Accordingly, any interim arrangement should be conceived as a twofold obligation on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers: first, a clear, binding commitment to nuclear disarmament, and secondly, an equally clear commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons during the period between the acceptance of the first obligation and the actual achievement of nuclear disarmament. Only the acceptance of that twofold commitment would adequately balance the decision by non-nuclear-weapon countries to forego the military option.

The Brazilian delegation followed with keen interest the discussions which took place last year in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, and which were very useful to clarify some of the issues involved in this complex matter. We fully support the efforts to arrive at a comprehensive prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. We believe, further, that the future convention must provide for the destruction of the existing stocks of such weapons through an explicit commitment on the part of the few States which do possess them, including a detailed and comprehensive declaration of such stocks and of the facilities for their production. The destruction of existing stockpiles and the dismantling and conversion of facilities are certainly the most significant features of the proposed convention, since they would give the new instrument the character of a true disarmament measure. Accordingly, it would perhaps be more adequate to conceive the instrument under negotiation as a "convention on the destruction of stocks of chemical weapons and on the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling", rather than the other way around. Another priority aspect of the future convention is the promotion of scientific and technological co-operation in the international field for peaceful activities and research involving the use of chemicals.

As regards radiological weapons, the Brazilian delegation continues to believe that the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its efforts on the negotiation of items to which higher priority has been assigned. The overwhelming majority of the international community has recognized the urgency of other aspects of the disarmament spectrum, and in particular nuclear disarmament.

Finally, we believe that the Committee should not miss the opportunity to contribute substantively to the success of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are glad that this fact has been duly recognized by all delegations and is reflected in our agenda for the 1981 session. The negotiation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament, to be submitted to

(Mr. De Souza E Silva, Brazil)

the second special session on disarmament in 1982, is but one aspect of this contribution, albeit a very important one. In our opinion, the main task of the second special session will be the examination of the implementation of the Programme of Action embodied in the Final Document of the first special session; and that document entrusted this Committee with the very substantive task of negotiating disarmament measures. In this, the third year of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, it is imperative that concrete progress be made. The machinery set up in 1978 must live up to the expectations of the world community and become a truly effective instrument of advancement of the cause of disarmament. As the arms race attains intolerable levels, and as even those levels are now being deemed insufficient by those who have the power decisively to influence the course and pace of the arms race, the prospect of our failure seems ominous indeed.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil for his statement and I should also like to assure him of my warm gratitude for his very cordial remarks about myself.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, first of all, allow me to congratulate you warmly, Ambassador François de la Gorce, on behalf of the Chinese delegation, upon your assumption of the Chairmanship for the first month of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. I am convinced that your brilliant Chairmanship will ensure a good beginning for the present session, and you can count on the full co-operation of the Chinese delegation. I also wish to take this opportunity to extend a welcome to the ambassadors from Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire who are participating in our work for the first time this year.

As the Chinese saying goes, "A year's work depends on a good start in spring". Spring invariably brings hope for the new year. During this second spring of the 1980s, we are once again gathered here to discuss a question of universal concern, the question of disarmament. It is our sincere hope that as a result of the joint effort of all present here the Committee will, at the present session, make further progress on the basis of last year's achievements.

However, no one can escape a feeling of serious concern and disquiet at the world situation which has a direct bearing on the disarmament negotiations. The international situation continues to be turbulent, and in certain conflict areas it is becoming worse. In particular, one Superpower has directly dispatched its armed forces to occupy the sovereign State of Afghanistan where the flames of war are still raging. At the same time, this Superpower is supporting its agent in the latter's continued aggression and occupation of Cambodia. They have refused so far to implement the resolutions adopted last year by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session, calling once again for the unconditional withdrawal of all aggressor troops from Afghanistan and Cambodia. Recently, the situation in Europe has been fraught with new dangers as a result of the massing of armed forces and the frequent military manoeuvres on the part of the same Superpower in some strategic areas in Europe. All this will certainly affect and create obstacles for the present disarmament negotiations.

In the past year, the rivalry between the two Superpowers has continued to intensify. On the one hand, these Powers have heightened tension and the danger of war in various regions of the world, particularly the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, by the continuous reinforcement of their military forces and deployment. On the other hand, they are intensifying their competition for military superiority. One Superpower is clamouring for "maintaining a balance", but it is in fact going all out to improve the quality of its conventional armaments now that it has gained quantitative superiority. After it has achieved a rough

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

parity with the other Superpower in nuclear arms, it is now concentrating on the development and improvement of its MIRVs. Its nuclear offensive power is now much greater with the addition of new types of nuclear missiles and strategic bombers. The other Superpower, not to be outdone, is also raising its military budget and engaging in the research and manufacture of new types of weapons. They have already begun a new round in the arms race centred on qualitative improvement.

In the face of the worsening international situation and the intensifying arms race, the people of the world are calling ever more vigorously for an end to aggression and expansion and a halt to the arms race. During the past year, the representatives of many countries have emphatically pointed out in the various disarmament forums that the Afghan incident has seriously heightened international tension, poisoned the atmosphere of confidence necessary for the international disarmament talks and blocked progress in those negotiations. What the people now demand from the Superpowers is action rather than empty words for "the maintenance of peace" and "the promotion of disarmament", a just demand which emanates from the existing international situation.

It was in the midst of the turbulent international situation at the beginning of the 1980s that the Chinese delegation first joined the Committee on Disarmament. We have come with a sincere desire to discuss and study seriously the various disarmament questions with the other members and we hope that the work of the Committee will contribute to the realization of disarmament and the maintenance of world peace. Judging from the experience of the previous session, we believe it is necessary for this Committee to follow sound principles and proper procedures in order to achieve progress.

The most salient feature of the present world situation in terms of the level of armaments is that the two Superpowers possess enormous arsenals which are both quantitatively and qualitatively far superior to those of other countries. Only the two Superpowers are capable of waging a world war, and it is the hegemonist policy they pursue that is seriously threatening world peace and the security of nations. Therefore, a fundamental principle applicable to all areas of the disarmament effort at present is that the Superpowers should be the first to act and drastically reduce their super-arsenals. It is regrettable that the Superpowers have so far refused to take any measure that would entail a real reduction of their armaments. This is the key to the lack of substantive progress in disarmament negotiations.

Since the question of disarmament has a direct bearing on international peace and security, countries participating in the discussions and negotiations on the various disarmament items should enjoy full equality. At present, in terms of institutional arrangements and working procedures, the Committee on Disarmament represents an improvement upon its predecessors. The monopoly over disarmament negotiations by a few big Powers has begun to disintegrate. Small and medium-sized countries have more say now in these matters, and this is commendable. However, the views and demands of these countries are yet to command the respect that they deserve. In our view, the small and medium-sized countries are fully entitled to voice their views and urge the Superpowers to take effective disarmament measures.

I now wish to state our views on some of the questions inscribed on the agenda of the present session of the Committee.

First, I will speak on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament which is of concern to everyone. It is quite clear that the

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

people of the world are being subjected to the ever-menacing danger of a nuclear war as a result of the accelerating nuclear arms race between the Superpowers and their intense preparations and deployment for a nuclear war. All effective measures should be taken to prevent such a war, which would spell unprecedented disaster for the people of the world. It has been the consistent view of my delegation that the fundamental way to remove the danger of a nuclear war is the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. The worth of any nuclear disarmament measure should be judged by whether it would serve to reduce and remove the danger of a nuclear war. At the present stage, the reduction of such a danger requires the two countries which possess the largest nuclear arsenals to put an end to their ever-intensifying nuclear arms race, take the lead in drastically reducing their nuclear arsenals, halt their production of all types of nuclear weapons and close the enormous gap between themselves and the other nuclear-weapon countries, thereby creating the necessary conditions for the joint reduction and final destruction of nuclear weapons by all the nuclear countries.

On the question of a nuclear-test ban, our view is that the halting of tests alone will in no way stop the nuclear arms expansion of the Superpowers. To call on all nuclear countries without distinction to end nuclear testing before the Superpowers have drastically reduced their nuclear arsenals would only serve to maintain and consolidate the nuclear superiority of the Superpowers without reducing the danger of a nuclear war. Only the drastic reduction by the Superpowers of their nuclear arsenals can provide the necessary prerequisite for a comprehensive nuclear-test ban and help to reduce and remove the danger of a nuclear war.

On the question of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States, the consistent position of the Chinese delegation is that, pending the achievement of the over-all objective in nuclear disarmament of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons, all nuclear-weapon countries should undertake unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to proceed on that basis to negotiate and conclude as soon as possible an international convention to that effect. As non-nuclear countries pose no nuclear threat to the nuclear countries, there can be no justification for any nuclear-weapon country to shirk its responsibility to extend such security guarantees.

I now turn to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The CCD was seized of this question for more than 10 years. It is disappointing that the objective of a complete prohibition of chemical weapons has remained as remote as ever. On the contrary, more and newer chemical weapons have appeared in the arsenals of the Superpowers. During the last year, numerous reports have revealed that people subjected to oppression and aggression are being cruelly injured and massacred by the use of chemical weapons. This very real threat of the use of chemical weapons has given more urgency to the question of the complete prohibition of such weapons. In our view the Committee should proceed at its present session

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

on the basis of last year's achievement and enter into substantive negotiations for the drafting of an international convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

The reported use of chemical weapons in Afghanistan, Cambodia and Laos is of serious concern to people everywhere. A resolution was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session calling for an international investigation into the use of chemical weapons. This reflects the strong indignation of the countries of the world at the use of such weapons. The Chinese delegation will support all proposals and measures that would strengthen the 1925 Geneva Protocol and effectively prevent crimes in violation of the said Protocol.

With respect to the question of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, the Chinese delegation has always attached importance to the formulation of the programme because it involves the objectives and principles of disarmament as well as specific disarmament measures, and therefore has a great significance for, and impact on, the future course of disarmament. In order to help promote progress in the field of disarmament, the programme should lay down the basic principles and establish the priorities of disarmament measures on the basis of the actual situation in the world at present.

In our opinion, the programme should incorporate the reasonable proposals that countries in possession of the largest arsenals should bear special responsibilities for disarmament, that disarmament should help to safeguard the sovereignty, independence and security of countries, and that conventional disarmament should also be given importance together with nuclear disarmament. All of these are in line with the urgent requirements of the small and medium-sized countries and would help to reduce the threat against world peace and the security of countries posed by the enormous arsenals of the Superpowers. These important proposals are also reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and in the proposals on the main elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. Our Committee should take this into full account in the course of formulating the programme.

The Chinese delegation shares the hope of many others for real progress in the negotiations on the various agenda items during the present session. People have high hopes for the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament to be held in 1982, and our Committee should contribute to the preparations for that session through our efforts here. The task facing us is therefore both important and urgent. The Chinese delegation is prepared to co-operate with other members and join in the common effort to overcome the difficulties and obstacles and contribute effectively to the promotion of disarmament and the safeguarding of world peace.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of China for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, it gives me great pleasure to join all the distinguished speakers who took the floor before me in welcoming you most warmly on behalf of the Polish delegation as the Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of February, at the beginning of its 1981 session. Let my sincere congratulations be accompanied with words of high appreciation that the members of my delegation and I share for your diplomatic skill so well reflected in your excellent performance during the first two weeks of our debate.

Together with our best wishes to you for the remaining part of this month, I cannot fail to say how pleased I am to welcome to this Chair a distinguished representative of France, the country with which Poland maintains age-old relations of mutual respect and co-operation.

I also wish to express warm thanks to His Excellency Ambassador Terrefe of Ethiopia for his valuable contribution to the work of the Committee in its concluding session last year, and particularly for performing the difficult task of presiding when the Committee's report to the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly was being prepared.

My best wishes go to the distinguished representatives of Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire who have recently joined us as heads of their respective delegations at this conference table. I also cordially wish all the best to the Secretary of the Committee, H.E. Ambassador Jaipal, and to all members of his staff who do not spare their efforts in discharging their responsible task of ensuring that the work of our Committee runs smoothly.

We are entering the third consecutive year of activity of the enlarged Committee on Disarmament and the second year of its work with its full membership. This work has enriched us with additional experience and we have now got to know each other much better than we did three years ago, although there have been, as usual, routine transfers of heads of delegations. On the other hand, the monthly rotation of the chairmanship brings variety to our work through consecutive chairmen's individual features shaped by the historical background and the specific characteristics of their nations.

My delegation fully shares the remarks, already expressed, on the importance of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. I shall probably not be giving away a secret if I say that my delegation has arrived at the 1981 session of the Committee with a clear instruction from its Government: to contribute to the strengthening of this Committee which constitutes the only forum of a world scope for multilateral disarmament negotiations, endowed with the confidence of Governments and the whole international community. In order not to fail this confidence, my delegation has been instructed to make every possible effort to ensure the constructive nature of the work of the Committee and of its subsidiary bodies, to seek persistently a compromise which would secure a balanced character in the formulas worked out and would not infringe upon the interests of mutual security. This approach is based on the conviction that the balance of security must be sought along a declining line of the armaments spiral, since, in the past 35 years, the movement upwards has brought a five-fold increase in armaments spendings. However, no one would venture to give an affirmative answer to this simple question: is the world today five times more secure?

The Government of the Polish People's Republic, mindful of the historical experiences of its own nation and faithful to its alliances, invariably spares no effort in order that the process of détente, begun in the late 1960s and early 1970s, should be developed and strengthened by accompanying indispensable disarmament efforts.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Such a position has been held by my country not only in those times when dangerous clouds were gathering over the world but also and, perhaps, particularly in the times when we were witnessing equally dangerous local storms. Just such particular times make it imperative to intensify the search for a lowering of the levels of military means of confrontation. In this context, the signals of a new phase in the arms race must cause concern in Poland. The well-known decision of the Council of NATO on the deployment of medium-range rockets in western Europe, as well as the recent news on the neutron bomb and binary weapons constitute such signals. And again, as in the past, it is being argued that a resumption of the issue of the deployment of the neutron bomb and proceeding to the production of binary weapons would restore the shaken strategic balance. Of course, one feels inclined to ask: what are the new elements or facts which have arisen since mid-1979 when, with the signing of the SALT II agreement, the existence of a strategic balance of forces was explicitly confirmed. After all, it cannot be assumed that the endorsement of such a balance was based at that time on miscalculation or with a view to deceive one's own nation as well as its partners.

My country is vitally interested in putting an end to the search for any excuses which could serve to justify the speeding up of the arms race. We are interested in abandoning the philosophy of seeking a balance of forces and in favour of the philosophy of the balance of reason. Guided by such a sense of reason, Poland has put forward at the Madrid follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, on behalf of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, a proposal to convene in Warsaw a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe of all States participating in the Madrid meeting. Realizing the fact that there are different approaches towards such a conference, we earnestly hope, however, that the idea of convening it will be accepted by all participants in the Madrid meeting. We see this conference as, first of all, a decisive step towards strengthening confidence-building measures in Europe, the continent which has the greatest accumulation of all possible dangerous weapons. To host such a conference would be an honour to my country, whose peaceful initiatives have been markedly reflected in the post-war political realities of Europe. In line with the aforementioned conference goes the invariable interest of Poland in a prompt and meaningful breakthrough in the talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe which are taking place in Vienna.

As a representative of a State Party to the Warsaw Treaty, I should also like to mention the initiatives of this defensive organization, recapitulated during its jubilee session in Warsaw in May 1980. The decisions taken at this session, contained in the document of the Committee CD/98, clearly call for the acceleration of progress in disarmament negotiations. This appeal was repeated at the meeting of leaders of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty last December.

I wish to express the firm conviction of my delegation that we shall, this year, find enough will, determination and perseverance to make, in this Committee, more significant progress than we have done in past years. This conviction is based on the following premises:

1. We have accumulated enough experience in the conditions of the enlarged Committee's membership;
2. We have achieved concrete results in its work, such as:
 - (a) An outline of negotiating positions, i.e. an awareness of convergent and divergent positions;

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

(b) A selection of issues and their outlines from their starting points to their solutions;

(c) Agreed organizational platforms, methods and forms of negotiations;

3. Within the Committee there is a prevailing tendency towards maintaining and strengthening its function as a negotiating body, endowed with a business-like atmosphere and a will to avoid any superfluous formalism and unnecessary political controversies.

The working paper CD/141 introduced by Ambassador Herder, the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic, on behalf of a group of socialist States reflects also the views of my delegation on the organizational aspects of the work of our Committee. There is no need to repeat them now. I would like to confine myself to expressing my delegation's deep satisfaction and, at the same time, congratulations to you as our Chairman on the consensus achieved on the re-establishment of four working groups. There should be no difficulties, I think, for these groups to start their substantive work without further delay.

It would respond adequately to the appeal of the United Nations General Assembly, contained in resolution 35/152 E addressed to States members of the Committee on Disarmament "to intensify their efforts to bring to a successful end the negotiations which are currently taking place in the Committee on Disarmament". Another element of optimism would be a decision that, for the time being, the ad hoc working groups could continue their work on the basis of last year's mandates which might later be amended or changed if the Committee so decides.

The general goal and point of departure in the work of the ad hoc groups should be: to continue and advance and perhaps even finalize what is ready for solution on the basis of what has already been done.

With your permission I should now like to say a few words about the tasks of the specific working groups as we see them.

First, the Working Group on the prohibition of chemical weapons. My delegation looks forward to participating and to contributing actively and constructively to the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. The group should-- without undue delay-- continue and advance the work undertaken in 1980. In our view, it could in particular take up the issues which were not discussed last year owing to lack of time, or it could elaborate in a more detailed manner the questions on which a general convergence of views has already appeared.

Let us not forget that parallel to our work in the Committee on the prohibition of chemical weapons there are also the bilateral talks on that subject. We consider them very important for the process of multilateral negotiations, especially as their results have been very hopeful. I can only wish and hope that they be resumed very soon and that their results will enhance our work.

It is my strong personal conviction that there are already sufficient premises for a tangible progress in the process of working out the draft of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. What we really need is a political will and the political decisions of Governments to have such an agreement.

(Mr. Sujka (Poland))

I now come to the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons. The Polish delegation believes that the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject should immediately proceed with the negotiations. This group has at its disposal the jointly agreed proposal which is a good basis for the drafting of a convention. We see no major difficulties in reconciling different approaches which appeared in the process of negotiations. Allow me to express my hope that this will be feasible in 1981 as the Group will have more time for negotiations than it had last year.

Another Ad Hoc Working Group which should, in our view, finalize its work this year is the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. My delegation shares the opinion that there is no doubt as to the validity of the Group's mandate. It has been set up with the specific and concrete task of elaborating a comprehensive programme of disarmament which will be presented, in due course, to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament, to be held in 1982. This adds an element of importance and urgency to its work, since such a programme will have to be fully drafted well in advance of the special session. My delegation is convinced that the Group will make an effective and constructive contribution to the success of the second special session. The comprehensive programme of disarmament which we are striving for will not be really comprehensive if it does not include a certain psychological infrastructure of disarmament. It should, in the view of my Government, provide for such measures as would arm public opinion with the conviction that to live in peace one has first to start to disarm.

As far as effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons are concerned, the Polish delegation, while repeating that the Working Group's aim is the elaboration of an international convention, believes that in order to bring the issue closer to its solution, the Working Group could consider some kind of interim arrangement. In such an arrangement we would like to see an agreed common formula of assurances instead of five unilateral statements.

I should now like to turn to the items of our agenda on which no subsidiary bodies were established but which have always been accorded a very high priority in our considerations.

One such item is a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban. In the view of the Polish delegation we can no longer delay the establishment of an ad hoc working group on this subject. In fact, we are of the opinion that such a working group should be established immediately. The ad hoc working group on a comprehensive nuclear-weapon test-ban, with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, should take into account the results of the trilateral negotiations on the subject and all other proposals and future initiatives. It could define the issues to be dealt with in the negotiations on an agreement on this subject and start negotiations on the shape of this agreement.

Another high-priority item on our agenda is the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The high priority my country attaches to early progress in this area was shown by the proposals Poland and other socialist countries put forward in 1979 (contained in document CD/4) for the start of negotiations on ending the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. We firmly believe that this issue and other issues relevant to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament deserve to be negotiated within an ad hoc working group which should be established. This working group could begin its proceedings with the examination of the question of the elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament as envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, including the role and responsibilities of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Sujka (Poland))

While I am on the subject of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, I would like to mention another topic which has found its place on our agenda this year and which deserves a closer scrutiny. I have in mind the question of elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. The Polish delegation is convinced that such an agreement could contribute to the limitation of the nuclear arms race and to the progress of détente, and thus would constitute an important step towards the limitation of armaments. In our opinion such an agreement could best be elaborated by the ad hoc working group, which could start its work in the near future.

Last but not least is the question of banning new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. The Polish delegation lends its support to the proposal for the establishment of an ad hoc working group of experts on this subject. The main task of such a group, which would be working under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament, would be the elaboration of an expert report on all the consequences of developments in the field of potentially dangerous research work which might in effect bring about new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This group could also give us indications as to the particular types of weapons of mass destruction that should be subject to a ban.

It is worth remembering that the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament is the last full session we have before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It is also worth remembering that we have certain obligations which we are required to meet before that session. If we want seriously to meet them and to achieve tangible results in at least one or two particular areas of disarmament before the special session, we will have to achieve them within the next few months.

The good and constructive atmosphere in which we started our work this year as well as the concrete decisions already taken by the Committee under your Chairmanship fill us with optimism, and augur well for the results of this session. On behalf of the Polish delegation I would like to declare our full co-operation with you, Mr. Chairman, and with your successors in the Chair in the effort to attain our common goal.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Poland for his statement and I should also like to thank him warmly for his kind words both about myself and about my country.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, last Tuesday in this Committee, venturing upon a comparison with Monsieur de Callières, I said what I felt on the subject of your chairmanship. I think it might be somewhat unsuitable if, as the representative of Belgium, a neighbour country whose relations with France are so profound, so sustained and so friendly, I were to expatiate upon the satisfaction I feel at seeing you preside over our work. I would rather note the satisfaction expressed by everyone in the Committee at the way in which you are directing our discussions; I believe first, that, this illustrates your country's policy and the excellent relations that France maintains with all States and, secondly, that it also represents a recognition of your eminent qualities. In this connection, I should like to echo the words used by the Ambassador of Brazil in the speech he has just made. He spoke of your "gentle firmness", and I find that this is a most apt description of the representative of a country once celebrated in song as "gentle France".

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

You will remain in our minds as the man who, within the space of a fortnight, succeeded in solving the bulk of the difficult organizational problems with which our Committee was faced. Thanks to your diplomacy and skill, you have done it while preserving an exceptionally friendly atmosphere within our Committee.

In welcoming that friendly atmosphere, I should also like to say how glad we are to see Ambassador Jaipal, Mr. Berasategui and their whole team with us again. They are, I feel, trusty counsellors and enlightened guides both for the Chair and for each delegation. It is very often thanks to them that we can make our way through procedural tangles and solve problems in the organization of our work.

Lastly, I should like to welcome among us our new colleagues from Argentina, Egypt, Pakistan, Romania and Zaire. I believe that, through the contacts they have already established with us in the past few days, they have shown that they were adapting themselves perfectly to the atmosphere of our Committee, and I feel that this bodes well for our continued co-operation with them.

At the outset of this third year of activities of the Committee on Disarmament with its present structure and membership, I should like to draw attention to the risks that are increasingly confronting the effort to secure arms control and disarmament -- an effort in which an essential responsibility has been laid upon our Committee.

These risks arise, first, from the alarming state of international security. For a year now, the vast majority of the members of the international community have repeatedly voiced their concern over the deterioration of the conditions of security in the world. The continuation of actions involving force in various part of the world hardly encourages us to amend that view. A year ago, I told the Committee that "it would ... be a grave error of political judgement to speak today in ... the Committee on Disarmament without expressing the deep concern felt by our peoples and leaders over what has been taking place in Afghanistan since late December 1979". The situation has remained unchanged since then, and today we feel more than ever that only moderation in the behaviour of States could restore a better political climate, which alone would be conducive to further progress in disarmament negotiations.

But the stagnation which marked, in particular, the second half of the last decade may perhaps also be explained by factors more intrinsic than the political climate to which I have just referred. The approaches we have envisaged, our working methods and the ways and means we have devised also deserve close scrutiny. It would no doubt be mistaken to place the responsibility for the meagreness of the results achieved in the last few years exclusively upon political factors extrinsic to arms control. It is up to us, as well as to other competent bodies, to identify with the greatest possible rigour all the reasons for the situation.

Three years after the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we are forced to admit that although the Final Document which resulted from the session has lost none of its validity, the hopes it raised have not been fulfilled. The second special session planned for next year should give fresh impetus to the efforts of all States, and especially those represented on this Committee.

Possibilities do exist, even under present political circumstances. Thus, my country welcomed the opening last year of preparatory talks between the United States and the USSR, as part of the SALT process -- to whose continuation Belgium attaches the greatest importance -- concerning the limitation of certain specific systems of theatre nuclear weapons. My country's authorities look forward to the most rapid possible development of these talks.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Similarly, the conclusion of a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons also demonstrated the possibility of achieving concrete results notwithstanding the present disappointing international climate.

Some results were also achieved at the last session of the General Assembly, such as the adoption by consensus of resolution 35/156 D concerning the Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament. Belgium will do its best to ensure the follow-up of this Study so that it may, in the words of the resolution, "encourage Governments to take initiatives and to consult within the different regions with a view to agreeing upon appropriate measures of regional disarmament". Belgium hopes that other States will inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of their views regarding the study and its conclusions. In this connection I should add that Belgium is happy to note the importance attached in Europe to the regional approach and is taking an active part in the Vienna talks for mutual balanced forces reductions, where the western countries have, in particular, proposed the conclusion of an interim first-stage agreement on reductions in Soviet and United States forces and, at the same time, have submitted a set of associated measures aimed at strengthening confidence among the participating States. Belgium is also represented in Madrid, at the second conference for the review of the Final Act of Helsinki, to which it would like to impart renewed momentum, especially as regards the military aspects of security, by supporting the French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe.

In these areas relating to the regional approach, as in other, Belgium greatly looks forward to the contribution to disarmament work that will be made by the activities of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, whose recent establishment we warmly welcome.

So far as the Committee on Disarmament itself is concerned, it should endeavour, within the framework of its programme of work, to function effectively wherever it is able to make a useful contribution. To be able to do this, it is essential that it should avoid paralysing procedural disputes and get on as quickly as possible to the substance of the items on its agenda. We welcome the fact that under your wide, skilful and adroit chairmanship the Committee should have made such a good start as regards organizational matters.

The working instruments the Committee on Disarmament fashioned at its last session offer considerable advantages which should not be wasted in 1981. No time should be lost in putting these instruments into use once more. For this reason, Belgium suggests that the four working groups set up with regard to certain important items on the agenda -- chemical weapons, the comprehensive programme of disarmament, radiological weapons and security assurances -- should rapidly resume their activities in accordance with the negotiating role of our Committee. This role should be preserved at all costs, for there are, we believe, enough other forums within the United Nations framework where more theoretical problems connected with disarmament can be debated.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

My country has on a number of occasions made the point that the working groups method has proved perfectly compatible with efforts being pursued in separate negotiations. It should be possible to reconcile the desire to see those negotiations succeed -- both in the field of chemical weapons and in the immensely important one of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests -- with the legitimate concern of the Committee on Disarmament to deal in substance with the well-defined items on its agenda.

I should like to speak here of those which seem to me to be the most important among them, bearing in mind the limited time set aside for our work.

The question of a nuclear test ban will undoubtedly arouse special interest during this session of the Committee. First, the three States engaged in negotiations on this question presented at the end of the 1980 session of the Committee a report which was more substantial than that for 1979 and which will not fail to provide material for discussion. Secondly, the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons demonstrated that this key instrument of arms control should be seen merely as the point of departure of a policy and that it ought to be followed by other, more ambitious, precise and specific decisions on security and disarmament. The conclusion of a nuclear test ban treaty should be one of those decisions.

In this context, and without prejudging the manner in which we shall decide to tackle this question as a whole, Belgium would like, for its part, to dwell on the problem of the detection and identification of seismic events, to which the tripartite report itself attaches great importance.

Two topics could be submitted for our attention:

First, that of the means of ensuring a judicious geographical distribution of stations participating in the network for the detection and identification of seismic events, more particularly in the light of considerations expressed at the informal meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 13 July 1980 with the participation of experts from the Ad Hoc Group concerned with the detection and identification of seismic events;

Secondly, that of the consideration of the new mandate which could be given to the Group of Experts after 1981. That mandate might be more directly connected with the various problems of seismic data exchange which our Committee may discuss, particularly in relation to consideration set forth in the tripartite report and more specifically in connection with the setting up of a committee of experts to examine questions relating to international seismic data exchange.

Belgium has never ceased to show interest in the negotiations aimed at the prohibition of chemical weapons. Whereas, during its work in 1980, the Committee on Disarmament focused its attention principally on problems relating to the drafting of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, it would seem logical and timely if it were now to endeavour to supplement and, above all, to harmonize the various viewpoints expressed. My country will spare no effort to try to contribute to this process the aim of which is to reinforce the work begun by the Geneva Protocol more than a quarter of a century ago.

In the matter of radiological weapons, the path mapped out for us by the Committee's work in 1980 is clearer. Rapid agreement should be possible on the conclusion of a treaty, for the prohibition of such weapons, provided that, bearing in mind the security constraints to which our States are subject, we agree on a realistic definition of the weapon we want to prohibit. Such a definition, however limited it might be in its implications for the strategic relationships of the moment, should in no way prejudice the efforts yet to be made. It would in any case constitute the first prohibition in a field in which all States could undertake to pursue negotiations with a view to achieving further significant results.

The elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme should be continued without delay in such a way that it will be possible to submit it to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament. The value of this programme will not be derived from the constraints, whether chronological or legal. We have never thought that conditions of a coercive nature or strict negotiating deadlines could be imposed on negotiators from the outside. The programme's value will lie in the consensus achieved with regard to the elaboration of a series of measures the implementation of which should be stimulated by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Lastly, the question of the security assurances to be given by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear States has already been discussed so much that an imaginative effort would now seem to be called for. Belgium has already suggested the following two possible ways in which progress in this direction might be achieved, bearing in mind the difficulty of finding a universal common denominator in the unilateral declarations which have been made to date by the nuclear-weapon Powers:

The first suggestion, one of form, was that these assurances should be approved by the Security Council -- an idea recently echoed, with various qualifications, by certain delegations in the Committee;

The second suggestion, one relating to substance, was that an effort should be made to find a safeguard formula which would provide the maximum assurance for those States which have chosen the path of non-alignment.

The Committee on Disarmament will be best able to do its job successfully if it discusses proposals that are credible and well-defined. It is essentially in this pragmatic and, we hope, constructive spirit that Belgium proposes to work in the Committee in 1981.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Onkelinx for his statement and I should like to convey to him my warm gratitude for his very kind remarks about myself and my country -- I was very touched by them.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Allow me first to repeat in the name of my delegation our congratulations to you on your assumption of the Chair of the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of our work this year. We are convinced that under your skilled guidance, this body will begin to focus its attention on its principal task, that of achieving effective measures of disarmament.

I wish to assure you that in this aim you can count on the full co-operation of my delegation.

We wish also to extend our congratulations to the representative of our sister nation Ethiopia, the outgoing Chairman. At the same time, we should like to welcome to the Committee the new representatives of Pakistan, Romania, Zaire and Egypt and we look forward to co-operating with them in carrying out the tasks laid upon our Committee.

The year which has just ended was characterized by a marked tendency towards an increase in international tensions and an aggravation of the arms race. There is proof of this in the decision of some countries permanently to increase their military budgets up to the end of the present century and embark on the manufacture of sophisticated weapons of mass extermination.

These steps still further increase the gravity of the present international atmosphere already rendered precarious by the decision to deploy 572 medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe and by the escalation of armaments in the Indian Ocean, the Caribbean Sea, the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East.

In addition to these facts, moreover, there are the new ideas that now exist about the possibility of a limited nuclear war, increasing further the risk of a nuclear catastrophe, and the indefinite postponement of the ratification of the SALT II agreement, with the evident intent of making this important treaty a dead letter.

This gives the measure of the importance of the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981. As you are aware, the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament is to be held next year, and we consider it incumbent upon the Committee, therefore, to achieve concrete results to justify its work, in accordance with the mandate given it by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament.

A review of our work shows that the establishment of working groups for the tasks assigned to the Committee is the appropriate way of negotiating in this body, in an atmosphere of understanding which can contribute to the achievement of our objectives. Let me therefore express our congratulations and pleasure to the chairmen of the four groups that have been meeting up to the present, with the hope that the groups will be re-established without delay and will immediately embark on their substantive work.

It is the intention of my delegation to bend its efforts to ensuring that the Committee on Disarmament is not held back this year by sterile debates over procedural questions or matters that have nothing to do with our work, on which we have in the past spent too much time. We must establish the practice of embarking promptly on concrete work and fruitful negotiations which will bring tangible results.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The Cuban delegation feels obliged to endeavour to persuade the Committee on Disarmament to focus its work on the priorities established by the United Nations General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament, those same priorities which this negotiating body has set itself.

Unfortunately, it has not yet been possible to establish working groups on such important subjects as a comprehensive nuclear test ban, nuclear disarmament and new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We cherish the hope that for these items also, which are so vital to the cause of disarmament, the Committee will quickly decide to establish the appropriate working groups.

As the arms race intensifies, as the threat to human survival increases, so the demand of peoples for peace increases and with it the need for the Committee on Disarmament to achieve concrete results in its negotiations. My country observes with concern the spiralling of military expenditures the world over making it ever more difficult for the underdeveloped countries to escape from the situation of poverty and disaster which has been their lot for centuries.

In this connection, Fidel Castro, the President of Cuba, recently said:

'The underdeveloped world would go on as before, only still more underdeveloped; imperialism would go on as before, only even more wealthy; and mankind would go on as before, only with a thousand million people more than now living in the most absolute poverty'.

To the present world situation, so precarious in itself with all its centres of crisis and tension, with the increase of armaments in the most diverse regions, is added the appearance of governments announcing ultra-reactionary programmes which, far from promoting ways to secure a relaxation of tension or seeking acceptable solutions, encourage warlike, interventionist and hard-line policies.

My country is an integral part of the group of States threatened by aggression and injustice; consequently, while we are resolved to play our part in the defence of peace and international détente, at the same time we are strengthening our defences with a view to protecting our independence and sovereignty and the legitimate interests of our people.

The foreign policy of Cuba which has just been ratified is based on the principles of preserving peace and international security and striving for disarmament and the halting of the arms race.

Cuba will continue to pursue this policy in all the international forums and in particular in this multilateral negotiating body. The Committee on Disarmament offers the opportunity to demonstrate fully the true intentions of every country as regards the struggle for disarmament and peace.

As early as during the first year of work of this body, as restructured, the Group of 21 gave ample proof of their readiness to collaborate actively in the achievement of concrete results. Similarly, the socialist countries submitted various working papers reflecting their desire to achieve disarmament measures without delay.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

It is precisely those groups of States which have most urgently requested the establishment of various working groups in order to enter fully into negotiations, in accordance with the desire of peace-loving countries and peoples, which are struggling tenaciously for the cessation of the arms race, for the removal of the threat of war, for the strengthening of international détente and for the economic and social well-being of the peoples.

These are the general comments that my country wishes to make, while reserving the right to express our views and opinions on particular items in greater detail in the working groups and at future meetings.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Cuba for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. PROKOPIEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation came to this session of the Committee with the firm intention of making a constructive contribution to its work and of helping to create a business-like atmosphere in it. However, the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has begun its work this year in a constructive manner, on a business-like note, has apparently not been to everybody's taste. The Soviet delegation notes with regret that at today's meeting there has been an attempt on the part of the Chinese delegation once again to divert the Committee's attention from the important tasks before it and to poison the atmosphere in the Committee on Disarmament. There has been a repetition of hackneyed, slanderous and groundless assertions which have nothing whatever to do with the work of the Committee. The Soviet delegation reserves its right to revert to this question when it considers that necessary.

Mr. DABIRI (Iran) (translated from French): In the statement made a few minutes ago, the distinguished and honourable Ambassador of Cuba used an erroneous terminology in referring to the stretch of water which separates the Iranian plateau from the Arabian peninsula. As you all know, that stretch of water has been known under the name of the Persian Gulf since time immemorial. The expression Persian Gulf has always been used in all encyclopaedias and all atlases, as well as by all societies and men of culture. That term has also always been used by United Nations bodies and by all other agencies within the United Nations system. I feel sure that the honourable Ambassador of Cuba used the term he did in speaking of the Persian Gulf by oversight; all the same, my delegation wishes to make this declaration so that it may be included in the record.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, if in my statement I made an error of geographical terminology, I wish to apologize to the representative of Iran. It is not our intention to embark upon any contentious subject this year in the Committee on Disarmament but to work fundamentally towards the development of the task entrusted to us by the General Assembly at its first special session devoted to disarmament. If I made a mistake, therefore, I would ask the representative of Iran to accept my formal apology.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the representative of Cuba for his statement. If no one else wishes to speak, I would suggest that we take up Working Paper No. 28, which we discussed at yesterday's informal meeting, and I should like to know if I may take it that there is a consensus in the Committee regarding the content of this document with respect to the Committee's ad hoc working groups for 1981.

Mr. GARCÍA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): With reference to the third paragraph, I should like to ask a question which is on a point of English. According to what you told us yesterday, it would be for Ambassador Summerhayes, the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom, to answer it. I will indicate in advance that my delegation will accept the reply, whatever it is.

The question is the following: the first three lines of this third paragraph read: "It is understood that the Committee will, as soon as possible, review the mandates of the three ad hoc working groups with a view to adapting, as appropriate, their mandates to advance ..." and so on and so forth. My question is whether we could not delete the second 'their mandates' and replace it by the pronoun "them", which would follow "adapting". The text would then read as follows: "It is understood that the Committee will, as soon as possible, review the mandates of the three ad hoc working groups with a view to adapting them, as appropriate, to advance ..." , etc. etc.

I repeat that whatever the answer may be I will accept it as valid and of course I am merely asking a question.

With regard to the Spanish text, I have a few very modest suggestions for the fourth paragraph which are intended solely to bring it exactly into line with the English text, which is the original. Thus the Spanish text, in our view, should read: "Queda entendido también que la decisión adoptada por el Comité no excluye de ningún modo la consideración con carácter urgente ..." , etc. etc. The words, "la posibilidad de proceder a" should be deleted because they do not appear in the English text.

Then, in the fourth line, the Spanish text at present reads, "... de la agenda del Comité, y a la consideración ..." , etc. etc. In view of the change that needs to be made in the second line, I would suggest that this should be amended to read "... la agenda del Comité, ni tampoco la consideración ..." , etc.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): I will do my very best to answer the question, although I do not feel myself to be the only master of the English language in this gathering.

My comment would be that although the amendments suggested by Ambassador García Robles might perhaps be slightly more elegant grammatically, the existing wording is probably more explicit and makes itself quite clear.

Therefore, I think that the only gain to be made would be in a slight improvement in the elegance of the sentence; as I see it, the existing sentence is very clear in its meaning.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): My feeling would be that we could perhaps leave the text as it is, because this in no way affects the substance. I see that the French text does not repeat the reference to the mandates of the working groups, and speaks of adapting them according to need. It can be deduced from the context that this means adapting the mandates and not the working groups. I realize, in fact, that the English text, as Ambassador Summerhayes said, is more explicit. I wonder if it is really necessary to amend the text since its meaning is perfectly clear, although I appreciate that Ambassador Garcia Robles's concern for elegance is entirely justified.

Could we, then, accept the text as it stands with the small variations in the different languages which do not, I think, affect the basic identity of meaning?

It was so decided.

Mr. FLOWERREEE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I apologize for taking the floor at this late hour. Had we had more time, I would have added my voice more fully to those who have congratulated you on the manner in which you have conducted this session and to welcome our new members. My purpose in intervening at this point is simply to put on record a statement which I made at the informal meeting at the beginning of this week.

As is well known, the new administration which was installed in Washington just three weeks ago is engaged in a detailed review of important policy questions, including those that relate to the work of this Committee.

My Government is conscious, however, of the desire of the Committee to begin its substantive work as soon as possible, and therefore my delegation has been authorized to join in a consensus on the re-establishment, under their former mandates, of those working groups on which there was agreement last year.

In this connection, I wish to note that, since the subject-matter to be treated by these working groups is under review by the new United States Administration, the nature of the participation of the United States delegation will be guided by the pace and outcome of that review.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank Ambassador Flowerreee for his statement. Before adjourning the meeting I should like to suggest to the Committee that we hold a plenary meeting tomorrow at 10.30 a.m. so that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events can present the Group's report to the Committee. We can also, if necessary, take up other subjects. I am thinking in particular that we could perhaps take a decision on the appointment of the Chairmen of the working groups we have just set up, and it goes without saying that if we are in a position to take such a decision, it might perhaps be a good idea to interrupt the plenary meeting for a few minutes to make sure among ourselves that we really are in agreement on the persons to be appointed, and we can then resume our plenary meeting in order formally to record the agreement we have reached on that subject. If there are no other observations, I shall adjourn this meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

CD/PV.106
13 February 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 13 February 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. F. de la Gorce (France)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Mr. M. MATI

Argentina:

Mr. F. JIMENEZ DAVILA

Miss N. FREYRE PENABAD

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Mr. T. FINDLAY

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Miss G. VAN DEN BERG

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Mr. R. DEYANOV

Mr. K. PRAMOV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. G. SKINNER

Mr. B. THACKER

Mr. C. CACCIA

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. LIANG Yufan

Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Mr. YANG Mingliang

Cuba:

Mr. L. SOLA VILA

Mrs. V. BOROWDOSKY JACKIEWICH

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. A. CIMA
Mr. L. STAVINOHÁ

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. M.N. FAHY

Ethiopia: Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mr. P. BÜNTIG

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. H. MÜLLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. DARUSMAN
Mr. KARYONO
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. HARYOMATARAM

Iran: Mr. M. DABERI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. V. CORDERO DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. R. ISHII

Kenya: Mr. S. SHITEMI
Mr. G.N. MUNIU

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mr. M.A. CACERES

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S.-O. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. O. ADENIJI
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru: Mr. F. VALDIVIESO
Mr. A. DE SOTO

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
Mr. S. KONIK
Mr. T. STROJWAS

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD

Mr. L. NORBERG

Mr. S. STRÖMBÄCK

Mr. J. LUNDIN

Mr. J. PRAWITZ

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV

Mr. L.A. NAUMOV

Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV

Mr. V.A. PERFILIEV

Mr. L.S. MOSHKOV

Mr. Y.V. KOSTENKO

Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D.M. SUMTERHAYES

Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

Mrs. J.I. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE

Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER

Mr. J.A. MISKEL

Mr. H. WILSON

Venezuela:

Mr. A.R. TAYLHARDAT

Mr. O.A. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. M. VRHUNEC

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. VERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I declare open the 106th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament. We decided yesterday to hold a plenary meeting today so that the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events could submit to the Committee his Group's report which is contained in document CD/150.

Mr. ERICSSON (Chairman, Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events): As it has done several times in the recent past, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events again presents you with a progress report on its work. Last year, in July, I had the opportunity to give a somewhat detailed description of what this Expert Group was about to do. The Group has described how an international seismic data exchange could be designed in order to monitor a complete test map.

Under its most recent mandate, the Group has started to consider, review and assess a number of national investigations into the sending of seismological messages around the globe, involving, in particular, the use of the WMO communication network and a number of other, somewhat technical methods which need to be tested. Such limited tests of the different parts of the system were started in July last year and continue thanks to the very effective co-operation of a number of States through their relevant institutes. There has been actual sending of messages around the globe, involving institutes and States from here in Europe to the other side of the globe, for example Australia and New Zealand, and a number of States in between. Although the results have been most valuable, they are, however, of a preliminary nature only, and the Group therefore intends to pursue this method further. We have enjoyed the co-operation of WMO and understand, informally, that a similar experiment might be possible towards the end of this year.

This is not the only activity in which the Group is engaged; a very considerable effort is also being put into the design of the data centres, which are intended to take care of the data and present them to the participating States. There are also efforts to improve our understanding of how the details of the data should be designed, what kind of data should be taken and transmitted, and how data should be extracted from the ground.

Many of these investigations are such that they cannot be reported to the Committee until early next year, as the communication tests around the globe are bound to the times when the network is available for testing. Therefore, a report on them can not be presented to this Committee until some time in the first half of next year, as is stated in the report which is before you.

The Ad Hoc Group considered that it would require two or three further sessions in which to prepare a report covering all its present activities in the field, and therefore suggested that the next session, subject to the approval of this Committee, be convened here from 3 to 14 August 1981.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has received the eleventh progress report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and to Identify Seismic Events with great satisfaction.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

Under its present mandate, the Ad Hoc Group has initiated a number of national investigations of the foreseen data exchanged, some of them involving practical tests which, although of limited scope, require international co-operation not only between a number of States but also with the World Meteorological Organization, to which we are much indebted.

I understand that this co-operation and these national investigations, to which my country has been able to contribute continuously, and I hope significantly, will continue and bring us all closer to the day when an international seismic data exchange will contribute to a truly world-wide co-operation in monitoring and thereby politically maintaining a global convention on a test ban.

With this in mind, I formally propose that the Committee take note of the progress report as it is before us in document CD/150 and that we take the necessary decisions on it, if possible at our next plenary meeting.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor to thank Dr. Ericsson for the report which he has just tabled before the Committee. My delegation wishes to congratulate him and the members of his Group for the business-like way in which they have addressed their task of considering international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. I particularly wish to congratulate the Group for their efforts, as outlined in the report, and for the results they have achieved. My country looks forward to a continuation of their work.

My delegation derives special satisfaction from the various national and multilateral tests and trial exchanges which are becoming a feature of the Group's activity. Australia participated in two experimental tests last year, one to investigate whether the global telecommunication system operated by the World Meteorological Organization might be used to transmit seismic messages, and the other, conducted by Sweden, for the establishment of a common data base. It is our belief that such tests provide information of value to the proposed international exchange of seismic data.

We would, however, urge broader participation, for example, by countries in the southern hemisphere, in this activity.

Since Mr. McGregor, the Australian member of the Expert Group, is convener of the relevant study group, my delegation specifically wishes to draw attention to the proposed further tests later this year of the exchange of seismic data over the global telecommunication system of WMO, and I take this opportunity to express my belief that this Committee owes a special expression of appreciation to that organization for its co-operation.

Trial exchanges and similar tests with, as I have emphasized, as broad a participation as possible, undoubtedly have an important role to play in establishing a basis for a system to verify a future comprehensive nuclear test-ban agreement.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Japanese delegation I wish to thank Dr. Ericsson for the progress report he has just presented to us. I also, of course, wish to congratulate Dr. Ericsson and his Group of Scientific Experts on the very important work they have been doing over the years.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

Unfortunately, I again have to express the regret of my delegation that the experimental exercise on a global scale, which my Government has been calling for, has not yet been put into practice. My delegation does, however, appreciate the fact that a trial exchange of what is known as Level 1 data was conducted in October and November last year through the global telecommunication system of the World Meteorological Organization with the participation of some 14 countries, and that certain results were achieved.

However, it must be pointed out that the 14 countries which took part in the recent tests were countries which are geographically situated either on or near the main trunk circuit of the WMO global telecommunication system. Therefore, it is difficult to say that it was possible to make a full and satisfactory assessment from the point of view of the global exchange of data. It should be stressed that countries which participate in such trial exchanges do not have to undertake complicated procedures, nor do they have to accept too heavy an additional load or burden on their routine work. Indeed, most of the countries members of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts who were not able to take part in the recent trial are in fact already exchanging seismic data as a matter of routine through the WMO global telecommunication system, on a regional basis. One therefore wonders why it would not be possible for such countries to take part in future trial exchanges of a similar nature.

My delegation therefore hopes that, when the next trial exchange is conducted in November and December this year, all countries currently represented in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts will find it possible to take part; and of course we would like to request or invite those countries which were formerly members of the Ad Hoc Group, and especially countries in the southern hemisphere, to make efforts to take part in future trial exchanges, so that we can make an assessment of WMO's global telecommunication system from a wider and truly global point of view.

Finally, I am pleased to support the proposal just made by Ambassador Lidgard, our distinguished colleague from Sweden, that we formally take note of the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I also should like, on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation, to express our appreciation for the report which Dr. Ericsson has just given to the Committee. I am indeed sure that many delegations will join us in thanking him, not only for the account of his chairmanship which he has just given, but also for the work of the Ad Hoc Group itself and the experts who have come to Geneva under his leadership.

My delegation is pleased to see from the report that the Ad Hoc Group and its five subsidiary study groups are continuing to make good progress; we are particularly pleased to see that a number of practical tests of data handling have been carried out and that more are proposed. We believe that this sort of practical experience is particularly valuable in the furtherance of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group. The United Kingdom has participated in the past year in some of these experimental tests and, like the distinguished delegate of Australia, we would want to see wider participation in further tests which could be undertaken during this coming year.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): If no other member of the Committee wishes to speak, I shall assume that we take note of this report and, since delegations will certainly want more time in which to examine it, we can give it our approval at a later meeting.

I suggest that we hold our next plenary meeting on Tuesday, 17 February, at 10.30 a.m. We can then resume our discussions and I think that we shall also have time at that meeting to formalize a consensus on the question of the chairmanships of the ad hoc working groups, a matter we could perhaps consider during a short informal meeting at which we could agree on the terms of the statement to be made at the plenary meeting.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.

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