



# Administrative Committee on Coordination

29 June 1999

English only

## Report of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security

Washington, D.C., 11–13 May 1999

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## I. Introduction

1. The Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security met at Washington, D.C., from 11 to 13 May 1999. The list of participants is contained in annex I, the agenda and list of documents in annex II. The Meeting wishes to express its gratitude to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for hosting the meeting.

## II. Conclusions and recommendations of the meeting

### A. Residential security measures

2. The Meeting reviewed the existing residential security measures as well as a survey carried out by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) regarding the actual costs of residential security measures at each duty station where such measures have been approved. The Meeting also reviewed a proposal by the United Nations Office at Nairobi to simplify the reimbursement of residential security measures to staff members through the payment of a lump sum flat rate via monthly payroll deductions, without the need for detailed calculations and accounting by and for each individual staff member. During discussions, concerns were expressed by some organizations that such a proposal could result in abuse of the system. Other organizations were of the view that this proposal was in line with current thinking within the Organization to replace reimbursement for specific measures with a simple cash entitlement.

3. The Meeting recommended that:

(a) The United Nations Office at Nairobi reconsider the issue and rewrite the proposal, taking into consideration the concerns raised by the Meeting. It should then circulate the new proposal through UNSECOORD to all participants for review and comment. The proposal would then need to be considered by the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (CCAQ);

(b) Once the proposal has been approved in principle, it should be implemented in Nairobi by all organizations as a pilot project for a one-year period;

(c) The results of the pilot project should be presented to the next meeting of the Ad Hoc Meeting on Security for further consideration and recommendation to CCAQ.

### B. Funding of security

4. The Meeting had before it an extract from the Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (Financial and Budgetary Questions) (CCAQ(FB)) report (ACC/1999/6) regarding cost-sharing for inter-organizational security measures which had been considered by ACC at its second session of 1998. The Meeting expressed concern that, notwithstanding the decision by ACC at its March 1998 meeting, it had not been possible to achieve a uniform approach to the funding of security. The Meeting expressed the hope that the commitments made in CCAQ to make funds available as quickly as possible to respond to security situations would be honoured by all organizations (see also paras. 11 and 12 below).

### C. Security implications of the year 2000 problem for United Nations staff

5. The Meeting was provided with a briefing from UNSECOORD outlining the security implications which could result from possible problems associated with the year 2000 (Y2K) problem. Following extensive discussions, the Meeting recommended that:

(a) All organization headquarters immediately take action to mitigate the effects of Y2K on operations, both at Headquarters and in the field;

(b) Designated officials and security management teams take appropriate action to ensure that United Nations staff members are aware of the potential problems which might arise as a result of Y2K. Staff members should be briefed regarding what actions they could take to prepare for any eventuality;

(c) All organizations present at the duty station participate in contingency planning at the country level (in the context of the security management team) to ensure that Y2K problems are minimized;

(d) Headquarters of organizations advise their representatives in the field of the importance of addressing Y2K problems and of identifying actions which will minimize the effects of these problems on operations;

(e) UNSECOORD, with input from the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Questions regarding humanitarian issues, send a letter to all designated officials containing specific guidance regarding the identification of potential Y2K problems at the duty station. The letter should contain specific dates by which actions must be completed;

(f) Each duty station ensure that there is coverage by the security management system during the roll-over period;

(g) The Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions (Personnel Questions) (CCAQ(PER)) might wish to consider, on an inter-agency basis, what type of leave should be authorized during the period, i.e., permit advance home leave etc.;

(h) CCAQ(FB) might wish to consider, on an inter-agency basis, whether staff should be provided with salary advances;

(i) In order to avoid duplication of effort, UNSECOORD request specific organizations to undertake actions on behalf of the entire group. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) should check with the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Unit (IAPSU) regarding the Y2K compatibility of vehicles;

(j) Within the limits of the human resources available to it, UNSECOORD will keep track of actions taken or required relating to Y2K.

#### **D. Inter-agency security training**

6. The Meeting reviewed and endorsed the recommendations of the Working Group on Security Training, which met in New York from 15 to 17 December 1998. These recommendations concerned, *inter alia*, (a) the need for one standardized system-wide security training programme; (b) a “one-time” security training programme; (c) the development of training materials; (d) sustainment training; and (e) the role of Field Security Officers in security training. The report of the Working Group is contained in annex III below.

7. The Meeting also reviewed the report of the UNSECOORD mission, which presented special “one-time” security and stress training to the country teams for Tajikistan, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and made the following recommendations:

(a) Based on the availability of funding from the United Nations Security Trust Fund, UNSECOORD will continue with the proposed schedule of presenting security and stress management training to the remainder of the 68 countries where phases three or four have been declared for any part of the country;

(b) UNSECOORD will continue to present training specifically directed at the security management team, area coordinators and wardens, as well as providing general security awareness presentations to all staff members;

(c) Stress awareness training is becoming increasingly important, and the “one-time” training should continue to increase staff awareness in this area;

(d) Two stress counsellor positions should be created to be cost-shared by all the organizations to provide an immediate emergency response to critical incidents, as well as to increase staff awareness regarding stress. The counsellors should be able to conduct training and counselling in English/French and English/Spanish (see also para. 21 below).

#### **E. Communications**

8. At its meeting at Montreal in 1998, the Ad Hoc Meeting had recommended that a Working Group be established, chaired by the World Food Programme (WFP), to review the field security communications system and make recommendations on how the system should be improved and enhanced. Jim Arnold of WFP briefed the Meeting on the progress of the Working Group. Following discussions, the Meeting recommended that:

(a) The draft of the Working Group report be revised to reflect comments by the Meeting and sent to UNSECOORD for distribution to participants for review and comment;

(b) The *Field Security Handbook* be revised to include a section on minimum standards for telecommunications in the field;

(c) A coordinated approach to the Government be made by all organizations at the country level with respect to providing clearances for communications equipment for use by the United Nations system;

(d) When the mandate of a peacekeeping mission is being planned, the Department for Peacekeeping Operations be requested to consider extending assistance and/or cooperation to other United Nations bodies operating at the duty station;

(e) During the liquidation of a peacekeeping mission, the Department give consideration to United Nations bodies to enable them to obtain the existing communications equipment. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs indicated that it would be willing to assist in the coordination with the Department on this topic.

#### **F. Revision of the Field Security Handbook**

9. The Meeting concurred that a Working Group should be established, to be chaired by UNSECOORD, to revise the *Field Security Handbook* so as to make it more responsive to current situations. The Meeting specifically requested that greater flexibility be provided for the security clearance of personnel associated with an urgent crisis situation, and that the existing system of evacuation entitlements be reviewed and simplified. It was agreed that this latter point would be referred to CCAQ (PER) for action.

10. During discussions related to the selection of and the responsibilities of a designated official, as outlined in the *Field Security Handbook*, the Meeting expressed concern that UNSECOORD had no input into the selection process of resident coordinators, who in most cases were also appointed as designated officials. The Meeting recommended that UNSECOORD be included in the selection process.

## G. Field Security Officers

### 1. Funding issues

11. As a result of the continuing delays in the recruitment of Field Security Officers, caused by the failure of some organizations to provide account codes in a timely manner, the Meeting requested a small working group to develop an improved system for security funding for Field Security Officers (FSOs) to enable a speedier recruitment and fielding of these key staff to high-risk locations. The Meeting endorsed the proposals of the working group, and recommended the following steps, to be further discussed with CCAQ(FB) prior to final recommendation to ACC:

(a) Once the security management team has endorsed the recruitment of an FSO and UNSECOORD has given its agreement, UNSECOORD will contact the headquarters of the relevant organizations. Each organization will be required to respond within a two-week period with a specific account code to be charged. On the basis of past experience, it is expected that most organizations will be able to meet this time-frame. Otherwise, the charge should be made to a "security suspense account" which would need to be established in each organization. UNSECOORD would be able to proceed on the basis of these designated "security suspense accounts". Each of the organizations that was obliged to resort to this temporary measure would then be obliged to clear this account internally, transferring the charge to the appropriate account(s) within the respective organization;

(b) At the end of the two-week period, UNSECOORD would communicate to the UNDP Finance

Section the relevant account information, and UNDP would be able to proceed with the recruitment action on the basis of charging the respective accounts of the organizations;

(c) UNSECOORD will simultaneously be seeking the agreement of the relevant security management team for the preferred FSO candidate (see paras. 14 and 15 below);

(d) With the accelerated clearance/selection process for the candidates and the more streamlined approach for designating the accounts in the agencies, this part of the process can be completed within a month's time, enabling the speedy fielding of the Field Security Officer.

12. In addition to the above recommendations, the Meeting endorsed the proposals of the working group and recommended the following:

(a) UNDP must ensure that the information on expenditures related to FSOs is shared among the financing organizations on a regular, periodic basis. Some organizations require a detailed breakdown in order to distribute expenditures among different object codes;

(b) The statistics regarding the number of staff at the duty station, which is the basis for the apportionment of the FSO costs, must be updated on an annual basis by the security management team in order to obtain approval for the continuation of the FSO post and for the apportionment of the related costs. UNDP will continue to charge to the same account(s) originally specified by the organizations unless a change has been communicated.

### 2. Administration

13. In response to a request by the Meeting at its meeting at Montreal in 1998, UNSECOORD convened the Working Group on Field Security Officers in New York on 28 and 29 May 1998 to consider the issue of inter-agency funded Field Security Officers. The Meeting endorsed the recommendations of the Working Group, which relate, *inter alia*, to the general recruitment policy for Security Officers, general assignment policy, training and evaluation. The report of the Working Group is contained in annex IV below.

14. The Meeting took note of the present system of providing designated officials and security management teams with three curricula vitae from which to select the Field Security Officer and recommended that it be continued. However, the Meeting decided that UNSECOORD should strictly enforce the existing three-week timetable in which the security management team must provide a response; otherwise, the selection of the FSO will be made by UNSECOORD.

15. At the same time, the Meeting strongly reiterated that those Field Security Officers already in the system who have demonstrated their abilities through sustained outstanding performance of duty should, in the first instance, be given priority consideration for newly established or vacant FSO positions. The Meeting agreed that designated officials/security management teams should be required to explain why an external candidate had been selected over a qualified and experienced FSO, should this occur.

16. The Meeting requested that the standard terms of reference for Field Security Officers be reviewed, and that emphasis must be placed on the responsibility of the FSO for the entire country and not just the capital city. The Meeting noted the criticism that in many instances, FSOs tended to remain in the capital city instead of travelling on a regular basis to all areas of the country where United Nations staff were assigned.

17. The Meeting stressed that the evaluation of the Field Security Officer must be carried out with the input of the entire security management team, and must be provided to UNSECOORD for review before an extension of contract would be processed.

18. The Meeting also discussed the criteria under which an FSO position would no longer be required. The Meeting recommended that the following criteria be used:

(a) The absence of a security phase at the duty station for a six-month period;

(b) A recommendation from the security management team that the post be discontinued;

(c) A review by UNSECOORD after six months without a phase to remind the security management team that the FSO position should be reconsidered to determine whether its continuation is warranted;

(d) A mission by UNSECOORD to the duty station;

(e) Such other quantifiable improvements as may be relevant.

## H. Other matters

19. The Federation of International Civil Servants Association (FICSA) raised the issue of security arrangements for locally recruited staff, including their evacuation from the duty station, and suggested that the assistance provided to the families of detained staff be improved, where possible, through financial, medical and legal assistance. The Meeting suggested that taking into account the ACC decision on the safety of national staff, special attention should be given by

the Working Group in the redrafting of the *Field Security Handbook* to provide more information on options and procedures regarding the relocation of national staff, as well as to identify and include specific actions regarding national staff to be considered or undertaken during the various security phases. The Meeting also suggested that assistance given to the family of a detained staff member should be reviewed.

20. The Meeting suggested that FICSA might wish to undertake a review of the circumstances surrounding the death of locally recruited staff to determine whether any action could have been taken to prevent such incidents from occurring.

21. The issue of funding stress counsellors on an inter-agency basis was discussed. The Meeting considered various means of funding the stress counsellors, including the possibility of requesting contributions in kind from Member States and using United Nations Volunteers as stress counsellors. The Meeting recommended that consideration be given to arriving at a cost-sharing basis for stress counsellors that would replicate the overall cost-sharing that exists for the FSOs. It was felt that this approach might be desirable since the formula of cost-sharing on the basis of staff present in the high-risk countries was already accepted and in place. Furthermore, the approach of hiring by UNDP and dividing the charges on an agency-by-agency basis was one that was working overall, and had the advantage of being perceived as fair and generally effective. UNSECOORD should undertake a review of the numbers and determine what apportionment would result, based on this possible approach. Following that, it would be appropriate to consult again with the organizations to determine whether it might be possible to finally proceed, if the formula is seen to be appropriate.

22. The Meeting took note of the information provided by the Legal Adviser regarding an Advisory Opinion handed down by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) entitled "Differences relating to immunity from the legal process of a special rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights". ICJ was of the opinion that the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations was applicable in the case of Dato'Param Cumaraswamy, who was appointed Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in 1994, and that he was entitled to immunity from legal process of every kind for the words spoken by him during an interview as published in an article in the November 1995 issue of *International Commercial Litigation*.

23. At the invitation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the next Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting will be held at UNESCO

headquarters in Paris in 2000. The final date of the meeting will be determined in consultation with all organizations.

## Annex I

### List of participants

**Chairperson:** Diana Russler

**Secretary:** Gerald Ganz

#### United Nations entities and programmes

United Nations	Diana Russler Vladimir Golitsyn Leila Benkirane Lance Clark Gerald Ganz
United Nations Children's Fund	Marc Powe
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	Angelo Galindo
United Nations Development Programme	Bruce Frank Julio Grieco Philippe Borel
United Nations Office for Project Support	Peter Van Laere
United Nations Volunteers	Claude Belleau
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	Stuart Groves
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Roland L'Allier
United Nations Office at Nairobi	Naulu Mataitini
World Food Programme	Arnold Vercken Michael Ljungstrom Jim Arnold

#### Specialized agencies, International Atomic Energy Agency and other organizations

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	Robert Patterson
International Atomic Energy Agency	Alberto Salas-Barahona
International Civil Aviation Organization	William Withee



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United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization	Malik Ait Si Selmi
World Health Organization	Andrew Asamoah
Pan American Health Organization	Richard Marks Claude de Ville de Goyet Emilio Del Campo
International Monetary Fund	Inger Prebensen David Cook David Androff
International Telecommunication Union	Marie-France Fosaneli
World Intellectual Property Organization	Ihab Osman
World Bank	Thomas O'Hara Arnold Daxe Gary Rissen
World Trade Organization	Paul Rolian
International Organization for Migration	Marie Gunnarsson
<b>Observers</b>	
CCISUA	Mehri Madarshahi Lelei Lelaulu
Federation of International Civil Servants Associations	Alvaro Durao Lusmaria Esparza-Glvecksmann

## **Annex II**

### **Agenda and list of documents**

#### **Agenda**

1. Adoption of agenda.
2. Field Security Officers.
3. Security implications of the year 2000 problem for United Nations staff.
4. Communications.
5. Training.
6. Field Security Handbook.
7. Funding of security.
8. Review of residential security measures.
9. Other matters.

#### **List of documents**

Provisional agenda (CRP.1)

List of documents (CRP.2)

Inter-Agency Security Training (CRP.3)

Security implications of the year 2000 problem (CRP.4)

Field Security Officers (CRP.5)

Communications (CRP.6)

Revision of the Field Security Handbook (CRP.7)

Review of residential security measures (CRP.8)

Report of CCAQ(FB) regarding funding of security (CRP.9)

## Annex III

### Report of the Working Group on Security Training

New York, 15–17 December 1998

#### I. Introduction

1. In accordance with the discussions held by the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security, which met at Montreal from 17–19 March 1998, the United Nations Security Coordinator convened the Working Group on Security Training, consisting of representatives from interested organizations, to discuss the issue of security training in the field. A list of participants is contained in the appendix.

#### II. Conclusions and recommendations of the meeting

##### A. One system-wide security training programme

2. The meeting examined the various security training programmes currently being implemented by the various organizations, and agreed to the following:

(a) The security training programmes undertaken by UNSECOORD, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR and WFP addressed the same areas, generally using the same information. There were some instances where one agency did address several subjects that other agencies did not. The Working Group agreed that there was no reason to preclude the development of one standard system-wide security awareness training programme for use by the organizations of the United Nations system. This programme would provide training for both internationally and locally recruited staff, thereby ensuring that all staff receive the same consistent training. This new standard system-wide programme is to be developed incorporating the various components of the four training programmes that were examined;

(b) Coordination in the area of security training should be continuously maintained between all organizations and UNSECOORD. The Working Group should meet periodically to review and make recommendations concerning the state of security training for all staff;

(c) Organizations should continue to conduct security training for their staff at their respective headquarters and in the field, using their respective security personnel; however, this training should be in accordance with the new standard

system-wide programme. The standard programme will ensure that all field staff receive the same security message. Organizations can change the method of presenting the material; however, they cannot alter the substance of the standard. Recommended changes to the standard programme should be made to UNSECOORD for appropriate action;

(d) Three distinct target groups in the field should receive security training: the security management team; area coordinators and wardens; and the staff at large. The security management team and area coordinators and wardens should receive training focusing on their specific responsibilities and functions, with emphasis on planning and crisis management. The staff should receive training focusing on general security awareness;

(e) UNSECOORD, as the principle inter-agency coordinating mechanism for security, should continue to conduct training for all security management teams in the area of security and crisis planning in order to enhance their understanding of and capability to prepare effective security/contingency plans and enhance their ability to implement plans as required;

(f) UNSECOORD's "one-time" training initiative should continue, as previously agreed, as long as sufficient donor contributions to the United Nations Security Trust Fund permit.

##### B. UNSECOORD "one-time" training programme

3. The Working Group was briefed on the results of the first UNSECOORD "one-time" training mission to Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan in which 1,350 internationally and locally recruited staff members received training and were briefed regarding security. The feedback from this mission was that the security management team, area coordinator and warden training was well received, because it combined lectures and exercises in which the participants were required to do something. Due to the number of staff at large, the general staff presentations were more in the nature of briefings on a variety of personal security topics. Feedback regarding the initial sessions indicated that the participants in these sessions preferred that videotapes be used instead of

lectures with slides. Videotapes were incorporated in subsequent training sessions and an increased positive response was noted by the training team. The discussion on stress management was well received and solicited much interest by both internationally and locally recruited staff members. In addition to providing presentations, the instructor conducted several individual counselling sessions. It was generally acknowledged that stress training must be provided to all staff.

4. In a related matter, the “one-time” training programme being developed by WFP (which is complementary to the UNSECOORD training), for presentation to all WFP staff worldwide was discussed. As currently being developed, the workshop will be two days of security training as well as of other matters internal to WFP, to be presented by WFP staff, who will have undergone extensive training and preparation in Rome prior to being dispatched to the field to provide the workshop. Individuals selected as presenters, although not security professionals, will have some practical experience in security, and will rely on the Field Security Officer at the duty station for additional support, as required. These WFP staff members will be used for training for a three-to-four-month period. WFP will conduct four two-week intensive “train-the-trainers” workshops during 1999, with the first scheduled in January 1999. The first qualified graduates will be presenting workshops to WFP staff in the field in February 1999. UNSECOORD has been invited and will attend the “train-the-trainers” workshops.

### C. Training materials

5. The issue of materials used for security training was examined as follows:

(a) *Television videos:*

(i) Five videos were viewed by the Working Group which were determined to be very appropriate for security training without further work:

ICRC “Mobile 121 Calling”, 1997, 17 minutes

ICRC “Weapons”, 1995, 7 minutes

ICRC “Landmines”, 1995, 6 minutes, 35 seconds

UNHCR “Security awareness”, 1996, 9 minutes

UNHCR “Residential security”, 1996, 9 minutes

(ii) Several other videos were discussed but not viewed. These videos came from various sources but were principally used by Member States in their respective security training programmes. It was

generally agreed that these videos had potential for use in United Nations security training but needed to be edited, and only specific parts would be appropriate. In addition, several training tapes on various subjects were recommended for review and possible use in the United Nations security training programme.

(iii) The Working Group recognized the importance of incorporating videotapes in all training, especially training which is easily adaptable to video presentation and can be used consistently at all locations throughout the United Nations system for all audiences. It was agreed that producing videotapes was a costly venture, and that a mechanism needed to be developed for cost-sharing the development and production of these types of videos. It was clearly stated that any movement in this direction would require long lead-time for agencies to include financial implications in their respective budgets. It was recommended that UNSECOORD explore using the United Nations Security Trust Fund to provide for the development of new security training videos.

(iv) The Working Group pointed out that any videotape used should consider regional diversity of the audience, and must be usable for all staff, both internationally and locally recruited. The Working Group proposed the following topics as a starting point for potential videotape subjects:

General personal security awareness

Vehicle operation and general maintenance

Residential security

Convoy operations and procedures

First aid

Natural disasters

Fire evacuation and bomb threat response

General radio communications

General field survival skills

(v) It was recommended that UNSECOORD and the organizations, in the normal course of their activities, request donors and other partners to contribute either financial resources or in-kind resources to develop and produce security videos.

(b) *Training modules:*

(i) Following discussion, the Working Group agreed that the modular approach to security training is a good system and should be continued. The list of existing

security training modules was reviewed and considered to be a good start, but it was agreed that the subjects needed to be expanded. The Working Group proposed that modules be developed for the following topics:

<b>Agency to develop module</b>	<b>Module to be developed</b>
UNHCR	Camp security
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	Driving — defensive/evasive/emergency Witness protection Information security Investigating team security requirements
WFP	Convoy security Airfield and port security Fire safety First aid Survival in the field
UNSECOORD	Information reporting and dissemination Conducting investigations Security briefing and orientation Workplace violence Sexual harassment First aid and survival (with WFP)

#### **D. Sustainment training**

6. The Working Group noted that at the conclusion of the “one-time” training sessions being conducted as funds become available, a clear security training mechanism should be developed to maintain the level of security awareness achieved through the “one-time” programmes. While it was generally agreed that the organizations were free to continue carrying out their own internal training, a system-wide approach is needed. It was further agreed that additional resources (funds and personnel) to continue a mobile training team concept could not be ensured. Therefore, a coordinated mechanism for sustaining the enhanced security knowledge of the security management team, area coordinators and wardens, and the security awareness of the staff must be further explored and developed.

#### **E. Field Security Officers/Security Officers**

7. It was recognized that FSOs and agency SOs, as the security adviser to either the designated official and the security management team (as in the case of the FSO), or their respective agency representative (as in the case of the SO), should play a prime role in the conduct of security training at their duty station. Currently, there is no stated policy on what kind and how much security training should be conducted; therefore, most security training conducted by FSOs/SOs is informal and done on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, at those duty stations where there is no full-time Field Security Officer it is normally the UNDP Administrative Officer or Operations Manager who fills this position as an additional duty.

8. It was recommended that UNSECOORD take appropriate action to develop a coordinated mechanism to strengthen the FSO and SO roles in conducting security training on a recurring basis. A formal requirement to conduct annual security training should be examined and presented to the Working Group at a future date. It was acknowledged that FSO/SOs should receive additional training to accomplish this task, and that UNSECOORD should incorporate security training into any FSO training workshop. The UNV regional security enhancement workshop concept was briefly discussed with the Working Group, and it was considered that a similar concept of joint regional workshops for FSO and SOs has merit and should be further explored. The United Nations Security Trust Fund could possibly be used to fund such workshops.

## Appendix

### List of participants

*Chairperson:* Diana Russler  
Deputy United Nations Security Coordinator

*Secretary:* Gerald Ganz  
Security Coordination Officer

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights	Stuart Groves
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	Roland L' Allier
Office of the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator	Andrew Toh
Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator	Richard Manlove Michael Ljungstrom
United Nations Children's Fund	Marc Powe
United Nations Development Programme	Julio Grieco
World Food Programme	Arnold Vercken James Aberlee Arlene Mitchell

## Annex IV

### Report of the Working Group on Field Security Officers

New York, 28 and 29 May 1998

#### I. Introduction

1. In accordance with a decision by the Administrative Committee on Coordination based on a recommendation of the Ad Hoc Inter-Agency Meeting on Security, which met at Montreal from 17 to 19 March 1998, the United Nations Security Coordinator convened the Working Group on Field Security Officers, consisting of representatives from interested organizations, to discuss the issue of security officers in the field.

#### II. Conclusions and recommendations of the meeting

##### A. General recruitment policy for all security officers

2. The Working Group examined the various recruitment practices employed by the organizations system-wide, and agreed to the following:

(a) There should be in place one standard system-wide recruitment profile for recruiting security officers in the field. This profile should contain minimum requirements for education, experience, language skills, and other characteristics. This profile should be as follows:

*Level and field of study of university or equivalent education and training*

Advanced university degree (MA or equivalent), with a focus on security management and/or related disciplines (business administration; political/social science; psychology; international relations). Also relevant would be military or police academy degree (at the officer level), at the equivalent of an advanced university degree (MA or equivalent).

*Length and type of practical experience required to perform assigned work*

At least 10 years of relevant and progressive experience with security management, if possible in the police or

military, alternatively in companies providing security related services.

*Language requirements*

The Field Security Officer should be fluent in English or French. Knowledge of another official language highly desirable;

(b) UNSECOORD should establish and maintain a database of potential security officers to be used by all organizations. UNSECOORD should routinely provide a copy of the database to all organizations on a semi-annual basis. Any organization which undertakes to interview candidates on the roster should provide a summary of the interview results to UNSECOORD for inclusion in the database;

(c) UNSECOORD should establish and maintain a database of all security officers currently in the system. Organizations should routinely provide required information regarding their respective security officers to UNSECOORD for updating of the database. UNSECOORD will provide a copy of the database to all involved organizations. Comments/evaluations of the security officers, as appropriate, should be available to interested organizations;

(d) The employment of locally recruited national staff members to fill the position of Field Security Officer will no longer be authorized, and those currently in the system will be redesignated as Assistant FSO or Field Security Assistant. The determination of whether a position will be filled at the local level rests with UNSECOORD and not with the security management team;

(e) The practice of hiring private contracting firms to provide security officers should be discontinued. Individuals currently falling in this category will be advised of this policy and at their next contract renewal will be offered the position under existing United Nations employment conditions, as appropriate;

(f) The current FSO job description should include a portion on critical incident stress management, list training as a separate major issue and add a new heading outlining general security operations responsibilities;

(g) The issue of security officer/FSO recruitment demographics/gender distribution was highlighted; it was agreed that organizations would continue to be mindful of this in their respective organizations.

## **B. Field Security Officer/Security Officer general assignment policy**

3. Extensive discussions were held on the assignment of both Field Security Officers and organization Security Officers as follows:

(a) The normal length of assignment of a Field Security Officer at any one duty station should be generally limited to a minimum of two years and no more than four to five years. At duty stations where there is extreme tension and significant threat to the security and safety of United Nations staff, the Field Security Officer normally should be rotated in a shorter period of time;

(b) The meeting concluded that there are duty stations where one Field Security Officer cannot adequately provide appropriate security support to all organizations present. In these cases, the meeting was of the view that the assignment of additional Field Security Officers in the form of Deputy FSOs was appropriate to ensure that adequate security support would be provided to all organizations at the duty station. Assigning Deputy FSOs would strengthen the security programme, ensure that all organizations receive the required security support and reduce the need for the assignment of organizational security officers to the capital region. In those instances where dedicated organizational security officer support was required, it was agreed that the organization normally would assign their security officers outside the capital region and would not assign security officers with a higher grade than the assigned FSO;

(c) It was recognized that the FSO, as the security adviser to the designated official and the security management team, is the senior security officer at the country level and is responsible for the overall operation of the duty station security programme. Other security officers present at the duty station are required to work with the FSO to ensure that a coordinated and cohesive security programme exists and is fully operational at the duty station;

(d) In larger and more complex duty stations where several security officers (FSO and organization security officers) are assigned, UNSECOORD will prepare and implement a standard joint security mechanism in which all organizations will participate. This joint organization mechanism will coordinate all security issues at the duty station;

(e) Organizations with specialized security requirements will develop overall security policy papers/guidelines for those areas and provide these to UNSECOORD for system-wide coordination and publication

as United Nations standard policy. Examples of unique security issues are UNHCR security practices in refugee situations (which could be extended to internally displaced persons camps); WFP security considerations of convoy, air operations, ports and barge operations; and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees minimum operational security standards for investigative operations and monitoring in hazardous areas;

(f) In the process of examining assignment policy, a general discussion was held regarding the potential of a career development programme for Field Security Officers. While the meeting noted that there was a continuous need for a small core group of FSOs, it was generally accepted that the requirement for FSOs is driven specifically by the security situation at duty stations. The security situation was considered transitory in nature, meaning that ultimately the security situations do improve, and that an FSO is no longer needed and the requirement for the position is terminated. This is why all FSOs are on fixed-term contracts, which contain language specifically stating that there is no guarantee of future employment at the end of the contract period. In view of the unique nature of the FSO, the career development opportunities of this specific occupational field were considered to be limited at this time. However, it was noted that there existed a need for a programme for assignment and grade mobility that allows the United Nations system to take advantage of experienced FSOs in the system. UNSECOORD should establish a process to manage this aspect of the FSO programme. It was also agreed that the movement of security officers from one organization to another would be facilitated;

(g) It was also recognized by the meeting that the existing FSO grading model did not fit all situations. There are duty stations where the complexity of the security situation and the scope of the security programme require an FSO of a higher grade. It was suggested that UNSECOORD establish a mechanism for identifying these unique duty stations and take action to adjust the FSO grade for these unique duty stations;

(h) It was agreed that periodic re-evaluations should be undertaken at all duty stations where there is an FSO, using the criteria which led to the creation of the post, to determine whether the continuation of the post is warranted.

## **C. Field Security Officer/Security Officer training**

4. The issue of training for all United Nations system Security Officers was examined as follows:



(a) In recognition of the fact that any security officer within the United Nations system is bound by general authority from the security policy contained in the United Nations *Field Security Handbook*, it was agreed that all security officers, regardless of organizational affiliation, should receive Field Security Officer training. This training will prove a baseline understanding of the specific duties and responsibilities of the United Nations security management system, improve understanding of their system-wide security responsibilities, facilitate coordination within the United Nations security system and support mobility within the security field of the United Nations system;

(b) It was also agreed that annual Field Security Officer/Security Officer workshops/conferences, in which all security officers would participate in refresher training, exchange of common problems and solutions to these problems, would be held. The meeting continued to support the concept of regional training workshops for FSO and organizational security officers assigned to the region. A schedule of these workshops will be developed, and the dates and locations will be published by UNSECOORD.

#### **D. Field Security Officer evaluation system**

5. The meeting reviewed the existing system of using the appointments of limited duration format to evaluate the performance of Field Security Officers, as follows:

(a) The existing system was determined to be adequate and should continue to be used. UNSECOORD should take steps to better enhance the overall understanding of the system and the process by which Field Security Officers are evaluated to ensure that designated officials, security management team members and the Field Security Officer completely understand the overall process and their individual responsibilities in the evaluation process. It was also noted that UNSECOORD plays a key role in the evaluation of the Field Security Officer, and must be given the opportunity to provide comments regarding the individual's performance;

(b) Although the meeting noted that it would be impractical to establish one universal evaluation system for all security officers, it was agreed that there are common performance characteristics related to all security officers that can be universally evaluated using the various organizational systems. These common characteristics will be identified and provided by UNSECOORD for use by all organizations in evaluating their respective security officers;

(c) There are cases where security officers are released from an organization because they did not maintain

the requisite high standards of performance. It was agreed that all organizations would take measures to improve the exchange of this type information in the future.

#### **E. Funding of Field Security Officers**

6. The meeting noted that the present system of funding Field Security Officers was cumbersome and resulted in extensive delays. UNSECOORD was requested to explore with UNDP and CCAQ(FB) means of simplifying the process.

#### **F. New security strategy: Somalia**

7. The Working Group considered the situation in Somalia, where there is no inter-agency security officer; instead, seven security officers are being funded by five United Nations organizations. This approach has resulted in considerable difficulties in coordination and funding, as well as being an inequitable burden for the five funding organizations since nine other organizations, although they are using the services of the security officers, do not contribute to their costs. The Working Group agreed in principle that the costs of the seven security officers should be funded on an inter-agency basis. The Working Group also requested that a review of the programmes in Somalia be undertaken to determine the optimum number of security officers who were required.