

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/228
Appendix III/Vol. VII
21 August 1981

ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

APPENDIX III

VOLUME VII

Index of Statements by Country and Subject
and Verbatim Records of the Committee on Disarmament
in 1981

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.145
4 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-THIRD MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 4 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch.A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Mr. J.T. GOIENSORO
Ms. H. NASCHIBENE

Australia: Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. J.H. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.L. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV
Mr. K. PRAMOV
Mr. R. DEYANOV

Burma: U NGWE WIN
U THAN HITUN

Canada: Mr. McPHAIL

China: Mr. YU Peiven
Mr. YU Hengjia
Mr. LI Changhe
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Cuba: Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. M. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK
Mr. A. CHIA

Egypt: Mr. EL S.A.R. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. H. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE
Mr. M. NOETZEL

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. N. KLINGER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. A. SANI
Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIH
Mr. ACHDIAK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. S. BOLD
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. M. ARRASSEN Mr. M. CHRAÏBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. M.B. BRIMAH Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. M. AIMAD Mr. T. ALTAF
<u>Peru:</u>	
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. J. GIALOWICZ
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. H. MALITA Mr. T. NELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. T. JAYAKODDY Mr. H.M.G.S. PALINAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. H. BERGLUND Mr. U. ERICSSON
<u>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:</u>	Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV Mr. CHERNOV Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN Mr. V.M. GAIJA Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV
<u>United Kingdom:</u>	Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES Mr. H. MARSHALL Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. F.P. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. W. HESKROTT
Mr. J.E. TRENTON
Mr. S. FITZGERALD
Ms. L. SIEA

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRAJKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. C.O. GHOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of
the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee starts today its further consideration of agenda items and outstanding questions relating to the organization of work. As usual, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members are at liberty to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee. Distinguished colleagues, before proceeding, may I, on behalf of the Indonesian delegation, express our most sincere appreciation to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who has presided over the proceedings of the Committee during the month of July with great skill and efficiency. With a combination of firmness and flexibility he has succeeded in his inimitable way in creating an atmosphere which has helped the Committee to make further progress in its work. I hope that I can count upon his counsel in the days ahead.

Special tribute is also due to the Chairmen of the four ad hoc working groups. Ambassador García Robles with his vast experience and diplomatic skill has enabled the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament to make progress in elaborating the various stages of the programme. Ambassador Komives of Hungary, in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, is leading the Working Group with great efficiency in formulating the text of a draft convention. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons is manifestly making progress under the skilful leadership of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden. It is to be hoped that in due time the Committee can agree on a new mandate for this Working Group which takes into account the progress it has made. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances is working hard under its dedicated Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, to arrive at agreed formulations on the various alternatives of such security guarantees.

Distinguished colleagues, it is indeed a great honour to preside over the work of this important Committee, constituted to be the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament agreements, which will enable the world to achieve the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We are all aware that, in pursuing this objective, we have to pass through a long and difficult road. There are different national interests and different security concerns, sometimes conflicting, involved in dealing with disarmament matters. We should persevere in trying to narrow down those differences and reconcile the conflicting standpoints, so that convergent views may finally emerge as to how to ensure the survival of mankind.

August is the last month of this year's session in which the Committee will have to produce a report on its activities to be conveyed to the coming thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly. This time the report will be of special importance in view of the fact that the second special session of the General Assembly on Disarmament is to be convened in the spring of next year. The thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, and certainly the second special session, will evaluate the Committee's performance and effectiveness during the three years of its existence, since its restructuring in 1978. The General Assembly at its first special session established the Committee's terms of reference and priorities. It will be against those terms of reference and priorities, and against the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly, and especially resolution 35/46 declaring the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, that our performance will be evaluated and judged. In order that the General Assembly, and the international community at large, can be correctly informed of the work of this Committee, the report should reflect as truly as possible the real situation, the progress we are making and the difficulties we are still facing in our negotiations.

(The Chairman)

During the past three years delegation after delegation has expressed its disappointment at the meagre results which have been achieved by the Committee. Three years are, relatively, not very long, but we must not forget that before us the ENDC and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) had been occupying themselves with disarmament already since 1962. It is therefore for nearly twenty years that the issue of disarmament has been discussed and negotiated without too much progress.

On two items, considered of the highest priority by the General Assembly at its first special session on disarmament and in other relevant resolutions, namely, the comprehensive nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the Committee has not been able to agree even to form ad hoc working groups to start multilateral negotiations. It is not my intention at this time to put the blame on anyone in particular. It will not be an easy task to give an acceptable explanation to justify the Committee's inability to start dealing effectively with these issues to which the international community attaches the greatest importance and the highest priority.

When we speak about disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, it is obvious that we do not address ourselves to countries like Indonesia. When we speak about disarmament, it is the nuclear-weapon Powers and the militarily significant States that we have in mind. Everybody, including the nuclear-weapon Powers, speaks of the need for disarmament, but apparently the cultural and moral motivations are not yet strong enough to overcome mutual distrust and produce the necessary political will, and above all the readiness to translate that will, if it is there, into concrete disarmament measures.

The few weeks which remain of this year's session will mainly be needed by the Committee to produce its report. I hope that the four ad hoc working groups will wind up their substantive work as soon as possible and start finalizing their reports so that the Committee can finish with its report in time for this session to be closed on 21 August as has been agreed.

Distinguished colleagues, since for all practical purposes I am a newcomer to the actual work of the Committee, I am bound to make mistakes with regard to procedure, as well as substance. I will rely very much upon the indulgence, the co-operation and the counsel of all my colleagues, and especially of the Committee's Secretary, my old friend Ambassador Jaipal, to keep me on the right track.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr Chairman, let me first of all express the satisfaction of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic on seeing you preside over the Committee on Disarmament in the month of August. We all highly appreciate your well-known diplomatic experience and are confident that under your wise guidance the Committee will successfully accomplish its work during the last month of this year's session. May I wish you success in your difficult and responsible task. This is also an occasion to thank your predecessor, -- Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the excellent and eloquent way in which he steered the work of the Committee during the month of July.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

It is my intention to dwell today upon the question of effective international arrangements to ensure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As is well known, my country attaches great importance to efforts aimed at strengthening the security of States by means of special political and legally binding international instruments. The main aim in this regard is to exclude once and for all the possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Guided by this, my delegation as well as the overwhelming majority of CD member countries, have urgently demanded the beginning of negotiations with a view to ending the nuclear arms race and achieving nuclear disarmament.

Although it was not possible at this session of the Committee on Disarmament even to establish an ad hoc working group to initiate the relevant negotiations, my delegation intends to proceed with its efforts aimed at this goal. We hope that next year's session of the Committee and the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament will give a new impetus towards starting such multilateral negotiations.

Pending nuclear disarmament, appropriate international measures should be taken to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is why my delegation highly appreciates the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and of its able Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, to elaborate an appropriate international instrument. The work of this Group deserves our special appreciation since it is closely connected with difficult and complex political, strategic and legal questions.

Having this in mind, we appreciate that within the Group the idea of elaborating an international convention to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is gaining more and more support. Such a step would also correspond to General Assembly resolutions 35/154 and 35/155.

In the course of the 1981 session the Working Group has done a great deal to explore ways and means of reaching agreement on a common formula acceptable to all which could be included in an appropriate international instrument. Many valuable proposals have been submitted in the Group. In this connection we highly estimate the efforts of the delegations of Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Pakistan.

As far as my delegation is concerned we would favour a common formula providing for the extension of security guarantees to all States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and which have no nuclear weapons on their territories or under their jurisdiction or control, regardless of whether they are members of military alliances or not. Thus, our approach is based on two basic elements:

- (1) The nuclear-weapon-free status of countries which should receive the security assurances, and
- (2) The non-use commitment of nuclear-weapon States.

In this way, the overwhelming majority of States would receive security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. We share the opinion expressed on 16 April 1981 by Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden that "without any exceptions all non-nuclear-weapon States which are legally committed to their nuclear-weapon-free status are entitled to unambiguous assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them" (CD/PV.125). I think the Swedish non-nuclear-weapon record is well-known to all of us.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

In our approach to the elaboration of a common formula we attach great importance to the non-stationing commitment. Here we proceed from the fact that the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear-weapon States would not only escalate the nuclear arms race but would also include the danger of a nuclear attack being launched from the territory of countries where nuclear weapons are stationed. Thus, the non-stationing formula could by no means be regarded as a condition, but rather as a basic element of a "common approach" to security assurances. It seems to be quite obvious that a State having foreign nuclear weapons on its territory could become the source of a nuclear threat. Could such a State really expect to receive security assurances?

We cannot agree to the argument that in the case of the stationing of foreign nuclear weapons on its territory, the country concerned was pressured to accept these weapons and has no control over them. On the contrary, it is the sovereign decision of the country concerned to accept nuclear weapons on its territory or not. Who else, if not its authorities, is in a position to decide on the use of its territory? Moreover, there are relevant examples, such as in the Western neighbourhood of my country, where a State not only accepted the stationing of thousands of nuclear weapons on its territory, but also takes part in decisions on their use.

Likewise we find it difficult to agree to the argument that a non-stationing commitment could not be verified. Such an approach would put into doubt all efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones, since a basic element of such zones is the obligation not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of the States concerned.

Thus, my delegation believes that the non-stationing question is by no means just a theoretical one. This becomes quite clear when we look at the international political environment. I believe that nobody here in this room can really deny the negative impact which the stationing of nuclear weapons on additional territories will have on the international situation, not to speak about disarmament negotiations. It is well known that there are plans to deploy new nuclear missiles in some West European countries and also in South Korea.

In this case, too, we observe an interesting phenomenon: while some people -- consciously or not -- tend to play down the dangers inherent in such steps, concerned citizens in such countries are realizing more and more the prospect of becoming "nuclear hostages". I think we should not neglect this.

Thus, let me once again stress that we see the non-stationing of nuclear weapons together with a non-acquisition commitment as part and parcel of a common approach to security assurances. The non-stationing formula would effectively complement the non-proliferation Treaty. In this regard we see much merit in the position put forward on 7 April 1981 by Ambassador Darusman of Indonesia when he stated that "with regard to the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present, this question should, in the opinion of the Indonesian delegation, be part of the obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States. It is pertinent to note in this context that the obligation of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, to which Indonesia belongs, is quite clear. The non-stationing of nuclear weapons in the territories of those States constitutes a further measure to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons". (CD/PV.122).

Having this in mind we favour very much the conclusion of an agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. Such an international instrument would put a stop to the geographical spread of nuclear weapons and thereby reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict. It would also encourage efforts to create nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world and create a useful basis for an agreement on security guarantees.

This concludes: I thank the distinguished representative of the German Democratic Republic for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Before beginning my statement, Mr. Chairman, I should like, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, sincerely to congratulate you, the distinguished representative of the friendly country of Indonesia, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August.

I should also like to express our gratitude to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who guided the work of the Committee last month with great skill.

At today's meeting the Mongolian delegation would like to speak on item 3 of the agenda, namely the question of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use of nuclear weapons.

For the third year now, negotiations on this matter are going on in the Committee on Disarmament. For the past two years, the Ad Hoc Working Group has been doing all it can to consider this question thoroughly and it would seem that its task has been considerably lightened. For in fact all the nuclear-weapon Powers are sympathetic towards the demands of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons against them, and the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, for their part, declare that they are opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, it has not so far proved possible to reach an agreement on the question of assurances.

With the approach of the end of this year's summer session, the Ad Hoc Working Group will no doubt be considering what it has accomplished in its work. It will surely, then, not be superfluous to make some comments on the question under consideration in the Committee.

The Mongolian People's Republic has attached and continues to attach great importance to the provision of effective and reliable security assurances for States which do not possess nuclear weapons and which do not have them on their territories against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, considering this problem from the viewpoint of the whole complex of nuclear disarmament questions, and in particular that of the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.

I would also recall our position to the effect that we are, as we have been, in favour of the speediest possible preparation of a draft international convention on this question, which would have binding force in equal measure both for nuclear-weapon and for non-nuclear-weapon States. Our position in this regard is based on the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament and well-known resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

Our proposals and observations on the question of the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States are fully reflected in working paper CD/23, which was submitted by a group of socialist countries. Without going into details regarding the content of that document, I should like once again to stress that we are still, as before, convinced that in fact the preparation and conclusion of a convention on this question would be the most effective way of solving this important and urgent problem.

At the same time, the delegations of socialist countries, including the Mongolian delegation, have frequently stated that they are not opposed to the consideration, in addition, parallel to the preparation of a convention, of other ways of providing the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances, in which all nuclear-weapon States would make declarations, either identical or similar in content, which would then be approved by the United Nations Security Council.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

While explaining the Mongolian delegation's position on the approach to a solution of the problem of strengthening security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, I should also like to touch on a number of topics under consideration in the Ad Hoc Working Group.

After completing the work of the first stage, including, in particular, identification of the various features of the assurances the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances embarked on the second stage of its consideration of this problem -- namely, discussion of the possible alternatives which might be explored in the search for a "common approach".

The Working Group is at present considering the texts of formulas put forward by the delegations of the Netherlands and Pakistan which have been commented on in some detail by the group of socialist countries, including my delegation. I should therefore like to make some observations of a general kind.

As regards the solution of the question of providing security assurances, the socialist countries have been and are in favour of a formula which would impose obligations to an equal degree both on the nuclear-weapon Powers -- not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States -- and on non-nuclear-weapon countries -- not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and not to have them on their territory. Thus there are two basic principles for genuine non-nuclear status, namely the non-possession by the State of nuclear weapons and the non-stationing of such weapons on its territory. The question whether a non-nuclear-weapon State belongs to some military and political grouping or participates in some action of a nuclear-weapon Power is an entirely different matter.

I think there is no need for me to state the substance of the socialist countries proposals on this matter. I merely wish to say that a formula which requires the nuclear-weapon States to provide unilateral assurances does not solve the problem. Such an approach leaves open the possibility for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in the future in one form or another by non-nuclear-weapon countries.

What the Soviet Union and the socialist countries have proposed, in the matter of the granting of assurances, is the inclusion of a provision concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons. In fact, without a ban on the stationing of nuclear weapons, any assurances would undoubtedly be fraught with the danger of the territorial extension, that is, the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Such assurances could encourage nuclear-weapon States to station and perhaps to use nuclear weapons in the first instance from the territories of those States which have been granted assurances. The presence of foreign nuclear weapons on the territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State will automatically raise another problem: how to determine whose nuclear weapon was used, if such use were to take place. Those are the few comments my delegation wished to make at the present stage of the Committee's work on this subject.

Aware of the fact that the Ad Hoc Working Group is still confronted with many difficulties in its negotiations on the question of negative assurances, the Mongolian delegation is ready to continue to make efforts, in co-operation with other delegations, to find a positive solution to this important question.

In conclusion, I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to document CD/201 of 30 July 1981, containing "The Appeal of the Great People's Khural of the Mongolian People's Republic to Parliaments of All Asian and Pacific Countries", which has been circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, yesterday at our informal plenary meeting I already had an opportunity to express the satisfaction of my delegation at seeing you as our Chairman for the month of August. Today, in this first formal plenary meeting, I wish to place on record the satisfaction of my Government, my delegation and of myself personally at welcoming you, the representative of Indonesia, with which my country has had such long-standing and strong ties, as our Chairman. We are looking forward to working with you in order to bring to a successful conclusion this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, in so far as the international circumstances of today permit us.

Today I wish to introduce document CD/203, submitted by my delegation, concerning consultation and co-operation, verification measures and complaints procedure in the framework of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

Before doing so, however, may I acknowledge once again the crucial importance for our work in the Committee on Disarmament of a successful outcome of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an intervention on 2 April 1981 I said that it was a courageous political decision at the highest level that ten years ago provided a breakthrough with regard to the Biological Weapons Convention. I then expressed the hope that the same political courage and the same political wisdom would soon again prevail and lead to our common goal, a convention on chemical weapons. This hope we still hold, today.

We all know that virtually no substantial progress has been made of late in any field of arms control and disarmament. We are all aware of the expectations with regard to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament next year. We are also aware of the renewed hopes invested in the Committee on Disarmament since its transformation in 1978. That is why I wish to appeal once again to the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, to resume their bilateral negotiations with respect to chemical weapons in the near future. A courageous political decision at the highest level allowing a breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations would surely further enhance the momentum noticeable lately in the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

As for the mandate of Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons we have taken note of the statement of the Chairman of that Group, Ambassador Lidgard, at the 141st meeting of the Committee that no consensus could be reached on a revision of the present mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group. We regret that no such consensus emerged. We support the appeal contained in the final part of Ambassador Lidgard's statement. We hope very much that at the beginning of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament a new mandate can be agreed upon enabling the Ad Hoc Working Group to elaborate, as a matter of high priority, a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

It is a well-known position of my delegation that verification is no means in itself but should rather serve as a component in a system that together with a meaningful scope and a reasonable amount of protective measures will give a State more national security than the maintenance of the chemical weapon option would do. Since such a system is as strong as its weakest link, it is of great importance to obtain the best possible verification procedures. Without adequate verification, States will not be confident that the provisions of a convention will be observed.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Like many other delegations here, we believe that within the framework of a chemical weapons convention, national and international measures of verification are complementary. After all, we are dealing with a proven weapon system, ready and available in large amounts. Therefore, verification items cannot be left to the fine print, but have to be stated clearly in the treaty itself.

I shall not tax the endurance of the Committee with a full exposé of all aspects of chemical weapons verification. Enough has been said about it in recent weeks. Moreover, the Canadian document, CD/167, and the Finnish document, CD/196, form, between them, a unique and substantial inventory of the ingredients for chemical weapons verification. On that score, the document which I have the honour to introduce today is self-explanatory. It stems from what we believe to be a down-to-earth approach reflecting plain realities and designed to take care of practical needs. Thereby it gives a complete outline of a reasonable, but effective, verification system, a cornerstone of an adequate and consistent convention on chemical weapons.

Given the close interrelationship between the scope and the means of verification, we hope that our document may contribute to a move forwards. Let me summarize the main characteristics of our proposals:

Consultation, co-operation, verification and complaints -- and this is an innovation -- are not treated individually but form elements of one integrated, consistent system;

National and international verification are therefore interlinked;

The establishment of national implementation agencies will be called for;

The national implementation agency will, inter alia, work closely together with a consultative committee to be established;

The consultative committee should permanently oversee the destruction or diversion for permitted purposes of declared stocks of chemical weapons;

The consultative committee must carry out the supervision of the destruction and diversion through on-site inspections on a permanent basis;

Through random on-site inspections the consultative committee will check periodically that the production of supertoxic lethal chemicals does not exceed agreed quantities;

With a view to enhancing confidence the consultative committee should undertake inspections on a random basis at facilities on the territory of States parties that will on a regular basis be assigned by lot;

The consultative committee shall be competent to enquire into facts concerning alleged ambiguities in, or violations of, the compliance with the convention;

In the context of such an enquiry the consultative committee would be competent to undertake on-site inspections after consultation with the State party concerned. If the latter State party, however, does not agree to such an on-site inspection, it must provide appropriate explanations;

Each State party to the convention may use national technical means of verification;

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

Complaints can be lodged with the Security Council. Each State party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate.

As delegations will notice, we have refrained in our document from relating the organizational framework outlined therein to the Netherlands proposal, also supported by many others, concerning the establishment of an international disarmament organization. This is no omission. It is rather a reflection of our wish to provide the Committee on Disarmament with a practical manual rather than with the outline of more far-reaching, maybe less immediate objectives.

Nonetheless, for us these objectives do exist and it might be useful to recall them briefly in this context. One should, of course, not elaborate a chemical weapons convention in order to fall in line with one's wish to have an international disarmament organization. It should of course, rather be the other way round: if the organizational framework for the implementation of a chemical weapons convention and other arms control agreements, between them, would call for a streamlined universal, rational "servicing" agency, well, then an international disarmament organization might be helpful. It stands to reason that while establishing a verification system as well as a consultations and complaints procedure for a chemical weapons convention, one might usefully draw on the experience gained elsewhere. In this context, as my distinguished colleague from Morocco pointed out on 23 July, the example of IAEA springs to mind. In fact, IAEA has more than amply demonstrated its usefulness in the framework of NPT and the Tlatelolco Treaty. Multilateral consultative organs are provided for not only by the non-proliferation and Tlatelolco Treaties, but also by the Environmental Modification Convention. Future treaties such as the chemical weapons convention and the comprehensive test-ban treaty are hardly conceivable without similar tools and machinery to make them work. Other types of agreements which would require an operational framework for servicing verification and implementation are:

Agreements establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones;

Agreements on the prohibition or restriction of certain conventional weapons;

Agreements on the reduction of military budgets;

Regional arms control and confidence-building measures.

Bringing together the implementation and verification systems of such treaties -- including possible information from international satellite monitoring arrangements -- into one dependable and specialized world-wide servicing organization under United Nations auspices would cut operational costs considerably and warrant a rational over-all performance.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the kind words of welcome he addressed to me.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, as I have had the privilege of witnessing your brilliant performance as the permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations, it is a matter of particular satisfaction to me to see you now guiding the deliberations of this the only multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We are convinced that the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament could not be in better hands during the period that is beginning today, the period that is always the longest in each session, in the present

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

case extending up to the beginning of 1982. My delegation would also like once more to congratulate your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran, the distinguished representative of India, for the efficiency with which he guided our work during the month of July.

As members of the Committee know, rule 25 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament reads as follows:

"The approval by consensus of reports shall not be interpreted as affecting in any manner the essential requirement that such reports must reflect faithfully the positions of all the members of the respective organs."

The purpose of that provision was to ensure that one of the abuses of the consensus rule which occurred in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on more than one occasion should not be repeated in the Committee on Disarmament.

Working paper CD/204 which has just been circulated, and which I have the honour to introduce today on behalf of its sponsors, the delegations of Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, Yugoslavia and Mexico, has a similar purpose with respect to the abuse of the consensus rule that has been taking place in order to prevent the establishment of working groups. This is explained in the "Commentary" included in the document, which also summarizes the main facts relevant to this matter and which reads as follows:

"Since February 1980, the Group of 21, in its statement issued the 27 of that month as document CD/64, declared that it was 'the considered view of the Group of 21 that working groups are the best available machinery for conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee on Disarmament'. It added therefore that 'the Group of 21 in principle supports the establishment of working groups on the items on its annual agenda'.

"This position of the Group of 21 has been subsequently reiterated in the statements CD/72 of 4 March 1980, CD/116 of 9 July 1980, CD/134 of 6 August 1980, CD/180 of 24 April 1981, CD/181 of the same date and CD/192 of 8 July 1981. In all these statements special emphasis has been placed on the necessity and urgency of establishing working groups on the first two items of the Committee's agenda, particularly on the first of such items entitled 'Nuclear test ban'.

"For reasons well known to all members of the Committee it has been so far impossible to implement the repeated and well substantiated proposals of the Group of 21 to which reference has just been made. The delegations sponsoring the present working paper believe that the paralysis of an important section of the negotiating function of the Committee which has thus occurred is contrary to the spirit of the rule of consensus included in rule 13 of the rules of procedure of the Committee. Consequently the delegations have decided to submit this document with the intention that it may be studied by the members of the Committee during its recess. Thus, if, upon initiation of the Committee's session corresponding to 1982, it were not yet possible to give effect to the repeated requests of the Group of 21, the proposal may be formally considered in plenary session by the negotiating organ."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mexico for his statement and for the very kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Allow me first of all, Mr. Chairman, to congratulate you on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament. I have already -- yesterday -- had the opportunity of reminding you of our co-operation with you in New York, when you were the permanent representative of Indonesia to the United Nations. We wish you success in the difficult task of being Chairman of the Committee for the month of August, the concluding month of our work in 1981. We offer our greetings and respect to the representative of India and would ask him to convey them to Ambassador Venkateswaran, who is apparently now resting from the heavy burden he bore during the month of July, with our best wishes for his speedy recovery and return to our family.

Today I should like to refer to a number of topics, and in the first place to the very important question of the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. This is a major political issue and interest in it is great. There are good reasons for this, for it involves the security interests of all States, both nuclear-weapon States and, more particularly, States which do not possess nuclear weapons. On the solution of this question depends the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the averting of the threat of nuclear war.

The Soviet Union views with understanding the non-nuclear-weapon States' justified desire to receive, from the nuclear-weapon Powers, reliable guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The basis of our view is that States which renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not permit them to be stationed on their territory are making a substantial contribution to the lessening, and ultimately to the removal, of the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. These States have the right to receive the requisite assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Such assurances have in fact been given by the Soviet Union.

Our formula, which we have spoken about many times, both at plenary meetings and in the Ad Hoc Working Group, is clear and simple. It excludes from the sphere of application of the assurances only those non-nuclear-weapon States which permit -- I repeat, which permit -- nuclear weapons to be stationed on their territory. The Soviet formula makes no distinction between non-nuclear-weapon States which participate in military alliances and those which do not. It extends its formula to non-nuclear-weapon States in both categories. The Soviet formula makes no distinction between participants and non-participants in nuclear-weapon-free-zones: it grants assurances both to participants and to non-participants in such zones.

Whatever attempts may be made to distort the Soviet Union's position or to interpret it tendentiously, the undeniable fact is that the Soviet formula guarantees the security of the overwhelming majority of non-nuclear-weapon States. In this connection I should like to refer to the statement made by Comrade Voutov, Ambassador of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, in which he entirely correctly proved, with the help of figures, that only a very few non-nuclear-weapon States are outside the scope of our guarantees whereas the formula of the assurances of the other nuclear-weapon Powers covers a much smaller number of States.

The Soviet Union's genuine readiness and desire to meet the legitimate and justified demands of the States that do not possess nuclear weapons have recently been demonstrated in statements by the head of the Soviet State, Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, to which we have referred on a number of occasions. We should, however, like to draw particular attention to President Brezhnev's recent

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

replies to questions by a correspondent of the Finnish newspaper, Suomen Sosiali Demokraatti. In these replies he stressed that, in the interests of strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States of northern Europe, the Soviet Union is ready to proceed to a possible consideration of questions concerning several other measures relating to the Soviet Union's own territory in the region adjoining a nuclear-free-zone in northern Europe. This is in essence a new development. No other nuclear-weapon State has expressed readiness to consider measures relating to its own territory. This is, too, further clear evidence of our sincere desire to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and a manifestation of our readiness to seek other possible mutually acceptable ways of achieving these lofty aims.

We consider that the work of the Committee's Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been positive, on the whole. Useful and thorough discussions have been held in the Group on this subject, in the course of which the viewpoints of the various countries have been compared and clarified and the points on which the positions coincided, approximated or diverged brought out more clearly. In addition, the substance of the various countries' positions was made clear on the main aspects of this problem. The idea of concluding a convention again received wide support in principle. In connection with the Working Group, it is impossible not to note the energetic efforts and positive contribution of its Chairman, Mr. Ciarrapico.

The Soviet delegation, together with the delegations of other socialist countries, has participated actively in the negotiations on the question of security assurances. Unfortunately, such an active role was not forthcoming on the part of a number of other nuclear-weapon Powers. As a result, it was not possible to make real progress in the strengthening of security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, we are satisfied to note that the majority of delegations participated constructively in the negotiations and certain of them made proposals that are worthy of attention. The results of the negotiations can and should be utilized in the course of further deliberations on the problem of strengthening security assurances for States not possessing nuclear weapons.

I should like now to refer briefly to the subject of the prohibition of radiological weapons. In the light of the meetings held, during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament, by the Committee itself and by its Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, and also of the informal consultations on various aspects of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons, I should like today to dwell briefly on the results of our work on this question and at the same time to glance ahead, as it were, and offer certain comments on a possible way of moving forward.

As the members of the Committee are aware, we are approaching the end of our 1981 session, the end, that is, of the third year of our consideration of this matter, without having managed to reach agreement on the key problems of the instrument being drafted -- definition, scope of the prohibition and peaceful co-operation.

We have devoted a large part of our work on this agenda item, at least during the summer part of the session, to discussing how to deal with the proposal -- a very important and, I would say, pertinent proposal -- for the inclusion in a radiological weapons treaty of provisions concerning the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack.

At the last meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, the Soviet delegation stated its views on this question in detail. We indicated the way which, we believe, could lead the Committee out of the impasse both as regards

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

further work on a radiological weapons treaty and as regards solving the problem of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack. In other words it would be possible, in our view, to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of the protection of civilian nuclear facilities from attack if other delegations, too, would display the requisite flexibility and a spirit of compromise. Otherwise, we shall be unable to complete the work on a treaty on radiological weapons, and the question of protecting civilian nuclear facilities will likewise remain unresolved -- not to mention the fact that the Committee will be demonstrating its inability to solve the problems even in this relatively uncomplicated matter.

Solutions can also, we think, be found for other basic questions. The Group has not so far, for example, discussed the Chairman's revised texts relating to the key problems of definition and peaceful uses, which he submitted to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons last Friday. It seems to us, after a preliminary study of these new versions of the articles in the Chairman's texts, that they could form a good basis for the achievement of agreement, with due regard for the mutually acceptable settlement of other related questions.

All this shows that towards the end of this session we have seen a certain advance which permits us to hope that we may manage to find a way out of the present situation. In other words, we have some thing to consider as possible compromise solutions, but of course it will probably still be difficult for us to do this in what is left of the present session.

For these reasons we could, as other delegations have already done, support the proposal of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, -- Comrade Komives, Ambassador of the Hungarian People's Republic -- a proposal which he made during the informal consultations and then repeated at the Group's meeting on 31 July, that this Group should continue or resume its work in January 1982, i.e. somewhat earlier than the beginning of the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. We think that the additional time in January 1982 will give us an opportunity to work carefully and with due deliberation on the unresolved questions and, we hope, to complete the drafting of a treaty on radiological weapons before the beginning of the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament.

A number of organizational questions related to the holding of meetings of the Group in January can be settled if we agree in principle on the approach proposed by the Chairman.

The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that all the other members of the Committee will be guided by the same constructive approach so as to create a sound basis for progress in the completion of the work on the prohibition of radiological weapons at our next meeting.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to me.

Mr. BRIMAH (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, permit me to join other delegations which have congratulated you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. My delegation is confident that under your chairmanship the Committee will effectively conclude its work for the 1981 session; and I pledge my delegation's fullest co-operation. Taking the floor for the first time, having been held up elsewhere this morning -- I had to rush back in order to take the floor -- I must also vouch my full and unalloyed support and co-operation to you and to all members of this Committee for the successful fulfilment of its most important assignments. In the same vein, my delegation would like to thank your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the valuable contribution he made to the work of the Committee during the tedious month of July.

My intervention today is merely to associate myself with the views just expressed by the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico on the issue of the establishment of subsidiary organs. As a co-sponsor of the working paper, CD/204, dated 30 July 1981, my delegation fully shares the views and proposal contained in the working paper.

We have had the opportunity to stress our delegation's regret that it has not been possible to establish ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the agenda. The present stalemate which has arisen, through no fault of the overwhelming majority of members of this Committee, puts into serious question the negotiating status of this Committee. In fact, the impressions gathered from within and outside this Committee often point to the failure of this Committee to live up to its negotiating role. Certain nuclear-weapon States have continued to demonstrate lack of concern for the vital security interests of the non-nuclear-weapon States that desire progress in disarmament negotiations.

The "raison d'être" of this Committee is to negotiate, and we believe that items inscribed on the agenda are meant to be negotiated upon. We recognize the strained international climate which has "cast a dark cloud" on the work of this Committee, but we believe that substantive negotiations on such priority items as a comprehensive test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament will in themselves greatly help to improve the present climate. This is the urgent and legitimate concern of the international community as we approach the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We firmly believe that progress in negotiations in this Committee, especially in the field of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, will considerably strengthen international peace and security. We therefore fully endorse the proposals already tabled in this Committee by the Group of 21 in document CD/64 and reiterated most recently in documents CD/180 and 181 that ad hoc working groups provide the best machinery for the conduct of concrete negotiations within the Committee.

Finally, my delegation is well aware of the fact that the outlook for the present four working groups accomplishing their task within the next 12 months remains bleak. The political will needed to make progress continues to be withheld for no other reason than that of political expediency for the States concerned. As Ambassador Adeniji has stated on several occasions in this Committee, there is still time for a change of heart. During our recess, Mr. Chairman let those States who have caused the present paralysis on the Committee harken to the "cry of mankind all over the world for détente, not defence, for development not rearmament".

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Nigeria for his intervention and for his kind reference to the Chair.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, my statement today will be on the question of the providing of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States.

Allow me first, in the name of the Chinese delegation, warmly to congratulate you, Your Excellency, Ambassador Anwar Sani of Indonesia, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. In the course of performing your duties as Chairman, you may rest assured of the full co-operation of my delegation. We are convinced that, thanks to your guidance, the Committee will smoothly fulfil its tasks in the last month of its summer session.

I would like to express our thanks to your predecessor, His Excellency, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the efforts and contributions he made in conducting the proceedings of the Committee on Disarmament during the month of July.

The Chinese delegation has listened attentively to the statements made by other delegates on the question of the providing of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States. We think that the views put forward by a number of delegates merit our attention and will be helpful towards a positive settlement of the question.

I would like now to present briefly some views and suggestions on this matter.

China's position on the question of the provision of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States has been explained time and again at various meetings of the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and the ad hoc Working Group. Allow me here briefly to recall our consistent position on this question.

As early as 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement proposing the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons.

In order to break the nuclear monopoly, China tested its first atomic bomb in 1964. On the day the test succeeded, the Chinese Government reiterated the above position and declared that China would never at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons, nor would it use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In his statement on 29 May 1978, at the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, Mr. Huang Hua, Foreign Minister of China, stated that, in order to reduce the threat of nuclear war to small and medium-sized countries, a measure of urgency is for all nuclear-weapon States to undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

At the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 5 February 1980, Mr. Zhang Wenjing, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, pointed out that the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons are essential for the elimination of nuclear war and the nuclear threat. We are aware that its realization is no easy matter. This being the case, the nuclear-weapon States should at least undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

From this recapitulation it can be clearly seen that, on its own initiative and unilaterally, the Chinese Government declared long ago that it would unconditionally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

In August 1973, China signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, thereby undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the nuclear-weapon-free zone and the non-nuclear-weapon States of Latin America.

In accordance with the above position, the Chinese delegation holds that it is legitimate and reasonable for the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States to oppose nuclear threats and to require that security assurances be provided by nuclear-weapon States and that all the nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

It has been our consistent view that the fundamental security guarantees to be provided by the nuclear-weapon States to the non-nuclear-weapon States should be the complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons. However, as the nuclear-weapon States have hitherto failed to provide such guarantees, they should at least give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances, that is, the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

Should the nuclear-weapon States, in providing such negative assurances, impose various requirements and conditions on the non-nuclear-weapon States, would this not be tantamount to demanding security assurances from the non-nuclear-weapon States?

In fact, it is the two Superpowers with their enormous nuclear arsenals that pose a serious threat to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. The non-nuclear-weapon States lack adequate defence capabilities; therefore, the nuclear-weapon States have the obligation to give the non-nuclear-weapon States negative security assurances. This obligation cannot be shirked under any pretext whatsoever. Pending the realization of nuclear disarmament, this is the least the nuclear-weapon States should undertake to do towards the non-nuclear-weapon States.

Except for a few States, the overwhelming majority of States have, in one way or another, assumed the obligation not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons. Although some States have reached the necessary scientific and technological levels to manufacture nuclear weapons, they still abide by such obligations. Some nuclear-weapon States, while totally disregarding their own vertical nuclear proliferation and continuously expanding their own nuclear arsenals, clamour about the prevention of

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

horizontal nuclear proliferation among the non-nuclear-weapon States, and even attempt to deprive those States of the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy or seek to restrict such a right. This is obviously unfair and is an infringement of the sovereign rights of States. As the Superpowers are constantly expanding their nuclear arsenals and carrying out nuclear threats, it is only by halting vertical nuclear proliferation that horizontal nuclear proliferation can be prevented. This is self-evident.

China is opposed to major power nuclear monopoly. Like many other peace-loving countries, China does not advocate or encourage nuclear proliferation. And we are emphatically opposed to any production of nuclear weapons by racists and expansionists such as South Africa and Israel.

To sum up, negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States are only a transitional measure to be adopted pending nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should recognize the fact that the non-nuclear-weapon States find themselves menaced by the danger of nuclear war and nuclear threats, and that it is the strong demand of the peoples of the world that the Superpowers halt the arms race and carry out nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should unconditionally guarantee not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear-weapon States without further delay and, at the same time, they should take effective measures to carry out nuclear disarmament until the ultimate goal of complete prohibition and total destruction of nuclear weapons is achieved.

Finally, the Chinese delegation reiterates that China has unilaterally undertaken the unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and suggests that, when an international convention on security assurances is elaborated, the inclusion of such commitments should be taken into consideration. We are also prepared to work together with other delegates in the Committee on Disarmament in a continued effort to search for a common formula for security assurances which will conform to the requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States and will be acceptable to all the nuclear-weapon States.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Ambassador of China for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Distinguished colleagues, you will recall that the Committee adopted, at its 142nd plenary meeting, a timetable of meetings to be held by the Committee and its subsidiary bodies during the present week. On that occasion, my predecessor noted that no meeting was scheduled for Friday afternoon. He also noted that the Chair

(The Chairman)

would inform the Committee on how best to utilize the time made available. I have consulted with the Chairman of the ad hoc Working Groups and, at the request of the Chairman of the ad hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, we agreed to recommend to the Committee that the afternoon meeting of Friday, 7 August, be allocated for a meeting of that Working Group, which would start at 3 p.m. If there is no objection, I take it that the Committee agrees to this recommendation.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 6 August at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.144
6 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 6 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. Ch.A. Sani (Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria:

Argentina:

Mr. J.C. CARASALES

Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO

Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia:

Mr. R.A. WALKER

Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium:

Mr. A. ONKELINX

Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil:

Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA

Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria:

Mr. P. VOUTOV

Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma:

U SAW HLAING

U HGWE WIN

U THAN HTUN

Canada:

Mr. McPHAIL

Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China:

Mr. YU Peiwen

Mr. YU Mengjia

Mrs. WANG Zhiyun

Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba:

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. RUZEK

Mr. P. LUKES

Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:
Mr. M. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia:
Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:
Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:
Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:
Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:
Mr. A.P. VENKATHESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:
Mr. Ch.A. SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPPTO

Iran:
Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy:
Mr. V.C. DI MONTEZEMOLO
Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. L. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. H. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDENBILDG
Mr. S. DOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. H. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. E. WAGENFLAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. H. AHMAD
Mr. T. ALTAH

Peru:Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.F. PROKOFIEV
Mr. CHERNOV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. M.M. IPPOLITOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMNERHAYES
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. PELL
Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Ms. L. SHEA

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUIAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. C.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee continues today its further consideration of agenda items and outstanding questions relating to the organization of work. Of course, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

I would like to extend a warm welcome to His Excellency Ambassador Ruth, Commissioner for Disarmament and Arms Control of the Federal Republic of Germany. Ambassador Ruth is well known in the disarmament community and needs no introduction. I wish him a fruitful stay in Geneva and I hope that the first-hand contacts that he has made here will be useful in the performance of his important duties. Ambassador Ruth is listed to speak today and it will be my pleasure to give him the floor as first speaker, but before doing so I would like to give the floor to the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia for a very short statement.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, allow me also, on behalf of the Mongolian delegation, to welcome the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Ruth, who is taking part in today's plenary meeting of the Committee.

On this date, all those to whom peace is dear and who are fervently opposed to atomic war are commemorating the anniversary of the tragic events of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As the representative of Mongolia, a peace-loving Asian country, I should like to suggest to the members of the Committee that we honour the memory of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by a minute of silence.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Mongolia for his statement and would agree with him that we should observe a minute of silence in commemoration of those who died during the Hiroshima bombing. Let us stand and observe a moment of silence.

The Committee, standing, observed a minute of silence.

Mr. RUTH (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to be here with this Committee and I am very grateful for your kind words of welcome. I would like to reciprocate by wishing you good luck for your month of chairmanship of this important Committee. I would also like to thank your predecessor, the distinguished representative of India, for the work he has been doing for the Committee in the previous month.

It is a great honour for me to outline today the position of the Federal Republic of Germany on the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which is submitted today to the Committee by Australia, Belgium, Japan, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany. I am doing this to confirm my Government's support for the Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations on international disarmament and arms control.

I am deeply conscious of the historic dimension of 6 August, of Hiroshima as a symbol for man's hope for a world without war. The lesson of the sufferings of past and present wars as well as the dictates of reason must lead us to the conclusion that today, in the age of nuclear weapons, all policy must be directed towards peace. War and military conflicts can no longer be considered

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

as permissible options for political decision. Instead, all policy must be determined by the objective of preventing military conflict with all available political means. This presupposes that all States observe the principle of the renunciation of the threat to use and the use of force embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and take seriously the obligation to exercise restraint in the application of military power.

Disarmament and arms control consequently serve as instruments of a rational policy aimed at translating the principle of the renunciation of force into disarmament agreements, thus contributing to the achievement of dependable peace.

The United Nations General Assembly, the Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament are the arenas of the world-wide debate on security policy which is constantly gaining in importance. As Chancellor Schmidt said at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in the interest of peace we need a comprehensive political partnership for security. The tasks facing us today are more pressing than ever before. The destructive potential of modern weapons and the financial resources now taken up by military expenditure throughout the world compel us, wherever opportunities exist, to work with greater effort for concrete and verifiable arms limitation and reduction measures.

At the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly, Foreign Minister Genscher described disarmament as "the great task of the eighties". In so doing he stressed the importance of this subject for my country's policy. To us, disarmament and arms control are essential components of a policy aimed at the safeguarding of peace and at co-operation based on partnership.

The Geneva Committee on Disarmament is at present the only multilateral negotiating forum with world-wide competence dealing specifically with disarmament issues. This is a great responsibility. I am sure that we would like to see the Committee make progress and achieve tangible success in its work. Success has, unfortunately, been lacking so far this year. There is, therefore, no reason to give way to euphoria. But resignation is not called for either. One need only imagine how much poorer international diplomacy would be if this Committee, the numerous activities within the United Nations and the diverse bilateral and multilateral efforts for arms control and disarmament did not exist. The disappointment at the lack of tangible results is therefore offset by the conviction that the available instruments provide a framework for negotiations which can and must be used.

This also holds true for the activities of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which has made substantial progress during the past two years under the direction of two highly experienced diplomats -- Ambassador Adeniji from Nigeria and Ambassador Garcia Robles from Mexico.

Together with other States, we have already made a contribution to the discussions at this year's session of the Working Group: on 18 June, Ambassador Pfeiffer submitted a working paper which outlines the goals and principles that in our view should be embodied in a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In the paper we stated that we regard a CPD to be of particular value as it can provide a conceptual framework for disarmament negotiations, define criteria and principles of arms control and disarmament, and hence provide an important base for concrete negotiations.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

With the working paper introduced by Ambassador Pfeiffer, we and our co-sponsors wanted to assist this Committee in fulfilling the task it has been given in preparing for the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Today we want to go one step further by introducing a complete draft text, which is contained in the working paper before you, submitted by the countries I mentioned. This draft is based on the work carried out so far and is designed to develop further the results achieved. It is intended to demonstrate the form and substance which might, in our view, make a comprehensive programme of disarmament acceptable to all.

With this contribution to the discussion we are continuing the course we have pursued on this subject from the very outset. We know that the project of developing a CPD is a particular concern of our friends from the non-aligned countries, and we have consistently supported them in that endeavour. I should like to recall the contribution we made in 1979 (working paper A/CN.10/8 of 22 May 1979) when the aim was first to develop in the United Nations Disarmament Commission the "elements" of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. In our new contribution we are guided by the will to help promote effectively all serious efforts for disarmament and arms control. This means, in our view, that the programme must not lose sight of the long-term goals, but at the same time has to be geared to the goals that can be attained in the foreseeable future. We realize that a programme without a perspective would turn into routine and that a programme without a sense of reality would become a source of disappointment and resignation. Consequently, we aim at a programme which is both forward-looking and realistic.

We all realize that efforts for disarmament and arms control have become more difficult in the last few years. Much has been said about that here. This Committee knows that in performing its tasks it must not assume a position of privileged isolation. Military conflicts and hostilities in various parts of the world have been registered with concern. A political solution has still not been found for Afghanistan, as demanded by the majority of the Members of the United Nations. Unfortunately, the efforts of the non-aligned countries, especially the Islamic States, have been unsuccessful so far. It is to be hoped that the initiative taken by the ten member countries of the European Community will help bring about a solution. The Western States have underlined the destabilizing changes which have occurred in the East-West military balance. We are convinced that peace and stability between East and West serve world peace and that instability in this region will have adverse effects on other regions. Consequently, the members of the North Atlantic alliance regard a stable military balance as an important contribution to security and peace in general. The objective of arms control is to attain such a balance at the lowest possible level of armaments, especially nuclear armaments. This is the underlying objective of the decision taken by the members of the North Atlantic alliance on 12 December 1979. Taking into account the growing disequilibrium to the detriment of the West in the field of medium-range nuclear missiles, the members of the alliance took a decision which, we are convinced, can be described as both responsible and forward-looking. It contains the elements of restraint and moderation as potential instruments for preventing an arms race as it is characterized by the following facts:

The decision on modernization, necessary for reasons of defence and deterrence, was linked to an offer of negotiations aimed at limiting and reducing the number of weapons systems of both sides;

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

Great importance was attached to transparency and calculability: the number of new systems, limited from the outset, was made known four years prior to their deployment;

The future deployment of new systems will not increase the total number of nuclear weapons in Europe. This number will in fact be decreased. In December 1979 the decision was taken in NATO to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. This withdrawal has already been effected. In addition, the new weapons will replace old systems one for one. The reduced level will thus not be raised.

Our interest is now directed towards the opening of American-Soviet negotiations later this year. We are greatly gratified at the prospect of these negotiations being started. The Western allies are making intensive preparations for the talks.

Negotiations on arms limitation will be all the more fruitful the greater the transparency of existing potentials and military activities and the greater the confidence in predictable military conduct by the other side. Consequently, the confidence-building measures already agreed upon at the 1975 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are important. For the same reason we attach great significance to the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe originally made by the Government of France. This conference is to be held within the CSCE framework and initially have the task of working out confidence-building measures to be applied to the whole of Europe. The Madrid follow-up Conference, charged with formulating a precise mandate for such a disarmament conference, went into recess at the end of July and will be reconvened in October. We regret that, in spite of a constructive and far-reaching Western proposal, the desired results have not yet been achieved and we hope that the Madrid conference can be brought to a substantive and balanced conclusion later this year.

The forthcoming negotiations on medium-range nuclear weapons and the endeavours to achieve consensus on the mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe within the CSCE framework are of the utmost importance for East-West relations and the security of the States directly or indirectly involved. These negotiations and endeavours will supplement the Vienna MBFR talks and the SALT process and demonstrate that concrete negotiations are possible even under difficult international circumstances. They are designed, under the prevailing East-West security conditions, to help ensure confidence, through the greater transparency and calculability of military conduct and through restraint in the use of military force, and to create a stable balance at the lowest possible military level.

We are convinced that a successful outcome of these negotiations would be beneficial for world peace. We realize at the same time that negotiations and agreements between East and West can constitute only part of the universal endeavours for disarmament and arms control. They must be accompanied by negotiations and agreements on a global scale and in other regions. The work of this Committee, such important treaties as the non-proliferation Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, the comprehensive dialogue in the United Nations and especially the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament are but a few of the stages along the road so far.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

Those responsible for conceiving the idea of a comprehensive programme of disarmament felt it was necessary to give new impulses to the disarmament efforts. We share their conviction and feel sure that the next special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament can in fact provide important impulses by adopting such a programme.

We asked ourselves how such a programme should be drafted so that it is convincing, effective and at the same time capable of gaining acceptance by consensus. The paper before you contains the ideas which we and other members of this Committee consider important and useful. In drafting the paper we have followed as closely as possible previous work, but have developed certain points. Permit me to single out a few elements of the paper:

1. In the paper we use the two terms "disarmament" and "arms control". Disarmament is intended to designate the long-term goal of complete and general disarmament under effective international control as well as a world-wide process aimed at the gradual elimination of armaments.

Arms control is intended to mean the totality of co-operative efforts designed to restrict, in this armed world, the use of military force in spite of continuing differences, to promote stability and transparency in the military sphere and thus improve the prospects for managing and preventing crises. Arms control includes in particular verifiable arms limitation and reduction oriented towards the objective of stable military balance.

2. It is natural that the efforts to limit and reduce nuclear weapons have special significance in disarmament and arms control. For that reason we attach great importance to the SALT process. However, in the endeavours to limit nuclear weapons in accordance with article 6 of the non-proliferation Treaty one cannot overlook that conventional weapons are still used in conflicts today and that nuclear disarmament without trust, reliable data on existing potentials and adequate verification can have only limited prospects of lasting success. In these fields of collateral endeavours a realistic comprehensive programme of disarmament can, in our view, be particularly useful with regard to both nuclear disarmament and disarmament in general.

3. We regard the CPD as an overview of the negotiations currently in progress in other bodies and as a conceptual framework for the various negotiations in the future. With its concepts and concrete suggestions the CPD should be designed to facilitate negotiations, no matter in which body they are conducted. It is obvious that the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament itself and the activities of the United Nations must occupy a special position in the CPD.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

4. We consider it necessary that the CPD to be adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should improve conditions for achieving concrete and verifiable disarmament measures: mere disarmament declarations or polemics and unrealistic disarmament demands will not be capable of improving the chances of peace in our time.

5. With this in mind, we regard the following points of the CPD as particularly important. They apply to nuclear and conventional arms alike:

The world-wide dialogue on security issues must be intensified. It will be all the more fruitful, the more positive international developments are.

The agreement of concrete confidence-building measures which have to be adapted to the specific conditions of individual regions and which bring about greater transparency and calculability of each side's activities, is a way of reducing world-wide distrust and fear, tension and hostility. With concrete confidence-building measures we are tackling the root causes of the arms build-up.

We regard the ongoing activities in the United Nations system for achieving transparency and comparability of military potentials and budgets as another basis for present and future disarmament efforts and as a contribution to confidence-building. We therefore advocate that the standardized reporting system for military expenditures be developed further. It is a realistic initial step towards the balanced reduction of military expenditures.

The reliability and comparability of data on military potentials can also be prompted by establishing registers within the framework of the United Nations.

Verification remains a key element of all arms control and disarmament efforts. Effective practical verification methods are needed so that States will have a justification for basing their security increasingly also on arms control and disarmament agreements. Adequate verification is necessary to ensure that agreements that have been concluded are in fact being observed. Through effective verification coupled with a departure from excessive secrecy the credibility of arms control and disarmament efforts can be achieved which is needed to gain the dependable support of the general public.

6. The credibility of the CPD itself will depend on how realistic its objectives are. We agree that the programme should not be confined to principles alone but should include concrete measures as well. The most important of these measures should be assigned to the first phase. Anything that can be achieved now or in the immediate future must be given priority. Every step counts.

(Mr. Ruth, Federal Republic of Germany)

But let us not overlook the fact that we are dealing with a programme -- no less but no more. Such a programme cannot be expected to be able to determine when States must initiate particular negotiations and when they must produce results.

This does not mean that we regard the time factor as irrelevant. We take account of it in our draft by proposing periodic reviews as a central element of the CPD. This proposal is based on the final document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of which paragraph 109 stresses the need for a continuing review.

The purpose of such reviews should be to analyse the progress achieved in the implementation of the programme, in other words to effect a kind of interim assessment. They would serve to show whether the current phase of the programme could be regarded as completed. It would then be possible to examine which steps need to be taken next, and the date would be set for the next review.

The rhythm of these periodic reviews should be such as to ensure their optimum effectiveness. We regard them as the centrepiece of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. They are to provide the impulses which we want the CPD to generate.

The growing interdependence of all parts of the world and the commitment to safeguarding peace apply world-wide. Consequently, we should do our utmost to contribute to the vitality and the effectiveness of the discussions within the United Nations and the negotiations in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament.

This is the great task facing the Committee on Disarmament. The work performed here should not be underrated. It should not be measured only by the number of agreements prepared for signature. The dedication of a large number of States with differing interests to the work of the Committee on Disarmament and to progress in arms control and disarmament -- here I have in mind in particular the working groups on chemical and on radiological weapons -- is indeed encouraging. In view of the preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, this applies as well to the CPD Working Group. The work of the first special session devoted to disarmament, which was the result of an initiative launched by the non-aligned and neutral countries, must be followed up successfully at the second special session. An important contribution to achieving this objective could be made by assuring that the comprehensive programme of disarmament is prepared as carefully as possible and in a way which will increase the prospects of it being accepted by consensus. This is the objective motivating the draft which I have had the honour of submitting today.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Federal Republic of Germany for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. Before giving the floor to the next speaker, I should like to recognize the presence among us of Senator Clayborne Pell of the United States Senate, where he is the ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is here to observe the work of the Committee and I hope that he will find time to meet with members and exchange views with them.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): Mr. Chairman, although it was I who suggested at an informal meeting of the Committee that we could perhaps simplify our protocol, I do wish to extend a warm welcome to you on your arrival in Geneva and to congratulate you on your assumption of the Chair for the final month of our 1981 session. I also wish to express my delegation's warm feelings of gratitude to Ambassador Venkateswaran for the witty Indian summer he provided for us all and for the smart and efficient manner in which he presided over us and our fates during the month of July. May I also take this opportunity to welcome Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany amongst us this morning and to thank him for having formally introduced document CD/205 to the Committee. My delegation is one of the co-sponsors of that document. May I also express my delegation's welcome to Senator Pell of the United States of America.

At the meeting of the Heads of State and Government of seven nations held in Ottawa on 20 and 21 July 1981, Mr. Zenko Suzuki, the Japanese Prime Minister, once again made a strong appeal to his six colleagues on the need for nuclear disarmament. Placing nuclear disarmament as the item of the highest priority on the list has long been the fundamental position of Japan in the field of arms control and disarmament.

In 1945, 36 years ago, when Japan became the victim of nuclear weapons, there was only one nuclear-weapon State in the world. That number has been increasing, and will continue to increase in the years ahead, unless there can be a concerted effort by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to muster human common sense to counter this suicidal trend. Our ultimate aim should be, of course, to reduce the present number of nuclear-weapon States to zero -- through the complete and total elimination of nuclear weapons from this planet. Since that eventuality is not and cannot be foreseen in the near future, we must, in the meanwhile, at least try to keep the present number from increasing. That is why the Government of Japan regards the existing non-proliferation regime as an important contribution to international peace and security in the present world. This regime, with all its shortcomings, must be maintained. It must be prevented from disintegrating. It must be further strengthened so that the objective of preventing the further spread of nuclear weapons can continue to be achieved, while of course allowing for and promoting the peaceful application of nuclear energy for those in need in the decades ahead.

But we, the members of this Committee, and, especially the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, must not forget what happened at last year's NPT Review Conference. They must remember that the failure of that Conference to adopt a final declaration was due to the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty. The question of halting vertical proliferation is, at least in the view of the non-nuclear-weapon States, of even greater urgency than that of preventing horizontal proliferation -- considering that the latter has so far been prevented by the NPT regime. The nuclear-weapon States,

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

all five of them, must make much greater efforts towards nuclear disarmament. This is absolutely essential, not only for the maintenance of the existing non-proliferation system, but indeed for the very survival of mankind. It is not merely a question of establishing ad hoc working groups or of conducting structured informal consultations in this Committee. It is a matter of momentous importance, a matter on which real substantive progress must be made before it is too late.

Over the years, a great many concrete proposals for nuclear disarmament have been put forward by the non-nuclear-weapon States and by the nuclear-weapon States themselves. We have a whole list of such proposals before us in this Committee under the heading "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament". Japan would not be against any of them provided that they were to be feasible under the present circumstances. However, we are forced to admit that none of these proposals is going to be easily achieved if the existing international order -- characterized by confrontation between East and West -- continues as a carry-over from the immediate post-war period.

That is why my delegation has repeatedly emphasized the urgency of achieving a comprehensive nuclear test ban as the one measure that would appear to be feasible under the circumstances, and consequently the most important measure at the present moment. It is the one measure on which three nuclear-weapon States have been conducting serious negotiations since 1977; those States have even presented us with occasional progress reports on their negotiations. A comprehensive test ban treaty would act as a restraint on the further qualitative development of nuclear weapons, and in that sense would be the first meaningful step towards nuclear disarmament.

My delegation has expressed itself in favour of the establishment of a CTB working group in this Committee as one way of making progress on this matter. It will continue to call for the establishment of such a working group. Let me underline, however, that the setting up of the working group is not in itself the objective; it is the commencement of substantive discussions and negotiations in this multilateral forum that is important. The beginning of such multilateral negotiations, long overdue, is all the more important in view of the approaching second special session of the General Assembly. The mere setting up of a CTB working group would be a very meagre achievement indeed, but if the Committee on Disarmament were able to report even that achievement to the special session next year, it would be of some significance. At next year's special session, we must be able to report on some movement in the right direction.

In this connection, I am once again to urge the three nuclear-weapon States concerned to reopen their tripartite CTB negotiations without further delay. At the same time, I again remind the distinguished delegates of those three States that I addressed certain questions to them in this Committee on 7 August 1980, in connection with the tripartite report that they submitted to us last year.

Incidentally, my Government has noted that Mr. Eugene V. Rostow, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, referred to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, signed by the Soviet Union and the United States, in his statement before the Committee on Armed Services of the

United States Senate on 24 July 1981. Mr. Rostow said that he believed there was merit in these treaties, and that the United States Government should move forward on them. My Government considers this statement as worthy of attention from the point of view of the promotion of nuclear disarmament.

It is to be deplored that nuclear explosion tests continue to be conducted by the nuclear-weapon States. I am instructed to reiterate Japan's opposition to any nuclear test by any State whatsoever.

I shall now turn to the question of negative security assurances.

It is only natural that a State which has renounced the possession of nuclear weapons should wish to be assured that the nuclear-weapon States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against it. Such a State has every right to expect that its non-nuclear-weapon status will be respected, that its security will not be jeopardized because it has renounced its nuclear option; it feels entitled to an assurance that it will never be attacked with nuclear weapons -- unless it itself initiates an attack on a nuclear-weapon State or its allies with the support of or in association with another nuclear-weapon State.

As a means of seeking to satisfy the legitimate claims of the non-nuclear-weapon States in this regard, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances has been endeavouring since 1979 to achieve progress in this field. The Japanese delegation would like to express its deep appreciation to Mr. El Baradei of Egypt and Minister Ciarrapico of Italy for their painstaking and methodical efforts to advance our work on negative security assurances as the successive Chairmen of the Working Group. At this year's session of the Committee, we have particularly appreciated the various working papers which Mr. Ciarrapico has presented to us on the substance of eventual negative security assurances and on the identification of the various features of the assurances that could be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States. I wish to congratulate Mr. Ciarrapico on the masterly way in which he wound up the substantive part of the discussions in his Working Group last week, on 28 July.

Of course, it would be ideal if the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States could be guaranteed through a single global international convention. However, this possibility is totally unrealistic and no consensus can be achieved on this approach. We must be pragmatic, and we must avoid being perfectionists from the outset. That is why we have adopted the more realistic approach -- which is to take as a starting point the individual declarations already made by the five nuclear-weapon States, to try to extract the elements common to those five declarations and to use those elements to try to arrive at a common formula for security assurances.

In this connection, very special mention should be made of the substantial contribution made by Ambassador Fein of the Netherlands in his statements of 26 June 1979, 14 April 1981 and 30 July 1981. Ambassador Fein's statements provide an extremely interesting analysis and the Government of Japan is of the view that the Dutch proposal constitutes a realistic and promising basis for our deliberations in this Committee.

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

The non-nuclear-weapon States are naturally interested in obtaining the maximum degree of assurances regarding their security, but at the same time we must not forget that it is the nuclear-weapon States which are to extend the assurances. This delegation would therefore be interested in hearing more from the nuclear-weapon States regarding the Dutch proposal.

Before concluding on this subject, I wish to state the view of my delegation that effective international arrangements for negative security assurances would help to reinforce the existing non-proliferation regime and could constitute a preliminary step towards nuclear disarmament. However, my delegation agrees with Ambassador Yu Peiwen of China that a negative security assurance is only a transitional measure pending nuclear disarmament. My Government continues to maintain that optimum negative security assurances can be achieved only through nuclear disarmament -- that is to say, the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

The existence of mutual trust and confidence among the nuclear-weapon States is essential to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the advancement of nuclear disarmament. And such trust and confidence among nations can be generated only through self-restraint in the behaviour of nations, based on the strict and faithful observance of the principles of the United Nations Charter. The general international security situation has to be improved. The settlement of disputes between nations must be sought through the United Nations; and if international disputes can be prevented from turning into armed conflicts, this will help to create and increase confidence among nations and the task of disarmament, and particularly of nuclear disarmament, will become a trifle easier.

My Government and my country have been reminding the world for the past 36 years, as if such reminding were needed, that Japan is the only country to have suffered from nuclear weapons. I myself feel inclined these days, and particularly on this the thirty-sixth anniversary of the Hiroshima bomb, to change that wording slightly and instead of saying that Japan is the only country, to say that Japan was the first country to know the horrors of these weapons and that, if the world continues behaving as it does, many other countries may have the chance to follow in our wake. I shall not fail to report to my Government and to the people of Japan the most cordial gesture shown by the Committee at the beginning of its session this morning. My delegation wishes to interpret this gesture also as a reaffirmation of our determination to make further efforts in disarmament and in particular in nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Japan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, since the suggestion just referred to by Ambassador Okawa regarding our protocol has not yet been put into practice, I too will conform with tradition, and I would like, therefore, with your permission -- following the chronological order -- to address myself to your predecessor. I should like to express my delegation's appreciation of the very skilful, intelligent and dynamic way in which our colleague from India directed the Committee's work last month, and I think we should all be grateful to him for that.

This month, we are very happy to work under your direction, Mr. Chairman. Since you came from Jakarta to join us here in Geneva, we have come to know you; we all have very warm feelings for you personally, and I think you can be sure of our fullest co-operation during this month. Your country is an important member of ASEAN, a political grouping towards which we are very sympathetic and whose regional and international co-operation efforts we appreciate, and it is a pleasure to note that you assumed the chairmanship of our Committee just a few days before the celebration of "ASEAN Day" -- for, if my information is correct, it is to be held tomorrow, and I should like to offer you my congratulations on that occasion.

I would also like to welcome among us Senator Pell whose interest in the international discussions which take place in these venerable buildings in Geneva is well known to us all.

I was planning to talk about two subjects in my statement today: the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the prohibition of radiological weapons. With respect to the latter topic, the Belgian delegation was contemplating making a suggestion as regards our work. However, consultations are still in progress and my authorities have asked me to defer this suggestion for a while. Thus, the statement I shall make today will deal only with the subject of the comprehensive programme of disarmament; it will therefore be shorter than planned -- a fact for which my colleagues will, I hope, be grateful to me.

I referred in my last statement, at the plenary meeting of the Committee on 9 July, to my country's great interest in the timely preparation, i.e. before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of a comprehensive programme of disarmament which should constitute one of the essential elements of that session.

The Ad Hoc Working Group set up by our Committee on this question has undoubtedly already done important preliminary work. I should like to thank the two successive chairmen, Mr. Adeniji of Nigeria and Mr. García-Robles of Mexico. However, we must not conceal from ourselves the fact that the essential work still remains to be done. I am glad to note, in this connection, that the Committee is on the point of taking procedural decisions which will enable us to intensify our work in this regard.

Together with the Federal Republic of Germany, Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom, Belgium is a co-sponsor of document CD/205, which sets forth in detail the main views of these delegations on the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This document has been presented by the Federal Republic of Germany as a complete draft text. In fact, it seems to me essential that at this stage of our work we should have a clearer idea of the general structure of the programme.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In preparing this draft, our aim was to present a clear, concise and logical document. The comprehensive programme might thus, I believe, be what the international community expects, namely, a credible instrument which will facilitate negotiations in the sphere of disarmament, and not an academic collection of our various wishes.

The framework of this instrument comprises a permanent element and a dynamic element.

The permanent element consists of the major principles on which the disarmament negotiation efforts should be based. Without in any way forgetting the principles -- albeit sparse -- contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, we think that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should clearly and rigorously identify the fundamental principles which should guide the negotiators in determining the successive stages of disarmament. These principles derive from the need on the one hand to ensure the security of States at all stages of the disarmament process, and on the other to see to it that the Charter of the United Nations is scrupulously respected so that no actions contrary to it will hinder efforts in the sphere of disarmament.

Apart from the principles I have just mentioned, the permanent element of the framework for the disarmament process also includes what I would call "methods".

These are **first** of all the priorities defined in the Final Document, it being understood that these priorities constitute a coherent whole and that, as regards the prospects for negotiations, nothing must be allowed to prevent efforts to reach agreements on questions the outcome of which seems the most promising.

We cannot neglect any possibility of progress, however small. It is, in fact, with this in mind that Belgium has always defended the regional approach to disarmament. Indeed, we believe that partial solutions and regional measures must be sought wherever there is a possibility of reconciling the views expressed by the international community.

We also think that the comprehensive programme of disarmament should reflect in an appropriate manner something which constitutes another permanent element of the disarmament process, namely, the need for disarmament measures to be accompanied by adequate means of verification. Such means will not only contribute to the creation of confidence between States, but they will also help to ensure their security. A State will not undertake disarmament measures if it is not absolutely convinced that its security will not be endangered by such measures. Lastly, we should not overlook the probable impact on the actual negotiation of a disarmament measure of the prospect of there being created an adequate system for the verification of the agreement reached.

In addition to these permanent elements which I have just described, the comprehensive programme of disarmament also has a dynamic aspect.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

This is a result of the changing nature of circumstances -- particularly the contemporary political and security situation and the actual course of the disarmament process -- circumstances which determine the pace of negotiation of disarmament measures. States cannot be required to disregard these circumstances. This is why we do not believe that it is possible for States to undertake to carry out a particular disarmament measure at a particular period of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the other hand, it can reasonably be expected that the programme should be implemented within the framework of a series of interdependent phases, each of these phases determining the negotiations to be conducted on disarmament measures, themselves interrelated in a coherent manner.

Parallel to the disarmament measures proper and during each of the phases, it will also be necessary to provide for the negotiation of what are known as collateral measures, and also the carrying out of studies which will help to improve the prospects for negotiations.

The first of the phases to which I have just referred should have as its aim the conclusion of the negotiations that are at present under way. This completion of negotiations should be taken in its broadest sense and cover all measures for which advanced preparatory work has been done and approved. The document of which Belgium is a co-sponsor gives a detailed list of such measures.

The list of other measures which should form part of subsequent phases of the comprehensive programme of disarmament is in fact a catalogue of the steps the international community should take to reach the goal of general and complete disarmament.

All these measures should be formulated in as general a manner as possible in the comprehensive programme. We must avoid two dangers, on the one hand that of excessive specificity, which would inevitably lead to incompleteness, and on the other that of giving the negotiators such precise instructions that they would, at this stage, prove to be paralysing.

The review meetings will play an important part in the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. They should on the one hand determine how far the measures allocated to a phase have been carried out. Where appropriate, they could declare the phase to have been completed. They could also, if necessary, redefine a phase and those which are to succeed it. So, taking account of the circumstances prevailing at that time, they can specify the content of the next phase. My delegation considers that these meetings should be periodic. This does not mean that they ought necessarily to be regular. Here again it is the circumstances of the moment which ought to determine when these meetings should be held. In view of the similarity of the measures envisaged for the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the measures contained in the programme for the Second Disarmament Decade, it would be useful if the review of these two undertakings could be combined.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

My delegation, for its part, is not in favour of the setting up of a new body for the purpose of such reviews. We consider that the present disarmament structures within the United Nations could undertake this task. The United Nations Disarmament Commission could perhaps be requested, when the General Assembly deemed it appropriate to carry out reviews of the implementation of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. This would then confirm the role which has already been conferred upon the United Nations Disarmament Commission within the framework of the Second Disarmament Decade.

I have explained why I thought that the comprehensive programme of disarmament could not be a legally binding instrument. It should, however, be understood that in view of its importance the comprehensive programme of disarmament should form the subject of an undertaking by States to respect its objectives, principles and priorities, and should contain an expression of the firm determination of the international community to implement the programme through the negotiation of specific and verifiable measures of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (translated from French): I thank the distinguished representative of Belgium for his statement, the kind words he addressed to me and the reference he made to the Association of South East Asian Nations.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, while relinquishing the Chair last week, I had already offered to you the warm greetings of my delegation and best wishes for a successful tenure as Chairman for this month. Since I am now speaking for the first time under your distinguished chairmanship, I would like to thank you, as well as other distinguished delegates, for their kind and friendly words concerning my own tenure as Chairman of the Committee last month. I would also like to welcome in our midst Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany whose statement we were privileged to listen to this morning. The presence of Senator Clayborne Pell of the United States of America in our midst will, we trust, enable him to carry back to the Senate the views of the Committee on Disarmament which I believe constitute a major plank in the efforts of the international community towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

I now turn to the theme of my statement today, namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

In the early 1960s, several non-aligned countries as well as the two major Powers, the United States and the USSR, put forward fairly detailed programmes for the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. These programmes envisaged sweeping and drastic reductions in existing arsenals of all types of weapons, to be achieved within a limited time-span, extending, at the most, over just a decade or so. During the past several years, however, progress in the field of disarmament has been marked by an emphasis on partial measures. By the end of the 1960s, this partial approach to disarmament had relegated the comprehensive approach to the background. At the same time, bilateral and restricted negotiations amongst a few States had eroded and gradually attained an ascendancy over the multilateral approach. The reasons for this change in emphasis are fairly obvious. The pursuit of limited measures of disarmament permitted a greater flexibility and the opportunity to harmonize conflicting security concerns in a relatively predictable framework for the handful of countries concerned.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

Negotiations in bilateral and restricted forums also enabled the more heavily armed States to pursue a reconciliation of their national interests in an environment insulated, to a large extent, from the pressures of world public opinion and the need to satisfy the concerns and security requirements of a larger number of States.

This change of emphasis did achieve some limited results in the decade of the 1970s. However, as the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament itself recognized,

"The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament."

Given this consensus assessment of the impact of limited and partial measures of disarmament, we find it rather strange that some delegations still continue to insist on pursuing this discredited strategy of the 1970s without any essential change. General and complete disarmament under effective international control will become a credible goal only if limited and partial measures of disarmament are pursued within a universally accepted programme embodying well-recognized principles, objectives and priorities in the field of disarmament negotiations. These principles, objectives and priorities are clearly enunciated in the Final Document of the first special session and this is what makes that Document a touchstone for the disarmament process.

What is the nature of the comprehensive programme of disarmament which the Committee on Disarmament is expected to formulate and to elaborate? For one thing, the quotation I have just used from the Final Document would naturally lead us to the conclusion that the programme is conceived in terms of a treaty. The very fact that the elaboration of the programme has been entrusted to the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament would seem to support this view. If the programme were to be only a mere indicative framework, with no legal and binding political commitments, why was it necessary to entrust the task to the Committee on Disarmament instead of to a deliberative body like the United Nations Disarmament Commission? Paragraph 38 of the Final Document makes it abundantly clear what the nature of the CPD is expected to be:

"Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

If it is in fact a treaty which we are engaged in negotiating, then it is obvious that we must agree upon explicit provisions for its entry into force and for its implementation, the mechanism for its periodic review and the procedure

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

for future amendments of its provisions. The CPD would not conform to what is expected of it if its entry into force and the implementation of its provisions were to be left vague or open-ended, as some States want it to be. I may point out that not one treaty negotiated so far in the field of arms limitation or disarmament has been conceived without very specific provisions relating to its entry into force and the periodic review of its implementation.

I might mention that the 1962 draft treaties on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States and the USSR were conceived as a package of interrelated measures of disarmament that the parties were committed to implement within a period of less than a decade. The provisions of the Soviet draft were intended to be implemented within a period of five years, while the first two stages of the three-stage United States draft treaty were to have been implemented within a period of six years. Both these draft treaties contained provisions for their entry into force and for a review of their implementation. Although certain specific provisions in the two drafts may have been overtaken by both political and technological developments in the intervening years, surely one cannot claim that their aims and objectives were any different from what the Committee on Disarmament is trying to achieve at the present time. The nature of the document we are engaged in negotiating is basically the same as that of the draft treaties presented by the major Powers in 1962. If this is not the case and some delegations would prefer to ignore paragraph 38 of the Final Document, then it is best that we should be made abundantly aware of this fact now at once, so that we do not waste valuable time in trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. My delegation, for one, cannot countenance a retreat from the provisions of the Final Document which the international community adopted by consensus.

What are the principles on which the CPD ought to be based? Here again I would base myself primarily on the provisions contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be necessarily and actively concerned with and contribute to measures of disarmament and arms limitation. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have a right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race. Most important of all, the adoption of disarmament measures should appropriately take place in an equitable and balanced manner so as to ensure the right of each State to security and so that no individual State or group of States may obtain unilateral advantages over others. At each stage, our objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces. These are some of the fundamental principles that I have selected from the Final Document. With respect to each category of disarmament measures, e.g., those relating to nuclear disarmament or the setting up of nuclear-weapon-free zones, there would naturally be more specific principles governing the negotiation and implementation of those measures. These specific principles can also be garnered from the Final Document.

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

I would now like to turn to priorities in the field of disarmament negotiations. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document states categorically that "priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces". While States are not precluded from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently, this certainly does not imply that the order of priorities may be reversed or ignored in the Committee on Disarmament, which is, after all, the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament. The spectacle of some of the major nuclear-weapon States refusing to allow the CD to undertake negotiations on nuclear issues and restricting the terms of reference with respect to negotiations on chemical weapons, even while recording little or no progress in their own restricted bilateral or regional negotiations on these issues, is a regrettable state of affairs. Throughout the Final Document, the emphasis is on the urgent negotiation of measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war. It is universally recognized that "the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace". Yet in the negotiations on the draft CPD, there is a curious reluctance to accord measures of nuclear disarmament, and particularly measures for the prevention of nuclear war, the priority they amply deserve and which has in fact already been spelt out by consensus in the Final Document. One has sometimes heard the argument that measures to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons should be implemented not merely in the first stage of the CPD but as a continuous objective during subsequent stages since they could probably not be implemented until nuclear disarmament had been substantially achieved. The Final Document, in paragraph 58, has referred to these measures in the context of the overriding and urgent aim of ensuring "that the survival of mankind is not endangered". One would have expected that these measures, which we have all agreed are essential to the survival of mankind, would figure unequivocally in the very first and earliest stage of the CPD. It is a measure of the air of unreality which afflicts our work in this Committee that attempts are made to put such simple logic aside under the cover of national or alliance security interests.

During the last meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and again during the negotiations on the elaboration of the CPD, we have witnessed a disturbing trend which makes progress in disarmament negotiations conditional upon an improvement in the international situation, an increase in confidence among States and in prior agreement being reached on measures of verification and control. For example, document CD/198 submitted on behalf of a group of Western States asserts that confidence-building measures are "a necessary prerequisite for the successful outcome" of disarmament negotiations. The same document also seeks to equate measures for verification and control with the development of trust and confidence among nations. This is a one-sided view. I would draw attention specifically to paragraph 34 of the Final Document which states:

"Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others".

In fact, the first few paragraphs of the Final Document would appear to emphasize that it is the accumulation of armaments and the lack of progress in disarmament which constitute the real threat to international peace and security and which undermine trust and confidence among nations. Thus, paragraph 11 states in part:

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

"The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war."

The aggravation of international tensions cannot be held out as a pretext or justification for lack of progress in disarmament negotiations. These tensions are themselves a symptom of the relentless accumulation of arms which is taking place, especially among the major Powers. To make disarmament conditional upon the improvement of the international environment is largely a case of putting the cart before the horse.

Similarly, while it is true that adequate measures for verification may contribute to confidence among States, verification can never be a substitute for relations of mutual trust among States. Even with the very effective and intrusive means of verification available to them, the major Powers are vigorously engaged in an unprecedented build-up of nuclear and conventional armaments. This build-up has nothing to do with lack of means of verification. Furthermore, those who lay so much emphasis on verification could not have failed to notice that more stringent and so-called intrusive means of control have historically been far more acceptable in an era of relatively good relations among the major Powers and their allies than would be the case otherwise. The recent demands for more stringent verification are a reflection of the deterioration in the relations among the major Powers and the opposing military alliances, the causes for which have little or nothing to do with a genuine verification process.

While recognizing the importance of verification, we would urge, therefore, that the proper perspective should be maintained. My delegation will soon submit a working paper to the secretariat concerning the question of verification which will be circulated to members of the Committee and which we trust will be useful to all concerned.

In conclusion, I would like to offer some views on the measures to be included in the comprehensive programme of disarmament. The Final Document envisaged the CPD as one that would encompass "all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

The elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament drawn up by the United Nations Disarmament Commission in 1979 conceived the programme as a framework within which negotiations on a multilateral, bilateral and regional level could be conducted on specific measures of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission itself provided only an outline of the programme. It was left to the Committee on Disarmament to elaborate and give shape to the above outline. If the purpose of the exercise we are undertaking here is only to stick closely to the formulations contained in the Disarmament Commission's draft "Elements" or even to reproduce formulations from the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document, as some delegations appear to be suggesting by the positions they have taken in the Working Group on a CPD, then we wonder if we are not wasting valuable time, which could be used for negotiations on more urgent and priority issues, e.g., nuclear disarmament. For our part we look upon

(Mr. Venkateswaran, India)

the CPD as going further than the Programme of Action contained in the Final Document. The draft treaty that should emerge from our negotiations must accordingly contain detailed and specific measures of disarmament to be implemented in a feasible manner consistent with our objectives, principles and priorities in the field of disarmament as already endorsed by the international community. However, constructive recommendations made by the Group of 21 regarding such specific measures, whether under nuclear disarmament or conventional disarmament, have drawn the rather strange and negative response from the major Powers and some of their allies that these recommendations are "too specific" in character. The entirely untenable position has been advanced from certain quarters that the specific measures to be negotiated under each category of disarmament items must be left to those involved in the negotiations and those who are most directly concerned. If this is the case then either the draft elements drawn up by the Disarmament Commission for the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament ought to be sufficient as a framework for pursuing the goal of general and complete disarmament. Should the Committee on Disarmament then report to the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament that it is unable to advance any further than the Final Document adopted at the first special session? If we are not going to deliver the goods, is it legitimate for us to pretend that we are engaged in elaborating a CPD containing specific measures of disarmament, when a number of States, including the major Powers, appear to have little intention of accepting any concrete commitments with respect to either nuclear or conventional disarmament? If the identification of concrete measures is to be just left to the States involved in the negotiations, then why have a CPD at all? The answer is that the objectives, principles and priorities in the field of disarmament are already well-known. The major categories of disarmament measures have already been outlined in the declarations prepared by the United Nations Disarmament Commission based on the Final Document of the first special session. As we see it, it is the elaboration of the various measures of disarmament which requires intensive negotiations, so that this outline is transformed into a series of well-defined and interrelated commitments by States incorporated into a multilateral treaty for universal adherence. If this is not what we are really engaged in, then we may as well confess that we are unable to fulfil the serious mandate given to us by the General Assembly at its first special session.

In concluding this statement, my delegation would like to pay a sincere tribute to the meticulous and painstaking way in which the distinguished Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the CPD, Ambassador García Robles, has been directing the course of negotiations on this important document, from the very beginning, hopefully towards a successful completion. However, while a preliminary consideration of measures to be included in the CPD, in a hypothetical first stage, has been completed, the more fundamental issues such as those which I addressed myself to today need to be debated and thrashed out with the minimum of delay. Our negotiations on the concrete formulations of the various measures would obviously be influenced by our agreement, or lack of it, concerning the nature of the CPD and its relationship to the Final Document of the first special session. Negotiations within the Working Group so far indicate that it might well be difficult to go beyond the terms of the Final Document. Perhaps this is due to certain delegations not being quite clear in their own minds regarding the nature of the CPD we are all engaged in negotiating. In such a situation, it is only natural that we seek to stand still on familiar ground. But our mandate is to build further on this ground and the sooner we manage to clarify our ideas concerning the nature and contents of the CPD the better would be the chances of our being able to go to the second special session on disarmament with a document worthy of ourselves and the confidence reposed in the Committee on Disarmament by the entire international community.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of India for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. With the last speaker on my list, we have concluded that list for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage?

The Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, a timetable for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 10-14 August. In that connection, I wish to inform the Committee that, in accordance with rule 44 of the rules of procedure, the first instalment of the draft report of the Committee to the General Assembly has been prepared by me with the assistance of the Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and will be made available to all members in the delegations' boxes tomorrow, early in the afternoon for the English text and after 5 p.m. in the other languages. Since the first instalment of the report deals mainly with technical aspects, I hope that it will be possible to start a first reading at an informal meeting on Monday afternoon. In that connection, provision has been made in the timetable for consideration at that meeting of a draft statement by the Chairman proposed by the delegation of Pakistan regarding the implications of the Israeli military attack against Tammuz, if members are ready to do so.

As regards the substantive paragraphs of the report on items 1, 2 and 5 of the agenda, I have consulted with the Co-ordinators of the various groups and other delegations in order to devise flexible and practical ways to deal with them. I have requested the Secretariat to provide us with texts which could be used as a basis for consideration. During my consultations I found that members agreed to this approach.

As we approach the closing date of the Committee's work, the activities in the working groups are particularly intense, and you will notice that we have attempted to meet the concerns of their Chairmen in the context of the timetable. Its provisions might not be ideal, but at this stage we need to fully utilize our time and I am sure that members will understand that we should depart from normal practices in order to meet the closing date decided by the Committee.

Also in connection with the timetable, may I note that the work of the drafting group dealing with proposals on the improved and effective functioning of the Committee has been making substantive progress under the able leadership of Ambassador Venkateswaran and, accordingly, I intend to put the recommendations before the Committee at an appropriate stage, possibly during the coming week. I will be in touch with the Chairman of the drafting group in order to ensure appropriate consideration of those recommendations.

If there is no objection, I shall consider that the Committee is prepared to accept the timetable, which as usual is merely indicative and can be adjusted as we proceed. I recognize the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia.

Mr. BRANKOVIC (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I share entirely the views just expressed by you, that we are approaching the end of the Committee and we should use all the available time in the manner which we find appropriate. However, I see that in the programme you have suggested, Monday morning, the 10th, is free and I feel that we should try our best to utilize this time for the work of the working groups.

(Mr. Brankovic, Yugoslavia)

At the same time I see that on Friday 14 August two different working group meetings have been scheduled. There is no need for me to go into a detailed explanation why the CPD Working Group needs all available time to finish its work, but having this in mind I would suggest that we allocate the whole of Friday, both morning and afternoon to the CPD Working Group because we know that this is the only working group with a heavy load which to finish its work has been allowed only until Friday evening. At the same time we feel that the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should be allocated time on Monday morning. Tomorrow there is a meeting of the Radiological Weapons Working Group to start discussion of the report and I feel that we should continue on Monday morning hopefully to finish it on Wednesday, as is scheduled, between 9 a.m. and 11 a.m.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been informed that the Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons is not yet ready to hold a meeting on Monday morning and that is why it has been scheduled as it appears on the draft programme. I hope that you will take this into account as regards your proposal.

Mr. BRANKOVIC (Yugoslavia): I do not know if the Chairman of the Radiological Weapons Working Group is ready but I was thinking much more on the lines of whether the report is ready, and whether the Working Group is ready to consider it. If we are going to start discussion of the report tomorrow, Friday morning, and I see that working paper No. 24 is before us now, I see no reason why we should not utilize Monday morning for this Working Group also.

The CHAIRMAN: The best thing is to ask the view of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to explain why it is not possible for the group to meet on Monday.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons I would like to say the following in connection with the proposal made by our distinguished colleague from Yugoslavia. The Working Group on Radiological Weapons will tomorrow have the first reading on the draft report on its work. I am sure that many proposals and comments will be made which will have to be taken into account in the further elaboration and improvement of the draft report. It is quite clear that for this purpose, in order to submit a new version of the draft, the time between Friday morning and Monday is very short. That is why I have already asked for an additional meeting for the Working Group on Wednesday which, in my opinion, will bring us very close to the finalization of the report which can then be adopted on Friday, the 14th. I would therefore like to ask the understanding of my Yugoslav colleague for this consideration, and that of my colleagues.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Hungary for his explanation and I hope that this is acceptable to the Committee.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, in the timetable contained in the informal paper that was just distributed, only one meeting for the negative security assurances Working Group is scheduled. That will take place on Tuesday in the afternoon as usual. I hope, and am even confident that on that occasion it will be possible to approve the report of the Group. However, as I cannot be sure of

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

that, I have to draw your attention to the possible need for a further meeting of this Group on the following day, that is Wednesday, or even Thursday. I think it will therefore be necessary to leave open the possibility of holding another meeting of this Group. I repeat that it is my firm hope that that will not be necessary, but I cannot rule out this possibility.

The CHAIRMAN: I think we will have to wait and see, but I will take note of the statement made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances.

Mr. SARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a request that in the timetable both for next week and for the subsequent week at least one full afternoon be left free to give delegations an opportunity to go through the massive amount of documents they have to consider, both of the working groups and of the Committee. I think it will be extremely difficult for small delegations like mine to function if each and every day of the week we have to work from 9 in the morning until about 8 in the evening. I would therefore request, Mr. Chairman, and through you the various Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, that they should take into account the difficulties of small delegations, and at least some time during the week should be set aside so that delegations can reflect on and digest the amount of documentation that is made available to us.

The CHAIRMAN: We will take note of this request by our distinguished colleague from India.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make only two comments. The first is that my delegation is glad to see that no meeting either of the Committee or of its working groups has been planned for Monday morning. We are glad of this because at the weekly meeting of the Group of 21 held yesterday, it was agreed that another meeting could usefully be held next Monday morning. The only reason why a final decision was not taken on the matter was that it was possible then that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons might meet and naturally we did not wish to compete with it. Now that there is to be no meeting of the Radiological Weapons Group, I am certain that the distinguished representative of Yugoslavia will agree with me that a meeting of the Group of 21 will make good use of Monday morning. My second point concerns the meetings planned here for the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The secretariat has said that the draft report of that Group will be distributed next Monday. I do not think that its contents will be very controversial: it is an objective, narrative account of what happened and I dare to hope that we could complete consideration and approval of this report in the two meetings currently scheduled in the work programme, i.e. one on Thursday afternoon and the other on Friday afternoon. However, if my forecast proves to be wrong, we could hold a night meeting on Friday, 14 August.

The CHAIRMAN: I would hope, with the distinguished representative, that it would be possible to finish the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group under his leadership after the two meetings on Thursday and Friday and also that he will be able to avoid night work on Friday the 14th. Are there any other speakers who wish to take the floor? If not, I wish to announce, before adjourning, that a drafting group on Radiological Weapons will meet in Room C-108 this afternoon at 3 p.m. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 11 August 1981. The meeting is adjourned.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.145
11 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FIFTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 11 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch. A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE 'SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U HGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LI Changhe
Mr. SA Benwang

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTIURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India: Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. A. SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIAK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran: Mr. A. JALALI

Italy: Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan: Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico: Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia: Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco: Mr. H. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands: Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria: Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan: Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland: Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania: Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka: Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden: Mr. L. NORBERG
Mr. H. BERGLUND

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. N.F. CHERVOV
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom: Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Ms. L. SHEA
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA
Mr. C.O. GNOK
Mrs. E. EKANGA
Mr. S. MBONGO

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work, the Committee starts today its consideration of the reports of its subsidiary bodies as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Of course, in accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members are at liberty to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

Mr. HERDER (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, it is with great concern that my delegation today has asked for the floor to denounce the recently published decision of the United States to start the full-scale production of the so-called enhanced radiation weapon system, the neutron bomb.

Everybody will recall the discussion at the beginning of the 1981 CD session, when many delegations voiced their concern about statements by the United States Secretary of Defense, Mr. Weinberger, that he was favouring the production of the neutron bomb and its deployment in western Europe. What at that time appeared as a threat has now become reality.

We share the view expressed on 5 February 1981 by the head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Thorsson, that such a decision "would give a new aspect to nuclear warfare, adding further to its terrifying effects, and ... entails the inherent risk of lowering the nuclear weapon threshold".

The recent United States decision cannot but be regarded as a challenge to world opinion that is demanding concrete negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

It is disturbing to note that this decision obviously has been prepared at a time when here in the Committee on Disarmament we have tried to explore ways and means for initiating such negotiations. At that time the delegation of the country concerned was not prepared to embark upon the way of negotiations, arguing that the international situation would not allow for such negotiations.

But what consequences will the decision to produce neutron weapons have for the international situation? First and foremost the introduction of these weapons into nuclear arsenals is a new step bound to escalate the nuclear arms race with all its grave consequences for international peace and security. Besides, the timing of the decision should remind us very clearly of this, since according to press reports the decision was taken precisely on the thirty-sixth anniversary of the day when a nuclear bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, causing 200,000 deaths.

The German Democratic Republic, as a central European country, feels obliged to draw your attention to the dangers the production of the neutron weapon could have for our region. People all over Europe, recognizing this danger, have already for many years been demanding the abandonment of plans for producing these weapons. This call was only recently reaffirmed at the Geneva Non-Governmental Organizations' Action Conference against the renewed arms race and by the Tokyo World Conference against A and H bombs.

(Mr. Herder, German Democratic Republic)

Let no one be deceived by the argument that this weapon is not going to be stationed outside its country of origin. In this connection we would only like to refer to recent American press reports stating cynically that the only appropriate area for the use of neutron weapons would be the "European theater". But does Europe really need new dangerous weapons of mass destruction? To provide an answer let me quote from the communiqué on the recent Crimean meeting of the Presidents of the German Democratic Republic and the USSR, Erich Honecker and Leonid I. Brezhnev. They emphasized: "Europe does not need the addition to its arsenals of weapons from overseas, but a limitation and reduction of any kind of arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race."

On 10 March 1978, the group of socialist States submitted to the CCD a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559). Recent events have shown that the prohibition of the neutron weapon has today become more urgent than ever before. The time has come for the Committee as the single multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations to live up to its responsibilities and to act accordingly. On behalf of the socialist States sponsors of CCD/559, therefore, my delegation calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to consider without delay appropriate measures to prohibit the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, thus contributing to the prevention of a nuclear holocaust.

We furthermore expect the report the Committee is now preparing for the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly to reflect adequately the efforts the CD has undertaken to make headway on the road towards the prohibition of such a dangerous weapon of mass destruction.

Mr. NZENGEYA (Zaire) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, in taking the floor during this last month of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, in which you are filling the office of Chairman of our Committee, I should first of all like to perform the agreeable duty of offering you the sincere congratulations of my delegation on your assumption of that office. Your country, Indonesia, through the Bandung Conference of 1955 and the noteworthy personality of President Sukarno, played a leading role in the creation of the movement of the non-aligned countries. I can assure you of the whole-hearted co-operation of my delegation during your chairmanship.

Nor can I fail to mention the dynamism shown in that office by Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, a worthy representative of the country of Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, the apostles of peaceful revolution.

Ambassador Jaipal, the personal representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary of the Committee on Disarmament, also merits the gratitude of our delegation for the valuable contribution he has made to the work of this Committee.

I intend to take advantage of the opportunity you have afforded me of addressing the Committee today in order to explain Zaire's position on all the questions that constitute at once the concerns and the objectives of this Committee in the matter of disarmament problems.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

The maintenance of international peace and security by taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and by bringing about, by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of international disputes -- these are among the most fundamental goals pursued by the United Nations since its foundation at the end of the Second World War.

It was the terrible sufferings inflicted on mankind twice since the beginning of this century which led the peoples of the world, in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, to set themselves this goal.

Among the States signatories of the Charter at San Francisco (on 26 June 1945) were those which possessed and had already tried out nuclear weapons and had thus discovered the magnitude of their destructive consequences for human beings. Hiroshima will remain for ever engraved in the annals of the history of mankind through being selected as the first target of the atomic bomb for the manufacture of which my country, at that time, alas, subjected to exploitation and colonization, had to supply the raw materials -- I am referring to uranium -- which were used in its manufacture. This is to say that all the nations of the world, great and small, developed or developing, poor and rich, that yearn for peace and justice, have a share in the responsibility for reducing tension in the world.

There is a close link between disarmament, the relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the strengthening of peace and international security, just as there is also a direct link between disarmament and development.

All States therefore have the duty to contribute to the efforts made in the sphere of disarmament, for on the success of the negotiations on disarmament will depend international peace and security and more especially the development of the countries which are still poor, though the release of the vast resources that are swallowed up in the nuclear arms race. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, said recently that for 1980 alone it was estimated that the developed countries' expenditures on armaments amounted to some \$500 billion, whereas a mere 5 per cent of that amount would have sufficed for the implementation of the International Development Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade! Furthermore, this figure is curiously similar to that of the total external indebtedness of the developing countries.

While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States nevertheless bear the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race.

The role of the countries of the third world or members of the Group of 21 is to secure the active participation of the nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations on disarmament so that they will accept the idea of initiating a process of the gradual lowering of the level of armaments.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

My delegation is aware of the difficulties encountered by the Group of 21, to which it belongs. For, at the same time as negotiations are proceeding in this Committee and elsewhere, there are reports of the strengthening of the defence systems both of the Warsaw Pact countries and of the NATO countries. As regards the latter, one illustration of this is the establishment of a base in Sicily for the launching of strategic rockets or Euro-missiles, for which 200 billion lire were allocated, while as regards the former, there is the heavy concentration of armed forces of Warsaw Pact countries around the frontiers of Poland.

This very ambiguous attitude of the nuclear-weapon and militarily significant States, to which the appeal of the international community for disarmament is primarily addressed, is contrary both to the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and to the spirit which should prevail in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. There is no need for me to remind you that these negotiations on measures of nuclear disarmament should be complemented by negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments on the basis of the principle of the undiminished security of the States concerned with the objective of ensuring stability at a lower level of forces, bearing in mind the need for all States to protect their security. At this stage in history, the security of all mankind rests on the balance of military forces, and it is clear that in a nuclear war there would be no victors but only the vanquished.

The survival of all mankind, including the inhabitants of the countries possessing nuclear weapons, henceforward depends on the whims of those who can order the use of those weapons.

Twenty years ago, the desire of the nuclear Powers, following the cold war, to acquire a deterrent or striking force, was understandable to the peoples of the world as being aimed at the maintenance of international peace and security.

Now, however, the capacity of the new nuclear weapons to destroy all life on earth several times over no longer makes them a deterrent force and consequently no longer corresponds to the original aims of these States.

To collect, stockpile and continue to manufacture such weapons at a time when the international community is calling for their destruction (the peace march of the Scandinavians in Europe to protest against the nuclear-arms race) is something which appears to be going against the current of history. At this stage in the frantic nuclear arms race and its escalation, for reasons which are no longer connected with the safeguarding of international peace and security, we can but fear the dangers inherent in these arsenals for peaceful populations. Furthermore, the fires which frequently ravage nuclear facilities constantly endanger innocent people.

In view of all these facts, my delegation considers that it is incumbent on the Committee on Disarmament to find ways and means of breaking the vicious circle of the chain of reactions in order to create a climate of confidence among States.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

Such a break implies an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers to convert nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities to peaceful purposes and the economic and social development of the peoples of the world. For, through this aim of development, the promotion of international co-operation will help to put an end to the permanent state of mistrust and hence of belligerence.

My delegation would wish to see the freely-expressed political will of every nuclear-weapon State to contribute to the achievement of nuclear disarmament before the end of the negotiations on items 1 and 2 of our agenda, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

This is the only way of creating the climate of confidence that could promote the conclusion of agreements or treaties on general and complete disarmament under effective international control -- agreements which would be universally recognized in character. For the achievement of such agreements, it is necessary for all States to adopt a constructive attitude with respect to the negotiations.

In the sphere of the nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race, no progress has been made. The statements of the nuclear-weapon Powers betray their intention to continue nuclear tests for the purpose of the manufacture of even more advanced nuclear weapons, like the neutron bombs, which one nuclear-weapon Power has been developing since 1978.

Furthermore, all the conditions exist for an increase in the nuclear arsenals of certain warlike States which defy the decisions of the United Nations and are notorious for their arrogance towards our Organization, thus creating centres of tension in a world where the threats and risks of war cannot predispose the States of the region to disarm but incite them rather to increase their armaments.

This is, unfortunately, the situation prevailing in southern Africa, where a nuclear-weapon test site was discovered in the Kalahari Desert, and a flash of light resembling that of a nuclear explosion in the atmosphere was detected in the region of the South Atlantic on 22 September 1979 by a United States VELA reconnaissance satellite.

As long ago as in 1961, the General Assembly asked all States to consider the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone and to respect it as such, and it has repeatedly called for the implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, adopted in 1964 by the African Heads of State and Government. It has also urged the cessation of all co-operation with South Africa in the nuclear sphere.

It appears, however, from the report (document A/35/402) of the Group of Experts (France, Nigeria, Philippines, Sweden, USSR and Venezuela) established pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/76 B to investigate South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field, that South Africa's nuclear energy activities have advanced steadily since the Second World War. Through its illegal seizure of the uranium resources of Namibia, South Africa has gained control of a large share of the world market in uranium.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

According to the experts, there is no doubt that South Africa has the technical capability to make nuclear weapons and the necessary means of delivery. It already possesses a uranium enrichment facility, not subject to safeguards, which is capable of producing weapon-grade uranium, and it is building another enrichment facility with an even higher capacity. It cannot be excluded, moreover, that in their desperate attempt to preserve the apartheid system, South Africa's leaders might decide to use nuclear weapons.

Moreover, this régime continues to enjoy the sympathy of certain nuclear-weapon Powers although in the eyes of the international community it is considered to be the most abject and cruel of systems because it disregards the most elementary human rights.

The introduction of nuclear weapons on the African continent, and particularly in a region as unstable as southern Africa, would not only be a severe blow to the efforts to ensure the non-proliferation of these weapons in the world as a whole but also frustrate the efforts to keep the African continent out of the nuclear arms race and make it a denuclearized zone. The sanctions adopted with regard to South Africa in the matter of arms sales should be applied by all States without exception.

Another State as warlike as South Africa is to be found in the Middle East. Strong in its impunity and using sophisticated weapons and equipment for aggressive purposes without fearing any retaliation by neighbouring countries, Israel has since the 1950s possessed nuclear reactors which are not subject to international inspection because it has still not signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Although some American experts were able to visit Israel's reactor in the 1960s, visits have not been authorized since then. Is Israel prepared to authorize a control visit by the International Atomic Energy Agency? If it refuses, it must justify itself to the international community and say what this centre conceals.

The complicity of the Pretoria-Tel Aviv axis needs no demonstration for it is known that Israel is working in close co-operation with South Africa in the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, as part, of course, of a latent proliferation strategy.

On 7 June 1981 Israel attacked the Osirak (Iraq) nuclear centre recognized by IAEA as a civilian facility for peaceful purposes, on the pretext of seeking to anticipate events and forestall possible danger. France and Italy, both of them members of the Committee on Disarmament, would never have agreed to contribute to the execution of that project had it been proved that it was to be diverted from its original purpose, which was to be placed at the service of development and technological progress, in accordance with paragraph 68 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's second special session on disarmament. Following the attack, the Executive Council of Zaire strongly condemned this act of aggression and considered the Israeli action as a flagrant and intolerable violation of international law.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

My delegation fully supported the Statement of the Group of 21 (document CD/187) on that Israeli air attack and urges the Committee to take appropriate measures to help prevent any undesirable consequences ensuing from that action.

To revert to consideration of agenda items 1 and 2 (Nuclear test ban and Cessation of the nuclear arms race), matters of the greatest interest to the entire international community since they are concerned with its security, we believe that the Committee on Disarmament ought to try, before the end of this session, to provide answers to the pertinent questions raised in the statements of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/181 and CD/180.

My delegation is particularly interested in the following three matters, the questions on which have yet to be answered:

- (1) The trilateral negotiations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR: are they continuing or have they been suspended, and if so, for what reasons? If they are continuing, might we have an interim report, indicating the stage reached in these negotiations? Such reports were submitted during the 1979 and 1980 sessions.
- (2) In its documents CD/64 of 27 February 1980 and CD/72 of 4 March 1980 the Group of 21 proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda item 1. This proposal is repeated in document CD/181, submitted at this session. Are we to understand that the nuclear-weapon States refuse to agree to entrust a working group with a mandate to undertake the substantive consideration of concrete questions relating to item 1, even though it would have to report to the Committee on the progress made in its work?
- (3) To what role do the nuclear-weapon States wish to reduce the other members of the Committee on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiation of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, in view of the small amount of progress that has been made in the trilateral negotiations?

The Committee on Disarmament should pursue and intensify the search for a common approach which would enable it to fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly in the sphere of disarmament.

Multilateral negotiations on questions that are of vital interest both to nuclear-weapon States and to non-nuclear-weapon States should be initiated without delay in the Committee on Disarmament, the only multilateral negotiating body in the realm of disarmament. The proposal that we should set up an ad hoc working group to deal with questions of substance such as:

The elaboration and clarification of the stages of nuclear disarmament envisaged in paragraph 50 of the Final Document, including the determination of the responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States and the role of the non-nuclear-weapon States in the process of implementation of nuclear disarmament;

The clarification of questions relating to the prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, pending nuclear disarmament, and to the prevention of nuclear war; and the clarification of questions connected with the discrediting of doctrines of nuclear deterrence

would appear to be both wise and realistic if we wish to spare mankind the catastrophe threatening it through the danger of nuclear war.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

To conclude my statement on agenda items 1 and 2, items to which my country attaches vital importance, my delegation would wish that the concrete proposals formulated by the Group of 21 for the establishment of working groups on items 1 and 2 to permit the initiation of negotiations on those items on a multilateral basis, should be faithfully reflected in the report to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session.

The third agenda item, "Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons", was clearly defined in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the General Assembly's second special session devoted to disarmament. It was understood that during the negotiations in the Committee, efforts should be made to conclude effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. It is clear from the discussions which have taken place in the Ad Hoc Working Group that there are still marked divergencies of views and opinions despite the thoroughness of the Group's discussion of the questions and elements to be included in stage one, and linked with the identification of the various aspects of the undertakings. The view of the non-nuclear-weapon States that they are entitled to receive unconditional guarantees of security from the nuclear-weapon States was widely expressed and should have won the nuclear-weapon States' sympathetic consideration.

Consideration of all the variants of a common formula led the Group to note the absence of any major objection to the idea of an international convention having a legally binding character. My delegation's view is that any interim measure would deprive the negotiations on this question of any substance or basis.

The process of the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones should be encouraged, with due regard for the particular features of each region. (An example: the Treaty of Tlatelolco, with reference to the Latin American region.) The countries of Africa, South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean have long expressed their desire to become such zones, in the same way as Latin America. In this connection, the nuclear-weapon States ought to undertake strictly to respect the status of nuclear-weapon-free zones and to refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against the States of such zones.)

It is the Committee's duty to request the Working Group, or some other working group, to explore other possibilities with a view to overcoming the difficulties the Group has encountered in the negotiations, and so to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Working paper CD/SA/CRP.4 of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, to whom my delegation pays tribute for the tireless efforts he has made in that office, is still a valid basis for discussion.

With regard to agenda items 4 and 5, on chemical weapons and new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, such as radiological weapons, respectively, my delegation has the following comments to make:

- (1) All States should accede to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

(Mr. Nzengeya, Zaire)

- (2) All States which have not yet done so should consider acceding to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction.
- (3) In accordance with General Assembly resolution 35/144 B, urging the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of high priority, the negotiations towards the adoption of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, under the dynamic chairmanship of Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, has given proof of the good will which has prevailed during the negotiations. My delegation was able to appreciate the results achieved by that Group from documents CD/CW/CRP.15 and Add.1 (revised suggestions by the Chairman for elements of a chemical weapons convention), CD/CW/WP.21 (suggestions by the Chairman of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons for elements of a chemical weapons convention) and documents CD/CW/WP.19 and 20.

The positive contribution by the Swedish delegation (document CD/142) and in particular that of the Chairman (Sweden) of that Working Group has been a determining factor in the noteworthy progress the Group has made within the framework of its mandate.

The Committee will from now on have at its disposal a substantial basic working documentation on chemical weapons.

- (4) With regard to the item on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons, General Assembly resolution 35/156 G calls upon the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Divergencies of views appeared during the discussions with respect to the definition of radiological weapons, the scope of the prohibition, the procedure for verification of compliance with the treaty, peaceful uses and the relations between the future treaty and other agreements or nuclear disarmament measures. My delegation considers that the Committee is far from achieving a compromise on this item. Further discussions appear to be needed to bring together the opposing views of the countries concerned. The Chairman of this Group should be congratulated on the patience he has shown throughout the work.

In concluding my statement with a reference to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, I should like first of all to offer Ambassador García Robles of Mexico every sympathy on behalf of my delegation in the exhausting work he has been doing in the Ad Hoc Working Group on this item. The proposals of the Group of 21 contained in documents CD/CPD/WP.36, CD/CPD/WP.36/Add.1 and CD/CPD/WP.3/Rev.1 fully reflect my country's concern that the long-term objective of the programme should be to ensure that general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated.

My delegation, anxious to preserve harmony in the work of the Committee, would suggest that the sponsors of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament (document CD/205/CD/CPD/WP.52), eloquently introduced by Ambassador Onkelinx of Belgium and Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany during the Committee's plenary meeting on 6 August, should agree to negotiate with the Group of 21 on the merging of their draft with the concrete proposals formulated by the Group of 21, to which my country belongs. In this way, the views of the two groups would together enhance the comprehensive programme of disarmament and make it a universally recognized agreement, to be implemented by all States.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Zaire for his statement and for the kind words he was good enough to address to my country.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, at this time, when the work of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament is nearing its end, disturbing reports are once again reaching us from Washington about the neutron weapon.

The new United States administration has taken the decision to embark on the full-scale manufacture of nuclear neutron weapons. In line with their notorious idea of a "limited nuclear war", official circles in the United States, side by side with activities relating to strategic weapons in Europe, are beginning implementation of project W-63, as one of the "attractive alternatives" in defence of the "national interests" of the United States of America.

The world community learned of this reckless step by Washington with profound anxiety and a feeling of indignation, and it sees it as an open challenge to peace and détente, an action flagrantly contrary to the hopes and aspirations of peoples to avert the threat of a new, nuclear war and to secure the cessation of the arms race and the achievement of effective measures in the sphere of disarmament.

Arguments about the "clean" action and the "defensive" and "humane" nature of the neutron weapon do not stand up to any criticism. They are only to justify the use of nuclear weapons and the possible conduct of a "limited nuclear war".

The arms race begun and accelerated by the United States, and particularly the development of its new neutron element, is fraught with serious consequences increasing the threat of a nuclear catastrophe. These dangerous actions not only undermine the effectiveness of the international treaties and agreements that are already in force in the sphere of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, but also create new obstacles to the achievement of agreed measures in the negotiations on disarmament questions, in the first instance in the Committee on Disarmament.

The People's Republic of Mongolia, a peace-loving State in Asia, urges the elimination of the centres of tension and conflict on this vast continent, and the prevention of a new war; it is opposed to the use of force in the relations between States and in favour of the strengthening of confidence and the development of good-neighbourly relations between all the countries of Asia. In addition, like many other States in the region, Mongolia is unswerving in its support for the maintenance of peace and security in Europe and in other regions of the world.

Mongolia therefore fully shares the profound anxiety and alarm of the peoples of the European States at the danger of the deployment of neutron weapons on the territory of the NATO countries, which could well cause an increase in tension in this region, and in other parts of the world too.

As you know, the Soviet Union has already proposed to the United States that they agree on the joint renunciation of the production of the neutron bomb. It has also unequivocally declared that it would not start producing such weapons provided others did not produce them.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries were and are in favour of the peaceful alternative. Their firm position of principle in this respect has repeatedly been stated both in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament.

The Mongolian delegation believes that an item should be included in the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the urgent initiation of negotiations on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament should begin work on an international convention, a draft of which was put forward on 14 March 1978 by a group of socialist countries and is contained in document CCD/559.

Mr. DESIMONE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation, as always, has listened very carefully to the statements made in the plenary of this Committee this morning. I refer specifically on this occasion to the statements made by the distinguished representatives of the German Democratic Republic and of Mongolia. In both those statements, detailed comments were made concerning the recently-announced decision of the United States Government concerning production of the so-called neutron bomb. Both speakers drew attention to their views concerning the relationship and the effect of that decision on various facets of the work of this Committee and on the international situation in general, based, of course, on their respective views and their respective understandings of this matter. As both speakers noted, this is not a new subject for this Committee. Therefore, I will not take the time of the Committee at this meeting to make any comment on behalf of the delegation of the United States. However, I would most certainly not wish that my silence this morning on the substance of this matter be interpreted as agreement with, or acceptance of, certain of the views expressed, as well as some of the formulations used to express them. The delegation of the United States therefore reserves its right of reply to those statements, at an early meeting, following an appropriate opportunity to carefully examine their substantive content.

Mr. KLINGLER (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman I should like through you, to thank the distinguished representative of Zaire, Ambassador Nzengya, for the remarks he made concerning the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament which has been submitted by my delegation and the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Japan and the United Kingdom. We are indeed of the view that it is essential for the speedy and successful conclusion of the negotiations which are at the moment being conducted, that the opinions of all delegations be reflected in the comprehensive programme. With this aim in mind my delegation looks forward to negotiating with States from all groups the texts to be included in that programme.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished colleagues, in accordance with the time-table for meetings of the Committee during the present week, I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting and to convene, in five minutes time, an informal meeting to begin the consideration of the draft report to the General Assembly of the United Nations contained in Working Paper No. 44. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 13 August, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.45 a.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.146
13 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 13 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. C.A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINK
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U HGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. LIN Chen

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. F.O. RODRIGUEZ

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt:

Mr. EL REEDY
Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia:

Mr. F. YOHANNES

France:

Mr. F. DE LA GORCE
Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic:

Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of:

Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary:

Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. A. LAKATOS

India:

Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia:

Mr. A. SANI
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIAK
Mr. SOEPRAPTO

Iran:

Mr. A. JALALI

Italy:

Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

Japan:

Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:Mexico:

Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:

Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco:

Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:

Mr. F.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:

Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:

Mr. M. AHMAD
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Mr. A. THORNBERRY

Poland:

Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIALOWICZ

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITA
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:

Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:

Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. U. ERICSSON
Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. N.F. CHERVOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L. SHEA
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIQUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. B. BRANKOVIC

Zaire:

Mr. G.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In conformity with its programme of work, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with the consideration of the reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as of the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members wishing to do so may make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

You will recall that, at the time of the adoption of the programme of work for the second part of the annual session of the Committee, the Chairman stated, inter alia: "It is envisaged that the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will be duly considered at a plenary meeting in August after its submission". The Ad Hoc Group completed its work on 12 August and I intend to invite its Chairman, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to introduce it in the Committee today, after we complete our list of speakers. In accordance with the statement that I just quoted, I also intend to put before the Committee for approval the report of the Group, contained in document CD/210, at our next plenary meeting, on Tuesday, 18 August.

Mr. EL REEDY (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, we are happy to see you presiding over this Committee. Although you have joined us only recently, you have extensive and profound experience in our field of work. We have all been greatly impressed by the exemplary manner in which you have been conducting our work during the past few days. Please also allow me to refer to another aspect that your chairmanship embodies; you represent the sister State of Indonesia whose people are linked to our own by ties of brotherhood and love. While launching our vibrant appeal for disarmament, let us now remember that first appeal, made at Bandung over a quarter of a century ago, which expressed the wisdom of hundreds of millions of human beings in Asia and Africa.

Your chairmanship brings to mind the spirit and the words of Bandung. Here in this Committee we urgently need to apply that spirit and to seek inspiration from those concepts.

While we are putting the final touches to the report on the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the 1981 session, it might be useful to consider the impact that the report might have when it is submitted to the General Assembly at its last regular session before the special session devoted to disarmament to be held next spring. The question that will be asked will undoubtedly be: what is the end result of our work during the current year and what have we achieved with regard to the items on the agenda?

I am certain that we will be satisfied that, from the outset, we set about our tasks without wasting too much time on procedural matters and that the working groups that we set up straight away under distinguished and experienced chairmen benefited from the serious and effective participation of all delegations.

From the substantive point of view, the report will certainly reflect not only the serious and intensive discussions that took place on the subject of chemical weapons but also the detailed and careful manner in which the Ad Hoc Working Group

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

dealt with the various aspects of that subject. We would like to pay tribute to that Ad Hoc Working Group and to its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, for the practical and scientific approach that he applied to its work. However, despite the progress achieved, we have not yet succeeded in removing the obstacles that are still impeding our efforts to attain the goal of concluding a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons under effective verification measures. There are still differences of opinion regarding the most important elements of the draft convention, especially those relating to scope of application, verification measures and international co-operation in the field of peaceful uses.

As an essential step towards the achievement of this goal, it was only natural that the mandate of the Group should be amended so as to authorize it not only to study the relevant elements but also to conduct negotiations with a view to reaching agreement, but unfortunately this did not prove possible at the current session. Consequently, despite the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group and the meetings of experts that were held, the Committee was hampered in its efforts to make real progress towards its goal.

On the other hand, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, whose work was characterized by a joint political will on the part of the two Superpowers to conclude a treaty prohibiting the use of radiological weapons, continued its endeavours this year during which it benefited from the wide experience of its distinguished Chairman, Ambassador Komives. Various States, including the group of non-aligned States to which my country belongs, participated seriously in the work of this Ad Hoc Working Group, although some of them felt that the conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons was not among the top priority items on the disarmament agenda.

In spite of all the efforts made to narrow the gap between divergent views regarding the elements of the draft treaty, we believe that further endeavours will still be required to overcome the remaining differences, especially in connection with three fundamental issues, namely: definition, the scope of the prohibition, and the peaceful uses of radioactive materials. Taking into account the flexibility shown by the Group of 21 with respect to these issues, and their readiness to enter into a dialogue regarding the specific proposals that they submitted in their working paper, we believe that there is still hope of reaching agreement if the other groups show similar flexibility and understanding of the positions adopted by the developing countries with regard to the Swedish proposal concerning the prohibition of attacks on peaceful nuclear installations. The importance of such a prohibition was highlighted by recent events since an attack on such installations could lead to the leakage and dissemination of radioactive materials, thereby causing damage the scale and effects of which would not be less than those resulting from the use of radiological and nuclear weapons.

Turning to the subject of negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States -- and I recently had occasion to commend the efforts of the Ad Hoc Working Group dealing with this topic, as well as its able Chairman, Minister Ciarrapico -- my delegation can only note with regret that we are still far from our original aim of establishing clear and specific binding legal commitments by which the nuclear-weapon States would undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

With regard to the Ad Hoc Working Group entrusted with the task of formulating a comprehensive programme of general and complete disarmament, which was fortunate to have as its Chairman our dean, Ambassador García Robles, our report will no doubt reflect the way in which this Ad Hoc Working Group has dealt with the various elements of the proposed draft programme. However, this Group still has the task of crystallizing and drafting those elements in a generally acceptable and agreed manner. At a later stage, this Group will also have to deal with the other points of divergence relating to the legal nature of the programme and the time-frame needed for its implementation. The success of the Working Group in its task will ultimately depend on the extent of our combined efforts and our flexibility. It is to be hoped that by the time the special session is convened next year we shall have a full and comprehensive document ready for submission to the General Assembly.

In our view these are the principal features of our Committee's achievements during the current year that will be reflected in our report to the United Nations General Assembly at its coming session. However, in spite of our appreciation of the efforts made, these results do not truly constitute a real achievement in the sphere of disarmament, and especially nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban, which are the first two items on our agenda. We cannot even claim to have achieved any procedural progress on these two items. Although we have made every attempt to establish the framework within which negotiations can proceed on these two issues, we have constantly encountered obstacles created by nuclear-weapon States opposed to the establishment of working groups in this connection. Having received no alternative suggestions, we were finally forced to agree to the holding of informal meetings to discuss the questions of nuclear disarmament and a nuclear test ban. Our delegation had hoped that these informal discussions would lead to a substantive dialogue through which we could identify the obstacles impeding negotiations on the two most serious matters affecting the destiny of mankind, so that we could make every possible effort to help to overcome those obstacles. However, we were not given any clear answers in this respect and the Group of 21 therefore stated its position in working papers CD/180 and CD/181. Among other questions that we put to the nuclear-weapon States in those two documents, we enquired whether those States were intending to resume their trilateral negotiations on the cessation of nuclear tests and, if so, when. Unfortunately, even this question has so far remained unanswered.

Therefore, we can only note that the Committee on Disarmament was, in fact, prevented from accomplishing its task under those two items, largely because of the absence of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to enter into negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests.

This is the picture that we will be presenting to the General Assembly just before it convenes its second special session devoted to disarmament. It is a picture that should give rise to concern and anxiety in all of us. Moreover, it should also give rise to questions regarding the consequences of the course of action of the nuclear-weapon States, consequences that will affect not only those States themselves but also mankind as a whole.

(Mr. El Reedy, Egypt)

While the Committee on Disarmament, the principal negotiating body in this field, has failed to achieve real progress, we are witnessing a constant increase in the rate of production and stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, together with an escalation in the use of outer space for military purposes, with all the serious dangers which that implies, as pointed out by Mrs. Thorsson, the head of the Swedish delegation, in her statement to the Committee on 9 July.

Concurrently, the world has recently been witnessing events which constitute serious challenges to the non-proliferation régime, a régime that we are constantly endeavouring to promote. In our view, such events should be taken into consideration by the nuclear-weapon States that have assumed specific responsibilities under this régime. It is within the framework of this régime that a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States have entered into legal commitments to renounce the acquisition of nuclear weapons and to place their peaceful nuclear installations under the international safeguards and inspection system.

We are not calling on any State to take unilateral disarmament measures or to disarm in the absence of an effective system of control and verification. However, we are urging States to enter into serious negotiations in order to control the appalling arms race that we are witnessing today, to put an end to this race through measures binding on the various parties and to proceed along the path towards disarmament, to which there is no alternative. In this context, let us recall paragraph 18 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in which all States expressed their conviction that "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation".

Consequently, as our current session is about to conclude, my delegation expresses the earnest hope that our next session will be held in an atmosphere conducive to serious and real negotiations on nuclear disarmament and the cessation of the arms race. This will require political will on the part of the Superpowers, together with political initiatives to create an appropriate political climate in which the principles of peaceful co-existence based on respect for the sovereignty of States and non-interference in their internal affairs will be strictly observed.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Egypt for his statement and for the kind reference he made to my country and myself.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman I am pleased to be able to disengage myself from other responsibilities to be present today and to have the honour of welcoming you to the Chair on behalf of the United States delegation. You have come a long distance in order to take up the important duty of guiding the Committee through the final days of the 1981 session and we will do our best to ensure that when you return to Djakarta it will be with a feeling of accomplishment. To your predecessor, about whom much has been said, all of which was well deserved, I should like to say that the style, the deep sense of involvement and the sense of humour that he brought to the chairmanship gave us at least a Venkateswaran July if not an Indian summer.

It will not have escaped the notice of members of the Committee that the United States delegation has been relatively silent during our 1981 session. Apart from my April 7 intervention and a recent brief discussion of chemical weapons last month, my delegation has spoken only when spoken to -- that is, when it has been necessary to put our position on an issue on the record. We have thought this to be an appropriate posture, given the fact that the review of United States arms control policy is still continuing. On the other hand, in the working groups, whose efforts are directed at making progress toward goals that had already been agreed on, the United States has been an active and, we believe, a constructive participant. We do not, however, wish to let our relative silence in plenary meetings be taken as acceptance of some assertions that have been made in the Committee about United States attitudes and policies concerning defence programmes and arms control negotiations -- assertions that turn the facts on their heads or distort the real situation.

The over-all thrust of United States policy has been made clear by high-level United States Government officials who have addressed the interrelated problems of security and the control of armaments in a clear and straightforward manner. In an important speech delivered in New York on 14 July, Secretary of State Haig said:

"One of the President's first acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, the better to learn the lessons of the past in the hope of achieving more lasting progress for the future. Two fundamental conclusions have emerged from this review:

First, the search for sound arms control agreements should be an essential element of our programme for achieving and maintaining peace.

Second, such agreements can be reached if negotiations among adversaries about their national security interests are not dominated by pious hopes and simplistic solutions."

The Secretary of State went on to say that the United States has a broad agenda of specific arms control efforts and negotiations already under way or about to be launched. The charge that the United States is not interested in arms control or that we have cut off communications with the Soviet Union is simply not true, he said. He concluded with these words,

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

"It is one of the paradoxes of our time that the prospects for arms control depend upon the achievement of a balance of arms. We seek to negotiate a balance at less dangerous levels but meanwhile we must maintain our strength. Let us take to heart John F. Kennedy's reminder that negotiations are not a substitute for strength -- they are an instrument for the translation of strength into survival and peace."

The current United States approach to the control of nuclear armaments is strongly influenced by historical developments over the past decade or so which have caused the NATO alliance to take steps to respond to a Soviet military build-up that is continuing relentlessly. Some have suggested that the Western alliance has over-reacted -- that the Soviet build-up of nuclear weapons is merely for the sake of maintaining parity and that in any event the weapons targeted against Europe -- or the United States for that matter -- are defensive, and simply for deterrence, or that the threat posed by nuclear weapons is rhetorical rather than real. We wish that were so. The Soviet build-up, however, has exceeded the level of force needed simply for deterrence.

Let me dwell for a moment on the question of nuclear strategy. Several interventions in this Committee during the past months have alluded to United States doctrines that purportedly make nuclear war "more thinkable" or suggest that United States planning is based on an assumption that a limited nuclear war is winnable. That is not the case; the goal of United States strategic policy is to convince potential adversaries that they could not win or profit from any level of nuclear conflict and thus to deter them from starting one.

What about Soviet doctrine? While my delegation and others have noted on previous occasions that the closed nature of the Soviet society does not allow us the privilege of following closely the strategic debate within that country, we do have a few insights into Soviet military doctrine from authoritative sources, and what they reveal is not reassuring. Since the 1960s, Soviet doctrine has stressed the vital role of nuclear arms in any large-scale conflict. The publication, Soviet Military Strategy, by an authors' collective headed by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, first published in 1962, and revised in 1964 and 1968, assumes that any major war will be fought with nuclear weapons. A sample quotation:

"The basic means for armed combat in land theatres in a future world war will be the nuclear weapon used primarily with operational-tactical missiles, and also frontal aviation (bombers, fighter bombers, and fighters).

In addition, the strategic rocket troops and long-range aviation will deliver nuclear strikes against important objectives in the zone of the offensive fronts ... On the battle-fields the decisive role will be played by the firing of nuclear weapons. The other means of armed combat will utilize the results of nuclear attacks for the final defeat of the enemy."

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

A 1971 publication, The Officers' Handbook, edited by Major-General S.N. Kozlov, sets out the role of nuclear weapons in unvarnished terms:

"Soviet military doctrine allocates the decisive role in contemporary war to nuclear missile weapons. At the same time it considers that along with the nuclear missile strikes of a strategic and operational-tactical character, the armed forces will employ conventional armament."

It is not often that we are able to get such insights into Soviet thinking about nuclear war, but what we see in the way of the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons is entirely consistent with what we have been able to read. And, just recently, in the May 1981 issue of Kommunist, the Soviet Communist party's principal periodical, Lieutenant-General P. Shilin denies that war changes its nature with the advent of mass destruction weapons. He rejects the argument that the Marxist-Leninist theory of "just" and "unjust" wars no longer applies because of the alleged immorality of any use of nuclear weapons.

Is there any wonder that after years of marking time the United States and its allies feel compelled to redress the nuclear balance? Moreover, the United States on behalf of the Western allies offered and has subsequently reconfirmed our willingness to negotiate reductions in European theatre nuclear forces.

It has been argued that a rough nuclear balance between East and West existed in 1964; others believe a balance was achieved some time later. But whether parity was achieved in 1964 or 1974, there is no evidence to support the Soviet claim that recent heavy increases in their military spending and deployment of weapons have been undertaken in response to Western provocations. How can the deployment of SS-20's which began in the mid-1970s possibly be construed as a response to a NATO decision that was taken in December 1979 about deployments projected for 1983 and beyond?

Let us quickly review the record. In the last decade or so, the United States took the following actions: (1) it introduced a moratorium on the production of chemical weapons beginning in 1969; (2) it stopped entirely the production of biological weapons and destroyed all stocks some five years before the BW Convention went into force in 1975; (3) it cancelled production of the B-1 bomber, (4) it reduced the Trident submarine programme. In that period the number of United States ICBM launchers remained constant. Defence spending in real dollar terms, after removing the effects of inflation, was on a downward slope and only regained the 1964 level this year, in 1981. In contrast, over the same period from 1960 until today, the Soviet Union increased defence spending (after removing the effects of inflation), each and every year by 4 or 5 per cent. Regardless of bilateral SALT negotiations, regardless of what went on in the United Nations or in this Committee, regardless of Moscow's high-sounding rhetoric about peace and disarmament, the USSR increased its military spending to the point where the resources it devotes to arms is double what it was in 1960 while the United States effort is at this moment very nearly what it was twenty years ago.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

One other unilateral action which the United States took in recent years also had no effect on the steady Soviet build-up. It was the 1978 decision not to proceed with the manufacture and deployment of the enhanced radiation reduced-blast weapon which the Soviet delegation and others have referred to as the "neutron bomb". Yes, there was a response to this action by the Soviet Union, but unfortunately that response lay entirely in the realm of propaganda. There was no slowdown in the output of the Soviet war machine, not in tanks, not in airplanes, not in missiles, large or small. Now that the United States has decided to manufacture and stockpile the enhanced radiation weapon we hear the same outcry, the same distortions of fact from Eastern spokesmen. They speak as though the enhanced radiation weapon is designed to annihilate population whereas in fact it is pre-eminently an anti-tank device. The enhanced radiation weapons, if they ever had to be used, which we pray will never happen, would be more effective and do less unintended damage to civilian populations than the weapons they replace.

Indeed, most of the nuclear weapons in the Soviet arsenal are far more massive and indiscriminate than the enhanced radiation weapon. We have heard the Soviet representative and some others speak of the inhumanity and barbarity of the "neutron bomb". But I fear that we would wait in vain to hear them speak of the inhumanity and barbarity of Soviet nuclear weapons, thousands of times more powerful, which are suitable for hitting cities, not tanks.

In some of the statements that have been made concerning the enhanced radiation weapon, the argument has been advanced that somehow its deployment would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war. The United States rejects this argument categorically. The United States rejects this argument categorically.

The enhanced radiation warhead is still a nuclear weapon, and the decision to use it to defend United States forces of territory, or to defend the forces or territory of our allies, would be no easier to make than the decision to use any other nuclear weapon. That decision would remain the most agonizing one a political leader could face. The possibility of indiscriminately destructive responses from the other side would remain high, as would the potential for nuclear escalation. Here again, the enhanced radiation weapons are designed not to make nuclear war more thinkable, but to make aggression less so.

The declaration of the 26th Party Congress, which the Soviet delegation has been good enough to circulate for us and of which it frequently reminds us, gives one version of Soviet intentions in the area of defence and arms limitations. But far more persuasive are the facts of increasing Soviet capability in terms of strategic nuclear, theatre nuclear and conventional forces. The specifics of the recent increase in Soviet nuclear capabilities -- the SS-20, the SS-18 ICBM and increasing Soviet power projection forces are already familiar to you and were discussed in my 7 April statement. The reality of these armaments has forced the West to react.

(Mr. Flowerrec, United States)

We wish that it had not been so -- that the Western nations could have continued to hold steady or cut back their defence expenditures in the interest of the economy and the welfare of their people, and that the Soviet Union would have exercised some restraint in the development of its military forces. We shared that wish with one political figure who was in an exceptional position to evaluate the increasing military thrust of Soviet policy, Nikita Khrushchev. In his memoirs, published in 1971, Mr. Khrushchev wrote,

"But from my position as pensioner, I can't help noticing that the economizing trend we started seems to have been reversed, that now money is being wasted on unnecessary items and categories, and that this new trend of military overspending is putting a pinch on some of the more important, but still underfinanced, areas of our country's life."

It is not only in the West that the build-up of Soviet military forces casts an ominous shadow. Writing in Kommunist in May 1972, General A.A. Yepishev said:

"In the present era, which is characterized by a strengthening of the positions of socialism and by sharp antagonism between the two social systems, a deepening of the external function of the Soviet armed forces has logically taken place."

We are seeing that "external function" of the Soviet armed forces in operation at this very moment as the brutal repression in Afghanistan continues. And, like it or not, this action has had a profound impact on the climate for arms control negotiations in the United States.

Earlier this year, we had in this Committee a wide-ranging debate on deterrence. Many countries expressed and continue to express the view that deterrence is an abhorrent doctrine. But many nations and groups of nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, practice it, including even neutral countries like our host country of Switzerland, where nearly 20 per cent of the federal budget is devoted to national defence. In the case of Switzerland, a combination of astute policy and rugged defence forces has spared the country from invasion for 500 years. Deterrence has its virtues, but it is naive to hope that it can continue to serve indefinitely into the future. We would all prefer to live in a world in which that doctrine and the military forces which support it were unnecessary. Nevertheless, with the best of will on all sides, arms and the impulses which cause nations to use them are not likely to be brought fully under control in the near future.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

The tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence, among other things, may be satisfying to the psyche, but it doesn't get us anywhere. Moral rectitude is not the exclusive property of any nation or group of nations. In fact, it cannot be truthfully claimed by any of us as nations. In citing the reasons why the Western alliance believes it must now gird up its loins, I am not attributing any particular virtue to that decision, just common sense. Nations first came into being out of a necessity for a group of people sharing the same territory, interests and beliefs to protect themselves against those with incompatible objectives. In the nation-State system that exists in the world today, the first duty of Governments towards their citizens is protection. Some non-aligned States, for what they consider good and sufficient reasons, devote a greater percentage of their national budgets to defence than does the United States. Progress toward disarmament can be helped if we accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be.

The United States does not believe that the Soviet Union's military build-up is justified, but we don't think for a minute that merely telling them so is going to stop that build-up. That famous quality, "political will", about which we hear so much in this forum is not going to be produced by waving a magic wand. Nations are induced to do things they normally do not want to do by various forms of leverage and demonstrations of mutual advantage. Some seem to assume that we in the United States enjoy putting so much of our resources into national defence instead of more productive domestic uses. To shapers of budgets, who in my country must be responsible to the will of the electorate, an increase in military spending is a painful business. For more than a decade the United States sought to trim the military budget. It took incontrovertible evidence that our security was in danger of slipping away to cause us to make the extra effort that is going into our current defence programmes.

Misconceptions abound even concerning the nature of those programmes. Speakers go on about the mad build-up in nuclear armaments as though every notion that had ever been mentioned in Aviation Week was about to spring to life as a full-blown military system. The fact is that our current increase in military programmes is far more heavily weighted on the side of conventional forces than on that of nuclear forces, which in any case are not projected for immediate deployment.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

I have pulled no punches in giving this assessment of how things look from the United States point of view. I hope it will be taken in the spirit in which it was offered -- as an attempt to present honestly the way we see things, not to stir up controversy, although I am aware that there are other delegations here who may be itching to take exception to what I have said. However, we should be able to be frank with each other in this Committee without stirring up enmities. We cannot afford to behave otherwise.

I have been dealing with the broad aspects of the factors that shape current United States arms control policies. The specific elements are in the process of being shaped now. The Presidential statement on non-proliferation policy that was distributed as Committee document CD/202 is the first of the specific elements of our over-all arms control policies to be fully elaborated. United States views on a timetable for the initiation of United States-Soviet negotiations on European theatre nuclear weapons were precisely spelled out in Secretary Haig's speech on 14 July to which I referred earlier. President Reagan, in an interview on 4 August, mentioned the many exchanges on this subject that have taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union and went on to say that the United States is willing to move on to the larger area of strategic arms reductions, not just limitations.

In closing, I must stress the necessity for a sense of realism in our work. People of noble intentions have tried before and failed in their efforts to create peace through international agreements on arms and armed forces. The Washington Naval Disarmament Conference of 1922 placed limitations on the tonnages of warships. The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1929 was intended to outlaw war. But these and other high-minded efforts of the era were swept away by the winds of war.

The root causes of war and international tension were left untouched by the diplomatic efforts of our predecessors. If we are to be more successful than they, we must build our arms control efforts on a foundation that takes full account of the interaction between the causes of tension and the accretion of armaments. To do less would be to risk a bitter re-enactment of the past.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United States for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. VOUTOV (Bulgaria): Mr. Chairman, I would like to make today a brief statement concerning the most burning questions of our time, that is, the continued nuclear arms race and the urgent necessity to take decisive and concrete steps in controlling and reversing it.

Before doing so however, Mr. Chairman, I would like to congratulate you on your assumption of the chairmanship of the Committee during this important period of the annual session. My delegation is sure that under your able guidance we shall successfully conclude the 1981 session. At the same time, I should not fail to note the energy, ability and contribution to the successful work of the Committee of your predecessor, the distinguished Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, who presided over the Committee during one of the most difficult months of this session.

It is with growing concern that we perceive the beginning of yet another stage in the deadly upward spiral of the nuclear arms race. On behalf of my people, with deep pains in my heart, I would like to say that we deplore the fact that the United States Government started, "some two weeks ago", the production of nuclear neutron weapons. We cannot accept the idea that the world should be made hostage to the fierce competition between the American nuclear weapon laboratories pushing through their horrible inventions, the latest one being the "cost-effective", "clean" and so on neutron weapon. With the usual openness of our delegation we believe this to be a short-sighted and dangerous decision, a fallout from the greatest war hysteria after the second world war and the quest for unchallenged military supremacy over the world.

Many delegations in this Committee have commented on the nature and the consequences of the deployment of nuclear neutron weapons. To my delegation it seems that the neutron weapons come to underline once again the fact that the proponents of the crazy idea of "limited nuclear war" are still having the upper hand in the leading Western power. They come to underline once again that in the United States strategy Europe is regarded as an "expendable item", to use this interesting American expression.

Permit me to quote a leading American military man, General Brown, who, explaining why the United States wishes to establish strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, stated while presenting the "Military Posture for 1979":

"This means that the territorial integrity must be assured and that an international environment must be maintained in which United States interests and United States freedom of action are ensured."

Does that not sound like a military policy with clearly imperial overtones?

Against this gloomy background, may I inform the Committee that during the recent meeting of the Presidents of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Comrades Todor Zhivkov and Leonid Brezhnev, the two leaders expressed the opinion that the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions of Europe, including the Balkans, could contribute to the reduction of tensions. The Politbureau of the Bulgarian Communist Party, the Bulgarian Government and the Bulgarian people welcomed this initiative. There is no doubt that the idea will evoke wide and positive reactions not only in the Balkans but throughout Europe as well.

(Mr. Voutov, Bulgaria)

This annual session of the Committee has demonstrated in a clear-cut way that we cannot circumvent the issues relating to nuclear weapons. We have spent another year without much tangible result, accepting willy-nilly the "absence of instruction" of the United States delegation. Let us hope that the views of the overwhelming majority of the States members of this Committee, which have appealed repeatedly for the commencement of meaningful multilateral negotiations on items 1 and 2 of the agenda, will not be lost on the United States leadership. In this connection, I would like to remind the Committee of the initiative of the socialist countries contained in document CD/200, namely, the urgent necessity of creating a sub-committee on nuclear weapons questions.

As to the neutron weapons, the developments around them require our close attention. We support the idea of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic for reintroduction in the Committee of the draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. In this connection, the Bulgarian delegation would like to make the following proposal.

At the beginning of the next annual session, in 1982, the Committee should consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons, taking as a basis the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries and contained in document CCD/559.

In conclusion, I would like to quote from an important political statement of the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and General Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Todor Zhivkov, entitled, "The borderline between the two decades, between the seventies and the eighties, should not be a borderline between détente and confrontation". Copies of the speech have been distributed to all the delegations in the Committee. I quote: "Two social systems co-exist today in the world, competing with each other as to which of them will ensure better conditions for the development of society and man, of man's way of life. But the cardinal problem now, in the current troubled hour of the history of mankind, is to safeguard peace as a primary condition and a prerequisite for all peoples' social progress. This is the real problem; this is the highly ethical, complicated and difficult but feasible political goal. It is exactly this credo that meets the needs of all peoples, and of each and every person on Earth - to ensure social progress in conditions of lasting peace."

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Bulgaria for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Disarmament will be concluding its work in a few days, but there will still be time for an evaluation of the work done this year. What we should like to do today, in a brief statement, is to touch on issues raised by a number of delegations at recent meetings, including our meeting today. There has been discussion here, broadly speaking, on the effect of the international climate, the international situation, on negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament. Some delegations have said that certain developments in the international arena hinder the reaching of agreements in the field of disarmament, while others, as one speaker did on 6 August, have called upon the Committee not to assume a position, as he called it, of "privileged isolation".

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The Soviet delegation itself has more than once stated that the absence of political will on the part of certain States members of the Committee hampers the negotiations on various important disarmament issues such as, for instance, the limitation of the nuclear arms race. We have drawn attention to the fact that decisions aimed at the development of new types of weapons, both conventional and nuclear, cannot but complicate disarmament negotiations. The intensified military co-operation between certain nuclear-weapon Powers, particularly noticeable of late, and directed against the Soviet Union and its allies, also diminishes the prospects of reaching agreements in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race. The nuclear-weapon Powers in question should realize this. Aggressive actions such as the Israeli attack on the nuclear reactor near Baghdad, which was strongly condemned by many delegations in the Committee, undermine the international disarmament agreements now in force.

All these issues have been repeatedly raised in the Committee, and it would therefore be unjust to say that the Committee has assumed a position of "privileged isolation". Evidence of the lively reaction in the Committee to any steps which run counter to the lofty ideals of the strengthening of peace and disarmament may be found in the statements of the representatives of the German Democratic Republic, the Mongolian People's Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, at the last meeting and the present one, in which they rightly observed that the decision taken by the Government of the United States concerning the production of neutron weapons represents a serious challenge to the cause of disarmament.

We all well remember how in 1978 the powerful campaign of protest launched by the anti-war forces made President Carter stop the implementation of plans for the deployment of neutron weapons in western Europe and to defer their production for an indefinite period of time. Today it is clear that the so-called "deferment" of the production of neutron weapons which was much publicized at that time in no way impeded the course of the preparations for the creation of this abominable weapon. We know that the Capitol provided generous appropriations to finance this work. As early as 17 December of last year, the Congress passed an appropriations bill in which it directed the Department of Energy to ensure the production of all the components for this weapon and to supply the necessary nuclear materials. Now the new nuclear bomb is on the assembly line, and the Pentagon has added it to its nuclear arsenal.

The shadow of the neutron bomb is again hanging over densely populated Europe. As was recognized by the United States Secretary of Defense, intensive consultations are now being held in NATO offices with a view to securing the consent of the West European members of NATO to the deployment of neutron weapons on their territories. It is difficult to find any justification for such actions. The only thing that can be said with complete certainty is that the practical steps taken by the United States Administration towards the production of neutron weapons are objectively increasing the threat of a new qualitative leap in the arms race, are increasing the danger of war and are gravely complicating the work of the international organizations in solving the disarmament problem.

In his statement today the representative of the United States tried to convince us that the neutron weapon is comparatively harmless and that its use would significantly reduce losses among the civilian population. This weapon, he claimed,

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

would increase the capacity of NATO to withstand the alleged "Soviet military threat", and is a reliable means of combating Russian tanks. Nothing of this corresponds to the reality. It was evidently intended for those who are not very well informed about the substance of the matter. The neutron weapon is first and foremost a nuclear weapon. Its lethality from the blast wave is approximately the same as in the case of other nuclear weapons, but in addition it has a powerful penetrating radiation capacity for which there is no comparison. The civilian population will not be protected from this penetrating radiation even in deep concrete shelters. Consequently the neutron weapon can in fact only be called "humane" as regards buildings. It has also been said here that the neutron weapon would help to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war. I do not have to hand all the various sources that would refute this argument, but even in today's edition of the International Herald Tribune there is a short quotation from the English newspaper, the Guardian, which affirms the contrary. It says the following:

"It is a fiction to say that the neutron bomb will not be deployed in Europe: it is useless anywhere else. This is a battlefield weapon par excellence. Whatever its value in deterrence theory it virtually promises nuclear response to a conventional attack, but on a scale small enough to ensure that continental United States and continental Russia could, if they so agree, stay out of it.

The contingency of a Soviet attack, or the threat of one, is still sufficiently remote, in many a European view, not to need an emotionally charged new weapon to guard against it. The introduction of such a weapon makes the U.S. assessment of the contingency appear more immediate than the European. And if that is the U.S. assessment, then Europeans may believe that what is intended to forestall might in the event provoke.

NATO has 6,000 nuclear warheads already in Europe. To say that they are not enough, as Mr. Weinberger now says, is to fear the worst. And to fear the worst is to expect that it will happen."

Of course we do not agree with everything that is said in this short article; I simply wanted to draw your attention to the fact that to claim that the neutron weapon will prevent the possibility of the outbreak of nuclear war is completely false.

I should now like to turn to another question. We would not wish to leave without comment the attempts that have been made to distort the meaning of certain decisions that have a great impact on the disarmament negotiations. I shall also try to some extent to answer the statement made by the representative of the United States.

In his statement of 6 August, Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany said that the decision taken by the NATO Council, at its December 1979 meeting, on the additional deployment in a number of west European countries of nearly 600 new American nuclear missiles was aimed at the stabilization of the military balance between East and West, and would not increase the total number of nuclear weapons in Europe. The actual position in this matter is quite different. I shall, as usual, quote facts and figures. What are these facts?

In Europe there has already for some years been an approximate equality in the number of medium-range nuclear weapons of NATO and the Soviet Union. There are about 1,000 delivery vehicles on each side. What do these 1,000 items consist of on the NATO side? They include United States forward-based nuclear systems, that is, nuclear-weapon-carrying aircraft stationed at air bases in a number of west European countries; FB-111 medium-range bombers, and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons (A-6 and

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

A-7) aboard United States aircraft-carriers -- a total of over 700 units. There are also the land-based medium-range ballistic missiles, missile-carrying submarines and the bombers of the United States' allies, amounting in all to about 300 delivery vehicles.

When Ambassador Ruth spoke about the disequilibrium to the detriment of the West in the field of medium-range missiles, he for some reason did not say a word about the United States forward-based nuclear systems and the medium-range systems of its allies. But can one really ignore all these systems? Of course not. In fact, they have a range of from 1,000 to 4,500 kilometres, and they present a very real threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.

The NATO armaments mentioned above have undergone several modernizations and the process of their improvement is continuing at the present time. What evidence is there of this? I will give it to you. The United Kingdom, for example, is equipping its submarines with the sophisticated "Polaris A-3 TK" missiles, and "Trident" missiles are in prospect. In France the land-based and sea-based single warhead missiles will be replaced by missiles with seven warheads. The United States forward-based systems are also being replaced by new ones.

In these circumstances it could hardly be expected that the USSR would stop improving its armaments. We are doing the same thing. This is only natural because weapons and technology become obsolete. However -- and I should like to stress this -- in the process of renewing its weaponry the Soviet Union, for the sake of maintaining parity, does not increase by a single item the total level of Soviet medium-range delivery systems in Europe. The number of missile launchers is even decreasing since for every new missile that appears in the USSR one and sometimes even two older missiles are immediately removed; they are dismantled and are not deployed in other areas.

However, with the deployment in Europe of about 600 new United States medium-range nuclear missiles, NATO will have a more than 1.5 times superiority in nuclear delivery vehicles. As for nuclear warheads, even now the NATO medium-range vehicles can carry in one launch (sortie) one and a half times as many as the corresponding systems of the USSR. After Europe's "additional armament", the NATO superiority in nuclear warheads in one launch (sortie) will further increase. As a result, the present rough equality in the nuclear weaponry of the two sides in Europe will be substantially tilted in NATO's favour.

The representative of the Federal Republic of Germany said in his statement that the United States had withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe and therefore, he argued, the deployment of new United States missiles would not result in an increase in nuclear weapons in Europe. Such arguments used to justify the December decision of NATO do not stand up to criticism. The fact is that the relationship between the nuclear forces of the two sides should be determined not by the number of warheads stored in depots but in the first instance by the number of delivery vehicles and the quantity of nuclear charges lifted by these delivery vehicles in one launch (sortie). Consequently, the withdrawal from Europe of obsolete nuclear mines and fougasses kept in stores can in no way be used as a cover to conceal NATO's attempt to disrupt the nuclear balance in its favour.

To the question whether the NATO decision of December 1979 on the "additional armament" of Europe can be viewed as a factor stabilizing the East-West military balance, even a layman in military matters will give a negative answer. The Soviet evaluation of the NATO December decision on the "additional armament" of Europe is unequivocal: it will result in an arms race, the disruption of the military balance in Europe and between the USSR and the United States, and the destabilization of the situation in the world.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

The leader of our State, L.I. Brezhnev, has repeatedly stated that the USSR and other socialist countries will not allow any military supremacy to be established over them. In the long run, the equilibrium will be maintained, but at a higher level, as a result of which international security will not increase but decrease.

The only reliable way to resolve this problem lies not in the NATO "missile solution" but in the maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance between the USSR and the United States, between the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO, which objectively serves to safeguard peace on our planet.

I should now like to say a few words about the statement made at today's meeting by the United States representative, Ambassador Flowerree. We have already replied to some of the points he raised. I should like to make a more general comment. Ambassador Flowerree rightly mentioned that the United States delegation has rarely taken the floor this year -- only two or three times in all. That is why many of us awaited with interest a statement by the United States delegation, having heard it say more than once that it had difficulty in taking part in the discussion because it had no instructions on specific items on our Committee's agenda. Of course many of us expected that today the United States delegation would at last tell us that it was ready to conduct negotiations on item 1 of the agenda, the question of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It was expected that it would also say "yes" on the second item of the agenda and say it was ready to conduct negotiations on the question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It was expected, too, that it would adopt a positive attitude on item 5 of the agenda, that is, that it would not stand in the way of the Committee's engaging in negotiations on the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Finally many, of course, expected the United States delegation to say that it was willing to proceed to a revision of the mandate under agenda item 4 -- the prohibition of chemical weapons -- and that it would adopt a more active attitude on item 3 -- the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

This, however, did not happen. The "no" which we had heard throughout the whole year rang out clearly again today. Nothing positive! Instead, we have heard a whole set of misstatements about and distortions of the Soviet Union's position of a kind of which, to be frank, we are thoroughly tired by now, with references to some very dubious sources and various obscure publications printed in the United States of America which, of course, hardly deserve to be invoked in a serious discussion. But I should not like to be drawn into an argument at this stage. I do not think that this was the purpose for which the Committee on Disarmament was established. What I should like is that the slight signs of a more positive attitude that were in evidence at the end of the American delegation's statement should receive specific confirmation, that the systematic "no" should be replaced by positive replies that would open up possibilities of conducting business-like negotiations, and, lastly, that a positive reply should be given to the numerous proposals and appeals addressed by the leadership of the Soviet Union to the United States of America concerning the resumption of the dialogue on a wide range of questions relating to the limitation of the arms race on the basis of principles of honesty and equality, with respect for the interests of the security of both parties and with non-impairment of their interests.

All the various attempts to lay the blame for the deadlock which has occurred in the different disarmament negotiations on the Soviet Union are doomed to failure. The Soviet Union has shown in fact that it is interested in progress being achieved in the negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament.

U SAW HLAING (Burma): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor today in order to present formally to the Committee in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21 a working paper on the chapter entitled "Principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. Before doing so, may I take this opportunity to express, on behalf of my delegation, my deep gratification and satisfaction to see you presiding over the Committee on Disarmament at this final and crucial stage of its session.

I am sure that your wisdom and rich diplomatic experience and skill will bring a fruitful and speedy conclusion to the third annual session of the Committee. I would also like to add my voice of thanks and appreciation for the invaluable contribution made by Ambassador Venkateswaran of India to the work of the Committee last month.

Allow me now to speak in my capacity as the Co-ordinator of the Group of 21, on whose behalf I would like to present to the Committee on Disarmament a working paper which is already circulated as document CD/208, on the chapter entitled "principles" of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

As is stated in paragraph 10 of the 1980 report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which was incorporated in paragraph 68 of the report submitted by the Committee on Disarmament to the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session (CD/139), it has been expressly agreed that "since the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained, it should encompass in extenso all the principles that are thought to be relevant, including even those that are not to be found in the Final Document but which may be found appropriate".

Bearing in mind this decision, the Ad Hoc Working Group, during its 1981 session, has provisionally approved on the basis of a first reading the "principles" compiled by the Secretariat in working paper 29 of 16 April 1981, following the two objective criteria defined in the introduction to the document. In addition to those "principles" which have all been reproduced from the Final Document, the Working Group has also approved two which originated in proposals submitted by delegations.

It seems appropriate to note that the term "principles" as used both in the Secretariat compilation and in the present working paper, should be understood -- as it also was in the Final Document -- in a broad sense. If a more strictly accurate definition were desired, the term "principles and guidelines" would be preferable.

In view of what has just been stated, as well as of the tentative nature of the approval given by the Ad Hoc Working Group to these texts, it is obvious that both the Working Group and the Committee are entitled to reformulate the "principles" where they deem it necessary or to incorporate additional formulations which may be proposed and agreed upon.

The Group of 21 feels, nevertheless, that the material already approved on first reading by the Working Group, in spite of its provisional character and of the fact that it remains subject to whatever modifications may be found advisable, is already sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially be the contents of the chapter which under the title of "Principles" or "Principles and Guidelines" would form an integral part of the comprehensive programme of disarmament. It is for this reason that the Group has concluded that it would be useful to submit to the Working Group and to the Committee the present working paper before the 1981 session comes to an end.

(U Saw Hlaing, Burma)

Finally, it should be pointed out that, although in all the texts incorporated in this working paper their substance has been scrupulously respected, on some very few occasions minor modifications of form have been made. It should likewise be mentioned that the order followed in the enunciation of the "principles" is that which has been considered the most logical and appropriate and does not correspond to the order followed in working paper 29. As a last observation, it would be wise to bear in mind that in several instances there exist repetitions which can no doubt be eliminated without difficulty at a later stage.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Burma for his statement and for the reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation would like first of all to offer you its congratulations and best wishes. You have the onerous task of bringing the work of this session to a close. We should like to compliment you on the skill and competence with which you are doing so.

I should also like once again to express to your predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran, our appreciation of the exceptional qualities he showed in that office. We were all impressed by his talent, his courtesy and his humour.

The French delegation has listened very carefully to what has been said at this meeting and the preceding one on the subject of the enhanced radiation weapon. The French Government has reserved its options as regards this weapon. It seems to me therefore that it would be useful for me to restate the reasoning behind its attitude in this matter.

In the first place, France is concerned to maintain the conditions of its security and the independence of its defence. It is from this angle that it has considered and will continue to consider the scientific, technical and military means which may seem to it to be necessary to achieve this end. In the circumstances at present prevailing in Europe, a deterrence resting on the maintenance or restoration of a global balance determines security and hence peace on our continent.

With reference to the statements we have heard and some of the proposals that have been made, I should like to stress that the enhanced radiation weapon is a nuclear weapon based on the same physical principles as all other nuclear weapons. The only difference lies in the way the effects common to all nuclear explosions are distributed. While the radiation effect is greater, the blast effect is smaller; hence the difference in ideas about the use of this weapon which, as everyone knows, is essentially defensive.

In view of its nature, this weapon falls within the general category of problems connected with the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. There is no reason for giving it special treatment or, therefore, for making specific provision with respect to it in treaty form.

Lastly, I should like to reply to our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union on a point in his statement which casts doubt upon a fundamental position of the French Government. In the comparison he made between the forces of the NATO countries and those of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, Ambassador Issraelyan mentioned the systems of the United States' allies and he referred in this connection to the process of modernization of France's forces that is at present under way. My delegation cannot pass over in silence this inclusion of French forces. France's forces are independent, and they constitute a strategic system. We cannot therefore accept a reference to them as NATO medium-range forces.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, it is my intention formally to introduce working document CD/210 which has been distributed, but I think that I would be remiss, since this is the first time I am taking the floor this month, if I did not also congratulate you on your assumption of that office, wish you well in the performance of your task here and assure you of the co-operation of my delegation. We are entirely aware of the difficulties of leading this body during the final month of its session, but I am confident that you will do it in a successful way. At the same time, I should like to pay tribute to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India, for the excellence he showed in his chairmanship of the Committee in the month of July, which became a good and truly productive month for this Committee, not least thanks to his leadership.

So, then, I would like now formally to introduce the twelfth progress report to the Committee on Disarmament of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. I have been informed that the experts have continued their excellent co-operation and that they have been exploring the matter in depth. We suggest that their next meeting should take place from 1 to 12 March 1982. The report does not say when a formal report will be forthcoming but we should note the plan to provide this Committee with an extended progress report in early 1982, as a contribution to the Committee's own report to the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Mr. Chairman, you have already announced that you will ask the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Experts Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to answer questions and maybe in some detail explain the report.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Sweden for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair. May I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, Dr. Ulf Ericsson, to speak on the report contained in document CD/210 which has been introduced by our colleague from Sweden.

Mr. ERICSSON (Sweden): Document CD/210, before you, has the same format as a number of progress reports which have been presented to the Committee. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events operates now under a mandate given to it on 7 August 1979 and its developing results were reported upon earlier in the reports in documents CCD/558 of 1978 and CD/43 of 1979. As the Ambassador of Sweden has already mentioned, the experts enjoyed excellent co-operation among themselves. The recent session lasted two weeks and engaged experts and representatives from 20 countries, and during the present mandate more than 100 working documents were submitted for consideration. The work has been organized in five directions. The first one is to consider all seismological stations and station networks in greater detail, to assist in the monitoring of underground nuclear testing. Secondly, there

(Mr. Ericsson, Sweden)

is a group looking at exactly how these measurements should be taken out of the earth and transmitted on. Thirdly, there is a group looking at the transmission of data around the globe, and here we enjoy the co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization, because it has been proposed, and they have also in principle accepted the idea, that their network of telecommunications lines would be used. Fourthly, we have the transmission of more extensive measurements, large bunches of data; and the fifth item is exactly how the envisaged computerized data centres should operate and how they should be designed and structured. The Group has been busy doing a number of national, unilateral studies on these matters which are presented to the whole Group and then discussed. They are also providing drafts towards a formal report to this body. It might also be of interest to you to know that the recent development of readily available computers and associated equipment for telecommunication facilities with low prices and high performance is of very great relevance to what the experts are doing when reviewing the organization proposed a number of years ago. In their development of the scientific and technical details of this system they are, I think, making great efforts to take into account how these modern developments might be exploited. The development there is so fast that the cake changes flavour while you are eating it.

Another development of some interest is a series of experimental tests of this global transmission of data, which is very much a question of co-operation with WMO, which is very good, as well as of co-operation between States. We have repeatedly stated, in this context, that it would be advantageous to extend our co-operation into the southern hemisphere, and here I am happy to say that we were very glad to receive information that scientists in Peru will join us in making such tests of the global system. I should also mention that several national research units are developing the subject of international data centres, where great advances have been made but where quite a lot of work still remains. This therefore means that the experts do not see clearly when they will be able to deliver a formal report under the present mandate. The report before you says during the second part of the 1982 session of the Committee on Disarmament or later. Under the circumstances, however, the Group intends to place before you an extended progress report which might assist the Committee in reporting to the United Nations General Assembly and its Secretary-General, in view of the special session of the Assembly on disarmament.

The Group this time also explicitly considered what might be done in the future, beyond the immediate present concerns, and on page 3 of the report you have a few of these items. One of them, which is very fascinating, is the use of seismographs and other instruments on the ocean bottom to improve coverage of the southern hemisphere, which as you know, is covered mostly by the ocean. There are recent developments and experiences which make this option appear more and more realistic. Then there are the items widespread digital recording, automation of the extraction of parameters from instruments and automated processing; these are reflections of the developments in computers. Finally, there is a purely seismological item -- methods to accommodate the reporting of large earthquake sequences. This is another view of what is going on, and I wish to end by repeating that the Group suggests that its next session should be convened between 1 and 12 March next year here in Geneva.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts for his statement. As I said at the beginning of this meeting, we will consider the report at our plenary meeting next Tuesday. However, if there are any delegations wishing to comment at this stage they can do so.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): I do want to thank the Expert Group and its Chairman, and to comment on the report but would be quite happy to do so at our next plenary meeting.

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): I would also be very glad to follow the example of Ambassador Walker of Australia.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished colleagues, the Secretariat has circulated today, at my request, an informal paper containing the time-table for meetings to be held by the Committee on Disarmament and its subsidiary bodies during the week of 17 to 21 August. Provision is made for meetings of subsidiary bodies on Monday and I hope that no activities of Working Groups will go beyond that day; otherwise we would have to have night meetings and Saturday meetings. We would start discussing the last additions to the report of the Committee on Tuesday afternoon and I hope that the consideration of the draft report will be concluded by Wednesday afternoon, since the Secretariat will need some time to produce a consolidated text of the draft report for adoption on Friday morning. If we are not able to conclude on Wednesday afternoon, we can still use Thursday morning, on the understanding that the last plenary meeting for adoption of the report will then be held on Friday afternoon.

In connection with the time-table, may I also note that Working Paper No. 44/Add.1 has been circulated today. That working paper contains the draft concluding paragraphs under items 1, 2 and 5 of the agenda of the Committee, as well as on the question of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee and on the Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre. I intend to convene the drafting group for the consideration of Working Paper No. 44/Add.1 tomorrow, Friday, at 10.30 a.m., in Room C-108. The drafting group will continue on Friday afternoon as well as on Monday, if necessary. May I again recall that, in addition to the nucleus which I announced at our informal meeting on Monday for the drafting group, the group is open to other members to attend whenever they see fit to do so and to make contributions on matters of interest or concern to them.

Of course, since we may need to adjust our activities to changing circumstances, the time-table is merely indicative. Its only purpose is to provide us with an outline of what we may have to do next week. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee accepts the time-table.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with our time-table for the present week I had intended to convene in five minutes, after the closing of this plenary meeting, an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45, entitled, "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament". That working paper was circulated on Tuesday afternoon in all the languages used by the Committee, but since there is no time left we shall have an informal meeting immediately after our plenary meeting next Tuesday morning, 18 August. The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 18 August, at 10.30 a.m. The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.147
18 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-SEVENTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 18 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m.

Chairman: Mr. Ch.A. SANI (Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARASALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. MASCIBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. DE SOUZA E SILVA
Mr. S. DE QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U HCAVE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. D.S. McPHAIL
Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Hengjia
Mrs. WANG Zhiyun
Mr. LIN Chen
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. Pelegrin TORRAS
Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. MUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. RUZEK
Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES
Miss Kongit SINEGIORGIS

France: Mr. J. DE BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. ROHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KOMIVES
Mr. C. GYORFFY

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. A. SANI
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYONATARAH
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. W. ACHDIAK
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran: Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. D. AMERI

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. M. BARENGHI
Mr. E. DI GIOVANNI

<u>Japan:</u>	Mr. Y. OKAWA Mr. H. TAKAHASHI Mr. K. TANIKA Mr. K. SHIMADA
<u>Kenya:</u>	
<u>Mexico:</u>	Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO
<u>Mongolia:</u>	Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG Mr. S. BOLD
<u>Morocco:</u>	Mr. H. ARRASSEN Mr. M. CHERAIBI
<u>Netherlands:</u>	Mr. R.H. FEIN Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Mr. H.B. BRINAH Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI
<u>Pakistan:</u>	Mr. H. AHMAD Mr. H. AKRAM Mr. T. ALTAF
<u>Peru:</u>	Mr. J. BEHAVIDES
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. B. SUJKA Mr. J. CIALOWICZ
<u>Romania:</u>	Mr. H. HALITA Mr. T. MELESCANU
<u>Sri Lanka:</u>	Mr. T. JAYAKODDY Mr. H.H.G.S. PALIHAKKARA
<u>Sweden:</u>	Mr. C. LIDGARD Mr. L. NORBERG Mr. H. BERGLUND Mr. J. LUNDIN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. V.A. SEMIONOV
Mr. L.A. NAUIOV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. G.V. BERDENNIKOV

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Ms. K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Miss L. SHEA
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA
Mr. C.O. GNOK

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with its programme of work for the present week, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with reports of subsidiary bodies as well as the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Of course, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, members are at liberty to make statements on any other subject relevant to the work of the Committee.

May I extend a warm welcome to His Excellency, the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cuba, Dr. Pelegrin Torras, who has come today to address the Committee. I wish him a successful visit to Geneva, where I understand he is also dealing with other important problems for the international community.

Before we listen to the statements of members inscribed to speak today, I would like to invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Radiological Weapons to introduce briefly the reports of those working groups. The reports are contained in document CD/215 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, and in document CD/218 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. The reports of the Ad Hoc Working Groups on Chemical Weapons and on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which concluded their work yesterday, will be introduced by their Chairmen at our plenary meeting on Thursday.

As I announced at our last plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Committee for its approval the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, contained in document CD/210. I will proceed to do so at the end of this plenary meeting, so that delegations wishing to comment on the report may make their views known.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, Minister Ciarrapico.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy): Mr. Chairman, it is my honour and pleasure to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group to continue to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The report is contained in document CD/215, which consists of four sections, namely: (1) Introduction; (2) Organization of work and documentation; (3) Substantive negotiations; and (4) Conclusions and recommendations.

In carrying out the task entrusted to it, the Ad Hoc Working Group took note of the extensive discussions on the subject and intensive negotiations on the elements that took place during the period of the previous Working Group with a view to reaching agreement on a common approach acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. At the beginning of its work, the Group decided to concentrate its attention essentially on the examination of the substance of the assurances given, on the understanding that an agreement on the substance could facilitate an agreement on form. Accordingly, a programme of work

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

(CD/SA/WP.5) was submitted by the Chairman as a general guideline for deliberations and negotiations, taking into account various views expressed and proposals submitted. It contained principally two stages of work for the current session, namely, (1) stage one: identification of the various features of the assurances not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States; (2) stage two: consideration of possible alternatives which can be explored in the search for a "common approach" or "formula". After extensive consideration of stage one of the programme of work, it was generally felt that deeper understanding of the various positions held by delegations, their similarities and differences, had been reached as a result of the discussion. In carrying out the task outlined in stage two of the programme of work the Working Group examined thoroughly, in the manner of a comparative analysis, possible alternatives for a "common approach" or "formula" with a view to concentrating efforts on the most promising among them. Subsequently, without prejudice to further exploration of other alternatives, which could be elaborated in the future, the Working Group decided to concentrate its efforts at this stage of consideration, on alternative D in conjunction with alternative E contained in stage two of the programme of work. These alternatives called for "a 'common formula' for security assurances containing such elements as may be raised in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and agreed upon by all concerned" and "a 'common formula' which could reconcile the elements contained in the existing unilateral undertakings of the nuclear-weapon States".

In this connection, various proposals were submitted by some delegations as a basis for further consideration of a "common formula". Different approaches to the question of developing a "common formula" became apparent in the course of discussions, and divergent views on these approaches and the pertinent issues, particularly the question of eligibility for the assurances and the desirability and the nature of a possible "suspension clause", continued to be maintained.

In considering the possible "common approach" or "formula", the question of an appropriate form was also raised. Although there was no objection, in principle, to the idea of an international convention, the difficulties involved were also pointed out. Furthermore, the idea of interim arrangements was considered, particularly taking note of the proposals for an appropriate Security Council resolution on which divergent views were expressed. At the same time, it was pointed out that the value of any interim arrangement would depend on its substance. A number of delegations believed that interim measures should not be a substitute for an international convention or other international arrangements of a legally binding character.

It was the conclusion of the Working Group that non-nuclear-weapon States should be effectively assured by the nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. There was continuing recognition of the urgent need to reach agreement on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, especially in view of the goal of nuclear disarmament and of general and complete disarmament. Negotiations on the substance of the effective arrangements revealed that specific difficulties were related to differing perceptions of some nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States as well as to the complex nature of the issues involved in evolving a "common formula" acceptable to all which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Working Group recognized that adequate consideration needed to be given to the security interests of non-nuclear-weapon States. It regarded the efforts devoted to the search for a "common approach" or "formula" as a positive step towards the agreement on the question of security assurances.

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

Against this background, the Working Group recommends to the Committee on Disarmament that various alternative approaches, including in particular those considered during the 1981 session, should be further explored in order to overcome the difficulties encountered. In this context further efforts should be devoted to the search for a "common approach" acceptable to all, and in particular for a "common formula" which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. Accordingly, a working group should be established at the beginning of the 1982 session for the purpose, as recommended in United Nations General Assembly resolution 35/46, "urgently to negotiate with a view to reaching agreement, and to submit agreed texts where possible before the second special session devoted to disarmament", on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In concluding my introductory statement, I would like to express my deep appreciation and gratitude to the members of the Ad Hoc Working Group for their co-operation and their spirit of compromise and flexibility, which were indispensable for the work of the Group, especially as demonstrated during the course of considering and adopting this report. I would also like, on behalf of the Ad Hoc Working Group, to note with appreciation the assistance provided to the Group by Mr. Lin, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire secretariat staff.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons for his statement introducing the report of the Working Group. I now give the floor to the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, Ambassador Komives.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): Mr. Chairman, in my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group which was re-established by the Committee to continue negotiations with a view to elaborating a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, I have the honour to present to the Committee on Disarmament the report on the progress of the Group's work as approved by the Working Group last Friday and distributed in document CD/218. During both parts of this annual session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Ad Hoc Working Group, in fulfilling its mandate, gave intensive consideration to the main elements of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons on the basis of the joint USSR/United States proposal, the Chairman's consolidated text, and other documents and proposals submitted with a view to elaborating draft provisions for the future treaty. The substantive discussions which took place in the Working Group demonstrated that some progress had been made in narrowing down the differences between the participants in our negotiations. With regard to the whole range of the treaty provisions, a number of new concrete amendments and proposals were submitted during this session. However, the activities of the Working Group showed that divergencies still exist, particularly on such questions as the scope of prohibition, the definition of radiological weapons, the procedure for verifying compliance, peaceful uses and the relationship of the treaty on radiological weapons with other international agreements and disarmament measures. Taking into account the widespread desire to accomplish the

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

elaboration of the treaty before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, may I express my hope that the Working Group will be able to overcome these divergencies during the next round of our work.

Bearing this in mind, the Working Group recommends that the Committee on Disarmament set up, at the beginning of next year's session, an ad hoc working group, under an appropriate mandate, to continue negotiations on the elaboration of a treaty prohibiting radiological weapons. The Ad Hoc Working Group also agreed to recommend to the Committee on Disarmament that it consider whether the Group should resume its work early, that is, on 18 January 1982.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to all members of the Working Group for their co-operation and their spirit of compromise, without which we could not have progressed towards the conclusion of our work. I would like also, on behalf of the Working Group, to acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided to the Group by Mr. Efimov, the Secretary of the Working Group, as well as the entire Secretariat staff.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons for his statement introducing the report of the Working Group. Distinguished colleagues, in view of the long list of speakers for this plenary meeting, we might need to suspend the plenary and to continue this afternoon. Immediately following the afternoon meeting, I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45 entitled, "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament."

Mr. TORRAS (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, allow me to congratulate you, on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee on Disarmament for the month of August. The Cuban delegation will co-operate with you, Ambassador Anwar Sani, so that we can bring our work to a successful conclusion. At the same time I should like to express our appreciation to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India for the very intelligent, firm and consistent way in which he conducted the work of the Committee during July.

The Republic of Cuba is paying particular attention to the work of the Committee on Disarmament. As this is the only multilateral negotiating body on these topics, it is obvious that great responsibility devolves on each of its members; hence the importance of the negotiations conducted here with a view to achieving concrete disarmament agreements designed to put an end to the arms race which already involves expenditures of some \$500 billion, an intolerable burden which swallows up resources needed to remedy the distressing situation of hundreds of millions of human beings in the underdeveloped world.

However, if we take stock of what we have achieved as we approach the end of our 1981 session, we find that the results are not very encouraging. To take merely items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda, on a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament respectively, the priority importance of which has repeatedly been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly -- these have formed the subject of informal exchanges only.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

It is regrettable that two delegations have, so to speak, vetoed the start of concrete negotiations on these important items on the Committee's agenda.

This situation is the more critical because never, since the so-called "October crisis," has the danger of nuclear war been greater. Then, as now, it was the aggressive and arrogant policy of imperialism which was responsible for such a situation.

The reasons why two States have prevented the start of negotiations on those items in the Committee on Disarmament are the same as those which have paralysed the SALT negotiations, the bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons and the trilateral negotiations on nuclear tests. They are the same as have halted the process of détente and made the international situation difficult.

The decision to station new medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the postponement of the ratification of the SALT II agreement, the military escalation and the despatch of rapid deployment intervention forces to various regions of the world, including the Caribbean, are vivid demonstrations of the warmongering and hegemonistic policy of those who are hindering the disarmament negotiations and doing their utmost to return to the times of the cold war.

It should be borne in mind that next year will see the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and our Committee should endeavour to have some positive results to show from its negotiations. The existence of political will is therefore of fundamental importance for this negotiating forum.

In view of the priority attaching to agenda items 1 and 2, I should like to make some brief comments on them.

The Cuban delegation considers that although the exchange of views which took place in the informal consultations was quite useful, it is essential for working groups to be set up on those items without delay so that the Committee can embark on serious negotiations in that regard.

In view, again, of the urgency of nuclear disarmament matters and of the fact that the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to make a start on negotiations in this sphere, I wish also to stress once more the need for the earliest possible resumption of the trilateral negotiations which have been taking place outside the framework of the Committee on Disarmament, the importance of which goes without saying.

The Committee on Disarmament is undoubtedly in a position to initiate concrete negotiations on these items: in the first place, a number of working papers have been submitted, including documents from the group of socialist countries and from the Group of 21; and secondly, all the nuclear-weapon States are represented in the Committee. It is clear that there is no justification whatsoever for further delay.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

I should now like to make some comments on an item which is on the Committee's agenda and with regard to which the Committee could do more than it has done up to date: I am referring to the prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The importance of this subject has increased considerably in recent years. Both the United Nations General Assembly and other forums outside the United Nations, such as the meetings of the movement of non-aligned countries, have stressed the importance and necessity of reaching an agreement to prohibit new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In connection with this topic, artificial obstacles have been created such as the need for the prior identification of such weapons and all the difficulties raised with respect to the problem of verification. The Cuban delegation believes that it is necessary to grasp the need to reach an agreement which will prevent the appearance of such weapons.

Experience has shown that once a given type of weapon exists, it is very difficult to prohibit it. We are, therefore, convinced that the initiation of negotiations on this subject is also very important for the international community.

What is necessary is to prevent the use of scientific and technological advances for destructive purposes. The Committee on Disarmament can do a great deal in this regard.

We have already expressed our support for the setting up of a group of qualified governmental experts to meet periodically and keep the Committee informed on all matters concerning scientific discoveries and their possible use for military purposes.

Another item which appears on the Committee's agenda and which is of particular importance to the Cuban delegation is the one relating to security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

As a non-nuclear-weapon State Cuba is profoundly interested in protecting its national security as well as that of other non-nuclear-weapon States. In the present circumstances, in which the warmongers are again baring their teeth, the need to find a broad solution to this problem is becoming increasingly urgent.

The Ad Hoc Working Group on this question, assiduously presided over by Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, has concentrated on seeking a common formula negotiated in the Committee on Disarmament which will be acceptable to all. The Cuban delegation has already had an opportunity of expressing its views in this regard.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

We believe that it is essential to adopt a treaty on this question and that that would be a step forward in the disarmament negotiations; we therefore fully support it.

On the other hand, although we recognize the importance which the adoption of a Security Council resolution in this regard would have, we have said that it must be identical for all the nuclear-weapon States and that it cannot constitute an end in itself but should be followed by the adoption of an international instrument of a binding character.

As regards the different alternatives considered, we are against the inclusion of unjustified requirements which tend to delay the reaching of any agreement. We consider that the assurances should be granted without further requirements, particularly to non-nuclear-weapon States which do not have weapons of this kind on their territories. This is a broad position which could serve as a basis in the search for a solution on this important item.

We should also like to stress once again that it must be borne in mind that this question is very closely linked to the complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the non-use of force in international relations, and should therefore be dealt with in that context.

One subject which I cannot fail to mention in my statement is that of chemical weapons, the Ad Hoc Working Group on which is skilfully presided over by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Lidgard.

The negotiations which have so far taken place have brought out the complexities of this topic, particularly in view of its links in some aspects with the use of chemicals for peaceful purposes in the economies of States. However, the Committee on Disarmament should redouble its efforts towards achieving an agreement with respect to chemical weapons.

This is another topic which has also been dealt with outside the context of the United Nations. Paragraph 220 of the Final Declaration of the Sixth Conference of Heads of States or Government of Non-Aligned Countries calls, inter alia, for the urgent conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction. Hence my delegation's position.

We consider that the Committee's efforts should be basically aimed at determining the most relevant aspects of the future convention, such as its content and scope. This done, it would be possible to go on to other questions which, although they are not secondary, nevertheless depend to a large extent on the content and scope of the convention.

The work which the Working Group is doing has shown that there is an adequate basis for serious negotiations to be conducted on this important item, and we hope that the negotiations will continue at their present pace.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

I should now like to refer to the item concerning the prohibition of radiological weapons, the Ad Hoc Working Group on which is wisely presided over by Ambassador Komives of Hungary.

The drafting of a treaty for the prohibition of radiological weapons has been requested in several General Assembly resolutions, and in the Final Document of the 1978 special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Cuban delegation firmly believes that this is a task which can be completed before the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly, scheduled for next year.

The conclusion of a treaty on radiological weapons, particularly at this time, would be a praiseworthy achievement by the Committee on Disarmament in its negotiations, and would also create a serious obstacle to the development of weapons of mass destruction. It is undeniable that the submission of a treaty on radiological weapons by this Committee would be very well received by the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

I should now like to refer to an item which I have deliberately left to the end. It is that of the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, for which this Committee decided to set up a Working Group, which has been presided over in a most noteworthy manner by Ambassador Garcia-Robles, the representative of Mexico.

The urgency of this question is due in part to the fact that the Committee has to submit this programme for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly, at its second special session devoted to disarmament, next year.

There is abundant material which can serve as a basis for the drawing up of the programme. Suffice it to mention, on account of their importance, the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the elements identified by the Disarmament Commission in this regard, and the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade.

At the same time, all States, whether or not they are members of the Committee on Disarmament, have an interest in the adoption of the programme in view of the importance which such a document would have. The conditions therefore exist for the Committee to be able to have the programme ready by the end of its spring session next year.

The Cuban delegation intends to continue, as it has been doing in the past, striving to expedite the activities of the Working Group, and it hopes that obstacles will not arise to complicate the drafting of the comprehensive programme.

The comprehensive programme of disarmament is to constitute the basis for future negotiations in this connection, and it ought therefore to be drawn up in a realistic manner, bearing in mind the need for concrete measures in this field.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to a subject of topical interest, one which is of necessity bound up with the work of this Committee. That is the recent decision of the United States Administration to authorize the manufacture of neutron weapons.

I wish to express the Cuban delegation's most energetic condemnation of this decision.

(Mr. Torras, Cuba)

While the initiation of concrete negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament on urgent matters of nuclear disarmament has been blocked on flimsy pretexts which have not succeeded in convincing anyone, a decision has now been adopted which in itself represents the beginning of a new upward spiral in the arms race.

The manufacture of the neutron bomb, as has been stressed on more than one occasion in this Committee, brings new aspects to nuclear war and increases its horrors. We must not forget that the aim is to destroy people while reducing to a minimum the destruction of buildings -- a feature which makes clear its anti-human nature.

Such a decision constitutes a mockery of the work of the Committee on Disarmament and a challenge to world public opinion, particularly as it was adopted in the context of yet another anniversary of the Hiroshima massacre.

I wish to urge the Committee on Disarmament, in addition to redoubling its efforts in its consideration of the items which have high priority on its agenda, to adopt such measures as may be necessary so that it may consider the documents submitted to it concerning neutron weapons.

The decision to begin the manufacture of neutron weapons opens up the possibility that similar decisions will be taken by these same reactionary sectors with regard to other types of weapons. In this connection the Cuban delegation has considered it pertinent to submit to the Secretariat of the Committee a document reproducing some paragraphs of a statement made by President Fidel Castro on 26 July last, which we hope will be useful for the work of the Committee in the accomplishment of its noble task.

To conclude, I should like to quote some remarks from another statement by our President, Comrade Fidel Castro, made on the occasion of the meeting of the presiding officers of the World Peace Council in our country, when he compared the present situation in the sphere of nuclear weapons with that existing at the time of the October crisis. He said the following:

"Although in 1962 the arsenals already contained more than enough megatons to wipe out the last vestige of life on earth, today the numbers, power and effectiveness of strategic weapons systems have multiplied to a frightening degree. The frontiers of terror were long ago left behind, and no new means of mass destruction that may be added today can instil greater terror in its eventual victims. Mankind can only be exterminated once. No person in his senses has any doubt that in a nuclear war, under present conditions, the results would be equally cruel for attackers and attacked, for the belligerents and for neutral countries, for the atomic Powers and for all the nations which do not possess such weapons. There is even the risk that a technical fault, a human error or mere carelessness may precipitate a reaction with catastrophic consequences".

He went on:

"We are not and we shall never be fatalists. We do not and we shall never accept the idea that a world holocaust is inevitable. Mankind must have a nobler destiny."

In man's struggle to avoid this holocaust a particular responsibility devolves on the Committee on Disarmament, which is called upon to find the means to put an end to the uncontrolled arms race. In this noble but difficult task, in which we must all make an effort, you may count on the steadfast participation of Cuba.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Cuba for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. AHMAD (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first opportunity which the Pakistan delegation has had to intervene in the Committee this month, let me first express to you our very sincere satisfaction in seeing you, the representative of a brotherly country, Indonesia, presiding over our deliberations. We have no doubt that the work of the Committee in this important concluding part of our annual session will be greatly facilitated by the firm guidance of a Chairman whose diplomatic experience and wisdom have already made a deep impression in the past two weeks.

May I also avail myself of this opportunity to express our deep appreciation to Ambassador Venkataswaran, the distinguished representative of India, for the efficiency and good humour with which he guided the deliberations of the Committee during the month of July.

The 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament will draw to a close in the next few days. It is possible at this stage to offer some reflections of the Pakistan delegation on the work of the Committee this year.

This year, just as the preceding one, was not particularly propitious for progress in disarmament. The climate of mutual trust and confidence among States so necessary for disarmament is obviously not present today. Such a climate can be created only when all States, and especially the militarily significant States, demonstrate in word and deed that they are prepared to adhere strictly to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and especially those regarding respect for the territorial integrity of States and non-intervention in their internal affairs. These principles are being violated at present with impunity in various parts of the world, including our own region.

In this context, some members of the Committee have spoken about the importance of bringing to an end the foreign military intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has a direct and self-evident interest in this objective, not least because of our desire to restore stability and peace to our region and enable the 2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan to return to their homeland in safety and honour. My Government has taken several important initiatives to promote a political solution of the tragic conflict within Afghanistan in the framework of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, the Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. Pakistan is persisting with these endeavours.

We feel, nevertheless, that the current climate of confrontation should not be allowed to lead to an unbridled escalation in the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons. Our concern is aroused, whether such escalation in the arms race is quantitative or qualitative in nature, whether it involves the deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile or the production of the enhanced radiation weapon.

The present is not the time for self-serving postures or proposals; it is a time for resolute and wise statesmanship. Pakistan considers that in the present international circumstances there is an indispensable need to undertake serious negotiations on a broad spectrum of interrelated issues that could help in promoting a climate of international security and create the right conditions for disarmament. We welcome indications that a dialogue between the Superpowers may commence in the near future. At the same time we consider it equally important that efforts to bring about a climate of peace and security in the world and to facilitate disarmament should be conducted under the aegis of the United Nations so that the vital security interests of the small and medium-sized States and the non-aligned countries are taken fully into account.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

The Committee on Disarmament possesses the potential to make a significant contribution to promoting international security and arresting and reversing the arms race. Unfortunately, as yet there seems to be no readiness on the part of the major Powers to exploit this potential. Despite the intensive pace at which the Committee has worked during 1981, it has achieved very little in terms of concrete progress towards evolving agreements on the various items on its agenda.

The disappointment felt about our failure even to commence negotiations on the nuclear test ban, the item which has the highest priority on the multilateral disarmament agenda, is genuine and widespread. We would have thought that the suspension of the trilateral negotiations on this subject was an additional reason to open multilateral talks in the Committee. It is apparent from the progress report submitted by the trilateral negotiators last year that the perspective of these negotiations is seriously flawed. Even if these restricted negotiations were to be resumed, it is unlikely that they would produce a treaty which can gain general support and wide adherence. The failure of the trilateral negotiators to respond, jointly or individually, to the fundamental questions posed by members of the Group of 21 regarding the treaty that was being negotiated confirms this assessment. The major nuclear-weapon Powers should realize that they cannot repeat the NPT experience and impose an unequal arrangement on the non-nuclear-weapon States. They must also ponder carefully the consequences of a continued delay in negotiating an equitable and generally acceptable nuclear-test-ban treaty.

The discussions in the Committee this year on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament have been interesting if only because they have shown in sharp relief the divergent approaches of various States on this subject. It seems to us that all the nuclear-weapon States adhere, explicitly or implicitly, to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and accord an important place to nuclear weapons in the preservation of their security and that of their allies. It is also quite apparent that each of the two major nuclear-weapon Powers is afraid to fall even a fraction behind the other in their nuclear equation and that both wish to preserve the advantage they enjoy over the other nuclear-weapon Powers. And, of course, none of the nuclear-weapon Powers would like to lose the military edge they have over the non-nuclear-weapon States. These are, in simple terms, the impulses behind the nuclear arms spiral and the main obstacles to nuclear disarmament.

Common sense also indicates that the first steps in the process of nuclear disarmament will have to be taken by the two nuclear-weapon Powers whose arsenals are, in size and sophistication, immensely superior to those of the other nuclear-weapon States. The SALT negotiations were a recognition of this special responsibility. We hope that the SALT agreements signed by the United States and the USSR will continue to be observed and that early negotiations will be undertaken by the two sides with the aim of reducing rather than limiting their strategic and medium-range nuclear weapons. Progress in these negotiations can open the way for multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament. In the meantime, the Committee can actively assist the process of nuclear disarmament by further clarifying and harmonizing the divergent approaches of the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States on this question and setting out the agreed stages in which the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons can be achieved. We hope the Committee will seriously address itself to this task next year in accordance with the proposals of the Group of 21.

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

While the nuclear-weapon States reserve the right to expand and improve their nuclear and conventional arsenals on the questionable assumption that this will enhance their security, they have so far proved to be entirely insensitive to the security concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States. The negotiations in the Working Group on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons have, if nothing else, confirmed this evaluation.

Under the able guidance of Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, the Working Group, for the first time, made a concrete effort this year to bridge the political and conceptual difficulties in developing a "common formula" for an obligation to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States. Although certain delegations, such as that of the Netherlands and my own, made serious suggestions regarding the possible ways of evolving a common formula, the nuclear-weapon States, apart from China, did not demonstrate any readiness to contemplate even a slight modification of their respective positions. The proposals for a possible compromise were in fact excluded from the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group. Each of the four nuclear-weapon States clung to its own narrowly conceived nuclear doctrine designed to serve national interests that are most broadly defined. It should be quite clear by now that the unilateral declarations made in 1978 by these nuclear-weapon Powers cannot serve as a basis for a genuine response to the quest of the non-nuclear-weapon States for security against the nuclear threat. Pakistan will continue its efforts to promote an agreement on this question; but I must say quite categorically that we shall not be prepared to accept a cosmetic solution which provides the illusion rather than the substance of security assurances while extracting additional obligations from the non-nuclear-weapon States.

The contradiction between the desire of the major nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies to keep open their own nuclear options and their overriding concern to interdict the options of other States is very difficult to justify. While we could endorse many of the preoccupations about nuclear proliferation expressed by the Canadian delegation on 16 July 1981, I must confess that we share, to an even larger extent, the considerations outlined in the response to this statement by the distinguished representative of India. The inordinate preoccupation of certain States with the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty leads them into adopting positions that contradict fundamental international norms. The responses to the Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre demonstrate this in practice.

It has been stated here and elsewhere that the Israeli attack is a cause for deep concern especially because Iraq is a party to the non-proliferation Treaty and accepts IAEA safeguards. Is it by any chance implied that if a State is not a party to this unequal Treaty, it should be considered fair game for such attacks in the cause of nuclear non-proliferation? It is ironic that the occasion of the Israeli attack has been used to underline the importance of securing wider adherence to the NPT. The fact that the action has demonstrated that adherence to this Treaty is obviously not sufficient to prevent an adversary from making subjective and unilateral judgements about another country's nuclear programme has been conveniently passed over. What has also been ignored is that the justification used for the aggression, howsoever implausible, was in fact provided by the campaign of propoganda, launched and sustained in those very countries which are the most ardent advocates of the NPT,

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

about the purported danger of nuclear proliferation from the peaceful nuclear facilities of various developing countries including Iraq. Indeed, the Israeli military raid can be seen as the ultimate step in the escalating process of unacceptable pressures and punitive actions that have been employed by certain supplier States to impede the normal development of the peaceful nuclear programmes of a number of developing countries. We note, of course, that the Israeli aggression has been roundly condemned, although the aggressor has not paid any price for the aggression. No sanctions were imposed on it by the Security Council, and no reparations were demanded of it. On the contrary, further military supplies to Israel are to be promptly resumed. And what of the victim of the aggression? The State which supplied the destroyed facility, while it has rightly defended its exclusively peaceful nature, now reportedly expects additional obligations to be assumed by the aggrieved State as a condition for the reconstruction of the plant.

The Israeli attack against the Tammuz nuclear research centre reinforced the opinion of most members of this Committee that resolute measures must be taken to prohibit such attacks in the future. In the course of negotiations on the convention to ban radiological weapons, which have been guided with dedication and energy by Ambassador Komives of Hungary, it was pointed out that such attacks against nuclear facilities are the most realistic and perhaps the only means by which radiological warfare can be waged. The Working Group has clearly recognized the risk of mass destruction through attacks on nuclear facilities. The necessity for the elaboration of an international legal norm to prohibit such attacks is also not contested, although reservations have been expressed to the inclusion of such a provision in the radiological weapons convention. My delegation considers that the conclusion of this convention will be facilitated if a satisfactory solution can be found to the question of prohibiting attacks against nuclear facilities. Of course, there are other important differences regarding the scope of the convention and the peaceful uses of radioactive substances and nuclear energy which need to be resolved taking into account the position of the non-aligned and neutral States. We hope that the sponsors of the "joint elements" will exhibit greater flexibility in the resumed negotiations on this subject next year.

My delegation derives a measure of satisfaction from the outcome of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. Despite the Committee's failure to agree on a broader mandate for the Working Group, it has succeeded, largely owing to the imaginative leadership of its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, in building onto the work done last year and creating a solid basis for substantive negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention. The draft elements formulated by the Chairman have taken into account the substance of the views expressed by various delegations and, together with the comments made on these elements, provide a valuable repertoire for the conduct of future negotiations on the text of the treaty. Admittedly, differences persist even on such basic issues as the scope of the convention and the question of verification and compliance. However, the agreement reached to give an appropriately revised

(Mr. Ahmad, Pakistan)

mandate to the Working Group next year that would enable it to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences is a welcome development. Negotiations on the text of a chemical weapons convention should commence at our next session and, we believe, the existing differences can be overcome if the necessary political decisions are taken, particularly by the two major Powers. We fervently hope that their policies will not take us in the opposite direction.

Under the patient and experienced direction of Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has identified the main issues to be addressed under relevant parts of the programme and drawn together the various proposals for the disarmament measures to be included in it. My delegation considers that, in accordance with paragraph 38 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the comprehensive programme should be an international instrument which would create legal obligations on the part of all States to implement and achieve the measures included therein. These disarmament measures should be set out in defined stages and lead to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament within a specific and agreed time-frame. The working paper submitted by the Group of 21 on disarmament measures to be included in the programme broadly reflects this approach. We consider that efforts to conceive the comprehensive programme in the restricted framework of existing documents are incompatible with the fundamental purposes for which the instrument was remitted to this Committee for negotiation. My delegation hopes that the Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme will be enabled to undertake intensive negotiations next year and to finalize the programme for submission to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament.

The failure of the Committee to make substantive progress on any of the items on its agenda has prompted an examination of our procedures and methods of work. Some interesting proposals were put forward for improving the negotiating role and procedures of the Committee. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the failure to make progress in negotiations is in no way due to organizational or procedural difficulties. Quite frankly, there has been no willingness on the part of the major military Powers to engage in genuine give and take and to allow the Committee to undertake negotiations on various agenda items including those on which working groups have been established for the express purpose of conducting such negotiations. One major Power has said in so many words that the Committee should await the outcome of its policy review. Another has used the Committee to extol its own "positive" approach while it remained unyielding on the substance of the issues under consideration. The Committee on Disarmament should not allow itself to become the handmaiden of the Superpowers.

The Pakistan delegation believes that unless the Committee is able early next year to conduct substantive negotiations on the priority items on its agenda, it should report its impotence to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament. At that session, we will have to give serious consideration to ways and means of ensuring the effective conduct of multilateral negotiations on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Pakistan for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. WALKER (Australia): Mr. Chairman, I intend to be extremely brief this morning but I do wish to tell you of the great pleasure my delegation feels at working in this Committee under the chairmanship of someone of your great personal distinction. For an Australian, of course, it is also a particular pleasure that you should be the representative of Indonesia, our great neighbour and close friend. I also wish for the sake of brevity to associate my delegation with the many deserved compliments which have been paid to your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran.

In this short statement I will be talking about the several different matters before the Committee on Disarmament. In the first place I wish, on this occasion to say that I believe it appropriate for the Committee once again to thank the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts under its Chairman, Dr. Ericsson, for their continuing excellent work. My delegation greatly appreciates the progress report submitted to the Committee last Thursday, and we look forward in due course to receiving the full, third report of the Group of Seismic Experts. It is evident from the report which we received on Thursday that all five of the study groups are making important contributions to the Group's task of considering international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events. I wish in particular to mention the study group assessing national investigations into the sending of seismological messages around the globe, involving the use of the communications network of the World Meteorological Organization. Mr. McGregor of Australia and Mr. Ichikawa of Japan are the co-convenors of this group. At the February meeting of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts, this study group assessed a preliminary and limited test of the feasibility of sending such messages in this way and agreed on a more elaborate test for later this year.

The Ad Hoc Group has now put in train preparations for a test to cover six weeks in November and December of the present year. This test will build on last year's work. In particular it will assess the transit time of messages and their accuracy, by detailed comparison with other conventional methods of transmission. In this exercise the experts are receiving the enthusiastic co-operation of the World Meteorological Organization, to which body, I submit, the Committee should express its warm appreciation. Equally satisfactory is the indication that this test will have markedly wider participation than did last year's. I join Dr. Ericsson in placing particular value on the prospect of participation by one or more new States from the southern hemisphere. Ideally, of course, there would be participation from both Latin America and Africa. We also welcome other new participants from amongst the Ad Hoc Group's members themselves. The report of this exercise will be considered at the next meeting of the full Group. With good co-operation in this test, I have every hope that the report will show that the global telecommunications system of WMO is indeed an effective method of conveying around the world the seismic messages which are central to the purposes of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts and the Committee on Disarmament.

I believe that the Committee should take special note of the progress that is being made in this area, which has direct relevance to our future work in addressing item 1 of the Committee's agenda, a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Walker, Australia)

I would also like to say a few words about the other positive development which we have recorded in the Committee on Disarmament this year. I am, of course, referring to our work towards a chemical weapons convention. Yesterday the Ad Hoc Working Group on this subject finalized its annual report. This report has two noteworthy aspects. It records the very real progress achieved this year towards our objective of a comprehensive chemical weapons convention. This year the Committee has built on the first-class work done last year in defining the issues to be covered in a chemical weapons convention. This year we have been able to consider draft elements for such a convention and to exchange views in considerable detail on these elements.

The second notable point about the Working Group report is that it indicates the willingness of all the members of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed further next year under an appropriately revised mandate to build on areas of convergence and to resolve the differences identified in the last two years so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest possible date.

My delegation wishes to pay a heart-felt tribute to the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, for his personal contribution to achieving this important result.

I would have preferred to end on this positive note, celebrating constructive work performed in the Committee at a time when external events have severely limited its ability to achieve agreements to which my Government attaches great importance. I feel impelled by the statements of other delegations, however, to say a very few words about what is commonly called the neutron bomb. Several distinguished delegates from socialist countries have spoken as if all of mankind shared the views expressed by their Governments on this topic. This is not the case. The Australian Prime Minister has pointed out that many people in many countries will feel that the United States had no choice but to take this decision. The Prime Minister pointed out that there is a widespread consensus in Western countries as to the need to strengthen their defences in view of the sustained Soviet arms build-up over recent years. The Prime Minister also said that he did not believe that this decision would increase tension between East and West.

On behalf of the Australian delegation, I express the fervent hope that next year will be a more productive one for the Committee on Disarmament. As in the past, my delegation stands ready, now and in the future, to do everything in its power to contribute to the early, successful outcome of the negotiations in this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Australia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. MALITA (Romania) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I should like to tell you what a pleasure it is to me to congratulate you on behalf of the Romanian delegation on the flawless way in which you have been discharging your responsibilities. I should like to add that you have followed the splendid example set by the series of excellent Chairmen we have had this year, each of whom has endeavoured to contribute some new achievement to the work of our Committee.

Through your competence and your tact you have increased respect for the active diplomacy of your country, which is engaged in the solution of numerous regional and international problems.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

This year the task of our Committee has probably been one of the most unrewarding. For it is difficult to discuss disarmament at a time when the word is no longer used with conviction and is replaced by expressions such as "arms control", which in fact represents a different approach, and when the arms race is simultaneously undergoing an unprecedented intensification. Arms control is not the same thing as disarmament, for it accepts, instead of excluding, the idea of the use of force, and confirms the role of arms as a possible instrument of international policy. In spite of all that, however, the Romanian delegation feels profoundly that in 1981 the Committee on Disarmament has shown its maturity; it has not been side-tracked into useless disputes and has succeeded in maintaining a constructive atmosphere in spite of the circumstances, being virtually the only international forum where negotiations or at least discussions on disarmament have been conducted.

At a time when other international negotiations on this subject have regrettably been temporarily interrupted, the Committee has succeeded in consolidating its position as a forum for dialogue. While its capacity for influencing international relations should not be overestimated, it must be recognized that its activity has maintained a sense of hope and promise. This has expressed itself both in the character of the debates and in the general spirit in which they have been conducted, in the constructive approach, in the technical language, in the increased activities of the ad hoc negotiating groups. I would like to stress the attitude our delegation has adopted from the beginning, that is, one of a will to find ways and means of bringing the disarmament negotiations out of the deadlock and of increasing the effectiveness of the Committee's activities. There should also be positive appreciation of the fact that it has been possible to find practical ways, even if they have not been entirely satisfactory, of approaching the problems of nuclear disarmament and the halting of nuclear-weapon tests, discussing the subject of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and taking a new step, even if not formally confirmed, towards the negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Allow me to take this opportunity to thank the Chairmen of the four working groups, our distinguished colleagues, Ambassador A. García Robles of Mexico, Ambassador I. Komives of Hungary, Ambassador C. Lidgard of Sweden and Minister A. Ciarrapico of Italy, for their tireless efforts and dedication, which have brought positive elements into our work.

However, while taking note of their efforts and of the results achieved by the Committee this year, we cannot but recognize that in the context of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, more generally, in that of the hopes placed in the activities of the Geneva Committee, the results obtained are far from fulfilling expectations, a fact which gives rise to those feelings of disappointment and legitimate impatience which have so often been mentioned during the session.

I should like to set forth some of the conclusions which, in our opinion, emerge from the Committee's activity this year:

(a) Flexibility of action. The process of multilateral negotiation, of which our Committee is by definition a part, has its demands. A partner cannot be refused the right to raise a problem or to propose a debate in depth. Even less is it possible to refuse to discuss in the Committee fundamental questions concerning the arms race, when such discussion is requested by the majority of delegations. Greater flexibility is therefore necessary for these demands to be accommodated. The establishment of subsidiary bodies is a practice we have ourselves adopted in order to help us in our daily activities and to enable us to make a careful study of the problems entrusted to

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

How is it possible, then, that on a subject like nuclear disarmament there is not a single concrete statement in our Committee's report, when this question is dealt with more closely and in greater detail in public discussions and in any newspaper? The Committee's inability really to tackle the problem of nuclear weapons, with their ever-increasing risks and implications for every country, and especially non-nuclear-weapon countries, constitutes the major deficiency of this session, in my delegation's view.

(b) Democratization of the Committee's work. Our delegation has repeatedly raised the question of the need to respect the right of all delegations to take part in the work as representatives of sovereign States with equal rights, regardless of their size, their stage of development, their economic, social or political system, the level of their armaments or their participation in military alliances. This position starts from the principle of equal security achieved through equal participation. The Committee's rules of procedure based on the recommendations contained in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament have constituted an important step in this direction. The analysis and adoption of measures to increase the effectiveness of the Committee have also contributed to this end. The interest shown by other States in taking part in the Committee's work and the constructive contribution some of them have made are further arguments in this direction and at the same time they confirm that the Disarmament Committee must be open to the widest possible participation.

(c) Realism of approach has been mentioned a number of times in our debates, with the idea that we should wait for the external signals that will enable us to work. In our delegation's view, it is disarmament which should form the primary aim of that work, before countries' economies are threatened, natural resources exhausted and international security endangered. In order to prevent such a situation arising, the Committee should act preventively and not merely watch helplessly the acceleration of the arms race. In view of the relation between political will and negotiated solutions, we ought to see to it that we are ready with all the requisite solutions. Then, the moment the political will appears, disarmament agreements can be adopted without further delay. This requires, among other things, a wider use of the necessary technical expertise and of the research facilities of the United Nations system, and even outside the latter, a closer link with contemporary science.

(d) Definition of the moment of the cessation of the arms race and the transition to disarmament. Defining this moment in the mechanism of the arms race which operates by inertia implies the determination of the point of inflexion of the process.

We are of the opinion that in spite of the broad approach in our debates to the problem of the acceleration of the arms race and of the need to proceed to disarmament, we have not dealt in practical terms with the point of linkage of these movements, that are in opposite directions. We believe that the definition of a package of complex measures based on the ideas of a freeze, limitation and discontinuance should be explored if we are to fulfil our mandate.

(e) Our work is affected by certain circular problems, real logical paradoxes, and once our negotiations have become entangled in one of these problems, they can remain blocked for ever. Attempts to resolve within the Committee such problems as the priority between security and disarmament, the relation between comprehensive measures and partial measures, the definition of a mathematical formula to measure the balance of forces, the priority between confidence-building measures and disarmament, and the place of verification in the different stages of disarmament -- none of this can lead to any practical results. The essential interconnection between all these elements is obvious, as is the fact that they are an intrinsic part of our efforts.

(Mr. Malita, Romania)

As regards the balance of forces, it should be recognized that it has existed for a long time and that it will continue to exist. But there are only two ways of achieving parity -- either through the action-reaction sequence and the constant increase in armaments, or through the negotiated reduction of arms and military expenditures. There is no other possibility. Clearly, verification is an integral part of the approach to disarmament, and must be carried out under appropriate international control, in order to ensure the maintenance of the balance of forces, together with the security and independence of each State. Verification and balance are to us essential elements in any disarmament measure and not merely the subjects for an endless debate.

As the representative of Romania in the Committee on Disarmament, I speak on behalf of a country which is convinced that the right of every people to free and independent development cannot be achieved without the adoption of concrete, effective measures to halt and reverse the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race.

In the present complex and contradictory circumstances of international life, there is a need for concerted efforts to prevent the deterioration of the international situation and to promote the resumption of a policy of détente, co-operation, independence and peace. It is the duty of every Government not to do anything or take any step which might further aggravate the existing situation, or create new sources of tension and mistrust. This is why we believe that the United States' decision to start production of the neutron bomb is a negative and most regrettable measure, and one which entails a clear risk of provoking a new and powerful impetus in the senseless arms race.

Any rational analysis will show that such a measure not only fails to reduce the causes of conflict and sources of hostility but in fact on the contrary, merely complicates the solution of controversial international problems and makes it difficult to deal with them constructively.

Convinced of the responsibility of every State, regardless of its size, to contribute to the conditions needed for an increase in confidence and the start of a real disarmament process, Romania has always acted consistently towards this end. For several years running, my country has reduced and refrained from increasing its military budget.

Our decision in this respect is based on the conviction that it is within the power of every State to avoid seeing this phenomenon as something inevitable in human society. The Romanian delegation reaffirms its confidence in the disarmament process and in the substantial contribution which the Committee can make in this direction. When explaining this position which my country has adopted, the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu, said: "I do not agree with the old saying that if one wants peace, one must prepare for war. If everyone prepares for war, a state of affairs may arise in which we are no longer in control of the situation, and that would mean endangering the lives of many peoples. I would replace that saying by another one: if we want peace, we must work for peace, for disarmament, for understanding and co-operation between peoples and for the elimination of the military blocs. Romania wants peace, and it is acting accordingly."

It is this viewpoint which has guided our contribution to the work of the Committee this year, and we shall act similarly in the future also.

The CHAIRMAN {translated from French}: I thank the distinguished representative of Romania for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, bearing in mind that we are now in the last week of our work, I shall be as brief as possible in making what I expect to be my concluding statement. As it is still appropriate, however, I take this opportunity to welcome you most warmly into the Chair and to say how impressed I have been with your expert and sure handling of the various problems that arise in winding up the session. I also want to thank and congratulate Ambassador Venkateswaran for the particular flair he brought to the conduct of our business in July.

I have asked for the floor to speak briefly on items of current business, as we draw to the end of the 1981 session. I shall start by commenting on some observations made at our meeting on 13 August by my neighbour, the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union. In the course of a statement in which he concentrated mainly on nuclear problems, Ambassador Issraelyan made several assertions which were misleading. It is not right that they should go uncorrected.

I wish to draw particular attention to three points. In the first place the Soviet statement presented an analysis of the nuclear dispositions in Europe without taking any account of the political and military background. Not surprisingly, perhaps, there was no mention at all of the fact that by comparison with the Soviet Union the States of western Europe devote rather modest resources to their defence, or of the fact that they are flanked to the east by States which have an overwhelming preponderance of conventional military capacity, particularly in armoured formations and artillery. Nor did it point out that, because our eastern neighbours operate closed societies and publish almost nothing about their military plans and activities, we in western Europe have to make the most prudent deductions we can from the observed military capacity of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the actions of its member States.

Against this background the question of the precise quantities of nuclear hardware deployed in Europe may seem a secondary matter to those not involved in the political confrontation in Europe. I would ask them, however, to be patient and to bear with me because the question does not look secondary to those of us in western Europe. It is our concern that the position should be accurately represented so that all may understand the apprehensions which underlie the attitude of our Governments.

In his speech on 13 August, Ambassador Issraelyan attempted to rebut the statement by Ambassador Ruth of the Federal Republic of Germany to the effect that nuclear forces in Europe were in disequilibrium in favour of the Warsaw Pact countries. He said that there were approximately 1,000 Soviet missile delivery systems in Europe, which I believe is the case. In comparison with this he said NATO deployed a similar number. However, when he listed the components of the Western total he said that this Western total included the so-called United States forward-based systems, medium-range missile systems and aircraft of other NATO Western allies. For good measure he also included submarine-launched rockets.

However, he did not specify how the Soviet total was comprised. It is well known that there are nearly 1,000 Soviet missiles and bombers of medium range alone in the European theatre. If you also include Soviet aircraft and missiles comparable to the NATO systems which he referred to, the so-called balance is seen to be an advantage of approximately 2,600 Soviet systems compared with the supposed 1,000 NATO systems which I would add are mainly in the so-called United States forward-based systems, that is

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

aircraft, some of which are on aircraft carriers. And this, I might say, excludes any Soviet submarine-launched missiles, all of which are capable of being used against targets in the European theatre.

Alternatively, we could strike the balance sheet the other way. We could exclude from the NATO list all those systems for which equivalents do not appear in the total of 1,000 Soviet systems. There would then be seen to be less than 280 Western systems, depending on exactly which Western components are included. This indicates a Soviet preponderance of between 3 and 4 to 1. So, either way, the facts do not support Ambassador Issraelyan's proposition that there is what he called "rough equality in medium-range nuclear armaments" between East and West in Europe.

There is another matter on which I equally want to introduce a better sense of perspective. On 13 August my other distinguished neighbour, Ambassador Flowerree, referred to a decision taken by the United States Government to proceed with the production and stockpiling in the United States of what are properly called enhanced radiation warheads (ERWs), but for which the more emotive description "neutron bomb" was chosen in 1978, especially by those who wished to present an exaggerated picture of the character and potential of these weapons. A number of statements have been made in the Committee which have contained distortions, and since I believe it is important for us in this forum to maintain our objectivity, I venture to bring to your attention one or two basic facts about these ERWs.

The enhanced radiation warhead, of which we have heard so much, is a nuclear weapon which is designed to be employed either as an artillery shell or as the warhead on a short-range rocket. Its yield is thus clearly limited. And although it has acquired a doomsday reputation, it is actually designed to be less destructive than the many other nuclear weapons which are already deployed on either side of the line in Europe.

A different, and much more far-reaching, distortion which I think it necessary for my delegation to controvert most specifically is that which accuses the NATO alliance of preparing for "limited nuclear war". The allegation seems to be that the fact that enhanced radiation warheads are designed as short-range and tactical weapons is evidence of this intention. The argument runs, very briefly, that alliance thinking about nuclear war is in the course of making a dangerous shift, that with the introduction of weapons that are more accurate or have more limited effect NATO is somehow moving away from the concept of deterrence and beginning to plan for nuclear war. This is a fallacy resting on a complete misconception. The fact is that the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is linked to their actual capability and that deterrence is designed to operate at every level. The only purpose for which the neutron weapon came into existence was to provide an effective counter to the threat of concentrated tank attacks, bearing in mind the almost three to one superiority that the Warsaw Pact has in armoured formations. Now in fact we know from the United States statement that no deployment is being considered at the present time. But the mere potential for deployment of the ERW will maintain balanced deterrence and will thus continue to prevent the risk of conflict. Deterrence, and the capacity to deal with any form of potential attack, are two sides of a single coin.

Turning to other matters, I should like to record that my Government was one of the co-authors and co-sponsors of the draft comprehensive programme of disarmament -- document CD/205 -- which was formally introduced in the Committee by the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany on 6 August. Our joint purpose in preparing a

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

draft for a complete programme in this way was to help the Ad Hoc Working Group to focus more fully on the likely end-product of its work, since it is difficult to decide on language for particular sections of the programme without seeing how these individual points will fit into an over-all whole. We hope that early in the next session the Working Group will be able to stand back from the detailed work it has been doing this year to discuss some of the crucial general issues, such as the question of the stages for implementation and the nature of the programme. As well as offering language on many aspects of a comprehensive programme of disarmament our draft is, I think, the first working paper to attempt to get to grips with these general and essential points. We hope it will be seen as a serious attempt to move the work of the Ad Hoc Group forward, and that the Group will discuss it fully at the beginning of next year.

Another agenda item in which we have taken particular interest is that dealing with negative security assurances. When I introduced the United Kingdom working paper (CD/177), I stressed that my delegation was willing to explore any approach in the search for effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On 14 April the distinguished representative of the Netherlands made a statement in which he outlined a possible formula for a common guarantee. The text of the Netherlands proposal was subsequently presented to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances and I wish to place it on record that my delegation continues to support the formula which Ambassador Fein proposed. I do not therefore perhaps agree with the statement by the distinguished representative of Pakistan this morning that all the nuclear-weapon States except China had stuck rigidly to their own narrow approach.

In concluding, I should like to say that we believe that delegations should draw at least modest satisfaction from the work that has been done in the Committee during this session. I know that many are disappointed that more signs of progress have not emerged from the working groups. But we should not deny the steady pace of our work on all subjects. In my view all four working groups have played an essential role in clarifying the positions of all our Governments. Without such clarification there would be no understanding of each other's positions; without such understanding, there can be no eventual agreement.

I could not end without thanking the four Chairmen of the ad hoc working groups, Ambassadors Lidgard, Komives and García Robles, and Mr. Ciarrapico. They have worked exceptionally hard throughout the year, and -- perhaps just as important -- they have made sure that delegations all worked hard too. And finally, I would like to thank all the members of the Secretariat, upon whose assistance we now rely even more heavily.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the United Kingdom for his statement and for the kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): I should like in this statement briefly to review some points relating to the vital interest of all peoples in a radical change being brought about in the international situation which has been created by the "existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race", a situation which called forth the justified alarm of the United Nations General Assembly because of the threat it implies to nothing less than "the very survival of mankind", to use the words of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I shall begin by saying how much we regret that the statements made by the representatives of the two nuclear Superpowers last Thursday have brought into the Committee on Disarmament, in this final stage of its 1981 session, a new blast of the cold war. Repeated and very recent declarations by the President of Mexico and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs reveal once again my country's energetic rejection of any attempt to revive the deplorable international conditions of the 1950s and the 1960s.

We were deeply disappointed that the statement with which one of those two representatives finally broke his long silence during this session which is now about to end contained so little that is encouraging as regards the implementation of the task entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament.

We are sure that certainly neither of the two Superpowers can aspire to a saint's halo where disarmament is concerned, particularly nuclear disarmament. We would, however, be prepared to pass over some imaginary descriptions we were given of the course of the nuclear arms race between 1960 and 1980, although the fact that such descriptions were given in this Committee would seem to imply a presumption that its members' knowledge of the subject is at the level of that of a primary school child. After all, anyone who wishes to obtain reliable information in this connection can easily find it in serious publications like those of the Stockholm institute known by the initials SIPRI or those of the Washington Center for Defense Information. The latter, for example, recently published the results -- extremely illustrative in this regard -- of a study made last year by an interdepartmental group consisting no less than of representatives of the Department of Defense, the Chiefs of Staff, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the National Security Council.

However, in the statement I mentioned, there are other aspects which indeed seem to us rather disturbing. I shall refer briefly to two of them, both of which emerge from the following paragraphs:

"Earlier this year, we had in this Committee a wide-ranging debate on deterrence. Many countries expressed and continue to express the view that deterrence is an abhorrent doctrine. But many nations and groups of nations, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, practise it ...

"The tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence, among other things, may be satisfying to the psyche, but it doesn't get us anywhere ... In the nation-State system that exists in the world today, the first duty of Governments towards their citizens is protection ... Progress toward disarmament can be helped if we accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be."

The first point to which I should like to draw attention is the statement contained in the last part of that quotation. The view there expressed that the security requirements of each State depend on its own judgement of them and that this judgement "is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be" is in direct contradiction with numerous provisions of the Final Document, such as, for example, paragraph 47 which, as we know, says:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"... Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons."

The strict application of the approach in question seems to us so incompatible with the spirit and the letter of the Final Document that we believe that if any State were to begin seriously to put it into practice, it ought to start thinking about giving up its membership of the Committee on Disarmament.

The second point to which I should also like to draw particular attention is the reference to "deterrence".

I should like to point out for a start that, perhaps inadvertently, the statement to which I have been referring omits to say that the deterrence discussed in the Committee, both at formal and at informal meetings has been deterrence based on nuclear weapons. My delegation expressed its position in this regard more than 12 years ago when, on 18 March 1969, at the opening meeting of the session of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament for that year, we said:

"We refuse to believe that the so-called deterrent power -- a formula that has regrettably been much abused -- of such weapons can be regarded as a positive factor justifying their existence. The fact that in the past 20 years we have had a precarious peace based on a frightening balance of terror is for us far from being a convincing argument.

"In the millions of years of pre-history which are usually divided into the Stone Age, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age it was enough for man to have the deterrent power of primitive weapons made from such materials; and during thousands of years of recorded history in which, we must not forget, for many periods over half a century long peace prevailed and the deterrent power never until quite recently went any further than the instruments of destruction, quite terrifying enough, that were based on TNT and dynamite. We cannot understand why today international peace and security should have to depend on weapons such as the nuclear weapons, the very existence of which entails the danger of universal suicide."

This is the kind of deterrence which we should like to disappear since, far from protecting international security, it carries with it an obvious danger for the survival of the human species. My delegation is in good company in this respect -- that of all the Members of the United Nations, including all the members of the Committee, unless there is anyone who would like to repudiate the solemn declarations embodied by consensus in the Final Document, for example:

"The attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind."

The passage I have just quoted comes from the very first paragraph of the Final Document. A little further on, in paragraph 11, the General Assembly declared:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

"The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it."

Two paragraphs later, in paragraph 13, the General Assembly made this emphatic statement which is particularly relevant to the subject we are dealing with here:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority."

As is clear from what I have said, my delegation has not found anything very encouraging in the statement made here on Thursday, 13 August, by the distinguished representative of the United States.

Fortunately, that very day, in distant California, the President of the United States made an announcement which on the contrary seems to us to justify moderately optimistic inferences: he stated that he had sent a letter to the President of the Soviet Union inviting him seriously to discuss disarmament at what it is customary to call a "summit meeting". Since this invitation is similar to the one issued earlier by the Soviet Head of State, my delegation considers it reasonable to expect that this meeting may become fact in the not too distant future.

Since, as it would seem, the President of the United States has expressed his desire that at the proposed meeting the two parties should discuss "what the peoples really want", my delegation would like now to make its modest contribution to that discussion, by expressing its view that what the peoples of the world essentially want in the sphere of disarmament can be summed up in the words of paragraphs 18 and 109 of the Final Document:

In the first of those paragraphs the General Assembly said that "Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day", and it concluded immediately thereafter that "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

In the second of those two paragraphs, the body that is the most representative of the international community agreed on the elaboration "of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated".

Mr. OKAWA (Japan): On behalf of my delegation, I wish to thank Ambassador Lidgard and Dr. Ericsson for the report they presented to us last Thursday, the progress report on the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make just a few comments in connection with the work of this Ad Hoc Group.

My delegation is aware that a second limited test of exchanges of seismic data over the WMO global telecommunications system network is to take place in October and November this year. Ambassador Walker of Australia referred to this test earlier this morning. It will be recalled that, when the previous progress report of the Ad Hoc Group was before us, on 13 February this year, I expressed the hope that all

(Mr. Okawa, Japan)

countries represented on the Group would find it possible to take part in the next trial exchange. That hope was expressed because only 14 countries had taken part in the trial exchange held in October and November last year. I am therefore glad to hear that 15 countries have already formally expressed their willingness to participate in this year's trial exchange and that a few more countries may be expected to do likewise. I am pleased to note that the name of a socialist country appears on the list of the 15, and I hope that many more socialist countries from eastern Europe will also find it possible to participate in this year's test.

I need hardly repeat that my Government has been continuously calling for an experimental exercise on a global scale and my delegation regards last year's and this year's trial exchanges as limited steps towards such a global experiment, although, frankly, the global experiment itself seems to me to be continuing to recede further into the future.

Reference is made in the progress report to "the use of seismographs and hydroacoustic instruments on the ocean bottom to improve the detection and identification capability for seismic events in the southern hemisphere" (paragraph 9 (a)). Japan has been making some progress in research and development in the field of ocean bottom seismographs. Indeed, Japanese seismographs placed on the ocean bottom off the south coast of Honshu have been in operation since the summer of 1979 and have been transmitting seismic data to land-based monitoring stations in Japan ever since, without interruption and without mishap. Japan has thus been making an important contribution to real-time observation of seismic activity for the past two years. Japan hopes to be able to continue its activities in this field in the years ahead.

My delegation has learnt from paragraph 10 of the progress report that the submission of a full formal report -- the long-awaited third report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts -- is now envisaged for the second part of next year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, or even later. We would have hoped that the third report could have been produced at least in time for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation understands, however, that the delay is due partly to the need to await the results of the trial exchange to be held in October and November, and has noted that an extended progress report is to be delivered to the Committee early in 1982.

Finally, I wish to thank Dr. Ericsson and the members of his Ad Hoc Group for the role they are continuing to play in working out international co-operative measures to detect and identify seismic events in anticipation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The CHAIRMAN: I now intend, with your permission, to suspend this meeting until 3 o'clock this afternoon. If there is no objection the meeting is suspended and we convene again at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 12.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic, as the co-ordinator of the group of socialist countries in the Committee on Disarmament, has the honour to make the following statement on its behalf.

The socialist countries which were co-sponsors of the draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559) express their profound conviction that it is urgently necessary, without any further delay, to take practical steps within the Committee in order to remove a grave new danger threatening mankind, the danger entailed by nuclear neutron weapons. Recent events connected with the adoption by the United States Government of a decision to proceed with the production of this barbarous means of mass destruction of persons make this task particularly urgent.

The decision to embark on the development of the production of neutron weapons will lead to a further lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold, that is, to an increase in the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war, and the entire responsibility for this will rest with the United States of America.

Assertions to the effect that the neutron warhead is somehow a "clean", a "humane" weapon are dangerous illusions. It is well-known to all that the neutron bomb is specially designed to destroy people and the consequences of its use persist for an extremely long period and adversely affect future generations.

It is therefore the task of all those who are concerned about the fate of the world and of the future of civilization to take practical steps to safeguard the foremost human right -- the right to life. The stockpiling of ever newer means of warfare must be resolutely opposed in favour of the alternative of limiting, reducing and ultimately eliminating armaments, including nuclear armaments. It is precisely this that the socialist countries have been consistently advocating, in the Committee on Disarmament as elsewhere.

As long ago as in 1973, the socialist States submitted for consideration by the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (document CCD/559). Unfortunately, as a result of opposition on the part of a number of States, that document has not yet received proper consideration by the Committee on Disarmament.

In view of the recent dangerous development in matters concerning the neutron weapon, the socialist States in the Committee on Disarmament wish to submit a formal proposal on the need for the urgent establishment within the Committee of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The ad hoc working group might take as the basis for its work the above-mentioned draft convention submitted by the socialist countries.

Naturally, the socialist countries would be prepared to consider any other constructive proposals aimed at the speediest possible prohibition of this particularly barbaric type of weapon of mass destruction.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In view of the urgency of the matter, the socialist countries request that the proposal they have put forward should be considered and a decision taken on it at the next meeting of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): A document has been circulated at the request of the Soviet delegation containing a statement by TASS on the decision of the United States Administration to embark on the scaled up production of neutron weapons. In addition to what was said in this connection by the Soviet delegation in its intervention of 13 August, I have been instructed to state the following.

With its decision to start the full-scale production of neutron weapons the United States Administration has taken a further step which will lead to the escalation of the arms race. In taking this decision, the United States seeks to acquire a weapon which would help it to put into practice its doctrine of a limited nuclear war. Neutron weapons are regarded as particularly suitable for confining a nuclear conflict to a given region, for example, Europe or the Middle East. Neutron weapons can also be installed on delivery systems which are not tied to specific regions, for example, those at the disposal of the "rapid deployment" forces or aboard United States naval vessels sailing around the entire globe. The introduction of neutron weapons essentially leads to the lowering of the nuclear threshold and increases the probability of the escalation of an armed conflict to the level of an all-out nuclear war.

The attempts by the United States Administration to minimize the dangers inherent in its decision by declaring that what is involved is only the production of neutron weapons and not their deployment in specific regions are futile. There can hardly be any doubt that the production of neutron weapons is merely an initial stage, which will be followed by pressure on the allies to secure their agreement to the deployment of neutron weapons on their territories.

The United States Administration's decision in many respects creates a new situation in the approach to the problem of the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. The production of neutron weapons will considerably hamper the ongoing disarmament negotiations. It can in no way serve as an appropriate overture to the negotiations on nuclear armaments in Europe. For the United States to believe that it will thus be able to strengthen its position at the proposed Soviet-American negotiations is a profound fallacy. The production of neutron weapons in conditions where Europe is already over-saturated with various types of weapons of mass destruction in fact diminishes European security.

The position of the USSR with regard to neutron weapons has been repeatedly set forth in statements by the leader of the Soviet State, L.I. Brezhnev, and other Soviet leaders. It is also reflected in formal statements and proposals by the USSR, and in particular in the draft convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons which was submitted to the Committee on Disarmament jointly with other socialist countries in March 1978. The reason why the United States and its NATO allies blocked the elaboration of such a convention in Geneva is now very obvious.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Every State is responsible for the way in which the situation in the matter of the production of neutron weapons will evolve. Not a single Government can stand aloof if it really cares for the interests of peace and the security of its own country. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet Union advocates the immediate establishment of a working group within the Committee on Disarmament for working out an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. As you know, a basis for negotiations in the working group exists. This is the draft of an appropriate international convention which was tabled by a group of socialist countries in 1970. The Committee cannot disregard this issue.

In taking its decision to produce neutron weapons, the United States Administration has assumed a heavy responsibility for the consequences this step will have for future developments in the international situation.

The Soviet Union of course cannot remain a passive onlooker in the situation which is taking shape now. It will draw conclusions from what is happening at present and, taking into account future developments, it will take appropriate measures to ensure the security of the Soviet people and its allies and friends. However, the Soviet Union firmly opposes any new upswing in the nuclear arms race.

Mr. KOMIVES (Hungary): In my statement today I would like to dwell briefly on a specific aspect of the unfolding latest round of the nuclear arms race, that is, on the recent decision of the United States Administration to start the production and deployment of nuclear neutron weapons, or, as it is called by that country's delegation, the enhanced radiation, reduced blast warhead. First of all I would like to put on record once again that the people and Government of the Hungarian People's Republic strongly condemn this decision of the United States Administration and consider it as a dangerous decision forming a part of its general quest to attain military superiority.

The Hungarian representative in the CCD in 1978 in one of his statements pointed out that "by its political influence the neutron bomb has already proved to be an effective instrument in the hands of those who strive to hinder détente and continue the escalation of the arms race". This happened in 1978 when, in view of the extremely condemnatory and hostile reaction of world public opinion, particularly in Europe, the United States Administration put off the execution of this inhumane plan turning the neutron weapon into some sort of "bargaining chip". Now the statement referred to is more valid than ever.

The recent decision of the United States Administration, however, turned this so-called "bargaining chip" into a horrifying reality of our days. Studying the records of the debates of the CCD in 1978 one cannot help but conclude that the hightmarish fears of world public opinion are coming true. The proponents of neutron weapons try to gain acceptance for the idea that a large-scale nuclear war could be avoided by the use of this new weaponry. In this connection the danger was emphasized that the relatively small yield and collateral damage will reduce the military and political restraint to use this weapon, thereby lowering the nuclear threshold. At the same time, the possible proliferation of this weapon was mentioned, with the consequence that if the weapon were to be deployed outside of Europe, in different parts of the world, the danger of a nuclear war would be greatly increased.

(Mr. Komives, Hungary)

Since the neutron weapon is meant by its proponents as a tactical "anti-tank" weapon, it was supposed that the command over it might be given to military commanders, including those of allied States. In this respect it was emphasized that the deployment of the neutron weapon would dangerously alter the over-all balance of power in Europe and would have unpredictable repercussions in relation to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by inducing some non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire this "easy-to-use" weapon. These are only some of the conclusions arrived at during the CCD's 1978 session.

In 1978, delegations of the socialist community in the CCD introduced a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

The Hungarian delegation shares the idea expressed by the representative of Bulgaria, Ambassador Voutov, in his intervention of 13 August 1981, that the Committee on Disarmament should consider the establishment of an ad hoc working group for the elaboration of an international convention on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons.

A group of socialist countries has presented an official proposal to the Committee in the form of a working paper urging the Committee to consider and take an appropriate decision in the nearest future to establish a working group with the task of elaborating an international convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The Hungarian delegation, as a co-sponsor of the draft convention of 1978, and of this latest proposal, urges the Committee to take prompt and effective measures.

In conclusion, I would like to reiterate the concern of my Government over the grave situation created by the decision of the United States to produce and deploy nuclear neutron weapons, which is a step strongly condemned by world public opinion including those who, it is planned, are to be defended by these weapons.

Mr. RUZEK (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all ask the indulgence of the Committee in taking the floor now when we all are looking forward to finishing our session, but I am doing so upon the instructions of my Government regarding a very serious matter.

But before I begin my remarks let me -- even if it is almost at the end of the session -- extend a warm welcome to you in Geneva knowing very well that you came exclusively for the purpose of chairing our Committee. Your performance as Chairman has undoubtedly been most helpful to the Committee during this final and difficult period. At the same time I would like to express our thanks to Ambassador Venkateswaran of India for the efficient and pleasant way he guided the work of the Committee during the month of July.

I asked for the floor first of all to support the proposal of a group of socialist countries, introduced a short while ago by the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia, Comrade Erdembileg, for the setting up of a working group to deal with the problem of neutron weapons.

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

In this connection I should like to make three remarks:

First, the most dangerous aspect of the decision to start the production of nuclear neutron weapons by the United States Government is that it will have as a consequence the lowering of the threshold at which nuclear weapons might be used. The fact that we are being told that one of the probable geographical areas for these weapons to be used is Europe must lead every responsible person to consider the serious consequences which would be contained in a scenario of an armed conflagration begun in the European theatre with the use of nuclear neutron weapons. Moreover, it is clear that the decision to start the production of nuclear neutron weapons by the United States Government cannot but complicate the situation as far as the ban on nuclear testing is concerned as well as the ban on nuclear weapons in general.

Secondly, the world is being told that nuclear neutron weapons are "defensive" weapons destined for defence against tanks, particularly on the European battlefield. Let us leave aside for the moment the question whether that is the true intention or not. One might also suppose that this contention is regarded as the only feasible way of securing the deployment of neutron warheads on the territory of west European countries. At the moment of course, the American officials speak only about the warheads of the Lance missile and the eight-inch howitzer shell. May I ask who would guarantee that once the production of nuclear neutron weapons begins it will only be these two warheads which will be produced? Who can guarantee that -- once a system like this exists -- it will not be used for offensive purposes? Who can guarantee that apart from the two warheads mentioned, a real bomb which can be dropped from an aircraft or put on a longer-range missile than the Lance will not be produced? I am convinced that for a military planner under certain circumstances the concentration of tanks does not differ so much from a concentration of economic units or population centres.

Thirdly, for many years it was believed that the Hiroshima and Nagasaki blasts were unique in that they produced a large field of fast neutrons, and that this led to a high frequency of cancer among the victims. According to new research being done especially at the Lawrence Livermore weapons laboratory in California as well as at a number of other research institutions, there is no reason for an assumption of the decisive role of neutrons in Hiroshima. The research completely changes the scheme of radiation doses that people are supposed to have received particularly in Hiroshima, and has serious implications on the concept of the radiation effects of nuclear weapons. One of the important implications is that the neutron weapon is really a new weapon in its principle, with far more dangerous neutron radiation effects having no relevant precedent.

As one of the well-known experts in this field, Professor Jorma Hietinen of Finland, pointed out already four years ago:

"Introduction of the enhanced radiation warhead with its new weapons effects would force all countries to start a lot of new research ... on nuclear weapons effects and new approaches to radiation protection ..."

(Mr. Ruzek, Czechoslovakia)

The enhanced radiation weapons are advertised as "small" and "clean" weapons. In fact, they are "clean" only for buildings, not for any living beings. Neutron weapons would kill soldiers in hours or days when the dose was huge, 800 to 1,800 rads ... i.e. within 1 km or so from the explosion. But many more soldiers, as well as civilians in cities at a greater distance, would get doses between 200-600 rads, doses which would kill a part of the victims slowly and painfully within weeks or months, leaving those who did not die invalid, living "dummies" like many of the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for the rest of their lives. The survivors and all who received doses smaller than 200 rads would have an increased risk of deleterious genetic effects ..."

As is well known, the socialist countries introduced in the CCD on 10 March 1978 a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons (CCD/559). At that time nuclear neutron weapons were regarded only as a potential system of weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime the production of components and now the assembly of the whole weapon has become a reality. Under such circumstances the establishment of a working group which would start negotiations on a treaty prohibiting nuclear neutron weapons has become a matter of the utmost urgency.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Czechoslovakia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. CIARRAPICO (Italy) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, as this is the first time this month that I am taking the floor on behalf of my delegation, I should like first of all to offer you my sincere congratulations and those of my delegation on your accession to the chairmanship of the Committee. During this period of intense activity preceding the closure of our annual session you have shown great skill and I have no doubt that we can count fully on your eminent qualities in guiding us during the rest of our work and in concluding that work in the most satisfactory manner possible.

I should like at the same time to take this opportunity to express my appreciation and gratitude and those of my delegation for the very active contribution made to our efforts by your distinguished predecessor, Ambassador Venkateswaran of India. I have asked for the floor in order to thank Dr. Ericsson who, last Thursday, submitted to the Committee the report on the twelfth session of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events. My delegation would like to congratulate him, and the members of his Group, for the serious way in which they have done their work over the years, and for the results they have obtained. My country is very much interested in the further pursuance of this work.

There are some encouraging aspects, mentioned in the progress report, which we should like to stress. Dr. Ericsson himself drew our attention to these aspects when he presented the report last Thursday. There is, for instance,

(Mr. Ciarrapico, Italy)

the prospect of greater participation in future experimental data exchanges by countries situated in the southern hemisphere; this will be important in helping to make possible an evaluation of the world telecommunications system of the World Meteorological Organization on a truly global scale. Then, in paragraph 9 of the report, there are some interesting indications concerning the advantages that may be derived from more recent developments in seismology and associated techniques.

There is, finally, a list of subjects on which further studies are desirable.

While noting the above facts with satisfaction, we should like to go beyond the confines of the report and offer some comments, here and now, on the question of the possible renewal of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. This is a question which will in all probability arise towards the middle of next year. It is one to which we should give some thought during the interval before the resumption of the Committee's work. While aware of the difficulties which exist in this connection, my delegation for its part is convinced that once the present work has been successfully completed, the Group of Scientific Experts should go a step further and tackle the problem of the discrimination of seismic events. If we do not want the world system for the exchange of seismological data which we are in the process of testing to become a source of contradictory declarations, we must study and identify discrimination methods which could be generally and uniformly adopted. For this purpose, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts should be given a broader mandate which would enable it to discuss and compare the different methods of discrimination with a view to identifying scientifically valid methods likely to meet with general approval.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Italy for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to myself.

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, in a few days' time, the Committee on Disarmament will wind up its 1981 annual session. It has been a year of hectic negotiating activity at least with respect to some items on our agenda. Although we are naturally disappointed that actual agreements have not yet emerged on these items, we believe that the work accomplished during these last several months has laid the basis hopefully for concrete progress to be made during the next session. This is especially true of negotiations on chemical weapons. However, it is a matter of deep regret to my delegation that the Committee was unable to initiate multilateral negotiations on two of the most urgent items on its agenda -- namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. It is our conviction that unless the Committee makes sufficient progress in finding solutions to the most urgent problems which have a bearing on the very survival of mankind and which affect the security and well-being of all nations, its credibility as the sole multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament is bound to be seriously undermined. The prospects for a successful outcome to the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament would also, as a consequence, be adversely affected.

The need for redoubled efforts in the field of disarmament has recently been underscored by the decision by one nuclear-weapon State to manufacture and deploy neutron weapons. The Indian delegation deplures this latest development which will no doubt herald a new round in the qualitative nuclear arms race. Speaking at a press conference in Nairobi on 12 August, the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, expressed great concern over the confrontation between the big

(Mr. Venkateswavan, India)

Powers and the danger arising from the continuing arms race, including the manufacture of neutron bombs. This morning, the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico made a very important statement and my delegation endorses several of the pertinent observations made by him. We share his concern at some of the ideas expressed in this august body, particularly by the distinguished representative of the United States in his statement last week.

We have heard two interesting statements at our last plenary meeting, on 13 August -- one from the delegation of the United States of America and the other from that of the USSR. I would like to express my delegation's views on some of the issues raised by these two delegations.

The representative of the United States seemed somewhat perturbed by what he called "the tendency in the Committee to adopt a high moral tone in preaching about the evils of deterrence". My delegation is not aware that anyone here had "preached" sermons about any "evil" or had adopted "a high moral tone". In any event, we are not really concerned about such subjective reactions. But we would like to place on record our position on the question of deterrence. It is certainly true that nations practise deterrence against their perceived adversaries. In a certain sense, the Charter of the United Nations itself can be seen as a declaration of deterrence against war, against want, against the violation of human rights and rights of nation-States, etc. What we have drawn attention to are the dangers and risks inherent in the practice of the doctrine of deterrence with nuclear weapons, whose use could pose a threat to the survival of mankind. The nuclear-weapon States have themselves recognized that a nuclear war would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Those who feel this threat, especially we the non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States, and therefore speak about it and strive to avert a nuclear war, cannot be said to be adopting a high moral tone or preaching about the evils of deterrence. This is tantamount to accusing a potential victim of "wrongfully" objecting to his undeserved slaughter!

It is not to justify our psyche or to score any debating points that we speak of the danger of nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence. We speak of such issues for a simple yet compelling reason -- the desire to survive. Survival is hardly a moral question. For most of us, I would imagine, it is a matter of considerable practical consequence.

The distinguished representative of the United States has also stated that we must accept the reality that each State is going to maintain that its own judgement of its security requirements is not subject to challenge, no matter what others may think or what the realities may be. We are not here to challenge the security perceptions of one or another State. But we do consider it necessary that in the process of evolving an enduring system of international peace and security, we must also take account of the security perceptions of all States. Implicit in the process of negotiations is the willingness to consider the security concerns of others and to the extent possible, to modify one's own policies and positions. If we regard our current security perceptions as immutable, then I am afraid we would have already closed the door to any possible harmonization of divergent views and dashed any hope of evolving a just and equitable regime of world peace and security.

There is another, more fundamental problem which we have with the position stated by Ambassador Flowerree. Agreed that each State has the right to protect its own security in the manner it deems most appropriate. However, are there no limits to this right? As we have asked repeatedly before, is it permissible for a handful of nuclear-weapon States to endanger the survival of other States, of mankind as a whole,

(Mr. Venkateswavan, India)

in the pursuit of their perceived security interests? Is it permissible for a State to adopt security policies and strategies which, while deterring a perceived adversary, also, at the same time, jeopardize the vital security interests of third States, who are neither involved nor regarded as a threat? The doctrine of nuclear deterrence appears to be based on the assumption that in fact some States do have unlimited rights to pursue what they regard as their legitimate security concerns and that others may be sacrificed to their sacred concepts. My delegation categorically rejects such a doctrine.

While the representative of the United States devoted the greater part of his statement to informing this Committee of what, in fact, lies behind the security concerns of the United States, the representative of the Soviet Union also gave us an insight into what underlies the anxieties felt by the USSR.

The group of non-aligned and neutral non-nuclear-weapon States have for their part clearly and consistently stated what their primary security concerns are, especially on nuclear issues. We are, therefore, in this multilateral negotiating body, in a position to look at the problem of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, from an objective angle. We are perhaps in a better position to understand the mutual anxieties of the two major Powers as well as the apprehension of the vast majority of States belonging to the developing world. For example, we have been given a picture of theatre nuclear weapons deployed in Europe as it appears to the Soviet Union and to the United States. Could not some of the mutual apprehensions felt by these two major Powers in this regard be removed? Should we not make an effort in this Committee to do so?

Again, it is clear from the Soviet statement that it considers what it regards as parity or balance to be upset each time there is a move to "modernize" weapons and their systems. It is also clear from that statement that the Soviet Union will not permit the other side to upset what it regards as the existing parity. Given these perceptions (which we ourselves do not subscribe to), should not both sides reflect upon the consequences of decisions to introduce new and modernized weapons? For, if each side continues "mirror-imaging" the fears, anxieties and perceived intentions of the other, the arms race would of course become magnified and have no finishing post at all. Does this also not point to the need for our Committee to examine these aspects with a view to breaking this vicious circle of action and reaction?

We sincerely believe that there is room for the two major Powers to reconcile their main differences. Secretary Haig stated recently that the United States and the USSR have to "search for co-operation to protect mankind". We trust that this is a practical imperative and not a moral issue. However, as far as the Committee on Disarmament is concerned, I would say that not only must the major Powers, including the United States and the USSR, co-operate to protect mankind but that all the delegations represented here have an equally significant role to play in pursuing that objective. We trust, therefore, that we can raise this question in the Committee on Disarmament without being charged with moral pretensions. For this appears to us to be plain common sense to protect mankind and ensure its survival.

I would like to conclude this statement by expressing the hope that we in this Committee will deal with the causes underlying the arms race, because this is fundamental to disarmament negotiations. As Ambassador Flowerree has said, the root causes of war and international tension have been ignored by our predecessors. We are ready to join him and all others in this Committee in ensuring that the Committee on Disarmament is not found guilty of dereliction of its responsibilities to the international community.

Mr. SKINNER (Canada): Mr. Chairman, we note that the initiative concerning neutron weapons comes from a group of countries which poses a nuclear threat to Europe and indeed to ourselves. We hope that the scruples they have expressed on enhanced radiation warheads also apply to their own devastating nuclear capacity. If not, we should accordingly draw our own conclusions. I shall comment briefly today on one aspect of the Committee's recent discussion on nuclear questions, particularly in their horizontal dimension. On 21 July, the distinguished deputy representative of India made a lengthy intervention largely concerning a Canadian statement the previous week. Although I will not comment on the parts of the intervention in which he describes the Indian view on nuclear disarmament, I am compelled to address those parts where the deputy permanent representative may have misunderstood the intent of Canadian views as Ambassador McPhail expressed them. The first is that in which the Canadian statement is described as asserting an apologia for the continuing nuclear arms race among the nuclear-weapon States. The Canadian Government has been working for many years to promote concrete and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements. I need not review and describe these efforts. Let me simply say that the continuation of the SALT process and the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty are Canada's top priorities in arms control and disarmament, and we look forward to the forthcoming bilateral talks aimed at controlling long-range theatre nuclear forces in Europe. While the Canadian statement also insisted on the importance of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to States not now possessing them, we do not consider it constructive to be told that it is only a small step from there to espousing two positions which my Government most emphatically does not espouse.

Canada fully shares the sense of frustration and impatience reflected in the Indian representative's words at the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. But I deeply regret that Canada's concern about the risks of horizontal nuclear proliferation was linked to the suggestion that we support any further growth of nuclear arsenals, or that Canada advocates the acceptance of an indefinite continuation of the nuclear have and have-not division. The nuclear arms area is one where Canada wishes that all States were equal as have-nots.

This Committee is supposed to be a place for negotiation. Perhaps some of those who have spoken today should bear this in mind. However, it might be useful to reply to the question posed by our distinguished Indian colleague about what was meant by the concept of balance in nuclear disarmament as described in the Canadian intervention. Ambassador Summerhayes has just spoken clearly on the matter. It may indeed have been situated primarily in an East-West context, but the concept itself was meant to be that which we believe is behind paragraph 49 of the Programme of Action adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which states that "the process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way ... that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments".

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, if attention to my delegation and mention of its name in this forum was any measure of popularity, I am sure that the United States would be at the top of the list by now. At any rate, I do feel that there are a few things that have been said that require me to make a response, and in view of the late hour I will not respond on all aspects of the points which have been made with which I disagree. This morning we heard the Vice-Minister of Cuba noting that his delegation had circulated a statement on biological warfare, document CD/211, "which might be useful to the Committee in its work" -- those were

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

his words. The United States has examined this document and has found it to be tendentious and completely without foundation in fact. The Cuban Government should be aware of the fact that the United States destroyed all its biological weapons stocks and ceased all production some five years before the entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention to which the United States is a party. On 27 July of this year the United States rejected the suggestion that the outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba was caused by any action of the United States. Our spokesman said that this latest charge, like earlier ones about sugar rust, tobacco mould and swine fever, was totally without foundation. Now, what was not mentioned in the statement by Mr. Castro which was circulated to the Committee is that the United States Government, in line with its general policy of humanitarian concern, has co-operated with the Pan-American Health Organization in helping to stem this latest outbreak of dengue fever in Cuba. On 17 July the Department of Commerce of the United States received a licence application from the Pan-American Health Organization to export to Cuba 300 metric tons of abate, a United States-made granular pesticide which is used to kill the mosquitoes that spread dengue fever. The application was approved expeditiously, on the same day. There are substitute products made in other countries for dealing with dengue fever, but Cuba and the Pan-American Health Organization preferred the United States-made product as being the most effective and efficient.

There is another point which I wish to take up. It has to do with the discussion that we have had on neutron weapons. There are several points that have been made by different speakers, some that were made by the representative of the Soviet Union last Thursday; I will not address all of them, but there are two, at the moment, to which I would like to call attention. One point was addressed in part by our British colleague this morning. It had to do with what is called the United States forward-based systems. The capabilities in these systems reside largely in submarines and aircraft-carriers. The proper response to those forward-based systems is certainly not a land-based missile with multiple warheads. The number of warheads which the Soviet Union has accumulated in the SS-20 system is now well over 700 and is growing weekly. But you do not sink submarines or aircraft-carriers, or shoot down airplanes with SS-20 land-based surface-to-surface missiles, and those more than 700 warheads are far beyond the needs for fixed targets in Europe. One then must ask oneself what they are for.

There is another point about neutron weapons which I think needs to be cleared up, and that is what is the nature of the weapon. I am not at this point speaking about whether it is a good or a bad weapon; I just want to explain what the weapon is. All nuclear weapons create blast, heat and what is called prompt radiation and fallout, which is delayed radiation. Each of these characteristics can be enhanced or suppressed in building the weapons, depending on their military purposes. The enhanced radiation weapon, the radiation warhead, is a fission-fusion device, a small hydrogen fusion bomb with an atomic fission trigger that enhances the prompt radiation characteristics while reducing blast, heat and fallout. The enhanced radiation weapon is designed primarily for anti-tank warfare; a small enhanced radiation weapon can penetrate a tank's armour and immobilize the tank with its prompt radiation effects without causing significant blast or thermal damage to surrounding areas. Now, we have never advertised this as being anything but a weapon, and weapons kill. But our Soviet colleague somehow or other thinks that death from an SS-20 half-megaton warhead might be more pleasant than death from a neutron weapon. Well, I heard him say that this neutron weapon can penetrate concrete bunkers -- I am pretty sure that he would not like to be in that concrete bunker when the warhead of a Soviet medium-range missile exploded overhead.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

One final point. Since the subject has been brought up by two of our colleagues today -- and I am glad to see that people do read my speeches -- I would like to make a brief comment about this business of deterrence. In regard to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Mexico this morning, I am sorry that he chose to quote only selectively from my statement of 13 August regarding deterrence. I am sure that a full reading would make clear the valid point I was making, so with your indulgence, I will read a part of the statement that was left out. I described the fact that deterrence had been used for many purposes by Governments, or had been in long use by Governments, over many years, and then said: "Deterrence has its virtues, but it is naive to hope that it can continue to serve indefinitely into the future. We would all prefer to live in a world in which that doctrine and the military forces which support it were unnecessary. Nevertheless, with the best of will on all sides, arms and the impulses which cause nations to use them are not likely to be brought fully under control in the near future." I wish that were not our judgement, but it happens to be our judgement and I think that very many people here would share it. Now, in the statement by the distinguished representative of India this afternoon, he talked about the terrible consequences of a nuclear war, which we share fully and understand. Our point of difference is that we think that deterrence makes nuclear war less likely, and that is the premise on which we have been proceeding for a long time. We know it is not the best system; in fact I said that in this very Chamber in my statement on 7 April, I went into great detail about the possible dangers to the world -- dangers to the world as a whole -- of dismantling deterrence on a unilateral basis. So, I hope that my statement will be read in its entirety and not be mistaken as an advocacy of deterrence as a long-term solution to our problems. Finally, in closing, I am glad to see that the representative of India and the representative of Mexico cited Secretary of State Haig and President Reagan in statements that indicated their understanding of the concerns which preoccupy this Committee and the fact that they are interested in doing something about it.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I too should like to comment briefly on some of the statements which have been made today and at recent meetings. First of all I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to the fact that the question of medium-range missiles does not form the subject of negotiations in the Committee. This is a very complex question and affects the interests of a large group of States and preliminary consultations are at present under way, or rather, I should say, could be under way with a view to such negotiations. The Soviet delegation has not brought these questions before the Committee for its consideration. We do not quite understand why the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany considered it necessary to make this question the subject of negotiations or discussions in the Committee, quoting various figures which were not in accordance with the facts, and obliging us on 13 August to give an explanation in this connection. Apparently that was not sufficient. Today the representative of the United Kingdom decided to continue the discussion on a question which, I repeat, does not form the subject of negotiations in the Committee.

As regards neutron weapons, this is a question which is certainly within the competence of the Committee, for the simple reason that questions concerning the limitation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament constitute the second item on the agenda and naturally the Committee is entitled to discuss those questions. A draft agreement on this subject was put before the Committee as long ago as in 1978. The views of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in this connection have

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

already been expressed here. I found it very unpleasant to hear the neutron bomb being lauded; I do not think that such advertising redounds to the credit of those responsible for it. We should like once again to emphasize the essential fact about the neutron bomb. The essential fact is a political one. The essential political fact about it is very simple; there is no need to go into details about its technical characteristics. The essential political fact about the neutron bomb is that it brings nuclear war nearer to us. Whereas nuclear war was at a certain distance away from us, now it has come much closer to the realities of the day. In what exactly does the essential political fact about the neutron bomb consist? It consists in the terrible danger that this weapon represents and in the basic difference between it and other types of advanced medium-range missiles, including those referred to in his statement by Ambassador Flowerree. And a last point. But I am referring to this only because of the rather recent date of the participation of the representative of Canada in the work of the Committee. Otherwise I cannot explain how he could have asked why countries which put forward a proposal for the prohibition of neutron weapons do not advocate the prohibition of the nuclear capacity which they themselves possess. I would draw the attention of the representative of Canada to document CD/4 which is in the archives of the Committee on Disarmament. I would recommend him to read it. He would see that the Soviet Union and a large group of other socialist countries put forward a proposal for the starting of negotiations on nuclear disarmament. It is not the fault of the Soviet Union or of the socialist countries but undoubtedly that of Canada's allies that these negotiations have not yet begun. We were ready for these negotiations and we are still ready for them today. With the appearance of the neutron bomb we consider that it has become all the more urgent to undertake these negotiations.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): We are in the habit of hearing the United States delegation deny various accusations that have been made by Cuba only to see, a short time later, in official documents of the United States Senate itself or in statements issued by that country's leaders, a recognition of the truth of the charges made by Cuba at a time when they were denied. We might recall in this connection the 'mercenaries' invasion of the Girón beach, or the Bay of Pigs as it is known in United States literature, when, although the United States Ambassador to the United Nations denied the participation of the United States in the preparation and financing of and the provision of air support for that invasion, a few days later the President of the United States himself acknowledged the full responsibility of the United States Government.

During the decades of the 1960s and 1970s the Cuban Government made repeated charges, after capturing the actual agents, of plans for the assassination of our leaders, all of which were at that time also denied by the United States Government. In the recent investigations by the United States Senate into the activities of the CIA, the authenticity and veracity of all that we said about such plans were fully recognized.

We are grateful to Ambassador Flowerree for referring to this matter, although we are still awaiting a response to the fundamental question put by the Cuban Government to the United States Government as to whether its plans for aggression and blockade against our country are being maintained. We do not deny that on 17 July the United States Government gave the authorization to which Ambassador Flowerree referred. However, we can state with assurance that by 27 July not one gramme of the disinfectants needed to deal with that pest had arrived.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

The suspicions of our people are based on the experienced facts of 20 years of aggression, blockades and attempted assassinations. We would not wish it to happen that a short time from now, in one of the memoranda of one of the generals or departmental Secretaries or some other such person, there should appear an acknowledgement of the truth of Cuba's charge and suspicion in this connection and a refutation of what Ambassador Flowerree has claimed.

The CHAIRMAN: As I announced at the beginning of this plenary meeting, I intend to put before the Committee for approval the recommendation contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events contained in document CD/210. In particular, the Ad Hoc Group suggested that the next session should be convened from 1-12 March 1982, in Geneva.

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee approves the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group. I see no objection.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with our time-table for the present week, I will convene now, in five minutes' time, an informal meeting of the Committee to continue our consideration of Working Paper No. 44 containing the draft report to the United Nations General Assembly, as well as Working Paper No. 45, entitled "Draft decision containing proposals for the functioning of the Committee on Disarmament."

The next plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament will be held on Thursday, 20 August, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/PV.148
20 August 1981
ENGLISH

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 20 August 1981, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch. A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Algeria:</u>	Mr. A. SALAH-BEY
<u>Argentina:</u>	Mr. J.C. CARSALES Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO Ms. N. NASCIBENE
<u>Australia:</u>	Mr. R.A. WALKER Mr. R. STEELE
<u>Belgium:</u>	Mr. J. ONKELINX Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE
<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. P. VOUTOV Mr. I. SOTIROV
<u>Burma:</u>	U SAW HLAING U HGWE VIN U THAN HTUN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. C.R. SKINNER
<u>China:</u>	Mr. YU Peiwen Mr. YU Mengjia Mr. LI Changhe Mr. YANG Mingliang Mr. SA Benwang Mrs. WANG Zhiyun Mr. PAN Jusheng
<u>Cuba:</u>	Mr. L. SOLA VILL Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. P. LUKES Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIEBLICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS
Mrs. H. HOPPE

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER
Mr. W. RÖHR

Hungary: Mr. I. KÓMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. Ch. A. SANI
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT
Mr. SOEPRAPTO

Iran: Mr. A. JALALI

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG

Morocco:
Mr. M. ARRASSEN
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:
Mr. R.H. FEIN
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:
Mr. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:
Mr. J. BENAVIDES

Poland:
Mr. B. SUJKA
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ

Romania:
Mr. O. IONESCU
Mr. T. MELESCANU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. APLIHAKKARA

Sweden:
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. H. BERGLUND
Mr. J. LUNDIN
Mr. C.-M. HYLTENIUS
Mr. L. NORBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELIAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHLIN

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J. LUNK

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIGUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Zaire:

Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary General:

Mr. F. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the Committee:

Mr. V. BERSATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: In conformity with the programme of work for the present week, the Committee continues today its consideration of the item dealing with reports of subsidiary bodies, as well as the annual report to the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Before we listen to the statements of members who have put their names down to speak today, I would like to invite the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons to introduce the reports of those Working Groups. The reports are contained in document CD/217 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, and in document CD/220 for the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In my capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on The Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, I have the honour of introducing the Group's report to the Committee on Disarmament on its work during the 1981 session.

I shall do this very briefly, both because I am well aware of the need to save as much of the little time remaining to the Committee as possible, and because I feel that the report is -- as is usually said in such cases, although here it is particularly apt -- self-explanatory, especially in view of the fact that the text is supplemented by a full, detailed and well-documented annex which contains the results of the examination of the measures which could form stage I of the programme.

I think that the conclusions appearing in paragraph 17 of the report are balanced and realistic since, although the Working Group has been able to make considerable progress in the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament during the 24 meetings it has held this year, much still remains to be done to resolve certain issues which, as stated in the report, are "important and complex". These issues undoubtedly include those relating to the stages of implementation and the nature of the Programme, to which reference was already made in paragraphs 13 and 15 of last year's report and which, as indicated in paragraph 16 of this year's report, were briefly considered at the first two meetings in 1981.

When the work of the Committee resumes next year -- and the Working Group has recommended that this should take place on 11 January 1982 -- it will be necessary to go into these questions more thoroughly, as would seem to be necessary for the consideration of working papers CD/CPD/WP.36/Add.2 and 3, and CD/CPD/WP.52, which could not be considered during the current session, as the report states, for lack of time.

I should like to mention here that, at the closing session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on 17 August, I suggested to the members of the Group that it would be useful if, at the start of the Group's work next year, it could agree on a deadline for the submission of new proposals. Obviously the word "proposals" in this context should be understood to mean only proposals on the comprehensive programme as a whole or any of its substantive chapters as a whole. Thus it would not apply to those proposals for additions, amendments or deletions which will no doubt frequently be made during the consideration of the paragraphs of those chapters, and for which no deadline would be established.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Lastly, I can think of no better way of concluding this brief statement than by saying how much I appreciated the spirit of co-operation shown by all the representatives who took part in the work of the Committee and expressing my sincere gratitude to Miss Aída Luisa Levín of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament for her superlative work as Secretary of the Ad Hoc Working Group, which culminated in the preparation of the report in document CD/217, to which I have been referring, and of the very detailed and complicated annex to that report. I am also grateful to all the other members of the Secretariat, both visible and invisible, as we usually say, who lent the Group their assistance, and especially the interpreters, who so often showed their goodwill by going on performing their task well beyond normal working hours.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, I have the honour to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons, as contained in document CD/220.

The work of the Group was carried out under the same mandate as in 1980, which many delegations regretted, since they would have preferred a revised mandate which would have enabled the Group to initiate negotiations on the text of a convention. Nevertheless it was generally agreed that the Group made substantive progress during its 1981 session. During this year's session the Group carried out another substantive and more detailed examination of the issues to be dealt with in the negotiation of a convention on chemical weapons. This work was carried on during the first part of the session on the basis of the outline suggested by the Chairman, and of which I have given a more detailed account in the form of a progress report as contained in document CD/179 of 23 April 1981. I think one can say that the main benefit of this exercise was that all delegations secured a thorough introduction to the various issues and had an extensive exchange of views on them.

This summer the Working Group has considered draft elements which originally were presented by the Chairman. The main part of the report contains those elements, after they have been revised on the basis of statements and other comments by the members of the Group. It was my intention thus to elaborate the initial framework for a future chemical weapons convention, which could facilitate further work. The revised elements do not, however, reflect all the views which emerged on certain issues and they include elements on which delegations' views differed. Some delegations did not deem it advisable at the present stage to enter into discussion on certain elements, in particular some related to the issues of verification. These delegations considered that it was too early to do this until general agreement had been reached on the scope of the prohibitions. Other delegations, however, did express their opinions on these elements, since they considered that they could be examined at the present stage of the work and would contribute to future negotiations. As you will notice, under each element there are comments which contain dissenting views. Sometimes, but not always, there are also comments which record the positions of delegations which opposed these dissenting views. Of course, delegations reserved their right to consider these and other proposals further at the appropriate time.

The report contains a series of recommendations in connection with consultations which the Chairman held on issues relating to toxicity determination. The first of these recommendations is that the Committee should take note of the report of those consultations, as contained in CD/CW/WP.22/Rev.1, of 23 July 1981, and consider it a suitable basis for delegations to prepare further work on methods to be agreed for toxicity determinations for a chemical weapons convention.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

The second recommendation is that certain specified technical questions on toxicity determination should be discussed at the Committee's 1982 session. It is pointed out in that context that **expertise**, particularly in toxicology, as well as scientific and technical background material, which may be provided by delegations, will be of value for such discussions.

The third recommendation is that further consultations, similar to those held this year, should take place in the week 1 - 5 March 1982 on the technical issues I have just referred to, unless the Committee decides otherwise at the beginning of its 1982 session.

The fourth and final recommendation is that questions related to possible applications of toxicity criteria in a chemical weapons convention should be taken up in the Committee in the week thereafter.

The conclusions of the report principally reaffirm that the prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction is one of the most urgent measures of disarmament and that the conclusion of such a convention is of the highest priority in multilateral negotiations. The urgency of achieving concrete results to this end was especially recognized in the light of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The Group found that after this year's work a convergence of views had emerged on many issues, but that some important divergencies of view still existed on certain elements. The Group expressed its hope that the Committee would take due account of the results of its work, as presented in the report, so that it would contribute to the process of negotiating and elaborating a chemical weapons convention. Finally, the Group has recommended that the Committee should at the beginning of its 1982 session re-establish the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons with an appropriately revised mandate, which will enable the Committee to build upon the areas of convergence and to resolve the differences of views which were identified by the Group during the 1980 and 1981 sessions, so as to achieve agreement on a chemical weapons convention at the earliest date.

If you permit me, I wish to conclude this presentation of the report by expressing my sincere appreciation of all the important and valuable contributions which delegations have given to our endeavour in the Working Group. I have been deeply convinced of the earnest will of everybody to reach a positive and final result in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention as soon as possible. Our work has sometimes been hard; our endurance may have been tested, but the spirit of co-operation which has prevailed all through our work has been the finest reward I could have received. As I have said on another occasion, the possibility of the survival of the elements which we have elaborated rests entirely on their own strength: I am moderately optimistic in that respect.

My sincere thanks also go to Mrs. Liselotte Waldheim-Natural for her very skilful and experienced assistance as Secretary of the Working Group, as well as to her assistants in the secretariat and to the interpreters for their valuable collaboration.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament and of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons for their statements introducing the reports of the Working Groups. I intend to take up the reports of the four Working Groups for consideration and action by the Committee later today, after we conclude our list of speakers and other pending business.

In view of the number of statements to be made at this plenary meeting, we might need to suspend the plenary and continue this afternoon. Immediately after the afternoon meeting I intend to convene an informal meeting of the Committee to consider the concluding paragraphs under various sections of the report of the Committee to the General Assembly of the United Nations, as agreed upon in the drafting group which has been meeting during the last few days.

Mr. ONKELINX (Belgium) (translated from French): As the work of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament draws to a close, our delegation would like to make some general comments on the results of our deliberations -- results which, although not entirely negative, are, as everyone will agree, rather meagre.

Despite the difficulties involved in this exercise of reflection, we finally decided to embark on it because it seemed to us essential, in the present political circumstances, to try to draw the lessons of the recent past in order the better to prepare ourselves for coming events and the future work of our Committee.

Our first comment will concern the meagre concrete results achieved in terms of negotiation, during the 1981 session. It is true that the main reason for this situation, which all of us must regret, is the deterioration in international relations since the end of 1979.

Our 1980 session also concluded without substantial results.

However, if we look back beyond the past two years, we have to admit that the second half of the 1970s was very unproductive in the disarmament sphere, and that for nearly 10 years now real possibilities for negotiation at the multilateral level have ceased to exist.

Thus, although events of a political nature and disturbances of the balance have recently given rise to action -- reaction phenomena which are hardly propitious for achievements in disarmament matters, the international community ought also to try to perceive the more remote and perhaps deeper reasons why our achievements have petered out and most of our efforts have failed.

In the difficult period through which we are passing, the Committee on Disarmament has not been capable of providing the smallest chance of progress, however slight, in an effort to restart a process which has come to a halt.

Rather than trying to identify the categories or groups of countries responsible for this regrettable situation, the Belgian delegation considers it more useful for the future of our efforts to offer some very general comments on our methods of action and the use we make of the remarkable instrument we have in our Committee.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

In the first place, the 1981 session, as compared with the preceding session, will at least have had the merit that we have concentrated our attention more on the programme of work which we ourselves adopted, and that we have avoided engaging in political and procedural discussions which have nothing to do with the negotiating function of this Committee.

And it is undoubtedly this task of negotiation that we ought all to think about more when we are considering our actions and our statements. For although for the most part we have managed to avoid procedural debates in our work, nevertheless it has too often been burdened by rhetorical speeches and academic discussions which have in no way helped us to make progress on the subjects under negotiation in the Committee.

If we want in the future to try to achieve really concrete results in the spheres of negotiation, our delegations ought not, I think, to allow themselves to be distracted by overly theoretical subjects the discussion of which, in our view, falls rather within the competence of such forums as the General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

A stricter adherence to the differentiation in the nature of the various United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament problems would, it seems to me, help prevent the occurrence in the Committee on Disarmament of discussions that are more appropriate to the international deliberative bodies.

However, to revert to the Committee's work at its present session, we may ask ourselves whether we have in fact fulfilled our mandate for negotiation when we have had an opportunity to do so. Unfortunately, it seems to us that real efforts to seek the necessary compromises have been relatively rare. All too frequently, delegations have simply repeated their positions and arguments ad nauseam, without once trying to provide an opening for a possible compromise. The best example is undoubtedly the work on the prohibition of radiological weapons, where each delegation has stuck to its position, although progress appeared possible in the negotiations. When we resume our work in 1982, we shall have to consider propositions other than those that divide us if we want to be able to conclude our work on this matter.

Similarly, with regard to the comprehensive programme of disarmament, for which we have a mandate with an absolute time-limit, our efforts, which will undoubtedly be resumed very early in January, will demand clarity of purpose, realism and the will to succeed on the part of all the groups if we wish to avoid presenting the General Assembly at its second special session on disarmament with a mosaic of points of view which ultimately prove irreconcilable.

With regard to chemical weapons, we particularly appreciated the fact that the Working Group was able, with the agreement of all participants, to develop the elements of a possible agreement, and that despite the limitations imposed by a rather restrictive mandate. However, if we really wish to make progress towards the conclusion of a treaty, we must reach agreement at the next session on accepted formulas or it will be almost impossible to reconcile the great conceptual differences which still exist.

With regard to security assurances, here too some interesting proposals have been made. And next year the possibilities, for agreeing on arrangements, however small they may be, should not be ignored even if not all the basic concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States which have chosen non-alignment can be fully satisfied from the outset.

(Mr. Onkelinx, Belgium)

Our Committee has yet to prove its collective capacity for negotiation. Once the areas for negotiation have been defined, each delegation must show flexibility and a will to achieve the goal, without polemics or doctrinaire debates and avoiding those overly theoretical discussions which cannot contribute anything to our work.

The excessive dispersion of our efforts, too, is hardly a guarantee of success. The history of disarmament since the 1960s has shown us that negotiation cannot be undertaken on all subjects at the same time, and that every opportunity of reaching an agreement should be seized.

If, in 1971, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had not agreed to negotiate on chemical weapons and bacteriological weapons separately, the convention prohibiting the latter might not yet have been adopted, even today.

In 1982, the four Working Groups should resume their task very quickly. The formulation of their mandates should not constitute a major obstacle. And we hope that the mandate of the Working Group on Chemical Weapons will go further than the one which has guided our work during the past two sessions. In this connection, my delegation notes with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Working Group has proposed that its next mandate should enable the Committee to resolve the substantive divergencies of views which were identified during its 1980 and 1981 sessions.

Similarly, at the beginning of the next session, the complete prohibition of nuclear tests could form the subject of an appropriate procedural decision enabling the Committee to deal with the substance of the matter.

On these last two subjects, chemical weapons and the cessation of nuclear tests, my delegation has always considered that the multilateral approach and separate talks among the principal States concerned were complementary, one to another, and likely to ensure the final success of both sets of negotiations. Belgium has not changed its point of view. It therefore earnestly appeals for the rapid resumption of these talks and trusts that international conditions will make them possible in the fairly near future, perhaps before we meet again next February.

On the other hand, we do not think that it would be appropriate to contemplate the setting up of a working group on matters which, however important they may be, do not lend themselves, at the present stage, to negotiations of a multilateral character. We feel that such matters should continue to form the subject of separate talks within the framework of a process which we hope will develop.

The past 10 years of disarmament efforts have, I repeat, hardly been productive. It would be pointless to try to lay the blame for these poor results on a particular category or group of countries. But each State ought to undertake a careful and conscientious examination of its own conduct, of the options it has chosen, and of the views and doctrines it has upheld all through these years.

Some States could perhaps either adopt a more flexible approach to working methods or somewhat modify their positions as regards certain options for negotiations.

Belgium believes that these changes in attitude could take place without any risk to the security conditions of our States. But these modifications and adjustments of attitude, these easings of positions, which are necessary in order to break the deadlock, would help bring about more substantial progress in the future, to the benefit of the entire international community.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, at the closing of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, many delegations take the floor to offer their own individual views on our performance. The Brazilian delegation, having associated itself with the document of assessment of the Group of 21, wishes to add a few general remarks.

The third session of the Committee has gone by without significant results in any of its priority items. An optimistic observer might see an exception in the item on chemical weapons. The conclusions of the Working Group on the subject have rekindled the faint hope of achieving a procedural decision on its new mandate, so as to allow the Committee to start negotiating the text of a convention next year. Real progress, however, all of us would agree, has been virtually non-existent, in procedural as well as in substantive questions. We certainly can point to the many pages of reports in which all questions on our agenda are dealt with, sometimes very extensively and in great detail; but we have travelled no further than our predecessors on the road to negotiating disarmament agreements.

Many of us have tried to describe the causes for this immobility, and many of us have painted with dark overtones the dangers inherent in the course taken by those who continue building up on their already excessive arsenals. Yet the response from the two main military alliances, and particularly from the two superpowers, amounts to little more than mere mutual accusations about which one between them is responsible for the massive escalation in their military might. We listen in worried silence as each one of them describes in detail the reasons why its security will be better protected by adding a few more megatons to and improving the accuracy of its delivery systems, or by making those systems undetectable to the rival's radar network, or by "modernizing" the warheads aimed at each other's territory. Their stated positions on security assurances, for instance, stem from the conviction that their own security requirements should prevail over any other considerations. We hear them argue in unison that a treaty dealing with weapons that do not exist must not mention the armaments they already possess, except to exclude those weapons from the scope of the prohibition. We watch with disappointment their reluctance to accept any binding commitment to the implementation of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. We listen in bewilderment to them saying that new systems of weapons of mass destruction are simple "conventional nuclear weapons" designed for theatre use, so that we should not really have anything to fear from their appearance.

After all, we are told, something mysterious and apparently unattainable, usually described as "balance", must be maintained at all costs, even at the cost of increasing every nation's insecurity and at the mounting risk of wiping out life on the planet. Each side seems to act constantly under the assumption that the "balance" is always about to be tipped in favour of the opponent, so that neither of the two ever considers that balance has been achieved. Consequently, each superpower, or their military allies, seem to experience the constant need to explain to those not belonging to their alliances, as well as to their own peoples, how important it is to counteract the evil machinations of the other side. Each side perceives the activities of the other as unfailingly resulting in the disturbance of the balance, thus creating the imperative, urgent and justified necessity of its redress.

We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the contention of the distinguished representative of the USSR, Ambassador Issraelyan, last Thursday, when he stated that the maintenance of the existing military and strategic balance between the USSR and the United States of America, and between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, objectively serves to safeguard peace on our planet.

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

This Committee is not a court of justice that must pass judgement on the intentions of nations, nor was it created to decide whose defence policies are right and whose are wrong. It is a multilateral body established by the free will of every Member of the United Nations, through a consensual document, with the specific and agreed purpose of negotiating disarmament agreements. It would be logical to expect from its members the will to explore all possibilities conducive to the realization of the objectives of this Committee, as they have been expressed in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It seems to us highly strange, therefore, that delegations to the Committee on Disarmament confine their participation to the utterance of vague indications of their dedication to an ideal world in which armaments, or doctrines of nuclear deterrence, would no longer be necessary. It is even stranger when these indications are coupled with the clear warning that they intend to pursue the armaments race, regardless of what others may think. The international community would expect from the nuclear-weapon Powers, which have recognized their special responsibility, a more active engagement in utilizing the multilateral machinery to further objectives to which they have agreed, instead of merely paying lip-service to the outward aspects or to the over-all purposes of this Committee.

We believe, as the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Flowerree, said last Thursday, that moral rectitude is not the exclusive property of any nation or group of nations. Moral rectitude is, I submit, a part of the common treasure of mankind as a whole. The outcry at the unbridled race towards the illusion of absolute military superiority does not come only from individual delegations around this table, but from every corner of the earth, especially from the peoples that feel more threatened by this state of affairs. No individual delegation claims the monopoly of moral virtue; we do claim, however, the right, and indeed the duty, to point out that to negotiate for disarmament is the only possible course for survival in the nuclear age.

During the present session of the Committee, many delegations pressed this same point again and again. The nuclear arms race feeds on itself and is leading the world inexorably closer to the brink of its own destruction. There is no way out but to face the ultimate reality -- either we negotiate or we perish. Or, to paraphrase the late President Eisenhower, there is no alternative to negotiation. "Negotiation" does not simply mean bilateral accommodation of the rival war machines at higher levels of destructiveness, a process in which each side gets rid of the obsolete and less efficient systems and concentrates on the current turn of the arms spiral. To "negotiate" does not simply mean to "control" nuclear armament, because this notion assumes that the object of such control -- namely, the deadly nuclear arsenals -- is here to stay for ever, as a monopoly of their present possessors. To negotiate, I submit, means to take due account of all aspects of reality, and not simply of the narrow security perceptions of the two rival alliances; it implies an open, frank and forward-looking attitude, coupled with the humble recognition that other nations' security is as important and as worthy of attention and respect as one's own. No individual nation holds a mandate to decide by itself how the security of others is best served; neither is any nation entitled to jeopardize the security of the whole

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

world in attempting to secure its own. My delegation earnestly hopes that the proceedings of the 1981 session, and the interpretation of its lack of results by the Governments concerned, will bring about a change of perception of the role of this Committee that will permit the multilateral negotiating body to fulfil the objectives for which it was established.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): The Mongolian delegation, in its capacity as co-ordinator of a group of socialist countries during the month of August, today has the honour of making a statement on behalf of the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Soviet Union and Mongolia summing up the results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The present session of the Committee on Disarmament has taken place in a difficult international situation, in conditions in which there was a marked increase in the activities of the opponents of peace, détente and disarmament, who were endeavouring to impose on the world a qualitatively new round in the armaments race and working in the direction of the exacerbation of international tension.

Even in these circumstances the socialist countries, acting on the basis of their fundamental policy in disarmament matters, have consistently and with initiative adopted in the Committee an approach aimed at constructive negotiations and the achievement of concrete agreements for the curbing of the arms race.

Among the noteworthy events which took place during this session of the Committee on Disarmament were the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the congresses of the fraternal parties of other socialist countries. At these congresses new major initiatives and proposals were put forward aimed at the checking of the arms race and the safeguarding of world peace.

During the Committee's 1981 session the delegations of the socialist countries, as always, played an active part with respect to all the questions on the agenda and put forward a large number of constructive proposals aimed at achieving real progress in the sphere of disarmament.

Those delegations have consistently urged the earliest possible start in the Committee of negotiations on the vitally important question of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic, putting forward a proposal which expressed the general position of the socialist countries, presented to the Committee document CD/193, in which it was proposed that consultations should be held within the framework of the Committee in order to prepare concrete negotiations on this question. The socialist countries also continued to strive to bring about the establishment of a working group to conduct negotiations on the question of nuclear disarmament. However, owing to the position adopted by certain nuclear-weapon States it proved impossible again this session to achieve agreement on these proposals.

The socialist countries, like many other States, vigorously condemn the decision of the Government of the United States to begin production of neutron weapons, regarding this decision as a challenge to the cause of peace and disarmament.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

In initiating the full-scale production of neutron weapons the United States is taking a step towards putting into practice the doctrine of a "limited nuclear war" and increasing the probability of the escalation of armed conflict to the scale of a general nuclear war.

The socialist countries in document CD/219 which they put before the Committee, called for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons. A draft of such a convention was put before the Committee for its consideration by the socialist countries as long ago as in 1978 (document CCD/559). This time again, too, however, the western Powers blocked the establishment of such a working group.

The socialist countries attach great importance to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. They are fully resolved to do all in their power to bring about the cessation of nuclear tests in all spheres and by all those who carry them out. The socialist countries have consistently urged the Committee on Disarmament, in which all five nuclear-weapon Powers are represented, to play an active part in this matter. And here they themselves took the initiative by proposing, as did the Group of 21, the setting up of an ad hoc working group on this question. Unfortunately, certain nuclear-weapon States have prevented the Committee on Disarmament from beginning multilateral negotiations on this urgent problem which bears upon the interests of all mankind.

Convinced that the work of the Committee on Disarmament in this connection would be greatly assisted by the successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations, the socialist countries appealed to the United States and the United Kingdom to resume those negotiations without delay. They also supported the appeal of the Soviet Union to the other participants in the trilateral negotiations to work out together answers to the questions put by the Group of 21 and also by other delegations.

With respect to the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, the socialist countries endeavoured to secure the consolidation and continuation of the progress achieved at earlier stages of the discussion of this question in the Committee on Disarmament. They are satisfied at the fact that, on a number of substantive aspects of the future convention, a definite degree of mutual understanding has been reached among the majority of the States members of the Committee. This justifies a hope for further progress towards the earliest possible achievement of agreement on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The socialist countries declare that they will give the Committee their full support towards this end.

The socialist countries continue to consider that the question of the prohibition of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction is an important element in the work of the Committee, which should concern itself with this question more actively and seriously, using for this purpose whatever means are available to it, including the setting up of an ad hoc group of experts. The past session has confirmed the complexity of the various problems connected with new types of weapons of mass destruction and the need for the competent study of those problems by specialists. The informal meetings of the Committee with the participation of experts which were held in this connection in response to a proposal by the Hungarian People's Republic (CD/174) revealed the necessity and desirability of setting up an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts on this question.

(Mr. Erdenbileg, Mongolia)

The delegations of the socialist countries believe that in 1961 the Committee on Disarmament could have completed the drafting of a treaty on the prohibition of radiological weapons. They note with regret that it did not prove possible to do so. The socialist countries confirm their intention of working actively towards the earliest possible completion of the work on the preparation of such a treaty.

The delegations of the socialist countries attach the importance due to it to the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. They have urged that the various stages to be worked out within the framework of the comprehensive programme of disarmament should comprise the maximum possible number of concrete measures leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament, and that the entire programme should be oriented towards the achievement of practical agreements in the sphere of the halting of the arms race and disarmament. At the same time they do not consider that it would be advisable to include in the comprehensive programme of disarmament provisions concerning principles, mechanisms and procedures, which are reflected in detail in the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. It would therefore be sufficient, in their view, merely to include in the comprehensive programme of disarmament references to the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

The socialist countries consider that the solution of the question of strengthening the security guarantees of the non-nuclear-weapon States is an urgent task. They have consistently advocated the preparation and conclusion of an international convention on this subject, and regret that here again it has not been possible up to now for the Committee to proceed to the drafting of the text of such a convention owing to the negative attitude adopted by certain nuclear-weapon Powers and their allies.

In this connection they are convinced that the Committee on Disarmament ought without delay also to undertake negotiations for the purpose of elaborating an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; the conclusion of such an agreement would also help to strengthen the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States.

In the course of the session the delegations of the socialist countries made suggestions for increasing the effectiveness and improving the organization of the work of the Committee, submitting specific proposals in that connection which were aimed at improving the content of the work of the Committee, increasing the effectiveness of the activities of its subsidiary bodies, increasing the amount of time spent on the discussion of questions of substance, improving the character of the representation of States, and so on (document CD/200).

The delegations of the socialist countries believe that the Committee's rules of procedure have proved their validity during the negotiations in the Committee and contain the requisite reserves for the solution of questions arising in the course of the Committee's work. The basis of the entire activity of the Committee is the principle of consensus, embodied in section VI of the rules of procedure.

The delegations of the socialist countries express their satisfaction at the fact that their suggestions and proposals were supported by many States members of the Committee, and they express their readiness to continue in the future to bend every effort towards the improvement of the Committee's work.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

The socialist States are convinced that now as never before it is important to intensify efforts towards the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. A crucial role in this matter devolves upon the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body -- the Committee on Disarmament. The next session of the Committee will be of particular importance in view of the forthcoming second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The socialist countries declare their firm resolve to continue in the future to contribute by every means possible to the success of the work of the Committee.

I request that the above statement should be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): At the time when the Committee on Disarmament is drawing to the end of its current session, the Chinese delegation wishes to review the Committee's work in 1981 and look ahead to its task for 1982. In this connection, the secretariat of the Committee has distributed document CD/221 entitled "Some observations of the Chinese delegation on the work of the Committee on Disarmament in 1981". Now I would like to make a brief introduction to the content of this document.

In document CD/221, we have pointed out the achievements made during the current session of the Committee on Disarmament. In a short period of time during the session, the Committee on Disarmament has finished the arrangements for organization and procedural matters, and the four Ad Hoc Working Groups soon got down to substantive discussion and negotiation. During the discussions and negotiations on some of the important items, the Working Groups further clarified the views expressed by various delegations and enhanced their understanding of each other's positions. This will help future considerations and negotiations. The Committee on Disarmament also put forward some ideas and recommendations on the improvement of its organizational work. We hope that these ideas and recommendations will help raise the efficiency of the Committee.

At the same time, we have also pointed out that, although the Committee on Disarmament has made some achievements in its work during the 1981 session, no substantive results have been achieved on various items of the agenda. This falls short of satisfaction. In our view, the failure to achieve substantive progress is closely related to the worsening of the international situation and the lack of political will on the part of certain countries.

In the document submitted by my delegation, we have also made some specific comments on the considerations and negotiations on nuclear disarmament, a nuclear test ban, the prohibition of chemical weapons, security assurances for non-nuclear States, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the prohibition of radiological weapons. In order to save time, I will not repeat them here.

Finally, in the name of the Chinese delegation, I wish to take this opportunity to pay tribute and express thanks to Ambassador Sani, the Chairman for the current month, for the objectivity and outstanding skill with which he has led our Committee to the solution of some complex and difficult problems the Committee has encountered. I would also like to express my appreciation to the Chairmen of the Working Groups for the constructive efforts they have made in guiding the Groups' work. I must also sincerely thank Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and Secretary of the Committee, and all the secretariat staff, as well as the interpreters, translators and all the working staff, for their co-operation and assistance in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. SUJKA (Poland): Mr. Chairman, first of all I would like to join all the distinguished speakers who preceded me in congratulating you on the excellent manner you are conducting the work of the Committee in this month so crucial for the results of this year's session. My congratulations also go to your predecessor, the distinguished representative of India, Ambassador Venkateswaran, on his able Chairmanship in the month of July and for his successful Chairmanship of the drafting group.

My brief intervention today will be devoted exclusively to one urgent matter introduced in this Committee's document CD/219 by the group of socialist countries, including Poland, in particular calling for urgent consideration by the Committee of the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The urgency of this problem stems from the conviction, entirely shared by my delegation, that there may still be time to stop a new phase of the nuclear arms race.

The group of socialist countries put forward a draft of an appropriate convention in this respect in 1978 in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, contained in document CCD/559. Perhaps at that time it was the most appropriate moment for elaborating a legally binding document prohibiting the production of nuclear neutron weapons. Unfortunately, as a result of the objection of the delegations of some States which considered our proposal to be "one-sided propaganda", that initiative of ours did not receive a positive response. At that time, in 1978, we also heard the argument that the neutron bomb did not exist and that the decision on its production had not been taken. Today, we are even more conscious of the reasons for such opposition: it was to pave the way for the decision which was taken a fortnight ago.

We have heard up to now the following arguments for the said decision:

First, it is said that the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty countries have been gaining for the last 20 years a military strategic advantage over the NATO countries, so something has to be done to restore the balance. Last Tuesday we even heard that the United States decision on the production of neutron weapons is in this situation the only and maybe the best way out.

Second, we also heard here lectures on the substance of the neutron weapons and its advantages. The weapon itself was unequivocally termed as a new kind of tactical nuclear weapon.

Third, we have been told that the neutron weapon is in essence a defensive and deterrent weapon and, as such, it can only be used against the potential aggressor and mainly against an attack by tanks. Fourth, we have also been told that the decision on the production of nuclear weapons, if not accompanied by a decision to deploy it beyond the frontiers of the producer, is his own internal affair.

These arguments do not stand up under criticism. My delegation would of course be ready to discuss each of the above-mentioned arguments, in a very precise and more detailed way, with reference to facts and data. At the moment, I wish to confine myself only to some remarks of a more general character:

Firstly, on the military strategic balance. The military strategic balance, according to our belief, is a complex of objectively existing real events or facts and not a complex of speculations or mental manipulations, serving for circumstantial justification of any given concept at any given moment. Thus, for the work of our Committee, there is doubtful value in the kind of approach which, in the span of a single year, leads to two different conclusions contradicting each other. We witnessed

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

this kind of approach in 1979; the competent United States authorities announced in June that year the existence of a strategic military balance between East and West, and specifically between the United States and the USSR while several months later and of course without any proved changes in the objectively existing reality, they announced the absence of such a balance. Using this argument, they started their pressure towards an increase of rocket-type armaments in Europe. But even this was not enough. In their mental manipulations, the question of the non-existence of strategic balance has reached such dimensions that, in order to restore it, they thought it necessary to take the decision on the production of a new generation of nuclear weapons. We may rightly ask now; what more will confront us tomorrow from the followers of such an approach to the problem of strategic balance? Regardless of the above, my delegation entirely shares the view, expressed during the plenary meetings over the last days, that the balance between East and West cannot be kept by raising the spiral of armaments but by its gradual lowering. Such is the sense of the proposal contained in document CD/219 and such is the noble purpose of our common endeavours in this Committee.

Secondly, the neutron weapon, as a new kind of tactical nuclear weapon. Precisely here, we see the most dangerous character of this weapon. We are for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, both the "new ones" called tactical and the "old, normal" strategic weapons. Such was the sense of the proposal of the group of socialist countries put forward in document CD/4. When we speak of the particular danger of neutron weapons, we have in mind two main reasons: the decision on its production entails at present unforeseen consequences of the opening of a new phase of the arms race; and its production and stockpiling in the military arsenals will further increase the danger of the eruption of a nuclear conflict, by significantly lowering the nuclear threshold.

Thirdly, the defensive and deterrent character of neutron weapons. May I say that this is merely the declaration of intent of the owner of this weapon and not of its technical characteristics. If, as the distinguished Ambassador of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Summerhayes, has stated, "the only purpose for which the neutron weapon came into existence was to provide an effective counter to the threat of concentrated tank attacks", the question arises whether such escalation of the defensive force against aggression is to be the privilege of one side only, or whether such escalation out of proportion is to become a common rule in armed conflicts. Where can the world be led to by such an approach to "self-defence and deterrence"? Could it be to our committing suicide out of fear of dying?

Fourthly, the production of the neutron bomb is an internal affair of the producer himself. Here again the Ambassador of the United Kingdom tried to reassure. Europe when he stated that "now, in fact, we know from the United States statement that no deployment is being considered at the present time". This, certainly, is an outright implication that the decision on the production of the neutron bomb is an "internal matter". It may be wondered, however, as a matter of fact, against whose tanks this weapon might be used if it is not to be deployed outside United States territory; but that is not so important, since even in the most daring, or perhaps most naive, assumption one cannot believe that the United States neutron weapon will not be deployed outside the United States.

The argument that the production of the neutron weapon is the United States internal affair cannot stand up under criticism, mainly because of the simple fact that never in the history of international relations has the appearance of a new type or a new generation of weapons been considered an internal affair of any producer State, nation or tribe.

(Mr. Suika, Poland)

We were told during our informal meeting yesterday that the ban on neutron weapons cannot be singled out from the whole complex of nuclear weapons under our agenda item 2. Well, generally, we could agree with this approach. But what can the Committee do when one has been trying to persuade us that the problems under agenda item 2 are not yet ripe for negotiation? Does it mean that some delegations believe that the ban on neutron weapons is not ripe for negotiation either? What kind of logic is this? Instead of trying to answer this very question, I can only say that the world community is frequently, and has been frequently, confronted with the results of such logic -- that is, with an uncontrollable escalation of the arms race. I leave it to the Committee to judge to what extent these words are "one-sided propaganda".

My delegation belongs -- and I quote again from the statement of my distinguished colleague, Ambassador Summerhayes -- my delegation belongs to "those who wished to present an exaggerated picture of the character and potential of these weapons". I would like to state that I do "exaggerate" and I will always be "exaggerating" whenever and wherever there appears a threat of new escalation of armaments, consuming not only the creative forces of nations but also ever larger resources for purposes contrary to the interests of security and endangering the world peace. These are the main reasons why my delegation fully supports the proposal to elaborate in this Committee a convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We hope that it is maybe not yet too late now. But this might be the last chance that the Committee will have.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Poland for his statement and for the kind reference he has made to the Chair.

Mr. TERREFFE (Ethiopia): As we are about to conclude this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament, I would like to take this opportunity to extend to you my delegation's sincere appreciation for the competent way in which you are guiding the work of the Committee as its Chairman during the difficult month of August. My delegation's warm gratitude also goes to Ambassador Venkateswaran for the most efficient and amiable leadership which he provided to us as Chairman of the Committee during the month of July.

In my brief statement today I would like to make some general comments and observations concerning our work during this year's session of the Committee.

First of all, my delegation cannot but express a feeling of great disappointment that, despite repeated calls by many delegations -- including that of a major nuclear-weapon State -- for the initiation of negotiations on the items concerning a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, two nuclear-weapon States remained opposed to the proposal and to the establishment of ad hoc working groups for this purpose. I would like once again to reaffirm my delegation's belief and that of the Group of 21 that working groups provide the best means for conducting effectively the work of the Committee on Disarmament. In this respect, my delegation recognizes and welcomes the useful work done by the four Ad hoc Working Groups and is appreciative of the leadership provided by their respective Chairmen. We trust that the various degrees of the results achieved in each Working Group, and the conclusions and recommendations that we are about to adopt today will facilitate our future work and result in concrete disarmament measures next session. The establishment of a working group on a nuclear test ban with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States should remain a priority task for the Committee on Disarmament. Furthermore, the need for an urgent resumption of the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban cannot be overemphasized.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In view of the foregoing, my delegation reaffirms the position taken by the Group of 21 with respect to the future work of the Committee in relation to the Ad hoc Working Groups. In view of the forthcoming second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, our attention needs, it seems to me, to be focused on the following points:

(a) Ad hoc working groups on items 1 and 2 of the Committee's agenda should be established at the beginning of 1982 session;

(b) The Ad hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons should be given a broader mandate to continue its work with a view to elaborating a draft text for a CW convention;

(c) A comprehensive programme of disarmament should be prepared before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to Disarmament, and to this end the early commencement of the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament in 1982 is essential; and

(d) In parenthesis, I should like to state that the trilateral negotiations on a nuclear test ban should resume as soon as possible and should also respond to the questions posed by the Group of 21 and other members of this Committee;

(e) My delegation believes, as do other members of the Group of 21, that an agreement could be reached on a radiological weapons convention if genuine efforts were made by all concerned to advance negotiations. To this end, the early resumption of the work of the Ad hoc Working Group on this question will be productive;

(f) Finally, we share the view that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. In this respect, the nuclear-weapon States have to provide, in the form of an international agreement of a legally binding nature; assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In the second part of my intervention, I would like to refer to the recent disturbing development which in my delegation's view has undermined the disarmament process and runs counter to the ultimate goals of general and complete disarmament and also frustrates our immediate objective of the relaxation of international tension. Naturally, I am referring here to the recent decision by the United States Government to manufacture and stockpile the neutron weapon. Possibly, deployment of this weapon may be yet another surprise in the making. I cannot but register my delegation's strong opposition to this decision and its consequences, about which many delegations have already expressed concern.

We have listened with great interest and anxiety to the views expressed in this connection by a number of delegations in the course of recent meetings in the Committee. The generally negative reaction to the decision taken by this nuclear-weapon Power has also been featured prominently in the international news media. The world has clearly observed a case where United Nations resolutions and decisions, as well as the genuine aspirations of the international community to live in relative peace and security, have been completely ignored.

(Mr. Terrefe, Ethiopia)

In sharp contrast to the views held by the advocates of the neutron bomb, world public opinion is generally opposed to the decision on the manufacture, stockpiling and deployment of this weapon. We identify ourselves with this sentiment of genuine concern and the legitimate apprehension about this development. We have no doubt in our minds that the production of the neutron weapon would further provoke and intensify the spiralling of the nuclear arms race. Its full implication is yet to be known. There is no need to downplay the impact of this decision on the deterioration of international tension; nor is it wise to sidetrack the issue or to ignore the views and genuine feelings shared by an overwhelming international public opinion and a good number of delegations in the Committee on Disarmament representing by and large the non-nuclear-weapon States. We cannot hide the fact that the neutron bomb introduces new nuclear phenomena with far more dangerous neutron radiation effects to human beings. The decision of the United States on the production and stockpiling of these weapons will no doubt lead to a further lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold; thus increasing the risk of the outbreak of a nuclear war.

The Ethiopian delegation has made repeated calls for the halting of the development and manufacture of the neutron weapons. We now realize more than before the need for a concrete step, preferably in the form of agreements, banning the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of the neutron weapons. Taking into account paragraph 50 of the Final Document, the Committee on Disarmament could play an active and constructive role in the preparation and concluding of such agreements. The draft convention in document CCD/559 submitted by a group of socialist countries as early as March 1978 could also serve as a basis for such agreements. In this connection, the establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, as proposed in document CD/219, has our general support.

I would like to conclude my brief intervention by pointing out again my delegation's concern about the recent development, the origin of which seems to be the "doctrine of nuclear deterrence" and the misleading belief that a limited nuclear war can be waged and won. Consciously or unconsciously, the proponents of such a philosophy are contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thus threatening international peace and security; and by their provocative actions they are repeatedly violating the principles of the United Nations Charter and United Nations decisions and frustrating the aspirations of the world community for the promotion of peace and international understanding. We earnestly hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to work in a more propitious international climate next year and to achieve more by way of concrete results so it can contribute substantially to the success of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of Ethiopia for his statement and for the kind reference he has made to the Chair.

Mr. SAW HLAING (Burma): At the 146th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament, the Group of 21 had the opportunity to present to the Committee a working paper on the principles of the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Today, on behalf of the Group of 21 and as its co-ordinator, I would like to present to the Committee the working paper of the Group on the chapter entitled "Measures" in the comprehensive programme of disarmament.

The Group of 21 has already presented a set of Working Papers (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Add 1, 2 and 3) to the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. The paper which I am going to submit will constitute an explanatory note to these working papers. I am given to understand that this paper, together with the aforementioned working papers of the Group, will be circulated as an official document of the Committee bearing the symbol CCD/223. The explanatory note reads as follows:

"During the course of the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, the delegations belonging to the Group of 21 have submitted a document containing in detail specific measures which should be included in a comprehensive programme of disarmament during four stages of implementation (CD/CPD/WP.36 and Add.1, Add.2 and Add.3). The formulations in respect to these specific measures are provisional in nature representing the highest common denominator achieved within the Group of 21 at the present stage. Revisions, amendments or additional formulations to the contents of this Chapter may be proposed by any delegation, whenever deemed necessary. In spite of its provisional character, the present document is sufficiently illustrative of what should essentially be the contents of the Chapter under 'Measures'. For this reason the Group of 21 has concluded that it would be useful to submit this document to the Committee before the end of its 1981 session."

The second part of my intervention relates to the statement of the Group of 21 on the conclusion of the third annual session of the Committee on Disarmament. The text of the Group's statement reads as follows:

"The Group of 21 regrets that the adverse trends in the international situation which it had noted at the end of the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament continued to prevail during the third annual session of the Committee. The Committee has not been able to make any significant progress in negotiations on most of the items on its agenda, especially the items to which the United Nations General Assembly has accorded the highest priority, namely, a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, owing to the absence of political will on the part of certain major Powers. The Group of 21 is deeply disturbed over this trend which seriously undermines the effectiveness of the Committee as the single multilateral negotiating organ in the field of disarmament.

"The Group of 21 reaffirms its belief and confidence in the multilateral approach to all disarmament questions and considers that ad hoc working groups have proved to be the best available machinery for the effective conduct of all substantive disarmament negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

"The Group of 21 expresses deep regret that during the 1981 session the Committee was once again prevented from setting up an ad hoc working group to undertake multilateral negotiations on the scope, arrangements for verification and final clauses of a nuclear test ban treaty as proposed by the Group. In view of the fact that the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament will be held next year, the Group reaffirms the political significance of initiating negotiations on a nuclear test ban in the Committee on Disarmament at the beginning of its next session.

"It is also regrettable that the parties which had been engaged in trilateral negotiations on this subject did not respond, either jointly or individually, to the questions posed to them by the members of the Group of 21, as contained in document CD/181, seeking clarifications on issues which are of vital concern to both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. The Group calls upon the States concerned to respond urgently to these questions.

"During the third annual session, members of the Group of 21 emphasized the dangers of the continuing arms race and the need for urgent measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. The Group of 21 is convinced that the continuing escalation of the quantitative and qualitative development of nuclear arms directly and fundamentally jeopardizes the vital security interests of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Convinced, therefore, that the issues of nuclear disarmament have a bearing on the security of the whole world, the Group of 21 has recommended in document CD/180 the establishment of an ad hoc working group of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate without delay negotiations on certain concrete issues of nuclear disarmament, particularly the elaboration of the stages of nuclear disarmament contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. It is a matter of regret that no consensus could be reached on this proposal during the 1981 session of the Committee, thus precluding the single multilateral negotiating body in the field of disarmament from undertaking concrete negotiations on an item of the highest priority on its agenda.

"The Group of 21 deplors the fact that no consensus could be achieved to give the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons a mandate to negotiate on a multilateral convention. The Group of 21 welcomes the intensive and business-like work carried out by the Ad Hoc Working Group. It considers of particular importance the fact that in the Working Group all relevant issues involved have been presented and thoroughly examined and that the Committee is now provided with a solid basis for negotiation on the text of a convention for the total prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. It is indispensable that the Committee at the beginning of its 1982 session gives the Working Group a clear mandate to urgently negotiate the text of such a convention.

"The Group of 21 attaches considerable importance to the adoption of the comprehensive programme of disarmament at the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament. To be meaningful, the programme must contain concrete disarmament measures in defined stages leading to the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

within an agreed time frame. In accordance with the provisions of paragraph 30 of the Final Document which refers, inter alia, to the negotiation of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, a comprehensive programme of disarmament should create obligations on the part of all States to implement the measures included in the programme.

"The Group of 21 has submitted a working paper containing specific disarmament measures to be included in the various stages of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as well as a working paper on the principles underlying such a programme. The Group of 21 calls upon all delegations to be forthcoming and submit such proposals as would be conducive to the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament as conceived of in the relevant provisions of the Final Document.

"The Group of 21 recommends that more intensive negotiations should be conducted from the beginning of 1982 in the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament to ensure the adoption of a programme at the second special session.

"The Group's position on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been outlined on previous occasions (documents CD/50 and CD/134). The Group believes that the most effective assurance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is the achievement of nuclear disarmament and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The Group reiterates its view that the nuclear-weapon States have an obligation categorically to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

"Members of the Group of 21 have supported and played an active role in the negotiations in the Ad Hoc Working Group to evolve an agreement on a common approach or formula which could be included in an international instrument of a legally binding character. The Group recommends that negotiations on this question should be actively pursued at the next session of the Committee. It is of the view that an agreement on this question is possible before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament provided certain nuclear-weapon States revise their positions based on their nuclear strategic doctrines which so far have prevented progress towards a common approach acceptable to all.

"In the negotiations on a radiological weapons convention, the Group of 21 has recommended that the definition of such a weapon must be precise and complete, and that it should not include an exclusion clause with respect to nuclear weapons.

"The Group of 21 considers that there exists a very real risk of mass destruction from the dissemination of radioactive substance through attacks on nuclear facilities. In this context the Group suggested in the relevant Working Group that serious consideration should be given to the inclusion of an undertaking never to attack or deliberately damage any such facilities, and to the prohibition of radiological warfare.

(Mr. Saw Hlaing, Burma)

"The Group of 21 has recommended that the proposed convention must contain an explicit commitment for the urgent pursuit of measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The Group of 21 reaffirms the inalienable right of all States to develop and apply their programmes for the peaceful use of radioactive materials and sources of radiation, including nuclear energy, and their right of access to and acquisition of related materials, equipment, information and technology. In this regard, the need to strengthen international co-operation was also emphasized. These and other issues still remain to be resolved. In the opinion of the Group of 21, agreement on a radiological weapons convention can be reached if a sincere effort is made in the negotiations to take into account the positions and views of all the members of the Committee on Disarmament.

"The Group of 21 considers it imperative that concrete negotiations should be initiated on effective measures to reduce current international tensions and to halt and reverse the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and avert the growing danger of the outbreak of war, in particular nuclear war.

"If the Committee on Disarmament is unable to undertake concrete negotiations and conclude specific agreements on priority items on its agenda before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, consideration would have to be given at that session to the situation arising therefrom".

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. The last sentence of the seventh paragraph in the statement of the Group of 21 (CD/222), which its Co-ordinator has just read out, was the result of intensive discussions in the Group. As often happens in such cases it does not in my delegation's opinion have the desired clarity. Therefore, my delegation would like to refer, in the following brief statement, to the significance and scope it attaches to it.

My delegation interprets the obligations referred to in the last sentence of the seventh paragraph as an obligation to undertake, as soon as the comprehensive programme of disarmament has been adopted, intensive negotiations for the joint elaboration of legally binding agreements guaranteeing effective implementation of the measures included in the programme. When I requested the floor, Mr. Chairman, that was my only intention in doing so.

Subsequently, however, my distinguished colleague on my left, the representative of Mongolia, referred in his speech to one aspect of the Group's work on the comprehensive programme of disarmament which also, in our opinion, deserves a brief explanation.

I understood him correctly, his statement was to the effect that with regard to mechanisms and procedure, the comprehensive programme of disarmament should not include provisions but only references to the provisions of the Final Document.

This question has already been raised in the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme. Nevertheless, since, as we all know, the Group did not have records, I would like to repeat what I have said in the Group many times, namely, that the Committee on Disarmament last year adopted the decision of the Group contained in paragraph 10 of its report to the effect -- and I quote -- that "the comprehensive programme will have to be self-contained". Accordingly, that decision is still fully in force and will remain so unless the Committee decides to change it.

Mr. SOLA VILA (Cuba) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, I have asked for the floor at this point to state for the record that my delegation deeply regrets the fact that the Committee on Disarmament, owing to the opposition of certain States, has been prevented from taking a decision in favour of establishing a working group on the neutron bomb.

It is also regrettable that attempts have been made to link this question with other aspects that have nothing to do with the neutron bomb. The particularly inhumane features of these weapons and also their very nature, which reduce the so-called nuclear threshold, are more than sufficient reasons why the Committee on Disarmament should have decided to establish a working group on this question as a matter of urgency.

It is a fact that the decision to begin production and stockpiling of the neutron bomb, in addition to initiating a new spiralling of the arms race, represents an attempt to put into practice the doctrine of limited nuclear war and creates serious obstacles to disarmament negotiations. Accordingly, my delegation constantly supports the proposal that the Committee should begin considering this item as soon as possible, through concrete negotiations in a working group.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to read out the statements issued yesterday by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba on this question.

"On 8 August last, international cable agencies published the news that, according to information provided by White House spokesmen, the United States President, Ronald Reagan, had at a meeting of the National Security Council decided to authorize the production of the neutron bomb or the so-called enhanced radiation weapon, according to the technical language of its inventors.

"Barely 24 hours after the announcement, the same news agencies, including those based in the United States, undertook to shed new light on the question.

"The decision to manufacture neutron bombs had not in fact been taken on 8 August but on 6 August, the date of the thirtieth anniversary of the criminal bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which directly or indirectly cost more than 200,000 victims -- the date when the 1981 World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was being held at Nagasaki, and also the date of the March for Peace 1981 through several western European cities, from Copenhagen to Paris, in which demonstrators expressed their opposition to nuclear weapons.

"As will be recalled, the Administration of ex-President Carter had decided to produce the neutron bomb which, as we know, destroys all human beings but leaves installations intact; but the international outcry which this decision provoked led to the suspension of the decision in April 1978.

"Now Mr. Reagan is not only making again the decision which Carter was obliged to suspend; he is going further. He is publicly and cynically ridiculing the international community by taking the reprehensible decision to produce these mass-extinction weapons on the same date on which, thirty-six years ago, the Administration of President Truman ordered a nuclear attack against Japanese cities.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

"This is the true nature of the country which has claimed to set itself up as the champion of human rights throughout the world and which is saying today that it wishes to combat international terrorism.

"There is no better example of international terrorism than the current policy of the United States Government. Its acts clearly prove this.

"The decision to manufacture and stockpile neutron bombs in United States territory is an affront to international public opinion and to all Governments, but at the same time, and above all, it is a major affront to the United States people and the peoples of western Europe. The former already have -- and the latter will soon have -- on their soil this diabolical scientific monstrosity which has been placed in the service of bellicose interests and is intended for the annihilation of human beings.

"The United States people and the peoples of western Europe, who love and desire peace and are in favor of international détente, and who do not want to be pushed into a nuclear war which would claim the whole of mankind as its victim, must now say what they think.

"Memories are still fresh of the furtive attack by the Israeli Air Force on 7 June last against nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes in Iraq -- an attack for which the Israelis used ultramodern and sophisticated F-15 and F-16 aircraft provided by the United States.

"Who can say for sure that in addition to being designed for a European scenario -- for the purpose of neutralizing a mass attack by tanks as we are told -- these weapons will not be used tomorrow by the Zionist friends of the United States against the Arab countries and the Palestinian people, or that the capital of apartheid, protected by the United States, will not use them against progressive African countries?

"The question of President Reagan's decision to produce the neutron bomb is clearly not only a matter of concern for the United States people and the peoples of Europe. It is an affront to all the peoples of the world, and it should be condemned from all corners of the planet.

"The United States decision is being made after the NATO countries have been pressured to increase their military budgets to astronomical levels and have been forced to agree to the deployment of 572 medium-range nuclear missiles from 1983 onwards. At the same time steps are still being taken for the establishment of a large rapid deployment force to operate wherever its interests may be in danger, and it is essential not to overlook the fact that its military presence in the Indian Ocean and its network of military bases and installations are growing at an uncontrolled pace, causing great concern for every country in the world.

"As if the aforementioned were not enough, it should be recalled that in line with the approval of the manufacture of a neutron bomb, they began the military manoeuvres entitled 'Ocean Venture 81', which are the most extensive war exercises to be undertaken since the Second World War by the United States and the NATO countries, and which are being conducted in the north and south Atlantic and the North and Baltic Seas, and also in the Caribbean, including the territory illegally occupied by the Guantanamo naval base. In the last-mentioned case, the exercises coincide with the war games of the United States and certain Latin American countries known as Unitas XXII.

(Mr. Sola Vila, Cuba)

"The decision to manufacture the neutron bomb is one more step in the arms escalation provoked by the United States; and it is endangering international peace and security.

"Thus the United States Government is sabotaging United Nations agreements and resolutions, and the decision -- to which it formally subscribed itself -- that the 1980s should be declared as the Second Disarmament Decade with the objective of curbing and reversing the arms race and of taking measures conducive to general and complete disarmament under international control; and it is doing this at the very time when the United Nations is preparing to hold the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and when it is hoped that important decisions will be taken leading to the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

"There are some who with uncontrolled hotheadedness try to fan the flames of war and are ready to make foolish statements. Thus barely twenty-four hours after the Yankee decision became known, the governing clique in China, through its press, expressed its satisfaction that production of the neutron bomb was now beginning in the United States and said it would like to see such bombs deployed in Europe.

"Some still believe in the mistaken theory of limited nuclear war and, what is worse, they think that, in the event of a nuclear conflagration, they could remain outside any conflict that might break out.

"Such attitudes are conceivable only by those who are bereft even of a minimum of respect not only for their own peoples but also for the very existence of mankind.

"The Ministry of Foreign Relations of the Republic of Cuba expresses its most vigorous condemnation of the United States Government's decision to manufacture the neutron bomb, and wishes to point out that full responsibility for the effect that this decision will have on international peace and security rests entirely with the Government of the United States and those who support it in its plans".

The CHAIRMAN: Does any other delegation wish to take the floor at this stage? As I anticipated earlier, we will have to resume the plenary meeting this afternoon at 3.30 p.m. We shall then adopt the reports of the Working Groups and also take up discussion of document CD/219 for decision. During the afternoon's plenary meeting, we hope to circulate the results of the work of the drafting group. We shall then adjourn the plenary and meet in informal meeting this evening to consider the remaining parts of the annual report. I am planning our final plenary meeting for 6.00 p.m. tomorrow by which time all documents will be ready. The meeting is suspended until 3.30 p.m. this afternoon.

The meeting was suspended at 1 p.m. and resumed at 3.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN: The one hundred and forty-eighth plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament is called to order. You will recall that, at our last plenary meeting the representative of Mongolia, Ambassador Erdembileg, introduced document CD/219 entitled "Statement of a group of socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron nuclear weapons". In that document the sponsors requested that their proposal should be considered and a decision should be taken on it by the Committee at this plenary meeting. Is there any objection to the proposal contained in document CD/219?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, if your request was for a decision on the document CD/219, as I understand it, which proposes the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons, I will, of course, have to take exception to that proposal. I will confine my remarks to that question, and will not attempt to rebut some of the tendentious statements that have been made today about my country's policies in that regard and on some other subjects, particularly the statement made by the Cuban representative, which contained so many outrageous assertions as to be undeserving of a response that would dignify its contents. I take this restraint in my own intervention out of respect for the need of the Committee to make the best use of the precious few hours remaining to us. Now, as the title of the proposal contained in CD/219 suggests, we are dealing here with a question concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons. But, as a number of speakers have noted in our informal meetings, why deal with only one type of nuclear weapon while leaving others aside?

In fact, the most lethal and damaging weapons, those that have actually been deployed, would not be considered under this proposal.

The so-called nuclear neutron weapon, which is more properly designated "enhanced radiation weapon" (ERW), is one possible variant in the broad range of nuclear weapons. Every one of them, including the ERW, produces blast, thermal effects, prompt radiation and residual radiation. These effects vary according to the design, yield and even such things as the height of the explosion. Thus, all sorts of distinctions can be made among nuclear weapons. But the fact remains that all can kill and wreak varying degrees of damage, ranging up to the catastrophic for the larger warheads carried by medium-range and intercontinental missiles. Therefore, there would seem to be no reason connected with an approach to nuclear disarmament for selectively concentrating on one particular variant of nuclear weapons, particularly since it is one of the least damaging of nuclear weapons and is designed to be placed in artillery shells and short range rockets.

The question of the reason for the selective approach in CD/219 then remains. As the United States has pointed out on many occasions, the ERW weapon is defensive in character and is intended, if ever deployed, to maintain deterrence of attack. It would be considered for use only in extreme circumstances, which we pray will never occur, in responding to a mass armoured attack. A look at the disposition of forces in Europe might suggest the answer to the question of why this proposal is being pressed by the sponsors of CD/219, nearly all of whom are members of the Warsaw Pact. There are over 40,000 Warsaw Pact tanks ranged against some 11,000 NATO tanks in Europe.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

The argument has also been made that the danger of nuclear war has been heightened by the beginning of production of the ERW because the temptation to use it would be greater -- that somehow its existence would make it easier to cross the threshold into nuclear war. I dealt with this question in my intervention on 13 August. I noted that the ERW is still a nuclear weapon, and that the decision to use it would be no less difficult to make than the decision to use any other nuclear weapon. The possibility of indiscriminately destructive responses from the other side would be high, increasing the potential for escalation.

For these and other reasons my delegation does not believe that a case has been made for the urgent creation of a working group to negotiate a convention on the prohibition of so-called nuclear neutron weapons. The introduction of this proposal at this late date in our session, and under the prevailing circumstances, leads to the conclusion that it is not a serious disarmament proposal.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): My delegation has listened carefully to the arguments put forward both yesterday and today on the proposal to establish immediately a working group on nuclear neutron weapons. I have already introduced some views of my own into the debate. I believe that there are three main issues that have to be considered:

- (i) Is there some exceptional urgency for setting up such a working group?
- (ii) Is it appropriate that neutron weapons be singled out for independent treatment in this Committee?
- (iii) Do neutron weapons constitute some new and immediate threat to peace, as some delegations try to allege?

My delegation's views on these three questions are as follows:

On the question of "exceptional urgency", we do not consider that a decision by the United States Government to manufacture and stockpile in the United States a weapon which is designed to meet the potential -- but I am sure not immediate -- threat of armoured warfare in Europe justifies some almost emergency step on our part. As I have made clear, the United States decision was taken as a matter of precaution and involves no deployment of enhanced radiation weapons.

On the second question, which is that of appropriateness of singling out neutron weapons and negotiating a convention on them, I believe that neutron weapons fall within the definition of nuclear weapons. My delegation has consistently pointed out that the only secure route to effective nuclear arms control lies through negotiation between the nuclear Powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union. It seems obvious to us that the negotiations have to take place between the States which have to accept the obligation to control and to reduce their nuclear armouries. For this reason, my Government has never seen how the negotiation of nuclear arms control agreements can initially be conducted by this Committee as a whole.

(Mr. Summerhayes, United Kingdom)

On my third question which was whether neutron weapons, and the deterrence purpose for which these could be used, constitute a possible threat to peace, I would repeat here what I said in plenary on 18 August. It is alleged that, because enhanced radiation weapons are designed as short-range and tactical weapons, this somehow indicates an intention within the NATO Alliance to prepare for what is called "limited nuclear war". It is suggested that Alliance thinking is making a dangerous shift, and that NATO is somehow moving away from the concept of deterrence. These allegations, which imply that NATO intends to give up its purely defensive role and posture, are completely unfounded. Indeed, arguments of this kind are so patently false as to be merely malicious and seem to be designed to create fear and anxiety where this is unjustified.

In all, my conclusion -- for the reasons I have just stated -- is that there is no case for establishing immediately a CD working group to deal with the question of neutron weapons.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation has made known its gratitude to the proposal which was submitted to us at the private meeting we had yesterday. Today, it confirms this position. For the reasons expressed at an earlier plenary meeting, we consider that the enhanced radiation weapon is part of the over-all problem posed by the arms race and nuclear disarmament; in our opinion, it is not therefore necessary to give it special treatment or to prepare any specific conventional provisions relating to it. The establishment of a working group to negotiate on that subject does not therefore seem to us to be justified. Such discussions as might be desirable on the subject of this weapon will find their normal place at our next session in the informal meetings which the Committee will no doubt, as we would hope, devote to the consideration of questions relating to the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: In the light of the discussion, are you going to speak in objection to the proposal, Mr. Ambassador? I saw the distinguished representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Is this to speak against, in objection to, the proposal?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to express its profound dissatisfaction at the lack of consensus ...

The CHAIRMAN: I asked whether there are any objections to the proposal contained in document CD/219. If I may, I would like to conclude this debate as to the decision of the Committee with regard to the proposal. Afterwards, if I may and if you agree, I will give the floor to allow arguments against those which have been put forward against the proposal. Would that be agreeable?

In the light of the discussion held on this question, there is no consensus on the proposal contained in document CD/219, and therefore it is not adopted.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): The Soviet delegation wishes to express its profound dissatisfaction at the lack of consensus on the document submitted by a group of socialist countries, containing a proposal for the immediate commencement of negotiations in the Committee on the preparation of a draft international convention on the prohibition of neutron weapons and for the establishment of an ad hoc working group for that purpose. Today we should like once again to stress that this is an exceptionally important and urgent matter directly connected with international security and disarmament and affecting the destinies of peoples, since the emergence of neutron weapons considerably increases the threat of a nuclear war.

We therefore consider that the efforts made by individual delegations to minimize the danger of such weapons and to conceal a number of negative aspects of the decision taken by the Administration of the United States of America are unsound. The Soviet delegation will certainly continue its efforts aimed at solving the problem of the prohibition of neutron weapons, in order to outlaw them.

We should like once again to recall the statement by Mr. L.I. Brezhnev, Head of the Soviet State in which he said -- and I quote -- that: "We for our part confirm that we shall not begin to produce them -- that is, neutron weapons -- unless they appear in other States; and we are prepared to conclude an agreement prohibiting such weapons once and for all". As we have already emphasized, in the situation which is developing, the Soviet Union cannot and will not remain a passive onlooker.

I should now like to say a few words concerning our discussions, including the statements made today. We have not heard anything new today either. We have been asked why we raised this issue. We have answered that question: we did so because President Reagan had taken the decision a little more than ten days earlier to produce neutron weapons. Clearly, we would not have raised this question now if President Reagan had not taken that decision on 6 August. Secondly, why do we consider this question urgent? We have explained that it is an urgent question because the development of neutron weapons increases the threat of the outbreak of a nuclear war. I think this is clear and simple. We have been asked why we are proposing that this issue should be considered separately. We have replied that we are prepared to examine this issue in an ad hoc working group. We are prepared to consider it in the context of a ban on nuclear weapons -- a subject on which the same States have blocked the establishment of a working group. We have also said that we are prepared to listen to any serious counter-proposal. We heard none yesterday, and we have heard none today.

Finally, we have been told that we are creating fear with our proposal. Excuse me, Mr. Chairman; but this is something that can be said only by people who do not even read the newspapers. It is not we who are creating fear, it is the neutron bomb that creates fear. In this connection, one has only to go one floor down from this room and take any newspaper in any language, in order to see that it is not the statement of the Soviet delegation or the proposal for the establishment of a working group that is creating fear, and that the peoples are not protesting against the establishment of a working group but against the production of neutron weapons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Lastly, we are accustomed to listening with attention and respect to the discussion in the Committee. We have just been told that essentially only the countries of the Warsaw Pact are advocating the prohibition of neutron weapons, and that their delegations are responsible for raising this issue. For the information of the United States delegation, in the last days of the 1981 session, at least 21 States have spoken on the question of neutron weapons, and representatives of a group of socialist countries and representatives of the non-aligned States have voiced a vigorous condemnation. Consequently, to endeavour to distort the essence and the nature of this discussion is, to say the least, unworthy of a responsible delegation.

In conclusion, I should also like to draw attention to one more point. Some delegations, and in particular the delegation of Pakistan, have referred to their anxiety not only in regard to the production of neutron weapons but also in regard to the deployment of certain types of weapons with nuclear warheads, particularly medium-range weapons. In this connection I should like to quote from a speech made by President L.I. Brezhnev at a dinner in honour of Mr. Willy Brandt on 30 June 1981. He said that:

"The Soviet Union is prepared to stop the deployment of its medium-range missiles in the European part of the country on the day when negotiations begin on the substance of the matter -- but it will do this of course only if the United States tells us that during the negotiations it will not increase the number of its medium-range nuclear devices in Europe either."

The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it is prepared to limit and prohibit any type of weapon but, of course, on the basis of reciprocity and without impairing the security of any of the parties.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the sponsors of document CD/219, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express our gratitude to you for the efforts you have made in connection with the consideration in the Committee, both at the informal meeting and at the plenary meeting today, of the proposal by the socialist countries on the need for the urgent establishment in the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc working group to elaborate an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons.

I should like to place particular emphasis on the fact that this important and timely initiative of the socialist countries was given much attention in the Committee and received the support of many delegations.

We note with regret, however, that owing to the well-known position of a number of Western countries, the Committee was today unable to take a positive decision on this important matter. The representatives of these Western countries, having earlier prevented the Committee from adopting a decision to establish ad hoc working groups to start negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the question of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, once again showed their negative attitude, this time in regard to the important question which brooks no further delay and which is raised in document CD/219.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

Having listened to the statements of certain representatives of Western countries at today's plenary meeting, I should like to say the following: I did not quite understand yesterday's statement by the distinguished representative of the United States, Ambassador Flowerree. After the statement by the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Issraelyan, he said that Ambassador Issraelyan's statement fully confirmed his own statement; but I should like to note that in his statement today the distinguished representative of the United States alleged that the discussion here is about the least destructive type of nuclear weapon. It is precisely this statement which bears out our concern. The statement that the neutron nuclear weapon is a "clean", "defensive", "humane" weapon is totally inadmissible. The distinguished representatives of Western countries have also alleged that the proposal by the countries of the socialist community is not serious. I leave that to the conscience of the representatives of the Western countries; but I would like to ask the members of the Committee the following question. Were the Western countries taking a serious step when they blocked the proposal to establish working groups on the problem of nuclear disarmament and on the problem of the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests?

For our part, we state frankly that those delegations which have prevented the adoption by the Committee of a positive decision on such an urgent and extremely important problem are assuming a serious responsibility.

With regard to the position of the socialist countries, their position of principle has been and is clearly set forth in their statements, in document CD/219, and in other documents which have been officially submitted to the Committee on Disarmament.

The socialist States members of the Committee on Disarmament are prepared to examine, this very day if you like, any other constructive proposals aimed at the prohibition as soon as possible of this most barbarous type of weapon of mass destruction, namely the neutron weapon.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, permit me to bring to your attention, and to that of the members of the Committee, the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Mongolian People's Republic a few days ago issued a statement clearly and precisely reasserting the position of principle of the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic regarding this monstrous type of weapon of mass destruction and severely condemning the foolhardy step taken by the United States Administration in escalating the armaments race by introducing the new neutron spiral which constitutes a serious threat to the cause of peace, disarmament and détente. My delegation intends to have this statement circulated without delay as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. YU Peiwen (China) (translated from Chinese): Mr. Chairman, at the recent meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, there have been debates around the decision of the United States Administration to produce neutron bombs. The Soviet delegation has distributed in the Committee working paper CD/216, which contains a TASS statement of 13 August. In this statement, the TASS made groundless attacks on China. I am compelled, in the name of the Chinese delegation, to reject categorically such wanton attacks by the Soviet Union.

The facts are that: China's press organs, among others, our official newspaper The People's Daily, have responsibly and objectively reported the views of some countries on the United States decision to produce neutron bombs, including the contents of press release issued by TASS.

(Mr. Yu Peiwen, China)

Then what is the motive of the Soviet attacks on China? Why did Moscow fly into a rage when China's newspapers have reported views and reactions of some countries on the production of neutron bombs by the United States? What is behind all this? These are questions worth pondering.

Evidently, the production of neutron bombs by the United States will affect the balance of nuclear forces between the Soviet Union and the United States. In recent years, the Soviet Union has stepped up its development of nuclear weapons in order to gain nuclear superiority. By deploying a large number of SS-20 missiles and Back-fire bombers in Europe, the Soviet Union has gained nuclear superiority in the European theatre. Now, with the production of neutron bombs by the United States, the nuclear balance between the two sides is bound to be affected.

The production of neutron bombs by the United States will offset the "tank advantage" enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the European theatre. It is reported that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty States have deployed as many as 47,000 tanks in Europe, whereas the Western counterpart has but 12,000. As we all know, the neutron bomb is an effective anti-tank weapon.

The United States decision to produce neutron bombs was made at a time when the United States is preparing to conduct negotiations with the Soviet Union in 1981 on theatre nuclear weapons. This shows that the United States is trying to strengthen its military capabilities so that it may stand in a relatively favourable position in future disarmament negotiations, i.e. from a position of strength.

It seems that the above points are precisely the reasons why Moscow is so disturbed and panic-stricken by the production of neutron bombs by the United States, and so furious about the objective reporting in the Chinese newspapers. In the final analysis, the production of neutron bombs is in fact a product of the nuclear arms race between the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. China has all along been against the nuclear arms race and holds that the two superpowers should take the lead in carrying out nuclear disarmament. The Soviet vilification against China's clearcut position on disarmament is utterly futile.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): I just wanted to clear up one point of fact. During his remarks a moment ago, the representative of the Soviet Union suggested that I had not acted like the representative of a responsible delegation in saying that only the members of the Warsaw Pact supported the proposal or had certain views on the desirability or the undesirability of the neutron weapon. I will give the Soviet representative the benefit of the doubt. I would like to read what I actually said, and that is that "the answer to the question of why this proposal is being pressed by the sponsors of CD/219, nearly all of whom are members of the Warsaw Pact ..." I did not say that other delegations had not spoken out against the neutron weapon, as they call it. I had simply said the sponsors of CD/219 were nearly all members of the Warsaw Pact. I did not appreciate being misquoted on that point.

If it is not true that nearly all the sponsors of CD/219 are members of the Warsaw Pact, I would appreciate that information.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian):
Mr. Chairman, forgive me for taking the floor a second time, but I should like to reply to some comments that have been made here including some comments about my country.

I must say that speculation about tanks is one of the favourite hobby-horses of Western propaganda. Various figures are quoted in an attempt to create an impression of some kind of nightmarish and terrible superiority of Soviet tanks; and the figures quoted vary considerably. It is typical, Mr. Chairman, that today, even with the increasing military co-operation between the United States and China, the United States mentioned one set of figures -- saying, I believe, that we have 40,000 tanks while NATO has, I think he said, 11,000 tanks --- but the representative of China decided, so to speak, to arouse some emotion and said that we have 47,000 tanks while NATO has 13,000 tanks. This is an altogether unfortunate fact because, I repeat, in view of their growing military co-operation it should certainly be possible for them to share their information more systematically and more accurately.

With regard to superiority in tanks, we do indeed have a superiority in tanks and we have repeatedly said so. Indeed, I even mentioned in the Committee on Disarmament, in my statement on 26 March, that in order to counterbalance this tank advantage, NATO has -- in addition to other types of weapons, including such redoubtable weapons as aircraft carriers -- NATO has a great superiority in anti-tank weapons, with which the NATO countries seek to offset or counterbalance the difference in types of weapons between the Warsaw Pact countries and the NATO countries. Thus, this excuse that neutron weapons are being developed to counter Soviet tanks is without foundation. I am bound to recall today's statement by Ambassador Sujka who quite rightly asked how the United States would combat Soviet tanks with neutron weapons if it did not intend to bring such weapons to Europe. But that is another question.

With regard to the statement by the representative of China, in the beginning I found it rather pleasing. It seemed to me that he really wanted to base himself on an objective appraisal of the situation; but where is the objectivity, when everything which the representative of China said concerning military balance was word for word the same as what our NATO colleagues have been telling us? Consequently, we heard nothing new or objective. We heard the NATO interpretation in the statement by the representative of China. Thank you; and I think that with these remarks I have finished the discussion of this matter.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation -- as, I am sure, the majority of the members of this Committee -- has listened with great interest and, I am sure, with no small measure of concern to the exchange of views which has taken place both this afternoon and earlier, in our Committee. In response to the question that has been raised here about the enhanced radiation weapon, I think Mr. Chairman, that this occasion may be an appropriate one for my delegation to express its own views and suggestions on this situation which presents itself to the Committee.

I would like to recall, and I believe that the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union mentioned this point earlier on, the remarks which were made by the head of the Pakistan delegation in his intervention yesterday, when he stated, and I quote, "that the current climate of confrontation" -- and we have seen evidence of this this afternoon -- "that the current climate of confrontation should not be allowed to lead to an unbridled escalation in the arms race, especially in nuclear weapons. Our concern is aroused whether such escalation in the arms race is quantitative or qualitative in nature, whether it involves the deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile, or the production of the enhanced radiation weapon". The head of my delegation added that "the present was not the time for self-serving postures or proposals, it was time for resolute and wide statesmanship".

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the exchange of views which we have had on the proposal contained in document CD/219 has, at least for my delegation -- and I believe this to be true of other members of the Group of 21 also -- reinforced our view that the Committee on Disarmament should be enabled, at a very early date, to establish an ad hoc working group which can deal with the whole question of nuclear disarmament and in the first instance with measures to halt the qualitative and quantitative escalation in the nuclear arms race. We hope that a positive decision on this proposal of the Group of 21, which is still on the table, will become possible in the near future, perhaps as soon as we resume our work next year. At the same time Mr. Chairman, my delegation believes that the Committee ought not to remain completely silent about the present situation. I think we must note the current and prospective escalation in the nuclear arms race, in both its quantitative and qualitative aspects, and the fact that this escalation is taking place mainly between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe, Sir, that it would be in keeping with the high responsibilities of this Committee and with its important mandate if we could at least issue an appeal -- phrased in very objective language -- to the United States and the Soviet Union to open early negotiations with a view to halting and diverting the present and potential escalation in the nuclear arms race between the two Powers in its quantitative and qualitative aspects. I believe Sir, that this is something that we could do, and that we could, I hope, reach agreement on; and I believe that this is something that would bring credit to this Committee and to the 40 members who have sat around this table during this year, watching with some consternation the developments taking place in the world around us.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now go on to the next item on this afternoon's agenda. In accordance with the practice followed by the Committee in previous years, I would like now to put before the Committee for adoption the reports of the four Working Groups, re-established during the present session. Those reports are contained in documents CD/215, CD/217 and Corr.1, CD/218 and CD/220.

(The Chairman)

If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons (CD/215).

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I now turn to document CD/217 and Corr. 1 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament. In particular, may I draw the attention to the recommendation contained in paragraph 17 of the report which recommends to the Committee that the Group should resume its work on 11 January 1982. If there is no objection, I will take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: I put now before the Committee for adoption document CD/218 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons. In paragraph 23 of its report the Working Group agreed to recommend to the Committee that it consider whether the Group should resume its work on 18 January 1982. In connection with this report, may I also draw attention to paragraph 11 of the report of the Working Group and to the communication addressed to me by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons dated 10 August 1981 by which I am informed that, subject to the Committee's agreement, it would be appreciated if I could invite the Director-General of the IAEA to provide the information described in that letter. Before we adopt the report, I wish to ask the Committee, firstly, whether there is any objection to the proposal that the Chairman invite the Director-General of the IAEA to provide the information concerning the draft convention which has been requested by the Chairman of the Working Group. Is there any objection?

Mr. VENKATESWARAN (India): Mr. Chairman, during the meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, my delegation had already expressed some serious reservations concerning a reference to the Director-General of the IAEA. However, we did not stand in the way of Ambassador Kómives, Chairman of the Working Group, holding further consultations on this matter with members of the Committee.

In the meantime, we have reflected further on this, and have had an opportunity also to consult our authorities. We have come to the conclusion that, at a time when neither the definition of radiological weapons nor the scope of application of the future treaty has been settled, a reference to the Director-General of the IAEA would be premature. We therefore request that the proposal be dropped for the present.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, it will be noted that in paragraph 11 of document CD/218 it is stated that some delegations had expressed their reservations on the proposal to invite the Director-General of the IAEA to express some views on the question referred to in that paragraph. My delegation was one of those. We, like the Indian delegation, have had an opportunity to reflect further on this matter, and we do believe, Sir, that at the present time it is somewhat premature to address this invitation to the Director-General of the IAEA.

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

Inter alia, we have studied the scope of the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and it would appear from that Convention that the activities which are of concern to the IAEA under that Convention relating to the protection of special fissionable material, under certain particular situations, are considerably narrower than the responsibilities that would arise in relation to the proposed action to prevent diversion of radioactive substances under the proposed convention on radiological weapons. We would think that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons would need to examine, first of all, what precisely it wishes to do in terms of safeguard activities with relation to this action before it could invite any views either from the Director-General of the IAEA or from some other technical body about the methods for preventing the diversion that is referred to in the proposed RW convention.

For these reasons, Sir, we believe that this decision should be postponed to our session in 1982 when we would like to study this matter further and then seek very clear and precise guidance from the Director-General of the IAEA, or from any other agency, on this and any other relevant question.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): At the time the Netherlands delegation welcomed the spirit of accommodation that led the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons to agree that it would benefit the work of the Group if, in conformity with rule 41 of the rules of procedure of the Committee on Disarmament, the Director-General of IAEA could be invited to provide information on the possible relationship between a draft convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of RW on the one hand and the Vienna Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as well as the Guidelines for Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on the other hand. We are grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, for the consultations you have initiated on this request.

The Netherlands delegation regrets that a request was made that this proposal be dropped.

It does not augur well that no consensus could be reached, Mr. Chairman, on your sending a letter to the Director-General of IAEA inviting him to provide the information indicated above. We are perturbed by this lack of consensus since it had been clearly understood that the information sought would be technical and in the nature of providing relevant facts to delegations. It would have no bearing on the process of negotiation. In this context let me quote from the Netherlands Statement in the plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament held on 14 July 1981:

"Our sole aim is to try to establish maximum congruence between the work done in various fora, in casu located in Geneva and Vienna respectively, where new instruments of international law are being created. It goes without saying that the possible future advice of the Director-General of IAEA will in no way prejudice the decision the Ad Hoc Working Group will finally take as regards the wording of the article IV of the consolidated text. The Ad Hoc Working Group works under the mandate given to it by the Committee on Disarmament, and this Committee is of course the only instance which de jure is empowered to draw up the radiological weapons convention. All the same, we deem it the duty of all States to see to it that agreements dealing with the handling of radio-active materials -- be these texts drawn up in Geneva or in Vienna -- form, between them, a formidable and coherent obstacle to unauthorized or illegal use of these dangerous materials".

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In this light, the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to empower you to send the letter under reference does not augur well for our future negotiations. If facts are going to be barred from being provided, what is to come of the much vaunted "business-like" negotiations? It seems that six precious months for bringing factual information together will be lost.

We deplore this failure.

The CHAIRMAN: As there is no consensus, the proposal that the Chairman invite the Director-General of the IAEA is dropped. Secondly, I would like to know whether there is any objection to the Working Group resuming its work on 18 January 1982.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I have a comment rather than an objection. My delegation is one of those which took the view that we should postpone taking a decision about the date until we had considered the matter further at this meeting.

The essential point, as we see it, is that we have to establish whether we would be able to embark on the next round of discussions in January, with a genuine hope of making early progress. In the view of my delegation, there would not be any virtue in calling a special early meeting of the RW Group unless the prospect of substantive progress was well demonstrated; and so perhaps we all need to go back and think about our negotiating positions. If by the beginning of next year, it does become apparent that a meeting on 18 January would be fruitful and justified, then we would be very much in favour of it. But we suggest that it might be appropriate for the Chairman to consult, perhaps among a few delegations who are particularly concerned on the central points, to make certain that the way forward has been unblocked before we actually get down to that new round of meetings at an early date in January.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation unfortunately has some difficulties with endorsing the view that the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should resume on 18 January next year. Our difficulties are both constitutional, and substantive in nature.

As far as the procedural questions are concerned, there is, as you know, Mr. Chairman, a distinction between the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme and the other three Working Groups which we have set up. The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme has been established up to the time when it would submit the programme for adoption at the second special session devoted to disarmament, whereas the other three Working Groups are set up on an annual basis with annual mandates. Therefore, Sir, the problem of reconvening the Radiological Weapons Group before the fourth annual session of the Committee on Disarmament resumes would be one of constitutionality because that Working Group, as far as the procedural question is concerned, ceases to exist with the completion of the present session of the Committee; and we would have to re-establish that Group, by deciding anew on its mandate, appointing its Chairman, and so forth, when we resume our work in 1982. That is, Sir, the constitutional position.

With regard to the substance, we see that there are considerable difficulties within the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons, on the questions of definition scope, peaceful uses, the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities and other questions. What is required basically is not more time for negotiations, but substantive political decisions on the part of the negotiating

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

parties with a view to reaching an agreement. We hope, Sir, that these political decisions will be taken and that once they are taken, we think that the Ad Hoc Working Group could, within the time available after the resumption of the 1982 session, achieve agreement on an RW convention. Therefore, Sir, we believe that the work of the Working Group should be resumed when the Committee itself meets in 1982.

Mr. CARSALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, with regard to this question my delegation just wishes to say that the decision whether the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons should meet on 18 January or not is a decision exclusively for this Committee. I am making this explanation because I do not know whether I correctly understood the remarks of the representative of the United Kingdom, who mentioned the possibility that there might be consultations between the Chairman and a group of delegations particularly concerned with this matter on the question whether or not this Group would meet on the date envisaged.

If that was the meaning of his remarks, my delegation would like to say that it cannot agree that decisions of this type should be taken between the Chairman and a certain group of delegations particularly concerned, because the interest of all the members of the Committee in this matter is the same and has the same value. Thus I repeat that any decision taken on this matter, either one way or the other, should be taken exclusively within this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: In view of the statements which have been made, I conclude that there is at present no consensus on the question of convening the Working Group on Radiological Weapons on 18 January 1982. In the absence of objections, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall proceed now to take up document CD/220 containing the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons. If there is no objection, I will consider that the Committee wishes to adopt the report of the Working Group.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: That concludes our business in the plenary meeting for today. Papers on the concluding paragraphs under certain sections of the annual report have been circulated to the members under the symbol Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.2 in all languages. Members need some time to read these papers and so the informal meeting will convene at 8 p.m. this evening.

Mr. HASSAN (Egypt) (translated from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, my country's delegation has no objection to the approval of the reports that have just been adopted. However, we would like to state that we have some comments on the Arabic translation of those reports. Since this may not be the appropriate time to raise such questions, we reserve the right to transmit these comments to the secretariat at a future time in order to ensure that the Arabic version is in conformity with the English text of the reports. Thank you.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I understood that you suggested ending our deliberations now and reconvening at eight o'clock. Is that correct? As we have very little time left for our future deliberations, I wonder if there is nothing we can take up right now as there is still one hour until six o'clock, which I think it would be a pity to lose. I have no specific proposals. There are others who have participated more assiduously than I have in the informal negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN: The drafting group could actually convene now to draft a paragraph on the issue of neutron bombs. So, I hope that the members of this open-ended drafting group will be available for a meeting immediately after this meeting adjourns.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I should like in my turn to express the thanks of my delegation to our colleague, Ambassador Issraelyan, who has described very clearly the organizational problems to which we must certainly give particular attention this year, since we are approaching the end of this third session and the experience we have accumulated makes it possible for us to reflect on the conclusions which we can derive from it.

We too are in agreement with much of what has been said by our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union. We consider that it would be highly desirable to be able to work for long periods, and that it would also be highly desirable for delegations to have the necessary resources and the autonomy to be able to devote themselves entirely to the work of our Committee. We also agree, of course, on the fundamental nature of the work which is performed in the subsidiary bodies, basically the working groups. With regard to the practical solutions which can be arrived at, we are, of course, bound to recognize certain limits.

First of all, with regard to the status and the size of delegations, on which nearly everything depends. We ourselves consider that the means available to delegations -- and I include in this comment, the case of my own delegation -- are inadequate in the light of the mass of work with which we have to deal. We would be happy if a larger number of the participant countries were able to establish separate missions headed by ambassadors responsible exclusively for disarmament matters. In expressing this wish we are of course aware of the difficulties which this transformation might raise for a number of participants in the Committee. We are therefore being rather guarded in our opinions on this matter, though we very much hope that a great deal of attention will be given by all to these requirements with respect to the resources available to delegations.

I am referring, of course, both to permanent staff and to the experts required for some of the work conducted here. With regard to the length of our sessions, our Soviet colleague has very properly distinguished -- and our colleagues from Mexico and the Federal Republic of Germany have done the same -- between sessions of the Committee itself and the work of the Working Groups which could possibly be extended beyond the time when the Committee is in formal session. We believe that this is a useful distinction. My delegation entirely shares the opinion expressed by Ambassador Garcia-Robles and Ambassador Pfeiffer that it is very useful, and indeed necessary, for heads of delegations whose Governments so wish to participate in the work of the First Committee of the General Assembly and also in the work of the Disarmament Commission. There is a unity in all the multilateral disarmament endeavours conducted within the international community as a whole, even if this Committee is not very formally part of the United Nations system for many of those

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

here present. We consider that the advantages we derive from our personal participation in the work of the First Committee are invaluable and the link thus established between the negotiating body and the deliberative bodies is an extremely valuable one at the political level both for the Committee on Disarmament and for the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission.

It should be possible both to take into account the constraints thus imposed with regard to the calendar of meetings and at the same time to schedule a session for the Committee which might be a little longer. We would have no objection to a reconsideration of the provision in our rules of procedure which states that the session shall begin on the first Tuesday in February of each year; and we think that it might be possible to gain two or three weeks by convening the Committee, for example, on 10 or 15 January. This is an idea I am expressing; I do not know how it may be received, but I observe that our Soviet colleague has already proposed a formula of this kind for next year if, as is probable, the constraints relating to the preparation of the second special session oblige us to conclude our spring session next year earlier than usual.

Ambassador Garcia-Robles has made a very useful calculation which enables us to conclude that there are in fact 30 working weeks between the beginning of February and the beginning of September; and this would, I think, be sufficient for the Working Groups. The Groups could perhaps be left to continue their meetings during the four weeks of the Disarmament Commission's session if heads of delegations wished to go to New York on that occasion. It would no doubt be desirable for the work to be completed at latest by early September unless the groups went on until early October, i.e. after the approval of the report on the session. It would be perfectly possible to arrange for the report on the session to review the state of the work of the groups, for example up to 15 August; they could then continue their work, after devoting about a week -- as they do now -- to the preparation of their reports for the over-all report by the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, which must be ready by the end of August.

These are the comments which I wish to submit at this stage. It is obvious that the requirements we are referring to, and which will certainly call for a major effort, depend substantially on the possibilities for negotiation open to us. We hope that these will be as extensive as possible. There is a political factor in the practical prospects for negotiation, and then of course there is the international situation; and we are among those who believe that this situation has inevitable effects. But we also think that this is not a reason for relaxing our efforts in continuing the negotiations on disarmament.

These are the thoughts which I wished to submit at the present stage on the matter with which we are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN: I think it is necessary for the drafting group at least to spend some time looking into the draft for a paragraph on our discussion about the neutron bomb.

The meeting rose at 5 p.m.

FINAL RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH PLENARY MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Friday, 21 August 1981, at 6.00 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. Ch.A. SANI

(Indonesia)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Algeria: Mr. A. SALAH-BEY

Argentina: Mr. J.C. CARSALES
Mr. J.F. GOMENSORO
Ms. N. NASCIMBENE

Australia: Mr. R.A. WALKER
Mr. R. STEELE

Belgium: Mr. A. ONKELINX
Mr. J.-M. NOIRFALISSE

Brazil: Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA
Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE

Bulgaria: Mr. P. VOUTOV
Mr. I. SOTIROV

Burma: U SAW HLAING
U NGWE WIN
U THAN HTUN

Canada: Mr. C.R. SKINNER

China: Mr. YU Peiwen
Mr. YU Mengjia
Mr. LI Changhe
Mr. YANG Mingliang
Mr. PAN Jusheng

Cuba: Mr. L. SOLA VILA
Mr. P. NUÑEZ MOSQUERA

Czechoslovakia: Mr. P. LUKES
Mr. J. FRANEK

Egypt: Mr. I.A. HASSAN
Mr. N. FAHMY
Miss W. BASSIM

Ethiopia: Mr. T. TERREFE
Mr. F. YOHANNES

France: Mr. F. de la GORCE
Mr. J. de BEAUSSE
Mr. M. COUTHURES

German Democratic Republic: Mr. G. HERDER
Mr. H. THIELICKE
Mr. M. KAULFUSS

Germany, Federal Republic of: Mr. G. PFEIFFER
Mr. F. RUTH
Mr. N. KLINGLER

Hungary: Mr. I. KÓMIVES
Mr. F. GAJDA

India: Mr. A.P. VENKATESWARAN
Mr. S. SARAN

Indonesia: Mr. Ch.A. SANI
Mr. S. DARUSMAN
Mr. M. SIDIK
Mr. HARYOMATARAM
Mr. F. QASIM
Mr. ACHDIAT
Mr. E. SOEPRAPTO

Iran: Mr. A. JALALI
Mr. J. ZAHIRNIA

Italy: Mr. A. CIARRAPICO
Mr. B. CABRAS
Mr. E. di GIOVANNI

Japan:
Mr. Y. OKAWA
Mr. M. TAKAHASHI
Mr. K. TANAKA
Mr. K. SHIMADA

Kenya:

Mexico:
Mr. A. GARCIA ROBLES
Mrs. Z. GONZALEZ Y REYNERO

Mongolia:
Mr. D. ERDEMBILEG
Mr. S. BOLD

Morocco:
Mr. M. CHRAIBI

Netherlands:
Mr. H. WAGENMAKERS

Nigeria:
Mr. M.B. BRIMAH
Mr. W.O. AKINSANYA
Mr. T. AGUIYI-IRONSI

Pakistan:
Mr. M. AKRAM
Mr. T. ALTAF

Peru:

Poland:
Mr. J. CIAŁOWICZ

Romania:
Mr. O. IONESCU

Sri Lanka:
Mr. T. JAYAKODDY
Mr. H.M.G.S. PALIHAKKARA

Sweden:
Mr. C. LIDGARD
Mr. C.-M. HYLTENIUS
Mr. L. NORBERG

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. V.L. ISSRAELYAN
Mr. B.P. PROKOFIEV
Mr. V.M. GANJA
Mr. L.A. NAUMOV
Mr. V.F. PRYAKHIN
Mr. S.N. RIUKHINE

United Kingdom:

Mr. D. SUMMERHAYES
Mr. N.H. MARSHALL
Mrs. J. LINK

United States of America:

Mr. C. FLOWERREE
Mr. F. DESIMONE
Miss K. CRITTENBERGER
Mr. R.F. SCOTT
Mr. W. HECKROTTE

Venezuela:

Mr. R. RODRIQUEZ NAVARRO
Mr. O. AGUILAR

Yugoslavia:

Mr. Z. JERKIC

Zaire:

Mr. B.A. NZENGEYA
Mr. L.B. NDAGA

Secretary of the Committee and
Personal Representative of
the Secretary-General:

Mr. R. JAIPAL

Deputy Secretary of the
Committee:

Mr. V. BERASATEGUI

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to inform members from the very beginning that we should try to finish our work in three hours at the most. Thereafter, it is not certain that technical services will be available. As we approved the annual report only last night at an informal meeting, I would expect its formal adoption this evening without undue delay or complication although there are bound to be mistakes of one kind or another in typing, translation or placement. Such matters should be brought directly to the notice of the appropriate person in the secretariat. Any temptation to reopen old points or bring up new points at this late stage should be resisted, and I trust members will exercise the necessary degree of self-restraint and display a spirit of compromise.

The Committee has before it two documents -- Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1 being the main report and Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3 containing certain concluding paragraphs. We shall deal with them together. I shall go through the main report section by section and, when we come to places where additions or insertions have to be made, I shall draw the attention of the Committee to relevant parts of the other paper, that is, Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3; and, as I said earlier, please inform the secretariat of errors, omissions or translation mistakes. The plenary meeting need not be troubled with them.

I should also like to suggest that when a delegation objects to something strongly enough to want a deletion, it should speak out and say so clearly and I will declare that there is no consensus; but where the degree of opposition is not so strong, kindly express your reservations briefly for the record. It is much too late at this stage to try to improve the grammar or expressions of form or structure. The report, you will agree with me, is not a piece of literature competing for an international prize. Now let us proceed section by section.

The introduction -- I think there will be no problems in accepting the introduction. I do not see any.

The introduction was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The second chapter entitled "Organization of the Committee", chapter II, section A -- are there any difficulties?

Mr. FLOVERNEE (United States of America): Excuse me, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a suggestion. When you take a section for consideration, would you give us the inclusive paragraphs please? I think that might help us to make sure we know what we are discussing.

The CHAIRMAN: We are now taking section A, paragraphs 2 to 4. I hope that there are no difficulties. There are none.

Section A was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section B -- "Participants in the work of Committee". Only one paragraph -- paragraph 5. No difficulties?

Section B was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section C -- "Agenda for the 1981 Session and Programme of Work for the First and Second Parts of the session". Paragraphs 6 to 11. Are there any problems? There are none.

Section C was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section D -- "Participation by States not members of the Committee" That is, paragraphs 12 and 13. No difficulties?

Section D was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section E -- "Proposal for an addition to rule 25 of the rules of procedure". Paragraph 14. No problems?

Section E was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section F -- "Consideration of the modalities of the review of the membership of the Committee". We will take paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 first. No problems?

Paragraphs 15, 16 and 17 were adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Now I would like to request you to look at the other paper -- that is, Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3, page 17. The heading is "Draft of concluding paragraphs concerning the question of the review of membership". There are three paragraphs there. Are there difficulties? I see none.

The three paragraphs were adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We look now at paragraph 18, on page 10 of Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1. No problems?

Paragraph 18 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Section G -- "Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations".

Mr. SARAH (India): Mr. Chairman, with respect to paragraph 18, I recall that we had agreed at an informal meeting to a draft recommendation concerning consultation to be conducted by the Chairman two weeks before the 1982 session on the programme of work and agenda; and it was also indicated to the Secretariat that this should be inserted at an appropriate place. Perhaps note should be taken of that.

The CHAIRMAN: We take note of that.

Let us now consider section G -- "Communications from Non-Governmental Organizations". No difficulties?

Section G was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We have arrived now at chapter III -- "Work of the Committee during its 1991 session".

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia): (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I would like to request on behalf of my delegation that, starting with this section of the report, we proceed paragraph by paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN: Then we shall go on from here, paragraph by paragraph. Paragraph 20 -- are there any difficulties with paragraph 20? None.

Paragraph 20 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 21 -- I do not see any problems.

Paragraph 21 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 22 -- no difficulties?

Paragraph 22 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 23 -- no problems?

Paragraph 23 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 24 -- no difficulties?

Paragraph 24 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 25 -- no problems? Just a listing of documents.

Paragraph 25 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We go now to section A -- "Nuclear Test Ban". Paragraph 26 -- no problems?

Paragraph 26 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 27?

Paragraph 27 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 28?

Paragraph 28 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 29?

Paragraph 29 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 30?

Paragraph 30 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 31?

Paragraph 31 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 32?

Paragraph 32 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 33?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, my delegation has an objection to the inclusion of this paragraph as well as a related paragraph, paragraph 42, because of the reference to a document which was intended to be of assistance to the members of the Committee only and is an unofficial document. Attention should not be called to that document in a public document such as this, which will be widely circulated.

Mr. de la CORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, for the same reasons we believe it is preferable not to mention in our report to the General Assembly the distribution of the unofficial document in question.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I wish to associate the Netherlands delegation with the observations made by the delegations of the United States and of France, for the same reason.

The CHAIRMAN: That means that these delegations would like the paragraph to be deleted? I am correct. In that sense, as there is opposition to this paragraph ...

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, we had a discussion on this in our informal meetings yesterday. This paragraph reflects exactly what happened in the Committee; and my delegation thought that it should go further than it does and should include also a precise reference to the document. But now, Sir, three members of the Committee think that the General Assembly should not be informed of what factually and actually happened in this Committee. I am surprised by this attitude, because these paragraphs have been approved and endorsed by those same delegations on two different occasions -- when they approved them and endorsed them in the informal meeting and before in the drafting group. I therefore should insist that those paragraphs, as they are drafted here, should remain; otherwise, those delegations are withdrawing the endorsement they gave.

Now, Sir, when it was agreed that the document prepared by the secretariat should not be circulated as an official document, there was a kind of gentleman's agreement that it was only for the use of the members of the Committee. Yesterday I made the proposal that a precise reference should be made to that document. But,

(Mr. de Souza e Silva, Brazil)

on second thoughts, as there was a kind of gentleman's agreement, my delegation was and is prepared to drop the suggestions I made. But if those delegations do not stick to the endorsement they gave to the approval of these paragraphs, I should consider that my delegation might request the circulation of the document in question as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament on behalf of the Brazilian delegation. It is therefore for them to decide: either they stick to the endorsement already given, if they do not want the document to be circulated as an official document of the Committee on Disarmament; or, if they want the document to be circulated as an official document of the Committee, then they propose the amendment or withdrawal of this paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that the three delegations have heard the request made by our colleague from Brazil. I would like to ask them whether they maintain their objections to the inclusion of this paragraph in our report.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, the French delegation's position was expressed quite clearly at yesterday's informal meeting. We objected to the mention of the unofficial document. The existence of the unofficial document is of no importance to the General Assembly. What is of importance to the General Assembly is the fact that we have had discussions on these items, and these discussions are indeed reflected in the report itself. We do not see any need whatsoever to mention the document. Such a mention will give rise to requests for the distribution of the document. This is precisely what my delegation does not want, and we would be altogether opposed to the circulation of the document as a Committee document under the auspices of the delegation of Brazil, because it is not a document of the delegation of Brazil. Once again, there is a danger that the whole spirit of our informal discussions on questions of substance may be spoilt if the document is given official distribution; or we would in that case have to reach an understanding on this document.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I simply wish to state that, having heard the intervention of the distinguished representatives of Brazil and the comments on it made by the distinguished representative of France, I agree thoroughly with what the distinguished representative of France has said and maintain my wish to see this paragraph dropped. I would also recall that there is another paragraph, paragraph 42, which poses the same problem.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, if we are taking this decision in the Committee on Disarmament -- since it is the Committee which will take the decision -- and if two representatives of a single State

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

are seated at the Committee table, how are we going to settle this matter in such a situation? I first wanted to ask you this, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I think that, with regard to the inclusion of this paragraph 33, there is clearly no consensus, so paragraph 33 is dropped. With regard to the question of the circulation of this document as ... Point of order from Mongolia.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I asked you a question -- namely, how are we going to settle this matter if one delegation is occupying two places at the negotiating table? How will we settle the question in such a situation? I asked you this question, but you have not answered. I should like clarification on this point.

The CHAIRMAN: I would like to ask our distinguished colleague from Mongolia to clarify his intervention.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): My question was settled immediately after my second statement. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN: Thank you. If that question is settled, then I give the floor to our distinguished colleague from Brazil.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Mr. Chairman, I am still puzzled about this proposal because in paragraph 33 we refer to the 126th plenary meeting on 21 April. It was an official meeting of the Committee. It was a public meeting of the Committee with verbatim records; and how can we now hide this from the General Assembly and delete any reference to what was done in that meeting? I think, Sir, that no delegation has the intention of doing so; but the result of the proposal made by the delegations of the United States and France would amount to the same -- to avoid giving information to the General Assembly as to what actually happened in this Committee -- and it is very difficult for my delegation to accept that, Sir.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with our colleague, the distinguished Ambassador of Brazil. For us there is no question of hiding something from the General Assembly. The question is whether everything which appears in the verbatim records of plenary meetings of the Committee should be put into the report (and we would remind our colleague from Brazil that the verbatim records are in fact annexed to the report, and can therefore be consulted). It would in our view be inappropriate to mention in this consolidated document, which is intended for the Assembly, a purely internal document to which we would thereby be giving a prominence and an official consecration which it does not have.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): I am sorry to take the floor again, but this discussion and this proposal reminds me of a well-known book, 1984, where history was written and now we are re-writing it. But, as I said before, we are withdrawing the endorsement of this paragraph which has been adopted twice in our informal meetings; and I also state that my delegation does not feel committed to restrict a document prepared by the secretariat for its divulgation whenever it thinks fit.

The CHAIRMAN: As there is no consensus with regard to the inclusion of this paragraph, the Chair is compelled to declare that this paragraph is dropped.

Paragraph 33 was deleted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 34. I do not see any difficulties with 34.

Paragraph 34 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 35? No difficulties?

Paragraph 35 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 36? No difficulties with regard to 36?

Paragraph 36 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we go to our other paper, the first page of Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3, and we shall go through this part paragraph by paragraph. The first paragraph on the first page. Are there any difficulties? If not, the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The second paragraph? No problems either. The second paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Page 2, the first paragraph on page 2 starting with "A number of delegations". Are there difficulties with that paragraph? If none, it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Second paragraph on page 2? No difficulties. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The third paragraph on page 2. No difficulties? The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The paragraph continues to page 3 and I hope that, of course, the rest of the paragraph will be acceptable to the Committee too.

The entire paragraph was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Next paragraph on page 3?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I apologize for adding an editorial comment, but it seems to us that this paragraph that begins on the bottom of page 2 and continues on to page 3 should be broken at the point in the first line on page 3 where it says: "The proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group ... was put to the Committee on 14 July." The entire subject matter changes at that point and we would like to make that suggestion. I do not want to hold up our work any further to discuss it.

The CHAIRMAN: I have been informed by the Secretary that this has already been taken care of. Thank you very much. So the paragraph, now divided into two, has been adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, starting with the words "The third participant" and ending with the words "resume them immediately". Are there any difficulties with regard to that paragraph? There is none. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, beginning with the words "Some members", is a one-sentence paragraph. No difficulties?

The paragraph was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph on page 3. Are there problems with that paragraph? There are none.

The last paragraph on page 3 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to page 4, the first paragraph. Are there difficulties with that paragraph? None.

The first paragraph on page 4 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The second paragraph on page 4, starting with "The Group of 21" and ending with "the provisions of rule 23". Any problems? There are none.

The second paragraph on page 4 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph beginning with "The sponsors of the proposal" and ending with "session by the Committee". Does that create difficulties? None.

The paragraph was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting "At the 140th plenary meeting", a one-sentence paragraph. Would that create difficulties? None.

The paragraph was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The next is also a one-sentence paragraph. Are there any difficulties? None.

The paragraph was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph. Are there any difficulties? None?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, this paragraph was discussed at great length last night, and our representative gave a detailed explanation of why it caused my delegation some difficulties. I neither wish to take up the Committee's time this afternoon discussing the details, nor to interfere with the consensus on the adoption of this document. I would therefore appreciate it if the Secretary would accept a foot-note which I will read out, to be placed relevant to this paragraph, either by an asterisk or whatever the appropriate means of indicating a foot-note may be. The foot-note would read as follows:

"The delegation of the United States pointed out that it was not in a position to state what the United States intentions might be regarding this issue at the beginning of the Committee's next session, and therefore it reserved its position on paragraph ..." whatever this number is.

The secretariat has copies of this foot-note which, if anyone should wish to see it, can be circulated.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): On occasions much more solemn than this one, for example when the Final Document was adopted, a number of delegations had observations of this kind to make, and thought it sufficient for these observations to be noted in the record of the meeting. I would venture to ask the distinguished representative of the United States whether it would be sufficient for him if this position were noted in the records because, if we begin to include foot-notes in our report I am afraid that its value, which is not very great as it is, will be still further diminished.

The CHAIRMAN: Would the distinguished representative of the United States be able to accept the suggestion by our distinguished colleague from Mexico?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the comments that were just made by the distinguished representative of Mexico, but I believe that, under the circumstances which prevail in this particular instance, it is appropriate for the United States to assert their position, since otherwise I think that those reading the document might not fully appreciate it.

I do not think that the foot-note would be a signal for many others to place foot-notes. I hope it would not be, and I do believe that the intention here was to be as co-operative as possible. We recognize, of course, that the preponderant views in this Committee are expressed in that paragraph, and we are not prejudging one way or the other what the United States position might be in 1982. Therefore, we thought that this would be the most simple way of clarifying for all those who read this document what the actual situation is.

The CHAIRMAN: If there is no objection, I consider the paragraph with a foot-note adopted.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection to this mode of action, my delegation would, of course, not stand in the way of putting a foot-note to the effect proposed by Ambassador Flowerree.

I would like, however, at this stage to note that this is perhaps the first instance in which we have interpreted the rule of consensus in a way which makes it possible for a delegation to make a reservation in a foot-note; and perhaps this is something that we all ought to note for future reference.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): My delegation would like to express an opinion similar to that presented by the delegation of Pakistan. Without going into the details of the matter, my delegation believes that a precedent is being created, a precedent of much greater importance than we perhaps realize. There is a tradition of not mentioning delegations by name. In the drafting of this report, resort has been made to various devices -- which some might almost describe as ridiculous -- in order to avoid naming delegations; and, if we start the practice of including reservations of position in the report, I am genuinely afraid that we are embarking on a path that is full of problems since other delegations will inevitably be tempted, perhaps not this year but in the future, to ask for their positions to be duly recorded in foot-notes.

I repeat that I do not object to the consensus if this is the feeling of the Committee; but I do believe that, apart from the specific matter we are dealing with, we should reflect more deeply on the significance of the precedent we are establishing.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I was hoping not to create difficulties for the Committee by this course of action. I have taken note of the comments that have been made by some of our distinguished colleagues, and can think of alternative ways of solving this problem -- one of which would be to accept the convention that we say:

"One delegation pointed out that it was not in a position to state what its intention might be regarding the issue at the beginning of the Committee's next session" and so forth.

(Mr. Flowerree, United States)

And put a period after that point, That would be one way of solving the problem without having a foot-note and without mentioning a delegation by name. I could then, in a later statement, make my delegation's position clear.

Another solution to the problem would be to drop the paragraph, but I do not think that would be acceptable to the majority of the Committee, and that is why we were looking for alternative solutions to a problem which I am afraid is one of serious concern to my delegation and to my Government.

The CHAIRMAN: If I am not mistaken, I have asked if there are any objections to the adoption of this paragraph with the addition of a foot-note as proposed by our colleague from the United States. At that time, I did not see any objection; but two delegations explained their positions in reminding this Committee of the grave consequences of the decision to accept, as normal practice, the inclusion of foot-notes to reserve our positions with regard to certain facts in our report.

If this is correct, may I take it that -- taking note of the remarks that have been made -- the paragraph can be adopted with the foot-note as proposed by our colleague from the United States?

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): Without wishing to prolong this discussion I would say that, as far as my delegation is concerned, it would prefer the other alternative given by the representative of the United States, -- i.e. a statement that one delegation had pointed out that it was not in a position to say what its Government's intention might be, or something along those lines -- rather than the introduction of a foot-note, which I believe would set a much more important precedent. That is the view of my delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: I see that Argentina has proposed an additional paragraph reflecting his position. Starting with "One delegation..." Would that be more acceptable?

Mr. BRIMAH (Nigeria): Mr. Chairman, my delegation would like to appeal to the United States delegate that this paragraph reflects the relevant United Nations General Assembly resolution declaring the question of a nuclear test ban to be a matter of high priority. My delegation would like the concluding part of this paragraph to remain as it is, without a foot-note.

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I am prepared to accept the proposal of the distinguished representative of Argentina.

Mr. CARASALES (Argentina) (translated from Spanish): I apologize for speaking a third time. My delegation has not made any proposal; it stated that it regarded the alternative proposed by the representative of the United States as preferable to the inclusion of a foot-note. I referred to the alternative proposed by the representative of the United States; it was not a proposal by the Argentine delegation.

The CHAIRMAN: May I remind my colleagues again that I have put the question whether there is any objection to the acceptance of this paragraph with the addition of the foot-note proposed by the United States. I remember that there was no objection to this. Remarks were made, but I had concluded at that time that we had accepted the paragraph as no objections were expressed. It has therefore become a decision of this Committee and, in the course of discussion, several other delegations have requested the floor. As usual, inborne courtesy cannot deny them their request. May I now take it that the paragraph, with the request by the United States to add a foot-note to it, has been accepted by this Committee? There were reservations and the remarks, since this is a plenary meeting, are recorded.

The last paragraph on page 4 of Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3, with the addition of the foot-note proposed by the United States, was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We go back now and return to our first paper, Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1, to start with "B. Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Nuclear Disarmament", paragraph 37. Are there any problems? If none, may I consider that the paragraph is adopted?

Paragraph 37 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 38 runs from page 20 to 21. Can this paragraph be accepted by the Committee?

Paragraph 38 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 39 -- are there any problems with this paragraph? If there are none, then the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 40 -- if there are no difficulties with regard to this paragraph, it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 41 -- are there any difficulties? If there are none, paragraph 41 is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 42 -- are there any problems with paragraph 42?

Mr. FLOWERREE (United States of America): Mr. Chairman, I called attention earlier to the fact that this paragraph was connected with paragraph 33, which we have dropped, and we suggest it also be dropped.

The CHAIRMAN: I do not think that we have to repeat the discussions which were held before with regard to the earlier paragraph. But, as there is no consensus to keep this paragraph in our report, I have to decide whether the paragraph should be dropped. The paragraph is dropped.

Paragraph 42 was deleted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 43 -- does that paragraph have difficulties? None. Paragraph 43 is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 44 -- are there any difficulties with 44? If there are none, it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 45. If there are no problems with paragraph 45, it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I invite my colleagues to turn again to Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3? Page 5 -- the first paragraph on page 5 starting "Several delegations" and ending "the Committee as a whole". Does that paragraph pose difficulties? If none, it is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 5? Would that paragraph be acceptable to the Committee? I see no objection. It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 5 starting "As this proposal" and ending "on nuclear disarmament". Are there any difficulties with this paragraph? If none, the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, at the bottom of page 5 and going on to page 6, starting with "At the informal meetings" and ending "the non-use of nuclear weapons". Are there any difficulties with that paragraph? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 6, starting with "Certain nuclear-weapon States" and ending "on a global scale". Would that paragraph lead to difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, beginning with "A nuclear-weapon State" and ending "for all time". Does that paragraph lead to difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: And then there is a one-sentence paragraph following that. Does that paragraph have any difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, starting at the bottom of page 6 and continuing on to page 7, starting "Attention came" and ending "on nuclear disarmament". That paragraph can be adopted. Thank you. This paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 7, starting with "The Group of 21" and ending with "nuclear-weapon States". That paragraph can be adopted. Thank you very much. That paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, starting with "In the opinion of the Group of 21" and ending with "appropriate forum for this purpose". Would that paragraph create difficulties? There are none, and so the paragraph is accepted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We have arrived at the paragraph at the bottom of page 7 and going on to page 8, starting with "A group of socialist States" and ending "concerning nuclear disarmament". Is that paragraph acceptable to the Committee? It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph on page 8, starting "The delegation of a nuclear-weapon State" and ending "the reduction of their own armaments" on page 9. Would that paragraph create difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We come to the next paragraph, starting with "Other delegations" and ending with "weapons in other regions of the world". Does that paragraph create difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, starting with "A group of socialist countries" and ending with "by limiting it". Any problems with that paragraph? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: At the bottom of page 9, there is a one-sentence paragraph. Can that paragraph be adopted? Thank you. That paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to page 10, the first paragraph. Does that paragraph create difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 10, starting with "In making an assessment" and ending with "field of disarmament". Would that create difficulties? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph is a one-sentence paragraph, starting with "The substantive". Would that create difficulties? None. It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph on page 10, starting with "The Committee" and ending with "working group". No problems with that paragraph? This paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to page 11, the first paragraph. Any problems with that paragraph? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, starting with "Some delegations" and ending with "nuclear-weapon States". Any difficulty with that paragraph? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we come to consider the next paragraph, starting with "At the request of a group of socialist States" and ending with "appropriately used".

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, this paragraph at the present time is followed by a paragraph which proceeds to the question of nuclear neutron weapons. In order to get a better ordering of the sense of these materials, I believe that it would be right to take the paragraph which is now the penultimate one in the section on nuclear disarmament on page 13, and which starts "It was stressed by all members that acts of aggression, expansion ..." and to put it more suitably at the end of the paragraph which we are dealing with, before passing on to the neutron weapon section to which it does not relate. I am suggesting a change merely in the order.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom. Would that suggestion by our colleague from the United Kingdom be acceptable to the Committee?

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, I must confess that we are quite happy with the place of this paragraph referred to by the Ambassador of the United Kingdom: but, if there is a suggestion to move it, I would submit that we should perhaps move both of the last two paragraphs in this section to the new place, and then start with the question of the nuclear neutron weapon.

The CHAIRMAN: I see at least my distinguished colleague from the United Kingdom nodding at the proposal by our distinguished colleague from Pakistan. May I take it that the Committee can go along with this proposal?

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you Mr. Chairman. I have not altogether understood the reason why it is necessary to move the third paragraph on page 11 of the English text to some other place; and I would prefer to leave it in the place proposed by the secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from the Soviet Union, but I think the proposal was to put the last two paragraphs on page 13 of the English text after the paragraph which starts "At the request of a group of socialist States" -- not to move the paragraph which started "At the request of a group of socialist States", but to move up the two paragraphs on page 13 after this paragraph.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My neighbour has explained his proposal more precisely, and I now have no objection to it.

The CHAIRMAN: So this is agreed? The paragraph is adopted, and we move the last two paragraphs on page 13 of the English text to page 11 after the paragraph which we have just adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: May I continue with the next paragraph starting with "The question of the nuclear neutron weapon", which is at the bottom of page 11 going on to page 12? Would that paragraph create difficulties? If none, the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph on page 12, starting with "Some delegations" and ending with "nuclear weapons". Would that be agreeable to this Committee? The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Then a one-sentence paragraph starting with "One delegation". Are there any difficulties with that paragraph? If none, the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We come to the next paragraph starting with "Some delegations" and ending "subject appeared unjustified". Would that paragraph raise any difficulties? If none, that paragraph is adopted, too.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starts with "One delegation" and ends with "qualitative terms". Would that paragraph be acceptable to the Committee? Thank you. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We have arrived at the paragraph at the bottom of page 12 running on to page 13. Is that paragraph acceptable to the Committee? The paragraph is accepted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph, which starts "Some delegations" and ends with "particular nuclear weapon". Can I take it that we adopt the paragraph? Thank you. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting "A group of socialist countries". It is a one-sentence paragraph. Are there any difficulties with that? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Then the next paragraph, which is also a one-sentence paragraph starting "At the 148th plenary meeting". Would that create any problems? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We have decided to move up the last two paragraphs on this page, which has been proposed and agreed upon by the Committee. I think that those two paragraphs have been adopted also. I thank you very much.

We now go back to Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1, page 23, "C. Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Against the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons". Paragraph 46 -- would that paragraph create any difficulties?

Paragraph 46 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 47 -- are there any difficulties with that paragraph? None.

Paragraph 47 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 48 -- no problems with that paragraph, either.

Paragraph 48 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph on page 23, paragraph 49, a one-sentence paragraph. Is it agreed?

Paragraph 49 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We turn now to page 24. Paragraph 50 -- a one-sentence paragraph. No problems?

Paragraph 50 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 51 -- no problems, either?

Paragraph 51 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Then paragraph 52. The insert will follow, that is, CD/215. Do we have difficulty with that? That is a working group report which we have adopted already.

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make a suggestion not about the working group report itself which of course we have adopted but, in using the report last year, I -- and I think others -- found it rather inconvenient to have the working group reports inserted in sections in the main report with paragraphing which did not follow in order. I must say that we found it much more logical and convenient to have the working group reports perhaps referred to at this point but actually placed somewhere else, so that the numbering sequence was not complicated. I wonder whether this would not be an improvement in the whole layout of the report.

The CHAIRMAN: If this is just a suggestion, perhaps we could deal with it at our next session because we do not want to reopen discussion. I think that we should have a look at it for our next report and follow now the practice of previous reports? May I plead with our colleague from the United Kingdom at this stage?

Mr. SUMMERHAYES (United Kingdom): Mr. Chairman, it was just a proposal which I do not insist upon. I will bring it up again next year.

The CHAIRMAN: May I continue with "D. Chemical weapons"? Paragraph 53 -- do we have problems? None.

Paragraph 53 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 54 -- have we problems with paragraph 54? None.

Paragraph 54 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 55 -- any difficulties with paragraph 55? None.

Paragraph 55 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 56 -- none. It is then adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 57 -- no problems?

Paragraph 57 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 58 -- no difficulties?

Paragraph 58 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 59 -- no problems?

Paragraph 59 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 60?

Paragraph 60 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 61?

Paragraph 61 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We go now to "E. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons". Paragraph 62 -- would that create difficulties? None.

Paragraph 62 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 63 -- are there problems with 63? None.

Paragraph 63 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 64?

Paragraph 64 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 65?

Paragraph 65 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 66?

Paragraph 66 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 67?

Paragraph 67 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 68?

Paragraph 68 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 69? We have to look at Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.2 page 14. The first paragraph on page 14 -- would that create difficulties? If none, the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting with "The attention of the Committee" and ending with "in these fields". No problems with this paragraph? This paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The last paragraph on page 14, starting with "The view was" and ending "under continuing review". Would that create difficulties? None. Then the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Now we have arrived at "F. Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament", paragraph 70 in Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1. No problems?

Paragraph 70 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 71 -- no problems?

Paragraph 71 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 72 -- no difficulties?

Paragraph 72 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 73 -- no problems, either?

Paragraph 73 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 74?

Paragraph 74 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 75?

Paragraph 75 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 76?

Paragraph 76 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: We have arrived at page 29 -- "G. Consideration of other areas dealing with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament and other relevant measures". Paragraph 77 -- any problems? None.

Paragraph 77 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: "H. Israeli air attack of 7 June 1981 on the Tammuz nuclear research centre near Baghdad", paragraph 78; and the concluding paragraphs are on page 15 of Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3. Would the first paragraph on page 15 be acceptable? It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting with "The Group of 21" and ending "other members supported these views". Are there difficulties with this paragraph? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting with "One member" and ending "has imposed on Iran". Does that paragraph create problems? None. It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: Let us turn to page 16, the first paragraph. Does that create problems? None. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The next paragraph starting with "Some members" and ending with "developing countries". No problems? The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The following paragraph beginning "A group of socialist countries" and ending "to that instrument". Would that paragraph create difficulties? No. The paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: The paragraph at the bottom of page 16, starting "In that connection" and ending "against military attacks". Would that create problems? None. It is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We now go to page 17 -- the last paragraph of this section. Would that create problems? None. Then the paragraph is adopted.

It was so decided.

The CHAIRMAN: We now go back to our first paper, Working Paper No. 44/Rev.1. Paragraph 79 is a one-sentence paragraph starting with "At the 110th plenary meeting". No problems with that paragraph?

Paragraph 79 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 80, at the bottom of page 29?

Paragraph 80 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Page 30, "J. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report as appropriate to the General Assembly of the United Nations", paragraph 81. No problems?

Paragraph 81 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 82 -- no problems?

Paragraph 82 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: Paragraph 83 -- no difficulties?

Paragraph 83 was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I have a request here from the distinguished representative of Brazil to speak before the adoption of our report.

Mr. de SOUZA e SILVA (Brazil): Before giving the approval of my delegation to this report, I should like to make the following statement for the record:

The delegation of Brazil deeply regrets the fact that three delegations have objected to the inclusion, in the final report of the Committee on Disarmament, of the factual reference to the decision adopted by the Committee at its 126th meeting on 21 April 1981. Those objections amount in fact to an attempt to hide, from the membership of the United Nations, a document to which public mention has been made in this Committee in more than one respect. It would seem to us utterly pointless to try to rewrite history by way of impeding the objective description of a fact. The delegation of Brazil sees no reason for denying the United Nations access to document CD/UN/SUMM/1 dated 29 May 1981. That document contains a synthesis prepared by the Secretariat of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament on agenda items 1 and 2 during the informal meetings devoted to both items and held on 6 and 30 April and 23 and 30 March, respectively. We believe that both subjects -- namely, the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and the question of nuclear disarmament -- are of vital interest to all members of international community and not for a handful of States alone.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should merely like to point out that the Russian text of the report contains many errors, omissions, inaccurate numbering and in some cases even substantive misrepresentations. In approving the report, we therefore reserve the right to introduce appropriate changes in the final version of the report in Russian.

Mr. BRIMAH (Nigeria): As the 1981 session draws to a close, let me first of all stress the admiration of my delegation to you, Sir, for the most efficient way in which you have conducted the work of this Committee this month. Your competence, patience and wealth of experience in the field of multilateral diplomacy, we are sure, would enable this Committee to wind up its work successfully.

My brief intervention today is merely to comment on some aspects of the Committee's work as the annual session is about to end; but, in commenting on some of these issues, let me stress at the onset that my delegation is not adopting any "high moral tone" nor indeed "preaching about the evils of deterrence". Like other delegations, we feel justified in placing on record our position on the question of deterrence. In the recent weeks, the controversy over the development of the neutron bomb has reared its ugly head again. The recent decision of a nuclear-weapon State to develop and stockpile the neutron bomb or the so-called enhanced radiation weapon (ERW) has further demonstrated the inexplicable escalation of the arms race and the dangers it poses to the very existence of mankind. The main justification for such a nuclear weapon, as we have been told, was that the weapon would kill living beings by its enhanced radiation, but will spare objects by its reduced heat and blast, as well as its deterrent effect on the superiority of one military alliance over the other in conventional weapons, particularly in tanks. The immediate problem is that by blurring the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons technology, the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons is dramatically lowered, and makes nuclear war the more conceivable. Furthermore, the other side will, I stress, build and deploy its own neutron bomb.

As far back as the CCD's spring session of 1978, the Soviet delegation quoted the following statement by Mr. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR:

"The Soviet Union is decisively against the development of a neutron bomb ... but if this bomb is developed in the West -- developed against us, which no one even attempts to conceal, then it should be clearly understood that the USSR will not stand by as a passive observer. We shall be faced with the necessity of meeting this challenge ..."

Also, as indicated in the recent document CD/216 dated 17 August 1981, a statement by TASS notes that:

"In light of the steps taken by the United States of America, the Soviet Union will appropriately evaluate the situation as it evolves and will take the necessary measures to safeguard its security and that of its friends and allies."

My delegation has had the opportunity to state that the present level of nuclear armaments on both sides is more than sufficient to cope with the unacceptable retaliation of a first striker. What needs to be stressed over and over again is that both sides have become captives to an uncontrollable technological advance in weaponry, whereby a new system developed and deployed by one has to be matched by the other. This situation, to my delegation, is like a competition for its own sake; and this is what makes the nuclear arms race particularly irrational. Having been trapped in the doctrine of deterrence which is based on the perception by each of the nuclear-weapon States (particularly the superpowers) of the capability of the other, their assessment of parity or balance keeps on changing. Each side continues to acquire weapons not on the basis of need but as a reaction to presumed superiority of the other side. Thus, security for the nuclear-weapon States is based on ever higher levels of nuclear arsenals with the consequent uncertainty and danger. The situation

(Mr. Brimah, Nigeria)

is further compounded by the theory of flexible response, of limited and survivable nuclear war. The fallacy of a limited nuclear war is even more dangerous than the concept of the maintenance of world peace, stability and balance through the process of deterrence.

We agree fully with the delegation of India on the danger of nations basing their security on doctrines of nuclear deterrence, because we also desire to survive. My delegation often has stated, and will continue to hold the view, that the doctrines of deterrence, strategic balance and parity are all based on the narrow security interests of the nuclear-weapon States which refuse to take into consideration the vital security interests of third States. It is a fact that, the greater the quality and quantity of nuclear weapons, the greater the risk of nuclear war either by deliberate calculation or by accident. It is in this respect that my delegation refutes the doctrine of nuclear deterrence.

As regards the proposal by a group of socialist countries contained in document CD/219 on the need for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons, my delegation commends the principle behind this concrete proposal but we believe that any prohibition should be in the context of the achievement of nuclear disarmament, which requires urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages -- particularly the cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapon systems. My delegation therefore sees the development of the neutron weapon in the context of the mad race for armaments -- a situation which underlines once again the urgency of the need to set up an ad hoc working group on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. We therefore share the views already expressed in this regard by the Indian, Pakistan and Romanian delegations at the informal meeting last Wednesday.

In the Committee on Disarmament, the sole multilateral negotiating organ, an attempt must be made to de-link national security from armaments, especially nuclear armaments, and to proceed towards a freeze, reduction, and total elimination of these weapons. What needs to be borne in mind is paragraph 13 of the consensus Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament which stated that:

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control."

Before proceeding to some other issues, I merely wish to state that, while my country respects the prerogative of every State to ensure its self-defence, this fact takes on a different characteristic when nuclear weapons are involved. Much has already been stated in this Committee about the "rapid development of forces", especially those armed with the so-called tactical nuclear warheads. My Government does not favour the proliferation of military alliances with foreign Powers, which will threaten the stability of our subregion and Africa as a whole.

On the work done by the various Working Groups, my delegation would like to congratulate the distinguished Ambassadors Lidgard of Sweden, García Robles of Mexico, Kónives of Hungary, as well as Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, for their tireless efforts in advancing the work of the various Ad Hoc Working Groups. The modest achievement so far points to the greater work that still remains to be done next session, if the Committee is to meet the anxiety of the international community in concluding concrete disarmament agreements. The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, for example, has continued to make some progress by concentrating on the measures to be included in the programme. By so doing, the Ad Hoc Working Group has

(Mr. Brimah, Nigeria)

quite rightly devoted itself to the most important area of its work. Much work, however, remains to be done, and the political will to compromise and negotiate by all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, will be most crucial for the successful completion of the elaboration of the programme. Many delegations have stressed the importance of the nature of the programme. In this connection, my delegation has had the opportunity to state in document CD/CPD/WP.18 of the Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament that the programme must be more than just a framework for negotiations. It should create full commitments for all States to implement the measures contained in the programme.

With regard to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Security Assurances, to date, the security perceptions of certain nuclear-weapon States have continued to cast a shadow on the work of the Group. Nevertheless, substantive discussions were held on the question of finding a "common approach" or "formula". In trying to achieve a "common formula", the tendency to look for yet another interim measure to assure non-nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons should not be threatened or used against them pending nuclear disarmament should be resisted.

In the same vein, the other two Ad Hoc Working Groups, on chemical weapons and radiological weapons, require further efforts on the part of delegations to harmonize their various positions to permit the conclusion of agreements before the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation, however, deeply regrets that, contrary to the hope of the international community, the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to establish additional subsidiary bodies in its current session to initiate substantive negotiations on items 1 and 2 on its agenda, namely the high priority issues of a nuclear test ban, and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. The obvious reason is that two nuclear-weapon States have found it politically inexpedient to join the consensus existing among the remaining 38 members of this Committee -- a situation which would have enabled this sole multilateral negotiating organ to discharge its responsibilities. My delegation recognizes the tense international climate but does not share the view that disarmament negotiations on a global scale should be made conditional on the "good or bad humour" of the superpowers. It is the hope of my delegation that the recess would afford opportunities for sombre reflections and "a change of heart" that would bring about the much-desired progress in the 1982 session.

In conclusion, my delegation has always urged that disarmament negotiations ought to be undertaken at this time of international tension as we firmly believe that such negotiations can make an effective contribution to improving the international climate, and that the Committee on Disarmament can play a crucial role in this respect. What is required is not only the political will but also the need for members of this Committee to interpret flexibly the Committee's rules of procedure in order to ensure that negotiations on priority items are not unnecessarily blocked. Progress in disarmament negotiations in the Committee should enable this sole multilateral negotiating body to retain its credibility, and should also contribute significantly to the lessening of international tension.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Nigeria for his statement and for the kind references made to the Chair.

I intend now to adopt the report. May I take it that the report as a whole is adopted?

The report as a whole was adopted.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translated from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the current session of the Committee on Disarmament is now drawing to a close. We have already reached the finishing line; and very shortly, with a bang of your gavel, you will declare that our work is concluded. According to the established tradition, delegations are now summing up the results of the negotiations which have taken place in the Committee during the session which is now ending.

The representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Erdembileg, speaking on behalf of a group of socialist countries including the Soviet Union, made a statement on this question at the Committee's last meeting. In our brief statement today, we would like merely to mention a few points.

What can one say, from a close-up view, concerning the nature, and results of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament? As in the past, the work of our Committee has proceeded in circumstances of conflict between two lines, two approaches to the problem of halting the arms race and achieving disarmament. On the one hand, there is the line aimed at stopping and reversing the race of warlike preparations in the world, a race which is assuming ever larger and more dangerous proportions; and on the other hand, there is the line aimed -- to speak frankly -- at blocking progress in disarmament negotiations.

The position of the Soviet Union on the disarmament question is clear and understandable. It is not subject to any considerations or temporary manoeuvrings related to particular political situations. It is determined by the dictum of the founder of our State, V.I. Lenin that "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism".

This year, the political will of the Soviet State for peace and for disarmament has, as you know, once again been expressed at the most authoritative level, in the highest forum of our Party, the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. We have in mind a whole series of new initiatives and proposals in the field of disarmament contained in the foreign policy programme of the Congress put forward by the Head of the Soviet State, Mr. L.I. Brezhnev. These proposals are known to participants in the negotiations. As you know, the material relating thereto has been circulated as a Committee document. The interest displayed in the documentation of the Congress, which sets forth the long-term policy of the USSR on cardinal questions of disarmament, testifies to the urgency and constructiveness of the proposals contained therein. We intend to continue resolutely, persistently and systematically to advocate the implementation of those proposals.

In order to achieve any real progress in the matter of disarmament, it is of course essential that all States should be interested in this. We have a saying which goes: "You can't clap with one hand"; and this is really so. The results of the session of the Committee that is now coming to an end, when viewed from the standpoint of actual achievements, can hardly give grounds for satisfaction.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Indeed, have we really crossed any new boundaries in solving disarmament questions? Unfortunately, no. It must be recognized that in essence the Committee has not succeeded in making progress on any single one of the items on the session's full agenda, be it a nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament or the elaboration of international conventions on new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Despite the considerable intensity of the Committee's work and the participation of a large number of States and of highly qualified experts, the Committee has not even got down to actual negotiations on the most urgent problems of limiting the arms race -- the prohibition of nuclear weapons and a nuclear test ban.

As regards radiological weapons, it seems to us that these could have been banned as long ago as 1979. A large group of States was ready, in principle, to assume an obligation to prohibit this type of weapon. However, agreement on this question has been long delayed in the Committee -- due mainly, in our opinion, to the fact that some delegations consider the solution of this question to be "premature" since radiological weapons do not yet exist.

In this connection, the Soviet delegation would like to point out that similar sentiments existed three years ago, when a group of socialist countries submitted to the Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. (CCD/559). At that time, also, there was talk of the solution of this question being "premature". But now the Government of the United States of America has taken a decision to produce this barbarous weapon. The Soviet delegation, like those of many other countries, decisively condemns this step and considers that it not only represents a serious threat to the cause of peace, but complicates even further the solution of urgent disarmament questions.

Owing to the opposition of those same States which blocked the establishment of working groups on a nuclear test ban and the limitation of the nuclear arms race, the Committee did not succeed in starting negotiations on the question of banning new types of weapons of mass destruction and a number of other questions.

What does all this imply? It implies that the lack of readiness for serious disarmament negotiations in the capitals of some States is the main reason why we have been unable to make any concrete progress towards solving the questions on the Committee's agenda.

The discussions in the Committee have shown convincingly that there are no two opinions about the fact that the international situation has become more complex in recent times, and that it is now urgently necessary to make every effort to reduce the tension which has arisen, and to give a new impetus to the negotiations on their limitation and cessation of the arms race. The Soviet Union is consistently speaking out against the policy of foreign interference in internal affairs, against plunder and aggression in international relations in all its manifestations, and for the settlement of international conflicts through negotiations. Our course has been and still is the course of co-operation and mutual aid, and not the course of confrontation. Our entire peace-loving foreign policy is aimed at delivering mankind from the threat of war, particularly nuclear war. Moreover, this is reflected in our concrete actions and in our concrete initiatives.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In spite of the complication of the international situation, we do not in any way intend to become pessimistic. We are deeply convinced that peace and disarmament in our time are not just fine words, but are the objective and the sole conditions for the existence for mankind, conditions for which there is no alternative. And we believe that mankind's will for peace will prevail.

With regard to the Committee, despite the fact that a great deal of time has been lost, we are convinced that it is still possible for it to make up for lost ground and fulfil its primary duty, which is to carry out -- if only in part -- the measures connected with the preparation of the second special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We are now leaving one another after intensive work which demanded considerable efforts and energy both from delegations and from the secretariat, to which our delegation would like to take this opportunity of expressing its appreciation for the commendable technical servicing of our work. But as we leave Geneva, we cannot, if we have an honest attitude to our task, banish from our thoughts a growing anxiety for the fate of the world.

The Soviet delegation is not saying this because we over-estimate the role of the Committee on Disarmament. No. We have no illusions. We have a clear idea of the nature of the political decision-making machinery in different countries, and of the comparatively modest part played in this machinery by the Committee on Disarmament.

But it would be an even greater mistake to underestimate the Committee's role and to overlook the possibilities which exist in it for curbing the arms race and improving the international situation as a whole. The Soviet delegation considers that the Committee on Disarmament, in its present form and composition, is the offspring of the détente of the 1970s. Its structure and rules of procedure are aimed at the elaboration of concrete agreements on limitation, binding on all States parties.

It is understandable that the views of individual delegations on the efficiency and future prospects of the Committee's work may differ. The Soviet delegation is also far from considering that the Committee's machinery is perfect and cannot be improved. As you know, we have put forward proposals on this matter, which have aroused a great deal of interest on the part of delegations.

Mr. Chairman, what is important is not only what we, the delegations in the Committee on Disarmament, think of ourselves. Far more important are the hopes which millions of people throughout the world place in the Committee's work. That is certainly so. By the beginning of August, the secretariat has registered more than 7,000 letters from private individuals addressed to the Committee from various countries in the world, from all continents. Most of the envelopes bore the mark "Earth for Life".

These words -- Earth for Life -- are a direct appeal to the delegations of the countries represented in the Committee to improve the efficiency of its work and to perform the duty entrusted to them. As far as the Soviet delegation is concerned, we are ready, as ever, to take a most active part in the constructive work of the Committee and to contribute to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to it by the world community.

Mr. de la GORCE (France) (translated from French): I should like to begin by extending to you our warm congratulations on the masterly way in which you have directed the exercise -- which is always difficult and seems to be becoming more and more complex -- of establishing our report. We are most grateful to you for your efforts, your patience, your courtesy and your authority.

The time has now come to take stock. The Committee has already heard assessments, expressed individually or collectively, by the great majority of delegations. Broadly speaking, they reflect a feeling of disappointment.

To a large extent, the French delegation shares this feeling. At the same time, it would like today to participate very briefly in an analysis of the results which may lead to certain conclusions concerning the conditions for progress and future prospects, at least for the next session.

This session which is drawing to a close is in many respects our first normal working session since, for the first time, the Committee has been able to devote the major part of its time to the consideration of questions of substance in the Working Groups.

This was a favourable aspect, which at the outset gave us a feeling of confidence. At the same time, the approach of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament encouraged us to aspire to achieve results sufficiently significant to bear witness to the efficiency and credibility of the Committee at next year's great debate on the situation of the disarmament endeavour as seen four years after the new impetus it received in 1978.

We have, however, encountered the negative effects of the present state of international relations on the feelings of trust and security which are essential for progress in the field of disarmament. That is doubtless the reason why the considerable efforts deployed in the Committee have not led to the results for which we had hoped.

The Working Groups have accomplished a considerable amount of work, guided with great method, competence and conviction by their respective Chairmen. We extend to them our whole-hearted congratulations on the remarkable manner in which they have discharged their responsibilities.

With regard to negative security assurances, Mr. Ciarrapico has patiently and skilfully conducted a detailed review of the elements of existing declarations, and of the variants which could contribute to progress towards a common approach. These discussions have illustrated once again the difficulty of the endeavour, in the light of existing positions. The French delegation will continue to participate in this difficult search.

The Working Group on Chemical Weapons has managed, on the basis of inadequate and indeed outdated terms of reference, to continue negotiations on the elements of a future convention prepared by its Chairman, Ambassador Lidgard, whose energy and efficiency deserve our admiration.

For the French delegation, this is one of the basic and priority tasks of the Committee. Our delegation is gratified to note that there is agreement in the Working Group on the principle of a suitable revision of its terms of reference at the beginning of the next session.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

Virtually complete agreement has been established on the problem of definitions. This is not the case with the problems of scope and verification. The answers which will be given to these two questions are mutually interdependent. It would therefore be wrong to wait until agreement has been reached on the problem of scope before starting negotiations on provisions relating to verification.

The question of radiological weapons is not regarded as a priority issue by several members of the Committee; but the Committee cannot renounce its negotiating role with respect to such weapons. The French delegation, like other delegations, had hoped that a draft convention could be adopted before the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

However, despite the praiseworthy efforts of Ambassador Kómives, Chairman of the Working Group on Radiological Weapons, who guided the Group most authoritatively and competently, progress was blocked by differences of opinion on the most important questions.

We consider that the Group should adhere to its precise terms of reference. The negotiations in progress should not be used for the purpose of prejudging the solution of other problems -- the use of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament -- or of solving problems which belong to a different area of international law, e.g. the prohibition of attacks on civilian nuclear installations.

The French delegation has no doubts as to the importance of these issues; and it hopes that the proposals which have been made for getting out of the deadlock will enable the Group to make rapid progress towards a conclusion.

The Working Group on the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament has tackled its difficult task under the guidance of the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, whose skill and extensive experience will certainly be required to bring the work to a successful conclusion. We attach particular importance to this endeavour, in view of the place it is to occupy in the work of the second special session devoted to disarmament.

I should like very briefly to state again here certain views held by the French delegation with regard to the comprehensive programme.

In our opinion, it should essentially be based on agreed texts: the Final Document the elements defined by the Disarmament Commission and the Declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade.

We are, of course, prepared to consider other appropriate elements, as well as more elaborate formulations for the elements already agreed upon; but further discussion should be avoided on subjects on which we know that agreement cannot be reached.

With regard to the general aspects of the programme, its principles and objectives, the French delegation has made known its views in a document of which it is one of the sponsors (CD/198). We attach great importance to these general aspects, and particularly to the principles, since it is the principles in fact which orient the whole endeavour and which must ultimately determine to a large extent what we are to decide upon with regard to the content of the programme itself and the organization of its stages.

(Mr. de la Gorce, France)

With regard to the nature of the programme, we consider that it must be a commitment of a political nature relating to a series of negotiations each of which will have a bearing upon the other.

It will not be the treaty on general and complete disarmament referred to in article 38 of the Final Document -- a treaty which, according to that article, is to be negotiated following the negotiations on partial measures and more comprehensive measures.

With regard to the question of a time frame, we do not think that any Government would be able to guarantee observance of a pre-established timetable; and besides, there is no objective criterion for establishing such a timetable. The political will of States can be expressed through the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament; but an expression of intent to observe time-limits for implementation would not have much credibility.

Finally, with regard to the stages of the programme, we consider that these should be defined and arranged with the necessary flexibility, in the light of the varying conditions in which the negotiations are to be held, which are difficult to foresee.

We steadfastly hope that the work of the Group will rapidly lead to the elaboration of a balanced text that is well adjusted to the conditions of the disarmament endeavour, the most ambitious but also the most difficult of all the endeavours to be undertaken by the international community.

Our attention has also focused on other major questions -- those appearing under agenda items 1 and 2. On these matters we have had useful and serious discussions which are reflected in our report. These discussions have illustrated the complexity of the problems and the diversity of the positions regarding the prospects of negotiation, and also regarding the organization of the negotiations. The discussions should be continued on the substance of the issues, in order to explore the possibilities of progress. The French delegation hopes that the forthcoming session will be a landmark in that search.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I should like once again to express my congratulations to you and also to extend them to the Secretary of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and to the Deputy Secretary, Mr. Berasategui, to all their collaborators in the secretariat, to the interpreters and translators, and to all those who have helped us in the painstaking and difficult work which we have carried out this year. Also, as we are now going our different ways, I should like to express to all my colleagues my kind regards and best wishes, and my hope that they will be able to enjoy some rest.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of France for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (translated from Spanish): In the period of barely six months for which our deliberations have lasted, my delegation has already had an opportunity to express its views on all the items on our agenda; and we believe it would be superfluous to try to recapitulate today, even in summary form, the content of our statements. The systematic index which is fortunately included in the Committee's report will make for easy consultation of the records by delegations, either in Geneva or New York, which might be interested in the content of these statements.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

I would merely like to say that the principal elements in the position of our delegation on the two items which, apart from the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament, concerning which I had occasion to speak yesterday when I introduced the report of the Working Group over which I have the honour to preside -- I repeat, the principal elements in our position on the other two items, apart from that item, to which my delegation attaches the greatest importance and the highest priority, i.e. a nuclear test ban and the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament are summarized principally in two records, the record of the Committee's 134th meeting which took place on 2 July and the record of the 147th meeting, which was held on 18 August.

Rather than repeat what I have already said, I would like, in concluding the substantive part of my intervention at this late hour, to quote two statements from the Final Document of the 1978 Assembly, which I venture to recall on this occasion. The first is taken from paragraph 13; and it is the one in which the Assembly told us -- and by consensus, as we all know -- that:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority".

The second statement, also taken from the Final Document, is that in which the Assembly told us in paragraph 18 that: "Removing the threat of a world war -- a nuclear war -- is the most acute and urgent task of the present day" and immediately afterwards concluded that:

"Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

We are now within a few minutes of parting company, after this last week in which you, Mr. Chairman, have guided our work with particular skill. In consequence you may find it appropriate for us, albeit with the brevity of which you have given us so many examples during the last few days, yet nevertheless, with the very greatest sincerity, to offer you our warmest congratulations and thanks. I would also like to thank the distinguished Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Jaipal, and his alternate, Mr. Berasategui, the Deputy Secretary; and, as is the custom on such occasions, I would like to thank all the members of Secretariat, both visible and invisible, for their invaluable collaboration for the more effective performance of our tasks.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished Ambassador of Mexico for his statement and for the very kind words he has addressed to me.

Mr. DESIMONE (United States of America): The United States delegation has been pleased to be able to participate in the consensus adoption of the Committee's report of its 1981 activities. However, the particular position in which my delegation has found itself during this session makes it necessary for us to make a comment concerning those elements of the report dealing with the future.

In this respect, we note that the final report of the Committee, which includes the reports of the various Working Groups, makes recommendations and comments about the future activities of the Committee. As we believe is generally recognized, the questions of how the Committee will organize itself and what its programme of work will be in 1982 can be decided only at the beginning of the 1982 session. Delegations will recall that the United States Government is reviewing its arms control policies, many of which touch directly on the work of this Committee. For that reason, United States participation in the consensus adoption of the report should not be interpreted as a commitment regarding specific aspects of the Committee's future activities.

In spite of the many difficulties we have encountered during this session, the Committee has managed to accomplish useful work through the Working Groups, in which the United States delegation has been pleased to participate. This record does give us some cause for satisfaction and some hope for the future, and we congratulate the Chairmen of the Working Groups who have rendered such yeomen service to all of us during the 1981 session: Ambassador Lidgard for chemical weapons, Ambassador García Robles for the comprehensive programme of disarmament, Ambassador Kómives for radiological weapons and Minister Ciarrapico for negative security assurances.

We have also been blessed with a series of outstanding Committee Chairmen during this session; and you, Mr. Chairman, have showed yourself to be cast in the same mould as your predecessors, especially in these extremely difficult days -- and, I might add, evenings -- devoted to writing our final report. Without your hard driving but fair leadership, and the skill and hard work displayed by our Secretary, Ambassador Jaipal, and his deputy, Mr. Berasategui, we might not have managed to finish the session by our target date.

On behalf of my delegation, may I extend our thanks to the members of the Secretariat staff for their assistance and many kindnesses to us that went beyond the call of duty. And finally, may I express our gratitude to those with whom we rarely have contact -- except as disembodied voices travelling over the wires in this room -- the interpreters sitting in their glass compartments who somehow manage to make our most routine interventions sound both fresh and profound.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from the United States for his statement and for the kind references he made to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): On behalf of the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic I should like to make some remarks on the report that has just been adopted on the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

First of all, I should like to note with satisfaction the major contribution which you, Mr. Chairman, have made to the preparation of the Committee's present report. Under your able guidance, the Committee has done a great deal of work in the concluding stage of the session.

(Mr. Erdembileg, Mongolia)

I should like to point out that, in the drafting group established by decision of the Committee, painstaking work was undertaken in order to achieve agreement on important sections of the report relating to items 1 and 2 on the Committee's agenda.

In our opinion, the present report of the Committee to the United Nations General Assembly basically reflects the essence of the negotiations in the Committee. This does not mean, however, that the Mongolian delegation shares the views contained in certain parts or paragraphs of particular sections of the report, or that it agrees with the positions of individual delegations as reflected in those paragraphs. This comment applies, for example, to a number of paragraphs of the report relating to the question of nuclear neutron weapons. In this connection, I should like to state once again that my delegation greatly regrets the fact that the socialist countries' proposal for the urgent establishment of an ad hoc working group for the preparation of an international convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of neutron weapons was not approved in the Committee because of the position taken by the delegations of certain States members of the Committee.

Also, we were absolutely astonished when, yesterday evening in this room during the informal meeting of the Committee, we heard the representative of one country, who was speaking authoritatively on behalf of his Government — we have no serious doubts about this — but who arbitrarily stated that he could not accept even the inclusion, in this report of the Committee of a section on nuclear neutron weapons.

The fact is that the Committee has adopted by consensus the entire report including that part, in spite of the opposition of those who would have liked to create an undesirable situation in this body and impose their will on it.

Another comment. At yesterday's informal meeting the distinguished representative of Zaire expressed the opinion that the socialist countries had not, he said, supported the initiative of the Group of 21 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on agenda items 1 and 2. I would frankly like to ask the distinguished representative of Zaire to look once again, and in greater detail, at the statements by delegations of socialist countries, including Mongolia, and also at documents CD/193, CD/224 and others.

The delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic wishes once again to express its readiness to continue, by its constructive participation, to further the work of the Committee with a view to achieving practical results in our activities.

Finally, on behalf of a group of socialist countries I should like to convey our sincere thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, and also to the Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, Ambassador C. Lidgard of Sweden, Ambassador Kórnives of Hungary and Minister Ciarrapico of Italy. I would also like to express our thanks to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and Secretary of our Committee, Ambassador Jaipal; to the Deputy Secretary, Mr. V. Berasategui, and to all the officials of the secretariat, the interpreters and translators and the servicing staff, for their conscientious efforts in our common cause.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Mongolia for his statement and for the kind references he made to the Chair.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): The Netherlands delegation cannot agree with the statement made earlier this evening, before the adoption of the 1981 report of the Committee that certain facts regarding our discussions on agenda item 1 (Nuclear test ban) and agenda item 2 (Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament) are going to be concealed from the world community.

Our objection to mentioning the synthesis document in the report of the Committee is one of principle.

Let me briefly resume the background.

On 19 March 1981 the Committee on Disarmament decided that we would have informal meetings on agenda items 1 and 2 so as to facilitate a frank exchange of views.

Only afterwards, on 21 April 1981, a month later, at the request of certain delegations, the Committee decided to request the secretariat to prepare the said unofficial document containing the synthesis under reference.

But it was agreed by all members that this was to be a confidential document, drawn up for assistance of the members of the Committee on Disarmament only. In fact this reference is clearly printed on the document itself.

If now, by a sudden retrograde decision, we were to decide to change the character of that confidential document, we would risk to prejudge in a negative way any informal exchanges we may have in the future on these two priority items on the Committee's agenda. It is the understanding of my delegation that it is only a matter of fair play that a delegation should know in advance whether a particular statement it makes will be put on record or not.

If in 1982 a request would be made to divulge the informal transactions of the Committee on agenda items 1 and 2, well, we may decide to do so. However, such a decision should be taken in advance, so that all members of the Committee are well aware of the nature of these particular informal meetings.

Turning now to paragraph 68 of the Committee's report dealing with the report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Radiological Weapons (CD/213), in particular paragraph 11 of the latter report, I wish to put on record the regret of the Netherlands delegation that the Committee could not agree as yet to empower you, Mr. Chairman, to send a letter to the Director-General of IAEA inviting him to provide certain information which might be relevant for the elaboration of the future convention on radiological weapons.

Yesterday, at the Committee's 148th meeting, I stated the reasons why the Netherlands think that asking such information from the Director-General of IAEA would be useful. I shall not tax the endurance of the Committee on Disarmament at this late hour with a full exposé of our reasoning. We outlined our approach in our statement at the 137th plenary meeting of the Committee on Disarmament on 14 July 1981.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

At this juncture I simply want to place on record our regret at the inability of the Committee on Disarmament to agree as yet on a modality for providing certain factual information which we deem to be of high potential relevance to the future convention on the prohibition, development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

Mr. Chairman, how could I wind up my statement otherwise than by stating the pleasure my delegation has felt in seeing you, the representative of Indonesia, with which my country is linked through close brotherly ties, preside over our meetings in the month of August 1981. This pleasure of ours was increased by the leadership you displayed in the discharge of your functions. In fact, Mr. Chairman, we owe it to your skill and dynamism that we were able to finish this session at the agreed date and time. Allow me, Mr. Chairman, to express the thanks and appreciation of my delegation to the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and head of the Secretariat of the Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, to his deputy, Mr. Berasategui, and to all the other members of the Secretariat. Our thanks also goes to the interpreters. Finally I want to thank all my colleagues for the friendship they showed this year and for the way in which we were able to do our business.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the distinguished representative of the Netherlands for his statement and for the very kind reference he made to the Chair.

Mr. AKRAM (Pakistan): Mr. Chairman, my delegation regrets the fact that the serenity and solemnity of this final meeting of our Committee during 1981 has been disturbed because of a rather provocative statement which was made by the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia. The distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia has taken it upon himself to refer, in an extremely partial way, to a rather heated debate which occurred at the informal meeting of the Committee last night when we were in the process of considering our report. I am not against a reflection of anything that happens in the informal Committee because there is nothing that my delegation wishes to hide; but I think that, whenever something of that nature is stated, perhaps the whole truth should be exposed and that is my purpose in taking the floor.

During the discussion we had last night on the paragraphs relating to the section on nuclear disarmament in our report, one delegation -- the delegation of a nuclear-weapon State -- opposed the inclusion of a paragraph in the report regarding the need to end foreign occupation and intervention as a means to promote disarmament. It was in response to this arbitrary position which related to a paragraph that had been agreed upon in the informal consultations which you held, that my delegation stated that the procedures of the Committee are based on

(Mr. Akram, Pakistan)

give-and-take and that, if certain delegations would reject the inclusion of paragraphs of interest to my delegation -- and naturally a paragraph relating to the elimination of foreign occupation and intervention, you will understand, Mr. Chairman, is of interest to my delegation particularly -- if certain delegations would oppose the inclusion of this paragraph, my delegation too could under the rules of procedure prevent the adoption of other paragraphs in the report which were of interest to other delegations, such as the paragraph relating to the nuclear neutron weapons.

We had a heated exchange after that and I do not wish to go into that again; but I would like to note, Mr. Chairman, that we have no difficulty in substance with the section on nuclear neutron weapons and we have made our position clear on that. I am glad, Mr. Chairman, that the report has by consensus included a section on the nuclear neutron weapons; and I am even more glad, Mr. Chairman, that the report we have adopted includes a paragraph which reads as follows:

"It was stressed by all members that acts of aggression, expansion, foreign occupation and other violations of the Charter of the United Nations have an adverse impact on negotiations on disarmament, including nuclear disarmament. In the context of promoting the goals of disarmament, the necessity of eliminating such manifestations and of resolving existing international disputes through negotiations was underlined".

This text has been included; and I would like to express my gratitude to all concerned, including the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia who apparently had some difficulties, for accepting the inclusion of this text.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, may I express to you, Sir, my deep appreciation of the manner in which you have conducted the very long and arduous negotiations that we have had at informal meetings and in this Committee during this month; and also may I take this opportunity to thank Ambassador Jaipal, Mr. Berasategui and the rest of the very able staff of the Secretariat for the excellent work they have done and which has made it possible for the Committee to adopt its report on schedule.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Pakistan for his statement and the kind references he made to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I shall be very brief, Mr. Chairman. I am the representative of Mongolia. As you know, this is a beautiful country which includes in the southern part of its territory the vast Gobi desert. And among my people there is a very wise saying, which is shared by all peoples of the East: "Come what may, the caravan must move forward".

Mr. NZENGEYA (Zaire) (translated from French): Before replying briefly to the observation by the representative of Mongolia, may I, on behalf of my delegation, warmly congratulate the Chairman of our Committee during this concluding month of our work.

Allow me also to express my sincere thanks to the Secretary of our Committee, Ambassador Jaipal, and to all his staff for their valuable assistance, for the quality of the documents, and also for their total dedication to the success of our work.

Mr. Chairman, when my delegation spoke at yesterday's informal meeting on the proposal submitted by the group of socialist countries, our concern was purely one of principle. The principal objective of the Group of 21 is to comply with the mandate entrusted to the Committee on Disarmament -- namely, to try to promote the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. The Group of 21 is largely -- I would say almost entirely -- composed of non-nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, it is above the wrangling of the nuclear Powers, whether of the East or the West.

The Group of 21 proposed, in documents CD/180 and CD/181, the setting up of an ad hoc working group to consider the agenda item concerning a nuclear test ban, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. When those proposals were submitted, the nuclear Powers situated, let us say, to the East did not support the establishment of such a group; and, in my delegation's view, the Group of 21 could not, on account of a decision by a nuclear-weapon State to manufacture and stockpile neutron weapons, agree to associate itself with a particular action initiated by a group of countries in connection with a particular situation.

Thus, my delegation was anxious not to see the Group of 21 being influenced by the group of socialist countries. Moreover, its position was understood by the Group of 21 as a whole, as is clear from the paragraph which may be read in the report just adopted -- in Working Paper No. 44/Add.1/Rev.3, page 12 -- and which reads:

"Some delegations stated that the exchange of views on the proposal in document CD/219 had reinforced their view of the necessity of establishing an ad hoc working group to negotiate on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as proposed by the Group of 21 (CD/116 and CD/181), in the first instance on measures to halt and reverse the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons".

There is no mention here of neutron weapons; no mention whatsoever is made of neutron weapons, and such was my delegation's proposal. We did not want the proposals concerning neutron weapons to embrace in any way the proposal of the Group of 21 for the establishment of an ad hoc working group on item 2 -- namely, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament as a whole -- since we consider that neutron weapons constitute one type of nuclear weapon.

In view of the comprehension displayed towards my delegation by the Group of 21 as a whole -- which explains why in the late hours of yesterday evening we were happily able to reach agreement, and why this report, which was submitted to us all, has been adopted by consensus -- I believe that my attitude was fully understood by the Group of 21 and my delegation is satisfied that its concern has been taken into consideration by the Group of 21. If my distinguished colleague from Mongolia thinks that my view was not, perhaps, shared by his delegation, I respect his opinion and would ask him to respect mine as well.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Zaire for his statement and for his kind reference to the Chair.

Mr. ERDEMBILEG (Mongolia) (translated from Russian): I should like to express my sincere thanks to my distinguished colleague from Zaire for his explanation. I do not wish to engage in polemics with the distinguished representative of Zaire. We are profoundly convinced that we shall find a common language in the course of our future work. We should like our "caravan" -- and I have in mind the Committee on Disarmament -- always to move forward regardless of any difficulties.

U NGWE WIN (Burma): Mr. Chairman, may I be the last speaker on your list to conclude the session of this Committee on a happy note. Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the members of the Group of 21, on behalf of the leader of the delegation of Burma who was obliged to leave this Council Chamber for an urgent call of duty, and in the name of the delegation of Burma, I would like to express to you, our deep appreciation and thanks for bringing the extremely complex and delicate work of this Committee, in its last stage, to a successful conclusion. We feel particularly proud of the way you handled our difficult work with such efficiency, pliancy and courtesy, as well as with firmness, and guidance where necessary, and with a wisdom which is so evident. I consider that a big tribute not only to the delegation of Indonesia but also to the Group of 21, to which you belong.

I would also like to express our thanks to the four Chairmen of the Ad Hoc Working Groups, Ambassador García Robles of Mexico, Ambassador Lidgard of Sweden, Ambassador Kórnives of Hungary and Minister Ciarrapico of Italy, for their excellent contributions and guidance. I would be amiss, Sir, if I did not express our deep thanks and appreciation also to Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of our Committee, and to the members of the Secretariat for their excellent work. I would like also to express our thanks to those who are less visible. In particular I would like to pay special tribute to the interpreters whose patience and understanding makes our work easy and efficient.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank our distinguished colleague from Burma for his statement and for the very kind reference he has made to the Chair.

Mr. AGUILAR (Venezuela) (translated from Spanish): I would like to state that my delegation has listened with interest to the statement by the distinguished Ambassador of the Soviet Union, and would not like its silence to be interpreted as acceptance of what has been said. At the next session, my delegation will give a suitable response to his intervention.

Mr. JAIPAL (Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General): Mr. Chairman, to borrow the language of the distinguished Ambassador of Mongolia who has happily described the Committee on Disarmament as the caravan of disarmament -- if the caravan is to move on, may the camel speak?

The Secretariat has prepared and circulated today a draft of the index of the statements made by the member States. The index is chronological and tentative at the moment. The Secretariat would like delegations to kindly check the index and send us their corrections as early as Wednesday, 26 August, at 12 p.m. Thereafter, the index will be recast in the form in which it will appear eventually as an appendix to the report.

(Mr. Jaipal, Secretary of the Committee and Personal Representative of the Secretary-General)

We have also circulated today a comparative statement showing the number of meetings held during the last five years. Members will have observed that this year we had 103 meetings more than we had in 1979, without any increase in staff. As a consequence, the strain has been quite considerable, on the interpreters, the translators, the stenographers and typists, not to speak of the professional and general staff who had to perform more than their normal share of work. I would expect that, with increasing experience, this "caravan" of disarmament is likely to be used with greater confidence and frequency as a negotiating and a pre-negotiating body. I feel sure that the quantum of work and the responsibility given to the Secretariat shows that it is somewhat understaffed. I intend therefore to request the appropriate authorities of the United Nations Secretariat in New York to examine our workload and to apply established norms and standards for providing adequate staff to service this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: Distinguished colleagues, now that the 1981 session of the Committee is drawing to an end, allow me to say a few words before closing our meeting.

This year's session of the Committee was held under an international climate marked by tensions and an escalating arms race, the nuclear arms race in particular, a situation which is not conducive to the achievement of tangible progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations. With regard to nuclear disarmament, actual negotiations have not even been started, in spite of the fact that the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament accorded the highest priority to this question. In our efforts to draft international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, the Committee has not gone beyond the pre-negotiating stage. In the field of chemical weapons, although significant progress has been made, the Committee has not yet entered the stage of actually drafting a legally binding international instrument on the total elimination and prohibition of such weapons, which were considered by the Final Document as belonging to the category of weapons of mass destruction and were supposed to be treated as a matter of high priority.

While progress has also been made in the drafting of a text of a convention prohibiting radiological weapons, intensive negotiations continue to be required to narrow down differences on the important elements of a future convention. Despite the timeless efforts exerted by the members of the Committee, the drafting of a comprehensive programme of disarmament is still far from its conclusion. It is therefore to be hoped that the contemplated resumed session of the relevant Ad Hoc Working Group early next year will yield fruitful results, thereby enabling the Committee to present its final report on this item to the second special session on disarmament.

The very meagre achievements, not to say the failure, of our Committee in the discharge of the task entrusted to it by the Final Document as the sole multilateral negotiating forum in the field of disarmament do not respond to the expectations of the international community which had high hopes of this body. While recognizing that improvements in the organizational and procedural aspects would contribute to a more effective functioning of the Committee, I continue to hold the view that a genuine will to negotiate and arrive at an agreement remains the key to its successful

(The Chairman)

performance. The Committee finds itself in the unenviable position that it has to go to the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly and later to the second special session devoted to disarmament with only such meagre results to show for its three years of work.

In the absence of concrete achievements, the international community may question the effectiveness of the Committee as a multilateral negotiating machinery in the field of disarmament. The Committee must make the utmost of the remaining time until the convening of the second special session devoted to disarmament to achieve some concrete results. It is my hope therefore that, during the recess, it may be possible for the members of the Committee to reassess seriously their respective positions and that we would meet again next year with a strong determination to achieve concrete results on one or more of the priority items. I think that some serious introspection is badly needed, to scrutinize ourselves in the first place and to see whether our own policies and actions are not preventing the Committee from achieving the results expected of it. Hopefully, a breakthrough will be forthcoming before the conclusion of the spring session of the Committee next year, so that the Committee will be able to report some success to the second special session devoted to disarmament.

At the beginning of the assumption of my duty as Chairman of the Committee, I stated that I was bound to make mistakes with regard to procedure as well as substance, and that I would rely very much upon the indulgence, the co-operation and counsel of all my colleagues. I am now most happy to state that during the period of my Chairmanship, I have been granted what I asked for by all the members of the Committee without exception and by my old friend Ambassador Jaipal, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General and Secretary of the Committee, and by his deputy, Mr. Berasategui. I should also like, on behalf of all the members of the Committee, on behalf of the non-members participating in the work of the Committee this year and on my own behalf, to express our deepest gratitude to the Secretary and his dedicated staff, to the interpreters and translators, and to all others, known or unknown, visible or invisible, whose assistance, patience and courtesy have enabled the Committee to complete its work as originally scheduled. I wish "Bon voyage" to those colleagues who will return to their respective capitals or posts, or join their families for a well-earned holiday, and to all "Au revoir".

Thank you.

The meeting rose at 9.10 p.m.

DOCUMENT IDENTIQUE A L'ORIGINAL

DOCUMENT IDENTICAL TO THE ORIGINAL